Ebarle - Garcia

Ebarle v Sucaldito
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga

del Sur and a candidate for reelection in the local
elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate
petitions, to enjoin further proceedings in Criminal Cases
Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI8-ZDS of the then Circuit Criminal Court sitting in
Pagadian City, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 571, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of
the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation
of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) and various
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, commenced by
the respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.
On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we

issued temporary restraining orders directing the
respondents (in both petitions) to desist from further
proceedings in the cases in question until further orders
from the Court. At the same time, we gave due course to
the petitions and accordingly, required the respondents
to answer.
The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are

hence, undisputed.
interest for personal gain for approving said award which

was manifestly irregular and grossly unlawful because
the same was facilitated and committed by means of
falsification of official documents.
SPECIFICATION NO. II
That after the aforecited award and contract, Tabiliran

Trucking Company, represented by respondent Cesar
Tabiliran, attempted to collect advances under his
trucking contract in the under his trucking contract in the
amount of P4,823.95 under PTA No. 3654; that the same
was not passed in audit by the Provincial Auditor in view
of the then subsisting contract with Tecson Trucking
Company; which was to expire on November 2, 1969;
that nevertheless the said amount was paid and it was
made to appear that it was collected by Tecson Trucking
Company, although there was nothing due from tile latter
and the voucher was never indorsed or signed by the
operator of Tecson Trucking; and that in facilitating and
consummating the aforecited collection, respondent
officials, hereinabove cited, conspired and connived to
the great prejudice and damage of the Provincial
Government of Zamboanga del Sur. 1
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On September 26, 1970, the private respondent AntiGraft League of the Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint
with the respondent City Fiscal, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1-70 thereof, for violation of the provisions of
the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, as follows:
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SPECIFICATION NO. I
That on or about October 10, 1969, above-named

respondents, conspiring and confabulating together,
allegedly conducted a bidding for the supply of gravel
and sand for the Province of Zamboanga del Sur: that it
was made to appear that Tabiliran Trucking Company
won the bidding; that, thereafter, the award and contract
pursuant to the said simulated bidding were effected and
executed in favor of Tabiliran Trucking Company; that, in
truth and in fact, the said bidding was really simulated
and the papers on the same were falsified to favor
Tabiliran Trucking Company, represented by the private
secretary of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle, formerly
confidential secretary of the latter; that said awardee
was given wholly unwarranted advantage and
preference by means of manifest partiality; that
respondent officials are hereby also charged with
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On the same date, the private respondent commenced

Criminal Case No. 2-71 of the respondent City Fiscal,
another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No.
3019 as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The complaint reads as follows:
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That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding was held for the

construction of the right wing portion of the Capitol
Building of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, by the
Bidding Committee composed of respondents cited
hereinabove; that the said building was maliciously
manipulated so as to give wholly unwarranted advantage
and preference in favor of the, supposed winning bidder,
Codeniera Construction, allegedly owned and managed
by Wenceslao Codeniera, brother-in-law of the wife of
respondent Bienvenido Ebarle; that respondent official is
interested for personal gain because he is responsible
for the approval of the manifestly irregular and unlawful
award and contract aforecited; and that, furthermore,
respondent, being a Member of the Bidding Committee,
also violated Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by
making it appear in the very abstract of bids that another
interested bidder, was not interested in the bidding,
when in truth and in fact, it was not so. 2
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On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted

I.S. No. 4-71 of the respondent Fiscal, a prosecution for
violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised
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That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian City, said

respondent testified falsely under oath in Cadastral Case
No. N-17, LRC CAD REC. NO. N-468, for registration of
title to Lot No. 2545 in particular;
That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE testified falsely

under oath during the hearing and reception of evidence
that he acquired said lot by purchase from a certain
Brigido Sanchez and that he is the owner, when in truth
and in fact Lot 2545 had been previously acquired and is
owned by the provincial Government of Zamboanga del
Sur, where the provincial jail building is now located.
2.
That aforesaid deceit, false testimony and
untruthful statement of respondent in said Cadastral
case were made knowingly to the great damage and
prejudice of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga
del Sur in violation of aforecited provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. 3
On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent

filed a complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 5-71 of the
respondent Fiscal, an action for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019 and Articles 171 and 213 of the Revised Penal
Code, as follows:
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We hereby respectfully charge the above-named

respondents for violation of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Articles 171 and 213, Revised Penal Code and the
rules and regulations of public bidding, committed as
follows:
1.
That on June 16, 1970, without publication,
respondents conducted the so-called "bidding" for the
supply of gravel and sand for the province of
Zamboanga del Sur; that said respondents, without any
valid or legal ground, did not include or even open the

bid of one Jesus Teoson that was seasonably submitted,
despite the fact that he is a registered duly qualified
operator of "Teoson Trucking Service," and
notwithstanding his compliance with all the rules and
requirements on public bidding; that, instead, aforecited
respondents illegally and irregularly awarded said
contract to Cesar Tabiliran, an associate of respondent
Governor Bienvenido Ebarle; and
2.
That in truth and in fact, aforesaid "bidding" was
really simulated and papers were falsified or otherwise
"doctored" to favor respondent Cesar Tabiliran thereby
giving him wholly unwarranted advantage, preference
and benefits by means of manifest partiality; and that
there is a statutory presumption of interest for personal
gain because the transaction and award were manifestly
irregular and contrary to applicable law, rules and
regulations. 4
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The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid

preliminary investigations, but the same having been
denied, he went to the respondent Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable
Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, on prohibition and
mandamus (Special Case No. 1000) praying at the same
time, for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin further
proceedings therein. The court granted preliminary
injunctive relief (restraining order) for which the AntiGraft League filed a motion to have the restraining order
lifted and to have the petition itself dismissed.
On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito,

handed down the first of the two challenged orders,
granting Anti-Graft League's motion and dismissing
Special Case No. 1000.
On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on

certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(G.R. No. 33628). As we said, we issued a temporary
restraining order on June 16, 1971.
Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series

of criminal prosecutions, the private respondent, on April
26, 1971, filed three complaints, subsequently docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the Circuit Criminal Court
of Pagadian City for violation of various provisions of the
Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171(4) of the Revised
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That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE
MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative
by consanguinity within the third degree, and
appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of the
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he
well know that the latter is related with him within the
third degree by consanguinity.
feloniously made untruthful statements in a narration of

facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion,

seniority and nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the

appointment he extended to TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece Elizabeth
Ebarle, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial
Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew
that the latter is related with him within the third degree
affinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
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Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private

respondent brought I.S. No. 6-71 of the respondent
Pagadian City Fiscal against the petitioner, still another
proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and
Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
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c.
That the provisions of law and rules on
promotion, seniority and nepotism have been observed.

appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLEMONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of
the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although
he well know that the latter is related with him within the
third degree of consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
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BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and
feloniously made untruthful statements in a narration of
facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit: ,
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First Count.

feloniously extended and gave MARIO EBARLE, son of
his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third
degree, an appointment as SECURITY GUARD in the
Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur
although he well knew that the latter is related with him
in the third degree by consanguinity and is not qualified
under the Civil Service Law.
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Second Count.
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That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, Gov.

BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE replaced JOHNNY ABABON
who was then the incumbent Motor Pool Dispatcher in
the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del
Sur with his nephew-in-law TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS relative by affinity within the third
Civil degree, in violation of the Civil Service Law, this
knowingly causing undue injury in the discharge of his

administrative function through manifest partiality against
said complaining employee.
Third Count:

feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE
MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative
by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment
as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know
that the latter is related with him within the third degree
of consanguinity, and said appointment is in violation of
the Civil Service Law.
That on August 19, 1967, respondent BIENVENIDO A.

EBARLE, Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, taking
advantage of his position caused, persuaded, induced,
or influence the Presiding Judge to perform irregular and
felonious act in violation of applicable law or constituting
an offense into awarding and decreeing Lot 2645 of the
Pagadian Public Lands subdivision to him who,
according to the records of the case, failed to establish
his rights of ownership pursuant to the provisions of the
Land Registration law and the Public Land Act, it
appearing that the Provincial Government of Zamboanga
del Sur as and is a claimant and in adverse possession
of Lot 2545 whereon the Provincial Jail Building thereon
still stands.
III.
SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 171 (4), REVISED PENAL CODE
First Count.
Fourth Count.
That on or about January 22, 1970, in Pagadian City,

feloniously extended and gave ZACARIAS UGSOD, JR.,
son of the younger sister of Governor Ebarle, his relative
by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment
as Architectural Draftsman in the Office of the Provincial
Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur although he well know
that the latter is related with him in the third degree of
consanguinity.
Fifth Count.
That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City,

feloniously extended and gave TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH
EBARLE, his relative by affinity within the third degree,
an appointment as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he
wen knew then that the latter was not qualified to such
appointment as it was in violation of the Civil Service
Law, thereby knowingly granting and giving unwarranted
advantage and preference in the discharge of his
administrative function through manifest partiality.
II.
SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019

feloniously made untruthful statement in a narration of
facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion,


appointment he extended to TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH
EBARLE, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he
wen knew that the latter is related with him within the
third degree of affinity and is in violation of the Civil
Service Law.
Second Count.

feloniously made untruthful statements a certificate, to
wit:
c. That the provisions of the law and rules on promotion,


appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLE-
MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of

the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although
he well knew that the latter is related with him within the
third degree of consanguinity, and is in violation of the
Civil Service Law. CONTRARY to aforecited laws. 8
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respondent, an appointment as CONFIDENTIAL

ASSISTANT in the Office of the Provincial Governor,
Pagadian City, although he well knew that Phenina
Codinera is related to him in the second civil degree of
consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service
Law.
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ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.
On September 21, 1971, the private respondent

instituted I.S. No. 7-71 of the said City Fiscal, again
charging the petitioner with further violations of Republic
Act No. 3019 thus:
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Please give due course to the above complaint and

please set the case for immediate preliminary
investigation pursuant to the First Indorsement dated
August 27, 1971 of the Secretary of Justice, and in the
paramount interest of good government. 9
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First Count.

BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits and
privileges BONINDA EBARLE, wife of his brother
Bertuldo Ebarle, the former being his relative by affinity
within the second civil degree, an appointment as
LABORATORY TECHNICIAN in Pagadian City, although
he well knew that the latter is related to him in the
second degree by affinity and is not qualified under the
Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City,

privileges JESUS EBARLE, nephew of said respondent,
an appointment as DRIVER of the Provincial Engineer's
Office, Pagadian City, although he well knew that Jesus
Ebarle is related to him within the third civil degree by
consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service
Law.
Third Count.
That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City,

privileges PHENINA CODINERA, sister-in-law of said
The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of

First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable
Asaali Isnani presiding, on a special civil action (Special
Civil Case No. 1048) for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction. The respondent Court issued a
restraining order. The respondent Anti-Graft League
moved to have the same lifted and the case itself
dismissed.
On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order,

dismissing the case.
On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No.

34162 of this Court, a special civil action for certiorari
with preliminary injunction. As earlier noted, we on
October 8, 1971, stayed the implementation of dismissal
order.
Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and

considered the same submitted for decision.
Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the

failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft
League to comply with the provisions of Executive Order
No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH
COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION
OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED," 10
preliminary to their criminal recourses. At the same time,
he assails the standing of the respondent Anti-Graft
League to commence the series of prosecutions below
(G.R. No. 33628). He likewise contends that the
respondent Fiscal (in G.R. No. 34162), in giving due
course to the complaints notwithstanding the restraining
order we had issued (in G.R. No. 33628), which he

claims applies as well thereto, committed a grave abuse
of discretion.
He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are

politically motivated, initiated by his rivals, he being, as
we said, a candidate for reelection as Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur.
We dismiss these petitions.
The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of

Executive Order No. 264 has no merit. We reproduce
the Order in toto:
MALACAANG
RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the

constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, the
Administration believes that many complaints or
grievances could be resolved at the lower levels of
government if only the provisions of law and regulations
on the matter are duly observed by the parties
concerned; and
WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct should

be eliminated and punished, it is equally compelling that
public officials and employees be given opportunity
afforded them by the constitution and law to defend
themselves in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law and regulations;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,

President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby order:
1.
Complaints against public officials and
employees shall be in writing, subscribed and sworn to
by the complainants, describing in sufficient detail and
particularity the acts or conduct complained of, instead
of generalizations.
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264
OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH

COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION
OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED.
WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be

duly informed or reminded of the procedure provided by
law and regulations by which complaints against public
officials and employees should be presented and
prosecuted.
WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at times delayed

because of the failure to observe the form.91 requisites
therefor, to indicate with sufficient clearness and
particularity the charges or offenses being aired or
denounced, and to file the complaint with the proper
office or authority;
2.
Complaints against presidential appointees shag
be filed with the Office of the President or the
Department Head having direct supervision or control
over the official involved.
3.
Those against subordinate officials and
employees shall be lodged with the proper department
or agency head.
4.
Those against elective local officials shall be
filed with the Office of the President in case of provincial
and city officials, with the provincial governor or board
secretary in case of municipal officials, and with the
municipal or city mayor or secretary in case of barrio
officials.
5.
Those against members of police forces shall be
filed with the corresponding local board of investigators
headed by the city or municipal treasurer, except in the
case of those appointed by the President which should
be filed with the Office of the President.
6.
Complaints against public officials and
employees shall be promptly acted upon and disposed
of by the officials or authorities concerned in accordance

with pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring
officials or employees can be soonest removed or
otherwise disciplined and the innocent, exonerated or
vindicated in like manner, and to the end also that other
remedies, including court action, may be pursued
forthwith by the interested parties after administrative
remedies shall have been exhausted.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October, in the

year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
By the President:
(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary 11
It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has

exclusive application to administrative, not criminal
complaints. The Order itself shows why.
The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF

IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by
implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes."
While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive
Order could have very well referred to the more specific
term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.
The first perambulatory clause states the necessity for

informing the public "of the procedure provided by law
and regulations by which complaints against public
officials and employees should be presented and
prosecuted. 12 To our mind, the "procedure provided by
law and regulations" referred to pertains to existing
procedural rules with respect to the presentation of
administrative charges against erring government
officials. And in fact, the aforequoted paragraphs are but
restatements thereof. That presidential appointees are
subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, for
instance, is a reecho of the long-standing doctrine that
the President exercises the power of control over his
appointees. 13 Paragraph 3, on the other hand,
regarding subordinate officials, is a mere reiteration of
Section 33 of Republic Act No. 2260, the Civil Service
Act (of 1959) then in force, placing jurisdiction upon "the

proper Head of Department, the chief of a bureau or
office" 14 to investigate and decide on matters involving
disciplinary action.
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against

elective local officials, reiterates, on the other hand, the
Decentralization Act of 1967, providing that "charges
against any elective provincial and city officials shall be
preferred before the President of the Philippines; against
any elective municipal official before the provincial
governor or the secretary of the provincial board
concerned; and against any elective barrio official before
the municipal or secretary concerned. 15
Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the

provisions of the Police Act of 1966, vesting upon a
"Board of Investigators" 16 the jurisdiction to try and
decide complaints against members of the Philippine
police.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these

existing rules and streamlines the administrative
apparatus in the matter of complaints against public
officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there is no
reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a
preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal)
recourse, not because it makes such a resort a
secondary measure, but because it does not intend to
serve as a condition precedent to, much less supplant,
such a court resort.
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s]

[being] pursued forthwith by the interested parties, " 17
but that does not, so we hold, cover proceedings such
as criminal actions, which do not require a prior
administrative course of action. It will indeed be noted
that the term is closely shadowed by the qualification,
"after administrative remedies shall have been
exhausted," 18 which suggests civil suits subject to
previous administrative action.
It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in

question makes specific reference to "erring officials or
employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. 19 If it
were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would
have employed such technical terms as "accused",
"convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a
controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in
construing the intent of the measure.
What is even more compelling is the Constitutional

implications if the petitioner's arguments were accepted.
For Executive Order No. 264 was promulgated under the
1935 Constitution in which legislative power was vested

exclusively in Congress. The regime of Presidential
lawmaking was to usher in yet some seven years later. If
we were to consider the Executive Order law, we would
be forced to say that it is an amendment to Republic Act
No. 5180, the law on preliminary investigations then in
effect, a situation that would give rise to a Constitutional
anomaly. We cannot accordingly countenace such a
view.
The challenge the petitioner presents against the

personality of the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines to
bring suit is equally without merit. That the Anti-Graft
League is not an "offended party" within the meaning of
Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section
3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot
abate the complaints in question.
A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by

the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party." The
rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is
one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may
be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any
competent person. 20 The "complaint" referred to in the
Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court, not with the
fiscal, In that case, the proceeding must be started by
the aggrieved party himself. 21
For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by

complaint or information, both of which are filed in court.
In case of a complaint, it must be filed by the offended
party; with respect to an information, it is the fiscal who
files it. But a "complaint" filed with the fiscal prior to a
judicial action may be filed by any person.
The next question is whether or not the temporary

restraining order we issued in G.R. No. 33628 embraced
as well the complaint subject of G.R. No. 34162.
It is noteworthy that the charges levelled against the

petitioner whether in G.R. No. 33628 or 34162
refer invariably to violations of the Anti-Graft Law or the
Revised Penal Code. That does not, however, make
such charges Identical to one another.
The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in

general, nepotism under Sections 3(c) and (j) of
Republic Act No. 3019; exerting influence upon the
presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur to award a certain parcel of land in
his favor, over which the provincial government itself lays
claims, contrary to the provisions of Section 4(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019; and making untruthful
statements in the certificates of appointment of certain
employees in his office. On the other hand, the

complaints subject matter of G.R. No. 33628 involve
charges of simulating bids for the supply of gravel and
sand for certain public works projects, in breach of
Section 3 of the Anti-Graft statute; manipulating bids with
respect to the construction of the capitol building;
testifying falsely in connection with Cadastral Case No.
N-17, LRC Cad. Rec. N-468, in which the petitioner
alleged that he was the owner of a piece of land, in
violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised
Penal Code; and simulating bids for the supply of gravel
and sand in connection with another public works
project.
It is clear that the twin sets of complaints are

characterized by major differences. When, therefore, we
restrained further proceedings in I.S. Nos. 1-71, 2-71,
and 4-71, subject of G.R. No. 33628. we did not
consequently stay the proceedings in CCC-XVI-4-ZDS,
CCC XVI-6-ZDS, CCC XVI-8-ZDS, and I.S. Nos. 6-71
and 7-71, the same proceedings we did restrain in G.R.
No. 34162.
This brings us to the last issue: whether or not the

complaints in question are tainted with a political color.
It is not our business to resolve complaints the

disposition of which belongs to another agency, in this
case, the respondent Fiscal. But more than that, and as
a general rule, injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal
prosecutions. 22 The rule is subject to exceptions, to wit:
(1) for the orderly administration of justice; (2) to prevent
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner; (3) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (4)
to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and
(5) because the statute relied on is constitutionally infirm
or otherwise void. 23 We cannot perceive any of the
exceptions applicable here. The petitioner cries foul, in a
manner of speaking, with respect to the deluge of
complaints commenced by the private respondent below,
but whether or not they were filed for harassment
purposes is a question we are not in a position to decide.
The proper venue, we believe, for the petitioner's
complaint is precisely in the preliminary investigations he
wishes blocked here.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The

temporary restraining orders are LIFTED and SET
ASIDE. Costs against the petitioners.
It is so ORDERED.
NICOLAS Y. FELICIANO, PETITIONER-APPELLEE,

