Consti I

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
ARTICLE XVI: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 1: The flag of the Philippines shall be red, white, and blue, with a sun and
three stars, as consecrated and honored by the people and recognized by law.
Sec. 2: The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national
anthem, or a national seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the
ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its
ratification by the people in a national referendum.
Elenas excessive mahjong sessions is indicative of her psychological incapacity. In the September
2011 ruling, the SC noted that all the children of Tyrone and Elena testified that although their
parents have differences, both took good care of them. However, upon closer look at the
testimonies of the children, it was shown that Elena was too addicted to mahjong that she would
even bring her children to her mahjong sessions which were so frequent and would last from early
in the afternoon to past midnight. The fact that the Elena brought her children with her to her
mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her
tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture
of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist
desires. This revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral and mental development.
Sec. 3: The State may not be sued without its consent.
1. VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ,

G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
DOCTRINE: This case is controversial as many would point that this ruling significantly relaxed the
application of Article 36 of the Family Code and would thus make annulment of marriages easier.
However, Supreme Court explained that the ruling in this Kalaw Case is exclusive to this case only.
The SC did not relax in all cases the guidelines set forth in its precedentsall of which remain
and have not been overturned.
FACTS:
In 1994, Valerio Tyrone Kalaw filed a petition to have his marriage with Ma. Elena Fernandez be
annulled on the ground that Elena is psychologically incapacitated. The RTC, after hearing the
expert witnesses testify in court, eventually granted the petition, but on appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the said decision. Tyrone appealed to the Supreme Court. In September 2011,
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the September 2011 decision (657 SCRA 822) should be reversed.
HELD: Yes.
Trial courts findings of facts should be given due weight. The SC ruled that it misappreciated the
findings made by the RTC when the SC reviewed the case in September 2011. The SC ruled
that the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in
the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect. Therefore, it was not proper for the SC to brush aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina
Gates, a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based
on the Tyrones version of the events. The conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses
because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be
disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the Tyrones factual premises.
Respondent could also establish the psychological incapacity of the plaintiff spouse. The plaintiff in
an annulment case under Article 36 carries the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage,
however, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could also establish the psychological
incapacity of the plaintiff spouse if the respondent raised the matter in her/his answer. The courts
are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of
whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the
other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity
may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
2. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (METRAN) vs. JOSE

MA. PAREDES
G.R. No. L-1232, January 12, 1948
DOCTRINE: STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

The Metropolitan Transportation Service, not being a juridical person, any suit, action or
proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would in practice be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself.
FACTS:
Before the Court of Industrial Relations a petition was filed in case No. 36-V entitled "National Labor
Union, versus Metropolitan Service (Metran)," wherein petitioner alleged that it was a legitimate
labor organization, thirty of whose affiliated members were working and under the employ of the
respondent; that the respondent is a semi-governmental transportation entity, popularly known as
'Metran,' and after several other allegations concluded with the prayer that its nine demands at
length set forth in said petition be granted. In behalf of the so-called respondent an oral petition
for dismissal of the case was made before the court on October 22, 1946, "on the ground that the
respondent belongs to the Republic of the Philippines and as such, it cannot be sued"
ISSUE: Whether or not METRAN can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit
HELD:
It is beyond dispute that the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) is and was at the times
covered by the petition in the Court of Industrial Relations an office created by Executive Order No.
59 and operating under the direct supervision and control of the Department of the Public Works
and Communications
CALLEJO. EVANGELISTA. GRIMARES. NARCISO. RAPISTA. VILLAFUERTE | 1C 2019

