JAYSON ABABA

ASSIGN NO.14

Republic vs CA and Wong

Facts: Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo
Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years
old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was
then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents and
by order of the court in Special Case No. 593 issued on September 9, 1967,
adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized
Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an insurance agent while
Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher. They decided to adopt the
children as they remained childless after fifteen years of marriage. The
couples showered their adopted children with parental love and reared them
as their own children.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then
married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University,
Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It
was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry
when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien
nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does
not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
As earlier stated, on July 2, 1986, the matter was resolved in favor of private
respondent, the trial court decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements
having been fully complied with, petitioner's prayer to change his name from
Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted. On appeal to respondent
court, and over the opposition of petitioner Republic through the Solicitor
General, the decision of the court below was affirmed in full, hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his

petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the
granting of said petition.

Held:
A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person
involving his relation with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard
to, the rest of the community. It is a proceeding in remand, as such, strict
compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is
essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover. For this
purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register.
To digress a little for purposes of clarification, the change of name
contemplated under Article 376 and reglementarily implemented by Rule 103
must not be confused with and cannot be effected through the summary
proceeding proposed in Article 412 of the some Code, as procedurally
regulated by Rule 108 of the Rules, which refers only to correction of clerical
errors, such as those which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, or an error made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in
copying or writing, or some harmless or innocuous change, and not those
which will involve substantial changes.
Turning now to the case at bar, we are guided by the jurisprudential dictum
that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for the purpose of identification, and a change of name is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons
adduced and the consequences that will likely follow; it is a privilege which
may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or reasonable cause or
compelling reason therefor.
We find unacceptable the assertion of the Solicitor General that private
respondent's allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to the use of his
present surname is unsubstantiated.
It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of name,
petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor

but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a)
When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT THE

RTC BRANCH 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC, A.M.No.06-7-414-RTC October 19,
2007
Facts: A judicial audit and physical inventory of cases was conducted on 2024 June 2005 at the RTC, Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, then presided by Judge
Cesar M. Sotero who compulsorily retired on 23 February 2006.
The audit team noticed that there were no special proceedings case
records presented. Upon inquiry, the Clerk of Court Paulino Saguyod
asserted that most of these cases are for Petitions for Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry and gave the audit team copies of the decisions.
The audit team observed that almost all of the petitions have no
hearings conducted and that the date of filing indicated in the docket books
and the date of the decision was so near that it will be improbable to comply
with the publication requirement under the Rules of Court.
In view of these observations, the Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court
Saguyod were made to explain why these petitions for change of name and/
or correction of entries in the civil registry were granted without the required
hearing. In their answer, they explained that these petitions may be covered
by RA 9048 which authorized city or municipal registrar to correct clerical or
typographical errors in the civil registry without need for a judicial order.
They further averred that these petitions were filed before the trial court

because there was no incumbent Local Civil Registrar and the OIC-Civil
Registrar could not act on these petitions. Since RA 9048 allows correction of
entries without hearing and publication, the trial court considered the same
procedure. The trial court also adopted the procedure in civil cases where
the defendant is declared in default and the court renders judgment based
on the pleadings filed by the plaintiff.
Issue: Whether trial court still have jurisdiction over petitions on change of
name and correction of entries.
Whether the summary procedure prescribed in RA No. 9048 should be
adopted in cases filed before the courts, or should the proceeding under Rule
108 be followed.
Held:
During the deliberation, it was clear that the local civil registrar is given the
authority to act on petitions for corrections of entries and change of first
name or nicknames, yet there was no mention that such petition can no
longer be filed with the regular courts. There was no intent on the part of the
lawmakers to remove the authority of the trial courts to make judicial
corrections of entries in the civil registry. It can thus be concluded that the
local civil registry has primary, not exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions
for correction of clerical errors and change of first name or nickname.
Since RA 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary proceedings
before the local civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the same
procedure to petitions for correction of entries in the civil registry before the
courts. The promulgation of rules of procedure for court of justice is the
exclusive domain of the Supreme Court. Moreover, as observed by the Office
of the Court Administrator, there is nothing in RA 9048 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations that warrants the adoption of the procedure set
therein for petitions before the court even for purposes of expediting the
resolution of said petitions.
Thus, there should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the courts as
if RA 9048 were not enacted at all. In other words, the procedure provided
in the Revised Rules of Court for such petitions remains binding and should
be followed by the courts. The procedural requirements laid down in Rules
103 and 108 still have to be complied with.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE

Facts: Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote,Giovannis guardian ad litem filed a
petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to
Giovanni Nadores. Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial
courts decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the
non-joinder of indispensable parties.
Issue: Whether or not the change petition for change of name should be
granted?
Ruling:
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni
availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103
of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements.
After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that
the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother
has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her
in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification
of mother and son.