VS. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RESPONDENTAPPELLANT.
On November 11, 1955, the respondent-appellant
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., was proclaimed elected to the
position of Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac, as a result of
the elections held on November 8 of that year. Four days
after the proclamation, defeated candidate Nicolas Y.
Feliciano instituted quo warranto proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac (Case No. 2021)
challenging the eligibility of respondent Aquino on the
ground that the latter did not have twerty three (23)
years of age at the time of his election. It is uncontested
that respondent Aquino became 23 years of age only on
November 27, 1955, nineteen (19) days after the
elections were held, and sixteen (16) days after the
canvassers proclaim him Mayor-elect.
The court below, relying on section 2174 of the

Administrative Code, declared Aquino's election unlawful
and illegal, and enjoined him from assuming office.
Contending that the 23-year age requirement applied
only to the assumption of office (in this case on January
1, 1956) and not to his eligibility, respondent Aquino
appealed to this Court.
The controversy revolves around sec. 2174 of the

Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (Act 2711), reading
as follows:
"Sec. 2174. Qualifications of Elective Municipal Officer. An elective municipal officer must, at the time of the
election, be a qualified voter in his municipality and must
have been resident therein for at least one year; he
must be loyal to the United States 1and not less than
twenty-three years of age. He must also be able to read
and write intelligently either Spanish, English or the local
dialect."
Appellant avers that the phraseology of the section and

the existence of a semi-colon (;) after the first two
requirements (improperly converted into a comma (,) in
the 1951 edition of the Revised Administrative Code)
proves that while the candidate must be a qualified voter
and a resident at the time of the election, he need not
possess the remaining qualifications until he assumes
the office; that appellant was chosen by an
overwhelming majority of his constituents and that the
evident will of the electorate was thwarted by the
judgment appealed from.
In our opinion, the spirit of the law, as well as the natural

and obvious sense of section 2174,is that the candidate
for a municipal elective office must be not less than 23

years of age at the time the election is held. The section
only makes mention of this time: it refers to no other.
And this interpretation of the section aforementioned is
in harmony with the legal requirements for other elective
offices, from President of the Republic to provincial
officers.
"(a) As to President and Vice-President.

No person may be elected to the office of President or
Vice-President, unless he be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over,
and has been a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding the election.
Constitution of the Philippines. Art. VII. Sec. 3.
(b) As to Senator.
No person shall be a Senator unless he be a naturalborn citizen' of the Philippines and, at the time of his
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, a qualified
elector, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than
two years immediately prior to his election. Constitution
of the Philippines. Art. VI. Sec. 4.
(c) As to Member of the House of Representatives.

No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, at the time of his election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, a qualified elector, and a
resident of the province in which he is chosen for not
less than one year immediately prior to his election.
Constitution of the Philippines. Art. VI, Sec. 7.
(d) As to provincial officer.

An elective provincial officer must be a citizen of the
Philippines and, at the time of his election, a qualified
elector in the province, a bona fide resident therein for at
least one year prior to the election, is loyal to the
Republic, and not less than twenty-five years of age.
Secs. 2070. 2071. Revised Adm. Code."
No reason is shown why, after plainly and inequivocably

requiring that candidates for all other elective offices
should possess the age qualification "at the time of the
election", the law should suddenly change the
requirement in the case of municipal officers. And in view
of the express reference to the time of the election in the
first part of sec. 2174 (in requiring the candidate to
possess the voting and residence qualifications), the
least that can be said is that if the Legislature intended
to refer the rest of the requirements to the time of
assuming office, then it would have said so expressly,

instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and
doubt. For it can not be gainsaid that the elaborate
specification of the various conditions that a candidate
must possess is motivated by a desire to avoid
conflicting interpretations; and with such intent in view, it
is inconceivable that the lawmakers should have
considered that a semi-colon would be sufficient to refer
the loyalty and age requirements to the time of assuming
office, without words to that effect, when the voting and
residence conditions are expressly required as of the
time of the election.
And such haphazard formulation of the rule becomes the

more unlikely when we consider that the drafters of
section 2174 of the Administrative Code had before
them, as immediate precedent, section 12: of Act 1582
(of the Philippine Legislature) that clearly differentiated
eligibility and holding office:
"An elective municipal officer must have been, at the

time of the election, a qualified voter and resident in the
municipality for at least one year, owing allegiance to the
United States; he must be not less, than twenty-three
years of age, and be able to read and write intelligently
either Spanish, English, or the local dialect: Provided.
That a person ineligible for office by reason of
nonpayment of taxes who is elected to any office may
remove such ineligibility by the payment of the taxes
before the date fixed by-law for assuming office, but not
afterwards.
Unless fully pardoned, no person who has been

convicted of a crime which is punishable by
imprisonment for two years, or more shall hold any
public office and no person disqualified from holding
public office by the sentence of a cburt or under the
provisions of Act Numbered Eleven hundred and
twenty-six shall be eligible to hold.public office during the
term of his disqualification.
The official acts of a person who is elected and assumes

office when ineligible thereto shall not be invalid, but
such office shall be vacated in the manner following
dmmediately upon discovery of such ineligibility."
(Emphasis supplied)
The text just quoted is clear in requiring the candidate to

owe allegiance to the United States at the time of the
election, since this requisite came before the semi-colon.
In substituting for it the phrase "he must be loyal to the
United States" in sec. 2174 of Act 2711, and placing this
condition after the semi-colon, it is scarcely arguable that
the law intended to permit the election of disloyal
persons, provided they took an oath of loyalty before

assuming office. And if this be clearly improbable, why
should the semi-colon assume such overwhelming
importance in connection with the age requirement, as to
nullify the common antecedent, "at the time of the
election"?
The appellant's case is built exclusively upon this semicolon that separates the voting and residence
requirements on the one hand and the loyalty and age
requirements on the other. He argues that the semicolon, in lieu of a comma, indicates that the last two
conditions need not be present at the time of the
election. We deem this reliance upon punctuation
altogether too shallow a foundation upon which to rest a
conclusion that would upset the obvious pattern of the
Constitution and the laws, of requiring candidates to
possess the requisite age at the time of the election,
without any cogent reason to justify departure from such
requirement in the case of municipal offices. And as
already pointed out, had the legislators intended to
radically alter the time when the loyalty and statutory age
must be possessed, they would have done so more
clearly than by the simple recourse to a semi-colon.
The Supreme Court of the United States is on record as

holding that "punctuation is most fallible standard by
which to interpret a writing" (Ewing vs. Burent, 11 Pet.
41, 9 L. Ed. 624), and that -
"Punctuation marks are no part of a statute; and to

determine its intent the court in construing it willdisregard punctuation or will repunctuate if that be
necessary, in order to arrive at the natural meaning of
the words employed. (U.S. vst Shreveport Grain and
Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 77 L. Ed. 175; Hammock vs.
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77, 26 L.Ed.
1111)."
Professor Sutherland,in his classic work on Statutory

Construction, (Vol. 2, pp. 479-4&0, 3rd Ed.) says:
"Courts have indicated that punctuation will not be given

too great consideration in interpretation because it
results from the whim of printer or proofreader. The
author's experience confirms his conclusion. Printters
are prone to use their own style manuals and to make
all copy conform to it. When a bill is repunctuated and
printed to conform to a manual it is usually too late and
too risky to resubmit the bill to the legislature for the
correction of the changes unless they are particularly
flagrant. Thus often the punctuation becomes that of the
printer rather than of the legislature.2 (Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, pp. 479-430"
requirements of Act 1582, it must have intended also

that the requiredage of 23 should be attained at the time
of the election, as demanded by the model legislation.
Other courts have expressed the same opinion: Thus, in
Holmes vs. Phoenix Ins. Co., 47 L.R.A., 308, 9S Fed.
240, the court said:
"Punctuation is no part of the English language. The

Supreme Court says that it is a most fallible guide by
which to interpret a writing" Ewing v. Burent (1837) 11
Pet. (U.S.) 41, 54, 9 L.Ed. 624, 630. The Century
Dictionary tells us, what,is common knowledge, that
tthere is still much uncertainty and arbitrariness in
punctuation.' It is always subordinate to the text, and is
never allowed to control its meaning."
And in Olivet vs. Whiteworth, 82 Md. 258, 33 Atl. 723,

the court stated:
"That punctuation alone is not necessarily conclusive

must be conceded, as it is well known that draftsmen of
legal instruments frequently ignore all the rules on that
subject, to which grammarians and rhetoricians attach
great importance. The most learned and accomplished
lawyers oftentimes pay .but little attention to it in their
preparation of legal documents. This may be because
the copyist or the writer to whom the paper is dictated
has not followed the directions or intonations of the
author, or it may be because it is known that the cases
are few that are determined by punctuation, or for other
reasons. But when, where is an ambiguity which may be
wholly or partially solved by it, provided the punctuation
itself has not created the ambiguity, it can be considered
(Weatherly v. Mister (1874) 39 Md. 629; Black v. Herring
(1894) 79 Md. 149, 22 Atl. 1063), but it can never be,
permitted to over turn, what seems the plain meaning of
the whole instrument."
In the case at bar there are additional reasons for dis~

regarding the semi-colon which the appellant views with
a respect bordering on fetishism. A comparison of the
texts of sec. 2174 of Act 2711, and sec. 12 of Act 1582
(both heretofore reproduced),shows beyond doubt that
the former is a practical reproduction of the qualifications
demanded by the latter of municipal elective officials;
wherefore, we may conclude that the intent of both
provisions is one and the same. Now, it is incontestable
that, under Act 1582, the candidate to an elective
municipal position must be twenty-three years of age at
the time of the election, if only for the reason that he
could not be a qualified voter under said Act unless he
was 23 years old. This being the case, it necessarily
follows that when sec. 2174 of Act 2711 reproduced the
It is true that the voting age has been reduced from 23 to

21 years. But this reduction is of no importance, since
neither sec. 12 of;Act 1582 nor sec. 2174 of Act 2711
made the candidate's age requirement dependent on the
voting age. Then, again, the Congressional Record of
the discussions on the Election Code, with respect to
what was intended to be covered by the candidate's
certificate of candidacy, and the requirement that he
should certify to his eligibility to the office sought, clearly
shows that the term "eligibility" included the attainment
of the age required by law; so that this requisite was
considered a condition precedent to the valid election of
the particular candidate and not a prerequisite to his
assuming office after being elected.
That the term "eligibility" as used in the Election law has
reference to the election time, and not to the
commencement of the term of office is further confirmed
by seetion 31 of said law, about certificates of candidacy.
It says:
"SEC. 31. Certificate of Candidagy for oniv one office. No person shall be eligible unless, within the time fixed
by law, he files a duly signed and sworn certificate of
candidacy, nor shall any person be eligible for more than
one office to be filled in the same election, and, if he files
certificates of candidacy for more than one office, eh
'shall not be eligible for any of them."
No argument is needed to show that where the

candidate is mentioned as "eligible" or "ineligible" in this
section, taking part in the election is meant, and not
capacity to assume office. No reason is shown why the
word "eligibility" should have different meanings in the
law. Whatever the weight of American authority should
be, the stark fact is that "eligibility" in our law has its own
meaning, and refers to possession of qualifications at
the time of the election.
And this view is entirely in accord also with the

requirement of the Election Code, sec. 173, that "when a
person who is not eligible is elected to a provincial or
municipal office, his right to the office must be contested
by quo warranto proceedings within one week after the
proclamation of his election. Nothing in this section
indicates that the age requirement is not included. If the
contest must be filed within one week after proclamation,
it must be because by that time it can be determined
whether or not the candidate has complied with the age
and other requirements of the law. Were we to follow
appellant's contention that he needs to be twenty three
only upon assuming office, obviously his compliance

with the age requirement can not be determined
beforehand; nor could a successful candidate be ever
contested for disloyalty or non-age, because he can
always defer his assumption of the office until he attains
the requisite age or is ready to take a loyalty oath.
On this point, the Supreme Court has remarked in

Topaclo vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 23$, 252:
"It is possible to finally pass upon the eligibility of a

candidate for such elective offices at any time prior to
the date upon which he is to assume office? It is plain
that if the candidate can not qualify on election day as to
length of residence, age, or other requirement which can
only be met by time, he would be ineligible to hold office
and the court or any other deciding power cduid! very
well decide immediately after the election that he was
ineligible."
It is true that the Court was discussing Act 1582 in the

particular case; but as already pointed out, the
qualifications required being identical to those
demanded by the present law, the passage quoted is
perfectly applicable to the case now before us.
Appellant cites the case of Morrero vs. Bocar as

authority in his favor. We think it is not, for the reason
that the decision was there rendered under the
provisions of Art. VII, sec. 2 of the Constitution as it
stood before the 1941 amendments,, At the time Bocar
was elected, the constitutional provision required that-
"No person shall be a member of the National Assembly

unless he has been five years a citizen, is at least 30
years of age, and at the time of his election, a qualified
elector and a resident of the province",
so that it could be plausibly argued and held that the

phrase "at the time of his election" qualified only the
requirements of residence and electoral capacity, since
only these two conditions followed the qualifying words;
while the age requirement (which preceded the words
"and at the time of his election") could not be restricted
by that expression, but should be construed as a
qualification only for assuming membership in the
Assembly. But the Constitution was amended
subsequently to the Bocar case, and now reads:
"unless he be a natural born citizen of the Philippines

and, at the time of his election, is at least twenty-five
years of age," etc.-
The interversion of the phrases "at the time of his

election" and "at least twenty-five years of age" by
placing the first requirement ahead of the latter, makes it
clear that now the age requirement must be possessed
by the candidate at election time, precisely in line with
the requirement for other offices. Wherefore, the Bocar
decision could not be maintained under the present
Constitution. And precisely section 2174 of the
Administrative Code, covering appellant's case, is
constructed in a manner identical to the present
constitutional and legal requirements for national and
provincial offices since the words "at the time of the
election" precede, and therefore, modify, all
qualifications set forth in the law after such words,
including the age requirement.
Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441, held that a

disqualification from being a voter, due to a criminal
conviction at the time of the election, was retroactively
wiped out by a plenary pardon granted after the election.
Such retroactive operation is in line with the general
doctrine as to the effect of pardons; and moreover is
supported by section 99 of the Election Law:
"Sec. 99. Disqualifications. - The following persons

shall,not be qualified to vote:
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon."
It will be noticed that the law does not limit the time i
when the pardon should be issued, whether before or
after elecion. The majority of the Court chose to interpret
the law liberally, by giving the pardon full rehabilitating
power, regardless of the time it was issued, because "an
absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed
but removes all disabisalities resulting from the
conviction". But since that ratio decidendi of the
Pelobello case does not apply to a candidate's age, and
there is no authority for granting retroactive operation to
the attainment of a certain age (which would be absurd),
plainly the Pelobello decision does not support appellant
Aquino's case.
Appellant argues, as a last resort, that the construction

to be given to see, 2174 of the Administrative Code (Act
2711) should be in harmony with the popular will,
reflected in his overwhelming victory at the polls. We do
not believe that it was ever the legislative intent to make
the application of the law dependent upon the vagaries
of the election results. Appellant's argument simply
amounts to this that because he won, the 23 years of
age requirement should be held as required by law only
at the time of the candidate's assumption of office.
Logically, the sequel of this argument would be that if
appellant had lost, the age requirement would be
demanded by law as of thu time of the election. And yet
the meaning of the statute must have been fixed sinee
the time it was enacted in 1917 long before appellant
was born.
In conclusion, we are of the opinion that, as in the case

of candidates for elective provincial and national offices,
a candidate for an elective municipal office must have, in
order to be eligible, at least twenty three years of age at
the time the election is held. In so holding, the court
below committed no error.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with

costs against appellant. So ordered.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ABELARDO SUBlDO, defendantappellant.

