G.R. No.

196435

January 29, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR, Accused-Appellant.
1

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"[T]he trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to he highest respect
absent a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that would affect the result of the case."
2

On appeal is the October 22, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape.
3

In three separate Informations, appellant was charged with rape committed as follows:
5

Criminal Case No. 99-16235 (Rape by Sexual Assault)

That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there commit an act of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and
[inserting] the same into the genital orifice of "AAA," a minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby
causing the labia majora of the vagina of said minor to suffer a third degree burn, against her will
and consent.
6

Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (Rape by Sexual Assault)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there commit an act of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and
[inserting] the same into the anal orifice of "AAA", a minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby
causing the perianal region of the said anal orifice of said minor to suffer a third degree burn, against
her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (Statutory Rape)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge [of] "AAA", a minor who is six (6) years of age; that on the same occasion that the

Accused raped said minor, the accused did, then and there burn her buttocks by the use of a lighted
cigarette, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on January 9, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial conference was
terminated upon agreement of the parties. Trial on the merits ensued.
7

Factual Antecedents
The facts as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
The victim in these cases[,] "AAA[,]" testified that at noon time of April 8, 1999, she was x x x playing
x x x with her playmates whereupon she wandered by the house of accused which x x x was just
below their house. "AAA" clarified during her cross-examination that there was a vulcanizing shop
owned by her father located in their house x x x and where accused was employed. While "AAA"
was at the house of accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted
cigarette by the said accused. "AAA" testified further that her clothes were taken off by the same
accused who also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of her, inserted
his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge [of] the then six (6) year old girl. (TSN May
29, 2001, pp. 5-9; TSN Aug. 7, 2001, pp. 10-12.)
"BBB," father of "AAA," presented in court his daughters birth certificate (Exhibit "B") which stated
that she was born on April 4, 1993 (TSN Sept. 25, 2001, p. 4). On the other hand, Dr. Emmanuel
Reyes the Medico-Legal Officer who examined "AAA" identified his Medico-Legal Report (Exhibit
"M") and testified that the victim indeed had two (2) third degree burns in the perianal region. Dr.
Reyes testified that it was possible that the said burns were caused by a lighted cigarette stick being
forced on the victims skin. Moreover, Dr. Reyes confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on the
part of the victim and that the same could have been done 24 hours from the time of his examination
which was also on April 8, 1999. (TSN Nov. 7, 2001 pp. 11-17)
"CCC" [aunt of "AAA"] testified that x x x she x x x assisted the mother of "AAA" in bringing the victim
to the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame where a doctor also examined "AAA"
and confirmed that the latter was indeed a victim of rape. "CCC" testified that they then proceeded to
the Womens [D]esk to file the instant complaint against the accused. (TSN August 5, 2003 pp. 4-8)
On the other hand, accused denied the allegation of rape against him. Accused presented his
brother-in-law Rogelio Oletin who testified that he was tending the store located at the house of
accused when the latter supposedly arrived from work at 10:00 [a.m.] of April 8, 1999 and slept until
5:00 [p.m.] of the same day. According to Rogelio that is the usual routine of accused as the latter
worked in the night shift schedule as vulcanizer in the vulcanizing shop owned by the victims father.
(TSN February 3, 2006 pp. 6-8)
When accused testified on November 17, 2006, he essentially confirmed the testimony of his
brother-in-law that it was impossible for him to have raped "AAA" on the date and time stated in the
information as his night shift work schedule just would not permit such an incident to occur. Accused
added that he knew of no reason why the family of the private complainant would pin the crime
against him. (TSN Nov. 17, 2006 pp. 9-11 & 14)
In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of "AAAs" body, the defense presented a
supposed playmate of "AAA" in the person of Mary Pabuayan. According to Mary, she was then 7

years old when she and two other playmates together with "AAA" and Joel "Liit" the son of accused
were burning worms near a santol tree in their neighborhood on a Good Friday in the year 1999.
This Joel "Liit" supposedly lighted a straw which inadvertently burned the anal portion of "AAAs"
body. Marys exact words were to the effect that "napatakan ang puwit ni "AAA"."
8

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 3, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of three counts of rape, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Joel Crisostomo y Malliar is found GUILTY of all
offenses stated in the three (3) Criminal Informations and is hereby sentenced to the following:
a) In Criminal Information # 99-16235 and Criminal Information # 99-16236, accused is to
suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum and is ordered to pay the victim "AAA" civil indemnity of P30,000.00,
moral damages of P30,000.00 and exemplary damages of P15,000.00 for each of the two
Criminal Informations.
b) In Criminal Information # 99-16237, accused is to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity of P75,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00
and exemplary damages of P30,000.00 with cost [of] suit for all Criminal Informations.
SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the trial court in its
Order dated February 2, 2009.
10

11

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his Brief filed before the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY FOR
THE CRIME OF RAPE (ARTICLE 266-A PAR. 1 AND ART. 267-B, PAR. 7 IN RELATION TO R.A.
NO. 7610) DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
12

Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred when it lent full credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. In particular, appellant insisted that the trial court erred in finding "AAAs"
testimony credible considering that she was unsure whether a match, rod or a cigarette stick, was
used in burning her private parts. Appellant argued that "AAA" never showed signs of shock,
distress, or anxiety despite her alleged traumatic experience. Appellant also alleged that "CCCs"
testimony should be disregarded as she was not even present when the rape incidents
happened. He opined that "CCC" influenced her niece, "AAA," to file the suit against him which
bespoke of ill-motive on her part. Appellant concluded that these "inconsistencies and
contradictions" are enough to set aside the verdict of conviction imposed upon by the RTC.
1awp++i1

13

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16

However, the CA gave short shrift to appellants arguments. The CA rendered its Decision disposing
as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed July 3, 2008 Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalties imposed, and to be read thus:
"1. For Criminal Case Nos. 99-16235 and 99-16236, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (8) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay AAA Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
civil indemnity, Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifteen
Thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as exemplary damages, all for each count of rape by sexual
assault; and
17

(2) For Criminal Case No. 99-16237, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole, and ordered to pay AAA SeventyFive Thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages, and Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and all
the costs of suit."
SO ORDERED.

18

Hence, this appeal which the CA gave due course in its Resolution of January 6, 2011. In a
Resolution dated June 15, 2011, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs. In its Manifestation and Motion, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed this Court
that it will no longer file a Supplemental Brief because it had already exhaustively discussed and
refuted all the arguments of the appellant in its brief filed before the CA. Appellant likewise filed a
Manifestation In Lieu of Supplemental Brief praying that the case be deemed submitted for decision
based on the pleadings submitted.
19

20

21

22

23

Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found appellant guilty of two counts of rape by sexual
assault and one count of rape by sexual intercourse. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above should be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or

anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
(Emphases supplied)
When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is "termed statutory rape as
it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and
whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a
will of her own on account of her tender years." In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily
established all the elements of statutory rape. "AAA" testified that on April 8, 1999, appellant took off
her clothes and made her lie down. Appellant also removed his clothes, placed himself on top of
"AAA," inserted his penis into her vagina, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. At the
time of the rape, "AAA" was only six years of age. Her birth certificate showed that she was born on
April 4, 1993. "AAAs" testimony was corroborated by Dr. Emmanuel Reyes who found "AAA" to
have fresh and bleeding hymenal lacerations.
24

Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellants guilt for two counts of rape by
sexual assault. Records show that appellant inserted a lit cigarette stick into "AAAs" genital orifice
causing her labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn. Appellant likewise inserted a lit cigarette stick
into "AAAs" anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in her perianal region.
1wphi1

We agree with the CA that "AAAs" "uncertainty" on whether it was a match, rod or a cigarette stick
that was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her credibility. Such "uncertainty" is so
inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her
private parts. This is the essence of rape by sexual assault. "[T]he gravamen of the crime of rape by
sexual assault x x x is the insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another persons genital or anal orifice." In any event, "inconsistencies in a
rape victims testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial
matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape." We also held in People v.
Piosang that
25

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"[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly
if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are
inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability
but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA
could not have invented a horrible story. x x x "
Moreover, appellants argument that "AAA" did not manifest any stress or anxiety considering her
traumatic experience is purely speculative and bereft of any legal basis. Besides, it is settled that
people react differently when confronted with a startling experience. There is no standard behavioral
response when one is confronted with a traumatic experience. Some may show signs of stress; but
others may act nonchalantly. Nevertheless, "AAAs" reaction does not in any way prove the
innocence of appellant. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, regardless of "AAAs" reactions, it did
not diminish the fact that she was raped by appellant or that a crime was committed.
28

We also agree with the CA that "CCCs" efforts to hale appellant to the court should not be equated
with ill-motive on her part. On the contrary, we find "CCCs" efforts to seek justice for her niece who
was raped more in accord with the norms of society. At any rate, even if we disregard "CCCs"
testimony, appellants conviction would still stand. We agree with the observation of the OSG that
"CCCs" "testimony actually had no great impact on the case. In truth, her testimony [was] composed

mainly of the fact that she was the one who accompanied the mother of "AAA" in bringing "AAA" to
the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame and later on to the Womens desk."
29

On the other hand, appellants alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when weighed against
"AAAs" positive identification of him as the malefactor. Appellant did not even attempt to show that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. In fact, he
admitted that he lived just four houses away from the house of "AAA". His denial is also
unsubstantiated hence the same is self-serving and deserves no consideration or weight. The RTC
properly disregarded the testimony of Rogelio Oletin (Oletin), appellants brother-in-law, who claimed
that appellant was at his house at the time of the incident. As appellant already admitted, his house
is near the house of "AAA" hence there was no physical impossibility for him to be present at the
crime scene. Also, the RTC observed that Oletins testimony did not "prove beneficial to the defense.
Suffice it to state that the private prosecutor correctly noted that the said witness was always smiling
and laughing when answering questions propounded to him as if making a mockery of the
proceedings which his own brother-in-law was facing."
30

Pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for statutory rape (Criminal Case No. 99-16237) is
death when the victim is a child below seven years old. There is no dispute that at the time the rape
was committed on April 8, 1999, "AAA" was only six years old, having been born on April 4, 1993.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on
the appellant but without eligibility for parole. The CA thus correctly imposed the said penalty on
appellant.
31

32

On the other hand, rape by sexual assault committed against a child below seven years old is
punishable by reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no
other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty shall be prision
mayor as minimum, to reclusion temporal, as maximum. The CA thus correctly imposed the
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of sexual assault.
33

34

35

As regards damages, the CA correctly awarded the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory rape). However,
the award of moral damages must be increased to P75,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. As regards Criminal Case No. 99-16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by
sexual assault), the CA likewise properly awarded the amounts ofP30,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P30,000.00 as moral damages, for each count. However, the award of exemplary damages for
each count of rape by sexual assault must be increased to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. In addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
36

37

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The October 22, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237
(statutory rape) is increased to P75,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case
No. 99-16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by sexual assault) is increased to P30,000.00
for each count. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum
from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T.CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 188653

January 29, 2014

LITO LOPEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed. in this petition is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of petitioner
Lito Lopez by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. T-3476, which found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
1

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, in an
Information which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of July, 2000, at 7:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Purok 1,
Brgy. Baranghawon, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to possess and violate the law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession and control 0.0849 gram of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu", a regulated drug contained in four
(4) small transparent packets; four (4) pieces of aluminum foil and one (1) transparent plastic packet,
both containing "shabu" residue, without authority, license or permit from the government or its duly
authorized representatives.
3

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

The witnesses for the prosecution testified on the following facts:
Senior Police Officer 4 Benito Bognalos (SPO4 Bognalos) was the team leader of the group of police
officers assigned to implement the search warrant issued by Judge Arsenio Base of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, on the house of petitioner located at Purok 1, Barangay Baranghawon,
Tabaco, Albay. The search group was composed of SPO3 Domingo Borigas (SPO3 Borigas), PO3
Carlos Desuasido (PO3 Desuasido), and PO3 Ferdinand Telado (PO3 Telado) while another group,
consisting of SPO1 Venancio Rolda, PO3 Cesar Templonuevo and SPO2 Melchor Codornes, were
tasked to secure the perimeter area. SPO4 Bognalos contacted the barangay officials to ask for
assistance in the conduct of the search.
At around 7:30 p.m. of 31 July 2000, the search team, together with three (3) barangay officials,
went to the house of petitioner and presented the search warrant to him. He eventually relented to
the conduct of search. PO3 Desuasido seized a piece of folded paper containing four (4) 1/4 x 1/2
inch transparent plastic packets of white powder, two (2) 2x1-1/2 inch plastic sachets containing
white powder, and a crystal-like stone measuring 2 inches in contoured diameter concealed in the
kitchen. SPO3 Borigas found two (2) 2x1-1/2 inch plastic sachets containing white powder in the
bathroom. PO3 Telado seized one (1) 1/4 x 1/2 inch plastic packet containing suspected residue of
shabu inside the masters bedroom. PO3 Telado also recovered one (1) 1x1-1/2 inch plastic sachet
containing suspected residue of shabu, four aluminum rolls, and a piece of paper partly burned at
one end. Barangay Captain Angeles Brutas witnessed the conduct by the policemen of the search in
petitioners kitchen and saw how the plastic sachets containing the suspected shabu were
recovered. Barangay Kagawad Leticia Bongon also saw how the policemen found outside the
house a white, round, hard and "tawas-like" object in the kitchen and aluminum foils, which were
allegedly used as shabu paraphernalia. After the search, the seized items were photographed and a
seizure receipt, properly acknowledged by petitioner, was issued. Petitioner was then brought to the
police station while the seized plastic sachets were brought by the Chief of Police to the Legazpi City
Crime Laboratory for examination.
4

Forensic Chemist Police Superintendent Lorlie Arroyo in her Chemistry Report No. D-1112000, found that the seized plastic sachets are positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. She likewise testified on her findings.
9

Testifying on his own behalf, petitioner narrated that at exactly 7:30 p.m. on 31 July 2000, more than
ten (10) policemen barged into his house. Petitioner initially asked them for their purpose and he
was told that they had a search warrant. Petitioner was not able to take a good look at the search
warrant because one Butch Gonzales pushed him aside while the others entered his house. The
policemen searched different parts of his house while he was made to sit in the living room by PO3

Desuasido. From where he was seated, he could not see what was happening inside the kitchen or
in the bedroom, where policemen allegedly recovered plastic sachets containing shabu. He was
asked to sign a seizure receipt but refused to do so. After the search, he was taken into custody and
brought to the police station. Salvacion Posadas, petitioners former common-law partner, was also
inside petitioners house at the time of the search. She corroborated petitioners testimony that they
were not able to witness the search because they were made to sit in the living room. She also
claimed that the barangay officials did not accompany the policemen in the search inside the kitchen
and bedroom.
10

11

On 23 May 2007, the RTC convicted petitioner of the charge of illegal possession of shabu in
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused Lito Lopez
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act 6425 and
considering the quantity of the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from the accused, which is
0.0849 gram, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court hereby sentences him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its
medium period as minimum, to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium period as
maximum.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, subject matter of this case is forfeited in favor of the
government, and the Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over the same to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for proper disposition, upon finality of this decision.
12

In convicting petitioner of illegal possession of shabu, the trial court lent more credence to the
evidence of the prosecution. The trial court held that the prosecution was able to prove all elements
of the crime charged, more particularly, that petitioner was in possession of the shabu. The trial court
dismissed petitioners claim that the seized shabu was planted by the policemen by explaining that
these police officers have no ill-motive to falsely testify against petitioner.
In his Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that there was an irregularity in the
conduct of the search when it was witnessed only by barangay officials while petitioners view from
the living room was blocked by a concrete wall partition. Petitioner thus advanced the possibility of
indiscriminate search and planting of evidence. Petitioner also questioned the time when the search
was conducted. Petitioner pointed out that one Butch Gonzales, who is not a part of the search
team, participated in the search and was able to seize a plastic sachet allegedly containing shabu.
Petitioner averred that the seized items were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant. In
addition, petitioner claimed that the police officers did not properly observe the chain of custody rule,
such that the pieces of evidence were not properly marked in the house of petitioner but were
marked at the police station.
On 31 March 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs Decision convicting petitioner of illegal
possession of shabu. The appellate court upheld the valid implementation of the search warrant by
police officers. According to the appellate court, petitioner was present during the search and his
movement was not restricted as he was free to follow the policemen conducting the search. The
appellate court considered the time of the search as reasonable. With respect to the argument that

the seized items were not delivered to the court, the appellate court observed that said issue was not
raised during trial, hence, the objection is deemed waived.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari zeroing in on the argument that the identity
and integrity of the seized items were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner insists that the
records were bereft of evidence showing every link in the chain of custody of the seized shabu.
Petitioner points out that the person in the crime laboratory who allegedly handled the seized items
was not presented during the trial and there was no testimony made on the disposition of the alleged
shabu after its examination by the forensic chemist and prior to its presentation in court. Petitioner
also notes that the alleged seized drugs were not immediately marked at the time of the alleged
seizure.
In the prosecution of drug cases, it is of paramount importance that the existence of the drug, the
corpus delicti of the crime, be established beyond doubt. To successfully prosecute a case involving
illegal drugs, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been
preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug's unique characteristic that
renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution
either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and
integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is
the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-petitioner.
13

In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must show
the chain of custody over the dangerous drug in order to establish the corpus delicti, which is the
dangerous drug itself. The chain of custody rule comes into play as a mode of authenticating the
seized illegal drug as evidence. It includes testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the
testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be
derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the
accused. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted
searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on
planting of evidence and on allegations of robbery or theft.
14

15

16

The rule requires that the marking of the seized items should be done in the presence of the
apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence.
17

Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.
18

According to PO3 Telado, all the seized items were marked only at the police station. But when
asked who put the markings, PO3 Telado surmised that it was PO3 Desuasido. Aside from PO3
Telado, no other witnesses testified on the supposed markings. PO3 Desuasido was not asked on
the witness stand about the markings. When cross-examined how the seized items were handled,
SP04 Bognalos testified:
19

Q: After you have searched and found these sachets containing "Shabu" what did you and your
party do?
A: It was photographed, given seizure receipt properly acknowledged by the respondent. And later
on for proper disposition and then Lito Lopez was brought to the police station for proper booking
and further investigation.
Q: You said these recovered sachets found in the house of the accused were photographed. Do you
have copies of these photographs?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because it was submitted to the Municipal Trial Court, Tabaco together with the filing of the case.
Q: What did you do with these seized sachets containing "Shabu" after the same was brought to the
police station?
A: It was sent to the Legazpi City Crime Laboratory for proper examination.

20

There are occasions when the chain of custody rule is relaxed such as when the marking of the
seized items immediately after seizure and confiscation is allowed to be undertaken at the police
station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused in
illegal drugs cases. However, even a less-than-stringent application of the requirement would not
suffice to sustain the conviction in this case. There was no categorical statement from any of the
prosecution witnesses that markings were made, much less immediately upon confiscation of the
seized items. There was also no showing that markings were made in the presence of the accused
in this case.
21

Evidently, there is an irregularity in the first link of the chain of custody.

We have consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. Failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were
seized from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on
reasonable doubt.
22

Furthermore, the Chemistry Report, containing a description of the items seized, does not show or
make any mention of any markings made on all the items seized. As a matter of fact, during the trial,
PO3 Desuasido seemingly could not readily identify the plastic sachets he allegedly seized inside
petitioners house, thus:

Q: If I show to you the four (4) plastic sachets containing "shabu" will you be able to recognize it?
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
Same objection. No basis.
COURT:
Let the witness answer.
PROSECUTOR PIFANO:
Q: Showing to you [these] plastic sachets. Kindly examine the same and tell the court if these were
the ones that were found in the house of the accused?
WITNESS:
A: If it were the ones that came from the crime laboratory then it is, sir.

23

On the other hand, PO3 Telado identified the plastic sachets he seized based only on their sizes, to
wit:
Q: Now, you identified the supposed sachets that you had found in the house of the accused. What
made you identify them today as the ones that you had found?
A: Because I can distinctly remember those aluminum foils.
Q: Okay. No, Im referring to the sachets?
A: I can remember it because of the size.
Q: Of course, you will agree with me that you did not first measure the size of those two (2) sachets
at that time before you actually identified them today?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How were you able to identify today that the aluminum foils shown to you by the Fiscal were the
ones used as supposedly found in the house of the accused?
A: Because its crumpled and folded.
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
Q: Was that your only basis as you have identified it today?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.

24

Even the evidence presented in court were not identified with certainty as the ones which were
seized by the police officers.
As already stated, it is the unique characteristic of dangerous and illegal drugs which renders
imperative strict compliance with the prescribed measures to be observed during and after the
seizure of dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the custody and transfer thereof for
examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.
25

The conflicting testimonies of the police officers and lack of evidence lead to a reasonable
conclusion that no markings were actually made on the seized items. It is also worth mentioning that
the photographs which the prosecution witnesses claim to have been taken after the seizure do not
appear on the records nor were they presented or offered as evidence.
A substantial gap in the chain of custody renders the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti
dubious.
We ruled in People v. Kamad that the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a
buy-bust situation are: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
26

27

There were indeed substantial gaps in the chain of custody from the initial stage with the apparent
lack of markings. Upon confiscation of the shabu, the prosecution witnesses never recounted which
police officer had initial control and custody upon their confiscation and while in transit. At the police
station, nobody witnessed if and how the seized items were marked. SPO4 Bognalos alleged that it
was the Chief of Police who forwarded the seized sachets to the crime laboratory, while PO3 Telado
intimated that it was the investigator who turned them over to the crime laboratory. Their records
were likewise bereft of any detail as to who exercised custody and possession of the seized items
after their chemical examination and before they were offered as evidence in court. All these weak
links in the chain of custody significantly affected the integrity of the items seized, which in turn,
created a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
28

In this light, we are constrained to acquit petitioner on reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 31 March 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 30939 affirming the conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Tabaco City, in
Criminal Case No. T-3476 for illegal possession of shabu under Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner LITO LOPEZ is ACQUITTED and
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Tabaco District Jail, San Lorenzo,
Tabaco City is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken
hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 201156, January 29, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. JOSELITO MORATE Y TARNATE, Accused
Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:
The accusedappellant Joselito Morate appeals from the Decision 1 dated October 18, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. CR.H.C. No. 04197 denying his appeal from the Joint Decision 2 dated September 7,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco City, Branch 17 in Criminal Case Nos. T4466 and T4467,
which found him guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Informations filed against the accusedappellant in the trial court read:
I. Criminal Case No. T4466 (For violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165)
That on or about 12:05 oclock in the afternoon of April 25, 2006 at P5, Cormidal[,] Tabaco City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent to
violate the law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and criminally possess and have in [his]
control dried MARIJUANA LEAVES with fruiting tops, contained in One (1) heatsealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 0.3035 gram, without the necessary government authority, to the detriment of the public
welfare.3
II. Criminal Case No. T4467 (For violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165)
That on or about 12:05 oclock in the afternoon of April 25, 2006 at P5, Cormidal, Tabaco City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent to
violate the law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and criminally sell, deliver and give away
to a poseurbuyer three (3) heatsealed transparent plastic sachets of MARIJUANA LEAVES with fruiting
tops, with a total weight of 1.0291 grams, without the necessary government authority, to the detriment of
public welfare.4
The accusedappellant pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned. 5
trial ensued.

After pretrial was conducted,

The prosecution established that, sometime in April 2006, the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Tabaco City
received confidential information that a certain Palito of Purok 5, Cormidal, Tabaco City is engaged in the
illegal sale of marijuana. Accordingly, Police Senior Inspector (PSInsp.) Fernando Bolanga, Chief of the
Tabaco City Central Police Stations Investigation and Detective Management Division, instructed Police
Officer (PO) 1 Macneil Manamtam to build up a case about the matter. Going undercover, PO1 Manamtam
met with his asset, Edwin, on April 17, 2006 and made inquiries. The latter informed PO1 Manamtam that
Palito is accusedappellant Joselito Morate. Edwin confirmed that the accusedappellant is indeed
involved in the sale of illegal drugs. PO1 Manamtam signified his intention to buy drugs from accused
appellant and asked Edwin to make the necessary arrangements. Edwin made an assurance that he can
facilitate the transaction. He subsequently told PO1 Manamtam that they could buy drugs from the
accusedappellant on April 25, 2006 at the canteen near the TMG outpost at the pier in Cormidal, Tabaco
City.6
PO1 Manamtam reported to PSInsp. Bolanga and informed the latter that he would be having a transaction
with the accusedappellant. In the morning of April 25, 2006, PSInsp. Bolanga called his men for a pre
operation briefing to plan how the buybust would be conducted. 7 PO1 Manamtam was designated as
poseurbuyer. He was given two pieces of P50.00 bills as marked money. Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1
Remus Navarro, SPO3 Benigno Dilla, SPO4 Benito Bognalos, PO3 Pedro Antonio Eva III and PO1 Anacito

Colarina were to serve as backup.8 With them was PO1 Alden Bayaban, an agent of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) detailed at the Tabaco City Police Station. 9 The team then proceeded to the
venue of the transaction in Cormidal, Tabaco City.10
As agreed upon, PO1 Manamtam met Edwin in a canteen. The accusedappellant arrived later and
Edwin introduced PO1 Manamtam as a prospective buyer of marijuana. When the accusedappellant
asked how much PO1 Manamtam intended to buy, the latter answered that he would buy P100.00 worth of
marijuana. When the accusedappellant demanded immediate payment, PO1 Manamtam initially hesitated
but eventually obliged and handed the marked money to the accusedappellant. The accusedappellant left
but returned shortly thereafter. He then asked PO1 Manamtam and Edwin to go with him to a nearby
basketball area where the accusedappellant produced four transparent plastic sachets containing dried
leaves and handed three sachets to PO1 Manamtam. The police officer asked the accusedappellant to
place the sachets inside the formers backpack. The accusedappellant then showed PO1 Manamtam and
Edwin another sachet for use by the three of them. The accusedappellant instructed Edwin to look for
some aluminium coated paper. Edwin obliged and left. Meanwhile, PO1 Manamtam sent a text message
to the other members of the buybust team informing them that the sale had been consummated. 11
cralawred

Upon receiving PO1 Manamtams message, PO1 Bayaban and PO3 Eva rushed in to arrest the accused
appellant. The accusedappellant noticed the approaching police officers and dropped the sachet that he
was holding. PO3 Eva saw what the accusedappellant did and picked up the sachet from the ground.
Thereafter, he proceeded to bodily search the accusedappellant to look for the marked money but did not
find it.12
The accusedappellant was arrested. The team also made it appear that PO1 Manamtam was arrested with
the accusedappellant to protect PO1 Manamtams identity. The accusedappellant and PO1 Manamtam
were then brought to the police station.13
Upon arrival at the police station, the items confiscated during the buybust were counted, marked and
inventoried. In particular, PO1 Manamtam marked the three sachets that the accusedappellant handed him
as MCM A, MCM B, and MCM C, respectively, while PO3 Eva marked the sachet that the accused
appellant dropped on the ground as PAE III. The marking and inventory of the seized items were
witnessed by Barangay Kagawad Julio Marbella of Cormidal, Tabaco City and Emmanuel Cea III, a local
newsman, both of whom signed the Certification of Inventory. The seized items were all transferred to PO3
Eva as the evidence custodian.
PO3 Eva thereafter prepared a Receipt of Seized Evidence/Property before handing the seized items to PO1
Reynaldo Borromeo who signed the receipt upon taking hold of the items. PO1 Borromeo proceeded to the
PNP Crime Laboratory in Legazpi City bringing with him the seized items and a Request for Laboratory
Examination.
The seized items were received by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Legazpi City where PSInsp. Josephine
Macura Clemen, a forensic chemist, examined them. The results of her examination showed that the sachet
which the accusedappellant dropped on the ground and picked up by PO3 Eva contained 0.3035 gram of
marijuana fruiting tops,14 while the three sachets which the accusedappellant sold to PO1 Manamtam
contained marijuana with an aggregate weight of 1.0291 grams. 15
PSInsp. Clemen subsequently presented the seized drugs to the trial court as the prosecutions evidence in
the course of her testimony.16
For his part, accusedappellants defense was denial. According to him, after finishing his work at around
noon of April 25, 2006, he went out of the premises of the Tabaco Pier to go home. He was suddenly
accosted by SPO3 Eva and Edwin Morate. He was familiar with SPO3 Eva as he frequently sees the latter
around. SPO3 Eva asked him if he is Joselito Morate alias Palito and he answered affirmatively. At that
moment, SPO3 Eva handcuffed the accusedappellant and brought the latter to the police station where he
was detained for no apparent reason.17
In its Joint Decision dated September 7, 2009, the trial court found the accusedappellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges against him. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused JOSELITO MORATE y TARNATE @ PALITO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Violation of Section 5 of Art. II of R.A. 9165, in Criminal Case No. T4467[,] judgment is hereby rendered
sentencing JOSELITO MORATE yTARNATE to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of

P500,000.00.
Further finding the accused JOSELITO MORATE y TARNATE @ PALITO [guilty beyond reasonable doubt] in
Criminal Case No. T4466 for Violation of Section 11[,] Art. II of R.A. 9165[,] judgment is hereby rendered
sentencing JOSELITO MORATE y TARNATE to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and 1
day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and a fine of P300,000.00.
The confiscated dried marijuana leaves are hereby ordered to be turned over to the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Tabaco City, which, in turn, shall coordinate with the proper government agency for the proper
disposition and destruction of the same.18
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Accusedappellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. He questioned his conviction on the basis of
what he claimed as noncompliance with the rule on chain of custody of seized illegal drugs. He further
claimed that the trial court should not have given full weight and credence to the prosecutions evidence as
there was failure to prove the integrity of the seized drug. Such failure on the part of the prosecution
means failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 19
In particular, the accusedappellant points to the following violations of the chain of custody requirement
under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations: the seized items
were marked and subjected to inventory not at the scene of the buybust but at the police station; the
marking and inventory of the seized drugs were conducted in the presence of the buybust team, together
with Marbella and Cea, but without the accusedappellant or his representative; and, no photographs were
taken during the inventory.20
In its Decision dated October 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rejected the contentions of the accused
appellant and denied his appeal. According to the Court of Appeals, there was substantial compliance with
the requirements of Republic Act No. 9165. In particular, the Court of Appeals noted the following links in
the chain of custody:
(1) PO1 Manamtam who was tasked to act as the poseurbuyer testified that the three (3) sachets of
marijuana which he bought from the accusedappellant were marked by him as []MCM A[], []MCM B[],
and []MCM C[]. While the subject sachet of marijuana which was confiscated by PO3 Eva III when the
accusedappellant was frisked during the arrest was marked by the former with []PAE III[].
(2) The Receipt of Seized Evidence/Property clearly states that the subject sachets of marijuana were turned
over by PO3 Eva III and were received by PO1 Borromeo, Jr. who testified and corroborated the said turn
over. He further said in open court that aside from being the tasked driver at the buybust operation, he was
also assigned by the Chief of Police Bataller to bring the items to the Crime Laboratory.
(3) The plastic sachets were brought to the laboratory for examination per Requests for Laboratory
Examination signed by PO1 Borromeo.
(4) According to Chemistry Report No[s]. D8206 and [D] 8306, prepared by Sr. Insp. Josephine
Macura Clemen, the four (4) plastic sachets positively contain Marijuana, a dangerous drug. 21 (Citations
omitted.)
For the Court of Appeals, the circumstances above show that the chain of custody of the seized items was
properly established: the items seized from the accusedappellant at the scene of the crime were also the
items marked by the arresting officers, turned over to the investigator, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and
returned after yielding positive results for Marijuana.22 Thus, the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of
the accusedappellant for both crimes. The decretal portion of the Decision dated October 18, 2011 reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Joint Decision dated 07
September 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Branch 17 in Criminal Cases Nos. T4466 and T
4467 finding accusedappellant JOSELITO MORATE y TARNATE guilty of the violations charged
is AFFIRMED.23
Accusedappellant is now before this Court insisting on the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt on account of the prosecutions noncompliance with the chain of custody
requirement under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations.

This Court denies the accusedappellants appeal.

Initially, it must be emphasized that accusedappellants defense of alleged noncompliance with Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165 was raised belatedly and for the first time on appeal. Failure to raise the issue of
nonobservance of the chain of custody requirement during trial is fatal to the case of the accused
appellant.24 As explained in People v. Sta. Maria25 :
The law excuses noncompliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may
excuse the police officers involved in the buybust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will
remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from
him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not
raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant
least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value.Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal;
when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

In this case, the accusedappellant never questioned the chain of custody during trial. Specifically, the
records show that the accusedappellant never assailed the propriety and regularity of the process of
marking and inventory of the seized items during the prosecutions presentation of evidence on that matter
during the testimony of PO1 Manamtam.26 Also, when the prosecution formally offered the Certification of
Inventory as evidence for the purpose of proving the immediate and accurate inventory, marking and
packing of the purchased and the seized marijuana to maintain and preserve [their] identities and integrity
and the four sachets of marijuana as evidence for the purpose of proving the identities and integrity of the
purchased and the seized marijuana as those were immediately inventoried, marked and
documented/recorded,27 the accusedappellants comment was simply Denied as to the purposes for which
they are being offered for being self[]serving pieces of evidence 28 and said nothing about non
compliance with the chain of custody requirement.
More importantly, the accusedappellants counsel himself has dropped the bomb that demolished the
accusedappellants defense. He admitted the identity and integrity of the specimens. As regards the illegal
drugs subject of Criminal Case No. T4466, the following is instructive:

Q
A

Tell us, Madam, where are the items that are covered by the laboratory
examination and the chemistry report?
Here are the drug items that are the subject of my chemistry report.

PROS. BROTAMONTE:
So you are handing over to me the drug items encased in a large
transparent plastic sachet which has marking D8206 and initial on a
masking tape seal. May we request, Your Honor, without necessarily
opening the packet that it be marked as Exhibit I1 to be placed on the
masking tape and[,] again without necessarily opening the transparent
plastic packet[,] the three (3) transparent plastic sachets inside it be
assigned markings as Exhibit I1A, Exhibit I1B and Exhibit I1
C be placed on the masking tape on the outside [of] the large
transparent packet.
Now, stipulations. Would the defense admit that those items marked as
Exhibit[s] I1A to I1C are those referred to in the request for
laboratory examination x x x.

xxx
ATTY. NASAYAO:
We admit, Your Honor, that these plastic sachets contain items
MC[MA], MC[MB] and MC[MC].29 (Emphasis supplied.)
As regards the illegal drugs subject of Criminal Case No. T4467, the following is enlightening:

PROS. BROTAMONTE:
Q

The items?

WITNESS:
A

This is the actual drug item with the letter request.

May we ask the witness as preparation to the stipulation from whom is

this large transparent pack where the smaller plastic sachet where the
supposed marijuana is encased came from?

The original.

PROS. BROTAMONTE:
May we know if the defense admit[s] that the supposed marijuana inside
a small transparent sachet which is in turn encased in a large
transparent pack with serial number D8306 and the signature along
with the marking and written in blue pentel pen are the items examined
x x x.
ATTY. BUAG:
Admitted. But along this line[,] we would stipulate that PInsp. Clemen
has no personal knowledge as to where this evidence was found and she
had no personal knowledge and has no participation in the arrest of the
accused.
PROS. BROTAMONTE:
We stipulate as per record these containers and the items came from the
Tabaco City PNP.
ATTY. BUAG:

Admitted.30 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, through counsel, the accusedappellant admitted that the seized sachets subjected to laboratory
examination and which were confirmed as containing marijuana were the same items referred to in the
request for laboratory examination the very same sachets which the accusedappellant sold to PO1
Manamtam and marked by the latter as MCMA, MCMB and MCMC during the inventory. The
accusedappellant also admitted that the other seized sachet subjected to laboratory examination and which
was confirmed as containing marijuana was the same item referred to in the request for laboratory
examination the very same sachet dropped by the accusedappellant when he was about to be arrested
but picked up by PO3 Eva and marked by the latter as PAE III during the inventory. While the latter
admission may be qualified by the statement that the forensic chemist who conducted the laboratory
examination had neither personal knowledge of the source of the evidence nor participation in the arrest of
the accusedappellant, such admission was coupled with the further admission that the item came from the
Tabaco City PNP in connection with the case against the accusedappellant as reflected in the chemistry
report.
These two circumstances (1) the omission of the accusedappellant to raise the issue of noncompliance
with the chain of custody requirement on time, and (2) the admission of the accusedappellant as to the
identity and integrity of the seized items that the PNP Tabaco City submitted to the Crime Laboratory,
subjected to examination by the forensic chemist and presented in court as evidence are sufficient to
defeat the claims of the accusedappellant. Nevertheless, even the consideration of the compliance with the
chain of custody requirement calls for the denial of the accusedappellants appeal.
The chain of custody is basically the duly recorded authorized stages of transfer of custody of seized
dangerous drugs, from their seizure or confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory for examination to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.31 The function of the chain of custody requirement is
to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. 32 Thus, the chain of custody
requirement has a twofold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence.
The law recognizes that, while the presentation of a perfect unbroken chain is ideal, the realities and
variables of actual police operation usually makes an unbroken chain impossible. 33 With this implied judicial
recognition of the difficulty of complete compliance with the chain of custody requirement, 34substantial
compliance is sufficient as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending police officers.35
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the chain of custody requirement has been
substantially complied with. The police officers duly recorded the various authorized stages of transfer of
custody of the dangerous drugs confiscated from the accusedappellant. In particular, PO1 Manamtam had
custody of the three sachets of marijuana which the accusedappellant sold him, from the scene of the buy
bust to the police station, while PO3 Eva had custody of the sachet of marijuana which the accused
appellant dropped, from the scene of the buybust to the police station. Upon arrival at the police station,
PO1 Manamtam and PO3 Eva marked the items of contraband in their respective possession and conducted
an inventory in the presence of the accusedappellant, Barangay Kagawad Marbella and media
representative Cea. The seized items subject of the inventory were then transferred to the custody of PO1
Borromeo who brought them to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Legazpi City where they were examined by
PSInsp. Clemen, the forensic chemist. PSInsp. Clemen then brought the contraband to the court as the
prosecutions evidence when she testified in court. The four sachets of marijuana taken from the accused
appellant were the same sachets of marijuana which the police officers marked and subjected to inventory,
and they were the very same sachets of marijuana brought to the crime laboratory, examined by the
forensic chemist and presented to court as evidence. Thus, the identity and evidentiary integrity of the
seized items were properly preserved.
Contrary to the contention of the accusedappellant, the marking and inventory of the seized items at the
police station did not contravene the procedure laid down in Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165. The
said provision provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs x x x:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
On the other hand, the relevant portion of the implementing rules and regulations of the law states:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, x x x:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures;Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.]
The seizure and confiscation of the prohibited drugs from the accusedappellant was a warrantless seizure
resulting from a buybust. The law, as carried out by its implementing rules and regulations expressly
authorizes the taking of the inventory of the seized contraband at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure.
Thus, this Court has ruled that marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. 36 In this light, the marking and inventory of the
seized items at the police station immediately after the arrival thereat of the police officers who conducted
the buybust operation was in accordance with the law, its implementing rules and regulations, and relevant
jurisprudence.
As regards the accusedappellants claim that he was not present during the inventory, this is contradicted
by Cea, the media representative who witnessed the marking and inventory of the articles seized from the
accusedappellant. During crossexamination by the accusedappellants counsel, Cea categorically
declared that the accusedappellant witnessed the inventory:

[ATTY. BUAG:]
Q

Was the accused present during the time of the inventory?

[WITNESS:]
A

During that time he was there x x x.

Were you informed by the police that that person was the accused?

Yes, I am sure that he was there as a suspect because we usually

interview the suspect to confirm.

While the items were on the table was the accused already there?

Yes, sir.37

The media representative, who witnessed the inventory and signed the Certification of Inventory of the
confiscated drugs which have been duly marked by the police officers, firmly testified that the inventory was
conducted in the presence of the accusedappellant. There is no reason, and the accusedappellant himself
does not give any basis, to doubt Ceas testimony.
As to the failure to photograph the inventory of the seized items, such omission on the part of the police
officers is not fatal to the case against the accusedappellant. This Court has ruled in various cases, such
as People v. Almodiel,38People v. Rosialda,39People v. Llamado,40 and People v. Rivera,41that the failure of the
prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated is not fatal and does not automatically render the arrest of the accused illegal or the
items seized from him inadmissible.42 As has been said earlier, the prosecution has sufficiently shown that
the identity and evidentiary integrity of the seized items were properly preserved, and that is not materially
affected by the prosecutions failure to take a photograph of the seized items.
As the contentions of the accusedappellant have been addressed, we now proceed to discuss his criminal
liability.
A successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires that the following elements be
established:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration
of the sale; and
(2) the delivery to the buyer of the thing sold and receipt by the seller of the
payment therefor.43
On the other hand, there can be conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs only if the following
elements are present:

(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be

a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. 44
Illegal sale of dangerous drugs is committed when the sale transaction is consummated, 45 that is, upon
delivery of the illicit drug to the buyer and the receipt of the payment by the seller. In this case, the RTC
and the Court of Appeals both found beyond reasonable doubt that the accusedappellant, as seller, sold
1.0291 grams of marijuana to the poseurbuyer, PO1 Manamtam, for P100.00. The former handed the
latter three sachets of marijuana after the latter paid the P100.00 consideration for the sale. Under Section
5 of Republic Act No. 9165, such illegal sale of dangerous drugs, regardless of quantity, is punishable with
the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). In light of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346,
otherwise known as An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of
the supreme penalty of death has been proscribed. Consequently, the penalty applicable to the accused
appellant shall only be life imprisonment, without eligibility for parole, and fine. 46 Thus, the accused
appellant was correctly meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals likewise found beyond reasonable doubt that the accusedappellant
had in his possession a sachet containing 0.3035 gram of marijuana fruiting tops, which he dropped when
the police operatives closed in on him, and that he had no authority to possess the dangerous drug. Under
Section 11(3) of Republic Act No. 9165, illegal possession of less than 300 grams of marijuana is punishable
with the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos

(P400,000.00). Thus, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accusedappellant was
correctly meted the penalty of imprisonment for a minimum term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to a
maximum term of twenty (20) years, and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
In sum, the accusedappellant has been correctly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession
of 0.3035 gram of marijuana in Criminal Case No. T4466 and of illegal sale of 1.0291 grams of marijuana in
Criminal Case No. T4467. The respective penalties imposed on him are likewise proper and in accordance
with law.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.H.C. No. 04197
affirming the Joint Decision dated September 7, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Branch 17 in
Criminal Case Nos. T4466 and T4467 which found the accusedappellant GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Sections 11 and 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 201860

January 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.
MARCELINO DADAO, ANTONIO SULINDAO, EDDIE MALOGSI (deceased) and ALFEMIO
MALOGSI,*Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from a Decision dated May 16, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 00364, entitled People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi
and Alfemio Malogsi, which affirmed with modifications the Decision dated January 31, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, Branch 11 that convicted appellants Marcelino
Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Malogsi for the felony of murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 93-1272.
1

The genesis of this court case can be traced to the charge of murder against the appellants in the
trial court via an Information dated July 16, 1993. The accusatory portion of said indictment reads:
3

That on or about the 11th day of July 1993, at 7:30 in the evening more or less at barangay Salucot,
municipality of Talakag, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with
(sic) one another, with intent to kill, by means of treachery, armed with guns and bolos, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and sho[o]t PIONIO YACAPIN, hitting his back
and left leg, inflicting wounds that cause[d] his death thereafter.
To the damage and prejudice [of] the heirs of the deceased PIONIO YACAPIN in such sum they are
entitled under the law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
On September 27, 1993, the appellants were arraigned. All four (4) accused pleaded "NOT GUILTY"
to the charge leveled against them.
4

The factual backdrop of this case as condensed in the trial courts assailed January 31, 2005
judgment and adopted by the Court of Appeals in its similarly assailed May 16, 2011 Decision is
reproduced hereunder:
Evidence for the Prosecution
Prosecutions first witness, Ronie Dacion, a 14-year old stepson of the victim, Pionio Yacapin,
testified that on July 11, 1993 at about 7:30 in the evening he saw accused Marcelino Dadao,
Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and [A]lfemio Malogsi helping each other and with the use of
firearms and bolos, shot to death the victim, Pionio Yacapin in their house at Barangay Salucot,
Talakag, Bukidnon.
The testimony of the second witness for the prosecution, Edgar Dacion, a 12-year old stepson of the
victim, corroborates the testimony of his older brother Ronie Dacion.
Prosecutions third witness, Nenita Yacapin, the widow of the victim, also corroborates the testimony
of the prosecutions first and second witness. The said witness further testified that she suffered civil
and moral damages [due to] the death of her husband.
Prosecutions fourth witness, Bernandino Signawan, testified that at about 10:00 oclock in the
evening of July 11, 1993, Ronie and Edgar Dacion reached to [sic] his house and related to him that
their stepfather was killed by accused Eddie Malogsi, [A]lfemio Malogsi, Marcelino Dadao and
Antonio Sulindao. Witness Signawan further testified that on the following morning, he and the other
people in Ticalaan including the barangay captain, Ronie and Edgar Dacion returned to the house of
the victim and found the latter already dead and in the surrounding [area] of the house were
recovered empty shells of firearms.
Prosecutions fifth witness, SPO2 Nestor Aznar, testified that he was the one who prepared the
sketch of the hut where the incident happened and further testified that the four accused were in the
custody of the government and in the following morning of the incident, he was at the scene of the
crime and found in the yard of the hut eight (8) garand empty shells caliber 30m[m].
The prosecution presented its sixth and last witness, Modesto Libyocan, who testified that on the
evening of July 11, 1993, at Barangay Salucot, he saw in the house of the victim, Pionio Yacapin,
lights caused by flashlights and heard several gunshots from the house of the victim, and that the
family left their house on that evening and went to Ticalaan where they learned that Pionio Yacapin
was killed in his house and that early the following morning, July 12, 1993, he was with some
companions, barangay officials of Ticalaan in the house of the victim where they found him dead and
sustaining gunshot wounds.
Evidence for the Defense
Defenses first witness, Police Inspector Vicente Armada, testified that on July 30, 1993, at 11:00 in
the morning, he conducted an examination for paraffin test on all four accused with the findings that
they yielded negative result x x x.
The defense presented Eddie Malogsi, one of the accused, as its second witness, who testified that
on July 11, 1993 at 7:30 in the evening, he was at the farm of a certain Boyle together with his

brother, [A]lfemio Malogsi, one of the accused herein, being a worker of that farm. He further testified
that on the said date and time, he never fired a gun.
Defenses third witness, [A]lfemio Malogsi, another accused in this case, corroborates the testimony
of his brother and co-accused, Eddie Malogsi, that on the said date and time above-mentioned, he
was at the farm of a certain Boyle with his brother and that they heard several gunshots. He further
testified that he never owned a garand rifle.
Another accused, Antonio Sulindao, defenses fourth witness, testified that on the date and time
above-mentioned, he was at Salucot together with his family and at 7:30 x x x in the evening, he
heard some gun shots. He further testified among others, that he has no grudge x x x with the victim
prior to the incident.
The testimony of defenses fifth witness, Fernandez Saplina, [was to] establish the defense of denial
and alibi in so far as accused Marcelino Dadao, that on the whole evening of July 11, 1993, accused
Marcelino Dadao was all the time at his house in San Fernandez, Salucot, Talacag, Bukidnon, and
there was no occasion that said accused went outside or left his house on the said date and time.
The said witness further testified that he visited the accused at the municipal jail of Talakag,
Bukidnon, where he was detained for having been the suspect in the killing of Pionio Yacapin.
The defense presented its sixth witness, Camilo Dumalig, who corroborates the testimony of
Fernandez Saplina to the effect that accused Marcelino Dadao has been residing at San Fernandez,
Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon at the time of the incident on July 11, 1993 which place is about 7
kilometers from the place of the incident.
Defenses seventh witness, Venancio Payonda, father-in-law of accused Antonio Sulindao, testified
that the latter was in his house the whole day of July 11, 1993.
The defense presented as its last witness, accused Marcelino Dadao, who testified that three (3)
months prior to July 11, 1993, he had been staying at the house of one Fernandez Saplina at Sitio
San Fernandez, Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon, which is about 7 kilometers away from the house of the
victim. He further testified that on July 11, 1993, he did not leave the house of Fernandez Saplina
until the following morning.
5

After trial was concluded, a guilty verdict was handed down by the trial court finding appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murdering Pionio Yacapin. The assailed January 31, 2005 Decision
disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused, EDDIE MALOGSI, [A]LFEMIO
MALOGSI, ANTONIO SULINDAO and MARCELINO DADAO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the said four accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and are ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, the amount of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P75,000.00) as moral damages and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as exemplary
damages and to pay the cost of the suit. Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 292, dated January 20, 1992, the bailbonds of all four accused are hereby ordered cancelled and the
latter are ordered detained, pending resolution of any Appeal that may be pursued in this case.
6

Appellants elevated their case to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, the
appellate court acted on a Manifestation filed by Rogelio Tampil, bondsman for Eddie Malogsi, who
sought the cancellation of the memorandum of encumbrance that was reflected in his land title
(Original Certificate of Title No. P-13825, Entry No. 165683) for the reason that Eddie Malogsi had
already died on August 25, 2003. Thus, on February 11, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution granting Tampils request. Subsequently, after considering the pleadings and memoranda
of the parties, the Court of Appeals issued its May 16, 2011 Decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
7

ACCORDINGLY, this appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
modification the P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as temperate damages shall be
awarded in addition to the moral and exemplary damages already awarded by the lower court.
8

Hence, appellants, through counsel, seek final recourse with the Court and reiterate the following
assignment of errors from their Appellants Brief filed with the Court of Appeals:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE OF THE
DEFENSE.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH WHEN THE SAME WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION.
9

The foregoing arguments were later on amplified by appellants Supplemental Brief.

10

Appellants reiterate that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were afflicted with inconsistencies and
improbabilities, thus, making them of doubtful veracity. Furthermore, appellants faulted the trial court
for disbelieving their alibis and for disregarding the fact that the paraffin test which all of them were
subjected to produced a negative result. Appellants also underscored the fact that they did not take
flight despite the knowledge that they were made suspects in the murder of Pionio Yacapin. Lastly,
appellants maintain that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength should not have
been appreciated as it was not alleged in the criminal information filed against them.
The petition is without merit.
In fine, the pivotal issue raised by appellants in questioning the validity of their conviction for the
crime of murder is whether or not the eyewitness testimonies presented by the prosecution,

specifically that of the two stepsons (Ronie and Edgar Dacion) and the widow (Nenita Yacapin) of
the deceased victim, Pionio Yacapin, are credible enough to be worthy of belief.
We have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of such a factual question is best left
to the sound judgment of the trial court and that, absent any misapprehension of facts or grave
abuse of discretion, the findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. In People v. De la Rosa, we
yet again expounded on this principle in this wise:
11

[T]he issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of [the] witness, which is best
addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the
witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are
the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth,
especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire
proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose
testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters
will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. x x x.
Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution
were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit. In the case at bar, no imputation of improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses was ever made by appellants.
12

Furthermore, appellants contend that the prosecution witnesses made inconsistent and improbable
statements in court which supposedly impair their credibility, such as whether or not the stepsons of
the victim left for Ticalaan together to report the incident, whether the accused were still firing at the
victim when they left or not, and whether or not the accused went after the stepsons after shooting
the victim. We have reviewed the relevant portions of the transcripts pointed out by the appellants
and have confidently arrived at the conclusion that these are matters involving minor inconsistencies
pertaining to details of immaterial nature that do not tend to diminish the probative value of the
testimonies at issue. We elucidated on this subject in Avelino v. People, to wit:
13

Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to assimilate all material details of a
given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken
their probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a
testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants.
As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor
inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not
undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness. (Emphasis omitted.)
Notwithstanding their conflicting statements on minor details, Ronie, Edgar and Nenita positively
identified appellants as the perpetrators of the dastardly crime of murder committed on the victim
which they categorically and consistently claimed to have personally witnessed.
In order to counter the serious accusation made against them, appellants put forward the defense of
alibi which necessarily fails in the face of positive identification. It is a time-honored principle in
jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated
and is inherently unreliable. Hence, it must be supported by credible corroboration from
disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused. An examination of the record would
14

15

indicate that Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi were unable to present a corroborating witness to support
their alibi that they were working at a farm owned by a certain Boyle on the date and time of Pionio
Yacapins murder. While the witnesses presented by the defense to corroborate the respective alibis
of Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends and relatives who are hardly the
disinterested witnesses that is required by jurisprudence.
With regard to appellants assertion that the negative result of the paraffin tests that were conducted
on their persons should be considered as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can only declare that
such a statement is misguided considering that it has been established in jurisprudence that a
paraffin test is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. It should also be noted that,
according to the prosecution, only Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi held firearms which were used in the
fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin while Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao purportedly held bolos.
Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the latter two tested negative for powder burns because
they were never accused of having fired any gun. Nevertheless, the evidence on record has
established that all four accused shared a community of criminal design. By their concerted action, it
is evident that they conspired with one another to murder Pionio Yacapin and should each suffer the
same criminal liability attached to the aforementioned criminal act regardless of who fired the
weapon which delivered the fatal wounds that ended the life of the victim.
16

In People v. Nelmida, we elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its ramifications in
this manner:
17

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every
one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them.
In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode
and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the
mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the
act of all. (Citation and emphasis omitted.)
As to appellants argument that their act of bravely reporting to the police station to answer the
serious charge of murder against them instead of fleeing militates against a finding of any criminal
liability on their part especially in light of the dubious evidence presented by the prosecution, we can
only dismiss this as a hollow line of reasoning considering that human experience as observed in
jurisprudence instructs us that non-flight does not necessarily connote innocence. Consequently, we
have held:
Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and
even erratically in externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee a
circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to
create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from other members of the community.
Contrary to appellants claim that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was
used by the trial court to qualify the act of killing committed by appellants to murder despite it not
having been alleged in the criminal information filed against them, the text of the assailed January
31, 2005 Decision of the trial court clearly shows that, even though abuse of superior strength was

18

discussed as present in the commission of the crime, it was not appreciated as either a qualifying or
generic aggravating circumstance.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court appreciated treachery, which was
alleged in the information, as an aggravating circumstance which qualified the offense to murder.
This is proper considering that, even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged and proven
in court, it cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled
that when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is
absorbed in the latter.
19

Time and again, we have declared that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. Furthermore, we have also held that the essence of treachery is that the
attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In the case at bar, the
manner by which Pionio Yacapin was killed carried all the indubitable hallmarks of treachery. We
quote with approval the following discussion of the Court of Appeals on this matter, to wit:
20

21

Treachery, which was alleged in the information, was duly proven by the prosecution. The Court
notes, in particular, the testimony of Nenita Yacapin who declared that when the victim was making a
fire in the kitchen, she heard shots and she saw the barrel of the gun inserted on the bamboo split
walling of their house. Exhibit "B", the anatomical chart certified by the Philippine National Police
(PNP) personnel, shows the relative location of the gunshot wounds sustained by the victim. The
chart indicates that the victim was shot from behind. Clearly, the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. (Citations omitted.)
1wphi1

22

After reviewing the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, we declare that the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellants is
correct and should be upheld. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant
to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
23

Anent the award of damages, it is jurisprudentially settled that when death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.
24

Thus, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is proper. Likewise, the award of
temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, in the amount of P25,000.00 is warranted
considering that the death of the victim definitely caused his heirs some expenses for his wake and
burial though they were not able to present proof.
25

26

However, we must modify the amounts of moral and exemplary damages already awarded in order
to conform to existing jurisprudence. Therefore, the exemplary damages awarded should be
increased from P20,000.00 toP30,000.00. Moreover, there being no aggravating circumstance
present in this case, the award of moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 should be decreased
27

to P50,000.00. Lastly, the interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from
the date of finality of this ruling until fully paid.
28

29

Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals did not rule on the effect of the death of Eddie Malogsi
during the pendency of this case. Considering that no final judgment had been rendered against him
at the time of his death, whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant
because even assuming that he did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were
totally extinguished by his death, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and, by analogy,
our ruling in People v. Bayotas. Therefore, the present criminal case should be dismissed with
respect only to the deceased Eddie Malogsi.
30

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 16, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00364 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) The amount of exemplary damages to be paid by appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio
Sulindao and Alfemio Malogsi is increased from Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);
(2) The amount of moral damages to be paid by appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio
Sulindao and Alfemio Malogsi is decreased from Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
(3) Appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio Malogsi are ordered to pay
the private offended party interest on all damages at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment; and
(4) Criminal Case No. 93-1272 is DISMISSED with respect to Eddie Malogsi in view of his
death during the pendency of this case.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:
The accusedappellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19, 2012 Decision1of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.H.C. No. 03794, which affirmed in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts
of Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos.
041556CFM and 041557CFM.2
On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. The Informations
for the three charges read as follows:

I. For the two counts of Rape:

Criminal Case No. 041556CFM

chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the
common law spouse of the minor victims mother, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and
there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of [AAA 3 ], a
minor 13 years of age, by then and there mashing her breast and inserting his finger inside her vagina
against her will.4
Criminal Case No. 041557CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being
the stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years of age, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said minor against her will. 5
II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:
Criminal Case No. 041558CFM
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, being the
common law spouse of minor victims mother by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape against the person
of minor, [AAA], a 13 years old minor by then and there crawling towards her direction where she was
sleeping, putting off her skirt, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produce[d] the
crime of rape for the reason other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor
victims mother who confronted the accused, and which acts of child abuse debased, degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor complainant as a human being. 6
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him. 7 After
the completion of the pretrial conference on September 16, 2004, 8 trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse took place on
three (3) different dates, particularly [in December 2003], February 2004, and March 27, 2004.
AAAs parents separated when she was [only eight years old9 ]. At the time of the commission of the
aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with herein accusedappellant Bernabe Pareja
who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12),
eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAAs mother was not in
the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was
asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was already naked, begun to undress AAA.
[Pareja] then started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his penis into
AAAs anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of
their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003] incident for fear that
[Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the incident to
anyone.
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once. According to AAA,
[i]n February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by [Pareja]. Under the same
circumstances as the [December 2003 incident], with her mother not around while she and her halfsiblings
were asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this time, [Pareja]
caressed [her] and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.

With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAAs mother who saw
[Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAAs
mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then narrated to
the barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine
General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional
MedicoLegal Report Number 2004030091. Her medicolegal report stated the following conclusion:
Hymen:
Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 57 oclock area, Type of hymen: Crescentic

chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

xxx
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medicolegal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAAs mother then filed a
complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him as his
defense. He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his livein partner
and that they all stay in the same house.
Contrary to AAAs allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible that the alleged incidents
happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of their house and argued that there was no
way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10) meters,
and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the vicinity where their
house is located was thickly populated with houses constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no
choice but to sleep beside her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly still go about
with his plan without AAAs siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled against him by AAA. He
contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as an act of revenge because AAA was mad at
[him] for being the reason behind her parents separation. 10
Ruling of the RTC
On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the
crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents, respectively.
The dispositive portion of the Decision11 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from the charge of attempted
rape in Crim. Case No. 041558, for want of evidence.
In Crim. Case No. 041556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness and he is meted out
the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day as minimum to 4 years and 2
months of prision [correccional] as maximum.
In Crim. Case No. 041557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he is meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more weight to the
prosecutions evidence as against Parejas baseless denial and imputation of ill motive. However, due to the
failure of the prosecution to present AAAs mother to testify about what she had witnessed in March 2004,

the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of
evidence. The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAAs testimony for being hearsay evidence as
she had no personal knowledge of what happened on March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that
time.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed13 to the Court of Appeals, which on January 19,
2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 041556 and 041557, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and,
consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in Criminal Cases Nos. 041556 to
041557 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Issues
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court15 and posited before us the following errors as he did
before the Court of Appeals:
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS TESTIMONY.16
In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following argument:
The private complainants actuations after the incident negate the possibility that she was raped. 18
Parejas main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony of AAA in convicting
him for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is attacking the credibility of AAA for being
inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if nothing happened after the alleged sexual abuse.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no reason to reverse Parejas conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAAs testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was riddled with
inconsistencies.19
We find such argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain guidelines that
have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez,20 we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTCs assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower courts findings, particularly when no
significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked
or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. (Citations omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best
left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on
the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courtsand when his findings have been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.21 While there are recognized
exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the
trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAAs credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony are generally expected. 22
Court stated in People v. Saludo23 :

As this

Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an offense is not
analogous to a persons achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is
something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche
for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be
expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience
she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has
never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness. 24 The inconsistencies mentioned by
Pareja are trivial and nonconsequential matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being
questioned. The inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining
to AAAs ordeal.25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important only when
it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for
purposes of conviction. In other words, the date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only
when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainants narration practically hinge on the date of the
commission of the crime.26 Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of
the crime.27
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v. Ladrillo,28 implying that our rulings
therein are applicable to his case. However, the factual circumstances in Ladrillo are prominently missing in
Parejas case. In particular, the main factor for Ladrillos acquittal in that case was because his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the
Information against him only stated that the crime was committed on or about the year 1992. We said:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the Rules Court
which requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as
the information or complaint will permit. More importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Information
is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accusedappellant of the date on which the
criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase on or about the year 1992 encompasses not only the twelve (12 ) months of 1992 but includes
the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which accusedappellant has to virtually
account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the
commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of the commission of the
offense as alleged in the Information, deprived accusedappellant of his right to intelligently prepare for his
defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At most, accusedappellant could only establish
his place of residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for the particular time he supposedly
committed the rape.
xxx
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that accusedappellant raped
complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the commission of the offense as alleged was based
merely on speculation and conjecture, and a conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum
of evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime
was committed on the date and place indicated in the Information. 29 (Citation omitted.)

In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents were not specified, the
period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short, unlike on or about the year 1992. Moreover,
Ladrillo was able to prove that he had only moved in the house where the rape supposedly happened, in
1993, therefore negating the allegation that he raped the victim in that house in 1992. 30
While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim in Ladrillo contributed to his
eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were not enough to reverse Ladrillos conviction, viz:
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness testimony that militates heavily against
its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently, the defects
might not suffice to overturn the trial courts judgment of conviction, but assessed and weighed in
its totality, and in relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a
powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment. 31 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the crime charged against him
to exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi, which, together with the other evidence, produced
reasonable doubt that he committed the crime as charged. In contrast, Pareja merely denied the
accusations against him and even imputed ill motive on AAA.
As regards Parejas concern about AAAs lone testimony being the basis of his conviction, this Court has
held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a
conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would
be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single
witness in a rape case.32 (Citations omitted.)
Improbability of sexual abuse
in their small house and in the
presence of AAAs sleeping siblings
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA, considering that their house was
so small that they had to sleep beside each other, that in fact, when the alleged incidents happened, AAA
was sleeping beside her younger siblings, who would have noticed if anything unusual was happening. 33
This Court is not convinced. Parejas living conditions could have prevented him from acting out on his
beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape cases appealed to us were
not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or place,34 and rape defies constraints of
time and space. In People v. Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on such occurrence in this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples with big families
living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons
around them. Considering the cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten
used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members;
otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even when
asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be
awakened while the sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep
more soundly than grownups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night.
There is no merit in appellants contention that there can be no rape in a room where other people are
present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that
lust is no respecter of time and place, and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places.
(Citations omitted.)
Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAAs demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was raped. He said that the
ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce of her strength and courage to thwart any attempt to
besmirch her honor and blemish her purity. Pareja pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated area

such that any commotion inside their house would have been easily heard by the neighbors, thus, giving
AAA the perfect opportunity to seek their help.36 Moreover, Pareja said, AAAs delay in reporting the
incidents to her mother or the authorities negates the possibility that he indeed committed the crimes.
AAAs belated confession, he claimed, cannot be dismissed as trivial as it puts into serious doubt her
credibility.37
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the blame on the
victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court has recognized the fact that no
clearcut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that
failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that the
victim has consented to the sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into submission by the
accused. In cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common
law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence. 38 In this case, AAAs lack of
resistance was brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever
spoke of the incident.
AAAs conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is also not enough
to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in
accordance with societys expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to an
irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in an
unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind placed under emotional
stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard reaction or behavior among victims of the crime
of rape since each of them had to cope with different circumstances. 39
Likewise, AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities is insignificant and
does not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be remembered that Pareja threatened to kill her if
she told anyone of the incidents. In People v. Ogarte,40 we explained why a rape victims deferral in
reporting the crime does not equate to falsification of the accusation, to wit:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or to report
the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested
and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the
offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal
charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to
the world or risk the offenders making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)
Medical examination
not indispensable
Pareja avers that the MedicoLegal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt force or penetrating
trauma upon examination of AAAs hymen, cannot be given any significance, as it failed to indicate how and
when the said signs of physical trauma were inflicted. Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAAs
hymen sustained trauma cannot be utilized as evidence against him as the alleged sexual abuse that
occurred in December, was not by penetration of the vagina. 41
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole
testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado,42 we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of
the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAAs anus at the time she was
examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination actually bolsters AAAs claim of
being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However, as the
prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot
be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:

This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve
full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a
public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against
her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years,
one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what
she claims is not true. (Citations omitted.)
Criminal Case No. 041557CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 041557CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was charged and convicted of the
crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or the AntiRape Law of 1997,
revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition of sexual violence on sexrelated orifices other
than a womans organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crimes expansion to cover genderfree
rape. The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the
introduction of rape by sexual assault as differentiated from the traditional rape through carnal knowledge
or rape through sexual intercourse. 44 Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the provision on rape in
the Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article 266A which reads:
Article 266A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as organ rape or
penile rape. 45 The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.46
2. Article 266A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called instrument or object rape, or
genderfree rape.47 It must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to
(d) of paragraph 1.48
In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as follows:

(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the
offender may be a man or a woman;

(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the
second, the offended party may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the
vagina, while the second is committed by inserting the penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into
the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the
second.
Under Article 266A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual assault is [b]y
any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis into her anus.
While she may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004 incident, she was positive that
Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual
assault. In other words, her testimony on this account was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive,
and probable.50
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape through carnal
knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during trial.
This is due to the material differences and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the
first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and viceversa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape
by sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the variance
doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 52 to
wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other
persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished
by prisin correccional.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:

(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
c.

When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and

(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.53 (Citation
omitted.)
Clearly, the abovementioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and were sufficiently
established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal
knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his
constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape. 54
Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the State, the People of the Philippines,
as represented by the public prosecutor, to exert more diligence in crafting the Information, which contains
the charge against an accused. The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see that justice is
done55 to the State, that its penal laws are not broken and order maintained; to the victim, that his or her
rights are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished for his crime. A faulty and defective
Information, such as that in Criminal Case No. 041556CFM, does not render full justice to the State, the
offended party, and even the offender. Thus, the public prosecutor should always see to it that the
Information is accurate and appropriate.
Criminal Case No. 041556CFM:
The February 2004 Incident
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the prosecution against Pareja,
especially AAAs testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found AAAs declaration on the rape in the December
2003 incident credible enough to result in a conviction, albeit this Court had to modify it as explained
above. However, it did not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, was fully
satisfied by the prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second count of rape against Pareja. In
Criminal Case No. 041556CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the RTC considered AAAs confusion as to
whether or not she was actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Parejas favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated that aside from sucking
her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not able to give a clear and
convincing account of such insertion during her testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the
prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja
also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis in her
vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be
convicted of rape in the February 2004 incident. Nonetheless, Parejas acts of placing himself on top of AAA
and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed above,
is included in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked both her breasts in the
February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the courts a quo of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with the attribution of ill
motive against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases against him because she was angry that he
caused her parents separation. Pareja added that these cases were initiated by AAAs father, as revenge
against him.57
Such contention is untenable. AAAs credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such imputation of ill

motives. It is highly unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or
grudge.58 Furthermore, motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from
giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim. 59 In People v. Manuel,60 we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her
private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and
impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of
childvictims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girlchild says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is prisin correccional in
its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,61 the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall
be taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree, 62 i.e.,arresto mayor, which ranges from 1
month and 1 day to 6 months.63 The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall come from the proper
penalty64 that could be imposed under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness, 65 which, in this
case, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, is the medium period of prisin correccional,
ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. 66
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as follows: P20,000.00 as
civil indemnity;67 P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, 68 for each count of
acts of lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.H.C. No. 03794 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accusedappellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of
two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. He is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim,
AAA, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
for each count of acts of lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195064

January 15, 2014

NARI K. GIDWANI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before us is a Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision and the
subsequent Resolution of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32642 dated 17 September
2010 and 6 January 2011, respectively.
1

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner is the president of G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation GSMC), which is engaged
in the export of ready-to-wear clothes. GSMC secured the embroidery services of El Grande
Industrial Corporation El Grande) and issued on various dates from June 1997 to December 1997 a

total of 10 Banco de Oro (BDO) checks as payment for the latters services worth an aggregate total
of 1,626,707.62.
Upon presentment, these checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn
against a closed account.
Thus, El Grande, through counsel, sent three demand letters regarding 8 of the 10 issued checks:
Date of letter

BDO Check No.

Date of Check

Amount

24 September 1997

0000063646

4 September 1997

24 September 1997

0000059552

12 June 1997

412,000.00

0000063643

24 July 1997

138,859.69

0000063644

7 August 1997

138,859.69

0000063650

7 August 1997

144,457.56

0000063645

28 August 1997

138,859.68

0000063647

25 September 1997

130,000.00

0000063648

2 October 1997

130,000.00

8 October

P 130,000.00

On 15 October 1997, petitioner wrote to El Grandes counsel acknowledging receipt of the 8

October demand letter and informing the latter that, on 29 August 1997, GSMC had filed a Petition
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It was a Petition for the Declaration of a State
of Suspension of Payments, for the Approval of a Rehabilitation Plan and Appointment of a
Management Committee. Acting on the Petition, the SEC issued an Order on 3 September 1997
ordering the suspension of all actions, claims, and proceedings against GSMC until further order
from the SEC Hearing Panel. Petitioner attached this SEC Order to the 15 October 1997 letter. In
short, GSMC did not pay El Grande.
5

Despite its receipt on 16 October 1997 of GSMCs letter and explanation, El Grande still presented
to the drawee bank for payment BDO Check Nos. 0000063652 and 0000063653 dated November
and December 1997, respectively.
Thereafter, sometime in November 1997, El Grande filed a Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila charging petitioner with eight counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(B.P. 22) for the checks covering June to October 1997. El Grande likewise filed a similar Complaint
in December 1997, covering the checks issued in November and December 1997. Corresponding
Informations for the Complaints were subsequently filed on 1 October 2001.
For his part, petitioner raised the following defenses: (1) the SEC Order of Suspension of Payment
legally prevented him from honoring the checks; (2) there was no consideration for the issuance of
the checks, because the embroidery services of El Grande were of poor quality and, hence, were
rejected; and (3) he did not receive a notice of dishonor of the checks.
On 24 March 2008, after trial on the merits, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten counts of violation of B.P. 22. It ordered him to pay
the face value of the checks amounting to P1,626,707.60 with interest at the legal rate per annum
from the filing of the case and to pay a fine of P200,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency. The MTC held that the Petition for voluntary insolvency or a SEC Order for the
suspension of payment of all claims are not defenses under the law regarding violations of B.P. 22,
since an order suspending payments involves only the obligations of the corporation and does not
affect criminal proceedings.
9

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the findings of the MTC and likewise denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
10

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42.
In its Decision dated 17 September 2010, the CA found that the prosecution was able to establish
that petitioner had received only the 8 October 1997 Notice of Dishonor and not the others. The CA
further held that the prosecution failed to establish that the account was closed prior to or at the time
the checks were issued, thus proving knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
Thus, the CA partly granted the appeal and acquitted petitioner of eight counts of violation of B.P. 22,
while sustaining his conviction for the two remaining counts and ordering him to pay the total civil
liability due to El Grande. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the assailed
RTC Decision dated January 29, 2009 and its Order dated June 5, 2009 are AFFIRMED with
modifications: (a) sustaining accused-appellants conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 301888 and
301889; (b) acquitting him in Criminal Case Nos. 371112-13, 301883-87 and 301890; and (c)
ordering him to pay private complainant, El Grande Industrial Corporation, the aggregate amount
of P1,626,707.62 representing the value of the ten (10) BDO checks with interest at 12% per annum
reckoned from the date of the filing of the Information until finality of this Decision, and thereafter, the
total amount due, inclusive of interest, shall be subject to 12% annual interest until fully paid.
The rest of the Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.

11

Petitioner filed his Motion for Partial Reconsideration on 11 October 2010, raising the following as
his defenses: (1) there was no clear evidence showing that he acknowledged the Notice of Dishonor
of the two remaining checks; (2) the suspension Order of the SEC was a valid reason for stopping
the payment of the checks; and, (3) as a corporate officer, he could only be held civilly liable.
12

On 6 January 2011, the CA denied the motion through its assailed Resolution.

13

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner raises these two issues in the present Petition:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ORDER FOR THE
SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT ISSUED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION IS NOT A VALID REASON TO STOP PAYMENT OF A CHECK EVEN IF
SUCH ORDER WAS ISSUED PRIOR TO THE PRESENTMENT OF THE SUBJECT
CHECKS FOR PAYMENT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING A CORPORATE OFFICER
PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE CIVIL OBLIGATION OF THE CORPORATION.

14

We find the appeal to be meritorious.

The elements of a violation of B.P. 22 are the following:

15

1) making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value;
2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
In convicting petitioner of two counts of violation of B.P. 22, the CA applied Tiong v. Co, in which we
said:
16

The purpose of suspending the proceedings under P.D. No. 902-A is to prevent a creditor from
obtaining an advantage or preference over another and to protect and preserve the rights of party
litigants as well as the interest of the investing public or creditors. It is intended to give enough
breathing space for the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to make the business
viable again, without having to divert attention and resources to litigations in various fora. The
suspension would enable the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively
exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extrajudicial interference that might unduly hinder or
prevent the "rescue" of the debtor company. To allow such other action to continue would only add to
the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources
would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its
restructuring and rehabilitation.
Whereas, the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is designed
to prevent damage to trade, commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks. In Lozano v.
Martinez, this Court declared that it is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of
its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The prime purpose of
the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to
maintain social order. Hence, the criminal prosecution is designed to promote the public welfare by
punishing offenders and deterring others.
Consequently, the filing of the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not a "claim" that can be enjoined
within the purview of P.D. No. 902-A. True, although conviction of the accused for the alleged crime
could result in the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the felonious act of the accused, nevertheless,
prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a criminal action. (Emphasis supplied.) The CA furthermore
cited Tiong in this wise:
17

Hence, accused-appellant cannot be deemed excused from honoring his duly issued checks by the
mere filing of the petition for suspension of payments before the SEC. Otherwise, an absurdity will

result such that " one who has engaged in criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere
filing of a petition for rehabilitation by the corporation of which he is an officer." (Emphasis supplied.)
However, what the CA failed to consider was that the facts of Tiong were not on all fours with those
of the present case and must be put in the proper context. In Tiong, the presentment for payment
and the dishonor of the checks took place before the Petition for Suspension of Payments for
Rehabilitation Purposes was filed with the SEC. There was already an obligation to pay the amount
covered by the checks. The criminal action for the violations of B.P. 22 was filed for failure to meet
this obligation. The criminal proceedings were already underway when the SEC issued an Omnibus
Order creating a Management Committee and consequently suspending all actions for claims
against the debtor therein. Thus, in Tiong, this Court took pains to differentiate the criminal action,
the civil liability and the administrative proceedings involved.
In contrast, it is clear that prior to the presentment for payment and the subsequent demand letters
to petitioner, there was already a lawful Order from the SEC suspending all payments of claims. It
was incumbent on him to follow that SEC Order. He was able to sufficiently establish that the
accounts were closed pursuant to the Order, without which a different set of circumstances might
have dictated his liability for those checks.
Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed suspended. When a
contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it again becomes operative when a
condition occurs or a situation arises warranting the termination of the suspension of the
contract.
18

In other words, the SEC Order also created a suspensive condition. When a contract is subject to a
suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences only if and when the event
that constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, at the time private respondent presented
the September and October 1997 checks for encashment, it had no right to do so, as there was yet
no obligation due from petitioner.
19

Moreover, it is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the interpretation or application
of the law must be made in favor of the accused. Surely, our laws should not be interpreted in such a
way that the interpretation would result in the disobedience of a lawful order of an authority vested
by law with the jurisdiction to issue the order.
Consequently, because there was a suspension of GSMC s obligations, petitioner may not be held
liable for the civil obligations of the corporation covered by the bank checks at the time this case
arose. However, it must be emphasized that her non-liability should not prejudice the right of El
Grande to pursue its claim through remedies available to it, subject to the SEC proceedings
regarding the application for corporate rehabilitation.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 7
September 2010 and the Resolution dated 6 January 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 32642 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. 301888 and 301889 are
DISMISSED, without prejudice to the right of El Grande Industrial Corporation to file the proper civil
action against G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation for the value of the ten (10) checks.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200915

February 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
MERLITA PALOMARES y COSTUNA, Appellant.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the need for police officers involved in buy-bust operations to mark the items they
seize (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon seizure.
The Facts and the Case
On March 21, 2007 the City Public Prosecutor charged the accused-appellant Merlita Palomares y
Costuna (Merlita) with selling prohibited drugs in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) 9165 before the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Manila in Criminal Case 07-251767.
1

PO2 Reynaldo Mallari and PO2 Marvin Flores testified that at around 4:00 p.m. on March 16, 2007
an informant came to their station with the report that a certain Inday Kirat, later identified as
accused Merlita, was selling shabu at Paradise Heights, Balut, Tondo, Manila. PO2 Mallari relayed
this information to their chief who then formed a team composed of PO2 Mallari, PO2 Flores, and
PO2 Dranreb Cipriano that would undertake a buy-bust operation with Mallari as poseur buyer. With
the marked money ready, the team proceeded to the target place: Unit 52, Building 8, of Paradise
Heights.
3

After the team deployed, PO2 Mallari and the informant found Merlita outside Unit 52 and in
conversation with a certain Teresa Ortega (Ortega). Mallari approached Merlita who asked him,
"Iskor ka ba friend?" Mallari replied, "Dalawang piso lang friend." He then handed over the money
to Merlita who pocketed it, went inside the unit, and returned with a white plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance. She handed this over to Mallari. Mallari scratched his head as a prearranged signal to his companions, introduced himself as a policeman, took back the marked money,
and arrested Merlita.
4

PO2 Flores and PO2 Cipriano came out of hiding and approached Ortega while PO2 Mallari took
accused Merlita downstairs to the police service vehicle and waited for the others to come down.
Mallari retained custody of the plastic sachet he bought from Merlita as well as the buy-bust money
he seized from her. He placed the marking MCP on the sachet and turned it over at the police station
to P/Insp. John Guiagui. The latter in turn prepared the report for laboratory examination and
forwarded the seized items to the crime laboratory on the same day. The laboratory examination
showed that the plastic sachet from Merlita tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
Accused Merlita testified that at about 5:00 a.m. on March 16, 2007 she was at her shanty located at
Pier 18, Dumpsite, Vitas, Tondo, with her live-in partner Rolando Palomares when PO2 Mallari and
his companions roused her from sleep. They told her to go with them, she having been pinpointed by
a certain Teresa as selling illegal drugs. Merlita denied the accusation but went with the police
officers to avoid harm. As she came out of her shanty, she saw her mother-in-law, Teresa Ortega,
with other policemen. The police brought the two women to the police station where they were told to
pay P100,000.00 or face an illegal drugs case. Rolando Palomares corroborated Merlitas testimony.
6

Barangay kagawad Louie Lizano testified that he saw the police officers on the day in question enter
Merlitas shanty and arrest her.
7

On March 18, 2008, the trial court found Merlita guilty as charged and sentenced her to life
imprisonment with a fine of P500,000.00 and liability for the cost of suit. Upon review in CA-G.R.
CR-HC 03373, the CA rendered judgment on June 23, 2011, affirming in full the RTC Decision,
hence, the present appeal to this Court.
8

10

The Issue Presented

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding, like the RTC before it, that the
prosecution succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that accused Merlita sold dangerous
drugs in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.
The Courts Rulings
To secure conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the identity of the prohibited drug seized
from the accused must be proved with moral certainty. The prosecution must establish with such
measure of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same
substance offered as evidence in court. Proof of the chain of custody from the time of seizure to the
time such evidence is presented in court ensures the absence of doubt concerning the integrity of
such vital evidence. This requires as a minimum that the police mark the seized item (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation.
11

12

13

Of course, the Court has ruled that immediate marking could be made at the nearest police station
or office of the apprehending team. Here, however, the evidence is unclear as to where the
responsible police officer marked the seized substance and whether it was done in Merlitas
presence.
14

In fact, it is also not clear from the evidence which police officer did the marking since P02 Mallari
and P02 Flores gave conflicting testimonies on this point. This uncertainty concerning a vital
element of the crime warrants overturning the judgment of conviction.
15

16

Besides, neither P02 Mallari nor P02 Flores testified that they conducted a physical inventory and
took photos of the article that was seized from Merlita. In fact, their joint affidavit of arrest made no
mention of any inventory taking or photographing of the same. And they did not bother at all to offer
some justification for the omission.
1wphi1

17

Parenthetically, barangay kagawad Lizano, an elected public official, testified that he saw the police
officers enter Merlita's shanty and arrest her on the date in question. This testimony from a neutral
party strikes at the heart of the prosecution's theory that they arrested Merlita at Unit 52, Building 8,
of Paradise Heights in Balut, Tondo. Though Merlita's denial and alibi as a defense are weak, such
cannot relieve the prosecution the burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an
illegal transaction actually took place.
18

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the judgments of
conviction of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03373 dated June 23, 2011 and the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case 07-251767, and ACQUITS accused-appellant Merlita
Palomares y Costuna of the charge of violation of Section 5, Article

II of Republic Act 9165 against her.

The Court ORDERS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to immediately RELEASE accusedappellant from custody, unless she is detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190178

February 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA, Accused-Apellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely upon the word of
the private complainant because it is essentially committed in relative isolation or even in secrecy,
and it is usually only the victim who can testify of the unconsented coitus. Thus, the long standing
rule is that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed. Since the participants are usually the only
witnesses in crimes of this nature and the accused's conviction or acquittal virtually depends on the
private complainant's testimony, it must be received with utmost caution. It is then incumbent upon
the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the credibility of the victim's testimony. Judges
must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have
been sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant
of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should
equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice according to law.
1

Before Us is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Forcible Abduction with Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2

The present case involves eight (8) sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape filed by
private complainant ("AAA") against appellant, Felimon Patentes.
The Prosecutions Case
On 5 December 1998, at about 11:00 a.m., AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit and
bring medicines to her sick grandmother. While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant
suddenly sat next to her. It was the second time AAA met appellant; the first time was on 4
December 1998, when appellant persistently courted her. She only knew appellant as he was a
friend of her brother.
After a brief conversation, appellant suddenly showed her his bolo, covered by a red scabbard
tucked in his right side while he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which he used to
threaten to kill AAA should AAA disobey him. Appellant then accompanied AAA to her grandmothers
place and returned to Davao City proper by bus. As they walked around, appellant placed his right

hand on AAAs shoulder. Appellant also held AAAs right hand, which covers her mouth with a
handkerchief.
Upon reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and alighted at a nearby convenience store.
Upon arrival, a man gave something to appellant, which he immediately placed inside his pocket.
Appellant then brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his parents, sister,
brother-in-law, nephews and nieces live.
Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her to a sewing
machine. Appellant then started to smoke something, which he also forced AAA to inhale, causing
AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy. This prevented AAA from fighting back as appellant removed AAAs
clothes. Doffed of his own clothes, appellant mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina.
The following day, 6 December 1998, appellant again forced AAA to inhale the smoke from his
cigarette, causing her to feel weak and dizzy as appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.
On 7 December 1998, appellant again had carnal knowledge of AAA using threats, force and
intimidation, causing bruises on AAAs arms.
On 8 December 1998, while appellant was sleeping beside AAA, AAA slowly got up to escape.
However, AAAs attempt, while feeble, woke up appellant. Appellant then punched her in the
stomach, causing AAA to lose consciousness. When AAA gained a little strength, appellant again
mauled her and raped her again.
On 9 December 1998, after AAA took a bath, appellant raped AAA while pointing a bolo to her neck.
On 10, 11 and 12 December 1998, appellant raped AAA while threatening her with bodily harm. He
also threatened to kill her family, in case she tells anyone of her ordeal.
On 13 December 1998, to free herself from her predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she will
marry him. Appellant agreed. Appellants mother accompanied AAA to the latters house to discuss
the marital plans with AAAs family. Surprised by the marital plans, AAAs mother asked for a private
moment with AAA. In their conversation, AAA confessed how appellant forcibly took her to his house
on 5 December 1998 and raped her for more than a week. AAAs mother then accompanied AAA to
report her ordeal to the police, where AAA was examined by a doctor, Dr. Samuel Cruz, the City
Health Officer of Davao City.
Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following observations about
AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can readily admit
a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for
spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAAs first sexual intercourse as
the vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations.
The Accused-Appellants Defense
On 5 December 1998, pursuant to their previous agreement, appellant accompanied AAA to
Bansalan to visit and bring medicines to AAAs grandmother. After going around Davao City, they
went to his house at about 7:00 p.m. Appellant then offered to bring AAA to her house but the latter

refused, insisting that she wanted to live with appellant because she was fed up with her mother,
who often called her "buntog" or prostitute.
AAA stayed in appellants house together with the latters parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews
and nieces. AAA slept in the same room with appellant and had consented sexual intercourse.
Throughout AAAs stay, she was free to roam around the house and even helped in the household
chores. Pursuant to their marital plans, AAAs grandfather went to appellants house on 7 December
1998. As a result, they agreed to set the wedding date on 27 May 1999. Appellants mother also
went to AAAs house to discuss the marital plans on 14 December 1998. However, AAAs mother
rejected the marriage proposal because of appellants social standing.
Leonora Gerondio (Gerondio), appellants neighbor, testified that she first met AAA in appellants
house on 5 December 1998. The following day, Gerondio again saw AAA when she went to
appellants house. Appellant told her that he will marry AAA. Since then, Gerondio saw AAA
everyday from 7 to 11 December 1998, cleaning the surroundings, doing the laundry, and walking
around the vicinity. AAA even visited her house and talked about AAA and appellants marital plans.
In her observation, AAA and appellant acted like a couple. Gerondio also accompanied appellants
mother to AAAs house to discuss AAA and appellants marital plans. However, AAAs mother
rejected the marriage proposal.
Wilma Enriquez (Enriquez), a common friend of AAA and appellant, testified that between 5 to 12
December 1998, she went twice to appellants house upon AAAs invitation to talk about the couples
marital plans.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, private complainant herself;
(2) Dr. Samuel Cruz; (3) PO1 Lennie Ronquillo; (4) private complainants mother; and (5) Julie
Dayaday.
On the other hand, the defense presented: (1) Felimon Patentes, accused-appellant himself; (2)
Leonora Gerondio; (3) Wilma Enriquez; and (4) Francisca Patentes.
After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of
Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
Felimon Patentes a.k.a. Arnold Patentes is hereby sentenced as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 42,786-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
2. Criminal Case No. 42,787-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
3. Criminal Case No. 42,788-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
4. Criminal Case No. 42,789-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
5. Criminal Case No. 42,790-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
6. Criminal Case No. 42,791-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

7. Criminal Case No. 42,792-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

8. Criminal Case No. 42,793-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
The accused shall indemnify AAA Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) in each of the eight cases for
a total of Two Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P240,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED as to the conviction of appellant FELIMON
PATENTES for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of eight (8)
counts of Rape and as to the imposition upon him of the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the
eight (8) offenses. His civil liability, however, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
Appellant FELIMON PATENTES is hereby directed to pay the following amounts:
1. P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of P400,000.00;
2. P75,000.00 each as moral damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of P600,000.00; and
3. P25,000.00 each as temperate damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with
Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses
for the prosecution. According to the appellate court, "AAAs account of her ordeal in the hands of
appellant was straightforward, firm, candid and consistent. Notwithstanding the rigid, lengthy and
rigorous cross-examination by the defense, AAA remained steadfast in her narration of the details of
her harrowing experience. A thorough reading of the transcript shows that AAAs testimony bears the
earmarks of truth and credibility."
6

Hence, this appeal.

The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge
of the victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12
years of age or is demented. In the case at bar, appellant never denied having carnal knowledge of
AAA. The only matter, thus, to be resolved by this Court is whether appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation, or that AAA was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or was under 12 years of age or is demented.
7

Appellant argues that if AAA really was raped for more than an entire week, it is perplexing why she
did not escape, or even seek the help of the neighbors despite several opportunities to do

so. Appellant further alleges that AAAs failure to escape and her helping in the household chores in
appellants house prove that she was not raped and that they had consensual sexual intercourse.
8

About this position, the appellate court noted and reasoned that, "appellant threatened AAA with
harm in the event that she told anyone of what happened between them. The lingering fear instilled
upon AAA is understandable considering that appellant was always armed with a bolo and was
constantly showing it to AAA. The possibility of him making good his threat was not at all remote and
the fear for her life remained palpable."
10

Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. There is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. Nevertheless, the Court must
be guided by established principles.
11

In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape
is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) inasmuch
as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense. So long as the private complainants testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
12

13

Following these legal precepts, AAAs testimony, placed side by side with the prosecutions evidence,
must stand the test of credibility.
1. Absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape since proof
of injuries is not an essential element of the crime. And, it is also a precept that physical evidence is
of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together. In the case at bar,
the prosecution failed to present any scintilla of proof to support its claim. In fact, contrary to the
prosecutions claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and boxed, the medical certificate
revealed no telltale sign of the prosecutions allegations. It has to be noted that the medical
examination was conducted the day after AAAs supposed escape from appellant. As shown by the
medical certificate, AAA had no external signs of physical injuries, save for a kiss mark, to wit:
14

15

16

EXTRAGENITAL PHYSICAL INJURY:

Contusion, reddish purple, breast, right side, lower-inner quadrant, 2.0x1.0 cm. xxx
CONCLUSIONS:
1. The above physical injury was noted on the body of the subject, age of which is consistent
with the alleged date of infliction.
2. That under normal conditions without subsequent complications and unless a deeper
involvement might be present but which is not clinically apparent at the time of examination,
said injury will require medical attendance of not more than seven (7) days from date of
infliction.

3. Hymen intact and its orifice, wide as to allow complete penetration by an average-sized
male organ in erection without causing hymenal injury.
17

2. The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility
with human knowledge, observation and common experience of man. Thus, whatever is repugnant
to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie
outside judicial cognizance.
18

19

As culled from the records, AAA lived with appellants family for eight (8) days in the same house
where appellants parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces also lived. AAA even called
appellants mother, "mama." As argued by the defense, "the members of the appellants family could
have noticed that she was being forced and raped by the accused if the accusations were really
true." Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex slave for eight (8) days in a
house where the abusers entire family, including the abusers minor nephews and nieces live.
20

When appellant and AAA arrived in the formers house, they were greeted by appellants father. If
AAAs account were true that appellant dragged her to a room upstairs and then tied her to a sewing
machine, appellants father could have noticed and reacted to the obvious violence. To say the least,
he would have talked to the appellant about the deed. Instead, and incredibly, appellants mother
went to AAAs house to propose marriage contrary to the common experience.
Contrary to the prosecutions claim that AAA only saw appellant on 4 December 1998, a day before
the alleged commission of the crime, it was stipulated that AAA knew appellant as appellant was a
neighbor and friend of AAAs brother. Furthermore, appellants mother was the midwife who
assisted AAAs housemaid in giving birth. Lastly, AAA and appellant have a common friend,
Enriquez, who testified that she saw the two in appellants house, through AAAs invitation. The TSN
reflects the inconsistencies in AAAs testimony:
21

22

23

24

Q: Do you know that his mother is a midwife?

A: No, Sir. Because she helped in the delivery of our housemaid.
Q: When did your housemaid give birth?
A: When I went to Bansalan on December 5 I passed by the house she was about to deliver and I
saw the mother of the accused thats the time I came to know his mother.
Q: Is it not that your stepfather even went to the house where you stayed?
A: No, sir.
Q: You will deny that?
A: I did not see him.
xxxx
Q: Is it not you said you were being locked?

A: I was locked at the door when my father arrived. I do not know because he locked me at the
room. [Emphasis supplied]
For several days that AAA had been missing, which would have caused worry and anxiety among
AAAs family members, AAAs father, instead of reporting the matter to police authorities, went to
appellants house to discuss AAA and appellants marital plans on 7 December 1998. Clearly, this is
contrary to human logic and experience, and inconsistent with the prosecutions claim.
25

3. The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance
in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape. In the case at bar, the actuations of AAA
after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is contrary to normal
human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abusers mother, and worse, to live with her abusers
entire family in one roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to escape.
26

It goes against the grain of human experience for a woman who has been robbed of her honor and
chastity not to seize an opportunity to escape from the clutches of her malefactor. Instead of
escaping from her abuser, AAA visited appellants neighbor. Even if AAA had several opportunities
to share her ordeal to be rescued by her friend, Wilma, AAA inexplicably failed and instead described
the details of her marital plans. What is truly exceptional, however, is the testimony of AAA that she
visited her grandmother during the period of her alleged abduction. Despite inconsistencies in her
testimony as shown in the TSN, AAA admitted the visit to her grandmother:
27

28

29

Q: So you did not proceed to your grandmothers house, where is the house of your grandmother?
A: Km. 81.
Q: Near the Dulo?
A: A bit farther of Dulo.
Q: You rode in a jeep and the driver is your cousin?
A: No sir we rode (sic) pedicab going to my grandmothers place.
Q: There were no people?
A: We are used to ride (sic) pedicab.
Q: So you rode a pedicab at that time?
A: No, Sir. [Emphasis supplied]
We are mindful that appellants bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must
be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes,
photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers. There is such
corroboration in this case. To support its sweetheart theory, the defense presented appellant and
AAAs common friend, Enriquez, who attested to the veracity of appellants claim:
30

31

Q: When you arrived at their house did you see the complainant AAA?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell the court what was the subject of your conversation?
A: She told me that she and Felimon Patentes are getting married, saying where they will live and
that they will go into the buy and sell business.
Q: Did you notice AAA to be happy with Felimon Patentes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the second time you went to their place do you remember what was the subject of your
conversation?
A: Regarding their plan of getting married. [Emphasis supplied]
Appellants neighbor, Gerondio, corroborated the testimony:

32

Q: Do you remember seeing the accused sometime on December 5, 1998?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you see him?
A: In their house, he just arrived.
Q: Was he alone?
A: He is with AAA.
xxxx
Q: On the following day did you see again AAA?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you see her?
A: Inside their house, she was walking.
xxxx
Q: When was that when you saw her?

A: The next day, December 6, 1998.

xxxx
Q: On the succeeding days, from December 7 to 11 were you able to see AAA in the house of
Felimon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you see her?
A: In the house of the accused, Felimon.
Q: What was she doing?
A: She was cleaning the surroundings of the house and did the laundry, and she was also going
around.
Q: When you said going around or "suroy-suroy" where did she go around?
A: She also went to our house.
Q: Were you able to talk to her personally?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: What did you observe from them?
A: As if they are married.
Q: What were the actions that you saw in them?
A: They were loving with each other.
Q: What do you mean by loving?
A: They are close to each other, they joke, and Felimon would place his arm on the shoulder of AAA.
[Emphasis supplied]
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means
a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. In the
case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the
truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats,
force or intimidation.
33

The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate
credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility
to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is
not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting
interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim
undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
justice based on the law.
34

35

36

The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable
doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of
appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the
quantum of proof to support a conviction.
1wphi1

37

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, finding appellant
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Forcible Abduction with Rape,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. His immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless he is being
detained for some other charge.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199268

February 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
AURELIO JASTIVA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is the final appeal of Aurelio Jastiva from his conviction for the crime of rape in
Criminal Case No. 12772, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Aurelio Jastiva," by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 9, in Dipolog City on September 1, 2009, which the Court of Appeals affirmed
with slight modification through its Decision promulgated on August 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 00754-MIN.
1

Gathered from the records of the case, the facts are as follows:
On September 29, 2004, appellant Jastiva was charged in the RTC with rape penalized under Article
266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, under the following
information:
That in the evening, on or about the 3rd day of August, (sic) 2004, in x x x, Zamboanga del Norte,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a knife, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having
sexual intercourse with one [AAA ], a 67-year-old married, against her will and without her consent.
4

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code).

With the assistance of counsel, appellant Jastiva pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged when he
was arraigned on November 26, 2004.
6

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely (i) AAA, the private offended party, 69
years old, married, a farmer, and a resident of Sitio WWW, Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ,
Zamboanga del Norte; (ii) BBB, the husband of AAA, 74 years old, a farmer, and a resident of Sitio
WWW, Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte; (iii) Dr. Domiciano
Talaboc, Municipal Health Officer, ZZZ Rural Health office, Zamboanga del Norte; (iv) Celedonio
Paul T. Payla, Jr., Barangay Kagawad, Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte;
and (v) Police Officer (PO) 3 Alfredo Esmade, Desk Officer, PNP Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte; and several pieces of documentary evidence, specifically: (i) the Medical Certificate of AAA
dated August 5, 2004 issued by the Office of the Municipal Health Officer; (ii) the Barangay
Blotter; (iii) a Certification of the Excerpt from the Record Book of Dapitan City Police Station; and
(iv) the Affidavit of BBB.
7

10

11

12

14

13

15

16

As summarized by the Court of Appeals, the prosecution tried to establish from the preceding
enumerated testimonial and documentary pieces of evidence that
On August 3, 2004, then [67 ]-year old AAA was drying corn in their small barn ("kamalig") in a
farmland located at [Sitio XXX], Zamboanga del Norte, when her husband[,] BBB[,] left her alone.
BBB spent that night in their permanent residence at [Sitio WWW] because their daughter has (sic)
no companion.
17

At about 11:00 x x x in the evening, AAA was fast asleep when a certain man she later identified as
accused-appellant Aurelio Jastiva covered her mouth, threatened her with a knife and told her not to
scream because he will have sexual intercourse with her. AAA grabbed accused-appellants hand
and felt the blade of the knife he held. Thereafter, accused-appellant removed AAAs underwear.
However, he cannot proceed with his lewd design because his penis was not yet erected (sic),
accused-appellant therefore toyed with AAAs sexual organ by licking it. Accused-appellant then
made his way up and tried to suck AAAs tongue. The latter evaded her assaulters sexual advances
by closing her lips tightly and in the process wounded the same through her teeth. Once done,
accused-appellant held his penis and inserted it to (sic) AAAs vagina. After fulfilling his sexual desire
and before AAA could stand up, accused-appellant tapped AAAs shoulder and said "Salamat"
(Thank [y]ou).
AAA stood up and opened the door to let accused-appellant out. When the latter passed through
(sic) AAA, it was then that the (sic) AAA clearly recognized, through the illumination of the moon, that
it was their (sic) neighbor accused-appellant who abused her. Engulfed with fear, AAA immediately
closed the door because she thought that accused-appellant might go (sic) back and kill her. AAA
later learned that accused-appellant destroyed a particular rack in their kitchen to enter the small
barn. AAA was no longer able to sleep after the incident.
At about 5:00 x x x in the morning of the next day, AAA relayed her ordeal to her neighbor Corazon
Mokot and her husband BBB. The latter immediately told her that they will bring the matter to the
attention of the authorities.

On August 5, 2004, they [AAA and BBB] went to the Barangay Hall of Barangay [YYY] to report the
incident. Barangay Kagawad Celedonio Paul Payla, Jr., the officer-on-duty wrote a barangay blotter
about the incident. On the same day, AAA was medically examined by Dr. Domiciano Talaboc, the
Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality of [ZZZ]. The Medical Certificate dated August 5, 2004
revealed that AAAs labia majora and labia minora on both sides showed signs of irritation and are
reddish in color, in addition to a partial separation of tissues noted between the labium. AAAs vaginal
opening also showed signs of irritation and are (sic) reddish in color. The same also stated that AAA
sustained multiple scratches at both her upper and lower lips.
On August 6, 2004, assisted by Police Inspector and Chief of Police of the Philippine National Police,
[ZZZ] Police Station of Zamboanga del Norte, AAA filed a Complaint for Rape against accusedappellant. A warrant for the arrest of accused-appellant was subsequently issued and on August 29,
2004, accused-appellant was apprehended by the police authorities. (Citations omitted.)
18

To counter the evidence summarized above, the defense offered the testimonies of the following
witnesses: (i) Gloria Ordas (Ordas), 48 years old, housekeeper, and a resident of Villahermosa,
Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte; (ii) Vilma Jastiva (Vilma), the common-law wife of
appellant Jastiva, 56 years old, laundry woman, and a resident of Sitio XXX, Poblacion YYY,
Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte; (iii) Merlyn Jastiva (Merlyn), the daughter of appellant
Jastiva, 25 years old, and also a resident of Sitio XXX, Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ,
Zamboanga del Norte; and (iv) appellant Jastiva, 54 years old, and a resident of Sitio XXX,
Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte. And the defense formally offered a single
documentary evidence the Medical Certificate of AAA.
19

20

21

22

According to the defense, appellant Jastiva, 49 years old at the time of the incident, could not have
committed the crime because on the date and time thereof, he was at home sleeping. Likewise, as
digested by the Court of Appeals, the testimonies of appellant Jastiva, Vilma and Merlyn, commonlaw wife and daughter of appellant Jastiva, respectively, as well as Ordas, a friend of Merlyn, were
offered to show that
On August 3, 2004, accused-appellant Aurelio Jastiva was in their house at the Municipality of [ZZZ],
Zamboanga del Norte. He was then with his wife Vilma and his youngest child. The Jastivas had a
visitor that time, a certain Gloria Ordas, the friend of accused-appellants daughter, Merlyn.
At around 11:00 x x x in the evening, the time the alleged incident happened, accused-appellant was
fast asleep with his wife. This fact was corroborated by Vilma.
Merlyn also corroborated his fathers story that he was sleeping at the time of the incident because
their house has only one door and nobody can go out without waking the other members of the
family. Merlyn narrated that his father could not have left the house unnoticed because their feet
were blocking the door. Merlyn does not remember waking on the day of the incident. Thus,
accused-appellant could not have gone outside their house. This fact was also confirmed by Gloria
who visited and eventually spent the night with the Jastivas on August 3, 2004. Gloria recounted that
she was sleepless that night and she clearly saw that accused-appellant was sleeping at around
11:00 x x x on that evening. (Citations omitted.)
23

After trial and upon evaluation of the evidence on record, the RTC found appellant Jastiva guilty of
the crime charged. The dispositive of the Decision dated and promulgated on September 1, 2009
states:

WHEREFORE, premised in the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Aurelio
Jastiva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape penalized under Article 266-A in
relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Accordingly, he is hereby
sentenced to serve the determinate penalty of reclusion perpetua. In view of his conviction and
without need of further proof, he is also ordered to pay complainant [AAA] the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
as moral damages.
Being a detention prisoner, Aurelio Jastiva is entitled to the full benefit of his preventive
detention. (Citations omitted.)
24

Aggrieved, appellant Jastiva questioned his conviction to the Court of Appeals grounded on the
following: (i) the RTC "gravely erred by giving weight to the testimony of [AAA] that she recognized
the accused-appellant when he went out of the house of [AAA];" and (ii) the RTC "gravely erred in
convicting [the] accused-appellant despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt."
25

In his Brief, appellant Jastiva particularly argued the following points, (i) that "[t]he identity of the
appellant was not established," x x x "considering that the private complainant herself admitted that
the room where the alleged incident happened was dark;" (ii) that "the witness could not possibly
identify the real culprit" because she testified that "she only saw his back, albeit the alleged
moonlight;" (iii) that "private complainant even opened the door for her rapist to let the latter go out of
her house x x x private complainant had all the opportunity to shout for help but she did not do so;"
(iv) that the private complainants two conflicting statements in her sworn affidavit that appellant
Jastiva removed her panty and inserted his penis in her vagina vis--vis her testimony in open court
that appellant Jastiva removed her panty but first sucked her vagina to make his penis erect, and
then inserted his penis into her vagina seriously cast doubts on her credibility; (v) that "[t]he
testimony of the private complainant failed to show any force or intimidation exerted upon her
person" as appellant Jastiva was still able to engage in sexual foreplay with leisure prior to the actual
sexual intercourse; (vi) that "[t]he absence of rape is further bolstered by the medial (sic) findings x x
x the medical certificate states, among other things, that no sign of irritation at the external genitalia;
external genitalia appeared multiparous with corrugated skin folds x x x;" and (vii) that his defense of
alibi and denial should be given great weight in view of the weakness of the evidence of the
prosecution.
26

27

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for appellee People of the Philippines, rebutted the
foregoing points with the two basic counter-arguments: (i) that "[b]ased on the x x x testimonies [of
AAA], there is no doubt that the victim positively identified appellant as the individual who raped her
on the night of August 3, 2004 x x x positive identification, when categorical and consistent and
without ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial;" and (ii) that "[t]he act of holding a knife is by itself strongly suggestive of force or at least
intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring her into submission x x x.
Inasmuch as intimidation is addressed to the victims mind, response thereto and the effect thereof
cannot be measured by any hard and fast rule such that it must be viewed in the context of the
victims perception and judgment not only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at the
time immediately thereafter.
28

Physical resistance is immaterial in a rape case when the victim is sufficiently intimidated by her
assailant and submits against her will because of fear for her life or personal safety x x x."
29

On August 31, 2011, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC
albeit with a slight modification, i.e., that appellant Jastiva be further required to pay interest on all
damages awarded to AAA. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all respects except that accused-appellant
Aurelio Jastiva is further ordered to pay AAA interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6%
per annum from the finality of this Decision. (Citation omitted.)
30

In affirming the conviction of appellant Jastiva, the Court of Appeals held that the elements of the
crime of rape as defined under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code were
established by the prosecution, that is, "[a]ccused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through
intimidation as shown by her sordid experience x x x" coupled with the positive identification of
appellant Jastiva by AAA as her tormentor. On the issue that the RTC erred in giving weight to AAAs
testimony that she saw her assailants face; hence, she could positively identify appellant Jastiva,
the Court of Appeals stated that
31

Accused-appellant however[,] maintains that the trial court erred in heavily relying on AAAs positive
identification because her testimony on this matter is dubious considering that AAA herself admitted
that the small barn, where the alleged incident happened, was dark, hence[,] she could not have
identified him. Accused-appellant added that AAA could not have seen him due to the illumination of
the moon when he went out of the small barn because AAA testified that she only saw his back
through the window when he was going towards his house.
Accused-appellants argument is misleading.
True, the place where the incident happened was dark[,] which prevented AAA from recognizing
accused-appellant as the author of her honors ravishment. But it was not only through the window
when AAA saw accused-appellant but also when he passed through her upon going out the door of
the small barn. This put AAA in a position to clearly see accused-appellant. AAAs testimony on this
point is revealing:
Q: And you also said that you were the one who opened the door to let him go out, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir. I was afraid if he will stay longer, he will kill me.
Q: So you were already standing up?
A: Yes, considering I was the one who unlocked the door.
xxxx
Prosecutor Olvis: (to the witness)
Mrs. Witness, you stated that you were the one who unlocked the door to let Aurelio Jastiva got (sic)
out form (sic) your house. So when he passed the door, you saw him, clearly, isnt it?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: You stated that the room was dark. How were you able to see him?

A: When the door was opened, he was illuminated by a moonlight.

Q: So, it was Aurelio Jastiva who left your house when you opened the door?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: He was the one who raped you?
A: Yes, maam.
xxxx
Atty. Velasco: (to the witness)
Now when you saw the person who came out from your house, did you see exactly his face?
A: Yes, sir. In fact, when he walked away, I even looked at him over the window.
Q: Why (sic) was he walking towards you or walking away from you?
A: He was walking to the direction of his house.
Q: So in other words, his back was directed towards you while the front of his body was directed to
where he was going?
A: After he passed the door, I saw him. When he already walked away, what I only saw was his back.
Q: But in your room, the surroundings was still dark?
A: Yes, sir. Inside the house was dark but when he came out, there was a moonlight, so I saw him
clearly.
32

And on the various points above-quoted anent the supposed failure of the trial court to prove
appellant Jastivas guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had this to say:
Accused-appellant next asserts that the case of People v. Castro is on all fours with the instant case.
He claims that if indeed AAA saw him as [her] attacker, she should have mentioned distinguishing
features or physical appearance on his body to recognize him.
We do not agree.
In Castro, x x x [t]herein accused-appellant Castro was practically a stranger to private complainant
Edith, thus the need x x x for the latter to mention distinguishing features in the face or physical
appearance of the former to show that she indeed recognized him as the person who raped her.
Unlike in this case, AAA testified that she knows accused-appellant very well, they being neighbors.
In fact, she is a friend of accused-appellants wife as sometimes, the latter would sleep with her at
night. Accused-appellant even admitted that she knows AAA and that the latter could not have

mistaken her for someone else. Thus, AAA does not need to mention any distinguishing features of
accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant next posits that AAAs testimony below failed to show any force or intimidation
exerted upon her. Accused-appellant stated that what further erodes the credibility of AAA is her
testimony that accused-appellant appeared to have indulged in "sexual foreplay" first, i.e.[,] he
sucked AAAs vagina and then went up to kiss her, which does not happen in rape cases. Usually,
according to accused-appellant, a rapist is pressed with (sic) time so as not to be caught in flagrante
delicto; thus, a rapist would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim being in
consonance with reason and common experience.
We still disagree.
For one, the "sexual foreplay" referred to by accused-appellant was not improbable considering that
as testified to by AAA, accused-appellant was not yet erected (sic) at that time. For another, there is
a sufficient reason to believe why accused-appellant did this because he may have been aware that
BBB, AAAs husband, was not around on that night. Certainly and more likely, accused-appellant
would not have acted upon his lewd design had he known that BBB was there in the small barn with
AAA. In addition to this was accused-appellants testimony that aside from the fact that he knows
AAA very much, he also knows that sometimes AAAs family would stay in their small barn in
Barangay XXX and sometimes in their permanent residence in Barangay ZZZ. (Citations omitted.)
33

As to the damages awarded by the RTC to AAA, though the Court of Appeals affirmed the same,
however, in the dispositive portion of the decision, it further imposed upon appellant Jastiva the need
to pay interest on all the damages due at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of its
decision the Court of Appeals anchored its directive upon this Courts decisions in People v.
Galvez and People v. Abella.
34

35

On September 9, 2011, appellant Jastiva filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals. In a
Resolution dated October 4, 2011, the appellate court resolved to grant the same and ordered its
Judicial Records Division to elevate the records of the case to this Court.
Hence, this appeal under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, as amended, wherein appellant Jastiva
essentially prays for his acquittal based on reasonable doubt.
Appellant Jastiva reiterates his assignment of errors in the Court of Appeals, viz:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED BY GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT THAT SHE RECOGNIZED THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN HE WENT OUT OF THE HOUSE OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
36

To restate, according to appellant Jastiva, the evidence presented by the prosecution was not
sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the crime charged; and
"[t]he manner by which AAA was allegedly raped is incredible," and is tantamount to reasonable
doubt as to his legal culpability thereto, viz:
37

From her testimony, it would appear that accused-appellant indulge (sic) into (sic) foreplay in raping
AAA. This is highly unbelievable. Normally, a rapist, who is pressed for time so as not to be caught in
flagrante, would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim, as what actually
happened in this case.
38

And in his Supplemental Brief filed before this Court, appellant Jastiva continues to insist that his
guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues further that AAAs claim that he
indulged in sexual foreplay prior to having sexual intercourse with her is unbelievable and contrary to
the normal conduct of a rapist, to wit:
39

The manner by which AAA was allegedly raped is incredible. From her testimony, it would appear
that accused-appellant indulge (sic) into (sic) foreplay in raping AAA. This is highly unbelievable.
Normally, a rapist, who is pressed for time so as not to be caught in flagrante, would not leisurely
engage in sexual intercourse with his victim, as what actually happened in this case.
xxxx
With utmost due respect to the Court of Appeals, we beg to disagree with its findings that the "sexual
foreplay" was not improbable considering that accused-appellant may have been aware that AAAs
husband was not around on the night of the alleged rape. With all due respect, there was no
evidence showing that the accused-appellant was indeed aware of the fact that AAAs husband was
not around at that night so that [the] accused-appellant can do the sexual foreplay without fear of
having (sic) caught. Apparently, the Court of Appeals made a conclusion which was not present in
evidence x x x it merely made a conclusion that the accused-appellant "may have been aware that
AAAs husband was not around during the night of rape" thereby the accused-appellant could have
resorted to sexual foreplay. Why would the accused-appellant resort to sexual foreplay knowing that
the husband of AAA might arrive anytime of the night?
The postulation therefore that the accused-appellant could resort to sexual foreplay is possible
because he is aware that BBB was not around at the night of the alleged rape cannot be taken
against the accused-appellants resulting in his conviction especially so if there is no evidence that
indeed accused-appellant was aware of the absence of BBB. The said theory is merely a suspicion
not supported by evidence. It is hornbook doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never be the
basis of conviction in a criminal case. Courts must ensure that the conviction of the accused rests
firmly on sufficient and competent evidence, and not the results of passion and prejudice.
We humbly submit that the foregoing evidence leads to one conclusion, that is, the guilt of the
accused-appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt there being doubt as to who the
real culprit was. (Citations omitted.)
40

On March 29, 2012, appellee People manifested that it will no longer file a Supplemental Brief as it
had already refuted thoroughly in its Appellees Brief all the assignments of error raised by appellant
Jastiva filed before the Court of Appeals.