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR

CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF
JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to
be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG,
duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG vs. CEBU CITY
CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO

Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for
change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry
of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and
have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian
Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop
his middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and
integrate himself into Singaporean society.
Issue: Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered
name on the cause mentioned?
Ruling:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be
proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which
have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a
legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by
the father bears only a given name and his mother surname, and does not
have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by
the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he
bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers

surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an

acknowledged child.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA

GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his

minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein,
among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother
is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers
middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia
be changed to Catindig, his surname.

Issue: May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue
raised in the instant case.
Ruling:
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with
her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she
remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion
and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not
prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is

ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by
the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother.

REPUBLIC V. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHANG.R. NO. 166676,

September 12, 2008
Facts: On December 11, 2003, Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC of Laguna. She
alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed
secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Andrenal Hyperplasia (CAH).She then alleged that, for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her
gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from
Jennifer to Jeff. The RTC granted Cagandahans petition. The Office of the
Solicitor General filed a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking a reversal
of the ruling of the RTC.
Issue: W/N THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION
OFENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF CAGANDAHAN TO CHANGEHER
SEX OR GENDER FROM FEMALE TO MALE ON THE GROUND OF HERMEDICAL
CONDITION KNOWN AS CAH, AND HER NAME FROMJENNIFER TO JEFF.
Held:
No. To the person with Congenital Andrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health, and to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path
of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an incompetent: and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are
equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a
male. As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion,

to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences

that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from
Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, the Court finds merit in respondents
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in
his birth certificate from female to male.
Silverio vs Republic
FACTS: On November 22, 2003, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name from Rommel Jacinto to Melly
and sex of birth from male to female in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered in
favor of petitioner as it would be more in consonance with the principle of
justice and equity. That grating the petitioner would bring much awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her fianc and the realization of
their dreams. ON August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, thru the
office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
ISSUE: Whether or not a person born male would be entitled to change of
gender on the civil registrar and afterwards be legally capacitated to entered
into marriage with another man.
HELD: No. Sex reassignment is not a ground for change of gender. There is
no law present that allows such in our country. Neither may entries in the
birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity.
The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. As to contracting
marriage, our law allows only male and female with the main reason of
procreation. Sex reassignment scientifically has not yet made one
completely into female, with the complete function for reproduction.

CERUILA vs DELANTAR

FACTS: Rosilyn complained against her father, Simplicio Delantar (Simplicio)

for child abuse, particularly prostitution. Simplicio was incarcerated at the
Pasay City Jail starting August 22, 1996 which prompted the filing of a
petition for involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), as the whereabouts of the mother,
Librada Ceruila, was unknown.
RTC: granted the petition and Simplicios motion to vacate said judgment
was denied.
CERUILAS: filed a petition before the RTC of Manila, entitled "IN THE
MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE
OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR," praying that the birth certificate of
Rosilyn be canceled and declared null and void for the reasons that said birth
certificate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and
therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein.
a. The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada A. Telin;
b. The signature of informant referring to Librada T. Delantar being a
forgery;
c. The name of Simplicio Delantar as the biological father, considering that,
as already mentioned, he is merely the foster father and co-guardian in fact
of Maria Rosilyn and the name of the natural father in (sic) unknown;
d. The date of marriage of the supposed parents, since the parents reflected
in said certificate were (sic) actually full blood brother and sister and
therefore marriage between the two is virtually impossible;
e. The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child as the same (sic) is
actually not legitimate;
f. The date of actual birth of Marial (sic) Rosilyn, since the known father
merely made it appear that she was born at the time the informations for
the birth certificate were supplied by him to the civil registrar or (sic) proper
recording;
g. The name of the physician who allegedly attended at the time of birth of
Maria Rosilyn, being a fictitious Dr. Santos.
RTC: issued an Order setting the case for hearing on March 19, 1997 and
directed the publication of said order once a week for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. The Order also stated that any

person who is interested in the petition may interpose his/her comment or

opposition thereto on or before the scheduled hearing.
Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila. 8 However,
representative appeared during the scheduled hearing.

no

RTC: rendered its decision granting the petition of the Ceruilas.