Appeal on questions of law from the Orders of the Court
of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 23041,
entitled People of the Philippines versus Abelardo
Subido, denying defendant-appellant's motion for the
cancellation of his appeal bond and declaring him to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay
the fine and indemnity.
From an adverse decision in said case, the dispositive

portion of which reads:
From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused
guilty of libel and he is hereby sentenced to three (3)
months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of
the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to
indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson in
the sum of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.
defendant-appellant Abelardo Subido has taken an

appeal to the Court of Appeals, which modified the said
judgment in the following tenor:
However, in the application of the penalty provided for

the violation of the libel law, the courts are given
discretion of whether or not both fine and imprisonment
are to be imposed upon the offender. In the instant case,
we believe, considering the attendant circumstances of
the case that the imposition of the corresponding penalty
should be tempered with judicial discretion. For this
reason, we impose upon accused-appellant a fine of
P500.00.
Similarly, the amount of the indemnity to be paid by

appellant to the offended party is reduced to P5,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications above indicated,

the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at appellant's
costs.
In due time the case was remanded to the trial court for
execution of the judgment.
On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a

motion with the trial court praying that (1) the court enter
of record that the judgment of the Court of Appeals has
been promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be
cancelled. Accused-appellant argued that although he
could not pay the fine and the indemnity prescribed in
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could not be
required to serve the amount of fine and indemnity in the
form of subsidiary imprisonment because said judgment
did not expressly and specifically provide that he should
serve the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On December 20, 1958, upon motion of the offended

party the lower court issued a writ of execution of its
judgment. However, the writ was returned unsatisfied.
On February 25, 1959, the Sheriff of the City of Manila,

armed with an alias writ of execution, attached "whatever
rights, interests, or participation, if any, defendant
Abelardo Subido may have" in a two-storey building
situated at No. 2313 Suter, Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54170 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila. However, it turned out that the property
levied upon be the sheriff was registered in the name of
Agapito Subido who, upon learning of the levy,
immediately filed a Third party claim with the sheriff's
office and instituted an action in the lower court (Civil
Case No. 41731) to enjoin the Sheriff of Manila from
proceeding with the sale of his property. In the meantime
the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the sale of property levied upon by the sheriff.
On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its

opposition to accused-appellant's motion for cancellation
of appeal bond and asked the lower court to require
accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the
indemnity of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
On December 19, 1959, the lower court issued an order

denying the accused-appellant's motion and declared
that in accordance with the terms of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals the accused-appellant has to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case he could not pay the
fine and indemnity prescribed in the decision. Accusedappellant moved for reconsideration, but the same was
denied on December 26, 1959.
Hence this appeal from the lower court's orders of

December 19 and 26.
given the discretion to impose the penalty of

imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will
be noted that the lower court chose to impose upon the
accused: three months of arresto mayor; a fine of
P500.00; indemnification of the offended party in the
sum of P10,000.00; subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and the payment of the costs. On the other
hand, the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its
discretion decided to eliminate the penalty of three (3)
months arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity of
P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.
Thus the Court of Appeals resolved:
However, in the application of the penalty provided for in

the violation of the libel law, the courts are given
discretion of whether or not both fine and imprisonment
are to be imposed upon the offender. In the instant case,
we believe, considering the attendant circumstances of
the same, that the imposition of the corresponding
penalty should be tempered with judicial discretion. For
this reason we impose the accused a fine of P500.00.
In his appeal, accused-appellant presses that the lower

court erred
Similarly, the amount of the indemnity to be paid by
appellant to the offended party is reduced to P5,000.00.
I
IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE

DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ACCUSEDAPPELLANT IS LIABLE TO SUBSIDIARY
IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY.
WHEREUPON, with the modifications above indicated,

cost.
To Us it is clear that when the Court of Appeals provided

in the concluding portion of its decision:
II
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF

ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN SATISFIED WITH
THE ATTACHMENT SECURED BY THE OFFENDED
PARTY. 1
The threshold issue in this appeal is whether or not the

accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and
indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code
"a libel committed by means of writing, printing,
litography, engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings,
theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition or any
similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional
in its minimum and medium period or a fine ranging from
200 to 6000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party". It is
evident from the foregoing provision that the court is
WHEREUPON, with the modifications above indicated,

costs
the alluded modifications could mean no less than the

elimination of the three months of arresto mayor and the
reduction of the indemnity to the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00. All the
rest of the punishment remains including the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Had the Court
wanted to do away with the subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency of accused-appellant to pay the fine
and the indemnity it would have so expressly provided.
A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals

that the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency" is separated by a comma (,) from the
preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three months
of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law,

to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to
indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in
the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos."
The use of a comma (,) in the part of the sentence is to
make "the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency" refer not only to non-payment of the
indemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.
If the lower court intended to make the phrase "with

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer to
non-payment of indemnity only and not to the nonpayment of the fine, it would have omitted the comma (,),
after the phrase "to indemnify the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson in the amount of P10,000.00 pesos," so
that the decision of the lower court would read:
From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused
guilty of libel and he is hereby sentenced to three (3)
months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of five hundred
(P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of ten thousand
(P10,000.00) pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
As thus worded and punctuated there would be no doubt

that the lower court would want to make accusedappellant serve the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment of the indemnity only.
Besides, We see no plausible reason why the lower

court would want accused-appellant to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the indemnity
only and not to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment of the fine. Accordingly if according to the
lower court's decision, the accused-appellant should
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to
pay the fine and the indemnity and the only modifications
made by the Court of Appeals are to eliminate the three
(3) months of arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity
to the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, from
P10,000.00 to P5,000.00, then by force of logic and
reason, the fine of P5000.00, the reduced indemnity of
P5,000.00 and the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency should stand.
Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by

the retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 which
exempts an accused person from subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay his civil
liability. 2
It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal

statutes are to be strictly construed against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused. 3 In the
interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it
careful scrutiny, and to construe it with such strictness as
to safeguard the rights of the defendant. 4 Considering
that Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
is favorable to the accused-appellant, the same should
be made applicable to him. It is so provided in Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code that:
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as

they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving sentence.
Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, to the accused-appellant, he cannot also be
required to serve his civil liability to the offended party in
form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
because this is no longer required by the aforesaid
article.
Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be made to

suffer subsidiary imprisonment because his civil liability
has been satisfied with the attachment secured by the
offended party on the property of Agapito Subido,
wherein he is supposed to have an interest. He therefore
argues that until the final determinations of Civil Case
No. 71731 which Agapito Subido filed to enjoin the
Sheriff of Manila from proceeding with the sale of his
property, accused-appellant's liability for subsidiary
imprisonment cannot attach as the determination of
whether the accused is solvent or not is a prejudicial
question which must first be determined before
subsidiary imprisonment may be imposed.
We cannot agree. Attachment does not operate as a

satisfaction of the judgment on civil liability and the
accused must suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment thereof. Subsidiary imprisonment applies
when the offender is insolvent as shown in the present
case. There is nothing in the law that before subsidiary
imprisonment may attach, there must be prior
determination of the question of solvency of the
accused. The moment he cannot pay the fine, that
means he is insolvent and he must serve the same in
form of subsidiary imprisonment. So accused-appellant
has to choose to pay the fine or serve in jail.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING except with the

modification that accused-appellant may no longer be
required to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency to pay the indemnity provided for in the

judgment below, the Orders of the lower court dated
December 19 and 26, 1959 denying defendantappellant's motion for cancellation of appeal bond and
sentencing him to suffer the subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency to pay the fine imposed by said
judgment, are hereby affirmed.
Presidential Decree No. 4, in addition to the gratuity

which they have already received under Commonwealth
Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No. 1616.
This is so because to assume otherwise would not only
be an act of "over-liberality" on the part of the State but
likewise inconsistent with its policy against double
pension or gratuity for the same service." 6
SO ORDERED.
To bolster his submission, he cited the ruling in

Borromeo v. Government Service Insurance System: 7
"The gratuity received by petitioner under Act 2589 was
obviously in consideration of his services to the
government as of his retirement in December 15, 1949.
It is similarly obvious that the retirement benefits he was
found to be entitled to receive under the provisions of Act
910, as amended, were in consideration of the same
services to the government. Therefore, for petitioner to
receive full benefits under the law, in addition to the
gratuity he had already received under Act 2589, would
amount to allowing him to receive double pension for
exactly the same services as consideration. The rule in
construing or applying pension and gratuity laws is that,
in the absence of express provisions to the contrary,
they will be so interpreted as to prevent any person from
receiving double compensation." 8 It was further
stressed that the enactment of later legislations after the
retirement of a public official "is not a circumstance of
sufficient weight to justify our ignoring the general policy
of the State expressed both in Act 2589 as well as in
Act 910 against double pensions for the same
services. To the contrary, the fact that even after
petitioners retirement under Act 2589 another pension
law was enacted under which he could claim greater
benefits affords a greater reason for the application of
the general policy against double pensions, unless the
contrary was expressly and clearly provided in the later
enactment." 9
Cajiuat v Mathay
The claim of petitioners, which was denied by the then
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Ismael
Mathay, Sr., is based on par. 3, Section 26 of
Presidential Decree No. 4. It reads as follows:
"Permanent officials and employees of the Rice and
Corn Administration . . . who prefer to retire, if qualified
for retirement, shall be given gratuity equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service but in no case
more than twenty-four months salary, in addition to all
other benefits to which they are entitled under existing
laws and regulations." 1 There is no dispute that
petitioners were, prior to their retirement, permanent
officials and employees of the then Rice and Corn
Administration abolished under Presidential Decree No.
4. They being retirable, they exercised the option to do
so under the Optional Retirement Law. 2 They had,
therefore, by virtue thereof, received the gratuity under
such law. With the issuance of the aforesaid Presidential
Decree, however, they were led to hope that a claim for
separation gratuity would likewise be justified.
Respondent, the then Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Audit was of a different mind. For him,
there was no legal basis for allowing them double
gratuity. He rendered such a decision. In view of such
refusal to give due course to their plea, they filed this
petition before this Court.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library
It is their submission that to deny them separation

gratuity "would render the clause under consideration
meaningless as if it is (sic) never written in the decree.
This would be contrary to the rules on statutory
construction and interpretation that every part of the
statute should be carried into effect." 3 The Solicitor
General, in his memorandum for respondent, rejected
such an argument. Thus: "It is respectfully submitted that
since the petitioners herein have already retired and
were paid the gratuity under Commonwealth Act No.
186, as amended by Republic Act No. 1616, they are no
longer entitled to the gratuity provided under paragraph
3, Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 4." 4 After
referring to the gratuity as "a free gift, a present, or any
benefits of pecuniary value bestowed without claim or
demand, or without consideration," 5 he pointed out that
from its very nature, "there seems to be no apparent
reason for granting to the herein petitioners the gratuity
provided for under paragraph 3, Section 26, of
This Court, after a careful consideration, arrives at the

same conclusion. There must be a provision, clear and
unequivocal, to justify a double pension. The general
language employed in paragraph 3, Section 26 of
Presidential Decree No. 4 fails to meet that test. All that
it states is that permanent employees of the Rice and
Corn Administration who are retirable are entitled to
gratuity equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service but in no case more than twenty-four months
salary in addition to other benefits to which they are
entitled under existing laws and regulations. To grant
double gratuity then is unwarranted. No reliance can he
placed to the use of the term "other benefits" found in
the paragraph relied upon. As clearly stated in the
memorandum of the Solicitor General, they refer to
"those receivable by a retiree under the general
retirement laws, like the refund of contributions to the
retirement fund and the money value of the accumulated
vacation and sick leaves of said official employee. The
clause in addition to all other benefits to which they are
entitled under existing laws and regulations, was
inserted to insure the payment to the retiree of the
refund of the contributions to the retirement fund and the

money value of the accumulated vacation and sick
leaves of said official or employee." 10
That is all it can plausibly signify. To go further would

make it a fruitful parent of injustice. It would set at
naught a state policy dictated by reason and fairness
alike. Petitioners seek to claim the status of an exempt
class. The burden of proof is on them. That they failed to
meet, relying as they do on words hardly indicative of
their being accorded a favored status. To justify such a
result, it is imperative that the language employed be of
the clearest and most satisfactory character. The
paragraph relied upon in Section 26 of Presidential
Decree No. 4, to repeat, cannot be so
characterized.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
One last word. It is to be added that the rule against

double compensation is nothing new. It was so held in
Peralta v. Auditor General. 11 While the question
involved is not identical, its ratio decidendi applies to the
instant situation, namely, to allow what petitioners seek
"would be a clear disregard of the prohibition to receive
both the compensation and the pension, annuity, or
gratuity." 12 Peralta was cited with approval in a later
case, San Diego v. Auditor General. 13 A recent
decision, Chavez v. Auditor General, 14 puts the matter
tersely but emphatically. Thus: "Appeal from a decision
of the Auditor General, in which we reaffirm the Courts
doctrine against the payment to retirees from the
government service of double pension for exactly the
same services." 15 We do so again.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is denied for

lack of merit and the decision of respondent, the then
Auditor General, denying due course to the claim of
petitioner for double gratuity affirmed. No costs.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF TAX APPEALS and LITONJUA SHIPPING
COMPANY represented by Granexport Corporation
as sub-agent, respondent.
This refers to a petition for review of the decision dated
July 28, 1978 of the Court of Tax Appeals in C. T. A.
Cases No. 2785, 2831 and 2832 which was promulgated
prior to the issuance on February 27, 1991, of Circular
No.
1-91 to the effect that appeals from a final order or
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals shall be to the Court
of Appeals.
The undisputed facts of the case as established by the

evidence and as found by respondent Court of Tax
Appeals, are as follows:
The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation

at Kiwalan were constructed and improved and are
operated and maintained solely by and at the expense of
Iligan Express Corporation, a private corporation.
The MS "Chozan Maru", MS "Samuel S", MS "Ero", MS

"Messinia", MS "Pavel Rybin", MS "Caledonia", and MS
"Leonidas" are vessels engaged in foreign trade and
represented in the Philippines by private respondent
Litonjua Shipping Company Granexport Corporation as
its sub-agent.
On various date, berthing facilities of the Iligan Bay

Express Corporation at Kiwalan, Iligan City were used by
the above vessels and were assessed berthing fees by
the Collector of Customs which were paid by private
respondent under protest, to wit:
a)
June 27, 1973, MS "Chozan Maru" P2,551.00
paid on April 17, 1973;
b)
April 27, 1973, MS "Samuel S" P8,000.00
paid on May 9, 1973;
c)
May 27, 1973, MS "Ero" P5,000.00 paid on
June 4, 1973;
d)
June 2, 1973 MS "Messinia" P5,000.00 paid
on June 11, 1973;
e)
March 22-26, 1975, MS "Pavel Rybin"
P4,000.00 paid on April 3, 1975;
f)
April 26-May 3, 1975 MS "Caledonia"
P7,000.00 on May 7, 1975; and
g)
May 25-June 3, 1975, MS "Caledonia"
P9,000.00 paid on June 7, 1975.
Private respondent filed cases before the Bureau of

Customs for refund of the berthing fees paid under
protest. The Collector of Customs of the City of Iligan
denied the protest, prompting private respondent to
appeal to the Commissioner of Customs who, however,
affirmed the decision of the Collector of Customs.
Private respondent then resorted to the Court of Tax

Appeals. Consolidating the protests, the tax court,
thereafter rendered a decision on July 28, 1978, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decisions appealed from are hereby

reversed and respondent Commissioner of Customs is
ordered to refund to petitioner the amount of
P40,551.00. No costs. (p., 51, Rollo)
Hence, the present recourse by the Commissioner of

Customs.
The only issue involved in this petition for review is:

Whether a vessel engaged in foreign trade, which berths
at a privately owned wharf or pier, is liable to the
payment of the berthing charge under Section 2901 of
the Tariff and Customs Code, which, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 34, reads:
Sec. 2901.
Definition. Berthing charge is the
amount assessed against a vessel for mooring or
berthing at a pier, wharf, bulk-head-wharf, river or
channel marginal wharf at any national port in the
Philippines; or for mooring or making fast to a vessel so
berthed, or for coming or mooring within any slip,
channel, basin, river or canal under the jurisdiction of
any national port of the Philippines: Provided, however,
That in the last instance, the charge shall be fifty (50%)
per cent of rates provided for in cases of piers without
cargo shed in the succeeding sections. The owner,
agent, operator or master of the vessel is liable for this
charge.
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs contends that the

government has the authority to impose and collect
berthing fees whether a vessel berths at a private pier or
at a national port. On the other hand, private respondent
argues that the right of the government to impose
berthing fees is limited to national ports only.
The governing law classifying ports into national ports

and municipal ports is Executive Order No. 72, Series of
1936 (O.G. Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 65-66). A perusal of said
executive order discloses the absence of the port of
Kiwalan in the list of national ports mentioned therein.
Furthermore, Paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 72

expressly provides that "the improvement and
maintenance of national ports shall be financed by the
Commonwealth Government, and their administration
and operation shall be under the direct supervision and

control of the Insular Collector of Customs." It is
undisputed that the port of Kiwalan was constructed and
improved and is operated and maintained solely by and
at the expense of the Iligan Express Corporation, and
not by the National Government of the Republic or any
of its agencies or instrumentalities.
Petitioner insists that Kiwalan is a national port since it is

within the jurisdiction of the collection district and
territorial limits of the national port of Iligan City. The
claim is put forward that "Kiwalan simply cannot claim to
be an independent port within a national port without
infringing on the territorial jurisdiction of the Port of
Iligan", citing the support thereof Customs Administrative
Order No. 1-76 dated February 23, 1976. However, a
reading of said administrative order shows that it was
issued merely for administrative purposes redefining the
jurisdictional limits of each Customs Collection District
"based on the approved staffing pattern." It has nothing
to do with the collection of berthing fees. On this point
we quote with approval the following conclusions of
respondent Court of Tax Appeals:
. . . we see no significance therefore in the stand of

respondent, as averred as affirmative and special
defenses of his answers, that it is not necessary to list
Kiwalan as a national port being already an integral part
of the national port of the city of Iligan, within its territorial
limits, jurisdiction or collection district. Such an assertion,
besides being violative of the legal basis for the
classification of ports into national or municipal under
Executive Order No. 72, series of 1936, as implemented
by subsequent Republic Acts and Executive Orders,
would make all ports in the Philippines national ports. A
port is not classified as a national port just because it is
located within the territorial limits or boundaries of a city
or municipality where a national port is situated, much
less within the jurisdiction or collection district of a
national port; otherwise, all ports in the Philippines would
be classified as national ports without any municipal
ports.
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . Customs Administrative Order No. 1-72 dated

September 21, 1971, which is entitled as defining the
jurisdictional limits of customs collection districts, divided
the entire Philippines into thirty-four (34) collection
districts. It bears emphasis that no point or locality in the
Philippines is not covered by a collection district, or does
not fall within the territorial jurisdiction or limits of a
collection district, with a principal port of entry which is
always national port properly, classified and listed as
such by law or executive order. (pp. 47-48, Rollo)
The Bureau of Customs itself in its Customs

Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 dated March 29, 1973,
does not accord the status of national port to the port of
Kiwalan, nor does the list of national ports appended
thereto include the port of Kiwalan. Moreover, said
memorandum circular indicates the specific law (Public
Act, Commonwealth Act, Republic Act or Executive
Order) creating a particular national port. Petitioner has
not cited or brought to our attention, and we have found
none, any law creating Kiwalan Port as a national port or
converting it to one.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the

express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed
in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine
its terms to those expressly mentioned (Agpalo,
Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed., 1990, pp. 160-161, and
the cases therein cited). The port of Kiwalan not being
included in the list of national ports appended to
Customs Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 nor in
Executive Order No. 72, it follows inevitably as a matter
of law and legal principle that this Court may not properly
consider said port as a national port. To do otherwise
would be to legislate on our part and to arrogate into
ourselves powers not conferred on us by the
Constitution.
Even the Bureau of Customs in its Customs