The principal issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the
guilt of appellant Jastiva beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and the documentary evidence presented.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape, viz:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation[.]
From the above-quoted provision of law, the elements of rape (under paragraph 1, subparagraph a)
are as follows: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;
and (3) that such act is accomplished by using force, (threat) or intimidation.
41

The RTC and the Court of Appeals were one in finding that appellant Jastiva had carnal knowledge
of AAA against the latters will through force and intimidation. Despite his vigorous protestations, this
Court agrees in the finding that the crime of rape committed by appellant Jastiva against AAA was
proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the following:
a) AAAs credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the circumstances
surrounding her rape;
b) AAAs positive identification of appellant Jastiva as the one who raped her;
c) The physical evidence consistent with AAAs assertion that she was raped; and
d) The absence of ill motive on the part of AAA in filing the complaint against appellant
Jastiva.
Consequently, this appeal is denied, and the conviction of appellant Jastiva is affirmed.
Firstly, the appeal of appellant Jastiva centers on the credibility of AAA, the main prosecution
witness. But credibility of a witness is the sole province of the RTC being the trial court in this case.
Basic is the rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on matters of credibility of witnesses are
generally conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts. Such conclusiveness derives from the
trial courts having the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner of the victim
when he/she testified at the trial. Undeniably, the calibration of the testimony of a witness, and the
assessment of the probative weight thereof, are virtually left, almost entirely, to the trial court which
has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness at the stand. Unless there are
substantial matters that might have been overlooked or discarded, generally, the findings of the trial
court as to the credibility of a witness will not be disturbed on appeal. The foregoing is especially
true when such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. In this case, with appellant Jastiva not
showing that the RTC and the Court of Appeals overlooked any fact or material of consequence that
could have altered the outcome had they taken it into consideration, this Court will not disturb on
appeal the RTCs findings of fact, but must fully accept the same.
42

43

At this point, it is worthy to recall the three guiding principles in rape prosecutions: (1) an accusation
of rape is easy to make, and difficult to prove, but it is even more difficult to disprove; (2) bearing in
mind the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
utmost care and caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits;
and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. So, when a woman says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime of rape was committed. In
a long line of cases, this Court has held that if the testimony of the rape victim is accurate and
credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victims testimony. This is
because no decent and sensible woman will publicly admit to being raped and, thus, run the risk of
public contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.
44

In this case, appellant Jastiva insistently makes an issue out of AAAs failure to shout for help or
struggle against him, which for him does nothing but erode her credibility. This Court, however, does
not agree. It does not follow that because AAA failed to shout for help or struggle against her
attacker means that she could not have been raped. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a
relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the parties but also on their
relationship with each other. And physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the rapists
advances because of fear for her life and personal safety. Record disclose that in this case, AAA
was already 67 years of age when she was raped in the dark by appellant Jastiva who was armed
with a knife. Justifiably, a woman of such advanced age could only recoil in fear and succumb into
submission. In any case, with such shocking and horrifying experience, it would not be reasonable to
impose upon AAA any standard form of reaction. Time and again, this Court has recognized that
different people react differently to a given situation involving a startling occurrence. The workings
of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be shocked into insensibility even if there
may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion.
45

46

47

48

More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily
succumbed to the lust of an accused. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too
intimidated to offer any resistance at all, just like what happened in this case. Thus, the law does
not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the
prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the
victim which it did in the case at bar.
49

50

51

The preceding paragraphs altogether, the testimony of AAA was shown to be credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature; and the fact that AAA is already of advanced age
lends more credence to her protestations of rape and inspires the thought that this case was filed for
the genuine reason of seeking justice.
Secondly, the circumstances after the commission of the rape testified to by AAA sufficed to
establish the ability of the latter to identify appellant Jastiva as the perpetrator of the crime. Appellant
Jastivas assertions that the cover of darkness and lack of lighting inside the "kamalig" where the
crime took place, utterly diminished AAAs ability to identify him or anyone for that matter, is
downright specious. AAA never claimed to have seen her attacker inside the "kamalig." What AAA
testified to was the fact that she saw appellant Jastiva when he walked past her by the open door of
the "kamalig" and his face was finally illuminated by the moonlight. As explained by the RTC

In not a few cases, though, the High Court held that an accused need not always be identified under
a perfect or near perfect visibility. This was demonstrated in People v. Villaruel with the Supreme
Court saying that
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlight, even moonlight and starlight may, in proper
situations, be sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on this
ground unmeritorious.
The ruling in People v. Pueblas, citing the earlier ruling in People v. Vacal, is even more to the point,
thus:
[I]f identification of persons is possible even by the light of stars, with more reason that one could
identify persons by moonlight. (Citations and emphases omitted.)
52

From the above, the RTC correctly held that "the Court is not disposed to doubt the evidenced ability
of the complainant to identify her rapist especially because her familiarity of the latter could easily be
strengthened by the fact that the accused is her neighbor living some 100 meters away from the
crime scene."
53

Thirdly, contrary to appellant Jastivas claim that the "absence of rape is x x x bolstered by the
medical findings," the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Domiciano P. Talaboc, Municipal Health
Officer of the town where the crime of rape was committed, stating his medico-legal findings of his
examination of AAA made on August 5, 2004 showing:
54

Findings: 1) Patient is ambulatory, conscious, coherent and oriented as to time, day and place.
2) Multiple scratches noted at both upper and lower lips, towards the inner folds.
xxxx
5) On internal examination, both labia majora and labia minora on both sides showed signs of
irritation, reddish in color, and partial separation of tissues between labia majora and labia minora on
both sides was noted with more separation on the right side.
55

is consistent with AAAs assertion that appellant Jastiva succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her.
And, fourthly, worth noting is the fact that appellant Jastiva did not allege, much less show, that AAA
was prompted by improper or malicious motives to impute upon him such a serious charge. This
being so, the categorical and positive identification of appellant Jastiva prevails over the latters plain
alibi and bare denial.
Moreover, such prevarication was devoid of any persuasion due to its being easily and conveniently
resorted to, and due to denial being generally weaker than and not prevailing over the positive
assertions of an eyewitness. It has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of
the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its
commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime
scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the accused must

demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene
and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.
56

Here, appellant Jastiva utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. From the testimonies
of the witnesses, it was shown that the distance between AAAs farmhouse and appellant Jastivas
house was only 150 meters, more or less. Certainly, 150 meters is not too far as to preclude the
presence of appellant Jastiva at the farmhouse of AAA. That he presented witnesses to attest to his
presence at his own home around the time the rape was said to have been committed did not help
him one bit. If truth be told, the testimonies of his wife and daughter were more deleterious to his
defense because they contradicted each others account on material points relative to the
circumstances of that fateful night. Appellant Jastivas common-law wife, Vilma, testified that:
57

Q: Mrs. Witness, how are you related with (sic) Aurelio Jastiva?
A: My husband, sir.
Q: Where were you on August 3, 2004 at around 11:00 x x x in the evening?
A: In our house.
xxxx
Q: How about Aurelio Jastiva, where was he on August 3, 2004 at around 11:00 x x x in the evening?
A: He was still in our house because during the time we had a visitor in our house.
Q: Who was your visitor in your house at that time?
A: Gloria Ordas.
Q: Why can you say that Aurelio Jastiva was in your house at that time?
A: I was a witness because I was there also in our house.
Q: Now, Aurelio Jastiva is charged of alleged Rape which allegedly happened on August 3, 2004 at
around 11:00 x x x in the evening, what can you say about that?
A: I have no knowledge about that old woman who was raped because she was lying.
Q: Why can you say that?
A: Because I have no knowledge about that incident considering that we are on a far
place. (Emphasis supplied.)
58

On the other hand, the testimony of appellant Jastivas daughter, Merlyn, is quite informative:
Q: Merlyn Jastiva, how are you related with the accused Aurelio Jastiva?

A: He is my father, sir.
Q: Where were you in the evening of August 3, 2004?
A: At home, sir.
xxxx
Q: Where was Aurelio Jastiva in the evening of August 3, 2004?
A: He was sleeping at home.
Q: Before 11:00 x x x in the evening, where was Aurelio Jastiva?
A: He did not leave the house. He just stayed home.
Q: At about 11:00 x x x in the evening of that day, August 3, 2004 where was Aurelio Jastiva?
A: At home sleeping.
Q: Why can you say that during that time Aurelio Jastiva was in your house?
A: Because I was sleeping with my parents. I know that my father slept beside my mother.
Q: Will you be able to notice if your father went out of your house in that evening of August 3, 2004?
A: Yes, because we have only one door in our house.
Q: Did he go out of the house in that evening of August 3, 2004 at about 11:00 x x x in the evening?
A: No sir, he already fall (sic) asleep. (Emphasis supplied.)
59

But when she was cross-examined, Merlyn revealed that her father did not actually sleep beside her
mother; thus, contradicting her earlier declaration that her father slept beside her mother, and she
(Merlyn) slept with them, viz:
Q: You said earlier that your brothers used to go out even at night. Now, during that time was any of
your brothers was (sic) out during that night?
A: No maam. We already fall (sic) asleep.
Q: Where was Rolly [her brother] sleeping at that time?
A: We, women are sleeping near the door and the other siblings in the other corner of the house.
Q: You said the women are sleeping near the door?
A: Yes, maam.

Q: And the men sleep safely far from the door?

A: Yes maam.
xxxx
Q: And your father is just sleeping far from the door? From the women?
A: Yes, maam. Because he slept with my brother siblings. (Emphasis supplied.)
60

The aforequoted testimonies highlighted the fact that appellant Jastiva could have slipped in and out
of their house undetected by Vilma and Merlyn. Such scenario is all the more likely as appellant
Jastiva himself admitted upon questioning by the RTC that he actually slept in another room; hence,
his wife and daughter had no way of being sure if he was inside their house or not, to wit:
Q: How about the "kamalig". How far is the kamalig to your house?
A: 150 meters more or less.
Q: Who are the occupants of your house [on] August 3, 2004?
A: We, your Honor.
Q: Who are those "we"?
A: My children together with my wife.
Q: How many children do you have?
A: Seven (7) children and my wife.
Q: Meaning, all of you were at your house at [Poblacion YYY], [ZZZ], Zamboanga del Norte on
August 3, 2004?
A: Yes maam.
Q: And the dimension of the house is 8x12 with only one room?
A: Yes maam, Only one (1) room.
Q: Meaning, there is no division in your house?
A: There is a division maam which divides the house into two.
Q: In that division are there doors or what?
A: Yes, your Honor, going to the sala.

Q: So, the sala and the other room is used for sleeping?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: All the nine (9) of you were asleep in that one (1) room?
A: No your Honor. Only my wife together with our youngest sleep in that room.
Q: How about the other six (6) children of yours? Where do they sleep?
A: In the sala, your Honor. (Emphasis supplied.)
61

Appellant Jastiva further tries to interject reasonable doubt by pointing out that AAAs claim that he
indulged in sexual foreplay prior to having sexual intercourse with her is unbelievable and contrary to
the normal conduct of a rapist, i.e., that "[n]ormally, a rapist, who is pressed for time so as not to be
caught in flagrante, would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim, as what actually
happened in this case." He reasons that he could not have engaged in sexual foreplay because he
could not have known that AAA would be all alone in the farmhouse on the night in question.
62

Case law, however, shows numerous instances of rape committed under indirect and audacious
circumstances. The lust of a lecherous man respects neither time nor place. Neither the crampness
of the room, nor the presence of people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held
sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape.
63

64

Also, appellant Jastivas objections are without basis, and at best, merely lip service. During his
cross-examination, he admitted that he knew AAA; in fact, he acknowledged that she could easily
identify him, to wit:
Q: And the residence of [AAA] is also at [Poblacion YYY], [ZZZ], Zamboanga del Norte?
A: It is not their real residence it is only a barn.
Q: That place is just near from your house. Is that right?
A: Yes, maam. We are only apart by a rice field which is about more or less 150 meters.
xxxx
Q: You know very well [AAA]?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And she could not be mistaken of your identity. Right?
A: Yes maam, being a neighbor.

65

And when the RTC propounded clarificatory questions, appellant Jastiva disclosed that he knew
pretty well the routine of the spouses AAA and BBB, viz:

Q: You mentioned about "kamalig" or barn. Is that where [AAA] and her family live?
A: Yes, maam. If they are working in the field.
Q: How about when they do not work in the field, where does [AAA] live?
A: In [WWW]. Their real residence.
Q: And [she] live there in [WWW] together with her family?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Who are the members of her family if you know?
A: She has only two (2) children.
xxxx
Q: How far is the residence of [AAA] from [WWW] to your residence at [YYY], [ZZZ], Z.N.?
A: About a kilometer maam.

66

All told, this Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Jastiva committed the crime
of rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA using force and intimidation. Under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty to be imposed is:
Art. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
But the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines;" thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, properly imposed upon appellant Jastiva the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Relative to the award of damages, the RTC correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory
damages, and is obligatory upon conviction of rape. As to moral damages, it is automatically
awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof, for it is assumed that they suffered moral
injuries entitling them to such award. Similarly, the Court of Appeals fittingly imposed interest on all
damages awarded to AAA, the private offended party, at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of the finality of this Court's decision in conformity with present jurisprudence.
67

This Court notes, however, that both the RTC and Court of Appeals overlooked the award of
exemplary damages. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages can be awarded even in the
absence of an aggravating circumstance if the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. Thus, this Court deems it necessary to modify
68

the civil liability of appellant Jastiva to include exemplary damages for the vindication of the sense of
indignity and humiliation suffered by AAA, a woman of advanced age, and to set a public example, to
serve as deterrent to those who abuse the elderly, and to protect the latter from sexual assaults.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00754-MIN is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Aurelio Jastiva is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Appellant Aurelio Jastiva is further ordered
to pay legal interest on all damages awarded in this case at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 189833

February 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier Morilla y Avellano (Morilla) from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction and that of his co-accused Ronnie
Mitra y Tena (Mayor Mitra) by the trial court, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each.
1

The Regional Trial Court Judgment

On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang) and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan
(Dequilla) were charged in a criminal information as follows:
That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, one of
them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an
organized/syndicate crime group as they all help one another, for purposes of gain in the transport of
illegal drugs, and in fact, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding and abetting one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously transport by means of two (2) motor
vehicles, namely a Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with commemorative plate to read
"Mayor" and a municipal ambulance of Panukulan, Quezon Province, methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug which is commonly known as shabu, and with an approximate
weight of five hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos, without authority whatsoever.
3

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 1 August 2007 convicted Morilla and his coaccused Mayor Mitra, then incumbent Mayor of Panukulan, Quezon, of illegal transport of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, with an approximate weight of five
hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos. However, it absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the
prosecutions failure to present sufficient evidence to convict them of the offense charged. The
dispositive of the decision reads:
4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Ronnie Mitra y
Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Accordingly, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P10,000,000.00 each. Accused Willie Yang y Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are
ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered retained by the Court as representative sample which
is still in the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory is ordered turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.
6

The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on the vehicles driven by Mayor
Mitra and Morilla, one with control number 888 and the other an ambulance with plate number SFK372, as the police officers have already acquired prior knowledge that the said vehicles were
suspected to be used for transportation of dangerous drugs. During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon,
the information turned out to be accurate and indeed, the two accused had in their motor vehicles
more than five hundred kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
7

The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any knowledge of the
contents of the sacks and that he was merely requested to transport them to Manila on board his
Starex van. He explained that he only accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because the
latter bought his fishing boat. It likewise dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack of
knowledge of the illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that he was just
transporting wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other passenger of
the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he
was merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.
The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra as they were caught in
flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous drugs in two vehicles driven by each of them. Absent any
convincing circumstance to corroborate their explanations, the validity of their apprehension was
sustained.
8

The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the testimonies of the four
accused themselves. It was found by the trial court that the two vehicles, the Starex van driven by
Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van driven by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The
Starex van which was ahead of the ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police
officers. However, the ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers. Through the
untinted window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry of the
contents, Morilla replied that the sacks contained narra wooden tiles.
Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further
inspection. When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline granules were

scattered on the floor, prompting them to request Morilla to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla
told the police officers that he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade them to let him
pass. His request was rejected by the police officers and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks
turned out to be sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride. This discovery prompted the operatives
to chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to overtake the van and Mayor
Mitra was asked to stop. They then inquired if the mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the operatives
noticed that his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance. Thus, Mayor
Mitra was also requested to open the door of the vehicle for inspection. At this instance, Mayor Mitra
offered to settle the matter but the same was rejected. Upon examination, the contents of the sacks
were likewise found to contain sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
9

10

11

The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted by the trial court for failure on
the part of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court ruled that
Dequillas and Yangs mere presence inside the vehicle as passengers was inadequate to prove that
they were also conspirators of Mayor Mitra and Morilla.
12

The Court of Appeals Decision

On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It upheld the finding of
conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to transport several sacks
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board their respective vehicles. The singularity of
their intent to illegally transport methamphetamine hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla
agreed to drive the ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with Mayor Mitra, who
drove the lead vehicle, the Starex van.
13

The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of knowledge of the illegal contents of
the sacks. The claim that the sacks were loaded with wooden tiles was implausible due to the
obvious disparity of texture and volume.
14

Courts Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he may be convicted for conspiracy
to commit the offense charged sans allegation of conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether the
prosecution was able to prove his culpability as alleged in the Information.
15

We dismiss his arguments.

Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure to
substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. He pointed out that the Information itself failed to state the word conspiracy
but instead, the statement "the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the
Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicated crime group
as they all help one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport x x x."
He argued that conspiracy was only inferred from the words used in the Information.
16

17

Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information, at this point, is
deemed to have been waived due to Morillas failure to assert it as a ground in a motion to quash
before entering his plea.
18

Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses to contradict
the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or neglect to assert a
right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
19

The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to
commit a felony.
20

21

Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not
sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of
dangerous drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the totality of the factual
circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to
transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were
on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by
the police operatives. When it was Morillas turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to
open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police
officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor
Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the mayor.
22

His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just obeyed
the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears no
merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the
dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act
means "to carry or convey from one place to another." It was well established during trial that
Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van
going to Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum
since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks
containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or
knowledge.
23

24

In a similar case of People v. Libnao, this Court upheld the conviction for illegal transportation of
marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag full of marijuana leaves when they
were flagged down on board a passing tricycle at a checkpoint.
25

However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, the penalty for illegal transportation of
methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve
years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1683, the penalty was amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
twenty to thirty thousand pesos. The penalty was further amended in Republic Act No. 7659, where
the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos.
26

27

28

From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of P10,000,00.00 to be paid by each of
the accused but amend the penalty to reclusion perpetua following the provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 and the principle of retroactive application of lighter penalty. Reclusion perpetua entails
imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also
carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. Life imprisonment,
on the other hand, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration and carries no accessory
penalties.
29

The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People, thus:

30

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the
same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the commission
of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1683. The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty
of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be imposed.
Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659 further introduced new amendments to Section 15, Article III
and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty
prescribed in Section 15 was changed from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
fromP20,000.00 to P30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00
to P10 million." On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of
R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending
on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No.
7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive
application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.

1wphi1

We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held:

"In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory
law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x x x."
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the rule
that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect," the
penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the
penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the
trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.
31

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed 13 July 2009 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 02967 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with
respect to the penalty to be imposed as Reclusion Perpetua instead of Life Imprisonment and
payment of fine of P10,000,000.00 by each of the accused.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195525

February 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WILFREDO GUNDA alias FRED, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On appeal is the March 30, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No.
00397 which affirmed with modification the May 20, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, finding appellant Wilfredo Gunda alias Fred (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
1

Factual Antecedents
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 25, 1997, the victim, Eladio Globio, Sr., and his son,
Eladio Jr., were walking along a trail at Sitio Candulungon, Barangay Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern
Samar. Suddenly, when Eladio Jr. was about 10 meters ahead of his father, the latter was waylaid by
appellant and his unidentified companions. The John Does held the victim's arms whereupon
appellant stabbed him several times. Fearing for his life, Eladio Jr. fled. The unidentified assailants
pursued him. Fortunately, he was able to outrun them and was able to reach their house. In the
morning of the following day, Eladio Jr. went to the house of his sister and informed her of the death
of their father. They then reported the incident to the police authorities who eventually arrested the
appellant. The body of the victim was recovered and post-mortem examinations revealed that he
suffered multiple stab wounds which caused his death.
Aside from Eladio Jr., Teofilo Ambal, Jr. (Ambal) who is a brother-in-law of the appellant, also
witnessed the crime. In the afternoon of May 25, 1997, while Ambal was at his farm gathering feeds
for his pigs, he saw appellant who was armed with a wooden pole position himself at the back of the
victim and strike the latters head with the wood. The companions of appellant then held the victims
arms whereupon appellant drew a bolo locally known as depang from his waist and stabbed the
victim several times. Fearing for his life, Ambal likewise left the crime scene.
On July 31, 1997, an Information was filed charging appellant and the John Does with the crime of
murder. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
3

That on May 25, 1997, at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon at Sitio Candulungon, Barangay Cabay,
Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, and without justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully,

unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound Eladio Globio, Sr., with the use of a sharp
bladed weapon (Depang) which the accused provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting
injuries upon the latter, which injuries caused the death of the victim, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with aggravating circumstances that the crime committed in an uninhabited
place and the superior strength [sic].
4

Arraigned on September 10, 1997, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. The other accused
who have not been identified remained at large.
5

Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that in the afternoon of May 25, 1997, he was
at Barangay Camada gathering and cleaning rattan poles.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On May 20, 2005, the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, rendered its Decision finding
appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
6

WHEREFORE, finding accused Wilfredo Gunda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH; and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages; and another sum
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

The trial court disregarded the denial of the appellant. On the other hand, it lent full credence to the
testimonies of Eladio Jr. and Ambal who both positively identified appellant as the assailant. The
RTC noted that their testimonies coincided with the postmortem findings of Dr. Samuel Baldono that
the victim suffered multiple stab wounds which caused his death. The RTC likewise brushed aside
the alibi of appellant. It noted that although he claimed that he was in Barangay Camada at the time
of the incident, appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at
Barangay Cabay where the crime took place. Appellant even admitted that the distance between the
two barangays could be traversed in an hour or even less. The RTC also found that appellant
conspired with the John Does in committing the crime. It also noted that treachery attended the
commission of the crime because the victim was unarmed and totally unaware of the impending
attack. The attack was sudden thus depriving the victim of any opportunity to escape or defend
himself.
In imposing the death penalty, the RTC considered treachery and conspiracy as qualifying
circumstances.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 30, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 20, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 8th Judicial Region, Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, is

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the lesser penalty of Reclusion Perpetua instead of Death be
imposed against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

The CA affirmed the factual findings of the trial court that indeed, it was appellant, in conspiracy with
the other John Does, who killed the victim. The CA also agreed with the findings of the trial court that
the killing was done in a treacherous manner. However, the CA noted that although the trial court
properly appreciated treachery and conspiracy to have attended the commission of the crime, the
presence of both would not warrant the imposition of the death penalty. It ratiocinated that Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating circumstance. Its presence
served to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the same time be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty. Since treachery
qualified the commission of the crime to murder, this circumstance could no longer be appreciated
anew as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
Furthermore, although there was conspiracy in this case, it is neither a qualifying circumstance [nor]
a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The two penalties being both
indivisible, and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the deed, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be applied pursuant to the second
paragraph of the Revised Penal Code.
9

Aggrieved, appellant filed this appeal to which the CA gave due course in its Resolution of
December 1, 2010.
10

11

On March 21, 2011, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. However,
both parties opted not to file their briefs anymore considering that their arguments had been amply
discussed in the briefs that they filed before the CA.
12

13

Our Ruling
We dismiss the appeal.
Based on the above narrations, we find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the trial court
as affirmed by the CA, that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Two
prosecution witnesses positively identified him as the person who waylaid the victim, and with the
help of his conspirators, stabbed the victim several times. According to the postmortem findings, the
victim suffered 12 stab wounds which caused his death. There is also no doubt in our mind that the
attack on the victim was attended by treachery. The victim was unarmed and had no inkling of the
impending attack on his person. In fact, he was just on his way home together with his son Eladio Jr.
The victim was attacked by appellant from behind with a blow to his head with a wooden pole. His
cohorts then held the victims arms rendering him helpless and immobile. In such position, there is
no opportunity for the victim to escape or even offer a feeble resistance. Appellant then delivered the
coup de grce by stabbing the victim multiple times. Undoubtedly, treachery qualified the killing to
murder. "There is treachery when the offender commits [a crime] against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." As
14

regards conspiracy, the CA correctly ruled that it is not a circumstance which would aggravate or
qualify the crime.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no other aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the CA correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of
the two indivisible penalties. "It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for
parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
1wphi1

15

As regards the damages, the amount of civil indemnity must be increased to P75,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence. Exemplary damages must likewise be increased to P30,000.00. Moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, however, was correctly awarded by the trial court and the
CA. Moreover, we note that the trial court and the CA did not award actual damages. In lieu thereof,
we award temperate damages in the amount ofP25,000.00 "as it cannot be denied that the heirs of
the [victim] suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved." "This award is
adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the
purpose of indemnification." In addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
16

17

18

19

20

21

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The March 30, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 00397 which affirmed with modification the May 20, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, finding appellant Wilfredo Gunda alias
Fred guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As
modified, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
PS0,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, andP25,000.00 as temperate
damages. Interest on all damages awarded is imposed at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168539

March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Third Division of
the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein
respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
1

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the
Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine
Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the
above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein
respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired
with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
3

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he
died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense
in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T.
GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the
project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession
Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the
NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the
provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of
PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to
Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
4

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that
the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is
already deceased, and not an accused in this case.
5

The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a
motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has
exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged
to have conspired with a public officer.
6

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently
of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government
agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
7

The prosecution filed its Opposition.

On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing
that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspiratorpublic official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in
this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.
9

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090
ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT
GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE,
IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO
DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS
PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090
10

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
11

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with
public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which
may lead thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases,
among which is a case involving herein private respondent.
12

13

The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a
private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who
was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation
of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that
there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
14

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. If two
or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is,
in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This
means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of
the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes
no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death
of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors. Thus, this Court held that:
15

16

17

18

x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person
cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not
remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
19

The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is
also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative
intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices," would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private
person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
20

In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta as to the nature of and
the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
21

x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when
the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of
conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to
commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators
do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is
not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more
malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the
liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in
U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime
unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a
conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together
with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and its
commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of

the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the
act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or
more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or
all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the
wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."
Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons
agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to
graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted
by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by
them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason
of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any
conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping
ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime
amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that
conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule
of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted
action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil
partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily
liable.
22

This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with
Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters. Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left
ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or
disprove its presence.
23

Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve that
in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary
Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement
(Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted
respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the
24

25

person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute
resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the
part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now
argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R.
No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that
private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with
jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in
filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.
26

27

Thus, it has been held that:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of
arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he
must raise the question of the courts jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he
gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives
the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted
himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If
the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for
respondent courts exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said courts
jurisdiction over him. x x x.
28

In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of
the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his
Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an
Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract
entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special
criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and
Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However,
by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already
discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and
the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such
as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main
case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the
case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by
no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005,
granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan
is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No.
28090.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196960

March 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ERWIN TAMAYO y BAUTISTA, Appellant.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
The City Prosecutor of Manila originally filed separate charges of homicide and theft of a necklace
worthP1,500.00 against accused Erwin Tamayo y Bautista (Erwin) and John Del Rosario (John)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Criminal Cases 04-225922-23. Subsequently,
however, the prosecution amended the charge of homicide to one of murder, qualified by taking
advantage of superior strength and employing means to weaken the defense and afford impunity. It
also claimed the attendance of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. Trial took place only as to Erwin since John jumped bail and remained at-large.
1

The prosecution presented Norman Pleno (Norman), Wilson Quinto (Wilson), Alvin Hernaez (Alvin),
and Leonard Miranda (Leonard). They testified that in the early morning of April 8, 2004, while Joey
M. Obamen (Joey), Wilson, Alvin, and Lorenzo Gloria (Lorenzo) were having drink and merriment
beside the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) chapel on Lacson Street in Tondo, Manila, someone hurled empty
bottles of gin at them. As Wilson went to look for whoever had done it, he saw accused Erwin and
John, in the company of several others, also having their drink.
3

Retaliating, Joey and his group threw stones and empty gin bottles at accused Erwin and his
companions. Enraged, the latter group gave chase to Joey and the others with him. Unfortunately,
Joey tripped on an iron chain that guarded the INCs parking area and fell to the ground. He was in
this position when Erwin and his companions attacked and mauled him. Some, including Erwin,
stabbed Joey with their knives. The assailants scampered away afterwards.
6

Joey was rushed to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but died shortly on arrival. A subsequent
autopsy of his body showed that he died of traumatic injuries on the head and multiple stab wounds
on the abdomen.
9

10

In his defense, Erwin claimed that when the killing took place, he was asleep at home with his wife
and a certain Maricel Bustarde although it would take but about 20 to 25 minutes to walk from his
house to where the incident took place. He also claimed that he and Norman, his wifes former
boyfriend and one of the prosecution witnesses, had an altercation shortly before the killing
incident. This was the reason Norman testified falsely against him.
11

12

13

On November 21, 2008 the RTC found accused Erwin guilty of murder but innocent of the separate
charge of theft. Although it did not find sufficient evidence of treachery, evident premeditation, or
employment of means to weaken the defense and afford impunity, the RTC elevated the crime that
Erwin committed from homicide to murder based on its finding that abuse of superior strength
attended the killing. The RTC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
Joeys heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P36,981.85 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. Erwin appealed the conviction.
14

15

16

On November 19, 2010 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Decision with modification in
that it further ordered Erwin to pay Joeys heirs P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, hence, the
appeal to this Court.
17

18

Accused Erwin claims that since about 15 men mauled Joey, it is "highly possible" that the
prosecution witnesses made a mistake in saying that it was he who caused Joeys death. Erwin
cites several variances in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that lend credit to his defense
that he was elsewhere when the incident took place. He also insists that Normans testimony
cannot be believed for being tainted with ill motives. Lastly, Erwin contends that the CA and the RTC
erred in finding that abuse of superior strength qualified the killing of Joey to murder.
19

20

21

But the Court has always been inclined, with few exceptions, to defer to the findings of fact of the
trial court since it had the opportunity to observe how each witness expressed himself and whether
his eyes agreed with his lips. The Court finds nothing from the transcripts that would indicate that the
trial court and the CA misapprehended the facts.
The Court also finds no error in the RTC and the CAs rejection of his alibi. The site of the murder
was not far from where he lived. Besides, he presented no corroborating testimony that he was then
at his house. As to his lament that the RTC and the CA should not have given credit to Normans
testimony for he had a grudge against him, Erwin presented no proof apart from his word that this
was so. At any rate, the accounts of the remaining eyewitnesses were just as positive,
straightforward, consistent, and clear. They all testified that Erwin stabbed Joey with a knife.
1wphi1

Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal wounds on
Joey during the commotion, Erwins liability is not diminished since he and the others with him acted
with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally
liable as co-principals by direct participation.
22

Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one helpless victim, relentlessly
bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead, there is no
question that the accused took advantage of their superior strength.
In disposing the civil aspect of the case, the RTC correctly awarded to Joey's heirs the amount
of P36,981.85 as actual damages representing medical and funeral expenses as this amount was
adequately supported by the receipts. In addition, this Court sustains the award of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages given to
Joey's heirs for being in accord with established jurisprudence.
23

24

25

With regard to the penalty, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
9346, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. In this case, the
RTC correctly imposed reclusion perpetua as the penalty for murder due to absence of any
modifying circumstance.
26

27

28

29

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
03851 dated November 19, 2010 which affirmed with modification as to damages the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court in Criminal Cases 04-225922-23 dated November 21, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199689

March 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. y BINAYUG, a.k.a. "JOJIT," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This appeal challenges the Decision dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.H.C. No. 03353, affirming the Decision dated April 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (R TC),
Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal Case No. 10516, which found accused-appellant
Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a. "Jojit" (Constantino), guilty of the crime of illegal sale of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, under Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
1

The Information filed before the R TC charged Constantino, as follows:

3

That on January 20, 2005, in the City of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and without permit to
sell, transport, deliver and distribute dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, transport, distribute and deliver two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing 0.14 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a
dangerous drug to a member of the PNP, Tuguegarao City who acted as a poseur-buyer; that after
receiving the two (2) plastic sachets, the poseur-buyer simultaneously handed to the accused the
marked money consisting of one (1) piece of FIVE HUNDRED PESO BILL (P500.00) with Serial No.
QP278070 and five (5) pieces of ONE HUNDRED PESO BILL with Serial Nos. SM989053,
PS724429, XM484584, BB048002, and EK6900025 or a total of P1,000.00 and this led to the

apprehension of the accused and the confiscation of the dangerous drug together with the buy-bust
money by the said apprehending law enforcers of the Tuguegarao City Police Station who formed
the buy bust team in coordination with the PDEA.
When arraigned on July 8, 2005, Constantino pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter,
pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
4

Evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:

On January 20, 2005, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Mariano
Rodriguez (Rodriquez), the Chief of Police of Tuguegarao City, received a report from a confidential
informant (CI) that a certain Jojit was selling illegal drugs in the said city. P/Supt.
Rodriguez immediately formed a buy-bust group composed of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Noel
Taguiam (Taguiam), SPO2 Alexander Tamang (Tamang), SPO1 Arthur Blaquera (Blaquera), Police
Officer (PO) 3 Edwin Hernandez (Hernandez), and PO3 Rolando Domingo (Domingo). PO3
Domingo was designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust money, consisting of one P500.00 bill
and five P100.00 bills, were dusted with fluorescent powder and their respective serial numbers
were recorded in the police blotter.
5

Around 8:00 in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded to Reynovilla St., Caritan Centro,
Tuguegarao City, the place where, according to the CI, Jojit was selling shabu. PO3 Domingo
positioned himself beside a street light while the rest of the team hid behind a nearby concrete
fence. After waiting for about 45 minutes, Constantino arrived on board a tricycle. PO3 Domingo
recognized Constantino as the Jojit described by the CI. PO3 Domingo approached Constantino and
asked him if he was Jojit. When Constantino replied in the affirmative, PO3 Domingo next asked,
"Mayroon ka bang stuff?" ("Do you have stuff?") In response, Constantino inquired of PO3 Domingo
how much he wanted to buy. PO3 Domingo said he wanted to buy P1,000.00 worth of shabu,
simultaneously handing over the buy-bust money to Constantino, who, in turn, handed two plastic
sachets to PO3 Domingo. Thereupon, PO3 Domingo turned his cap backwards, the pre-arranged
signal for the consummated sale. Upon seeing the signal, the other members of the buy-bust team
approached the scene at once and arrested Constantino, from whom SPO2 Taguiam recovered the
buy-bust money.
6

Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the police station where the recovered drugs and money
were turned over to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang. The recovered drugs were then marked with
the initials "A-1" and "A-2." The incident was recorded in the police blotter with an inventory of the
recovered drugs and money.
7

Later that evening, at around ten oclock, P/Supt. Rodriguez and SPO2 Tamang submitted to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Services, Camp Marcelo Adduru, Tuguegarao
City, a request for laboratory examination of two plastic sachets with white crystalline substance
marked as "A-1" and "A-2" to determine the presence of dangerous drugs; as well as both hands of
Constantino, one piece P500.00 bill, and five pieces P100.00 bills, to determine the presence of the
ultra violet powder. Per Chemistry Report No. D-08-2005 and Physical Identification Report No. PI04-2005, prepared by Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.) Mayra Matote Madria, Forensic Chemist,
the contents of the two plastic sachets tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; while the
other specimens tested positive for the presence of bright-yellow ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
9

10

12

11

13

Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted that he was merely framed-up.
According to Constantino, at around 8:00 in the evening on January 20, 2005, he was enjoying a
joyride with his friend, Jeff Abarriao, on the latters motorcycle, within the vicinity of Caritan Centro.
After 30 minutes, Constantino decided to go home. While walking along Reyno or Reynovilla St., two
vehicles suddenly stopped, one in front and the other behind him. Five men, all in civilian clothes,
alighted from the two vehicles. Two of the men held Constantinos hands, while another poked a gun
at him, asking him where he came from and ordering him to bring out the shabu. Constantino
answered that he did not know what the men were talking about. The men then forced Constantino
into one of the vehicles. Inside the vehicle, one of the men frisked and searched Constantino, and
told him that he was being arrested for selling shabu. The men, who were now apparently police
officers, brought Constantino to the Tuguegarao City Police Station. At the police station, the police
officers took Constantinos cellphone and wallet. Also at the police station, one of the arresting police
officers brought out two pieces of plastic sachets and money and turned it over to one of his
companions. At around 9:30 in the evening, the police officers brought Constantino to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, but nothing happened because he heard that the person who was supposed to
conduct the examination was not around, so, Constantino was brought back to the police station.
14

The following day, January 21, 2005, the police officers again brought Constantino to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Along the way, one of the police escorts forced Constantino to hold a certain amount of
money. Constantino tried to resist but he could not really do anything because he was handcuffed.
After his examination, Constantino was detained and was told that he was suspected of selling
shabu.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on April 15, 2008, finding Constantino guilty as charged. The trial
court rejected the arguments of the defense, thus:
1. The Prosecution failed to give a detailed account of the arrangement with the accused for the
purchase of the shabu.
The Courts response: The testimony of PO3 Domingo was detailed enough, corroborated by other
witnesses. It is the defense that has failed to show in what crucial detail the prosecutions account is
wanting.
2. The police officers categorically admitted that they did not personally know the accused until they
were at the alleged place of transaction.
The Courts response: Substantive law does not require this; the rules of evidence do not. Did they
know he was Jojit? Yes, from the description given the informant. Domingo asked whether he was
Jojit. He answered "Yes".
3. The arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements of Article II, Section 21 of R.A. 9165
that requires that an inventory be taken and that photographs be taken of the items seized.
The Courts comment: The Police Blotter Entry No. 0270 enumerates the items seized. This, the
Court holds to be substantial compliance. Even assuming, without admitting, that not all the
requirements may not have been complied with, these omissions do not operate to exclude the
evidence nor to cause suppression thereof. They are directory, not mandatory provisions.

4. The chain of custody was not established with certainty.

The Courts comment: The chain is not difficult to trace, and has been established by evidence, thus:
a. Exhibit "B": The police blotter recording that on 20 January 2005 at 2100 hours,
mentioning the two sachets of shabu which according to the blotter the accused admitted he
handed over to Domingo; Domingo had testified that the markings A-1 NBT and A-2 NBT
were placed on the sachets by Investigator Alexander Tamang;
b. Exhibit "F": Dated January 20, 2005, a request to the PNP Crime Lab Services for the
examination of "two plastic sachet (sic) with white crystalline substance marked A1 and A2";
c. Exhibit "D": Chemistry Report No. D-08-2005 completed 21 January 2005 reporting a
qualitative examination of the contents of two heat-sealed sachets marked as A1 NBT and
A2 NBT and identifying the substance as "Methamphetamine Hydrochloride".
5. There was no prior coordination with PDEA.
The Courts response: None was needed. Exhibit "H" clearly evidences that SPO1 Blaquera was
authorized to conduct anti-drug operations. Domingo also answered the question about coordination
with PDEA when he testified: "During that time 3 representatives of the Intelligence Operatives were
deputized in the PDEA in the persons of Noel Taguiam, Arthur Blaquera and the Chief of Police."
Hermanos testified in his behalf and his testimony can be reduced to the following story:
1 He went on a joy-ride that night with his friend aboard a motorcycle;
2 Tiring, he alighted and started to walk along Reyno Villa Street;
3 He was accosted by police officers who, at the time, he did not know to be police officers;
4 They took him to the police station and produced the sachets;
5 Next day, while on the way to the Crime Lab, they forced him to hold marked bills, although
he was cuffed.
All told, it is a story that is meant to endeavor to explain the circumstances around the accuseds
arrest and apprehension. For one thing, it is self-serving; for another, we are not told any reason why
the police officers should have wanted to apprehend him a supposedly guiltless man; third, the
Court never heard the testimony of his friend with whom he was supposed to have had a joy-ride
that night. In sum, his story does not convince this Court. (Citations omitted.)
15

The RTC imposed the following sentence upon Constantino:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Sec. 5,
Art. II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine
of P500,000.00.
16

Maintaining his innocence, Constantino appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that:
1. The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses despite the patent irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operation.
2. The trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant despite the prosecutions
failure to establish that chain of custody of the drug specimens allegedly confiscated from
the accused-appellant.
3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the prosecutions
failure to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs constituting the corpus delicti of the
offense.
In its Decision dated July 29, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction
of the RTC against Constantino. The appellate court held that Constantinos defense of frame-up
was not worthy of credence as his version of the incident was not at all corroborated.
Constantino was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to PO3 Domingo, who acted as the
poseur-buyer, therefore, he was legally arrested without a warrant. The appellate court also found
that the chain of custody of the shabu had been preserved from the time said drugs were
confiscated from Constantino to the time the same drugs were delivered to the crime laboratory and
thereafter retrieved and presented as evidence before the trial court. Lastly, the appellate court
stressed that between the positive and categorical declarations of the prosecution witnesses, on one
hand, and the unsubstantial denial or negative statements of the appellant, on the other hand, the
former generally prevails; and that negative averments, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, deserve no weight in law, especially vis-a-vis the time-tested presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty on the part of the apprehending officers.
In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 5, dated 15 April
2008, in Criminal Case No. 10516, is AFFIRMED.
17

Consequently, Constantino comes before this Court seeking the reversal of his conviction by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
In his Supplemental Brief, Constantino contests his conviction, averring inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly, on the circumstances of the marking of the two
plastic sachets containing shabu allegedly confiscated from him. Different people claim to have
made the marking "NBT" on the two plastic sachets and gave various explanations as to what the
initials "NBT" stand for. In short, Constantino argues that the prosecution failed to establish a crucial
link in the chain of custody of the shabu in this case.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Admittedly, denial is an inherently weak defense, consistently viewed with disfavor by the courts,
being a self-serving negative evidence. In view, however, of the constitutional presumption that an
accused is innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt, the burden lies on the
prosecution to overcome such presumption by presenting the required quantum of evidence. In so

doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense.
18

In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, "[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is
material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence." And in the prosecution of these offenses, the primary
consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles
have been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation
as evidence in court.
19

20

Article II, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 lays down the procedure to be followed in the
seizure and custody of dangerous drugs:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof[.]
Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165
describes in more detail how the foregoing procedure is to be applied:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the

integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
While police officers are enjoined to strictly comply with the procedure prescribed by law, the IRR
also explicitly excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds, but only if the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items have been properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as long as the chain of
custody of the same are duly established.
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002, defines "chain of custody"
as follows:
21

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.
In Mallillin v. People, the Court discussed how the chain of custody of seized items is established:
22

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked
illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
23

After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court finds glaring
inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from Constantino. The
inconsistent testimonies of PO3 Domingo, PO3 Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to who, when,
and where the two plastic sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to question whether the two
plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones confiscated from Constantino.
The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the seized shabu at a very early stage.
To recall, the first crucial link in the chain of custody is seizure and marking of the illegal drug. In this
case, PO3 Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets of shabu from Constantino in
exchange for P1,000. However, PO3 Domingo himself did not put any markings on the two plastic

sachets of shabu. Instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust team with Constantino at the police station,
PO3 Domingo turned over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang, who
was also a member of the buy-bust team. PO3 Domingo testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who put
the marking "NBT" on the said sachets of shabu. Below are the excerpts from PO3 Domingos
testimony:
Q If that plastic sachets which was sold to you by Hermanos Constantino is shown to you will you be
able to identify the same?
A Yes, maam.
Q How were you able to identify the plastic sachets?
A There is an initials (sic), maam.
Q What initials are you referring to?
A A-1 initial NBT and A-2 initial NBT.
Q Who placed those initials in the plastic sachets?
A The Investigator, maam.
Q And who is the investigator?
A Alexander Tamang, maam.
Q Where did he place those initials?
A In the police station after the apprehension, maam. (Emphasis supplied.)
24

However, PO3 Hernandez, another member of the buy-bust team, categorically pointed to SPO2
Taguiam, also a member of the buy-bust team, as the one who put the marking "NBT" on the plastic
sachets upon the teams return to the police station, thus:
PROS. NICOLAS:
Q During the buy bust operation you stated that the accused handed to the poseur buyer in the
person of PO3 Rolando Domingo two plastic sachets containing as you claimed methamphetamine
hydrochloride, have you seen these plastic sachets at that time when they handed to PO3 Rolando
Domingo?
A Yes, sir.
Q If these two plastic sachets will be shown to you again today will you be able to tell that these two
plastic sachets were the same plastic sachets that were handed by the accused to PO3 Rolando
Domingo?

A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you these two plastic sachets kindly tell us if these are the plastic sachets that
were handed to PO3 Rolando Domingo?
A These are the ones, sir.
Q Why do you say that these are the two plastic sachets handed by the accused?
A Because I was there and I saw the accused handed the two plastic sachets to PO3 Rolando
Domingo, sir.
Q Why do you know that these are the same plastic sachets?
A These are the ones, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, there are markings on these two plastic sachets, do you know whose markings are
these?
xxxx
A It was Noel B. Taguiam, sir.
The witness is pointing to the marking NBT partly hidden.
COURT:
Q Who is Noel B. Taguiam?
A A member of the buy bust team also, sir.
PROS. NICOLAS:
Q You stated this NBT was placed by one Noel B. Taguiam, why do you know that he was the one
who placed this?
A Because I was present during that time when he placed his initial, sir.
Q Do you know when this Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials on those two plastic sachets?
A After we conducted the buy bust operation, sir.
Q How soon Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials after the conduct of the buy bust operation?
A After a few hours, sir.
Q Where did he place those initials?

A In our office, sir. (Emphasis supplied.)

25

To complicate things even further, P/SInsp Tulauan, the Forensic Chemist, also declared before the
trial court that the marking "NBT" on the two plastic sachets of shabu were made by SPO3 Nelson B.
Tamaray (Tamaray), the duty officer who received the specimens at the crime laboratory. P/SInsp.
Tulauan testified:
26

PROS. ISRAEL:
Q When you received these two specimens Madam Witness, will you please tell us the physical
appearance of these items when you received the same?
A They were heat-sealed and with markings "A-1" and "A-2," your Honor.
B And will you please point to us these markings "A-1" and "A-2" when you received these items
Madam Witness?
A This is the markings "A-1" and "A-2," Maam.
INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to the markings "A-1" and "A-2" with the use of a black pentel pen.
PROS. ISRAEL:
Q There is another marking in this plastic sachet Madam Witness marked as NBT, what is this
marking all about?
A That is the marking of SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, Maam.
Q Is he authorized to make the necessary marking which was requested to be examined Madam
Witness?
A Yes, Maam because he is the one who received the specimen from the one who deliver it, Maam.
Q In this second plastic sachet Madam Witness which you identified earlier, that there is a marking
"A-1," there is another marking NBT, what is this marking all about Madam Witness?
A That is the marking of SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, Maam. (Emphases supplied.)
27

On cross-examination, P/SInsp. Tulauan confirmed her previous declaration that SPO3 Tamaray had
claimed making the marking on the sachets of shabu:
Atty. Aquino
Madam Witness, with respect to that marking made which are "A1" and "A-2", they are not your
markings, is it not?

A Yes, sir.
Q And with respect also to that NBT marked and placed in that exhibit which you have earlier
identified, you did not see this duty officer placed his markings thereon, is it not?
A Yes sir but I asked him who placed that marking and he said that he was the one who placed the
initial NBT, sir.
28

The Court already emphasized in People v. Zakaria the importance of marking the seized item right
after seizure:
29

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference
point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the
corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until
disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of
evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of
custody that the law requires. (Citation omitted.)
1wphi1

Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseur-buyer, despite
having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu purchased from Constantino, failed to
immediately mark the seized drugs before turning over the custody of the same to another police
officer. This lapse in procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the identity of the
drugs actually seized from Constantino during the buy-bust and the ones presented before the trial
court, especially considering that three different people, during the interval, supposedly received and
marked the same. To clarify the matter, the prosecution could have presented as witness either
SPO2 Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam to directly validate the marking in court, but unfortunately, the
prosecution chose to dispense with the testimonies of both officers. This omission diminished the
importance of the markings as the reference point for the subsequent handling of the evidence. As a
consequence, an objective person could now justifiably suspect the shabu ultimately presented as
evidence in court to be planted or contaminated.
30

The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidences chain of custody is fatal to its case as the
Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved.
31

In light of the foregoing, Constantino is acquitted of the crime charged, not because the Court
accords credence to his defense of frame-up, but because the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03353, affirming the Decision dated April 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal Case No. 10516, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a. "Jojit," is ACQUITTED for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and is ORDERED to be immediately
released from detention unless he is confined for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 205230

March 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ERNESTO VENTURA, SR., Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Accused-appellant Ernesto Ventura, Sr. (Ventura) challenges in this appeal the Decision dated April
13, 2012 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04133, which affirmed
with modification the judgment of conviction for Rape rendered against him on May 27, 2009 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 194, in Criminal Case No. 05-0366.
1

Through the testimonies of the victim herself (AAA), her aunt BBB, Barangay Tanod Ronaldo
Antiporda (Antiporda), and the medico legal officer, the prosecutions case was summarized as
follows:
4

On March 24, 2005, at about 2:00 a.m., BBB had just came from a wake and was passing by the
bakery of Venturas son when she saw Ventura, naked from waist down, on top of a woman on a
bench in front of the bakery. BBB coughed to get their attention and Ventura immediately stood up,
put on his pants and entered his house. BBB then realized that the woman was her niece, AAA, who
was then only 17 years old, unschooled and has a mental disability. She then held AAAs hands and
brought her home. Thereafter, BBB confronted AAA who confessed that she was already
impregnated by Ventura and admitted that the latter was sexually abusing her. Upon learning this,
BBB sought help from the employer of AAAs sister who accompanied them to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) to file a complaint against Ventura.
8

Thereafter, the members of the CIDG went to AAAs barangay hall, and Antiporda was one of the
barangay tanods who was tasked to escort them to the residence of Ventura. Antiporda testified that
upon arriving at Venturas house, he informed Ventura of the complaint against him and invited the
latter to the barangay hall. Ventura, with his wife, voluntarily went with them. At the barangay hall,
the wife of Ventura approached AAA and asked her for forgiveness.
10

AAA narrated that she was near the bakery of Venturas son when Ventura asked her to lie down on
the bench. Ventura undressed her, went on top of her, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. After
succeeding in having carnal knowledge of her, Ventura threatened AAA by poking a knife at her
while instructing her not to tell anyone about the incident. She was then forced by Ventura to
accompany him in selling pandesal until the early morning, and she could not escape him because
he was holding her hands and would not let her go. AAA said that Ventura would give her clothes
and money every time he would rape her and instructed her not to tell anyone of the sexual
assaults.
11

12

13

The Medico Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory testified that based on
his interview with AAA, he found out that AAA was mentally deficient. His initial and final medico
legal report revealed that AAA was already pregnant and that there was definite evidence of abuse
or sexual contact.
14

15

For his part, Ventura denied the charge against him and invoked the defense of alibi alleging that
he did not rape AAA on March 24, 2005 as he did not leave his home because he was busy making
bread for their bakery with his children, and it was already 10:00 a.m. when he was able to leave
their bakery. He also admitted having knowledge that AAA has a mental defect.
16

17

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment on May 27, 2009, convicting Ventura of the crime charged
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay AAA by way
of damages the amount of P100,000.00. The trial court viewed the findings of the medico legal
officer that AAA was already pregnant at the time of her physical and medical examination as clear
proof and manifestation that she is a victim of rape, particularly in her case who was then only 17
years old, mentally deficient, illiterate, unschooled, and thus, incapable of giving rational consent to
any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. The trial court also noted that Ventura failed to present any
defense as to the explicit testimony of AAA that she was also sexually abused by him on other
occasions since the only denial he interposed was against the consummated rape done on March
24, 2005.
18

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification as to the award of
damages. The CA ordered Ventura to pay the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
as moral damages, andP30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Ventura then appealed his conviction
to this Court.
19

20

The Issue
Whether the guilt of Ventura for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Rulings
The appeal lacks merit.
In the Information filed before the RTC on March 31, 2005, Ventura was charged with rape of a
demented person under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to wit:
21

That on or about the 24th day of March 2005, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having moral ascendancy, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of victim [AAA], 17[-]year old minor, a demented person and with mental capacity below
18 years old, against her will and without her consent, the accused knowing the victims mental
disability at the time of the commission of the crime, which acts are demeaning to the demented
minor. (Emphasis ours)
22

Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC, as amended, provides for two circumstances when having
carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered rape, to wit: paragraph 1(b)
when the offended party is deprived of reason; and paragraph 1(d) when the offended party is
demented.
23

Under paragraph 1(d), the term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition
of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individuals former intellectual
level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, under paragraph 1(b),
the phrase deprived of reason has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental

abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Since AAA is mentally deficient, she should properly be
classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented." Hence, carnal
knowledge of a mentally deficient individual is rape under subparagraph b and not subparagraph d
of Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, as amended. Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to paragraph
1(d) in the Information will not exonerate Ventura because he failed to raise this as an objection, and
the particular facts stated in the Information were protestation sufficient to inform him of the nature of
the charge against him.
24

25

From the foregoing, all that needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the rapist
and his victim, and the latters mental retardation. This Court has repeatedly held that "mental
retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of
witnesses and even the observation by the trial court." The trial judges assessment of the credibility
of witnesses testimonies is accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on its part, it having had the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial
evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the appellate court.
26

27

28

In the present case, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is, indeed, a mental retardate
through the testimony of BBB and the medico legal officer, and the trial courts observation. It is also
worthy to note that the defense did not dispute but even admitted the fact that AAA is suffering from
mental retardation. Though AAA proceeded with much difficulty in describing the sexual abuse made
on her, no convincing reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial
court with respect to the assessment of her testimony, the same being straightforward, candid, and
worthy of belief. This Court is also convinced that AAA has no ill-motive to manufacture such a tale if
it were not true.
In impugning AAAs accusation of rape against him, Ventura interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. As can be gleaned from the records of this case, Venturas argument centered only on the fact
that it was impossible for him to rape AAA on the said date and time of the incident because he was
busy making bread at their bakery, and the only time he left their house was at 10:00 a.m. Even
assuming that he worked inside their bakery the whole day, it was not impossible for him to commit
the crime because the rape took place on the bench located just in front of their bakery.
The fact that no consummated rape happened on March 24, 2005 based on the testimonies of BBB
and the medico legal officer, as well as the absence of lacerations on AAAs vagina, pointed to by
Ventura cannot work in his favor. The absence of hymenal lacerations on AAAs vagina upon medical
examination does not negate the fact of rape. A freshly broken hymen is not also an essential
element of rape. In the context it is used in the RPC, carnal knowledge does not necessarily require
that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.
29

30

AAAs failure to recall the exact date of the first rape and the number of times she was sexually
assaulted by Ventura prior to March 24, 2005, does not militate against her credibility since rape
victims are not expected to cherish in their memories an accurate account of the dates, number of
times and manner they were violated. This is especially true in the case of AAA who obviously
cannot be expected to act like an adult who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard the
threat to her life and complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted. AAAs testimony
was clear that every time Ventura would rape her, he would threaten her against revealing the
offense. Given AAAs mental condition, it can well substitute for violence and intimidation enough to
cow her into submission.
31

The Court had repeatedly held that the exact date when the victim was sexually abused is not an
essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman. Indeed, the precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such,
the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. Inconsistencies and
discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be
considered grounds for acquittal. Hence, the allegation in the information under Criminal Case No.
05-0366, which states that the rape was committed on or about March 24, 2005, is sufficient to affirm
the conviction of Ventura in the said case.
32

33

34

Lastly, the trial court had observed that Venturas actions were detested by his family because
despite having a large kin, none of them testified for Venturas defense or did anything to support
his case. They did not even bother to visit him while he was in jail.
35

36

In sum, the defense of denial as well as the points advanced by Ventura miserably failed to cast
doubt on his culpability. The prosecution was able to prove that Ventura is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8353. Taking into consideration the presence of the special qualifying circumstance of
Venturas knowledge of AAAs mental deficiency, the same being properly alleged in the Information
charging the appellant of the crime of rape and proven during trial, this Court has no option but to
impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 ofR.A. No.
9346.
37

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated April 13, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 04133 which found accused-appellant Ernesto Ventura, Sr. GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193768, March 05, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. JERRY CARANTO Y PROPETA, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the 28 July 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. C.R.H.C. No. 01680. The
CA affirmed the 7 October 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 267, Pasig City, that
found Jerry Caranto y Propeta (Jerry) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and imposed upon him the
penalty of life imprisonment.
Jerry was charged under the criminal information,2 which reads:

chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

That, on or about the 24th day of July 2002, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without having been authorized
by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another one (1)
heat sealed transparent sachet containing 0.39 gram of white crystalline substance, which was found
positive to the test of Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in
consideration of the amount of PhP 500.00, in violation of [Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002].
The Facts

The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case, particularly the Appellees Brief 3 for the
version of the prosecution and the Appellants Brief4 for the version of the defense.
Version of the Prosecution
On 24 July 2002, PO2 Danilo Arago (PO2 Arago) was inside the office of the Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Taguig City when his informant approached him and reported that
there was widespread selling of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) by a certain Jojo at the latters
residence at No. 13 Santos Street, Barangay Calzada, Tipas, Taguig City.
PO2 Arago immediately reported the information to his superior, P/Supt. Ramon Ramirez (P/Supt. Ramirez),
who in turn organized a buybust operation to apprehend Jerry.
Inside P/Supt. Ramirez office, PO2 Arago, along with the informant, PO3 Angelito Galang, SPO3 Arnuldo
Vicuna, PO3 Santiago Cordova, PO2 Archie Baltijero and PO1 Alexander Saez, discussed the conduct of the
buybust operation.
The team agreed that the informant would accompany the team to Jerrys residence where PO2 Arago would
act as the poseur buyer while the rest of the team would serve as his back up. P/Supt. Ramirez thereafter
provided the buybust money of five hundred pesos (P500.00), which PO2 Arago marked with his initials,
DBA.
At around 12:00 in the afternoon of the same day, the team proceeded to Jerrys residence. Upon nearing
the area, the informant and PO2 Arago separated from the rest of the team. They walked ahead of their
companions and proceeded towards Jerrys residence while the rest of the team hid in a corner some six to
seven meters away from the two.
When they were about 10 to 20 meters when they got near him, from the house, the informant pointed PO2
Arago to Jerry and the informant introduced PO2 Arago to Jerry as a balikbayan who was looking for some
shabu.
Jerry then asked them how much worth of shabu they planned to buy, to which informant answered Five
Hundred Pesos (P500.00) worth. PO2 Arago then handed Jerry the marked money.
Upon receiving the money, Jerry went inside his house and after around thirty (30) seconds to one (1)
minute, he returned and handed PO2 Arago a plastic sachet, which PO2 Arago suspected to beshabu.
After the completion of the transaction, Jerry noticed the informant and PO2 Aragos companions moving in
from behind the two. Jerry immediately tried to flee but was stopped by PO2 Arago.
Seeing the scuffle between PO2 Arago and Jerry, the rest of the buybust team rushed towards them.
After Jerry was subdued, PO2 Arago recovered the marked money inside Jerrys right pocket. Thereafter, the
team introduced themselves as police officers, informed Jerry of his constitutional rights in Filipino and then
returned to their station in Taguig City where Jerry was duly investigated.
Version of the Defense
Recalling what transpired on 24 July 2002, Jerry said that he went through his route as a tricycle driver from
6:00 a.m. until he went home around 12:00 in the afternoon to have lunch. He was at the rooftop of their
house feeding the dog when policemen arrived looking for his father Cesar Caranto. The policemen kicked
the door and forced it open. They held Jerry and told him that they would have to bring him in unless they
get his father. Jerry told the policemen that he was not aware of his fathers whereabouts because his father
did not live with them anymore. The policemen frisked him and took his wallet. He was brought to the DEU
and was thereafter hit by P/Supt. Ramirez on the chest. He denied that he sold any shabu.
The mother of Jerry, Teresita Propeta Caranto (Teresita), testified that on that date, she was at the Baclaran
church attending mass when her daughter called and told her that her son Jerry was taken from their house
and invited by policemen. She hurriedly went to the police station and cried when her son told her that the
policemen mauled him. The policemen also asked money from her, but she did not give them anything as
her son is innocent. Upon learning that her sons case was nonbailable, she went back to the police station
and uttered invectives against the policemen who arrested her son.

More than a month after the incident or on 28 August 2002, Teresita, together with her son Christopher
Caranto, her daughter Cynthia Caranto, and a housemaid, were arrested in Baclaran. A drug related case
was also filed against them. They were incarcerated for about two years but they were eventually acquitted.
Teresita filed a case against the policemen who arrested them and is also planning to file a case against the
law officers who arrested her son Jerry.
At the pretrial, the parties stipulated:5 1) that a request has been made by the arresting officers for
examination of the specimens confiscated; 2) that the forensic chemist P/Insp. Lourdeliza Gural (P/Insp.
Gural) examined the specimens submitted and thereafter issued her initial and final laboratory report; 3)
that P/Insp. Gural has no personal knowledge from whom the alleged specimens were taken and that the
test conducted on the alleged specimen yielded positive to metamphetamine hydrochloride. After
stipulations were made, the public prosecutor dispensed with the testimony of P/Insp. Gural. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
The RTC Decision
On 7 October 2005, the RTC found Jerry guilty of the offense charged and imposed upon him the penalty of
life imprisonment. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision is as follows:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, this Court acting as a Special Drug Court in the abovecaptioned case hereby
finds JERRY CARANTO y PROPETA a.k.a. Jojo, accused in Criminal Case No. 11539D, GUILTY as charged
and is hereby sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 500,000.00).
xxxx
Moreover, the shabu contained in one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.39 gram of
shabu which is the subject matter of the abovecaptioned case is ordered to be immediately transmitted
and/or submitted to the custody of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for its proper
disposition.6
The CA Decision
The CA, in its assailed decision, affirmed the judgement of conviction by the RTC. The appellate court ruled
that Jerrys guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 267, subject of the appeal is AFFIRMED in toto.7
In a Resolution8 dated 22 November 2010, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs. The prosecution manifested that it was no longer filing any supplemental brief.9The issues raised in
appellants supplemental brief10 were similar to those previously raised to the appellate court. The appellant
raises the following assignment of errors:
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I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS SEARCH AND ARREST AS
ILLEGAL.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.11
Ruling of this Court
It should be noted that the significant issues, as discussed below, were initially raised by Jerry in his
Memorandum12 filed with the RTC. Unfortunately, the RTC failed to discuss the issues raised when it rendered

its 7 October 2005 decision. On the other hand, the Brief for Jerry filed with the CA was wanting of said
pertinent issues. In effect, the CA, likewise, failed to include in its discussion said issues. Upon appeal, the
Supplemental Brief for Jerry filed with this Court once again raised and expounded on said issues. Given the
foregoing circumstances and in the interest of justice, this Court gives due consideration to the issues raised
in Jerrys Supplemental Brief. The Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the importance of the rights of the
accused. For this reason, we consider the required procedure for the timely raising of issues, substantially
complied with.
Jerry was arrested during a buybust operation conducted on 24 July 2002 by the members of the DEU of
the Taguig PNP. A buybust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to apprehend
prohibited drug law violators in the act of committing a drugrelated offense. 13 We agree with the appellate
court when it opined that:
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x x x [T]here is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buybust operations. The choice of effective ways
to apprehend drug dealers is within the ambit of police authority. Police officers have the expertise to
determine which specific approaches are necessary to enforce their entrapment operations. 14
The builtin danger for abuse that a buybust operation carries cannot be denied. It is essential therefore,
that these operations be governed by specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs. We had
occasion to express this concern in People v. Tan,15 when we recognized that by the very nature of anti
narcotic operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the
ease with which illegal drugs can be planted in the pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and
the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, the courts have
been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the
unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.16
Moreover, we have time and again recognized that a buybust operation resulting from the tip of an
anonymous confidential informant, although an effective means of eliminating illegal drug related activities,
is susceptible to police abuse. Worse, it is usually used as a means for extortion. 17 It is for this reason, that
the Court must ensure that the enactment of R.A. No. 9165 providing specific procedures to counter these
abuses is not put to naught.18
Noncompliance with the requirements
of Section 21, par. 1 of Article II of
R.A. No. 9165
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
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1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
9165, which reads:
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(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x x xProvided, further, that
noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court recognizes that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may
not always be possible under field conditions, many of them far from ideal. For this reason, the

Implementing Rules provide that noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 is not necessarily
fatal to the prosecutions case because courts recognize the possible occurrence of procedural lapses.
However, we emphasize that these lapses must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable
grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been
preserved.19 In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to present any explanation to justify the
nonobservance of the prescribed procedures. Therefore, the nonobservance by the police of the required
procedure cannot be excused. It likewise failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
adduced were not tainted.
Chain of Custody
To secure a conviction for the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be present: (a) the identities
of the buyer and seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment for the thing. It is material to establish that the transaction actually took place, and to
bring to the court the corpus delicti as evidence.20 In the prosecution of a drug case, the primary
consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles have
been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in
court.21
The chain of custody requirement ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
In a long line of cases, we have considered it fatal for the prosecution when they fail to prove that the
specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused. The
case of Malillin v. People22 is particularly instructive on how we expect the chain of custody to be maintained.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked
up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link
in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of
the same.23 An unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real
evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. 24
The chain of custody rule requires that the marking of the seized items to truly ensure that they are
the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in
the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates the process
of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches. 25Marking means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the poseurbuyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized.
This Court previously held26 that the following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy
bust operation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
A perusal of the records will show that the procedure of preserving the chain of custody as laid down by
jurisprudence27 was not observed. This is evident from the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Prosecution witness PO3 Angelito Galang testified on how the seized item was handled, to wit:
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PROSEC.
BAUTISTA:
A:

At the time you proceeded to the area, what did you

observe?
I saw the buybust money recovered by PO3 Arago and the
plastic sachet he bought was placed in his wallet, sir.<SUP
STYLE="COLOR: RGB(255, 0, 0); >[28]</SUP>

PO3 Santiago Cordova, on the other hand, testified in this wise:

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PROSEC.
BAUTISTA:
A:
PROSEC.
BAUTISTA:
A:
PROSEC.
BAUTISTA:
A:

So you assisted Arago in arresting this accused?

Yes sir.
What did Arago did with the stuff, which was taken?
He kept it and brought to the office.
Before keeping, did Arago do something with the stuff?
I saw him holding the specimen and he put the
specimen inside his pocket.
He did not do anything with the stuff?

PROSEC.
BAUTISTA:
A:
I did not notice other things he did with the specimen.
PROSEC.BAUTISTA: You did not see what happened afterwards?
A:
I did not notice because I am busy holding alias Jojo,
because he is resisting.
PROSEC.
And what did Arago do with the stuff?
BAUTISTA:
ATTY. HERRERA:
Your Honor, the question has been repeatedly asked,
your Honor.
PROSEC.
You saw the stuff?
BAUTISTA:
A:
Yes sir.
PROSEC.
And thats all what you saw?
BAUTISTA:
A:
Yes sir.<SUP STYLE="COLOR: RGB(255, 0, 0);
>[29]</SUP>
It is clear from the aforecited testimonies that the evidence was not marked in front of the accused or his
representative. Evidently, there was an irregularity in the first link of the chain of custody.
Even assuming that the physical inventory contemplated in R.A. No. 9165 subsumes the marking of the
items itself, the belated marking of the seized items at the police station sans the required presence of the
accused and the witnesses enumerated under Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 9165, and absent a justifiable ground to stand on, cannot be considered a minor deviation from the
procedures prescribed by the law. We note that other than the allegation that a marking was done at the
police station, there was no proof that such marking was actually undertaken at all. From the time it was
placed inside the pocket or wallet of PO2 Arago, it surfaced again only at the marking of exhibits. In fact,
there was no statement from any of the witnesses that markings were made on the seized item in the
presence of any of the persons mentioned in Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 9165. Moreover, the prosecution even failed to present an accomplished Certificate of Inventory.30
Another gap in the chain of custody is apparent from the lack of evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove that the sachet of shabu, which was entrusted by PO2 Arago to the investigator, is the same sachet
that was delivered to the forensic chemist. The records are wanting of testimonies showing the manner of
handling of the evidence, precautions taken and other significant circumstances surrounding this essential

transfer of custody. The prosecution did not take the testimony of the investigator, nor did they adduce
evidence on what the investigator did with the seized shabu, how these got to the forensic chemist, and how
they were kept before being adduced in evidence at trial. In fact, the identity of such investigator was not
even mentioned nor was there any mention of a marking made on the seized item.
Upon further examination, we find that another gap in the chain of custody is apparent. There was no
information on what happened to the drugs after P/Insp. Gural examined it. This Court recognizes that the
chemists testimony was stipulated upon.31 However, the stipulations did not cover the manner on how the
specimens were handled after her examination. Without this testimony, there is no way for this Court to be
assured that the substances produced in court are the same specimens the forensic chemist found positive
for shabu.32 Furthermore, most glaring is the fact that the prosecution even stipulated that the forensic
chemist had no knowledge from whom the alleged specimens were taken. 33
Ultimately, when the prosecution evidence is wanting, deficient to the point of doubt that the dangerous
drug recovered from the accused is the same drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and
examination, or the same drug presented to the court, an essential element in cases of illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, is absent.
Negation of Presumption of Regularity
The lower courts erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the performance that a police
officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that would induce him to falsify his
testimony. The regularity of the performance of the police officers duties leaves much to be desired in this
case given the lapses in their handling of the allegedly confiscated shabu. The totality of all the
aforementioned procedural lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of
the corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frameup. 34 We have previously held35 that these
lapses negate the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers. Any
taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable.
In People v. Santos, Jr.,36 we held that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. 37 It
should be noted that the presumption is precisely just that a presumption. Once challenged by evidence,
as in this case, it cannot be regarded as binding truth.38
We recognize that the evidence proffered by the defense is far from strong; the appellant merely denied the
occurrence of a buybust operation and failed to present impartial witnesses who were not interested in the
case. In our jurisdiction, the defense of denial or frameup, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it
can easily be concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.39 It should be emphasized, however, that these weaknesses do not add any strength to the
prosecutions cause. Thus, however weak the defense evidence might be, the prosecutions whole case still
falls. As the wellentrenched dictum goes, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. 40
We therefore resolve to acquit the accused for failure of the prosecution due to the gapinduced weakness
of the case to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the 28 July 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
CR.H.C. No. 01680 affirming the judgement of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 267, Pasig City
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jerry Caranto y Propeta isACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt and is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful
cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this
Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203605

April 23, 2014

P/C INSP. LAWRENCE B. CAJIPE, P/C INSP. JOELL. MENDOZA, P/C INSP. GERARDO B.
BALATUCAN, PO3 JOLITO P. MAMANAO, JR., P03 FERNANDO REYS. GAPUZ, PO2
EDUARDO G. BLANCO, PO2 EDWIN SANTOS and PO1 JOSIL REY I. LUCENA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
As narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA), on July 28, 2009 Lilian I. De Vera (Lilian) filed a complaint
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) charging with multiple murder the following Philippine
National Police (PNP) officers connected with the PNP Highway Patrol Group (HPG): petitioners P/C
Insp. Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C Insp. Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B. Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P.
Mamanao, Jr., P03 Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, PO2 Eduardo G. Blanco, P02 Edwin Santos, and PO1
Josil Rey I. Lucena (collectively, petitioner HPG officers). The other HPG members were P/C Supt.
Perfecto Palad and P/C Supt. Eleuterio Gutierrez, Jr. Another group of accused consisted of police
officers from the PNP Special Action Force (SAF).
1

In her complaint Lilian alleged that joint elements of the SAF and the HPG conspired in carrying out
a plan to kill her husband, Alfonso "Jun" S. De Vera (Jun) and their 7-year-old daughter, Lia Allana.
Lilian said that at around 9:30 p.m. on December 5, 2008 she called Jun to tell him that she was on
her way to Pasay City to meet him and their daughter. She got to Pasay City but the two did not
show up. After an hour, Lilian called their house helper who assured her that Jun and Lia had
already left. Lilian tried calling Jun but she got no answer. She again called their house helper, who
informed her that there had been a shootout in their subdivision.
2

Lilian decided to go home. When she arrived at the entrance of their subdivision, the police had
blocked the area and did not allow civilians to pass through. She got a call from her house helper
who told-her that Jun and Lia had been involved in the shootout. A certain Hilario Indiana
approached Lilian and advised her to go to the hospital where Lia had been rushed. When she got
there, she learned that Lia had died of gunshot wound on the head. Jun was found dead near a
passenger jeepney with a gunshot wound on his head.
3

Witnesses to the shootout said that Jun and Lia were riding in his Isuzu Crosswind van when police
officers wearing Regional SAF vests suddenly fired at the van. Jun got out, went to the passenger
side, and tried to carry Lia out to safety as she had been wounded. The police officers went after
Jun, however, and shot him on the head.
On December 28, 2009 the DOJ issued a resolution after preliminary investigation finding probable
cause to indict all the police officers involved in the police action that led to the shooting of Jun and
Lia for two counts of murder. On March 15, 2010 the DOJ filed the information before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Parafiaque City in Criminal Cases 10-0280 and 10-0281. On the following day,
March 16, petitioner HPG officers filed an omnibus motion for judicial determination of probable
cause with a prayer to hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants for their arrest. They also
sought the annulment of the DOJ resolution on the ground of violation of their constitutional rights.
Further, they asked that the information be quashed on the ground that the facts it alleged did not
constitute an offense.
4

On June 16, 2010 the RTC dismissed the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable
cause against them, given that the witnesses made no mention of seeing anyone from the HPG
group taking part in the shooting and killing of Jun and his daughter. Instead, the RTC found that the

evidence tends to show that petitioner HPG officers were requested and acted merely as blocking
force in a legitimate police operation and Lilian had not refuted this. On the other hand the R TC
issued an arrest warrant for the accused SAF officers, having found probable cause against them.
Lilian moved for reconsideration of the dismissal order covering petitioner HPG officers but the RTC
denied the same on September 24, 2010.
5

On January 21, 2011 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 117756 alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the RTC's part. On June 15, 2012 the CA granted the petition. It ruled that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in failing to evaluate the sworn statements of the witnesses on whom the DOJ
relied on. The R TC based its finding of lack of probable cause primarily on the absence of evidence
directly linking the petitioner HPG officers to the shooting of the victim and their physical presence at
the crime scene.
6

In a special civil action filed before it, however, the CA pointed out that Indiana and Ronald Castillo
executed affidavits stating that petitioner HPG officers joined the SAF officers in pursuing and
shooting Jun while he was bringing Lia to a safer place. The CA said that, with this evidence, it is for
the petitioner HPG officers to rebut such testimonies at the trial. The CA thus ordered the issuance
of warrants of arrest against the petitioner HPG officers. On October 5, 2012 the CA denied the
motion for reconsideration of its decision and the urgent motion to quash warrants of arrest and/or
motion to suspend the implementation of the warrants of arrest, hence, this petition.
8

10

The Issues Presented

The case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in granting the OSG's petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
given that the RTC's order of dismissal is a final and appealable order;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in counting the prescriptive period for filing a Rule 65 petition
from the time of receipt of the court order by the OSG rather than by the city prosecutor's
office; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
judge in holding that no probable cause exists against petitioner HPG officers and in
dismissing the criminal charge against them.
The Court's Rulings
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
The R TC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner HPG officers. Section
6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the judge "may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." The CA should have denied
the People's petition for special civil action of certiorari that assails the con-ectness of the order of
dismissal since Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that such action is available only when "there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
1wphi1

The fact, however, is that Section 1, Rule 122 of the same rules provides that an appeal may be
taken in a criminal action from a judgment or final order like the RTC's order dismissing the case
against petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable cause. It is a final order since it disposes of the
case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further to do with respect to the
case against petitioner HPG officers. The Court had made a similar pronouncement in Santos v.
Orda, Jr. Of course, the People may refile the case if new evidence adduced in another preliminary
investigation will support the filing of a new information against them. But that is another matter. For
now, the CA clearly erred in not denying the petition for being a wrong remedy.
11

Petitioner HPG officers point out that, assuming the propriety of the filing of a special civil action of
certiorari against the RTC's order of dismissal, the People had sixty days from receipt of such order
within which to file the action. Here, the People filed its petition for certiorari 112 days from receipt of
the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Paraaque, clearly beyond the 60-day period allowed
for such action.
The OSG contends, however, that the reckoning point should be from the date the Department of
Justice or the court gave it notice of the order of dismissal since, as held in Bautista v. CunetaPangilinan, the OSG alone has the authority to represent the People before the CA. But such a
proposition is unfair. There is no reason for the RTC to serve copy of its judgments or final orders
upon the OSG since it does not enter its appearance in criminal cases before it.
12

In case of permissible appeals from a final order in a criminal action, the public prosecutor who
appears as counsel for the People in such an action and on whom a copy of the final order is thus
served, may file a notice of appeal within the appropriate time since it is a notice addressed to the
RTC and not to the CA. Only the Office of the Solicitor General, however, may pursue the appeal
before the CA by filing the required appellant's brief or withdraw the same.
In special civil actions such as that taken by the OSG before the CA, the public prosecutor's duty, if
he believes that a matter should be brought by special civil action before an appellate court, is to
promptly communicate the facts and his recommendation to the OSG, advising it of the last day for
filing such an action. There is no reason the OSG cannot file the petition since the People is given
sixty days from notice to the public prosecutor within which to file such an action before the CA or
this Court.
Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People 112 days from
receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Paraaque, the petition was filed out of time.
The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate review.
Although a purely academic exercise in view of its above rulings, the Court has taken a look into the
merit of the RTC's order of dismissal since it clashes with the findings of the DOJ investigating
prosecutors.
The OSG relies on the affidavits of Indiana and Ronald V. Castillo (Castillo) in claiming that probable
cause exists against petitioner HPG officers.
In the sworn statement he made before the police on December 9, 2008 Indiana said: "x x x. Tapos
narinig ko ang sigaw 'Bro ang driver tumakas andyan sa jeep, duon nilapitan ng isang naka-Vest na
meron pangalan sa likod RSAF at nakabunet at pinutukan ang driver sa ulo. Tapos nagsalita ang

nagsabing RSAF 'Bro may bata pala.' Kinuha ng RSAF ang bata at dinala sa kanilang sasakyan na
kulay puti ng sasakyan. x x x."
13

On the other hand, witness Castillo said in his sworn statement: "x x x. May dumaang sasakyang
papuntang gate ng UPS JV, mayroong sumigaw na mga pulis 'PLATIN NYO, PLATIN NYO.' Biglang
hinabol ng dalawang pulis ang nasabing sasakyan at pinagbabaril. May ilang sandali ay bumalik ang
dalawang pulis at sinabi nila ng 'NAPATAY NA NAMIN ANG DRIVER NG GATE A WAY CAR,
ANDOON SA TABI NGJEEP'."
14

It is clear from Indiana's testimony that the man he saw shoot Jun was an RSAF officer, identified by
his assault vest and accompanied by another RSAF officer who also wore such a vest. Castillo did
not see the act of shooting but confirmed that two police officers gave chase and took shots at the
fleeing vehicle then turned back to announce to their companions that they had killed the driver of
the get-away car.
The HPG men belonged to another unit and there is no claim that they wore another unit's vest.
More telling is the crime laboratory report which revealed that none of the HPG operatives
discharged their firearms during the shootout. It did not also help the prosecution's case that, per
Indiana's testimony, the SAF police officers involved in the shootout carried long firearms,
specifically M16 rifle, M16 baby armalite, and M14. But the National Police Commission issued two
certifications dated January 14 and 19, 2010 to the effect that the petitioner HPG officers had not
been issued long firearms from 2007 up to 2010.
15

16

17

Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The prosecution evidence fails to establish probable
cause against petitioner HPG officers.
18

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the Court of Appeals Decision dated June 15, 2012 and
Resolution dated October 5, 2012 in CAG.R. SP 117756 and AFFIRMS the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque City in Criminal Cases 10-0280 and 10-0281 that dismissed the case
against petitioners. The Court ORDERS the DISMISSAL of the charge against the petitioners P/C
Insp. Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C Insp. Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B. Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P.
Mamanao, Jr., PO3 Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, P02 Eduardo G. Blanco, PO2 Edwin Santos, and PO2
Josil Rey I. Lucena. The Court further ORDERS the withdrawal of the warrants for their arrest.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208760

April 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FLORO BUBAN BARCELA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the March 19, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 04961, which affirmed with modifications the January 6, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna (RTC), in Criminal Case Nos. 5517-SPL, 5526-SPL and 5527SPL, finding accused-appellant Floro B. Barcela (Barcela) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Qualified Rape committed against AAA, and of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault and Violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 and Acts of Lasciviousness, committed against BBB.
1

The Facts
Barcela was charged with the following crimes: 1] Qualified Rape, docketed as Crim. Case No.
5517-SPL; 2] Violation of Article 266-A(2) in relation to R.A. No. 7610, docketed as Crim. Case No.
5526-SPL; and 3] Violation of R.A. No. 7610 (Acts of Lasciviousness), docketed as Crim.
Case No. 5527-SPL, in three (3) separate Informations which read:
Crim. Case No. 5517-SPL
That sometime in the year 2002, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused being the stepfather of AAA by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with AAA, a minor, nine (9) years of age, against her will and to her damage and prejudice.
The crime is qualified by minority and relationship between the offender and offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case No. 5526-SPL
That on or about November 12, 2004, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused being then the stepfather of
BBB, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual assault and/or subject to
sexual abuse the latter by inserting his finger into the genital or private part of the said BBB, a minor,
fourteen (14) years of age, against her will and consent, which act being detrimental to her normal
growth and development.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case No. 5527-SPL
That sometime on 2003 and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon his stepdaughter BBB, a
minor, fourteen (14) years of age, by touching the private part of the said minor, against the latters
will and consent, which act is detrimental to the normal growth and development of the said minor
child.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecutions version of the events was succinctly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in its Brief as follows:
5

Private complainants BBB and AAA were living, along with the appellant, their mother, grandmother
and sister in a two-storey house where all of the family members sleep together in one room in San
Pedro, Laguna, because the other rooms [were] being rented to other people. AAA was seven (7)
years old when her stepfather, appellant Barcela, committed the despicable by sexually abusing her.
She was lying on the floor sleeping one early morning in 2002, when she was awakened and noticed
that her stepfather lifted her clothes and removed her shorts. Appellant then placed his hand on his
organ as AAA lay still with her hands on the floor shocked by what was happening. Appellant
successfully inserted his penis inside complainant AAAs vagina. While committing the bestial act,
appellant threatened her not to tell anyone what he was doing to her, otherwise he would kill her.
Her elder sister BBB also suffered the same horrible fate. On 12 November 2004 at around 3:00
oclock in the morning, appellant Barcela made a similar sexual assault upon BBB who was only
fourteen (14) years at that time. It happened while BBB was sleeping in one room with her
stepfather, mother and other sister. Appellant was lying at her right side. Suddenly, appellant lifted
her skirt, removed her underwear and inserted his finger inside her vagina. After accomplishing the
atrocious act, appellant threatened to kill her if she [would] disclose to anyone what happened to her.
BBB was very afraid because of the threat that she pretended to be asleep after being raped. On
that same night, BBB also saw her stepfather molesting her sister AAA. BBB also testified that prior
to being raped in 2004, appellant had been regularly touching her private organ.
AAA informed her mother, grandmother and her sister BBB of what happened to her. Sadly, her
mother did not believe her but her grandmother and sister BBB (who also suffered the same fate)
believed her. BBB then informed her classmate, teacher and school principal of the grim experience
she and her sister underwent in the hands of her stepfather. Her grandmother was summoned by the
principal and, together, they reported to the police the rape incidents. In order to protect herself, AAA
stayed at the "Kanlungan" shelter. As a result of the loathsome episode in their lives, AAA and BBB
both felt afraid, ashamed and aggrieved.
Private complainants were eventually examined by Dr. Roy Camarillo, a medico-legal officer of the
Philippine National Police. In his medico-legal report, he concluded that BBB sustained a shallow
healing laceration in her hymen caused by the insertion of a hard object which may be a penis,
finger or a flat hard object. As regards the examination conducted on AAA, he concluded that there
was no evident injury at the time of the examination but testified that the injury that AAA incurred
may have totally healed as the rape occurred two (2) years from the time of the examination.
6

Version of the Defense

Barcela denied the accusations and alleged the following in his Brief to substantiate his claim of
innocence:
7

Accused Floro B. Barcela is the common law husband of the private complainants mother, CCC.
They all resided at the two-storey house of CCCs mother in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna.
On November 12, 2004, the private complainants were sleeping beside their mother CCC and their
half-sister DDD, herein accused-appellants daughter with CCC. He did not rape AAA. Neither did he
insert his finger inside BBBs vagina, nor threatened either of the two (2) private complainants. He

knew of no reason why the private complainants would accuse him of such crimes charged against
him.
8

Ruling of the RTC

In its January 6, 2011 Decision, the RTC found Barcela guilty as charged. In its assessment, the
testimonies of AAA and BBB have successfully met the test of credibility and were found to have
been solely motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong done against them.
The denial proffered by Barcela must then yield to the positive testimonies of the offended parties.
The RTC explained:
The culpability of accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA was clearly established by private
complainants AAA and BBB. In this regard, there is nothing in the records to show that their
testimony was motivated by any other reason other than to bring to justice the perpetrator of the
crimes against them. Indeed, the Court finds that there is no evidence to show that AAA and BBB
were prejudiced against accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA that they would impute to him the
commission of the crimes charged if he was not guilty thereof. It must be noted that not only were
the testimony of AAA and BBB convincing and unequivocal, the same were also backedup by the
physical evidence, which is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth.
9

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment:
1) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape in
Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. In addition, accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA is ORDERED to pay the victim
the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages.
2) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Violation of Article 266-A (2) in relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL and
hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4)
Months and One (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum and to pay the victim the amounts of P30,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages
3) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Violation of R.A. No. 7610 (Acts of Lasciviousness) in Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL and
hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum and to pay the victim the amounts ofP30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

10

Feeling aggrieved, Barcela appealed the RTC judgments of conviction before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts finding of Barcelas guilt of the crimes charged. The
appellate court lent credence to the testimonies of AAA and BBB, declaring the same to be credible
and sufficient to sustain the conviction. It ruled that the crime of penile rape committed against AAA
and that of rape by sexual assault committed against BBB were qualified by the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and the relationship between the offender and the offended party because
Barcela was the common-law husband of the victims mother. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed RTC
Decision dated January 06, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL (Qualified Rape), Floro Barcela y Buban is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole. Accusedappellant is ordered to pay AAAP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL (Qualified Sexual Assault in relation to RA 7610),
accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay BBBP30,000 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as
moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL (Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610), accusedappellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence, he is
ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and to pay BBB of the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

11

The Issue
Insisting on his innocence, Barcela filed the present appeal and raised this lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
OFFENSES CHARGED ALTHOUGH HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.

Barcela faults the courts a quo for giving undue faith and credence to the testimonies of AAA and
BBB, contending that the same were laced with inconsistencies and improbabilities that tainted the
veracity of their charges. He avers that the lack of concrete prosecution evidence showing any
unusual behavior exhibited by AAA and BBB after the alleged commission of the crimes, rendered
said victims complaints dubious. Barcela points out that it is incredible that AAA and BBB would still
sleep with him in the same room despite the fact that they had been previously sexually assaulted by
him. He argues that the absence of hymenal lacerations, healed or otherwise, in the vagina of AAA
and the presence of a mere shallow laceration in the vagina of BBB, together with the
inconsistencies in their testimonies, effectively belied their charges against him.
The Court, however, is not at all swayed by the contentions of Barcela. His arguments boil down to
the credibility of the victims testimonies and the weight and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that questions on the credibility of
witnesses should best be addressed to the trial court because of its unique position to observe that
elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying
which is denied to the appellate courts. The trial judge has the advantage of actually examining
both real and testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the judges
assessment of the witnesses testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal.
In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial courts assessment and
conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the formers findings. The rule is even more
stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court.
12

13

After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the
findings of the RTC and the CA, together with their respective calibration of the credibility of the
private complainants. AAA and BBB, guileless and innocent in the ways of the flesh, categorically
narrated in detail their ghastly ordeal in the hands of Barcela. Their respective stories bear the stamp
of truth and candor. There is neither cause nor reason to withhold credence from their testimonies.
Moreover, Barcela did not establish any ill motive that could have compelled the private
complainants to falsely accuse him of committing the crimes charged. The failure of Barcela to
effectively cite any plausible reason for the private complainants accusations, all the more
strengthens the latters credibility and the validity of their charges. Besides, no sane woman, least of
all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject
herself to public trial or ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice
for the wrong done to her. The Court finds it hard to believe that AAA and BBB would fabricate a
tale of defilement and make public knowledge that Barcela robbed them of their virtue and chastity,
dragging themselves and their family to a lifetime of agony and shame, unless motivated by a
genuine desire to obtain redress for the foul deed forced upon them.
14

Barcela claims that it is incredible that: 1] AAA did not cry out loud when he allegedly inserted his
penis into her tight vagina; 2] BBB just went back to sleep after he allegedly inserted his finger into
her vagina; and 3] private complainants still opted to sleep next to him despite the incidents. To him,
these are contrary to human nature and could not be the actuations of abused young girls.
The Court is not convinced. Behavioral psychology teaches us that, even among adults, people
react to similar situations differently, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response
when one is confronted with a startling or frightful experience. Let it be underscored that these
15

cases involve victims of tender years, and with their simple, unsophisticated minds, they must not
have fully understood and realized at first the repercussions of the contemptible nature of the acts
committed against them. This Court has repeatedly stated that no standard form of behavior could
be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement, particularly a child who could not be
expected to fully comprehend the ways of an adult. At any rate, it is not inconceivable that the
victims continuously slept with Barcela despite the sexual molestations as it was undisputed that
everybody in the victims family slept in one room.
16

The absence of hymenal laceration on AAA and the finding of a shallow vaginal laceration on BBB
are not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. The Court has repeatedly held that the presence of
hymenal rapture, vaginal laceration or any genital injury is not indispensable because the same is
not an element of the crime of rape. In the same breath, an intact hymen does not negate the
finding that the victim was raped. The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and BBB
cannot exculpate him either. Obviously, the inconsistencies referred to are trivial and only pertained
to inconsequential matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. What is
decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of rape has been sufficiently proven.
Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal.
17

18

19

In stark contrast to the convincing narration of facts by AAA and BBB are the bare-faced and shaky
defenses of denial and alibi proffered by Barcela. Jurisprudence has decreed that alibi and denial
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the complainant and her identification of
the accused. Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can
easily be fabricated. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Here, not a shred of competent proof was adduced
by Barcela to corroborate his denial and alibi as they are only supported by his self-serving
testimony. Hence, they do not merit any evidentiary value.
20

21

22

The Court will now determine the specific crimes committed by Barcela with the corresponding
penalties to be imposed and the appropriate damages to be awarded.
Criminal Case Nos. 5517-SPL and 5526-SPL
The statutory provisions relevant to the present review are Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), which state:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation; xxx
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw-spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxxx
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.
xxxx
Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article. (Emphases supplied)
To sustain a conviction for qualified rape, the following elements must concur: a) the victim is a
female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim; and c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through
force, threat or intimidation; or when she was deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by
means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.
23

In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, the prosecution proved that AAA was only 7 years old when the
penile rape was committed in 2002. Her birth certificate showed that she was born on September 24,
1994. The prosecution was also able to establish the fact of sexual intercourse between Barcela and
AAA. The Court notes that AAA told her story by words and demonstrations using male and female
dolls. AAA recounted that while she was lying on the floor of their house, Barcela lifted her clothes
and removed her shorts; that he inserted his penis into her vagina; that she felt pain; and that he
warned her not to tell the incident to anyone, otherwise, he would kill her. The straightforward
narration of AAA of what transpired, and her categorical identification of Barcela as the malefactor,
sealed the case for the prosecution.
In the crime of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the
offender is a special qualifying circumstance and raises the penalty to the supreme penalty of death.
It is essential that this circumstance must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information and
must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall be
considered simple rape warranting the imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
24

The aforesaid qualifying circumstance, however, could not be appreciated in Criminal Case No.
5517-SPL. To begin with, AAA was under 12 years old (only 7 years old) when she was raped in
2002. More importantly, the prosecution failed to prove the allegation in the information that Barcela

was the step-father of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime. It bears stressing that a
stepfather-stepdaughter relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship, which in this case is the
valid marriage between Barcela and the natural mother of AAA (also of BBB), and the best evidence
to prove the same is the marriage contract. Nowhere in the record, though, does it show that such
certificate of marriage was submitted in evidence by the prosecution. In People v. Manggasin, the
Court held that the qualifying circumstance was not proved because there was no proof of the
allegation that the accused-appellant was the stepfather of the complainant as the evidence showed
that he was not married to the complainants mother.
25

26

Being regarded as the "tatay," Barcela had gained such moral ascendancy over AAA and BBB that
any resistance normally expected from girls their age could not have been put up by them. His moral
ascendancy and influence over them substituted for actual physical violence and intimidation as an
element of rape. This made them easy prey for his sexual advances. Barcelas moral and physical
dominion of AAA and BBB are sufficient to cow them into submission to his beastly desires. No
further proof is needed to show lack of consent of the victims to their own defilement. Further, record
shows that threat and intimidation were indeed employed by Barcela to consummate the purpose
which he had in mind. The threat of death he communicated to AAA and BBB produced fear in their
minds which made them yield to his bestial demands. In any event, the prosecution need not prove
that Barcela employed force, threat or intimidation against AAA because rape is committed when the
offender had carnal knowledge of the offended party who is under 12 years of age.
The Court likewise finds convincing the testimony of BBB, which clearly established that at around
3:00 A.M. of November 12, 2004, she was awakened when Barcela, who was then sleeping next to
her, lifted her skirt, removed her panty and, thereafter, inserted his finger into her vagina; and that
she suffered pain during the insertion but could not shout for fear that Barcela would kill her. The
Court notes that she consistently and without hesitation pointed to Barcela as the person who
sexually molested her. The prosecution also established that she was only 14 years old when she
was sexually molested as evidenced by her birth certificate.
Taken in this light, the Court affirms Barcelas conviction in Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL of rape by
sexual assault under Art. 266- A, par. 2 of the RPC, but not in its qualified form. The special
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were likewise not present. While the minority of
BBB was duly proven, the allegation of stepfather-stepdaughter relationship was not established.
Although it was shown during the trial that Barcela was the common-law spouse or live-in partner of
the mother of victims AAA and BBB, this fact would not alter the crimes in their qualified form
inasmuch as the two separate informations did not specifically allege such relationship as a
qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge
lodged against him. The relationship alleged in the informations is different from that actually
proven. Verily, the CA erred in convicting Barcela of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL
and qualified rape by sexual assault in Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL.
27

There being no qualifying circumstance attendant to the commission of rape in Criminal Case No.
5517-SPL, Barcela should be convicted of simple statutory rape and should suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The award of damages should also be modified in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. AAA is thus awarded the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as
moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
28

In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL, Barcela should be convicted with simple rape by sexual assault,
instead with the penalty of prision mayor as provided in Art. 266-B par. 7 of the RPC. Considering
that there was neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its
medium period pursuant to Article 64(l) of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Barcela should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is prision
correccional (6 months and 1 to 6 years) and the maximum of which is within the range of prision
mayor, in its medium period (8 years and 1 day to 10 years). More specifically, the Court imposes
the penalty ranging from five (5) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as maximum. The Court sustains the CA in awarding P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages being consistent
with prevailing jurisprudence.
29

30

Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL

The Court also upholds Barcelas conviction in Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL of Acts of
Lasciviousness committed against a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which
reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: x x x. (Italics supplied)
The elements of sexual abuse under the above provision are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

31

Here, it was proven with certitude that Barcela had repeatedly molested BBB by regularly touching
her vagina since 2003 when she was still in Grade III. This act is covered by the definition of
"lascivious conduct" under Section 2 (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement R.A. No. 7610:
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with intent to abuse,

humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or private area of a person.
The circumstance of relationship, Barcela being the common-law husband of BBBs mother, cannot
be considered as an ordinary aggravating circumstance to increase the imposable penalty. While it is
true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against
chastity (such as Acts of Lasciviousness), regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a
higher or lower degree of the offended party, it is only taken into consideration under Article 15 of the
Revised Penal Code "when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender." The
relationship between Barcela and BBB is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned.
32

1wphi1

Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance is present, the penalty should be

imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Barcela should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is prision mayor in its medium period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period (8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months) and the
maximum of which is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua, in its medium period (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years). Thus, the CA is correct in
imposing the penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Likewise, the award of P20,000 as civil
indemnity;P15,000.00 as moral damages; P15,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the fine
of P15,000.00, are proper.
33

1wphi1

34

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the March 19, 2013 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04961, which should read:
1. In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, finding accused-appellant Floro Buban Barcela GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Statutory Rape under subparagraph ( d) of
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the Court sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.0 ) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL, finding accused-appellant Floro Buban Barcela GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape by Sexual Assault under Article 266A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the Court sentences him to suffer
the penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum; and to pay AAA in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
as civil indemnity; Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages; and Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL, finding the accused-appellant Floro Buban Barcela
GUILTY of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to R.A. No. 7610, the Court 1
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and !one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(Pl5,000.00) as fine; and to pay BBB the amounts of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
as civil indemnity; Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as moral damages; and P15,000.00
as exemplary damages, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188052

April 21, 2014

JEAN D. GAMBOA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Petitioner Jean D. Gamboa (Gamboa) beseeches us in this appeal by certiorari for reprieve from the
concurring convictions by the lower courts, specifically, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 145,
Makati City in Criminal Case No. 00-526, and the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. No.
30354, finding her guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
1

Gamboa was charged in an Information dated 18 February 2000, which reads:

That on or about the month of February, 1999 or prior thereto, at Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Gamboa],
being then employed as Liaison Officer of complainant TFS Pawnshop, Inc. represented by its
Operations Manager Felicidad Samson and as such is authorized among others to secure and/or
renew municipal/city licenses and permits for TFS Pawnshop branches received in trust from
complainant the total amount of P78,208.[9]5 with the obligation on the part of the accused to use
the said amount for the renewal of licenses and permits for all complainants brancheslocated in
Manila, but [Gamboa], once in possession of the said amount, with intent to gain and abuse of
confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to her own personal use and benefit said amount of P78,208.95 as a consequence thereof[,]
complainant paid the total amount ofP85,187.00 for the renewal of the licenses and permits of its
branches in Manila and that [Gamboa] refused and/or failed and still refuses and/or fails to account
or return said amount despite demand from complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the total amount of P163,395.95.
3

Upon arraignment on 28 September 2000, Gamboa pleaded not guilty.

At the trial, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses: (1) Felicidad Samson (Samson),
Operations Head of (private complainant) Tambunting Finance Services Pawnshop, Inc. (TFS); (2)
Knestor Jose Y. Godino (Godino), the Human Resource Manager of TFS at the time of the incident
in question subject of this criminal case; (3) Estrella Cuyno, Liaison Officer of TFS; and (4) Liberty
Toledo, formerAssistant City Treasurer Chief of the License & Permit Division of the Cityof Manila,
now the City Treasurer of Manila. The following facts were testified to:
Gamboas job function, as the liaison officer of TFS, included the processing and securing of the
necessary government permits and licenses of all branches of TFS in Metro Manila. In that regard,
Gamboa received from TFS the money allotment therefor in the total amount of 247,117.25. The
money allotment included the sum ofP81,000.00 to cover the renewal and processing of government
licenses and permits of twelve (12) of TFS branches in the City of Manila.

Gamboas receipt of the amount of P81,000.00 was evidenced by a Request for Payment dated 18
January 1999 signed by her and approved by TFS President, a certain Ongsiako. Witness Samson,
Operations Head of TFS, likewise presented in evidence a notebook which she kept for recording
purposes and which contained Gamboas signature next to a written entry corresponding to
Gamboas receipt of the amount of P81,000.00.
TFS, through Samson, a Mrs. Tan and Godino, TFS Human Resource and Management
Development (HRMD)Manager, made several demands for Gamboa to render a proper liquidation
report of the various money allotments she had received for the renewal of the government permits
and licenses of the twelve (12) TFS branches. However, the demands went unheeded.
TFS HRMD issued HRMD Memorandum No. 036 dated 25 February 1999 notifying Gamboa of her
violation of company rules and regulations for failing to liquidate the sum of P249,117.27. On the
same date, Gamboa had an altercation with some of TFS officers.
In response to HRMD Memorandum No. 036, Gamboa submitted a letter dated 27 February 1999,
explaining that: (1) the money allotment constituting her cash advances were distributed to her staff
for the delegated assignment of renewal of the required government permits and licenses for TFS
branches all over Metro Manila; (2) she has surrendered all the necessary liquidation papers; and (3)
as scheduled, all of the required licenses of TFS branches were already fully paid on 20 January
1999 and no additional penalty was incurred therefor.
Notwithstanding her letter-explanation, Gamboa was placed under preventive suspension via
Memorandum No. 037 dated 1 March 1999 which also notified Gamboa of another failure on her
part to liquidate the amount ofP50,809.85 as of 26 February 1999.
On 9 May 1999, Gamboa was terminated from employment.
Apparently, contrary to Gamboas claim, payment for the permits and licenses of all of TFS branches
in Manila for the year 1999 was never made.
4

Subsequently, TFS, through, Samson, filed the criminal complaint charging Gamboa with the crime
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code for misappropriating,
misapplying or converting the following amounts: (1) P78,208.95 for the renewal of permits and
licenses of the twelve (12) branchesin Manila; (2) P85,187.00 representing the permits and license
fees including surcharges which TFS paid because of Gamboas failure to do so; and (3) P25,213.58
comprising of previous cash advances to Gamboa.
Gamboa denied that she misappropriated, misapplied or converted the various unliquidated amounts
insisted upon by TFS. On the whole, albeit belatedly, and only at the trial stage before the RTC,
Gamboa claimed that for the year 1999, upon the instruction of her superior, Estrella Cuyno (Cuyno),
she transacted with a Joselito "Lito" Jacinto, a casual employee of the Office of the City Mayor of
Manila, concerning the processing and renewal of TFS branches business permits and licenses.
As part of her transaction, Gamboa admitted receipt of the amount of P45,587.65 evidenced by
Request for Payment dated 18 January 1999. Gamboa likewise admitted receipt of the amount
of P24,000.00 representing a mobilization fee of P2,000.00 per TFS branch evidenced by Request
for Payment also dated 18 January 1999. These Requests for Payment were duly signed and

approved by TFS Vice-President Ramon Luis Carlos Tambunting, and the amounts represented
therein admittedly received by Gamboa.
Gamboa claimed she turned over the monies to Lito Jacinto as instructed by Cuyno. In support of
the claim, Gamboa presented as documentary evidence, a photocopy of a receipt covering the
amount of P45,587.65 signed by Lito Jacinto. The original of this receipt designated during trial as
Exhibit "6" was purportedly lost in an occasion when Gamboa rode a taxi cab.
5

Gamboa further claimed that two others were present when she handed the monies as payment to
LitoJacinto: one of TFS messengers, a certain Jayson, and Carmencita "Menchie" Cornejo, an
officemate of Lito Jacinto.
As is routine, Gamboa followed up on the renewal permits with Lito Jacinto who told her that the
permits were still being processed.
After Gamboa received Memorandum No. 036 dated 25 February 1999 notifying her of her
supposed violation of TFS company policies for failing to liquidate the amounts representing the
renewal of TFS branches permits and licenses, she learned from Lito Jacintos officemates that the
latter did not remit the monies she had handed over to him as supposed payment for TFS renewal
permits and licenses.
Consistent with her story, Gamboa claimed that she filed an administrative complaint by way of a
letter dated 9 March 1999 against Lito Jacinto before the Office of the City Mayor of Manila. In
conjunction with the administrative complaint, Gamboa purportedly filed a criminal complaint against
Lito Jacinto before the City Prosecutors Office of Manila. However, this same criminal complaint was
subsequently dismissed upon Gamboas motion to withdraw the complaint.
To corroborate her claim that she handed the monies representing payment of TFS renewal permits
and licenses for its branches in Manila, Gamboa presented the testimony of ReyMarquez (Marquez),
also a liaison officer of Tambunting Puyat Pawnshop,Inc. (TPP), a sister company of TFS. Marquez
testified that in 1999,he likewise transacted with Lito Jacinto for the renewal of TPPs business
permits and licenses. Specifically, on 15 January 1999, Marquez and Gamboa both transacted with
Lito Jacinto on behalf of their respective companies. Marquez himself had handed the amount
of P10,000.00 to Lito Jacinto for the processing of the renewal of TPPs business permits and
licenses. Lito Jacinto also absconded with the money so Marquez likewise filed anadministrative
complaint dated 15 March 1999 before the Office of the City Mayor.
On 18 May 2006, the RTC convicted Gamboa of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code for misapplying and/or converting the amount of P81,000.00 which she had
received in trust for the specific purpose of the renewal of TFS branches business permits and
licenses. The trial court found credible the testimony of Samson as to Gamboas receipt of the
amount of P81,000.00. On the other hand, the trial court found Gamboas defense, that asinstructed,
she handed the monies, P45,587.65 and P24,000.00, respectively, to Lito Jacinto to facilitate the
renewal of TFS business permits and licenses, as an afterthought, and this defense directly
contradicted her categorical statement that the licenses and business permits of TFS had already
been paid as of 20 January 1999. The trial court extrapolated, thus:
Anent to her defense that she merely acted as messenger upon the instruction of her supervisor
Ms.Cuyno to give the amount of P45,587.65 to Lito Jacinto, thus, she should not be accountable for

the same, this contention is unavailing, given the oral as well as documentary evidence of the
prosecution.
For one thing, this defense appears to be contrived as it was never raised in her reply to the
memorandum [of] TFS x x x asking her to liquidate her cash advances. On the contrary, she pithily
claimed that all municipal licenses for all branches were completely paid as of January 20, 1999 as
per schedule, thereby making it appear to her employer TFS that she has nothing to account for.
For another, this actuation is palpably contrary to logic and common sense since if she already knew
that Lito Jacinto had converted to his benefit the sum of 45,587.65, then she should not have
incessantly asserted that the licenses and permits of all the branches of TFS in the City of Manila
had already been paid for as of 20 January 1999.
This inconsistency is also evident in the Counter-Affidavit and Supplemental Counter-Affidavit, which
she submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City during the preliminary investigation,
when she egregiously failed to aver any transaction she had with Lito Jacinto and that the latter
should be solelyres ponsible for the loss of the aforementioned amount. Verily, and as observed
earlier, this defense is clearly an afterthought and does not deserve faith and credit.
Additionally, on the assumption that she indeed turned over the amount of P45,587.65 to Jacinto,
she failed to establish the fact that she is authorized to do so by private complainant TFS. This
notwithstanding however, insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, she is only to be
held accountable of P81,000.00 proven to be received by her. The amount of P74,690.00
subsequently paid by TFS to the City Government of Manila for its licenses and permits cannot be
charged to the accused as she did not benefit from this and it is the obligation of TFS to pay its
licenses and permits fees in order to legally operate its business.
xxxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years[,] two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccionalas minimum to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by law. She is further ordered to
pay the private complainant TFS Pawnshop Incorporated the sum ofP81,000.00 representing the
amount misappropriated by her plus interest at the rate of six (6%) to be reckoned from the rendition
of the judgment until fully paid (Article 2211, NCC). Costs against [Gamboa].
6

At the appeal stage before the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) joined
Gamboas stance of innocence and prayed for the reversal and setting aside of the trial courts
judgment of conviction. The OSG filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Appellees Brief arguing the
absence of the element of misappropriation because Gamboa simply followed instructions when she
gave the monies to Lito Jacinto for the renewal of TFS branches business permits and licenses.
Ultimately for the OSG, the fact that the business licenses and permits were apparently not paid
does not establish misappropriation or conversion by Gamboa of the monies allotted therefor.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the findings of the RTC. Extensively delving on Gamboas defense
that there was no misappropriation since she turned over the amount of P45,587.65 and P24,000.00
to Lito Jacinto as instructed by her superior, the Court of Appeals reviewed the case, thus:

It likewise bears stressing that prior to the filing of the instant estafa case, [Gamboa] was requested
inseveral instances by TFS, oral and written, to liquidate the cash advances made by her, but, she
failed to do so.
In [Gamboas] effort to exculpate herself from criminal liability, she belatedly claimed during her
direct examination in court that she gave the amount of P45,587.65 as payment for the renewal of
the business permits and licenses and P24,000.00 as mobilization fee to one Lito Jacinto, allegedly
an employee of the Office of the City Mayor of Manila who was assigned at the Mayors Permits and
License Division, in order to expedite the processing thereof. This was allegedly upon the express
instruction of her superior, Estrella Cuyno, that she deal directly with Lito Jacinto, TFS contact
person in Manila City Hall. To prove the actual receipt of the said amount by Lito Jacinto, she
presented a document marked as Exhibit "6." The said document was prepared by [Gamboa]
herself, which is just a reproduction of Exhibit "5" or the Request of Payment dated January 18, 1999
in the sum of 45,587.65 signed and approved by TFS VP Tambunting, except that the signatory in
Exhibit "6" was one Lito Jacinto.
We agree with the court a quoin not giving probative value to Exhibit "6" of the defense.
A perusal of Exhibit "6" shows that the same is merely a photocopy of the original. This was pointed
out by private prosecutor Atty. Marcelo and was admitted by defense counsel Atty. Matula during the
cross-examination of [Gamboa]. x x x.
xxxx
Notably, [Gamboa] testified that she herself prepared Exhibit "6," which allegedly contained the
signatureof Lito Jacinto as having received the amount of P45,587.65. However, she lost the original
copy thereof in a taxi on May 17, 2001 as evidenced by a Certification of even date issued by Chief
Inspector Vicente Dizon Flores of the PNP Makati Police Station indicating therein that she left her
folder containing documents vital to the instant estafa case. Such being the case, [Gamboa] failed to
clearly establish as to how she got hold of the photocopy of the original thereof.
A perusal of Exhibit "6" further shows that it is a "certified xerox copy (from the original)" and the
same was signed by one Othelo V. Salvacion, Administrative Officer IV of the City of Manila with
O.R. No. 1101860 dated February 11, 2002. Considering that Exhibit "6" is a private document, it
was not shown how the original thereof came under the custody of Mr. Salvacion. Neither was Mr.
Salvacion also presented on the witness stand to testify as to his alleged signature appearing on the
purportedly certified true copy of the original of Exhibit "6."
Neither did the defense present the original or xerox copy of Exhibit "6" before the court a quo for
marking during the pre-trial held on November 14, 2000. In addition, it was only during the direct
examination of [Gamboa] on July 30, 2002 that she raised for the first time Exhibit "6" as a defense
by passing the blame to oneLito Jacinto. She never raised the said defense at the earliest
opportunetime when she made a liquidation report of her cash advances. Further, she again failed to
raise the said defense before the Office of the Prosecutor of Makati City during the preliminary
investigation. If indeed she was innocent of the crime charged, ordinary human behavior dictates
that she should have divulged the said information to her superiors or the investigating public
prosecutor of such fact. Her failure to do so casts serious doubt on her credibility.

