HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES HEIRS OF MARIO

MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 179987 April 29, 2009
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before
the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite,
consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for
more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged
to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had
four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess
grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it
among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino.
After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, includingLot9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle,
Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the
application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of
the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and
dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June
12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of

the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of
land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use
or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on
acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired,
one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty
(30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their
own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
G.R. No. 164408

March 24, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An application for original registration of land of the public domain under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only that the land has previously been declared
alienable and disposable, but also that the land has been declared patrimonial property of the State
at the onset of the 30-year or 10-year period of possession and occupation required under the law
on acquisitive prescription. Once again, the Court applies this rule-as clarified in Heirs of Mario

Malabanan v. Republic in reviewing the decision promulgated on June 10, 2004, whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) granted the petitioner's application for registration of land.
1

Antecedents
On May 28, 1993, respondent Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in San Pedro, Laguna an application for original registration covering a 1,520
square meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Banlic, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna,
denominated as Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-006985-D, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao
Cadastre, alleging that it had purchased the land on March 9, 1992 from Jane de Castro Abalos,
married to Jose Abalos, for P300,000.00; that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the
name of its predecessor-in-interest under Tax Declaration No. 22711; that there was no mortgage or
encumbrance of any kind affecting the land, nor was there any other person or entity having any
interest thereon, legal or equitable, adverse to that of the applicant; and that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of
the land in the concept of an owner.
3

Attached to the application were several documents, namely: (1) tracing cloth plan as approved by
the Land Management Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);
(2) blue print copies of the tracing cloth plan; (3) copies of the technical description; (4) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 2711; and (5) copies of the Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1992.
The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application, arguing that the
applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945; that the muniments of title and tax
declaration presented did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition
of the land; and that the land was a portion of the public domain, and, therefore, was not subject to
private appropriation.
4

The RTC directed the Land Management Bureau, Manila; the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baos, Laguna; and the Land Management Sector and Forest
Management Bureau, Manila, to submit a status report on the land, particularly, on whether the land
was covered by a land patent, whether it was subject of a previously approved isolated survey, and
whether it was within a forest zone.
5

In his memorandum to the DENR, Region IV (Lands Forestry Sector), and the Provincial Prosecutor
of Laguna, a copy of which was furnished the trial court, CENRO Officer Arnulfo Hernandez stated
that the land had been "verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable land under Land
Classification Project No. 23-A of Cabuyao, Laguna, certified and declared as such pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, under Forestry Administrative Order No. A1627 dated September 28, 1981 per BFD Map LC-3004." Attached to the memorandum was the
inspection report declaring that "the area is surrounded with concrete fence, three (3) buildings for
employees residence;" that the land was acquired through sale before the filing of the application;
that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had been in "continuous, open and peaceful
occupation" of the land, and that "no forestry interest is adversely affected."
6

CENRO Land Management Inspector/Investigator Rodolfo S. Gonzales reported that: (1) the land
was covered by a survey plan approved by the Regional Land Director/Land Registration Authority
on May 25, 1988 pursuant to PD No. 239 dated July 9, 1975; (2) it consisted of 22,773 square
meters and was located in Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna; (3) the area was entirely within the
alienable and disposable area; (4) it had never been forfeited in favor of the government for nonpayment of taxes, and had not been confiscated in connection with any civil or criminal cases; (5) it
was not within a previously patented property as certified to by the Register of Deeds, Calamba,
Laguna; and (6) there was no public land application filed for it by the applicant or any other persons
as per verification from the records unit of his office. The report further stated that a verification at the
Office of the Municipal Assessor showed that: (1) the land was declared for the first time in 1960
under Tax Declaration No. 6712 in the name of Enrique Hemedez with an area of 23,073 square
meters; (2) it was now covered by Tax Declaration No. 2253 issued in the name of the respondent;
(3) the real property taxes had been paid since 1968; and (4) it had not been earmarked for public or
quasi-public purposes per information from the District Engineer.
After inspection, it was also found that (1) the land was residential; (2) the respondent was in the
actual occupation and possession of the land; and (3) the land did not encroach upon an established
watershed, riverbank/bed protection, creek, right-of-way or park site or any area devoted to general
use or devoted to public service.
7

A certification was issued by the Records Management Division of the Land Management Bureau
stating that it had no record of any kind of public land applications/land patents covering the parcel of
land subject of the application.
8