Memorandum Circular No. 47-73 held
It appearing that Banago Wharf in Bacolod City is not

one of those listed as a national port, the said part
should be considered a municipal, pursuant to the
provisions of Executive Order No. 72 series of 1936.
Berthing charges therefore may not be collected from
vessels docking thereat. (p. 3, Customs Memorandum
Circular No. 47-73)
Plainly, therefore, the port of Kiwalan is not a national

port. However, petitioner maintains that regardless of
whether or not the port of Kiwalan is a national port,
berthing charges may still be collected by the Bureau of
Customs from vessels berthing at said port, citing the
case of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation vs. Court of Tax
Appeals and Commissioner of Customs (18 SCRA 436
[1966]), where it was held:
Adverting to the terms of the law, it is quite apparent that

the government's right to collect berthing charges is not
planted upon the condition that the pier be publicly
owned. The statute employs the word pier without
more. Nothing there said speaks of private or public pier.
Where the law does not exact the nature of ownership
as a condition, that condition should not be read into the
law. We are not to indulge in statutory construction.
Because the law is clear. Our plain duty is to apply the
law as it is written. So applying, we rule that, berthing or
mooring charges here were properly collected. (at pp.
438-439.)
The above ruling, however, is no longer effective and

can not apply in the case at bar for the same was
decided before the Tariff and Customs Code was
amended by Presidential Decree No. 34 which took
effect thirty days from October 27, 1972, the date of
promulgation.
Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code prior to its

amendment and said section as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 34 are hereunder reproduced
with the amendments duly highlighted:
Sec. 2901.
Definition Berthing charge is the
amount assessed against a vessel for mooring or
berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or
channel marginal wharf at any port in the Philippines; or
for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed; or for
coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river
or canal under the jurisdiction of any port of the
Philippines (old TCC)
Sec. 2901.
Definition Berthing charge is the
amount assessed a vessel for mooring or berthing at a
pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or, channel marginal
wharf AT ANY NATIONAL PORT IN THE PHILIPPINES;
for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed; or for
coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river,
or canal under the jurisdiction of ANY NATIONAL port of
the Philippines; Provided, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE
LAST INSTANCE, THE CHARGE SHALL BE FIFTY
(50%) PER CENT OF RATES PROVIDED FOR IN
CASES OF PIERS WITHOUT CARGO SHED IN THE
SUCCEEDING SECTIONS.
It will thus be seen that the word "national" before the

word "port" is inserted in the amendment. The change in
phraseology by amendment of a provision of law
indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of
the provision from that it originally had (Agpalo, supra, p.
76). The insertion of the word "national" before the word
"port" is a clear indication of the legislative intent to
change the meaning of Section 2901 from what it
originally meant, and not a mere surplusage as

contended by petitioner, in the sense that the change
"merely affirms what customs authorities had been
observing long before the law was amended" (p. 18,
Petition). It is the duty of this Court to give meaning to
the amendment. It is, therefore, our considered opinion
that under Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34, only vessels
berthing at national ports are liable for berthing fees. It is
to be stressed that there are differences between
national ports and municipal ports, namely: (1) the
maintenance of municipal ports is borne by the
municipality, whereas that of the national ports is
shouldered by the national government;
(2) municipal ports are created by executive order, while
national ports are usually created by legislation; (3)
berthing fees are not collected by the government from
vessels berthing at municipal ports, while such berthing
fees are collected by the government from vessels
moored a national ports. The berthing fees imposed
upon vessels berthing at national ports are applied by
the national government for the maintenance and repair
of said ports. The national government does not
maintain municipal ports which are solely maintained by
the municipalities or private entities which constructed
them, as in the case at bar. Thus, no berthing charges
may be collected from vessels moored at municipal ports
nor may berthing charges be imposed by a municipal
council (Tejam's Commentaries on the Revised Tariff and
Customs Code, p. 2486, citing Circular Letter No. 2981
dated September 30, 1958 quoting Op. No. 122, s. of
1958 and Op. No. 373, s. of 1940, Sec. of Justice).
The subject vessels, not having berthed at a national

port but at the Port of Kiwalan, which was constructed,
operated, and continues to be maintained by private
respondent Iligan Express Corporation, are not subject
to berthing charges, and petitioner should refund the
berthing fees paid private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the

decision of the Court of Tax Appeals AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitionerappellant, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION,

respondent-appellee.
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission
issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: .
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing

the premiums due the System, will take into
consideration and include in the Employee's
remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as

the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these
will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings,
upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be
based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias

Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social
Security Commission in effect protesting against the
circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7,
dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay
and bonus in the computation of the employers' and
employees' respective monthly premium contributions,
and submitting, "In order to assist your System in
arriving at a proper interpretation of the term
'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation,
their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its
amendment and on the general interpretation of the
words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages".
Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for
lack of authority on the part of the Social Security
Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the
President and for lack of publication in the Official
Gazette.
Overruling these objections, the Social Security

Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or
regulation that needed the approval of the President and
publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a
mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere
statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law
should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this

Court on appeal.
The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not

Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated
in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the
Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and
repeal subject to the approval of the President such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions and purposes of this Act."
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between

an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative
interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to
an administrative body. When an administrative agency
promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law
with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it
renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker,
Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p.
194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon
the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature

of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced
by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so
because statutes are usually couched in general terms,
after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives,
remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The
details and the manner of carrying out the law are often
times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules
and regulations are the product of a delegated power to
create new or additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law. (Davis, op. cit., p. 194.) .
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure

fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is
within the statutory authority granted by the legislature,
even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy
stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of
the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that
finally determine what the law means.
Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social

Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the
provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term
"compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic
Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as
follows: .
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment

include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any
medium other than cash except (1) that part of the
remuneration in excess of P500 received during the
month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3)
dismissal and all other payments which the employer
may make, although not legally required to do so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of

"compensation" to:
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment

include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any
medium other than cash except that part of the
remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the
month.
It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment,

bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition
to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or
exempted from the definition of the term "compensation",
such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the
amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social
Security Commission to interpret the effect of such
deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore,
issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation

or understanding of the Commission, of the law as
amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add
any duty or detail that was not already in the law as
amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of
the Commission as to how the law should be construed.
1wph1.t
The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553,

promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by appellant, does
not support its contention that the circular in question is
a rule or regulation. What was there said was merely
that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a
circular. Such statement simply meant that the
substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in
determining its nature. It does not lay down a general
proposition of law that any circular, regardless of its
substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes
a rule or regulation which must be published in the
Official Gazette before it could take effect.
The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also

cited by appellant is not applicable to the present case,
because the penalty that may be incurred by employers
and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding
premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the
employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of
non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of
the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161.
We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely

to advise employers-members of the System of what, in
the light of the amendment of the law, they should
include in determining the monthly compensation of their
employees upon which the social security contributions
should be based, and that such circular did not require
presidential approval and publication in the Official
Gazette for its effectivity.
It hardly need be said that the Commission's

interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular
No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the
exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses,
allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the
"compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative
that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be
included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of
the amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this
Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it
is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the
employee. But the question in the instant case is not
whether bonus is demandable or not as part of
compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in
fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses
shall be considered compensation under the Social
Security Act after they have been received by the
employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be

interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted
meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is
specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation
must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it
can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may
have one meaning for one purpose and another
meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that
is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined
what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of
this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by
deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act.
By virtue of this express substantial change in the
phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or
judicial construction may have been given to the phrase
in question should give way to the clear mandate of the
new law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution

appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), Petitioner, vs. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL
COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by
the Department of Public Works and Highways through
the Office of the Solicitor General, questions the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 108499, to wit:
1. Resolution dated October 30, 20092 dismissing

petitioners petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being
filed out of time; and
2. Resolution dated July 15, 20103 denying petitioners

motion for reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
The instant case arose from two cases filed by the

Republic seeking expropriation of certain properties in
the name of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. (St.
Vincent). In Civil Case No. 0062-04, the Republic sought
to expropriate 1,992 square meters out of a total area of
6,068 square meters of land for the construction of the
Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project (MCTEP). Said
property belongs to St. Vincent covered by TCT No. T821169 and located in Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite. In Civil
Case No. 0100-04, on the other hand, the Republic
sought to expropriate 2,450 square meters out of a total

area of 9,039 square meters, also belonging to St.
Vincent and covered by TCT No. T-821170. Said
property adjoins the property subject of Civil Case No.
0062-04.
Subsequently, the Republic filed in both cases an

amended complaint alleging that the subject land
originated from a free patent title and should be
adjudicated to it without payment of just compensation
pursuant to Section 112 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
On August 9, 2005, the Republic filed in Civil Case No.

0062-04 a motion for the issuance of an order of
expropriation.4 It was granted by the trial court per
Order5 dated August 16, 2005, ruling that the Republic
has a lawful right to take the 1,992 square meters
portion of the subject property, with "no pronouncement
as to just compensation" since the subject property
originated from a free patent.6 A motion for the issuance
of an order of expropriation was likewise filed by the
Republic in Civil Case No. 0100-04 but before this could
be resolved, the Republic moved to consolidate the two
cases, which was granted by the trial court.7
On November 16, 2006, the trial court denied St.

Vincents motion for reconsideration of its Order dated
August 16, 2005 granting expropriation.8 As alleged in
the petition, no appeal was taken by St. Vincent from
said orders.9
After almost 2 years, or on July 28, 2008, St. Vincent

filed a Manifestation with Motion for Clarification of the
Order dated August 16, 2005,10 contending that
although it does not oppose the ruling regarding the
determination of public purpose and the Republics right
to expropriate the subject land, it, however, claims that it
is entitled to just compensation.
Meanwhile, the Republic attempted to implement the

Order dated August 16, 2005 by entering the subject
portion of St. Vincents property. Aggrieved, the latter
demanded upon the Republic and its agents to
immediately vacate, and remove any and all equipment
or structures they introduced on its property in a
demand-letter11 dated October 3, 2008.
Due to St. Vincents refusal to honor the order of

expropriation, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied by
the lower court in its Order12 dated November 25, 2006
2008. The lower court, however, modified its Order dated
August 16, 2005 and required the Republic to
immediately pay St. Vincent in an amount equivalent to
one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property

sought to be expropriated. The Republic moved for
reconsideration but it was denied by the lower court per
Order13 dated January 29, 2009 for lack of factual and
legal basis.
Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic filed
with the CA a motion for additional time of fifteen (15)
days within which to file its petition. The CA granted the
motion in its Resolution14 dated April 30, 2009 and the
Republic was given a non-extensible period of fifteen
(15) days or until May 4, 2009 within which to file its
petition for certiorari.
On April 30, 2009, the Republic filed its petition for

certiorari assailing the lower courts orders dated
November 25, 2008 and January 29, 2009 for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Hence, this petition.
The Republic relies on the CA resolution granting its

motion for extension of time and upon the strength of the
substantial merits of its petition. The Republic also
invokes Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan,21 where the Court ruled that absent a
prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed, subject
to the Courts sound discretion.
St. Vincent, however, contends that the present petition

fails to neither allege any circumstance nor state any
justification for the deliberate disregard of a very
elementary rule of procedure like Section 4 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. And in the absence of any such
circumstance or justification, the general rule on pro
forma motions/pleadings must apply.
The Issue
On June 19, 2009, the CA, motu proprio, issued a
Resolution15 ordering the Republic to show cause why
its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for
being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation16

dated July 1, 2009 pleading for the relaxation of the rules
by reason of the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in the case and in consideration of substantial
justice. St. Vincent filed its Comment/Opposition17 dated
July 15, 2009 alleging among others that the said
explanation is merely pro forma due to the Republics
failure to justify its explanation.
On October 30, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed

resolution dismissing the Republics petition for certiorari
on the ground that the petition was filed out of time
inasmuch as extensions of time are now disallowed by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC18 and as applied in Laguna Metts
Corporation v. Court of Appeals.19
On November 26, 2009, the Republic filed its motion for

reconsideration alleging that it merely relied in good faith
on the appellate courts resolution granting the former an
additional period of fifteen (15) days within which to file
the subject petition.
On July 15, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed

resolution denying the Republics motion for
reconsideration, stating that it cannot disobey the ruling
in Laguna Metts Corporation.20
The Republic discussed the substantial merits of its

case; however, the CA did no more than include such
matters in its narration of facts, and neither did St.
Vincent dwell on said issues. Hence, the only issue to be
resolved in this petition is whether the CA committed a
reversible error when it dismissed the Republics petition
for certiorari for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC.
The Courts Ruling
We GRANT the petition.
The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30,

2009, which initially granted the Republics motion for
extension, was premised on the mistaken notion that the
petition filed by the latter was one for petition for review
as a mode of appeal. The CA resolution stated, among
others: "Provided that this Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review is seasonably filed, as prayed
for, x x x."22 Thus, the CA granted extension inasmuch
as motions for this purpose are allowed by the rules.23
On this score alone, the CA should have admitted the
petition filed by the Republic since the latter merely
relied on its Resolution dated April 30, 2009 granting the
extension prayed for.
Nevertheless, the CA subsequently dismissed the

petition filed by the Republic on the ground that the
same was filed out of time, following A.M. No. 07-7-12SC. In its Resolution dated July 15, 2010, which
dismissed the Republics motion for reconsideration, the
CA also relied on the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation
that the sixty (60)-day period within which to file a
petition for certiorari is non-extendible. The petitioner,
however, insists that Domdom allows extensions of time
to file a petition.
In order to resolve the instant controversy, the Court

deems it necessary to discuss the relationship between
its respective rulings in Laguna Metts Corporation and
Domdom with respect to the application of the
amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Before said amendment, Section 4 of Rule 65 originally

provides:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition

shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it

relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed
in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted

except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding
fifteen (15) days.
As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 4 of Rule

65 now reads:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition

shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a

municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an
officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with
the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan,
whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate
jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission
of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a

municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be
filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.
In interpreting said amendment, the Court, in Laguna

Metts Corporation, held that:
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain

words or phrases indicates an intention to change its
meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have
been made if there had been no intention to effect a
change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended
law or rule should accordingly be given a construction
different from that previous to its amendment.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper

courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65,
the paragraph providing for such authority would have
been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph
under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of
Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer
be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file
a petition for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-712-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or
even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph
allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds
did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now
stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within
60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration.24 (Citation omitted
and emphasis ours)
Nevertheless, Domdom later stated:
On the Peoples argument that a motion for extension of

time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer allowed,
the same rests on shaky grounds. Supposedly, the

deletion of the following provision in Section 4 of Rule 65
by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC evinces an intention to
absolutely prohibit motions for extension:
"No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted

except for the most compelling reason and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days."
The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by

A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads:
xxxx
That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended

Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in
the previous for formulation, does not make the filing of
such pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the
intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been
reworded to state that "no extension of time to file the
petition shall be granted." Absent such prohibition,
motions for extensions are allowed, subject to the
Courts sound discretion. The present petition may thus
be allowed, having been filed within the extension
sought and, at all events, given its merits.25 (Citation
omitted and emphasis and underscoring ours)
What seems to be a "conflict" is actually more apparent

than real. A reading of the foregoing rulings leads to the
simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation
involves a strict application of the general rule that
petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty
(60) days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on the
other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of
the sixty (60)-day period subject to the Courts sound
discretion.26
However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict

observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty
reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting
party by immediately paying within a reasonable time
from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case;
(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not
be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence without appellants
fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial
justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the
judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus,
there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious
explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.28
(Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Note that Labao explicitly recognized the general rule

that the sixty (60)-day period within which to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is non-extendible,
only that there are certain exceptional circumstances,
which may call for its non-observance. Even more
recently, in Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,29 the Court, taking into consideration
Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom, "relaxed the
procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 077-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and
safeguard strong public interest" and affirmed the
extension granted by the CA to the respondent Power
One Corporation due to the exceptional nature of the
case and the strong public interest involved.
Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within a period
of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or
resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would
violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of their case.
In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we

explained that the reason behind the amendments under
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to prevent the use or abuse of
the remedy of petition for certiorari in order to delay a
case or even defeat the ends of justice. We thus deleted
the clause that allowed an extension of the period to file
a Rule 65 petition for compelling reasons. Instead, we
deemed the 60-day period to file as reasonable and
sufficient time for a party to mull over the case and to
prepare a petition that asserts grave abuse of discretion
by a lower court. The period was specifically set and
limited in order to avoid any unreasonable delay in the
dispensation of justice, a delay that could violate the
constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition
of their case.
xxxx
x x x.
Labao v. Flores27 subsequently laid down some of the

exceptions to the strict application of the rule, viz:
Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v.

