II Sentences, Distinction 43, Question 1

Concerning the Sin against the Holy Spirit

a. 5: utrum aliquis possit peccare in
spiritum sanctum in primo actu peccati.

Article 5: Whether someone can sin against the Holy

Spirit in the first act of sin.

ad quintum sic proceditur. videtur quod

aliquis in primo actu peccati non possit
peccare in spiritum sanctum, sed quod
hoc peccatum praeexigatalia peccata.

It would seem that someone in the first act of sin is

unable to sin against the Holy Spirit, but that this sin
presupposes other sins.

dicit enim bernardus in 4 sermone super

cantica: nemo repente fit summus; sed
paulatim proficere volo. ergo e contrario
nullus repente fit pessimus. sed peccatum
in spiritum sanctum est gravissimum. ergo
non statim aliquis hoc peccato potest
peccare.

Objection 1: For Bernard says in his 4 Sermons upon

the Songs: "No one becomes best by repenting; but I
wish to advance gradually. Therefore, on the
contrary, no one becomes worst by (sinning)". But
the sin against the Holy Spirit is most grave.
Therefore, one cannot immediately commit this sin.

praeterea, gregorius in moral., exponens

illud job 39: clamorem ducum etc. dicit,
quod vitia quae primo mentem invadunt,
cum quadam ratione hominem, quasi
persuadendo, ad modum ducis vincunt;
sed postmodum mens per diversa vitia
irrationabiliter dissipatur. sed peccatum in
spiritum sanctum est maxime a
persuasione rationis recedens. ergo non
potest esse primum; sed oportet quod
sequatur alia peccata.

Objection 2: Furthermore, Gregory, expounding upon

Job 39 "The cry of the leaders" etc. (in his Moralium),
says that the vices which first take possession of the
mind conquer man with a sort of reasoning,
persuading, as it were, after the manner of a leader.
But afterwards the mind is dissipated irrationally by
diverse vices. But the sin against the Holy Spirit
withdraws most greatly from the persuasion of
reason. Therefore, it cannot be first, but appears,
rather, to follow upon other sins.

praeterea, philosophus dicit in 5 ethic.,

Objection 3: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in
quod non est in potestate hominis ut
Book V of the Nichomachean Ethics that it is not in
statim injusta operetur, sicut injustus facit. the power of a person to do unjust acts immediately,
sed injustus operatur injusta delectabiliter as the unjust so do (see V. 9. 1137a4-9 of that work,
et ex electione. ergo non est in potestate and 1074 of Aquinas's commentary on the NE). But
hominis ut statim et ex electione peccatum the unjust do unjust acts with pleasure and by
faciat. quicumque autem peccat in
choice. Therefore, it is not in the power of man that
spiritum sanctum, ex electione peccat.
he immediately and by choice commits sin. However,
ergo etc..
everyone who sins against the Holy Spirit, sins
through choice. Therefore, in the first act of sin, one
is unable to sin against the Holy Spirit.
praeterea, sicut spei opponitur desperatio,
ita meritis opponuntur demerita. sed spes
praesupponit merita: est enim spes certa
expectatio futurae beatitudinis ex meritis
et gratia proveniens. ergo et desperatio
praesupponit demerita; et sic saltem haec
species peccati in spiritum sanctum

Objection 4: Furthermore, just as hope is opposed to

despair, so too are merits opposed to demerits. But
hope presupposes merits. For hope is a definite
expectation of future beatitude gifted to one by
reason of merit and grace. Therefore, despair
presupposes demerits. At the least, this species of
the sin against the Holy Spirit appears to be that

oportet quod ad alia peccata sequatur.

which follows upon other sins.

praeterea, poenitentia et impoenitentia,

cum sint opposita, sunt circa idem. sed
poenitentia est dolor de commissis. ergo
et impoenitentia aliqua peccata commissa
praesupponit.