The respondent presented Gloria P. Noel, its Vice President and Treasurer, who testified that the
respondent had purchased the land from Jane de Castro Abalos on March 9, 1992 for P300,000.00;
that the land had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Abalos under Tax Declaration
No. 22711; that after the sale, a new Tax Declaration had been issued in the name of the
respondent, who had meanwhile taken possession of the land by building a fence around it and
introducing improvements thereon; that the respondent had paid the real property taxes thereon
since its acquisition; that the respondents possession had been continuous, open and public; and
that the land was free from any lien or encumbrance; and that there was no adverse claimant to the
land.
9

Engr. Edilberto Tamis attested that he was familiar with the land because it was a portion of Lot No.
8017 of Subdivision Plan Cad-455-D of the Cabuyao Cadastre, owned by Corazon Tapalla who had
acquired it from the Hemedez family; that Tapalla had sold a portion of Lot No. 8017 to Abalos and
the remaining portion to him; and that he had witnessed the sale of the land to the respondent.
10

The respondents final witness was Armando Espela who declared that he was a retired land
overseer residing in Barangay Banlic from birth; that he was familiar with the land which was part of
a bigger parcel of land owned by the Hemedez family; that his father, Toribio Espela, with his
assistance, and one Francisco Capacio worked on the land since 1960; that the entire landholding
had originally been sugarland, but was later on subdivided, sold, and resold until it ceased to be
agricultural land; that, in 1982, the land was sold to Corazon Tapalla who hired him as the overseer;
that as the overseer, he fenced and cleared the area; that he was allowed to use the grassy portion

for grazing purposes; that in 1987, Tapalla sold part of the land to Abalos and the remaining portion
to Engr. Tamis; that he continued to oversee the land for the new owners; that Abalos then sold her
portion to the respondent in 1992; that since then, the respondent took possession of the land, and
he then ceased to be the overseer; that the possession by the Hemedez family and its successorsin-interest was open, continuous, public and under claim of ownership; and that he did not know any
person who claimed ownership of the land other than those he and his father served as overseers.
11

Decision of the RTC

On May 12, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision, holding that the respondent and its predecessorsin-interest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960 and, accordingly,
granted the application for registration, viz:
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the evidence submitted by the applicant, this Court hereby
orders the confirmation and registration of title of the land described as Lot 8017-A of subdivision
plan Csd-04-006985-D, being a portion of Lot 8017 of subdivision plan Cad-455-D, Cabuyao
Cadastre situated at Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna with an area of 1,520 square meters to be
entered under the name of the applicant Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation, a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with office address at 33 M.
Viola St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City by the Land Registration Authority. After the
decision shall become final, let an order for the issuance of a decree of title be issued in favor of said
applicant.
SO ORDERED.

12

Judgment of the CA
The Republic appealed, arguing that the issue of whether the applicant and its predecessors-ininterest had possessed the land within the required length of time could not be determined because
there was no evidence as to when the land had been declared alienable and disposable.
On June 10, 2004, the CA promulgated its judgment affirming the RTC, and concluded that the
reports made by the concerned government agencies and the testimonies of those familiar with the
land in question had buttressed the court a quos conclusion that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive, and adverse
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960.
13

Issue
Hence, the Republic appeals the adverse judgment of the CA upon the following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE TRIAL COURTS GRANT OF THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT AND ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST

HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE PERIOD OF POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION REQUIRED BY

LAW.
14

The Republic contends that the respondent did not establish the time when the land covered by the
application for registration became alienable and disposable; that such detail was crucial because
the possession of the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, for the purpose of determining
whether it acquired the property by prescription, should be reckoned from the time when the land
was declared alienable and disposable; and that prior to the declaration of the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, it was not susceptible to private ownership, and any
possession or occupation at such time could not be counted as part of the period of possession
required under the law on prescription.
15

16

The respondent counters that whether it established when the property was declared alienable and
disposable and whether it complied with the 30-year required period of possession should not be
entertained anymore by the Court because: (a) these issues had not been raised in the trial court
and were being raised for the first time on appeal; and (b) factual findings of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the CA, were binding and conclusive on this Court. At any rate, the respondent
insists that it had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the property
for the prescribed period of 30 years as evidenced by the fact that the property had been declared
for taxation purposes in 1960 in the name of its predecessors-in-interest, and that such possession
had the effect of converting the land into private property and vesting ownership upon the
respondent.
17