As to [Gamboas] administrative complaint filed before the Office of the City Mayor against Lito
Jacinto, [Gamboa] did not make any follow-up on the status of the case nor take any further action in
connection therewith. And, as to [Gamboas] criminal complaint for estafa against Lito Jacinto which
was filed before the City Prosecutor of Manila, the same was dimissed upon [Gamboas] motion to
withdraw the same without prejudice. No further action was likewise taken by [Gamboa] to pursue
her claim against Lito Jacinto.
Thus, the asseveration of the OSG that [Gamboa] should be acquitted because she was able to
prove the fact of receipt of the money by Lito Jacinto, must necessarily fail.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated May
18, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 145, Makati City in Criminal Case No. 00-526 is
AFFIRMED with modification in that [Gamboa] is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. (Emphasis supplied).
7

Hence, this appeal by certiorari assigning the following errors in the appellate courts ruling:
I.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS SUSTAINED [GAMBOAS] CONVICTION BY
FOCUSING ON THE WEAKNESSES OF THE DEFENSE RATHER THAN BASING IT ON THE
STRENGTH OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE[.]
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DELIBERATELY IGNORED THE MANIFESTATION IN
LIEU OF APPELLANTS BRIEF OF THE PEOPLES COUNSEL, THE OSG, WHICH PRAYED FOR
[GAMOBAS] ACQUITTAL[.]
8

In essence, Gamboa asks for her acquittal since the prosecution did not prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Gamboa, backed by the OSG, maintains that the element of misappropriation or
conversion in the crime of Estafaunder paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code was
not met: she turned over the monies for the processing of the renewal of TFS business permits and
licenses to Lito Jacinto as has been the practice in the Tambunting Group of Companies.
While the Manifestation in Lieu of Appellees Brief of the OSG did call for attention, we remain
unconvinced.
The pass on arguments of the OSG follows:
The critical issue in the instant case, therefore, is whether [Gamboa] misappropriated the cash she
received from TFS intended for payment of the latters business permits.
As previously mentioned, [Gamboa] does not deny receiving such amount. She contends, however,
that she delivered it to Lito Jacinto, the TFS contact person in the City Hall of Manila who absconded
with the money instead of paying it in behalf of TFS.

It must be noted that delivery to a third person by an agent of the thing entrusted to her, by itself,
does not constitute misappropriation. In the following case, the High Court extensively discussed the
rationale behind such principle:
Petitioner did not ipso facto commit the crime of estafa through conversion or misappropriation by
delivering the jewelry to a subagent for sale on commission basis. We are unable to agree with the
lower courts conclusion that this fact alone is sufficient ground for holding that petitioner disposed of
the jewelry "as if it were hers, thereby committing conversion and clear breach of trust."
It must be pointed out that the law on agency in our jurisdiction allows the appointment by an agent
of a substitute or sub-agent in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary between the
agent and the principal. In the case at bar, the appointment of Labrador as petitioners sub-agent
was not expressly prohibited by Quilatan, as the acknowledgement receipt, Exhibit B, does not
contain any such limitation. Neither does it appear that petitioner was verbally forbidden by Quilatan
from passing on the jewelry to another person before the acknowledgement receipt was executed or
at any other time. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners act of entrusting the jewelry to Labrador is
characterized by abuse of confidence because such an act was not proscribed and is, in fact, legally
sanctioned.
xxxx
Thus, the next question that must be settled is whether the evidence upholds [Gamboas] claim of
delivery by her to Lito Jacinto of the money intended to be paid to secure permits and licenses from
the City of Manila, or at least create a reasonable doubt that she misappropriated the money given
to her by TFS.
Notably, in the instant case, [Gamboa] is claiming that not only is she not prohibited from delivering
the amount to Lito Jacinto, but under TFS practice and as well as by direct orders of her superiors,
she is actually mandated to give such amount to him for the release of TFS business permits. x x x.
Thus, she should not be held liable for Lito Jacintos failure to remit such amount to the City
Government of Manila.
Apart from her testimony, [Gamboa] presented various documentary evidences. Exhibit "5" x x x, for
instance, is a TFS voucher denominated as Request for Payment, dated January 18, 1999, wherein
the company vice president, Ramon Louis Carlos Tambunting, signed his approval for the release of
45,587.65 to [Gamboa] for payment of business permits for TFS branches in Manila. Exhibit "5"
contains detailed information as to the original assessment, the amount compromised and the
resulting amount to be paid for each branch in Manila.
[Gamboa] likewise presented Exhibit "6" x x x, the same Request for Payment Form as in Exhibit "5"
but without the signature of Ramon Louis Carlos Tambunting. Instead the purported signature of Lito
Jacinto appears therein acknowledging the receipt of P45,526.65 [sic] to be paid for the release of
business permits of TFS.
There seems to be no doubt that TFS deals with contact persons within the City Government of
Manila such as Lito Jacinto to facilitate the release of its business permits for some consideration
which TFS terms as "Mobilization Fee." Exhibit "27" x x x is a request for payment form dated
January 18, 1999 signed by Ramon Louis Carlos Tambunting authorizing the release to [Gamboa] of
the amount of P24,000.00 or P2,000.00 per TFS branch in Manila as "Mobilization Fee."

The prosecution never challenged the authenticity of Exhibits "5," "6" or "27," thereby giving
plausibilityto [Gamboas] claim that she paid such amounts to Lito Jacinto as sanctioned by TFS
officials. There is no doubt that Lito Jacinto exists and that TFS has dealings with him.
9

In sum, the OSG ascribes great weight to Gamboas belated testimony that she turned over the
monies,P45,587.65 and P24,000.00,respectively, to Lito Jacinto to process and facilitate the renewal
of TFS branches business permits and licenses such that the prosecution failed to discharge the
requisite burden of proof in criminal cases, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt.
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court reciting constitutional mandate, exacts acquittal absent
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The universal test is moral certainty in ascertaining the guilt of the
accused, obtained only by proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
In this case, the elements of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code sought to be established by the prosecution are as follows:
1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to 2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property
by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

10

The first and fourth elements were readily admitted by Gamboa while she categorically disputed the
second and third elements by declaring in her letter-explanation to TFS dated 27 February 1999,
and at the stage of preliminary investigation, that:
1. her cash advances were distributed to her staff for purposes of processing the renewal of
the required permits and licenses;
2. she [had] surrendered all the necessary liquidation papers; and
3. all of TFS branches licenses were already completely paid on 20 January 1999 as per
schedule, hence, no additional penalty was incurred therefor.
11

It was only during trial, specifically at her direct examination, that Gamboa raised the defense of her
handing over the monies to Lito Jacinto, as instructed by her superior, Cuyno.
It is well-settled that the credibility of witnesses is best determined by the trial judge, who has the
direct opportunity and unique advantage to observe at close range their conduct and deportment on
the witness stand. The general rule is that findings of fact of the trial court, its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, and the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions based on said finding, are accorded by the appellate court utmost respect, if not
conclusive effect, and can only be set aside upon a clear showing that it overlooked, ignored,
misconstrued and misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would alter
the outcome of the case.
12

We do not find the testimony of Gamboa credible because it is riddled with inconsistencies and
consists of documentary evidence which cannot be authenticated.
We quote with favor the disquisition thereon of the appellate court:
Notably, [Gamboa] testified that she herself prepared Exhibit "6[,]" which allegedly contained the
signature of Lito Jacinto as having received the amount of 45,587.65. However, she lost the original
copy thereof in a taxi on May 17, 2001 as evidenced by a Certification of even date issued by Chief
Inspector Vicente Dizon Flores of the PNP Makati Police Station indicating therein that she left her
folder containing documents vital to the instant estafa case. Such being the case, [petitioner] failed
to clearly establish as to how she got hold of the photocopy of the original thereof.
A perusal of Exhibit "6" further shows that it is a "certified xerox copy (from the original)" and the
same was signed by one Othelo V. Salvacion, Administrative Officer IV of the City of Manila with
O.R. No. 1101860 dated February 11, 2002. Considering that Exhibit "6" is a private document, it
was not shown how the original thereof came under the custody of Mr. Salvacion. Neitherwas Mr.
Salvacion also presented on the witness stand to testify as to his alleged signature appearing on the
purportedly certified true copy of the original of Exhibit "6[.]"
Neither did the defense present the original or xerox copy of Exhibit "6" before the court a quo for
marking during the pre-trial held on November 14, 2000. In addition, it was only during the direct
examination of [Gamboa] on July 30, 2002 that she raised for the first time Exhibit "6" as a defense
by passing the blame to one Lito Jacinto. She never raised the said defense at the earliest
opportune time when she made a liquidation report of her cash advances. Further, she again failed
to raise the said defense before the Office of the Prosecutor of Makati City during the preliminary
investigation. If indeed she was innocent of the crime charged, ordinary human behavior dictates
that she should have divulged the said information to her superiors or the investigating public
prosecutor of such fact. Her failure to do so casts serious doubt on her credibility.
13

Moreover, we scoured the OSGs Manifestation in Lieu of Appellees Brief and Gamboas petition
and these do not offer any plausible reason that will explain the significantly long delay in raising
such a plausibly turning point of his defense considering that the alleged turnover of funds was
routine part of her work.
The OSG simply makes a throw-away assertion:
x x x The record shows, however, that [Gamboa] only knew of Lito Jacintos failure to deliver the
payment sometime in March 9, 1999, while her memorandum to the TFS was given on February 27,
1999. It is also possible that [Gamboa] did not mention Lito Jacinto in her counter and supplemental
affidavits because the complaint affidavit of Felicidad Samson was vague, as [Gamboa] was being
made to account for various amounts of money. In fact, the investigating prosecutor initially agreed
with [Gamboa] that there was no certainty as to the amount demanded from her and he even
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against [Gamboa] x x x.
14

We cannot subscribe to the OSGs reasoning.

During the preliminary investigation stage Gamboa stated under oath that:

It is not true that I was not able to pay for the Mayors permit for different branches and the
documents are with me. The truth of the matter is that all payments have already been made as of
January 20, 1999 and some permits are awaiting release.
15

Contrary to the OSGs assertion, Gamboa was not confused on what she was being made to
account for, as she categorically denied that: (1) she failed to pay the Mayors permit for different
branches; (2) the documents attesting to the fact that its payment are in her possession; and (3)
some of the permits are only yet to be released.
Again, we refer to the appellate courts solid reasoning:
Neither did the defense present the original or xerox copy of Exhibit "6" before the court a quo for
marking during the pre-trial held on November 14, 2000. In addition, it was only during the direct
examination of [Gamboa] on July 30, 2002 that she raised for the first time Exhibit "6" as a defense
by passing the blame to one Lito Jacinto. She never raised the said defense at the earliest
opportune time when she made a liquidation report of her cash advances. Further, she again failed
to raise the said defense before the Office of the Prosecutor of Makati City during the preliminary
investigation. If indeed she was innocent of the crime charged, ordinary human behavior dictates
that she should have divulged the said information to her superiors or the investigating public
prosecutor of such fact. Her failure to do so casts serious doubt on her credibility.
16

The lack of certainty in the amount demanded by TFS merely puts into question the actual amount
that was misappropriated and the damage on TFS, but not the fact of Gamboas misappropriation.
However, we still find, as the lower courts did, that the amount of P81,000.00 was sufficiently
established by the prosecution through the positive testimony of Samson backed by documentary
evidence:
ATTY. MARCELO
xxxx
A. All the cash that have to be disbursed comes from me [sic].
Q. And the Petty Cash?
A. All the expenses in the office like the transportation of the messenger and all the needs in the
office I was the one who prepared the payments.
Q. In all these works, do you use records?
A. Yes, Maam.
Q. How?
A. I have my own notebook for the Petty Cash.
Q. Do you know x x x Jean Gamboa?
A. Yes, Maam.

xxxx
A. For every transaction that she has[,] she will consult me.
xxxx
A. If ever she needs money to pay the permits and licenses[,] she has to go to me to get for the cash
advances.
xxxx
Q. I am showing to you Mrs. Witness a document entitled Request for Payment Form, will you
please examine this and tell the Court what is the relation of that to the Request for Payment Form
which Jean Gamboa usually handed to you when she asked for cash disbursement?
A. This is a Request for Payment form.
xxxx
A. This refers to her cash advances intended for the permits and licenses for the Manila branches.
Q. This Request for Payment Form has been approved by the authorized signatory, were you able to
give that amount to her as requested?
A. Yes, Maam.
Q. What proof do you have that you were able to give Jean Gamboa this amount?
A. She has a signature in my Petty Cash notebook.
Q. Where is that notebook?
INTERPRETER
Witness is handling a notebook with a caption school notes.
ATTY. MARCELO
Q. You have handed to me a notebook, where in particular is this entry for P81,000.00?
A. This is the one, Maam.
INTERPRETER
Witness is pointing to the entry P81,000.00 after which the name Jean Gamboa, her signature and
the date January 19, 1999.
ATTY. MARCELO

Q. In this entry, whose handwriting is this[?]

A. Jean Gamboas handwriting.
Q. How about this signature?
A. This is her signature.
Q. Why do you say so?
A. Because I am familiar with her handwritings and signatures.
Everyday we are together in the office.
xxxx
Q. x x x how did you enter the transaction in this notebook?
A. I entered the transaction in pencil. After receiving the amount[,] she will place her name, the date,
her signature or her initial.
xxxx
Q. What happened to this amount of P81,000.00, was she able to liquidate?
A. No, Maam.
Q. Why did you say so?
A. No, Maam, because when we checked at the City Treasurers Office, we were able to verify that
the licenses and permits within the City of Manila were not able to pay (sic).
Q. Mrs. Witness, in the answer of the accused in her Counter Affidavit she stated that she already
liquidated that. In fact, that appears also in your notebook this liquidation, what can you say about
that?
A. Because the receipts which she submitted according to the City Treasurers of Manila were not
valid, these are assessment only.
17

On the imposable penalty, the appellate court modified the penalty imposed by the trial court from
"four (4) years[,] two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional[,] as minimum[,] to twelve
(12) years of prision mayor[,] as maximum," to "four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum."
18

19

We again quote with favor the computation of the appellate court on the imposable penalty, applying
therein the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the corresponding award of civil indemnity:

Under Article 315 of the RPC, the penalty for estafa is prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not
exceed P22,000.00; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000.00;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty should range from six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods. On the other hand, the maximum imposable penalty is the maximum range of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which is six (6) years, one
(1) month and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years plus one(1) year for each
additional P10,000.00, since the amount involved in the instant case is more than P22,000.00
or P81,000.00 to be exact.
Accordingly, this Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
1wphi1

The court a quo likewise correctly awarded by way of civil indemnity the sum of P81,000.00 plus
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) to be reckoned from the rendition of the judgment until fully
paid in view of existing jurisprudence in that the quantification of the amount misappropriated was
only reasonably ascertained during the trial of the instant case.
20

The minimum penalty imposed by the appellate court is within the maximum term of six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor and the maximum
penalty imposed resulted in a total of five (5) years, an additional one (1) year for each
additional P10,000.00 in excess of the P22,000.00, for a total of thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal.
We note that the appellate courts award of civil indemnity plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
reckoned from the rendition of judgment until fully paid remains correct with the advent of Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 pegging the rate of interest allowed in judgments back to six
percent (6%).
21

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. No.
30354 dated 30 January 2009 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner Jean D. Gamboa is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193856

April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SUKARNO JUNAIDE y AGGA, Appellant.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:

The Court addresses Sukarno A. Junaide's motion for reconsideration of the Court's Resolution of
January 20, 2014.
It may be recalled that the prosecution witnesses in this case testified that on November 25, 2004
the Zamboanga Drug Enforcement Unit received a tip that accused Junaide was selling prohibited
drugs at Lower Calarian, Zamboanga City. The police unit formed a buy-bust team with SPOI
Roberto Roca as poseur-buyer. It then went to the place mentioned. As the informant and SPOl
Roca saw accused Junaide standing near a store, they approached him. The informant told Junaide
that his companion wanted to buy PI00.00 worth of shabu.
Accused Junaide took a sachet from his pocket and handed it to SPOI Roca who in turn gave him a
marked PI00.00 bill. The police officer then signaled the rest of the police team to come. When SPO
1 Roca let it known that he was a police officer, Junaide tried to flee but the police stopped him. SPO
1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. searched and found four sachets of suspected shabu and the marked money
on Junaide.
Subsequently, the police brought accused Junaide to the police station where SPO1 Mirasol marked
the four sachets seized from him and turned these over to the case investigator, SPO1 Federico
Lindo, Jr. The latter then turned over the seized items to the police crime laboratory. The sachet
Junaide sold was found to contain 0.0101 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; the
other sachets contained a total of 0.0235 gram.
Accused Junaide, on the other hand, testified that he was napping at home when sounds of
commotion outside his house woke him up. As he took a look, he saw people being chased and his
neighbors getting arrested. Junaide left his house a little later to fetch his nephew from school but
while waiting for the boy, two armed men alighted from a white jeep and handcuffed him. They
frisked him but found nothing. They showed him a sachet of shabu and said that they would use it as
evidence against him. Junaide later identified the two men as SPO1 Roca and SPO1 Mirasol. Two
neighbors claimed that they had seen the incident and corroborated Junaides story.
1wphi1

The Public Prosecutor charged accused Junaide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City with (1) illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
9165 in Criminal Case 5601 (21215) and (2) illegal possession of shabu in violation of Section 11,
Article II of the same law in Criminal Case 5602 (21216).
1

On January 30, 2008 the RTC found accused Junaide guilty of both charges. The trial court
sentenced him to suffer the penalties of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 for selling
dangerous drugs and 12 years and 1 day to 16 years of imprisonment and a fine of P300,000.00 for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On January 29, 2010 the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered
judgment in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00593-MIN affirming the RTC Decision in toto, hence, the appeal in this
case.
On January 20, 2014 the Court affirmed the CAs Decision. It held that, despite a few deviations from
the required procedure, the prosecution sufficiently proved the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items.
On February 24, 2014 Junaide filed a motion for reconsideration pleading for a reexamination of the
Courts finding that the police officers involved substantially complied with the requirements of

Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165. The Court has
accommodated the plea.
In a prosecution for the sale and possession of the prohibited drugs known as shabu, the State does
not only carry the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense. It also bears the obligation to
prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the State would not have proved the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
2

And, to prove the corpus delicti, it is indispensable for the prosecution to show that the dangerous
drugs subject of the sale and examined in the police laboratory are the same drugs presented in
court as evidence. The first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or
related items. Marking is the affixing of the initials or other identifying signs on the seized items by
the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer. This must be done in the presence of the accused shortly
after arrest.
3

Here, compliance with the requirement of marking is not clear. SPO1 Roca testified that he marked
the plastic sachet of shabu that he bought with his initials "RR" but when the supposed sachet was
presented to him in court for identification, it instead carried the marking "RR-1." This may be just a
mistake but he denied having made a mistake and admitted that the "RR-1" marking could have
been made by just anybody. Thus:
6

Prosecutor Pajarito:
Q: If this one sachet of shabu be shown to you, the one which you said sold to you by Sukarno will
you recognize it?
A: Yes Maam.
Q: How would you be able to recognize it Mr. witness?
A: I mark my initial Maam.
Q: What initial did you place?
A: RR means Roberto Roca.
xxxx
Q: I have one sachet of white crystalline substance bearing RR marking what relation has this to the
one sachet which you bought from the accused and turned over to the investigator?
A: This is the very one that I bought from Sukarno here is my RR marking.
Atty. Talip: May I manifest for the record Your Honor that the actual marking that appears on the
shabu is RR-1 and not RR.
xxxx

Atty. Talip:
Q: You said double R, you ever mentioned RR-1 and when shown to you it was RR-1 can you tell us
why?
A: I was not able to mention the -1 but it is RR-1.
Q: It would been a different item RR is different from RR-1.
A: Yes Maam.
Q: Do you agree?
A: But RR s my very initial marking.
Q: How many times have you been designated as poseur buyer?
A: I can not recall Maam if as poseur buyer for how many times.
Q: Just an estimate Mr. witness?
A: More or less 10 times.
Q: In those instances your marking would be RR only?
A: Yes Maam.
Q: Thats why you mention a while ago, that what you place is RR only?
A: Yes Maam.
xxxx
Prosecutor Pajarito:
Q: Mr. witness on that day November 25, 2004 there was only how many sachet did you have from
your possession?
A: Only one sachet Maam.
Q: This was the result of the buy bust operation?
A: Yes Maam.
Q: How many bills did you also have on that day?
A: Only one Maam.

Q: So you could not be confused with it?

A: Yes Maam.
xxxx
Atty. Talip:
Q: Mr. witness, regarding the discrepancy, you said there was no buy bust operation, do you agree
to the letter RR-1 could have been written by anybody else?
A: Yes maam. (Emphasis supplied)
SPO1 Roca may have truly marked the item of shabu he seized from accused Sukarno as "RR"
which he insisted he did. Someone else, therefore, replaced the item by another one, now marked
as "RR-1." Indeed, Roca has not ruled out the possibility that the latter marking on the shabu item
presented in court may have been made by someone else. This leads the Court to conclude that
there may have been switching of evidence in the selling charge. Guilt in that charge has not,
therefore, been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the accused Sukarno A. Junaide's Motion for
Reconsideration and ACQUITS him on the ground of reasonable doubt of the charge of selling
dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165 in Criminal Case 5601
(21215) of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City. His conviction, however, in Criminal Case
5602 (21216) on the charge of possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 11, Article II of
the same law remains.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196753

April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ERWIN LALOG, ROOSEVELT CONCEPCION, EDWIN RAMIREZ, and RICKY LITADA, AccusedAppellants.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The facts of this case as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
On September 29, 1999 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Ryan Gain [Gain], Roswel Mercado
[Mercado], Rex Rey [Rey] and Jayson Manzo [Manzo] were strolling at the Municipal Park of
Poblacion, Municipality of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, when they were blocked by four (4)
persons, namely Erwin Lalog [Lalog], Roosevelt Concepcion [Concepcion], Edwin Ramirez
[Ramirez] and Ricky Litada [Litada]. xx x Lalog angrily talked to x x x Gain, but x x x Mercado
intervened and apologized to the group of xx x Lalog x x x.

Later, x x x Gain and x x x Mercado went down the stairs of the park locally known as the
"RAINBOW[.]" x x x Mercado [was] walking ahead ofx x x Gain by six (6) arms length[;] when he
looked back, he saw xx x Gain being ganged upon by the group of the accused-appellants x xx
[held] both the hands of x x x Gain, while x x x Lalog stabbed x x x Gain. x x x [Fearing for his life,]
Roswel x x x immediately fled the scene.
Sensing that the assailants had left the scene, x xx Mercado approached x x x Gain and brought him
to the hospital x x x but it was already too late for he was declared x x x [d]ead on [a]rrival x x x.
On the other hand, x x x Lalog admitted stabbing x x x Gain in self-defense, while the other three
appellants, x x x Concepcion, x x x Ramirez, and x x x Litada denied their participation in the
stabbing incident, claiming that the three of them were in a drinking session, in the house of
[Ramirezs aunt] in Quezon Street, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.
1

Thus, on October 28, 1999, an Information was filed charging appellants Lalog, Concepcion,
Ramirez, and Litada with the crime of murder. During their arraignment on February 21, 2000,
appellants pleaded not guilty. The case was set for pre-trial on April 27, 2000. However, upon
agreement by both parties, the pre-trial was terminated. Trial on the merits ensued.
2

In a Decision dated October 17, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 42, found appellants guilty as charged, viz:
5

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Erwin Lalog, Roosevelt Concepcion,
Edwin Ramirez and Ricky Litada guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal[s] of the crime of
MURDER for having conspired in killing Ryan Gain, qualified by treachery, which is defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by RECLUSION PERPETUA to DEATH.
Considering that there is neither a mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
crime, all accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all
the accessory penalties and to jointly and severally pay the heirs of Ryan Gain the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the sum of P29,510 as expenses incurred during the wake of
deceased Ryan Gain including the funeral expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
to pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

The trial court lent credence to the testimony of Mercado who never wavered in his narration that he
saw appellants gang up on the victim and that appellant Lalog stabbed the victim at the back. It was
not persuaded by Lalogs claim of self-defense as it was quite improbable for Lalog to have stabbed
the victim on the back while he was lying on the ground and the victim on top of him. The number of
wounds sustained by the victim negated Lalogs claim of self-defense; rather, it was indicative of
appellants intent to kill. The trial court disregarded Concepcions, Ramirez, and Litadas defense of
alibi considering that the place where they claim to be was only about a hundred meters away from
the scene of the crime. Thus, it was not physically impossible for them to be present at the crime
scene. The trial court found that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation did not attend
the commission of the crime. It noted that appellants and the victim met only by chance at
Pinamalayan Park; there was no showing that appellants planned the killing. However, it found that
the killing was done in a treacherous manner. The prosecution established that appellants first held
the hands of the victim to render him immobile and to foreclose any defense from the latter.
Thereafter, appellant Lalog stabbed him at the back. As regards the aggravating circumstance of

abuse of superior strength, the same was absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Nocturnity was not considered to have qualified the crime because there was no showing that
appellants took advantage of the same to perpetrate the crime or to conceal their identity.
Aggrieved, appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, in its November 11, 2010
Decision, the appellate court affirmed in full the Decision of the trial court, viz:
7

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. P-6043 convicting the accused-appellants of
the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties, and to jointly and severally pay the heirs of Ryan Gain the sum of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, the sum of P29,510.00 as expenses incurred during the wake of deceased Ryan
Gain including the funeral expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay costs of
suit, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, this appeal.

Appellants claim that Mercados testimony should not have been given credence by the trial court
and the appellate court as there were inconsistencies. They allege that Mercado initially testified that
appellants attacked the victim at the place known in the locality as the "rainbow" but later recanted
and stated that the stabbing occurred on the ground near the "rainbow".
This contention deserves no consideration. Whether the victim was stabbed at the "rainbow" or near
the "rainbow" is inconsequential. What is important is the fact that Mercado unwaveringly testified
that he saw appellants gang up on the victim, render him immobile, and then stab him at the back
several times.
Appellants next argue that the trial court and the appellate court erred in disregarding Lalogs claim
of self-defense. We are not persuaded. As correctly held by the trial court:
To avail of self-defense as a justifying circumstance so as not to incur any criminal liability, it must be
proved with certainty by satisfactory and convincing evidence which excludes any vestige of criminal
aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It cannot be entertained where it is not only
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also doubtful. If the accused fails to
discharge the burden of proof, his conviction, shall of necessity follow on the basis of his admission
of the killing (People v. Suyum et. al. G.R. No. 137518, March 6, 2002).
The claim of x x x Lalog that he stabbed x x x Gain at the back portion of the latters body (Lumbar
area) while the former was lying down is not only uncorroborated by any other evidence but it is
improbable and contrary to the physical evidence because how could x x x Lalog [stab] x x x Gains
back when the former was lying on the ground while the latter was on top and at the same time
choking him. The testimony of prosecution witness x x x Mercado that x x x Gain was stabbed at his
back by x x x Lalog while x x x [both his hands were being held by the other appellants] is more
logical, believable and [in] consonance with the physical evidence. x x x Gain could not have been
easily stabbed at his back if his x x x hands were not being held x x x considering that x x x Gain is
much taller and bigger in built than the accused particularly x x x Lalog unless x x x Gain just simply
let his back (lumbar area) [be] stabbed without any resistance or struggle on his part which is

impossible under any state of circumstances. Furthermore, the number of wounds [sustained by
Gain] (Exh. "A") [is] indicative of x x x Lalogs desire to kill the former and not really defend himself
because not a single moment of the incident was his life and limb being endangered which is the
essence of self-defense. The fact that the deceased x x x Gain was not armed all the more negates
self-defense.
9

Finally, we are not persuaded by appellants argument that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
was not proved. We agree with the trial courts observation that appellants attacked Gain in a
treacherous manner. They held Gains arms, rendered him immobile and then thrust the knife into
his body several times.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals properly sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua
there being no aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
However, appellants are not eligible for parole.
10

As regards damages, the award of civil indemnity must be increased to P75,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence. The awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and actual
damages in the amount of P29,510.00 are proper. In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00. Finally, interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this judgment until the awards of damages are fully paid is imposed.
11

12

13

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The November 11, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R CR-HC No. 00325 which affirmed the October 17, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, finding appellants Erwin Lalog, Roosevelt
Concepcion, Edwin Ramirez and Ricky Litada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS
that appellants are without eligibility for parole; the award of civil indemnity is increased
to P75,000.00; appellants are ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and interest on all damages awarded is imposed at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194446

April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
HERMENIGILDO DELEN y ESCO BILLA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The accused-appellant Hermenigildo Delen y Escobilla seeks the reversal of his conviction for child
abuse under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 and qualified rape under Article 266A, paragraph 1 in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 1, adjudged the accused-appellant guilty of said crimes in a
Consolidated Decision dated January 29, 2008. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a
Decision dated February 17, 2010 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03324.
1

The accused-appellant was separately charged with child abuse under Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610 and qualified rape in separate informations, respectively docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 13870 and 13932, before the RTC of Batangas City. Said crimes were alleged to have
been committed against AAA as follows:
3

[CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13870]

That on or about January 23, 2005 at around 6:00 oclock (sic) in the evening at [XXX] and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a hammer, without
any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit [a] cruel act
against [AAA], a 12-year old girl, by violently striking her head with the said hammer, kicking her and
smashing her head on a wooden post, thereby causing her physical injuries, which act debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of [AAA] as a human being, in violation of the
aforecited law.
That the aggravating circumstance of relationship is attendant in the commission of the offense, the
accused being the father of the offended party.
4

[CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13932]

That on or about January 17, 2005 at around 6:00 oclock (sic) in the morning at [XXX] and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd
designs, through force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge on one [AAA], a 12-year old minor, against the latters will.
That the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship, the victim being then a 12-year old
minor and daughter of the accused, are attendant in the commission of the offense.
5

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. On motion of the
parties, the two cases were tried jointly.
6

The Prosecutions Version of Events

AAA was born on March 29, 1992 to accused-appellant and BBB. AAAs parents separated as the
accused-appellant was beating BBB. AAA then lived with her aunt until the accused-appellant took
her in. In the year 2000, AAA lived in the accused-appellants house. One day, she was awakened
from her sleep when the accused-appellant removed her shorts and panty. The accused-appellant
then removed his shorts and went on top of AAA. He inserted his penis into her organ and told her
not to create any noise because their neighbors might hear them. He also warned AAA that he would
kill her if she would report the incident. AAA could not do anything but cry. Subsequently, at around
6:00 a.m. on January 17, 2005, AAA woke up with her legs spread apart and tied to wooden panels
on the wall. She was only wearing her upper clothing and was not wearing her shorts and panty
anymore. The accused-appellant removed his shorts and only wore briefs. The accused-appellant
then lay on top of her and began to insert his penis into her organ, which caused her pain. While the
accused-appellant was doing said act, he told AAA not to report the incident; otherwise, he
threatened to cut her tongue and kill her. Thereafter, the accused-appellant untied her.
8

10

On January 23, 2005, the accused-appellant asked AAA to look for a lighter. When AAA failed to find
one, the accused-appellant told her to go inside a room in their house. There, he kicked AAA in the

buttocks, hit her head with a hammer and smashed her head on the wooden wall. She suffered
injuries on her forehead and the back of her head. Afterwards, she told the accused-appellant that
she was going to use the toilet so she was able to go out of their house. She ran to the street and
went to the house of a neighbor, Ate Annie. The accused-appellant looked for her there so she hid
under the bed. After the accused-appellant left, AAA was brought to the house of Nanay Loleng, a
neighbor of Ate Annie. They treated AAAs wounds and put her to sleep. When she woke up, the
barangay tanods were already at the place. They first talked to AAA then they called the police so
that the accused-appellant could be apprehended. When the accused-appellant was arrested, AAA
was brought to the police station where she gave her statement. AAA was then taken to the hospital
where she was treated and examined by doctors.
11

The Medico-Legal Certification executed by Dr. Rex B. Rivamonte and Dr. Aristotle R. Arellano of the
Batangas Regional Hospital showed that AAA sustained the following injuries:
SURGICAL FINDINGS:
(+) contusion hematoma right parietal area.
(+) contusion hematoma left parietal area.
(+) contusion hematoma right flank area.
(+) contusion hematoma left flank area.
(+) contusion hematoma with abrasion frontal area.
(+) contusion hematoma right lumbar area.
Multiple physical injuries secondary to mauling.
OB-GYNE FINDINGS:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: (+) Physical injuries on time of examination.
EXTERNAL GENITALIA: well coaptated labia majora (-) pubic hair.
HYMEN: (+) complete healed laceration at 1, 3, 6, 9 oclock position[s].
INTERNAL FINDINGS: Admits 2 fingers with ease, cervix closed, firm, uterus not enlarge, no
adnexal mass (-) tenderness.
LABORATORY RESULT: SPERM CELL DETERMINATION: No sperm cell seen.
PREGNANCY TEST: Negative.
In the opinion of the undersigned, these injuries will incapacitate or require medical attendance for a
period of less than nine (9) days barring complications; otherwise, this period of healing will vary
accordingly.
12

The Defenses Version of Events

For his part, the accused-appellant testified that he has been residing at XXX since 1999. He lived in
a house shared with his eldest brother and his family. On January 17, 2005, he was at his house
together with AAA and the family of his brother but he left early at about 6:00 a.m. He denied that he
raped AAA on said date. He claimed that AAA might have been raped at her grandparents house
where she lived prior to January 17, 2005. He alleged that there was a person with a mental defect
living in said house. He further asserted that the charge of rape was instigated by the sibling of
AAAs mother who was angry with him because he separated from his wife. Moreover, the barangay
kagawad who lodged a complaint against him was also angry with him as he was a guard at the
cockpit and the kagawad did not want a cockpit in their barangay.
13

On January 23, 2005, the accused-appellant was also at his house with AAA and the family of his
brother. He denied causing the contusions on the different parts of AAAs body. He stated that AAA
was injured when she fell in a canal at the side of their house and this fact was witnessed by his
brother and AAAs cousin. He even brought AAA to the barangay health center for treatment. The
accused-appellant admitted, however, that he did hit AAA on her buttocks on January 23, 2005. He
explained that he asked her to cook rice but because she played with her playmates, the rice was
overcooked.
14

The Judgment of the RTC

In a Consolidated Decision dated January 29, 2008, the RTC handed down a judgment of conviction
against the accused-appellant. The trial court ruled that AAAs testimony against the accusedappellant was sufficiently conclusive, logical and probable to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of the latter. According to the trial court, AAAs testimony that she was physically
and sexually abused by the accused-appellant was amply corroborated by the medical findings of
Dr. Arellano and Dr. Rivamonte. As such, the trial court concluded that the accused-appellant was
indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the Accused Hermenigildo Delen y Escobilla guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crimes of Child abuse (by infliction of physical injury)
defined under Section 3, Article I and penalized under Section 10, Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610
in relation to Section 2(b) of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and rape defined and penalized
under Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act 9346 he
is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4)
YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and One (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as maximum, and to pay the
costs, in [C]riminal [C]ase [N]o. 13870 and [the] penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, in [C]riminal [C]ase
[N]o. 13932, respectively.
Further, for the rape committed the accused is ordered to indemnify [AAA] the sum of Seventy-Five
Thousand (Php75,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity plus the sum of Fifty Thousand (Php50,000.00)
Pesos, as moral damages, the sum of Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages of
[AAA]s mother, and the sum of Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages,
and to pay the costs.
Considering that Accused Hermenigildo Delen y Escobilla has undergone preventive imprisonment,
being a detention prisoner, and there being no evidence to show that he is a recidivist, he shall be

credited in the service of sentence with the full time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment, had he agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited only with four-fifths (4/5) of the time during which
he has undergone preventive imprisonment, as provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
15

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the above ruling of the RTC in a Decision dated February
17, 2010. The appellate court ruled that the RTC correctly appreciated the evidence and properly
concluded that the accused-appellant indeed committed the acts of child abuse and rape against
AAA. The appellate court likewise found AAAs testimony straightforward, candid and clear. In
contrast, the appellate court rejected the unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi put forth by the
accused-appellant. The Court of Appeals disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Consolidated Decision dated January 29, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos.
13870 and 13932 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, that the moral damages awarded to the victim
is INCREASED toP75,000.00, while the award of moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 to the
victims mother is DELETED.
16

The Ruling of the Court

On appeal to this Court, the accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the allegedly erroneous
judgment of the trial court.
The appeal lacks merit.
The RTC unequivocally ruled that the testimony of AAA passed the test of credibility. The Court of
Appeals thereafter upheld the trial courts assessment of AAAs testimony. After thoroughly reviewing
the records of the present case, the Court similarly finds worthy of credence the testimony of AAA
that the accused-appellant is guilty of physically and sexually abusing her. We, thus, find no reason
to disturb, much less overturn, the trial courts reliance on the testimony of AAA. Verily, in People v.
Leonardo, the Court had occasion to reiterate that:
17

It is a fundamental rule that the trial courts factual findings, especially its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and binding upon this Court,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the
trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because
of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate
courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These are
significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The
appellate courts will generally not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. (Citations omitted.)
In Criminal Case No. 13870, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing child abuse by infliction of physical injury against AAA.
Under Section 3(b), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, the term "child abuse" is defined as the
18

maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes the physical abuse of a child, among
other acts.
In this case, AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the person who kicked her in the
buttocks, hit her head with a hammer, and smashed her head on the wall on January 23, 2005.
Because of the said brutal and inhumane acts of the accused-appellant, AAA suffered bruises and
contusions in different parts of her body. The Medico-Legal Certification of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr.
Arellano clearly reflected the fact that AAA indeed sustained contusions, coupled with a finding that
she suffered multiple physical injuries secondary to mauling.
In Criminal Case No. 13932, the accused-appellant was also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of qualified rape.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape by sexual intercourse as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Thus, for a charge of rape to prosper under the above provision, the prosecution must prove that: (1)
the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force,
threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she
was under twelve years of age or was demented.
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that the accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of AAA on January 17, 2005. AAA narrated in a straightforward manner the harrowing
details of how the accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her. Again, the RTC found credible
and convincing AAAs testimony on this matter. Likewise, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disbelieve AAAs testimony, which was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Rivamonte and
Dr. Arellano that the victims hymen had "complete healed lacerations at 1, 3, 6, 9 oclock
position[s]." We held in People v. Oden that the "eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the
medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her
charges." As to the manner by which the rape was committed, the accused-appellants moral
ascendancy over AAA takes the place of the force and intimidation that is required in rape cases.
19

20

To exculpate himself from the charges of child abuse and rape, the accused-appellant merely denied
the accusations of AAA. The Court finds that the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in
rejecting the accused-appellants bare denials. Undeniably, the accused-appellant did not present
any clear and convincing evidence to substantiate his claims that another person with mental defect
could have raped AAA and that her injuries were caused when she fell in a canal beside their house.

The accused-appellant also failed to present any evidence to prove that AAA was impelled by ill
motive to testify against him. Settled is the rule that where no evidence exists to show any
convincing reason or improper motive for a witness to falsely testify against an accused, the
testimony deserves faith and credit.
21

The Proper Penalties

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the minority of a rape victim and her relationship to
the accused-appellant qualify the charge of rape in this wise:
Art. 266-B. Penalties. x x x.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
For the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 13932, the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship attended the commission of the crime. Not only were the said circumstances specifically
alleged in the information, the same were sufficiently proved during the trial of the case. The fact that
AAA was only 12 years old when she was raped by the accused-appellant on January 17, 2005 was
established by the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of x x x, Batangas,
which stated that AAA was born on March 29, 1992. Moreover, said certification stated that AAAs
biological father is none other than the accused-appellant Hermenigildo Delen. The accusedappellant likewise admitted this fact when he testified in court. Still, notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly held that the
appropriate penalty that should be imposed upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua. This
is in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty.
22

The Court of Appeals properly upheld the trial courts award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in favor of AAA, as well as the increase of the award of
moral damages in favor of AAA fromP50,000.00 to P75,000.00, in accordance with current
jurisprudence. The appellate courts removal of the separate award of moral damages in favor of
AAAs mother is also in accordance with our ruling in People v. Alajay where we held that "the
prevailing jurisprudence is that the award of moral damages should be granted jointly to both the
victim and her parents. Stated differently, the parents are not entitled to a separate award of moral
damages."
23

For the charge of child abuse in Criminal Case No. 13870, the RTC found the accused-appellant
guilty of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which states:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to
the Childs Development.

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC, which imposed against the accused-appellant an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 6 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum. The trial
court imposed the above penalty as it found no modifying circumstance that attended the
commission of the aforestated crime charged.
1awp++i1

The Court, however, disagrees. We find that the penalty imposed by the trial court needs to be
modified since, as previously discussed, the alternative circumstance of relationship, i.e., that the
accused-appellant is the father of AAA, has been duly established by the prosecution.
In this case, the imposable penalty is prision mayor minimum, the range of which is from 6 years and
1 day to 8 years. In the imposition of the penalty herein, Section 31(c), Article XII of Republic Act No.
7610 expressly provides that the penalty provided therein shall be imposed in its maximum period
when the perpetrator is a parent of the victim. Now then, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
and taking into consideration the circumstance of relationship, the maximum term of the sentence
shall be taken from the maximum period of prision mayor minimum, which is 7 years, 4 months and
1 day to 8 years. The minimum term of the sentence shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is prision correccional maximum, the range of which is from 4 years, 2 months and 1
day to 6 years. Thus, in Criminal Case No. 13870, considering the gravity of the physical abuse
committed against AAA, the Court imposes upon the accused-appellant the indeterminate sentence
of imprisonment ranging from 6 years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision
mayor, as maximum.
24

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated February 17, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03324. The accused-appellant Hermenigildo Delen y
Escobilla is hereby sentenced as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 13932, the accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of one count of qualified rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole, in lieu of death. The accused-appellant is ORDERED to
pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from
the date of finality of this Decision.
2. In Criminal Case No. 13870, the accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of committing child abuse in violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No.
7610 and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from 6 years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196735

May 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L.
ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students, faculty, and research personnel should
feel safest. After all, this is where ideas that could probably solve the sordid realities in this world are
peacefully nurtured and debated. Universities produce hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade misplaced concepts of perverse
brotherhood for these hopes. Fraternity rumbles exist because of past impunity. This has resulted in
a senseless death whose justice is now the subject matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are
prosecuted. It is even more extraordinary that there are credible witnesses who present themselves
courageously before an able and experienced trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this society for hooliganism disguised as
fraternity rumbles. The perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal consequences of their actions.
They must do so for there is an individual who now lies dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams
of his family. Excruciating grief for them will never be enough.
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7)
members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main
Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked
men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113 3, was filed against several
members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla,
Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida,
Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict
Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219. The
information reads:
1

That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating with other
persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, and with evident
premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes, and
cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the head and
clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said DENNIS F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis supplied)

Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Sigma Rho fraternity
members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Cristobal Gaston, Jr., and Leandro Lachica, and the frustrated
murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members Mervin Natalicio and Amel Fortes. Only 11 of the accused
stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at large.
2

A trial on the merits ensued.

The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Derinis Venturina, Mervin Natalicio, Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Felix
Tumaneng, and Cesar Magrobang, Jr. are all members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. On December
8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1 :00 p.m., they were having lunch at Beach House Canteen, located at
the back of the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. Suddenly,
Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"
7

According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked around when
Venturina shouted, and he saw about ten (10) men charging toward them. The men were armed
with baseball bats and lead pipes, and their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or
shirts. Within a few seconds, five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him with their lead
pipes. During the attack, he recognized one of the attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir
because his mask fell off.
10

11

12

13

Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and contusions.

14

He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education. Just before reaching it, he looked
back and saw Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla holding lead pipes and standing where
the commotion was. Both of them did not have their masks on. He was familiar with Alvir, Zingapan,
and Medalla because he often saw them in the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP)
and Zingapan used to be his friend. The attack lasted about thirty (30) to forty-five (45) seconds.
15

16

17

18

19

According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when
Venturina shouted. He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing masks,
running toward them. He was stunned, and he started running. He stumbled over the protruding
roots of a tree. He got up, but the attackers came after him and beat him up with lead pipes and
baseball bats until he fell down. While he was parrying the blows, he recognized two (2) of the
attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva since they were not wearing any
masks. After about thirty (30) seconds, they stopped hitting him.
20

21

22

23

24

25

26

He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to five (5) men
coming toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero. This group also beat him up. He did not move until
another group of masked men beat him up for about five (5) to eight (8) seconds.
27

28

29

When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground. Several bystanders brought him to the
U.P. Infirmary where he stayed for more than a week for the treatment of his wounds and fractures.
30

31

According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he also looked back when Venturina
shouted and saw a group of men with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them wore pieces of
cloth around their heads. He ran when they attacked, but two (2) men, whose faces were covered
with pieces of cloth, blocked his way and hit him with lead pipes. While running and parrying the
32

33

blows, he recognized them as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo because their
masks fell off. He successfully evaded his attackers and ran to the Main Library. He then decided
that he needed to help his fraternity brothers and turned back toward Beach House. There, he saw
Venturina lying on the ground. Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while
Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina. When they saw him, they went toward his
direction. They were about to hit him when somebody shouted that policemen were coming.
Feliciano and Narag then ran away.
34

35

36

37

38

39

40

Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes. Fortes accompanied him to his car so they could
bring Venturina to the U.P. Infirmary. When they brought the car over, other people, presumably
bystanders, were already loading Venturina into another vehicle. They followed that vehicle to the
U.P. Infirmary where they saw Natalicio. He stayed at the infirmary until the following morning.
41

42

43

44

According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he immediately stood up when he heard
someone shout, "Brods!" He saw a group of men charging toward them carrying lead pipes and
baseball bats. Most of them had pieces of cloth covering their faces. He was about to run when
two (2) of the attackers approached him. One struck him with a heavy pipe while the other stabbed
him with a bladed instrument. He was able to parry most of the blows from the lead pipe, but he
sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left forearm.
45

46

47

48

49

50

He was able to run away. When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he looked back to Beach
House Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano. He decided
to go back to the canteen to help his fraternity brothers. When he arrived, he did not see any of his
fraternity brothers but only saw the ones who attacked them. He ended up going to their hang-out
instead to meet with his other fraternity brothers. They then proceeded to the College of Law where
the rest of the fraternity was already discussing the incident.
51

52

53

54

55

56

According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran when he saw the group of attackers
coming toward them. When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina. He was
also able to see Warren Zingapan and George Morano at the scene.
57

58

59

Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of Education, boarded a jeepney to
the College of Law to wait for their other fraternity brothers. One of his fraternity brothers, Peter
Corvera, told him that he received information that members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west
wing of the Main Library and were regrouping in SM North. Lachica and his group then set off for
SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and identify their attackers.
60

61

62

When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them. Lachica saw Robert
Michael Beltran Alvir and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan. They had no choice but to
get away from the mall and proceed instead to U.P. where the Sigma Rho Fraternity members held a
meeting.
63

64

65

On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims to lodge their
complaints with the National Bureau of Investigation. Their counsel, Atty. Frank Chavez, told the
U.P. Police that the victims would be giving their statements before the National Bureau of
Investigation, promising to give the U.P. Police copies of their statements. In the meantime,
Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's Hospital on December 8, 1994. He
died on December 10, 1994. On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was conducted on the cadaver of
Dennis Venturina. Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
66

67

68

Investigation, found that Venturina had "several contusions located at the back of the upper left arm
and hematoma on the back of both hands," "two (2) lacerated wounds at the back of the
head, generalized hematoma on the skull," "several fractures on the head," and "inter-cranial
hemorrhage." The injuries, according to Dr. Victoria, could have been caused by a hard blunt
object. Dr. Victoria concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.
69

70

71

72

73

74

75

On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston executed their
respective affidavits before the National Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico-legal
examinations with their medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he found
that Mervin Natalicio had "lacerated wounds on the top of the head, above the left ear, and on the
fingers; contused abrasions on both knees; contusion on the left leg and thigh," all of which could
have been caused by any hard, blunt object. These injuries required medical attendance for a period
of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from the date of infliction.
76

77

78

79

Dr. Villena found on Amel Fortes "lacerated wounds on the head and on the right leg which could
have been caused by a blunt instrument." These injuries required hospitalization for a period of ten
(10) days to thirty (30) days from date of infliction. He also found on Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a
"healed abrasion on the left forearm which could possibly be caused by contact with [a] rough hard
surface and would require one (1) to nine (9) days of medical attention." He found on Leandro
Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the infra
scapular area, left side." On Christopher Gaston, Jr. he found "lacerated wounds on the anterior
chest, left side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of both hands; contusions on the mid auxiliary left
side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side."
80

81

82

83

84

On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief, the court granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the ground that he was not identified by the
prosecution's witnesses and that he was not mentioned in any of the documentary evidence of the
prosecution.
85

Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense introduced their own statement of the facts, as
follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera, a member of the U.P. Police, he was on foot patrol with another
member of the U.P. Police, Oscar Salvador, at the time of the incident. They were near the College
of Arts and Sciences (Palma Hall) when he vaguely heard somebody shouting, "Rumble!" They went
to the place where the alleged rumble was happening and saw injured men being helped by
bystanders. They helped an injured person board the service vehicle of the Beach House Canteen.
They asked what his name was, and he replied that he was Mervin Natalicio. When he asked
Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not able to reply but instead told him that his attackers were
wearing masks. Oscar Salvador corroborated his testimony.
86

87

Benjamin Lato, a utility worker of the Beach House Canteen, likewise testified that the identities of
the attackers were unrecognizable because of their masks. He, however, admitted that he did not
see the attack; he just saw a man sprawled on the ground at the time of the incident.
88

Frisco Capilo, a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main Library, was buying a cigarette at a
vendor located nearby. From there, he allegedly saw the whole incident. He testified that ten (10)
men, wearing either masks of red and black bonnets or with shirts covering their faces, came from a
red car parked nearby. He also saw three (3) men being hit with lead pipes by the masked men. Two
89

(2) of the men fell after being hit. One of the victims was lifting the other to help him, but the
attackers overtook him. Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He then saw students helping those who
were injured. He likewise helped in carrying one of the injured victims, which he later found out to be
Amel Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority, Eda Panganiban, testified that she and
her friends were in line to order lunch at the Beach House Canteen when a commotion happened.
She saw around fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) masked men attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did
not see any mask fall off. Her sorority sister and another U.P. student, Luz Perez, corroborated her
story that the masked men were unrecognizable because of their masks. Perez, however, admitted
that a member of Scintilla Juris approached her to make a statement.
90

91

Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon, testified on substantially the same matters as
Panganiban and Perez. She also stated that she saw a person lying on the ground who was being
beaten up by about three (3) to five (5) masked men. She also stated that some of the men were
wearing black masks while some were wearing white t-shirts as masks. She did not see any mask
fall off the faces of the attackers.
92

According to Feliciana Feliciano, accused-appellant Danilo Feliciano, Jr.'s motlier, her son was in
Pampanga to visit his sick grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her son went to
Pampanga before lunch that day and visited the school where she teaches to get their house key
from her.
93

According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, he had not been feeling well since December 5, 1994. He
said that he could not have possibly been in U.P. on December 8, 1994 since he was absent even
from work. He also testified that he wore glasses and, thus, could not have possibly been the person
identified by Leandro Lachica. He also stated that he was not enrolled in U.P. at the time since he
was working to support himself.
94

According to Julius Victor Medalla, he and another classmate, Michael Vibas, were working on a
school project on December 8, 1994. He also claimed that he could not have participated in the
rumble as he had an injury affecting his balance. The injury was caused by an incident in August
1994 when he was struck in the head by an unknown assailant. His testimony was corroborated by
Jose Victor Santos who stated that after lunch that day, Medalla played darts with him and,
afterwards, they went to Jollibee.
95

96

Christopher Soliva, on the other hand, testified that he was eating lunch with his girlfriend and
another friend in Jollibee, Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They went back to U.P. before 1:00 p.m.
and went straight to their fraternity hang-out where he was told that there had been a rumble at the
Main Library. He also met several Sigma Rhoans acting suspiciously as they passed by the hangout. They were also told by their head, Carlo Taparan, not to react to the Sigma Rhoans and just go
home. Anna Cabahug, his girlfriend, corroborated his story.
97

98

Warren Zingapan also testified that he was not in U.P. at the time of the incident. He claimed to
have gone to SM North to buy a gift for a friend's wedding but ran into a fraternity brother. He also
alleged that some Sigma Rhoans attacked them in SM North that day.
99

On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision with the finding that Robert Michael Alvir,
Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were guilty
100

beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other
penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida,
Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag. The case against
Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension. The trial court, m
evaluating the voluminous evidence at hand, concluded that:
101

102

103

After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the considered view that of the ten accused,
some were sufficiently identified and some were not. The Court believes that out of the amorphous
images during the pandemonium, the beleaguered victims were able to espy and identify some of
the attackers etching an indelible impression in their memory. In this regard, the prosecution
eyewitnesses were emphatic that they saw the attackers rush towards them wielding deadly
weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of wood and bladed ones, and pounce on their
hapless victims, run after them, and being present with one another at the scene of the crime during
the assault. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently
behind bars, not one .of them testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were
all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could
have easily tagged each and every single accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric
assault to make sure that no one else would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named
only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered the blows
against them.
104

Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to this court
on automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal, the case was
remanded to the Court of Appeals. In the Court of Appeals, the case had to be re-raffled several
Times before it was eventually assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. for the writing of
the decision.
105

106

107

On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five, affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, with three (3) members concurring an one (1) dissenting.
108

109

110

The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this court for review.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellants attacked private complainants and caused the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this court by both parties, the issue may be
further refined, thus:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when the information
against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off; and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on the basis of
the evidence, that accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.
I
An information is sufficient
when the accused is fully

apprised of the charge against

him to enable him to prepare
his defense
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. They argue that the
prosecution should not have included the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in
the information since they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were
wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law." This includes the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty and "to be informed of the nature and accusation against him."
111

112

Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor against the accused, in
compliance with the due process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended pary; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab-ea, this court has stated that:
113

The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to

know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to
allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.
114

Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other
forms of disguise" in the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
115

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were
masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating
circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there
was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was,
therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were
being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
116

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also
not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of
one is the act of all." This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their
identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.
117

In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and
attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the
crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons
involved in the offense.
II
Findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the
appellate court, are entitled
to great weight and credence
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
given great weight and credence on review. The rationale for this was explained in People v. Daniel
Quijada, as follows:
118

Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses,
are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the
witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an
insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant
answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.
119

There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People v. Leticia Labarias, this court
stated that:
120

It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the reasonable
assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies
of the witnesses, who reveal much of themselves by their deportment on the stand. The exception
that makes the rule is where such findings arc clearly arbitrary or erroneous as when they are tainted
with bias or hostility or are so lacking in basis as to suggest that they were reached without the
careful study and perceptiveness that should characterize a judicial decision. (Emphasis supplied)
121

In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance since the presumption is always in
favor of innocence. It is only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that a conviction is
sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution and forty-two (42) witnesses for the
defense were put on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In an eighty-three (83)-page decision, the trial

court acquitted six (6) and convicted five (5) of the accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it
cannot be said that the trial court acted arbitrarily or that its decision was "so lacking in basis" that it
was arrived at without a judicious and exhaustive study of all the evidence presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great persuasive value, there is also nothing
that precludes this court from coming to its own conclusions based on an independent review of the
facts and the evidence on record.
The accused were sufficiently
identified by the witnesses for
the prosecution
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution to be credible. In its decision, the trial court stated that:
x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently behind
bars, not one testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma
Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have
easily tagged each and every accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make
sure no one would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named only one or two and some
were candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered the blows against them.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan, Dennis Gaio and Darwin Asuncion, testified to
have seen it all but they could not, and did not, disclose any name. Lachica, on the other hand, said
that he did not have the opportunity to see and identify the person who hit him in the back and
inflicted a two-inch cut. His forearm was also hit by a lead pipe but he did not see who did it.
Natalicio, one of the other three who were hospitalized, was severely beaten by three waves of
attackers totalling more than 15 but he could only name 3 of them. He added, however, that he
would be able to recognize those he saw if he would see them again. Of them, Mangrobang pointed
to at least 5 but he stressed that he did not see Zingapan, Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario, Daraoay,
Denoista, and Penalosa during the onslaught. Gaston could have named any of the accused as the
one who repeatedly hit him with a heavy pipe and stabbed him but he frankly said their faces were
covered. Like Natalicio, Fortes was repeatedly beaten by several groups but did not name any of the
accused as one of those who attacked him. The persons he identified were those leading the pack
with one of them as the assailant of Venturina, and the two others who he saw standing while he
was running away. He added that he saw some of the accused during the attack but did not know
then their names. (Emphasis supplied)
122

We agree.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of the incident," there would be slight
inconsistencies in their statements. In People v. Adriano Cabrillas, it was previously observed that:
123

124

It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying
details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe
or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different
witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed. (Emphasis
supplied)
125

According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla;

126

Natalicio was able to identify Medalla, Zingapan, and Soliva; and Fortes was able to identify
Feliciano, Medalla, and Zingapan. Their positive identification was due to the fact that they either
wore no masks or that their masks fell off.
127

128

It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a crime would endeavor
to find ways to identify the assailant so that in the event that he or she survives, the criminal could be
apprehended. It has also been previously held that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of
their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of
the assailant and body movements thereof, creates a lasting impression which cannot be easily
erased from their memory.
129

In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked assailants could have lost their masks. It
had been testified by the victims that some of the assailants were wearing masks of either a piece of
cloth or a handkerchief and that Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, and Feliciano had masks on at first but
their masks fell off and hung around their necks.
130

131

132

133

Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco Capilo during cross-examination who
observed that some of the attackers were wearing masks and some were not, thus:
Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris Fraternity?
A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were a lot of people eating in the Beach House
Canteen, and then running towards different directions, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some people were wearing masks and some were not?
A Yes, sir.

134

While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have had the presence of mind to take a
look at their assailants if they were identifiable. Their positive identification, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, must be upheld to be credible.
It has been argued that the trial court did not give Mangrobang's testimony credence while Gaston's
testimony was found to be "hazy." This argument is unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that the acquittal of the Scintilla Juris
members identified by Mangrobang "should not be. misinterpreted to mean that the tt:'.stimony of
Mangrobang was an absolute fabrication." The court went on to state that they "were exonerated
merely because they were accorded the benefit of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang,
under tumultuous and chaotic circumstances were [sic] not corroborated and their alibis, not
135

refuted." There was, therefore, no basis to say that Mangrobang was not credible; it was only that
the evidence presented was not strong enough to overcome the presumption of innocence.
136

Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered "hazy" by the trial court only with regard to
his identification of Zingapan's companion. Gaston testified that he saw Zingapan with Morano, with
Zingapan moving and Morano staying in place. Fortes, however, testified that both Zingapan and
Morano were running after him. Lachica also testified that it was Medalla, not Morano, who was with
Zingapan. Because of this confusion, the trial court found that there was doubt as to who was really
beside Zingapan. The uncertainty resulted into an acquittal for Morano. Despite this, the court still
did not" impute doubt in their testimonies that Zingapan was present at the scene.
137

Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further prove that its decision was brought
about only upon a thorough examination of the evidence presented: It accepted that there were
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victims but that these were minor and did not affect their
credibility. It ruled that "[s]uch inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not unusual 'for there is no
person with perfect faculties or senses."'
138

Evidence as part of the res

gestae may be admissible but
have little persuasive value in
this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he
interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they
were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
139

As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x." All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and
are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the
general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
140

Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
141

In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the admissibility of testimony
taken as part of res gestae, stating that:
142

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as
an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the
res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents
of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way,

res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
143

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a
startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after
the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido, however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human experience:"
144

x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference.
Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot
expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects because different
persons have different impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x
145

(Emphasis supplied)
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points
in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the
attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were
unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the
entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be
given considerably less weight than that of the victims.
The belated identification by
the victims do not detract from
their positive identification of
the appellants
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the incident to the U.P. Police or the
Quezon City Police but instead executed affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation four (4)
days after the incident gives doubt as to the credibility of their testimonies.
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera testified that on their way to the U.P. Infirmary, he interviewed
the victims who all told him they could not recognize the attackers because they were all wearing
146

masks. Meanwhile, Dr. Mislang testified to the effect that when she asked Natalicio who attacked
them, Natalicio answered that he did not know because they were masked.
147

It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case belong to rival fraternities. While this
court does not condone their archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded that there are
certain practices that are unique to fraternal organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the identities of their attackers but chose not to
disclose it without first conferring with their other fraternity brothers. This probability is bolstered by
the actions of Sigma Rho after the incident, which showed that they confronted the members of
Scintilla Juris in SM North. Because of the tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it would not have
been prudent for Sigma Rho to retaliate against the wrong fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P. Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make
the police officer or the doctor's testimonies more credible than that of the victims. It should not be
forgotten that the victims actually witnessed the entire incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer
Cabrera, and Dr. Mislang were merely relaying secondhand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident also
does not affect their credibility since most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries and
needed to recover first.
Since a fraternity moves as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait until all of
them were well enough to go to the National Bureau of Investigation headquarters in order to give
their statements.
Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the advice of their senior "brads" and their
legal counsel that they executed their sworn statements before the National Bureau of Investigation
four (4) days after the incident.
The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation instead of to the U.P.
Police was the call of their legal counsel who might have deemed the National Bureau of
Investigation more equipped to handle the investigation. This does not, however, affect the credibility
of the witnesses since they were merely following the legal advice of their counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of Investigation is better equipped than
the U.P. Police to handle the investigation of the case. As stated in the U.P. College of Economics
website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with maintaining campus security. Their station is located in
front of the College of Architecture.
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain peace and order, secure and protect lives and
property, enforce basic laws, applicable Quezon City Ordinances, and University Rules and
Regulations including policies and standards; and to perform such other functions relative to the
general safety and security of the students, employees, and residents in the U.P. Diliman Campus. x
x x. (Emphasis supplied)
148

It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P. primarily for campus security. They are by no
means an actual police force that is equipped to handle a full-blown murder investigation. Fraternityrelated violence in U.P. has also increasingly become more frequent, which might possibly have
desensitized the U.P. Police in such a way that would prevent their objectivity in the conduct of their
investigations. The victims' reliance on the National Bureau of Investigation, therefore, is
understandable.
III
Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the
victim
It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the victim. In
People v. Benjamin Peteluna, this court stated that:
149

150

It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a witness destroys the
defense of alibi and denial. Thus:
x x x. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed
with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the
least credibility or none at all and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by
the prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving
of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification[,] is inherently weak and if
uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative
evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
151

In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their attackers while the accused-appellants
merely offered alibis and denials as their defense. The credibility of the victims was upheld by both
the trial court and the appellate court while giving little credence to the accused-appellants' alibis.
There is, thus, no reason to disturb their findings.
Accused-appellants were
correctly charged with
murder, and there was
treachery in the commission
of the crime
According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellants were
correctly charged with murder. Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes and baseball bats
attacked Dennis Venturina and his companions, which resulted in Venturina's death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed against Dennis
Venturina was committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of
armed men. The appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the
commission of the offense.
It has been stated previously by this court that:
[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
152

Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz, this court stated that:

153

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected
manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For
treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution
that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. (Emphasis supplied)
154

The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, ruled that contrary to the
findings of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that although the
attack was sudden and unexpected, "[i]t was done in broad daylight with a lot of people who could
see them" and that "there was a possibility for the victims to have fought back or that the people in
the canteen could have helped the victims."
155

156

This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They
were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack
by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way
they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also
happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to
help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or
even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.

The presence of conspiracy

makes all of the accusedappellants liable for murder
and attempted murder
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the murder of
Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro
Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The appellate court, however, modified their
liabilities and found that the accused-appellants were guilty of attempted murder only against
Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased
by the attackers," it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing them and
from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not have the intent to do more than to make
them suffer pain by slightly injuring them." It also pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston
"was too shallow to have been done with an intent to kill."
157

158

159

Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.
This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the accusedappellants and the appellate court sustainedthis finding.
160

161

Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their
degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the
sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose
evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than
his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all
the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of
the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of
the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason
of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
162

The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein the
accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest
amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover, but the
others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the
moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the
presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the
seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of their
attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and
whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight physical
injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the
attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica,
Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the accusedappellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent to kill.
1wphi1

For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and the
attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and
Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note
It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is also the effect on the five other lives
whose once bright futures are now put in jeopardy because of one senseless act of bravado. There
is now more honor for them to accept their responsibility and serve the consequences of their
actions. There is, however, nothing that they can do to bring back Dennis Venturina or fully
compensate for his senseless and painful loss.
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it be the last. Perhaps this
case and many cases like it can empower those who have a better view of masculinity: one which
valorizes courage, sacrifice and honor in more life-saving pursuits.
"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of the Philippines. It colors the stories of
many who choose to expend their energy in order that our people will have better lives. Fraternity
rumbles are an anathema, an immature and useless expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a culture
that retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at dangal."
This_ kind of shameful violence must stop.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November 26,
2010 is AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla,
Christopher Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder in. Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the MODIFICATION that they be
fouhd GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136,
Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207774

June 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CARLOS ALHAMBRA y MASING, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
The Court resolves in this Resolution the appeal from the Decision dated November 28, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04949. The CA affirmed the Decision dated February
2, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite City, Branch 17, in Criminal Cases Nos. 219-05,
220-05 and 347-04, finding Carlos Alhambra y Masing (Alhambra) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of: (1) rape, as defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended; and (2)
sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, otherwise known as the
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
1

Antecedent Facts
In Criminal Case No. 220-05, Alhambra was charged for the crime of rape, in an Information, which
reads:
That on or about October 6, 2004, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his own daughter
[AAA], a minor, 17 years old, against her will and without her consent. CONTRARY TO LAW.
3

The Information in Criminal Case No. 219-05, which likewise charged Alhambra with the crime of
rape, is similarly worded except as to the date of the commission of the crime, which is during the
summer of 1999, and the age of AAA, who was then only 12 years old.
5

In Criminal Case No. 347-04, Alhambra was charged with the crime of acts of lasciviousness under
Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, in a Complaint, which reads:
That on or about October 21, 2004, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force
and intimidation and being the father of the undersigned complainant, [AAA], a minor 17 years old,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kiss her lips, neck, breast, private parts and
lay on top of the said complainant against the will and without the consent of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Alhambra entered a plea of not guilty to the charges against him. After pre-trial
conference, a joint trial on the merits ensued.
AAA is the daughter of accused-appellant Alhambra. AAA testified that, on October 6, 2004, while
she was changing her clothes inside her room, Alhambra suddenly entered her room, pushed her,
removed her undergarments, and kissed her on the neck, breasts, and vagina. At that time, AAAs
mother was not around as she was then working. AAA tried to resist her fathers advances, but the
latter overpowered her. AAA did not dare make any noise as she was afraid that her father would

harm her siblings, who at that time were just in the living room. Alhambra then inserted his penis into
AAAs vagina, while kissing her on the breast and undressing her. AAA alleged that something sticky
came out of his fathers penis and spilled on her mouth. Thereafter, Alhambra put on his clothes and
left AAA crying. Initially, AAA did not divulge to anyone what her father did to her.
In the afternoon of October 21,2004, AAA, still in her undergarments with a towel wrapped around
her body, after having taken a bath, entered her bedroom to put on clothes. To her surprise, her
father immediately followed her to her bedroom. Alhambra then removed the towel covering AAAs
body and her bra. He then started to kiss AAA on the neck. AAA cried and tried to push her father
away; she pleaded her father to stop, but her father ignored her plea. Thereupon, her father
removed her underwear, pushed her onto the bed, and kissed her on other parts of her body. Her
fathers lascivious design was interrupted when AAAs siblings suddenly returned to their house.
Alhambra then instructed AAA to get dressed, and immediately went out of the room.
AAA then got dressed and asked permission from her father to visit a nearby friend. As she got out
of their house, AAA chanced upon Senior Police Officer 2 Jesus Ubaldo (SPO2 Ubaldo) who,
together with SPO1 Roland Costales (SPO1 Costales) and two civilian agents, was in the area to
conduct a buy-bust operation. AAA then reported to them that her father was molesting her.
Thereupon, SPO2 Ubaldo and SPO1 Costales went to AAAs house and, after having informed him
of his constitutional rights, arrested Alhambra. They then went to the place of work of AAAs mother
to inform her of Alhambras arrest.
Consequently, AAA told her mother what her father had done to her. AAA told her that her father
raped her when she was 12 years old; that it happened again on October 6, 2004. That on October
21, 2004, her father sexually abused her. AAAs mother then asked her why she did not immediately
divulge her ordeal. AAA replied that she was afraid that her father would harm her and her siblings.
Upon medical examination, AAAs hymen showed deep healed lacerations, which evinces the
conclusion that "an erect penis, a finger, or a blunt instrument" had caused the lacerations, "although
it cannot be determined how many times the vagina was penetrated."
For his part, Alhambra denied the allegations against him, claiming that AAA only fabricated the
allegations against him since he wanted her to be separated from her boyfriend. He denied having
molested AAA in the summer of 1999; he claimed that he was then working at a poultry store and,
after work, he was home all of the time with his wife and children. He likewise denied having raped
AAA on October 6, 2004, claiming that he was then at home taking care of AAAs siblings. That AAA
arrived at their house on said date at around 10:00 a.m. and immediately left an hour later.
Alhambra also denied having sexually abused AAA on October 21, 2004. He claimed that he was
then resting in their house as he was sick. That he was surprised when police officers arrested him
for having molested AAA.
The RTC Ruling
On February 2, 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
7

1. Finding accused Carlos Alhambra guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 22005 of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under paragraph (1), Article 266-A in relation

to sub-paragraph (1) of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353,
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole pursuant to R.A. 9346; further, he shall indemnify private complainant, [AAA], in the
amount of []75,000.00 as civil indemnity, []75,000.00 as moral damages, and []25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
2. Finding accused Carlos Alhambra guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 34704 of the crime of sexual abuse, defined and penalized under Sec. 5 (b), R.A. 7610 and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of thirteen(13) years, nine (9)
months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen [16] years, five
(5) months, and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay a fine of
[]15,000.00 and to indemnify private complainant [AAA] in the amount of []20,000.00 as civil
indemnity, [P]15,000.00 as moral damages, and [P]15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. Acquitting accused Carlos Alhambra in Crim. Case No. 219-05 considering that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

The RTC acquitted Alhambra of the charge in Criminal Case No. 219-05 since the evidence
presented by the prosecution therein was insufficient to establish that he indeed raped her daughter,
AAA, during the summer of 1999. The RTC pointed out that "[a]n examination of the statement of
[AAA] before the police and her testimony in court shows that there was just a passing mention of
the incident complained of."
9

In convicting Alhambra of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 220-05 and of sexual abuse under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case No. 347-04, the RTC gave more credence
to the testimony of AAA, finding the same to be simple, direct and spontaneous. It appears that the
RTC convicted Alhambra of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal
Case No. 347-04 notwithstanding that the designation of the crime in the Information therein was for
acts of lasciviousness under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, considering that the
allegations therein makes out a case for sexual abuse under Section 5(b).
Unperturbed, Alhambra appealed the RTC Decision dated February 2, 2011 to the CA. In his
appeal, Alhambra pointed out that the RTC erred in finding him guilty for the crime of rape in
Criminal Case No. 220-05 since AAA is not a credible witness. He pointed out that his acquittal for
the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 219-05 seriously casts doubt on the allegations of AAA.
Moreover, he claimed that AAAs delay in reporting the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 219-05,
which supposedly happened during the summer of 1999, calls into question the credibility of AAA as
a witness. Further, Alhambra alleged that AAAs testimony is riddled with inconsistencies and, thus,
should not have been given credence by the RTC.
10

As regards Criminal Case No. 347-04, Alhambra alleged that he cannot be convicted for the crime of
sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is neither a child exploited in
prostitution nor a child subjected to other sexual abuse. He claimed that a child may only be
considered as subjected to other sexual abuse if "he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult." Considering that it was only Alhambra who sexually abused AAA,
assuming that the allegations against him are true, Alhambra claims that he cannot be convicted
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
11

The CA Ruling
On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision which affirmed the RTC
Decision dated February 2, 2011.
12

The CA ruled that Alhambras acquittal in Criminal Case No. 219-05 does not negate his criminal
liability for the charge in Criminal Case No. 220-05. It pointed out that the RTC merely acquitted
Alhambra of the charge in Criminal Case No. 219-05 since it found AAAs testimony therein
incomplete, and not because it found AAAs testimony incredible. Further, the CA opined that the
failure of AAA to immediately report the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 219-05 does not tarnish
her credibility as a witness; that the threats made by Alhambra actually prevented AAA from
reporting the incident. As regards Alhambras conviction for sexual abuse in Criminal Case No. 34704, the CA held that Alhambras claim that AAA is neither a child exploited in prostitution nor a child
subjected to other sexual abuse is untenable.
Hence, this appeal.
Both Alhambra and the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that they would no longer file with
the Court supplemental briefs, and adopted instead their respective briefs with the CA.
13

Issue
Essentially, the issue for the Courts resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision
dated February 2, 2011, which found Alhambra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape
and of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
Criminal Case No. 220-05
The crime of rape is defined under Article 266-A of the RPC, which states that:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. Rape is committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
(Emphasis ours) "The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a)
through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented."
14

Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the felony of rape is qualified when the victim is under 18 years of
age and the offender is, inter alia, a parent.
After a thorough perusal of the records of this case, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to
establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC. AAA
testified that Alhambra succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her on October 16, 2004, and,
thus, being AAAs father, is presumed to have employed force and/or intimidation. Both the lower
courts found AAAs testimony in this matter straightforward and worthy of credence.
15

It is well-settled that, in a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great
weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence
on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material
and relevant matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court
below. The Court sees no reason to depart from the foregoing rule.
16

Alhambras claim that his acquittal for the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 219-05 casts serious
doubt on AAAs credibility deserves scant consideration. The charge in Criminal Case No. 219-05 is
separate and distinct from the charge in Criminal Case No. 220-05. AAA may have given an
incomplete account of the attendant circumstances in Criminal Case No. 219-05, which resulted in
Alhambras acquittal from the charge therein, but her testimony as regards the attendant
circumstances in Criminal Case No. 220-05 is clear. There is, thus, no reason for the Court to acquit
Alhambra in Criminal Case No. 220-05 merely on the mundane reason that he was acquitted of the
charge in Criminal Case No. 219-05.
Furthermore, contrary to Alhambras insinuation, AAAs delay in filing a complaint against him, for the
alleged rape incident, which happened during the summer of 1999, cannot be taken against AAAs
claim. "[D]elay in reporting an incident of rape does not create any doubt over the credibility of the
complainant nor can it be taken against her." That it took several years before AAA was able to
divulge what Alhambra did to her during the summer of 1999 does not tarnish her credibility and the
veracity of her allegations. The threat made by Alhambra against her is sufficient reason to cow AAA
into silence, especially considering that she was just 12 years old then.
17

Moreover, the "[d]elay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily
render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather
than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is
unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant." In any case, it should be
stressed that the delay in the filing of the complaint is only with respect to the charge in Criminal
Case No. 219-05, where Alhambra was acquitted by the RTC. There was no considerable delay in
the filing of the complaint against Alhambra in Criminal Case No. 220-05. Anent the supposed
inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA, suffice it to say that "[d]iscrepancies referring only to minor
details and collateral mattersnot to the central fact of the crimedo not affect the veracity or
18

1awp++i1

detract from the essential credibility of witnesses declarations, as long as these are coherent and
intrinsically believable on the whole. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness
to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for
the crime charged. It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished,
let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony."
19

Likewise, it is highly unlikely that AAA, then only 17 years old, would feign a traumatizing experience
merely out of spite towards her father, who supposedly wanted to separate her from her boyfriend.
No sane girl would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and
subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to
seek justice for the wrong done to her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity. The weight of such testimony may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary or
indubitable proof that the accused could not have committed the rape, but in the absence of such
countervailing proof, the testimony shall be accorded utmost value.
20

Against AAAs testimony, Alhambra was only able to proffer the defense of denial and alibi. The
Court has time and time again ruled that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses as these are
self-serving.
Criminal Case No. 347-04
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides that:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
yeas of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
xxxx
Sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements: (1) the accused
commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years old.
21

The prosecution was able to establish Alhambras criminal liability under Section 5(b), ArticleIII of
R.A. No. 7610. First, AAA testified that on October 21, 2004, whilst clad only in towel after having
taken a bath, her father forcibly removed her towel covering her body, kissed her on the neck,

removed her undergarments, and kissed her on the other parts of her body. Second, Alhambra used
his moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter AAA to consummate his lascivious design.
Third, AAA was only 17 years old when the said incident happened. Alhambras assertion that he is
not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child
engaged in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse is plainly without merit. The law covers
not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through
coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. A child is deemed subjected to "other
sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult. As established by the prosecution, Alhambra was only able to consummate his lascivious
design towards AAA through coercion and with the use of his influence over the latter as her father.
1wphi1

22

Imposable Penalties
As regards Criminal Case No. 220-05, the Court finds the same to be consistent with Article 266-B of
the RPC, which pertinently provides that the death penalty shall be imposed "[w]hen the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent x x x." In view of the foregoing, the
lower courts correctly imposed upon Alhambra the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the eligibility
of parole, in lieu of the death penalty, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346.
23

In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court affirms the award of P75,000.00 as moral
damages andP75,000.00 as civil indemnity. Further, the presence of the aggravating circumstance
of relationship entitles the offended party to exemplary damages. Thus, the Court also affirms the
award for exemplary damages, but, pursuant to established jurisprudence, in the amount
of P30,000.00 up from the P25,000.00 fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Likewise, the Court
deems it proper to modify the penalty imposed upon Alhambra in Criminal Case No. 347-04. Under
Section 5(b), Article III, of R.A. No. 7610, the penalty for sexual abuse performed on a child under 18
years old but over 12 years old under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua. The lower courts failed to consider the alternative
circumstance of relationship against Alhambra as an aggravating circumstance; that Alhambra is the
father of AAA was sufficiently established. Since there is an aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua.
Alhambra shall likewise not be eligible for parole. Besides, Section 31 of R.A. No. 7610 expressly
provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is, inter alia,
the parent of the victim.
24

25

26

27

The Court finds no error in the accessory penalties imposed by the CA upon Alhambra in Criminal
Case No. 347-04. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, Alhambra is liable to pay AAA the amounts
of P15,000.00 as fine,P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P15,000.00 as moral damages. In view of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the amount of P15,000.00 as
exemplary damages is also appropriate.
28

29

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, the Court imposes interest on all monetary awards
for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until
fully paid.
30

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED. The

Decision dated November 28, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04949 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. 220-05, the award of exemplary damages in
the amount of 25,000.00 is increased to 30,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 347-04, accused-appellant

Carlos Alhambra y Masing is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole. Accused-appellant Carlos Alhambra y Masing is likewise ordered to pay interest
on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this Resolution until fully satisfied.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207763

June 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO RONDINA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision dated September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CEB CR-HC No. 00594, affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Rolando Rondina
(Rondina) on September 13, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 99-2293 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Basey, Samar, Branch 30 for the crime of simple rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
and the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, civil indemnity of P50,000.00, and moral
damages of P50,000.00.
1

Factual Antecedents
On December 15, 1998, an information was filed against Rondina charging him of rape, as follows:
3

The undersigned Public Prosecutor, based upon the sworn complaint of victim [AAA] hereby,
accuses ROLANDO RONDINA, alias "Lando", of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
4

That on or about the 30th day of August, 1998, about 12:00 oclock noon, at Barangay [XXX],
Municipality of [YYY], Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and lustful intent and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with one [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Rondina was arraigned on February 8, 1999, and he pleaded "not guilty." Trial ensued, with the
prosecution presenting three witnesses, namely, AAA, the victim, BBB, AAAs grandmother, and
Teodulo Gultian (Captain Gultian), Barangay Captain of XXX, town of YYY in Samar, and a first
cousin of AAAs grandfather. The testimony of Dr. Francis Gerald Mijares (Dr. Mijares), the attending
physician who examined AAA, was dispensed with upon the parties stipulation that AAA submitted
herself to medical examination a week after the incident. Rondina testified alone for his defense.
According to the prosecution, the rape happened in this manner: Sometime around noon of August
30, 1998, AAA, allegedly only 14 years old, lay awake beside a wall of their house while her 1-year-

old sister was sleeping next to her. She heard a noise coming from the kitchen, and suddenly
Rondina was on top of her. Poking a knife at her chest, he warned her not to tell her parents, stuffed
her mouth with a face towel, and quickly removed her shorts and underwear. He then inserted his
penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement, keeping at this for a "long time." AAA felt
pain in her organ, and just before he finished, she felt him discharge something inside her. He pulled
out his penis, and she noticed blood oozing from her vagina. He sat beside her while she remained
supine and crying. At that exact moment, BBB entered the house and overheard Rondina and AAA
talking in a low voice. In the kitchen, she was surprised to see AAA and Rondina on the floor still
naked from the waist down. She angrily demanded to know what they were doing, but AAA said
nothing and just cried, still in terror of Rondina, as the latter quickly put on his clothes and ran out
through the kitchen. At first, BBB told no one what she saw that day, having been kept busy in the
farm. But the next day, she told CCC, AAAs mother, and two days later, after AAA had left for
Tacloban where she worked as a laundrywoman, CCC and BBB sought the help of Captain Gultian,
who advised them to get a medical report on AAA.
6

On September 7, 1998, CCC brought AAA to the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center in
Tacloban City, where she was attended by Dr. Mijares. His medical certificate showed the following
results:
9

P.E. Findings:
= Negative pertinent P.E. Findings
Ob-Gyne findings:
= Pelvic exam
external genitalia - grossly normal
introitus - nulliparous
hymen - intact, elastic, open
vagina - admits one (1) examining finger with ease
Speculum exam:
cervix - small, pinkish
(+) scanty whitish discharge
= Internal exam:
cervix - close, non-tender on wriggling
uterus - small
adnexae - (-) masses, tenderness

Laboratory results:
UCG negative
Grams stain result: Grams (+) rods = +++
e. cells = ++
REMARKS:
CONCLUSIONS: 1. The above[-]described physical injuries are found in the body of the
subject the age of which is compatible to the alleged date of infliction.
xxxx
On September 9, 1998, AAA, accompanied by CCC and Captain Gultian, executed a complaint
affidavit before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) charging Rondina with rape. On
September 17, 1998, Rondina was arrested on a warrant.
The version of the defense paints a lovers tryst. According to Rondina, 24 years old, a laborer in a
rice mill, he met AAA on August 10, 1998 at a benefit dance held during their town fiesta. They
danced three times to slow music, and in the course of the evening she agreed to be his sweetheart.
He visited her several times at home, and each time her parents were around. On August 29, 1998,
a Saturday, at around 7:00 p.m., Rondina again saw AAA, and it was then that he broached an
"intimate" proposal to her. She agreed, but told him to come back at noon the next day since her
parents would be away in the farm. Rondina returned as agreed, and AAA herself opened the door.
AAA led him to the kitchen, and there the lovers lost no time kissing and caressing each other. AAA
took off her bra and shorts, and Rondina also took off his shorts. Rondina insisted that he and AAA
still had their underwear on when BBB arrived just when they were about to commence the sexual
act. He denied that he used a towel and a knife to facilitate the rape.
10

BBB caught them half-naked, and she angrily demanded, "birat ano hin pagbuhat niyo hito?" ("why
did you do it?"). But AAA just cried, while Rondina quickly arose and feebly tried to explain that he
and AAA already had an understanding. BBB refused to be pacified and Rondina had to leave. He
put on his shorts and exited through the kitchen. Believing that he committed no crime, Rondina was
surprised when the police came to his rented house and arrested him on September 16, 1998. He
also claimed that Captain Gultian tried to extort money from him.
11

12

13

On September 13, 2004, after three changes in the presiding judge, the last judge, Honorable Jovito
C. Abarquez, having personally observed only the demeanor and testimonies of Captain Gultian and
of Rondina but not those of the complainant and her grandmother, the RTC rendered judgment
against Rondina, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding accused
ROLANDO RONDINA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353
and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant, [AAA], in the amount of Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and moral damages in the amount of Php 50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

14

On October 4, 2004, Rondina filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court, but conformably to this
Courts decision in People v. Mateo, the Court transferred the case to the CA for intermediate
review. At the CA, Rondina raised a lone error, to wit: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
[RONDINA] OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
15

16

On September 27, 2012, the CA affirmed the conviction of Rondina, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 13 September 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), 8th Judicial Region, Branch 30, Basey, Samar, in Criminal Case No. 99-2293, finding
accused-appellant Rolando Rondina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects except that he is further ORDERED to pay AAA interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

17

The case is again with this Court on automatic final review, and meanwhile, Rondina has been in
detention since 1998.
Ruling of the Court
This Court votes to acquit the accused.
Discussion
The crime of rape is now found in
Article 266-A of the RPC
R.A. No. 8353, known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997," was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos on September 30, 1997 and took effect on October 22, 1997, becoming Article 266-A to 266D of Title VIII of the RPC under Crimes Against Persons. Providing for a broader definition of rape, it
reclassified rape from a Crime Against Chastity to a Crime Against Persons. Article 266-A of the RPC
now reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Throughout our recorded history, rape has been invariably regarded with unmitigated odium, and
meted the highest penalties allowed in our statute books. By its very nature, a charge of rape must
be resolved by giving primordial consideration to the credibility of the victims testimony, since
conviction may be solely based thereon, provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things. For when a woman says she was raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. So if her testimony meets the
test of credibility, conviction may issue on the basis thereof.
18

19

20

The constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused demands no less than a moral certainty
of his guilt free of reasonable doubt. Moreover, the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its
own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The
testimony of the victim must be scrutinized with utmost caution, and unavoidably, her own credibility
must also be put on trial.
21

The Supreme Court as the court of last resort is obligated to conduct a comprehensive and
extensive assessment of a conviction for rape, and in the Courts review of the decisions of the RTC
and the CA, the Court has followed the oft-cited guiding principles, to wit:
22

A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences both for the accused and the
complainant, so that utmost care must be taken in the review of a decision involving conviction of
rape. Thus, the Court has consistently adhered to the following guiding principles, to wit: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility, while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more
difficult for the accused, albeit innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only
two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme care; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must succeed or fail on its
own merits, and cannot be allowed to derive strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. Corollary to the above principle is the rule that the credibility of the victim is always the
single most important issue in the prosecution of a rape case. (Citations omitted)
23

The elements of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the offender is a man
who had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force or
intimidation upon her; or she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or she is under 12
years of age or is demented. The RTC and the CA both found that AAAs testimony clearly
established that Rondina had sexual intercourse with her without her consent and against her will;
that to satisfy his lust, he employed force and threats. There being only one witness to her harrowing
experience, it behooves this Court to go over AAAs testimony anew in detail:
[PROSECUTOR AGERICO A. AVILA:]
Q Do you recall where were you around 12:00 oclock noon of August 30, 1998?
A I was in the house.

Q And where is your house located?

A Along the side of the road.
Q What barangay, municipality and province?
A Brgy. [XXX], [YYY], Samar.
Q Who were with you in the house at that time?
A My one[-]year[-]old sister.
Q Who else were there in the house aside from you and your younger sister?
A Only the two (2) of us.
Q Why, where were your father and your mother then?
A They were in the mountain.
xxxx
Q While you.... where were you particularly situated while you were lying down?
A I was near the wall of the house.
Q So, while you were near the wall of your house lying down, do you recall of any incident that
transpired? What happened if any?
A I heard a noise which noise came from a bamboo.
Q From what bamboo did the noise come from?
A Near the kitchen.
xxxx
Q So, after hearing the sound of the bamboo, what did you observe next if any?
A He placed himself on top of me.
Q You said he. A person? Did you understand the question?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And did you know the person who went on top of you?
A No.

Q But, would you be able to recognize this person if you will see him again?
A Yes.
xxxx
Q After the person whom you pointed in Court went on top of you, what did he do to you?
A He poked a knife at me and placed a face towel inside my mouth.
xxxx
Q To what part of the body was the knife pointed to?
A On my chest.
xxxx
Q So, after this person you pointed to in Court pointed a knife and placed a hand towel in your
mouth, did he say anything?
A He said, "Dont tell your father and mother because if you will tell them, I will kill you."
Q After he uttered those words, what did he do next if any?
A After uttering those words, he took off my shorts and underwear.
Q After taking off your shorts and your underwear, what did he do next if any?
A He inserted his penis into my organ.
Q So, when he inserted his penis to your organ, what did you feel if any?
A I felt pain.
Q So, while his penis was inside your organ, what did he do?
A He was making push and pull actions.
Q For how long in your estimate did he do his push and pull action?
A A long time.
xxxx
Q What did you notice in your organ when he made the push and pull movement?
A I was feeling pain.

Q Did you notice if he discharged anything in your organ?

A Yes.
Q And what did you notice?
A There was a blood.
Q When did you notice this blood coming from you?
A After he finished.
Q When he finished, what did he do?
A He sat in my side.
Q How about you, what did you do?
A I was crying.
Q So, while he was sitting by your side, what happened if any?
A My grandmother arrived.
xxxx
Q Where was Rolando Rondina when your grandmother arrived?
A He was on my side.
Q Left or right side?
A Right side.
Q Did he already put his pants on when your grandmother arrived?
ATTY. MARIO NICOLASORA
Leading, Your Honor.
xxxx
A Yes.
PROS. AVILA
Q What was he wearing at that time?

A He was wearing short pants.

Q Was he with an underwear?
A Yes.
ATTY. NICOLASORA
The question is leading. COURT
GO AHEAD. DID HE TAKEOFF HIS UNDERWEAR?
A Yes.
PROS. AVILA
Q While this accused was sitting beside you, was he still naked at that time?
ATTY. NICOLASORA
We object, leading. COURT
LET THE WITNESS ANSWER. PROS. AVILA
A Yes.
Q So, when your grandmother arrived, what did the accused do?
A He ran towards the kitchen.
Q What did your grandmother do when she arrived in your house?
A My grandmother asked me, "[AAA], who was that?"
Q What did you answer?
A I did not answer because I was afraid that he might kill me.
Q Going back when he removed his underwear. After removing his underwear, what did he do next if
any?
A He placed his penis inside my organ.
Q Before that, did he what did he do to your legs if any?
ATTY. NICOLASORA
Leading, Your Honor.

COURT
SUSTAINED.
PROS. AVILA
Q Before he inserted his organ to your organ, what did he do to you?
ATTY. NICOLASORA
Assuming that the accused [did] something.
COURT
LET THE WITNESS ANSWER.
PROS. AVILA
A Immediately after taking off his short pants and underwear, he placed himself on top of me and
placed his organ inside my organ.
Q What was your position?
A I was prostrate.
Q How about the person whom you pointed to, what was his position when he inserted his penis
inside your organ?
A He was on top of me.
Q All the time while he was making the push and pull movement, where was the knife all the while?
A On my chest.
Q It was on your chest all the while until he finished?
A No.
Q So sometimes, where would he placed his knife?
A It was no longer on my chest.
Q Do you know the accused personally?
A I dont know him.
Q So, how were you able to identify him?

A I could hear his name from other persons.

Q Why, where is he a resident of?
A He is living with Tiying.
Q Do you know the surname of this Tiying?
A I dont know the surname.
Q In what barangay is the accused living?
A I dont know where he is a resident of.
Q How about this Tiying, where does he resides?
A In Brgy. [XXX]
Q Since you did not inform your grandmother about the incident, who was the first person whom you
informed?
A I did not tell anybody.
Q So, how come that you were able to file a Complaint?
A Because I told my mother about the incident just before I left for Tacloban.
Q How long was that after the incident?
A I cannot remember.
Q How many days after the incident before you went to Tacloban?
A About two (2) days.
Q What was your purpose in going to Tacloban?
A Because when the incident happened, I was working in Tacloban.
xxxx
Q Did you go to the house of the Brgy. Chairman?
A Only my mother went there.
Q With respect to this case, did you submit yourself for medical check-up?
A Yes, Sir.

Q Where?
A In Tacloban.
xxxx
[CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. NICOLASORA]
Q At that time of incident at 12:00 noon of August 30, 1998, the windows and door of your house
were opened?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You mean, all the windows were opened?
A Yes.
Q There is a house located on the right side of your house?
A Yes.
Q Will you please try to tell us whose house is that?
A Ging-Ging.
Q If you are in your house, you could see it directly?
COURT:
YOU HAVE NOT SPECIFIED THE DISTANCE.
ATTY. NICOLASORA
Q How far is the distance of the house located on the right side of your house?
A From where I am sitting, up to that wall of the Chamber, which is about two (2) meters.
COURT:
DO YOU KNOW ARMS LENGTH? HOW MANY ARMS LENGTH?
A Two (2) arms length.
ATTY. NICOLASORA
Q Immediately before the incident, you noticed that the windows near your house were opened?
COURT:

WHETHER THERE WAS A WINDOW ON THE RIGHT SIDE.

ATTY. NICOLASORA
Q On the right side of your house, does the house nearest you [have] a window?
A No, Sir.
Q To the left side, is there a window?
A Yes.
Q How far is your house to that house?
A About two (2) arms length.
Q Who lives in this house?
A I dont know who owns the house.
Q Did you notice if there were persons before the incident happened?
A I did not notice.
Q Is there a house at the back of your house?
A None, Sir.
Q How about on the front portion of your house, is there a house?
A None.
Q Would you agree with me that there are number of houses located in your house aside from the
left and right houses?
PROS. AVILA
Vague, Your Honor.
ATTY. NICOLASORA
Q Aside from these two (2) houses located on the left and right side of your house, are there other
houses in the immediate vicinity?
A There are other houses.
xxxx

Q There are a number of people living within the vicinity?

A Yes.
xxxx
Q Alright, at 12:00 oclock noon of August 30, 1998?
A There was none.
xxxx
Q At 12:00 oclock noon, am I correct that you heard a sound of bamboo in your kitchen?
A Yes.
xxxx
Q When for the first time did you notice a person in your house on August 30, 1998?
COURT:
SHE NOTICED A PERSON WHEN HE WAS ALREADY LYING DOWN ON HER AND POKING A
KNIFE ON HER.
ATTY. NICOLASORA
Q Before the incident, you have not seen that person who laid on top of you?
COURT:
IMMEDIATELY BEFORE?
ATTY. NICOLASORA
Prior to the incident. A No, Sir.
Q So, you were lying prostrate on the flooring of your house allegedly when the incident transpired?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You were looking directly upward when the incident transpired?
A Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q You did not see what was actually placed inside your organ?

A No.
Q You did not sustain any injury during the incident?
A No.
Q You said during your direct examination that after he laid on top of you, he seated on your right
side?
A Yes.
Q He stayed there for a long period of time?
A Yes.
Q While he was sitting on your right side, he did not do anything to you?
A He did nothing.
Q Am I correct to say, to hear from you during the direct examination, you did not tell your
grandmother anything about the incident?
A Yes.
Q And when she arrived at your house, she did not do anything?
A Yes.
ATTY. NICOLASORA
That will be all, Your Honor. COURT:
RE-DIRECT?
PROS. AVILA
xxxx
Q You said you did not sustain any injury during the incident. Where did the blood come from?
A From my organ.
Q After the incident while he was sitting along side with you, did he try to converse with you?
A No.
xxxx

COURT:
ALRIGHT, CLARIFICATORY.
Q After he took out his organ from your organ, what did you do with your panty and short pants?
A I put my underwear and short pants on.
Q You said that while he was sitting beside you, he was still naked?
A Yes.
Q Was he still naked when your grandmother arrived?
A Yes.
Q So, when he ran to your kitchen, he was still naked?
A Yes.
Q What did he do with his pants and brief?
A He took it with him.
Q When you said you told your mother what happened to you, whom did you mention? You said you
told your mother what happened, what did you tell?
A I said, "Nay, I was raped by Lando."
Q So, before Lando raped you, you knew his name already?
A Yes, I was familiar with his name because I could hear his name from other persons.
Q And this Lando you are referring to is the person you pointed to before?
A Yes.
Q And he is the person you referred to, whom your mother understood?
A Yes.
Q Your mother knew this Lando already?
A No.
Q When you told your mother about this Lando, did your mother already know this Lando?
A Yes, because she could hear his name from other persons.

Q When you told your mother, you proceeded to Tacloban, while your mother went to the Brgy.
Chairman?
A My mother told the Brgy. Chairman the next day.
Q But you proceeded to Tacloban?
A Yes.
Q But your mother went to Tacloban for your medical check-up?
A Yes.
x x x x. (Emphasis ours)
24

According to the appellate court, AAAs testimony says it all and bears the hallmarks of truth, that her
positive identification of Rondina was made with moral certainty and thus sufficient to convict him,
and that considering AAAs age, it was hard to believe that she could have concocted such an
ignominious tale, told in a guileless and straightforward manner, unless it was the truth.
The Court disagrees.
The victims narration is
inconsistent with the physical
evidence of the supposed rape by a
stranger
It has been held that when the victims testimony is corroborated by the physicians finding of
penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of
carnal knowledge; that laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration. The Court, however, finds no physical evidence of sexual penetration and no
corroboration of other vital details in AAAs narration of the rape.
25

At the outset, it must be stated that Dr. Mijares medical report was not testified to, and therefore it is
at best a hearsay evidence. At the hearing scheduled on October 17, 2001, Dr. Mijares appeared,
after several subpoenas and warnings from the court, but instead of presenting him to be examined
on his medical report on the alleged rape of AAA, Prosecutor Filotea Estorninos manifested that she
was dispensing with his testimony provided the defense agreed to the prosecutions offer of
stipulation that AAA submitted herself to medical examination one week after the alleged rape, to
which the defense acceded. Nonetheless, even granting it to be admissible, the report clearly
shows that AAA suffered no lacerations in her hymen, whether recent or healed and whether deep or
superficial, nor other similar injuries consistent with violent sexual assault. AAAs hymen is described
as "intact, elastic, open," and the report nowhere indicates that she is in a non-virgin state. The
report carries a pre-typed conclusion that "[t]he above[-]described physical injuries are found in the
body of the subject the age of which is compatible to the alleged date of infliction," but being a mere
pro-forma printed statement, the "conclusion" serves only to further render the report of mere
hearsay value.
1wphi1

26

It is true that the absence of lacerated wounds in AAAs vagina does not negate sexual
intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, considered the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence
of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the
context used in the RPC, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse,
does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. But when
the victim says that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina and pushed and pulled inside her
"for a long time," and she felt pain and blood oozed from her organ, the stark absence of any vaginal
tear or laceration will have to be medically explained, or else, the Court is left with no inference other
than that the charge of rape may have been a mere fabrication.
27

28

The scenario created by the prosecution is that of a barrio maiden whose purity was being forcibly
assailed in a sudden attack, and the attacker is a stranger, one who naturally has no demands upon
the victims affections nor exercises moral ascendancy over her. It thus beggars belief that without
putting up a resistance, AAA just lay still on her back and mutely suffered the shame and pain of her
repeated violation by Rondina. She did not even raise a shout or a whimper, yet it was noonday, the
windows and doors of her house were open, there were people within a few arms length in the
vicinity, and her grandmother BBB lived just a house away. After her attacker had fled, still she raised
no outcry.
In People v. Dizon, the accused had a gun and he threatened to kill the victim, but she vigorously
resisted and tried to stop the sexual assault; she kicked and pushed the accused away to prevent
him from consummating his lustful desire; she screamed for help, although no one came. In this
appeal, the medico legal report found no external injuries whatsoever sustained by AAA, indicating
that she did not resist. Yet from her testimony, her hands were unrestrained, and although Rondina
poked a knife at her in the beginning, he later laid it beside her.
29

30

Unbelievably, too, despite the threat of injury or death, and with her mouth stuffed with a towel as her
attacker forcibly entered her repeatedly, AAA could still take notice that Rondina ejaculated inside
her. With such mental sangfroid, one wonders how AAA could have failed to devise any resistance.
Significantly, too, the Court finds it curious that AAA completely overlooked making any further
mention of the knife and towel used by Rondina. She was absolutely sure he used a knife to
threaten her, and then both she and BBB testified that he stuffed AAAs mouth with a face towel to
gag her. Yet they told nothing of the whereabouts of these objects, and neither AAA nor BBB saw
Rondina leave the house with the knife and towel. If then Rondina left them behind in the house,
where are these vital evidence? Towards the end of her testimony, BBB made an unbidden mention
of the towel stuffed into AAAs mouth when she saw her, but this was an obvious concoction, since
she did say that in the sala, she first overheard them talking softly in the kitchen. Also, upon seeing
them half naked in the kitchen, she immediately demanded from AAA what they had done. Why
would she ask her if she already saw AAA gagged with a towel? Incidentally, the RTC noted that
AAAs minority has not been established by any documentary or other evidence, nor even alleged in
the information.
31

32

AAA made contradictory claims

that rendered her chief testimony
doubtful.
In addition to the inconsistencies this Court has already noted, AAA lied during her testimony on
June 7, 1999, 10 months after the alleged incident, when she was asked if she knew the man who

suddenly sprung and laid on top of her. She answered with an emphatic "No," and when pressed
further she said she would recognize him if she saw him again. But in her complaint-affidavit which
she executed on September 9, 1998 at the NBI, she admitted that in fact she knew him.
Q Do you know LANDO personally?
A Yes.
Q How did you know him?
A He is residing in our Barangay.

33

AAA also admitted as much when she said she told her mother, "Nay, I was raped by Lando." The
medicolegal report itself states that she was being examined for alleged rape "by a known person."
For "Lando" was not a stranger, being a resident in the same barriofor one year already, whose
rented house was a mere 20 meters away from AAAs. AAA admitted that she had heard his name
from the neighbors,and that she knew that he lived in the house of Tiying, another barangay
resident.
34

35

Also, AAA testified that when BBB arrived and Rondina ran away (although BBB twice mentioned
that he walked out), BBB asked her, "[AAA], who was that?" But having first overheard them talking
in a low voice, and later seeing AAA and Rondina half-naked, BBBs natural reaction would logically
have been to exclaim, as the accused claimed in his testimony, "birat ano hin pagbuhat niyo hito?" or
"why did you do it!"
36

Then, AAA said that as soon as Rondina was through raping her, she put her shorts back on, and
when BBB arrived, Rondina fled; but BBB said she saw AAA on her back half-naked and talking
softly to Rondina. BBB likewise executed an affidavit stating that upon seeing her, Rondina took to
flight; but in her testimony, BBB corrected the defense lawyer who tried to get her to repeat what she
said. The counsel said, "He went out of the kitchen door and went outside the house of [CCC]," but
BBB clarified that "he walked". A little later, she repeated that he walked.
37

38

39

The testimony of BBB only

bolstered the story of Rondina
The RTC and the CA relied heavily on BBBs testimony, and this Court is reproducing pertinent
portions thereof:
[PROS. FILOTEA M. ESTORNINOS]
Q You said you are residing in [XXX] and [CCC] is also residing in [XXX], how far or how close is the
house of [CCC] to your house?
A One house away from my house.
Q On August 30, 1998 at about 12:00 noon, can you still recall where were you then?
A At that time[,] I was about to visit my daughter [CCC].

Q Were you in fact visit the house of [CCC]?

A Yes, I went upstairs.
Q When you went upstairs[,] were you able to get inside the house?
A Yes.
Q Why, is there no [shutter] of the door?
A It was open when I arrived.
Q When you arrived what did you see if ever?
A I saw Lando.
Q Who is this Lando you are referring to?
A That one. ([W]itness pointing to a person when asked his name answers to the name Lando).
Q What was Lando doing when you saw him?
A When I arrived[,] I saw him by the side of [AAA].
Q How did you observe him?
A He was naked from the waist down.
Q How about your granddaughter [AAA], have you seen [her]?
A Yes, I saw [her].
Q Where was she?
A She was lying beside him.
Q You said Lando was beside [AAA,] what was the position of Lando when you saw him?
A He was sitting down.
Q What happened when you went inside the house and you saw Lando?
A When I arrived at the house hewas already beside [AAA].
Q When you went inside the house you saw Lando, what did he do?
A When I saw him he went down.

Q Where did he pass through?

A By the door of the kitchen.
Q How about you where did you enter when you went inside the house?
A At the front door.
Q When Lando left through the kitchen door and you said he was naked[,] what did he do with
respect to his clothings?
A He was holding his short pants when he went out.
Q When you said naked what do you mean by naked?
A He was naked from the waist down without any clothing, he was holding his brief and short pants.
Q What did you do when you saw Lando in that particular situation?
A I asked [AAA] what was that all about and she said nothing.
Q What was the demeanor of [AAA] when you asked her?
A She was crying.
Q For how long did you stay in that house of [CCC]?
A Not very long.
Q Why?
A Because I already asked her what had happened.
Q How about you[,] what did you feel as a grandmother when you saw Lando and [AAA] in that
particular situation?
A I got mad because he did something bad to my granddaughter.
Q Who is this person as you claim when you saw?
A Lando.
Q Do you know his family name?
A I forgot his family name.
Q Is he a native of Brgy. [XXX]?

A He lives there but he isnot [from] that place.

Q With whom is he living in Brgy. [XXX]?
A He lives in the house of Remedios.
Q Do you know a person by the name of Teying?
A He is the son of Remedios.
Q How about [AAA] at the time you saw her, what was the condition of the body of [AAA] when you
first saw her?
A She was naked from the waist down.
Q When you went up[,] what did [AAA] do?
A She was crying.
Q How about her clothing[,] what did she do?
A It was on her waist.
Q And when you asked her[,] was she still naked when you asked her what is that?
A Yes.
Q Was she able to put on something on the lower portion of her body after you asked her?
A Yes she was able to put on her underwear.
Q As you said you got mad at Lando as he did something bad to your granddaughter what did you
do if any?
A I asked [AAA] what was that all about and she said nothing and she was crying.
Q How about [CCC,] did you talk with [CCC] with respect to what you have seen?
A Yes in the morning.
Q You mean to say the following day?
A Yes.
Q Why did it take you to tell [CCC] on the following morning what you have seen?
A Because I have so many obligation to do considering that we are only farmer.

Q When you told [CCC] about what happened to your granddaughter, what did you and [CCC] do?
A We went to the Brgy. Captain.
xxxx
ATTY. NICOLASORA [On cross-examination]
Q When you arrived in the house of [AAA] you saw [AAA] lying naked is that correct?
A Yes.
Q What was her position[,] was she face up or was she lying on her side?
A Lying face up.
Q For the first time that you saw [AAA], you did not see her crying?
A She was already crying because she was already half-naked.
Q Before you enter[ed] the house of your daughter [CCC] on August 30, 1998 at 12:00 oclock, you
did not heard [sic] any sound emanating from the house?
A I did not hear any sound only two of them inside.
Q When you first saw Lando[,] he was just sitting beside AAA?
A Yes.
Q They were talking small voice?
xxxx
A Yes, they were talking to each other.
Q But you were not able to hear the voice[,] what they were talking?
A No, because they were talking secretly[sic].
Q At the time you saw Lando[,] you were surprised why he was naked below? [sic]
A Yes.
Q You could hardly speak at that time when you first saw Lando naked below?
A I was not able to say anything because I was surprised.
Q It was only at that time when Lando saw you and bringing along with him his brief and pants?

A Yes.
Q He went out of the kitchen door and went outside the house of [CCC].
A He walked.
xxxx
PROS. ESTORNINOS [on re-direct]
Q Please tell the Court whether you have seen them talking?
A Yes[,] they were talking.
Q Why do you say that they were talking?
A Because I could hear them talking.
Q And when Lando pick[ed] up his pants and brief, he ran or walk slowly?
A He walked in going the door.
PROS. ESTORNINOS
That is all your honor.
COURT
Q You said Lando and [AAA] were talking, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Did you hear what Lando was talking?
A No, because he is talking in a low voice.
Q When Lando saw [you, he] immediately went out by the door of the kitchen?
A Yes.
Q Why did you say now that Lando was [stuffing] something in the mouth of [AAA] and poking
[bladed] weapon on her?
A Because [AAA] could not shout because the face towel was on her mouth.
Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes[,] I am sure about that. (Emphases ours)
40

The RTC summarized BBBs testimony as follows:

During the cross-examination, said witness [BBB] averred that when she arrived in the house[,]
[AAA]was lying half[-]naked and with face up crying. That she did not hear any sound when she
entered the house and Lando was sitting beside [AAA] and they were talking to each other, but she
was unable to hear what they were talking [about] because they were talking secretly and she was
surprised and could not say anything when she first saw Lando.
In the re-direct examination, [BBB] claimed that she saw Lando and [AAA] talking to each other
because she could hear them talking and further averred that accused just walked in going to the
door after picking [up] his pants and brief. And in the courts clarificatory questions, [BBB] contended
that Lando and [AAA] were talking to each other but she could not hear what Lando was talking
about because he was talking in a low voice x x x." (Emphasis ours)
41

While the natural reaction of a rape victim would have been to make an outcry after the danger to
her had passed, the truth is BBB saw no towel stuffed in AAAs mouth, and in fact there was no
need to gag AAA because, as she herself admitted, throughout her ordeal, she chose to just cry
quietly. BBB admitted that she initially overheard her granddaughter talking with Lando in a low
voice, or "secretly," which could only have meant that they both desired to avoid discovery. It is also
important to mention that BBB saw no knife either beside AAA or in the hand of Rondina as he
walked out.
42

The victims and her familys

actuations after the alleged rape
defy logic and ordinary experience
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that a womans conduct immediately after the alleged
assault is of critical value in gauging the truth of her accusations. One important test is that it must
coincide with logic and experience. If indeed she was raped, AAAs utter failure not only to resist
Rondinas advances but also to shout for help before, during or after the rape are truly baffling, and
defy the ordinary standards of human behavior. A stranger suddenly materialized who obviously had
unholy intentions, he quickly placed himself on top of her and raped her, yet AAA did not shout for
help, knowing that the neighbors were just nearby. Incomprehensibly, too, after the dastardly rape,
which went on for a "long time," AAA stayed half naked and supine, and with her face looking up she
carried on a hushed conversation with her supposed attacker, who just sat still beside her, also halfnaked like her. While a rape victim is not expected to resist until death, it is contrary to human
experience that AAA did not even make an outcry or put up a resistance, particularly since
throughout her ordeal, her hands were free of restraint, and Rondinas knife lay by her side most of
the time, if indeed he had a knife. The neighbors were just a few arms length nearby, and her
granduncle was the barangay captain, so after Rondina fled, AAA had no more reason to still be
afraid. Yet AAA did not even tell her mother the first night, or the next night, choosing instead to
return to her employer in
43

44

45

Tacloban two days later rather than report the incident. It has been held that "the victim's instant
willingness, as well as courage, to face interrogation and medical examination could be a mute but
eloquent proof of the truth of her claim." But as the R TC noted, it was BBB, not AAA, who told CCC
the next day. The second morning, she and CCC went to the barangay hall. BBB' s delay in telling
CCC defies logic, she merely saying she was busy farming. The barangay chief was a first cousin
of her husband, and CCC' s uncle, yet she and CCC waited two days to report the rape incident.
46

47

48

Conclusion
A most regrettable outrage was committed upon the family's name and honor. This is clear from
BBB' s fury when she exclaimed, "Birat ano hin pagbuhat niyo hito?" Unfortunately, there is less
evidence than the modicum demanded by law to build a case for rape. The Court has a duty, and it
is to set the accused free.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Rolando Rondina is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of simple
rape. His immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ordered, unless he is being held for another
lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation, who is then directed to report to this Court the action
he has taken within five (5) days from his receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207664

June 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GIL SALVIDAR y GARLAN, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 04989 affirming, albeit with modification as to the wordings of one of the penalties
imposed, the Decision dated April 11, 2011 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 120 in Criminal Case Nos. C-78532-33, convicting Gil Salvidar y Garlan (accused-appellant)
for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
1

Factual Antecedents
The informations filed before the RTC against the accused-appellant partially read as follows:
CRIM CASE NO. 78532
Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165
"That on or about the 12th day of November 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 RAMON GALVEZ, who posed, as
buyer, ten (10) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing dried MARIJUANA fruiting
tops weighing 0.37 gram, 0.35 gram, 0.40 gram, 0.28 gram, 0.35 gram, 0.36 gram, 0.32 gram, 0.36
gram, 0.67 gram & 0.57 gram, a dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or prescription
therefore, knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to law."

