CHAPTER 2 > QUASI-DELICTS

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of
the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his
own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)

Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it
may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage. (1905)
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use
of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless
driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. (n)
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n)
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a bond executed by a government-controlled
corporation or office, to answer for damages to third persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent public
official. (n)
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by
any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation
or business. (n)
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which
have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723,
the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within
the period therein fixed. (1909)
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from
the same. (1910)
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)

77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977

Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against
Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action
against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that
the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent
has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as
a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in
court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin
Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability
should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.

Read full text

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (188 SCRA 387 )

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Thursday, February 23, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Anacleto Viana was a passenger of M/V Antonia bound for Manila which was owned by defendant
Aboitiz. After the said vessel has landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corp., as the arrastre operator, took over the
exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on it. One hour after the passengers had disembarked, Pioneer
Stevedoring started operation by unloading the cargoes using its crane. Viana who had already
disembarked remembered that some of his cargoes were still inside the vessel. While pointing to the crew of
the vessel the place where his cargoes were, the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and
the crane which resulted to his death. Vianas wife filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for breach of
contract f carriage. Aboitiz, however filed a third party complaint against Pioneer since it had
control completely over the vessel during the incident. Furthermore, petitioner contends that one hour has
already elapsed from the time Viana disembarked, thus he has already ceased to be a passenger.

Issue: Whether or not Aboitiz is liable for the death of Viana.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of its
passengers makes Aboitiz liable. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of the carrier and passenger
does not cease the moment the passenger alights from the carriers vehicle, but continues until the passenger
has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises. A reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. The primaryfactor to be
considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the
petitioners vessel. In the case at bar, such justifiable cause exists because he had to come back for his cargo.
Aboitiz has failed to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence in requiring or seeing to it that
precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into a
forbidden area.

Dangwa Transco. Co. Inc. v. CA

Facts:
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of
Pedrito Cudiamat. The deceased was attempting to board a bus, but it suddenly
accelerated forward. He fell off and the bus ran over him, resulting to his death.
Issue:
Whether the bus is liable as a common carrier to the deceased who was still attempting
to board

Held:
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances a reasonable
length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they
are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting
up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.

CALALAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000
Facts: Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned
and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas
gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the
way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way
when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena
bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against
Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint
against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking
cognisance of another civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held
liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable
to Sunga for violation of contract of carriage.
Issues: (1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one
hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in this
case
(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of
carriage
(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded
Ruling: (1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact
that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata
does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the
same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On the
other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of
carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach
of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the
negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the
action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the

common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case
of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755
of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by
law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created.
(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion
being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that
petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an extension seat placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only
was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him
for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to
petitioners contention that Sungas taking an extension seat amounted to an
implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims
of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.
This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it
was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that
the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of
the debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such
as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner,
and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner
should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.
(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under
Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in
cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art.
1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the
carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is
no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract
of carriage.

Philippine School of Business Administration vs. CA [205 SCRA 729 GR No. 84698.
February 4, 1942]
Post under case digests, Civil Law at Tuesday, March 20, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the second

floor premises of the schools by assailants who were not
members of the schools academic community. This
prompted the parents of the deceased to file a suit in the
RTC of Manila for damages against PSBA and its
corporate officers.
The defendant schools (now petitioner) sought to have the
suit dismissed on the ground of no cause of action and not
within the scope of the provision of Art 2180 since it is
an academic institution. The trial court overruled the
petitioners contention and its decision was later affirmed
by the appellate court.
Issue: Whether the decision of the appellate court
primarily anchored on the law of quasi-delicts is valid.
Held: Although the Supreme Court agreed to the decision
of the Court of Appeals to deny the petition of motion to
dismiss by the PSBA, they do not agree to the premises of
the appellate courts ruling.
Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176 of the civil code
establishes the rule of in loco parentis, they can not be

held liable to the acts of Calitos assailants which were not

students of the PSBA and because of the contractual
relationship.
The school and the students, upon registration established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations.
The institution of learning must provide their students with
an atmosphere that promotes or assists its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge, and maintain peace
and order within its premises.
The SC dismissed the petition and the case was
remanded to the trail court to determine if the school
neglected its obligation to perform based on the
contractual relation of them and the students.
Air France v Carrascoso (Torts)
AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO September 28, 1966 AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and
the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's
Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly
gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral
damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between
first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with
interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for
attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10,
and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner.

Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on
any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first
class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon
the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of
having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed
a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the
Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is
placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case
of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland
Canteen in Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained
to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter
and other foreign substances. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH
and it was found out that the soft drinks are adulterated. As a result, her per day
sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12
December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC
which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of
Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks

manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article
1561 of the CC which prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.
RULING: Petition Denied.
The SC agrees with the CAs conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is
found on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years
and not on breach of warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is
supported by the allegations in the complaint which makes reference to the reckless
and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption."

LRT vs. NAVIDAD

G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003

FACTS:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an
altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and
was killed when a train came and ran over him.
The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver,
(Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent).
The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the
heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero
jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award for compensatory damages and
replacing it with nominal damages.
The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad
and LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by
the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA
and operated by Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert evidence
showing that the emergency brakes could not have stopped the train on time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil
Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.
RATIO:
Liability of LRTA Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code
A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in
carrying passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only

during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where
they ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.
Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence
of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through theexercise
of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death
or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof
of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the
carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is
due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.
Liability of Security Agency If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under
Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is
established, the employer, Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach How then must the
liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the
other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by
tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In
fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches
the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of ontract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.
Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages
is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established
rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. The award was
deleted/\.

ose Cangco vs Manila

Railroad Co.
August 13, 2011
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30 Phil 768 Civil Law Torts and Damages Distinction of Liability of Employers Under Article 2180 and Their Liability for Breach
of Contract
On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given
a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even
though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally
stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at
the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more
as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact
that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day
without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while
the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks
of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of
contract [of carriage]:

NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not
liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not
amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by
mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract
existed between the parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the
source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means an obligation of law, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.