In reply, the Republic asserts that it duly opposed the respondents application for registration; that it
was only able to ascertain the errors committed by the trial court after the latter rendered its
decision; and that the burden of proof in land registration cases rested on the applicant who must
prove its ownership of the property being registered. The Republic maintains that the Court had the
authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts when the conclusion reached
was not supported by the evidence on record, as in this case.
18

Ruling
The petition for review is meritorious.
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates those who may file an application for registration of land
based on possession and occupation of a land of the public domain, thus:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws.
xxxx
An application for registration under Section14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish the following
requisites, namely: (a) the land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain; (b) the
applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and (c) the applicant
and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. The Court has clarified in Malabanan that under Section14(1), it is not necessary that the
land must have been declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945, or earlier, because the
law simply requires the property sought to be registered to be alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed. The Court has explained that a contrary interpretation
would absurdly limit the application of the provision "to the point of virtual inutility."
19

The foregoing interpretation highlights the distinction between a registration proceeding filed under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 and one filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. According to
Malabanan:
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles
registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the
aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section
14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
20

In other words, registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
without regard to whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that time. The applicant
needs only to show that the land had already been declared alienable and disposable at any time
prior to the filing of the application for registration.
On the other hand, an application under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on acquisitive
prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as provided by the Civil Code. In that
regard, only the patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription pursuant to the
Civil Code. For acquisitive prescription to set in, therefore, the land being possessed and occupied
must already be classified or declared as patrimonial property of the State. Otherwise, no length of
possession would vest any right in the possessor if the property has remained land of the public
dominion. Malabanan stresses that even if the land is later converted to patrimonial property of the
State, possession of it prior to such conversion will not be counted to meet the requisites of
acquisitive prescription. Thus, registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 requires that the
land had already been converted to patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the period of
possession required by the law on prescription.
21

22

An application for registration based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 must, therefore, establish the
following requisites, to wit: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of
the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the

land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good
faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial property
of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.
To properly appreciate the respondents case, we must ascertain under what provision its application
for registration was filed. If the application was filed under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, the
determination of the particular date when the property was declared alienable and disposable would
be unnecessary, inasmuch as proof showing that the land had already been classified as such at the
time the application was filed would be enough. If the application was filed under Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529, the determination of the issue would not be crucial for, as earlier clarified, it was not
the declaration of the land as alienable and disposable that would make it susceptible to private
ownership by acquisitive prescription. Malabanan expounds thereon, thus Would such lands so
declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public
dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable
lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as
the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth."
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
23

The respondents application does not enlighten as to whether it was filed under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The application alleged that the respondent and its predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the property in
the concept of an owner, but did not state when possession and occupation commenced and the
duration of such possession. At any rate, the evidence presented by the respondent and its
averments in the other pleadings reveal that the application for registration was filed based on
Section 14(2), not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. The respondent did not make any allegation in its

application that it had been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier, nor did it
present any evidence to establish such fact.
1wphi1

With the application of the respondent having been filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the
crucial query is whether the land subject of the application had already been converted to
patrimonial property of the State. In short, has the land been declared by law as no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth?
The respondent may perhaps object to a determination of this issue by the Court for the same
reason that it objects to the determination of whether it established when the land was declared
alienable and disposable, that is, the issue was not raised in and resolved and by the trial court. But
the objection would be futile because the issue was actually raised in the trial court, as borne out by
the Republic's allegation in its opposition to the application to the effect "that the land is a portion of
the public domain not subject to prescription." In any case, the interest of justice dictates the
consideration and resolution of an issue that is relevant to another that was specifically raised. The
rule that only theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party on appeal refers
only to independent, not concomitant, matters to support or oppose the cause of action.
24

Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an area expressly declared
by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth. The Court is left with no alternative but to deny
the respondent's application for registration.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on June 10, 2004; and DISMISSES the respondent's application for
original registration of Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-006985-D, Cad. 455-D, of the
Cabuyao Cadastre.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163767 : March 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v.
ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
An application for land registration was filed in the CFI in Bulacan by herein Respondent. The subject
property was a riceland with an area of 12,342 sq.m. known as Lot 2633, Cad-297, Paombong, Bulacan.
It was originally owned and possessed by one Mamerto Dionision since 1907 and was, thereafter, sold to
Romualda Jacinto in 1926. Upon the death of Romualda Jacinto, her sister Maria Jacinto (mother of the
respondent) inherited the land. Thereafter, upon the death of Maria Jacinto in 1963, respondent had
herself inherited the land, owning and possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against the
whole world, and in the concept of owner since then. Taxes due thereon had been paid as well.