Objection 5: Furthermore, since penitence and

impenitence are opposites, they concern the same
things. But penitence is sadness concerning
transgressions committed in the past. Therefore,
impenitence presupposes some sin committed in the
past.

sed contra, peccatorum quae habent

1st. on the contrary: Of those sins which have distinct
actus distinctos, unum ad sui esse alterum acts, (each) one does not presuppose the other for its
non praesupponit.sed peccatum in
own being. But the sin against the Holy Spirit has an
spiritum sanctum habet actum ab aliis
act distinct from other sins, which is to throw aside
peccatis distinctum, qui est abjicere id per that through which someone may be drawn away
quod quis a peccato retrahitur, ut dictum from sin, as was said above in the body of article 2.
est, in corp. art. 2. ergo non de necessitate Therefore, it does not presuppose other sins by
alia peccata praesupponit.
necessity.
praeterea, peccatum in spiritum sanctum
consistit in hoc quod voluntas rejicit id per
quod a peccato retrahi deberet. sed
voluntas se habet ad utrumque
oppositorum. ergo potest homo statim in
spiritum sanctum peccare vel non
peccare.

2nd. on the contrary: Furthermore, the sin against the

Holy Spirit consists in the fact that the will throws off
that through which one ought to be drawn away from
sin. But the will is related to both of these opposites.
Therefore, a man can sin against the Holy Spirit
immediately or not.

respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra

Response: As was said previously in the body of
dictum est, dist. 42, art. 3, in corp., in
dist. 42, art. 3 (where one sin is said to arise from
peccatis quorum unum dicitur ex altero
another), one does not consider what always
nasci, non consideratur quid semper fiat, happens, but what happens for the most part on
sed quid in pluribus contingat, propter
account of an aptitude that one sin has that
quamdam aptitudinem quam habet unum frequently arises by reason of another, just as fraud
peccatum quod ex alio frequenter oriatur; is designated as an offspring of avarice which,
sicut fraus assignatur filia avaritiae, quae nevertheless, can arise from luxuria or because of
tamen potest ex luxuria vel ex alio vitio
some other vice, although it more often arises from
oriri, quamvis ex avaritia saepius oriatur. avarice. However, that sin has an aptitude so that
illud autem peccatum habet aptitudinem ut from it another (sin) arises whose object is more
ex eo aliud oriatur, cujus objectum est
vehemently desirable, as was said previously. This
vehementius appetibile, ut supra dictum comes about in so far as it has the greater
est. hoc autem est quod habet majorem
appearance of good. Hence, that sin whose object
apparentiam boni. unde illud peccatum
most greatly withdraws one from the nature of good,
cujus objectum maxime recedit a ratione is least able to be first. But as it is that which arises
boni, minime potest esse primum; sed
always or more frequently from another, this (latter)
quasi semper vel frequentius ex alio oritur: sort (of sin) is the sin against the Holy Spirit, as it is
et tale est peccatum in spiritum sanctum, determined to be a definite sin. It is for this reason
prout speciale peccatum ponitur: et ideo ut that it more often, and as it were always, follows
saepius et quasi semper sequitur ad alia upon another sin. Nonetheless, it is thus possible for
peccata: non tamen ita quin sit possibile man in the first act of sin to sin against the Holy
ut etiam homo in primo actu peccati in
Spirit, and particularly with respect to two ultimate
spiritum sanctum peccet, et praecipue in kinds, namely resisting the known truth, and envy of
duabus ultimis speciebus, scilicet
the spiritual graces by which we are reconciled (to