1. DECLARING the certificate of live birth of the Minor Maria Rosilyn Telin
Delantar as registered under the Local Civil Registry No. 85-27325 of the
office of the City Civil Registrar of Manila as null and void ab initio: and
2. ORDERING the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the National Statistics
Office, Manila, to expunge from their respective marriage registers the entry
of the birth of said minor and such other documents pertaining thereto, if
any.
ROSILYN, represented by her legal guardian, the DSWD, filed, with the CA,
a petition for the annulment of judgment in the petition for cancellation of
entry of her birth certificate.13 She claimed that she and her guardian were
not notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned about
the same only from the news on May 16, 1997. 14 She argued that the RTC
decision was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due
process; that the Judge did not have authority to declare her to be
illegitimate; and that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the
entire certificate, is the appropriate remedy
CA: rendered the herein assailed decision, instant Petition is GRANTED
ISSUE 1: Is the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth
certificate of Rosilyn an ordinary civil action or a special proceeding?
HELD 1: Considering that the petition, based on its allegations, does not
question the fact of birth of Rosilyn, all matters assailing the truthfulness of
any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which governs cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry. Thus, the petition filed by the
Ceruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as having been falsified,
is properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule
1 and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE 2: whether the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of Rule 108
HELD 2: NO. SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made
parties thereto. As enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito, unless all possible
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall
be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.
Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the
cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation,
legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake.
In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons,
who, however, did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not
sufficient to comply with the requirements laid down by the rules.
Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was
cured by the publication of the order of the trial court setting the case for
hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the
courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play and
due process.This is but proper, to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect her interest if she so chooses.
Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that even though an interested
party was not impleaded in the petition, such defect was cured by
compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 108 on publication. In said cases, however,
earnest efforts were made by the petitioners in bringing to court all possible
interested parties.

Republic vs. Kho

Facts: On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona
and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for
correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in
their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his
minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in
their birth certificates.

In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of

the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as the
deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of
parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania),
were allegedly not legally married. The same request to delete the "married"
status of their parents from their respective birth certificates was made by
Carlitos siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. With respect to the
birth certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the date of his and his
wifes marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the
date appearing in their marriage certificate.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition 3 in which it was
additionally prayed that Carlitos second name of "John" be deleted from his
record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his
(Carlitos) marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho"
and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
On September 14, 2001,7 the OSG entered its appearance with an
authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the case and
render assistance to it (the OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence
showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition and
testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his mother,
Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth
certificates of Carlitos children was requested to the effect that the first
name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
RTC Ruling:
The trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the
entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship
of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John" from his name;
and (3) delete the word "married" opposite the date of marriage of his
parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth
certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. As well as
the prayer for the correction in the birth certificates of Carlitos minor
children are granted. Further, the trial court granted the correction prayed
for in Carlitos marriage certificate.

Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA,
faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the
subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors
mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to
warrant the corrections with regard to the questioned "married" status of
Carlito and his siblings parents, and the latters citizenship.
CA Ruling;
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioners
appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos parents rendered the
trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial courts
judgment void.
Held:
No.
Ratio:
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 21 That case
stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of a
minor, June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father
(Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her surname. The petition
was granted by the trial court.
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo,
however, sought to annul the trial courts decision, claiming that she should
have been made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to implead her
deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she contended.
In dismissing Barcos petition, this Court held that the publication of the
order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an
indispensable party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the
civil registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate

adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules

of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule
108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her
wards share in the estate of her father. x x x.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to
the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would
cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule
108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
xxxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing
and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the
parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that
the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded
to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established.
It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party
in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 22
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel
or respondents parents should have been impleaded as parties to the
proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the
hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as

representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non-inclusion of
Marivel and Carlitos parents as parties to the proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the
proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth certificates,
especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all
sent to the residence23 she shared with Carlito and the children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to
correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the
facts recorded therein.24
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate
of marriage25 shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not
on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date "April
27, 1989" was supplied by his helper, adding that he was not married to
Marivel at the time his sons were born because his previous marriage was
annulled only in 1999.26 Given the evidence presented by respondents, the
CA observed that the minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction
would bring about no change at all in the nature of their filiation.
With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the
witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in
1959.27 Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlitos and his
siblings birth certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date of
marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on
November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van
Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had been living together as
common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted marriage legally.28
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to
respondents Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of
marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania. 29 Under the circumstances, the
deletion of the word "Married" opposite the "date of marriage of parents" is
warranted.
With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from
"Carlito John" to "Carlito," the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or