The CFI ordered the registration of the land in favor of respondent on the ground that she had sufficiently
established her open, public, continuous and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years. The OSG appealed to the CA and alleged that subject land is a part of the unclassified
region denominated as forest land of Paombong, Bulacan. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the land subject of the application for registration is susceptible of
private acquisition?
HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is overruled.
CIVIL LAW: land belonging to public domain
Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Property Registration Decree provides for those who may apply for
registration of title to land.
The Court in Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631 held that nder Section 14(1), respondent had to
prove that: (1) the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain and (2) she,
by herself of through her predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945
or earlier.Thus, the burden of proof is on the applicant and failure to do so warrants the dismissal of the
application.
It is without question that respondent complied with the second requisite. However, the same cannot be
said with regard to the first requisite. No evidence was presented that the subject land had been declared
alienable and disposable by the State.
Realizing that the burden to prove the second requisite belongs to her, respondent attached to her
appellee brief the certification dated March 8, 2000 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office declaring that Lot 2633 falls within the
alienable or disposable land of Paombong, Bulacan. The CA, however, expunged the appellee brief. The
Court in Menguito v. Republic G.R. No. 134308 declared that a survey conducted by a geodetic engineer
that included a certification on the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was not sufficient
to overcome the presumption that the land still formed part of the inalienable public domain.
It is a standing doctrine that land of the public domain, in order to be the subject of appropriation, must be
declared alienable and disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the DENR.
Granting for the sake of argument that the certification alone would have sufficed, respondent application
would still be denied considering that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable came only
after the filing of the application in court in 1976. The certification indicated that the land was reclassified
as alienable or disposable only on October 15, 1980.
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree provides that ownership of private lands acquired
through prescription may be registered in the owner name. However, respondent did not acquire the land
through prescription notwithstanding the fact that possession of the same by her and her predecessors-ininterest could be traced back as early as in 1926.
The Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987 ruled that, roperty of public domain,
which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed,
be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and
disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
xxx It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run./span>

Application for land registration of respondent Rosario de Guzman Vda. De Joson respecting Lot 2633,
Cad-297 is DISMISSED.

City Mayor v. Ebio, GR No. 178411, June 23, 2010

In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro
Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964,
respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of Paraaque for
the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an
affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his
name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed
Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land
occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Paraaque.
From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one
conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed
Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Paraaque in its corporate or private
capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are
deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription.
Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register
their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land
registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the
applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a
means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does
not confer, ownership. Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City, et al. vs. Mario D.
Ebio and His Children/Heirs namely, Arturo V. Ebio, Eduardo, et al., G.R. No. 178411,
June 23, 2010
G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES,
MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Martin B. Laurea for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

+.wph!1

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth
Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892 are accretion to the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 and ordered their registration in the names of
the private respondents.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco
Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of three lots
adjacent to their fishpond property and particularly described as follows:
t.hqw

Lot 1-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of
Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE.,
along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; on the SE., along lines 2-3-4, by
Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along fines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue River; on the
NE., along line 9-10, by property of Joaquina Santiago; on the E., NE., and NW.,
along lines 10-11-12-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877). ...
containing an area of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY
SEVEN (33,937) SQUARE METERS. ...
Lot 2-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of
Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the E., along
line 1-2, by property of Rafael Singson; on the S., along line 2-3, by Meycauayan
River; on the SW., along line 3-4, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; and on the N., along
line 4-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877). ... containing an area
of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (5,453) SQUARE
METERS. ...
Lot 3-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of
Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE.,
along line 1-2, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877); and along line 23, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892; on the S., along line 3-4, by Meycauayan River, on
the SW., along line 4-5, by Lot 1 of plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by property
of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877), and on the NW., along line 6-1, by property

of Joaquina Santiago. ... containing an area of ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED

EIGHTY FIVE (1,985) SQUARE METERS. ...
On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of
Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration
with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner
appointed by the Court.
On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with
respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that
the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 89709. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
t.hqw

WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) are

accretions to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they belong to the owner of said property. The Court,
therefore, orders the registration of lots 1 & 2 situated in the barrio of Ubihan,
municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, and more particularly described in
plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) and their accompanying technical descriptions (Exhs. E,
E-1) in favor of Benjamin Tancinco, married to Alma Fernandez and residing at 3662
Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.; Azucena Tancinco Reyes, married to Alex
Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th St., New Manila, Quezon City; Marina Tancinco Imperial,
married to Juan Imperial, residing at Pasay Road, Dasmarias Village, Makati, Rizal;
and Mario C. Tancinco, married to Leticia Regidor, residing at 1616 Cypress St.,
Dasmarias Village, Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens.
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the
lower court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
t.hqw

DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa kanyang

kabuuan nang walang bayad.
The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this
Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97
SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings of fact of said
courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where
there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents'
fishponds.

The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code
because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further
down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is manmade and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of
the river.
On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acua to the effect
that:
t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already dry almost
at the level of the Pilapil of the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from the boundaries
of the lots, for about two (2) arms length the land was still dry up to the edge of the
river; that sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was established on the boundaries of Lots
1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was transferred to the new Pilapil and this was
done sometime in 1951; that the new lots were then converted into fishpond, and
water in this fishpond was two (2) meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the
fishpond ... .
The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact of accretion without
human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete.
We agree with the petitioner.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:

t.hqw

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered
by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence
whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of
the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor
General that it is preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land came into being
because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private
respondents who happens to be their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their father
noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents
claim that at this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If so, their witness was
incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939.
However, the witness testified that in that year, sheobserved an increase in the area of the original
fishpond which is now the land in question. If she was telling the truth, the accretion was sudden.
However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not
the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial
deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of
the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is

not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the fishpond adjoining it.
It is under two meters of water. The private respondents' own evidence shows that the water in the
fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep
on the side of the pilapil facing the river
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a
river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If
estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force
of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners
thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).
Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works
expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private respondents transferred
their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect
their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony of the private respondents'
lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such alleged alluvial deposits,
deserves no merit. It should be noted that the lots in question were not included in the survey of their
adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality
of Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for
taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had supposedly permanently formed. The only
valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed
only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in
1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore
classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph
1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration
Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private
respondents is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of their fishponds to
their original location and return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs.
SO ORDERED.

1wph1.t

G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitionerappellee,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-appellants.
Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3 June 1968
in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650 entitled
International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines vs. University of the Philippines and
Jose Campos, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner and against
the respondents:
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of the
Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry, to
scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land
referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed by the
National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)
promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this Court as the "entire case
hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic Act 3990 as it applies to a set of facts
which are not disputed by the parties and therefore, is a legal question. 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28 June
1966. 2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University of the Philippines (hereafter
referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and
other forest products, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges,
reforestation fees and royalties from petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in
that portion of its concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963, ceded
in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be enjoined from committing
the acts complained of and prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00
as damages and costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably acted upon, and
pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967, respondents filed their Answer on 13
September 1987, 3 wherein they interpose the affirmative defenses of, among others, improper venue
and that the petition states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it by
petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP under R.A.
No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue
Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim.

On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the
Case for Judgment, 5 which reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by the undersigned counsel, and
respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT
SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without prejudice to the
presentation of evidence by either party:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation
of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government an exclusive
license for a period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and
remove timber from that portion of timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta,
Mauban and Sampaloc Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan,
Pangil, Paete, Cavite and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License Agreement
No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the Government through the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on January 11, 1960. ... ;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a renewal of the
Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the Government to the
plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. ... ;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in peaceful
possession of said timber concession and had been felling cutting and removing
timber therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned Timber License Agreement No. 27A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the Government
on June 4,1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has constructed roads and other
improvements and installations of the aforementioned area subject to the grant and
purchased equipment in implementation of the conditions contained in the
aforementioned License Agreement and has in connection therewith spent more than
P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of the Philippines issued
Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT STATION
FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND TRAINING
INSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND
PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS COLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL
OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA,
AND PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF
QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the
Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College
of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment station for the proposed
Dairy Research and production studies of this College, a certain parcel of land of the
Public domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil province of
Laguna, and partly in the municipality of Infants, Province of Quezon, Island of
Luzon, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to the condition that the