CRIM CASE NO. 78533

Violation of Section 11, Art. II, RA 9165
"That on or about the 12th day of November 2007, in Caloocan City[,] Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one
(1) transparent plastic box containing dried MARIJUANA fruiting tops weighing 29.01 grams, when
subjected for laboratory examination gave positive result to the tests of Marijuana, a dangerous
drug.
Contrary to law."

During arraignment, the accused-appellant entered a "not guilty" plea. Pre-trial then ensued. Since
the two cases were filed against the same accused and revolve around the same facts and
evidence, they were consolidated and tried jointly.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution offered the following as witnesses: (a) Police Officer 3 Ramon Galvez (PO3
Galvez), the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted against the accused-appellant; (b)
PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito), likewise a member of the buy-bust operation; (c) Senior Police
Officer 1 Fernando Moran (SPO1 Moran), then the investigator-on-duty to whom the accusedappellant and the seized evidence were turned over at the police station; and (d) Police Chief
Inspector Albert S. Arturo (PCI Arturo), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Northern Police District
Crime Laboratory Office, Caloocan City, who conducted the examination on the evidence seized
from the accused-appellant.
PO3 Galvez testified that on November 12, 2007, he was ordered by their chief to conduct a
surveillance operation to verify reported illegal drug selling activities in Don Antonio Street,
Barangay19, Caloocan City. A confidential informant told the police that a certain "Keempee," who
would later on be identified as the herein accused-appellant, was notoriously selling marijuanain the
area. A buy-bust team was thereafter formed. PO3 Galvez was designated as the poseur-buyer,
PO3 Fernando Modina (PO3 Modina) as team leader, and PO2 Hipolito as back-up member. A
hundred peso bill, marked with PO3 Galvezs initials, was prepared. To send a signal to the other
members of the buy-bust team of the consummation of the transaction with the accused-appellant,
PO3 Galvez was instructed to throw a lit cigarette.
8

The buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. PO3 Galvez and the informant saw the accusedappellant near the front door of his house, stripping marijuana leaves. The rest of the team remained
in the perimeter. PO3 Galvez approached the house, uttered "Keempee, pakuha nga ng damo,
halagang isang daan," and gave the latter the 100.00 marked money. The accused-appellant then
held ten (10) pieces of plastic, which appeared to contain marijuana and white pieces of paper,
placed them inside a Marlboro pack, and handed them all to PO3 Galvez. When PO3 Galvez threw
a lit cigarette, PO2 Hipolito joined him in arresting the accused-appellant, who was apprised of his
constitutional rights. After a further search, one transparent plastic box containing what likewise
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves, one plastic sachet with white pieces of paper, and a few
empty transparent plastic sachets were also seized from the accused-appellant.
9

PO3 Galvez marked the ten (10) plastic sachets with "GSG/RG 11/12/07" representing his and the
accused-appellants initials and the date the imprint was made. The rest of the items seized were
marked with "GSG/RH," the last two letters representing PO2 Hipolitos initials. The accusedappellant and the seized items were thereafter taken to the police station and turned over to SPO1
Moran, who prepared the letter request for laboratory examination. The crime laboratory tested the
seized items and found the same to be marijuana.
10

PO2 Hipolito corroborated PO3 Galvezs testimony about the conduct of a buy-bust operation and
the turnover of the accused-appellant and the seized items to the investigator at the police station.
Additionally, PO2 Hipolito stated that he held the accused-appellant whilePO3 Galvez was marking
some of the seized items. The accused-appellant was turned over to PO3 Modina upon the latters
arrival, while PO2 Hipolito marked the rest of the seized items.
11

The prosecution and the defense entered into stipulations and admissions of facts anent:
(a) SPO1 Morans (1) having caused the buy-bust money to be photographed; (2) receipt,
while at the police station, of the person of the accused-appellant and the items allegedly
seized from him; (3) preparation of the evidence acknowledgment receipt, affidavit of arrest
of the police officers, and referral slip to the inquest prosecutor; (4) preparation of a letter
request for laboratory examination of the seized items; and (5) receipt of the result of the
laboratory examination, which yielded positive for marijuana; and
12

(b) PCI Arturos (1) receipt of a letter request for laboratory examination of ten (10) heatsealed transparent plastic sachets containing white pieces of paper and dried marijuana
fruiting/flowering tops; (2) conduct of a laboratory examination Science Report No. D-382-07
stating therein the result of the laboratory examination.
13

The testimonies of SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo were thus dispensed with.
Version of the Defense
The defense, on its part, offered the testimonies of the accused-appellant and his son, Guillar
Salvidar (Guillar).
The accused-appellant claimed that contrary to the prosecutions statements, he was instead
arrested at around 4:00 p.m. of November 11, 2007. While playing a video game with Guillar, he
stood up to get snacks for the latter. Several men arrived, brought him to their vehicle, and
handcuffed him. He was subsequently asked to reveal the identities of big time drug pushers in the
area. The accused-appellant was unable to comply with the order and was brought to the
Sangandaan precinct. The men, who seized the accused-appellant, turned out to be police officers.
PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran belonged to the group. They inquired from him about his and his
wifes employment. The men then asked him to settle the case for 30,000.00. He told them that he
did not have money. When his wife arrived, she argued with the police officers. The officers got
angry and informed him that he would be indicted.
14

Guillar corroborated the accused-appellants testimony about the date of the arrest and their
whereabouts at that time. He added that three policemen arrived. They dragged his father out of the
video game shop and the latter, in turn, resisted. Guillar cried while he chased his father who was

taken away, but the formers attempt was futile. Guillar went home to inform his mother about the
incident.
15

Ruling of the RTC

On April 11, 2011, the RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
16

Premises considered, this court finds and so holds the accused Gil Salvidar y Garlan GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of [R.A. No. 9165], x x x and
imposes upon him the following:
(1) In Crim. Case No. C-78532, the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos ([P]500,000.00); and
(2) In Crim. Case No. C-78533, the penalty of Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to Fourteen (14) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos ([P]300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of these cases consisting of ten (10) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets each containing dried MARIJUANA fruiting tops weighing 0.37 gram, 0.35 gram, 0.40 gram,
0.28 gram, 0.35 gram, 0.36 gram, 0.32 gram, 0.36 gram, 0.67 gram & 0.57 gram[,] as well as the
one (1) transparent plastic box containing dried MARIJUANA fruiting tops weighing 29.01 grams[,]
are hereby confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with
law.
SO ORDERED.

17

The RTC found the accused-appellants defense of denial and claim of attempted police extortion as
bare, hence, unmeritorious. The trial court declared that the testimonies of the members of the buybust team deserve full faith and credit, unless it can be shown that they did not properly perform their
duties, or that they were inspired by ill motives. The accused-appellant, in this case, did not
personally know the policemen and had no previous altercation with any of them, which could have
otherwise prompted the filing of fabricated charges against him. Besides, the police officers could
not have been oblivious of the fact that Section 29 of R.A. No. 9165 imposes the penalty of death
upon persons found guilty of planting dangerous drugs as evidence.
18

Citing People v. Cueno and People v. Rigodon, the RTC emphasized that only two basic elements
must be present for the charge of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, namely: (a) the determination of
the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. In the case at bar, PO3 Galvez gave a detailed account of how
the sale involving the accused-appellant was consummated and his testimony was corroborated by
PO2 Hipolito. The seized items were also positively identified and the unbroken chain of custody
over the same was established.
19

20

21

The Parties Arguments Before the CA and its Ruling

The accused-appellant challenged the above ruling before the CA claiming that the prosecutions
version of what transpired was highly incredible. The members of the buy-bust team narrated that
the accused-appellant was packing and selling his illegal merchandise in public view. This, however,
is improbable and contrary to common experience.
22

The accused-appellant also alleged that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of
custody over the evidence. There was no explicit testimony that the specimens were marked in the
presence of the accused-appellant. There was likewise no proof that the items were photographed
and inventoried in the presence of a member of the media, a Department of Justice (DOJ)
representative, and an elective government official.
23

Further, not all who had custody of the specimens testified on the condition of the same upon receipt
and the precautions they took to preserve their integrity. It is perplexing as well why SPO1 Moran
delivered the seized items twice to the crime laboratory at first to a certain PO1 Bolora at 9:40 p.m.
of November 12, 2007, and subsequently to PCI Arturo at 9:45 p.m. of the same date. While PO1
Boloras custody over the seized items merely lasted for a few minutes, still, he should have testified
because that short span of time was more than sufficient to destroy the integrity of the evidence.
24

Admittedly, there are exceptions to the strict implementation of the rules and procedures mandated
by R.A. No. 9165. However, the prosecution should have, at the outset, recognized the procedural
lapses and cite justifiable grounds for the omissions, failing at which, a taint of doubt is cast upon the
presumption that official duties have been performed with regularity. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) opposed the appeal arguing that drug pushers have become more daring in selling
their wares without regard for place and time.
25

26

The prosecution had likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal sale of ten (10) plastic
sachets containing marijuana was consummated and the accused-appellant was the vendor. The
same ten (10) plastic sachets were seized from the accused-appellant, then later on, identified and
offered as evidence during the trial. PO3 Galvez and PO2 Hipolito had testified in detail about the
conduct of the buy-bust operation, including the markings done on the plastic sachets and
transparent box seized from the accused-appellant in the place where he was arrested, and no
irregularity can be ascribed as to the concerned police officers performance of duties.
27

On October 31, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Br.
120 in 1) Crim. Case No. C-78532 sentencing the Accused-Appellant to suffer life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos(PhP500,000.00) is AFFIRMED; and, 2) Crim. Case
No. C-78533 is likewise AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed in that the
Accused-Appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Twelve(12) years and One(1)
day, as minimum, to Fourteen(14) years, as maximum. Costs against the Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.

28

In affirming the accused-appellants conviction, the CA cited the following grounds:

Settled is the rule that in the prosecution for illegal sale of drugs, it is material to prove that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the evidence of
corpus delicti. Said otherwise, the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
are: 1)the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and 2) he knew that what he had
sold and delivered was a prohibited drug.

In the instant case, PO3 Galvez[s] testimony proves that the sale of illegal drugs actually took place.
x x x [T]he Accused-Appellant was caught in a buy-bust operation freely and knowingly selling and
delivering prohibited drugs. x x x.
x x x The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused-Appellant committed
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It was able to prove the following elements: 1)
the accused is in possession of an object identified as a prohibited drug; 2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and, 3) he freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
The records manifestly show that, after the buy-bust team arrested the Accused-Appellant, the
procedural body search was conducted on his person. The search led to the discovery of one (1)
transparent plastic box containing an undetermined amount of suspected dried marijuana
leaves(later weighed at 29.01 grams), which he freely possessed knowing the same to be prohibited
drugs. After the conduct of laboratory examinations, the same yielded positive for marijuana. Further,
he failed to present any document authorizing him by law to possess the same. x x x.
The Accused-Appellants allegation that the prosecution failed to preserve the integrity and prove the
identity of the seized drugs, holds no water.
In all cases involving the handling and custody of dangerous drugs, the police officers are guided by
Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165. The language of the foregoing
provision shows that the failure of the police officers to strictly comply with it is not fatal and does not
render the evidence adduced against the Accused-Appellant void and inadmissible. What is
important is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
At bench, there was compliance with the said provision and the integrity of the drugs confiscated
from the Accused-Appellant remained intact. The chain of custody of the seized drugs, later on
determined to be marijuana, was not shown to have been broken. The records show that, after PO3
Galvez bought ten(10) pieces of plastic sachets suspected of containing marijuana, the AccusedAppellant was bodily searched and found to be in possession of one(1) transparent plastic box
containing an undetermined amount of suspected dried marijuana leaves. Immediately thereafter,
the confiscated drugs were marked with the initials "GSG/RG 11/12/07" and "GSG/RH" and
inventoried at the place of arrest and in the presence of the Accused-Appellant. PO3 Galvez and
PO2 Hipolito then brought the Accused-Appellant to the Sangandaan police station where the same
were turned over to SPO1 Moran. Thereafter, the latter prepared the Evidence Acknowledgment
Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination of the seized substances for determination
of the presence of any dangerous drugs. PCI Arturo conducted the laboratory test and found them
positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
What is more, during the trial, PO3 Galvez and PO2 Hipolito were able to positively identify all the
plastic sachets containing marijuana with markings "GSG/RG 11/12/07" and "GSG/RH" as the same
ones that they confiscated from the Accused-Appellant. x x x.
In comparison to the prosecutions evidence, all that the Accused- Appellant could raise is the
defense of denial. x x x The defense of denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing
evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties. Bare denial of the Accused-Appellant cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of the prosecution witness. x x x.
1wphi1

The Accused-Appellants allegation that the police officers were exacting Thirty Thousand
Pesos(PhP30,000.00) from him has no basis. Other than his bare allegations, unsupported by
concrete proof, We cannot give such imputation a second look. (Citations omitted)
29

The CA modified the wordings of the penalty imposed by the RTC on the accused-appellant for
violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165. The CA emphasized that the Indeterminate Sentence Law
should be applied. Consequently, the proper penalty should be "expressed at a range whose
maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term shall
not be less than the minimum prescribed."
30

Issues
The accused-appellant and the OSG both manifested that they no longer intended to file
supplemental briefs.
31

Hence, the issues before this Court are the same ones raised before and disposed of by the CA.
Essentially then, the Court is once again asked to determine whether or not: (a) the testimonies of
the members of the buy-bust team about the accused-appellants illegal selling activities and
possession of marijuana while the latter was at the front door of his house and within public view are
credible; and (b) the prosecution had complied with the procedural requirements mandated by
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 as regards the chain
of custody over the evidence seized from the accused-appellant.
32

Ruling of the Court

The instant appeal lacks merit.
In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law, appellate courts tend to rely heavily on
the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses, because the latter had the unique
opportunity, denied to the appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under direct and cross-examination. Hence, its factual findings are accorded
great respect, even finality, absent any showing that certain facts of weight and substance bearing
on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied.
33

In the instant appeal, the RTC and CA uniformly found that PO3 Galvezs and PO2 Hipolitos
testimonies anent the conduct of the buy-bust operation were categorical, detailed, and
credible. Moreover, the accused-appellant had not ascribed any ill motive against the two police
officers which could have otherwise induced them to fabricate the charges.
34

As the first issue, the accused-appellant claimed that it was highly improbable for him to peddle and
possess marijuana right in front of his house and within public view. This allegation fails to persuade
especially in the light of the courts observation that of late, drug pushers have turned more daring
and defiant in the conduct of their illegal activities.
35

Anent the second issue, the Court finds the chain of custody over the evidence seized from the
accused-appellant as unbroken and that there was sufficient compliance with Section 21 of the IRR
of R.A. No. 9165.

PO3 Galvez positively testified that he marked the ten (10) plastic sachets containing marijuana and
the pieces of white paper while still in the place where the accused-appellant was arrested, and in
the presence of the latter. PO2 Hipolito did the same relative to the plastic container with marijuana
likewise found in the accused-appellants possession. When the members of the buy-bust team
arrived in the police station, they turned-over the person of the accused-appellant and the items
seized from him to SPO1 Moran, who in turn, prepared the Evidence Acknowledgment Receipt and
letter request for laboratory examination. Thereafter, PCI Arturo conducted the laboratory
examinations and found the specimens to be marijuana. These were the same items identified by
the prosecution witnesses and presented to the trial court as evidence.
36

37

38

39

The accused-appellant lamented that the evidence seized were not photographed and inventoried in
the presence of a member of the media, a representative from the DOJ, and an elective government
official. While this factual allegation is admitted, the Court stresses that what Section 21 of the IRR of
R.A. No. 9165 requires is "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect adherence," as long as it can be
proven that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
40

41

The accused-appellant attempted to establish that there was a breach in the chain of custody over
the evidence seized from him by pointing out that SPO1 Moran twice delivered the items to the crime
laboratory at first to a certain PO1 Bolora and later, to PCI Arturo. The Court notes that despite
the foregoing allegation, the defense agreed with the prosecution to dispense with the testimonies of
SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo. The parties entered into stipulations and admissions of facts as
regards the participation of the aforementioned two. This is no less than an admission on the part of
the defense that there was nothing irregular in SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturos performance of their
duties relative to preserving the integrity of the evidence which fell in their custody. Had the accusedappellant sincerely believed that there was indeed a breach in the chain of custody over the seized
items, he would have insisted on putting SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo on the witness stand for crossexamination.
42

1wphi1

In sum, the Court finds the herein assailed decision affirming the RTCs conviction of the accusedappellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 as amply supported by both
evidence and jurisprudence. The Court agrees as well with the CA in its modification of the wordings
of the penalty imposed on the accused-appellant for violation of the above-mentioned Section 11, as
the same is mandated by Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 31, 2012 in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 04989 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195668

June 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO, MARISSA DIALA, and BERNA
M. PAULINO,Accused,
MARICAR B. INOVERO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The several accused in illegal recruitment committed in large scale against whom the State
establishes a conspiracy are each equally criminally and civilly liable. It follows, therefore, that as far
as civil liability is concerned each is solidarily liable to the victims of the illegal recruitment for the
reimbursement of the sums collected from them, regardless of the extent of the participation of the
accused in the illegal recruitment.
The Case
Accused-appellant Maricar B. Inovero seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on
August 26, 2010, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her conviction for illegal recruitment
committed in large scale amounting to economic sabotage under the judgment rendered on January
14, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 133, in Makati City.
1

Antecedents
On March 17, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed in the RTC two
informations charging Inovero, Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino with
illegal recruitment as defined and penalized under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers Act of 1995), and 11 informations charging the same accused with estafa as defined and
penalized under Article315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Only Inovero was arrested
and prosecuted, the other accused having remained at large.
3

Six cases charging estafa (Criminal Case No. 04-1565, Criminal Case No. 1568, Criminal Case No.
1570, Criminal Case No. 1571 and Criminal Case No. 1572 and Criminal Case No. 1573) and one of
the two charging illegal recruitment (Criminal Case No. 04-1563) were provisionally dismissed
because of the failure of the complainants to prosecute. The seven cases were later permanently
dismissed after the complainants did not revive them within two years, as provided in Section
8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
5

Trial on the merits ensued as to the remaining cases (Criminal Case No. 04-1562, for illegal
recruitment; and Criminal Case No. 04-1564; Criminal Case No. 04-1566; Criminal Case No. 041567; Criminal Case No. 1569 and Criminal Case No. 04-1574, for estafa).
7

The CA recounted the transactions between the complainants and the accused, including Inovero, in
the following manner:
Regarding Criminal Case No. 04-1562, the prosecution presented the five (5) private complainants
as witnesses to prove the crime of Illegal Recruitment, namely: Novesa Baful ("Baful"), Danilo
Brizuela ("Brizuela"), Rosanna Aguirre ("Aguirre"), Annaliza Amoyo ("Amoyo"), and Teresa Marbella
("Marbella"), and Mildred Versoza ("Versoza") from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration ("POEA").
Baful testified that on May 20, 2003 she, together with her sister-in-law, went to Harvel International
Talent Management and Promotion ("HARVEL") at Unit 509 Cityland Condominium, Makati City
upon learning that recruitment for caregivers to Japan was on-going there. On said date, she

allegedly met Inovero; Velasco, and Diala, and saw Inovero conducting a briefing on the applicants.
She also testified that Diala, the alleged talent manager, directed her to submit certain documents,
and to pay Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) as training fee, as well as Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as placement and processing fees. Diala also advised her to undergo
physical examination.
On June 6, 2003, after complying with the aforesaid requirements and after paying Diala the
amounts of Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) and Ten Thousand pesos (P10,000.00), Baful
was promised deployment within two (2) to three (3) months. She likewise testified that Inovero
briefed her and her co-applicants on what to wear on the day of their departure. However, she was
never deployed. Finally, she testified that she found out that HARVEL was not licensed to deploy
workers for overseas employment.
Brizuela, another complainant, testified that he went to HARVELs office in Makati on February 7,
2003 to inquire on the requirements and hiring procedure for a caregiver in Japan. There, Diala told
him the amount required as processing fee and the documents to be submitted. And when he
submitted on March 7, 2003 the required documents and payments, it was, this time, Paulino who
received them. He claimed that he underwent training and medical examination; he likewise
attended an orientation conducted by Inovero at which time, he and his batchmates were advised
what clothes to wear on the day of their departure; he was assured of deployment on the first week
of June 2003, however, on the eve of his supposed "pre-departure orientation seminar," Paulino
texted him that the seminar was cancelled because Inovero, who had the applicants money, did not
show up. He testified that he was not deployed. Neither was his money returned, as promised.
On cross-examination, Brizuela testified that Inovero was the one who conducted the orientation,
and represented to all the applicants that most of the time, she was in the Japanese Embassy
expediting the applicants visa.
Aguirre, the third complainant to testify, alleged that she went to HARVEL on May 22, 2003, to apply
as caregiver in Japan; there, Diala informed her that Inovero was oneof the owners of HARVEL and
Velasco was its President; she paid Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00), and submitted her
documents, receipt of which was acknowledged by Diala; despite her undergoing medical
examination and several training seminars, she was however not deployed to Japan. Worse, she
found out that HARVEL was not licensed to recruit workers.
Amoyo, the fourth complainant, testified that she went to HARVELs office on May 28, 2003 to apply
as caregiver in Japan, and Diala required her to submit certain documents, to undergo training and
medical examination, and to pay Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) as placement and
processing fees. However, after complying with said requirements, she was never deployed as
promised.
Marbella was the last complainant to testify. She alleged that she applied for the position of janitress
at HARVEL sometime in December 2002; just like the rest of the complainants, she was required to
submit certain documents and to pay a total amount of Twenty Thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
processing fee; after paying said fee, Diala and Inovero promised her and the other applicants that
they will be deployed in three (3) months or in June 2003; however, the promised deployment never
materialized; she later found out that HARVEL was not even licensed to recruit workers.

[Mildred] Versoza, on the other hand, is a Labor and Employment Officer at the POEA Licensing
Branch. She testified that she prepared a Certification certifying that neither HARVEL nor Inovero
was authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment as per records at their office.
In her defense, Inovero denied the allegations hurled against her. As summarized in the assailed
Decision, she claimed that she is the niece of accused Velasco, the owner of HARVEL, but denied
working there. Explaining her presence in HARVEL, she alleged that she worked for her uncle,
Velascos husband, as an office assistant, hence, for at least two or three times a week, she had to
go to HARVEL on alleged errands for her uncle. She also testified that her alleged errands mainly
consisted of serving food and refreshments during orientations at HARVEL. Inovero likewise denied
receiving any money from the complainants, nor issuing receipts therefor.
8

Judgment of the RTC

On January 14, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Inovero of five counts of estafabut
convicting her in Criminal Case No. 04-1562 of illegal recruitment committed in large scale as
defined and penalized by Section 6 and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the aforestated cases as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 04-1562, accused Maricar Inovero is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale defined and penalized under Sections 6 and 7, II, of
Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. She is likewise ordered to
pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Criminal Case No. 04-1563 also for illegal recruitment in large scale is hereby ordered dismissed to
its finality for failure of complainants Alvin De Leon, Roderick Acuna, Agosto Vale and Marina
Viernes to revive said case despite the lapse of two years from its provisional dismissal.
Criminal Cases No. 04-1564, 1566, 1567, 1569, 1571 and 1574 are hereby ordered DISMISSED for
failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence to prove all the elements of the said offense.
Criminal Cases Nos. 1565, 1568, 1570, 1572 and 1573 also for estafa [are] hereby ordered
dismissed to its finality for failure of complainants Agosto Vale, Alvin De Leon, Roselyn Saruyda,
Roderick Acuna and Marina Viernes to revive said cases despite the lapse of two (2) years from its
provisional dismissal.
Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, she shall be credited in the service of her
sentence with the full time during which she has undergone preventive imprisonment if she agrees
voluntarily to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, with
four-fifths thereof.
Meanwhile, considering that the accused Ma. Harleta B. Velasco, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino
are still at large, let alias warrants of arrest be issued against them. In the meantime, let the cases
filed against them be archived, which shall be revived upon their apprehension.
SO ORDERED.

Decision of the CA
Inovero appealed, contending that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH [HER] GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
10

On August 26, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction, viz:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The January 14, 2008 Decision of the RTC is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

11

Issue
In this appeal, Inovero insists that the CA erred in affirming her conviction by the RTC because she
had not been an employee of Harvel at any time; that she could be faulted only for her association
with the supposed illegal recruiters; that in all stages of the complainants recruitment for overseas
employment by Harvel, they had transacted only and directly with Diala; and that the certification
from the POEA to the effect she was not a licensed recruiter was not a positive proof that she
engaged in illegal recruitment.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the entire findings of fact of the RTC, stating:
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the accused
engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code, or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the same Code; (2) that the accused had not
complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment with respect to the
requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and (3) that the accused
committed the unlawful acts against 3 or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal recruitment is
committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they
have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. In Our view, despite Inoveros
protestations that she did not commit illegal recruitment, the following circumstances contrarily
convince Us that she was into illegal recruitment.
First, private complainants Baful and Brizuela commonly testified that Inovero was the one who
conducted orientations/briefings on them; informed them, among others, on how much their salary
would be as caregivers in Japan; and what to wear when they finally will be deployed. Second, when
Diala introduced her (Inovero) to private complainant Amoyo as one of the owners of HARVEL,
Inovero did not bother to correct said representation. Inoveros silence is clearly an implied
acquiescence to said representation.

Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private complainant Brizuela, represented herself as
the one expediting the release of applicants working visa for Japan.
Fourth, in a Certification issued and attested to by POEAs Versoza Inovero had no license nor
authority to recruit for overseas employment.
Based on the foregoing, there is therefore no doubt that the RTC correctly found that Inovero
committed illegal recruitment in large scale by giving private complainants the impression that she
can send them abroad for employment purposes, despite the fact that she had no license or
authority to do so.
12

It is basic that the Court, not being a trier of facts, must of necessity rely on the findings of fact by the
trial court which are conclusive and binding once affirmed by the CA on intermediate review. The
bindingness of the trial courts factual findings is by virtue of its direct access to the evidence. The
direct access affords the trial court the unique advantage to observe the witnesses demeanor while
testifying, and the personal opportunity to test the accuracy and reliability of their recollections of
past events, both of which are very decisive in a litigation like this criminal prosecution for the
serious crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale where the parties have disagreed on the
material facts. The Court leaves its confined precinct of dealing only with legal issues in order to deal
with factual ones only when the appellant persuasively demonstrates a clear error in the appreciation
of the evidence by both the trial and the appellate courts. This demonstration was not done herein by
the appellant. Hence, the Court upholds the CAs affirmance of the factual findings by the trial court.
All that Inoveros appeal has offered was her denial of complicity in the illegal recruitment of the
complainants. But the complainants credibly described and affirmed her specific acts during the
commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Their positive assertions were far trustworthier than
her mere denial.
Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the
fact. Thus, courts both trial and appellate have generally viewed the defense of denial in
criminal cases with considerable caution, if not with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes
from the recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being an excuse too
easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of consideration at all, denial should be
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and
self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater evidentiary value than
the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. It is no different here.
1wphi1

13

We concur with the RTC and the CA that Inovero was criminally liable for the illegal recruitment
charged against her. Strong and positive evidence demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt her
having conspired with her co-accused in the recruitment of the complainants. The decision of the CA
amply recounted her overt part in the conspiracy. Under the law, there is a conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit
it.
14

The complainants paid varying sums for placement, training and processing fees, respectively as
follows: (a) Baful P28,500.00; (b) Brizuela P38,600.00; (c) Aguirre P38,600.00; (d) Amoyo
P39,000.00; and (e) Marbella P20,250.00. However, the RTC and the CA did not adjudicate
Inoveros personal liability for them in their judgments. Their omission needs to be corrected,
notwithstanding that the complainants did not appeal, for not doing so would be patently unjust and

contrary to law. The Court, being the ultimate reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also
the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. It is, indeed, a basic tenet of our criminal
law that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Civil liability includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages. To enforce the
civil liability, the Rules of Court has deemed to be instituted with the criminal action the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged unless the offended party waives the
civil action, or reserves the right to institute the civil action separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action. Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it involves the
transfer of funds from the victims to the accused, is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability
should include the return of the amounts paid as placement, training and processing fees. Hence,
Inovero and her co-accused were liable to indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid.
15

16

17

18

That the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by the RTC and the CA was not
disputable. The Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People that it was "imperative that the courts
prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be
imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or
a waiver of its recovery," because:
19

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the
legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the
accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty
imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their
disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their
omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an
appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only
the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are
properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy
of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot
be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the
judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in
their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal
penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or
in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine
and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims
who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.
20

What was the extent of Inoveros civil liability?

The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime requires solidarity,
and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. As a co-conspirator, then, Inoveros
civil liability was similar to that of a joint tortfeasor under the rules of the civil law. Joint tortfeasors
21

are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or
abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are
also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each
other, unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves. As regards the extent of their respective liabilities, the Court expressed in Far Eastern
Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals:
22

23

24

x x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty
owed by them to the injured person was not same. No actors negligence ceases to be a proximate
cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other acts. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. x x x
It would not be an excuse for any of the joint tortfeasors to assert that her individual participation in
the wrong was insignificant as compared to those of the others. Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro
rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by themselves. They cannot insist
upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally
liable for the whole amount. Hence, Inoveros liability towards the victims of their illegal recruitment
was solidary, regardless of whether she actually received the amounts paid or not, and
notwithstanding that her co-accused, having escaped arrest until now, have remained untried.
25

26

Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, interest as part of the damages may be adjudicated in criminal
proceedings in the discretion of the court. The Court believes and holds that such liability for interest
attached to Inovero as a measure of fairness to the complainants. Thus, Inovero should pay interest
of 6% per annum on the sums paid by the complainants to be reckoned from the finality of this
judgment until full payment.
27

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 26, 2010, subject to the
MODIFICATION that appellant Maricar B. Inovero is ordered to pay by way of actual damages to
each of the complainants the amounts paid by them for placement, training and processing fees,
respectively as follows:
(a) Noveza Baful - P28,500.00;
(b) Danilo Brizuela - P38,600.00;
(c) Rosanna Aguirre - P38,600.00;
(d) Annaliza Amoyo - P39,000.00; and

(e) Teresa Marbella - P20,250.00.

plus interest on such amounts at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
Inovero shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159031

June 23, 2014

NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial declaration of the nullity
of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and in existent for lack of a marriage license, is
guilty of bigamy as defined and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 29, 2002, whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for bigamy under the judgment rendered on October 30,
2000 in Criminal Case No. 49808 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
1

Antecedents
On February 16, 1968, Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo
solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the benefit of a
marriage license. The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of
cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo
reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose
Church in Iloilo City. They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that
purpose. Both ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982,
Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.
2

On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious
ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage
certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single.
10

On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against
Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch
39 of the RTC. The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and
fraud in securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches, psychological
incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and
11

social humiliation warranting the award of damages. In support of his complaint, he further alleged,
among others, that:
He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was officiated by Hon.
Carlos B. Salazar, Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is
herewith attached as Exhibit "A" and made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a wedding at
San Jose Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo City Registrar.
Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Annex "B";
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties except some personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the house of Mr. Raul L. Cataloctocan
in Burgos Street, Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the purpose of their meeting was for the plaintiff to
consult and seek treatment by the defendant because the latter was a "babaylan": Plaintiff was
treated by the defendant and the subsequent treatments were performed by the defendant at her
residence in Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo, the treatment made being on a continuing basis;
xxxx
On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with her to Iloilo City. They went to
Dainty Restaurant at J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw several persons therein. After eating plaintiff was
made to sign the marriage contract, which was null and void for lack of marriage license and based
on a false affidavit of cohabitation. After their marriage, they went home to Barangay Bangac, Mina,
Iloilo, which marked the start of a married life rocked with marital differences, quarrels and
incompatibilities, without love, but under the uncontrollable fear of harm that should befall him should
he not follow her;
xxxx
During the period the parties are living together defendant would nag the plaintiff, fabricate stories
against him and displayed her fit of jealousy, neglect her marital obligations even committed
infidelity, which psychological incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the petitioner to live
separately from defendant since 1982 up to the present.
12

In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iloilo City. After due proceedings, the accused was formally indicted for bigamy under the
information filed on October 20, 1998 in the RTC, viz:
13

That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage
with Socorro Patingo and without the said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
Josefa Eslaban.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

14

The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was raffled to Branch 38 of the RTC in
Iloilo City. The accused pleaded not guilty at his arraignment, and trial ensued in due course.
15

In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its judgment in Civil Case
No. 23133 dismissing the accuseds complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the
marriage between him and Socorro valid and legal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint filed by
the plaintiff Noel Arenga Lasanas against the defendant, Socorro Patingo, considering that the
marriage between them is valid and legal.
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly support to his wife, the defendant in this
case, Ma. Socorro Patingo in the amount of P3,000.00 a month, from the time that she filed her
answer with counterclaim on February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family Code and every
month thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.

16

The accused appealed to the CA.

17

Ruling of the RTC

On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in Criminal Case No.
49808, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering
him to serve an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.

18

Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC
thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage
license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element
of bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory
in his favor; and that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent marriage.
19

On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed
Decision.
SO ORDERED.

20

Issues

Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari. He argues that the RTC and
the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, asserting that
the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity
before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal
prosecution; that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted
because his subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity
of marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code; that, consequently,
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was
lacking; and that his good faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal
liability.
21

22

23

24

25

26

Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.
27

The CA specifically observed:

This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant
Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The
ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites
of a valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in
those instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor
affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious
wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration
of the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban.
Actually, he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law
on bigamy.
Accuseds reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per Relova v.
Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yaps ruling too

had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v.
Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellants defense of good faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Maozca v.
Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect.

28

Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC thereby erred in
finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of
cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element
of bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory
in his favor; and that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent marriage.
19

On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed
Decision.
SO ORDERED.

20

Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari. He argues that the RTC and
the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, asserting that
the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity
before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal
prosecution; that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted
because his subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity
of marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code; that, consequently,
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was
lacking; and that his good faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal
liability.
21

22

23

24

25

26

Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.
27

The CA specifically observed:

This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant
Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The
ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites
of a valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in
those instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor
affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious
wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration
of the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban.
Actually, he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law
on bigamy.
Accuseds reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per Relova v.
Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yaps ruling too
had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v.
Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellants defense of good faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Maozca v.
Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect.

28

Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article
40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:

29

x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked

for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is
now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and
hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.
We note that in petitioners case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a
nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. Following petitioners argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted,
such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his
earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so
would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public
Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly,
petitioners strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accuseds conviction for bigamy is affirmed. The crime of bigamy was
consummated from the moment he contracted the second marriage without his marriage to Socorro
being first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not
being yet declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction. "What makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy," according to People v. Odtuhan:
1wphi1

30

31

x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid

marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it beheld as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The accuseds defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially because the
records show that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to
the institution of the criminal complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second
marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC (Branch 39)
dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage after the information for bigamy had already been
filed against him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the

accuseds subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was
established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a
recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he
himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to
contracting his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, the Court has explained that
"[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy.
32

x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage."
33

The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People: x x x Nollora may not impugn his
[subsequent] marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we
would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies.
As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
34

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. With neither
an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the
imposable penalty is the medium period of prision mayor, which ranges from eight years and one
day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence should be within the range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed for the offense, which is from six months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the
indeterminate sentence of two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
years and one day of prision mayor as maximum, as imposed by the RTC, was proper.
35

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 29,
2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193478

June 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RODOLFO P. FERNANDEZ, NELSON E. TOBIAS, and FRANK R. BAAY, Accused,
NELSON E. TOBIAS, Accused-appellant.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:

This is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Nelson E. Tobias from the Decision dated 28 August
2009 issued by the Special Third Division and from the Resolution dated 9 February 2010 issued by
the Special Former Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02838.
2

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Rodolfo P. Fernandez, Nelson E. Tobias, Frank R. Baay, Joel B. Uy, Eduardo D. Manuel and Nenita
P. Manuel were charged with violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Information reads:
4

That on or about the 22nd day of June 2004 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any lawful authority,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver or distribute to a PDEA poseur-buyer one
(1) kilo of white powder substance which was found positive to the test of cocaine, for an agreed
amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), Philippine Currency without the corresponding license
or prescription, in violation of the above cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW.
5

All the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.

PROSECUTIONS VERSION
The prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely: (1) Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Antonietta
Abillonar of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; (2) Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) operatives, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Pedro Barbero, (3) Police Senior Inspector
(P S/Insp.) Prospero Bona; (4) Police Officer (PO) 2 Martin Francia; (5) PO1 Rogelio Hernando; (6)
SPO1 Catalino Gonzales, Jr.; (7) PO1 Narciso Padua; and (8) P S/Insp. Sandra Decena Go of the
PNP Crime Laboratory.
Their testimonies reveal that on 16 June 2004, PO1 Padua met with the accused Fernandez, a
retired Makati City police at the latters house to negotiate Fernandezs possible surrender of 150
kilos of cocaine in exchange for a monetary reward. The two were known to each other due to their
past positions in the police force. Not satisfied with the monetary award being offered, Fernandez
instead asked Padua to find a buyer of the cocaine. Pretending to have a buyer, Padua asked for
samples. Hence, on the night of 20 June 2004, Fernandez called up to tell him to go to the office of
the Eagles of Makati on 21 June2004 to receive the samples. The samples given by Fernandez
were delivered to Bona, who brought it to a forensic chemist at the crime laboratory for examination.
They turned out to be cocaine. Bona then formed a buy-bust team composed of Barbero, Hernando,
and Gonzales as back-ups and Padua as the poseur-buyer. Also prepared was boodle money
consisting of cut newspapers and photocopies of P1,000 bills supposedly amounting to P2 million,
which was to be used as buy-bust money.
7

On the morning of 22 June 2004, the team went to the house of Fernandez on board two vehicles
and parked 20 meters away. Padua alighted, took a taxi and proceeded to the house where
Fernandez was waiting. The latter told him to wait because the person bringing the cocaine had not
yet arrived. Twenty minutes after, a car with three persons on board stopped in front of the house
and one of them, later identified as Tobias, alighted carrying a bag. Tobias, Fernandez and Padua
went inside while the car, with the two remaining persons on board, left.
8

Inside the house, Tobias showed the cocaine and gave it to Padua, while the latter handed the
boodle money to the former. After the exchange, Padua sent missed calls to the team through his
cellphone, the prearranged signal that the sale had been consummated. The team rushed to the
house and arrested Fernandez and Tobias. The boodle money was found in the latters possession.
When interrogated, Tobias admitted that the two other persons in the car were Baay and Uy, who
were waiting for him at the nearby McDonalds restaurant. The police officers went to the restaurant
and arrested both men. Upon further interrogation, Fernandez and Tobias told the police that the
cocaine came from Cagayan Valley and was brought to Manila by the spouses Manuel, who at that
time were staying at the house of Tobias in Fort Bonifacio. The police proceeded to the identified
house and arrested the spouses. A forensic chemist examined the seized evidence which yielded a
positive result for cocaine.
9

DEFENSES VERSION
Accused Fernandez interposed the defense of denial. He asserted that he had invited Padua to
help facilitate the licensing of the formers firearm. Upon learning that Padua had been assigned to
PDEA, Fernandez asked him about the reward money if someone surrendered cocaine to PDEA.
Padua asked for a sample as he handed him a brochure, "Operation Private Eye," in which the
reward system for the surrender of drugs was spelled out. Fernandez supposedly relayed this
information to Tobias and told the latter to bring samples. On 20 June 2004, Tobias said that he
would arrive with the cocaine the next day. Fernandez then scheduled their meeting at his house on
21 June 2004. Padua arrived at 8:00 a.m., while Tobias and his friend "Mar" arrived an hour later.
Allegedly, Fernandez asked if they brought the drugs, and Tobias answered in the affirmative.
Meanwhile "Mar" brought out a wrapped item and gaveit to Padua, who eventually left with the
sample for testing. On the evening of the same day, Padua allegedly called up Fernandez and
informed him that the item had been found positive for cocaine. The latter immediately told Tobias to
bring the 150-kilo cocaine to be surrendered to Padua the following morning.
10

At 9:00 a.m. the following morning, Tobias arrived at the house of Fernandez. Padua, along with a
companion, arrived looking for "Mar." Upon learning that "Mar" was not around, Padua poked a gun
at both Tobias and Fernandez, handcuffed them, and placed them under arrest. The other PDEA
operatives arrived and searched the house for the drugs, but Fernandez argued that it was with
"Mar" who had not arrived. Padua insisted that he should tell them where "Mar" was, but Fernandez
did not know. The latter also claimed that there was no cocaine confiscated from his house on 22
June 2004.
Nelson Tobias , on the other hand, claimed having known Padua for a long time, but denied having
knowledge of the existence of the 150 kilos of cocaine. Tobias also testified that he had
accompanied his friend, PO Marino Manuel, to Fernandezs house. They were supposed to meet
Fernandez and Padua. Tobias was eventually told that the substance was really cocaine, and that he
should bring the remaining stuff to be surrendered the following morning. He told Marino Manuel
about the meeting and both agreed to meet at the designated place. When Tobias met with
Fernandez the following morning, Padua and the other operatives arrived. They immediately looked
for Marino Manuel, but he failed to show up. Tobias and Fernandez were arrested. Tobias claimed
that his wallet, wrist watch, drivers license, firearm license, ATM card and .45 cal pistol were
confiscated by the PDEA operatives.
11

12

After Tobias was arrested, he was brought inside a parked van and interrogated regarding his
companions. He identified one of them as Joel Uy, whose name was in the phone book of the mobile

phone confiscated from the former. The police officers then began contacting Joel Uy and asking
about the whereabouts of Frank Baay. Thus, Tobias brought them to a McDonalds branch along
Boni Avenue, where they nabbed Baay and later, Joel Uy, whom they asked to return tothat place.
Thereafter they were all brought to the PDEA office in Quezon City, where they were investigated.

13

Tobias admitted that he was a member of the Philippine Air Force, but that he had gone AWOL when
he went to Japan to work. He denied that Padua showed him a belt bag containing money as
payment for the cocaine.
14

15

Meanwhile, Frank Baay alleged that hewas at the McDonalds branch located at the corner of Boni
and Barangka Streets to meet Joel Uy. The latter was supposed to give him the price quotation for a
glass door and panel to be installed at the house of Baays neighbor. Around ten oclock in the
morning, Joel Uy arrived and invited Baay for a ride, as the former would just drop off a friend at a
place nearby. When Baay boarded the car, he was introduced by Joel Uy to Nelson Tobias, the
friend who later dropped off on Fabella St., after which they returned to McDonalds. But after their
brief conversation, Joey Uy left while Baay stayed behind to wait for a friend from whom Baay would
borrow money to pay for the latters electric bills. While waiting for that friend, however, Baay was
arrested by operatives from PDEA.
16

For his part, Joel Uy claimed to be a businessman engaged in contracting and installing glass
windows, aluminum panels and aquariums. He admitted owning the green Mazda car driven by
Nelson Tobias when the latter went to the house of Fernandez at No. 19 Fabella St., Mandaluyong
City, at about ten oclock in the morning of 22 June 2004. Joel Uy also admitted that he and Baay
were also in that car driven by Tobias, who alighted upon reaching the destination. Joel Uy then took
the wheels, made a U-turn and returned to McDonalds to drop off Baay. The latter proceeded to
Malate to meet Engineer Arnel Alarcon, Paul Peteros and Wilson Seguerra. While he was in Malate,
Baay called and texted Joel Uy to ask him to come over. Past 2:00 p.m. the latter returned to
McDonalds to look for Baay. Someone whom he later identified as Padua poked a gun at him. Joel
Uy testified later that Padua took his car key, cell phone, wrist watch and wallet, which had not been
returned to him until now.
17

18

Finally, Eduardo Manuel claimed that when he was arrested by Barbero, Bona and Hernando of
PDEA, he was with his wife inside the house of Nelson Tobias in Fort Bonifacio. Prior to that date, he
had known Tobias for four years, but met Fernandez, Baay and Uy only for the first time on that
same date at the PDEA office. Earlier that day, he and his wife had just arrived at the house of
Tobias from their hometown in Cagayan Valley. He was accompanying his wife, who was applying
for a job. While he was resting in the living room, he heard someone knocking on the door. He
opened it and three armed men entered introducing themselves as members of the police, whom he
later identified as Hernando, Bona and Barbero. Then they poked him with their guns and searched
the house looking for Marino Manuel. When Eduardo told them that Marino Manuel was his cousin,
they got mad. They handcuffed him, brought him to the waiting car and left. Not long after, they
decided to return to the house of Tobias because somebody said, "Pare balikan natinang babae
dahil sigurado akong nanduon ang pera." Thus, they also took Eduardos wife, and the two of them
were brought to the PDEA headquarters in Quezon City.
19

THE RULING OF THE RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 214 of Mandaluyong City, rendered its Decision dated 16
February 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads:
20

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(a) accused Rodolfo Fernandez, Nelson Tobias, Joel Uy and Frank R. Baay are hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of unlawfully selling, delivering, distributing one (1) kilo
of cocaine in violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26 of Article II of R.A. 9165, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of TWO
MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS each; and
(b) accused Eduardo D. Manuel and Nenita P. Manuelare hereby ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence and are hereby ordered RELEASED immediately from detention
unless detained for some other legal cause or causes.
Further, the cocaine taken and seized from the accused during the aforesaid operation are forfeited
and confiscated in favor of the Government and shall be turned over to the PDEA pursuant to law for
proper disposal without delay. Likewise, the green Mazda car used by accused in the perpetration of
the crime is ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, and the evidence
custodian of the said vehicle is directed to turn over the same to this court for its scheduled auction
pursuant to Section 20, Article II of R.A. 9165.
SO ORDERED.

21

Pending the appeal of Fernandez, Tobias, and Baay, Fernandez died of cardiac arrest on 22
February 2008. His death resulted in the dismissal of his appeal on 27 June 2008, insofar as he
was concerned, in a Resolution dated 12 January 2011 issued by the Supreme Court Third Division.
Henceforth, the appeal pertained only to Tobias and Baay.
22

23

In his Brief, Tobias claimed that the arresting officers failed to comply with the chain-of-custody
requirement and to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized dangerous drug. On
the other hand, Baay claimed in his Brief that the prosecution had failed to establish the identity of
the cocaine, as well as the whereabouts and the identity of the boodle money.
24

25

26

27

THE RULING OF THE CA

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
For failure of co-accused-appellant Frank Baay to file a Petition before the Supreme Court from the
CA Resolution dated 9 February 2010 denying his Motion for Reconsideration, the CA Decision
became final and executory on 27 February 2009. In a Resolution dated 31 May 2010, Partial Entry
of Judgment was ordered issued by the CA as far as he was concerned. Hence, this appeal solely
concerning Tobias on the issue of the police officers noncompliance with the chain-of-custody
requirement. This issue, stated in his Brief and reiterated in his Supplemental Brief, has been
brought before this Court.
28

29

THIS COURTS RULING

We sustain the conviction of accused-appellant Nelson Tobias.
As stated in the Information, the accused were charged not only with the sale of cocaine but also
with the delivery and distribution thereof, which is committed by the mere delivery of the prohibited

drug. The consideration therefor is of no moment. The law has defined "deliver" as "[a]ny act of
knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or
without consideration." Upon a careful review of the records, we find that the elements of the crime
as stated above were proven by the prosecution.
30

31

Padua clearly and convincingly testified that Fernandez had agreed to sell or deliver the cocaine to
the former. This testimony, complemented by the testimonies of the other police officers, provided a
clear picture of the transaction as well as the roles of Fernandez, Tobias, Baay and Uy. As observed
by the trial court, Padua "testified in a clear, straightforward manner and despite the rigorous crossexamination by the defense counsels, did not waver or hesitate in his testimony, a clear proof that he
was telling the truth."
32

The accused failed to destroy the credibility of the police officers. They failed to show a plausible
reason or ill motive on the part of the arresting officers to falsely impute to them such a serious and
unfounded charge. What the accused offered were merely denials and allegations of frame-up. But
these allegations are invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted
but are difficult to prove. Further, their bare denials were not proven by convincing evidence. Hence,
full faith and credit are accorded to the police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner in the absence of proof to the contrary.
33

34

The accused, too, in their attempt to discredit the police officers testimonies, point to
inconsistencies. In any event, we have time and again said that a few discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not actually touching
upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility. Instead of weakening their
testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility, because they discount the
possibility of their being rehearsed.
1wphi1

35

Meanwhile, in the present Petition, Tobias harps solely and exclusively on the absence of
compliance with the chain-of-custody rule.
The rule on the chain of custody under R.A. 9165, together with its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR), expressly demands the identification of the persons who handled the confiscated
items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia from the time these items were seized from the accused until the time they were
presented in court.
36

37

38

The rule also requires that the presentation and admission of the seized prohibited drug as an
exhibit be preceded by evidence to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. This requirement is essential to obviate the possibility of substitution, as
well as to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed. The rule is meant
to ensure the monitoring and tracking of the movements and custody of the seized prohibited item
from the accused, to the police, to the forensic laboratory for examination, and finally to its
presentation in evidence in court. Ideally, the custodial chain would include testimony about every
link in the chain or movement of the illegal drug, from the moment it is seized until itis finally adduced
in evidence. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that testimony supporting a perfect chain is
almost always impossible to obtain.
39

40

41

We have held that the failure of the prosecution to show compliance with the procedural
requirements provided in Section 21 of Article II of R.A. 9165 and its IRR is not fatal. What is of
42

utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as
these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. As long as the
chain of custody remains unbroken, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.
43

44

A careful scrutiny of the records reveals through testimonial, documentary and object evidence
that the chain-of-custody requirement was not broken.
The trial court notes that when SPO1 Padua, who "testified in a clear, straightforward manner and
despite the rigorous cross-examination by the defense counsels, did not waver or hesitate in his
testimony," was asked how the evidence was preserved, he stated as follows:
45

46

A: Immediately upon confiscation of the said evidence it was turned over to the possession of
Captain Bona and delivered to the Philippine National Crime Laboratory for examination and the
PNCL is the one who holding [sic] the cocaine, sir.
47

P S/Insp. Prospero Bona also took the witness stand and narrated how the seized item was handled
as follows:
Q: Immediately after the taking from Tobias, what did you do to the item?
A: SPO1 Padua gave me the item, sir.
xxxx
A: x x x. I ordered the investigator to take hold of the items because the team leader is not the one
who handles the evidences [sic], it is the office[r] on case. It was the investigator who take
possession of the items, sir.
48

SPO1 Catalino Gonzales, Jr., the investigator of the case, likewise took the witness stand and
testified thus:
49

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, what did you do with this? You said you carry this from the place of arrest up to
the PDEA office?
A: I let one of my colleagues, SPO3 Barbero, one of the arresting officers, to mark the evidence,
maam.
SPO3 Barbero testified, too, that he had marked the item with his initials "PGB," the date and his
signature, after which, he submitted it to the crime laboratory together with a letter-request dated 22
June 2004.
50

51

Finally, P/Insp. Antonietta Abillonar of the PNP Crime Laboratory testified that she had conducted
an examination of the submitted specimen and found it positive for the presence of cocaine as
indicated in Chemistry Report No. D-271-04, which was presented in court and made part of the
evidence for the prosecution.
52

53

The links of the chain of custody ofthe illegal drug are all accounted for by the testimonies of the
police officers who formed the buy-bust team: from the confiscation of the cocaine from petitioner
Tobias by the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Padua; its turnover to the buy-bust team leader, P S/Insp. Bona,

who gave it to SPO1 Gonzales, the investigator, and eventually to SPO3 Barbero who made the
marking; to the forwarding of the seized item to the crime laboratory for a forensic examination; up to
the presentation of the results to the court by P/Insp. Antonietta Abillonar. It is clear, then, that the
chain-of-custody requirement was properly observed by the police officers and proven by the
prosecution.
In the light of the foregoing, we see no reason to deviate from the RTC ruling and its affirmation by
the CA. As to the penalty imposed by the RTC, we, too, find it in order and proper. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 28 August 2009
issued by the Special Third Division and the Resolution dated 9 February 2010 issued by the Special
Former Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02838 are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
1wphi1

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199208

July 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal by Trinidad A. Cahilig (Cahilig) from the Decision qf the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 137, Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2178 to 2207 finding her guilty of thirty (30)
counts of Qualified Theft.
The Facts
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with handling, managing,
receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.
1

It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the funds
ofWPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare
disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order
to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAIs bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank
account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as
WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to another was said
to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead,
she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and
then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital
contribution.
2

The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of qualified
theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAIS funds a total of P6,268,300.00,
brokendown into the following amounts:
Criminal Case No. 03-2178

P200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2179

P250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2180

P200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2181

P55,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2182

P55,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2183

P85,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2184

P350,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2185

P250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2186

P20,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2187

P250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2188

P60,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2189

P150,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2190

P50,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2191

P46,300.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2192

P205,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2193

P200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2194

P25,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2195

P500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2196

P500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2197

P30,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2198

P400,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2199

P300,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2200

P500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2201

P65,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2202

P47,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2203

P500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2204

P40,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2205

P400,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2206

P35,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2207

P500,000.0

All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of the parties, only three of the 30
cases went thru trial. The remaining 27 cases were the subject of a written stipulation of facts, on the
basis of which these were submitted for resolution. The stipulation stated, among others: That for
purposes of efficient and speedy administration of these cases, the parties herein agreed, during the

pre-trial conference and approved by the Honorable Court, that the actualtrial and presentation of
evidence will be done only on the first three (3) counts of the cases, i.e., on Cases Numbers 03-2178
to 03-2180, with the understanding and agreement that after the termination of the hearing onsaid
three (3) cases, the parties shall adopt the results thereof in the remaining twenty-seven (27) counts,
considering that all the cases arose from similar transactions with the same methods or modus
operandi used in committing the crime charged, and involving the same accused and the same
offended party[.]
4

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged, in a Decision dated 16 June 2005, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds Trinidad Cahlig guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft in each of the informations, and sentences her to
suffer the penalty of:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2178, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of P200,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2179, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P250,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 03-2180, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of P200,000.00;
4. In Criminal Case No. 03-2181, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of P55,000.00;
5. In Criminal Case No. 03-2182, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P55,000.00;
6. In Criminal Case No. 03-2183, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P85,000.00;
7. In Criminal Case No. 03-2184, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P350,000.00;
8. In Criminal Case No. 03-2185, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P250,000.00;
9. In Criminal Case No. 03-2186, ten (10) years and one (1) days (sic) as minimum to twenty
(20) years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of P20,000.00;
10. In Criminal Case No. 03-2187, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P250,000.00;

11. In Criminal Case No. 03-2188, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P60,000.00;
12. In Criminal Case No. 03-2189, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P150,000.00;
13. In Criminal Case No. 03-2190, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P50,000.00;
14. In Criminal Case No. 03-2191, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P4[6],300.00;
15. In Criminal Case No. 03-2192, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P205,000.00;
16. In Criminal Case No. 03-2193, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P200,000.00;
17. In Criminal Case No. 03-2194, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P25,000.00;
18. In Criminal Case No. 03-2195, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P500,000.00;
19. In Criminal Case No. 03-2196, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P500,000.00;
20. In Criminal Case No. 03-2197, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P30,000.00;
21. In Criminal Case No. 03-2198, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P400,000.00;
22. In Criminal Case No. 03-2199, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P300,000.00;
23. In Criminal Case No. 03-2200, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P500,000.00;
24. In Criminal Case No. 03-2201, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P65,000.00;
25. In Criminal Case No. 03-2202, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P47,000.00;
26. In Criminal Case No. 03-2203, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P500,000.00;

27. In Criminal Case No. 03-2204, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P40,000.00;
28. In Criminal Case No. 03-2205, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P400,000.00;
29. In Criminal Case No. 03-2206, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P35,000.00;
30. In Criminal Case No. 03-2207, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P500,000.00.
Costs against accused in eachof the above numbered cases.
SO ORDERED.

The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key
officers ofthe association. The RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial
records of the association, a circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy withdrawal of
funds which she converted to her personal use in the manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly,
she betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer."
6

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Cahilig appealed her conviction to the CA. In a Decision dated 18 February 2011, the CA denied her
appeal and affirmed the RTCs Decision.
The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft were present in every charge:
x x x First, there was taking ofpersonal property, when accusedappellant took the proceeds of the
WPESLAI checks issued in her name as cashier of the association which are supposed to be
redeposited to another account of WPESLAI. Second, the property belongs to another, since the
funds undisputably belong to WPESLAI. Third, the taking was done without the consent of the
owner, which is obvious because accusedappellant created a ruse showing that the funds were
credited to another account but were actually withdrawn from her own personal account. Fourth, the
taking was done with intentto gain, as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit, took the fundsby
means of a modus operandi that made it appear through the entries inthe ledgers that all
withdrawals and deposits were made in the normal course of business and with the approval of
WPESLAI. Fifth, the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person [or]
force upon things. And finally, the acts were committed with grave abuse of confidence considering
that her position as cashier permeates trust and confidence.
7

The Courts Ruling

The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by the trial court in six of the 30
cases are incorrect and, therefore, must be modified.
Qualified Theft

Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of Qualified Theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken froma
fishpond or fishery, orif property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lostproperty, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove
or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or
which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the
same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

It is clear that all the elements ofQualified Theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her intent
to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit the
theft.

Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be the result of the relation by
reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that
might create a high degree of confidence betweenthem which the appellant abused."
9

Cahiligs position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves "handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAIs depositors and other funds of the
association. Cahiligs responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the
money entrusted into her care.
1wphi1

However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into
authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that
Cahilig did not deny.
Proper Penalty
The trial court, however, erred inthe penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 032194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206.
To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases
are P20,000.00, P46,300.00, P25,000.00, P30,000.00,P40,000.00, and P35,000.00, respectively.
Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article." Article 309, in turn, states:
Art. 309. Penalties. -Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed pr is ion mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxxx
In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below P12,000.00. Hence, if the crime
charged had been simple theft, the penalty in any of these six cases would have been, at least,
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since it was established that the crime was
qualified by grave abuse of confidence, Article 310 provides that the penalty to be imposed shall be
the one "next higher by two degrees," which in this case is reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, the
penalty in these six cases should be reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. In lieu of the penalties meted out by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 032186, 03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206, appellant Trinidad A. Cahilig is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified theft in the aforesaid
cases. The judgment to indemnify the amounts in each of the corresponding charges stands.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209373

July 30, 2014

JOEL YONGCO and JULIETO LAOJAN, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209414
ANECITO TANGIAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This treats of the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule
125 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR No. 00549-MIN, dated January 21, 2013 and September 10, 2013, respectively. Said
rulings affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision convicting petitioners of qualified theft.
1

The Facts
Petitioners Joel Yongco, Julieta Lafiojan, and Anecito Tangian, Jr. were employees of the City
Government of Iligan. Tangian worked as a garbage truck driver for the city, while Yongco and
Laojanwere security guards assigned to protect the premises of the City Engineers Office (CEO).
On November 14, 2005, an Information was filed before the RTC, Branch 5 in Iligan City, Lanao del
Norte charging the three with Qualified Theft. The information docketed as Crim. Case No. 12092
reads:
That on or about April 16, 2005, in the City of Ilagan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then regular and casual employees of the City
government as drivers and helpers respectively, of a garbage truck with Plate No. 496, conspiring
and confederating togetherand mutually helping each other, with grave abuse of confidence reposed
upon them by the city government, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the following articles, to wit: one (1) unit transmission, boom,
differential of Tamaraw and l-beam of Nissan with a total value of P40,000.00, belonging to the City
government of Ilagan, represented by Atty. Rommel Abragan of the City Legal Office, Iligan City,
withoutthe consent and against the will of the said owner in the aforesaid sum of P40,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
2

During the arraignment held on February 16, 2006, accused petitioners entered a plea of not guilty
tothe offense charged. Pre-trial was then conducted and closed on July 25, 2006. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented as one ofits witnesses a casual employee of the city government, Pablo
Salosod,who testified that on April 16, 2005 at around 1:30 a.m., while attending a wake at the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor, he was fetched and requestedby petitioner Tangian to accompany him
to the CEO. At the office garage, Salosod and his fellow garbage collectors were allegedly directed
by petitioners Tangian and Yongco to load car parts that petitioners considered aswaste items, the
subject items of the theft, on the truck driven by Tangian. They then drove to Tominobo, Iligan City
where the materials were unloaded in front of Delfin Junk Store, and before the truck left the shop,
Salosod allegedly saw petitioner Laojan giving a thumbs-up sign to Tangian. On the way back,
Tangian allegedly confessed to Salosod that it was Laojan who requested that the items be brought
at the junk shop. Another employee, Rommel Ocaonilla, corroborated the testimony of Salosod.
Prosecution witness Oliveros Garcia meanwhile testified witnessing the unloading of the items in
front of the junk store, after which, Laojan covered the items up with a sack. The following morning,
he allegedly saw Laojans brother-in-law, who coincidentally works at the shop, take the items
inside.
Witnesses Dioscoro Galorio and Atty. Ulysses Lagcao, employee and consultant of the city
government, respectively, testified that they conducted investigations relative to the incidentand
found out that the items stolen consisted of one Nissan transmission,one unit boom, one Nissan Ibeam, and one differential of Tamaraw, with total valuation of PhP 12,000. Upon their investigation,
they recommended tothe city legal officer the filing of the present criminal case against the three
petitioners.
Version of the Defense
In defense, petitioners testified intheir behalves. Their testimony is summarized by the CA in the
Decision now on appeal in the following wise:
Joel Yongco, 34, single, x x x and a casual employee, testified that, on August 9, 2004, he was
issued a Job Order and detailed at the Civil Security Unit (CSU). He was assigned to guard the
building installation of the CEO. On April 15, 2005, he was on duty with his companion, one Mr.
Quintana. They relieved Laojan and one Mr. Enumerables. Laojan gave him (Yongco) four gate
passes and saidthat the area would have to be cleared because the "Bacod" Iliganvehicle would be
arriving. Yongco read the entries on one of[the] gate passes. Theyread: "Loaded assorted scraps
with remark to be thrown atthe dump site." At the bottom of the gate pass was the "note" of
EngineerCabahug with the signatures of the guards, Laojan and Enumerables. From 5:00 PM to
12:00 midnight on April 15, 2005, there was only one shipment of scrap iron to the dump site. The
dump truck driven by Tangian entered the CEO premises at around 11:00 oclock in the evening of
the same date. Tangian went to the yard where the scrap iron were situated and asked Yongco to
accompany and help him. Tangian gathered the scrap materials and the four of them (Tangian,
Yongco, and the 2 helpers of Tangian) loaded the said scrap to the dump truck. At around 12:45
P.M., after loading the items, Tangian drove away without giving a gate pass to the guards on duty.

Yongco did not ask Tangian for a gate pass because Yongco had one companion in the guard house
to get the gate pass.
Julieto Laojan, 48, who was working in the CSU division for 20 years and assigned to guard the
CEO, testified that he was not on duty on April 15 and 16, 2005; he was on duty on April 14, 2005 at
7:00 A.M. up to April 15, 2005 of the same time. When Yongco and Quintana relieved him on April
15, 2005 at 7:00 in the morning, he gave the four gate passes which were used to ship outassorted
scrap irons to them to be kept for the file. Engineer Cabahug was the one who directed the removal
of the scrap iron because the area of the CEO would have to be cleared since new trucks for the
government were coming. His house, which was along the national highway, was about 40-50
metersaway from Delfin Junk Store. He knew Oliveros Garcia who was a kagawad of Tominobo,
Iligan City. Aside from that, Garcia had filed an ejectment case against him (Laojan), which was still
pending in court.
xxxx
Anecito Tangian, Jr., 59, garbage truck driver at the City Engineers Office for 16 years, testified that
his highest level of educational attainment was Grade I. It was his tour of duty on April 15, 2005 at
9:00 oclock in the evening up to April 16, 2005 at 6:00 oclock in the morning. At around 5:30 in the
morning of April 15, 2005, Laojan asked him to load scrap materials onto the garbage truck and to
bring them to the Delfin Junk Store in Tominobo. He asked Laojan if there were any problems about
the loading ofthe said items. Laojan answered that there were no problems about the loading of the
same, that the City Garbage would have to be cleared considering that "BACOD" trucks would be
arriving at thatarea. He followed Laojan because the latter was the guard at the City Garage. When
hearrived for duty at the City Garage at around 9:00 in the evening, Yongco asked him if Laojan
already informed him about the loading of the items. After that he checked up the garbage truck
while Yongco and the two helpers were loading the items. He did not know how many items were
loaded because he only helped the three of them during the loading of the differential. After loading
the scrap materials, Tangian and the two helpers drove away from the City Garage. They dropped by
the Cosmo Funeral Homes for more than an hour before they proceeded to Tominobo. When they
reached Delfin Junk Store, Laojan gave a thumbs-up sign to Tangian, which meant okay. He then
left and started his work collecting garbage.
3

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 11, 2008, the RTC held petitioners liable for qualified theft via conspiracy. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Julieto Laojan, Anecito Tangian,
Jr., and Joel Yongco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft defined and
penalized under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and the said
accused are hereby sentencedto a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years, eight (8) monthsand
twenty (20) days of prision correccionalmaximum as the minimum term, to ten (10) years and eight
(8) months of prision mayormaximum, as the maximum term, of their indeterminate sentence
including the accessory penalties thereof.
SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioners, in their appeal, prayed that the CA reverse the RTC Decision. Petitioner
Tangian reiterated in his Brief that he should not be considered as a conspirator since he merely
innocentlyobeyed Laojans instructions on the assumption that the latter was his superior and that
Laojan was authorized to get rid of the scrap materials in the CEO premises and that he had no
criminal intent whatsoever.
In their joint brief, Yongco and Laojan also disclaimed the existence of a conspiracy. Yongco, in his
defense, argued that Tangian and his two other helpers asked for his assistance which he extended
ingood faith, in view of Laojans statement earlier that day that the office garage has to be cleared.
Laojan, on the other hand, insisted that he cannot be considered as a conspirator since he was not
present at the time of taking, and that the mere giving of a thumbs-up sign to Tangian when the latter
delivered the materials to the junk shop does not amount to conspiracy.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 21, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying petitioners appeals. In affirming
the RTC Decision in toto, the CA ruled that there was indeed conspiracy because Tangian could
nothave taken out the items without a gate pass, but with the security guard Yongcos participation,
he was able to do justthat. The CA also ruled that it is implausible that Tangian would just leave the
items in front of the junk shop unattended. Thus, the appellate court appreciated the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses that Laojans presence was not merely coincidental and that his thumbsup and his subsequent act of covering the materials with sacks indicate that the plan was for him to
receive the said items. Petitioners, via motion for reconsideration, sought the CAs reversal of the
Decision only for the appellate court to deny the same through its challenged Resolution dated
September 10, 2013.
Not contented with the adverted Decision of the CA as reiterated in the Resolution, petitioners
Yongco and Laojan jointly filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari while petitioner Tangian
separately filed his own. The two petitions were later consolidated by this Court for resolution
herein.
1wphi1

The Issue
As with most criminal cases, the main issue in the instant case is whether or not the CA erred in
sustaining petitioners conviction. Central to resolving this issue is determining whether or not there
indeed existed conspiracy between petitioners in committing the offense charged.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are bereft of merit.
Article 310, in relation to Art. 308,of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines Qualified Theft, thusly:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft.Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence, against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove
or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or
which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fishupon the
same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forestor farm products.
xxxx
ART. 310. Qualified Theft.The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fishtaken from a
fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (emphasis added)
Synthesizing the foregoing provisions, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse
of discretion, can simply be enumerated as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

As correctly observed by the appellatecourt, all of the elements of Qualified Theft are present in this
case, viz:
There is no dispute that the items (transmission, boom arm, differential assembly, and I-beam) which
are the subject matter of this case belong to the CEO of Iligan City. There is no dispute that these
items, although considered "heap of scrap," have not yet been declared unserviceable or waste by
the proper authority or office. Nor have they been marked for proper disposal. Unless properly
disposed in accordance with Section 379 of the Local Government Code, these items are still
government properties or owned by the City of Iligan.
1wphi1

There is also no dispute that these items were taken away from the CEO and were already under
completeand effective control of the persons taking the same. This is because these items were
loaded onto the garbage truck driven by Tangian and brought to Tominobo at the Delfin Junk Store.

Apparently, the taking of these items was without the consent of the CEO of Iligan City because
there was no gate pass issued to that effect. Evidence shows that when the garbage truck left the
premises of the CEO, no gate pass was surrendered by Tangian. Yongco did not bother to ask for a
gate pass on the pretext that there was another guard on duty at the gate.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the
offender of the thing subject to asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is
the intent to gain. Since these items werebrought to the junk store, intent to gain becomes obvious.
The presumption of animus lucrandihas not been overturned.
It is equally patent that the taking of these items was done with grave abuse of confidence. The
accused in this case, itbears stressing, were guards and drivers with access tothe entrance and exit
of the CEO premises. In other words,they enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed on them by their
employer (the City ofIligan) to haveaccess throughout the CEO premises on account of their
respective duties. More so since the primary function of the CSU is to guard the properties, including
the said items, of the CEO. It was this trust and confidence that was gravely abused by them that
makes the theft qualified.
6

Concisely stated, the fact of taking without consent is indubitable. Indeed, petitioners hinge their plea
for acquittal and supporting argument primarily on their lack of criminal intent and the observed
conspiracy.
Addressing the issue head on, We uphold the findings of the appellate court. No error can be
ascribed to the CA when it determined the existence of conspiracy between and among petitioners in
this case.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and
decide to commit it. Well-settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previousagreement is
not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, or after the commission
of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminaldesign,
as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidenceof a chain of circumstances.
7

In the case at bar, even though there is no showing of a prior agreement among the accused, their
separate acts taken and viewed together are actually connected and complementedeach other
indicating a unity of criminal design and purpose.
10

Tangians complicity in the illicit deedwas manifest from the fact, as he himself admitted, that he was
the one who personally transported the stolen items from the CEO to the junkshop. His claim that he
was not aware of any irregularity in the act he performed is rendered dubious by his 16 years of
service as truck driver for the City of Iligan. To be sure, his record of service argues against his claim
of ignorance of the standard protocol that a gate pass to be issued by the CEO property custodian
should first be secured before taking out items from the CEO compound, including alleged waste
materials. He should also know better than to assume that Laojan can authorize the withdrawal of
items without the requisite gate pass since Laojans duty, as security guard, is precisely to prevent
the same.
Similarly, Yongcos claim of good faith is belied by his own admission that he knew of the office
procedure that a gate pass is required every time something is taken out of the CEO premises. In

fact, four gate passes were given to him that morning by Laojan, covering waste materials
withdrawn during the latters shift. At the very least, this should have reminded him of his duty to
demand a gate pass for property leaving the CEO premises. Neither memory lapses orlapses in the
performance of his duty will explain Yongcos failure to demand a gate pass.The only viable
explanation is that he was in connivance with other petitioners.
11

Lastly, the RTC, with valid reason, tagged Laojan as having instigated and marshalled the entire
scheme. To quote the trial court:
x x x As shown above, it appears that Laojan broached the idea to Yongco that the items subject of
this case will be withdrawn under the pretext of clearing the CEO scrap yard of unserviceable waste
materials. Then Laojan gave Yongco 4 gate passes apparently to be used to coverup or
camouflage the actual withdrawallater that evening. Then Laojan told Tangian to load the items
under the same ploy of clearing the scrap yard of unserviceable waste materials and that they will
not encounter any problem. Finally, Laojan was seen by Brgy. Kag. Oliveros Garcia at 1:30 oclock
in the morning of April 16, 2005 receiving the items as they were dumped near the Delfin Junk
Store,Tominobo, Iligan City. After the items were dumped, Laojan then gave Tangian the "thumbsup" sign, meaning everything is okay clear proof of meeting of minds between Tangian and
Laojan, and their collusion to steal the items under the pretext of disposing unserviceable waste
materials. This non-verbal "thumbs-up" sign was also seenby the truck helper Salosod. x x x
12

In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Once conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are
answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their participation. The guilt of one
is the guilt of all. It is common design which is the essence of conspiracyconspirators may act
separately or together in different manners but always leading to the same unlawful result. The
character and effect of conspiracy are not to be adjudged by dismembering it and viewing its
separate parts but only by looking at it as a wholeacts done to giveeffect to conspiracy may be, in
fact, wholly innocent acts. Applying this doctrine in the case at bench, it can reasonably be
concluded that despite Laojans lack of physical participation in hauling the items to Tangians truck
and bringing them to the junk shop, he can still be liable for Qualified Theft via conspiracy. All told,
there is no cogent reason for us todisturb the findings of the appellate court, affirmatory of those of
the trial court.
13

14

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The CA's January 21, 2013 Decision and September 10, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No.
00549-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200334

July 30, 2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,

vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of
their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more
apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what
could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of
society.
Squarely raised in this appeal is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless
arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based on their
personal knowledge. The information as to the accuseds whereabouts was sent through a text
message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly
contained the contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without
the accused having been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within the
meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop
and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly,
and without improper pressure or coercion.
1

The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article III,
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence, the accused should
be acquitted.
I
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector
Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a
text message from an unidentified civilian informer" that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin
Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana" from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.
2

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." PSI Bayan ordered SPO1
Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint
in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. A passenger
jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatacs checkpoint. The jeepney driver
disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were
carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified
as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack
while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
5

10

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao
told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their
barriomatenamed Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks
of what looked like marijuana. Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet
gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the
bag." "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police
station." Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags" inside the station.
11

12

13

14

15

16

17

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit)
requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. Inside Cogaeds sack was "four (4) rolled pieces
18

of suspected marijuana fruiting tops," and inside Dayaos yellow bag was a brick of suspected
marijuana.
19

20

PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing. PSI Bayan personally
delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Forensic Chemical Officer Police
Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were
indeed marijuana. The marijuana collected from Cogaeds blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5
grams. The marijuana from Cogaeds sack weighed 4,246.1 grams. The marijuana collected from
Dayaos bag weighed 5,092 grams. A total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaeds and
Dayaos bags.
21

22

23

24

25

26

27

According to Cogaeds testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney
to take him" to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide. He boarded a jeepney and
recognized Dayao, his younger brothers friend. Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel,
Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney. Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaeds] help in
carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a sack." Cogaed agreed because they were
both going to the market. This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1
Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know. SPO1
Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation. Thereafter,
SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station. These facts
were corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot
where Cogaed was apprehended.
28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head." The bags were also
opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.
38

39

It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165. The information against them
states:
40

That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La
Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN
DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody and
possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four
hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165
(otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002").
41

The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union. Cogaed
and Dayao pleaded not guilty. The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14
years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344. Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision dated May 21,
2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
42

43

44

45

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the

"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and
to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).
46

The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaeds arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was
not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that hewas about to do so or
that had just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest." Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also
be considered illegal. However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest,
Cogaed "waived his right to object to such irregularity" when "he did not protest when SPO1
Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag."
47

48

49

50

Cogaed appealed the trial courts decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and
affirmed the trial courts decision. The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against
warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened
his bag." Hence, this appeal was filed.
51

52

53

The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellants brief:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN
UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE ARRESTING OFFICERS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE ARRESTING OFFICERS FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY
VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.
54

For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of
marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the search should be
admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the requirements on
the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.
55

We find for the accused.

II

The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many
dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and
seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the
requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause
that can only be determined by a judge. The existence of probable cause must be established by
the judge after asking searching questions and answers. Probable cause at this stage can only
exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by
the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched.
56

57

58

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules
of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. This
court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured." The
known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
59

60

61

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. (Citations omitted)
62

III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk"
searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of
Court. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto,
63

and the search conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to
ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.
64

On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals was similar "to a stop and frisk situation
whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." This court stated that the
"stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search
warrant."
65

66

67

The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all
the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches ) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
68

The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer
finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern based on facts that they themselves observe
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the
police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of
an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented by
people abusing drugs. When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes
and [who was] walking in a swaying manner." The suspicion increased when the man avoided the
police officers. These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on
drugs. These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and]
investigate."
69

70

71

72

73

74

In People v. Solayao, police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. This man was also
"wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit." Upon seeing the police, the man fled. His flight
added to the suspicion. After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade
firearm" in his possession. This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents
could not possibly have procured a search warrant first." This was also a valid search.
75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing
a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative
of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding
something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag.
The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the
driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:

COURT:
Q So you dont know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the passenger
jeep?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, Your Honor.

83

SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:

COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to believe that
the accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A No, Your Honor.

84

The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers
otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion
of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is
necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less
than this would be an infringementupon ones basic right to security of ones person and effects.
85

IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge
to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the
"stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious
circumstances as probable cause:
86

The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. (Emphasis supplied)
87

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of
suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged."
88

Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable
cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a "genuine reason" to serve the purposes of the
"stop and frisk" exception:
89

90

92

91

Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. (Emphasis supplied,
footnotes omitted)
93

In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely
on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than oneseemingly
innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one
suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.
94

95

96

97

98

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the
probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched
was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting
the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been
enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
V
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is
compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of
protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety
and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer. (Emphasis supplied)
99

The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons. As in Manalili, jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving
dangerous drugs.
100

101

The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant told the
police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus
terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged
that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The bag contained marijuana leaves.
102

103

104

105

106

107

108

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. There were no
suspicious circumstances that preceded Arutas arrest and the subsequent search and seizure. It
was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her. The evidence obtained was not
admissible because of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.
109

110

111

112

113

Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the polices informant,
who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. Here, the National Bureau
ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs. The NBI
waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a
boat. Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudins bag and found bundles of what
turnedout to be marijuana leaves. The court declared that the searchand seizure was
illegal. Aminnudin was acquitted.
114

115

116

117

118

119

People v. Chua also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been
receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles
City." One night, the police received information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the
Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. A car "arrived and parked" at the hotel. The
informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs. The man alighted from
his car. He was carrying a juice box. The police immediately apprehended him and discovered
live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding.
120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chuas situation when the
police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no validstop-and-frisk."
129

VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there
to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, withouta
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest was made. At
the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to
commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected,
"two elements must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert act indicating that he

has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done inthe presence or within the view of the arresting officer." Both elements were missing
when Cogaed was arrested. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
130

131

Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last
allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not
object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:
Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence
to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee. (Citations omitted) Cogaeds silence or lack of aggressive objection
was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officers excessive
intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the
waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all
cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
132

The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned again from
the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:
ATTY. BINWAG:
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their bags, is it
not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, maam.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?
A Yes, maam.
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?
A None, maam.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents ofthe bag,
you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?
A It seems they were frightened, maam.

Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it
not?
A Yes, maam but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised. (Emphasis supplied)
133

The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatacs responses to Judge
Florendos questions:
COURT:
....
Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was somewhat
frightened. He was a little apprehensive and when he was already stepping down and he put down
the bag I asked him, "whats that," and he answered, "I dont know because Marvin only asked me to
carry."
1wphi1

134

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police
officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer. The police officer must also
inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of
his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer
must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or
her constitutional rights. There must be anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a persons constitutional right to privacy
requires no less.
1wphi1

VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
135

Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this
constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule prohibits the issuance of
general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures." It ensures that
the fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon
and are upheld.
136

137

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags,
a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict
Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law
enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better. However,
we cannot, in any way, compromise our societys fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution.

Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to
protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union
and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he
is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188707

July 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MANUELITA AMPATUAN y GONZALES, ET AL., Accused,
MASTOR SARIP y MARUHOM and WARREN TUMOG y SAMPARADO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Under review is the conviction of the accused-appellants for illegal sale of shabu, illegal possession
of shahu and shabu paraphernalia, punishable under Sections 5, 11 (3), and 12, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as the "'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002". The challenged decision is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated 9 October 2007
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00356 MIN, which affirmed with modifications the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) dated 18 August 2003, in Criminal Case No. 51,765-2003, 51,766-2003, 51,7672003 and 51,768-2003.
1

The present case involves four (4) separate Amended Information charging accused-appellants
Manuelita Ampatuan (Manuelita), Warren Tumog (Warren) and Mastor Maruhom (Mastor), with
violation of R.A. No. 9165. The first Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 51,765-2003,
charged accused-appellants Manuelita, Warren and Mastor with violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A.No. 9165 or illegal sale of shabu.
The second Information, docketedas Criminal Case No. 51,766-2003, charged accused-appellant
Warren with violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia.
The third Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 51,767-2003, charged accused-appellant
Manuelita also with violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia.
The last Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 51,768-2003, charged accused-appellant
Manuelita with violation of Section 11 (3), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.
These four cases were tried jointly.

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

Version of the Prosecution
On 29 January 2003, police officers apprehended Edward Dujon (Dujon) for violation of R.A. No.
9165, which resulted to his detention at the Philippine Drug Enforcement Authority (PDEA) in Davao
City pending prosecution of his case.
While in detention, on 8 February 2003, Dujon approached Police Chief Inspector Wilkins Villanueva
(Chief P/Insp. Villanueva), Regional Director of the PDEA to give information on the alleged drug
activity of accused-appellant Manuelita and her group who are based in Cotabato City, as one of his
suppliers of shabu,.
To verify Dujons claim, Chief P/Insp. Villanueva ordered Dujon to contact Manuelita. When Dujon
was ableto talk to Manuelita, he ordered three (3) jumbo packs of shabu, consisting of 50 grams per
packet, and asked that it be delivered the following day. Manuelita agreed.
The following day, 9 February 2003, Manuelita called Dujon, informing him that she could not deliver
the three (3) jumbo packs of shabu due to lack of supply and that she only had one (1) jumbo sachet
in her possession. Manuelita asked Dujon to postpone the delivery for another day. When Manuelita
again failed to deliver on 10 February 2003, Dujon called Manuelita and asked that she deliver the
one jumbo sachet of shabu, worthP70,000.00, in Davao City. Manuelita agreed.
At around six oclock in the morning of 11 February 2003, Manuelita texted Dujon that she and her
men, accused-appellants Mastor and Warren, were already waiting for him inside a white pick-up
truck with plate number LBP 648 near Dimsum Diner on Guerrero Street, Davao City. Dujon
informed the PDEA about the arrival of Manuelita and her group. They immediately commenced the
entrapment operation. Dujon, driving his own car, proceeded to the Dimsum Diner, discreetly
followed by the PDEA operatives.
At the Dimsum Diner, Dujon and Manuelitas group agreed to conduct the delivery at Jogues
Apartelle("Jogues") in Juna Subd., Matina, Davao. The PDEA operatives went ahead to Jogues to
secure the area.
At around nine oclock in the morning, Dujon and Manuelitas convoy arrived at Jogues. Dujon, after
getting a room, went to Room No. 3 together with Manuelitas group. After a few minutes in Room
No. 3, they were informed to move to Room No. 2 as Room No. 3 had already been reserved.
In Room No. 2, the group tasted the sample shabu to test its quality. Satisfied with the quality, Dujon
asked Manuelita to wait for his assistant, who was already on his way to withdraw his money from
the bank. Manuelita then took out the headscarf she was clasping, opened it, and handed the jumbo
sachet with crystalline substance over to Dujon.
Meanwhile, when Dujon failed toupdate the PDEA as previously planned, PO1 Anthony Alpiz (PO1
Alpiz) peered through a window of Room No. 2. According to PO1 Alpiz, he clearly saw Manuelita
hand Dujon the jumbo sachet with crystalline substance. Upon seeing that the jumbo sachet with
crystalline substance was in Dujons possession, PO1 Alpiz, followed by other PDEA operatives,
rushed into Room No. 2.

After reading accused-appellants their constitutional rights, the PDEA operatives handcuffed them.
PO1 Alpiz confiscated the jumbo sachet with crystalline substance then proceeded to frisk accusedappellants and saw a black canister with kettle tube inside hanging from Warrens neck, which upon
examination, turned out to bea drug paraphernalia for sniffing shabu. On top of the table was
Manuelitas headscarf. Upon inspection, PO1 Alpiz discovered four pieces of aluminum foil, a lighter,
and a small sachet containing a crystalline substance, which later tested positive for shabu. After
seizure of the illegal drugs and paraphernalia, the PDEA operatives brought the accused-appellants
to the PDEA headquarters for investigation.
According to the Forensic Report executed by Chief P/Insp. Noemi Austero, Head of the Chemistry
Section:
3

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
"A"- White crystalline substance weighing 46.4490 grams contained in a transparent plastic.
"B"- White crystalline substance weighing 0.2284 gram[s] contained in a plastic sachet.
"C"- Three (3) pieces aluminum foil marked "C1" to "C3", each suspected to contain shabu residue.
"D"- One (1) black keyholder with test tube inside suspected to contain shabu residue. xxxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimens have POSITIVE result to the
test for Methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
CONCLUSION
Specimens "A", "B", "C1" to "C3" and "D" contain Methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug.
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellants deny the charges against them. They narrate as facts the following:
At around one oclock in the morning of 11 February 2003, Warren and Mastor set out for Davao
City, on board the pick-up truck of Warrens mother, to get the cellular phone of Warrens uncle.
While in Cotabato City, they passed by Manuelita, who was waiting for a ride to go to the bus
terminal going to Davao City for a medical check-up. Manuelita flagged down Warren and Mastor
and requested if she could ride with them to Davao City, to which the two acceded.
When they arrived in Davao City at around six oclock in the morning, Manuelita invited Warren and
Mastor to have breakfast at Chowking near Victoria Plaza Mall.
After having breakfast, they proceeded to see Warrens brother-in-law on Malvar Street to get his
uncles cellular phone. However, upon arrival, Warren discovered that the cellular phone has already
been sent to Cotabato City. Warren and Mastor then decided to go back to Cotabato City. When they

were about to drop-off Manuelita, Manuelita received a call from Dujon. Manuelita then asked
Warren and Mastor if they could drive her to Dimsum Diner to meet Dujon.
At the Dimsum Diner, Dujon invited the accused-appellants to his place at Jogues Apartelle to get
rest. When they arrived, they stayed in Room No. 3. Dujon told them to rest while he went outside to
get drinks. While they were making themselves comfortable, Warren noticed cigarettes, plastic
sachets and aluminum foils on top of the table and inquired about it. Manuelita informed Warren that
Dujon was a big time drug pusher in Davao City. When Dujon arrived, he placed the drinks on top of
the table and called somebody in his phone. After making a call, Dujon told the accused appellants
to transfer to Room No. 2 because Room No. 3 was already reserved. Dujon then borrowed
Manuelitas headscarf, wrapped it over the shabu and drug paraphernalia, brought the headscarf to
Room No. 2, and placed it on top of the table.
Inside Room No. 2, Dujon asked accused-appellants to taste the shabu, boasting its fine quality. The
accused-appellants initially declined, but Dujon was very insistent. Because of pakikisama, the
accusedappellants all sniffed the shabu. Feeling nervous, Warren and Mastor decided to go out of
the room. However, before opening the door, somebody knocked. When Dujon opened the door, the
police barged inside and arrested them.
Upon entering a not guilty plea to all the four sets of Information and after trial, the trial court ruled in
the following:
Wherefore, the Court finds and so rules that:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 51,765-2003, the three (3) accused Manuelita Gonzales y
Ampatuan, 47 years old, married, Filipino, a resident of 111 Sinsuat Avenue, Cotabato City,
Warren Samparado Tumog, 30 years old, married, Filipino, a resident of 18 Salisa Street,
Cotabato City, and Mastor Sarip Maruhom, 36 years old, married, Filipino, a resident of
Macapagal Street, Cotabato City, are hereby all found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt,
and are CONVICTED of the crime for Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. Each of them is hereby imposed a penalty of DEATH and a fine of SEVEN MILLION
PESOS (P7,000,000.00) EACH with all the accessory penalties corresponding thereto
including absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office for Mastor Sarip Maruhom
and Warren Samparado Tumog;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 51,766-2003 Warren Samparado y Tumog, 30 years old, married,
Filipino, a resident of 18 Salisa Street, Cotabato City, is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, and is CONVICTED for the crime of Violation of Section 12, Paragraph
(3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. He is hereby imposed a sentence of
IMPRISONMENT of FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of FIFTY Thousand Pesos (P50,00.00)
with all the accessory penalties corresponding thereto including absolute perpetual
disqualification form any public office;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 51,765-2003, Manuelita Gonzales y Ampatuan, 47 years old,
married, Filipino, a resident of 111 Sinsuat Street, Cotabato City, is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, and CONVICTED of the crime for Violation of Section 12,
Paragraph (3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. She is hereby imposed a sentence of
IMPRISONMENT of FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) with all the accessory penalties corresponding thereto and;

(4) In Criminal Case No. 51,768-2003, Manuelita Gonzales y Ampatuan, 47 years old,
married, Filipino, a resident of 111 Sinsuat Avenue, Cotabato City, is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, and CONVICTED of the crime for Violation of Section 11,
Paragraph (3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. She is hereby imposed a sentence of
IMPRISONMENT of TWENTY (20) YEARS and a fine of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P400,000.00) with all the accessory penalties corresponding thereto.
SO ORDERED.

On appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9 in Davao City finding
appellants Manuelita Ampatuan, Mastor Sarip and Warren Tumog for Violation of Republic Act No.
9165 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS that [a] in Criminal Case No. 51,765-2003, appellants
are sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine ofP500,000.00 each; [b] in
Criminal Case No. 51,766-2003, appellant Warren Tumog is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to two (2) years,
as maximum and to pay a fine of P50,000.00; [c] in Criminal Case No. 51,767-2003, appellant
Manuelita Ampatuan is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
six (6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to two (2) years, as maximum, and topay a fine
of P50,000.00; and [d] in Criminal Case No. 51,768-2003, appellant Manuelita Ampatuan is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P400,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

We deny the appeal.

Elements of Illegal Sale of ShabuDuly Established
The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as follows: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and payment therefor. The prosecution, to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must present in
evidence the corpus delictiof the case. The corpus delictiis the seized illegal drugs.
6

The duty of the prosecution is not merely to present in evidence the seized illegal drugs. It is
essential that the illegal drugs seized from the suspect is the very same substance offered in
evidence in court as the identity of the drug must be established with the same unwavering
exactitude as that required to make a finding of guilt.
7

This Court is convinced that the prosecution has sufficiently discharged its burden to establish the
elements in the illegal sale of shabu. The prosecution was able to establish the (1) identity of
accused-appellants as the sellers, and the buyer, Dujon; and (2) the object of the transaction, which
is the jumbo sachet of shabu, weighing 46.4490 grams; and the delivery of the sold illegal shabuto
Dujon, the poseur-buyer.
The absence of marked money does not run counter to the presented proof of illegal sale of
shabu. Lack of marked money is not an element to the crime of illegal sale of shabu. The marked
8

1wphi1

money used in the buy-bust operation, although having evidentiary value, is not vital to the
prosecution of the case. It is merely corroborative in nature. What is material to the prosecution of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the illegal sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delictias evidence. In the case at bar, the prosecution duly
established both.
9

Relative to the required proof of anunbroken chain of custody of the seized illegal shabuand
shabuparaphernalia, the parties agreed to stipulate on the relevant testimony of the witnesses, the
requestfor laboratory examination, machine copy blotter, inventory, photographs, and affidavits, all
attesting to the fulfillment of the requirement. Indeed, the defense never raised as defense any
break in the chain of custody of the seized shabu and drug paraphernalia.
10

The accused-appellants accuse the PDEA operatives of instigation. They submit that Dujon, as the
principal witness for the prosecution and poseur-buyer, lacks credibility, because heis engaged in the
illegal sale of shabu.
It is elementary that entrapmentand instigation are different. In instigation, the instigator induces the
would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment,
the means originates from the mind ofthe criminal. Otherwise stated, the idea and the resolve to
commit the crime come from the criminal. While in instigation, the law enforcer conceives the
commission of the crime and suggests the same to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it
into execution.
11

While it is true that it was Dujon, who initiated the illegal sale, it does not disprove the fact of illegal
sale and habitual activity of illegal sale of shabuof accused-appellants: the accused-appellants
brought the illegal shabuall the way from Cotabato to Davao, and handed the same to Dujon.
Evidently, the accused-appellants voluntarily resolved to commit the crimes as charged. Indeed,
what transpired in the instant case was a legitimate buybust operation and not instigation.
Furthermore, the defenses mere denial of the charges and allegations of instigation and frame-up
cannot prevail over the clear and unequivocal pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution. We
are not unaware of the common defenses of frame-up or instigation by police officers in illegal drugs
cases. However, because instigation and frame-up as a defense can easily be concocted and
fabricated, they are given little evidentiary value.
12

Accused-appellants were arrestedduring a buy-bust operation, in flagrante delicto. Thus, unless

there is clear and convincing evidence that the arresting officers have ill-motive, the presumption of
regularity shall prevail. The defense has not adduced any such evidence.
The qualification and credibility ofDujon as a principal witness cannot be assailed. The law has
specifically provided for the immunity of informants from prosecution and punishment. Section 33,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides:
Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of Republic Act No.
6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act of 1991, any person who has violated
Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19, Article II of this Act, who voluntarily gives information about any
violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II of this Act as well as any violation of the
offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading to the whereabouts,
identitiesand arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and who willingly testifies against such

persons as described above, shall be exempted from prosecution or punishment for the offense with
reference to which his/her information of testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of
such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided,That the following conditions
concur:
(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the persons described
above;
(2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points;
(4) the informant or witness has notbeen previously convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, except when there is no other direct evidence available for the State other than the
information and testimony of said informant or witness; and
(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without delay, any condition or
undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully imposed by the State as further consideration for
the grant of immunity from prosecution and punishment.
Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness who does not
appearto be most guilty for the offense with reference to which his/her information or testimony were
given: Provided, finally, That there is no direct evidence available for the State except for the
information and testimony of the said informant or witness.
The allegation that Dujon is engaged in illegal sale, indeed even the fact that Dujon is a detainee
charged with violation of the law is not a disqualification from immunity since such is not equivalent
to a previous "conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude."
Dujon, having all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the law, is eligible for
immunityfrom prosecution. While Dujon was part of the entrapment, the sale and possession of
dangerous drugs were proven solely by Dujons testimony but largely and importantly by the
testimony of the apprehending authorities and by the admitted documents.
WHEREFORE, We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00356-MIN
dated 9 October 2007 as to the imposable penalty. Thus:
1. Criminal Case No. 51,765-2003, accused-appellants, Warren Tumog and Mastor
Maruhom are sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00 each;
2. Criminal Case No. 51,766-2003, accused-appellant Warren Tumog is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day, as
minimum, to two (2) years, as maximum and to pay a fine of P50,000.00;
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178115

July 28, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, PASOT SALOLI, ERIC
ENOC, WARLITO MONTEBON,* and CIO LIMAMA, Accused,
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, and PASOT
SALOLI, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated July 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00187-MIN, which affirmed with modifications the Regional Trial Court's (RTC)
conviction of appellants Jojo Sumilhig (Jojo), Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig (Carding),
and Pasot Saloli (Pasot) in Criminal Case No. 3(99).
1

Factual Antecedents
Appellants, together with the accused Eric Enoc, Warlito Montibon and Cio Limama, were charged
with double murder and double frustrated murder in an Amended Information, the accusatory portion
of which reads:
3

That on or about October 31, 1998, inthe Municipality of Kiblawan, Province of Davao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with assortedfirearms, with intent to kill
with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
simultaneously strafe the house of Eugenio Santander resulting to death of [Cresjoy] Santander and
RollySantander and seriously wounding Marissa Santander and Micel Santander, which would have
caused their death had there been no timely and able medical assistance rendered to them, to the
damage and prejudice of the offended parties.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Only Jojo, Carding and Pasot, who entered separate pleas of "not guilty" during their
arraignment, faced trial. The other accused could not be located and remain at-large to this day.
5

Factual Antecedents
The prosecution established that onOctober 31, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., Jerry Masaglang (Jerry),
together with Eugenio Santander (Eugenio) and his son Mario, were in the living room of Eugenios
house in SitioOverland, Kimlawis, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Suddenly, they heard gun bursts and
saw six persons firing at the kitchen where members of the Santander family werehaving dinner.
Jerry and Mario recognized the assailants to be the appellants and their co-accused.
The strafing of the kitchen lasted for about two minutes. Before the gunmen dispersed, Jojo shouted,
"At last, I have retaliated!" In the aftermath, the children of Eugenios other son Remegio Santander
(Remegio), 3-year old Cresjoy, 8-year old Rolly, and teeners Marissa and Micel, sustained gunshot
wounds. Unfortunately, Cresjoy expired while on the way to the hospital while Rolly was pronounced
6

dead-on-arrival. Marissa sustained gunshot wounds atthe right breast area and left wrist, while Micel
was wounded inthe left sternal area and elbow.
Jojo denied involvement in the incident and interposed the defense of alibi. At the time of the
incident, he claimed to be in the house of his parents-in-law in SitioOlogo-o, BarangayTacub,
Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. He further asserted that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime on October 31, 1998 since he could not walk briskly due to a gunshot wound he earlier
sustained in his left knee and anus. He maintained that it was only in January 1999 that he was able
to walk without the aid of crutches. However, Jojo admitted harboring ill-will against the Santander
clan since he believed that they were the ones responsible for the massacre of his family in February
1998.
Carding, for his part, claimed to be illiterate and unaware of the incident. He contended that at the
time of the shooting, he was in Dalmandang, Tacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, which is four-hours
walk away from the crime scene. Pasot, on the other hand, maintained that he was withhis wife at
the house of Pablo Mot in Lampara, Balasiao, Kiblawan, Davao atthe time the crime was committed.
Bothclaimed total ignoranceof the incident.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC convicted the appellants ofthe complex crime of double murder and double frustrated
murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death. It further ordered them to indemnify,
jointlyand severally, the heirs of Cresjoy and Rolly the sum of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and the
surviving victims, Marissa and Micel, the sums of P50,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, respectively.
8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the RTC. However, it found merit
in appellants argument that the crime committed could not have been a complex crime since the
death and injuries complained of did not result from a single act but from several and distinctacts of
shooting. And as treachery was alleged in the Amended Information and sufficiently proven during
trial, appellants should be convicted instead of two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder. Thus, in rendering its Decision dated July 28, 2006, the CA disposed ofthe case as follows:
9

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of appellants Jojo Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and
Pasot Saloli is affirmed butmodified as follows
Appellants Juan "Jojo" Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli, are found guilty
beyondreasonable doubt of:
a. Murder for killing Crisjoy Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua;
b. Murder for the killing of Rolly Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua;
c. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Marissa Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and [ten] (10) days of prision mayoras

minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporalas maximum; d. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Micel Santander and x x x are
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of
prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporalas maximum. All accused are ordered to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of Crisjoy Santander and Rolly Santander the sum of P100,000.00 and the
surviving victims Marissa Santander and Micel Santander P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.

10

Hence, this appeal.

Since there is no more dispute that appellants should not have been convicted of the complex crime
of double murder and frustrated murder as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) already
concedes to the same, the only error left from those raised by appellants in their brief is as follows:
11

GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY, THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY WAS PRESENT AND INFINDING THAT THE
CRIMES COMMITTED WERE MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.
12

It must be noted at the outset that Carding diedon June 24, 2011 during the pendency of this
appeal. "[I]n view of [this] supervening event, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on [Cardings]
appeal. Whether x x x he was guilty of the [crimes] charged has becomeirrelevant since, following
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, x x x, even assuming [that Carding] had incurred any
criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because [the] appeal was still
pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him [before] he died, his civil
liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto,was likewise extinguished by his death."
13

14

Appellants Arguments
Appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying heavily on the ill-feelings and vendetta Jojo harbored
against the Santander family. They contend that this motive for committing the crime is not a
substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, Jojosalibi that it was impossible for him to
be at the crime scene due to the gunshot wounds in his knee and anus is amply corroborated by a
medical prognosis.
Anent Pasot, appellants argue that although the trial court found his claim of total ignorance on
almost about everything to beincredulous, still, his conviction must not rest on the weakness of his
defense but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence.
Appellants likewise question the finding of conspiracyand treachery.
Our Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Appellants conviction was based on
their positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses.
True, the RTC noted in its Decision the existence of motive on the part of Jojo for committing the
crime as well as Pasots incredulous claim of ignorance on almost about everything. It is well to note,
however, that the said court neither based the appellants conviction on the existence of such motive
nor on Pasots weak defense of ignorance alone, but upon the prosecution witnesses identification
of appellants as the assailants, viz:
Assessing the evidence presented by both [P]rosecution and defense, we see a less than glaring
hint of vendetta. As part of his defense, the accused Jojo Sumilhig narrated that his family was
massacred by Jerry Santander, brother of Remigio Santander [in] February 1998. Short of admitting
the crime, Sumilhig stated that because of this, he harbored ill feelings not only against Jerry and
Carlos Santander but also against their family. Thus a clear motive for killing the Santander family
has been established giving credence to prosecution witnesses allegation that after the strafing Jojo
Sumilhig shouted"Nakabalos na ko!" The likelihood of his intention to wipe out the said family
became even more apparent.
Despite his positive assertion that it was the Santanders that killed his family, he did not file any case
against them. It was only after he was arrested that he filed a complaint against Jerry and Carlos
Santander.
His alibi likewise failed to meet the stringent requisites of the Rules. Even as Dr. Quirapas appeared
determined to rule out the possibility that he could walk without crutches five months after his
discharge, the same was based on general medical prognosis. Such prognostication admits certain
exception[s], as could be gleaned from the testimony of the doctor himself that the healing period
may vary depending on the age and physical condition of the patient. Notably Jojo Sumilhig was
then 23 years old.
What was certain was the positive identification made by Jerry Masaglang and Remegio Santander
of all of the accused.
The "overkill" by which the accused Pasot Saloli and Carding Sumilhig claimed total ignorance of
almost anything only served to arouse incredulity. Both accused claimed they could not read, write,
tell time, day, month or year. Neither could [they] allegedly speak [or] understand Visayan, which is
of common knowledge to be widely spoken in almost every part of Mindanao. Saloli claimed he did
not know what day [it] was when he was testifying, or the day before and after that. Both claimed
they did not know the complainants or of the massacre that took place.
xxxx
More importantly, these claims [of] utter ignorance are belied by the evasiveness by which all three
accused answered in obvious effort to avoid criminal responsibility. Behind the faade of ignorance
and lack of education lurks a calculating mind. We find [it] difficult to ascribe innocence to the
accused when traces of ingenuity and craftiness characterize their testimonies.

All these observations however become insignificant in the face of the positive and spontaneous
identification of the assailants/accused by credible witnesses Jerry Masaglang and Remigio
Santander.
15

There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Marios identification of the appellants considering that (1)
Jerry was just six meters away from them; (2) the moon was bright and Jerry was familiar with all
the accused as most of them are his relatives; and, (3) Mario knows Jojoever since he was
small. Besides, "[t]ime-tested is the rulethat between the positive assertions of prosecution
witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former undisputedly [deserve] more
credence and [are] entitled to greater evidentiary weight."
16

17

18

19

Anent the respective alibis interposed by appellants, suffice it to say that "[a]libi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of a credible witness."
20

There was conspiracy among the accused.

"[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it." It is not necessary to adduce evidence of a previous
agreement to commit a crime. "Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such leadto a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community
of interest."
21

22

23

Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but there is a series of events
that clearly established conspiracy among them. First, they were all armed with firearms. Second,
they surreptitiously approached the crime scene. Third, when they were within close range of the
intended victims, they simultaneously discharged their firearms. Fourth, they ceased firing at the
same time and fled together. Undoubtedly, their acts before, during and immediately after strafing
the house of Eugenio evince their unanimity in design, intent and execution. Treachery attended the
commission of the crime.
24

"There is treachery whenthe offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods orforms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the
execution, without risk to himself arising from [any] defense which the offended party might make."

25

Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault deprived the
victims of an opportunity to resist it or offer any defense of their persons. This is considering that the
victims were unaware that they would be attacked by appellants with a hailof bullets from their
firearms fired at close range. Indeed, "[t]he suddenness of the attack, without the slightest
forewarning thereof, placed the [victims] x x x in such a position that they could not have defended
themselvesfrom the aggression x x x."
26

The crime committed is two counts of

murder and two counts of frustrated
murder.
As earlier discussed, treachery attendedthe commission of the crime. This qualifies the killing of
Cresjoy and Rolly to murder.

With regard to Marissa and Micel, the Court notes that while the RTC was silent as to the nature of
injuries sustained by them, the CA correctly ruled on the seriousness thereof. The Medico Legal
report of Marissa shows that she suffered multiple gunshot wounds in her right breast and left
wrist while the Certificate of Treatment/Confinement of Micel states that she sustained gunshot
wounds in the area of the sternum and elbow. As aptly found by the CA, the girls would have died if
not for the timely medical attention provided to them. The crimes committed by the appellants
against them were thus frustrated murders.
27

28

The Penalty
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion
perpetuato death. With both penalties being indivisible and there being no aggravating circumstance
other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the lower of the two penalties which is reclusion
perpetua was properly imposed by the CA on appellants for each count of murder. However,
appellants are not eligible for parole.
1wphi1

29

30

As regards the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the penalty lesser by one degree shall be
imposed on appellants. Accordingly, the penalty that must be imposed is reclusion temporalfor each
count of frustrated murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of
modifying circumstances other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the maximum penalty
shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, which has a range of fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayorin any of its
periods, the range of which is from six (6) years,one (1) day to twelve (12)years. The prison term
imposed by the CA on appellants must therefore be modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporalas maximum, which is within these ranges, for each count of frustrated murder.
31

32

Awards of Damages
For the murders of Cresjoy and Rolly, the CA correctly held that their heirs are entitled to an award of
civil indemnity, however, the amount of the award must be P75,000.00 for each death pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence. The awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each and
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 each are proper. In addition, the heirs of the
victims are entitled to temperate damages in the sum of P25,000.00 for each death in lieu of actual
damages.
33

34

35

For the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the awards of moral and exemplary damages by
the CA must be decreased to P40,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively for each victim. They are
likewise entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 each in lieu of actual
damages.
36

37

All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annumfrom the date of finality of
thisjudgment until fully paid.
38

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00187-MIN which
affirmed withmodification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of DigosCity, Davao del Sur,
Branch 19, finding appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of murder and two counts offrustrated murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONSas follows:

For the murders of Cresjoy Santander and Rolly Santander:

(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall suffer the prison tenn of reclusion
perpetua for each count of murder without eligibility for parole;
(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims the amount
of P5,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of each victim;
(3) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims P25,000.00 as
temperate damages for each death.
For the frustrated murders of Marissa Santander and Micel Santander:
(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count
of frustrated murder; and,
(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are ordered to pay moral damages and
exemplary damages to each of the victims in the reduced amounts of P40,000.00
and P25,000.00, respectively.
All amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum commencing
from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
Due to the death of Ricardo Swnilhig alias Carding Sumilhig prior to final judgment, his criminal
liability and civil liability ex delicto as found by the Regional Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are extinguished. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 3(99) is ordered dismissed insofar as
Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig is concerned.
Costs against appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208623

July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
VIRGILIO ANTONIO y RIVERA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on October 8, 2012 in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 04149 affirming, albeit with modification8 as to the damages imposed, the
Judgment dated September 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Branch 4,
in Criminal Case Nos. 10244-10245, convicting Virgilio Antonio y Rivera (accused-appellant) of two
counts of Rape committed against AAA, a minor.
1

Antecedents
Two separate informations for rape were filed against the accused-appellant before the RTC, viz:
Criminal Case No. 10244
That on or about and sometime in the year 2001, in the Municipality of Alcala, Cagayan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, VI[R]GILIO ANTONIO, with lewd design
and by the use of force, threat, and intimidation, did [then] and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the offended party, [AAA], a minor 14 years of age against
her will.
5

That in the commission of the offense[,] the aggravating circumstance of uninh[a]bited place was
present.
Contrary [to law].

Criminal Case No. 10245

That on or about August 26, 2003, in the Municipality of Alcala, Province of Cagayan[,] within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, VIRGILIO ANTONIO,being then the guardian
of the private complainant [AAA], a minor 14 years of age[,] who was then under his care and
custody[,] with lewddesign and by the use of force, threat and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the offended party, [AAA], a minor
14 years of [age] against her will.
Contrary to law.

The accused-appellant entered a not guilty plea during the arraignment.