Sandiganbayan, we ruled that the deletion of the clause
in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not,
ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to file
a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited. We held in
Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended, the
deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to
specifically prohibit an extension of time to file such
petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express
prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be
allowed, subject to this Courts sound discretion, and
only under exceptional and meritorious cases.
use (MCTEP); and finally, no undue prejudice or delay

will be caused to either party in admitting the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

GRANTED. The Resolutions dated October 30, 2009
and July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 108499 are NULLIFIED. The Court of Appeals is
hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE and ADMIT the
petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the
Philippines in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 and to proceed
with the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities
introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve
substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x
x x:
xxxx
The present Petition involves one of those exceptional

cases in which relaxing the procedural rules would serve
substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x
x x Consequently, in order to protect strong public
interest, this Court deems it appropriate and justifiable to
relax the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 under A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC, concerning the reglementary period for
the filing of a Rule 65 petition. Considering that the
imminent power crisis is an exceptional and meritorious
circumstance, the parties herein should be allowed to
litigate the issues on the merits. Furthermore, we find no
significant prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants as respondent was able to file the Petition
before the CA within the 15-day extension it asked for.
We therefore find no grave abuse of discretion
attributable to the CA when it granted respondent Power
Ones Motion for Extension to file its Petition for
Certiorari.30 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court and as applied in Laguna Metts Corporation, the
general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed
within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order,
or resolution sought to be assailed. Under exceptional
circumstances, however, and subject to the sound
discretion of the Court, said period may be extended
pursuant to Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power
cases.
Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republics

petition: first, due to its own lapse when it granted the
extension sought by the Republic per Resolution dated
April 30, 2009; second, because of the public interest
involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for public
EMILIO FLORES, ET AL., petitioners, vs. VICENTE

SAN PEDRO, ET AL., respondents.
This case deals with the prescription of action for the
recovery of overtime compensation under the Eight-Hour
Labor Law (Com. Act No. 444).
The petitioners, former employees in respondents'

electric and ice plants in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, filed
three suits on May 7, 1954, in the Court of First Instance
of that province to recover compensation for overtime
work alleged to have been rendered by them during the
period of their employment, the aggregate sum claimed,
including damages, interests and attorney's fees, being
P152,473.34. The defendants, now respondents herein,
moved for the dismissal of the suits on the ground of
prescription, invoking the three-year prescriptive period
provided for in the Minimum Wage Law (Rep. Act No.
602)in default of a prescriptive period for actions under
the Eight-Hour Labor Law. Upholding defendants' theory
that claims for overtime compensation prescribe in three
years, the lower court ordered the complaints amended
"so as to include only the claims for overtime payments
due to plaintiffs within three years before the filing of said
complaints and which accrued after May 7, 1951."
Reconsideration of the order having been denied,
plaintiffs brought the present petition for certiorari to
have the said order annulled as violative of their vested
rights and rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondents in their answer question the propriety of
the remedy, but they did not press that point of law, the
same may well be decided on the merits.
It is settled that the right to extra compensation for

overtime work cannot be validly waived and that the
action for its recovery is not barred by laches or
estoppel. (Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Court
of Industrial Relations et al., 90 Phil., 665; Manila
Terminal Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., 91
Phil., 625; 48 Off. Gaz., 2725.) But this does not
necessarily mean that such action is imprescriptible, for
the principles underlying prescription on the one hand
and laches and estoppel on the other are not exactly the
same. Moreover, as this Court said in the case of Luzon
Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Luzon Marine Department et
al., 101 Phil., 257, "there may be cases in which the
silence of the employee or laborer who lets the time go
by for quite a long period without claiming or asserting
his right to overtime compensation may favor the
inference that he has not worked any such overtime or
that his extra work has been duly compensated." And the
Congress, by the enactment of the law for the recovery
of overtime compensation could not have intended that
an employee might, before bringing his action, wait until
the passing of time had destroyed all the documentary
evidence and the memory of witnesses had faded or
become dim (157 A. L. R. 546), for that would render the
action practically indefensible and might cause such
great accumulation of unpaid overtime wages as would
bankrupt an employer who is ordered to pay them and
necessitate the closure of his business to the detriment
of the employees themselves.
A similar situation has confronted the courts of the

United States under the Fair Labor Standards Act of that
country, which contains no provision limiting the time for
commencing action thereunder. The courts there hold
that the right to overtime compensation under that Act
may neither be waived nor its enforcement defeated on
the ground of estoppel (56 C. J. S. 736-739);but they are
also unanimous in the opinion that actions for the
recovery of such compensation are subject to state
statutes of limitations. (56 C. J. S.776; 157 A. L. R. 545546.) Considering that our labor laws are patterned after
those of the United States, the ruling of the courts there
is entitled to great weight.
The next question to determine is what period of

prescription to apply where the law itself, i.e., the EightHour Labor Law, has not fixed the period.1wphl.nt
The court below ruled that the three year period

prescribed in the Minimum Wage Law for enforcing a
cause of action arising thereunder should also apply to
actions for enforcing the Eight-Hour Labor Law since the
latter law did not provide for a prescriptive period of its
own (It should here be explained that on June 22, 1957
an amendment was approved-Rep. Act No. 1993providing for such a period but with the proviso that the
same shall not affect actions already commenced). The
ruling below cannot be upheld. The prescriptive period
provided for in the Minimum Wage Law (section 17, Rep.
Act No. 602) specifically refers to the enforcement of any
cause of action under that Act and its application cannot
be extended to causes of action arising under the EightHour Labor Law on the theory propounded by the lower
court that the two laws are in pari materia, because in
point of fact they are not. Both, it is true, relate to labor.
But they are distinct and separate measures. One treats
of minimum daily wages with no provision for
compensation for overtime work; the other deals with the

length of a working day in terms of hours with express
provision for compensation for service rendered beyond
the required hours of work. Also, the penalties
prescribed in one are different from those in the other.
Moreover, the rule pari materia is resorted to only as an
aid to statutory construction. We do not think its
application should be widened to the extent of supplying
a deficiency of a prescriptive period provided for in
another.
On the other hand, the rule is that the general law shall
supply deficiencies in special laws. (Art. 16, old Civil
Code; Leyte A & M. Oil Co. vs. Block, Johnston &
Greenbaum, 52 Phil. 429; see also art. 18, new Civil
Code.) In the absence, therefore, of any prescriptive
period in the Eight-Hour Labor Law, the statute of
limitations provided for in the general law-in this case Act
No. 190 (the old Code of Civil Procedure) or the new
Civil Code-applies.
On the theory that the laws in force at the time a contract

is entered into, in so far as applicable form part of the
contract, actions for recovery of wages or overtime
compensation under the Fair Labor Standard Act of the
United States are regarded by most courts there as
actions upon contract. We find this view reasonable, and
there being no dispute that the contracts of employment
in the present case were oral, we have to hold that the
period of prescription applicable to petitioners' actions in
the lower court was, both under Act 190 and the new
Civil Code, six years. (Section 43, par. 2, Act 190; art.
1145, new Civil Code; art. 1150 of the new.) And such
actions could have been brought at the end of each
regular pay period when payment of overtime
compensation became due.
In view of the foregoing, the order complained of is

modified in the sense that the petitioners' complaints
shall be amended to include only those portion of
petitioners' claims for overtime payment as are within the
period of six years counted from the accrual of their
respective causes of action.
LITEX EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs.

GEORGE A. EDUVALA, in his capacity as Officer-inCharge, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
Departmentof Labor and FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS (F.F.W.), respondents.
In this and certiorari and prohibition proceeding, what is
sought to be nullified is an Order of respondent George
A. Eduvala, the then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, requiring that a memorandumm
election be held among the members of the Litex
Employees Association, petioner labor union, to
ascertain their wishes as to their wishes as to their
affiliation with respondent Federation of Free Workers. It

is the contention of petitioner Union that there is no
statutory authorization for the holding of such a
referendum election. That is the decisive issue in this
comtroversy. In support of the competence of
respondent public official, Article 226 of the Present
Labor Code is cited. It reads thus: "The Bureau of Labor
Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the the
regional offices of the Labor shall have and exclusive
authority to act, at their own initiation or upon request of
either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and disputes, grievances of probe arising from
or affecting labor-management relations in all
workplaces, whether natural or non-agricultural, except
those arising from the implementation or interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements which shall be the
subject of grievance Procedure and/or voluntary
arbitration." 1 The comment of the then Acting Solicitor
General, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal,
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., treated as the answer, 2
maintained that the wording of the above provision
sustains the authority thus challenged. There is
considerable persuasiveness to such a view. It would be
an unduly restrictive interpretation them if a negative
answer were Seven to the question posed. It would be
oblivious to the basic end and aim of the pant Labor
Code to confer on the Department of Labor and its
bereaus the competence to pass upon and decide labor
controversies and thus minimize judicial intervention.
There is no legal basis for nullifying such order.
This later dispute originated from a petition of

respondent Federation of Free Workers filed with the
Bureau of labor Relations against petitioner labor Union
to hold a referendum among the members of the union
for the of determining whether they desired to be
affiliated with such Federation. It was alleged that a
"great majority" of the members of the union desired
such affiliaion, but that its President, a certain Johnny de
Leon, was opposed. The contention of petitioner Union
acting through its counsel was that only about 700 out of
more than 2,200 employees of the company had
manifested their desire to affliate with the Federation and
that a substantial number of such had since then
repudiated their signatures. It also raised the point that
what was sought was a certification election which was
not proper as there was a certified collective bargaining
agreement between the union and the company. The
Compulsory Arbitrator, after a careful study of the
pleadings, reached the conclusion that the truth of the
matter could best be assertained by a referendum
election. Respondent as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau
of labor Relations affirmed. Hence this petition directed
to this Court, as a jurisdictional question is raised.
The petition, as noted at the outset, lacks merit.
1.
Article 226 of the New Labor Code cannot be
misread to signify that the authority conferred on the
Secretary of labor and the officials of the Department is
limited in character. On the contrary, even a cursory
reading thereof readily yields the conclusion that in the
interest of industrial peace and for the promotion of the
salutary constitutional objectives of social justice and
protection to labor, the competence of the governmental
entrusted with supervision over disputes involving
employers and employees as well as "inter-union and
intra-union conflicts," is broad and expensive. Thereby
its purpose becomes crystal-clear. As is quite readily
discernible where it concerns the promotion of social and
economy rights, the active participation in the
implementation of the codal objective is entrusted to the
executive department. There is no support for any
allegation of jurisdictional infirmity, considering that the
language employed is well-nigh inclusive with the stress
on its "and exclusive authority to act." If it were
otherwise, its policy might be rendered futile. That is to
run counter to a basic postulate in the canons of
statutory interpretation. Learned Hand referred to it as
the proliferation of purpose. As was emphatecally
asserted by Justice Frankfurter: "The generating
consideration is that legislation is more than
composition. It is an active instrument of government
which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws
have ends to be achieved. It is in this connection that
Holmes said, 'words are flexible.' Again it was Holmes,
the last judge to give quarter to loose thinking or vague
yearning, who said that 'the general purpose is a more is
a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which
grammar or formal logic may lay down.' And it was
Holmes who chided courts for being apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of a law when those words
import a policy that goes beyond them." 3 What is
intended by the framers of code or statute is not to be
frustrated. Even on the assumption that by some
strained or literal reading of the employed, a doubt can
be raised as to its scope, the 'immitation should not be at
war with the end sought to be attained. It cannot be
denied that if through an ingenious argumentation, limits
may be set on a statutory power which should not be
there, there would be a failure to effectuate the statutory
purpose and policy. That kind of approach in statutory
construction has never recommended itself. 4
2.
Nor has petitioner made out a case of grave
abuse of since the matter involved is a dispute as to
whether or not the members of petitioner labor union had
decided, contrary to the wishes of its president, to join
respondent Federation. What better way could there be
of ascertaining the truth there than to hold the
referendum election. The guarantee of fairness as to
whether there is accuracy depends on the impartiality
and neutrality of the Bureau of Labor Relations. There is
nothing in petitioner's submission to indicate that such
would not be the case. Under such circumstances then,
petitioner labor union could not be held to allege that
there was an abuse, much less a grave abuse, of the
discretionary authority vested in such office. It suffices to
take note of how often this Court, after a careful

consideration of the issue involved, had rejected such a
contention in certification cases, analogous, if not similar
in character. Invariably, the imputation that the holding of
an election for the purpose of determining with
exactitude the wishes of the employees concerned as
amounting to arbitrary exercise exercise of a power had
been rejected. 5
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.

This decision is immediately executory.
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION

CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. Macroasia Corp.,
Respondent.
Before us are four (4) petitions. The first is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 docketed as G.R.
No. 169080, wherein petitioner Celestial Nickel Mining
Exploration Corporation (Celestial) seeks to set aside
the April 15, 2005 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931. The CA affirmed the
November 26, 2004 Resolution of the Mines Adjudication
Board (MAB) in MAB Case Nos. 056-97 and 057-97
(DENR Case Nos. 97-01 and 97-02), upholding the
authority of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary to grant and cancel
mineral agreements. Also assailed is the August 3, 2005
Resolution[3] of the CA denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed Decision.
Through our July 5, 2006 Resolution,[8] we consolidated

the first two cases. While in our subsequent April 23,
2007[9] and July 11, 2007[10] Resolutions, we
consolidated the four cases as they arose from the same
facts.
The undisputed facts as found by the CA in CA-G.R. SP

No. 87931 are as follows:
On September 24, 1973, the then Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral
and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining
Lease Contract (V-1050) for a term of 25 years up to
September 23, 1998 for mining lode claims covering an
area of 216 hectares at Sitio Linao, Ipilan, Brookes
Point, Palawan. The mining claims of Infanta covered by
lode/lease contracts were as follows:
Contract No. Area Date of Issuance

LLC-V-941 18 hectares January 17, 1972
LC-V-1050 216 hectares September 24, 1973
LLC-V-1060 16 hectares October 30, 1973
LLC-V-1061 144 hectares October 30, 1973
LLC-V-1073 144 hectares April 18, 1973
MLC-MRD-52 306 hectares April 26, 1978
The second is a Petition for Certiorari[4] under Rule 65

docketed as G.R. No. 172936, wherein petitioner Blue
Ridge Mineral Corporation (Blue Ridge) seeks to annul
and set aside the action of then Secretary Michael T.
Defensor, in his capacity as DENR Secretary, approving
and signing two Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSAs) in favor of Macroasia Corporation (Macroasia)
denominated as MPSA Nos. 220-2005-IVB and 2212005-IVB.
And the third and fourth are petitions for review on

certiorari[5] under Rule 45 docketed as G.R. No. 176226
and G.R. No. 176319, wherein petitioners Celestial and
Macroasia, respectively, seek to set aside the May 18,
2006 Decision[6] of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828.
The CA reversed and set aside the November 26, 2004
and July 12, 2005 Resolutions of the MAB, and
reinstated the October 24, 2000 Decision in MAB Case
Nos. 056-97 and 057-97, granting Blue Ridge the prior
and preferential right to file its application over the
mining claims of Macroasia. These petitions likewise
seek to set aside the January 19, 2007 Resolution[7] of
the CA denying petitioners motions for reconsideration of
the assailed Decision.
MLC-MRC-53 72 hectares April 26, 1978
Infantas corporate name was changed to Cobertson

Holdings Corporation on January 26, 1994 and
subsequently to its present name, Macroasia
Corporation, on November 6, 1995.
Sometime in 1997, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the

subject mining lease contracts and other mining claims
of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease
Contract No. V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators
(POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of
the DENR. The petition was docketed as DENR Case
No. 97-01.
Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the

Director of Mines to seek cancellation of mining lease
contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia and
another entity, Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach), in
mining areas in Brookes Point. The petition was
eventually docketed as DENR Case No. 97-02.
Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering

such areas contiguous to Infantas (now Macroasia)
mining lode claims. Said area was involved in protracted
administrative disputes with Infanta (now Macroasia),
Lecar & Sons, Inc., and Palawan Nickel Mining
Corporation. Celestial also holds an MPSA with the
government which covers 2,835 hectares located at
Ipilan/Maasin, Brookes Point, Palawan and two pending
applications covering another 4,040 hectares in
Barangay Mainit also in Brookes Point.
Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasias lease

contracts on the following grounds: (1) the nonpayment
of Macroasia of required occupational fees and
municipal taxes; (2) the non-filing of Macroasia of
Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations; (3) the failure of
Macroasia to provide improvements on subject mining
claims; (4) the concentration of Macroasia on logging;
(5) the encroachment, mining, and extraction by
Macroasia of nickel ore from Celestials property; (6) the
ability of Celestial to subject the mining areas to
commercial production; and (7) the willingness of
Celestial to pay fees and back taxes of Macroasia.
In the later part of the proceedings, Macroasia

intervened in the case and submitted its position paper
refuting the grounds for cancellation invoked by
Celestial.[11]
The Ruling of the Panel of Arbitrators in

DENR Case Nos. 97-01 and 97-02
Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and

findings of the field investigations, the POA found that
Macroasia and Lebach not only automatically
abandoned their areas/mining claims but likewise had
lost all their rights to the mining claims. The POA granted
the petition of Celestial to cancel the following Mining
Lease Contracts of Macroasia: LLC-V-941, LLC-V-1050,
LLC-V-1060, LLC-V-1061, LLC-V-1073, MLC-MRD-52,
and MLC-MRC-53; and found the claims of the others
indubitably meritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential
right to Macroasias mining areas.[12] It upheld Blue
Ridges petition regarding DENR Case No. 97-02, but
only as against the Mining Lease Contract areas of
Lebach (LLC-V-1153, LLC-V-1154, and LLC-V-1155),
and the said leased areas were declared automatically
abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the
aforesaid Lebachs areas/mining claims.[13]
Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the MAB,

and the cases were docketed as MAB Case Nos. 056-97
and 057-97, respectively.
Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required
memorandum of appeal; thus, with respect to Lebach,
the above resolution became final and executory.
The Rulings of the Mines Adjudication Board in

MAB Case Nos. 056-97 and 057-97 (DENR Case Nos.
97-01 and 97-02)
The MAB resolved the issues of timeliness and

perfection of Macroasias appeal; Macroasias
abandonment of its mining claims; and the preferential
right over the abandoned mining claims of Macroasia.
Conformably with Section 51 of Consolidated Mines

Administrative Order (CMAO)[14] implementing
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 463[15] and our ruling in
Medrana v. Office of the President (OP),[16] the MAB
affirmed the POA findings that Macroasia abandoned its
mining claims. The MAB found that Macroasia did not
comply with its work obligations from 1986 to 1991. It
based its conclusion on the field verifications conducted
by the MGB, Region IV and validated by the Special
Team tasked by the MAB.[17] However, contrary to the
findings of the POA, the MAB found that it was Blue
Ridge that had prior and preferential rights over the
mining claims of Macroasia, and not Celestial.
Thus, on October 24, 2000, the MAB promulgated its

Decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel
the Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia;
declaring abandoned the subject mining claims; and
opening the mining area with prior and preferential rights
to Blue Ridge for mining applications, subject to strict
compliance with the procedure and requirements
provided by law. In case Blue Ridge defaults, Celestial
could exercise the secondary priority and preferential
rights, and subsequently, in case Celestial also defaults,
other qualified applicants could file.[18]
Both Celestial and Macroasia moved for reconsideration.
[19] Celestial asserted that it had better rights than Blue
Ridge over the mining claims of Macroasia as it had
correctly filed its petition, and filed its MPSA application
after Macroasias lease contract expired on January 17,
1997 and after the POAs resolution was issued on
September 1, 1997. Moreover, it argued that priority was
not an issue when the contested area had not yet been
declared abandoned. Thus, Blue Ridges MPSA

application filed on June 17, 1996 had no effect and
should not be considered superior since Macroasias
lease contracts were still valid and subsisting and could
not have been canceled by Macroasias mere failure to
perform annual work obligations and pay corresponding
royalties/taxes to the government.
Macroasia, in its Motion for Reconsideration, reiterated

that it did not abandon its mining claims, and even if
mining was not listed among its purposes in its amended
Articles of Incorporation, its mining activities were acts
that were only ultra vires but were ratified as a
secondary purpose by its stockholders in subsequent
amendments of its Articles of Incorporation.
Before the MAB could resolve the motions for

reconsideration, on March 16, 2001, Macroasia filed its
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[20]
questioning the jurisdiction of the POA in canceling
mining lease contracts and mining claims. Macroasia
averred that the power and authority to grant, cancel,
and revoke mineral agreements is exclusively lodged
with the DENR Secretary. Macroasia further pointed out
that in arrogating upon itself such power, the POA
whimsically and capriciously discarded the procedure on
conferment of mining rights laid down in Republic Act
No. (RA) 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and
DENR Administrative Order No. (AO) 96-40,[21] and
perfunctorily and improperly awarded its mining rights to
Blue Ridge and Celestial.
Subsequently, on November 26, 2004, the MAB issued a