disposition of timber and other forest products found therein shall be subject to the
forestry laws and regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as
follows, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of September, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the
sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P.
GARCIA President of
the Philippines
xxx xxx xxx
7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act No. 3990
was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines and approved by the President of
the Philippines, which Republic Act provides as follows:
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central experiment station
for the use of the University of the Philippines in connection with its
research and extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and
Sciences.
SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain consisting
of three thousand hectares, more or less, located in the Municipality
of Paete, Province of Laguna, the precise boundaries of which are
stated in Executive Proclamation 791, Series of 1961, is hereby
ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the
Philippines, subject to any existing concessions, if any.
SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central
experiment station shall be exempt from taxation, local or general,
any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general
fund of the University of the Philippines.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June
18, 1964.

8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to the
institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded, verbally as well as in
writing to plaintiff-.
(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff under the
License Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2
hereof be paid to the University of the Philippines, instead of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the
boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as defined in Republic
Act No. 3990 be performed by personnel of the University of the
Philippines.
9. That the position of the plaintiff oil the demand of the defendants was fully
discussed in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer addressed to the
President of the University of the Philippines, copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "A" hereof.
10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph thereof, plaintiff has refused to
allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines to the Central Experiment
Station area assigned thereto for the purpose of supervising the felling cutting and
removal of timber therein and scaling any such timber cut and felled prior to removal
11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in Relation to the implemetation of
Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted
below to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
xxx xxx xxx
Februar
y 8,
1966
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Manila
Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant
Dear Sir:
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land
approximately 3,500 hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by the government
to the University of the Philippines. This area is known as Paete Land Grant, the title
to which is presently issued in the name of the University of the Philippines. The law
transferring the ownership to the University of the Philippines gives the university full
rights of dominion and ownership, subject to the existing concession of International
Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines. Under the terms of this law all
forest charges due from the concessionaire should now be paid to the University of
the Philippines. The purpose of giving this land grant to the University is to enable us

to generate income out of the land grant and establish a research and experimental
station for the Colleges of Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary
Medicine.
I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the following
matters:
1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District Forester of
Laguna from June, 1964 up to the present should be remitted in favor
of the University of the Philippines pines;
2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall hereafter be
paid to the University of the Philippines and lastly
3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all forest
charges and royalties due from any logging concession at the land
grant.
May we request that proper instructions be issued by the district Forester of Laguna
about this matter. Thank you.
Very
truly
yours,
Sgd.)
JOSE
C.
CAMP
OS JR.
Busine
ss
Executi
ve
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive dated February
8, 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the following letter-ruling
dated March 11, 1966:
xxx xxx xxx
March
11,
1966
U.P. Paete Land Grant
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City

Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.

Business Executive
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section 15(a) of
Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations, forest products, cut,
gathered and removed from registered private woodlands are not subject to forest
charges, but they must be invoiced when removed to another municipality or for
commercial purposes in the manner prescribed by the regulations. As the Paete
Land Grant was ceded by law to the U.P. in full private ownership and as the grant is
manifestly to be considered registered, no forest charges are actually due and
payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest charges purportedly to
be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be
entered into by the U.P. are, therefore, to be considered not as the charges
contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties
payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the
land grant.
Accordingly, you queries are answered viz:
1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges
payable by concessionaires of the land grant.
2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer
Company of the Philippines may be refunded provided that a formal
claim for the refund thereof is made within two years from the date of
payment. The proper claimant shall be International Hardwood and
not the University.
Very
truly
yours,
(Sgd.)
MISAE
L P.
VERA
Commi
ssioner
of
Internal

Reven
ue
13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to
the District Forester of the province of Laguna una dated April 18, 1 966:
April
18,
1966
The District Forester
Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning
the right of the University of the Philippines to collect forest charges from the existing
logging concessionaire at the Laguna Land Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This
tract of forest land containing some 3,500 hectares was ceded to the University of
the Philippines in full ownership by Republic Act No. 3990, approved in June, 1964.
In view thereof, the University of the Philippines requested that its authority over said
land be recognized and that the existing concessionaire, International Hardwood and
Veneer Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its forest charges directly to the
University instead of to the national government.
Please take note of page "2" of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the following
points raised by the University:
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly collect
forest charges from INTERWOOD, the existing logging
concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau of
Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to the
University of the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is
requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore paid
by it to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.
On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is understood
that forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant as scaled by scalers of
the University of the Philippines shall now be paid directly to the University of the
Philippines. In another ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
University, particularly the Laguna Land Grant, is exempted from all kinds of Internal
Revenue taxes.