On February 23, 2005, pre-trial was conducted. The prosecution proposed for the parties to stipulate
on the following, which the defense admitted: (a) the identity of the accused-appellant; (b) his
relationship as AAAs godfather; (c) the dates, times and places of the commission of rape; and (d)
AAAs minority at the time the crimes were allegedly perpetrated.
8

The prosecution marked and offered: (a) AAAs birth certificate indicating that she was born on May
28,1989; (b) the medicolegal certificate dated September 2,2003, which was preparedby Dr. Rafael
Sumabat (Dr. Sumabat); and (c) AAAs affidavit. The defense, on its part, offered no documentary
evidence.
9

In the joint trial that ensued, the prosecution offered the testimonies of AAA and Dr. Sumabat. On the
other hand, the accused-appellant was the defenses lone witness.
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) aptly summed up the prosecutions version of the events
as follows:

In March of 2001, eleven[-]year old [AAA] began living with [accused-appellants] family in
Maraburab, Alcala, Cagayan Province after her parents had separated. [Accused-appellant] and his
wife, Rose, are [AAAs] godparents[,] who treated her as one of their own children x x x. Sometime in
April 2001, [accused-appellant], who maintains a farm in the highlands of Cagayan, asked [AAA] to
help him harvest palay there. Alone together, [accused-appellant] and [AAA], started for the farm
very early that April morning. After an hours walk, they reached the place and immediately began to
harvest palay x x x.
Just before lunch time, [accused-appellant] led [AAA] to a bamboo grove within the farm. Once
there, hethreatened to kill her if she told anyone regarding what he was about to do. [Accusedappellant] lost no time in making [AAA] lie down. After which, he took off her shorts and underwear.
Although very much alarmed, he likewise removed his own shorts and underwear. [AAA] could not
do anything as she was afraid because they were alone x x x.
With both their private parts now uncovered, [accused-appellant] inserted his penis into [AAAs]
vagina. She felt pain course through her genitals. Helpless, [AAA] could only cry and mutter "aray".
After awhile, she felt liquid emitting from [accused-appellants] penis. Satiated, [accused-appellant]
threatened [AAA] with death once again if she reveals to anyone that he had abused her. They went
home later that afternoon. Fearful of [accused-appellants] threat, [AAA] did not dare to reveal to
anyone regarding her ordeal and went on to stay with [accused-appellant] and his family x x x.
On the evening of August 26, 2003, Rose Antonio, together with her two children with [accusedappellant], went to the town proper of Alcala to celebrate its fiesta. [AAA]and [accused-appellant]
were left alone in the house on that night. She went to bed around eight in the evening. However,
around 10PM, she was awakened by the weight of [accused-appellant] bearing down on her body.
[Accused-appellant] was wearing a shirt and nothing else. She realized to her horror that her shorts
and underwear had already been removed. [Accused-appellant] soon began to insert his penis into
her vagina. He made a push-pull movement for awhile. [AAA] was not able to shout a single word
inside the room which had no light on x x x.
[In] the morning of August 27, 2003, May Dumalay, [accused-appellants] niece, confronted[AAA]
regarding her suspicions that something happened between her and [accused-appellant]. [AAA]
finally admitted that [accused-appellant] had raped her. May Dumalay then told [accused-appellants]
wife, Rose Antonio what [AAA] related to her. In turn, Rose Antonio told [AAAs] father regarding the
unfortunate developments. When her father and the barangay captain of Maraburab confronted
[AAA], she told all the incidents of sexual abuse committed by [accused-appellant] x x x.
On August 28, 2003, Barangay Captain Rey De Luna of Maraburab accompanied [AAA] to the local
office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). After being interviewed, [AAA]
was brought to the police station in Alcala[,] Cagayan x x x. Eventually, she was examined by the
Medico-legal Officer of Alcala, Dr. Rafael Sumabat x x x. His findings on [AAA] were: 1) On
examination[,] abdomen is soft, palpable mass noted. External genitalia and thighs are normal. No
evidence of trauma; 2) On examination of genitalia, there are old lacerations of hymen at 3-6-9
oclock respectively; 3) Vagina admits one finger easily and presence of whitish secretions inside
vagina. Pregnancy test negative x x x.
10

Version of the Defense

The accused-appellant was vehement in denying the charges against him. He insisted that AAA only
started living with them in May of 2002. Hence, he could not have perpetrated the rape ascribed to
him which allegedly occurred in April of 2001. As to what transpired in August of 2003, he narrated
that Rose, his wife, and AAA left their house to attend a town fiesta on August 25, 2003. The two
returned home drunk on August 28, 2003. Rose and the accused-appellant then had a fight because
the latter received an information that the former and AAA had a male companion while attending the
town festivities. Rose and AAA denied the accusation, which irked the accused-appellant, who in
turn ordered the two to leave their house.
11

Ruling of the RTC

On September 4, 2009, the RTC rendered a Judgment convicting the accused-appellant of two
counts of rape. The trial court found that AAA had no ill motive to testify against the accusedappellant, whom she had considered as her guardian or foster father. Further, AAAs testimony as to
the sordid acts committedby the accused-appellant was spontaneous and categorical, and her
statements were corroborated by Dr. Sumabats medical findings. On the other hand, the accusedappellants defenses of denial and alibiwere weak and could not prevail over AAAs positive
testimony. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision thus reads:
12

ACCORDINGLY, accused VIRGILIO ANTONIOy Rivera is hereby found GUILTYbeyond reasonable

doubt for the crime of Rape for two (2) counts, in Criminal Case Nos. 10244 and 10245 defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659 and
further amended by Republic Act No. 8353; and Article 266 (A) No. 1 in relation to Article 266 (B) No.
1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case; to pay [AAA] the amount of ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND ([P]150,000[.00]) PESOS as civil indemnity, ONEHUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
([P]150,000.00) PESOS as moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND ([P]50,000.00) PESOS as
exemplary damages.
The preventive imprisonment of the accused shall be credited in full in his favor if he abided in
writing by the rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

13

The Contending Parties Arguments Before the CA

The accused-appellant challenged the above disquisition before the CA. He pointed out that
according to AAA herself, Dr. Sumabat performed a physical examination on her on August 29, 2003,
or three days after the alleged second rape incident occurred. However, this did not complement Dr.
Sumabats explanation that the healed lacerations at "3-6-9 oclock" positions could have been
inflicted at least seven days prior to the examination. The accused-appellant further claimed that it
was unusual for a rape victim, whose virtue was allegedly at stake, not to have (a) shouted at all to
repel the sexual advances, (b) tried to escape when she had the chance to do so, and (c) prevented
at all cost that she be left alone in the company of her assailant.
14

The OSG, on its part, argued that AAAs failure to shout during the rape incidents should not affect
the credibility of her claims. AAA was then a minor, and understandably, she must have been

overcome by feelings of helplessness especially since her assailant is her godfather and de facto
guardian. AAA likewise cried during the trial dispelling insinuations that her testimony was
rehearsed.
15

Ruling of the CA
On October 8, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the accused-appellants conviction and
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetuafor each of the two counts ofrape. However, for
each count, the CA reduced the award of (a) civil indemnity to P50,000.00, (b) moral damages
to P50,000.00, and (c) exemplary damages to P30,000.00.
16

The CA declared that any inconsistency in AAAs testimony anent the date she was examined by Dr.
Sumabat was not enough to destroy her credibility. As a child witness, she cannot be expected to
perfectly remember all the details of her harrowing experience. Besides, Dr. Sumabat merely made
nothing more but a rough estimate that AAAs hymenal lacerations could have been inflicted at least
seven days prior to the examination. Citing People v. Corpuz, the CA emphasized that AAA was
intimidated by the accused-appellant and her alleged lack of resistance did not signify voluntariness
or consent to the sexual advances.
17

Anent the appreciation of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the informations, the CA slightly
differed from the RTC in the following wise:
In Our review of the penalty imposed on [accused-appellant], We have noted that the trial court
considered the qualifying aggravating circumstance of relationship, since [accused-appellant] is
supposedly the guardian of [AAA].
In People v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that the guardian must be a person who has legal
relationship with his ward. The court adhered to the theory that a guardian must beone who has
been legally appointed.
In this case, however, We note withgreat significance that the fact of being a guardian was not
alleged inthe Informations as a qualifying aggravating circumstance. Instead, there was merely a
stipulation during the pre-trial hearing that accused-appellant was the "godfather" of [AAA], without
showing that accused-appellantwas legally constituted in law as the "guardian" of [AAA]. On the
other hand, the factof minority of [AAA] has been proven by her birth certificate and confirmed by her
physical appearance.
Consequently, on the first count of rape, We find the existence of the aggravating circumstances of
minority of [AAA] and commission of the sexual abuse in an uninhabited place. On the second count
of rape, We find the fact of minority of [AAA] as the sole aggravating circumstance. Both crimes are
penalized by Reclusion Perpetua. However, We shall reduce the award of civil indemnity
from P75,000.00 to 50,000.00 and moral damages fromP75,000.00 to P50,000.00, for each count of
rape since accused-appellantis only guilty of simple rape. On the other hand, the award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00, for each count
of rape in line with the recent jurisprudence, to set an example for public good. (Citations omitted)
18

Issue

Aggrieved, the accused-appellant is now before this Court once again insisting on his innocence and
reiterating the issue of whether or not his guilt for allegedly having raped AAA on two
separateoccasions was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused-appellant and the OSG both dispensed with the filing of supplemental briefs and
merely adoptedtheir respective arguments raised before the CA.
Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms the CAs verdict, but modifies the same by imposing interests upon the damages
awarded to AAA.
"It is a fundamental rule that the trial courts factual findings, especially its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and binding upon thisCourt,
particularly when affirmed by the [CA]. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in
the best position to assess the credibilityof witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique
position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment
on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied tothe appellate courts. Only the trial judge
can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These are significant factors in evaluating
the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally
not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, mightaffect the result of the case."
19

"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was
accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation; or (b) when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the victim is twelve years of age, or is demented."
20

"[I]n rape through force or intimidation, the force employed by the guilty party need not be irresistible.
Itis only necessary that such force is sufficient to consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted.
Similarly, intimidation should be evaluated in light of the victims perception at the time of the
commission of the crime. Itis enough that it produced the fear in the mind of the victim that if she did
not yield to the bestial demands of her ravisher, some evil would happen to her at that moment or
even thereafter. Hence, what is important is that because of force and intimidation, the victim was
made to submit to the will of the appellant."
21

In the case at bar, the Court findsthe RTC and CAs factual findings as sufficiently supported by
evidence and jurisprudence.
The following is AAAs account of the rape incident which happened in April of 2001:
Q: What was that incident thathappened while you and your ninong were in the mountain?
A: We went in the bamboo groves, sir.
Q: And when you reached the bamboo groves, what happened there[,] madam witness?
COURT: Make it of record that the witness started crying.

A: My ninong threatened me, sir.

Q: How did he threaten you?
A: He told me that he will kill me if I will report the matter to anybody, sir.
Q: After he uttered those threatening words to you, what happened next if there was any?
A: He laid me down, sir.
Q: After that[,] what happened next when he laid you down?
A: After he laid me down, he removed my short pants and my underwear and after that[,] he
removed his pants and brief, sir.
Q: When he was removing his pants and brief, why did you not ran (sic) away?
A: Because I was afraid because nobody was there[.] [W]e do (sic) not have any companion, sir.
Q: After removing his pants and brief, what happened next?
A: He inserted his private part into my vagina, sir.
Q: What was your position when he inserted his penis in your vagina[?]
A: I was lying down, sir.

22

AAA likewise recounted the second rape incident, which occurred on August 26, 2003, viz:
Q: You said that you were left behind in the house of your uncle the night of August 26, 2003[.][W]hat
time[,] if you can still recall[,] when you went to bed to sleep?
A: 8:00 oclock, sir.
Q: How about your ninong Virgilio Antonio[?] [W]here was he when you went to sleep[,] madam
witness?
A: He also went to sleep, sir.
Q: Do you recall if your sleep was interrupted?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What time [was that] when you were awaken? (sic)
A: About 10:00 oclock in the evening, sir.
Q: Why, what happened during that night?

A: When I woke up, I noticed thatmy ninong was on top of me, sir.
Q: Can you describe his appearance when he was on top of you?
A: He moved in a push and pull position.
Q: Was he with his pants at that time?
A: He has (sic) his t-shirt but he was naked down.
Q: What were you wearing when you slept that night?
A: T-shirt and underwear, sir.
Q: What about your clothing[?] [W]hat happened with your clothing?
A: When I woke up[,] I [no longer had] my short[s] and panty.
Q: When you noticed that you werealready naked, did you not shout?
A: I shouted, sir.
Q: What did you utter when you shouted?
A: I did not shout, sir.
Q: Aside from noticing that you were naked down, what did you notice?
A: He inserted his penis in my vagina, sir.
Q: How long did he insert his penis in your vagina?
A: I cannot remember because I was sleeping at that time, sir.
Q: Can you describe his body movementwhen he inserted his penis in your vagina?
A: He was doing the push and pull movement[,] sir.

23

"The eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-virgin
state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her charges."
24

AAAs testimonies on the two rape incidents were impressively straightforward and categorical. In
April of 2001, while in the farm up in the mountain, the accused-appellant threatened her with death.
Against her will, he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. In her statements regarding the
second rape incident on August 26, 2003, AAA did not mention that the accused-appellant
threatened to kill her. Nonetheless, the accused-appellants moral ascendancy over AAA takes the
place of the force and intimidation that is required in rape cases. It is expected that for a minor like
AAA, fear and memories from her previous harrowing experience already loomed over her. They
1wphi1

25

weremore than enough to cow her to submission at the time of the second rapeincident. This is
especially true here where the accused-appellant is AAAs own godfather and de facto guardian.
In the physical examination performed after the second rape incident, Dr. Sumabat found lacerations
in AAAs hymen. The accused-appellant alleged that there were inconsistencies in the dates of the
commission of the crime, on one hand, and the conduct of the physical examination, on the other.
However, this stance, taken together with the accused-appellants uncorroborated defenses of denial
and alibi, pales vis--visAAAs positive testimony and the medical evidence which prove that, indeed,
AAAs hymen sustained lacerations, albeit healed. As we held in People v. Laog,
1wphi1

26

Discrepancies referring only to minordetails and collateral mattersnot to the central fact of the
crimedo not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses declarations,
as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. For a discrepancy or
inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond
doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. It cannot be overemphasized that the
credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her
testimony. (Citations omitted)
27

The Court agrees with the CAs findings that only the generic aggravating circumstances of
commission of the crime in an uninhabited place and minority can be appreciated relative to the first
rape incident. As regards the second rape incident, guardianship was alleged in the information and
was not assailed by the defense. The Court notes, too, that the parties stipulated during the pre-trial
that the accused-appellant was AAAs godfather. Notwithstanding the foregoing, jurisprudence
strictly dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship with his ward, which
does not obtain in the case before this Court. Ineluctably, guardianship cannot be considered as a
qualifying circumstance and the accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape.
28

29

30

Nonetheless, this Court sustains the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the RTC and CA on
the accused-appellant for each of the two counts of rape which he committed. The aggravating
circumstances of minority and commission of the crime in an uninhabited place were present as
regards the first rape incident. The second rape was,on the other hand, aggravated by minority
alone since legal guardianship was not proven. The aggravating circumstances attendant in the
instant case are all merely generic and not qualifying. Generic aggravating circumstances increase
the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same o the next higher
degree. In the accused-appellant's case, the two counts of rape were committed through the use of
force and intimidation. The crime falls under Article 266-A(l)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Article
266-B of the same code provides that the said crime is punishable by reclusion perpetua, which is
an indivisible penalty. Therefore, despite the attendance of generic aggravating circumstances, the
penalty imposable upon the accused-appellant for each count of rape remains the same.
31

32

In precis, the Court finds no compelling ground to reverse the accused-appellant's conviction for two
counts of simple rape by both the RTC and the CA. The Court likewise finds proper the CA's
modification of the amount of civil indemnity and damages imposed by the RTC. However, to
conform to prevailing jurisprudence, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all the damages
awarded shall be imposed, to be computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
33

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 2012, in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 04149, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Virgilio Antonio y Rivera is directed

to pay interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on all the damages awarded to AAA, to be
computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 207818

July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALEX DE LOS SANTOS, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision dated September 17, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 03790 which affirmed the Judgment dated January 7, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 1165-T, convicting Alex De Los Santos
(accused-appellant) of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
1

The Facts
Accused-appellant was indicted for killing one Fernando A. Catriz (Catriz) through an information
articulating the following criminal charges, viz:
That on or about April 06, 2004, inthe Municipality of Tuao, Province of Cagayan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused ALEX De LOS SANTOS y AGINAWAN armed
with long bolo with intent to kill, with treachery and treachery, (sic) did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack FERNANDO A[.] CATRIZ, inflicting upon him
several hack wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death. CONTRARY TO
LAW.
3

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant entered a "not guilty" plea. Pre-trial and trial thereafter
ensued. The prosecution presented the testimonies of Reynaldo Bayudan (Bayudan), the victims
nephew and an eyewitness to the incident, and Dr. Exuperio Yuaga (Dr. Yuaga), Municipal Health
Officer of Tuao, Cagayan. The prosecution also adopted the testimony of Eduardo Archibido which
was presented during the hearing on the petition for bail. Taken together with documentary evidence
marked as Exhibits A to E, the evidence for the prosecution showed that:
Catriz and the accused-appellant werebrothers-in-law. The formers wife was the latters sister. At
about 4:00 p.m. of April 6, 2004, Catriz and Bayudan were at BarangayMungo, Tuao, Cagayan,
unloading culled cob chickens from a Toyota Tamaraw vehicle. While Bayudan and Catriz were
transferring the chickens into a cage beside the vehicle, the accused-appellant suddenly appeared
behind Catriz and hacked him on his right shoulder with a tabas(long-bladed bolo). The impact from
the blow caused the handle of the tabasto dislodge thus enabling Catriz to run towards the nearest
house. The accused-appellant, however, drew a "Rambo-type" knife, pursued Catriz and repeatedly

stabbed him until he fell. Pleading for his life, Catriz kneeled infront of the accused-appellant and
asked him to stop. His pleas were not heeded though and the accused-appellant continued stabbing
him until he fell again on the ground. Upon seeing the lifeless Catriz, the accused-appellant jumped
and exclaimed: "Happy New Year, natayen ni Ferdie!" (Happy New Year, Ferdie is dead!). The
accused-appellant thereafter went to a nearby pump well and nonchalantly washed his
hands. Meanwhile, Bayudan ran towards a nearby house for fear of his life.
4

Dr. Yuaga testified that based on his post-mortem examination of the cadaver, Catriz sustained 11
stab wounds, four (4) of which were in the mid extremity of the heart area that could cause
instantaneous death while two (2) were located at the back portion ofhis body. Catriz also sustained
one (1) incised wound on the left scapula. His cause of death was "hypovolemic shock, secondary to
multiple stab wounds."
6

The witnesses for the defense werethe accused-appellant himself and his uncle, Joseph Aginawang
(Aginawang). According to them, on the night of April 4, 2004, they had a drinking spree with Catriz.
After consuming two bottles of gin, Catriz asked the accused-appellant if he can till the family lot in
Bagumbayan, Tuao, Cagayan. When the accused-appellant answered that he cannot decide on the
matter since the land is family-owned, Catriz suddenly stood up and slapped the accused-appellants
face.
The accused-appellant did not takeoffense and simply left, while Catriz summoned his wife and
children, and headed home. Catriz, however, returned between 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. looking for the
accused-appellant but didnt find him. Catriz was again unable to find the accused-appellant when
he returned the next day.
1wphi1

On April 6, 2004, at about 4:00 p.m., the accused-appellant saw Catriz unloading chickens. He
approached him and offered help, but Catriz pushed him away causing the accused-appellant
tostumble down. Catriz then tried to hack the accused-appellant twice with a bolobut the latter was
able to dodge the attacks. On Catrizs third attempt, the accused-appellant got hold of a knife from
the wall of a nearby house and defended himself by plunging the same on Catriz. When Catriz again
attempted to hack the accused-appellant, the latter shoved the knife against him once more. The
accused-appellant failed to recall how many times he stabbed Catriz because he got dizzy and lost
touch with his senses.
Dazed with what he has just witnessed, Aginawang ran to the back of a house towards a creek. The
accused-appellant, on the other hand, proceeded towards the road where he met one Abe Ballesil
who accompanied him, upon his request, to the police station to surrender.
7

Ruling of the RTC

In its Decision dated January 7, 2008, the RTC sustained the testimony of prosecution witness
Bayudan, as corroborated by Dr. Yuagas post-mortem examination, that the accused-appellant
struck a hacking blow on Catriz from behind. Treachery was also found to have attended the killing
because while Catriz was on a kneeling position begging for his life, the accused-appellant
continued to stabhim. At that moment, Catriz was totally helpless while the accused-appellant was in
no danger from any retaliation.
8

The accused-appellants allegation of self-defense was rejected because: (1) he failed to claim it
atthe earliest opportunity when he surrendered to the police station; (2) the number and seriousness

of the wounds he inflicted on Catriz showed a determined effort on his part to kill the victim; and (3)
he failed to surrender the weapon to the police and he instead threw it away. Accordingly,the RTC
ruling was disposed as follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the herein accused
ALEX DE LOS SA[N]TOS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of MURDER, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentencing him:
1. To suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua;
2. To pay civil indemnity/damages to the heirs of the victim Fernando Catriz[;]
2.1 The amount of [P]50,000.00 as death indemnity;
2.2 The amount of [P]25,000.00 as moral damages;
2.3 The amount of [P]20,000.00 as nominal damages in lieu of actual damages; and
2.4 The amount of [P]25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the conviction and penalty meted upon the accused-appellant adding that "the
attitude and behavior of Catriz at that time certainly did not constitute the unlawful aggression which
the law requires." The CA further found the defense version of the events unbelievable because the
accused-appellants claim that he was at a disadvantageous position from Catrizs relentless assault
is belied by the fact that the former was actually unscathed.The presence of a knife which the
accused-appellant picked up to repel Catrizs alleged attack was likewise held highly specious since
it seems tosuggest that knives are scattered around the walls of houses in Mungo, Tuao, Cagayan.
Thus, the CA ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the
appeal filed in this case. The Decision dated January 7, 2008 rendered by Branch 11 of the Regional
Trial Court in Tuao, Cagayan in Criminal Case No. 1165-T is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

10

The accused-appellant is now before the Court pleading for his acquittal based on the same and
sole argument raised in his Appellants Brief before the CA that the trial court gravely erred in not
giving credence to his claim of self-defense.
11

12

Ruling of the Court

The Court affirms the accused-appellants conviction. It is immediately apparent thatthe argument
proffered by the accused-appellant essentially assails the evaluation by the trial court of the
testimony of the prosecutions principal witness, Bayudan, and its ruling that the same satisfactorily
repudiatedhis claim of self-defense.
Basic is the rule that the matter ofassigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and
most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the
witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indiciaavailable but not reflected on the
record. Hence, the corollary principle that absent any showing that the trial court overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances that would affect the final disposition of the case, appellate
courts are bound to give due deference and respect to its evaluation of the credibility of an
eyewitness and his testimony as well as its probative value amidst the rest of the other evidence on
record.
13

The Court sees no compelling reason to depart from the foregoing tenets especially considering the
accused-appellants failure to pinpoint significant details, which if considered, will alter the outcome
of the trial courts judgment and the affirmation accorded it by the CA.
Even an assiduous examination ofthe records of the case yields a similar finding: the factual basis of
accused-appellants plea of self-defense cannot relieve him fromcriminal liability. Generally, the
burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather
than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent. However, if the accused admits killing the victim,
but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his
part. Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance implies the admission by the
accused that he committed the criminal act. Thus, to escape criminal liability, the accused must
prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second
paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
14

15

16

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance
ofself-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can
validly be invoked. "There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual
or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual
physical force or actual use of a weapon." "It is present only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to ones life."
17

18

19

Here, the accused-appellant failed toprove that unlawful aggression was initiated by Catriz. The
physical evidence of Catrizs incised wound on the left scapula belies the version ofevents adduced
by the defense and is more consistent with the narration of the prosecutions eyewitness Bayudan
that the initial blow came from the accused-appellant who suddenly emerged behind Catriz and
hacked him. The testimony of expert witness Dr. Yuaga further confirmed that such incised wound
could have been inflicted from behind.
1wphi1

The accused-appellantsclaim that Catriz boxed him first and then tried to hack him with a bolois
grounded on contradictory, hence, unreliable testimonies. According to defense witness Aginawang,
he saw Catriz push and then box the accused-appellant. It is noticeable, however, from the accusedappellants own narration that the detail relating to the punching is absent. Also, Aginawang admitted

oncross-examination that it was the accused-appellant who delivered the first aggression by
stabbing Catriz.
20

Further, the Court agrees with the CAs observation that the presence of a knife in the wall of the
nearby house was highly dubious. The immediate availability of a knife within the accusedappellants convenient reach in a public place at the exact moment that he was allegedly being
hacked by Catriz is too inconceivable to warrant trustworthiness. The sequence of the narration of
eyewitness Bayudan is more rational and thus in accord with the spontaneity of a truthful account
that all the while, the accused-appellant had the knife in his possession and he used it to continue
stabbing Catriz when the first weapon he used dislodged from its handle.
Further, the location, the number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on Catriz indicate a determined
effort to kill and not merely to defend. Based on Dr. Yuagas post-mortem examination, 4 of the 11
stab wounds inflicted on Catriz were in the mid extremity of the heart area sufficient to cause
instantaneous death. True enough, Catriz died of "hypovolemic shock, secondary to multiple stab
wounds." It has been repeatedly ruled that the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained
by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense.
21

In fine, the courts a quo were correct in finding that the accused-appellant failed to discharge his
burden of proving the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
The Court also upholds the findings of the courts a quo that the killing of Catriz by the accusedappellant was attended with treachery.
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to ensure the
execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular
means of attack employed."
22

"The essence of treachery lies inthe attack that comes without warning, and the attack is swift,
deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape, thereby ensuring its accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack
madeit impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate."
23

It is evident in this case that, astestified by eyewitness Bayudan, the accused-appellant attacked
Catriz whenthe latter was defenseless and unable to retaliate. The accused-appellantcommenced
his attack from behind Catriz and when the latter eventually fell down to his knees begging for his
life, the accused-appellant continued stabbing him. Clearly, the accused-appellant took advantage of
the vulnerable position of Catriz to ensure the successful execution of the offense without risk, and
deny the victim the opportunity to defend himself.
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetuato death. The two penalties being both indivisible and there being no mitigating
nor aggravating circumstance to consider, the lesser of the two penalties which is reclusion
perpetuashould be imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the RPC. Hence, the
courts a quo correctly sentenced the accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua.
24

The accused-appellant shall not beeligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346
which states that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
25

The award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages were correct. Civil indemnity
is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of the accused for such
death. Despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional
suffering, the award of moral damages is also proper in view of the recognized fact that death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims
family. The heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to exemplary damages since the killing was
attended by treachery.
26

27

28

However, in conformity with current jurisprudence, the amounts granted by the courts a quoshall be
increased toP75,000.00 for civil indemnity, P75,000.00 for moral damages, and P30,000.00 for
exemplary damages.
29

The award of nominal damages mustbe deleted and replaced with temperate damages in the
amount ofP25,000.00. Nominal damages are proper when there is no proof of actual damages; and
when it is granted, it is as if there was in fact no damage at all. Temperate damages, on the other
hand, are awarded when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot be proved with certainty. There is no doubt that pecuniary expenses were incurred in the
funeral and burial of Catriz and the award of temperate damages shall answer for the same.
30

31

32

33

Lastly, all the monetary awards shall earn an interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annumfrom the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
34

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 17, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03790 finding accused-appellant Alex De Los Santos GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Alex De Los Santos is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuawithout eligibility for parole and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Fernando Catriz,
the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of six percent
( 6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
The accused-appellant shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
G.R. No. 208170

August 20, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PETRUS YAU a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a.
"Susan", Accused-Appellants.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
CR-I-IC No. 03446, which affirmed the December 14, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 214, Mandaluyong City (RTC). in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923. The RTC found accusedappellant Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping
for ransom and serious illegal detention, as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, (R.A. No. 7659), and convicted accusedappellant Susana Yau y Sumogba (Susana)as an accomplice to the commission of the same crime.
1

The Facts
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the
Information, dated February 13, 2004, the accusatory portion of which reads:
3

That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of Shoemart Mega Mall,
Mandaluyong City, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with the use of a sleeping substance, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap and take away ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM inthe following manner, to wit: while
said ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM was on board a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number
PVD-115 being driven by the above-named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and the
taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell unconscious
and upon regaining consciousness he was already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located
at B23, L2, Ponsettia St., Camilla Sorrento Homes, Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept
for twenty two (22) days, which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while
therein he was maltreated; that ransom in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS
(US$600,000.00) and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php20,000.00) for each day of detention was
demanded in exchangefor his safe release until he was finally rescued on February 11,2004, by
PACER operatives of the Philippine National Police.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Version of the Prosecution
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the following narration of
the kidnapping:
4

On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair Onglingswam,
who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States, went out of Makati Shangrila
Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take
him from the said hotel to Virra Mall Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said
taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant
received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the
phone conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black hair,
a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was
also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer

knew what transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a
plastic bag and he was handcuffed and chained.
When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was wearing a
red mask and introduced himself as "John" approached him and removed the plastic bag from his
head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and
that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with
telephony equipment, tape recorder, phone and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these
equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked them for the
PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was
kidnapped. A day after, he was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them thathe
was still alive as well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers
were demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand
Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.
The private complainants family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text message
purportedly from the former informing them that he was kidnapped and ransom for his liberty was
demanded.
On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in Manila about
the situation and a meeting with the representatives of the Philippine National Police was arranged.
Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding US$2,000.00. Chau
then wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro Bank and Trust Company.
Likewise, private complainants brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong Kwai
Pings account in Metro Bank, amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to
ensure his brothers safety and eventual release.
During private complainants twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to communicate
with his family almost daily to prove that he was still alive and was served with meals almost five
times a day either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten with
sticks, made to lay-down biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.
On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying
along Bacoor was victimizing passengers. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of
the Police Anti-Crimeand Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) were ordered to proceed to
Bacoor, Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115. On February 11,
2004, at around 4:00 oclock in the morning, the PACER group proceeded to Bacoor and positioned
themselves along Aguinaldo Highway under the overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not having caught
sight of the taxi, after three hours, the group moved to a different location along the Aguinaldo
Highway where they were able to chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then flagged
it down and approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll down his window and was told that
the vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to make any
comment. Hence, this prompted the officers to ask for his name and since he answered that he was
Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his drivers license and car registration but
appellant was not able to produce any. Since he could not produce any drivers license and car
registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police station for investigation, however, when
shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him, he answered that the man is being
kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed under arrest for

kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his constitutional
rights. Thereafter, appellants cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and Sony Erickson were confiscated.
Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant] was brought to the parking lot of SM City Bacoor for a
possible rescue operations of the victim.
Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, hewas led back to
the police car. The rest of the members of PACER proceeded inside the house and found a man
sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed. The man later identified himself as Alastair
Onglingswam.
During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as his captor and the
taxi driver. Test conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation reveals that the DNA
found in the mask used by private complainants captor matched that of appellant Petrus Yau.
5

Version of the Defense

Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief to substantiate their
claim of innocence:
6

Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the supposed kidnap victim
coordinated with the police to set up the subject case against him and his family. He is a British
national. He had been in the Philippines for many times since he was 14 years old. He came to the
country in July 2001 for a vacation and had not left since then. On September 2001, he got married
to Susana Yau. Prior thereto, he was in Singapore running some businesses. On January 20, 2004,
at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon (the date and time the victim was kidnapped), Petrus Yau
was at home sleeping.
On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 9:00 oclock in
the morning, he went to his wife Susana in her shop and got money to be deposited to the Asia Trust
Bank. He parked his car outside the bank. After he alighted from his car, three (3) men bigger than
him held his hands: one (1) of them held his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his
hands with packing tape, covered his eyes with the same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They
kicked and beat him until he became unconscious.
When he regained consciousness, he was inside an airconditioned room. His hands were
handcuffed and he felt very cold because his body was wet. His head was still being covered. He
shouted asking where he was. People came in and he heard them talking in Tagalog. They kicked
him for about twenty (20) seconds. Later, he was made to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said
that he could not see anything, thus, someone removed the cover of his head. They accused him of
being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to make a
call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail.
When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag containing his
British passport, alien certificate, drivers license, Asia Trust bankbook in the name of Susana Yau,
ATM Cards (in his name) of Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro, VISA Card, and
some cash given to him by his wife . He lost those personal properties.
After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a window. The following
day, he was brought to and detained at the PACER Custodial Center.

Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both Mandarin and
Cantonese. He bought the taxi he was driving in August 2003 for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos
(Php85,000.00) for personal use and/or for resale. It had a defective engine (usually overheats),
without an aircon and cannot travel for long journey. He does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had
police friends who told him that he cannot drive a taxi as an occupation since his drivers license is
non-professional.
Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his womanizing.
Hence, she decided to live separately from him (though she was pregnant at that time) and moved to
another house (Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes, she would
visit him.
Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victims testimony that he
was placed in the basement. He was not in his house when the police officers allegedly rescued the
kidnapped victim. He left his house in good condition in the morning before his arrest. The white
Toyota Corolla taxi he was driving had markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.
During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was not informedof
his constitutional rights.
Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the kidnapper every
time the latter served Alastairs food (lunch and dinner). She is legally married to Petrus Yau. They
have two (2) children named Charlie and Vivian. On February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5, Lot 4,
Tulips Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia
Street, Sorrento Town Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, with his girlfriend. Susana and Petrus were separated
since June 2003.
On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00 (earnings of her sarisari store) and to deposit it in her account at Asia Trust Bank. She would request Petrus to do such
errand for her as she does not trust her househelp. Petrus came to her at around 7:00 oclock in the
morning. At around 11:00 oclock a.m. of the same day, four(4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her
residence and told her to come with them to the hospital where Petrus was brought because he met
a vehicular accident along Aguinaldo Highway.
Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their van. They,
however, were not brought to the hospital but to an office. Thereat, Susana saw her husband (almost
dead) inside a small room with a one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him. She, together with
her children and helpers, were detained for three (3) days inside a small room. After three (3) days,
her children and helpers were released and they went home. At that time, she was not provided with
the assistance of a counsel.
Susana stated that her husbands name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as John or Ong Kwai
Ping. He is engaged in the business of buying cars for resale. They owned three (3) houses and lots,
all registered in her name. At the time she was taken into custody by the police, she had withher Five
Thousand Pesos cash, Allied Bank passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank),
VISA card, passport, wedding ring, necklace and cellphone, which were taken away by persons
whom she does not know.
7

The Ruling of the RTC

In its judgment, dated December 14,2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the crime
of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, and Susana Yau,as an accomplice to the
commission thereof. The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and
sufficient, with their versions of the incident dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It
observed that Petrus failed to rebut his positive identification by the victim, Alastair and his brother
Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron John), with whom he talked for several times over the phone. It
stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution had adequately reinforced its
theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of the heinous act.
With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair as the Filipino
woman who fed him or accompanied Petrus in bringing him food during his 22 days of captivity and,
for said reason, should be held liable as an accomplice.
The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and Susana because
the same were unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The dispositive portion of the said
decision states:
WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention and pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison term of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court also finds the accused Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT as accomplice to the commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
serious illegal detention and applying to her the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law wherein
her minimum penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree of the imposable penalty
of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is prision mayor, she is hereby therefore sentenced to suffer the
prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS MINIMUM to
TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS
MAXIMUM.Accused are credited in full of the preventive imprisonment they have already served in
confinement.
Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim ALASTAIR JOSEPH
ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two Hundred Seventy Three Thousand and One Hundred
Thirty Two Pesos (273, 132.00) plus interest from the filing of the information until full payment,
moral damages of One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (200,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana. The appellate court likewise lent credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were able to establish with certitude the
commission of the crime and the identities of the culprits thereof.
9

Hence, this appeal.

ASSIGNED ERRORS:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE PIECES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED ARE INADMISSIBLE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AS THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
10

Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that she was living
separately with her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not considering that she was not mentioned in the
sworn statement executed by Alastair, dated February 12, 2004, even when said victim was asked if
there was another person assisting Petrus in the perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the
Resolution of the Department of Justice, dated February 13, 2004, finding probable cause against
her because she is the registered owner of the house where Alastair was held captive and not
because she served food on the victim; and 4] in convicting her as an accomplice.
11

On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution notifying the parties that they could file their
respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. The People of the Philippines, represented by the
OSG, opted not to file any supplemental brief, maintaining its positions and arguments in its brief
earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446. Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief on December 27,
2013 in amplification of his arguments raised in his brief filed before the CA.
12

13

14

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.
Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses; (b) the
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove the commission of kidnapping for ransom and the
identity of the culprits thereof; and (c) the degree of responsibility of each accusedappellant for the
crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the Court in People v.
Maxion that:
15

The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best addressed by
the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and
observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most
significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in
the face of conflicting testimonies.Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial
court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and
which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on

appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
16

It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial courts factual findings, such as its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the
conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive
effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by
the CA
17

In the case at bench, the RTC gavemore weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses compared to those of the accusedappellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on
record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA,
and their respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
In every criminal case, the task ofthe prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same
quantumof proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, evenif the
commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor
being likewise clearly ascertained. Here, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this
burden.
18

Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab with Plate
No. PVD 115 which he boarded before he lost consciousness on the afternoon ofJanuary 20, 2004.
He claimed that while he was conversing with his business associate Kelly Wei over his phone inside
the taxicab, Petrus would turn his face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was
being spoken to. Alastair claimed that he had a good look and an ample opportunity toremember the
facial features of the driver as to be able to recognize and identify him in court. It is the most natural
reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their accosters and the manner in
which the craven acts are committed.
19

Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to
Petrus. It was established that from the first to the twentieth day of Alastairs captivity,his kidnapper
would meet him five times a day and would talk to him for an hour, thus, enabling him to remember
the culprits voice which had a unique tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with
certainty that it was the voice of Petrus. Witness Aaron John insisted that the person who introduced
himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he had talked over the phone for three weeks, demanding
necessity money and ransom for the release of his brother Alastair, was Petrus because of the
distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent. There was no showing that Alastair and Aaron John
had any ill motive to falsely testify against Petrus. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any
reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no suchimproper
motive exists, and their testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.
20

Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence that led
tothe inescapable and reasonable conclusion that Petrus committed the crime charged. The settled
rule is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferencesare derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The corollary rule is that the circumstances proven
21

must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
22

The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the findings of guilt by
the RTC and the CA:
1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and Susana,
located at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento Homes, Bacoor, Cavite;
2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim recalled
boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center on the afternoon of January 20,
2004 and where he lost consciousness, was found in the possession of the accusedappellant Petrus on February 11, 2004;
3] The drivers license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were
recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau;
4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found: one (1)
chain with padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain; checkered pajama; black blazer; one (1)
Onesimus black coat; two (2) video camera cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down
position and family footages, and the other one labeled "sex scandal"; eight (8) pieces of
cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards; Globe SIM card; two (2) Transfer
Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in Bacoor, Cavite, under the name of Susana
Sumogba; original copy of the OfficialReceipts and Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki
1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No. 2M9748; business license and mayors permit issued to
Susana Yau; marriage contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana
Sumogba; birth certificates of their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco bills; Asia Trust
deposit slips; five ATM deposit slips; and PLDT bills;
5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the possession
of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the owner ofthe QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a
certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had not been known yet;
and
6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was recovered inside
the house and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus showed that both DNA profiles
matched.
23

The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces of circumstantial
evidence, when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus
was the author of the kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a whole, the prosecution evidence
effectively established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, are asfollows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual
deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for
the release of the victim.
24

All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary evidences
for the prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus is a private individual. Second, Petrus
kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a
taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the
house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor, Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and
chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth,
Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of US$600,000.00 for the release
of the victim.
Anent the criminal liability of eachaccused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is liable as
principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as an
accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that there was
no evidence indubitably proving that Susanaparticipated in the decision to commit the criminal act.
The only evidence the prosecution had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he
remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever
he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner. Jurisprudence is instructive of the
elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a person may be
considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there bea community of design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2)
that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying
material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice.
25

In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet
and never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the
house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the victim.
Susana not only countenancedPetrus illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It
has been held that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a
person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. As keenly observed by the RTC, the
act of giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration
ofthe crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression of sympathy orfeeling of support to
her husband. Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De Vera, where it was
stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an
accomplice rather thanthat of a principal.
26

27

28

Alastairs positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention her
name in his sworn statement, dated February 12, 2004. It is well-settled that affidavits, being ex
parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, butdo not really detract from the credibility
of witnesses. Oftentimes, the allegationscontained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of
details anchored entirely on the investigators questions. The discrepancies between a sworn
statement and a testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal ofan accused, as testimonial
evidence carries moreweight than an affidavit. Testimonies given during the trial are more exact and
elaborate. Besides, sworn statements are often executed when an affiants mental faculties are not
in such a state as to afford the affiant a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which
transpired.
29

30

31

Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the
defenses of alibi and frame-up interposed by the accused-appellants. Alibi is the weakest of all

defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be proven by the accused with
clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably
viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to
prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence. Apart from their bare allegations, no competent and independent evidence was adduced
by the accused-appellants to substantiate their twin defenses of alibi and frame-up and, thus, remain
selfserving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More importantly, nowhere in the records does it
show of any dubious reasons or improper motive that could have impelled the prosecution
witnesses, particularly victim Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely testify and fabricate documentary or
object evidence just to implicate accused-appellants in such a heinous crime as kidnapping for
ransom. Their only motive was to see to it that the kidnapper be brought to justice and
sentencedwith the appropriate penalty.
32

1wphi1

33

As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the accused-appellants
questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests. This too must fail.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned the legality of
their warrantless arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before
theyentered their respective pleas to the kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and
coupled with their full and active participation in the trial of the case, accused-appellants were
deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. The accused-appellants
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC thereby curing whatever defects that might have
attended their arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over their persons. Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their
acquittal.
34

35

Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their warrantless
arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the view that their conviction was proper
despite being illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu, the Court ruled that the
illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all
other facts on record point to their culpability. Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial
free from error.
36

37

With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility of parole against Petrus as principal in the charge of kidnapping
for ransom in view of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the Court finds that the
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten
(10) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be
proper.
The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of 273,132.00 plus
interest committed from the filing of the information until fully paid. As regards the moral damages
against the accused-appellants, the Court findsthe award of P1,000,000.00 to be exorbitant. Hence,
the same is being reduced toP200,000.00, as the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and
sufferings that Alastair and his family endured because of the accused-appellants inhumane acts of

detaining him in handcuffs and chains, and mentally torturing him and his family to raise the ransom
money. The fact that they suffered the trauma from mental, physical and psychologicalordeal which
constitutes the basis for moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code is too obvious to still
require its recital at the trial through the superfluity of a testimonial charade. The Court also finds the
award of exemplary damages to be in order in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
demand for ransom, and to serve as an example and deterrence for the public good. The Court,
however, reduces the amount from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.
38

The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for the payment of
damages. This is an erroneous apportionment of the damages awarded because it does not take
into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Petrus,
and the accomplice, Susana. The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros is instructive on the
apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accusedappellants. The entire amount of the civil
liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime
according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation.
Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of damages than Susana
who was adjudged only as an accomplice.
39

In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam actual damages
in the amount of P273, 132.00; moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00; and exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00, or a total amount of P573, 132.00. Taking into consideration
the degree of their participation, the principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total
amount of the damages (P573, 132.00 x 213) orP382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should
be ordered to pay the remaining one-third (1/3) orP191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus shall be liable for
actual damages in the amount of P 182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of P133,333.33; and
exemplary damages in the amount or P66,666.6 7; and Susana for the amount of P91,044.00 as
actual damages; P66,666.67 as moral damages; and P33,333.33 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decisi0n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03446 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellants Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y
Sumogba are ordered to pay the victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages in the amount
of P200,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of Pl 00,000.00. The award of actual
damages in the amount or P273, 132.00 is maintained. The civil liabilities of the accused-appellants
shall be apportioned as follows:
1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of P182,088.00; moral
damages in the amount of P 133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount
of P66,666.67; and
2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of P91,044.00,
moral damages in the amount of P66,666.67 and exemplary damages in the amount
of P33,333.33.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 200987

August 20, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RONALDO BAYAN y NERI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 19 July 2011 affirming the
conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 82, of appellant Ronaldo Bayan
y Neri for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
1

Appellant was charged following a "buy-bust" operation.

The accusatory portion of the Information against appellant reads:
That on or about the 5th day of July 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and
there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said
transaction, zeropoint zero three (0.03) grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochlorideknown as
Shabu, a dangerous drug.
3

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses PO2 Emeterio Mendoza, Jr. (PO2 Mendoza), who acted as
poseur-buyer, and PO3 Ferdinand de Guzman (PO3 de Guzman), a back-up operative who assisted
PO2 Mendoza. Their testimonies sought to establish the following facts:
Police operatives from the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Novaliches Police Station
conducted a buy-bust operation on 5 July 2003 based on a tip from an informant thata certain
Ronaldo Bayan and Irene Bayan (Irene) were engaged in illegal drug trade in BarangayCapri,
Novaliches, Quezon City. The team leader, PO3 de Guzman, narrated that the buy-bust team
conducted a surveillance at BarangayCapri where they were able to confirm that an illegal drug
activity was ongoing in the house of appellant. PO2 Mendoza prepared the pre-operation report
which was submitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. PO2 Mendoza was assigned as
the poseur-buyer while PO3 de Guzmanacted as one of his backups. At about 7:40 p.m. of the same
day, the team proceeded to the target place. The buy-bust team was strategically positioned in the
area while the informant and PO2 Mendoza went directly to the house of appellant. When appellant
opened the door, the informant introduced PO2 Mendoza to appellant as the buyer of shabu.
Appellants live-in partner, Irene, was likewise present during the introduction. PO2 Mendoza readily
gave the 100-peso bill to appellant in exchange for the small plastic sachet containing shabu.
Immediately after the exchange, PO2 Mendoza placed his hand on appellants shoulder, introduced
himself as a police officer and arrested appellant. Irene meanwhile tried to escape but PO3 de
Guzman was able to arrest her. PO3 de Guzmanrecovered from Irenes possession dried marijuana
leaves wrapped in a newspaper.Appellant and Irene were brought to the police station where PO2
4

Mendoza put his markings "EM" on the plastic sachet he received from appellant. Thereafter, they
brought the plastic sachet to the crime laboratory.
5

The forensic chemist issued anInitial Laboratory Report which revealed that the heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet with markings "EM" containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance
was found positive for shabu.
6

In his defense, appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he and Irene were walking
on their way home when they were blocked by five men at the corner of Guyabano Street and
Amparo Capri Street. Appellant recognized one of them as Isagani Mateo, who frequently displaces
them whenever they sell inthe market. The five men frisked, handcuffed, and brought them to Station
4, Novaliches, Quezon City. Thereat, they were asked to remove their clothes and they were frisked
again. Appellant saw a sachet of shabuand marijuanaon top of a table. They were forced by one of
the policeman to point to the objects under threat of physical harm, while their photographs were
being taken. They were also asked to sign a document which they were not able to read. Later that
night, they were brought to the fiscals office for inquest without the presence of counsel.
7

On 20 February 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay
a P500,000.00 fine. Irene was likewise found guilty for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 and was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve
(12)years and one (1) day as minimum to thirteen (13) years as maximum and to pay a fine in the
amount P300,000.00. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the members of the buybust team.
8

After receiving a copy of the trial court's Decision, the two accused seasonably filed a Notice of
Appeal before the Court of Appeals. On 19 July 2011, the appellate court acquitted Irene for
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 but appellants conviction was affirmed in
toto.
9

The appellate court held that the prosecution established the consummation of the sale through the
testimony of the poseur-buyer.
Appellant appealed his conviction before this Court, adopting the same arguments in his Brief before
the Court of Appeals.
Appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
appellant dueto the glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses.
Appellant points out that PO2 Mendoza spoke of an alleged informant while PO3 de Guzman
mentioned a concerned citizen who called the police station to inform them of an illegal drug trade.
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to present the buy-bust money as proof of the illegal
sale of shabu. Appellant argues that since the buy-bust money was the consideration of the alleged
sale, failure to adduce it in evidence is tantamount to failure to establish the elements of the crime.
Appellants arguments deserve scant consideration. Jurisprudence dictates that minor
inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the witness. We have held that "discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality
touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of witnesses
need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal

occurrence. In fact, such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen the witnesses
credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed."
10

Failure to present the buy-bust money is not fatal to the prosecutions cause. It is not indispensable
in drugcases since it is merely corroborative evidence, and the absence thereof does not create a
hiatus inthe evidence for the prosecution provided the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven
and the drug subject of the transaction ispresented before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence
requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation.
11

In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be sufficiently proved: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. Indeed, all these elements were duly established.
12

Appellant was caught in flagrante delictoselling shabuthrough a buy-bust operation conducted by the
operatives of SDEU of the Novaliches Police Station.
The poseur-buyer, PO2 Mendoza, positively testified that the sale took place and appellant was the
author thereof, thus:
Q: What happened after you were tasked as poseur-buyer?
A: We proceeded to the subject of our operation.
Q: Where was that?
A: No. 17 Guyabano Street, Barangay [Capril], Novaliches, Quezon City.
Q: What time was that, what time did you arrive there?
A: About 7:40.
COURT:
7:40 in the evening? A: Yes, your Honor.
PROS. ANTERO:
What happened when you arrived there?
A: The informant introduced me to Ronaldo Bayan.
Q: Where did you get contact with the subject?
A: At No. 17 Guyabano Street.
Q: How were you introduced to the subject by the informant?
A: I was introduced as buyer of shabu.

Q: To whom?
A: Ronaldo Bayan, sir.
Q: Is this Ronaldo Bayan inside this courtroom?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you point to him?
INTERPRETER:
The witness is going to a man inyellow shirt who answered by the name of?
ACCUSED:
RONALDO BAYAN.
INTERPRETER:
RONALDO BAYAN.
COURT:
Who were present when you were introduced by the informant to Ronaldo Bayan?
A: The live-in partner, Irene Bayan, me, the informant and Ronaldo Bayan, your Honor.
PROS. ANTERO:
Is this Irene Bayan inside this courtroom?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you point to her?
INTERPRETER:
The witness is [pointing] to a woman who answered by the name of?
ACCUSED 2:
IRENE BAYAN.
INTERPRETER:
Irene Bayan.

PROS. ANTERO:
What happened after you were introduced to Ronaldo Bayan by the informant?
A: I gave the P100.00, sir.
A: Ronaldo Bayan, sir.
Q: You gave it to whom?
A: To Ronaldo Bayan, sir.
Q: What did this Ronaldo Bayan do after you handed him this P100.00?
A: He gave me shabu, sir.
COURT:
Where was it contained?
A: Small plastic sachet, your Honor.
PROS. ANTERO:
He gave you a small plastic sachet?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after he gaveyou a small plastic sachet?
A: I introduced myself as policeman.
Q: What happened after you introduced yourself asa policeman?
A: I placed my hand on his shoulder and introduced myself as a policeman and told him of his
mistake and of his rights.
13

Appellant produced the plastic sachet containing shabuand handed it to the poseur-buyer in
exchange forP100.00. This transaction was witnessed by PO3 de Guzman who acted as one of the
back-ups.
Furthermore, the prosecution was ableto preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the said
illegal drugs. The prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the following circumstances showing
an unbroken chain of custody over the shabuthat was seized from herein accusedappellant: (1) P02
Mendoza, who acted as the poseur-buyer during the buybust operation, was the one who received
the transparent plastic sachet containing shabu from the appellant; (2) the said transparent plastic
sachet was then brought by PO2 Mendoza to the police station where he placed his initials
1wphi1

14

"EM"; (3) thereafter, said sachet was brought to the crime laboratory for examination; and (4) the
laboratory examination was conducted by Police Inspector Abraham Verde Tecson.
15

16

17

The result of the laboratory examination confirmed the presence of methylamphetamine

hydrochloride on the white crystalline substance inside the plastic sachet confiscated from appellant.
The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.
Appellants defense, which is predicated on a bare denial, deserves scant consideration in light of
the positive testimonies of the police officers. The defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases
requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement
agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Bare denials of appellant cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of the three police officers. Moreover, there is no evidence of
any improper motive on the part of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation to
falsely testify against appellant.
18

19

Generally, factual findings of trial courts especially those which revolve matters of credibility of
witnesses deserve to be respected when no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of
the facts, or where no speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions, can be gleaned from such
findings. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are best undertaken by
the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnessesdeportment, demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
20

21

We do not find any cogent reason to reverse the lower courts.

In fine, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellants sold shabu. Under
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and fine
ranging from P500,000.00 toP1,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium
poppyregardless of the quantity and purity involved. Hence, the trial court, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 19 July 2011 of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of
appellant Ronaldo Bayan y Neri by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 82 for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 200645

August 20, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WENDEL OCDOL y MENDOVA, EDISON TABIANAN, AND DANTE BORINAGA, Accused.

WENDEL OCDOL y MENDOVA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal filed solely by accused Wendel Ocdol y Mendova questioning the
Decision of the Eighteenth Division of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CRH.C. No. 00305 affirming in toto the Decision dated 16 January 2003 in Criminal Case No. 6027-0
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Ormoc, Branch 35. The RTC Decision
found Wendel Ocdol (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, while Edison
Tabianan and Dante Borinaga both guilty beyond reasonable doubt as acC'omplices for the said
crime. We affirm the conviction. It is in accord with a textbook of principle in the law on and
procedure in rape cases, which we by this case restate.
1

THE FACTS
The accused were charged under the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 6027-0 for the
crime of rape under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
which reads as follows:
3

That on the 31st day of August, 2000 at around 8:00 O clock in the evening, more or less, in sitio
Pingag, barangay Matlang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, accused
Wendel Ocdol y Mendova by means of force and intimidation, did lie, place on top of [AAA], 15
years old, removed her pant(y) and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the latter while his
companions Edison Tabianan and Dante Borinaga were looking at the sexual assault of their
companion Wendel Ocdol y Mendova, while pointing their knives to the lady-victim, thus,
consumating (sic) the crime of rape against her will and without the consent of said[AAA], a minor.
4

All accused pleaded not guilty during arraignment. Thereafter, a fullblown trial proceeded. Based on
the evidence presented, records reveal that the prosecution established the following factual
antecedents:
5

The evidence of the prosecution shows that on August 31, 2000 at around 8:00 oclock in the
evening, AAA was sent by her mother to buy ice at the store of Shirley Guadas which is situated at
Sitio Pingag, Barangay Matlang, Isabel, Leyte. While AAA was about to go home, Edision Tabianan
(hereafter referred to as Edison) who was then in front of the store called AAAs attention. Since AAA
knew Edison, she went to the latter and asked what he wanted. Edison told AAA "just something"
and he immediately held AAAs arm dragging her to a darkened portion of a chapel near the store.
AAA resisted but she could not move because Edison poked a knife at her. Then, AAA saw two (2)
people in the place where she was dragged. She identified the two as Dante Borinaga (hereafter
referred to as Dante)and Tisoy known as Wendel Ocdol (hereafter referred to as Wendel) since there
was an illumination coming from the light at the pier. Dante likewise poked an arrow locally known as
"indian pana" at AAAs neck. Wendel suddenly held AAAs hand, laid her on the ground, and
removed her shorts and panty. AAA still resisted the attack by stamping (sic) her feet. Wendel took
off his shorts and brief, mounted on top of AAA and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina causing the
latter to feelso much pain. Wendel also kissed AAA on the lips and fondled her breasts but the latter
could not shout as Edison and Dante were respectively poking a knife and an indianpana at the

victim. When the three (3) accused heard that someone was looking for AAA, Wendel immediately
got up and put on his brief and shorts and three (3) accused scampered away. AAA put her panty
and shorts on, and ran towards home without bringing the ice she bought from the store. When AAA
arrived home, she saw her mother waiting for her at the door. She immediately went upstairs and
fellasleep. The following day, AAAs grandmother came and it was only then that AAA narrated what
happened to her. Upon learning of the incident, AAAs grandmother left and reported it to Rufino
Villarino, the barangay captain of Matlang. Rufino summoned three (3) of his barangay tanods who
arrested Edison and Dante. The barangay officials referred the matter to the police who picked-up
the two accused for investigation. Upon advice of the policemen, AAA was brought by her mother to
a doctor for medico-legal examination.
Dr. Refelina Cerillo Baje, the Municipal Officer in the Municipality of Isabel, Leyte who conducted the
physical and genital examination of AAA testified that the labia minora and majora of the victim were
moderately coaptated; the vaginal canal was slightly loose and admits one finger with slight
resistance; there were fresh hymenal lacerations corresponding to the 2:00 oclock, 5:00 oclock and
10:00 oclock position; there is presence of erythematous area surrounding the vaginal opening
which could have beencaused by severe friction, and she noted an abrasion at the posterior vaginal
fourchette. Dr. Baje also testified that the vaginal canal which was slightly loosened had undergone
some kind of stretching due to insertion of a hard object. The friction could have been caused by an
object which was inserted into the vagina. According to her, AAA at the time of examination was
having her period. Thus, the vaginal smear revealed absence of male seminal fluid and sperm cell
even if the alleged rape incident took place a day before the examination was conducted.
6

For its part, the defense presented another version of the facts, to wit:
Wendel vehemently denied having raped AAA and put up the "sweetheart defense". He testified that
he first came to the Barangay Sawang Isabel, Leyte, in 1999 to visit his uncle, Winnie Mendova and
stayed there until 2000. Then, he went to his home in Basey, Samar but returned to Isabel, Leyte in
that sameyear. This time, he stayed at the house of his friend, Philip Sambilad (hereafter referred to
as Philip). On August 27, 2000, Philip introduced [him] to AAA at the pier in Pingag, Isabel, Leyte
until they became friends. He met AAA again on August 29, 2000 at Philips house when the latter
came to visit him. They talked at the balcony of Philips house for one(1) hour and courted AAA until
they became sweethearts. The next time hesaw AAA was in the morning of August 30, 2000 in
Philips house whencurious onlookers milled around a captured python. AAA who was among the
crowd told Wendel to meet her at the pier at 7 oclock in the evening of that day. He acceded to
AAAs invitation and they met in a hut just beside the video "carirahan." The hut was not lighted and
there were no other people except them. There were people inside the "carirahan" but they could not
see them inside the hut. When they were there, AAA embraced him first and so he returned the
favor, and they kissed each other. Then, he removed his shorts and AAA also took off her shortsand
panty. Wendel inserted his organ into the vagina of AAA but he was not able to penetrate because
the latter felt pain. During the sexual act, AAA neither cried nor shouted. Not long thereafter, they
stopped and went home. Wendel brought AAA to a store near the latters house and that was the last
time he saw the latter. On his way home, Wendel met Philip Sambilad and he told the latter that he
almost got AAA. Wendel denied the allegation that Dante and Edison were with him in the evening of
August 30, 2000. Neither did he see the two on August 31, 2000. Wendel strongly denied having
raped AAA as it was their agreement to meetin the evening of August 30, 2000. He only learned that
he was accused of raping AAA when the police arrested him at his uncles house on September 1,
2000.
7

THE RULING OF THE RTC

In its Decision dated 16 January 2003, the RTC of the City of Ormoc, Branch 35, convicted
appellant of rape and his co-accused as accomplices thereof. The RTC gave much evidentiary
weight to the testimony of AAA considering that it was plain, straightforward, and positive, and
without showing of any motive to falsely testify against her accused. The court a quo declared that
between the positive testimony of the rape victim, AAA, in narrating that both accused Edison
Tabianan and Dante Borinaga pointed their weapons at her while she was being raped by appellant,
as against the mere denial by them, it is axiomatic in adjective of law that positive evidence is always
stronger than that which is merely negative in character.
8

Furthermore, with regard to appellants proffered "sweetheart theory," it was found to be a selfserving allegation and deemed fabricated, as it was not supported by any independent and concrete
evidence. In other words, the RTC ruled that the prosecution havesuccessfully discharged its
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that appellant forced AAA to have sex with him, with the
assistance of his co-accused on 31 August 2000. Thus:
10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Wendel Ocdol GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as principal for which he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, he is also ordered to indemnify the private complainant the sum of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages, and Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages.
As against the accused Edison Tabianan and Dante Borinaga, the Court finds both accused Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as accomplices for the crime of Rape and appreciating in their behalves
the mitigating circumstance of minority and after applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby imposes the penalty of Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of
prision correccional medium as minimum to Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor,
medium as Maximum, they are alsoordered to indemnify the private complainant [AAA] the sum of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as indemnity; Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages and Twenty-Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages and to pay the
costs.
If the accused are detained, the period of their imprisonment shall be credited in full if they abide
bythe terms for convicted prisoners, otherwise, only four-fifths (4/5) thereof.
11

THE RULING OF THE CA

Upon appellate review, the CA affirmed in totothe RTCs Decision in convicting the accused. It
adhered to the rule that failure of the victim to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make
voluntarily the victims submission to the criminal acts of the accused. Not all rape victims can be
expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different people react differently
to a given situation or type of situation. Thus, the CA explained that AAAs failure to shout was
attributed to the shock and horror she felt from the force and intimidation employed by the two other
accused to ensure the consummation of appellants sexual assault. This was consistent with the
legal position that no woman would want to go through the process, the trouble and the humiliation
of trial for such debasing offense unless she actually has been a victim of abuse and her motive is
but a response to the compelling need to seek and obtain justice. More so, testimonies of childvictims are given full faith and credit since youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
12

13

sincerity. Assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by a trial
court, whose findings are binding and conclusive on appellate courts, since the former had the
opportunity to observe the elusive and incommunicable evidence of such witness deportment on the
stand during examination.
14

In addition, having invoked the positive defense of a romantic relationship with the victim, appellant
bears the burden of proof to support said defense by some documentary and/orother evidence such
as mementos, love letters, notes, pictures, and the like.Unfortunately for the appellant, he miserably
failed to do so since apart from the self-serving testimonies of appellant and his friend Philip
Sambilad, no documentary or any other concrete proof of the alleged relationship was shown. As a
matter of fact, the appellate court further pointed outthat even granting that there was indeed such
relationship between appellant and AAA, such does not preclude rape. A sweetheart cannot
becarnally embraced against her will, for love is not a license for lust.
15

Consequently, the CA Decision affirmed the RTC Decision, the pertinent portion of its disposition is
quoted hereunder:
All told, the testimony of AAA adequately proved that appellant had indeed raped her. AAAs
assertion of forced coitus was substantially corroborated by the medical findings on the presence of
vaginal injuries. Thus, this Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
appellant Wendel beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court was correct in finding him guilty of
rape.
WHEREFORE, the appeal solely filed by Wendel Ocdol y Mendova is denied for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the January 16, 2003 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35 of Ormoc City is
AFFIRMED in toto.
16

THE RULING OF THE COURT

In our considered view, the prosecution has proven all the elements of the offense of simple rape,
including the use of force or intimidation. Accordingly, we resolve to affirm the Decision of the CA
with modification as to the payment of interest imposed on all damages awarded in this case.
At the outset, for conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was
accomplished: (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
17

In the case at bench, the presence of the first element is undisputed since appellant admitshis
sexual congress with complainant. While making such admission however, he contends that there
was no force or intimidation to speak of as it was consensual. Appellant alleges that AAA willingly
participated in the sexual act because they were lovers. He even presented a witness to corroborate
his claim. Notwithstanding, their testimonies leave us unconvinced of appellants alleged innocence.
18

The "sweetheart theory" is an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places
on the accused the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence. Otherwise
called as the "sweetheart defense," it is an oft-abusedjustification that rashly derides the intelligence
of this Court and sorely tests our patience. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in
19

20

support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required such as tokens,
mementos, and photographs. Appellant presented no such evidence to substantiate his claim.
21

Moreover, we agree with the pronouncement of the appellate court that even if it were true that they
were indeed sweethearts, a love affair does not justify rape. As judiciously enunciated, a man does
not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his unreciprocated carnal desires.
22

First and foremost, in adjudging rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an
accusation ofrape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the nature of the crime in which only two
persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
23

Here, the trial court found complainants narration of the alleged rape to be clear, convincing and
straightforward. Accordingly, we see no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings ofthe RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, that appellant forced AAA to engage in sexual intercourse with him. This position
is consistent with the time-honored doctrine that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses,
and in this case their testimonies as well, the findings of the trial court are not to bedisturbed unless
the consideration of certain facts of substance and value, which have been plainly overlooked, might
affect the result of the case.
24

As correctly pointed out in the 19 September 2011 Decision of the CA, the court a quowas in the
best position to weigh the evidence presented during trial and ascertain the credibility of the
witnesses who testified. In addition, there was no showing that the lower court overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight which would have affected the
outcome of the case.
25

Again, by way of emphasis, we adhere to the rule that due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a
crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the
resolution of rape cases, the victims credibility becomes the primordial consideration. It is settled
that when the victims testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human nature
and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the
test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in
the victims testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial
matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. The trial courts assessment of
the witnesses credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding.
26

In People v. Sapigao, Jr., this Court expounded on the rationale for the abovementioned guideline:
27

It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
bestundertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitudeunder grilling examination. These are
important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the
face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are
potent aids in ascertaining the witness credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take
advantage of these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate
court can see are the cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk
that some of what the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As
1wphi1

correctly stated byan American court, "There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any
degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by
him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness
may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his
manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony.
Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things
cannot be transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be consideredby the appellate
court."
Applying the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements in the present case and based on the
findings of the trial court, AAAs demeanor during her testimony reveals the pain of remembering
thatill-fated event. Her narration of the entire traumatic ordeal was clear, candid, and straightforward.
It was clearly and convincingly established through her testimony that both carnal knowledge and
the use of force and intimidation, indicating absence of consent, wereextant in the present case.
Consequently, by use of force and intimidation, AAA succumbed to the carnal desires of appellant
even if it was against her will. AAA, while recounting her unfortunate ordeal, positively identified the
appellant as the perpetrator; and she never wavered in this identification.
Finally, appellant's defense of denial is weak and cannot succeed to overturn his conviction. The
victim's credible testimony was a sufficient basis for the CA to sustain the R TC' s Decision
convicting the appellant. Accordingly, the RTC and the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reciusion
perpetua under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8355, or the AntiRape Law of 1997.
However, the civil indemnity, the awards of moral damages and exemplary damages, must be
increased toP75,000.00, P75,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 19 September 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CRH.C. No. 00305 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the civil indemnity, the awards of moral
damages and exemplary damages shall be increased to P75,000.00, P75,000.00 and P30,000.00,
respectively, and that an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all
the damages awarded in this case, from the date of finality of this judgment until they are fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 181541

August 18, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff/Appellee,

vs.
MARISSA MARCELO, Accused/Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It is our commitment to apply the law without compassion against those who engage in illegal drug
trade.
1

This is an appeal from the Decision dated August 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00858, which affirmed the Decision dated January 26, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 52 of Sorsogon City in Criminal Case No. 2003-5973 finding Marissa Marcelo y
Madronero (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II
ofRepublic Act (RA) No. 9165.
2

Factual Antecedents
On August 4, 2003, an Information charging appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA
9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," as amended, was
filed in the RTC of Sorsogon City, the accusatory portion of which reads:
4

That on or about the 1st day of August 2003 at about 7:30 oclock in the evening at the Visitors Inn,
municipality of Donsol, province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, without any authority of law, did thenand there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, deliver and sell toHenry Tarog METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (shabu)
weighing approximately 2.3234 grams contained in a plastic sachet, in exchange for P1,500.00,
comprised of previously marked bills, to the damage and prejudice of the State and the general
public.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." After the termination of the pre-trial
conference, trial ensued.
The Prosecutions Version
The prosecution presented Police Inspector Perfecto Rabulan (P/Insp. Rabulan), Police Officer 2
Freddie Salvatierra (PO2 Salvatierra), Police Inspector Josephine M. Clemen (P/Insp.
Clemen),Police Officer 2 Russan Jimenez (PO2 Jimenez) and BarangayChairperson Elsa Arbitria
(Arbitria) as witnesses. From their testimonies, the following facts emerged:
6

Imrie Tarog (Tarog) informed P/Insp. Rabulan that appellant would arrive at his rented unit in Visitors
Inn, Brgy.Punta Waling-Waling, Donsol, Sorsogon to deliver and sell an unspecified quantity of
shabu. Prior thereto, there were already reports that appellant and her husband are engaged in
selling shabu. P/Insp. Rabulan thus ordered a surveillance of the area where the transaction would
take place and coordinated the matter with Arbitria, the Barangay Chairperson of Brgy. Punta
Waling-Waling. He subsequently formed a buy-bust team and requested Tarog to participate in the
operation.
On July 31, 2003, at 10 p.m., Tarog told P/Insp. Rabulanof appellants impending arrival. Tarog was
instructed to act asposeur-buyer and was given two 500-peso bills and five 100-peso bills as marked
money.P/Insp. Rabulan then prepared a pre-operation report dated August 1, 2003 and coordinated
the buy-bust operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

On August 1, 2003 at 6 p.m., appellant arrived at the Visitors Inn. Meanwhile, the buy-bust teamalso
arrived and waited in front of the inn until Tarog appeared at the second floor terrace. He threw the
key to the gate which is the pre-arranged signal for the buy-bust team to enter and proceed to his
unit. PO2 Salvatierra caught the key and together with P/Insp. Rabulan used it to open the gate.
They proceeded to Tarogs rented unit and through the slightly opened door, they had a clear view of
the living room. They saw appellant sitting on a couch with her back turned to the door as she was
giving shabuto Tarog who was in turn handing to her the marked money. The police officers thus
immediately entered the unit. PO2 Salvatierra took the shabufrom Tarog and handed it to P/Insp.
Rabulan, while the latter took the buy-bust money.
About an hour later, Arbitria entered the room and saw appellant sitting on a couch with a sachet
containing white crystalline substance beside her. After being asked why she was in the premises,
appellant answered that she was collecting a debt. PO2 Jimenez conducted a body search on
appellant in the comfort room and in the presence of Arbitria, butno prohibited drug was recovered in
her possession. Neither did the search on her wallet yield any illegal substance.
Subsequently, the buy-bust team photographed appellant with the shabu and money and thereafter
brought her to the police station for further investigation. A day later, P/Insp. Rabulan and a police
investigator brought appellant and the specimen confiscated from her to the Crime Laboratory for
examination. The specimen, which weighed 2.3234 grams, tested positive for shabu.
The Appellants Version
Appellant averred that there was no buy-bust operation conducted against her and that she was just
a victim of a frame-up. She testified that on August 1, 2003, she went to Tarog to collect from him the
payment for the pork that he purchased from her. Tarog saw her but just went upstairs to the second
floor of the apartment. She heard him say: "Here is again the person collecting the indebtedness
from us." A woman by the name of Suyen allowed her to enter the living room and told her to sit and
wait. While waiting, police officers suddenly arrived. They subjected her to a body search in the
comfort room but nothing was recovered from her. PO2 Salvatierra then searched the premises. He
saw a pair of short pants, turned its pockets inside out, and found a sachet of shabuwhich he placed
beside appellant on the couch.
A certain PO Militante then searchedappellants bag and asked if she had money. Appellant replied
that she only had P900.00 for her fare, which PO Militante took. When appellant requested for the
return of her money, she was threatened with the filing of a case.
Appellant was thereafter invited to the police station for questioning but was instead incarcerated.
She was brought by the police officers to the crime laboratory for examination but the results were
not given to her. She claimed to have seen the buy-bust money for the first time only when she was
brought to the PDEA to sign a document.
While under detention, appellant learned that Suyen,who turned out to be the wife of Tarog, is a
cousin of PO2 Salvatierra. She theorized that she was framed to prevent her from collecting the debt
of Tarog.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 26, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant for violation of Section
5,Article II of RA9165, as amended. The RTC was convinced that the prosecutions
evidenceestablished the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt since (1) appellant was
positively identified by the police officers in open court as the seller of 2.3234 grams of shabu, and
(2) the delivery of the shabuto the poseur-buyer as well as the appellants receipt of the marked
money were attested to by the prosecution witnesses. Moreover, appellants denial and alibi cannot
prevail overthe testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Besides, no improper motive can be
attributed to the police officers in imputing the crime to the appellant. Hence, their testimonies are
worthy of belief coming as it does from law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly performed
their duties. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:
7

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Marissa Marcelo y Madronero guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and she is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and Fine of Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) Pesos.
The shabu recovered is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the same shall be
turnedover to the Board for proper disposal without delay.
The accused having just [given] birth to a child, her immediate transfer to the Correccional Institution
of Women [in]Mandaluyong City is hereby ordered the moment she is already fit for travel.
SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling in its Decision dated August 31, 2007, viz:
9

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon City, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 2003-5973, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

10

Hence, this appeal.

Issues
Appellants assignment of errors in her Appellants Brief filed with the CA, which she is adopting in
this appeal per Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief), is as follows:
11

I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY WITH
[SIC] VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165 DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A WARRANT AUTHORIZING THE SAME.
III.
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED INCONVICTING THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT ON THE
BASIS OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE AND BY RELYING ON THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTY.
12

The Parties Arguments

Appellant makes issue on the fact that the poseur-buyer Tarog was never presented in court to
corroborate the other prosecution witnesses testimonies without a plausible reason for Tarogs nonpresentation. She also casts doubt on the integrity of the police officers considering that they sought
Tarogs cooperation in the buy-bust operation in exchange for their help or "assistance" in Tarogs
cases.
Appellant likewise asserts that the shabuwas not confiscated from her as testified by Arbitriathat she
saw the shabuonly on the sofa where the appellant sat. Neither was it shown that appellant was the
one holding the marked money when it was recovered by the police. To her, these prove that no buybust operation was ever conducted.
Appellant further asserts that assuming a surveillance on her which lasted for almost a week was
indeed conducted by the police officers, they should have secured a search warrant, but they did
not. Appellant also contends that she should not have been convicted on the basis of the weakness
of her defense. Further, as the alleged buy-bust operation is shown to berife with irregularities, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties should not have been applied to the
police officers concerned. She avers that she was a victim of frame-up and the alleged buy-bust
operation was a mere ploy orchestrated by the police.
The appellee People of the Philippines, on the other hand, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), argues that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugsare present in this
case; that the presentation of an informant in illegal drug cases is not essential for conviction nor
indispensable for a successful prosecution because an informants testimony would be merely
corroborative and cumulative; that there was no need for the police officers to secure a search
warrant because appellant was caught in flagrante delicto; and that in the absence of proof to the
contrary, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the police officers must stand.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Elements for the Prosecution of Illegal Sale of Shabu.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur: "(1) [the] identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. x x x What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the

proof that the transaction or saleactually took place, coupledwith the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti" or the illicit drug in evidence.
13

In this case, the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the essential elements of the
illegal sale of shabu. Appellant was positively identified by the police officers who conducted the buybust operation as the person who sold the shabupresented in court. P/Insp. Rabulan testified that
Tarog, their informant acting as a buyer, purchased the shabufrom appellant during a legitimate buybust operation.He narrated the circumstances leading to the consummation of the sale of the
shabuand the arrest of appellant as follows:
Q. Before you conducted the operation, what did you do?
A. We prepared the necessary documentary requirements addressed to the local government
executive, the letter of coordination with the PDEA.
xxxx
Q. Now, you said that you made a pre-operational plan and in coordination with the PDEA found on
page 7 of the records is a pre-operational report signed by Police Inspector Rabulan, are you familiar
with this?
A. With [regard] to the pre-operational report[,] x x x Marissa Marcelo was arriving in the area of
Donsol with undetermined quantity of shabu to be delivered to Imrie Tarog of Punta Waling-Waling,
Donsol, Sorsogon.
Q. That was the basis of your plan?
A. Yes, maam.
xxxx
Q. After making the pre-operational plan and coordination with the PDEA, what did your team do?
A. I invited this Imrie Tarog. He committed [to help us] in our problem.
Q. Who is this Imrie Tarog?
A. He was the one who helped us [by buying] shabu from the suspect Marissa Marcelo.
Q. Who supplied to you the reliable information as stated in your preoperational report that Marissa
Marcelo is selling shabu?
A. Imrie Tarog.
Q. You said that you invited Imrie Tarog and he committed x x x to cooperate with you, now, what did
you do after hearing the commitment from him?

A. I organized the team. I coordinated with the barangay captain of Walingwaling, Donsol, Sorsogon
which is the place where the transaction will be held.
Q. What about Imrie Tarog, where was he then while you were organizing the team?
A. He was occupying the rented apartment in Visitors Inn, in Walingwaling, Donsol, Sorsogon.
Q. After organizing the team and after that commitment with Imrie Tarog, what did you do next?
A. We focused on surveillance and monitoring ofthe place.
Q. How long did the surveillance and monitoring of the place last [before] the operation was
conducted?
A. More or less, one (1) week.
Q. Previous to that report made by Imrie Tarog that [Marissa] Marcelo will bring shabu to Donsol,
Sorsogon, does your office know this Marissa Marcelo?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Why?
A. Because she was already reported tous as carrier of shabu with her husband.
Q. What kind of anti-drug operation against Marissa Marcelo were you able to hatch?
A. [A] buy[-]bust operation.
Q. Where was the supposedmoney that will be usedin buying shabu from her?
A. When Imrie Tarog informed x x x us that Marissa Marcelo was in Daraga, x x x during that time, I
instructed him on what to do in the operation and I gave him the amount of [P]1,500.00 to be used
as marked money in the buy[-]bust operation.
Q. Before you gave the money to the team, to Imrie Tarog, what were the distinguishing marks in
that money?
A. Thru the serial numbers.
Q. How did you keynote the serial number, did you write it down?
A. We have the machine copies of the bills.
xxxx
Q. Mr. Witness, after giving these previously marked money to Imrie Tarog and after organizing the
team, where did you proceed?

A. We were still waiting for the information if Marissa Marcelo will arrive. Q. Did she, in fact, arrive?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. What time did she arrive?
A. More or less, almost 6:00 oclock in the evening at Visitors Inn.
xxxx
Q. After receiving information that Marissa Marcelo will be arriving or after receiving information that
Marissa Marcelo had arrived in Donsol, Sorsogon, whatdid you do?
A. We proceeded to the area.
Q. Together with Imrie Tarog?
A. No, maam, Imrie Tarog was already in the apartment.
Q. What is that apartment where he was?
A. A lodging house, Visitors Inn.
Q. That same apartment where Marissa Marcelo will arrive [sic]?
A. Yes, maam and there were two rooms in that lodging house.
Q. Who occupied those two rooms in that lodging house?
A. Imrie Tarog.
xxxx
Q. After knowing that Marissa Marcelo has arrived, what transpired next?
A. We proceeded to the area with the instruction of our asset that when they were already
transacting business regarding shabu, he will get out and give us the key so that we can enter the
room.
Q. That was the arrangement between you and Imrie Tarog?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Then, what happened after that?
A. While we were inthe vicinity of the VisitorsInn, Imrie Tarog came out [to] the terrace and gave us
the key.

Q. Is that terrace on the second floor?

A. Yes, maam.
Q. And where were you while Imrie Tarog was in the terrace?
A. In front of the Visitors Inn.
Q. And you were outside?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. And how did Imrie Tarog give you the key?
A. He threw it to my companion, PO2 Salvatierra.
Q. That the key was meant for what?
A. The key was intended to open the gate.
Q. After getting [the] key from Imrie Tarog, what did you do?
A. My companion opened the padlock and proceeded to the second floor, to the room of the
apartment.
Q. And whom did you come upon in that room?
A. Since the door was open, we found out that Marissa Marcelo and Imrie Tarog were actually
transacting business of shabu.
Q. How did you know that they were transacting business of shabu?
A. They were exchangingthe shabu and the money.
Q. Who was giving the shabu to whom?
A. Marissa Marcelo was giving the shabu.
Q. To whom?
A. To Imrie Tarog.
Q. So, Marissa Marcelo gave the shabu to Imrie Tarog?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. And who gave the money to whom?

A. Imrie Tarog gave the money to Marissa Marcelo.

Q. Upon seeing that transaction, what did you do?
A. We immediately apprehended and recovered from Marissa Marcelo the money x x x so we
apprehended her.
Q. What about the shabu?
A. My companion, Freddie Salvatierrarecovered the shabu from Imrie Tarog.
Q. Can you describe to us the appearance of the shabu which your team recovered?
A. It was placed inside a transparent plastic bag, heat[-]sealed.
Q. After seeing [the] transaction taking place and after recovering the marked money from Marissa
Marcelo and the shabu from your asset, Imrie Tarog, what did you do?
A. We photographed the suspect and the shabu and also the marked money.
Q. What about the suspect, how did you deal with [her]?
A. We brought the suspected shabu together with the suspect to the police station for investigation.
Q. What did you do [to ascertain] thatthe shabu was the one recovered from Marissa Marcelo?
A. On the following day, we brought the suspected shabu to the Crime Laboratory in Legaspi City
togetherwith the suspectfor laboratory testing [and a] drug test.
xxxx
Q. How did you know that it was the shabu that you confiscated from Marissa Marcelo?
A. Through the marking ofmy investigator (witness pointing to the marking on the suspected shabu).
Q. What kind of markings?
A. The date we had submitted and the initial of the investigator.
Q. Are you referring to the blue markings "RMB"?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. What does "RMB" [mean]?
A. Roel Miranda Briones.
Q. Who actually brought thisto the crime laboratory?

A. I together with my investigator.

Q. So, you were personally present when this was received by the Crime Laboratory?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. What about the shabu seller, Marissa Marcelo, what did you do to her?
A. We also submitted her for drug test.
Q. So you brought her tothe Crime Laboratory?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. After taking her to the Crime Laboratory, whatdid you do to her?
A. When the PNP Crime Laboratory released the result of the laboratory examination of the shabu,
we proceeded to the Provincial Headquarters Office.
Q. For what purpose, Mr. Witness?
A. To file a complaint.

14

PO2 Salvatierra corroborated the testimony of P/Insp. Rabulan on material points. He testified as
follows:
Q. Where is that place? Where [was] the supposed operation x x x to take place?
A. At [B]arangay Punta Waling-waling, Donsol, Sorsogon.
Q. Where did it take place, at what particular place?
A. At Visitors Inn.
Q. And, who x x x went [to] the Visitors Inn?
A. The Chief of Police and myself were the ones who entered the Visitors Inn, the others acted as
back[-]up, as security.
Q. Why did you enter that Visitors Inn?
A. Because the asset x x x and/or x x x the Chief of Police was already in the terrace and when we
arrived there, he(asset) threw to us his key; and, that was the appropriate time for us (the Chief
ofPolice and myself) to enter the said premises.
Q. What part of that Visitors Inn did you enter?
A. We went to the second room because [there are still other rooms upstairs].

Q. What did you come upon after you entered?

A. We came upon the exchanging of the marked money by our asset, that is, the giving of the
money; whereas, the suspect in turn delivers the shabu to the asset.
xxxx
Q. What is the name of the asset who gave the marked money?
A. Imrie Tarog.
Q. And who is this Marissa Marcelo whom you said handed the suspected shabu to your asset, Imrie
Tarog?
A. She is the one. (Witness pointed to a pregnant woman who identified herself as Marissa Marcelo.)
Q. Where were you then in relation to the buyer and the seller when the transaction was taking
place?
A. I was beside the Chief of Police. When we entered[,] the Chief of Police was able to recover the
marked money from Marissa Marcelo while I recovered the suspected shabu from our asset.
xxxx
Q. You said, you were the one who recovered the suspected shabu from the poseur[-]buyer, Imrie
Tarog, if you recall, please describe to us, how that [suspect] shabu look[ed] like?
A. It was placed in a medium-size[d] transparent plastic sachet which weighed around 3 grams.

15

Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Clemen examined the confiscated crystalline substance weighing 2.3234
grams and found the same to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. This finding
is contained in Chemistry Report No. D-321-03.
16

Clearly, the prosecution, through the testimonies of the police officers as prosecution witnesses, was
able to establish the elements of illegal sale of shabu. "Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend
largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation." The Court
finds no reason to doubt the credibility of the said witnesses and their testimonies. The RTC, as
sustained by the CA, found thatthe testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were direct and definite.
Their testimonies were consistenton relevant matters with each other and the exhibits that were
formally offered in evidence.
17

Moreover, the "findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are
accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; orspeculative,
arbitrary,and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is
that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility ofwitnesses, having heard their
testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an
even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals".
18

The Presentation of the Poseur-Buyer is not Indispensable.

Appellants insistence that the failure to present the poseur-buyer is fatal to the prosecution fails to
impress. "Therelevant information acquired by the [poseur-buyer] was equally known to the police
officers who gave evidence for the prosecution at the trial.They all took part in the planning and
implementation of the [buy-bust] operation, and all were direct witnesses to the actual sale of the
[shabu, the appellants] arrest immediately thereafter, and the recovery from [her] x x x of the marked
money x x x. The testimony of the [poseur-buyer] was not therefore indispensable or necessary; it
would have been cumulative merely, or corroborative at best." His testimony can therefore be
dispensed with since the illicit transaction was actually witnessed and adequately proved by the
prosecution witnesses.
19

20

There was no Evidence of Improper

Motive on the Part of the Poseur-Buyer.
Appellant argues thatthe poseur-buyers cooperation in the buy-bust operation was in exchange for
leniency in the serious criminal charges filed against him thereby constituting improper motive. This
argument lacks factual basis. While PO2 Salvatierra admitted that the poseur-buyer has a pending
criminal case, said case was filed after the buy-bust operation.
21

The Entrapment Established the Illicit Sale of Shabu.

Appellants contention that there was no direct link between her, the marked money and shabuagain
fails to impress. Inan entrapment operation, the prosecution must establish the poseur-buyers
receipt of the shabufrom appellant and present the same in court. The eyewitness testimonies of
P/Insp. Rabulan and PO2 Salvatierra are sufficient to provethe actual exchange of the marked
money and the plastic sachet of shabubetween the poseur-buyer and appellant.
22

These objects were presented in evidence during the trial. The existence of the illicit sale is therefore
evident.
A Warrant of Arrest was not Necessary.
Appellants argument that her warrantless arrest was not valid is untenable. We emphasize that the
prosecution proved that appellant was apprehended after she exchanged the shabuin her
possession for the marked money of the poseurbuyer. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, the
police officers were not only authorized but were evenduty-bound to arrest her even without a
warrant.
23

There was no Evidence of Denial and Frame-up.

Appellants defenses of denial and frame-up do not deserve credence. Denial cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses. On the other hand, frame-up is viewed with
disfavor since it can easily be fabricated and is a common ploy in prosecution for violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. For this defense to prosper, it must be proved with clear and convincing
evidence. There must also be evidence that the police officers were inspired by improper motive.
24

25

Here, aside from appellants self-serving testimony, her claim of frame-up is unsubstantiated by other
convincing evidence. It is alsounlikely thata team of police officers would conduct an entrapment
operation and arrest the appellant just to help the poseur-buyer avoid payment of a debt.

Besides, appellant should have filed the proper charges against the police officers if she was indeed
the victim of a frame-up. The failure to file administrative or criminal charges against them
substantiates the conclusion that the defense of frame-upwas a mere concoction.
1wphi1

26

In the absence of evidence that the prosecution witnesses were impelled by improper motive to
testify falsely, appellant failed to overturn the presumption that the arresting officers regularly
performed their duties. There is, therefore, no basis to suspect the veracityof their statements.
27

The Proper Penalty

All told, we find no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, as defined and penalized under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. Under this law, the penalty for the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its
quantity and purity, is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00
to P10,000,000.00. However, with the enactment of RA 9346, only life imprisonment and fine shall
be imposed. Moreover, appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 2 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
28

29

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
Decision dated January 26, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon City, convicting
appellant Marissa Marcelo y Madronero for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay the fine of P500,000.00, is
AFFIRMED with modification that appellant is not eligible for parole.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 208469

August 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
SAMUEL "TIW-TIW" SANICO, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on November 19, 2012 in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 00769-MIN affirming, but with modifications as to the penalties, damages and
interests imposed, the conviction by the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Butuan City, Branch 1, of
Samuel "Tiw-Tiw" Sanico (accused-appellant) for one count of rape under paragraph 1(a) of Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, and
lascivious conduct under Article 336 of the same code, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, otherwise
known as "The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act."
1

Antecedents

Two separate Informations were filed against the accused-appellant before the RTC, viz:
In Criminal Case No. 12021 for Acts of Lasciviousness
That at more or less 1:00 P.M. of April 19, 2006 at XXX City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a twelve (12) year
[old] minor, by touching her breast against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in such
amount as may be proven in Court.
8

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended in relation to R.A. [No.]
7610) (Citation omitted)
9

In Criminal Case No. 12022 for Rape

That sometime in the year 2005 at XXX City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat or intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA, a twelve (12) year old
minor, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 266-A, par. (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, par. 6(10) of R.A. [No.]
8353 in relation toR[.]A[.] [No.] 7610) (Citation omitted)
10

The accused-appellant went into hiding but was subsequently arrested in his hometown in Leyte on
May 13, 2008. He was arraigned on August 26, 2008, during which heentered a not guilty plea.
11

During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following: (a) the identity of
the accused-appellant and the fact of his arrest in Leyte; (b) AAA was more than 12 but less than 13
years of age at the time the acts complained of were allegedly committed by the accused-appellant;
and (c) the incident on April 19, 2006 occurred in AAAs residence.
12

In the joint trial that ensued, the prosecution offered the testimonies of AAA, her mother BBB, and Dr.
Roslyn D.Orais (Dr. Orais), medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Caraga
Region. On the other hand, the accused-appellant was the defenses lone witness. Version of the
Prosecution
13

As indicated in her birth certificate, AAA was born on June 14, 1993. Her mother BBB works as a
cook, while her father is a "trisikad" driver. AAA was 12 years old when the acts complained of were
allegedly committed by the accused-appellant, but was already 15 years of age at the time she
testified in court.
14

The accused-appellant was a pig butcher and ice cream vendor. He and his children rented a room
for about ten (10) to eleven (11) years in the house where AAA lives with her family. Thereafter, the
accused-appellants family moved to their own house built near AAAs residence.
15

AAA claimed that the accused-appellant raped her in 2005, but she could not recall the exact month
and date. She remembered though that she was raped at around 2:00 p.m.while she was washing
dishes in the kitchen. There was nobody else in the house except her and the accused-appellant. He
approached and held her hands tightly. She boxed the accused-appellant, but he pushed her.

Thereafter, he threatened to kill her if she would shout. Knowing that the accused-appellant was a
pig butcher, AAA was overcome by fear. He then succeeded in removing her clothes and
undergarments and pushing her against the wall. He took off his short pants and briefs and inserted
his penis into her vagina for two to three minutes. She felt pain. The accused-appellant then pulled
up his short pants and laid down in the sofa.
16

AAA alleged that she was again raped for six or seven times, but she endured the harrowing
experiences in silence due to the accused-appellants threat to kill her. She also dreaded the
possibilities of quarrels and deaths, which would ensue if her parents find out.
17

On April 19, 2006, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA was napping in a room with her niece. AAA woke up
when she felt that the accused-appellant was touching her. AAA rose and repeatedly boxed the
accused-appellant, but the latter held her tightly, pulled up her clothes and mashed her breast. Her
father, CCC, was just in another room atthat time, but out of fear, AAA kept quiet. When the accusedappellant took off his short pants and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina, the latter resisted. Being
merely built out of wood, the house shook, which caused CCC towake up. CCC lost consciousness
for a short period of time when he caught the accused-appellant performing lascivious acts on AAA.
The accused-appellant then seized the opportunity to flee.
18

At around 4:00 p.m. on the same day, Dr. Orais performed a medico- genital examination on AAA
and found the latter to have suffered from sexual abuse. AAAs hymen was "coaptated" or slightly
open and bore "old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock positions". The hymenal laceration was
possibly caused by "an injury secondary to intravaginal penetration by a blunt object". No human
spermatozoa was found in AAAs vagina. Dr. Orais, however, explained that even in the presence of
seminal fluid, there are cases whenno sperm can be found. Dr. Orais likewise noted no physical or
extra-genital injurieson AAA, but found ample evidence of sexual intercourse having occurred more
than one but less than four month/s ago. Dr. Orais also testified that AAA was at times
uncooperative, timid, and emotionally restrained.
19

BBB testified that it was CCC who saw the accused-appellant touching AAAs breast. BBB sought
payment of moral damages.
20

Version of the Defense

The accused-appellant was the lone witness for the defense. At the time he testified in court, he was
53 years old. He stated that for years, he had lived in the house of AAAs family, but was no longer a
resident therein when the acts complained ofwere allegedly committed.
21

On April 19, 2006, the accused-appellant had a drinking spree with CCC in the latters house lasting
from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. As the two were both drunk, the accused-appellant slept in the
salawhile CCC did so in his room. The accused-appellant woke up from slumber when AAA touched
the formers pocket to search for money.She got some coins and bills. The accused-appellant, in
turn, touched AAAs chest and asked the latter to remove her short pants. AAA complied. As the
accused-appellant was touching AAAs breast, CCC woke up. Upon seeing what was taking place,
CCC got a boloto hack the accused-appellant, but the latter escaped.
22

The accused-appellant testified that he had never inserted his penis in AAAs vagina. He admitted
touching AAA on April 19, 2006 but he did so only because the latter initiated it. He also claimed that
he was very close to AAA and he treated her as if she were his own child.
23

The Ruling of the RTC

On October 13, 2009, the RTC rendered an Omnibus Judgment convicting the accused-appellant of
one count of rapeand of acts of lasciviousness. The RTC found AAAs testimony of what had
transpired as sincere and truthful, noting though that a specific allegation as to the exact date and
month of the commission of rape in 2005 was absent. The trial court thus pointed out the settled
doctrine that in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the
occurrence of rape, not the time of its commission, the latter not being an element of the
crime. Further, the accused-appellant cannotascribe any ill-motive against AAA which could have
induced the latter to fabricate such grave charges. The accused-appellants flight after he learned
that charges were filed against him likewise worked to disfavor him. If he were indeed innocent, he
would have stayed to vindicate himself from the accusations.
24

25

26

27

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt in the offenses as charge[d], in criminal case no. 12022 for rape[,] he is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, to pay [AAA][,] through her father[,] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos ([P]50,000.00) as
civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos ([P]50,000.00) as moral damages. In criminal case
no 12021 for acts of lasciviousness, he is sentenced tosuffer imprisonment of 4 years, 2 months and
1 day to 6 years. He isfurther ordered to pay [AAA] the sum of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
([P]25,000.00) as moral damages and another Twenty Five Thousand Pesos ([P]25,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
He shall serve his sentence at Davao Prison and Penal Farms, Panabo City, Davao del Norte.In the
service of his sentence[,] he shall be credited with the full time benefit of his preventive imprisonment
provided he agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners[,] otherwise[,] if he does not[,] he shall be entitled with only four-fifths (4/5) of his
preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 as amended of the [RPC].
SO ORDERED.

28

The Parties Arguments Before the CA

The accused-appellant challenged the above disquisition before the CA. He argued that while the
time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of rape, a complainants inability to
give the exact dates, during which she was allegedly raped, puts her credibility in question.
29

30

AAA alleged that she was raped on April 19, 2006, at around 1:00 p.m. However, Dr. Orais, who
conducted a medical examination on AAA three hours after the incident, testified that human
spermatozoa was absent in AAAs vagina and the hymenal lacerations found were possibly inflicted
more than a month ago.
31

The accused-appellant admitted though that he could be held liable for acts of lasciviousness for
touching AAAs breast and asking her to remove her short pants.
32

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on its part, sought the dismissal of the appeal. It
contended that the accused-appellants denial of the charges against him cannot prevail over AAAs
positive testimony. Further, the date of the commission ofrape becomes relevant only when the
33

accuracy and truthfulness of the complainants narration practically hinge thereon. Such
circumstance does not obtain in the case under review.
34

35

The accused-appellant was also nonchalant in admitting that he touched AAAs breast and asked her
toremove her short pants. The accused-appellants behavior exhibited no less than his lewd designs
on AAA.
36

The Ruling of the CA

On November 19, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the decretal portion of which
states:
37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The October 13, 2009
Omnibus Judgment of the [RTC] of Butuan City, Branch 1, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 12021, [the accused-appellant] is sentenced to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayoras minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum. The moral
and exemplary damages of [P]25,000.00 each awarded by the court a quoare reduce[d] to
[P]15,000.00 each. He is further ordered to pay civil indemnity of [P]20,000.00 and a fine of
[P]15,000.00.
2) In Criminal Case No. 12022, being in accordance with the law and the evidence, [the accusedappellant] is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In addition to the awards of civil indemnity of
[P]50,000.00 and moral damages of [P]50,000.00, [the accused-appellant] is further ordered to pay
AAA exemplary damages in the amount of [P]30,000.00.
3) [The accused-appellant] is further ordered to pay interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annumon all the damages awarded in this case fromdate of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

38

In additionally directing the payment of fine and civil indemnity, and modifying both the penalty
imposed upon the accused-appellant and the award of damages to AAA as regards Criminal Case
No. 12021 for lascivious conduct, the CA explained that:
[A]n assiduous review of the arguments [the accused-appellant] proffered reveals that what was
questioned by him was his conviction for the crime of rape only. In fact, in his appellants brief, he
emphasized that he is liable only for the charge of acts of lasciviousness after having admitted that
he merely touched the breast of AAA and asked the latter to remove her short pants for him to see
her private part. Apparently, [the] accusedappellant no longer assailed his conviction [for] the crime
of acts of lasciviousness.
This notwithstanding, we are constrained to review the entire records of the case pursuant to the
settled rule that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives his
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of
the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as the law and justice dictate,
whether favorable or unfavorable to them, and whether they are assigned as errors or not. x x x

xxxx
While we sustain [the] accused-appellants conviction of acts of lasciviousness, yet, we nonetheless
modify the penalty imposed and the damages awarded by the court a quo. x x x [W]e find that the
court a quo erroneously imposed the penalty [for] the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC in relation to RA 7610. It is important to note that [the] accused-appellant was
charged [with] acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to RA 7610 which
defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefore under Article III, Section 5
thereof. Certainly, [the] accused-appellant was sufficiently informed of the accusation against him
and he can thus be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610 based on the
evidence presented against him. Article III, Section 5, of RA 7610 reads:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.- Children, whether male or female, who for
money or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporalin its medium period to reclusion perpetuashall be imposed upon
the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution orsubject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rapeor lascivious conduct, as the
case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period, x x x.
xxxx
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in
prostitution, but alsowith a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation
where a child is abused for profit, but also where one through coercion, intimidation or influence
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
[T]here is no doubt that [the] accused-appellant is guilty of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5(b),
Article XIII of RA 7610 after having admitted the lascivious conduct he made with AAA. It is
undisputed that AAA was still 12 years old when the crime happened and as admitted by [the]

accused-appellant himself, hewas touching AAA because AAA was looking for money inside his
pocket and he told AAA to remove her short pants for him to see her private part. x x x.
It is important to note however that a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child
indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. x x x
xxxx
Undoubtedly, [the] accused-appellants acts were covered by the definitions of sexual abuse and
lascivious conduct under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement the provisions of RA 7610, particularly
on child abuse:
(g) "Sexual abuse"includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of
a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin,breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or [pubic] area of a person. x x x Indubitably, AAA
was deemed to be [a] "child subjected to other sexual abuse" as defined above. Accordingly, the
imposable penalty should be the penalty prescribed under RA 7610 and not the penalty under Article
336 of the RPC as imposed by the court a quo. In People v. Leonardo, the Supreme Court ruled that
the penalty to be imposed for violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 is as follows:
For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No.
7610, the penalty prescribed is reclusion temporalin its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
Notwithstanding that Republic Act No. 7610 is a special law, the [accused-] appellant may enjoy the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the [accused-]appellant shall be entitled to a minimum
term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Republic Act No.
7610. The penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor medium to reclusion temporalminimum, the
range of which is from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. On the other hand, the
maximum term of the penalty should be taken from the penalty prescribed under Section 5(b), Article
III of Republic Act No. 7610, which is reclusion temporalin its medium period to reclusion perpetua,
the range of which is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to reclusion perpetua. The minimum,
medium and maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to
17 years and 4 months; medium 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20years; and maximum
reclusion perpetua.
Thus, in this case, we imposed on [the] accused-appellant the indeterminate sentence of 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas
maximum.
Corollarily, in view of recent jurisprudence,we deem it proper to reduce the amount of moral and
exemplary damages awarded by the court a quofrom [P]25,000.00 each to [P]15,000.00 each. [The]

accusedappellant is however ordered to pay civil indemnity of [P]20,000.00 and a fine of

[P]15,000.00. (Citations omitted)
39

On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 12022, the CA affirmed the accused-appellants conviction
for rapeand the award by the RTC of civil indemnity and moral damages in favor of AAA. Additionally,
the CA ordered the payment of P30,000.00 asexemplary damages. In both Criminal Case Nos.
12021 and 12022, the CA likewise directed the accusedappellant to pay AAA the legal interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum on all damages awarded to be computedfrom the date of finality of
the decision until full payment. The CA cited the following as reasons:
40

Indubitably, it is unimaginable for a young girl like AAA to concoct a tale of defloration, drag herself
and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame, and make them the object of gossip among their
neighbors and friends if the accusation was indeed untrue. x x x.
xxxx
The contention of [the] accused-appellant that the rape allegedly committed on April 19, 2006 was
highly implausible because of the absence of fresh lacerations and spermatozoa in AAAs vagina is
untenable. It should be emphasizedthat [the] accused-appellant was charged [with] rape that
occurred sometime in 2005 and not on April 19, 2006. The fact that only old healed lacerations were
found does not negate rape. x x x:
x x x In People v. Espinoza, it was held that healed lacerations do not negate rape. In fact,
lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.x x x.
Moreover, in the present case, Dr. Orais clarified to the court that even if the alleged sexual assault
took place in the year 2005 or a year after AAA was examined, the old healed lacerations could still
be found.
xxxx
[T]he absence of spermatozoa does not disprove rape, In fact, in People v. Perez, it was held that:
x x x The absence of spermatozoa is not a negation of rape. The presence or absence of
spermatozoa isimmaterial since it is penetration, not ejaculation, which constitutes the crime of rape.
x x x.
xxxx
As to the award of damages, x x x the victim shall likewise be entitled to exemplary damages in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos ([P]30,000.00) as justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to
set a public example and serve as a deterrent against the elders who abuse and corrupt the
youth. (Citations omitted)
41

Issue
The accused-appellant now comes before the court for relief insisting anew on the alleged failure of
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had, in fact, raped AAA.

Both the accused-appellant and the OSG did not file supplemental briefs, adopting instead their
respective arguments raised before the CA.
42

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the CAs verdict convicting the accused-appellant of the charges against him, but modify
the sameby (a) reinstating the penalty and damages for lascivious conduct imposed by the RTC in
Criminal Case No. 12021; and (b) reducing to six percent the interests imposed upon the damages
awarded to AAA in both Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022.
Criminal Case No. 12021
As aptly stated by the CA, it would be a superfluity to exhaustively re-evaluate the accusedappellants conviction in Criminal Case No. 12021 for lasciviousness conduct committed on April 19,
2006. First. The RTC and the CA uniformly found the accused-appellant guilty as charged. Second.
The accused-appellant himself admitted touching AAAs breast and directing the latter totake off her
short pants. Third. In the appeal filed before the CA and this court, no error was ascribed on the part
of the RTC in convicting the accused-appellant for lascivious conduct.
The RTC and the CA, were however, not in agreement as to the proper imposable penalty for the
accused-appellants lascivious conduct. The RTC applied the provisions of Article 336 of the RPC
and sentenced the accused-appellant to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years of imprisonment.
The CA, on the other hand, invoking Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which punishes sexual abuses
committed against minors, imposed upon the accused-appellant the indeterminate penalty of 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas
maximum.
In the instant appeal, the Information relative to Criminal Case No. 12021 bears the caption "for acts
of lasciviousness." It is, however, indicated that the acts are being prosecuted pursuant to the
provisions of "Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to R.A. No. 7610."
43

In the herein assailed decision, the CA explained that during the trial, the prosecution was able to
prove the existence of the requisites of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610. The CA
thus modified the penalty and imposed instead the one provided for in R.A. No. 7610.
In Flordeliz v. People, we allowed the imposition of a penalty provided for in R.A. No. 7610 despite
the absence in the Information filed of any explicit reference to the saidstatute. We declared that:
44

We are aware that the Information specifically charged petitioner with Acts of Lasciviousness under
the RPC, without stating therein that it was in relation to R.A. No. 7610. However, the failure to
designate the offense by statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an
erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein
clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. The character of the crime is not determined
by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have beenviolated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances inthe complaint or
information.

In the instant case, the body of the Information contains an averment of the acts alleged to have
been committed by petitioner and unmistakably describes acts punishable under Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610. (Citation omitted)
45

In the accused-appellants case beforethe Court, the Information even specifically mentions R.A. No.
7610. The accused-appellant, therefore, was fairly apprised that he was being charged with violation
of R.A. No. 7610 as well. Further, it was shown that the requisites of Section 5(b) of the statute are
present. The CA thus inferred that it could not be precluded from imposing the proper penalty
provided for in R.A. No. 7610.
The CA aptly declared that when an appeal isfiled in a criminal action, it opens the entire matter for
review and that the requisites of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are present in the
accused-appellants case. However, grounds exist compelling us to reinstate the penalty and
damages imposed by the RTC in Criminal Case No. 12021.
It bears stressing that the case before the Court involves two separate Informations filed one for
rape and another for lascivious conduct.
People v. Francisco involved the issue ofunder which appellate jurisdiction the crimes of rape and
lascivious conduct fall. The court, however, had the occasion to explain that:
46

Nor can we widen the scope of our appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the fact that the trial court
heard two (2) distinct and separate cases simultaneously. Such procedure [referring to the conduct
of a joint trial] adopted by the trial court cannot and did not result in the merger of the two (2)
offenses. In fact, a cursory reading of the assailed decision of the court a quoreveals with pristine
clarity that each case was separately determined by the trial judge, as each should be separately
reviewed on appeal. x x x.
47

In the case at bench, the commission of lascivious conduct was admitted by the accused-appellant
in his testimony. No issue regarding his conviction for lascivious conduct had been raised in his
appeal before the CA as well. Despite the fact that the appeal filed was captioned as one with
reference to Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022, the body stated in no uncertain terms that what
was being assailed was merely the conviction for rape. Effectively then, it was as if no appeal was
filed relative to Criminal Case No. 12021. Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC for lascivious
conduct should not be disturbed anymore.Necessarily then, the CA cannot impose upon the
accused-appellant a graverpenalty and increase the amount of damages awarded to AAA at least
relative to Criminal Case No. 12021. This is the path more in accord with the general rule that penal
laws are to be construed liberally in favor of the accused. Criminal Case No. 12022
48

The court finds no reversible error committed by the RTC and the CA anent the accusedappellantsconviction for rape in Criminal Case No. 12022.
In People of the Philippines v. Hermenigildo Delen y Esco Billa, the court emphatically stated that:
49

It is a fundamental rule that the trial courts factual findings, especially its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and binding upon this Court,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the
trial court is in the bestposition to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of
its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses

deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only
the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These are significant factors
in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The appellate courts
will generally not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and
value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
Moreover, "[w]e have repeatedly held that when the offended parties are young and immature girls,
as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering
not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be
exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true."
50

The foregoing doctrines apply with greater force in the instant case where the accused-appellant
cannot ascribe any ill-motive against AAA in accusing him of the offenses charged,and where the
factual findings of the RTC coincide with those of the CA.
"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was
accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is twelve years of age, or is demented."
51

In the instant appeal, the RTC and the CA both found AAAs testimony that she was raped in 2005 as
credible. AAA did not specifically refer to an exact month and date when the sordid act was
committed. Nonetheless, her testimony that the accused-appellant threatened to kill her, pushed her
to the wall and inserted his penis in her vagina at around 2:00 p.m., while she was alone washing
dishes at home, was positive, clear and categorical.
52

To exculpate him from liability, the accused-appellant invokes Dr. Orais medical findings that human
spermatozoa was absent in AAAs vagina, and that her hymen bore old healed and not fresh
lacerations possibly sustained more than one but less than four month/s ago. These, however, are
not compelling reasons to warrant the reversal of the assailed decision.
53

The Information in Criminal Case No. 12022 charged the accused-appellant for raping AAA in
2005.On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 12021, the accused-appellantwas indicted for
committing lascivious conduct on April 19, 2006. The results of the medical examination conducted
on April 19, 2006 by Dr. Orais, finding that there was no human spermatozoa found in AAAs vagina
and that the latters hymen bore old healed and not fresh lacerations, are not inconsistent with the
conclusion that the latter was raped in 2005. Repetitive as it may be, the rape was committed in
2005 and not shortly before the medical examination conducted upon AAA on April 19, 2006.
Interests on all the damages
imposed upon the accusedappellant reduced from 12% to 6%
Prescinding from the above, the Court finds no grounds to reverse the herein assailed decision
convicting the accused-appellant of one count of rape and of lascivious conduct. The Court likewise
finds no error in the penalty, civil indemnity, and damages ordered by the CA relative to Criminal
Case No. 12022. However, inCriminal Case No. 12021, the lesser penalty and damages imposed by
the RTC are reinstated. Lastly, to conform to prevailing jurisprudence, an interest at the rate of six

percent (6%) per annumshall be imposed on all the damages awarded to AAA in both Criminal Case
Nos. 12021 and 12022, to be computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
54

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated November 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00769-MIN, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) In Criminal
Case No. 12021, the indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of imprisonment as
minimum to 6 years as maximum imposed by the R TC upon the accused-appellant, and the award
in favor of AAA of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages, are reinstated; and
(b) An interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on all the damages awarded to AAA in
Criminal Case Nos. 12021 to 12022 is likewise imposed upon the accused-appellant to be computed
from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 203048

August 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RUSTY BALA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 25 July 2011 affirming the
conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City, Branch 72 of appellant Rusty Bala for
violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 ..
1

This case is an offshoot of G.R. No. 152351 promulgated on 18 September 2003, where the Court
affirmed the conviction only of Jamil Malay Ragid (Mala), appellant's co-accused in this case.
3

Following a buy-bust operation, appellant and Mala were charged with a violation of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, under an Information which reads:
That on or about the 4th day of April 2001, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping with one another, being private persons and without authority of law, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver in consideration of undetermined
pieces of money (boodle money) to poseur-buyer, two (2) pieces of transparent plastic bags each
containing yellowish crystalline substance with the following net weights:
A- (ABI-R1 4-4-01) = 105.89 grams
B- (ABI-R2 4-4-01) = 105.71 grams

which substances when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive results for
METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE otherwise known as "shabu" which is a regulated
drug.
4

When arraigned, both appellant and Mala pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. On 28 August 2001, the
RTC rendered a decision convicting both appellant and Mala of the crime charged. On 18
September 2003, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 152351 affirmed the conviction only of Mala,
appellants co-accused in this case. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of 28 August 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City,
Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 24514-MN is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as JAMIL MALA y RAJID is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged as penalized under Section 15, Article III,
R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuaand to pay a fine in the amount of P1 MILLION and the costs. However, insofar as appellant
Rusty Bala is concerned,the decision is SET ASIDE and this case is hereby remanded to the trial
court below for the reception of evidence for Rusty Bala, unless itis determined that he is not
mentally fit to face trial, in which case the trial court should take the appropriate steps provided by
law. (Emphasis supplied).
5

The factual antecedents, as narrated by prosecution witnesses, have been succinctly summarized
inG.R. No. 152351 as follows:
On 4 April 2001, at around 5:30 p.m., a confidential informant came to the office of the Drug
Enforcement Group, Malabon Police Station. He reported that a transaction with two Muslims for the
sale of 200 grams of shabuin the amount of P130,000 would take place between 9:00 and 10:00
p.m. in his house at C-4 Road, Barangay Taong, Malabon, Metro Manila. Acting on this information,
Police Inspector Virgilio Olalia forthwith formed a buy-bust team composed of PO1 Joel Fernandez
[PO1 Fernandez] as poseur-buyer, SPO2 Armando Isidto [SPO2 Isidto], SPO2 Manolito Manalo, and
other policemen. PO1 Fernandez was then given "boodle money" consisting of fakeP1,000 bills on
both ends of the bundle and cut newspaper prints in the middle, which were wrapped in a plastic
bag. At about 8:30 p.m. the team proceeded to the place of operation. They then waited along C-4
Road.
An hour later, the appellants arrived on board a taxicab. Fernandez and the confidential informant
immediately entered the latters house. After a short while, there was a knocking at the door. The
confidential informant opened the door and let appellants Jamil Mala and Rusty Bala enter his
house. He then talked with the appellants and introduced Fernandez to the two as the buyer of
shabu. When Mala asked for the money, Fernandez showed to him the boodle money contained in a
plastic bag. The former then gave to the latter the suspected shabu wrapped with a yellow
transparent plastic bag. As Mala was counting the money, he noticed it to be fake ormerely boodle
money. The appellants then talked with each other in Muslim and instantly grabbed the suspected
shabufrom Fernandez.
Meanwhile, the confidential informer went out of the house and gave the pre-arranged signal to the
other policemen by scratching his head. Isidto and Manalo immediately entered the house just as
Fernandez was drawing his gun. Isidto confiscated the suspected shabu from Mala, and the boodle
money from Bala. The shabuwas sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, which yielded
positive result for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

For his part, appellant Jamil Mala denied the accusation against him and his co-appellant. He
claimed that he was engaged in the selling of VCDs in the Muslim area in Greenhills, as well as in
Caloocan City. He was also selling at the Caloocan City market readymade pants on installment
basis. One time, he met a certain Manny in Czar Bar near the Wise Hotel in Monumento, Caloocan
City; and later Manny borrowed P18,000 from him. On 4 April 2001, he went to the house of Manny
to collect the P18,000 he loaned to him (Manny). He arrived at 7:00 p.m. only to be told by Mannys
daughter that Manny was not around. While Mala was saying that he would leave and would just
return later, Mannys wife told him to wait, as she would ask her daughter to fetch Manny.
Fifteen minutes thereafter, fourpersons in civilian clothes arrived. They frisked him and told him to
undress. They then handcuffed him along with his companion Rusty Bala. Two of the armed men
went out of the house and later returned with two plastic bags. Mala and Bala were thereupon taken
to the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon and then to a detention cell. When appellant Mala
subsequently learned of the charges against him and Bala, he asked his wife to file charges against
the arresting officers. But his wife instead returned home to their home province.
Appellant Rusty Bala was no longercalled to testify because his lawyer allegedly "had a hard time
communicating with him"; and besides, he (Bala) appeared somewhat mentally deficient and would
only corroborate Malas testimony.
6

Acting on the Resolution issued by the Court on 7 July 2004, further proceedings insofar as
appellant is concerned was conducted by the Muntinlupa RTC. The trial against appellant resumed
on 8 June 2006 during which appellant testified in his defense. Appellant denied the charges against
him. He claimed that around 5:00a.m. of 4 April 2001, he went to Balintawak market to sell baby
clothes. At 10:00 a.m., appellant proceeded to Caloocan City to attend a worship service in a
mosque until 12:00 p.m. While he was waiting for a tricycleto go back to Balintawak, an owner-type
jeep suddenly stopped beside him. Three men alighted from the jeep and asked appellant if he is a
Muslim. When he answered in the affirmative, the three men suddenly frisked him and forcibly
boarded him into their jeep where he was blindfolded. When theyreached their destination which
was unknown to appellant, he was brought to a room where he heard the three unidentified men
talking to another person. When his blindfold was removed, appellant was asked if he knew the
person whom they were talking to earlier. He only came to know said person as his co-accused,
Mala, when they were both left in the room handcuffed. On the following day, they were brought to
the Malabon City Jail. Appellant denied the charges against him.
7

Mohammad Nur Tandual (Tandual), a distant relative of appellant, corroborated his testimony.
Tandual recounted that after the worship service, he saw the police arrive outside the mosque and
arrest the appellant. Tandual recalled that appellant was merely standing when he was
apprehended. Appellant tried to resist but he was dragged and boarded into the police vehicle.
9

On 5 February 2008, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of
drug pushing under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, penalized with reclusion
perpetua. He was also ordered to pay a fine ofOne Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), and to pay the
costs. The trial court did not give credit to appellants defense of denial and frame-up.
10

After receiving a copy of the trial court's decision, petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of
Appeal before the Court of Appeals. In his Appellants Brief, appellant questioned the police officers
decision to immediately conduct a buy-bust operation without conducting a surveillance or test-buy.
Appellant found the action of the poseur-buyer in immediately demanding payment for the
11

shabuafter introductions were made as improbable because if appellant were indeed involved in
illegal drug trade, he would not have immediately agreedto transact business with such readiness
and willingness. Appellant alleged that the apprehending officers failed to immediately mark the
evidence, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items, and to photograph the same in the
presence of the accused. Appellant averred that the prosecution failed to account for every link in the
chain of custody starting from its turn over by SPO3 Isidto to the investigator and from the latter to
the chemist.
On 25 July 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction in toto. The issues raised by
appellant were resolved as follows: 1) The absence of a prior surveillance ortest-buy does not affect
the legality of the buy-bust operation. The Court has left it accordingly to the discretion of the police
authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers; 2) It is not improbable for
appellant to deal with drugs openly in a public place to persons he hardly knew, for drug dealers are
known to sell their goods even to strangers; 3) Strict compliance with the requirements relating to the
corpus delictiis not required as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized itemshave
been preserved; and 4) The prosecution was able to establish anunbroken chain of custody over the
shabu.
12

The appellate court also dismissed appellants claim of frame-up and denial as insufficient. Appellant
appealed his conviction before this Court.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be sufficiently proved: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. All these elements were duly established. Appellant was
caught in flagrante delictoselling shabuthrough a buybust operation conducted by members of the
Malabon Drug Enforcement Unit. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Fernandez, positively testified that the sale
took place and appellant was one of the authors of the illegal sale of drugs, thus:
13

Q: And after they entered the house, referring to the 2 accused, what happened next?
A: The 2 accused and the confidential informan[t] talked to each other.
Q: You were present when they talked?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after the confidential informant and the 2 accused talked to each other, what happened next?
A: Our confidential informant introduced me, sir.
Q: As what?
A: As the buyer of the shabu, sir.
Q: And after you were introduced by the confidential informant to the 2 accused as the buyer, what
happened next?
A: They demanded the money.