impugnatione veritatis agnitae, et

the Father). For these very species seem to possess
invidentia gratiae qua reconciliati sumus: a greater distinction from the other (species of the sin
quia istae species majorem videntur
against the Holy Spirit). However, this also happens
habere distinctionem ab aliis peccatis.
to the other species (of the sin against the Holy
sed tamen hoc etiam contingit in aliis
Spirit), if the matter is diligently considered. Upon
speciebus, si diligenter consideretur.
examining the diverse kinds of human states of life,
potest enim aliquis statim, inspectis
one can immediately throw off hope for future glory
diversorum hominum statibus, abjicere
(that is, despair) on account of the difficulty in arriving
spem futurae gloriae, propter difficultatem at it, and on account of the delights of those who do
perveniendi ad ipsam, et propter
not take care for it. And in this, similarly, the soul of
delectationes eorum qui de ea non curant; such a one stands firm so that in all these things, he
et similiter in hoc animum suum firmare ut follows his own will, which is obstinacy, and thus
suam voluntatem in omnibus sequatur;
with respect to the other (species of the sin against
quod est obstinationis; et sic de aliis.
the Holy Spirit).
ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non est Response to Objection 1: The advance of virtue and
simile de profectu virtutis, et de casu in
the advance into sin are not alike. For more things
peccatum: quia plura requiruntur ad actum are required for an act of virtue than for an act of sin.
virtutis quam ad actum peccati: et ad
And man is raised up to the act of virtue through
actum virtutis erigitur homo per gratiam;
grace. But anyone is able to fall by himself into the
sed in actum peccati per seipsum quis
act of sin.
cadere potest.
ad secundum dicendum, quod gregorius
ibi assignans origines vitiorum, considerat
id quod saepius accidit, non quin aliter
possit accidere: hoc enim ad moralem
pertinet, et etiam ad naturalem: quia
causae naturales, et multo plus morales,
deficiunt in minori parte, quia non sunt
necessariae.

Response to Objection 2: Gregory is there

determining the origins of the vices, and he
considers that which happens in the majority of
cases, and not what can otherwise happen. For this
pertains to moral science, and also to the study of
nature, since the natural causes, and many more of
the moral ones, fail in the minority of cases because
they are not necessary.

ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatum in

spiritum sanctum, ut supra dictum est, non
est hoc modo ex electione sicut habens
habitum ex electione peccat; immo per
actus peccati in spiritum sanctum
praecedentes habitum aliquis habitus
acquiritur: et ideo objectio non procedit:
quia injustus ex electione peccat sicut
habens habitum.

Response to Objection 3: As was said above, the sin

against the Holy Spirit is not from choice in this way,
namely, the way in which a person who has a habit
sins out of choice. On the contrary, through an act of
sin against the Holy Spirit, some habit is acquired
from preceding habits. And for this reason the
objection does not proceed because the unjust sin
by reason of choice as having a habit.

ad quartum dicendum, quod spes non

semper praeexigit merita in actu, sed
solum in proposito sperantis; similiter
etiam et desperatio non oportet quod
praesupponat aliqua demerita
praecedentia in actu.

Response to Objection 4: Hope does not always

presuppose actual merits, but only in the intention of
the one who hopes. In like manner, it is not fitting that
despair presupposes some actual preceding demerit.

ad quintum dicendum, quod poenitentia,

secundum quod dicit actum, non est nisi
de malis praeteritis: sed secundum quod
dicit habitum, quo quis dicitur poenitivus,

Response to Objection 5: Repentance, in so far as it

designates an act, is not a reality unless it deals with
past evils. In so far, however, as it designates a habit,
by which one is called a penitent, it is not required

non exigitur quod aliqua peccata

commiserit, sed quod habeat hoc
propositum, ut si contingeret ipsum
peccare, statim poeniteret. ita etiam ad
rationem impoenitentiae sufficit ut aliquis
nunquam poeniteat de peccatis, si qua
committet.

that a sin have been committed, but that one have

this intention, such that if one happens to commit a
sin, one would repent immediately. In like manner
this suffices for the notion of impenitence so that
someone never repents concerning his sins, if he
commits them.

Stephen Loughlin
(sjl1@desales.edu)

The Aquinas Translation Project

(http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/index.html)