Resolution[22] vacating its October 24, 2000 Decision,
holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power
to revoke a mineral agreement duly entered into by the
DENR Secretary, ratiocinating that there was no
provision giving the POA and MAB the concurrent power
to manage or develop mineral resources. The MAB
further held that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral
agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR
Secretary; that a petition for cancellation is not a mining
dispute under the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA
pursuant to Sec. 77 of RA 7942; and that the POA could
only adjudicate claims or contests during the MPSA
application and not when the claims and leases were
already granted and subsisting.
Moreover, the MAB held that there was no abandonment

by Macroasia because the DENR Secretary had not
decided to release Macroasia from its obligations. The
Secretary may choose not to release a contractor from
its obligations on grounds of public interest. Thus,
through its said resolution, the MAB rendered its
disposition, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed

Decision of October 24, 2000 is hereby VACATED. The
seven (7) mining lease contracts of Macroasia
Corporation (formerly Infanta Mineral & Industrial
Corporation) are DECLARED SUBSISTING prior to their
expirations without prejudice to any Decision or Order
that the Secretary may render on the same. NO
PREFERENTIAL RIGHT over the same mining claims is
accorded to Blue Ridge Mineral Corporation or Celestial
Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation also without
prejudice to the determination by the Secretary over the
matter at the proper time.[23]
After the issuance of the MAB Resolution, Celestial and

Blue Ridge went through divergent paths in their quest to
protect their individual interests.
On January 10, 2005, Celestial assailed the November

26, 2004 MAB Resolution before the CA in a petition for
review[24] under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The
petition entitled Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration
Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation, et al. was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87931.
On the other hand, Blue Ridge first filed a Motion for

Reconsideration[25] which was denied.[26] On August
26, 2005, Blue Ridge questioned the MABs November
26, 2004 and July 12, 2005 Resolutions before the CA in
a petition for review[27] entitled Blue Ridge Mineral
Corporation v. Mines Adjudication Board, et al. docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 90828.
CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 filed by Celestial was heard by

the 12th Division of the CA; while Blue Ridges CA-G.R.
SP No. 90828 was heard by the Special 10th Division.
Ironically, the two divisions rendered two (2)
diametrically opposing decisions.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division
On April 15, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931, the CA

12th Division affirmed the November 26, 2004 MAB
Resolution which declared Macroasias seven mining
lease contracts as subsisting; rejected Blue Ridges claim
for preferential right over said mining claims; and upheld
the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to
approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The
CA also denied Celestials Motion for
Reconsideration[28] of the assailed August 3, 2005

Resolution.[29]
Hence, Celestial filed its Petition for Review on

Certiorari[30] docketed as G.R. No. 169080, before this
Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals Special Tenth

Division
On May 18, 2006, the CA Special 10th Division in CAG.R. SP No. 90828 granted Blue Ridges petition;
reversed and set aside the November 26, 2004 and July
12, 2005 Resolutions of the MAB; and reinstated the
October 24, 2000 Decision in MAB Case Nos. 056-97
and 057-97. The Special Tenth Division canceled
Macroasias lease contracts; granted Blue Ridge prior
and preferential rights; and treated the cancellation of a
mining lease agreement as a mining dispute within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA
7942, explaining that the power to resolve mining
disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily
includes the lesser power to cancel mining agreements.
On February 20, 2006, Celestial filed a Most Urgent

Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction/Mandatory
Injunction[31] to defer and preclude the issuance of
MPSA to Macroasia by the MGB and the DENR
Secretary. We denied this motion in our February 22,
2006 Resolution.[32]
Upon inquiry with the DENR, Blue Ridge discovered that

sometime in December 2005 two MPSAs, duly approved
and signed by the DENR Secretary, had been issued in
favor of Macroasia. Thus, we have the instant Petition
for Certiorari[33] filed by Blue Ridge docketed as G.R.
No. 172936 under Rule 65, seeking to invalidate the two
MPSAs issued to Macroasia.
In the meantime, on June 7, 2006, Celestial filed its

Motion for Partial Reconsideration[34] of the May 18,
2006 CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828, while
Macroasia filed its motion for reconsideration of the
same CA decision on July 7, 2006. The motions were
denied in the assailed January 19, 2007 CA Resolution.
Hence, on March 8, 2007, Celestial filed the third
petition[35] docketed as G.R. No. 176226, assailing the
CAs May 18, 2006 Decision and January 19, 2007
Resolution, insofar as these granted Blue Ridges prior
and preferential rights. While on March 9, 2007,
Macroasia filed the fourth petition[36] docketed as G.R.

No. 176319, also assailing the CAs May 18, 2006
Decision and January 19, 2007 Resolution.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 169080, petitioner Celestial raises the

following issues for our consideration:
(1) Whether or not Macroasia, for reasons of public

policy is estopped from assailing the alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines
Adjudication Board only after receiving an adverse
judgment therefrom? [sic]
(2) Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR

who has the jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and
privileges? [sic]
(3) Whether or not a petition for the cancellation of a

mining lease contract or privilege is a mining dispute
within the meaning of the law? [sic]
(4) Whether or not Infantas (Macroasia) mining lease
contract areas were deemed abandoned warranting the
cancellation of the lease contracts and the opening of
the areas to other qualified applicants? [sic]
(5) Whether or not Macroasia/Infanta had lost its right to
participate in this case after it failed to seasonably file its
appeal and after its lease contracts had been declared
abandoned and expired without having been renewed by
the government? [sic]
(6) Whether or not Celestial has the preferential right to

apply for the 23 DE LARA claims which were included in
Infantas (Macroasia) expired lease contract (LLC-V-941)
and the other areas declared as lapsed or abandoned by
MGB-Region 4 and the Panel of Arbitrators?[37] [sic]
In G.R. No. 172936, petitioner Blue Ridge raises the

following grounds for the allowance of the petition:
At the outset, the instant petition must be given due

course and taken cognizance of by the Honorable Court
considering that exceptional and compelling

circumstances justify the availment of the instant petition
and the call for the exercise of the Honorable Courts
primary jurisdiction.
A. The exploration, development and utilization of

minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils are imbued
with public interest. The action of then Secretary
Defensor, maintained and continued by public
respondent Secretary Reyes, was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, has far-reaching consequences
because of the magnitude of the effect created thereby.
B. The issues in the instant petition have already been

put to fore by Celestial with the First Division of the
Honorable Court, and hence, this circumstance justifies
the cognizance by the Honorable Court of the instant
petition.
II
It was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

and/or excess of jurisdiction for then Secretary Defensor
to have issued the subject MPSAs in favor of private
respondent Macroasia, considering that:
A. Non-compliance of the mandatory requirements by

private respondent Macroasia prior to approval of the
subject MPSAs should have precluded then Secretary
Defensor from approving subject MPSAs.
B. Petitioner Blue Ridge has the prior and preferential

right to file its mining application over the mining claims
covered by the subject MPSAs, pursuant to the Decision
dated 24 October 2000 of the Board and as affirmed by
the Decision dated 18 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828.[38]
(2) That the Hon. Court of Appeals has so far departed

from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings or so far sanctioned such departure by the
Mines Adjudication Board in its Decision of May 18, 2006
and Resolution of January 19, 2007 because:
(A) The findings of fact of the Hon. Court of Appeals are

contradictory or inconsistent with the findings of the
Panel of Arbitrators;
(B) There is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

Hon. Court of Appeals in its appreciation of the facts, the
evidence and the law thereby leading it to make the
erroneous conclusion that Blue Ridge, not Celestial, is
entitled to the Award of prior/preferential rights over the
mining areas declared as abandoned by Macroasia;
(C) There is likewise, a grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the Hon. Court of Appeals in that the said Court
did not even consider some of the issues raised by
Celestial;
(D) That the findings of the Hon. Court of Appeals are

mere conclusions not supported by substantial evidence
and without citation of the specific evidence upon which
they are based; they were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of contradiction of the evidence on record and
findings of the Panel of Arbitrators in the Resolution of
September 1, 1997;
(E) That the findings of the Hon. Court of Appeals are

premised on the absence of evidence but such findings
are contradicted by the evidence on record and are
violative of the provisions of RA 7942 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.[39]
In G.R. No. 176226, petitioner Celestial ascribes the

following errors to the CA for our consideration:
In G.R. No. 176319, petitioner Macroasia raises the
following grounds for the allowance of the petition:
(1) That in reinstating and adopting as its own the
Decision of the Mine Adjudication Board affirming the
abandonment and cancellation of the mining
areas/claims of Macroasia (Infanta) but awarding the
prior or preferential rights to Blue Ridge, the Hon. Court
of Appeals had decided a question of substance in a way
not in accord with the Law (RA 7942) or with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; in other
words, errors of law had been committed by the Hon.
Court of Appeals in granting preferential rights to Blue
Ridge;
I.
The Court of Appeals (Special Tenth Division) should

have dismissed the Petition of Blue Ridge outright since
the issues, facts and matters involved in the said Petition
are identical to those which had already been
painstakingly passed upon, reviewed and resolved by
the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
87931
G.R. Nos. 169080, 176226 and 176319

II.
The Court of Appeals (Special Tenth Division) gravely

erred in denying Macroasias Motion to Inhibit Associate
Justice Rosmari Carandang from hearing and deciding
the Petition
We will jointly tackle G.R. Nos. 169080, 176266, and

176319 as the issues and arguments of these three are
inextricably intertwined.
Core Issue: Jurisdiction over Cancellation of Mineral

Agreements
III.
There were no factual nor legal bases for the Court of

Appeals to rule that Macroasia had waived its right to
question the jurisdiction of the Mines Adjudication Board
Petitioner Celestial maintains that while the jurisdiction to

approve mining lease contracts or mineral agreements is
conferred on the DENR Secretary, Sec. 77(a) of RA
7942 by implication granted to the POA and MAB the
authority to cancel existing mining lease contracts or
mineral agreements.
IV.
Republic Act No. 7942 contains provisions which

unequivocally indicate that only the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources has
the power and authority to cancel mining lease
agreements
V.
The Court of Appeals (Special Tenth Division) gravely

erred in perfunctorily transferring Macroasias mining
lease agreements to Blue Ridge without observing the
required procedure nor providing any basis therefor[40]
The Courts Ruling
The petitions under G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, and

176226 are bereft of merit, while the petition under G.R.
No. 176319 is meritorious.
The pith of the controversy, upon which the other issues

are hinged is, who has authority and jurisdiction to
cancel existing mineral agreements under RA 7942 in
relation to PD 463 and pertinent rules and regulations.
On the other hand, respondent Macroasia strongly

asserts that it is the DENR Secretary who has the
exclusive and primary jurisdiction to grant and cancel
existing mining lease contracts; thus, the POA and MAB
have no jurisdiction to cancel much less to grant any
preferential rights to other mining firms.
Before we resolve this core issue of jurisdiction over

cancellation of mining lease contracts, we first need to
look back at previous mining laws pertinent to this issue.
Under PD 463, The Mineral Resources Development

Decree of 1974, which took effect on May 17, 1974,
applications for lease of mining claims were required to
be filed with the Director of the Bureau of Mines, within
two (2) days from the date of their recording.[41] Sec. 40
of PD 463 provided that if no adverse claim was filed
within (15) days after the first date of publication, it was
conclusively presumed that no adverse claim existed
and thereafter no objection from third parties to the grant
of the lease could be heard, except protests pending at
the time of publication. The Secretary would then
approve and issue the corresponding mining lease
contract. In case of any protest or adverse claim relating
to any mining claim and lease application, Secs. 48 and
50 of PD 463 prescribed the procedure. Under Sec. 48,
the protest should be filed with the Bureau of Mines.
Under Sec. 50, any party not satisfied with the decision
or order of the Director could, within five (5) days from
receipt of the decision or order, appeal to the Secretary.
The decisions of the Secretary were likewise appealable
within five (5) days from receipts by the affected party to
the President of the Philippines whose decision shall be
final and executory. PD 463 was, however, silent as to
who was authorized to cancel the mineral agreements.
On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued

Executive Order No. (EO) 211. Under Sec. 2 of EO 211,
the processing, evaluation, and approval of all mining
applications, declarations of locations, operating
agreements, and service contracts were governed by PD
463, as amended. EO 211 likewise did not contain any
provision on the authority to cancel operating
agreements and service contracts.
On July 25, 1987, EO 279 was issued by President

Aquino. It authorized the DENR Secretary to negotiate
and enter into, for and in behalf of the Government, joint
venture, co-production, or production-sharing
agreements for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources with any Filipino citizen,
corporation, or association, at least 60% of whose
capital was owned by Filipino citizens.[42] The contract
or agreement was subject to the approval of the
President.[43] With respect to contracts of foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, the
DENR Secretary could recommend approval of said
contracts to the President.[44] EO 279 provided that PD
463 and its implementing rules and regulations, which
were not inconsistent with EO 279, continued in force
and effect.[45] Again, EO 279 was silent on the authority
to cancel mineral agreements.
RA 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995 enacted on

March 3, 1995, repealed the provisions of PD 463
inconsistent with RA 7942. Unlike PD 463, where the
application was filed with the Bureau of Mines Director,
the applications for mineral agreements are now
required to be filed with the Regional Director as
provided by Sec. 29 of RA 7942. The proper filing gave
the proponent the prior right to be approved by the
Secretary and thereafter to be submitted to the
President. The President shall provide a list to Congress
of every approved mineral agreement within 30 days
from its approval by the Secretary. Again, RA 7942 is
silent on who has authority to cancel the agreement.
Compared to PD 463 where disputes were decided by

the Bureau of Mines Director whose decisions were
appealable to the DENR Secretary and then to the
President, RA 7942 now provides for the creation of
quasi-judicial bodies (POA and MAB) that would have
jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the applications
and mineral agreements. Secs. 77, 78, and 79 lay down
the procedure, thus:
SEC. 77. Panel of Arbitrators.There shall be a panel of

arbitrators in the regional office of the Department
composed of three (3) members, two (2) of whom must
be members of the Philippine Bar in good standing and
one [1] licensed mining engineer or a professional in a

related field, and duly designated by the Secretary as
recommended by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
Director. Those designated as members of the panel
shall serve as such in addition to their work in the
Department without receiving any additional
compensation. As much as practicable, said members
shall come from the different bureaus of the Department
in the region. The presiding officer thereof shall be
selected by the drawing of lots. His tenure as presiding
officer shall be on a yearly basis. The members of the
panel shall perform their duties and obligations in
hearing and deciding cases until their designation is
withdrawn or revoked by the Secretary. Within thirty (30)
working days, after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and
original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:
(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
(b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;
(c) Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and

claimholders/concessionaires; and
(d) Disputes pending before the Bureau and the

Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.
SEC. 78. Appellate Jurisdiction.The decision or order of

the panel of arbitrators may be appealed by the party not
satisfied thereto to the Mines Adjudication Board within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof which must decide
the case within thirty (30) days from submission thereof
for decision.
SEC. 79. Mines Adjudication Board.The Mines

Adjudication Board shall be composed of three (3)
members. The Secretary shall be the chairman with the
Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau and the
Undersecretary for Operations of the Department as
members thereof.
xxxx
A petition for review by certiorari and question of law

may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme
Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or
decision of the Board.
RA 7942 is also silent as to who is empowered to cancel

existing lease contracts and mineral agreements.
(2) Formulate, implement and supervise the

implementation of the governments policies, plans, and
programs pertaining to the management, conservation,
development, use and replenishment of the countrys
natural resources;
Meanwhile, in Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. v.

MAB, we explained that the decision of the MAB can first
be appealed, via a petition for review, to the CA before
elevating the case to this Court.[46]
xxxx
After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO

279, RA 7942 and its implementing rules and
regulations, executive issuances, and case law, we rule
that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the
jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or
mineral agreements based on the following reasons:
1. The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral

agreements emanates from his administrative authority,
supervision, management, and control over mineral
resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, viz:
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands,

alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources
xxx
xxxx
(12) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction,

exploration and use of the countrys forest, land, water
and mineral resources;
Chapter 1General Provisions
(13) Assume responsibility for the assessment,

development, protection, licensing and regulation as
provided for by law, where applicable, of all energy and
natural resources; the regulation and monitoring of
service contractors, licensees, lessees, and permit for
the extraction, exploration, development and use of
natural resources products; x x x
Section 1. Declaration of Policy.(1) The State shall

ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources x x x
xxxx
Sec. 2. Mandate.(1) The Department of Environment

and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for
the implementation of the foregoing policy. (2) It shall,
subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of
carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization,
and conservation of the countrys natural resources.
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management

and disposition of all lands of the public domain x x x
Chapter 2The Department Proper
xxxx
Sec. 8. The Secretary.The Secretary shall:

xxxx
xxxx
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions.The Department shall:
xxxx
(3) Promulgate rules, regulations and other issuances

necessary in carrying out the Departments mandate,
objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects.
(4) Exercise supervision and control over all functions

and activities of the Department;
mineral agreement within thirty (30) days from its

approval by the Secretary. (Emphasis supplied.)
(5) Delegate authority for the performance of any

administrative or substantive function to subordinate
officials of the Department x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 29 is a carry over of Sec. 40 of PD 463 which
granted jurisdiction to the DENR Secretary to approve
mining lease contracts on behalf of the government,
thus:
It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages,
supervises, and regulates the use and development of
all mineral resources of the country. It has exclusive
jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public
domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits
from said lands. It has the power to oversee, supervise,
and police our natural resources which include mineral
resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers of
the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative
Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral
agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel
said agreements.
2. RA 7942 confers to the DENR Secretary specific

authority over mineral resources.
Secs. 8 and 29 of RA 7942 pertinently provide:
SEC. 8. Authority of the Department.The Department

shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development, and
proper use of the States mineral resources including
those in reservations, watershed areas, and lands of the
public domain. The Secretary shall have the authority to
enter into mineral agreements on behalf of the
Government upon the recommendation of the Director,
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to implement the intent and provisions of this
Act.
SEC. 29. Filing and approval of Mineral Agreements.x x

x.
The filing of a proposal for a mineral agreement shall

give the proponent the prior right to areas covered by the
same. The proposed mineral agreement will be
approved by the Secretary and copies thereof shall be
submitted to the President. Thereafter, the President
shall provide a list to Congress of every approved
SEC. 40. Issuance of Mining Lease Contract.If no

adverse claim is filed within fifteen (15) days after the
first date of publication, it shall be conclusively presumed
that no such adverse claim exists and thereafter no
objection from third parties to the grant of the lease shall
be heard, except protest pending at the time of
publication, and the Secretary shall approve and issue
the corresponding mining lease x x x.
To enforce PD 463, the CMAO containing the rules and

regulations implementing PD 463 was issued. Sec. 44 of
the CMAO provides:
SEC. 44. Procedure for Cancellation.Before any mining

lease contract is cancelled for any cause enumerated in
Section 43 above, the mining lessee shall first be notified
in writing of such cause or causes, and shall be given an
opportunity to be heard, and to show cause why the
lease shall not be cancelled.
If, upon investigation, the Secretary shall find the lessee

to be in default, the former may warn the lessee,
suspend his operations or cancel the lease contract
(emphasis supplied).
Sec. 4 of EO 279 provided that the provisions of PD 463
and its implementing rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with the executive order, continue in force
and effect.
When RA 7942 took effect on March 3, 1995, there was

no provision on who could cancel mineral agreements.
However, since the aforequoted Sec. 44 of the CMAO
implementing PD 463 was not repealed by RA 7942 and
DENR AO 96-40, not being contrary to any of the
provisions in them, then it follows that Sec. 44 serves as
basis for the DENR Secretarys authority to cancel
mineral agreements.
Since the DENR Secretary had the power to approve

and cancel mineral agreements under PD 463, and the
power to cancel them under the CMAO implementing PD
463, EO 211, and EO 279, then there was no recall of
the power of the DENR Secretary under RA 7942.
Historically, the DENR Secretary has the express power
to approve mineral agreements or contracts and the
implied power to cancel said agreements.
It is a well-established principle that in the interpretation

of an ambiguous provision of law, the history of the
enactment of the law may be used as an extrinsic aid to
determine the import of the legal provision or the law.[47]
History of the enactment of the statute constitutes prior
laws on the same subject matter. Legislative history
necessitates review of the origin, antecedents and
derivation of the law in question to discover the
legislative purpose or intent.[48] It can be assumed that
the new legislation has been enacted as continuation of
the existing legislative policy or as a new effort to
perpetuate it or further advance it.[49]
may deputize, when necessary, any member or unit of

the Philippine National Police, barangay, duly registered
nongovernmental organization (NGO) or any qualified
person to police all mining activities. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Corollary to the power of the MGB Director to

recommend approval of mineral agreements is his power
to cancel or recommend cancellation of mining rights
covered by said agreements under Sec. 7 of DENR AO
96-40, containing the revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 7942. Sec. 7 reads:
Sec. 7. Organization and Authority of the Bureau.
xxxx
We rule, therefore, that based on the grant of implied
power to terminate mining or mineral contracts under
previous laws or executive issuances like PD 463, EO
211, and EO 279, RA 7942 should be construed as a
continuation of the legislative intent to authorize the
DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements on
account of violations of the terms and conditions thereof.
3. Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision

of the DENR Secretary over the MGB to cancel or
recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly
demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to
cancel or approve the cancellation of mineral
agreements.
Under Sec. 9 of RA 7942, the MGB was given the power

of direct supervision of mineral lands and resources,
thus:
Sec. 9. Authority of the Bureau.The Bureau shall have

direct charge in the administration and disposition of
mineral lands and mineral resources and shall undertake
geological, mining, metallurgical, chemical, and other
researches as well as geological and mineral exploration
surveys. The Director shall recommend to the Secretary
the granting of mineral agreements to duly qualified
persons and shall monitor the compliance by the
contractor of the terms and conditions of the mineral
agreements. The Bureau may confiscate surety,
performance and guaranty bonds posted through an
order to be promulgated by the Director. The Director
The Bureau shall have the following authority, among

others:
a. To have direct charge in the administration and

disposition of mineral land and mineral resources;
xxxx
d. To recommend to the Secretary the granting of

mineral agreements or to endorse to the Secretary for
action by the President the grant of FTAAs [Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreements], in favor of
qualified persons and to monitor compliance by the
Contractor with the terms and conditions of the mineral
agreements and FTAAs.
e. To cancel or to recommend cancellation after due

process, mining rights, mining applications and mining
claims for non-compliance with pertinent laws, rules and
regulations.
It is explicit from the foregoing provision that the DENR

Secretary has the authority to cancel mineral
agreements based on the recommendation of the MGB
Director. As a matter of fact, the power to cancel mining

rights can even be delegated by the DENR Secretary to
the MGB Director. Clearly, it is the Secretary, not the
POA, that has authority and jurisdiction over cancellation
of existing mining contracts or mineral agreements.
4. The DENR Secretarys power to cancel mining rights

or agreements through the MGB can be inferred from
Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on
cancellation, revocation, and termination of a
permit/mineral agreement/FTAA. Sec. 230 provides:
Section 230. Grounds
(Macroasia) as lessee. Paragraph 18 of said lease

contracts provides:
Whenever the LESSEE fails to comply with any

provision of [PD 463, and] Commonwealth Acts Nos.
137, 466 and 470, [both as amended,] and/or the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder, or any of the
covenants therein, the LESSOR may declare this lease
cancelled and, after having given thirty (30) days notice
in writing to the LESSEE, may enter and take
possession of the said premises, and said lessee shall
be liable for all unpaid rentals, royalties and taxes due
the Government on the lease up to the time of the
forfeiture or cancellation, in which event, the LESSEE
hereby covenants and agrees to give up the possession
of the property leased. (Emphasis supplied.)
The following grounds for cancellation revocation and

termination of a Mining Permit Mineral Agreement/FTAA.
a.
Violation of any of the terms and conditions of the
Permits or Agreements;
b.
Nonpayment of taxes and fees due the
government for two (2) consecutive years; and
c.
Falsehood or omission of facts in the application
for exploration [or Mining] Permit Mineral
Agreement/FTAA or other permits which may later,
change or affect substantially the facts set forth in said
statements.
Thus, the government represented by the then Secretary

of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the DENR
Secretary) has the power to cancel the lease contracts
for violations of existing laws, rules and regulations and
the terms and conditions of the contracts. Celestial and
Blue Ridge are now estopped from challenging the
power and authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel
mineral agreements.
However, Celestial and Blue Ridge insist that the power

to cancel mineral agreements is also lodged with the
POA under the explicit provisions of Sec. 77 of RA 7942.
This postulation is incorrect.

Though Sec. 230 is silent as to who can order the
cancellation, revocation, and termination of a
permit/mineral agreement/FTAA, it has to be correlated
with the power of the MGB under Sec. 7 of AO 96-40 to
cancel or to recommend cancellation, after due process,
mining rights, mining applications and mining claims for
noncompliance with pertinent laws, rules and
regulations. As the MGB is under the supervision of the
DENR Secretary, then the logical conclusion is that it is
the DENR Secretary who can cancel the mineral
agreements and not the POA nor the MAB.
5. Celestial and Blue Ridge are not unaware of the

stipulations in the Mining Lease Contract Nos. V-1050
and MRD-52,[50] the cancellation of which they sought
from the POA. It is clear from said lease contracts that
the parties are the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now DENR Secretary) as lessor, and Infanta
Sec. 77 of RA 7942 lays down the jurisdiction of POA, to

wit:
Within thirty (30) days, after the submission of the case

by the parties for the decision, the panel shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following:
(a)
Disputes involving rights to mining areas
(b)
permits
Disputes involving mineral agreements or
The phrase disputes involving rights to mining areas

refers to any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an
application for mineral agreement. The POA therefore
has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse claim, protest,
or opposition to a pending application for a mineral
agreement filed with the concerned Regional Office of
the MGB. This is clear from Secs. 38 and 41 of DENR
AO 96-40, which provide:
Sec. 38.
Within fifteen (15) working days from the receipt of the

Certification issued by the Panel of Arbitrators as
provided in Section 38 hereof, the concerned Regional
Director shall initially evaluate the Mineral Agreement
applications in areas outside Mineral reservations.
He/She shall thereafter endorse his/her findings to the
Bureau for further evaluation by the Director within
fifteen (15) working days from receipt of forwarded
documents. Thereafter, the Director shall endorse the
same to the secretary for consideration/approval within
fifteen working days from receipt of such endorsement.
In case of Mineral Agreement applications in areas with

Mineral Reservations, within fifteen (15) working days
from receipt of the Certification issued by the Panel of
Arbitrators as provided for in Section 38 hereof, the
same shall be evaluated and endorsed by the Director to
the Secretary for consideration/approval within fifteen
days from receipt of such endorsement. (Emphasis
supplied.)
xxxx
Within thirty (30) calendar days from the last date of

publication/posting/radio announcements, the authorized
officer(s) of the concerned office(s) shall issue a
certification(s) that the publication/posting/radio
announcement have been complied with. Any adverse
claim, protest or opposition shall be filed directly, within
thirty (30) calendar days from the last date of
publication/posting/radio announcement, with the
concerned Regional Office or through any concerned
PENRO or CENRO for filing in the concerned Regional
Office for purposes of its resolution by the Panel of
Arbitrators pursuant to the provisions of this Act and
these implementing rules and regulations. Upon final
resolution of any adverse claim, protest or opposition,
the Panel of Arbitrators shall likewise issue a certification
to that effect within five (5) working days from the date of
finality of resolution thereof. Where there is no adverse
claim, protest or opposition, the Panel of Arbitrators shall
likewise issue a Certification to that effect within five
working days therefrom.
xxxx
It has been made clear from the aforecited provisions

that the disputes involving rights to mining areas under
Sec. 77(a) specifically refer only to those disputes
relative to the applications for a mineral agreement or
conferment of mining rights.
The jurisdiction of the POA over adverse claims, protest,
or oppositions to a mining right application is further
elucidated by Secs. 219 and 43 of DENR AO 95-936,
which read:
Sec. 219. Filing of Adverse

Claims/Conflicts/Oppositions.Notwithstanding the
provisions of Sections 28, 43 and 57 above, any adverse
claim, protest or opposition specified in said sections
may also be filed directly with the Panel of Arbitrators
within the concerned periods for filing such claim, protest
or opposition as specified in said Sections.
No Mineral Agreement shall be approved unless the

requirements under this Section are fully complied with
and any adverse claim/protest/opposition is finally
resolved by the Panel of Arbitrators.
Sec. 43. Publication/Posting of Mineral Agreement

Application.
Sec. 41.
The Regional Director or concerned Regional Director

shall also cause the posting of the application on the
bulletin boards of the Bureau, concerned Regional
office(s) and in the concerned province(s) and
municipality(ies), copy furnished the barangays where
xxxx
xxxx
the proposed contract area is located once a week for

two (2) consecutive weeks in a language generally
understood in the locality. After forty-five (45) days from
the last date of publication/posting has been made and
no adverse claim, protest or opposition was filed within
the said forty-five (45) days, the concerned offices shall
issue a certification that publication/posting has been
made and that no adverse claim, protest or opposition of
whatever nature has been filed. On the other hand, if
there be any adverse claim, protest or opposition, the
same shall be filed within forty-five (45) days from the
last date of publication/posting, with the Regional Offices
concerned, or through the Departments Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officers (CENRO)
or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officers (PENRO), to be filed at the Regional Office for
resolution of the Panel of Arbitrators. However previously
published valid and subsisting mining claims are
exempted from posted/posting required under this
Section.
No mineral agreement shall be approved unless the

requirements under this section are fully complied with
and any opposition/adverse claim is dealt with in writing
by the Director and resolved by the Panel of Arbitrators.
(Emphasis supplied.)
These provisions lead us to conclude that the power of

the POA to resolve any adverse claim, opposition, or
protest relative to mining rights under Sec. 77(a) of RA
7942 is confined only to adverse claims, conflicts and
oppositions relating to applications for the grant of
mineral rights. POAs jurisdiction is confined only to
resolutions of such adverse claims, conflicts and
oppositions and it has no authority to approve or reject
said applications. Such power is vested in the DENR
Secretary upon recommendation of the MGB Director.
Clearly, POAs jurisdiction over disputes involving rights
to mining areas has nothing to do with the cancellation of
existing mineral agreements.
On the other hand, Celestial and Blue Ridge contend

that POA has jurisdiction over their petitions for the
cancellation of Macroasias lease agreements banking on
POAs jurisdiction over disputes involving mineral
agreements or permits under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942.
Such position is bereft of merit.
As earlier discussed, the DENR Secretary, by virtue of

his powers as administrative head of his department in
charge of the management and supervision of the
natural resources of the country under the 1987
Administrative Code, RA 7942, and other laws, rules,

and regulations, can cancel a mineral agreement for
violation of its terms, even without a petition or request
filed for its cancellation, provided there is compliance
with due process. Since the cancellation of the mineral
agreement is approved by the DENR Secretary, then the
recourse of the contractor is to elevate the matter to the
OP pursuant to AO 18, Series of 1987 but not with the
POA.
Matched with the legal provisions empowering the

DENR Secretary to cancel a mineral agreement is Sec.
77 (b) of RA 7942 which grants POA jurisdiction over
disputes involving mineral agreements.
A dispute is defined as a conflict or controversy; a

conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of a right, claim
or demand on one side; met by contrary claims or
allegations on the other.[51] It is synonymous to a cause
of action which is an act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.[52]
A petition or complaint originating from a dispute can be

filed or initiated only by a real party-in-interest. The rules
of court define a real party-in-interest as the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[53]
Every action, therefore, can only be prosecuted in the
name of the real party-in-interest.[54] It has been
explained that a real party-in-interest plaintiff is one who
has a legal right, while a real party-in-interest-defendant
is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act
or omission violates the legal right of the former.[55]
On the other hand, interest means material interest, an

interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. It is settled in this
jurisdiction that one having no right or interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a partyplaintiff in an action.[56] Real interest is defined as a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a
mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest.[57]
From the foregoing, a petition for the cancellation of an

existing mineral agreement covering an area applied for
by an applicant based on the alleged violation of any of
the terms thereof, is not a dispute involving a mineral
agreement under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942. It does not
pertain to a violation by a party of the right of another.
The applicant is not a real party-in-interest as he does
not have a material or substantial interest in the mineral
agreement but only a prospective or expectant right or
interest in the mining area. He has no legal right to such
mining claim and hence no dispute can arise between

the applicant and the parties to the mineral agreement.
The court rules therefore that a petition for cancellation
of a mineral agreement anchored on the breach thereof
even if filed by an applicant to a mining claim, like
Celestial and Blue Ridge, falls within the jurisdiction of
the DENR Secretary and not POA. Such petition is
excluded from the coverage of the POAs jurisdiction
over disputes involving mineral agreements under Sec.
77 (b) of RA 7942.
Macroasia not estopped from raising the issue of

jurisdiction on appeal
On the related issue of estoppel, petitioner Celestial

argues that Macroasia is estopped from raising and
questioning the issue of the jurisdiction of the POA and
MAB over the petition for cancellation of its mining lease
contracts, when Macroasia raised it only in its
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
We rule that the principle of estoppel does not apply.
Indeed, Macroasia was not the one that initiated the

instant case before the POA, and thus was not the one
that invoked the jurisdiction of the POA. Hence, on
appeal, Macroasia is not precluded from raising the
issue of jurisdiction as it may be invoked even on
appeal.[58] As a matter of fact, a party can raise the
issue of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings.
Petitioner Celestials reliance on Villela v. Gozun[59] to

support the contention that the POA has jurisdiction to
hear and decide a petition to cancel existing mining
lease contracts, is misplaced. In said case, we
dismissed the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies and disregarded judicial
hierarchy as no compelling reason was shown to warrant
otherwise. While we pointed out the authority of the
POA, there was no categorical pronouncement on the
jurisdictional issue.
No valid pronouncement of abandonment due to lack of

jurisdiction over petition to cancel
As we are not a trier of facts, we need not make any

finding on the various investigations done by the MGB
and MAB on the issue of Macroasias non-compliance
with its work obligations and nonpayment of taxes and
fees. Verily, the law does not impose automatic
cancellation of an existing mining lease contract, as it is
a question of fact which must be determined by the MGB
which can recommend the cancellation of the mineral or
lease agreements to the DENR Secretary. Be that as it
may, since the POA and MAB have no jurisdiction over
the petition for cancellation of existing mining lease
contracts of Macroasia, they could not have made any
binding pronouncement that Macroasia had indeed
abandoned the subject mining claims. Besides, it is the
DENR Secretary who has the authority to cancel
Macroasias existing mining lease contracts whether on
grounds of abandonment or any valid grounds for
cancellation.
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828 not in accord with the

law
With our resolution of the issue on the lack of jurisdiction

of the POA and the MAB over petitions to cancel existing
mining lease contracts or mineral agreements, it is thus
clear that the May 18, 2006 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
90828 must be nullified for being not in accord with the
law and the April 15, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
87931 must be upheld.
Notwithstanding the nullification of the May 18, 2006

Decision of the Special Tenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
90828, the rendition of two conflicting decisions of the
two CA Divisions over the same challenged resolutions
of the MAB should be avoided in the future as this is
anathema to stability of judicial decisions and orderly
administration of justice.
The chronology of events reveals the following:
1. January 10, 2005 petitioner Celestial filed its petition

docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 with the CA.
2. April 15, 2005 the CA through its Twelfth Division

rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 affirming
the November 26, 2004 MAB Resolution.
3. July 12, 2005 respondent Blue Ridge filed its petition

docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90828 with the CA. It is
clear that the Blue Ridge petition was filed with the CA
three months after the decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
87931 was promulgated.
4. May 18, 2006 the CA through its Special Tenth

Division rendered its Decision setting aside the
November 26, 2004 and July 12, 2005 Resolutions of
the MAB and reinstating the October 24, 2000 MAB
Decision.
From these facts, the CA Special Tenth Division should

have ordered the consolidation of the petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 90828 by CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 pursuant to the
Internal Rules of the CA, the latter having the earlier
docket number. Had it done so, then the occurrence of
the conflicting decisions could have been prevented. The
CA Special Tenth Division should have abided by our
ruling in Nacuray v. NLRC, where we held,
Consequently, a division cannot and should not review a
case already passed upon by another Division of this
Court. It is only proper, to allow the case to take its rest
after having attained finality.[60]
The CA should take the appropriate steps, including the

adoption or amendment of the rules, to see to it that
cases or petitions arising from the same questioned
decision, order, or resolution are consolidated to steer
clear of contrary or opposing decisions of the different
CA Divisions and ensure that incidents of similar nature
will not be replicated.
G.R. No. 172936
No showing that the DENR Secretary gravely abused his

discretion
The October 24, 2000 MAB Decision, nullified by the

subsequent November 26, 2004 Resolution, is
unequivocal that Blue Ridge was granted only prior and
preferential rights to FILE its mining application over the
same mining claims.[61] What was accorded Blue Ridge
was only the right to file the mining application but with
no assurance that the application will be recommended
for approval by the MGB and finally approved by the
DENR Secretary.
Moreover, a preferential right would at most be an

inchoate right to be given priority in the grant of a mining
agreement. It has not yet been transformed into a legal
and vested right unless approved by the MGB or DENR
Secretary. Even if Blue Ridge has a preferential right
over the subject mining claims, it is still within the
competence and discretion of the DENR Secretary to
grant mineral agreements to whomever he deems best
to pursue the mining claims over and above the
preferential status given to Blue Ridge. Besides, being
simply a preferential right, it is ineffective to dissolve the
pre-existing or subsisting mining lease contracts of
Macroasia.
The DENR Secretary has full discretion in the grant of

mineral agreements
Blue Ridge also argues that the Secretary gravely

abused his discretion in approving the subject MPSAs
without Macroasia complying with the mandatory
requirements for mineral agreement applications under
Sec. 35 of DENR AO 96-40. Petitioner specifically cited
Sec. 36 of DENR AO 96-40 to the effect that no Mineral
Agreement shall be approved unless the requirements
under this section are fully complied with and any
adverse claim/protest/opposition thereto is finally
resolved by the Panel of Arbitrators. Moreover, Blue
Ridge contends that the MPSAs were approved even
prior to the issuance of the Compliance Certificate[62] by
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples under
the OP, which is a requisite pre-condition for the
issuance of an MPSA.
Now, going to the substance of the petition in G.R. No.