Very
truly
yours,
(Sgd.)
Jose C.
Campo
s, Jr.
Busine
ss
Executi
ve
14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated April 18,
1966 was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province of Laguna to the
Director of Forestry.
15. That on or about June 7, 19667 the Assistant Director of Forestry addressed to
plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as follows:
Sirs:
This is in connection with your request for this Office to comment on
your reply to the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the University of
the Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the
University of the Philippines is claiming the right:
(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside
the area covered by the U.P. Land Grant at Paete,
Laguna;
(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;
(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges;
and
(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law
upon the Bureau of Forestry in the cutting, removal
and disposition of the timber from said area, and the
authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
respecting the measurement and scaling of the logs
and the collection of the corresponding forest charges
and other fees in connection therewith.
This office is in full accord with your arguments against the claim of
the University of the Philippines to have acquired the above rights.
We believe that the right vested the INTERWOOD by virtue of
number License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) to utilize the

timber inside subject area is still binding and should therefore, be

respected. It is on the basis of this acknowledgment that we sent your
client our letter of November 4,1965 requesting him to comment on
the application of the State University for a Special Timber License
over the said area.
16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph l4, the Director of
Bureau of Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated June 30,1966:
xxx xxx xxx
June
30,
1966
District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter dated April
26, 1966, designated as above, as to whether or not you shall turn over the scaling
work for logs cut from the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of
the Philippines in the Pacto Land Grant to Scalers of the University of the Philippines.
In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the Paete Land
Grant, which embraces the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of
the Philippines, is considered a registered private woodland of the University of the
Philippines and therefore no forest charges are actually due and payable on the
timber cut and removed therefrom, and in view further of the ruling of said
Commissioner that the forest charges purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire
under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are to be
considered not as the charged contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code
but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the
timber resources of the land grant, you may turn over the scaling work therein to the
scalers of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of such licensing agreements entered or
to be entered into by the U.P. as a means of smuggling forest products from the
neighboring public forests.
Very
truly
yours,
(SGD.)
ANTO
NIO A.

QUEJA
DA
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the pleadings filed in
the case, and whatever additional evidence may be presented by the parties, the
parties hereto, through counsel, jointly move and pray of this Honorable Court that
judgment be rendered granting full and appropriate relief, on the following issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should
pay forest charges due and payable under its timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2
hereof', to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the
Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said
forest charges are to be paid to the University of the Philippines,
whether or not the University of the Philippines is entitled to
supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, telling
and removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as
described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus
felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29,1967.
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3 June 1968 in favor
of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at the beginning of this decision. In
deciding the case against UP, it held:
... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no legal basis.
In the first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of land referred to in the Act
was expressly made 'subject to any existing concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of
the enactment of the Act, the petitioner's timber concession over the tract of land was
existing and would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the University of the
Philippines will acquire full ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control and
administer the property only after February 1, 1985. The cession of the property to
the University of the Philippines is akin to the donation of a parcel of land, subject to
usufruct. The donee acquires full ownership thereof only upon the termination of the
usufruct. At the time of the donation, all what the donee acquires is the 'naked'
ownership of the property donated. In the second place, the respondents' demand
cannot be valid unless the provisions of Sees. 262 to 276 of the National Internal
Revenue Code regarding the measuring of timber cut from the forest and the
collection of the prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their arguments, the respondents tried to
stretch the scope of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990 in order to include
therein such amendment of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
and Revised Administrative Code, but they failed to convince the Court, not only
because of the first reason above stated, but also because it clearly appears that
such amendment is not intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not contain
even a remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory provision at the
end. In the third place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the University of the Philippines

cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for purposes other than those therein
expressly provided, namely, 'for the use of the University of the Philippines in
connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.'
Hence, upon the expiration of the petitioner's timber concession, the University of the
Philippines cannot even legally renew it or grant timber concession over the whole
tract of land or over portions thereof to other private individuals and exercise the
functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry by scaling and
measuring the timber cut within the area and collecting from them the forest charges
prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code.
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:
I
... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS
THAT SHOULD WARRANT A DISMISSAL.
II
... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT EMPOWER
THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN LIEU OF THE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF FORESTRY, TO SCALE,
MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE
TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO IN SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE
CORRESPONDING FOREST CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties jointly move
and pray that the trial court render judgment granting full and appropriate remedy on the following
issues:
l. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest
charges due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
or to the University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are to
be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the
Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging,
felling and removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as described
in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under Section 1,
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal to the rule laid down in Sarmiento,
et al. vs. Caparas, et al. 6that declaratory relief cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner,
for all legal intents and purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus,
what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and the answer), which is authorized by
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said section pertinently provides:

SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When

issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the
result of the trial by these issues. ...
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy the requisites for
declaratory relief. (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ape for judicial determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one
existsbetween the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration
sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is
translated into a claim of right which is actually contested. 8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the Republic of
the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges through the University of the Philippines
because the License Agreement does not expressly provide that the forest charges shall be paid to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to a
particular agency in collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic may effect such collection
through another agency. (b) Having been vested with administrative jurisdiction over and being the
owner of the tract of land in question, the UP acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other
resources within the area. Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the concession of
petitioner can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within the ceded property
but covered by the concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or more appropriately, royalties)
may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's license. To deny it such charges would
render its "full ownership" empty and futile. (c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived from
the tract of land ceded to it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly provides:
All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall be
exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the
general fund of the University of the Philippines. (emphasis supplied for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central
experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations for such purpose, it is clearly
the legislative intention that the establishment and maintenance thereof must be financed by the
earnings or income from the area, which can only come from the timber and the royalties or charges
payable therefrom. This is in accordance with the general principle that a grant of authority or
jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in connection with the matter over which
jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was
intended by R.A. No. 3990. (f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990 have
issued specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges and to supervise
petitioner's logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a) The UP has not
been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest charges or the authority to supervise
the operation by the petitioner of the timber concession affected by said Act.

The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and
most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in the grant except that which is
granted expressly or by clear implication. Under Section 262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the
duties incident to the measuring of forest products and the collection of the charges thereon shall be
discharged by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of the Department of Finance.
The reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of Forestry. 9The supervision and regulation of
the use of forest products and of the cutting and removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau of
Forestry. 10 R.A. No. 3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect from
the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due and payable to the
Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its provisions relating to charges on forest products or to
supervise the operations of the concessions by the holders thereof; (b) The cession in full ownership of
the land in question was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that petitioner's
concession would continue until 1 February 1985; the UP then would acquire full ownership and exclusive
jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after 1 February 1985. The position of UP is akin to
that of a donee of a parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover, said agencies
do not have the power to interpret the law, which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has
acquired a vested right to operate the timber concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau
of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the public domain
described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very parcel of land subject of R.A. No.
3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the
UP as experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research
and production studies of said college, subject however to private rights, if any, and to the condition
that the disposition of timber and other forest products found thereon shall be subject to forestry laws
and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for the use of
the UP in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved"
area was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any
existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely
removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the
timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its
rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the
absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of
the absolute ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe
it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential
quality. 11The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it
means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or
diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights
as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the
above transfer of full ownership. This is further home out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which
provides, inter alia, that "any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of
the University of the Philippines. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain
or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the authority and

jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that
the condition in Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry
laws and regulations is not reproduced iii R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise provide that it is
subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing without other limitations than those established by law. 12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or
the right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing
by its use. 13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the
industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to this rules, as where the property is
subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. 14 In the instant case, that exception is
made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut,
collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until I February 1985. However, it
has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at
the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the Republic
of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as
aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and
jurisdiction to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees
due thereon.

The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant the UP the
authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of its concession insofar as the
property of the UP within it is concerned. Its argument that it has acquired vested rights to operate its
concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor,
Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound under the License to perpetuate the Bureau as
its agent. Neither is there force to its contention that legislative grants must be construed strictly in
favor of the public and most strongly against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer
of absolute, full and entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict interpretation against the
grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of the private party pursuant to the license,
which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in favor of the petitioner which should, on the
contrary, be bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the decision
of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3 June 1968; DECLARING that forest charges
due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) within the area ceded and transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to
R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to the University of the Philippines; DECLARING that the University of
the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and
removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Costs against petitioner.