Q: The 2 of them?
A: Jamil, sir.
Q: Only Jamil?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what did you do when Jamil Mala asked for the money?
A: I showed the boodle money, sir, wrapped with yellow plastic bag.
Q: Then what happened?
A: I asked for the shabu, sir.
Q: From whom?
A: From Jamil, sir.
Q: And what did Jamil Mala do?
A: He gave to me the shabu, sir. What happened was like this: Jamil Mala was asked by the other to
count the money and while doing so, Mala noticed the money to be fake so the 2 accused talked in
Muslim after which Jamil Mala tried to grab from me the shabu and was able to do so. But before
that, the confidential informant went out of his house and gavethe signal to the others.
Q: Will you be able to identify the buy-bust shabuif shown to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: From whom did he grab the shabu?
A: From me.
Q: You said the confidential informant went out. What happened later when the confidential
informant went out?
A: It was our pre-arranged signal that that is the time that the deal was consummated already.
Q: What happened next after the confidential informant went out of his house?
A: When Jamil Mala was able to grab the shabufrom me, I drew my gun and at the same time,
SPO[2] Armando Isidto and SPO2 Manolito Manalo entered the house.
Q: Were you in civilian clothes?
A: Yes, sir. I was wearing shorts, sir.

Q: What about Isidto and Manalo? Were they also in civilian clothes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was your gun at the time?
A: Under my shirt at the back ofmy waist.
Q: What did they do when they entered the house?
A: Isidto recovered the shabufrom Mala and the boodle money from Bala, sir.
Q: And who recovered the boodle money?
A: Isidto recovered the money.
Q: From whom did he recover the boodle money?
A: From Rusty Bala, sir.

14

It can be gleaned from the above-quoted testimony that appellant acted in common concert with his
co-accused in the illegal sale of shabu. They were both present during the entire transaction. Mala
produced the shabu and handed it to the poseur-buyer in exchange for the boodle money.
Appellant ordered Mala to count the money. When they were placed under arrest, the boodle money
was recovered from appellant. Their acts clearly demonstrate the presence of conspiracy. To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in
every act or need not even know the exactpart to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy.
15

In his Supplemental Brief, appellant assails the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction despite
the apprehending officers failure to preserve the evidentiary value of the seized items. First,
appellant argues that the apprehending officers failed togive any explanation why they failed to place
the necessary markings on the items seized in the presence of the persons mentioned by law, to
take photographs, and, submit a detailed inventory of the same. Second, appellant avers that while
SPO3 Isidto claimed that he delivered the drugs to a certain SPO1 Mandac, it does not appear that
the latter received the same as the dispatch in the blotter was not signed by said person. Appellant
alsonotes that a certain PO1 Sigua made the delivery to the crime laboratory and not the investigator
as claimed by SPO2 Isidto. Third, appellant maintains that the failure of the apprehending officers to
observe the proper procedure negates the operation of the presumption of regularity accorded to
police officers.
Section 1 of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board
Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, provides that all prohibited and regulated drugs shall be physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof, to wit:
Section 1. All prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses and articles specially
designed for the use thereof when unlawfully used or found in the possession of any person not

authorized to have control and disposition of the same, or when found secreted or abandoned, shall
be seized or confiscated by any national, provincial or local law enforcement agency. Any
apprehending team having initial custody and control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia, should
immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in
the presence of the accused, if there be any, and/or his representative, who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Thereafter, the seized drugs and
paraphernalia shall be immediately brought to a properly equipped government laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination.
The apprehending team shall: (a) within forty-eight (48) hours from the seizure inform the Dangerous
Drugs Board by telegram of said seizure, the nature and quantity thereof, and who has present
custody of the same, and (b) submit to the Board a copy of the mission investigation report within
fifteen (15) days fromcompletion of the investigation.
This rule is now incorporated asSection 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 that repealed Republic Act
No. 6425.
The alleged procedural infirmity pointed out by appellant does not prove fatal to the prosecutions
case.
In People v. Gratil, a case wherein appellant therein claimed that proper procedure for taking
custody of the seized prohibited drugs was not faithfully followed, we ruled that:
16

In People v. De Los Reyes, a case which also involved an objection regarding the non-compliance
with the chain of custody rule, we held that:
The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979
is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally
irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of
illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is
established x x x and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers
to comply with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.
Moreover, in People v. Agulay, we held that:
Non-compliance with [Section 21, 19 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165] is not fatal and will not
render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. In People v.
Del Monte, this Court held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. x x x.
The ponenteof Agulaywould further observe in a separate opinion that the failure by the buy-bust
team to comply with the procedure in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which replicated Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165, did
not overcome the presumption of regularity accorded to police authorities in the performance of their
official duties, to wit:

First, it must be made clear that in several cases decided by the Court, failure by the buy-bust team
to comply with said section did not prevent the presumption of regularityin the performance of duty
from applying.
Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained in Section 21(a) were
already there per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the presence of
such regulation and its non-compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied such
presumption. x x x.
Notwithstanding the minor lapse in procedure committed by the police officers in the handling of the
illegal drugs taken from appellant, the identity and integrity of the evidence was never put into
serious doubt in the course of the proceedings of this case. x x x.
17

Pertinently, it is the preservation ofthe integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items which
mustbe proven to establish the corpus delicti.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the chain of custody requirement were proven during the
trial, thus:
A review of the evidence on recordwill show that the prosecution was able to establish an unbroken
chain of custody over the shabuwhich it claims as having been sold and possessed by the accusedappellant. SPO[2] Armando Isidto testified that he recovered the shabu from accused-appellant Bala
and Mala. He then sealed the recovered shabuin a plastic bag and marked it at the police station.
Heturned over the dangerous drugs to investigator SPO1 Vic Mandac, who prepared the request for
examination. The recovered shabu was then sent to NPDC Crime Laboratory. P/Insp. Sandra
Goacknowledged the receipt of the sealed plastic bag. She stated that the test she conducted on the
specimens yielded a positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
18

Appellants defenses, which are predicated on denial and frame-up, are invariably viewed with
disfavor because such defenses can easily be fabricated and are common ploy in prosecutions for
the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. They deserve scant consideration in light of the
positive testimonies of the police officers.
19

In fine, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant sold shabu. Section
15, Article III, in relation to Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, states:
Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated
Drugs.- The penalty of reclusion perpetuato death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated
drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the
Crime.- The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A,
15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the
following quantities:

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabuor methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hempor marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuanaresin or marijuanaresin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public
consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from
prision correccionalto reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
1wphi1

In the instant case, appellant was found to have sold to the poseurbuyer a total of 211.6 grams of
shabu, which amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of
two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, in this case, considering that no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the appellant's violation of Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the fine of P1,000,000.00.
20

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 25 July 201 1 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the conviction of
appellant Rusty Bala by the RTC of Malabon City, Branch 72 for violation of Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and to pay a fine of P 1,000,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 201644

September 24, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE C. GO and AIDA C. DELA ROSA, Respondents.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated September 28, 2011 and the
Resolution dated April 1 7, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108319 which
reversed and set aside the Orders dated December 10, 2008 and February 12, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 00-1 86069-7 5, and dismissed
the charges against respondents Jose C. Go (Go) and Aida C. Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) on the ground
that their constitutional right to speedy trial has been violated.
1

The Facts
On September 28, 2000, seven (7) Informations stemming from a criminal complaint instituted by
private complainant Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation(PDIC) were filed beforethe RTC
against various accused, including Go and Dela Rosa (respondents), charging them of Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Documents for allegedly defrauding Orient Commercial Banking
Corporation of the amount of P159,000,000.00. After numerous postponements, respondents were
finally arraigned on November 13, 2001 and trial on the merits then ensued.
6

However, the trial of the case was marred by a series of postponements/cancellation of hearings
caused mainly by the prosecution, resulting in its inability to finish its presentation of evidence
despite the lapse of almost five (5) years. This prompted respondents to file, on December 11,
2007, a Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute and for violation of their right to speedy
trial, claiming that the prosecution was afforded all the opportunity to complete and terminate its
case, but still to no avail.
9

10

11

12

The RTC Ruling

In an Omnibus Order dated January 9, 2008, the RTC dismissed the criminal cases, ruling that the
respondents right to speedy trial was violated as they were compelled to wait for five (5) years
without the prosecution completing its presentation of evidence due to its neglect.
13

14

Dissatisfied, the prosecution moved for reconsideration which, in an Order dated December 10,
2008, was granted by the RTC in the interest of justice, thus resulting in the reinstatement of the
criminal cases against respondents.
15

16

This time, it was the respondents who moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by
the RTC in an Order dated February 12, 2009. This prompted them to file a petition for
certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 108319. A copy of said petition was served,
however, only on the private complainant, i.e., the PDIC, and not the People of the Philippines (the
People), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as it was not evenimpleaded as party to
the case.
17

18

19

20

21

The Proceedings Before the CA

In a Decision dated September 28, 2011,the CA, without first ordering the respondents to implead
the People, annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC, and consequently dismissed the
criminal cases against respondents.
22

23

It ruled that the prosecutions prolonged delay in presenting its witnesses and exhibits, and in filing
its formal offer of evidence was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive to respondents, thereby
violating their right to speedy trial. It further held that double jeopardy had already attached in favor
of respondents, considering that the criminal cases against them were dismissed due to violation of
the right to speedy trial.
24

25

Aggrieved, the PDIC moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated April 17, 2012.
26

On May 2, 2012, the PDIC transmitted copies of the aforesaid CA Decision and Resolution to the
OSG. Thereafter, or on June 18, 2012, the OSG filed the instant petition, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA in giving due course to respondents certiorari petition and
proceeding to decide the case. It contends, among others, that the People the petitioner in this
case was neither impleaded nor served a copy of said petition, thereby violating its right to due
process of law and rendering the CA without any authority or jurisdiction to promulgate its issuances
reversing the RTC Orders and dismissing the criminal cases pending before it.
27

28

29

The Issue Before the Court

The central issue to resolve is whether or not the criminal cases against respondents were properly
dismissed by the CA on certiorari, without the People, as represented by the OSG, having been
impleaded.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Respondents certioraripetition in CA-G.R. SP No. 108319 that sought the dismissal of the criminal
cases against them should not have been resolved by the CA, without the People,as represented by
the OSG, having first been impleaded. This stems from the recognition that the People is an
indispensable party to the proceedings.
In Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos, where the petition for certiorarifiled with the [CA] failed to implead the
People of the Philippines as an indispensable party, the Court held:
It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents failed to implead the
People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously defective. As
provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the
petitioners (respondents herein) to implead the People of the Philippines asrespondent in the CA
case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.
30

While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per sea ground for the dismissal of an
action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court,on motion of the party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/orsuch times as are just, it remains essential as
it is jurisdictional that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before the court
renders judgment. This is because the absence of such indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present. As explained in Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz:
31

32

An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an

action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties
is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction,
which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the
presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real
finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authorityto act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
33

In this case, it is evident that the CA proceeded to render judgment, i.e., the September 28, 2011
Decision and April 17, 2012 Resolution, without an indispensable party, i.e., the People, having been
imp leaded. Thus, in light of the foregoing discussion, these issuances should be set aside and the
case be remanded to the said court. Consequently, the CA is directed to (a) reinstate respondents'
certiorari petition, and ( b) order said respondents to implead the People as a party to the
proceedings and thereby furnish its counsel, the OSG, a copy of the aforementioned pleading. That
being said, there would be no need to touch on the other issues herein raised.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 28, 2011 and the
Resolution dated April 1 7, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108319 are hereby
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the CA under the parameters above-stated.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 208716

September 24, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ELADIO B. LUMAHO alias "ATTUMPANG," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal filed by herein accused Eladio B. Lumaho alias "Attumpang" (Lumaho) from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming with modification the decision of conviction rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Lagawe, Ifugao, and finding the accused guilty of rape under Article 266A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
1

The Facts
Before the Regional Trial Court of Lagawe, Ifugao, Lumaho was charged with one count of the crime
of rape under Art. 266-A and B of the Revised Penal Code as amended in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610.
Criminal Case No. 1765

That sometime in the morning of December, 2007, at Nuntiguing, Panubtuban, Asipulo, Ifugao,
hence, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused DID then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by force and intimidation have sexual intercourse with one
[AAA], a minor, seven (7) years of age, at the time of the commission of the offense and a daughter
of the accused, against her will and consent.
2

When arraigned on 20 April 2010, hepleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

Version of the Prosecution

The victim, AAA, then 7-years-old,narrated that her father, accused Lumaho, raped her sometime in
December 2007. She narrated that she was staying in her grandfathers house in Panubtuban,
Asipulo, Ifugao, when she decided to visit her father Lumaho in his house located also in
Panubtuban. Upon reaching his house, she narrated that Lumaho brought her to a shanty and he
removed her shirt, pants and panty. He then had carnal knowledge of AAA by inserting his penis
inside her vagina. The victim felt pain and cried after the wrongful deed of her father. Lumaho
warned AAA not to tell anybody about the incident. However, the crime eventually came to the
knowledge of BBB (distant grandmother), prompting BBB and AAA to go to the police station to
report the crime. Afterwards, AAA was brought to the hospital for medical examination. Though the
victim failed to recall the exact date of the commission of rape, she remembered that it happened in
December because she was on a school vacation and Christmas carols were being played during
that time.
5

On cross-examination, AAA narrated that after the death of her mother, she stayed with her
grandfathershouse as she did not like to stay with her father. While on school break sometime in
December 2007, she visited her father, but such visit led to the commission of rape.
7

The prosecution likewise presented Dr. Mae Codamon-Diaz (Dr. Diaz), the medico-legal expert
assigned at Ifugao Provincial Hospital who examined AAA. Dr. Diaz narrated thaton 28 January
2008, she examined AAA in relation to her complaint of sexual abuse against her father. Upon
receipt of such information, she interviewed AAA and elicited from her that she was sexually abused
by her fatherone month ago. Upon examining AAAs genitalia, Dr. Diaz found out that there was a
month-old healed laceration on the part of the victims hymen.
8

During Dr. Diazs cross-examination, the defense emphasized that a healed laceration on a genitalia
can likewise indicate that a sexual abuse may have happened earlier thanDecember 2007. It was
also highlighted that laceration can also be caused by other means such as sexual manipulation and
insertion of a blunt object.
9

Finally, the prosecution presented its last witness, BBB. BBB testified that she is the first cousin ofthe
grandmother of AAA. She testified that sometime in March 2008, AAAs cousin, CCC, went to her
and told her about the rape incident committed against AAA. Out of pity, she brought AAA to the
police station to report the crime. In her presence, AAA narrated to the investigating officers that she
(AAA) was sexually abused by her own father Lumaho. Thereafter, CCC accompanied AAA to the
hospital to be medically examined. During cross-examination, however, BBB clarified that the first
part of her testimony was narrated to her by CCC while the last part was what she heard during the
investigation in the police station.
10

11

Aside from the testimonies of AAA, Dr. Diaz and BBB, the prosecution likewise offered as evidence a
certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registry of Asipulo, Ifugao that AAA was born on 12
January 2000 to prove that she was a minor whenthe incident of rape happened. The medical
certificate issued by Dr. Diaz was also presented.
12

13

14

Version of the Defense

The defense presented its lone witness Roland Bennog (Bennog) to prove that the accused Lumaho
was notpresent in his house in Nuntiguing, Asipulo when the alleged rape happened. He testified
that from August 2007 until 3 January 2008, Lumaho was with him in his house located at Naddug,
Panubtuban, Asipulo, Ifugao. He stated that it would take at around 20 to 30-minutes to travel from
Naddug to Nuntiguing through hiking. He identified AAA as the daughter of Lumaho and
remembered that she usually goes to her fathers house toeat and ask for money. However, he
denied that AAA was able to meet Lumaho on December 2007.
15

During the pre-trial, both parties stipulated that the victim AAA is the daughter of accused Lumaho
and AAA was only seven years of age at the time the alleged rape was committed. The Ruling of
the Trial Court
16

The trial court on 5 September 2011 found Lumaho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rapeand imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout the benefit of parole in lieu of
the non-imposition of the death penalty under Republic Act No. 9346 or the Anti-Death Penalty Law.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused guilty of rape under Article 266-A and
266-B beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences the accused of reclusion perpetua without
the benefit of parole. The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant AAA the amount
of Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos as indemnity; Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as
Moral Damages and Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos as Exemplary Damages.
17

In its ruling, the trial court found more credible the positive and straightforward testimony of AAA than
the testimony of the defenses witness Bennog. It concluded that the alibi presented cannot stand
against the categorical statement of AAA, that, it was her own father who sexually abused her when
she went to visit him in his house.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 30 May 2013, the appellate court modified the ruling of the trial court as to the imposition of
amount of moral and exemplary damages. The dispositive portion reads:
FOR THE STATED REASONS, the September 5, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-appellant ELADIO B. LUMAHO alias "ATTUMPANG"
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole and is ordered
to pay the offended party civil indemnity of Php75,000.00, moral damages of Php75,000.00 and
exemplary damages of Php30,000.00.
18

The appellate court sustained the finding of credibility of AAA in her full recollection of the rape. AAA
recounted the events vividly and narrated in open court how the accused Lumaho committed the
bestial act of rape against her. Further, it dismissed the argument that the victims responses in open

court were elicited from leading questions, thus, must be disregarded. The appellate court
emphasized that the victim was only 7 years of age when the crime of rape was committed and was
only 10-years-old when she testified in open court, thus, a leeway must be accorded in her narration.
Nevertheless, the answers propounded failed to diminish her credibility especially as against the alibi
presented by the defense. As to the penalty, the appellate court affirmed the imposition of the trial
court of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. Finally,
the award of moral and exemplary damages was increased to P75,000.00 and P30,000.00,
respectively, in view of the prevailing jurisprudence.
Our Ruling
After a careful review, we affirm with modification the rulings of the trial court and Court of Appeals.
Before this Court, the accused asserts alibi as its main argument. The accused likewise avers error
on the part of the appellate court when it found the testimonies of AAA and BBB as credible and
trustworthy to render the verdict of conviction against him.
We find no merit in the appeal.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code describes how rape is committed:
Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis ours).
Rape is qualified if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
19

In this case, the prosecution established all the elements to constitute as qualified rape.
In open court, AAA positively identified her father Lumaho as the person who had carnal knowledge
of her in his shanty. She narrated that when she visited her father, he brought her to a shanty and
while inside, he removed all her pieces of clothing, from her shirt up to her panty. He then
successfully had a carnal knowledge ofher by inserting his penis into her vagina. Without any other
recourse, AAA did nothing but cry. Before she left, Lumaho threatened her to keepsilent about what
happened.

AAAs narration of the crime of rape was strengthened by the testimony of Dr. Diaz, who narrated
that upon her examination of AAAs genitalia sometime in January 2008, she found that there was a
month-old healed laceration on the victims hymen.The period was held to consistent with the
allegation of rape which happened on December 2007.
In People v. Manigo, where a victims testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of
penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place. A rape
victims account is sufficient to support a conviction for rape ifit is straightforward, candid and
corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as in the present case. The
accused tried to raise doubt on the victims credibility due to the answers propounded because of
leading questions.
20

21

We are unconvinced.
While the Court noticed that someof AAAs responses were elicited from leading questions, we find
no fault on the part of the trial court in accepting the testimony of AAA as credible evidence. It must
be emphasized that the liberality in this case is acceptable in order to serve the ends of justice. We
are not obliviousto the circumstances of the case, a child testifying in open court at the age of ten to
narrate that she was raped by her father at the young age of age seven. Truly, liberality is more of an
exception. And in this case, we find that exception meritorious.
The liberality of the trial court is notequated to diminished credibility. In straightforward, positive
narration, she was able to convey, despite her tender age, the essential details to convict the
accused. Jurisprudentially settled is the principle that if a victim's testimony is straightforward,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any
material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility and the accused may be
convicted solely on the basis thereof. Putting more emphasis, the factual findings of the trial court,
especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal.
22

23

In the same way, we also dismiss the argument of hearsay evidence.

The defense is trying to suggest that BBBs knowledge of AAAs sexual abuse is only hearsay. It
emphasized BBBs answer during crossexamination that the first part of her testimony was related
only by CCC.
An evidence is considered hearsay if its probative value is not based on personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand. A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge and derived from his own perception.
24

Upon review of the records, BBB indeed testified that the first portion of her statement was related
only by CCC. However, the defense failed to specify with particularity which of the first portion was
hearsay. Contrary to the allegation of the defense, what isapparent is the narration of BBB that she
personally heard from AAA herself, during police investigation, that she was abused by her father.
And this statement obviously does not fall within the ambit of hearsay.
As final argument, Lumaho advanced the defense of alibi that he and Bennog were together in the
lattershouse when the alleged incident happened.

25

Time and again, this Court has consistently held that alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is
easy to fabricate and highly unreliable.
26

In his narration, Bennog testified that Lumaho was not in his house at Nuntiguing, Panubtuban when
the alleged rape incident happened as the accused was in his house at Naddug, also in
Panubtuban,from August 2007 until the summer of 2008. However, it was revealed upon further
inquiries that Naddug, where he supposedly was,is only three hundred meters away from
Nuntiguing, where the rape was done.
For Lumahos alibi to be given consideration, he (Lumaho) must be able to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminisat the time when the crime
was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
when it was committed. Undoubtedly, he failed to do so because his own witness said that the
distance between the two places was only three hundred meters away.
27

In criminal law jurisprudence, alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and
identification of the complainant. For alibi to prosper, it must be supported by credible corroboration
from disinterested witnesses. Evidently, Bennog is not a disinterested witness as he is a friend of
the accused. Aside from Bennog, no additional witness was presented by the defense to
corroboratethe physical absence of Lumaho in the scene of the crime. It is worth stressing that even
Lumaho himself failed to testify in court to personally deny the accusations against him.
28

Positive and categorical identification of AAA, without any showing of ill-motive on her part, prevails
over an unsubstantiated alibi. An alibi, without any clear and convincing evidence, is negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. It cannot be given greater evidentiary value over
the testimony ofAAA who testified on affirmative matters.
1wphi1

29

The penalty prescribed for qualified rape is death. As prescribed under Art. 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed by a parent against his
child under eighteen (18) years of age. As conclusively proven by the prosecution, accused Lumaho
had carnal knowledge of his 7-year-old child AAA through force and intimidation. However, in viewof
Republic Act No. 9346 or the AntiDeath Penalty Law, the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout the
eligibility of parole shall be imposed in lieu of the imposition of death penalty.
30

31

Following the new jurisprudential ruling of People v. Gambao on damages, we increase the
amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows: P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition,
we impose six percent (6%) interest from finality of judgment until fully paid. WHEREFORE, the
appeal is DENIED. The 30 May 2013 Decision or the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05214
modi rying the judgment of conviction dated 5 September 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
14 of Lagawe, lfugao is hereby AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATION on the amounts of civil
indemnity and damages, and imposition of six percent (6%) interest from finality or judgment until
fully paid.
32

33

34

SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 205561

September 24, 2014

DIONISIO B. COLOMA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the May
17, 2012 Decision and the January 11, 2013 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in SB-07-CRM-0020,
which found petitioner, P/C Supt. Dionisio 8. Coloma, Jr. (Coloma), guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
1

The Facts
Coloma was the Director of the Philippine National Police Academy (PNPA)at the time of the alleged
violation of R.A. No. 3019. On November 19, 1999, he was designated as Special Assistant and
Action Officer to the Director, Logistics and Installation Services (LIS)of the Philippine Public Safety
College (PPSC). Then PPSC President Ernesto B. Gimenez (Gimenez)assigned Coloma to assist in
the search for a suitable construction site of the Philippine National Police Regional Training Site 9
Annex in Bongao, Tawi-Tawi (RTS 9).
After several site inspections in 2002, the PPSC team including Coloma chose a four-hectare lot
planted with coconut trees and other fruit bearing trees, formerly owned by one Juaini Bahad. The
latter sold the property to the late Albia Lim, wifeof the labor contractor, Engineer Rolando E. Lim
(Engr. Lim).
After negotiations for the acquisition of a portion of the subject land, the Engineering Division of the
PPSC, composed of Engineer Dosmedo G. Tabrilla (Engr. Tabrilla)and Engineer Jerome Vacnot
(Engr. Vacnot), prepared the graphical layout plan for the construction of the following: a) fiftycapacity barracks; b) one (1) unit classroom; c) land development for the initial construction; and d)
administration building. The layout was approved by Gimenez.
The funds for the construction of RTS 9 came from the Congressional Development Fund (CDF) of
Tawi-Tawi Representative, Nur Jaafar. The same eventually formed part of PPSCscapital outlay. The
approximate cost of the project construction was P5,727,278.59, but the said amount was not
released in 1998. Thus, in 1999, the amount became "accounts payable" and were released to
creditors, namely: New Alems Enterprise (the supplier for materials) in the amount of P4,199,994.50;
and A.C. Lim Construction (labor supplier) in the amount ofP1,800,005.50. Thereafter, the
construction of RTS 9 was commenced and supervised by Engr. Tabrilla as project engineer.
On August 1, 2001, Coloma was relieved by Atty. Ramsey Lapuz Ocampo (Ocampo), the successor
of Gimenez as PPSC President. Colomas designation as Special Assistant and Action Officer to the
LIS-PPSC was terminated, and he was transferred to the Philippine National Training Institute
(PNPI). He was likewise ordered torender a termination report relative to his participation and
observation in the construction of RTS 9.

On October 10, 2001, Coloma submitted a report (After Mission Report)on the construction of the
training facilities, stating, among others, that: the land development was 100% complete; the
construction of the administration building was 90% accomplished; and the construction of the fiftycapacity barracks and classroom had just started and was expected to be completed by December
15, 2001. In the same report, Coloma allegedly attached the Deed of Donation signed by Juaini
Bahad in favor of the PPSC.
Subsequently, Ocampo ordered an investigation and instructed SPO4 Gilbert Concepcion (SPO4
Concepcion) to conduct the same. Meanwhile, Engineers Tabarilla and Vacnot prepared the
pertinent documents.
In his report, SPO4 Concepcion stated that his team conducted an ocular inspection and interviewed
the supplier of materials and the Land Bank officials. They discovered the following irregularities: 1)
the land development which Coloma reported to be 100% completed referred only to the exact site
where the administration building and the one-unit classroom were erected; 2) only the
administrative building with one-unit classroom was erected; 3) the construction of the 50-capacity
barracks which Coloma reported to have been started was nowhere to be found; 4) the 50-capacity
mess hall had also been erected; 5) the appropriate cost of the facilities constructed and the
improvements made on the project was valued at around P3,150,000.00 only, contrary to what was
reported by Coloma that the payment made for the project was P5,722,278,29; 6) the payment made
by the contractor and the supplier of the construction materials was deposited at Land Bank TawiTawi Branch under current accounts booked with Coloma as joint depositor; and 7) contrary to
Colomas After-Mission Report stating that the value of the property on which the training facilities
were constructed was P1,500,000.00, the value of the property per hectare was only P 9,730.00 as
per a provincial ordinance of Tawi-Tawi fixing the schedule of fair market value of real properties.
Upon this discovery, SPO4 Concepcion made the Final Investigation Report, which was eventually
endorsed to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and forwarded to the Office of
the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for appropriate action.
On September 15, 2006, Coloma was indicted in the Information filed with the Sandiganbayan and
docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-07-CRM-0020. The Information reads:
That sometime between June 2001 to October 2001, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in
Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a high-rankingpublic official with the rank of a Police Chief Superintendent, Salary Grade
27, being then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), committing the offense in relation
to office and with grave abuse thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally in his
capacity as then Director, PNPA, tasked to implement and oversee the construction of the building
facilities of RTS 9 Annex, in Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, cause[d] undue injury to Philippine Public Safety
College, a state college, in the amount of more or less Two Million five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,500,000.00) through evident bad faith by making it appear that the saidproject with the budget
of P5,727,278.59 was completed or almost completed as stated in his Memorandum dated October
10, 2001, when upon ocular inspection conducted in June 2002, the fifty-capacity barracks which
was part of the project was not completed, and that the actual cost of the facilities actually
constructed is only Three Million One Hundred Eight Thousand Pesos (P3,180,000.00), to the
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Public Safety College in particular and the government in
general.

Upon arraignment, Coloma entered a plea of "not guilty." After which, trial ensued. The prosecution
presented testimonial evidence, inter alia, through the following witnesses:
a) SPO4 Concepcion testified asto the results of his investigation.
b) Jimena Piga (Piga), Accountant III of the PPSC, testified that the nature of RTS 9 was an
expenditureand capital outlay. She recounted that the gross amount disbursed for the project
was P6,000,000.00 while the net amounted to P5,727,010,00. She said that they did not issue
checks for external creditors such as New Alems Enterprises and A.C. Lim Construction. Hence,
suchcreditors were required to open a savings account with a Land Bank branch.
c) Engr. Vacnot, as Project Evaluation Officer I of the PPSC, testified that he was verbally instructed
to conduct an inspection of the subject project. Upon investigation, he noted that a standard two-unit
classroom, an administration building and land development had already been constructed, but the
50-capacity barracks had not yet been built. He also gave a detailed estimate of the administration
cost of the works he found at the site. According to Engr. Vacnot, the administration building
approximately cost P11,280,000.00, while the standard two-unit classroom and its comfort rooms
approximately cost P1,800,000.00.
d) Architect Peter Razon Viduya (Viduya) testified as the overall supervisor for infrastructure projects
and chief of the investigation division of the LIS from 1999 to August 2001. He said that during a
meeting with Coloma, it was discussed that the lot to be donated to the PPSC was owned by the
wife of the labor contractor. When the documents were ready, they agreed that a bank account in the
name of the labor contractor or supplier be opened with the assistance of a representative of the
PPSC and Coloma. Eventually, the passbook for the said account would be surrendered to Piga for
safekeeping. On crossexamination, Viduya averred that after the bidding, the project was awarded to
New Alems for materials and Engr. Lim for labor work. After having prepared a program of
construction of RTS 9, he was relieved from his position.
e) Engr. Tabrilla testified that he was designated as acting director of the LIS from August 2001 to
2004. As such, he administered and managed the infrastructure development of the PPSC. He said
that after they went to the project site in Bongao, he accompanied Coloma and Engr. Lim to a Land
Bank branch where both opened a joint checking account. Coloma then issued a check
worth P500,000.00 in favor of Engr. Lim, intended for the mobilization expenses of the project. Engr.
Tabrilla claimed to have advised Coloma not to issue the check because the instruction of the PPSC
President was only to open a savings account for the supplier and labor contractor. Engr. Tabrilla
asserted that the PPSC lost control not only over the implementation of the project but over the
funds thereof, when Coloma opened the said checking account, and kept the checkbook in his
custody. The latter likewise failed to give the contact numbers of the suppliers and contractors to the
PPSC.
In addition, the prosecution presented various documentary evidence.

In defense, Coloma testified thatas director and chief executive officer of the PNPA, he was in
chargeof the organization, administration and operations of the academy. As SpecialAssistant to the
Director of LIS, he was tasked to help look for at least three locations for a training center. He found
sites in Maguindanao, Cebu and Tawi-Tawi. Together with Gimenez and Viduya, the site in
Bongao,Tawi-Tawi, was selected as it was near the airport, and power and water sources. The
Engineering Division of the LIS with Engr. Tabrilla as project engineer prepared the building plans to

estimate the cost of the project. They then searched for a labor contractor and supplier. Coloma
maintained that he had nothing to do with the construction of RTS 9. Hehad, on one occasion,
accompanied Engr. Tabrilla upon the instruction of Gimenez, to confer with the labor contractor Engr.
Lim as regards the construction of the facilities. Before he was relieved from the PPSC, he was
directed to conduct inspection of the ongoing construction in Bongao. After the said inspection, he
rendered his After Mission Report.
On cross-examination, Coloma reiterated that he had nothing to do with the construction of the
project because he was not the contractor and by the time he executed his After-Mission Report, he
had already been relieved from his position at the PPSC. He was able to read the report submitted
by SPO4 Concepcion when a case was already filed against him with the Ombudsman.
Engr. Lim likewise took the witness stand. He testified that he was a businessman engaged in a
construction business for about 15 years at the time of the controversy. Among his projects was the
RTS 9. However, he only participated therein as a labor contractor who provided labor services for
the construction of the project. He said that the project started in the middle of 2001 and was
finished by 2002, based on the two sets of plans prepared by the PPSC Engineering Division, one of
which was for the administration building, and the other for a long building with 281 classrooms. He
recalled that Engr. Tabrilla was in Tawi-Tawi. The project took more than a year to finish, and when
nobody from the PPSC wanted to accept the project, he was forced to maintain the building for more
than two years. The project had been completed and was being occupied by the Philippine Marines.
He stated that it was the project engineer who looked out for the condition of the construction
project.
The Sandiganbayans Ruling
On May 17, 2012, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision finding Coloma guilty as
charged. It found that all the essential elements of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 were present in the case. Coloma, irrefutably a public officer at the time of the disputed
transactions, acted with evident bad faith in his transactions concerning RTS 9. The testimonies of
SPO4 Concepcion and Engr. Vacnot yielded that upon inspection, "not even a trace of any
excavation for the foundation of the 50-capacity barracks was seen at the training site," contrary to
Colomas claim that construction thereof had started. Not only did Coloma assert that the
construction of the other buildings had begun when it had not, but he also failed to comply with the
project program which clearly specified a 50-capacity barracks. Further, by making himself a
signatory to the current bank account and presenting a cost estimate significantly higher than that
submitted by Engr. Vacnot, Coloma caused undue injury to the PPSC when the latter lost control of
the funds for RTS 9, because only the authorized signatories could enter into transactions with
regard to the project.
For his conviction, Coloma was sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one
(1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and perpetual disqualification to hold public
office.
Aggrieved, Coloma moved for reconsideration, insisting that prosecution witness, Engr. Vacnot,
failed to present factual and legal basis on how he came up with the amount of P3,180,000.00 as
actual cost for the project. Coloma pointed out that Engr. Vacnot did not refer to any agency estimate
on the price difference between that of the RTS 9 suppliers, as against what other suppliers could
haveprovided, thus, failing to establish that there was overpricing in the conduct of the project.

Further, Coloma stressed that he did not act in bad faithby being one of the signatories of the current
accounts for the creditors of PPSC because he simply followed the order of then PPSC President
Gimenez. He was not guilty either of misrepresentation when he stated that the project was almost
complete because his report merely embodied his latest factual observation. Coloma likewise
invoked the January 18, 2008 Resolution by the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan, which granted
the prosecutions motion to withdraw the Information in SB-07-CRM-0022, on the ground of absence
of proof of a specific injury or actual damage suffered by PPSC when Coloma allowed himself to be
one of the signatories in the subject accounts.
5

In the challenged resolution denying Colomas motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan stated
that the other cases pending with the court had no bearing in the case where Coloma was charged
with causing undue injury to the PPSC in the discharge of his functions through evident bad faith, by
making it appear that the project with a budget of P5,727,278.59 was completed or almost
completed, when an ocular inspection showed otherwise.
The Issue
Essentially, the issue in this case is whether or not Colomas conviction for the crime of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 was proper.
In this petition, Coloma contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in relying on Engr. Vacnots
testimony as gospel truth. While Engr. Vacnot said that the facilities constructed consisted, among
others, of a two-unit classroom, there was no approved two-unit classroom in the graphical layout
plan of RTS 9. In other words, Engr. Vacnots credibilitybecame suspect when he came up with the
actual cost of construction by merely looking at it. Also, it was shown during the trial that the
possession, control and release of payments to the suppliers remained with the PPSC Accounting
Office, when Piga admitted that the passbook was in the custody of the said office. Worse, there was
no proof of a Notice of Disallowance issued by the Commission on Audit (COA) regarding the
alleged irregularities in the construction of RTS 9. Hence, as project engineer, Engr. Tabrilla should
be made to explain and be held liable instead.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, as in this case, only
questions of law and not questions of fact may be raised. Issues brought to the Court as to whether
the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; or whether the
presumption of innocence was sufficiently debunked; or whether or not conspiracy was satisfactorily
established; or whether or not good faith was properly appreciated, are all, invariably, questions of
fact.
7

Settled is the rule that the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are
binding and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the established
exceptions, such as: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is a

grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) said findings of
facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and (6) the
findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record.
8

In the case at bench, it is readily apparent that Coloma decries the Sandiganbayans evaluation of
the witnesses testimonies. He contests the weight given to the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution, and the credibility of its witnesses, particularly, Engrs.
Tabrilla and Vacnot. By asserting this, Coloma, in effect, raises questions of facts that may not be
delved into by the Court.As the Court is not a trier of facts, a reassessment of testimonies may not
be conducted absent a showing that the findings of the Court a quois based on a misapprehension
of facts. Verily, a perusal of the Sandiganbayan decision would reveal that the testimonies of the
prosecution and defense witnesses, both on direct and cross-examination, were appreciated in
detail. As will be discussed hereunder, the Sandiganbayan considered the totality of circumstances
that led to the conclusion that he violatedthe law. Suffice it to say, none of the exceptions that would
warrant a reversalof the Sandiganbayans findings of fact are extant in this case. They remain
conclusive and binding to the Court.
Coloma was charged with the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 which has the
following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. As observed by the Sandiganbayan, all these elements exist in this case.
It is irrefutable that the first element is present. Coloma was undisputably the Director of the PNPA at
the time material to the charge against him. Apart from this, he never denied his designation as the
Special Assistant and Action Officer to the Director of the LIS-PPSC. From the task of selecting the
site for RTS 9 to the dealings with the contractors for the project, this latter position signifies
Colomas task to oversee and administer the construction of RTS 9. His claims that he had no
participation in the construction of the facilities do not, in any way, strip him of both his powers and
duties related to the implementation of the project.
As to the second element, Colomas argument is basically a denial of bad faith on his part. He claims
that his statements as to the completion of the projects land development; the 90% completion of
the administration buildings construction; and the commencement of the construction of the 50capacity barracks were his personal factual observations, thereby negating the charge that he was
guilty of misrepresentation in his official report.
This argument fails to persuade.
The second element of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed in three ways, that is,
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of anyof these
three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to
convict.
9

On the meaning of "partiality," "badfaith," and "gross negligence," the Court has elucidated:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report mattersas they
are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or

negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong;
a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud."
"Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care which eveninattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take
on their own property."
10

Here, the results of the ocular inspection clearly belie Colomas reports. While it may be conceded
thatthere was no averment of the entire projects completion, and that "completion" may be
susceptible of a subjective interpretation, it still perplexes the Court as to why Coloma, a responsible
officer in the administration of the multi-million peso project, failed to provide a reliable and accurate
description of the projects accomplishment. The discrepancy between the results of the ocular
inspection and Colomas statements in his report was not a trivial matter that would merit disregard.
The Court may not close its eyes from the ostensible manipulation of information stated by Coloma.
From a person tasked to administer the project in terms of siteselection and payment of suppliers, a
just and authentic reporting was expected. After-mission reports are not inconsequential documents
which merely partake of a formality or a mechanism for a smooth transition of duties. It is not an
empty statement of accomplishments. A report on the progress and/or completion of a government
infrastructure project serves not only as a descriptive account of the project, but more importantly, as
a source of information on the faithful execution of a government objective financed by public funds.
At this juncture, it is pertinent to cite the results of the inspection: inter alia,the land development
reported as100% complete only refers to the exact site where the administration building and a oneunit classroom were erected; only the administrative building with one-unit classroom was built; the
construction of the 50-capacity barracks which Coloma reported to have been started was nowhere
to befound; the appropriate amount of the facilities constructed and the improvements made on the
project was only valued at P3,150,000.00, more or less, opposed to the report of Coloma that it
amounted to P5,722,278,29; and the value of the property per hectare was onlyP9,730.00 as per a
provincial ordinance of Tawi-Tawi contrary to Colomas report which pegged the value
atP1,500,000.00. Again, the discrepancies are too obvious to ignore. These incongruities do not
project plain bad judgment on Colomas part. Uncontroverted as they were, the results of the
inspection would lead to the conclusion that Colomas statements in his report were distortionsof
facts. This is tantamount to moral obliquity and fraud which the law seeks to penalize.
Besides, the Sandiganbayan correctly considered the circumstance of Coloma being one of the
signatories ofthe current accounts for the creditors of PPSC. Although its Fifth Division granted the
prosecutions motion to withdraw the Information in SB-07-CRM-0022, this fact cannot exculpate him
from the charge in the present case. By making himself a signatory to the accounts, Coloma cannot
deny his participation in the implementation of the project. Simple logic would dictate that a person
who has a direct hand in the payment of creditors is expected tokeep abreast in the development of
the project. Thus, there is really no reason for Coloma to give erroneous information unless he,
mindful of the numerous irregularities in the implementation of the project, was ill-motivated in doing
so. Here manifests Colomas evident bad faith.
Notably, the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed even if bad
faith is not attendant. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that Coloma did not act in bad
faith in rendering his report, his negligence under the circumstances was not only gross but also
inexcusable. Again, it was clearly established that the degree of his involvement in the project may
11

not excuse his ignorance of the realistic progress of RTS 9. He should have exercised care in his
declaration in the report, especially because he had the duty to oversee the development of the
project.
Anent the third element, the Sandiganbayan aptly explained:
By making himself a signatory to the current accounts and presenting a cost estimate significantly
higher than that submitted by Engineer Vacnot, the accused also caused undue injury to the PPSC
when the latter lost control of the funds for RTS 9, and only the authorized signatories could enter
into transactions with regard to the projectIn herein case, the Prosecution was able to prove the
existence of undue injury by giving a detailed background of the estimate for facilities and materials
for the construction of the project. The substantial difference between the cost estimate given by the
accused and that of Engineer Vacnot caused injury to the government in the amount of
approximately P2,500,00000 becomes more evident in light of the fact that the fifty capacity barracks
have not been constructed.
12

In a catena of cases, the Court has held that there are two ways by which a public official violates
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (1) by causing undue
injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference. The accused may be charged under either mode or both. The
disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. In other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction. Further,the term "undue
injury" in the context of Section 3(e) of the R.A. No. 3019 punishing the act of "causing undue injury
to any party," has a meaning akin to that civil law concept of "actual damage." Actual damage, in the
context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.
13

14

As explained by the Sandiganbayan, the undue injury caused by Coloma to the government is based
on two grounds: 1) as a co-signatory in the current accounts created for the payment of
creditors, Coloma reserved to himself control over the deposits to and withdrawals therefrom, and
2) the cost of the RTS 9 as declared by Coloma in his report was significantly higher than the actual
cost computed after inspection.
15

The Court agrees.

The undue injury caused to the government is evident from Coloma's statement of a cost of RTS 9
higher than that discovered upon inspection. It bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan accorded
credence on Engr. Vacnot's testimony that the cost of the facilities constructed in RTS 9 only
cost P3, 180,000.00, more or less, lower than what was reported by Coloma. Contrary to Coloma's
claim, this information was supported by detailed costings and was unequivocally testified on during
trial. Despite the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, Coloma failed to controvert the evidence
against him. This fact, taken together with the showing that no 50-capacity barracks was ever built
on the site as opposed to Coloma 's reportage, established that the construction of RTS 9 was
replete with irregularities. Otherwise stated, the public funds disbursed for the project were not
utilized in strict accord to its purpose. Thus, the worth of public funds spent for the project does not
match the meager benefit to be derived therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 17, 2012 Decision and the January 11, 2013
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in SB-07-CRM-0020, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 198314, September 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD GUINTO Y SAN ANDRES, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal filed by herein accused Richard Guinto y San Andres (Guinto) from the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated 31 January 2011, affirming the decision of conviction rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. 2
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The Facts
The prosecution presented a buy-bust case.
As narrated by Police Officer 1 Melvin Jesus S. Mendoza (PO1 Mendoza), the operation was conducted on 20
January 2004 at around 1:00 oclock in the morning by the members of Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Task Force
(AIDSTF), Pasig City Police Station. It was prompted by an information given by a female caller received by
AIDSTFs Team Supervisor Senior Police Officer 3 Leneal Matias (SPO3 Matias), who in turn, coordinated with
Police Inspector Melbert Esguerra (P/Insp. Esguerra), the head of AIDSTF. According to the female caller, a
certain Chard was selling shabu in a place located at 137 MC Guinto, Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City.
Based on the information, P/Insp. Esguerra instructed the team to verify the call from their civilian informant
residing also in Barangay Pinagbuhatan. Upon positive verification, P/Insp. Esguerra formed a buy-bust team
composed of SPO3 Matias, SPO2 Braulio Basco (SPO2 Basco), PO1 Michael Familara (PO1 Familara), PO1
Alan Mapula, and PO1 Porferio Bansuelo (PO1 Bansuelo) and designated PO1 Mendoza to act as the poseurbuyer. In turn, SPO3 Matias prepared the pre-operation report and coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) on the buy-bust operation. PO1 Mendoza, as the poseur-buyer, was given two
(2) pieces of marked P100.00 bills as buy-bust money by P/Insp. Esguerra. 3
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After the briefing, the team including the informant proceeded to the target area at around eleven oclock in
the evening of 19 April 2004. Upon arrival, PO1 Mendoza and the informant positioned themselves outside
the house of this certain Chard (later identified as the accused Richard S.A. Guinto) and waited for him to
step out. Meanwhile, the rest of the team stood nearby and waited for PO1 Mendozas pre-arranged signal
of raising of hand to indicate that the sale transaction was already consummated. After two hours, Guinto
finally went out of the house. The informant approached Chard and introduced PO1 Mendoza as a person in
need of illegal drugs worth P200.00. PO1 Mendoza then gave buy-bust money to Guinto as payment.
Guinto, in turn, drew two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu and gave them to PO1 Mendoza. Guinto then
put the money on his left pocket. To indicate consummation of illegal sale, PO1 Mendoza made the prearranged signal to the other members of the team and introduced himself to Guinto as a police officer. The
other members of the team responded and arrested Guinto. Immediately, PO1 Mendoza confiscated the
marked money from the left pocket of Guinto and marked the plastic sachet containing shabu with the
markings RSG/MJM.4
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Afterwards, the buy-bust team brought Guinto to Pasig City Police Station and turned him over to SPO2
Basco for investigation. PO1 Mendoza turned over the confiscated drugs to SPO2 Basco. Consequently,
SPO2 Basco asked for a laboratory examination request to determine the chemical composition of the
confiscated drugs.5 Thereafter, confiscated drug was brought by PO1 Noble to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.6
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The prosecution also presented PO1 Familara as its second witness to corroborate the statements given by
PO1 Mendoza. However, several inconsistencies were apparent in his testimony.

When asked during his direct examination on who gave the buy-bust money to PO1 Mendoza, PO1 Familara
answered that it was SPO3 Matias.7 Likewise, the pre-arranged signal was differently described as
scratching of the nape instead of raising of hand. 8 He also testified that their asset arrived at around one
oclock in the morning to accompany them to Pinagbuhatan. 9 Another inconsistency which surfaced was
when PO1 Familara testified that upon the consummation of illegal sale, he went to the place of the arrest
and saw PO1 Mendoza arresting Guinto. PO1 Mendoza then positively identified Guinto as the one who sold
one (1) plastic sachet of illegal drug instead of two (2) sachets. 10
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Finally, the last witness presented by the prosecution was Police Officer 2 Richard Noble (PO2 Noble). 11 He
corroborated the statements given by his fellow police officers but again, presented an inconsistency as to
the time of the assets arrival compared to the one narrated by PO1 Familara. A conflict came out as to the
time of the teams arrival to the target area and as to how long they waited for the accused to go out. In his
direct, he testified that the asset arrived at the police station before eleven oclock in the evening prior to
the buy-bust operation.12 Afterwards, they had a briefing on the operation. He recalled that they waited for
around 15 to 20 minutes before the accused came out 13 while PO1 Mendoza testified that they waited for the
accused for two hours. When asked again by the Court on the time of their arrival, he answered that it was
at around one oclock in the morning.14
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The defense interposed denial.

Guinto narrated that at the time of the arrest at 10:00 oclock in the evening of 19 January 2004, he was in
their house cooking with his family. Several men suddenly entered the house, grabbed his arm and
searched the premises. When asked why the men entered their home, the men did not give them any
reason. Afterwards, Guinto was brought to the police headquarters and investigated by the police. 15
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Jane P. Guinto (Jane), the wife of the accused Guinto, corroborated the statements of her husband. She
recalled that several armed male persons entered their house while she and her family were cooking to
celebrate fiesta the next day. The men were not authorized to search nor arrest the person of his husband
and failed to introduce themselves to them. Thereafter, these male persons frisked her husband, handcuffed
him and brought to the police station. Meanwhile, Jane left her two children under the care of her aunt to
follow her husband. It was there at the station where the police officers tried to extort money from her in
the amount of P50, 000.00.16
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Finally, John Mark P. Guinto (John Mark), one of the two children of Guinto, affirmed the narration of his
parents on material points. He testified that he and his younger brother were watching television at the
time of the illegal arrest of his father. His parents were then cooking when some uniformed police officers
arrested his father and brought him to the police station. However, he testified that he went to their
neighbors house and hid there out of fear, contrary to the statement of his mother that she brought them to
her aunt.17
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Guinto was eventually charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs punishable under Section 5 of Article II
of R.A. No. 9165:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

On or about January 20, 2004 in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and
give away to PO1 Melvin Santos Mendoza, a police poseur buyer, two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag
each containing two centigrams (0.02 gram) of white crystalline substance, which were found positive to the
test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.18
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When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

Based on the Pre-Trial Order,19 the prosecution and defense stipulated that Forensic Chemist Annalee R.
Forro (Forro) of the PNP Crime Laboratory conducted an examination on the samples submitted and they
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court on 8 October 2008 rendered a Decision 20 finding Guinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged and imposed upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 for
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with all the accessory penalties under the law. It held that
all the elements to constitute illegal sale was present to convict the accused of the offense. Likewise, it

affirmed the testimonies of the police officers on the conducted buy-bust operation and the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties as against the claim of unsubstantiated denial of Guinto.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It ruled that all the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drug were proven as testified by the police officers PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Familara. It found
credible the straightforward and categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses on what transpired
during the buy-bust operation.21 Further, it held that the prosecution has proven as unbroken the chain of
custody of evidence and the regularity of performance of the police officers who conducted the operation.
Finally, it affirmed that the non-compliance of the strict procedure in Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 did not invalidate the seizure and custody of the
seized items as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
operatives. 22
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Our Ruling
After a careful review of the evidence, we reverse the finding of the trial courts. We find that the
prosecution failed to prove the identity of the corpus delicti. This is fatal in establishing illegal sale.
Moreover, the conflicting statements of the policemen on material points tarnished the credibility of the
testimony for the prosecution.
Primarily assailed by the accused are the inconsistent statements of the apprehending police officers with
respect to the circumstances of his illegal arrest and the broken chain of custody which would warrant his
acquittal.
We are convinced.
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object and consideration of the sale and the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.23 Hence,
to establish a concrete case, it is an utmost importance to prove the identity of the narcotic substance itself
as it constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a
judgment of conviction. It is therefore imperative for the prosecution to first establish beyond reasonable
doubt the identity of the dangerous drug before asserting other arguments. 24
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In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that each and every element that constitutes an illegal sale of
dangerous drug was present to convict the accused. Upon evaluation of the testimonies of PO1 Familara and
PO1 Mendoza, it is apparent that there is an inconsistency on the identity and number of plastic sachets
bought from the accused. In his statement, PO1 Familara recalled that upon arrival at the place of arrest,
PO1 Mendoza told him that he was able to buy one plastic sachet of shabu from Guinto. On the other hand,
PO1 Mendoza recalled that he was able to buy two plastic sachets instead of one. The pointed inconsistency
is not a minor one that can be brushed aside as the discrepancy taints the very corpus deliciti of the crime of
illegal sale. A vital point of contention, the prosecutions evidence places in reasonable doubt the
identification of the dangerous drug that was presented in court.
We likewise see that the conflicting statements of the police officers defeat the presumption of the regularity
of their performance of duties ordinarily accorded by the lower courts.
We find several inconsistencies on points material to the credibility of the buy-bust operation.
Among those are the inconsistencies on the pre-arranged signal, length of time the police officers spent in
waiting for the accused and the exact time of the arrest.
Aside from those alleged by defense, this Court found several more evident inconsistencies, which when put
together, erodes the presumption of regularity of performance of duty.
We discuss.
First, as already pointed out, as to identity of the corpus delicti of the crime.
PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Familara fatally contradicted each others testimony as to the number of sachets
bought from Guinto. In his direct testimony, PO1 Mendoza positively identified that the accused gave two

plastic sachets in exchange of the P200 marked money.25 However, the same identification was refuted
when PO1 Familara testified that PO1 Mendoza informed him that he (Mendoza) successfully bought one
plastic sachet of shabu from Guinto.26
cralawla wlibrary

Second, as to where the marked money was recovered after the buy-bust operation.
According to PO1 Mendoza, he was able to obtain possession of the buy-bust money from the left front
pocket of Guinto as transcribed in his direct testimony dated 19 August 2004. However, in his direct
testimony dated 18 August 2005, Mendoza testified that he was able to recover the buy-bust money from
the right hand of Guinto, as opposed from his previous narration that he recovered the money from Guintos
left pocket.27
cralawla wlibrary

Third, conflicting circumstances before the arrest.

In his first testimony, PO1 Mendoza recalled that upon their arrival at the target area at around eleven
oclock in the evening, the team waited for almost two hours for the accused to come out from his house. 28
However, PO1 Familara testified that they arrived at the target area at around one oclock in the morning of
20 January 2004.29 Witness PO1 Noble, on the other hand, recalled that they left for the area at around
eleven in the evening30 and waited for 15 to 20 minutes31 for Guinto to come out but contradicted his former
statement and testified that they arrived at around one oclock in the morning. 32
cralawlawlibrary

Fourth, as to the pre-arranged signal.

PO1 Mendoza testified that the agreed upon signal will be the raising of hand to signify the consummation of
illegal sale.33 Again, it was contradicted by PO1 Familaras statement that what was agreed upon during the
meeting was the scratching of the nape as the pre-arranged signal of PO1 Mendoza. 34
cralawlawlibrary

Finally, the source of the buy-bust money.

During his direct examination, PO1 Mendoza was asked on who gave him the buy-bust money. In his
answer, he identified that it was P/Insp. Esguerra35 as the source. On the contrary, PO1 Familara identified
SPO3 Matias as the one who gave PO1 Mendoza the marked money during their meeting. 36
cralawlawlibrary

We find support in several jurisprudential rulings.

In People v. Roble,37 the Court ruled that generally, the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great weight and generally not disturbed upon appeal.
However, such rule does not apply when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any
fact of weight or substance. In this present case, the contradictions, numerous and material, warrant the
acquittal of accused-appellant.38
cralawlawlibrary

Similarly, one of the means used by the Court in determining the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is
the objective test. Following this test, in order to establish the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding
the conduct of buy-bust operation, prosecution must be able to present a complete picture detailing the buybust operationfrom the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the
promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal
subject of sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the
payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by
courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. 39 In light of these
guiding principles, we rule that the prosecution failed to present a clear picture on what really transpired on
the buy-bust operation.
In People v. Unisa40 this Court held that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drug Act, credence is
given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties
in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police
officers.
True, the absence of ill motive or ill will is ordinarily considered by this Court as proof that the statements of
the police officers is credible. As maintained by the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, in
the absence of any improper motive, presumption of regularity of performance of duty prevails. However, it
must be similarly noted that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of public officers does
not outweigh another recognized presumption - the presumption of innocence of the accused until proven

beyond reasonable doubt.41

cralawla wlibrary

In several occasions, the Court had declared that the presumption of regularity of performance of duties
must be harmonized with the other interest of the State which is the interest of adherence to the
presumption of innocence of the accused.
However in case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police officers and the presumption of
innocence of the accused, the latter must prevail as the law imposes upon the prosecution the highest
degree of proof of evidence to sustain conviction. 42
cralawlawlibrary

In conclusion, this case exemplifies the doctrine that conviction must stand on the strength of the
Prosecutions evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. Evidence proving the guilt of the accused must
always be beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence of guilt falls short of this requirement, the Court will not
allow the accused to be deprived of his liberty. His acquittal should come as a matter of course. 43
cralawla wlibrary

The present case shows that the prosecution fell short in proving with certainty the culpability of the accused
and engendered a doubt on the true circumstances of the buy-bust operation. In dubio pro reo. When moral
certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter
of right.44
cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 31 January 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03844 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 8 October 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 164 of Pasig City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellantRICHARD
GUINTO y SAN ANDRES is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention unless
his continued confinement is warranted for some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.

cralawred

G.R. No. 189850

September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, and
RONNIE TORRES, Accused,
BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the July 23, 2009 Decision ofthe Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 02925, which modified the December 5, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Manila, Branch 27 in Criminal Case No. 02-200171. The RTC found appellant Bobby Torres
@Roberto Torres y Nava (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder but on
appeal, the CA found appellant guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
1

Factual Antecedents
On January 28, 2004, an Amended lnformation was filed before the charging siblings Reynaldo
Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie) and appellant with the special complex
crime ofrobbery withhomicide committed against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The Amended
Information contained the following accusatory allegations:
3

That on or about September 21, 2001, inthe City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, armed
with bladed weapons, conspiring and confederating together with one malefactor whose true name,

real identity and present whereabouts [is] still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence, and
intimidation,to wit: while one JAIME M. ESPINO was on board his car and travelling along C.M.
Recto Avenue corner Ylaya St., Tondo , this City, by blocking his path and forcibly grabbing from the
latter his belt-bag; that on the occasion of the said robbery and by reason thereof, the herein
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did thenand there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, attack, assault, use personal violence and abuse of superior strength upon the said
JAIME M.ESPINO and that when the latter resisted, by then and there stabbing the latter with bladed
weapons on x x x different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and afterwhich, divest, take, rob
and carry away a belt-bag, wallet, necklace, watch and ring of undetermined amount, belonging to
said JAIME M. ESPINO.
Contrary to law.

Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date. During arraignment,
appellantentered a plea of "not guilty". After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
5

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented as eyewitnesses Eduardo Umali (Umali), a butcher, and MerlitoMacapar
(Macapar), a cigarette vendor. Also presented were Dr. Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen), who testified on
the cause of death of Espino. From their testimonies, the following facts emerged:
7

At around 10:00 p.m. of September 21,2001, Espino was driving his car along C.M. Recto Avenue in
Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly blocked his path. Espino alighted from his vehicle and
approached Ronnie, who tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the
possession of his belt-bag but the latters brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified
companion suddenly appeared. With all of them brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and his
brothers took turns in stabbing Espino in different parts of his body while the unidentified companion
held him by the neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag,
wallet and jewelries and immediately fled.
Espino was rushed to the hospital butwas pronounced dead on arrival. In his Medico-Legal Report
No. W-658-2001, Dr. Salen concluded that Espino died of multiple stab wounds caused by sharp
bladedinstruments. The back portion of his head bore two stab wounds while his body suffered four
stab wounds which proved fatal. Considering the number and varying measurements of the wounds,
Dr. Salen opined that there weremore than one assailant.
8

To prove the civil aspect of the case, Espinos daughter, Winnie EspinoFajardo (Winnie) testified that
the pieces of jewelry stolen from her father consisted of a necklace worth P35,000.00, bracelet
worth P15,000.00, wristwatch worth P10,000.00 and two rings worth P10,000.00 each. As for their
expenses, Winnie said that P25,000.00 was spent for the burial lot and P37,000.00 for the funeral
services. She stated further that Espino was 51 years old at the time of his death and was
earning P3,000.00 a day asa meat vendor.
9

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of September
21, 2001, he was with his girlfriend, Merlita Hilario (Merlita). They proceeded to the house oftheir
friend, Marilou Garcia (Marilou), in Villaruel, Tayuman, Manila where they had a drinking session
which lasted until they fell asleep. They did not leave their friends house until the following morning
when they went home. Thereupon, he was told that policemen were looking for him because his
brothers got involved in an altercation that resulted in the death of someone. Merlita and Marilou
corroborated appellants alibi in their respective testimonies.
10

11

From the testimony of another defense witness, Jorna Yabut-Torres (Jorna), wife of Ronnie, the
defenses version of the incidentemerged as follows:
In the evening of September 21, 2001, Jorna and Ronnie were sharing jokes with other vendors in
Divisoria when a car stopped a few meters from their stall. The driver alighted and asked why they
were laughing. Ronnie replied that it had nothing to do with him. The driver seemed drunk since he
walked back to his vehicle in an unsteady manner. Moments later, the driver returned and stabbed
Ronnie on the wrist with a knife. Jay saw the assault on his brother, Ronnie, and got a bolo which he
used to hack the driver repeatedly. Thereafter, Ronnie and Jay fled. Ditas Biescas-Mangilya, a
vegetable vendor in Divisoria, corroborated Jornas version of the incident in her testimony.
12

13

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its December 5, 2006 Decision, the RTC held that appellant could not have committed robbery. It
ratiocinated, viz:
14

Prosecution witness Merlito D. Macapar testified that Ronnie took the belt bag of the deceased while
Bobby and the rest took his wristwatch, ring and necklace. However, on cross-examination, witness
admitted that he did not see who took the ring, wristwatch and necklace because as soon as the
deceased fell on the ground, accused and companions surrounded him. Merlitos testimony was
contradicted by Eduardo Umali on a vital point. Thus, Merlito testified that there was an exchange of
heated words. There was no intimation whatsoever what the altercation was about. He was ten
meters away. No such altercation, however, took place according to Eduardo who was barely five
meters away. This tainted the testimony of Merlitoand Eduardo with suspicion. When material
witnesses contradict themselves on vital points, the element of doubt is injected and cannot be
lightly disregarded. That was not all though. Merlito testified [that] several people witnessed the
incident. The stall of the victims daughter was about ten meters from the crime scene, which was a
few meters from the stall of Ronnie. They both had been in their respective stalls for quite sometime.
The principal prosecution witnesses are familiar with the deceased and the accused except for the
unidentified companion as they often see them at the vicinity. Thus, in all likelihood, accused and the
victim are familiar if not know each other very well. The perpetration of robbery at the place was thus
unlikely.
Even granting that the element of taking is present, still, accused cannot be held liable for the
complex crime of robbery with homicide for the reason that it was not indubitably shown that the
mainpurpose of the accused was to rob the victim. To the mind of the Court, this is precisely the
reason why the prosecution skipped the utterances made by the protagonist[s] during the attack. To
sustain a [conviction] for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the original criminal
design of the culprit must be robbery and the homicide is perpetrated with a view to the
consummation of the robbery, or by reason or on the occasion of the robbery (People vs. Ponciano,
204 SCRA 627).

xxxx
The crime of robbery not having been indubitably established, the accused cannot be convicted of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
15

The RTC thus concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing of Espino. It held him guilty
of murder after it found the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which was alleged
in the Information and duly established by the prosecution. Moreover, the RTC ruled that conspiracy
among the accused attended the crime.
Anent the civil aspect of the case, the RTC granted civil indemnity, actual and moral damages to the
heirs of Espino,but denied the claim for loss of earning capacity for lack of documentary evidence.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused Bobby Torres y Nava,
"Guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength attended the commission of the crime and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00, the
additional sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, actual damages in the amount of P62,000.00 and
to pay the costs.
Let alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Reynaldo Torres, Jay Torres and Ronnie Torres.
SO ORDERED.

16

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated April 10, 2007.
17

Hence, appellant appealed to the CA.

18

19

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In modifying the ruling of the RTC, i.e., finding appellant guilty of robbery with homicide instead of
murder, the CA found that the primary intention of appellant and his co-accusedwas to rob Espino
and his killing was only incidental to the robbery. The blocking of Espinos car and the struggle for
possession of his belt-bag after he alighted are clear manifestations of the intent to commit robbery.
The dispositive portion of the July 23, 2009 Decision of the CA reads as follows:
20

WHEREFORE, in view of foregoing, the appealed decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 27 dated
December 5, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ROBBERY with HOMICIDE and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The trial courts award to the heirs of the victim, Jaime Espino, of civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and actual damages in
the amount of P62,000.00 as well as its order to appellant to pay the costs of suit, are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

21

Hence, this present appeal.

Assignment of Errors
Appellant imputes upon the CA the following errorsin his Supplemental Brief.

22

The acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be left undisturbed as being final
and executory which cannot be overturned without violating the proscription against double
jeopardy.
23

The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire case despite the fact that
the accused-appellant only appealed his conviction for murder.
24

It was an error to convict the accused-appellant of the crimes charged considering that his guilt was
notproven beyond reasonable doubt.
25

Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
In an appeal by an accused, he waives his right not to be subject to double jeopardy.
Appellant maintains thatthe CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with homicide as charged in the
Amended Information. He argues that his appeal to the CA was limited to his conviction for murder
and excluded his acquittal for robbery. And by appealing his conviction for murder, he does not waive
his constitutional right not to be subject to double jeopardy for the crime of robbery. He claims that
even assuming that the RTC erred in acquitting him of the robbery charge, such error can no longer
be questioned on appeal.
We cannot give credence to appellants contentions. "An appeal in [a] criminal case opens the entire
case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties." "[W]hen an accused
appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called
upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
appellant." In other words, when appellant appealed the RTCs judgment of conviction for murder,
he is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it
became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment.
Thus, appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the
RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in the Information instead of murder.
26

27

Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.

"Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of
the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent togain; (3)
with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery, the crime of homicide, as usedin its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires
certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing ismerely
incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may
occur before, during or after the robbery."
28

In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the primary intention of
appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and Macapar, the eyewitnesses presented
by the prosecution, testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001, appellants brother
and co-accused, Ronnie, blocked Espinos car at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya Street.
When Espino alighted from his vehicle, Ronnie attempted to grab his beltbag. A struggle for
possession of the belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture that appellant and the other co-accused
joined the fray and stabbed Espino several times in the head and body. When Espino fell to the
pavement from his stab wounds, appellant, Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the victims wallet,
beltbag, wristwatch and jewelry then fled together.
29

From the foregoing, it is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his companions was to
rob Espino. Had they primarily intended to kill Espino, they would have immediately stabbed him to
death. However, the fact that Ronnie initially wrestled with appellant for possession of the belt-bag
clearly shows that the central aim was to commit robbery against Espino.This intention was
confirmed by the accuseds taking of Espinos belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and jewelries after he
was stabbed to death. The killing was therefore merely incidental, resulting by reason oron occasion
of the robbery.
The testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses are worthy of credence.
Appellant attempts to discredit Umali and Macapar by asserting that there are glaring contradictions
in their testimonies. He calls attention to the RTCs observation that Macapar gave conflicting
testimonies on whether he actually witnessed who among appellant and his cohorts took Espinos
valuables after he fell to the ground. Appellant asserts further that Umalis testimony that an
altercation did not precede the commission of the crime contradicts the testimony of Macapar that a
heated exchange of words occurred prior to the incident. He also claims that it is contrary to human
nature for Espino to alight from his car at 10:00 p.m. while in possession of a large amount of money
without fear of an impending hold-up.
We are not persuaded. The inconsistencies attributed to the prosecutions eyewitnesses involve
minor details, too trivial to adversely affect their credibility. Said inconsistencies do not depart from
the fact that these eyewitnesses saw the robbery and the fatal stabbing of Espino by appellant and
his cohorts. "[T]o the extent that inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to the Court to
relate to details of peripheral significance which do not negate or dissolve the positive identification
by [Umali and Macapar of appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime." "Inaccuracies may in fact
suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed. Witnesses are not
expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."
30

31

Moreover, it is unlikely that Espino feared alighting from his vehicle at a late hour while in
possessionof a huge amount of money since he was a vendor doing business in the vicinity where
the incident occurred. He was familiar with the people and their activities in the premises. In view of
the above, the Court finds that the CA properly lent full credence to the testimonies of Umali and
Macapar.
The weapons are not the corpus delicti.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient for his conviction since the weapons used in the
stabbing of Espino were not presented. In other words, he asserts that it was improper to convict him
because the corpus delictihad not been established.

We disagree. "[C]orpus delictirefers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the
body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime
of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered or, in this case, [the weapons used
in the commission of robbery with homicide]. Since the corpus delictiis the fact of the commission of
the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible may
suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delictimay even be established by
circumstantial evidence."
32

In this case, the corpus delictiwas established by the evidence on record. The prosecution
eyewitnesses testified that appellant and his cohorts used knives to perpetrate the crime. Their
testimonies on the existence and use of weapons in committing the offense was supported by the
medical findings of Dr. Salen who conducted the post-mortem examination. Dr. Salen found that
Espino sustained several stab wounds with varying measurements which were caused by sharp
bladed instruments. Appellant is therefore mistaken in arguing that the failure to present the
weapons used in killing Espino was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
The defenses of denial and alibi cannot prosper.
We are in complete agreement with the RTC and the CA in finding lack of merit in appellants
defenses of denialand alibi.
Appellant claims that he was in a drinking session in his friends house in Villaruel, Tayuman,Manila,
from 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001 until 1:00 a.m. of the following day. He alleges to have slept
atthe place and went home at around 7:00 a.m. of September 22, 2001. According to appellant, he
did not depart from his friends house from the time they started drinking until he went home the
following morning.
Appellants alibi is unworthy of credence. Appellant himself testified that Villaruel is less than two
kilometers awayfrom Divisoria and that it would only take a few minutes to go toDivisoria from
Villaruel. Clearly, it was not impossible for appellant to be physicallypresent at the crime scene
during its commission. "For alibi to prosper, it muststrictly meet the requirements of time and place. It
is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it
must also be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene
at the time the crime was committed."
33

34

The fact that appellant presented witnesses to corroborate his alibi deserves scant consideration.
Their testimonies are viewed with skepticism due to the very nature of alibi the witnesses
affirm. Appellant can easily fabricate an alibi and ask relatives and friends to corroborate it.
35

36

We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside
when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused.
Moreover, it is only axiomatic thatpositive testimony prevails over negative testimony.
37

The evidence was sufficient to establish the presence of abuse of superior strength.
Appellant argues that mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the presence of abuse of
superior strength. In the samemanner, appellant claims that the number of wounds inflicted on the
victim is not the criterion for the appreciation of this circumstance.

"There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their combined strength
in order to consummate the offense." Here, appellant and his four companions not only took
advantage of their numerical superiority, they were also armed with knives. Espino, on the other
hand, was unarmed and defenseless. While Ronnie was wrestling with Espino, appellant and his
coaccused simultaneously assaulted the latter. The unidentified companion locked his arm around
the neck of Espino while appellant and his co-accused stabbed and hacked him several times. While
Espino was lying defenseless on the ground, they divested him of all his valuables. Thereafter, they
immediately fled the scene of the crime. It is clear that they executed the criminal act by employing
physical superiorityover Espino.
38

39

The Proper Penalty

Nonetheless, the presence of abuse of superiorstrength should not result in qualifying the offense to
murder. When abuse of superior strength obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, it is to be regarded as a generic circumstance, robbery withhomicide being a composite
crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. With the penalty of
reclusion perpetuato death imposed for committing robbery with homicide, "[t]he generic
aggravating circumstance of[abuse of superior strength] attending the killing of the victim qualifies
the imposition of the death penalty on [appellant]." In view, however, of Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," the penalty that
must be imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
1wphi1

40

41

42

The Civil Liabilities

In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded automatically without
need ofallegation and evidence other than the death of the victim owing to the commission of the
crime. Here, the RTC and CA granted civil indemnity and moral damages to Espinos heirs in the
amount of P50,000.00 each. These courts were correct in granting the awards, but the awards
should have been P100,000.00 each.Recent jurisprudence declares that when the imposable
penalty is death, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages shall beP100,000.00 each.
43

44

In granting compensatory damages, the prosecution must "prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable to
the injured party." "Receipts should support claims of actual damages. Thus, as correctly held by
the [RTC] and affirmed by the CA, the amount of [P62,000.00] incurred as funeral expenses can be
sustained since these are expenditures supported by receipts." The existence of one aggravating
circumstance also merits the grant of exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we likewiseawardP100,000.00 as exemplary damages to the
victims heirs. An interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all awards of damages from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid should likewise be granted to the heirs of Espino.
45

46

47

48

Lastly, the RTC did not err in refusing to award indemnity for loss of earning capacity of Espino
despite the testimony of his daughter that he earned P3,000.00 a day as a meat dealer. "Such
indemnity is not awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was
either self-employed or was a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws. Since it was neither alleged nor proved that the victim was either selfemployed or was a
daily wage earner, indemnity for loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded to the heirs of the
victim."
49

WHEREFORE, the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02925
that affirmed with modifications the December 5, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 02-200171 is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS. Appellant
Bobby Torres@ Roberto Torres y Nava is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Jaime M.
Espino, P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages, and Pl00,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from
the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 182424, September 22, 2014
NENITA CARGANILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we review the decision 1 and the resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29371 which denied the appeal of Nenita Carganillo (petitioner). The CA
affirmed, with modification as to penalty, the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30,
Cabanatuan City, convicting the petitioner of the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
THE CASE
On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija, gave the petitioner the amount
of P132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. The petitioner, who was alleged to be an ahente or agent
in the buy-and-sell of palay, agreed to deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before
November 28, 1998. According to the Kasunduan signed by the petitioner, the parties agreed that for
every kilo of palay bought the petitioner shall earn a commission of twenty centavos (P0.20). But if
no palay is purchased and delivered on November 28, the petitioner must return the P132,000.00 to Teresita
within one (1) week after November 28.
After failing to receive any palay or the P132,000.00 on November 28 and one (1) week thereafter,
respectively, Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for the return of the P132,000.00 but
her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an affidavit-complaint for estafaagainst the petitioner
before the Fiscals Office. Thereafter, an Information4 for the crime of estafawas filed in court.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime and denied that she entered into a principal-agent
agreement with, and received the P132,000.00 from, Teresita. She alleged that she owed Teresita a balance
of P13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice that she purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996, 5 and that, in
November 1996, she was made to sign a blank Kasunduan that reflected no written date and
amount.6 She likewise denied personally receiving any written demand letter from Teresita. 7
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In a decision dated November 19, 2004, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime of estafa and
sentenced her to suffer, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imprisonment ranging from four (4)
years and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.8 Also, the RTC ordered the petitioner to indemnify Teresita the sum of P132,000.00 representing
the amount embezzled and to pay the costs of suit. 9
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On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction. 10 The CA held that the prosecution properly
established the elements of the crime of estafa. In debunking petitioners claim that her agreement with
Teresita was merely a money loan, the CA stated that:
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In this case, the Kasunduan dated September 23, 1998, which-accused-appellant admittedly signed, is clear
in its tenor and the failure to comply therewith makes out a case for estafa. Accused-appellants insistence
that she signed the said Kasunduan in blank is belied by her admission of the existence or authenticity of
the documentary exhibits x x x during the prosecutions formal offer of evidence and her own testimony x x
x.
Further, the CA ruled as immaterial the petitioners defense that she did not personally receive
awritten letter of demand from Teresita. The CA held that even a verbal query as to the whereabouts of the
money suspected to be misappropriated is already tantamount to a demand, and that the petitioner failed to
refute Teresitas claim that she went to the petitioners house to ask for the palayand/or the return of the
P132,000.00.11
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The CA, however, found error in the RTCs computation of the penalty and imposed upon the petitioner an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 (in excess of
P22,000.00), equivalent to eleven (11) years, or a total of nineteen (19) years. 12
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The petitioner elevated her judgment of conviction to the Court by filing a petition for review
oncertiorari under Rule 45.
THE PETITION
In her petition, the petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in affirming (with modification)
the judgment of conviction against her, despite the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt of the crime
of estafa beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner maintains that she is not engaged in the business of buying and selling palay and that the
Kasunduan between her and Teresita does not contain their real agreement of a simple money loan. She
argues that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of estafa because she never received the
P132,000.00 from Teresita; that an element of the crime is that the offender receives the money, or goods
or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligations
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the present petition. The CA did not commit any reversible error in its decision of
September 10, 2007.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the offense of estafacommitted
with abuse of confidence requires the following elements:
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(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same[;]
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property
by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt[;]
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.13
We find that all the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received in trust the
amount of P132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay and misappropriated it when she failed
to return the said amount to Teresita upon demand.
As the CA and the RTC did, we find worthy of credit and belief the Kasunduan presented in evidence by the
prosecution that was admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the terms of agreement
between her and Teresita. This document clearly stated that the petitioner received in trust the amount of
P132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay with the corresponding obligations to (1) deliver

the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998, and (2) return the
P132,000.00 to Teresita one week after November 28 in the event that the petitioner failed to
make palay purchases.
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties
rights, duties, and obligations and is the best evidence of the parties intention. Thus, when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.14 However, this rule, known as the Parol Evidence Rule, admits of
exceptions.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party to a written agreement may present evidence
to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the following:
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(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors
in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
xxxx
In this case, the petitioner alleges that the subject Kasunduan failed to express the real agreement
between her and Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan agreement and not that of a principalagent relationship in the buy-and-sell of palay. The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the
petitioner, however, fail to support her claims.
The RTC found that the receipts presented by the petitioner to prove her loan obligation with Teresita were
vague, undated and unsigned.15 Also, the RTC observed that the witnesses who testified that they saw the
petitioner sign the Kasunduan were not even certain of the real transaction between the petitioner and
Teresita.16 These findings of fact and evidence, which were affirmed by the CA, are accorded respect and
finality by this Court. Where the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals, there is great reason not to disturb these findings and to regard them not reviewable by this
Court. 17
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Also, we cannot sustain the petitioners claim that she had been the victim of a fraud because Teresita
deceived her into signing a blank document; that she signed the Kasunduan, even if it had no date and
amount written on it, because Teresita led her to believe that the document would be used merely for show
purposes with the bank.18
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For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the causal (dolo causante) inducement to the
making of the contract,19 and must be serious in character.20 It must be sufficient to impress or lead an
ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into account the circumstances of each case. 21
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In this case, we find no vitiated consent on the part of the petitioner. In her Memorandum 22 to this Court,
she narrated that after she signed the Kasunduan, Teresita subsequently made her execute a deed of sale
over her property, which deed she refused to sign.23 This statement negates the petitioners self-serving
allegation that she was tricked by Teresita into signing a blank Kasunduan,as she was fully aware of the
possible implications of the act of signing a document.
We affirm the correctness of the penalty imposed by the CA, as it is fully in accordance with the law. We
explained in People v. Temporada24 that:
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The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount defrauded
exceeds P22,000.00, is prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum. The minimum term is
taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisin correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from
6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). xxx

On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisin
correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of imprisonment for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. xxx To
compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional maximum to prisin
mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed
to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period
of prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years. The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and
21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by P22,000.00, and the
difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as was done starting with
the case of People v. Pabalan in consonance with the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally
in favor of the accused. xxx25
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In the recent case of Lito Corpuz v. People of the Philippines,26 we recognized the perceived injustice
brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property, such
as estafa, committed today based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eight years
ago in 1932. This Court, however, cannot modify these range of penalties in our decisions, as such action
would be an impermissible encroachment upon the power of the legislative branch of government and would
constitute proscribed judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the decision dated
September 10, 2007 and the resolution dated March 18, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
29371, finding petitioner Nenita Carganillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafapenalized under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 192912

June 4, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DEMOCRITO PARAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The Court resolves the appeal of the accused-appellant Democrito Paras from the Decision dated
February 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR.-H.C. No. 00465. The appellate court
affirmed the Decision dated October 18, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City,
Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. TCS-2729, which found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
rape.
1

The prosecution charged the accused-appellant of committing rape against AAA, a 17-year old girl,
allegedly committed as follows:
3

That at noon in March 1996 or for sometime subsequent thereto, in [XXX] and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with the use of a gun of unknown caliber, by
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with [AAA] against the latter's will and as a result of which the latter became pregnant, to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party.
4

The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. In the trial that ensued, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of AAA, Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Field
Officer Ma. Pamela Jusay, and Dr. Marcelo Pilapil, the physician who physically examined AAA. The
defense thereafter presented the testimonies of the accused-appellant and his mother, Luisa
Paras.
5

10

In their brief before the Court of Appeals, the prosecution summarized their version of the facts in
this wise:
Around noon of March 19, 1996, or subsequent thereto, while the victim [AAA], a house-helper of
spouses Sergio and Heny Agua, was weeding grass using a bolo at her employers farm in [XXX],
appellant Democrito Paras approached her from behind (TSN, July 15, 1999, pp. 6-7). He pulled
[AAA] towards the lower portion of the farm and pointed a short firearm at her mouth. While pointing
the gun at [AAA], appellant pulled down her long pants and panties. Appellant also pulled down his
pants and underwear. He laid [AAA] on the grassy ground and mounted her. He spread [AAAs] legs
with his two hands after putting down his firearm. He then inserted his penis into [AAAs] vagina.
[AAA] felt pain (Ibid., p. 8). [AAA] struggled and tried to kick appellant but all proved futile as
appellant was physically stronger (TSN, Nov. 19, 1999, p. 10)[.]
Since [AAA] was afraid of appellant and that she was also afraid to kill a person, she did not strike
appellant with the bolo she was holding (TSN, Jan. 11, 2000, p. 3). Appellant told[AAA] not to shout.
He made a push and pull movement. [AAA] felt appellants organ inside her while she continued to
struggle. While struggling, [AAA] even threw stones at appellant (Ibid. p. 4).
After appellant consummated his bestial lust, he dressed up and fled, while [AAA] went back to the
house of her employers (Ibid.).
Subsequently, [AAA] got pregnant due to the incident. She gave birth to a child who was more than a
year old when [AAA] testified on January 11, 2000. (TSN, Jan. 11, 2000, p. 5)[.]
11

The defense, on the other hand, laid out the following narrative of denial and alibi:
Accused-appellant, Democrito Paras, knows the private complainant because she was the helper at
the house of his elder sister. He vehemently denie[d] having raped AAA. On March 19, 1996, he was
at the Lusaran market to buy dried fish and other household items to be consumed for the whole
week because he lived in a mountain barangay. He could not estimate the distance between
Lusaran Market and his house but it would take two (2) hours of travel time by walking only. It was
about 8:00 oclock in the morning when he went to Lusaran Market on March 19, 1996 and arrived
home at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon already. AAA accused him of rape because of the
misunderstanding he had with the husband of his elder sister regarding the mango trees owned by
his mother. AAA is an employee of his brother-in-law, Sergio Agua, whose house is about seventy
(70) meters away from his house. Aside from their houses, there are also other houses, about five
(5) of them, located in their locality. The mango trees were already allocated by his mother to each
and every child. One of his brothers transferred residence to Compostela abandoning the mango
trees allocated to him. Accused-appellant took over the said mango trees and sprayed them with
chemicals. However, Sergio Agua also sprayed them and accused-appellant chided him. This made
his brother-in-law angry who pulled out his bolo. Thereafter, he told accused-appellant to "beware".
After that incident, accused-appellant and Sergio no longer talked about the mango trees. Aside from
this, accused-appellant and Sergio also had a disagreement regarding the five (5) hectares of land

owned by the latters mother. Sergio wanted it divided but accused-appellant objected since he has
other siblings who are still single. Sergio got mad and again threatened accused-appellant to
"beware"[.]
12

The Decision of the RTC

In a Decision dated October 18, 2005, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime
charged. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of AAA, finding the same frank, candid, and
straightforward. In contrast, the trial court rejected the accused-appellants defenses of denial and
alibi since the same were not corroborated even by the testimony of his mother, Luisa Paras. The
latter merely testified on an alleged feud between the accused-appellant and Sergio Agua, who
happened to be the employer of AAA. The RTC sentenced the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, this Court finds the guilt of the accused DEMOCRITO
PARAS to have been proved beyond peradventure of a reasonable doubt and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the offended party
[AAA] the sum of P50,000.00 by way of compensatory damages plus the amount of P100,000.00 as
and for moral damages.
13

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the RTC in a Decision dated February 2,
2010. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts appreciation of AAAs testimony, which was held
to be steadfast and unyielding throughout the direct and cross-examinations. The testimony of Luisa
Paras on the alleged misunderstanding between the accused-appellant and Sergio Agua was found
to be insufficient to overturn the candid testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the
accused-appellant as the malefactor. The Court of Appeals also brushed aside the accusedappellants arguments of alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in AAAs testimony, i.e., that
AAA could recall the details of the rape but not the birth date of her child and the name of her
neighbor, that AAA did not seize the opportunities given her to save herself, and that the supposed
date of the rape was not clearly established by the prosecution evidence. The appellate court ruled
that said inconsistencies were on inconsequential matters that did not bear upon the essential
elements of the crime of rape. The Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated October 18, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, Toledo City, in Criminal Case No. TCS-2729 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
As modified, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11
of Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 only as
moral damages plus exemplary damages in the amount ofP25,000.00. The award of civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000.00 stands.
14

The Ruling of the Court

The accused-appellant again appealed his case to this Court, arguing that the trial court erred in
convicting him of the crime charged even if his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
15

The appeal lacks merit.

As the accused-appellant was charged to have committed the rape "in March 1996 or for sometime
subsequent thereto," the applicable provision of the law in this case is Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. The relevant portions of said statutory provision read:
16

17

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
xxxx
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-appellant guilty of rape
by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The courts a quo
relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the Court finds
that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony that the accused-appellant was the
one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. We, thus, see no
reason to disturb the lower courts appreciation of the credibility of AAAs testimony. People v. De
Guzman teaches that:
18

In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the
witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is
able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal
record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth
or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply.
The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed
steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were
shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying
the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict.
The Court likewise upholds the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the inconsistencies pointed out by
the accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA, namely, her inability to remember the birth date of
her child and the name of her neighbor, did not destroy her credibility as a witness. These details
had nothing to do with the essential elements of rape, that is, carnal knowledge of a person through
force or intimidation. As held in People v. Maglente :
19

Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not
grounds for acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the same do not affect
the credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free
testimonies considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may even
suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed. (Citations omitted.)
Before the Court of Appeals and this Court, the accused-appellant also capitalized on the findings of
Dr. Pilapil that AAA was already three months pregnant when she was examined on October 7,
1996. If that were the case, the accused-appellant argued that AAA could have had sexual
intercourse sometime in June or July 1996 and not in March 1996 when the rape was supposed to
have been committed. We find that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected this contention. We had
occasion to state in People v. Adora that "authorities in forensic medicine agree that the
determination of the exact date of fertilization is problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown;
thus, the difficulty in determining the actual normal duration of pregnancy." At any rate, we ruled in
People v. Bejic that:
20

21

Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim
bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is
important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's will
or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. (Citation
omitted.)
Anent the alleged failure of AAA to defend herself despite having many opportunities to do so, we
are not persuaded. Were iterated in Sison v. People that:
22

[P]eople react differently under emotional stress. There is no standard form of behavior when one is
confronted by a shocking incident, especially if the assailant is physically near. The workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. In a given situation, some may
shout, others may faint, and still others may be frozen into silence. Consequently, the failure of
complainant to run away or shout for help at the very first opportunity cannot be construed consent
to the sexual intercourse. (Citations omitted.)
Finally, the accused-appellants defenses of denial and alibi also fail to convince the Court. Given
that the accused-appellant failed to support the same with strong evidence of his lack of guilt, said
defenses cannot prevail over the positive identification of AAA.
1wphi1

All told, the accused-appellant failed to show that the RTC and the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sexually abusing AAA. Under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use
of a deadly weapon the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In this case, the accusedappellants use of a gun in the commission of the rape against AAA was both specifically alleged in
the information and proven during the trial of the case. Considering that there was neither any
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.
23

As to the award of damages, the Court of Appeals properly imposed the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. On the award of exemplary damages, the same
is increased fromP25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence.
24

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated February 2, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR.-H.C. No. 00465. The accused-appellant is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of one count of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6%
per annum from the date of finality of this Decision.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y SILVANO, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an Appeal1 from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32275 dated August 11,
2010 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Leonardo Cataytay y Silvano for the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant Cataytay was charged of said crime in an Information dated September 9, 2003:

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That on or about the 07th day of September 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs[,] and by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of
AAA],3 19 years of age but with a mental age of a 5 year old, hence, a retardate, or demented, which is
known to accused at the time of the commission of the offense, against her will and consent and to her
damage and prejudice.4
Accused-appellant Cataytay entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment on October 3, 2003. Trial
thereafter ensued.
BBB (AAAs mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in their
compound in Mandaluyong City. Accused-appellant was a shoe repairman who had a shop six houses away
from BBBs house.5
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On September 7, 2003, at around 6:30 p.m., BBB left AAA in their house to look for BBBs youngest
daughter. Thirty minutes later, when she reached the bridge near Block 37, her neighbor, Lito, told her that
there was a problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA and the accused-appellant were
already at the outpost. Lito told the persons at the outpost that she was the mother of the victim. When
BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, Mommy, ni-rape po ako. BBB asked her who raped her. AAA responded
by pointing to accused-appellant. During the interviews made by thebarangay officials, AAA narrated how
she was raped by accused-appellant, which ended when a certain Mimi knocked at the door. When
accused-appellant answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the
house. AAA went out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita
Morante, called the barangay officials at the outpost.6
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BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) dated May 25, 1999, which was conducted in connection with another rape case. The report stated

that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-year-old child. 7 BBB also identified AAAs birth certificate
which showed that she was biologically 19 years old at the time of the incident. 8
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On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999 against a certain
Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness the alleged rape committed by the
accused-appellant.9
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When AAA appeared as the second witness for the prosecution, the prosecution manifested that by merely
looking at her, it was apparent that she was mentally retardate. 10 AAA, who was crying while being asked
questions, testified that she was raped by accused-appellant by inserting his penis into her, despite her
protestations. After the deed, she was given money by accused-appellant. She knew the accused-appellant
before the incident as a shoe repairman.11
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DSWD Social Worker Arlene Gampal testified that she referred AAA to the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH) for psychological examination. She also conducted a Social Case Study upon AAA in relation
to the incident of sexual abuse at the hands of the accused. 12 NCMH Psychologist Susan Sabado was
presented as a prosecution witness, but her testimony was dispensed with when the defense agreed to a
stipulation regarding her expertise and that the tests conducted on AAA affirmed that the latter had a
mental capacity of a seven-year-old child.13
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Police Chief Inspector (PC/Insp.) Bonnie Chua, the medico-legal officer who examined AAA on
September 8, 2003 was likewise presented as a prosecution witness. The defense agreed to a stipulation
that the findings of the examination were consistent with recent sexual intercourse. 14
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For the defense, accused-appellant testified that on September 7, 2003, at around 7:00 p.m., he was in
his house together with his brother, feeding his four-year-old daughter. He then went out and proceeded to
a videoke bar, which was around 20 meters from his house.15 He stayed at the videokebar for less than 15
minutes, as barangay officers suddenly arrived and arrested him. Upon asking why he was being arrested,
the officers told him that he was the suspect in the rape of AAA. He was brought to the Barangay Hall,
where he denied the accusations against him. He estimated that the house of BBB was more or less 50
meters away from his house,16 and that it would take more or less a one minute walk from the videoke bar
to the house of AAA.17 Accused-appellant admitted that by merely looking at AAA, he could tell that she has
a mental disability.18
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Accused-appellants brother, Jose Fresco Cataytay (Jose), testified that at 6:30 p.m. of September 7,
2003, accused-appellant was inside their house feeding his daughter. At around 7:00 p.m., accusedappellant told Jose that he will go to the videoke bar, which was around 30 meters away from their house.
Accused-appellant stayed in the videoke bar for 5 to 10 minutes, then went back to their house and watched
television. Accused-appellant was arrested that night within the vicinity of their house by the barangay
tanods. He estimated that AAAs house is 20 to 30 meters away from the videoke bar, and that it would take
less than five minutes to reach the house of AAA from thevideoke bar.19
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Alicia Panaguitol (Alicia), a neighbor of AAA and accused-appellant, testified that she lives two meters
away from AAAs house and 60 meters away from that of accused-appellant. She was inside her house at
around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003, during which time she heard AAA shouting that she was raped.
She asked AAA who raped her. AAA replied Pilay, apparently referring to their neighbor who was called Jun
Pilay. Alicia saw Jun Pilay run from AAAs house towards a dark area. 20
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On February 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused-appellant guilty as charged, and
disposing of the case as follows:
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WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape against one [AAA] defined and penalized under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 266-B paragraph 10 of the same
Code.
As a consequence thereof, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of from TWENTY YEARS (20) and ONE (1) DAY to FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion
perpetua.
Further, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim [AAA], the
amount of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as and by way of moral damages and SEVENTY

FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) by way of exemplary damages.

Finally, the period of detention of accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO at the Mandaluyong City Jail is
hereby fully credited to his account.21
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The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32275. On August
11, 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
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WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that an additional award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is granted to
the victim and the award of exemplary damages of P75,000.00 is reduced to P30,000.00. The penalty of
imprisonment to be served is simply reclusion perpetua.22
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Hence, this appeal, where accused-appellant Cataytay adopted his Appellants Brief with the Court of
Appeals, which contained the following assignment of errors:
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I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE
WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED.23
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In his appellants brief, accused-appellant claims that BBBs testimony concerning the details of the
commission of the rape as narrated by AAA is hearsay and therefore has no probative value. Accusedappellant also points out that the Psychological Evaluation Report dated May 25, 1999 and Psychological
Report dated June 29, 2009 illustrate that AAA can be easily influenced.
At the outset, we agree with accused-appellant that the details concerning the manner of the commission of
the rape, which was merely narrated by AAA at the barangay outpost, is hearsay and cannot be considered
by this Court. A witness can testify only on the facts that she knows of his own personal knowledge, or
more precisely, those which are derived from her own perception. 24 A witness may not testify on what she
merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what she has learned, read or heard. 25
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Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the details of the rape which BBB merely heard from AAAs narration,
we nevertheless find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court. Despite lacking certain
details concerning the manner in which AAA was allegedly raped, the trial court, taking into consideration
the mental incapacity of AAA and qualifying her to be a child witness, 26found her testimony to be credible
and convincing:
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Q-

Uulitin ko sa iyo yung unang tinanong ko sayo ha, bakit ka nandito

sa office ni Judge, para ano?
APara magsumbong.
QSinong isusumbong mo?
ALeonardo Cataytay.
INTERPRETER:
Witness at this moment is now crying.
QNandito ba si Leonardo Cataytay, [AAA], nandito ba siya ngayon sa
office ni Judge? Tingin ka sa office ni Judge kung nandito ngayon si
Leonardo, sabi mo isusumbong mo siya kay Judge, diba?
COURT:

Ituro mo nga kung nandiyan siya, sige.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to the male person seated in the first row of the
gallery, wearing white t-shirt, who when asked to identify himself,
answered to the name of LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y SILVANO.
PROS. LAZARO:
Q[AAA], itinuro mo si Leonardo, sabi mo kanina isusumbong mo siya,
bakit mo siya isusumbong, anong ginawa niya sayo?
ANi-rape po ako.
QIlang beses ka niya ni-rape?
AIsa lang po.
QPapaano ka niya ni-rape?
APinasok niya yung ari niya sa akin.
QAnong sinabi mo sa kanya nung ni-rape ka niya, anong sinabi mo
kay Leonardo?
AAyaw ko na po.
QAnong sinabi naman ni Leonardo habang nire-rape ka niya?
AWag daw po ako maingay.
QKasi pag maingay ka, ano daw ang gagawin sayo?
AUulitin daw niya po.
QAnong sinabi ni Leonardo sayo pagkatapos ka niyang ni-rape,
[AAA]? May sinabi sayo pagkatapos ka niya ni-rape? Meron o wala?
AWala po.
QMay binigay sya sayo?
AOpo.
QAnong binigay niya? Punasan mo ang luha mo.
APera po.
QAlam mo kung magkano?
AHindi po.27
AAAs mental condition may have prevented her from delving into the specifics of the assault in her
testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated the same when she was asked at
thebarangay outpost merely minutes after the incident. However, as we have ruled in a litany of cases,
when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary
to prove that rape was committed. Youth and, as is more applicable in the case at bar, immaturity are
generally badges of truth.28 Furthermore, the report of PC/Insp. Chua that the findings of the physical
examination were consistent with recent sexual intercourse, provide additional corroboration to the
testimonies of AAA and BBB. It should be noted that this report was stipulated upon by the prosecution and
the defense.
We have pronounced time and again that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot
prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the
crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial
and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 29 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be
sufficiently convincing as to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused
at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.30 In the case at bar, accusedappellant and his brother, second defense witness Jose, claim that the former was taking care of his
daughter in his house at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003. He then went out and proceeded to
a videoke bar, which was merely 20 meters away from his house. Accused-appellant and his brother
admitted that their house was merely 50 meters away, or around a one-minute walk, from the house of

AAA, where the alleged incident occurred. Accused-appellant was therefore clearly in the immediate vicinity
of the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime, and thus accused-appellants defense of
alibi must fail.
Other than alibi and denial, accused-appellant presented the testimony of Alicia, a neighbor of AAA and
accused-appellant, to prove that another person raped AAA. However, the record is clear that AAA positively
identified accused-appellant as the culprit both at the barangay outpost minutes after the incident, and in
open court. It is furthermore axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of
the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better position to
observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who among
them is telling the truth.31 The trial court, which was able to carefully observe the testimony of Alicia, was
not adequately convinced by her allegations.
To recall, the Information charged accused-appellant of committing the following act: by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of AAA], 19
years of age but with a mental age of a 5 year old, hence, a retardate, or demented, which is known to
accused at the time of the commission of the offense, against her will and consent and to her damage and
prejudice.32 The Information, as worded, can conceivably comprehend rape under either paragraph 1(b) or
1(d) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
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Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

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b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

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d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Caoile,33 we differentiated the terms deprived of reason and demented, as follows:

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The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,
characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often by emotional
apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b) has
been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA,
who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is
deprived of reason, and not one who is demented.
In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the mental capacity of a
seven-year old child.34 The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on the conclusion of the
psychologist that the mental age of the victim whose chronological age at the time of the commission of the
offense is nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7) year old child.35 Accused-appellant is
therefore criminally liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The
appropriate penalty is provided for by Article 266-B, which relevantly provides:
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The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
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xxxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
Since the accused-appellants knowledge of AAAs mental retardation was alleged in the Information and
admitted by the former during the trial, the above special qualifying circumstance is applicable, and the
penalty of death should have been imposed. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No.

934636 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead be
imposed.
The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty years and one day to
forty years of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals correctly modified the penalty to be simply reclusion
perpetua. Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law cannot be
applied.37
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As regards accused-appellants civil liability, the RTC ordered him to pay AAA in the amount of P75,000.00 as
moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals modified the trial courts
decision by granting the additional award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and reducing the award of
exemplary damages to P30,000.00. In accordance, however, to People v. Lumaho,38 where the penalty for
the crime committed is death which cannot be imposed because of Republic Act No. 9346, we increase the
amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00
as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition, we impose 6% interest per
annum from finality of judgment until fully paid. 39
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WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32275 dated August 11, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION increasing the amounts of
indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral
damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. All amounts are furthermore subject to interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183700

October 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not ordinarily weaken the
State's case against the accused. However, if the arresting lawmen arrested the accused based on
the pre-arranged signal from the confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer, his
nonpresentation must be credibly explained and the transaction established by other ways in order
to satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt because the arresting lawmen did not
themselves participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused.
Antecedents
On February 7, 2003, an information for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165)
was filed charging Pablito Andaya y Reano (Andaya). The accusatory portion of the information
reads:
1

That on or about December 16, 2002 at around 9:50 o'clock in the evening at Brgy. San Jose Sico,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell,
dispense or deliver, more or less 0.09 gram(s) of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug, which is a clear violation of the above-cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW.
2

Upon arraignment, Andaya pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
3

The CA summed up the versions of the parties, as follows:

Five (5) witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely: SPO4 Delfin Alea, SPO3 Nelio
Lopez, SPO2 Danilo Mercado, SPO4 Protasio Marasigan and Jupri Delantar.
SPO2 Delfin Alea testified that at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of December 16, 2002, their
asset who was conducting surveillance of Pablito Andaya in Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City,
arrived at their station. Said asset reported that he had arranged to buy shabu from Pablito. A team
composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto Villar
and asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. Two (2) pieces of P100.00 bills both duly
marked "X" were recorded in the police blotter. Alea gave the marked bills to the asset. Upon
reaching the designated place, the team members alighted from their vehicles and occupied different
positions where they could see and observe the asset. The asset knocked on the door of Pablito's
house. Pablito came out. Pablito and the asset talked briefly. The asset gave Pablito the marked
money. The asset received something from appellant. The pre-arranged signal signifying
consummation of the transaction was given. The team members approached Pablito and the asset,
introduced themselves as police officers and arrested accused. He was brought to the police station.
The arrival of the team was recorded in the police blotter. The merchandise handed by accused to
the asset was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. The
specimen was positive for methampethamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
SPO2 Lopez received the person of the accused, the marked money and the item accused handed
to the asset. Lopez prepared the request for laboratory examination. He also prepared the
documents required for filing of the case with the Public Prosecutor.
SPO2 Danilo Mercado recorded the marked bills in the police blotter before the buy-bust. Upon the
team's return, the marked money and the merchandise from accused were turned over to SPO2
Mercado. He prepared a complaint sheet. Thereafter, he turned over accused and the evidence to
the Police Investigator.
SPo4 Protacio Marasigan received a written request for laboratory examination of the subject
merchandise. He brought the request to the crime laboratory in Laguna.
Jupri Delantar, a Forensic Chemical Officer in Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna, conducted the
examination. The merchandise tested positive for shabu.
Accused-appellant denied the charge. He stated that at about 9: 15 in the evening of December 16,
2002 he was at home watching TV with his family when police officers arrived. When he opened the
door, a police officer poked his gun at him. Somebody else held a long firearm. Pablito was
handcuffed and brought outside. He refused to negotiate and asked for a warrant. The policemen
searched the house, turned over the beddings and uncovered their furniture. No gun nor shabu was
found. Pablito was brought to the police station and detained. After three (3) days he was released.
He received a subpoena from the Public Prosecutor afterwards.
His wife Crisanta, corroborated appellants' testimony. She added having told her husband about the
loss of their cellphone and the money in his wallet. She was asked to produce P5,000.00 which she
was unable to do. She was able to raise only P2,000.00.
Judgment of the RTC

On February 21, 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, in Batangas City (R TC) rendered its
judgment convicting Andaya as charged, and meted him the penalty of life imprisonment, viz:
5

In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation conducted on the night of December 16, 2002 is supported
by the police blotter wherein not only was the depaiiure and arrival of the operatives have been duly
recorded but also the two (2) pieces of marked one hundred peso bills. The arrest of the accused
was made after the police asset had given the pre-arranged signal outside his house. The marked
money was recovered from the very hand of the accused while the deck of crystalline substances
given to the asset upon the latter's handing over to the accused the marked money has been turned
over to the police by the asset. The crystalline substance when examined at the police crime
laboratory was found to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride a dangerous and prohibited drug
and weighed 0.09 gram.
These foregoing facts have been clearly testified to by the Prosecution witnesses who are members
of the Philippine Integrated National Police Force stationed at Batangas City. No ill-motive has been
imputed to any of these police officers prior to and at the time the herein accused was arrested on
the night of December 16, 2002.
The accused and his wife as a defense denied the sale of shabu that fateful night. There were
allegations in their testimonies that the police demanded money from them. The wife of the accused
even testified that she gave P 1,500.00 to the police officer who then eventually released said
accused. And early on, she even claimed money and a cellphone were missing after the accused
was arrested in their house.
The testimonies of the accused and his wife are bereft of any corroborating evidence emanating
from a disinterested source. It is no less than self-serving devoid of any credence considering the
following circumstances:
1. Scrutinizing the entirety of the testimony of the accused and his wife Crisanta Andaya,
there are material variances gleaned therefrom. The accused himself never testified that he
was pushed to a chair and yet witness Crisanta Andaya said she saw her husband pushed to
a chair. Also, the accused said there were two guns poked at him when he opened the door
but his wife said only one was holding a gun while another had a long firearm on his
shoulder.
2. The testimony of the accused was that only P500.00 was taken by the police before his
release. But the wife said P1,500.00 was given to the police before the accused was
released. 3. The accused and his wife never made any complaint to the proper authorities as
regards the alleged loss of money and cellphone when the accused was arrested on
December 16, 2002. Neither was there any complaint filed by them for the alleged P500.00
or Pl1500.00 demanded from and given by them to the police.
4. The accused was a resident of Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City since the 1980's
why was it that it was at Rosario, Batangas where the accused was arrested. The Defense
gave no evidence to contest the presumption of guilt based on flight.
5. It is significant to note also that the accused never bothered to ask who was knocking at
his door past 9:00 o'clock in the evening. While his family was already lying in bed to sleep
he was still watching T.V. These actuations of the accused tend to support the fact that the

police asset had made a deal with the accused for the sale of shabu and was expecting the
asset to come that night.
In the light of all foregoing considerations, the Court is left with no alternative than to find the herein
accused criminally liable for the offense charged in the information.
Wherefore, accused Pablito Andaya y Reano is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. He is therefore sentenced to undergo life imprisonment
and to pay the costs of this action. The 0.09 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride subject of this
case is confiscated and directed to be proceeded against pursuant to law.
The accused may be credited with his preventive imprisonment if he is entitled to any.
SO ORDERED.

Decision of the CA
In his appeal, Andaya contended:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
SEARCH AND ARREST AS ILLEGAL.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAIL URE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
7

On February 11, 2008, the CA promulgated its assailed decision affirming the conviction, viz:
8

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of Branch IV, RTC,
Fourth Judicial Region, Batangas City, in Criminal Case No. 12771 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Issues
Hence, Andaya appeals, insisting that the search of his house and his person and his arrest by the
police officers violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and that
the Prosecution's nonpresentation of the confidential informant was adverse to the Prosecution,
indicating that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.