correction of entries involving changes of name falls under letter "o" of the
following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108:30
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e)
judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)changes of name.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs
petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record from the Urious
College in Butuan City,31 certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service
Commission,32 and voter registration record33 satisfactorily show that he has
been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from
the dropping of the second name.
The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as
appearing in Carlitos birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that
during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not
deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction
prayed for, which certainly was not respondents fault, does not in any way
change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.
Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings
uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To disallow the
correction in Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would
perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings who
are unquestionably born of the same mother and father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of
the name of Carlitos wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is clearly
clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also
obvious to the understanding 34 considering that the name reflected in the
marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is "Marivel."

Apropos is Yu v. Republic35 which held that changing the appellants Christian

name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting of a clerical
error. The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz
Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous alteration, which can be
granted through a summary proceeding.36 The same ruling holds true with
respect to the correction in Carlitos marriage certificate of his fathers name
from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho." Except in said marriage certificate, the name
"Juan Kho" was uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of
his siblings.37
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
Maria Virginia V. Remo vs. The Honorable Secretary of Foreign
Affairs
FACTS: Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose
passport was then expiring on October 27, 2000. Being married to
Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear:
surname: Rallonza
given name: Maria Virginia
middle name: Remo
Prior to expiry of her passport, the petitioner (marriage still subsists) applied
for renewal in DFA Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. with a request to revert to her
maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. Petitioners
request having been denied (#1), Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III,
representing petitioner, wrote on the Secretary of DFA expressing a similar
request
On August 28, 2000, DFA through Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota, denied (#2) the
request, stating:
it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name.
Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the
married name has not been used in previous application. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippines Passport Act of
1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a woman may
revert to her maiden name, that is, of only in cases nnulment of
marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case does not
meet any of these conditions.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was

denied (#3) in a letter dated October 13, 2000. On November 15, 2000,
petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President. On July 27, 2004,
the Office of the President dismissed (#4) the appeal with the same
argument as the Asst. Secretary of DFA (RA 8239). The Office of the
President further held that in case of conflict between a general and special
law, the latter will control over the former regardless of the respective dates
of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general rule, it should yield to RA
8239.
The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration and on October 28,
2004, the Office of the President denied (#5) the motion. Petitioner filed
with the court of Appeals for a petition for review and on May 27, 2005, the
Court of Appeals denied (#6) the petition and affirmed the ruling of the
Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court
of Appeals denied (#7) in its Resolution dated August 2, 2005.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
Whether the petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in
her passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the
replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.
Whether there is a conflict between the general law (Civil Code Article
370) and the special law (RA 8239).
RULES/LAW
1. Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the
case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husbands
surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husbands surname, or
(3) Her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is
his wife, such as Mrs.
2. RA 8239: The Implementing
Philippine Passport Act of 1996

Rules

and

Regulations

for

Section 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. No passport shall

be issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized
representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has
complied with the following requirements: xxx

(d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced, or widowed,

or whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy
of the certificate of marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or
annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and
authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That
in case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void,
the woman applicant may revert the use of her maiden name: Provided,
further, That such divorce is recognized under the existing laws of the
Philippines; xxx
3. Section I, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of RA 8239
The passport can be amended only in the
following cases:
(a) Amendment of womans name due to marriage
(b) Amendment of womans name due to death of spouse, annulment
of marriage or divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or
(c) Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a
subsequent marriage of his parents
4. The DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the
first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to
adopt to her husbands name
5. In case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her
husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name.
6. Once a the woman adopted her husbands surname in her passport,
she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in cases
enumerated in section 5(d) of RA 8239.
APPLICATION
1. The petitioner used her maiden first name and her husbands last
name, thus, Maria Virginia V. Remo. This is in accord to Article 370(2),
Title XIII of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
2. it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name.
Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the
married name has not been used in previous application. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippines Passport Act of
1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a woman may
revert to her maiden name, that is, of only in cases nnulment of

marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case does not
meet any of these conditions. DFA Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota
CONCLUSION
No. Ms. Remo cannot revert to the use of her maiden name in the
replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage
because she used her husbands last name when she applied for her
passport for the first time. According to the rule, upon renewal of
passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname
or continuously use her maiden name. And once a the woman
adopted her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to
the use of her maiden name, except in cases enumerated in section
5(d) of RA 8239.
No. There is no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and
Section 5(d) of RA 8239.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the
provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with
passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of
the Civil Code which is a general law on the use of surnames. A
basic tenet in statutory construction is that special law prevails over
a general law.
The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the May 27, 2005
Decision and August 2, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 87710.

Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Executive Secretary Ermita

Facts:
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the
Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of respondent
Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the
vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported the following day, May
17, 2007, by the major daily publications.
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the
appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacaang in view of
the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong. There

is no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the

Office of the President.
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent
Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still there except that
the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC)."
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong
through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional,
arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is
plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his
Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as
Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that
at the time of respondent Ongs birth on May 25, 1953, his father was
Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No
person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines ." Sec. 2
of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine Citizenship."1
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after
respondent Ongs birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by
naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the
appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be
issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and restrain
respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of

respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrain respondent Ong from assuming
the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this Court.
Executive Secretarys Comment:
Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment, essentially
stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this
Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to the powers
vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, thus:
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall
be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed
respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who were duly screened by
and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8 of
the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment,
however, was not released, but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of
respondent Ongs citizenship."
Ongs Comment:
Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file
the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be addressed to the JBC
as the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those it
recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed
to include the President who is an indispensable party as the one who
extended the appointment.
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria
Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly
a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that these two
had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of
which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time
Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino
citizen;6 that respondent Ongs mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of
the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were
married in 1927; that, therefore, respondents mother was a Filipino citizen

at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong
Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong
was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and
as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the
naturalization.
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and
the DOJ a certification and an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his
mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their
standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of this
Court, e.g., Kilosbayan,
Incorporated
v.
Guingona8 and Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is one of
transcendental importance. They claim that the Presidents appointment of
respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is,
therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent Ongs birth
certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings
for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it
states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged
naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not make him a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
Issue: Is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?
Held:
No. He is still required to submit evidentiary documents.
Ratio:
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No.
1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date,
respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine
bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino
citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was
naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years
and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence,
in support of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the

naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate 12 states that he was a
Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese
citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted
evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the
oath as a lawyer.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his naturalborn status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the
final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother
were naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or
correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order,
and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change.
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary
administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth
certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to
the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should,
therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of
respondent Ongs ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all
entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship.
The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent
Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the
records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his
alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three
Constitutions.17 Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution.
For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

RENE B. PASCUAL, Petitioner, vs. JAIME M. ROBLES, Respondent.

FACTS: On 14 September 1989, a petition for Declaration of Heirship and
Appointment of Administrator and Settlement of the Estates of the Late
Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio) was
filed before the RTC [of Iriga City]. Henry, Certeza and Rosalina sought that
they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the late Antonio Rodriguez
and Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged they are the great grandchildren of
Antonio. Having no oppositors to the petition, the RTC entered a general
default against the whole world, except the Republic of the Philippines. After
presentation of proof of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC
allowed Henry, Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a
commissioner in support of the petition. Subsequently, six groups of
oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or individually, one
including Jaime Robles.In his opposition, Jamie Robles likewise prayed that
he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of Antonio and
Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the
estate of Hermogenes covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio
Manggahan, Pasig, Rizal.
After hearing on Jamie Robles' application for appointment as regular
administrator, the RTC issued an Order dated 15 December 1994 declaring
him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes. On 13 August
1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding. The
RTC dismissed the opposition of Robles. Robles then appealed the August 13,
1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a Notice of Appeal, but the same was
denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 22, 1999 for Robles'
failure to file a record on appeal. Robles questioned the denial of his appeal
by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Robles is an indispensable party and his failure to be

impleaded is a valid ground for the dismissal of an action
RULING: In the case at bar, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to
be injured or benefited by the outcome of the petition. He has an interest in
the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such
that the courts cannot proceed without his presence. Moreover, as provided
for under the aforequoted Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Robles is
interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision, considering that he would
benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion would render the
petition for certiorari defective. Petitioner, thus, committed a mistake in
failing to implead Robles as respondent.
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the plaintiffs/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.

Republic vs Marcos II
Facts: On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City
Branch 156, acting as a probate court, in Special Proceeding No. 10279,
issued an Order granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents
Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors
of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
The dispositive portion of the January 11, 1996 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the Last Will and Testament of Ferdinand
Edralin Marcos to have been duly executed in accordance with
law, the same is hereby ALLOWED AND ADMITTED TO PROBATE.
Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00, let
letters testamentary be issued in solidum to Imelda

Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos AND Ferdinand Romualdez

Marcos II, named executors therein.
Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is
hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos.
Let NOTICE be given to all known heirs and creditors of the
decedent, and to any other persons having an interest in the
estate for them to lay their claim against the Estate or forever
hold their peace.
SO ORDERED.