172936. A scrutiny of the records shows that the DENR
Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion in
approving and signing MPSA Nos. 220-2005-IVB and
221-2005-IVB in favor of Macroasia.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioner Blue Ridge anchors its rights on the May 18,
2006 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828, which we have
unfortunately struck down. Blue Ridges argument in
assailing the approval and issuance of the subject
MPSAs that it has been accorded preferential right by
the CA has no leg to stand on.
Blue Ridge cites Sec. 38 (not Sec. 36) of DENR AO 9640 as basis for claiming that then DENR Secretary
Defensor committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting MPSA Nos. 220-2005-IVB and 221-2005-IVB to
Macroasia. Petitioners postulation cannot be entertained

for the reason that the issuance of the mining
agreements was not raised before the MGB Director and
DENR Secretary, nor was it amply presented before the
CA. There is even a counter-charge that Blue Ridge has
not complied with the legal requirements for a mining
application. The rule is established that questions raised
for the first time on appeal before this Court are not
proper and have to be rejected. Furthermore, the
resolution of these factual issues would relegate the
Court to a trier of facts. The Blue Ridge plea is hindered
by the factual issue bar rule where factual questions are
proscribed under Rule 65. Lastly, there was no
exhaustion of administrative remedies before the MGB
and DENR. Thus, Blue Ridges petition must fail.
Primary jurisdiction of the DENR Secretary in

determining whether to grant or not a mineral agreement
Verily, RA 7942, similar to PD 463, confers exclusive and

primary jurisdiction on the DENR Secretary to approve
mineral agreements, which is purely an administrative
function within the scope of his powers and authority. In
exercising such exclusive primary jurisdiction, the DENR
Secretary, through the MGB, has the best competence
to determine to whom mineral agreements are granted.
Settled is the rule that the courts will defer to the
decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by
reason of their expertise and experience in the matters
assigned to them pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Administrative decisions on matter within the
jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected
and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law.[63] Unless it is shown
that the then DENR Secretary has acted in a wanton,
whimsical, or oppressive manner, giving undue
advantage to a party or for an illegal consideration and
similar reasons, this Court cannot look into or review the
wisdom of the exercise of such discretion. Blue Ridge
failed in this regard.
Delineation of powers and functions is accorded the

three branches of government for the smooth functioning
of the different governmental services. We will not
disturb nor interfere in the exercise of purely
administrative functions of the executive branch absent a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Without a restraining order or injunction, litigation will not

deter the DENR from exercising its functions
While it is true that the subject mining claims are under

litigation, this does not preclude the DENR and its
Secretary from carrying out their functions and duties
without a restraining order or an injunctive writ.
Otherwise, public interest and public service would
unduly suffer by mere litigation of particular issues where
government interests would be unduly affected. In the
instant case, it must be borne in mind that the
government has a stake in the subject mining claims.
Also, Macroasia had various valid existing mining lease
contracts over the subject mining lode claims issued by
the DENR. Thus, Macroasia has an advantage over Blue
Ridge and Celestial insofar as the administrative aspect
of pursuing the mineral agreements is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petitions under G.R. Nos. 169080,

172936, and 176229 are DISMISSED for lack of merit,
while the petition under G.R. No. 176319 is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed April 15, 2005 Decision and
August 3, 2005 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
87931 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. And the May
18, 2006 Decision and January 19, 2007 Resolution of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In view of the foregoing
considerations, we find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the then DENR Secretary in the approval and
issuance of MPSA Nos. 220-2005-IVB and 221-2005IVB. Costs against Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration
Corporation and Blue Ridge Mineral Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA and ANASTACIO

GARCIA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
ANGELINA D. GUEVARA and JUAN B. GUEVARA,
respondents.
This petition for certiorari to review a decision of
respondent Court of Appeals was given due course
because it was therein vigorously asserted that legal
questions of gravity and of moment, there being
allegations of an unwarranted departure from and a
patent misreading of applicable and controlling
decisions, called for determination by this Tribunal. The
brief for petitioners-spouses, however, failed to
substantiate such imputed failings of respondent Court.
The performance did not live up to the promise. On the
basis of the facts as duly found by respondent Court,
which we are not at liberty to disregard, and the
governing legal provisions, there is no basis for reversal.
We affirm.
The nature of the case presented before the lower court

by private respondent Angelina D. Guevara, assisted by
her spouse, Juan B. Guevara, as plaintiffs, was noted in
the decision of respondent Court of Appeals thus:

"Plaintiff seeks recovery of òne (1) lady's diamond ring
18 cts. white gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05 cts.
diamond-solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 cts. total
weight' which she bought on October 27, 1947 from R.
Rebullida, Inc."1 Then came a summary of now
respondent Guevara of her evidence: "Plaintiff's
evidence tends to show that around October 11, 1953
plaintiff while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of
La Bulakea restaurant recognized her ring in the finger
of Mrs. Garcia and inquired where she bought it, which
the defendant answered from her comadre. Plaintiff
explained that that ring was stolen from her house in
February, 1952. Defendant handed the ring to plaintiff
and it fitted her finger. Two or three days later, at the
request of plaintiff, plaintiff, her husband Lt. Col. Juan
Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, defendant and her
attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom
they showed the ring in question. Mr. Rebullida a
examined the ring with the aid of high power lens and
after consulting the stock card thereon, concluded that it
was the very ring that plaintiff bought from him in 1947.
The ring was returned to defendant who despite a
written request therefor failed to deliver the ring to
plaintiff. Hence, this case. Later on when the sheriff tried
to serve the writ of seizure (replevin), defendant refused
to deliver the ring which had been examined by Mr.
Rebullida, claiming it was lost."2
How the defendant, Consuelo S. de Garcia, the present

petitioner before us, along with her husband Anastacio
Garcia, sought to meet plaintiff's claim was narrated
thus: "On the other hand, defendant denied having made
any admission before plaintiff or Mr. Rebullida or the
sheriff. Her evidence tends to show that the ring (Exhibit
1) was purchased by her from Mrs. Miranda who got it
from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the
owner, Aling Petring, who was boarding in her house;
that the ring she bought could be similar to, but not the
same ring plaintiff purchased from Mr. Rebullida which
was stolen; that according to a pawn-shop owner the big
diamond on Exhibit 1 was before the trial never
dismantled. When dismantled, defendant's diamond was
found to weigh 2.57 cts."3
Plaintiff lost in the lower court. She elevated the matter

to respondent Court of Appeals with the judgment of the
lower court being reversed. It is this decision now under
review.
These are the facts as found by respondent Court of

Appeals: "That the ring brought by the parties for
examination by Rafael Rebullida on December 14, 1953
was the same ring purchased by plaintiff from R.
Rebullida, Inc. on October 27, 1947 and stolen in
February, 1952 has been abundantly established by
plaintiff's evidence. Before plaintiff lost the ring, she had
been wearing it for six years and became familiar with it.
Thus, when she saw the missing ring in the finger of

defendant, she readily and definitely identified it. Her
identification was confirmed by Mr. Rafael Rebullida,
whose candid testimony is entitled to great weight, with
his 30 years experience behind him in the jewelry
business and being a disinterested witness since both
parties are his customers. Indeed, defendant made no
comment when in her presence Rebullida after
examining the ring and stock card told plaintiff that that
was her ring, nor did she answer plaintiff's letter of
demand, ... asserting ownership. Further confirmation
may be found in the extra-judicial admissions, contained
in defendant's original and first amended answers ..."4
These further facts likewise appeal therein: "The

foregoing proof is not counter-balanced by the denial on
the part of defendant or the presentation of the ring,
Exhibit I, which has a diamond-solitaire 2.57 cts., or
much heavier than the lost diamond weighing 2.05 cts.
only. It is noteworthy that defendant gave a rather
dubious source of her ring. Aling Petring from whom the
ring supposedly came turned out to be a mysterious and
ephemeral figure. Miss Hinahon did not even know her
true and full name, nor her forwarding address. She
appeared from nowhere, boarded three months in the
house of Miss Hinahon long enough to sell her diamond
ring, disappearing from the scene a week thereafter.
Indeed, the case was terminated without any hearing on
the third-party and fourth-party complaints, which would
have shown up the falsity of defendant's theory.
Moreover, Mrs. Baldomera Miranda, third-party
defendant, who tried to corroborate defendant on the
latter's alleged attempt to exchange the ring defendant
bought through her, is [belied] by her judicial admission
in her Answer that appellee `suggested that she would
make alterations to the mounting and structural design of
the ring to hide the true identity and appearance of the
original one' (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 45 O.G. 3796).
Finally, defendant is refuted by her own extra-judicial
admissions ... although made by defendant's counsel.
For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is
permitted to act such, has the authority to manage the
cause, and this includes the authority to make admission
for the purpose of the litigation... Her proffered
explanation that her counsel misunderstood her is
puerile because the liability to error as to the identity of
the vendor and the exchange of the ring with another
ring of the same value, was rather remote."5
It is in the light of the above facts as well as the finding

that the discrepancy as to the weight between the
diamond-solitaire in Exhibit I and the lost diamond was
due to defendant having "substituted a diamond-solitaire
of plaintiff with a heavier stone" that the decision was
rendered, respondent Court reversing the lower court
and ordering defendant, now petitioner Consuelo S. de
Garcia, to return plaintiff's ring or fact value of P1,000.00
and costs, as well as to pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as
attorney's fee and P1,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Hence this appeal.
To repeat, there is no occasion to reverse respondent

Court. It correctly applied the law to the facts as found.
1.
The controlling provision is Article 559 of the
Civil Code. It reads thus: "The possession of movable
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the
person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a
movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale,
the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price paid therefor." Respondent Angelina D.
Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the
diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from
petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in
possession of the same. The only exception the law
allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the
possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. As
authoritative interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, 6 the right of
the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that there
was good faith by the acquisition by the possessor.
There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v.
Yapdiangco.7 Thus: "Suffice it to say in this regard that
the right of the owner to recover personal property
acquired in good faith by another, is based on his being
dispossessed without his consent. The common law
principle that where one of two innocent persons must
suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the another, the law
imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced
confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed,
cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an
express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically
Article 559. Between a common law principle and
statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this
jurisdiction."8
2.
It is thus immediately apparent that there is no
merit to the contention raised in the first assigned error
that her possession in good faith, equivalent to title,
sufficed to defeat respondent Guevara's claim. As the
above cases demonstrate, even on that assumption the
owner can recover the same once she can show illegal
deprivation. Respondent Court of Appeals was so
convinced from the evidence submitted that the owner of
the ring in litigation is such respondent. That is a factual
determination to which we must pay heed. Instead of
proving any alleged departure from legal norms by
respondent Court, petitioner would stress Article 541 of
the Civil Code, which provides: 'A possessor in the
concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption
that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be
obliged to show or prove it." She would accord to it a
greater legal significance than that to which under the
controlling doctrines it is entitled.lwph1.t The brief
for respondents did clearly point out why petitioner's
assertion is lacking in support not only from the cases
but even from commentators. Thus: "Actually, even

under the first clause, possession in good faith does not
really amount to title, for the reason that Art. 1132 of the
Code provides for a period of acquisitive prescription for
movables through ùninterrupted possession for four
years in good faith' (Art. 1955 of the old Spanish Code,
which provided a period of three years), so that many
Spanish writers, including Manresa, Sanchez Roman,
Scaevola, De Buen, and Ramos, assert that under Art.
464 of the Spanish Code (Art. 559 of the New Civil
Code), the title of the possessor is not that of ownership,
but is merely a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a
basis of acquisitive prescription (II Tolentino, Civil Code
of the Phil. p. 258: IV Manresa, Derecho Civil Espaol,
6th Ed., p. 380). And it is for the very reason that the title
established by the first clause of Art. 559 is only a
presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for
acquisitive prescription, that the clause immediately
following provides that òne who has lost any movable or
has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it
from the person in possession of the same.' As stated by
the Honorable Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court in
Sotto vs. Enage (C.A.), 43 Off. Gaz. 5075, Dec. 1947:
Àrticle 559 in fact assumes that possessor is as yet not
the owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor has
come to acquire indefeasible title by, let us say, adverse
possession for the necessary period, no proof of loss or
illegal deprivation could avail the former owner of the
chattel. He would no longer be entitled to recover it
under any condition.' "9
The second assigned error is centered on the alleged

failure to prove the identity of the diamond ring. Clearly
the question raised is one of the fact. What the Court of
Appeals found is conclusive. Again, petitioner could not
demonstrate that in reaching such a conclusion the
Court of Appeals acted in an arbitrary manner. As made
mention of in the brief for respondents two disinterested
witnesses, Mr. Rafael Rebullida as well as Lt. Col.
Reynaldo Cementina of the Pasay City Police
Department, both of whom could not be accused of
being biased in favor of respondent Angelina D.
Guevara, did testify as to the identity of the ring.
The third assigned error of petitioners would find fault

with respondent Court relying "on the weakness of the
title or evidence" of petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia. It
is true, in the decision under review, mention was made
of petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia making no comment
when in her presence Rebullida, after examining the ring
the stock card, told respondent Angelina L. Guevara that
that was her ring, nor did petitioner answer a letter of the
latter asserting ownership. It was likewise stated in such
decision that there were extra-judicial admissions in the
original and first amended answers of petitioner. In the
appraisal of her testimony, respondent Court likewise
spoke of her giving a rather dubious source of her ring,
the person from whom she allegedly bought it turning out
"to be a mysterious and ephemeral figure." As a matter
of fact, as set forth a few pages back, respondent Court
did enumerate the flaws in the version given by

petitioner. From the weakness of the testimony offered
which, as thus made clear, petitioner, did not even seek
to refute, she would raise the legal question that
respondent Court relied on the "weakness of [her] title or
evidence" rather than on the proof justifying respondent
Angelina D. Guevara's claim of ownership. Petitioner
here would ignore the finding of fact of respondent Court
that such ownership on her part "has been abundantly
established" by her evidence. Again here, in essence,
the question raised is one of fact, and there is no
justification for us to reverse respondent Court.
The legal question raised in the fourth assignment of

error is that the matter of the substitution of the diamond
on the ring was a question raised for the first time on
appeal as it was never put in issue by the pleadings nor
the subject of reception of evidence by both parties and
not touched upon in the decision of the lower court. Why
no such question could be raised in the pleadings of
respondent Angelina D. Guevara was clarified by the fact
that the substitution came after it was brought for
examination to Mr. Rebullida. After the knowledge of
such substitution was gained, however, the issue was
raised at the trial according to the said respondent
resulting in that portion of the decision where the lower
court reached a negative conclusion. As a result, in the
motion for reconsideration, one of the points raised as to
such decision being contrary to the evidence is the
finding that there was no substitution. It is not necessary
to state that respondent Court, exercising its appellate
power reversed the lower court. What was held by it is
controlling. What is clear is that there is no factual basis
for the legal arguments on which the fourth assigned

error is predicated.
What is said takes care of the fifth assigned error that

respondent Court was mistaken in its finding that there
was such a substitution. Again petitioner would have us
pass on a question of credibility which is left to
respondent Court of Appeals. The sixth assigned error
would complain against the reversal of the lower court
judgment as well as petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia
being made to pay respondent Angelina D. Guevara
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs. The
reversal is called for in the light of the appraisal of the
evidence of record as meticulously weighed by
respondent Court. As to the attorney's fees and
exemplary damages, this is what respondent Court said
in the decision under review: "Likewise, plaintiff is
entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees in the sum
of P1,000, it being just and equitable under the
circumstances, and another P1,000 as exemplary
damages for the public good to discourage litigants from
resorting to fraudulent devices to frustrate the ends of
justice, as defendant herein tried to substitute the ring,
Exhibit 1, for plaintiff's ring." 10 Considering the
circumstances, the cursory discussion of the sixth
assigned error on the matter by petitioner fails to
demonstrate that respondent Court's actuation is
blemished by legal defects.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of

Appeals of August 6, 1962 is hereby affirmed. With
costs.

Ebarle - Garcia

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Ebarle - Garcia

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Ebarle v Sucaldito

The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga

On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we

The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are

interest for personal gain for approving said award which

That after the aforecited award and contract, Tabiliran

That on or about October 10, 1969, above-named

On the same date, the private respondent commenced

That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding was held for the

On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted

That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian City, said

That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE testified falsely

On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent

We hereby respectfully charge the above-named

valid or legal ground, did not include or even open the

The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid

On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito,

On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on

Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,

feloniously made untruthful statements in a narration of

c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion,

required by law in such cases, in support of the

Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private

required by law in such cases, in support of the

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,

That on or about December 1, 1969, in Pagadian City,

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,

That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, Gov.

knowingly causing undue injury in the discharge of his

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,

That on August 19, 1967, respondent BIENVENIDO A.

That on or about January 22, 1970, in Pagadian City,

That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City,

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,

c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion,

required by law in such cases, in support of the

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,

c. That the provisions of the law and rules on promotion,

required by law in such cases, in support of the

MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of

respondent, an appointment as CONFIDENTIAL

On September 21, 1971, the private respondent

Please give due course to the above complaint and

That on or about December 2, 1969, in Pagadian City,

That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City,

That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City,

The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of

On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order,

On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No.

Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and

Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the

order we had issued (in G.R. No. 33628), which he

He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are

We dismiss these petitions.

The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of

RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT

WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the

WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct should

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264

OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH

WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be