To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as
defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of
2002), the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and ( b) that the
dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus
delicti.
10

We reiterate that a buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug
pusher. In such operation, the poseur buyer transacts with the suspect by purchasing a quantity of
the dangerous drug and paying the price agreed upon, and in turn the drug pusher turns over or
delivers the dangerous drug subject of their agreement in exchange for the price or other
consideration. Once the transaction is consummated, the drug pusher is arrested, and can be held
to account under the criminal law. The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust
operation is that the suspect is arrested in jlagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or
is in the act of committing, or is attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting
police officer or private person. The arresting police officer or private person is favored in such
instance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
11

12

Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the State,
and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond
reasonable doubt. This responsibility imposed on the State accords with the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence until and unless the
presumption of innocence in his favor has been overcome by sufficient and competent evidence.
13

14

Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur buyer
himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the prearranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buybust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya.
However, the State did not present the confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to
describe how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have
been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly
witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being
positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed
transaction.
The CA did not find anything wrong or odd in the non-presentation of the poseur buyer as a witness
against the accused. In fact, it justified the non-presentation as follows:
Appellant also questioned the failure of the prosecution to present the informer. The court is aware of
the considerations why confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. There
is the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. (People v. Khor,
307 SCRA 295 [1999], citing People v. Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 [1995].) Foremost is the desire to
protect them from being objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once they
become known. (People vs. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, June 21, 2004.)
In People vs Lopez (214 SCRA 323), it was held that there was no need for the prosecution to
present the confidential informer as the poseur buyer himself positively identified the accused as the
one who sold to him one deck of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." The trial court then

properly relied on the testimonies of the police officers despite the decision of the prosecution not to
present the informer.
15

The foregoing justification by the CA was off-tangent and does not help the State's cause any. It is
obvious that the rulings cited to supp01i the need to conceal the confidential infonnants' identities
related to the confidential informants who gave information against suspected drug dealers. The
presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in those instances could
be excused because there were poseur buyers who directly incriminated the accused. In this case,
however, it was different, because the poseur buyer and the confidential informant were one and the
same. Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate Andaya.
1wphi1

Indeed, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 punishes "any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." Under the law,
selling was any act "of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical whether for money or any other consideration;" while delivering was any act "of knowingly
passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without
consideration." Given the legal characterizations of the acts constituting the offense charged, the
members of the buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring that they had seen
from their positions the poseur buyer handing something to Andaya who, in turn, gave something to
the poseur buyer. If the transaction was a sale, it was unwarranted to infer from such testimonies of
the members of the buy-bust team that what the poseur buyer handed over were the
marked P100.00 bills and that what Andaya gave to the poseur buyer was the shabu purchased.
16

17

Another mark of suspicion attending the evidence of guilt related to the reliance by the members of
the buy-bust team on the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. To start with, the record does
not show what the prearranged signal consisted of. It is fundamental enough to expect the State to
be clear and definite about its evidence of guilt, particularly here where the conviction of Andaya
would require him to spend the rest of his natural life behind bars. Nothing less should be done here.
Secondly, the reliance on the supposed signal to establish the consummation of the transaction
between the poseur buyer and Andaya was unwarranted because the unmitigatedly hearsay
character of the signal rendered it entirely bereft of trustworthiness. The arresting members of the
buy-bust team interpreted the signal from the anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the
consummation of the transaction. Their interpretation, being necessarily subjective without the
testimony of the poseur buyer, unfairly threatened the liberty of Andaya. We should not allow that
threat to perpetuate itself. And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the right to
confront and test the credibility of the poseur buyer who supposedly gave it.
We should look at the situation of Andaya with utmost caution because of what our judicial
experience through the years has told us about unscrupulous lawmen resorting to stratagems of
false incrimination in order to arrest individuals they target for ulterior reasons. In this case, the
arrest did not emanate from probable cause, for the formless signal from the anonymous poseur
buyer did not establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
1wphi1

In affirming the RTC's conviction of the accused, the CA observed that the defense of frame-up put
up by the accused was discredited by the absence of proof of "any intent on the paii of the police
authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duty stands." Such outright rejection by the lower courts of Andaya's defense
of frame-up is not outrightly binding. For sure, the frame-up defense has been commonly used in
prosecutions based on buy-bust operations that have led to the an-est of the suspects. Its use
might be seen as excessive, but the failure of the accused to impute any ill motives to falsely
incriminate them should not deter us from scrutinizing the circumstances of the cases brought to us
for review. We should remind ourselves that we cannot presume that the accused committed the
crimes they have been charged with. The State must fully establish that for us. If the imputation of ill
motive to the lawmen is the only means of impeaching them, then that would be the end of our
dutiful vigilance to protect our citizenry from false arrests and wrongful incriminations. We are aware
that there have been in the past many cases of false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and that
should heighten our resolve to strengthen the ramparts of judicial scrutiny.
18

19

Nor should we shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our citizenry just because the
lawmen are shielded by the presumption of the regularity of their performance of duty. The presumed
regularity is nothing but a purely evidentiary tool intended to avoid the impossible and timeconsuming task of establishing every detail of the performance by officials and functionaries of the
Government. Conversion by no means defeat the much stronger and much firmer presumption of
innocence in favor of every person whose life, property and liberty comes under the risk of forfeiture
on the strength of a false accusation of committing some crime. The criminal accusation against a
person must be substantiated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court should steadfastly
safeguard his right to be presumed innocent. Although his innocence could be doubted, for his
reputation in his community might not be lily-white or lustrous, he should not fear a conviction for any
crime, least of all one as grave as drug pushing, unless the evidence against him was clear,
competent and beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the presumption of innocence in his favor
would be rendered empty.
20

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on February 11,
2008; ACQUITS accused Pablito Andaya y Reano for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; and ORDERS his immediate release from confinement at the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa City.
The Court DIRECTS that the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement the immediate
release of Pablito Andaya y Reano, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause; and to report
his compliance within ten days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 201565, October 13, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR
REINARIO REY ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO A.K.A. EDEL ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO
ITCOBANES A.K.A. NONONG ITCOBANES, NONOY ESTONILO-AT LARGE, TITING BOOC-AT
LARGE, GALI ITCOBANES-AT LARGE, ORLANDO TAGALOG MATERDAM A.K.A. NEGRO
MATERDAM, AND CALVIN DELA CRUZ A.K.A. BULLDOG DELA CRUZ, Accused,
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO REY ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO
A.K.A. EDEL ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES A.K.A. NONONG ITCOBANES, AND CALVIN
DELA CRUZ A.K.A. BULLDOG DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In this appeal, accused-appellants Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr. (Carlos, Sr.), Mayor Reinario Estonilo
(Rey), Edelbrando Estonilo (Edel), Eutiquiano Itcobanes (Nonong), and Calvin Dela Cruz (Bulldog) seek
liberty from the judgment1 of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Manila,
which found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Direct Assault in
Criminal Case No. 05-238607.
The above-named accused-appellants, along with four others, namely: Nonoy Estonilo (Nonoy),2Titing Booc
(Titing),3 and Gali Itcobanes (Gali),4 and Orlando Tagalog Materdam (Negro)5 were all charged in an
Information dated July 30, 2004 that reads:
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That on or about April 5, 2004 at 8:00 oclock in the evening thereof, at Celera Elementary School, 6 Brgy.
Villa Inocencio, Municipality of Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the
performance of his duty being the District Supervisor of public schools, hitting the latter on the different
parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death.7
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On November 8, 2005, the prosecutor filed an Amended Information, 8 which provides:

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That on or about April 5, 2004, at Celera Elementary School, Brgy. Villa Inocencio, Municipality of Placer,
Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court of Masbate, the abovenamed accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR. and MAYOR REINARIO REY ESTONILO, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce their co-accused, EDELBRANDO
ESTONILO AL[I]AS EDEL ESTONILO[,] EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES AL[I]AS NONONG ITCOBANES[,]
NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, GALI ITCOBANES, ORLANDO MATERDAM Y TAGALOG ALIAS NEGRO
MATERDAM[,] [and] CALVIN DELA CRUZ AL[I]AS BULLDOG DELA CRUZ[,] who were all armed with
firearms, to attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the
performance of his duty being a District Supervisor of public schools, by then and there shooting the latter,
hitting said FLORO A. CASAS on the different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death thereafter.9
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When they were arraigned on November 9, 2005, the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. On the same date, the RTC issued a pre-trial order which stated, among others:
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a) Upon request by the prosecution, the defense admitted the following:

1. The identities of the five (5) accused present;
2. As to the jurisdiction of this Court, there was an Order from the
Honorable Supreme Court as to the transfer of venue;
3. The fact of death of Floro A. Casas;
4. That the victim Floro A. Casas at the time of his death was a
District Supervisor of the Department of Education.
b) However, upon request by the defense, the prosecution did not admit
that Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr. and Mayor Reinario Estonilo were not

at the scene of the incident during the incident.10

The prosecution presented nine witnesses, namely: Elsa Q. Casas (Elsa), the victims wife; Felix Q. Casas
(Felix), the victims son; Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco (Dr. Francisco), the Municipal Health Officer, Placer,
Masbate; Senior Police Officer 4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. (SPO4 Lepatan), Placer Police Station; Serapion M.
Bedrijo (Serapion), employee of Municipal Councilor candidate Boy dela Pisa; Carlo S. Antipolo (Antipolo), a
resident of Placer, Masbate; Diego L. Casas (Diego), cousin of the victim; Rosalinda V. Dahonan (Rosalinda),
a resident of Placer, Masbate; and Servando P. Rosales (Servando), former employee of Ex-Mayor Carlos,
Sr.11
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The testimonies of the foregoing witnesses consisted of the following:

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Felix narrated that on April 4, 2005, the day before his father, Floro Casas (Floro), was gunned down, he was
with the latter and some teachers at the Celera Inocencio Elementary School, Placer, Masbate; that they
were working on the closing ceremonies to be held the following day; that one Ranio Morales called on Floro
and told him that Mayor Carlos, Sr. wanted to see him at his (Ranio) house; that Floro and Felix went to see
Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that when they saw Mayor Carlos, Sr., he showed them (Floro and Felix) a program of a
celebration of the Federation of 7th Day Adventist that contained the names of the governor, the
congressman, and Placer mayoralty candidate Vicente Cotero (Cotero), as guests of the said activity; that
Felix asked his father why Coteros picture was so big while Mayor Carlos, Sr.s name was not mentioned in
the program; that Floro replied that he cannot help it because Cotero paid for the program; that the answer
angered Mayor Carlos, Sr. and he scolded Floro; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. said you are now for Cotero but
youre only Estonilo when you ask for my signature to sign the voucher. This is up to now that you will be
the supervisor of Celera; that Floro responded when are you a superintendent when you dont have any
scholastic standing. Just look if I will still vote for your son; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. replied lets see if you
can still vote; and that the following day, Floro was shot to death. 12
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But prior to the April 4, 2005 incident, Felix recounted that on December 10, 2003, upon invitation of Nonoy,
he joined the latters group for a drinking spree at a videoke bar; that they talked about the death of one
Titing Villester; that Nonoy told Felix that brod, do not be afraid, because others are supposed to be afraid
[of] us because they believe that we were the ones who killed Titing Villester; that afterwards Felix and the
group were fetched at the videoke bar by Edel, a messenger of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that they were brought to
the house of one Bobong Baldecir (a nephew of Mayor Carlos, Sr.) in Daraga; that upon arriving thereat, Rey
uttered its good that Dodong (Felixs nickname) is with you; that Nonoy then said who would not [be]
otherwise, his father would be the next victim after Titing Villester;13 that Rey then turned to Felix and said,
its very important that your father is with us because a District Supervisor has a big [role] in the
Comelecs choice for those teachers who would become members of the Board of Election Inspectors; that
Felix clarified that Rey was then the 2004 mayoralty candidate for Placer, Masbate; and that Felix went along
with him since he was in Daraga, the bailiwick of the Estonilos.14
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On cross examination, the counsel for the accused tried to discredit Felix by questioning him on why it took
him a long time to execute an affidavit relative to his fathers killing. Felix explained that he went to Cebu to
stay away from Placer, which is under the Estonilos jurisdiction. 15 The defense confronted Felix of a criminal
case against him for illegal use of prohibited drugs, for which he was out on bail. 16
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On March 28, 2006, the prosecution presented two witnesses, Dr. Ulysses Francisco y Pedrano and SPO4
Restituto Lepatan, Sr. The prosecution and the defense entered into stipulation of facts relative to their
testimonies.
[Stipulation of Facts on Dr. Ulysses P. Franciscos testimony:]
1.

That Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, a Municipal Health Officer of Placer, Masbate, is expert in
medicine;
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2.

That he was the one who conducted the Post-Mortem Examination on the dead body of
Floro Casas y Baronda on April 6, 2004 at Katipunan, Placer, Masbate;
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3.

That in connection with his examination, he prepared the Post-Mortem Examination Report,
marked as Exhibit F, the printed name and signature of Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, marked
as Exhibit F-1;
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4.

That he also prepared the Certificate of Death, marked as Exhibit G and the Sketch of a
Human Body, marked as Exhibit H;
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5.

The veracity and truthfulness of the Post-Mortem Findings indicated in the Post-Mortem
Examination Report; and

6.

In the course of the examination of the victim, the said witness recovered three slugs: the
1st slug was marked as Exhibit I, the fragmented slug as Exhibit I-1, and the metallic
object consisting of two pieces of Exhibit I-2.

[Stipulation of Facts on SPO4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr.s testimony:]

1.

That there exists a Police Blotter in the Record/Blotter Book of the Placer, Masbate Police
Station relative to the shooting incident that occurred on April 5, 2004 at Celera Elementary
School. Said Police Blotter was requested to be marked by the prosecution as Exhibit J;
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2.

That said witness prepared the Police Report dated April 17, 2004 relative to the blotter
written on the Blotter Book. Said Police Report was requested to be marked as Exhibit J-1
and the signature of Sr. Police Officer IV Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. as Exhibit J-1-a;
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3.

The existence of the Police Blotter as appearing in the Blotter Book page number 325. Said
Police Blotter book page 325 was requested to be marked as Exh. K and the bracketed
portion thereof as Exh. K-1.17

According to Dr. Francisco, Floro sustained gunshot wounds caused by more than one firearm based on the
sizes of the slugs recovered and that some of them were fired at close range. The counsel for the accused
waived his cross examination.18
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Prosecution witness Serapion testified that while he was printing the name of Municipal Councilor candidate
Boy dela Pisa on the street facing the Celera Elementary School on the night of April 5, 2004, he heard
gunshots coming from inside the compound of the school; that after two or three minutes, he saw more or
less six persons coming out of the school; that he was able to identify three of them as present in the
courtroom: Edel, Nonoy, and Nonong; that he saw the six men approach Mayor Carlos, Sr.s vehicle, which
was parked near the school; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey came out of a house nearby; that upon reaching
the vehicle, Serapion heard Nonoy say to Mayor Carlos, Sr. mission accomplished, sir; that Mayor Carlos,
Sr. ordered Nonoy and his group to escape, which they did using two motorbikes towards the direction of
Cataingan; and thereafter, that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey drove towards the direction of Daraga. 19
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During his cross examination, the defense tried to discredit Serapion by confronting him with the fact that
he has a pending criminal case for frustrated murder and that he was out on bail. 20
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Antipolo testified that on April 5, 2004, he was riding his motorcycle and passing by the gate of the Celera
Elementary School when he heard gunshots and someone shouted that Floro was shot; that he stopped,
alighted from his motorcycle, went to the gate, and saw four persons holding short firearms; that he
identified Nonoy and Negro as the two who fired at Floro about seven times; that he identified Edel and
Nonong as the two other gun holders; that at that moment, Gali shouted sir, thats enough, escape!; that
Gali was accompanied by someone named Ace, Titing and Bulldog; that right after Gali shouted for them to
escape, all of them hurriedly left the school compound; that he saw Mayor Carlos, Sr.s pick-up vehicle arrive
soon thereafter; that Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and Negro alighted from the vehicle and watched the
proceedings; that he heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say leave it because its already dead; and that afterwards,
the police officers arrived.21
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In an attempt to discredit Antipolo, the defense counsel confronted him with a criminal case against him for
homicide of one Edgardo Estonilo (brother of accused-appellant Edel) that happened on October 30,
2005.22
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Elsa was presented to testify on the probable motive for the killing of Floro, the circumstances surrounding
the killing and its discovery, their family background, her husbands line of work, how she felt on their loss,

and the expenses relative to his killing. She testified that she heard there were people who were jealous of
Floros position because he could bring voters to his side during election time; that Placer mayoralty
candidate Cotero donated medals for the 2003-2004 closing ceremony of the entire district of public schools;
that during the closing ceremony, the donors name was announced, which angered then Mayor Carlos,
Sr.;23 that when Floro was processing a voucher worth P70,000.00, Mayor Carlos, Sr. refused to sign the
same and even threw the voucher on the floor saying let this be signed by Vicente Cotero; and that Floros
cousin, Diego Casas, helped Floro secure the Mayors signature by ensuring Mayor Carlos, Sr. that Floro was
for him, and only then did Mayor Carlos, Sr. agree to sign the voucher.24
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Diego L. Casas corroborated Elsas testimony relative to the fact that he helped Floro secure Mayor Carlos,
Sr.s signature on the voucher.25
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Rosalinda testified that at 7:00 a.m. on April 10, 2004, Mayor Carlos, Sr. went to her house and told her that
he would kill her husband following Floro; that she was shocked and scared, thus, she went to the Placer
Police Station and reported the incident; that she went to see her husband, who was then campaigning for
mayoralty candidate Cotero, and informed him of what happened; and that she went to Elsas house and
informed the latter of the threat.26
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Servando attested that at about 7:00 a.m. on April 1, 2004, he was in the house of Mayor Carlos, Sr.
together with said Mayor, Nonong, Edgar Estonilo, the group of Bulldog, Negro, Alias S [Ace], Rollie,
Nonong, Edel, and Gali; that he witnessed Mayor Carlos, Sr. say ipatumba si Floro Casas; that Servando
later learned that the mayors men were unsuccessful in their goal because Floro was no longer in Barangay
Taberna, where they intended to execute the mayors order; and that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his men again
planned to kill Floro at Celera Elementary School on April 4, 2004. 27
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During cross examination, the defense confronted Servando with the latters Affidavit of Retraction,which he
executed on June 14, 2004. The affidavit contained a withdrawal of his Sinumpaang Salaysay taken on May
30, 2004 at the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Camp
Bonny Serrano, Masbate City relative to the criminal complaint for direct assault with murder filed against
Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his company. He was also asked about two criminal charges filed against him in Cebu
relative to violation of Republic Act No. 9165, illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 28
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On re-direct examination, Servando narrated that Mayor Carlos, Sr.s nephew, Bobong Baldecir, fetched him
from his house and he was brought to the house of Mayor Carlos, Sr. in Daraga; that from there, he was
brought to Atty. Besario in Cebu; that Atty. Besario informed him about the Affidavit of Retraction that he
was supposed to sign, which he did not understand as it was written in English; and that he clarified that the
contents of the affidavit was not his but those of Bobong. 29
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The defense on its part called to the witness stand Jesus Baldecir, Jr. (Jesus/Bobong), Quirino D. Calipay
(Quirino), and the five accused-appellants.
Jesus denied Servandos allegation that he (Jesus) forced him to sign the Affidavit of Retraction. Jesus
narrated that Servando gave word that he (Servando) wanted to meet him (Jesus); that upon their meeting,
Servando told him that he wanted to retract his sworn statement because Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his
company did nothing wrong; that Jesus, Servando and Servandos wife went to Cebu to meet Atty. Besario;
that while traveling, Servando told him that was evading the men of Governor Go, Vicente Cotero and Casas
because he feared for his life; that during the meeting Atty. Besario prepared the affidavit and translated it
to Cebuano dialect; that afterwards, Jesus, Servando and Servandos wife went to the Capitol so that
Servando could sign it before the prosecutor; that Jesus, Atty. Besario, Servado and his wife, and Dante
Estonilo (another nephew of Mayor Carlos) went to Manila to meet with the media; that the media asked
Servando whether he was forced to sign, or was given money or reward to sign the affidavit of retraction,
Servando replied in the negative; and that the purpose of the press meeting was to present Servando and
show that he was not kidnapped.30
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But during his cross examination, Jesus admitted that his nickname was Bobong, and that Mayor Carlos, Sr.
is his uncle; that he is one of the accused in the criminal case for the kidnapping of Servando; and that it
was Dante (Dante) Estonilo who arranged for the meeting with the media, and who served as Servandos
and his wifes companion, while he was with Atty. Besario.31
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During his turn, accused-appellant Mayor Carlos, Sr. testified that in the early evening of April 5, 2004 he
was in a house near the Celera Elementary School attending a birthday party; that while thereat, he heard
successive gunshots and went out to ride his vehicle so he could check the source of the gunshots; that

when he reached the school gate someone informed him that Floro was gunned down; that he did not see
the victim because according to the people it was boarded in a jeep and brought to the hospital; and that he
and his son, Rey, confirmed that they were at the school minutes after the incident. 32
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During cross examination, Mayor Carlos said that he and Floro were close friends; that he learned that he
and his son were suspects in Floros killing five months after the incident; that he confirmed that Rey and
Calvin dela Cruz were with him while inquiring about the shooting at the school; and that he denied having
met Felix on April 4, 2004, seeing Rosalinda after April 5, 2004, or that Servando was his bodyguard. 33
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Accused-appellant Rey testified that in the early evening of April 5, 2004 he was in his house and was
planning to campaign at Barangay Matagantang, Placer, Masbate; that on his way to said barangay, he
passed by Celera Elementary School and noticed his fathers vehicle, and that there were several people
thereat; that he stopped and stayed in the school for a few minutes, and then proceeded to meet his
candidates for counselors at Ranios house; and that afterwards, they all went to Barangay
Matagantang.34
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On cross examination, Rey expressed that this criminal case may be politically motivated because his
opponents could not attribute anything to him since he won as mayor.35
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Quirino narrated that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he and his family were having supper at their house
located in front of Celera Elementary Schools guardhouse, when they heard gunshots; that they
immediately laid down, while Quirino ran across the road and took cover at the school fence; that he peeped
through the fence and saw three persons firing a gun; that he could not identify them or their victim
because it was a bit dark; that after 10 to 20 seconds, he went back home; that a certain Joel Alcantara and
his companions went to him asking him to go with them inside the school, once inside the school, they saw
Floro lying face down; that he took the liberty to go to the police headquarters located five minutes away;
and that when he and the Placer Chief of Police arrived at the school, he noticed Mayor Carlos, Sr. standing
near the gate.36
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For his part, accused-appellant Nonong testified that in the evening of April 5, 2004 he was engaged in a
drinking spree in Nining Berdidas house at Barangay Pili, Placer, Masbate; and that he stayed in her place
until 11:00 p.m.37
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During his cross examination, accused-appellant Nonong acknowledged that Mayor Carlos, Sr. is his uncle
and Rey is his second cousin; that he was not Mayor Carlos, Sr.s bodyguard, but admitted that he handled
the latters fighting cocks; and admitted that Barangay Pili is 40 to 45 minutes away from the poblacion of
Placer.38
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Edel related that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he was sleeping in his house when Rey called him to go to
Ranios house in Placer, Masbate for a meeting; that their group passed by Celera Elementary School and
saw that there were plenty of people, one of whom was Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that their group stopped to
inquire about what happened, and learned that Floro was gunned down; and that he and his group stayed
for about five minutes and left.39
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Accused-appellant Bulldog was also presented in court and confirmed that he was with Mayor Carlos, Sr. and
his wife attending a birthday party near the Celera Elementary School; that they went to the school to check
on what happened and learned that Floro was shot; and that they did not stay long and went home to
Daraga.40
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During cross examination, he denied that he was the bodyguard of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; and that he was
merely accompanying the latter to help in pushing his vehicle in case the starter failed to work. 41
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After trial, the RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The fallo of its March 30, 2009 Decision provides:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR.,
MAYOR REINARIO REY ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO alias EDEL ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO
ITCOBANES alias NONONG ITCOBANES, and CALVIN DELA CRUZ alias BULLDOG DELA CRUZ GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Murder with Direct Assault under Article 248 and Article 148 in
relation to Article 48 all of the Revised Penal Code and each of said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.

As civil liability pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the aforesaid sentenced the accused are
all hereby ordered to solidarily indemnify the family of the victim Floro Casas in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). Likewise, by way of moral damages, the said accused are furthermore
ordered to solidarily pay the said family the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
The accused are, however, credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which they have
been denied.
Let this case be archived as against the accused NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, and GALI ITCOBANES
who have warrants of arrest issued against them but still remain at large, pending their arrest/s.
As to the accused ORLANDO TAGALOG MATERDAM ALIAS NEGRO MATERDAM, separate trial is necessary
considering that he was only recently arrested when the trial of this case as to the other accused was
already about to end.42
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The RTC gave credence to the eyewitness account of Antipolo and the corroborating testimony of Serapion,
who were both present at the school grounds during the shooting incident. The RTC pronounced that the
evidence on record showed unity of purpose in the furtherance of a common criminal design, that was the
killing of Floro. Accused-appellants Nonoy and Negro were the gunmen, while accused-appellants Edel and
Nonong served as backup gunmen. Accused-appellant Bulldog, and accused Gali, Titing and one alias Ace
served as lookouts.43
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The RTC found accused-appellants Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey to have ordered their co-accused to kill Floro
based on the testimony of Servando, who was present when the group planned to kill Floro. Thus, the RTC
concluded that Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is a principal by inducement. And accused-appellant Rey conspired with
his father. In sum, the prosecution was able to establish conspiracy and evident premeditation among all the
accused-appellants.44
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The accused-appellants defense of alibi and denial did not withstand the positive identification of the
prosecution witnesses. The accused-appellants claimed that they were somewhere else in Placer, Masbate
when the shooting took place. However, they were not able to establish the physical improbability of their
being in the crime scene at the time of the shooting. The RTC was convinced that the motive for the murder
was due to Floros support for mayoral candidate Vicente Cotero. Since the victim was a district supervisor of
public schools, the RTC convicted the accused-appellants of the complex crime of murder with direct
assault.45
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All five accused-appellants appealed the foregoing RTC decision to the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC
erred in concluding that motive was duly established, in appreciating the prosecution evidence and
disregarding the salient points of the defense evidence, and in convicting the accused. 46
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In its May 12, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision. 47 The
dispositive part thereof reads:
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WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appealed is denied. The Decision dated 30 March 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45 is herebyAFFIRMED with modification in that the penalty
imposed upon accused-appellants shall simply be reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties and that
the award of civil indemnity is increased to Seventy[-]Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00). 48
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The Court of Appeals sustained the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the RTC considering that the
RTC had observed and monitored at close range the conduct, behavior and deportment of the witnesses as
they testified. The Court of Appeals corrected the penalty imposed, and explained thatreclusion perpetua is
an indivisible penalty which should be imposed without specifying the duration.
On June 29, 2011, the accused-appellants moved for reconsideration, 49 which the Court of Appeals denied in
its November 8, 2011 Resolution.50 Unsatisfied, the accused-appellants appealed their case before this
Court.51
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This Courts Ruling

The accused-appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment of conviction in the criminal case on the
following assignment of errors: the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in (1) giving credence and weight to

the prosecution evidence, (2) finding that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants, and (3)
finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the prosecution evidence.
In essence, the defense disagrees with the disposition of the Court of Appeals affirming their conviction for
murder with direct assault on the ground that some of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
constitute circumstantial evidence, and that the prosecution was not able to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The appeal fails.
After a review of the record of the case, this Court sustains the conviction of the accused-appellants for
murder with direct assault.
The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses on the witness stand
and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as a witness
testifies before it. It is, thus, no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of
witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the
demeanor of witnesses as they testify.52
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This Court had nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records but found no indication that the trial and the
appellate courts overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of
this case. The trial court and the appellate court did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly of Antipolo who was an eyewitness to the crime.
Antipolos testimony did not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency that could possibly detract
from his credibility. He identified the accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro as those who fired at
Floro about seven times, while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding their
firearms. He also witnessed accused Gali shouting to the gunmen to stop and escape. He narrated that
after all the accused left, Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and Materdam arrived aboard the mayors vehicle. He also
heard Mayor Carlos said leave it because its already dead. From his direct and straightforward testimony,
there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprits.
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: 53 (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not
parricide or infanticide.54
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In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Floro was killed; (2) Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr.,
Rey, Edel, Nonong, and Calvin were five of the nine perpetrators who killed him; (3) the killing was attended
by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as testified to by prosecution eyewitnesses,
Servando and Antipolo, as well as treachery as below discussed; and (4) the killing of Floro was neither
parricide nor infanticide.
Of the four elements, the second and third elements are essentially contested by the defense. The Court
finds that the prosecution unquestionably established these two elements.
For the second element, the prosecution presented pieces of evidence which when joined together point to
the accused-appellants as the offenders. Foremost, there is motive to kill Floro. It was Floros support for
Vicente Cotero, who was Reys opponent for the position of mayor in Placer, Masbate. Second, the
prosecution was able to establish that the accused-appellants planned to kill Floro on two separate
occasions. The prosecution witness, Servando, was present in Mayor Carlos, Sr.s house when they were
plotting to kill Floro. He also heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say ipatumba si Floro Casas. Third, Antipolo was an
eyewitness to the killing. His testimony was corroborated by another witness, Serapion, who testified
having seen the accused-appellants leaving the school a few minutes after he heard the gunshots. Serapion
also recounted having heard one of them said mission accomplished sir, after which, Mayor Carlos, Sr.
ordered them to leave.
Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. The
testimony of the eyewitness Antipolo is direct evidence of the commission of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue
may be established by inference.55 It consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the

existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. 56 Here, the
circumstantial evidence consists of the testimonies of Servando and Serapion. Servando was present when
Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered his men to kill Floro. Whether this order was executed can be answered by
relating it to Antipolos eyewitness account as well as Serapions testimony.
As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the prosecution witness, Servando, testified that he was
present on the two occasions when the accused-appellants were planning to kill Floro. His categorical and
straightforward narration proves the existence of evident premeditation.
Treachery also attended the killing of Floro. For treachery to be present, two elements must concur: (1) at
the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The essence
of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In this case,
accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro successively fired at Floro about seven times and the victim
sustained 13 gunshot wounds all found to have been inflicted at close range giving the latter no chance at all
to evade the attack and defend himself from the unexpected onslaught. Accused-appellants Edel and
Nonong were on standby also holding their firearms to insure the success of their mission without risk to
themselves; and three others served as lookouts. Hence, there is no denying that their collective acts point
to a clear case of treachery.
Defense of denial and alibi
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants must fail in light of the positive
identification made by Antipolo and Serapion. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be
brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused as
in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.57 The accusedappellants alibis that they were at different places at the time of the shooting are negative and self-serving
and cannot be given more evidentiary value vis--vis the affirmative testimony of credible witnesses. The
accused-appellants, the victim, and the prosecution witnesses reside in the same municipality and are,
therefore, familiar with one another. More so, that the two principal accused in this case are prominent
political figures. Therefore, the prosecution witnesses could not have been mistaken on the accusedappellants identity including those who remained at large.
Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i)
that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility
involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused
when the crime was committed; the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have
been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. 58
Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. In fact, Mayor Carlos,
Sr. and his other co-accused, except for Nonong, admitted that they were near the school before the
incident and at the school minutes after the killing took place. Certainly, the distance was not too far as to
preclude the presence of accused-appellants at the school, and/or for them to slip away from where they
were supposed to be, unnoticed.
Penalties
On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded that they should be held
accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of
committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused-appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an
attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault
was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and the
accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the
intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority.
In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer, Masbate, thus, was a
person in authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that there was direct assault just because
Floro was a person in authority, this Court clarifies that the finding of direct assault is based on the fact that
the attack or assault on Floro was, in reality, made by reason of the performance of his duty as the District

Supervisor.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises
the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the
maximum period. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty should have
been death. Plus the fact that there exists an aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2
of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is death. But the imposition of death penalty has been
prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines; thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed upon accused-appellants
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Proper Indemnities
As to the proper monetary awards imposable for the crime charged, modifications must be made herein.
The award of P100,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages is proper to conform with current
jurisprudence. 59
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Further, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance either as qualifying or generic, an
award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 223060 of the New Civil Code. Thus, conformably with
the above, the legal heirs of the victim are also entitled to an award of exemplary damages 61 in the amount
of P100,000.00.
Lastly, an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded,
to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.62
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At this point, notice must be made that on January 28, 2014, the Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison
informed this Court of the death of accused-appellant Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. on January 9, 2013. In view
thereof, the case against deceased Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is hereby ordered dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 12, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 04142, affirming the Decision dated March 30, 2009, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 45, in Criminal Case No. 05-238607, finding accused-appellants REINARIO REY ESTONILO,
EDELBRANDO EDEL ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO NONONG ITCOBANES, and CALVIN BULLDOG DELA
CRUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder with Direct Assault, is herebyAFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages is increased to P100,000.00 each, in
addition to P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the imposition of 6% thereon as legal interest upon
finality of this Courts Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208169, October 08, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWARD ADRIANO Y SALES, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
For review is the conviction of Edward Adriano y Sales (Adriano) for the crime of illegal sale
of shabupunishable under Section 5, Article II of the Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise
known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act (CDDA) of 2002, by the Court of Appeals (CA) in a
Decision1dated 29 October 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05182, which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) dated 23 August 2011 in "People of the Philippines v. Edward Adriano y Sales", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 16444-D.
The Information

That on or about 25th day of October 2008, in the City of Taguig, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, sell, deliver, and give
away to a poseur buyer, zero point twelve (0.12) gram of a white crystalline substance, commonly known as
"shabu" which is a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of Two Hundred Pesos (Php200.00) and
in violation of the above cited law.3
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When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the pre-trial conference on 13 July
2009, the parties stipulated on the following:
1.

The identity of the accused as the same person named in the information;

2.

The existence of the specimens and documents marked as evidence but with a counter-proposal
that the forensic chemist has no personal knowledge as to the source of the specimen;

3.

The qualification of the forensic chemist, P/Sr. Insp. Yelah Manaog;

4.

The existence and due execution of the Physical Science Report No. D-334-08;

5.

The due execution and genuineness of the FINDINGS on the qualitative examination conducted on
the specimens gave POSITIVE result to the test for the presence of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug;4

During trial, the prosecution presented Police Officer 1 Teodoro Morales (PO1 Morales), who testified that
acting on a report received from a barangay official and an informant that Adriano was selling drugs in North
Daang Hari, Taguig City, Police Chief Inspector Porfirio Calagan formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation to entrap Adriano, designating PO1 Morales as the poseur-buyer, and marking the buy-bust money
consisting of ten PI00.00 bills with the initials "PC". After briefing, PO1 Morales, together with the informant
and his team, proceeded to North Daang Hari where PO1 Morales bought P200.00 worth of shabu from
Adriano. Upon giving Adriano the marked money and after receiving a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance, PO1 Morales signaled his team to arrest Adriano. PO2 Ronnie Fabroa immediately
arrested Adriano.5 The marked money confiscated from Adriano was brought to the police station for
investigation, while the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, which was marked with "ESA251008"6 at the crime scene was brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory by PO2
Vergelio Del Rosario, who also prepared the letter-request.7
In the PNP Crime Laboratory, the result of the laboratory examination conducted by Police/Senior Inspector
Yelah Manaog confirmed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride. 8
On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, who testified that on 22 October 2008, at around 10:00
p.m., he was at home, putting his nephews and nieces to sleep when suddenly two (2) armed men barged
into the house and dragged him outside and forcibly took him to the police station in Taguig City. It was only
when they arrived at the police station when he learned that he was arrested for illegal sale of shabu.9
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated 23 August 2011, the RTC found Adriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The RTC gave credence to the testimony of PO 1 Morales based on the presumption that police
officers perform their duties in a regular manner because the defense failed to establish any ill-motive on
the part of the arresting officers to at least create a dent in the prosecution's case. The positive identification
of Adriano as the perpetrator of the crime charged without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the
witness testifying on the matter, prevails over Adriano's alibi and denial. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused Edward Adriano y Sales is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the crime, as charged, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PHP500,000.00). 10 x x x x
On appeal, Adriano argued that the shabu allegedly seized from his possession is inadmissible because of

the following reasons: (1) the warrantless arrest on his person is invalid; and (2) the arresting officers
violated Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Adriano asserted that the warrantless arrest was illegal because there
was no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before the arrest.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA ruled that the prosecution established the elements of the
crime of illegal sale of shabu. Even if the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements provided in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such noncompliance did not render the seized items inadmissible in evidence.
Further, the CA rejected the defense's attempt to debunk PO1 Morales' testimony based on the defense's
failure to substantiate its allegation of ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers.
The appeal before us maintained that the lower courts gravely erred in not finding the warrantless arrest on
the person of Adriano as illegal and in convicting Adriano despite the police officers' noncompliance with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
We rule in the negative.
Our Ruling
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following two (2) elements must be duly established:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of thecorpus delicti or the
illicit drug as evidence.11
In the case at bar, the prosecution duly established the two (2) elements: (1) to account that the transaction
or sale indeed took place, PO1 Morales narrated the transaction in a clear and direct manner; and (2) the
seized illegal drugs and marked money were presented before the trial court as proof of the identity of the
object of the crime and of the corpus delicti.12
The argument on the arresting officers' noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 deals with the
procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs. The law
reads:
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Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
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(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination;
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(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the
forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject
item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame,
a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of
dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification
shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four
(24) hours;
However, it has been repeatedly noted by the Court, the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165 offer some

measure of flexibility through the proviso, "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items".
Otherwise stated, non-compliance does not invalidate the seizure or render the arrest of the accused illegal
or the items seized from him as inadmissible as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved.
To prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, the Implementing Rules
allow the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, which in this case, has
been duly established by the prosecution. "Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. 13 details of the
unbroken chain of custody as found by the CA:
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The first link in the chain of custody is from the time PO1 Morales took possession of the plastic sachet of
shabu from accused-appellant and marked the same with the initials "EAS", to the time the plastic sachet of
shabu was brought to the Police Station. The Certificate of Inventory for the items seized from accusedappellant was signed by PO1 Morales, PO2 Ronnie Fabroa, and the accused-appellant.
The second link in the chain of custody is from the time the plastic sachet of shabu was brought from the
Police Station, to the PNP Crime Laboratory. A letter-request was made for the laboratory examination of the
contents of the plastic sachet of shabu seized from accused-appellant. The letter-request, and plastic sachet
of shabu, were delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory by PO2 Del Rosario. Per Chemistry Report No. D-33408 prepared by Police Senior Inspector Yelah Manaog, the contents of the plastic sachet tested positive for
shabu.14
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Thus, despite the arresting officers' failure to strictly observe the requirements of Section 21 on the custody
and disposition of the seized items, the violation of the CDDA of 2002 was duly proven. The arresting
officers duly recorded the movements and custody of the seized items from the time of seizure/confiscation
to receipt by the forensic laboratory to safekeeping up to presentation in court.
With regard to the warrantless arrest, the defense's contention that the buy-bust team should have procured
a search warrant for the validity of the buy-bust operation is misplaced. Warrantless arrests are allowed in
three (3) instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
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Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
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(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Based on the above provision, Adriano was arrested pursuant to Section 5(a), which provides that a person
may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense." In the case at bar, Adriano was caught in the act of committing an offense, in flagrante
delicto, when Adriano was caught selling illegal shabu through a buy-bust operation, within the plain view of
the arresting officers.
A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the
police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator
and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the
crime."15 In People v. Agulay,16 we discussed buy-bust operation as a form of a valid and effective mode of
apprehending drug pushers:
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A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and
effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime
originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out
with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction. 17

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Finally, the arresting officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties.
The presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. However, in the case at bar, the
defense failed to present any proof to substantiate its imputation of ill-motive on the part of the arresting
officers. Contrarily, the prosecution duly proved the existence of the two elements of the crime of illegal sale
of shabu and established the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The presumption of
regularity in favor of the arresting officers prevails.
WHEREFORE, we find no cogent reason to reverse the finding of the lower court which foundEdward
Adriano y Sales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale of shabu. The appeal is
hereby DISMISSED. The Court of Appeal's decision in "People of the Philippines v. Edward Adriano y Sales",
docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05182 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 196005

October 1, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR PIMENTEL, Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
On appeal is the Decision dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03943, affirming with modification the Joint Decision dated 3 November 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053, U-10054, and U10055.
1

The Facts
Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Comista (Comista) and Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel) were
charged in conspiracy with others for the murder of two jail guards and for camapping.
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10053 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO,
FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY
ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN PASCUA, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the use
of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention
prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intentto kill, treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold and shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa

inflicting upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused
escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO2 Reynaldo
Gamboa.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294. The
Information in Criminal Case No. U-10054 reads:
3

The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO,
FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY
ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN a.k.a. Joven, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the
use of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention
prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, Jr. inflicting
upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused
escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294.

The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10055 reads:

The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN
CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, and FEDERICO DELIM of the crime of carnapping committed as
follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 at Brgy. Anonas, Urdaneta City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having just escaped from the BJMP Compound,
Anonas Urdaneta, in order to expedite their escape armed with unlicensed firearm with intent to
gain, conspiring with one another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal,
and carry away one (1) Tamaraw Jeep with Plate No. CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin J. Bau[z]on
without the latters knowledge and consent, which accused used as a get away vehicle. CONTRARY
to R.A. 6539, as amended.
5

Upon arraignment, appellants pled not guilty.

Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jail Officer (JO) 2 Marlon Niturada, Dr. Constante
Parayno, Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr., Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Ernesto Gancea, Dionisio Badua,
Police Senior Inspector Philip Campti Pucay, PO3 Jimmy Garcia, PO3 Roberto Reyes, SPO1
Joselito Sagles, Pitz Dela Cruz, PO2 Danny Torres, Police Inspector Pamfilo Regis, Police Inspector
Reyland Malenab, Theresa Bacolor, Julie Gamboa, Benjamin Bauzon, JO1 Victor A. Sidayen,
Warden Romeo Jacaban, SPO4 Cirilo Lagmay and Col. Theresa Ann B. Cid.
The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9 March 1999, JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa
(JO2 Gamboa), JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1 Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada (JO2 Niturada) were

inside the nipa hut searching area near the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned
inmate Dionisio Badua (Badua). JO2 Gamboa gave Badua the keys to the prison cells and
instructed the latter to open all the cells for the routine headcount.
Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing
scheduled for that day. While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were conversing, the telephone in the
administration building rang. JO2 Niturada ran from the nipa hut to the administration building to
answer the phone.
After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded towards the basketball court. On his way there, he
turned his head towards the nipa hut and saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa,
who was seated, and shoot the latter with a short firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an armalite.
Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad,
armed with JO2 Gamboas gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal (Leal) took the armalite from
JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2 Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out the
main gate. After seeing the inmates run out, Badua padlocked the main gateand returned to his cell.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw
jeep with plate number CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the lattersknowledge and
consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the way. Before they reached
Asingan, Pangasinan, the group alighted from the Tamaraw jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up
truck. When they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned turtle. The group
abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field. Police authorities surrounded the cane field
and arrested appellants and their companions.
Dr. Constante Parayno conducted anautopsy on the body of JO1 Bacolor, and concluded that the
death was caused by shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the right lung. Dr. Parayno
also testified that based on the injuries sustained by JO1 Bacolor, it was possible that the shooting
was preceded by a fight between the shooter and the victim.
Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr. conducted an autopsy on the body of JO2 Gamboa, and concluded that the
death was caused by cardiac tamponade due to the gunshot wound that damaged the heart.
Versions of Appellants
Appellants denied any criminal liability.
Fieldads Testimony
At around 6:00 in the morning on 9 March 1999, JO2 Gamboa brought Fieldad out of his cell and
ordered him to clean the administrative offices. After cleaning the offices, he was told to fix a vehicle
parked inside the jail compound. He needed to prop the vehicle on a jack, but he could not find the
jack handle. He went back toJO2 Gamboa, who was in the nipa hut with JO2 Niturada and JO1
Bacolor. JO2 Gamboa told him to look for Badua. When he came back with Badua, JO2 Gamboa

handed Badua the key of the jail compound. Badua went out of the compound, while Fieldad
continued to look for the jack handle.
While JO2 Niturada talked to him regarding the vehicle, Fieldad noticed Elmo Mejia (Mejia) and the
other inmates playing basketball. The ball rolled towards the nipa hut and Mejia went to retrieve it.
Then Fieldad heard gunshots from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Niturada got his gun and fired
towards the nipa hut. Fieldad got nervous and took cover in the outpost. He peeped through the
windows and saw Mejia pointing a firearm toward JO2 Niturada. He hid again when he heard the
exchange of fire between Mejia and JO2 Niturada. He went out of the outpost when he heard people
calling for help to push the parked vehicle. The vehicle did not start, and the people pushing it
dispersed. Intending to return to his cell, he followed JO2 Niturada, who was proceeding towards the
main building. However, JO2 Niturada pointed a gun towards him, so Fieldad ran away and took
cover.
While still inside the jail compound, Leal told Fieldad that he needed the latter to go with him.
Fieldad, along with other inmates, left the jail compound. He followed Leal to a Tamaraw jeep parked
outside. Leal pointed a long firearm toward Fieldad,and ordered the latter to drive the vehicle.
Frightened, Fieldad drove the vehicle. On their way, they picked up Delim and Chan.
Pimentels Testimony
At around 7:30 in the morning of 9 March 1999, Pimentel was allowed to go out of his cell. He
proceeded to the basketball court for the headcount. He heard two or three gunshots, but did not
immediately mind it because he was used to the guards firing their guns in the morning. When he
saw Leal with an armalite, running after and shooting at JO2 Niturada, Pimentel ran to a house
outside the jailcompound. He was afraid to go back to his cell because of the exchange of fire.
Inmates were running in different directions.
Leal arrived at the place where Pimentel was hiding, and motioned to the latter by pointing his
armalite downward several times. Pimentel approached Leal, who ordered him to remove the stone
blocking the tire of the jeep parked near the house. Pimentel obliged. Pimentel boarded the jeep
because Leal told him at gun point to do so. Fieldad drove the jeep. He did not notice who their other
companions were. Along the way, they passed a parked vehicle. Leal ordered everyone to alight
from the jeep, and to board the other vehicle. The vehicle turned turtle in Tarlac.
Cornistas Testimony
Cornista was 17 years old on 9 March 1999. Between 6:00 and 6:45 that morning, he was cleaning
the jail compound. He was shocked and confused when he heard three rapid gunfires followed by
consecutive gunfires coming from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Gamboa, JO1 Bacolor, Leal and
Mejia were at the nipa hut. Leal was chasing JO2 Niturada, both of them armed. Then he saw the jail
guards lying down. Out of fear, he ran towards the already opened main gate.
Cornista hid in a Tamaraw jeep parked behind the jail compound. Then he saw Leal, Fieldad and
Pimentel board the jeep. He tried to alight but Leal threatened to shoot him if he did. Fieldad drove
the Tamaraw jeep. Delim flagged the jeep down and boarded.Chan also joined them along the way.
Upon seeing a parked Mazda pick up, Leal ordered Fieldad to stop the jeep and the inmates to
transfer to the other vehicle. Fieldad also drove the Mazda pick up until it turned turtle in Tarlac.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. U-10053, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista
are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay
the heirs of the deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as
moral damages, Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php47,845.00 as actual damages
and Php153,028.00 for loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and
Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.
2. In Criminal Case No. U-10054, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista
are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay
the heirs of the deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as
moral damages, Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php87,349.45 for the actual
damages, and Php178,500.00 for the loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and
Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.
3. In Criminal Case No. U-10055, accused Charlie Fieldad, Edgar Pimentel and Ryan
Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of CARNAPPING and
each is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from FOURTEEN YEARS AND EIGHT MONTHS
to SIXTEEN YEARS AND TWO MONTHS, and to pay nominal damages of Php15,000.00
and moral damages of Php25,000.00.
For insufficiency of evidence, accused Julius Chan and Federico Delim are ACQUITTED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.

Appeal was interposed only by Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel since Chan had died. They assigned
the following errors:
7

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE
THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN

THE ALLEGED KILLINGS OF JO2 REYNALDO GAMBOA AND JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, JR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MINORITY OF THE
ACCUSED RYAN CORNISTA AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED CRIMES WERE COMMITTED.
IV
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
TESTIMONIES.
8

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court only with respect to the penalties
imposed upon Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054, taking into account the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the
penalties of imprisonment imposed on Ryan Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054.
Accordingly the penalties of reclusion perpetua imposed on him are reduced to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, per each information.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

The appellate court held that "it ismanifest that Cornista acted with discernment, being able to
distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts." The
Court of Appeals enumerated the following acts of Cornista that clearly establish discernment:
10

x x x. His act of grappling for possession of an armalite with Bacolor and hitting the latters head
clearly demonstrated his discernment. He took advantage of the situation where Fieldad was also
grappling with JO1 Bacolor by striking the head of JO1 Bacolor which he obviously knew would
weaken the latters defenses. Moreover, his act of getting the keys from JO2 Gamboa which he
usedin opening the main gate clearly demonstrates the idea of escape and thus established
discernment on his part. Cornista, having acted with discernment may not be excused from criminal
liability.
11

Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel appealed from the Court of Appeals decision. In the interim,
Cornistafiled a Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 15 June 2011, which the Court granted in a
Resolution dated 15 August 2011. The case became final and executory as to Cornista on 5
October 2011. The instant appeal thus pertainsto Fieldad and Pimentel only.
12

13

14

Appellants and appellee adopted their respective briefs filed before the Court of Appeals as their
supplemental briefs in this case.
15

16

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

Nature of the Killings
Fieldad argues that there can be notreachery since "the jail guards were all issued with firearms to
protect themselves from danger and to maintain peace and order within the compound." This
argument is untenable.
17

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and speciallyto insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take.

18

In People v. Escote, Jr., where an armed off-duty police officer was killed, we held:
19

x x x. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission withour risk
of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life
where he was defenseless and unable to flee atthe time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In the
case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear,one on the
shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above
the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr.
and then shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless.
He was shot at close range, thus insuring his death. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
20

In the case of People v. Tabaco, treachery was appreciated in the killing of three peace officers, one
of whom was armed and assigned to maintain the peace and order. They were attending an event
where many armed peace officers were present to maintain peace and order. In that case, the
victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against the
sudden attack.
21

In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any chance of defending
themselves. Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan
held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista
to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun
and shot JO1 Bacolor.
Fieldads Identity was Established
According to Fieldad, since JO2 Niturada did not identify him as a participant in the killings of JO1
Bacolor and JO2 Gamboa, his identity and complicity in the killings were not established. However,
contrary to his contention, Fieldads identity in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054 was
proven by the prosecution. Fieldad disregarded the testimony of Badua, who categorically identified
Fieldad and recounted in detail his participation in the incident:
Q What happened when you bring (sic) water to the kubo?

A At the time when I brought water to the place where (sic) the guards used to take a bath there
were persons grappling possession of the armalite, sir.
Q With whom?
A Charlie and Cornista, sir.
Q You were told to fetch water, then you returned and brought the water to the place where (sic) the
guards used to take a bath and you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling with whom?
A Bacolor, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
You are referring to Jail Guard Bacolor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is this Charlie inside the courtroom right now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to him, you step down?
A This one, sir. (Witness pointed (sic) and shaked (sic) hand (sic) with accused and who when asked
his name he answered Felmer Fieldad).
Q Is he the same Charlie you are referring to?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Do you know Charlie?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is he in the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
Q You go to him, where is Charlie there?
A This one, sir. (Witness is pointing to the accused, Charlie Fieldad).
COURT
Warden what is the name?

BJMP WARDEN JACABAN

Felmer Fieldad and the nickname is Charlie, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
How about Cornista is he inside the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to him?
A (The witness is pointing to one ofthe accused who when asked his name he answered Ryan
Cornista).
Q What happened next when you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling possession of the armalite of
Jail Guard Bacolor?
A They struck the back of the head of Bacolor, sir.
Q Who struck the back head (sic) of Bacolor?
A Cornista, sir.
Q What happened to Bacolor when Cornista struck the back of his head?
A Bacolor fell down, sir.
xxxx
Q What happened when Gamboa was shot by Julius?
A He fell down, sir.
Q What else happened when Gamboa fell down?
A They got his gun, sir.
Q Who got the gun of Gamboa?
A Charlie, sir.
COURT
What kind of firearm?
A 9 MM, sir.

PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
What did Charlie do with the gun taken from Gamboa?
A Charlie shot Bacolor, sir.
Q How many times did Charlie shoot Bacolor?
A Two (2) times, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
22

It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. Positive
identification of the accused is entitled to greater weight than the bare denial and explanation by the
accused.
23

24

In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldads self-serving defense of denial and alibi must fail.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. True, the
conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution evidence. Hence, whenthe prosecution evidence has firmly established the guilt of
accused beyondreasonable doubt, conviction is in order.
25

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

Moreover, the positive identification of Fieldad by Badua is corroborated by circumstantial evidence.
A careful examination of the record reveals that the following evidence establish Fieldads active
participation in the conspiracy to kill the jail guards:
1. Badua testified that Fieldad, together with Cornista, grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the
possession of the latters armalite gun, and JO1 Bacolor finally fell when Cornista struck him
at back of the head;
26

2. Badua also testified that after Chan shot JO2 Gamboa, Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun
and usedit to shoot JO1 Bacolor;
27

3. Dr. Constante F. Parayno, the medical doctor who conducted the autopsy on JO1 Bacolor,
testified that because of the abrasions, the shooting of the victim may have been preceded
by a fight between the victim and the shooter;
28

4. JO2 Niturada testified that he saw Fieldad confederating with Leal and Chan by the nipa
hut before heading out the main gate;
29

5. JO Sidayen testified that he saw Fieldad with Leal, Chan and Cornista at the nipa hut but
moments before the gun shots rang;
30

6. P/Insp. Pamfilo Regis testified that he took the paraffin casts of the hands of
Fieldad; and
31

32

7. Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid testified that the paraffin test done on
Fieldads hands was positive for the presence of gun powder nitrates, as contained in her
report. In addition, Fieldad failed to controvert the paraffin evidence. We note that Fieldads
counsel manifested duringtrial that the paraffin casting was performed without the assistance
of counsel, contrary to the right of the accused. However, all the exhibits offered by the
prosecution, including the paraffin casts and test results, wereadmitted in the Order dated 3
March 2000. To be sure, the taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of the accused
against self incrimination. In People v. Gamboa, we held:
33

34

35

36

37

As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under the sixth
assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not
be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to havecompetent and independent
counsel of his own choice. His right against self incrimination is not violated by the taking of the
paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not
when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test
proved positively thathe just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of
the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)
38

Conspiracy in the Killings

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the
accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
39

40

Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before, during and after the attacks on JOs Bacolor,
Jr. and Gamboa disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission of the
felonies. The positive testimony of Badua is corroborated by a web of circumstantial evidence that
points to no other conclusion than that Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail
guards.
Penalty and Damages for Murder
Since treachery qualified the killingsto murder and there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. However, it must be stated
that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court correctly ordered appellant to pay to the heirs
of each deceased the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
however, the amount of exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00. Exemplary
damages are recoverable due to the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery in the commission of the crimes.
41

42

The award of actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection with the funerals of JO2
Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor in the amounts of P47,845.00 and P87,349.45, respectively, are
supported by receipts and are in order.

The trial court awarded the amounts of P153,028.00 and P178,500.00 to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa
and JO1 Bacolor, respectively, for loss of earning capacity, applying the formula
Net earning capacity =

{2/3 x [80 age at the time of death] x [gross

annual income reasonable and necessary living
expenses]}
43

However, instead of using the annual income, the trial court computed the net earning capacity using
the monthlyincome. Hence, we multiply the amounts by twelve in order to arrive at the amounts
of P1,836,336.00 for JO2 Gamboa and P2,142,000.00 for JO1 Bacolor.
Elements of Carnapping
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. The
elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the
offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than
the offender himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
44

45

All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded
the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, BenjaminBauzon, testified that he
did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.
Appellants argue that the testimony of the vehicle owner, Benjamin Bauzon, cannot be considered
for being hearsay because he was merely informed that his Tamaraw jeep was missing.
Appellants argument is misplaced. Bauzon had personal knowledge that when he arrived home, his
Tamaraw jeep was no longer at the place where he parked it, and that he had to retrieve it from
Bactad:
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
When you arrived in your house where a tamaraw jeep was parked what did you do?
A The tamaraw is no longer there, sir.
xxxx
COURT
What is the description of your tamaraw?
A Old fashioned tamaraw, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
What is the color of your tamaraw jeep?

A Red, sir.
Q Plate number?
A CDY 255, sir.
Q In whose name was that tamaraw jeep registered?
A In my name, sir.
Q What did you do when you learned that your tamaraw jeep was in Bactad?
A Somebody told me that the tank was emptied so I went to buy gas and then I went to Bactad, sir.
COURT
Did you leave the key?
A Yes, sir, at the ignition.
Q Is it visible?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
COURT
Did you find your tamaraw jeep at Bactad?
A Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
46

As for intent to gain, we held in People v. Bustinera:

47

Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain"
is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may
be derived orexpected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was
taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.
48

Defense of Uncontrollable Fear

To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants claim that Leal forced them to take the
Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. For such defense to
prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such
49

a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It is
necessary that the compulsion be of such a character asto leave no opportunity to escape or selfdefense in equal combat.
50

51

52

In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place, Leal was already armed
when Fieldad voluntarilyfollowed him to the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle
stopped three times: to board Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to transfer vehicles. In
addition, according to appellants testimonies, only Leal was armed. The following discussion of the
Court ofAppeals is quoted with approval:
x x x. Considering, however, that there were five of them who boarded the Tamaraw jeep, they could
have easily overpowered Leal, who was then alone, had they wanted to. Thus, there could not have
been any appreciable imminent danger to their lives. In fact, they had every opportunity to escape
individually. Bynot availing of this chance to escape, accused-appellants allegation of fear or duress
becomes untenable.
53

To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstance. The circumstances under which appellants participated in the
commission of the carnapping would notjustify in any way their claim that they acted under an
uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish the
fact that appellants, in their flight from jail, consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take
the Tamaraw jeep without the consent of its owner.
54

Penalty and Damages for Carnapping

The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539:
SECTION 14.Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen
years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight
months and not more than seventeen years and four months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose maximum term shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term not be less than the minimum
prescribed. Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court of imprisonment from fourteen years and
eight months to sixteen years and two months is in order.
55

The trial court awarded nominal damages in the amount of P15,000.00 and moral damages in the
amount ofP25,000.00 to the owner of the vehicle.
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be
adjudicated. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury.
56

57

58

The trial court's award of nominal damages is in order. However, we delete the award of moral
damages since there was no showing that Benjamin Bauzon experienced any physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, or any similar injury.
1wphi1

Finally, in addition to the damages awarded in the murder cases and in the carnapping case, we also
impose on all the amounts of damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
59

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. The Decision dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943, affirming with modification the 3 November 2008 Joint
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. Fieldad is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054;
2. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased
to P30,000.00; 3. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is
increased to P30,000.00; 4. The amount of Pl 53,028.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded
to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased to P1,836,336.00;
5. The amount of Pl 78,500.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded to the heirs of JO1
Bacolor in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is increased to P2,142,000.00;
6. The award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. U-10055 is deleted; and
7. Interest is imposed on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014
ARIEL T. LIM, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 30, 2009, and its Resolution 2 dated January 4, 2010. The CA affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), convicting petitioner of one (1) count of violation of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
Records reveal that petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and 0013814, dated June 30,
1998 and July 15, 1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) for each check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie Castor (Castor) as his campaign donation to
the latter's candidacy in the elections of 1998. It was Castor who ordered the delivery of printing materials
and used petitioner's checks to pay for the same. Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too
late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the two checks. Thus, the checks were
dishonored by the bank because of said order and during trial, when the bank officer was presented on the
witness stand, he admitted that said checks were drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). Private
complainant Magna B. Badiee sent two demand letters to petitioner, dated My 20, 1998 and July 23, 1998
and, subsequently, private complainant filed a complaint against petitioner before the Office of the
Prosecutor. After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters, and after receiving
the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement check dated September 8,
1998 in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee
was able to encash said replacement check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after petitioner had paid the amount of the bounced
checks, two Informations were filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), to
wit:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

CRIMINAL CASE No. 327138-CR

INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P. Big. 22 committed as follows:

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila. Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply on account
or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013814 dated July 15, 1998, payable to Cash in the amount
of PI 00,000.00 said accused knowing fully well that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED," but the same would have been dishonored for insufficient
funds had not the accused, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused,
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the amount of the said check or
to make arrangement for payment in full of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3

CRIMINAL CASE No. 327139 - CR

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.R Big. 22 committed as follows:

chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply on account
or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013813 dated June 30, 1998 payable to Cash in the amount
of PI 00,000.00 said accused knowing fully well that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED," but the same would have been dishonored for insufficient
funds had not the accused, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused,
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the amount of the said check or

to make arrangement for payment in full of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On September 12, 2006, the MeTC promulgated its Decision finding petitioner guilty of two (2) counts of
violation of B.P. Big. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), and on July 20,
2007, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

WHEREFORE, this court therefore modifies the lower court decision with respect to criminal case no. 327138
(07-249931), because the lower court of Manila has no jurisdiction to try and decide cases where the
essential ingredients of the crime charged happened in Quezon City. The decision of the lower court with
respect to criminal case no. 327138 (07-249931) is ordered vacated and set aside for lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court findings that accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of BP 22 with
respect to criminal case no. 07-24992 is affirmed and is ordered to pay a fine of P100,000.00 plus costs. No
findings as to civil liability because the court agrees with the lower court that the check was paid, is affirmed
and there is no cogent reason to disturb the same. In case of failure to pay fine, the accused shall undergo
subsidiary imprisonment of not more than six (6) months.
SO ORDERED.5
A petition for review was then filed with the Court of Appeals, and on June 30, 2009, the CA promulgated its
Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied per Resolution dated January 4, 2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits that jurisprudence dictates the dismissal of the criminal
case against him on the ground that he has fully paid the amount of the dishonored checks even before the
Informations against him were filed in court. Petitioner mainly relies on Griffith v. Court of Appeals.6 The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) likewise recommends the acquittal of petitioner, opining that Griffith7 is
applicable to the present case.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
In Griffith, the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the fact that two years before the filing of the
Information for violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused had, in effect, paid the complainant an amount greater
than the value of the bounced checks. The CA held that the factual circumstances inGriffith are dissimilar
from those in the present case. The Court disagrees with such conclusion.
The CA found Griffith inapplicable to the present case, because the checks subject of this case are personal
checks, while the check involved in Griffith was a corporate check and, hence, some confusion or
miscommunication could easily occur between the signatories of the check and the corporate treasurer.
Although the factual circumstances in the present case are not exactly the same as those in Griffith, it
should be noted that the same kind of confusion giving rise to petitioner's mistake very well existed in the
present case. Here, the check was issued by petitioner merely as a campaign contribution to Castor's
candidacy. As found by the trial court, it was Castor who instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment"
order for the two checks because the campaign materials, for which the checks were used as payment, were
not delivered on time. Petitioner relied on Castor's word and complied with his instructions, as it was Castor
who was supposed to take delivery of said materials. Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner made the
mistake of readily complying with the instruction to stop payment since he believed Castor's word that there
is no longer any valid reason to pay complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless,
two months after receiving the demand letter from private complainant and just several days after receiving
thesubpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, accused issued a replacement check which was successfully
encashed by private complainant.
The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of the checks only after receiving
thesubpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, which supposedly shows that petitioner was motivated to pay
not because he wanted to settle his obligation but because he wanted to avoid prosecution. This reasoning is
tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused therein did not even voluntarily pay the value of the dishonored
checks; rather, the complainant was paid from the proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of the accused's
property. In said case, the Court did not differentiate as to whether payment was made before or after the
complaint had been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor. It only mattered that the amount stated in the

dishonored check had actually been paid before the Information against the accused was filed in court. In
this case, petitioner even voluntarily paid value of the bounced checks. The Court, therefore, sees no
justification for differentiating this case from that of Griffith. Records show that both in Griffith and in this
case, petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored checks before the filing of the Informations in court.
Verily, there is no reason why the same liberality granted to the accused in Griffith should not likewise be
extended to herein petitioner. The precept enunciated in Griffith is herein reiterated, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of
worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal
laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason
for the law. Ratione cessat lex, el cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not
the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case
where a debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The
creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment
of rentals, viaauction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under
B.P. 22 two years after said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been
effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this
petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for
violation of B.P. 22. x x x8(Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International Bank,9 the foregoing principle
articulated in Griffith was the precedent cited to justify the acquittal of the accused in said case. Therein,
the Court enumerated the elements for violation of B.P. Big. 22 being "(1) The accused makes, draws or
issues a check to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he
or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."10 To facilitate proving the second element, the law created
a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit, which is established when it is
shown that the drawer of the check was notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter,
failed to fully pay the amount of the check or make arrangements for its full payment. If the check, however,
is made good or the drawer pays the value of the check within the five-day period, then the presumption is
rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential elements of the violation is no longer present and the drawer may
no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22. Said payment within the period prescribed by the law is a complete
defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day grace period would
exculpate the accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further elaborated in
Tan:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that were the creditor had collected more than a sufficient
amount to cover the value of the checks representing rental arrearages, holding the debtor's president to
answer for a criminal offense under B.P. Big. 22 two years after the said collection is no longer tenable nor
justified by law or equitable considerations. In that case, the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the
grace period but two years prior to the institution of the criminal case, the payment collected from the
proceeds of the foreclosure and auction sale of the petitioner's impounded properties, with more than a
million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of the petitioner.
cralawre d

xxxx
In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial pound of flesh by receiving and keeping in
possession the four buses - trust properties surrendered by petitioner in about mid 1991 and March
1992 pursuant to Section 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the estimated value of which was "about P6.6 million."
It thus appears that the total amount of the dishonored checks - P1,785,855.75 -, x x x was more than
fully satisfied prior to the transmittal and receipt of the July 9,1992 letter of demand.In keeping with
jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the dishonored checks to have obliterated the
criminal liability of petitioner.
It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the

accused. And since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether the
application of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law. x x x11 (Underscoring
supplied)
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period provided for in
B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned cases show that the Court
acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or offense
are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like
in Griffith and in Tan,12 petitioner should not be penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 are proven to be present. The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the
dishonored check after having received thesubpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have
forestalled the filing of the Information in court. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Big. 22, is the protection
of the credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have
evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been
filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has already
attained the purpose of the law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the information
has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible
conviction for violation of B.P. Big. 22. Since from the commencement of the criminal proceedings in court,
there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every intention to mitigate or totally
alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and compelling
reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well differentiated from cases
where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, where the
fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the check is
merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will
not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the
criminal liability.
In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition of penalties for
violation of B.P. Big. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months before
the filing of Informations with the court. Such a course of action is more in keeping with justice and equity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 30, 2009, in CA-G.R. CR No. 31725, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ariel T. Lim is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 190322

November 26, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
VIRGILIO AMORA y VISCARRA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The qualifying circumstance of treachery does not require that the perpetrator attack his victim from
behind. "Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when une)(pected and on an unarmed victim
who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it."
1

On appeal is the August 28, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03294, which affirmed with modification the February 21, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
2

(RTC), Branch 84, Malolos City, Bulacan. The RTC convicted Virgilio Amora y Viscarra (appellant) of
the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of the victim Romeo Gibaga (Romeo) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P35,000.00 for funerale)
(penses, and P16,770.69 for medical expense.
Factual Antecedents
On November 30, 2004, appellant was charged with murder defined and penalized under Article248
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Pertinent portions of the Information filed against him read:
4

That on or about the 12th day of September 2004, in San Jose Del Monte City, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a deadly weapon and with intent to kill one Romeo Gibaga, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the
said deadly weapon the said Romeo Gibaga, hitting him on the trunk, thereby inflicting upon him
mortal wound[s] which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment on January 18, 2006, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of eyewitnesses Maricris Alidon (Maricris), Anselmo
Benito (Anselmo), and Aurelio Amora (Aurelio). Linda Gibaga (Linda), the wife of the victim Romeo,
and Dr. Felimon C. Porciuncula, Jr. (Dr. Porciuncula), the Medico-Legal officer who conducted the
autopsy on the body of the victim, also testified for the prosecution. Their testimonies are
summarized below.
On September 12, 2004 at around 5:45 p.m., Anselmo, Aurelio, and the victim Romeo were walking
on their way to Sampol Market in San Jose Del Monte City. Maricris and her son were tailing them
about four meters behind. As they were making their way to the market, they saw appellant in his
store located on the right side of the street. Suddenly, appellant rushed towards them and stabbed
Romeo twice - one on the chest and another on the abdomen. They were all caught by surprise due
to the suddenness of the attack. Romeo fell to the ground while appellant quickly ran away from the
scene. Aurelio chased appellant but failed to catch up with him. Maricriswent to Romeos house to
inform his wife Linda about what had just happened.
Upon hearing the news from Maricris, Linda rushedto the scene of the crime but did not find her
husband there as Romeo was already brought by Anselmo to the Sapang Palay District Hospital.
Later on, he was transferred to East Avenue Medical Center where he died after three days. Linda
testified that before Romeo passed away, he told her that appellant was his assailant.
6

Due to Romeos injuries and eventualdeath, Linda spent P16,770.69 for hospital
expenses, P35,000.00 for funeral expenses, and P50,000.00 as expenses for the wake.
Dr. Porciuncula testified that Romeo died due to two fatal stab wounds. The first stab wound
penetrated his chest and pierced his heart while the wound on his abdomen pierced the pancreas

and his small intestines. Both stab wounds appeared to have been caused by a single-bladed
weapon.
7

Version of the Defense

The appellant was the lone witness presented by the defense.He declared on the witness stand that
on September 12, 2004, at around 5:45 p.m., he was working as a construction worker in a site 8 to
9 kilometers away from his residence. On his way home, Nestor Basco, his neighbor, informed him
about a stabbing incident that had just taken place near his home. Upon arriving at his house, his
wife and his parents told him that the stabbing incident took place in front of their store and that the
alleged assailant passed through their yard to the street at the back. The alleged assailant managed
to escape, and the stabbing was wrongly imputed against appellant. On December 9, 2004,
appellant was arrested. He claimed that he does not know Romeo, whom henever met before the
stabbing incident. The only reason he could think of why he is being falsely accused was that he
turned down Anselmos request for P200.00 to buy shabu. This happened when they were having a
drinking spree with Aurelio the day before the stabbing incident. According to appellant, Anselmo got
infuriated by his refusal and threw a bottle of gin at him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 21, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of the crime of murder.
Itfound that the stabbing of Romeo was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as it
was "sudden and unexpected such that [Romeo] was unable to react or defend himself from the
assault of [appellant]"
8

The dispositive part of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the family of the deceased Romeo Gibaga the following
amounts:
1. Php16,770.69 for medical expenses;
2. Php35,000.00 for funeral services; and
3. Php50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC. It held in its August 28,2009
Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 21, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84,
Malolos City is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in that the heirs of the victim are additionally
awarded Php25,000.00 as temperate damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

10

Faulting the Decision of the CA, appellant now appeals to this Court advancing the same issues he
raised before the CA.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant asserts that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
MURDER DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILTBEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
GRANTING ARGUENDOTHAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY.
11

Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Appellant argues that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing the testimony of prosecution witness Aurelio, appellant posits that the eye witnesses could
not have possibly identified the true assailant because it was already 5:45 p.m. and the place where
the stabbing incident occurred was almost shrouded in darkness. Appellant also stresses that
witness Aurelio, by his own statement, was drunk at the time of the incident, thereby impairing his
perception and making his judgment in identifying the assailant unreliable. Because there is
uncertainty as to the identity of the true malefactor, appellant asserts that he is entitled toan
acquittal.
12

We are not persuaded.

The RTC is correct in giving weight and credence tothe testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
viz:
x x x the Court finds the testimonies of the former ([Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio]) straightforward
and credible, hence, [deserving] recognition and respect as truthful account of what actually
transpired during the incident in question. The Court likewise noted the assertions of [Maricris,
Anselmo, and Aurelio] that they are familiar with or know the accused and the victim well since they
are neighbors in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan. The Court therefore does not
doubt [Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio] in identifying the accused as the attacker and assailant of
[Romeo]. Besides, no evidence was offered to show ulterior motive on the part of [Maricris, Anselmo,
and Aurelio] to testify falsely against the accused.
13

It bears stressing that the RTC Decision finding appellant guilty of the charge was not based solely
on the testimony of Aurelio. Two other eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant as the person
who stabbed Romeo. Anselmo and Maricris were consistent in their testimonies identifying appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime. Excerpts of their testimonies are reproduced below:
[FISCAL ROQUE:]
Q: You said that you were walking together with Aurelio Amora and Romeo Gibaga. [W]hile
you were walking, what happened if any?
[ANSELMO BENITO:]
A: Romeo Gibaga was suddenly stabbed, sir.
Q: In relation to you, where was this Romeo Gibaga before he was stabbed?
A: He was at myleft side, sir.
Q: How about this Aurelio Amora, where was he?
A: Aurelio was at my right side, sir.
Q: While this Aurelio Amora was on your right and this Romeo Gibaga on your left, you
mentioned that somebody came and stabbed this Romeo Gibaga[. W]ere you able to see or
notice where this assailant came from before he stabbed Romeo Gibaga?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: He came from behind, sir.
xxxx
Q: Considering your position, are you in a position to tell us whether this Romeo Gibaga
actually saw the assailant before he was stabbed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do?
A: None, sir.
Q: Why was he not able to react before he was stabbed?
A: Because he was not aware, sir.

Q: Mr. Witness[,] you mentioned that you were able to see this person who stabbed Romeo
Gibaga[. I]f he is now present, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly look around and point him out?
THE INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a person x x x wearing a detainees t-shirt who identified himself as
Virgilio Amora.
Q: And you mentioned that Romeo Gibaga was stabbed by this accused whom you [have
just] identified[. W]ere you able to see the weapon that was used in stabbing Romeo
Gibaga?
A: No, sir.

14

xxxx
[FISCAL ROQUE :]
Q: And while you were there going toSampol Market, do you still recall x x x any unusual
incident that transpired?
[MARICRIS ALIDON:]
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was this unusual incident, Madam witness?
A: The stabbing incident thathappened to Romeo Gibaga, sir.
Q: And were you able to see who stabbed him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was he?
A: Virgilio Amora, sir.
Q: If he is present today, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly look around and point him out?
THE INTERPRETER:

The witness pointed to a person who identified himself as Virgilio Amora.

15

It is clear that the witnesses have properly identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Astestified to by the witnesses and correctly ruled by the RTC and the CA, he was the person who
attacked, stabbed and killed Romeo.
Appellant tried to impeach the testimonies of Anselmo and Aurelio claiming that their motive for
falsely testifying against him was because of his refusal to give them money for shabu.
The Court finds that appellants assertion is a mere speculation that deserves scant consideration.
His explanation is neither supported by evidentiary proof nor buttressed by established facts. We
have consistently ruled that positive identification by credible witnesses prevails over self-serving
statements of the accused. Such statements cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over
affirmative declarations of eyewitnesses.
Finally, appellant claims that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was working at a
construction site 8 to 9 kilometers away from the scene of the crime. He argues that it was thus
impossible for him to be the person who stabbed and killed Romeo.
Appellants defenses of denial and alibi must likewise fail.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, "the accused must prove(a) that he was present at another place
at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him tobe at
the scene of the crime" during its commission. "Physical impossibility refers to distance and the
facility of access between the situs criminisand the location of the accused when the crime was
committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically
present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed."
16

17

In this case, the appellant failed to satisfy these requirements. While a distance of 8 to 9 kilometersis
quite far, appellant was not able to satisfactorily substantiate his claims regarding his whereabouts.
Aside from his own testimony, appellant did not bother to present the testimony of other witnesses or
any other proof to support his defense. Since he claimed that his parents and wife saw the stabbing
incident and that the assailant allegedly even entered their yard, it is puzzling why he did not present
them as witnesses to bolster his denial.
In any case, eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant to be present at the scene of the crime.
"Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that positive identification prevails over alibi since
the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable."
18

The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC. The rule is well-settled that
factual findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and
utmost respect given that trial courts have firsthand observation of the witnesses demeanor while
testifying in court. We shall not supplant our own interpretation of the witnesses testimonies for that
of the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine the issue of credibility of witnesses.
Moreover, in the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion, and especially
when the CA, asin this case, has affirmed the findings of the trial judge, the assessments and
conclusions of the trial court shall not be overturned.
Treachery

Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC provides that"[t]here is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make." Thus in order for the qualifying circumstance of
treachery to be appreciated, the following requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means,
method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or
retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate,
and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender. "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a
swift,deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim
no chance to resist or escape."
19

In this case, the appellants suddenattack on Romeo amply demonstrates that treachery was
employed in the commission of the crime. The eyewitnesses were all consistent in declaring that the
appellant in such a swift motion stabbed Romeo such that the latter had no opportunityto defend
himself or to fight back. The deliberate swiftness of the attack significantly diminished the risk to
himself that may be caused by the retaliation of the victim.
1wphi1

20

It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of Romeo when he thrust the knife to his torso.
Records show that appellant initially came from behind and then attacked Romeo from the front. In
any event, "[e]ven a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim
who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it," as in this case. Undoubtedly, the RTC
and CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder under Article 248 of the RPC by reason
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
21

Penalties and Awards of Damages

The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetuato death. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
is correct in holding that the appellant must suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the lower of the
two indivisible penalties, by reason of the absence of any aggravating circumstance. "It mustbe
emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346 which states that persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
22

With regard to the award of civil indemnity ex delicto, the same must be increased from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted
without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime. We uphold the CA in awarding
moral damages to the heirs of Romeo in the amount of P50,000.00. "As borne out by human nature
and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish
on the part of the victims family." We likewise award exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00 since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven by the prosecution. When
a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or generic, an award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. The CA however erred in
awarding temperate damages in lieu of actual damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Records show
that the RTC already awarded the heirs of the victim actualdamages consisting of P16,770.69 as
medical expenses andP35,000.00 as funeral expenses. These expenses were fully supported by
receipts.
23

24

25

26

27

Lastly, all damages awarded shall be subject to 6% per annuminterest from the finality of this
Resolution until fully paid, also in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The August 28, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03294, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, finding appellant Virgilio Amora y Viscarra guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuais AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
(1) the appellant is not eligible for parole;
(2) the award of civil liability ex delictois increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;
(3) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga the amount of P30,000.00
as exemplary damages;
(4) the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages is DELETED; and
(5) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga interest at the legal rate of
6% per annumon all the amounts ofdamages awarded, commencing from the date of finality
of this Resolution until fully paid.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014
ROSAL HUBILLA Y CARILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) to
protect the best interest of the child in conflict with the law through measures that will ensure the
observance of international standards of child protection,1 and to apply the principles of restorative justice in
all laws, policies and programs applicable to children in conflict with the law.2The mandate notwithstanding,
the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose the penalty of imprisonment whenever warranted on a child in
conflict with the law.
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Antecedents
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the petitioner with homicide under the
following information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2000-0275 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20,
in Naga City, to wit:
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That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30 P.M., in Barangay Dalupaon, Pasacao, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, and

without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab
one JAYSON ESPINOLA Y BANTA with a knife , inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in his body, thus,
directly causing his death, per Death Certification hereto attached as annex "A" and made an integral part
hereof, to the damage and prejudice of the deceased's heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
Acts Contrary to Law.3
The CA summarized the facts established by the Prosecution and the Defense as follows:

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Alejandro Dequito testified that around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he, together with
his compadre Nicasio, was at the gate of Dalupaon Elementary School watching the graduation ceremony of
the high school students. While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola, herein victim, arrived. Later, however,
appellant approached the victim and stabbed the latter. When asked to demonstrate in open court how the
appellant stabbed the victim, this witness demonstrated that with the appellant's left arm around the neck of
the victim, appellant stabbed the victim using a bladed weapon.
He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his feet and later brought him to the hospital.
Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito's companion at the time of the incident, corroborated the testimony of
Dequito on all material points.
Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was stabbed in front of the [elementary]
school and later brought to the Bicol Medical Center. She stated that her son stayed for more than a month
in the hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later, however, when her son went back to the hospital
for a check-up, it was discovered that her son's stab wound had a complication. Her son was subjected to
another operation, but died the day after.
She, further, stated that the stabbing incident was reported to the police authorities. She, likewise, stated
the amounts she incurred for the wake and burial of her son.
Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the cause of death of the victim, as stated by Dr.
Bichara, his co-admitting physician, was organ failure overwhelming infection. He, further, stated that the
underlined cause of death was a stab wound.
The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of facts in this manner:

chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

He testified that around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he was at the Dalupaon High School
campus watching the high school graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking towards the gate of
Dalupaon High School on his way home, he was ganged up by a group of four (4) men.
The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy and fell to the ground. He was not
able to see or even recognize who attacked him, so he proceeded home. Shortly after leaving the campus,
however, he met somebody whom he thought was one of the four men who ganged up on him. He stabbed
the person with the knife he was, then, carrying. When asked why he was in possession of a knife, he stated
that he used it in preparing food for his friend, Richard Candelaria, who was graduating that day. He went
home after the incident.
While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought him to the barangay hall, and later
to the Pasacao PNP. On his way to the town proper, he came to know that the person he stabbed was Jason
Espinola. He felt sad after hearing it.4
Judgment of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as charged, and
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day ofprision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay to the
heirs of the victim P81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and funeral expenses, and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.5
chanrobleslaw

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioner's conviction but modified the penalty and the
civil liability through the decision promulgated on July 19, 2006, 6 disposing thus:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in
Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants (sic) sentence is reduced to six
months and one day to six years of prision correccional as minimum, to six years and one day to twelve
years of prision mayor as maximum.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount of Php
81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil
indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason Espinola. We
affirm in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA promulgated its amended decision on December 7,
2006, decreeing as follows:7
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WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our decision promulgated
on July 16, 2006, which is the subject of the instant motion is, hereby AMENDED such that the judgment
shall now read as follows:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in
Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prison correctional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount of Php
81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil
indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason Espinola. We
affirm in all other respects.
The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Branch 20, for appropriate
action on the application for probation of, herein, appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the CA for not correctly imposing the penalty,
and for not suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to the mandate of
Republic Act No. 9344. In fine, he no longer assails the findings of fact by the lower courts as well as his
conviction, and limits his appeal to the following issues, namely: (1) whether or not the CA imposed the
correct penalty imposable on him taking into consideration the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344,
the Revised Penal Code and Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law); (2) whether or not he was entitled
to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence under Republic Act No. 9344; and (3) whether or
not imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and other
international agreements.
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Ruling of the Court

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. Considering
that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four
months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000, 8 such minority was a
privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.9
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Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the

penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six months and
one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its medium period eight years and one day to 10 years -was proper because there were no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day
of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for
probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioner's insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No.
9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the
Court to deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding principles in the
trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46
(2), in conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be
limited to the minimum.11 Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the CA imposed the
ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide under theIndeterminate Sentence Law. On its
part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower
the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968, 12 which disqualifies from probation an offender
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not
qualify for probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to remand the case to the trial court
to determine if he was qualified for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with
the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years
of age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
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Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. -If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence,
the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide by the
RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.
Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a child in
conflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements.
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of children in
conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on
children in conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty;
imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the
imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and
(b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby, the trial and
appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of
imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him
to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment
was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements13 supports the course of action taken herein. The United

Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines), 14 the United
Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations
Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty15 are consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is
a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period.
Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence,
may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, in a manner consistent with the offender child's best interest. Such service of sentence will be
in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended decision
promulgated on December 7, 2006 in C.A.- G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the order to remand the
judgment to the trial court for implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to commit the
petitioner for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other training facilities under its control,
supervision and management, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 205144, November 26, 2014

MARGIE BALERTA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The instant petition for review on certiorari1 assails the Decision2 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on
October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00693 affirming, albeit with modification as to the penalty imposed, the
Decision3 dated November 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66, in
Criminal Case No. 99-1103, convicting Margie Balerta (petitioner) of Estafa.
chanrobleslaw

Antecedents
The Information, dated October 27, 1999, filed against the petitioner before the RTC partially reads as
follows:
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That on or about May 31, 1999 until June 17, 1999, in the Municipality of Balasan, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then an
employee/cashier of Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BABMPC)[,] was in[-]charge
of collecting and keeping the collections turned over to her by the collectors of the cooperative [and of]
account[ing] for and deposit[ing] the collected amount to the depository bank which is the Balasan Rural
Bank, Balasan, Iloilo, but said accused, far from complying with her obligation, with unfaithfulness and/or
abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to her personal use and benefit the total collection of One Hundred Eighty[-]Five Thousand Five
Hundred Eighty[-]Four Pesos and 06/100 (P185,584.06) Philippine Currency and despite repeated demands,
the said accused failed and still fails, to liquidate or render formal accounting of her collections or return the
aforesaid amount to the Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative, to its damage and
prejudice in the aforesaid amount of ?185,584.06.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During arraignment, the petitioner entered a not guilty plea. 5 Pre-trial then ensued. The parties stipulated
on the following: (a) the identity and existence of Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(BABMPC); (b) the identity of the petitioner and her position as a cashier in BABMPC; (c) the petitioner
cannot withdraw from the bank account of [BABMPC] alone; and (d) the criminal complaint against the
petitioner was filed on the basis of the findings of an internal auditor and not of an independent
accountant.6
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Version of the Prosecution

During the pre-trial, the prosecution manifested that BABMPCs Manager, Napoleon Timonera (Timonera),
and Internal Auditor, Ruben Ambros (Ambros), would take the witness stand. Timonera would testify on the
function of BABMPC and the duties of the petitioner, while Ambros testimony would revolve on the facts and
circumstances leading to the filing of the complaint. The prosecution intended to offer before the RTC no
other documentary evidence except the affidavits of Timonera and Ambros. 7
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In the course of the trial, only Timonera appeared to testify. When the proceedings before the RTC was
concluded, both the prosecution and the defense did not formally offer any documentary evidence. 8
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In Timoneras testimony, he stated that BABMPC is registered with the Cooperative Development Authority
and is engaged in micro-lending, trading and equipment rental. 9 At the time he took the witness stand,
Timonera was BABMPCs Manager, and he was authorized through a board resolution to represent the
cooperative in pursuing the criminal complaint against the petitioner.10
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According to Timonera, the petitioner worked as one of the three cashiers in BABMPC. 11 She used to receive
daily remittances, deposit to the bank, withdraw and issue loans 12 specifically in connection with Care
Philippines account involving an amount of P1,250,000.00. 13 Care Philippines entrusted the sum to BABMPC,
which in turn can release to borrowers loans ranging from P500.00 to P50,000.00. 14
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The petitioner neither resigned nor was terminated from employment, but she stopped reporting for work
from June 19, 1999 onwards after BABMPC discovered discrepancies and fraud in her records. 15 Bank
records showed that there was a variance of ?40.00 indicated in BABMPCs passbook, on one hand, and in
the deposit slip, on the other.16 This prompted BABMPCs bookkeeper, Rose De Asis (De Asis) to request the
Internal Auditor, Ambros, to verify with the bank, which in turn disowned the entries and signatures in the
passbook made and affixed between March 12, 1999 and June 15, 1999. 17 BABMPC also found out from the
bank teller that the petitioner declared the cooperatives passbook as missing since March 1999, hence, a
new one was issued on May 6, 1999.18 The petitioner used the new passbook in making actual transactions
with the bank, but she kept the old passbook, upon which she made falsified entries to prevent BABMPC
from discovering the discrepancies.19 The court asked Timonera how he knew that the signatures in the old
passbook were affixed by the petitioner herself. Timonera replied that it was the petitioner who kept the
passbook,20 and collected, remitted and withdrew money from the bank. 21 BABMPCs bookkeeper, De Asis, on
the other hand, merely controlled the vouchers and the records of the transactions. 22 The petitioner and De
Asis were the two authorized signatories of BABMPC as regards the passbook kept with the bank. 23
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Upon audit, BABMPC found that there was a discrepancy of some P185,000.00, P90,000.00 of which in the
passbook, while the rest of the amount related to the records of the cooperative kept by the petitioner.
When asked by the petitioners counsel about where exactly was the discrepancy shown in the copy of the
banks ledger and pages of a passbook, which were part of BABMPCs records, Timonera answered that he is
not an accountant and Ambros knew more about the matter.24
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Timonera also stated that BABMPC had sent the petitioners three letters, dated June 22, 1999, June 24,
1999 and August 30, 1999. The first letter requested the petitioner to report to the office to explain the
discrepancies. The second letter requested the petitioner to pay BABMPC. The first two letters were brought
to the petitioners house by BABMPCs secretary, Marilyn Mombay (Mombay). Both times, the petitioner was
not at home, and it was Estela Balerta, the formers sister-in-law, who received the letters. The last letter
was sent by mail, but the petitioner refused to receive it as well. 25
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Timonera also testified that without the petitioners presence and permission, the latters table and drawers
were opened through the use of duplicate keys kept by De Asis. The use of the duplicate keys to open each
others office drawers was however a common practice between the petitioner and De Asis. 26
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Version of the Defense

The defense, on its part, offered the testimony of the petitioner.
The petitioner testified that the last day she reported for work as a cashier in BABMPC was on June 17,
1999. Timonera got angry that day when the petitioner reminded him of his cash advances, which were
already equivalent to his salaries for five months. The petitioner emphasized that Timonera had exceeded
the allowable cash advance amount of one month salary.27
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On June 18, 1999, the petitioner suffered from migraine and was advised by her doctor to rest for two
weeks. The day after, Timonera visited the petitioners house, instructed her to rest, and informed her that
she will be notified in case a necessity for her to report for work arises. On June 25, 1999, the petitioner
received a letter requiring her to go to BABMPCs office. She complied with the directive on the same day.
Timonera then presented to the petitioner the result of Ambros audit showing that she incurred a shortage
of P80,000.00. She was not however furnished a copy thereof. The petitioner also protested that the audit
was conducted in her absence, but Timonera informed her that they would just thresh the matter up in
court.28
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The petitioner likewise stated that she can no longer find the receipts, vouchers and books in her drawers
showing the cash advances of Timonera. Her plea for the conduct of an independent audit also fell on deaf
ears.29
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On July 7, 1999, the petitioner proceeded to the Balasan Police Station to report about the forced opening of
her table and drawers which occurred on June 25, 1999. She also informed the police that the amount of
P5,000.00 kept in the drawers was missing. She confronted BABMPC about the missing cash. Ambros
admitted that he and De Asis opened the drawers, but made no mention of any cash found thereon. 30
chanroble slaw

The petitioner alleged that Timonera was ill motivated when he initiated the filing of the criminal complaint
against her. Timonera intended to evade his financial liabilities from BABMPC relative to his cash advances
and the money which he had diverted to other projects in violation of the rules of the cooperative. The
petitioner also suspected that Timonera must have speculated that the former had money as she then had
plans to go abroad.31
chanrobleslaw

Prior to the petitioners reminder to Timonera about the latters cash advances, there was no untoward
incident whatsoever between them. She admitted though that she did not report Timoneras cash advances
to BABMPCs board.32
chanrobleslaw

The petitioner testified that the only shortage she was aware of involved the amount of P1,896.00, which
was reflected in a past monthly audit. To date, the amount remains unsettled. 33
chanrobleslaw

Ruling of the RTC

On November 15, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision, 34 the dispositive portion of which reads:

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WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the [petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
by misappropriation and hereby sentences [the petitioner to] five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, together
with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay [BABMPC] P185,584.06 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.35
The RTCs reasons are quoted below:

chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

According to the [petitioner], the internal audit wherein she has a shortage of P185,584.06 was false.
However, she failed to prove and explain to the Court the exact figure or amount of money she is
accountable of. She failed to cause an audit of her own to show that no shortage was incurred by her. Her
testimony was not corroborated by any witness or other documentary evidence. What she did was simply to
deny her shortage and pointed to [Timonera] as one responsible for the filing of charges against her. But the
[petitioner] alone, being the one keeping the passbook of the cooperative, was able to misrepresent with the
Rural Bank of Balasan that the passbook was lost and thereafter, she secured a new passbook. After she
secured a new passbook, she used both the old passbook and new passbook and falsified the entries in the
old passbook making it appear that the old passbook was presented and transactions were made using the
old passbook with the bank. With this scheme, it is clear that the accused has all the intention to defraud.
For what is the purpose of using the old passbook when it was already cancelled and of no legal use? Worst
is that, by means of falsification, she made false entries in the old passbook to mislead the officers of
[BABMPC] to believe that the money entrusted to her is safely kept, when in truth[,] there were already
shortages.

The Court believes that the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming to point out the [petitioners]
criminal liability to the offense charged.36
Ruling of the CA
The petitioner challenged the above ruling before the CA raising the factual issues of whether or not, as
claimed by BABMPC, she had (a) falsified the entries in the passbook, (b) received collections for remittance
to the bank, (c) misappropriated BABMPCs money, and (d) committed estafa.37
chanroble slaw

On October 31, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which states:

chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 99-1103 with modifications with respect to the
indeterminate penalties imposed. The [petitioner] is hereby sentenced to four (4) years and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay
[BABMPC] the amount of Php185,584.06.
SO ORDERED.38
The CA based its disposition on the following:

chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under subsection 1 (b) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows:
I.

That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;

II.

That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the person who
received it, or a denial on his part that he received it;

III.

That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

IV.

That there be demand for the return of the property.

The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words convert and misappropriate connote
the act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a purpose or
use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for ones own use includes not only conversion to
ones personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. In
proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when
the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an
account of their whereabouts.39
chanroble slaw

All the elements are present in the instant case. Firstly, it was sufficiently proven from the testimonies of
both the prosecution and defense witnesses that the [petitioner] was employed as one of the three cashiers
of the cooperative. From the testimonies, it was established that as a cashier, she was responsible in
handling the specific account of the money loaned by Care Philippines to the cooperative. The money from
Care Philippines was used by the cooperative for micro-lending, that is, lending a small amount of money to
small entrepreneurs from P500.00 to P50,000.00. Being such a cashier, [the petitioners] duties include
receiving daily remittances, making deposits to and withdrawals from the bank, as well as issuing loans. By
receiving the money of the cooperative, [the petitioner] also had the obligation to make delivery of or to
return the same to the cooperative.
Secondly, on the matter of misappropriation, [the petitioner] deplored the conduct of an internal audit in her
absence but she merely denied the shortage of money as shown by the result of the internal audit. [The
petitioner] did not cause an audit of her own to rebut the evidence against her. She did not show any
documentary evidence nor present any witness to support her claims. It is axiomatic that denial is the
weakest form of defense. As held in People v. Magbanua, [i]t is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated

by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which has far less evidentiary
value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
Through the use of the two (2) passbooks, [the petitioner] was able to dispose of the funds of the
cooperative to the latters disadvantage. Moreover, [the petitioner] did not refute the evidence of the private
offended party that she maintained two (2) passbooks. The certification issued by the Assistant Manager of
the rural bank showing that [the petitioner] had declared as lost the old passbook was not contradicted by
the defense at all. In like manner, there was no evidence presented by the defense to controvert the claim
that the [petitioner] falsified the initials of the bank employees every time she records an entry in the old
passbook, either withdrawal or deposit.
Thirdly, it is needless to say that the cooperative was greatly prejudiced by the misappropriation of its funds
and by the denial of [the petitioner] of the shortfall. Considering that the amount loaned by Care Philippines
to the cooperative for its micro-lending project was Php1,250,000.00 and considering further that most of its
clients only borrow from Php500.00 to Php50, 000.00, [the petitioners] shortage of P185, 584.06 is already
a substantial amount that could have been lent to a number of borrowers of the cooperative.
As to the last element pertaining to the demand by the offended party, it has been held that, [i]n a
prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion.
However, failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. Moreover, a query as to the whereabouts of the money, such as the one proven in the
present case, is tantamount to a demand. The prosecution in the case at bar, was able to show thatthe
offended party inquired as to the whereabouts of the shortage amounting to Php185, 584.06. The General
Manager of the cooperative sent letters to the [petitioner] asking her to report to the offices of the
cooperative in order to explain a number of questionable transactions that they have discovered.
In fine, the evidence of the prosecution was able to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that [the
petitioner] committed estafa by misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. With the
evidence on record, We find no convincing reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. 40 (Some citations
omitted, underscoring ours and italics in the original)
Issues
Undaunted, the petitioner assails the above ruling. Restated, the issues she presents for our resolution are
whether or not: (a) she is entitled to an acquittal considering that a cashier possesses no juridical
possession over the funds he or she holds; (b) demand, as an element of the crime ofestafa, had been
proven in the instant case; and (c) her guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 41
chanroble slaw

The petitioner claims that in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court ruled that a cashier cannot be
convicted of estafa if he or she has no juridical possession over the funds held. 43
chanrobleslaw

Further, the element of demand was not established. There was no proof conclusively showing that the three
letters were sent to the petitioner by BABMPC. Assuming they were sent, no ample evidence exists to prove
that they were in fact received by the petitioner.44
chanrobleslaw

More importantly, the prosecution had not discharged the burden of proof required to convict in criminal
cases. First. Timonera admitted that he did not have any personal knowledge about how the petitioner
committed the acts of misappropriation.45Second. The statements of the Internal Auditor, Ambros, were
vital, but he never appeared in court to testify or to shed light on any documents purportedly pointing to the
petitioners liability.46Third. No representatives of the bank testified on the alleged inconsistencies found in
the passbooks.47 Fourth. Even the amount of money claimed to have been misappropriated was not
determined with certainty.48Fifth. In convicting the petitioner, the RTC and the CA primarily relied on the
falsified entries made on the passbooks, but they were not formally offered as evidence, and the prosecution
failed to establish that the petitioner was solely in control of the said passbooks. 49
chanrobleslaw

In its Comment,50 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the petitioner had juridical
possession over the funds, which were lent by Care Philippines to BABMPC. The petitioner received daily
remittances, deposited to and withdrew money from the bank, and issued loans in connection with the said
account. Moreover, while denying having incurred the shortage, she offered no explanation as to how much
money she was accountable for. No other witness corroborated the petitioners claims as well. The petitioner
also failed to refute the existence of the two passbooks. Anent the prejudice caused to BABMPC, the amount
of P185,584.06 was substantial and could have been loaned to a number of borrowers.
chanroble slaw

Ruling of the Court

There is merit in the instant petition.
The petitioner had no juridical
possession over the allegedly
misappropriated funds.
Chua-Burce is instructive anent what constitutes mere material possession, on one hand, and juridical
possession, on the other, for the purpose of determining whether the first element of estafa is present in a
particular case, viz:
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Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element absent. When the
money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1)
in trust or (2) on commission or (3) foradministration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which
gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. In this
case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of
the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank employees.
In People v. Locson, the receiving teller of a bank misappropriated the money received by him for the bank.
He was found liable for qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the possession of the
bank. We explained in Locson that
The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the possession of the
defendant was the possession of the bank. When the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence, removed
the money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there was the taking
or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft.
In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals, a travelling sales agent misappropriated or failed to
return to his principal the proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or authorized to sell. He was,
however, found liable for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and not qualified theft.
In the Guzmancase, we explained the distinction between possession of a bank teller and an agent for
purposes of determining criminal liability
The case cited by the Court of Appeals (People vs. Locson, 57 Phil. 325), in support of its theory that
appellant only had the material possession of the merchandise he was selling for his principal, or their
proceeds, is not in point. In said case, the receiving teller of a bank who misappropriated money received by
him for the bank, was held guilty of qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the
possession of the bank. There is an essential distinction between the possession by a receiving teller of
funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of
merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to
the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and
has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other
hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain money or
goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he
has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault(Article 1915, [N]ew Civil Code; Article
1730, old).51 (Citations omitted, underscoring ours and italics in the original)
In the case at bench, there is no question that the petitioner was handling the funds lent by Care Philippines
to BABMPC. However, she held the funds in behalf of BABMPC. Over the funds, she had mere physical or
material possession, but she held no independent right or title, which she can set up against BABMPC. The
petitioner was nothing more than a mere cash custodian. Hence, the Court finds that juridical possession of
the funds as an element of the crime of estafa by misappropriation is absent in the instant case.
In the prosecution of the crime of
estafa, demand need not be
formal if there exists evidence of
misappropriation. However, in the
instant case, conclusive proofs of
both misappropriation and demand
are wanting.

Fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense must be
established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is the critical and only requisite to
a finding of guilt.52
chanroble slaw

At the outset, it is significant to point out that neither the prosecution nor the defense had made any formal
offer of documentary evidence.53 The two passbooks, ledger, and three demand letters, while mentioned by
Timonera in his testimony, were not formally offered as evidence.
The Court notes too that the contending parties each had only one witness, namely, Timonera, for the
prosecution, and the petitioner, for the defense. Both of their testimonies were therefore without any
corroboration. Considering the absence of formal offers of documentary evidence, the judgments rendered
by the RTC and the CA solely hinged on who was more credible between the two witnesses.
While this Court does not find Timoneras testimony as incredible, by itself alone, it is insufficient to
discharge the burden of proof required for conviction in criminal cases. The petitioner was indicted for
allegedly misappropriating the amount of P185,584.06. However, Timonera failed to state with certainty
where in the records held by the petitioner were the discrepancies shown. Timonera evaded answering the
question by emphasizing that he is not an accountant and that Ambros knew more about the matter.54 Note
too that Timonera admitted it was the petitioner and De Asis who were the two authorized signatories
relative to the funds lent to BABMPC by Care Philippines.55 Hence, the petitioner did not have sole access
over the records and funds. Consequently, the authorship of the falsified entries in the passbook cannot be
attributed with certainty to the petitioner alone. It was thus fatal for the prosecutions cause that Ambros,
De Asis, Mombay and the bank personnel did not take the witness stand especially since documentary
evidence were never formally offered as well.
The RTC and the CA faulted the petitioner for not offering countervailing evidence, including an audit
conducted in her own behalf. Still, it does not justify a conviction to be handed on that ground because the
[c]ourts cannot magnify the weakness of the defense and overlook the prosecutions failure to discharge
the onus probandi.56
chanrobleslaw

Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This, however, cannot be used to
advance the cause of the prosecution as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Moreover, when the
circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is consistent
with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence
must prevail and the court must acquit.57
chanroble slaw

In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.58
chanroble slaw

In the case at bar, however, the paltry evidence for the prosecution, consisting merely of Timoneras
testimony, casts doubts anent the guilt of the petitioner, and does not amply rebut her right to be presumed
innocent of the crime charged.
The acquittal of the accused from
the crime charged does not necessarily
negate the existence of civil liability.
However, in the instant case, the
prosecution had failed as well to present
preponderant evidence from which the
Court can determinately conclude that the
petitioner should pay BABMPC the amount
of P185,584.06.
Eusebio-Calderon v. People59 is instructive anent the effects of the two kinds of acquittal on the civil liability
of the accused, viz:
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In the case of Manantan v. Court of Appeals, we elucidated on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our
law as well as its different effects on the civil liability of the accused. Thus:

x x x. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being
no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted
must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule
111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, x x x. 60 (Citation omitted and underscoring ours)
In the case now under consideration, the Court acquits the petitioner not because she is found absolutely
innocent of the crime charged. The Court acquits merely because reasonable doubt exists anent her guilt.
Hence, the petitioner can still be held civilly liable to BABMPC if preponderant evidence exist to prove the
same.
Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court indicates how preponderance of evidence shall be
determined, viz:
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Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider
the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
(Underscoring ours)
In the instant petition, the prosecution manifested during the pre-trial that Timoneras testimony would
touch on the functions of the BABMPC and the duties of the petitioner.61 During the trial, Timonera made
references to the alleged falsifications and misappropriations committed by the petitioner. However, he
denied specific knowledge of where exactly the falsifications and misappropriations were shown and
recorded.62 This, plus the fact that the prosecution made no formal offer of documentary evidence, leaves
the Court in the dark as to how the petitioners civil liability, if any, shall be determined.
In prcis, the Court finds that Timoneras testimony does not qualify as preponderant evidence from which
the Court can conclude that the petitioner is civilly liable to pay BABMPC the amount of P185,584.06.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00693 is REVERSED. The petitioner, MARGIE BALERTA,
is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The directive of the
Court of Appeals for Margie Balerta to PAY Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative the
amount of P185,584.06 as CIVIL LIABILITY is likewise SET ASIDE for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 194068

July 9, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BENJIE CONSORTE y FRANCO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 27 May 2010 in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01806. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
1

67, Binangonan, Rizal, which found Benjie Consorte y Franco (appellant) guilty of Murder, sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and directed him to indemnify the heirs of Elizabeth
Palmar (Elizabeth) the amounts ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P29,500.00 as actual damages.
The CA, however, modified the judgment of the trial court in that, in addition to actual damages,
appellant was further directed to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of P50,000.00
and P25,000.00, respectively.
The Antecedents
As found by the CA, the facts ofthe case are as follows:
x x x [Appellant] was a former conductor of Elizabeth Palmars jeepney plying [the route of] Antipolo,
Teresa and Morong, Rizal. Sometime in June 2000, Elizabeths residence was robbed and several
personal belongings[,] including cash[,]were taken. Appellant was the only one who had access [to
the] house, aside from [Elizabeths] family. So [Elizabeths] brother x x x tailed appellant and found
outthat the latter pawned her tv [sic] set to Frederic Francisco. She then sued appellant for robbery. x
x x A hearing was scheduled on January 23, 2001, but on the night of January 22, 2001, Elizabeth
was murdered.
On January 22, 2001, Jose Palmar, Elizabeths husband, instructed Rolando Visbe to haul feeds
from Morong, Rizal and deliver them to their piggery in x x x Binangonan, Rizal. Ashe [was driving]
the jeepney, Rolando saw Elizabeth together with her 14-year old daughter Myrna and [her] 3-year
old nephew "Big Boy." They went with him to deliver the feeds to [Binangonan]. On their way back to
Morong, Rolando noticed appellant[,] who was wearing a hat.When they got near him, Rolando
slowed down and asked appellant where he was going. Appellant did not reply. Rolando veered to
the right toavoid hitting appellant. In the process, the jeepney ran over a stone, lost its balance, and
rolled [into] a ditch. While struggling to release the vehicle, Rolando heard a gunshot. He looked
around and saw appellant standing near the jeepneys left rear, holding a handgun. Appellant
immediately fled. He (Rolando) then heard Myrna x x x shouting "Ninong, may dugo si Nanay!" They
rushed Elizabeth to Angono District Hospital. But due to her fatal gunshot wound on the forehead,
she died x x x.
Aneline Mendoza, a resident of Greenpark, Cainta, Rizal, testified that on January 22, 2001, around
8:45 pm while on her way home, a stranger greeted her "magandang gabipo." He was carrying
something wrapped in a black cloth which looked like a gun. She was somewhat frightened so she
let him walk ahead of her. She saw him turn to a corner. Immediately after she entered her house,
she heard a gunshot. She opened her window and saw the stranger, standing by the side of the
jeepney. The [stranger] immediately ran toward the direction of Elizabeths house. She also heard
the driver saying "Putang ina, sinong bumaril?"
2

Appellant was arrested the following day in Morong, Rizal while attending the hearing of the robbery
case against him. He was charged with murder under an Information which reads: That on or about
the night of the 22 nd day of January 2001 in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province ofRizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a deadly weapon (hand gun), withintent to kill and by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
Elizabeth V. Palmar on the vital part of her body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound
which directly caused her death.
3

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. Trial thereafter ensued,
during which, appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed that at around 8 or 9 oclock in
the evening of 22 January 2001, he was at his brothers house in Antipolo. He had dinner with his
brothers family and left at 10 oclock in the evening, after his brother gave him P100.00 as fare. His
sister-in-law corroborated his statement, testifying that appellant was at their house on the
questioned date from 5 to 10 p.m.
The Ruling of the RTC
The trial court found that the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution leaves no doubt that it
was indeed appellant who shot Elizabeth. According to the RTC:
Against the eyewitness testimony who [sic] positively identified the [appellant] as the perpetrator of
the crime, the alibi of the defense will die. x x x
Other than himself[,] the accused presented only two witnesses, her [sic] sister-in-law and the
forensic chemist. As for the testimony of her [sic] sister-in-law, she could not reason out why, the
[appellant] who is gainfully employed as a tricycle driver would beasking for a one hundred peso
fare, just to appear at the hearing [the following day]. Her answers are full of open ends, which give
[her testimony] little credence.
The testimony of the Forensic chemist is also not conclusive. She testified that the [appellant]
testednegative for powder burns. On crossexamination, she testified that the lack or presence of
nitrates in the hands of the [appellant] could be affectedby several factors, like cloth or coverings on
the hand that fired the gun; gun fired at a downward direction; wind velocity; efficiency of the gun;
and finally[,] the kind of gun used[,] whether automatic or pistol.
xxxx
In a line of cases, the rulings on the weight and conclusiveness of [the] presence and absence of
gunpowder in [sic] the hands of the accused is dependent entirely on the evidencepresented [by] the
prosecution as a whole. Absence or lack of trace of gunpowder in [sic] the hands of the apparent
shooter does not necessarily equate that he did not fire a gun. This defense will not defeat what the
two witnesses for the prosecution saw on the night of the shooting.
5

x x x On the element of treachery, the rulings has [sic] been consistent that in order for the court to
appreciate treachery it must be established by the prosecution that the victim did not have any
opportunity to defend themselves (sic), or that the attack was so sudden or immediate that the
victims were in no position to defend or protect themselves.
xxxx
In the case at bar, [appellant] took advantage of the situation when he shot the unsuspecting victim.
The unexpected attack on the victim rendered her unable and unprepared todefend herself by
reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. [The] [f]acts [of this] case show that the victim
[had] her back [to] her assailant when attacked, [and] she was not aware of any danger on her part.
She was likewise cuddling a baby in [sic] her lap when the shot was fired. Clearly[,] she was in no
position to make any defense.