On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a

Motion for Partial Reconsiderationin so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC
Order granted letters testamentary to respondents. On the other hand,
respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence
and validity.
On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance
stating that he already filed a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed
by the January 11, 1996 RTC Order and that he took his oath as named
executor of the will on January 30, 1996.
On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration to BIR
Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato in accordance with an earlier Order
dated September 9, 1994, appointing her as Special Administratrix of the
Marcos Estate.
On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke
the Letters of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner
Vinzons-Chato.

On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion for partial
reconsideration filed by petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration
filed by respondent Imelda Marcos.
On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the
aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents.
On March 13, 1997, the CA issued a Decision, dismissing the referred
petition for having taken the wrong mode of appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was, however denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated August 27, 1997.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of
errors, to wit:
ISSUE: THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE DENIED AND
DISCLAIMED THE VERY EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF THE MARCOS
WILL.

HELD: Anent the third error raised by petitioner, the same has no merit.
Petitioner contends that respondents denied the existence of the will,
and are, therefore, estopped from claiming to be the rightful executors
thereof. Petitioner further claims that said actions clearly show that
respondents lack the competence and integrity to serve as officers of the
court.
This Court does not agree with the posture taken by petitioner, and
instead, accepts the explanation given by respondents, to wit:
Respondents opposed the petition for probate not because
they are disclaiming the existence of the will, but because of
certain legal grounds, to wit: (a) petitioner does not have the
requisite interest to institute it; (b) the original copy of the will
was not attached to the petition for probate as required by the
rules; and (c) the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal

Revenue is not qualified to be appointed as administrator of the

estate.[43]

Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition,

respondents cannot be held guilty of estoppel as they merely acted within
their rights when they put in issue legal grounds in opposing the probate
proceedings. More importantly, even if said grounds were later on overruled
by the RTC, said court was still of opinion that respondents were fit to serve
as executors notwithstanding their earlier opposition. Again, in the absence
of palpable error or gross abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere
with the RTCs discretion.
As for the remaining errors assigned by petitioner, the same are bereft
of merit.
Petitioner contends that respondents have strongly objected to the
transfer to the Philippines of the Marcos assets deposited in the Swiss Banks
and thus the same should serve as a ground for their disqualification to act
as executors. This Court does not agree. In the first place, the same are
mere allegations which, without proof, deserve scant consideration. Time
and again, this Court has stressed that this Court is a court of law and not a
court of public opinion. Moreover, petitioner had already raised the same
argument in its motion for partial reconsideration before the RTC. Said court,
however, still did not find the same as a sufficient ground to disqualify
respondents. Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross abuse of
discretion, this Court will not interfere with the RTCs discretion.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the assailed RTC Orders were based
solely on their own evidence and that respondents offered no evidence to
show that they were qualified to serve as executors. It is basic that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence. Consequently, it was the burden of petitioner (not respondents) to
substantiate the grounds upon which it claims that respondents should be
disqualified to serve as executors, and having failed in doing so, its petition
must necessarily fail.

Go, Sr. vs. LUIS T. RAMOS

Facts:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation
initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is
an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents
himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other
records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented
the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as FChinese. Luis argued
that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents,
Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered,
because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the
other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or
thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to
cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and
untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,verring that the
complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case
designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings.
Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien,
and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father

Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
In resolution dated Feb. 14 2001, Associate Comm. Linda L. Malinab Hornilla
dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy.
On March 8 2001, The Board of Commissioner reversed the decision. Their
contention is that Carlos election of citizenship was made out of time.
The board issued a decision dated April 17 2002 for apprehension and
deportation of Jimmy Go to China.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC but was denied by the
said court.
They questioned the said decision and filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of appeals. The petition was granted.
Their motion for reconsideration was denied at Bureu of immigration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
RULING:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding
governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the
writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time
of the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question
his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His
remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly
issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party

sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court
in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies
authorized to order the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of
the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be
assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the
Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation
by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release
such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law
authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact
ordered

arrested

pending

his

deportation,

coupled

by

this

Courts

pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue
with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered
moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the
other arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.