The eyewitness testimony likewise sufficiently established that [appellant] consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack[.] [A]ccused was armed and stealthily performed the
criminal act at nighttime at an unexpected time whilethe victim was defenseless. x x x Add to this
scenario the fact that on January 23, 2005 [sic], the [appellant] and [the] victim will meet at the
Municipal Trial Court hearing for the robbery case filed by the victim. Thisonly shows that the
[appellant] took into consideration these factors[,] hence he was bent on committing the crime on the
day prior to the robbery hearing. [Appellant] therefore has set the time frame within when (sic) to
commit [the] crime, and on the said day x x x he did not resist in perpetrating the crime. There is no
other construction in this picture other that [sic] the fact [that] the shooting was treacherous and well
planned.
6

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that appellants attack on the credibility of prosecution
witnesses Rolando Visbe and Aneline Mendoza has no merit. The CA pointed out that:
x x x Rolando and Aneline never wavered in their respective testimonies regarding appellants
presence in the situs criminis and his possession of the gun before and after the fatal shooting of
Elizabeth Palmar. Although Visbe may have shouted "x x x, sinong bumaril?", it did not mean he did
not recognize appellant. It was simply an instinctive reaction of one who heard a gunshot in the
middle of nowhere and saw his companion fatally wounded. At any rate, Rolando did not ask any
further question when right after the shooting, he saw appellant holding a gun beside the jeepney he
was driving. Rolando saw appellant twice that night and it was not improbable for him to remember
appellant. Precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before his eyes,
Rolando remembered with a high degree of reliability appellants identity.
xxxx
True, Rolando and Aneline did not see appellant actually fire the gun on Elizabeth, but the
circumstances surrounding the incident unerringly point to him as the perpetrator, viz:
First. Appellant had an axe to grind against Elizabeth for filing a robbery case against him. Elizabeth
got murdered the night before the initial hearing of the case;
Second. Rolando saw appellant near the jeepneys left rear, holding a gun, right after he heard a
gunshot;
Third. Right before the incident, Aneline saw appellant holding something in his hand wrapped in a
black cloth, which looked like a gun;
Fourth. Immediately after Aneline entered her house, she heard a gunshot and when she peeped
through the window, she saw appellant standing by the side of the jeepney where Elizabeths lifeless
body was sprawled. Shortly after, Aneline saw appellant running towards the direction of Elizabeths
house. x x x;
Fifth. Notably, appellant himself did not accuse Rolando and Aneline of any [ill] motive to falsely
testify against him and cause his damnation for such a serious crime of murder. Although he claims
their loyalty belonged to the victim and her family, loyalty does not equate with perjury, let alone,
persecution of an innocent peron [sic]. Settled is the rule that when there is no evidence to show any

dubious reason or improper motive why the prosecution witnesses should testify falsely against the
accused or implicate him in a serious offense, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
xxxx
Appellant, nonetheless, claims that the negative result of the paraffin test done on him isproof of his
innocence.
On this score, suffice it to state that the only thing a paraffin test can definitely establish is the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. From this test alone, it cannotestablish that
the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of firearm. x x x
7

The CA likewise concurred with the trial court with respect to its finding on the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. According to the CA, the trial court correctly found that the
two elements of treachery, which are: (1) the employmentof means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious
adoption of the means of execution,are present in this case. In addition to the foregoing, the CA
granted moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Elizabeth, aside from the civil indemnity and
actual damages previously granted by the trial court.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal but modify the award of damages.
Both the CA and the trial court haveexhaustively discussed the merits of the case at bench and
concur on their findings and conclusions. In this connection, it bears repeating that factual findings of
the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Supreme
Court. The rule is that, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored
on such findings are accorded respect, if not, conclusive effect. This specially holds true if such
findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial courts findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court, as in the case at bar, said findings are generally binding upon us. We find no
compelling reason in this case to depart from the general rule.
8

In the first place, appellant relies on alibi for his defense. As invariably held by this Court, however,
alibi is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to
the facility with which it can be concocted. Indeed, denial is an intrinsically weak defense which
must be buttressed withstrong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. For alibi to prosper,
appellantmust prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed but
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminisat the time of its commission. In
the case at bench, the defense failed to present convincing evidence to reinforce appellants denial
and alibi. It is significant to note that the distance between Binangonan (the scene of the crime) and
Antipolo (where appellant claimed hewas at the time of the incident in question) is only about twenty
(20) kilometers.
10

11

12

In People v. Bation, this Court held that there was no physical impossibility for the appellant to be
atthe scene of the crime, considering that appellant was merely twenty-six (26) kilometers away from
said scene. In People v. Ignas, the distance was even much farther:
13

14

x x x the defense admitted that the distance between La Trinidad, Benguet and Kayapa, Nueva
Vizcaya is 79 kilometers, which can be negotiated in 4 or 5 hours. Clearly, it was not physically
impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminisat the time of the killing. Hence, the defense of
alibi must fail.
"Physical impossibility in relation toalibi takes into consideration not only the geographical distance
between the scene of the crime and the place where accused maintains he was, but more
importantly, the accessibility between these points. In this case, the element of physical impossibility
of appellants presence that fateful night at the crime scene has not been established."
15

More importantly, the Court gives even less probative weight to a defense of alibi when it is
corroborated by friends and relatives. One can easily fabricate an alibi and ask friends and relatives
to corroborate it. When a defense witness is a relative of an accused whose defense is alibi, as in
this case, courts have more reason to view such testimony with skepticism.
16

In any case, the positive identification of the appellant by witnesses destroys the defense of
alibi. Alibi warrants the least credibility, or none at all and cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses. Absent any ill motive on the part of
witnesses, their positive identification of the appellantas the perpetrator of the crime prevails over the
defense of denial or alibi.
1wphi1

17

18

Here, two witnesses established appellants presence at the scene of the crime and the fact that he
had, in his possession at that time, a gun. While, as pointed out by the CA, the said witnesses did
not actually see appellant fire the gun at Elizabeth,the circumstances surrounding the incident, as
enumerated by the CA, "unerringly points to him as the perpetrator."
Indeed, no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of the crime. But jurisprudence
tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial
evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the
finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution establishes the
appellantsparticipation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads
to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committedthe imputed crime, the latter should be
convicted. In the case at bar, those circumstances were enumerated by the CA in its decision, as
follows:
19

20

First. Appellant had an axe to grind against Elizabeth for filing a robbery case against him. Elizabeth
got murdered the night before the initial hearing of the case;
Second. Rolando saw appellant near the jeepneys left rear, holding a gun, right after he heard a
gunshot;
Third. Right before the incident, Aneline saw appellant holding something in his hand wrapped in a
black cloth, which looked like a gun;
Fourth. Immediately after Aneline entered her house, she heard a gunshot and when she peeped
through the window, she saw appellant standing by the side of the jeepney where Elizabeths lifeless
body was sprawled. Shortly after, Aneline saw appellant running towards the direction of Elizabeths
house. x x x;

Fifth. Notably, appellant himself did not accuse Rolando and Aneline of any [ill] motive to falsely
testify against him and cause his damnation for such a serious crime of murder. Although he claims
their loyalty belonged to the victim and her family, loyalty does not equate with perjury, let alone,
persecution of an innocent peron [sic]. Settled is the rule that when there is no evidence to show any
dubious reason or improper motive why the prosecution witnesses should testify falsely against the
accused or implicate him in a serious offense, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
"[C]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one
circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All the foregoing
elements were sufficiently established in this case."
21

Anent the amount of damages, we sustain the grant of actual damages in the amount of P29,500.00,
the same being supported by official receipts. We likewise affirm the CAs award of P50,000.00 as
moral damages to the heirs of the victim in addition to civil indemnity. The grant of moral damages is
mandatory in cases of murder and homicide without need of allegation and proof other thanthe death
of the victim.
22

In conformity with current jurisprudence, however, we increase the amount of civil indemnity
from P50,000.00 toP75,000.00. Civil indeminity is given without need of proof other than the fact of
death as a result of the crime and proof of appellants responsibility for it. We also increase the
award of exemplary damages granted by the CA from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 consisted with
prevailing jurisprudence.
23

24

25

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 May 2010 in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
01806 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS (1) that the amount of civil indemnity is
increased from PS0,000.00 to P75,000.00; and (2) that the amount of exemplary damages is
increased from P25,000.00 toP30,000.00. An interest, at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
shall be imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from the date of finality of this judgment
until they are fully paid.
26

SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 207175, November 26, 2014
EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the December 14, 2012
Decision1 and the May 6, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 filed by
Eduardo Magsumbol (Magsumbol), questioning his conviction for Theft.
The Facts
Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino (Magsino), Apolonio Inanoria (Inanoria), and Bonifacio

Ramirez (Ramirez), was charged with the crime of Theft in the Information, dated August 30, 2002, filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55 (RTC) and docketed as Criminal Case No. 20021017. The Information indicting Magsumbol and his co-accused reads:
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That on or about the 1st day of February 2002, at Barangay Kinatihan I, in the Munipality of Candelaria,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with seven (7) John Does whose true names and real
identities are still unknown and whose physical descriptions were not made known by available witnesses,
and who are all still at large, and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and without the consent
of the owner, Menandro Avanzado, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut, take, steal and
carry away with them thirty three (33) coconut trees from the coconut plantation of the said owner, valued
at FORTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P44,400.00), Philippine currency, belonging to said
Menandro Avanzado, to his damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount. 3
Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ernesto Caringal (Caringal), private complainant Engr.
Menandro Avanzado (Menandro), and SPO1 Florentino Manalo (SPO1 Manalo), it appears that at around
11:00 oclock in the morning of February 1, 2002, Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare unregistered
parcel of land located in Candelaria, Quezon, and co-owned by Menandro, saw the four accused, along with
seven others, cutting down the coconut trees on the said property. Later, the men turned the felled trees
into coco lumber. Caringal did not attempt to stop the men from cutting down the coconut trees because he
was outnumbered. Instead, Caringal left the site and proceeded to San Pablo City to inform Menandro about
the incident.
On February 3, 2002, Menandro and Caringal reported the incident to the police. Thereafter, the two,
accompanied by SPO1 Manalo, went to the coconut plantation only to discover that about thirty three (33)
coconut trees (subject trees) had been cut down. The coco lumber were no longer in the area. They took
photographs of the stumps left by the men.
The defense, on the other hand, presented Atanacio Avanzado (Atanacio), accused Ramirez, petitioner
Magsumbol, Barangay Captain Pedro Arguelles (Brgy. Captain Arguelles) and accused Inanoria, to
substantiate its claim of innocence for all the accused.
Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut
trees within the boundary of his property, which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. Atanacio
admitted that he had never set foot on his property for about 20 years already and that he was not present
when the cutting incident happened.
Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on January 28, 2002, Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez,
and Inanoria came to his office seeking permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land of
Atanacio.
All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez and Magsumbol claimed that only the
coconut trees which stood within the land owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut
down on that morning of February 1, 2002. Ramirez added that he was a coco lumber trader and that
Atanacio offered to sell the coconut trees planted on his lot. Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the
felling of the coconut trees but merely supervised the same. He claimed that he did not receive any
remuneration for the service he rendered or a share from the proceeds of the coco lumbers sale. Inanoria
likewise denied participation in the cutting down of the coconut trees but confirmed the presence of
Magsumbol and Magsino at the site to supervise the accomplishment of the work being done thereat.
Inanoria corroborated the narration of Magsumbol and Ramirez that all the felled trees were planted inside
the lot owned by Atanacio. Inanoria intimated that Menandro included him in the complaint for theft due to
his refusal to accede to latters request for him to testify against his co-accused in relation to the present
criminal charge.4
chanroble slaw

Ruling of the RTC

On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision5 stating that the prosecution was able to establish with
certitude the guilt of all the accused for the crime of simple theft. The RTC rejected the defense of denial
invoked by the accused in the face of positive identification by Caringal pointing to them as the perpetrators
of the crime. It did not believe the testimony of Atanacio and even branded him as biased witness on
account of his relationship with accused Magsino and Magsumbol. The trial court adjudged:
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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria,
Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez guilty as charged and applying the Indeterminate sentence law,
the court hereby sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of Prision
Correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
The accused are likewise directed to pay jointly and severally Engr. Menandro Avanzado and the other heirs
of Norberto Avanzado the sum of P13,200.00 representing the value of the 33 coconut trees they have cut
and sold to accused Ramirez.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, the accused appealed from the March 15, 2011 judgment of the RTC before the CA insisting that
the prosecution evidence did not meet the quantum of proof necessary to warrant their conviction of the
crime charged. They posited that the RTC erred in failing to appreciate the lack of criminal intent on their
part to commit the crime of simple theft. They claimed that not a scintilla of evidence was presented to
prove the element of intent to gain.6
chanrobleslaw

Ruling of the CA
In its assailed Decision, dated December 14, 2012, the CA sustained the findings of facts and conclusions of
law by the RTC and upheld the judgment of conviction rendered against the accused. The CA was of the
view, however, that the crime committed in this case would not fall under the general definition of theft
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but rather under paragraph (2) of the same provision
which penalizes theft of damaged property. The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in giving full faith and
credence to the testimony of Caringal who was not shown to have been motivated by any ill will to testify
falsely against the accused. It agreed with the RTC that Atanacios testimony should not be given any
evidentiary weight in view of his relationship with Magsino and Magsumbol, which provided sufficient reason
for him to suppress or pervert the truth. Anent the element of intent to gain, the CA stated that the mere
fact that the accused cut the coconut trees on Menandros land and made them into coco lumber, gave rise
to the presumption that it was done with intent to gain. The fallo reads:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 15, 2011, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants
Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez are sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of tw0 (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day, as maximum; and to pay jointly and severally private complainant Menandro
Avanzado the amount of Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P13,200.00).
SO ORDERED.7
The accused moved for reconsideration of the December 14, 2012 Decision but their motion was denied by
the CA on May 6, 2013.
Issues:
Bewailing his conviction, Magsumbol filed the present petition before this Court and imputes to the CA the
following
ERRORS:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT FOUND
THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 308 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, IN THAT:
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I
NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE COCONUT
TREES THAT WERE CUT WERE BEYOND THE PROPERTY OWNED BY ATANACIO AVANZADO; and
II

MALICE AND INTENT TO GAIN, AS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT, ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE
CASE AT HAND.8
The Courts Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses
deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to
appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. Though it is
true that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. The exception is
observed if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have cast doubt on the guilt of the accused. 9 The said
exception apparently exists in the case at bench.
It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the RPC, while the
elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent. In the
case at bench, petitioner Magsumbol and his co-accused were convicted by the CA of the crime of theft of
damaged property under paragraph (2) of Article 308 of the RPC which provides:
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Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.: xxxx

Theft is likewise committed by:

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1.

xxxxx;

2.

Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove
or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and xxx.
[Emphasis Supplied]

To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft of damaged property, the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property belonging to another and,
thereafter, removed or used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of damaged
property is an intentional felony for which criminal liability attaches only when it is shown that the
malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal intent must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. 10 Was criminal intent substantiated to justify the
conviction of Magsumbol and his co-accused?
It does not so appear in this case.
There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to the land owned by Atanacio. The
prosecution claimed that the thirty three (33) cut coconut trees were planted within the land co-owned by
Menandro. The defense, on the other hand, averred that only the coconut trees found within the land of
Atanacio were felled by Magsumbol and his co-accused. Menandro testified that there were muniments that
delimit the boundaries between the adjacent lots11 while Atanacio claimed that there were none and that x
marks were just etched on the trunk of the trees to delineate the boundary of his land. 12 Apart from the bare
allegations of these witnesses, no concrete and competent evidence was adduced to substantiate their
respective submissions. In view of such conflicting claims and considering the meager evidence on hand, the
Court cannot determine with certainty the owner of the 33 felled coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact
location of the coconut trees negates the presence of the criminal intent to gain.
At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within Menandros land, no malice or
criminal intent could be rightfully attributed to Magsumbol and his co-accused. The RTC and the CA
overlooked one important point in the present case, to wit: Magsumbol and his co-accused went to Barangay
Kinatihan I, Candelaria, Quezon, to cut down the coconut trees belonging to Atanacio upon the latters
instruction.

Such fact was confirmed by Atanacio who narrated that due to financial reversals, he sold all the coconut
trees in his land to Ramirez, a coco lumber trader; that since he could not go to the site due to health
reasons, he authorized Magsumbol and Magsino to cut down his trees and to oversee the gathering of the
felled trees; that he informed Menandro about this and even offered to pay for the damages that he might
have sustained as some of his (Menandros) trees could have been mistakenly cut down in the process; that
Menandro refused his offer of compensation and replied that a case had already been filed against the four
accused; and that he tried to seek an audience again from Menandro, but the latter refused to talk to him
anymore.13
chanrobleslaw

Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted testimony of Atanacio for being
unreliable and considered him a biased witness simply because he is related by affinity to Magsumbol and
Magsino. Family relationship, however, does not by itself render a witness testimony inadmissible or devoid
of evidentiary weight.14 To warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown
that, independently of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that
improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.15
chanroble slaw

The relationship of Atanacio to the accused, per se, does not impair his credibilty. It bears stressing that
while Magsumbol and Magsino are Atanacios brothers-in-law, Menandro is his cousin. Considering that both
the accused and the accuser are Atanacios relatives, and purportedly both have bearing with regard to his
decision, why would then Atanacio support one over the other? The logical explanation could only be that
Atanacio had indeed ordered Magsumbol and Magsino to cut the trees on his land. The Court is convinced
that Atanacio was telling the truth.
If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacios instructions, Magsumbol and his co-accused encroached on
the land co-owned by Menandro, because they missed the undetectable boundary between the two lots, and
cut down some of Menandros trees, such act merely constituted mistake or judgmental error. The following
pronouncement in the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan16 may serve as a guidepost, to wit:
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If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or
criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him. x x x. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act
for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal
mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will
exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in the discharge of duty or
indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of
malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence. 17
chanrobleslaw

[Emphasis supplied]
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his co-accused even sought prior
permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut down the coconut trees which was done openly and during
broad daylight effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies reason that the accused
would still approach the barangay captain if their real intention was to steal the coconut trees of Menandro.
Besides, criminals would usually execute their criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth or strategy
to avoid detection of the commission of a crime or a wrongdoing.
The findings of this Court in this case should not create the mistaken impression that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses should always be looked at with askance. The point is that courts should carefully
scrutinize the prosecution evidence to make sure that no innocent person is condemned. An allegation, or
even a testimony, that an act was done should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done.
Evidence adduced must be closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope to ensure that
conviction only flows from moral certainty that guilt has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied. The prosecution miserably failed to establish proof
beyond reasonable doubt that Magsumbol, together with his co-accused, damaged the property of Menandro
with malice and deliberate intent and then removed the felled coconut trees from the premises.
Hence, we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be
resolved in favor of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14, 2012 Decision and the May 6, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner

Eduardo Magsumbol is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 190349, December 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCASIO DELFIN, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On appeal is the January 27, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00077,
which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16
by (1) finding appellant Francasio Delfin (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple
rape instead of statutory rape in Criminal Case No. N-2130 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and pay the victim AAA3 civil indemnity and moral damages at P75,000.00 each;
and, (2) acquitting him of statutory rape in Criminal Case No. N-2131.
Factual Antecedents
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations of statutory rape, the accusatory portions of which
read:
Crim. Case No. N-2130
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That on or about the 27th day of May, 2001, between 10:00 and 11:00 oclock in the evening, more or less,
in the Municipality of Naval, Biliran Province, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
said accused, with lewd designs, [summoned] AAA, an 11-year old lass on her way to a bakery after
[watching] a video show, through hand signal but as she was about to run, accused picked up a stone so
she approached him[. He then] held her right hand and pulled her towards the second floor of the new
commercial building of Naval, and while thereat, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously slap
her, [take] off her panty as well as his pants and [order] her to lie down on top of cartons, [cover] her
mouth and [succeed] in having carnal knowledge of said AAA, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Crim. Case No. N-2131
That on or about the 30th day of June, 2001, in the evening, in the Municipality of Naval, Biliran Province,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, one AAA, an 11-year old lass, after
watching a billiard game in front of the new municipal building of said municipality went to a jeep parked
near the back of said building, closed its windows and slept thereat but was awakened when herein accused,
who was then carrying a nightstick beamed his flashlight towards her, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously by means of force and intimidation [go] inside the vehicle and there, [take] off her panty
and his short pants and [succeed] in having carnal knowledge [of] the said AAA, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment on December 6, 2001, appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not
guilty to both charges. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
The first rape incident happened on May 27, 2001. At around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., AAA, then an 11-year
old girl, was watching television in a store at the public market in Naval, Biliran. When she went outside the
public market, appellant summoned her. AAA tried to run away, but appellant threatened to shoot her with
a slingshot. She thus approached appellant hesitantly. When already near him, appellant suddenly grabbed
AAAs hand and dragged her to the second floor of a newly-constructed commercial building facing the
public market.

When they were already in a secluded portion, appellant undressed AAA, spread her thighs, and inserted
his penis into her vagina, causing her pain and horror. Once satiated, appellant gave AAA P100.00 and told
her not to tell anyone about the incident or her family will be harmed.
The second rape incident happened during the evening of June 30, 2001. At about 11:00 p.m., AAA was
sleeping inside a jeepney parked outside a billiard hall when appellant focused a flashlight on her face. He
then went inside the jeepney and removed AAAs panty and again raped her by inserting his penis into her
vagina which caused AAA pain.
After having difficulty in urinating and experiencing pain and swelling in her abdomen, AAA told her aunt,
BBB, about the rape incidents and pointed to appellant as her rapist. Suspecting that AAA was suffering
from vaginal infection due to the rape, BBB brought AAA to the hospital. Accordingly, AAA was
examined and the results thereof as stated in the medical certificate 6 issued by Dr. Gabriel P. Edano (Dr.
Edano) on July 5, 2001 are as follows:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
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NAME: AAA
AGE: 11 years old
ADDRESS: x x x, Naval, Biliran
Nature of incident: Allegedly raped by unknown person.
Time of incident: Around 10:00-11:00 p.m.
Date of incident: May 27, 2001
Place of incident: Commercial building, near Land Bank Naval Branch.
Findings: (+) lacerated hymen at 6:00 oclock position.
(+) Corrugated hymen.
Introitus: Nulliparous
= Admits one finger with slight pain.
Vaginal smear result: Negative for the presence of spermatozoa.
Thereafter, AAAs family reported the incident to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Consequently, complaints were filed against appellant.
Version of the Defense
Five witnesses, including the appellant, testified for the defense.
Maximo Ombing (Ombing), a neighbor and friend of appellant, testified that on May 27, 2001, he was at
appellants house from 7:00 in the evening until 12:00 midnight watching television. He further stated that
appellant was with him the whole time and did not leave the house.
Ending Matugas, the owner of the store where AAA allegedly watched television the night she was raped,
claimed that it was not true that AAA stayed at her store to watch movies that night. Aside from the fact
that she does not allow children to watch television in her store late at night, said store was closed at that
time as she was then on her way to Cebu.
Eduardo Borrinaga, the Chief Tanod of Barangay P. Inocentes Garcia, stated that on June 30, 2001, he was
at the billiard hall having a drinking spree from 2:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m. of the following day. However, he
neither saw appellant nor any parked vehicle outside the billiard hall.
Appellant, for his part, denied the rape charges against him. With regard to the first rape incident, he
claimed that he was at home watching television with Ombing up to 12 midnight. Thereafter, he went to
sleep. And as he did not leave the house that night, it was impossible for him to have raped AAA. As to the

second rape incident, appellant averred that he was again at home on the night of June 30, 2001.
Appellant contended that AAAs allegations against him were fabricated. He surmised that AAAs aunt,
CCC, instigated the filing of the charges since he once reported to a police officer that CCC was involved
in illegal drug activities after he saw her and her live-in partner Violeto Oral (Violeto) alias Akid
packing shabu. To bolster his claim, appellant presented the testimony of Police Superintendent Victoriano R.
Naces (P/Supt. Naces), who declared in open court that appellant indeed reported to him such incident
during the first week of May, 2001. Because of appellants report, a surveillance on CCC, Violeto and two
other persons was conducted where it was confirmed that they were indeed involved in illegal drug
activities. However, P/Supt. Naces did not know what happened afterwards since he was relieved from his
post in June 2001.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In a Decision7 dated November 19, 2003, the RTC gave weight and credence to AAAs testimony. Hence, it
declared appellant guilty of two counts of statutory rape, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Francasio Delfin y Suan alias Aying GUILTY
in both Criminal Case No. N-2130 and Criminal Case No. N-2131; hereby imposing upon him the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua for each case.
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The accused shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 in civil indemnity for each rape committed.
SO ORDERED.8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA held that the prosecution was not able to satisfactorily prove that AAA was under 12
years of age at the time of the alleged rape since no independent evidence of her age such as her birth
certificate was presented. It thus concluded that appellant could not be held liable for statutory rape.
However, it noted that in Criminal Case No. N-2130, force, threat and intimidation were properly alleged in
the Information as having attended the commission of the crime 9 and was also duly established by evidence.
In view thereof, the CA held appellant liable for simple rape under par. 1(a), Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). However, the existence of force, threat or intimidation was found wanting with respect to
Criminal Case No. N-2131, thus, appellants acquittal in the said case.
The dispositive portion of the January 27, 2009 Decision 10 of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 19, 2003 of the RTC of Naval, Biliran, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
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In Criminal Case No. N-2130, appellant Francasio Delfin alias Aying, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of RAPE under Article 266-A, 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P75,000.00 as moral damages.
Appellant is ACQUITTED of the charge in Criminal Case No. N-2131 for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this appeal. As earlier mentioned, appellant was acquitted in Crim. Case No. N-2131. Thus, the only
subject of this appeal is his conviction for simple rape in Criminal Case No. N-2130.
When required to file their respective supplemental briefs, 12 both parties manifested that they would just
adopt the briefs they filed with the CA.13 And since the CA had already conceded to appellants argument in
the Brief for Accused-Appellant14 that the prosecution failed to prove that AAA was 11 years old at the time
of the alleged rape, the matters left for this Court to consider, as argued by appellant in the said brief, are
(1) the failure of the prosecution to prove that appellant used force, threat or intimidation in the commission
of the crime of rape; and, (2) the alleged material inconsistencies in AAAs testimony and her ill-motive in
filing the charges.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.

The elements of rape under par. 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC are present in this case.
Under par. 1(a) Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

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1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
xxxx
Pertinently, the elements of rape under [the above-mentioned provision] are the following: (1) that the
offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and, (3) that such act is
accomplished by using force or intimidation15 These elements are present in this case.
AAAs testimony established that appellant, a man, had carnal knowledge of her, a young lass. She
positively identified appellant as the one who raped her. Aside from being clear and straightforward, her
recollection of the material details of her harrowing experience at the hands of the appellant is consistent.
Moreover, the medical findings of Dr. Edano corroborated AAAs testimony as the same showed that her
hymen was lacerated at 6 oclock position. There is sufficient basis, therefore, to conclude that carnal
knowledge in fact took place.
Further, appellant, in committing the crime used force, threat, and intimidation. Per AAAs testimony, she
was forced to approach appellant because he threatened to shoot her with his slingshot. When AAA was
already near the appellant, he suddenly grabbed her and dragged her to the second floor of a commercial
building near the market. He then took off her panty, forcefully laid her down on top of folded cartons,
spread her thighs apart and inserted his penis into her vagina. After ravishing AAA, appellant threatened to
kill her and her family should she tell anyone about the incident. Verily, these satisfy the third element, that
is, that the carnal knowledge was accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation.
In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains appellants conviction for simple rape under par. 1(a), Article
266-A of the RPC.
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA do not detract from the actual fact of rape; Factual findings
of the trial court on the credibility of witness are accorded great weight and respect especially if affirmed by
the CA, as in this case.
In an attempt to discredit his accuser, appellant points to several supposed inconsistencies in AAAs
statements, to wit: (1) AAA stated on separate occasions three different amounts of money, i.e., P40.00,
P20.00, or P100.00, that the appellant allegedly gave her after the first rape incident; and, (2) she first
stated that appellant threatened to hit her with a stone if she would not come near him, yet at another time,
she mentioned that the threat was that he would hit her with a slingshot. Appellant avers that these
inconsistencies render the prosecutions evidence unreliable and insufficient to support a conviction.
The Court is not persuaded.
The CA correctly ruled on this matter when it held:
The alleged inconsistencies on matters relating to the amount that was given to AAA after she was raped
and as to whether it was a stone or a slingshot that was used by appellant to force AAA to go near him
concern only minor and collateral matters. It has been held that where the inconsistency is not an essential
element of the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact
testified to.16
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Indeed, the inconsistencies in AAAs statements are trivial matters that do not involve the essential
elements of the crime. It has been held that inconsistencies on matters of minor details do not detract from
the actual fact of rape.17
Besides, said inconsistencies cannot affect AAAs credibility especially so when the RTC and the CA have
already held that her testimony was straightforward, credible, and spontaneous. The rule is well-settled that
factual findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect
especially if affirmed by the CA. 18 The reason behind this is that trial courts have firsthand account of the
witnesses demeanor and deportment in court during trial. 19 The Court shall not supplant its own

interpretation of the testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine the
issue of credibility20 of witnesses being the one who had face-to-face interaction with the same. [I]n the
absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo, and especially when the
findings of the judge have been adopted and affirmed by the CA, [as in this case,] the factual findings of the
trial court shall not be disturbed.21
There is nothing sufficient to show that AAA was impelled by improper motive in filing the case.
Appellant imputes improper motive on the part of AAA as he surmises that her aunt CCC instigated her
to falsely testify against him. Appellant claims that the accusations of rape were prompted by CCC who
had every reason to instigate the filing of the criminal case since he reported to the police that she was
engaged in illegal drugs.
Contrary to appellants claim, however, CCC appears to have no knowledge of the rape incidents. AAA
testified that prior to the filing of the case, AAA and CCC did not speak with each other. In her crossexamination, AAA was questioned about her aunt CCC, to wit:
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ATTY. VILLORDON:
Q: Do you have an auntie by the name of [CCC]?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Does she know about this rape done to you by Aying?
A: No, Sir.
Q: You did not tell her even [if] she is your [a]untie?
A: I did not tell her.
Q: Have you talk[ed] to [CCC] before you filed these cases?
A: No, Sir.22
Moreover, appellants claim of instigation on the part of CCC is not supported by evidence. While P/Supt.
Naces was presented as witness and testified that appellant indeed made a report about CCCs alleged
involvement in illegal drug activities, there was no showing that prior to the filing of the complaints, CCC
came to know about such fact for her to harbor a grudge against appellant. Also, it was not even known if
CCC was incarcerated due to appellants report. The claim, therefore, that CCC merely instigated AAA
to claim rape against appellant is not worthy of credence. As things stand, no ill-motive can be imputed
upon AAA. It is a settled rule that where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate that the principal
witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that [she] was not so
actuated and [her] testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.23
Penalties
Article 266-B in relation to Article 266-A (1)(a) of the RPC provides that the penalty for simple rape
isreclusion perpetua. There being no qualifying circumstances, the CA is correct in imposing the said penalty.
It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant] shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9346 which states that [p]ersons convicted of offenses punished withreclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.24
With regard to the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, the same is proper and in
consonance with the prevailing policy of the Court. The award of moral damages in the amount of
P75,000.00 must however be reduced to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition,
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is awarded to the victim AAA.25 Prevailing jurisprudence
on simple rape likewise awards exemplary damages in order to set a public example and to protect hapless
individuals from sexual molestation.26
Finally, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.27

WHEREFORE, the January 27, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00077 finding
appellant Francasio Delfin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
(1) appellant Francasio Delfin shall not be eligible for parole;
(2) the award of moral damages is decreased from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00;
(3) appellant Francasio Delfin is ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and,
(4) appellant Francasio Delfin is ORDERED to pay AAA interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%)per
annum on all the amounts of damages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this Resolution until
fully paid.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192232, December 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE ESTALIN PRODENCIADO, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On appeal is the February 4, 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02861
affirming with modification the May 25, 2007 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Criminal Case Nos. 3206-M-2000 to 3209-M-2000 which found appellant Jose Estalin
Prodenciado (Prodenciado) guilty of two counts of Statutory Rape and two counts of Simple Rape.
Factual Antecedents
Prodenciado was charged with two counts each of Statutory Rape and Simple Rape committed against his
own daughter, AAA.3 The Informations for the charges narrate:
Crim. Case No. 3208-M-2000 for Statutory Rape
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That in or about the year 1993, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of threats, force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have
carnal knowledge of his daughter AAA, a girl 8 years of age, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.4
Crim. Case No. 3209-M-2000 for Statutory Rape
That in or about the year 1995, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of threats, force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have
carnal knowledge of his daughter AAA, below 12 years old, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.5
Crim. Case No. 3206-M-2000 for Simple Rape
That on or about the 13th day of August, 2000 at about 11:00 oclock in the morning, in the municipality of
Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
threats, force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of his daughter AAA, a girl 14

years of age, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.6
Crim. Case No. 3207-M-2000 for Simple Rape
That on or about the 13th day of August 2000 at about 11:30 in the morning, in the municipality of Baliuag,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of threats,
force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of his daughter AAA, a girl 14 years
of age, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.7
Upon arraignment, Prodenciado, assisted by counsel, entered separate pleas of not guilty to the crimes
charged.
The Prosecutions Case
As summarized in the Appellees Brief,8 the prosecutions case is premised on the following facts:
AAA was born on December 13, 19859 to common[-]law spouses BBB, a housewife, and Jose E.
Prodenciado (a.k.a. Rommel), a fisherman. The couple has five (5) children[,] with AAA being the eldest.
At the time the rape incidents took place, appellant and AAA resided at Sta. Barbara, Baliuag, Bulacan.
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xxxx
Sometime in 1993[,] at around noon, AAA brought food for appellant at the hut by the river where her
father usually rests after fishing. Suddenly, appellant pulled out a knife, poked it at her and told her to go up
the hut with him. As soon as they reached the hut, appellant removed both their clothes and told AAA to
lie down on the floor. Appellant lowered himself atop AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina.
After satiating his lust, appellant dressed and warned AAA not to tell anybody what happened[,] or else[,]
he would kill her mother. At that time, AAA was only eight (8) years old.
xxxx
The incident was repeated sometime in 1995 when AAA was then [10] years old and was in Grade III.
While appellant was fishing near their place in Sta. Barbara, Baliuag, Bulacan, he told AAA to go with him
to the hut. AAA obeyed and once there, she was instructed to take off her clothes. She was made to lie
down on the floor and while [in] that position, appellant [laid] on top of her. Appellant then inserted his
penis inside her vagina and raped her. There were no other people in the hut that day.
Afterwards, appellant told her to put on her clothes and go home. AAA did as she was told and upon
reaching their house, she prepared to go to school. She did not report the incident to her mother. She could
not recall the exact date when she was raped the second time.
xxxx
On August 13, 2000, appellant repeated his dastardly acts. This time, AAA was sexually violated not once
but twice that same day.
At around 11:00 oclock in the morning, AAA, was doing the laundry by the river while appellant was
sharpening his bolo nearby. Suddenly, appellant, clutching his bolo, approached AAA and dragged her
towards the hut. At that time, the victims mother[,] BBB, who was then cooking by their stove outside the
house about two (2) meters away[,] and two younger siblings saw appellant pulling AAA towards the
house. As appellant climbed the stairs, he warned BBB not to follow them.
Inside the hut, appellant raised AAAs blouse and forcibly took off her shorts and underwear. Appellant
kissed AAAs lips and breasts then mounted her and consummated his bestial desires. After satisfying his
lust, appellant told AAA to dress up and go downstairs. AAA did as she was told and resumed doing her
laundry chores.

A few minutes thereafter, or at around 11:30 oclock that same day, appellant, still holding his bolo, called
AAA and told her to go upstairs again to fix the clothes. AAA obeyed and, once again, she was sexually
ravished by her father.
On both times that AAA went down the hut with appellant, BBB noticed her daughter to be crying. At that
point, BBB suspected that AAA was being sexually abused by appellant. BBB wanted to ask her
daughter what appellant did to her, but she could not since they were constantly being watched by appellant
who was always armed with a bolo.
When Edwin, a neighbor, dropped by their place and talked with appellant, BBB took advantage of the
opportunity and advised AAA to report the incidents to the police.
Subsequently, BBB devised a plan to report the matter to the police authorities. BBB asked appellants
permission to leave the house on the pretext of buying medicines. Before she left, appellant warned her not
to do anything behind his back (walang traiduran). BBB then immediately proceeded to the police station
where she and the police officers plotted appellants arrest.
The following day, appellant was fishing by the river when the policemen arrived. BBB guided the police
towards the river and on their way thereto, she destroyed the fence so that the police would be able to pass
by without being noticed by appellant.
BBB called out [to] her husband and told him to come over as there was a snake. Knowing that BBB was
scared of snakes, appellant rushed to her side. The police immediately closed in on appellant and effected
his arrest.
Thereafter, AAA and BBB executed a complaint and caused the investigation of the rapes committed
against the victim. The victim was referred to the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, Philippine
National Police (PNP) in Malolos, Bulacan. Police Senior Inspector Ivan Richard A. Viray, a Medico-Legal
Officer, performed a physical examination on the victim. His Medico-Legal Report No. MR-146-2000 disclosed
his findings, thus:

GENERAL AND
EXTRAGENITAL:
PHYSICAL BUILT
PHYSICAL STATUS
BREAST[S]
ABDOMEN
PHYSICAL INJURIES

- Light built
- Coherent female subject
Are conical in shape with light brown areola and
- nipples from which no secretion could be pressed
out
- Is flat/soft
No external signs of application of any form of
trauma

GENITAL:
PUBIC HAIR
LABIA MAJORA
LABIA MINORA
HYMEN
POSTERIOR
FOURCHETTE
EXTERNAL VAGINAL

- Scanty growth
- Are full, convex and coaptated
- In between labia majora, pinkish brown in color
Elastic fl[e]shy type with the presence of deep
healed laceration at 2 and 3 oclock positions
- V-shaped or sharp
- Offers strong resistance to the examining index

ORIFICE
VAGINAL CANAL
CERVIX
PERI-URETHRAL &
PERI-VAGINAL
SMEARS

finger
- Narrow with prominent rugosities
- Is firm/close[d]
-

Are negative for spermatozoa and negative for

gram (-) diplococci.

During the trial, [Dr.] Viray elucidated on the procedures he undertook in examining the child and gave his
impressions on his findings, viz: (1) subject is in non-virgin state physically; and (2) there are no external
signs of application of any form of trauma.10
Appellants Defense
As set forth in his Accused-Appellants Brief,11 Prodenciado alleged that he could not have committed the
rape in 1993 as he was then a construction worker with a project in Pulilan, Bulacan and that thenipa hut
where the alleged rape took place was built only in 1994. Anent the alleged rape in 1995, he contended that
AAA and BBB lived with his mother-in-law during that year and that AAA never visited him in
the nipa hut by the river at any time then. With regard the alleged rape on August 13, 2000, Prodenciado
averred that AAA was already working in a factory at that time and she likewise did not pay him any visit
during that period.
Prodenciado asserted that AAA must have been impelled by anger in filing the cases against him as he
used to scold her for accepting suitors at a very young age. There were even occasions that he hit her for
coming home late. However, as AAA later on admitted to him that the suitors were not hers but her
mothers, Prodenciado likewise surmised that his wife wanted to get rid of him so she can live-in with one of
her suitors. In fact, immediately upon his detention, BBB already started living-in with another man.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On May 25, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds [the] accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Statutory Rape thru carnal knowledge on two (2) counts in Crim. Case Nos. 3208-M-2000 and
3209-M-2000, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count (Total:
Two (2) reclusion perpetua).
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The accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P100,000.00 for each
count (Total: P200,000.00).
The Court likewise finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape thru carnal
knowledge on two (2) counts in Crim. Case Nos. 3206-M-2000 and 3207-M-2000, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count (Total: Two (2) reclusion perpetua).
The accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00 for each
count (Total: P100,000.00).
SO ORDERED.12
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA issued the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED but
MODIFIED by reducing the amount of civil liability from P100,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each count in
Criminal Case Nos. 3208-M-2000 and 3209-M-2000, increasing the civil liability from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00 for each count in Criminal Case Nos. 3206-M-2000 and 3207-M-2000; and for appellant to pay
private complainant the sums of P75,000.00 and P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
respectively[,] for each count of rape against her.
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SO ORDERED.13
Issues

Thus, this appeal. Both parties manifested that they were adopting the briefs they filed with the CA. 14Hence,
the Court shall resolve the assigned errors contained in Prodenciados Accused-Appellants Brief, to wit:
I
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THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [PRODENCIADO] GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME[S] CHARGED.15
Our Ruling
We sustain Prodenciados conviction.
AAAs testimony deserves full weight and credence.
In People v. Sanchez,16 we reiterated the guidelines laid down by this Court in addressing the issue of
credibility of witnesses on appeal, viz:
First , the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
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Second , absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTCs assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower courts findings, particularly when no
significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked
or disregarded.
And third , the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. 17
Here, the trial court found AAAs testimony to be credible as it was made in a simple and consistent
manner. Notably, the CA agreed with the RTC on this point and saw no reason to overturn the same. And
upon perusal of the records of this case, this Court likewise sees no reason to depart from the lower courts
assessment of AAAs testimony. Indeed, her statements pertaining to the identity of Prodenciado as her
violator and the perverse acts he visited upon her were straightforward and categorical. Moreover,
[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she
is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact
been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit
to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which
she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity.18
In rape cases, the date of commission is not an essential element of the offense.
Prodenciado, however, makes much of AAAs failure to pinpoint the dates when she was raped. According
to him, this does not only render AAAs credibility suspect, but likewise deprived him of the full opportunity
to defend himself thereby violating his right to due process.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that it is not incumbent upon the victim to establish the date
when she was raped for purposes of convicting the perpetrator. This is because [i]n rape cases, the date of
commission is not an essential element of the offense; what is material is its occurrence,19 which in this
case, was sufficiently established by AAA.
Moreover, Prodenciados assertion that he was deprived of the full opportunity to defend himself by reason of
AAAs failure to disclose when the alleged rapes were committed was raised only during his appeal.
In People v. Aboganda,20 the Court declared that:
[I]f the accused really believed in the allegedly defective information and the prejudice to his rights, he
should have filed a motion for bill of particulars before his arraignment. We, thus, also rule in the instant
case that it is too late for accused-appellant to protest the [unspecified] dates found in the informations
against him.21
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What is telling here instead is that despite his insistence that his right to due process was violated,
Prodenciado entered pleas of not guilty, went on to deny raping AAA and, in the process, even offered a

number of excuses to extricate himself from the consequences of his transgressions.

It is understandable that AAA has no clear memory on when the alleged rapes were committed as she was
still a minor when the incidents occurred and when she took the witness stand to testify against her father.
Yet, despite her age, and as the Court likewise found in the similar case of People v. Dominguez,22 she was
able to narrate the incidents, albeit not exactly with the same coherence as a fully capacitated adult witness
would.23 Thus, just as in the said case, [l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially
when they are relating past incidents of abuse.24
AAAs failure to immediately report the rape incidents does not detract from the fact that they were
committed; neither does AAAs resumption of a normal life after the incidents negate rape.
Prodenciado also finds fault in AAAs failure to report the alleged rape incidents. He avers that if AAA was
indeed sexually abused, she should have wasted no time in reporting the matter to her mother, brothers and
sisters, other relatives and/or to the police considering that she was neither pushed against the wall nor
under Prodenciados watch 24 hours a day.
The Court notes, however, that AAA was able to satisfactorily explain why she kept silent about the rapes
for years and why, even if she had the chance, she did not run away or shout for help. She testified, viz:

Q: x x x [A]ccording to you, appearing on page 5 of the transcript, [o]n

August 13, 2000[,] allegedly the accused in this case raped you at 11:00
in the morning?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you still recall where you proceeded after 11:00 in the morning of
that date?
A: Yes, sir. I just remained there.
Q: You did not go anywhere?
A: [No], sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, you did not leave the house because, according to
you, at 11:30[,] you were again raped, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There is a difference of 30 minutes. Do you want to impress to this
Honorable Court that after the first incident you just stayed there and
waited for the other incident to occur?
A: No, sir, because he did not allow us to proceed to my lolas house, sir.
Q: You made mention of the word us[.] When you mentioned the word
us[,] you were with somebody then and you were not alone?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, on that very date of August 13, 2000[,] you were
with a person name[d] [BBB]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And this [BBB] is your mother

A: Yes, sir.25
xxxx
Q: Do you want to impress before this Honorable Court that the incident
occurred in 1993 and you k[ept] quiet about [it] until the year 2000?
A: Because the accused kept on telling me that if I report the matter he
would kill me and my mother, sir.
Q: Do you want to impress before this Honorable Court that in the year
2000 the accused did not threaten you anymore because you already
went to the police authorities and you were not afraid anymore?
A: He warned me not to report the incident, sir.
Q: But you still reported the same?
A: Yes, sir.26
xxxx
Q: x x x [Y]ou will agree with me when I say that you had all the time to
run away from the hut?
xxxx
A: I was nervous at that time, sir.
xxxx
I was afraid to run, sir.27
xxxx
Q: The only reason why[,] according to you[,] you did not shout in your
answer[,] and I quote [from page] 10, [of the February 21, 2002
transcript], even [if I] shout[,] nobody can hear me, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Nobody can hear you considering the fact that your mother was there?
A: My mother can hear me, sir, but [she] cannot do anything. 28
xxxx
Q: Ms. Witness, x x x you said that when you were raped by your father
your mother was around and you said you did not ask for help because

your mother could not do anything, what do you mean by that?

A: Because (referring to the accused) he was armed with [a] bolo (itak), sir.
Q: Are you afraid of itak?
A: I am afraid baka patayin po ako[,] sir.29
Clearly, AAA did not reveal to anyone what Prodenciado was doing to her out of fear that he might make
good his threats to kill her and her family. Indeed, in one case, we have recognized that [t]he fear of [the
victim] that her father would kill her and the other members of her family, should she report the incident to
her mother or the police, is not so unbelievable nor is it contrary to human experience.30 Besides, the
failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge and does not
detract from the fact that rape was committed.31
Prodenciado also questions the facility whereby AAA was able to resume her life despite the supposed rape
incidents. He avers, viz:
Not only did AAA fail to mention what ought to have been a traumatic experience to her older sister,
brothers and to her mother much earlier than she did, but she had apparently been able to resume her
life, as well as her role as the obedient daughter to the accused-appellant, despite the alleged
rape. Most notable was her revelation during her direct testimony on February 21, 2002, about the alleged
rape that happened in 1995.
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AAA recalled that after she was allegedly sexually molested by the accused, she was in fact sent home, to
which she obeyed and even mustered the courage to go to school after what could have been a
harrowing experience. x x x32 (Emphases supplied)
This hardly convinces. It has been held that different people react differently to different situations and
there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience,33 such as rape. Verily, some victims choose to suffer in silence; while others may be
moved to action out of a need to seek justice for what was done to them. Then there are those who opt not
to dwell on their experience and try to live as though it never happened. To the Courts mind, this is how
AAA tried to cope with the harrowing experience that befell her. Moreover, since she was just a young girl
when all these rapes were committed against her, AAA simply knew no other way of life than what she was
accustomed to.
A medical report is merely corroborative to a claim of rape.
Prodenciado also points out that the result34 of the medical examination done on AAA merely confirms the
fact that she had already engaged in sexual intercourse and this does not necessarily mean that it was with
him.
While it is true that the result of AAAs medical examination only supports the fact that AAA has already
had sexual intercourse and does not by itself establish that it was her father, Prodenciado, with whom she
had sex, this does not divest the results of medical examination of any relevance. InPeople v. Cial35 it was
explained that:
[T]he examining physician was presented to testify only on the fact that he examined the victim
and on the results of such examination. He is thus expected to testify on the nature, extent and
location of the wounds. Dr. Arnulfo Imperial (Dr. Imperial) found, among others, that AAA suffered
hymenal lacerations. This refers to the location and nature of the wounds suffered by the victim. Dr.
Imperial could not be expected to establish the cause of such lacerations with particularity
because he has no personal knowledge of how these hymenal lacerations were inflicted on
AAA. He could only surmise that the lacerations could have been caused by activities like cycling,
horseback riding x x x or the insertion of a hard object into the vagina of the victim x x x such as the
penis.36 (Emphases supplied)
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Clearly, the result of the medical examination and the testimony of the examining physician thereon are
essential to establish only the nature, extent and locations of the wounds and not the cause thereof. Verily,
AAAs medical certificate reveals that she sustained hymenal lacerations. The examining physician, Dr.
Viray, testified as to the location and nature of the same. However, Dr. Viray did not state on the said
medical certificate or in his testimony the exact cause of said lacerations as he has no personal knowledge
as to how they were inflicted on AAA. He could only theorize that they may have been caused by the
insertion of a hard object, such as an erected penis.37 It is only AAA herself who can positively state the
source of her hymenal lacerations. And as shown by the overwhelming evidence for the prosecution, she has

sufficiently demonstrated that it was her own father, Prodenciado, who caused the same when he repeatedly
raped her.
In any case, this Court has already concluded that a medical report is not even material for purposes of
proving rape as it is merely corroborative in character and, thus, can be dispensed with accordingly.38 In
fact, the Court has consistently maintained that:
x x x The medical report is by no means controlling. This Court has repeatedly held that a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape, and no law requires a medical
examination for the successful prosecution thereof. The medical examination of the victim or the
presentation of the medical certificate is not essential to prove the commission of rape as the testimony of
the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. The medical
examination of the victim as well as the medical certificate is merely corroborative in
character.39 (Emphasis supplied)
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Prodenciados defenses of denial and alibi do not deserve credence.

Prodenciado would also have this Court believe that AAA and BBB had an axe to grind against him, thus,
the filing of the rape cases. He claims AAA may have harbored ill-feelings against him for his having hit her
(napagbuhatan ng kamay) a number of times for entertaining suitors at a young age and for coming home
late at night. BBB, on the other hand, wanted him incarcerated as she wanted to live-in with another man.
The Court, however, finds Prodenciados theory not only flimsy but also unsupported by any proof, and, thus,
unworthy of credence.
In People v. Amistoso,40 the Court had the opportunity to discuss that:
Alleged motives of family feuds, resentment, or revenge are not uncommon defenses, and have
never swayed the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a complainant who
remained steadfast throughout her direct and cross-examinations, especially a minor as in this
case.
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Moreover, the Court finds it difficult to believe that a young girl would fabricate a rape charge
against her own father as revenge for previous maltreatment,ruling in People v. Canoy as follows:
We must brush aside as flimsy the appellant[]s insistence that the charges were merely concocted by his
daughter to punish him for bringing in his illegitimate daughters to live with them and for maltreating her. It
is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination of her most
intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity or
even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean the death sentence to
the very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not have been aggrieved. Nor do we believe that
the victim would fabricate a story of rape simply because she wanted to exact revenge against her father,
appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and maltreating her. (Citations omitted.)

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Neither is the Court convinced that BBB would use and manipulate her own daughter, AAA, to wrongfully
accuse Amistoso, her husband and AAAs father, of rape, just to cover-up her alleged affair with another
man. It is unthinkable that a mother would sacrifice her daughter[]s honor to satisfy her grudge, knowing
fully well that such an experience would certainly damage her daughters psyche and mar her entire life. A
mother would not subject her daughter to a public trial with its accompanying stigma on her as the victim of
rape, if said charges were not true. (Emphases supplied)
On the contrary, more telling is the fact that Prodenciado, in his testimony before the trial court, first stated
that he never hit the victim. Later and in an apparent effort to discredit AAA by imputing that she was
unduly resentful of him, he admitted that he hit her several times for returning home late.41
Anent Prodenciados other averments, i.e., that the nipa hut where he allegedly raped AAA in 1993 was
built only in 1994; that in 1995, AAA and BBB lived with the latters mother and the former never visited
him in the hut; and, that AAA was already working at a factory on August 13, 2000 and did not pay him
any visit during the said period, suffice it to say that these are mere allegations without proof. Moreover, it
has been held that the defense of denial is inherently weak and self-serving, especially if uncorroborated. 42
Neither does Prodenciados alibi hold water. In order for the Court to consider the defense of alibi, it must be
shown that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was
committed.43 A perusal of Prodenciados testimony would show that despite his adamant position that he
could not have committed the rape in 1993 as he was then employed as a construction worker in Pulilan,
Bulacan, he was, however, unable to demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been
present at the scene of the crime when the rape incidents occurred. Consequently, Prodenciados defense of

alibi must fail. Moreover, alibi cannot prevail over [AAAs] positive identification of [Prodenciado] as the
perpetrator of the crime.44
Appellant is liable for one count of statutory rape and three counts of qualified rape.
Coming now to the proper designation of the crimes committed, we are mindful of the fact that AAA was
born on December 13, 1985. Thus, she was only 8 years old when she was first raped by her father in 1993;
10 years of age during the second rape which took place in 1995; and 14 years old when the last two rapes
were committed in the year 2000. It must also be pointed out that different laws on rape are applicable to
the rape cases subject of this appeal.
During the commission of the rape in 1993 (first rape), Article 335(3) of the RPC was the prevailing statute
for the crime of rape, viz:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
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1.

By using force or intimidation;

2.

When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3.

When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
As such, the CA was correct in upholding Prodenciados conviction for
statutory rape and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.45 However, in view of Republic Act
No. 934646 (RA 9346), he is not eligible for parole.
For the rape in 1995 (second rape), Article 335 of the RPC as amended by RA 7659 was already the
pertinent law in rape cases. The relevant portions thereof provide:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
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1.

By using force or intimidation;

2.

When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3.

When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx
The death penalty shall x x x be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1.

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim

x x x x47 (Emphases supplied)

Here, the Information for the second rape subject of Criminal Case No. 3209-M-2000 alleges that the rape
was committed by appellant upon his own minor daughter AAA, who was then 10 years old. These were
eventually proved during trial. Thus, it was correct for the trial court to hold Prodenciado liable for rape
under Article 335(3) of the RPC, albeit with the modification that it is qualified by the attendant
circumstances of minority and relationship48 which, as mentioned, were sufficiently alleged in the

Information and ultimately proved by the prosecution in the course of the proceedings below. Accordingly,
and in view of RA 9346,49 we impose upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, in lieu of the death
penalty, without eligibility for parole.
Similarly, in the last two rape cases committed in 2000, the prosecution properly alleged in their
corresponding Informations and duly proved during trial that they were committed through force and
intimidation; that the victim AAA is a minor; and, that appellant as the offender is the victims father.
Hence, the trial court should have also found Prodenciado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape,
not simple rape, under the now prevailing provisions on rape cases which is Article 266-A of the RPC, in
relation to Article 266-B thereof. Pertinent portions of which provide:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
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1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under

any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
xxxx
Article 266-B. Penalty. - x x x
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
As such, his penalty therefor shall also be reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each of the two
counts of qualified rape.
Damages awarded
For the statutory rape committed by Prodenciado against AAA, we affirm the CAs award of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity. However, the award of moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00 while the award of
exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00.
As regards the three counts of qualified rape, AAA is entitled to the following awards: P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count; P100,000.00 as moral damages for each count; and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count.50
Finally, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the February 4, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02861
isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that appellant Jose Estalin Prodenciado is: (1) hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of one count of STATUTORY RAPE and three counts of QUALIFIED RAPE; (2)
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, for the statutory rape and
for each count of qualified rape; (3) ordered to pay the victim AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, in Criminal Case No. 3208M-2000 (statutory rape), and (4) ordered to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as
moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of qualified rape in Criminal Case
Nos. 3209-M-2000, 3206-M-2000 and 3207-M-2000 (qualified rape). Appellant is also ordered to pay
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 206162, December 10, 2014

ALEX M. VALENCERINA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court1 assails the October 11, 2012 Decision2and the
March 1, 2013 Resolution3 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27474, finding petitioner Alex M.
Valencerina (Valencerina), together with Amalio A. Mallari (Mallari), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, which provides as follows:
Sec. 3. - Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
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xxx

xxx

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
The Sandiganbayan found Valencerina, a high-ranking officer of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), guilty of giving unwarranted benefits to Ecobel Land Incorporated (Ecobel) on account of his
participation in the unjustified issuance of GSIS Surety Bond GIF No. 029132 (subject bond) covering the
amount of Ten Million US Dollars (US$10,000,000.00).
The Facts
As culled from the findings of the Sandiganbayan, it appears that sometime in October 1997, Ecobel,
represented by its Chairman and accused Josephine E. Boright (Boright), applied for the issuance of a bond
with GSIS to guarantee the repayment of a loan in the amount of US$10,000,000.00, supposedly obtained
from the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) and allegedly for the construction of a 26-storey
commercial/residential Ecobel Condominium Tower Building.
Boright approached accused Leticia G. Bernardo (Bernardo), the manager of the Suretyship Department of
GSIS for said purpose. Bernardo gave Boright the checklist of requirements. Thereafter, Ecobel submitted
the listed documents, except the loan agreement.
In a meeting held on December 10, 1997, the GSIS Underwriting Committee, chaired by Bernardo,
approved in principle the surety bond application, but subject to analysis and evaluation of the project
and the offered collaterals. It was noted in the same meeting that the collaterals offered were the project
sites in Malate, Manila, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 227727 and in Lipa City under TCT No.
66289.4
On January 16, 1998, the Underwriting Committee refused TCT No. 227727 as collateral on the ground that
it was already the subject of another mortgage. Under the GSIS policy, second mortgages were not allowed.
Ecobel then presented TCT No. 66289 as its collateral.
On January 27, 1998, a memorandum was prepared by Valencerina upon the instructions of accused Mallari,
who was then the Senior Vice-President of the GSIS General Insurance Group. It was addressed to the
President and General Manager of GSIS (PGM) and contained an endorsement of Ecobels bond for
evaluation of the GSIS Investment Committee. It also included Mallaris strong recommendation through a
marginal note with the words Strong reco. Based on info & collateral herein stated.5
On March 10, 1998, the GSIS Investment Committee approved the subject bond. The following day, or on
March 11, 1998, Surety Bond GIF No. 029132, a high-risk bond, was signed by Boright for Ecobel and by
Mallari for the GSIS.

On March 30, 1998, Valencerina certified that the subject bond could be redeemed if Ecobel would default in
paying the loan. The letter reads:
30 March 1998
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To Whom It May Concern:

GSIS G(16)
Re: GIF Bond No.
029132
Bond Amount: US 10,000,000
Issuing Date: 11 March 1998
Maturing Date: 11 March 2000
Bond Principal: Ecobel Land Incorporated
Project
26-Storey Commercial/Residential
Bonded:
Condominium Ecobel Tower Building
This is to advise that the above-captioned surety bond may be redeemed following a default by the Bond
Principal under the procedures set out below (the DRAWING CONDITIONS):
1.

presentation of original surety bond to GSIS at its office in either Manila or London;
together with

2.

presentation of demand for payment stating non-payment in full or in part by the Bond
Principal; and

3.

notification of assignment to GSIS of US Dollar loan obligations of the Bond Principal

Upon receipt of the above documentation via courier, GSIS will confirm the default by the Bond Principal and
will make full payment under the surety bond within ten (10) New York and London Banking days.
(Sgd.)
ALEX M. VALENCERINA
Cc: SVP A. Mallari
xxx.
In another certification, dated January 14, 1999, it was made to appear that the bond was a genuine, valid
and binding obligation of GSIS, to wit:
14 January 1999
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To Whom It May Concern:

GSIS G(16)
Re: GIF Bond No.
029132
Bond Amount: US 10,000,000
Issuing Date: 11 March 1998
Maturing Date: 11 March 2000
Bond Principal: Ecobel Land Incorporated
Project
26-Storey Commercial/Residential
Bonded:

Condominium Ecobel Tower Building

This is to advise that the captioned surety bond is genuine, authentic, valid and binding obligation of GSIS,
and may be transferred to Bear, Sterns (sic) International Ltd. and any of its assignees and Aon Financial
Products, Inc. and any of its assignees within the period commencing at the date above. GSIS has no
counterclaim, defense or right of set-off with respect to the surety bond provided that DRAWING
CONDITIONS have been satisfied.
We confirm that any such transfer requires only written or facsimile notification to GSIS by the then current
obligee and confirmation or approval from GSIS is not required.
(Sgd.)
ALEX M. VALENCERINA
Cc: SVP J. Navarette
xxx.
Eventually, accused Estela J. Edralin (Edralin), as a representative of Ecobel, signed on February 4, 1999 a
Term Loan Agreement with Bear, Stearns International, Ltd. (BSIL). The following month, Ecobel made a
drawdown from the loan in the amount of US$9,307,000.00.
On February 9, 1999, Valencerina approved the Suretyship Departments request for a facultative
reinsurance of the subject bond. On February 12, and 24, 1999, however, he wrote cancellation notices after
he was informed by Atty. Norma M. Saludares (Atty. Saludares) that TCT No. 66289 was spurious.
Meanwhile, Ecobel issued two post-dated checks both dated February 26, 1999, for P12,731,520.00 and
US$330,000.00. The peso check was signed by Boright and paid in the Philippines, while the dollar check
was signed by Edralin and paid in London.
On May 6, 1999, GSIS received a letter from Atty. Fernando U. Campaa (Atty. Campaa) of the GSISLondon Representative Office regarding Escobels premium payment in the amount of US$200,625.00
remitted to the Philippine National Bank (PNB)-London. Finally, on June 20, 1999, the Bond Cancellation
Advice was issued for the reversal of the said premium payment of Escobel.
In a letter, dated March 7, 2000, URSA Minor Limited, the assignee of BSIL, demanded payment from
Ecobel. A notice of failure was sent by Bankers Trust, informing GSIS of Ecobels failure to pay the obligation
which became due on March 9, 2001.
On April 5, 2000, Aon Financial Products, Inc., also a subsequent assignee of BSIL, sent a Notice of Demand
to the then Secretary of Finance, Pardo de Tavera, calling on the guarantee of the Republic of the Philippines
under the subject bond.
Thus, for having participated in, or contributed to the release or issuance of the subject surety bond, an
Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, against Valencerina, along with Campaa, Mallari, Leticia
G. Bernardo, Josephine Edralin Boright, and Estela J. Edralin for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. As
per the Amended Information,6 the allegations were as follows:
That on or about March 11, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused ALEX M. VALENCERINA, being
then the Vice-President, Technical Services Group (TSG) Marketing and Support Services, General Insurance
Group (GIG) of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and therefore a high-ranking
official,FERNANDO U. CAMPAA, Vice-President for International Operations (IO), London Representative
Office (LRO), General Insurance Group, GSIS, and therefore also a high-ranking official, AMALIO A.
MALLARI, then Senior Vice President of the General Insurance Group (GIG), GSIS and Member of the
GSIS-GIG Investment Committee, and likewise a high ranking official and LETICIA G. BERNARDO, then
Department Manager III of the Suretyship Department of the GSIS, and Chairman of the GSIS Underwriting
Committee, Bond Reinsurance Treaty, likewise a high-ranking official, while performing their respective
official functions and taking advantage of the same and/or using such official offices and functions,
conspiring and confederating with private parties JOSEPHINE EDRALIN BORIGHT and ESTELA J.
EDRALIN, Incorporators of, and who acted as Chairperson at different periods, of Escobel Land
Incorporated, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, participate, or contribute to, the release or issuance of Surety Bond GIF NO. 029132 in the
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amount of Ten Million US Dollars (US$ 10,000,000.00), with Escobel Land, Incorporated then chaired and
represented byJosephine Edralin Boright, as the Principal, and Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) as the
supposed Obligee, notwithstanding the legal infirmities and irregularities, as provided by GSIS laws,
guidelines, and policies, that attended its release or issuance, which accused public officials are duty-bound
to know and therefore comply, viz: (1) Absence of counter-bond prior to issuance as underwriting
requirement to protect the interest of GSIS; 2) Absence of sufficient collateral as underwriting safety
requirement, as in fact TCT NO. 227727 had an existing encumbrance; 3) Non-payment of the premium
prior to issuance and approval of the Surety Bond as a mandatory legal and safety requirement; (4)
Issuance of Surety Bond without the prior approval of the GSIS Board of Trustees required for high-risk
bonds regardless of the amount; 5) Absence of a Loan Agreement between the bond principal Ecobel Land
Incorporated and the supposed Obligee, Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB); 6) Issuance of the said Surety
Bond without prior approval from the Central Bank being a foreign-denominated bond; 7) Non-verification of
the collateral/s submitted to ensure non-exposure to risks; AND 8) Insufficient and highly irregular
evaluation of the bond application and its supporting documents, or of the character, capacity and capital of
the applicant, Ecobel Land Incorporated, and subsequently, or almost a year after the issuance of said
Surety Bond, it was discovered that one of two titles submitted as supposed collateral, or TCT No. 66289,
was spurious, which discovery came after an acknowledgment was made relative to the supposed premium
payment of Ecobel Land Incorporated, which premium payment was made almost a year after the issuance
of the Surety Bond, and despite being advised of the cancellation of said Surety Bond, Ecobel Land
Incorporated, then already represented by Estela J. Edralin, with the assistance of herein accused public
officials, was able to obtain an actual drawdown of Ten Million US Dollars (US $10,000,000.00) from Bear
and Stearns International Ltd., and subsequent thereto, despite knowledge of the cancellation of the Surety
Bond and return or disregard of the premium payment earlier made, Fernando U. Campaa of the GSIS
London Representative Office, received from Estela J. Edralin of Escobel Land Incorporated, the premium
payment previously disregarded at the GSIS Manila Office, without the authority or official duty to do so, or
even the consent of GSIS, and despite knowledge that Surety Bond No. 029132 was issued with PVB as
Obligee and not Bears and Stearns International, Ltd., thereby affording unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to Ecobel Land Incorporated and/or herein private accused, resulting [in] extreme prejudice to
the interest of the government and to exposure to injury in the amount of the actual drawdown of Ten
Million US Dollars (US $10,000,000.00)
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The People, through the Office of the Ombudsman, claimed that all the accused caused the Government
injury and/or gave unwarranted benefits to Ecobel when they participated in the issuance of the subject
surety bond, despite the obvious legal infirmities and irregularities which attended the same.
These infirmities include the following:

1) Absence of counter-bond prior to issuance as underwriting requirement

to protect the interest of GSIS;
2) Absence of sufficient collateral as underwriting safety requirement, as in
fact TCT NO. 227727 had an existing encumbrance;
3) Non-payment of the premium prior to issuance and approval of the
Surety Bond as a mandatory and legal requirement;
4) Issuance of the Surety Bond without the prior approval of the GSIS
Board of Trustees required for high-risk bonds regardless of the amount;
5) Absence of a loan agreement between the bond principal Ecobel and the
supposed obligee, Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB);
6) Issuance of the saidsSurety bond without prior approval from the Central

Bank being a foreign-denominated bond;

7) Non-verification of the collateral/s submitted to ensure non-exposure to
risks;
8) Insufficient and highly irregular evaluation of the bond application and its
supporting documents, or of the character, capacity and capital of the
applicant, Ecobel Land Incorporated; and
9) TCT No. 66289, being one of the collaterals, was found to be spurious.
All of those charged pleaded not guilty, except for Boright, who since then, had remained at large.
Eventually, the case against Campaa was dismissed in the Sandiganbayan Resolution, dated August 3,
2003.
After the trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision, finding Valencerina and Mallari guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
(6) years and one (1) month as minimum, up to ten (10) years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification
from holding public office. Bernardo and Edralin were acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Then, a warrant of arrest for accused Boright was issued.
The Sandiganbayan found that from the GSIS Underwriting Committee, the application for the issuance of
the subject bond moved to the office of Valencerina, who then endorsed it for assessment of the GSIS
Investment Committee. It stated that Valencerina must have known that Ecobel could not be given such
bond to guarantee payment of a loan obtained from foreign entities because his position entailed knowledge
of the fact that GSIS could only issue a guarantee payment bond if the government had an interest therein.
Yet, despite this rule and his knowledge that the obligee was not actually PVB, as misrepresented by Ecobel,
but a foreign funder, Valencerina still submitted the application to the PGM for the evaluation of the
Investment Committee. The Sandiganbayan took this as proof of the presence of the element of the offense:
that Valencerina acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in giving
unwarranted benefits in favor of Ecobel.
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan took note of the significant role Valencerina played for Ecobel even after the
bond had been issued. It pointed out his participation in the loan negotiation between Ecobel and BSIL, with
the certifications he himself issued which effectively made the transfer of the bond to an obligee, other than
PVB, possible. It appeared that Boright requested Valencerina and Mallari to issue the certifications which
were needed to facilitate the foreign loan.
Lastly, Valencerinas declaration that the bond was fully secured by collaterals was taken by the
Sandiganbayan against him as he already knew that the said collaterals were defective.
With respect to Mallari, his conviction was premised on the findings by the Sandiganbayan that he strongly
recommended the Ecobel bond application for evaluation notwithstanding its infirmities; that he approved
and subsequently signed the subject bond on behalf of GSIS; and that he knew beforehand that PVB was
not the obligee of the loan as manifested in the correspondence he had with accused Boright, thus,
highlighting his active participation in the negotiation with Bear and Stearns International, Ltd. on the
subject bond.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan disposed:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Accused ALEX M. VALENCERINA and AMALIO A. MALLARI are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and, pursuant to Section 9 thereof, are hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum, up to ten (10) years
as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding office;
2. Accused LETICIA G. BERNARDO and ESTELA J. EDRALIN are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Considering that the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, no civil liability
may be assessed against accused Bernardo and Edralin.
Let the hold-departure order against accused Bernardo and Edralin by reason of this case be lifted and set
aside, and their bonds released, subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedure.
Let a warrant for the arrest of accused Josephine Edralin Boright be issued. Pending her arrest, let this case
be archived.
SO ORDERED.7
Valencerina and Mallari separately moved for reconsideration, but their motions were subsequently denied
by the Sandiganbayan in its March 1, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
GROUNDS
1.

The Sandiganbayan (First Division) has decided questions of substance not heretofore
determined by the Supreme Court; or has decided in a way probably not in accord with law
or with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; or has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings (Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 6), as shown by
the grounds invoked and discussed hereunder,

2.

The conclusions, findings and judgment of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) are
speculative, surmises or conjectures; or based on misapprehension of facts; or the
inferences made are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible and rendered in grave
abuse of discretion or are beyond the issues of the case at bench (Office of the President,
et al. vs. Calimxto R. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, Sept. 14, 2011),

3.

The Court a quo admitted and relied on xerox copies of documentary exhibits, which were
not authenticated by the persons who executed them, and whose originals were not
presented in court by respondent, who failed to provide any valid reason for not presenting
them, in flagrant violation of the best evidence and other rules of evidence.

4.

The court a quo gravely erred in considering and relying on the hearsay testimonies of
witnesses who had no personal knowledge of the contents or due execution and
genuineness of the respondents xerox documentary exhibits or of the facts in issue that
they testified on.

5.

The records are bereft of any evidence, and the court a quo did not find any, that Bear
Stearns International, Ltd., granted a loan of US $10 million to Ecobel Land, Inc. in London.

5.1.
There being no such loan, as corpus delicti of the second mode of
="justify">committing the offense, there was no crime of graft or corrupt
practice under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, by petitioner giving
Ecobel unwarranted benefit, preference or advantage, with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence,
5.2.

There being no evidence that Estela J. Edralin obtained loan from

Bear Stearns, the court a quo grievously erred when It convicted
petitioner for facilitating the inexistent loan with the use of his
alleged two (2) certifications, Exhibits D-14 dated March 30,
1998 and D-17, dated January 14, 1999, that Estela J. Edralin

did not receive as unwarranted benefit, preference or advantage.

6.

Even assuming in arguendo that petitioners alleged two certifications, exhibits D-14
dated March 30, 1998 and D-17, dated January 14, 1999, are admissible evidence, their
issuance alone did not constitute the crime of graft or corrupt practice committed by way of
the second mode of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

6.1. The certifications, which are not even attempted or frustrated acts to
commit the crime, were not valid documents to transfer GSIS Surety
Bond No. G (16) GIF 029132 to Bear Stearns International, Ltd.,
6.2. Absent any evidence that the drawing conditions provided in the two
(2) certifications, Exhibits D-14 and D-17, were fulfilled or complied
therewith, GSIS Surety Bond No. G (16) GIF 29132 was not validly
transferred to Bear Stearns International, Ltd.
7.

Petitioners Memorandum dated January 27, 1998, Exhibit 10-Valencerina, was done in
the performance of his duty as Vice-President for Marketing and Support Services, following
the approval in principle of Ecobels bond application by the Underwriting Committee
headed by Leticia G. Bernardo, who was acquitted by the court a quo , and not because he
was already resigned to Ecobels side,

8.

It was PGM Cesar Sarino, not petitioner, who advanced Ecobels bond application to
INCOM in performance of duties and not because petitioner was already resigned to Ecobel
side to give Ecobel unwarranted benefit, preference or advantage, who was the lone bond
applicant.

9.

The court a quo violated petitioners constitutional rights to be informed of the charge
against him and to due processes of law by finding him guilty of violating Section 3 (E) of
RA 3019 under the second mode, that is, for allegedly giving Ecobel unwarranted benefit,
preference or advantage, with manifest partiality considering that the Amended Information
accused him of committing the offense under the first mode, which is for participating and
contributing to the issuance of the questioned surety bond and causing undue injury to the
government.

9.1.Petitioner was not validly accused or charged for violation of Section 3 of

RA 3019.
9.2.Violation of petitioners constitutional rights to be informed of the
accusation against him and to due process of law.
10. The court a quo erred when it assumed jurisdiction over, in violation of the doctrine of
territoriality of criminal laws, and considered incidents and term loan agreement relative to
the loan for US 10 Million Dollars that Ecobel Land, Inc. would have obtained in London
from Bear Stearns International, Ltd.
11. Respondent failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of giving to
Ecobel unwarranted benefit, preference or advantage, with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence, which is punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. 8
Valencerina insists that the complained act of giving unwarranted benefit, preference or advantage in favor
of Ecobel with manifest impartiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt. He posits that the pieces of evidence, both documentary and testimonial, supporting the

Sandiganbayans judgment of conviction, were hearsay and incompetent, thus, without probative value and
that the Sandiganbayan relied merely on the prosecutions xerox exhibits (referring to the two
certifications), which were not properly identified and authenticated, and, therefore, were not the best
evidence to prove his guilt. He adds that the prosecution witnesses had no personal knowledge of the
contents and due execution of the documents which were relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, including the
incidents, transactions and events on which they testified on.
Valencerina further argues that the memorandum containing his endorsement of the bond application was
issued in the performance of his functions and that the alleged act of giving unwarranted benefits in favor of
Ecobel was not sufficiently proved as he was the one who cancelled the bond upon learning of the
deficiencies in its issuance.
In its Comment,9 the prosecution counters, among others, that when the Sandiganbayan considered and
gave value to the faxed and photocopied documents claimed by Valencerina as hearsay and incompetent, no
mistake was committed inasmuch as all objections raised were duly considered and that no objection was
made during the formal offer of evidence. It cites as reference the ruling of this Court in Interpacific Transit,
Inc. v. Rufo Aviles and Josephine Aviles,10 where it was held that when secondary or incompetent evidence is
presented and accepted without any objection on the part of the other party, the latter is bound thereby and
the court is obliged to grant it the probative value it deserves. Moreover, the prosecution was of the view
that even if the documents were inadmissible in evidence, conviction would still be inevitable as regards the
act of giving undue advantage in favor of Ecobel because testimonial and documentary evidence
overwhelmingly established his participation and [guilt]. As to his claim that the witnesses the prosecution
presented in court had no personal knowledge of the matters testified upon, the prosecution argued that the
testimonies procured were based on the authentic documents these witnesses themselves issued, seen,
collated, gathered, reviewed, evaluated, investigated, and audited by reason of their office.
In his Reply,11 Valencerina reiterates his submissions.
The Court is, thus, called to determine whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding Valencerina guilty of
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Central to the proper determination of the correctness of the Sandiganbayans judgment is the question on
whether the fact of giving undue preference with bad faith or evident partiality to Ecobel was proved beyond
reasonable doubt by the testimonies of the witnesses and the documents presented by the prosecution.
The Courts Ruling
First, it must be emphasized that irregularities did occur in the issuance of the subject bond. These
irregularities were adequately proved by the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense, together
with the documentary evidence presented before the Sandiganbayan that the security bond was issued
without the adequate collaterals; that it was used to guarantee a high-risk foreign loan which was
disqualified for lack of government interest in it; that it was issued without the approval of the Board of
Trustees as required by GSIS for high-risk bonds; that it was issued without the premium for reinsurance
being paid; and that Ecobel received undue benefits as it was able to make a drawdown from the loan by
reason of the guarantee under the subject bond. All these were clearly established by the evidentiary
records. It is also quite clear that the issues surrounding the Ecobel bond had exposed the government to
unwarranted risks, which could have been avoided had steps been taken to consciously follow the policies of
GSIS.
It is in this light that Valencerina was tried. His participation in the issuance of the subject bond was put to
test to determine whether he violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The question, therefore, that remains
is whether he, as found by the Sandiganbayan, had a hand in the act of giving unwarranted benefits to
Ecobel with the issuance of the subject bond. Stated otherwise, did he participate in the giving of undue
benefits to Ecobel with evident bad faith, or manifest partiality, as punishable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, when the bond was issued and used by Ecobel to secure a foreign denominated loan?
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan in finding Valencerina guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 based upon the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution.
In all criminal cases, the prosecution is burdened with the duty of establishing with proof beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of an accused.12 The determination of whether the prosecution has fulfilled such a heavy
burden is left to the trial court, which, in turn, must be satisfied with moral certainty that an accused has

indeed committed the crime on the basis of facts and circumstances to warrant a judgment of
conviction.13 Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, acquittal must then follow.14The premise is that an
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.15
In finding Valencerina guilty of giving undue advantage or preference to Ecobel, in violation of Section 3(e)
of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that the elements of the crime
were duly established. These elements, as enumerated by the Court inBautista v. Sandiganbayan,16 are as
follows:
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(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officers official,
administrative or judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government,or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference.
Being the Vice-President for Marketing and Support Services of GSIS, Valencerina was no doubt a public
officer, and the alleged acts complained of were done while he was in office.
The Court also believes that the third and last constitutive elements were established. The Sandiganbayan
correctly relied on the testimonies of the witnesses, which were based primarily on the January 27, 1998
Memorandum, and the Certifications, dated March 30, 1998 and January 14, 1999, issued by Valencerina
himself. These documents purportedly showed his resignation to favor Ecobel in the issuance of the subject
bond as well as his alleged participation in the negotiation of the loan sought to be guaranteed under the
bond, thus, making him guilty of the offense charged.
The third element of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed in three
ways, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of
these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to
convict.17 The Court expounds:
[As defined], [p]artiality is synonymous with bias which excites a disposition to see and report matters
as they are wished for rather than as they are. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a
breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. Gross
negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with
a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of
that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. 18
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

In this case, Valencerina clearly extended, with evident bad faith, undue advantage to Ecobel in the process
of issuing and negotiating the subject bond. His act of endorsing Ecobels application to the PGM despite his
knowledge that the obligee of the loan was not PVB but a foreign lender, clearly shows his disregard for the
policy of GSIS requiring the existence of governmental interest in the transaction. In the observation of the
GSIS audit team, as it appeared in a report before the Sandiganbayan, PVB was merely used to show that
GSIS has an insurable interest in the loan. The truth, however, is that BSIL was the funder and obligee of
the credit sought to be guaranteed by the bond.
Valencerina admitted that he knew Ecobel would have a foreign funder at the time that he prepared the
memorandum, despite knowing that to guarantee a loan obtained from a foreign funder was contrary to the
policies of GSIS since no government interest was involved in it. The transcript reveals these statements as
follows:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Q
A

And on that basis you have made that statement in this memorandum
and you are telling that to the Court?
Yes, I did, sir.

Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

You are also alleged to have knowledge even at that time that the Ecobel
who applied for payment guarantee bond would have foreign funder, do
you confirm that?
Yes, sir, I was informed by Mr. Mallari about it, sir.
You know for a fact that an official of the GSIS, one requirement in the
issuance of surety bond, you would see to it that there is a government
interest in the transaction, do you remember that?
Yes, sir.
And yet in spite of your knowledge that eventually this bond would have
a foreign funder, you made the endorsement to the President and
General manager of the GSIS?
My information from Mr. Mallari is that the funds would have to be
coursed to the Veterans Bank since the Philippine Veterans Bank is a
government bank, it carries with it insurable interest of the
government.19

In addition, Valencerinas declaration in the same memorandum to the PGM that the bond was fully secured
by collaterals, strengthens the conclusion that he was in bad faith. As correctly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, the collaterals presented by Ecobel appeared to be questionable. TCT No. 227727 had an
existing mortgage while TCT No. 66289 was found to be spurious since it was different from what was on file
with the Registry of Deeds of Lipa City. These circumstances clearly show that Valencerina failed to
thoroughly review Ecobels compliance with GSIS policies before endorsing the application to the PGM. Thus,
his endorsement of Ecobels application was nothing but a conscious doing of a wrong and a breach of his
duty to uphold not only the interest of the GSIS but also of the Republic. It is clearly an indication of bad
faith on his part as he should have realized that his position required the utmost prudence knowing that to
guarantee a high-risk loan was, as the name implied, highly risky on the part of GSIS and could very well
affect the entire membership of the system.
Valencerinas defense that the memorandum was prepared and issued pursuant to the instructions of Mallari,
who was higher in rank, cannot exculpate him from liability. As Vice-President, his duties were not mere
perfunctory in the greater scheme of the process. He knew that GSIS could only issue a guarantee payment
bond if it had an interest in the transaction, and that the bond must be secured by adequate collaterals. Yet,
he still endorsed the Ecobel application which he could have denied at sight. He could have at least made
some remarks as to the propriety of the application in light of his information that a foreign funder was the
obligee of the loan which would violate GSIS policies in the issuance of a high-risk bond, but he did not.
The Court, moreover, notes the finding of the Sandiganbayan that Valencerina also participated in the
negotiations of the loan using the guarantees available under the bond. It appears from the records that
BSIL required Ecobel to verify the authenticity of the signatures in the subject bond. Boright then requested
Mallari to issue certifications containing declarations that he was authorized to sign the subject bond,
including a certification that he was authorized to sign certain letters that were requested apparently
referring to the certifications that Valencerina himself issued on January 14, 1999, together with the first
one he issued on March 30, 1998, both directed to an unnamed addressee. The certifications read as
follows:
30 March 1998
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To Whom It May Concern:

Re: GSIS G(16)

GIF Bond No.
029132

Bond Amount: US 10,000,000

Issuing Date: 11 March 1998
Maturing Date: 11 March 2000
Bond Principal: Ecobel Land Incorporated
Project
26-Storey Commercial/Residential
Bonded:
Condominium Ecobel Tower Building
This is to advise that the above-captioned surety bond may be redeemed following a default by the Bond
Principal under the procedures set out below (the DRAWING CONDITIONS):
1.

presentation of original surety bond to GSIS at its office in either Manila or London;
together with

2.

presentation of demand for payment stating non-payment in full or in part by the Bond
Principal; and

3.

notification of assignment to GSIS of US Dollar loan obligations of the Bond Principal

Upon receipt of the above documentation via courier, GSIS will confirm the default by the Bond Principal and
will make full payment under the surety bond within ten (1) New York and London Banking days.
(Sgd.)
ALEX M. VALENCERINA
Cc: SVP A. Mallari
xxx

xxx

xxx

14 January 1999
To Whom It May Concern:

Re: GSIS G(16)

GIF Bond No.
029132
Bond Amount: US 10,000,000
Issuing Date: 11 March 1998
Maturing Date: 11 March 2000
Bond Principal: Ecobel Land Incorporated
Project
26-Storey Commercial/Residential
Bonded:
Condominium Ecobel Tower Building
This is to advise that the captioned surety bond is genuine, authentic, valid and binding obligation of GSIS,
and may be transferred to Bear, Sterns (sic) International Ltd. and any of its assignees and Aon Financial
Products, Inc. and any of its assignees within the period commencing at the date above. GSIS has no
counterclaim, defense or right of set-off with respect to the surety bond provided that DRAWING
CONDITIONS have been satisfied.
We confirm that any such transfer requires only written or facsimile notification to GSIS by the then current
oblige and confirmation or approval from GSIS is not required.

(Sgd.)
ALEX M. VALENCERINA
Cc: SVP J. Navarette
xxx.
It appears now that without these letters, BSIL would not have approved and granted the loan to Ecobel. It
was even affirmed therein the validity of the obligation of GSIS under the subject bond, despite Valencerina
knowing at that time that the bond had not been secured by adequate collaterals, and that the premium
payment for reinsurance had not been paid. Records show that the said premium was paid only on February
26, 1999, or almost a year after the issuance of the bond. This would necessarily render the bond void
because an insurance policy is valid only if the actual premium is paid. 20
Worse, these certifications made the transfer of the bond effective as it was specifically mentioned by
Valencerina that the bond may be transferred to BSIL and any of its assignees. This he did despite knowing
that the obligee should have been PVB and not any other creditor with which GSIS had no interest in.
All these demonstrate Valencerinas conscious doing of a wrong. It was, thus, proven beyond reasonable
doubt that he acted in bad faith by making significant and unjustified contributions to the issuance of an
irregular bond and giving undue advantage to Ecobel which could have cost millions of dollars to GSIS and
the government.
In a last ditch attempt to save himself, Valencerina argues that the documents, especially the above
certifications from which the testimonies of the witnesses and eventually his conviction were based, could
not be used as evidence against him for being incompetent and hearsay as they were mere photocopies that
were not properly authenticated.
Indeed, these documents serve as the bedrock of the prosecutions position that he violated Sec. 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It is true that these were mere photocopies and, as a general rule, if
the original copy cannot be produced, a photocopy, can only be admitted in evidence if it is shown that the
original is unavailable21 by proving (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror,
the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. 22 The correct order of
proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. 23
Here, Valencerina claims that the prosecution failed to even attempt to prove the authenticity and due
execution of the memorandum and the certifications it presented and, thus should be enough reason to
conclude that the Sandiganbayan based its conviction on mere conjectures.
The Court finds the argument untenable.
Valencerina cannot now say that the certifications were not properly authenticated and their existence not
properly proved because the records would show that, during the trial, he himself adopted their contents
and admitted that he indeed issued the same certifications. For instance, he testified as follows:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A
Q
A

The prosecution offered a document purportedly a Certification by one

Alex Valencerina dated March 30, 1998 which the prosecution marked as
Exhibit D-14 which I am now showing you. Could you please go over this
document and inform the Honorable Court if you are aware of such a
document?
Yes, sir, I am aware of this document, sir.
Now, this is a certification prepared by one Alex Valencerina. Are
you the same Alex Valencerina who prepared this particular
document?
Yes, sir. It is me, sir.

Q
A

Why did you prepare this document?

This document was prepared upon the request of Senior VicePresident Amalio Mallari to simply draft a statement of facts and
procedures in relation to the bond itself, Ecobel bond.

We noticed, Mr. Valencerina, that this document was addressed to To

Whom It May Concern. Could you inform the Honorable Court why you
addressed it to To whom it may concern?
It is actually a generic statement, simply a statement of facts and
procedures and it is basically a GSIS policy, for information only.

A
Q
A

Q
A
Q

And what are the facts and procedures that you are referring to which
you mentioned in this particular memorandum?
These are actually referring to the drawing conditions which actually
refer to the event in which case there is a default in the bond. So are the
documents that must be presented by the obligee.
Are you referring to this bond which is mentioned in this memorandum,
Bond No. 092132, issued on March 11, 1998 and maturing on 11 March
2000?
Yes, sir, I am referring to that particular transaction, sir.
The prosecution also marked Exhibit D-17. It was testified to by a
witness and offered in evidence by the prosecution which is a
memorandum by one Alex M. Valencerina dated 14 January 1999. Could
you please go over this memorandum and inform the Honorable Court if
you are aware of that memorandum?
Yes, sir, I am aware of this letter.

Q
A

Why did you prepare this memorandum?

Again, this letter or this memorandum actually is requested upon by my
Senior Vice-President Amalio Mallari, sir.

Again, this is addressed only To whom it amy concern and not to

anybody in particular. Why did you address it only to To whom it may
concern?
Again, it is a statement of facts and procedures which practically govern
the policies of the GSIS, sir.24 (Emphases supplied)

By testifying as to the contents of the certifications he himself signed, Valencerina, in effect, admitted that
the said documents exist and that the same were duly executed by him. He himself built upon the said
documents to draw his defense that the certifications were mere statements of facts and procedures. He did
not contradict their existence but even went further to elaborate as to the reasons behind their issuance. As
such, the Court cannot give merit to his position that, being mere photocopies, the certifications could not
be relied on in determining his culpability. Conversely, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
assuming they had no personal knowledge of the contents and due execution of the said documents, would

now be a superfluity as he himself used the certifications to forward his defense.

The Court finds no value either to Valencerinas submission that no crime was proven to have been
committed because no evidence had been presented showing that BSIL actually granted a loan of US $10
million to Ecobel, it being the corpus delicti of the second mode of committing the offense under Sec. 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. The reason is simple. The corpus delicti of the crime is not dependent upon whether a loan
had been granted to Ecobel, but more on proving the fact of giving unwarranted preference or benefit to
another with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence. It is sufficient that such
fact has been established, as the prosecution did in this case.
Besides, the Court gives credence to the report and findings of the audit investigation team, affirmed by the
Sandiganbayan, that Ecobel failed to pay the loan from BSIL, which then gave rise to a notice making known
the decision of the assignee under the loan to collect on the surety bond subject of this case. This by itself
cemented the fact that, indeed, Ecobel received benefit by reason of the unjustified actions committed by no
less than the high-ranking officers of GSIS.
Furthermore, Valencerinas contention that his constitutional right was violated because he was not validly
charged with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 deserves no consideration. It is his theory that his right
to be informed of the crime he committed was violated as the Sandiganbayan convicted him for giving
undue advantage to Ecobel (second mode), which was contrary to the crime as alleged in the information that he caused undue injury to the government by participating in the issuance of the subject bond (first
mode).
The Court cannot agree. There are two ways by which Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be violated first
by causing undue injury to any party, including the government and second, by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense, an
accused may be charged under either mode or both. In the amended information, the prosecution charged
him for both. A perusal of the same simply yields no other conclusion that Valencerina, together with the
other accused, was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for [w]ilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, participat[ing], or contribut[ing] to, the release or
issuance of Surety Bond GIF NO. 029132 xxxx hereby affording unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to Ecobel Land Incorporated.
In the same breath, the Court dismisses or cannot allow the petitioners defense that no action, criminal or
civil, arises because the bond in itself was null and void. The subject bonds nullity was precisely brought
about by his actions and had he not acted the way he did, this would not even have existed. Suffice it to
state that to exculpate him from liability just because the bond cannot be made effective is to justify his
wrongdoings, which the Court cannot allow.
Finally, Valencerinas act of cancelling the bond upon information that the collateral submitted was spurious
does not negate the fact that at the time that the bond was issued as well as during the process of
negotiating for the loan using the same bond, the act of giving undue preference to Ecobel already existed.
Indeed, the cancellation was merely an afterthought as he did the same only when the irregularities had
become too apparent that they could no longer be overlooked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014
EDELBERT C. UYBOCO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO JR., J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner assailing the Sandiganbayans
Decision1 dated January 9, 2014 and Resolution2 dated March 14, 2014, finding petitioner and his coaccused Rodolfo G. Valencia guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.

3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, in Criminal Case No.
24461, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo G. Valencia, Carlo A. Maramot, & Edelbert C. Uyboco.
Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the existence of a conspiracy and in convicting
him in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt of such conspiracy. More importantly, petitioner finds
fault in the Sandiganbayans denial of his Motion to Reconsider the Decision of this Honorable Court
(Promulgated on January 9, 2014) with a Plea to Re-Open the Proceedings dated January 22, 2014. In his
motion, petitioner prayed for the reopening of the proceedings on the ground that his constitutional rights to
due process and to competent counsel were violated when his former counsel, due to blatant error, abuse of
discretion, and gross incompetence, did not present any evidence in his defense, causing serious prejudice
to him.
According to petitioner, he was accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by his former lawyer who
informed him that there was no necessity for a preliminary investigation and to present any evidence. His
former counsel also failed to cross examine the main prosecution witness because said counsel was
inexplicably absent on the trial date and even failed to prepare and file a memorandum and merely relied
on the defense presented by the lawyers of co-accused Valencia and Maramot by adopting the defenses of
the other accused and all their pleadings and manifestations, even when these were clearly not applicable to
petitioners defense. Thus, petitioner avers that his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due
process and of law and to competent counsel were violated.
In its Comment dated September 30, 2014, the Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed petitioners plea to
reopen the case on the ground of denial of due process. In citing Lagua v. CA,3 they claim there is no basis
to set aside the assailed decision and resolution since a client is bound by the action of his counsel.
After a careful review of the records of the case, We find that the petition has no merit.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth, as held by this Court in Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp,
Inc.,4 to wit:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of
fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set
of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
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Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal
and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case,
those findings should not be ignored.5 Absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness
committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding and conclusive upon this Court.6
This rule admits of exceptions, as follows: (1) where the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) where the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the
findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
evidence on record.7
Even if the foregoing rules were to be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, this Court nevertheless
finds no reason to disagree with the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. A meticulous scrutiny of the
records of the case persuades Us to conclude that the Sandiganbayan did not err in its finding that petitioner
is guilty of the crime charged. The evidence on record amply supports the findings and conclusions of
the Sandiganbayan and petitioner has shown no cause for this Court to apply any of the foregoing
exceptions.
Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
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xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross in excusable negligence. This provision shall

apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
For accused to be found liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements must concur:
1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

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2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. 8
Based on the records of the case, the elements of the crime charged exist in the present case.
On the first element, accused Valencia was a public officer at the time the acts in question were committed.
Thus, while petitioner was a private individual, he was found to have been in conspiracy with accused
Valencia. This is in accord with the rule that private persons may be charged in conspiracy with public
officers, as We held in People of the Philippines v. Henry T. Go:9
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A.
3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the
controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein
private respondent.
The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner and accused Valencia acted in conspiracy to commit the crime
charged, to wit:
The records show that conspiracy existed by and between accused Rodolfo Valencia and Edelbert Uyboco,
president of Gaikoku, considering that the procurement of the subject dump trucks for an overpriced amount
of PhP6,994,286.00 could not have been possible without each others participation and cooperation, as
evidenced by their execution and approval of the purchase order No. 4979 dated March 1993, and Gaikokus
proforma invoice.10
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Petitioner failed to dispute any of the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution and relied upon
by the Sandiganbayan. Thus, there appears to be no reason for this Court to review such finding.
As to the second element, accused Valencia entered into a negotiated contract with Gaikoku without
authority from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP). In fact, Valencia had already approved the purchase
request for the dump trucks as early as March 1993, prior to any SP resolution approving such direct
acquisition.
The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled, and respondents aptly pointed out, that accused Valencia failed to
comply with the requirements of Section 369 of the Local Government Code on negotiated purchase, which
required that there must have been at least two failed public biddings before a contract for a negotiated
purchase may be entered into. The defense failed to present any substantial evidence of the two failed
biddings. In fact, it was proved by presented evidence that the alleged failed biddings were merely
simulated.
The present case is similar to the case of Plameras v. People,11 wherein this Court upheld the conviction of
the accused, to wit:
As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of the
Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) were
knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to
successfully get full payment for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or omission
evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality.
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It must be borne to mind that any procurement or acquisition of supplies or property by local government
units shall be through competitive public bidding. This was reiterated in the Local Government Code of 1991
on procurement of supplies which provides:
Sec. 356. General Rule in Procurement or Disposal. Except as otherwise provided herein, acquisition of
supplies by local government units shall be through competitive public bidding. x x x
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The petitioner admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he proceeded just
the same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative that there was already a
negotiated contract a representation or misrepresentation he willfully believed in, without any verification.
As a Governor, he must know that negotiated contract can only be resorted to in case of failure of a public

bidding. As it is, there is no public bidding to speak of that has been conducted. Intentionally or not, it is his
duty to act in a circumspect manner to protect government funds. To do otherwise is gross inexcusable
negligence, at the very least, especially so, that petitioner acted on his own initiative and without
authorization from the Provincial School Board. This can be proved by his failure to present even a single
witness from the members of the Board whom he consulted as he claimed. 12
Finally, the third element of the crime is also present since it had been proven that an overpayment was
made for the dump trucks, since these were directly imported by the Provincial Government from the
distributor in Japan. With this direct importation, the Provincial Government should have only paid the taxfree amount of P4,594,119.85. Instead, accused Valencia had already authorized and caused the
disbursement of P6,994,286, or an excess of P2,400,166.15, in favor of petitioners company, Gaikoku. This
has clearly caused undue injury to the government.
As to petitioners claim that his right to due process was denied due to his former counsels error, abuse of
discretion or gross incompetence, We find no merit in this claim. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a
client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a case, 13 and to allow a client to
disown his counsels conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the
mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.14 While this rule has recognized exceptions, 15 We find that there is no
reason for this Court to deviate from the findings of the Sandiganbayan. We held in Gotesco Properties, Inc.
v. Moral:16
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an act performed by counsel within the scope of a general
or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this general rule certainly
depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case, there are exceptions recognized by this Court:
(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of
justice so require.
The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In Amil v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that to
fall within the exceptional circumstance relied upon x x x, it must be shown that the negligence of counsel
must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court. Thus, where a party was given the
opportunity to defend its interests in due course, it cannot be said to have been denied due process of law,
for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. To properly claim gross negligence on
the part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear
abandonment of the clients cause.17
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioners motion to re-open the proceedings on
the ground of violation of his due process, to wit:
In the same vein, accused-movant Uybocos clear admission that he had been given the opportunity to
present his evidence and despite said opportunity, he and his counsel decided/opted not to present any
evidence for his defense, as shown by their written Manifestation dated November 20, 2012, that after
earnest assessment and evaluation, the accused EDELBERT C. UYBOCO has deemed it unnecessary to
present further evidence in his defense, thus he is waiving his right to present further testimonial and
documentary evidence, militates against his claim of miscarriage of justice, and hence, his motion to reopen
proceedings must likewise fail. Accused-movant Uyboco cannot attribute any serious misjudgment or fault or
gross incompetence on his counsel alone as the decision not to present further evidence in his defense bears
his conformity as shown by his signature in the said manifestation. 18
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The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an opportunity to be
heard during trial. This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process. While petitioner claims that
he was incorrectly advised by his former counsel that the presentation of evidence is no longer necessary,
this unfortunate mistake cannot qualify as gross negligence or incompetence that would necessitate a
reopening of the proceedings. In fact, not once did petitioner refute, or at the very least, address
the Sandiganbayans finding that he had expressly consented to the waiver of the presentation of evidence
by affixing his signature as conformity to the manifestation submitted by his former counsel.
Petitioner also erroneously claims that his former counsel failed to prepare and file a memorandum for him
since the records show that petitioners former counsel had belatedly filed a memorandum on his behalf,
which the Sandiganbayan had admitted in the interest of justice.
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 9, 2014 and Resolution dated March 14,

2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24461 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170046, December 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MAXIMO A. BORJE, JR., BURT B. FAVORITO,
FLORENDO B. ARIAS, ERDITO Q. QUARTO, AGERICO C. PALAYPAY, NAPOLEON S. ANAS, DANILO
C. PLANTA, LUISITO S. DELA ROSA, ROGELIO L. BERAY, NORMA A. VILLARMINO, RICARDO M.
JUAN, JR., NELSON UMALI, MARIA LUISA T. CRUZ, MELISSA T. ESPINA, VIOLETA R. TADEO,
JESSICA J. CATIBAYAN, VIOLETA C. AMAR, RONALDO G. SIMBAHAN, FELIPE A. SAN JOSE,
ROLANDO C. CASTILLO, CONCHITA N. DELA CRUZ, JANETTE A. BUGAYONG, JESUS D. CAPUZ,
RODELIA R. UY, ROMEO C. FULLIDO, NONETTE H. FULLIDO, VICTORIA M. GO, CARMELITO V.
EDEM, AUGUSTO C. CAPUZ,+ VICENTE SANTOS, JR., JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, AND THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Resolutions dated January 20, 20051 and October 12, 20052 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
27969 dismissing the same for lack of probable cause for the crime of plunder without prejudice to the filing
of appropriate charges against respondents.
The factual antecedents follow.
On January 9, 2002, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Simeon
Datumanong, issued Department Order No. 15, Series of 2002, creating a committee for the purpose of
investigating alleged anomalies and illegal disbursements in connection with the repair of DPWH-owned
motor vehicles and equipment.3 As a result of the investigation, it was discovered that during the period of
March 2001 to December 2001, the emergency repairs conducted on hundreds of DPWH vehicles, approved
and paid for by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in the loss of about One Hundred
Thirty-Nine Million Pesos (P139,000,000.00).4
On August 7, 2002, Atty. Irene D. Ofilada, of the Internal Audit Service of the DPWH and member of the
committee, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended, in relation to Sections 20 and 9 of the General and Special
Provisions, respectively, of the General Appropriations Act, Memorandum of the Secretary on the Guidelines
on Purchases of Spare Parts and Repair of Vehicles dated July 19, 1997, Department Order No. 33, Series of
1988 of RA 6770, as amended by RA No. 3018, COA Circular 85-55 A, Series of 1985, COA Circular 76-412,
Series of 1976 on splitting of RSE, PO, vouchers and payrolls, against the several officials/employees of the
DPWH, including respondents herein.5
On March 1, 2004, the Special Prosecution Officer, Humphrey T. Monteroso, of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, filed an Information 6 with respondent Sandiganbayan accusing
Maximo A. Borje, Jr., Burt B. Favorito, Florendo B. Arias, Erdito Q. Quarto, Agerico C. Palaypay, Napoleon S.
Anas, Danilo C. Planta, Luisito S. Dela Rosa, Rogelio L. Beray, Norma A. Villarmino, Ricardo M. Juan, Jr.,
Nelson Umali, Maria Luisa T. Cruz, Melissa T. Espina, Violeta R. Tadeo, Jessica J. Catibayan, Violeta C. Amar,
Ronaldo G. Simbahan, Felipe A. San Jose, Rolando C. Castillo, Conchita N. Dela Cruz, Janette A. Bugayong,
Jesus D. Capuz, Rodellia D. Uy, Romeo C. Fullido, Nonette H. Fullido, Victoria M. Go, Carmelito V. Edem,
Augusto C. Capuz, Vicente Santos, Jr., of the crime of Plunder defined and penalized under RA No. 7080, as
amended, committed as follows:
That during the period from March to December, 2001, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused MAXIMO BORJE, JR. y AQUINO, a public officer, being then the Chief of the Motorpool Section of
the Department of Public Works and Highways, Port Area, Manila, by himself and in connivance/conspiracy
with his co-accused BURT FAVORITO y BARBA, FLORENDO ARIAS y BUAG, ERDITO QUARTO y
QUIAOT, AGERICO PALAYPAY y CORTES, NAPOLEON ANAS y SEBASTIAN, DANILO PLANTA y

CALUYA, LUISITO S. DELA ROSA, ROGELIO BERAY y LAGANGA, NORMA VILLARMINO y AGCAOILI,
RICARDO M. JUAN, JR., NELSON UMALI, MARIA LUISA CRUZ y TALAO, MELISSA ESPINA y
TANGPUZ, VIOLETA TADEO y RAGASA, JESSICA CATIBAYAN y JARDIEL, VIOLETA AMAR y
CASTILLO, RONALDO G. SIMBAHAN, FELIPE A. SAN JOSE, ROLANDO C. CASTILLO, and JOHN
DOES and JANE DOES, who are his officemates being likewise officials and employees of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), two of whom are high ranking public officers, namely: BURT
FAVORITO y BARBA, Director III, Administrative and Manpower Management Services [Salary Grade 27]
andFLORENDO ARIAS y BUAG, Assistant Director, Bureau of Equipment [Salary Grade 27], and in
further connivance/conspiracy with his other co-accused private individuals engaged in the business of
motor vehicle and spare parts supply, namely: CONCHITA N. DELA CRUZ, JANETTE A. BUGAYONG,
JESUS D. CAPUZ, RODELLIA UY y DEL ROSARIO, ROMEO C. FULLIDO, NONETTE H. FULLIDO,
VICTORIA GO y MANIEGO, CARMELITO EDEM y VARGAS, AUGUSTO CAPUZ y CO, VICENTE
SANTOS, JR., as well as other JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, with evident bad faith and intent to defraud
and cause damage to the government, and taking undue advantage of his official position, authority,
connection or influence as such public officer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally, amass,
accumulate and acquire, by himself, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY-TWO MILLION
THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE AND 38/100 PESOS
(P82,321,855.38), more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself at the expense and to the damage of
the Filipino People and the Republic of the Philippines in the aforestated amount, through a series and/or
combination of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or means, consisting of misappropriations,
conversions, misuses, diversions and/or malversation of public funds and/or raids on the public treasury, by
means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to, or simultaneously with, the fraud, by
falsifying public, officials and/or commercial documents, such as Job Orders, Pre-Repair Inspection Reports,
Post-Repair Inspection Reports, Requisition for Supplies and/or Equipment (RSE), Certificates of Emergency
Purchases/Repair, Waste Material Reports, Certificate of Acceptance, Certificates of Fair Wear and Tear, Price
Verifications, Requests for Obligation Allotment and Disbursement Vouchers, and such other falsified
documents, untruthfully narrating therein material facts on fictitious emergency repairs of various DPWH
vehicles and/or ghost purchases of spare parts, which are, in truth, imaginary or spurious transactions, and
by using such falsified documents of said imaginary or spurious transactions for said accused to unlawfully
cause the undue releases of public funds and obtain undue payments on 4,406 transactions, more or less,
for said fictitious emergency repairs of DPWH vehicles and/or ghost purchases of spare parts, thereby
misappropriating, converting, misusing, diverting and/or malversing the proceeds thereof for MAXIMO
BORJE, JR. y AQUINOs personal use and benefit.
Thereafter, respondents filed their responsive pleadings essentially assailing the Ombudsmans finding of
probable cause. On March 19, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order 7 giving respondents a period within
which to submit their memoranda of authority. In its Omnibus Comment/Opposition 8 of even date, petitioner
questioned the authority of the Sandiganbayan to act on respondents motions, arguing that the same had
not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents and, hence, it had no authority to hear and
decide their motions. Petitioner also alleged that it successfully established probable cause justifying the
issuance by the respondent court of a warrant of arrest.
On January 20, 2005, respondent Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution 9 upholding its authority to
act on respondents motions for their filing of the same may be considered as voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court and dismissing the case for lack of probable cause for the crime of plunder without
prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against the accused-respondents. It ruled that as the records
reveal, not all elements of the crime are present for the accused Borje had not amassed ill-gotten wealth of
at least P50 million. It further denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution 10 dated October
12, 2005 for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition invoking the following grounds:
I.
THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE FILING OF AN
INFORMATION IS VESTED SOLELY IN THE PROSECUTION.
II.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES IN ITS
DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE FILING OF A CRIMINAL CASE.

Petitioner maintains that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman is an
executive, not a judicial function. As such, it asserts that respondent Sandiganbayan should have given
deference to the finding and determination of probable cause in their preliminary investigation. Moreover,
petitioner faulted the respondent court for taking into consideration the findings of Atty. Irene Ofilada of the
Investigating Committee that it was not respondent Borje who encashed the checks but the respondentsuppliers, by virtue of a blanket authority given by the former to the latter. It posits that said findings cannot
bind the Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of the existence of probable cause.
Respondents counter that the respondent court correctly dismissed the case for the evidence clearly shows
the absence of certain elements of the crime. They maintain that while investigating officers have a wide
latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause, which deserves respect from the courts, the
acts of the Ombudsman in disregarding essential pieces of evidence are tantamount to an abuse of
discretion authorizing the dismissal by the court of the case.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
It is well to recall that there are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. On the
one hand, executive determination of probable cause ascertains whether a criminal case must be filed in
court.11 It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the
crime as defined by law and should be held for trial.12 On the other hand, judicial determination of probable
cause ascertains whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. It is one made by a
judge who must satisfy himself that based on the evidence presented, there is necessity in placing the
accused under custody so that the ends of justice will not be frustrated. 13
Verily, as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the determination of probable
cause during the preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter, is a function that belongs to
the Office of the Ombudsman, which is empowered to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether
probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. 14
It is well settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the
presence or absence of probable cause believing that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof necessitating the filing of the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts.15 This rule is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. If it were otherwise, the functions
of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much
the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 16
The Office of the Ombudsman, in this case, found probable cause which would warrant the filing of an
information against respondents. For purposes of filing a criminal information, probable cause has been
defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. It is such set of facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any
offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 17 A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and
was committed by the suspect. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt.18 Thus, unless it is shown that the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause was done in a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere with the same. 19
In the instant case, the act of filing an Information against respondents by the Ombudsman cannot be
characterized as arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. A
review of the records clearly reveals that accused Borje, Jr. was the payee of 4,406 checks amounting to
P82,321,855.38 covering the reimbursements of the supposed payments for the anomalous and
questionable repairs of the DPWH vehicles. While there may have been evidence presented which may lead
to an inference that the end-receiver of the amounts covered by the checks is not actually accused Borje, Jr.,
but the accused private individuals-suppliers, the fact that the name of accused Borje, Jr. appears on the

subject checks cannot be denied. Indeed, mere belief that respondents probably committed the crime
suffices to establish probable cause. Whether they are, in fact, guilty of plunder is a different matter, which
can properly be determined at a full-blown trial on the merits of this case. 20 As this Court has ruled in People
v. Castillo:21
Moreover, it was clearly premature on the part of the Sandiganbayan to make a determinative finding prior
to the parties presentation of their respective evidence that there was no bad faith and manifest partiality
on the respondents part and undue injury on the part of the complainant. In Go v. Fifth Division,
Sandiganbayan, we held that "it is well established that the presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be best passed upon after a full-blown
trial on the merits. Also, it would be unfair to expect the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to
secure the conviction of the accused upon the filing of the information against the latter. The reason is found
in the nature and objective of a preliminary investigation. Here, the public prosecutors do not decide
whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; they merely
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Moreover, the fact that the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman differs from the findings of Atty. Irene
D. Ofilada, of the Internal Audit Service of the DPWH, who conducted the initial investigation, falls short of
being capricious or arbitrary. It has consistently been held that there is grave abuse of discretion where
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. The abuse must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty or
to act at all in contemplation of law.22
The Ombudsman in this case, however, was merely performing his duty as mandated by the
Constitution23 and by law.24 Filing an Information against respondents in this case based on sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondents are probably guilty
thereof cannot be said to be whimsical or despotic. As effectively shown by evidence, the Ombudsmans
charge was not at all baseless for the link between the respondents and the anomalous transactions herein
has been satisfactorily established. In the absence, therefore, of any showing that the questioned acts of the
Ombudsman were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere with the
Ombudsmans exercise of his constitutionally mandated powers.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
January 20, 2005 and October 12, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27969 areSET ASIDE.
The Resolution dated January 7, 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-02-0507-H, finding probable cause to
indict respondents for the crime of plunder is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193670, December 03, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VENERANDO DELA CRUZ Y SEBASTIAN,AccusedAppellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this appeal is the June 25, 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01025 that affirmed the March 15, 2005 Judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch
28, in Criminal Case No. RTC03-0289 convicting Venerando Dela Cruz y Sebastian (appellant) of Violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
chanrobleslaw

Factual Antecedents
On July 25, 2003, police asset Warren Ebio (Ebio) received information from another asset that he could
purchase shabu by calling a certain person. He thus called the said person through cellular phone and

agreed to meet with him in front of the barangay hall of Lerma, Naga City.
Accordingly, a pre-operation plan to entrap the alleged seller was immediately drawn up in coordination with
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. SPO1 Ruben Antonio (SPO1 Antonio), SPO1 Cornelio Morano (SPO1
Morano), PO3 Raul Bongon (PO3 Bongon) and SPO3 Julio Tuason (SPO3 Tuason) then formed themselves
into a buy-bust team. Ebio was designated as the poseur-buyer and was given three P500.00 bills as buybust money, while PO3 Bongon was tasked to apprehend the seller after the consummation of the
transaction.
Upon their arrival at the designated area, Ebio, SPO3 Tuason and SPO1 Morano alighted from their vehicle.
Ebio proceeded towards the meeting place while the other two positioned themselves nearby. A few minutes
later, a man riding a motorcycle arrived. The buy-bust team recognized him as the seller based on his attire
as described by him to Ebio. Ebio introduced himself as the buyer. When the man asked for payment, he
gave him the buy-bust money. The man then took out two transparent plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance from his right pocket and gave them to Ebio. Thereupon, Ebio took off his hat, the prearranged signal that the transaction was already consummated. Immediately, PO3 Bongon, SPO1 Morano
and SPO1 Antonio rushed towards the man and apprehended him. They recovered from him the buy-bust
money and another plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Immediately after Ebio turned over
to him the two sachets subject of the sale, PO3 Bongon marked the same with RSB-1 and RSB-2. On the
other hand, he marked the third sachet recovered from the seller after he conducted a search on him with
RSB-3. PO3 Bongon thereafter turned over these seized items together with the marked money to SPO1
Antonio for proper disposition. A police investigation followed where the person arrested was identified as
the appellant. Afterwards, SPO1 Antonio brought the sachets to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for examination, during which Forensic Chemist Josephine Macura Clemen (Clemen) found their
contents positive for shabu. Thus, an Information3 for Violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 was filed
against appellant.
Appellant denied the accusation against him and claimed that he was merely a victim of frame-up. In his
version of the incident, appellant alleged that he was riding his motorcycle towards the Panganiban Bridge
near the Barangay Hall of Lerma, Naga City in the evening of July 25, 2003. He was going to his parents
house located in the boundary of Lerma and Triangulo Streets to inform them that he and his family would
leave early morning of the next day for Camarines Sur to attend the wake of his father-in-law who died a
few days earlier. As he was descending the bridge, however, two individuals grabbed his hands. A police
officer then suddenly came out of a car and told him to get off his motorcycle. PO3 Bongon frisked him and
took his cellphone and telephone directory that contained money. After that, he was made to board a mobile
car and was brought to a police station. Thereat, police officers threatened to charge him if he would not
cooperate in the arrest of a certain Habagat, who engaged his services as a computer technician. He did
not accede since he knew nothing about the case of Habagat. Hence, the police officers instead filed a case
against him.
In the RTC Judgment dated March 15, 2005, appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment with a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, the CA rendered its Decision on June
25, 2010 affirming the said RTC Judgment.
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue
Appellant points out the following: (1) it was not made clear by the prosecution where the markings of the
three sachets of shabu were made; and (2) the prosecution failed to show whether there was already a clear
understanding between appellant and the poseur-buyer with respect to the quantity ofshabu allegedly being
purchased. In view of these, appellant asserts that the presumption of innocence in his favor must be
upheld.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, [such as shabu], the following elements must be duly
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration, and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.4 Here, the

prosecution submitted evidence that duly established the elements of illegal sale of shabu. It positively
identified appellant as the seller of the seized illegal substance which turned out to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu, a dangerous drug. Appellant sold and
delivered the drug for P1,500.00 to Ebio, a police asset who acted as poseur-buyer. Verily, all the elements
of the sale of illegal drugs were established to support appellants conviction of the said offense.
We cannot give credence to appellants argument that failure to mention the place where the three plastic
sachets of shabu were marked constitutes a gap in the chain of custody of evidence.
Chain of custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.5 It eliminates doubts concerning the proper preservation of the identity and integrity of
the corpus delicti or the shabu in this case. Marking of the seized shabu is the initial stage in the chain of
custody in buy-bust operations. As requisites, the marking must be made in the presence of the
apprehended offender and upon immediate confiscation, and this contemplates even marking at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team.6
chanrobleslaw

In this case, Ebio turned over to PO3 Bongon the two sachets of shabu sold to him by the appellant.
Together with another sachet of shabu he recovered from appellant, PO3 Bongon immediately marked each
sachet with RSB-1, RSB-2 and RSB-3, respectively, before giving them to SPO1 Antonio. While it is true
that the exact location where the markings were made was not mentioned, it can reasonably be concluded
that the same happened during appellants apprehension, in transit to the police station or before the
sachets were turned over to SPO1 Antonio in the police station. Upon receipt, SPO1 Antonio then submitted
the sachets to the crime laboratory. PO2 Henry Escalora, Sr. received the three sachets and handed them to
Forensic Chemist Clemen whose examination of the contents thereof revealed that they were positive
for shabu. During trial, Forensic Chemist Clemen presented and identified the specimens. Clearly, the
prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the shabu from its possession by the police officers,
testing in the laboratory to determine its composition, until the same was presented as evidence in court.
Hence, even if there was no statement as to where the markings were made, what is important is that the
seized specimen never left the custody of PO3 Bongon until he turned over the same to SPO1 Antonio and
that thereafter, the chain of custody was shown to be unbroken. 7 Indeed, the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized shabu is shown to have been properly preserved and the crucial links in the chain of custody
unbroken.
We also cannot give credence to appellants argument that the absence of relevant testimony on any
agreement between him and Ebio with respect to the quantity of shabu sought to be purchased casts doubt
on the existence of a legitimate buy-bust operation. The existence of the illegal sale of theshabu does not
depend on an agreement about its quantity and price since the offense is consummated after the exchange
of the illegal drug for the marked money. Hence, Ebios testimony that appellant asked for the money before
handing over the shabu and that he received the sachets of shabu after giving appellant the P1,500.00, is by
itself sufficient.
Anent appellants defense of frame-up, such is inherently weak and viewed with disfavor for it can be easily
concocted.8 For this defense to succeed, it must be proven with strong and convincing evidence. 9 Appellant
failed in this regard.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we uphold appellants conviction of the offense charged.
The penalty for unauthorized sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165,10 regardless of its quantity
and purity, is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. However,
with the enactment of RA 9346,11 only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed. We therefore find the
penalty of life imprisonment and payment of fine in the amount of P500,000.00 imposed by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA to be proper. It must be emphasized, however, that appellant shall not be eligible for
parole.12
chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 25, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01025,
which affirmed the conviction of appellant Venerando Dela Cruz y Sebastian for Violation of Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 28 in its March 15, 2005
Judgment, is AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant shall not be eligible for parole.
SO ORDERED.

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