Any award, order or decision granting any of the Union's demands, if attempted to be executed,
would necessarily operate against the government which is really the entity rendering the services
and performing the activities in question through its office or agency called Metropolitan
Transportation Service (Metran). The case is different from those of the so-called government
corporations, such as the Philippine National Bank, National Development Company, the Manila
Hotel, etc., which have been duly incorporated under our corporation law or special charters, one
of whose powers is "to sue and be sued in any court"
The Bureau of Public Works under whose supervision the Metropolitan Transportation Service
(Metran) has been organized and functions is an integral part of the government, just as the said
office or agency. And apart from the consideration that neither said Bureau nor said office has any
juridical personality to be used for reasons already set forth, any suit or action attempted against
either will necessarily be a suit or action against the government itself. In a republican state, like
Philippines, government immunity from suit without its consent is derived from the will of the
people themselves in freely creating a government "of the people, and for the people"-a
representative government through which they have agreed to exercise the powers and discharge
the duties of their sovereignty for the common good and general welfare.
complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and
served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees
claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third party
defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party defendant
and its predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said Bacolod Airport No. 2
and, further, that the third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol
Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use of their lands."
The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint, first, because the
National Airports Corporation "has lost its juridical personality," and, second, because agency of
the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the
law, is incapable of suing and being sued."
ISSUE:
In so agreeing, the citizens have solemnly undertaken to surrender some of their private rights and
interest which were calculated to conflict with the higher rights and larger interests of the people
as a whole, represented by the government thus established by them all. One of those "higher
rights," based upon those "larger interests" is that government immunity.
Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration can be sued
The proceedings before the CIR are thereby declared null and void.
HELD:
3. NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION vs. JOSE TEODORO, SR

G.R. No. L-5122, April 30, 1952
DOCTRINE:
The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has
the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater
reason should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports
Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the
liabilities of the latter.
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under Section 3, to execute
contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to
charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies,
and rentals for the use of any property under its management.
These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration the power to sue and be sued.
The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has
the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater
reason should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports
Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the
liabilities of the latter. To deny the National Airports Corporation's creditors access to the courts of
justice against the Civil Aeronautics Administration is to say that the government could impair the
obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated
agencies.
The petition is denied with costs against the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
FACTS:
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly
made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation. On November 10,
1950, the National Airports Corporation was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its
place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.
Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245
as fees for landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and including July 31,
1948. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. which
owned the land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport, and the owner commenced an
action in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the Philippine Airlines, Inc., in
1951 to recover the above amount. The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party

4. PHILIPPINE ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC. vs. BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS
G.R. No. 84992, December 15,1989
DOCTRINE:
When a suit is directed against said unincorporated government agency (Board of Liquidators)
which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is
against the agency's principal, i.e., the State. If the Government conducts a business through
either a government-owned and controlled corporation or a noncorporate agency set up primarily
for a business purpose, the entity enjoys no immunity from suit even if there is no express grant of
authority to "sue or be sued."
REPACOM. It was not created for profit or to engage in business. Hence, when a suit is directed
against said unincorporated government agency which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no
juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency's principal, i.e., the State. If the
Government conducts a business through either a government-owned and controlled corporation
or a noncorporate agency set up primarily for a business purpose, the entity enjoys no immunity
from suit even if there is no express grant of authority to "sue or be sued." Having a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such government-owned and
controlled corporation and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not
exempt from garnishment.
It should be mentioned that when the State consents to be sued, it does not necessarily concede
its liability. By consenting to be sued, it waives its immunity from suit, but it does not waive its
lawful defenses to the action. Even when the government has been adjudged liable in a suit to
which it has consented, it does not necessarily follow that the judgment can be enforced by
execution against its hands for every disbursement of public funds must be covered by a
corresponding appropriation passed by the Legislature.
FACTS:
On July 30, 1982, PHILROCK filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, a complaint
against the Board of Liquidators for Specific Performance or Revaluation with Damages, praying
that the defective rock pulverizing machinery which it purchased from REPACOM (1) be replaced
with a new one in good and operable condition according to the specifications of their contract, or,
in the alternative, to refund the value of the defective rock pulverizing machinery at 31% of its
contract price; (2) actual damages of P 5,000 per month for losses it allegedly incurred due to the
increased expenses of maintaining the plant, P 4,000 per day as unrealized profits, exemplary
damages; and (3) attorney fees of P 50,000, plus expenses and costs of the suit.On April 23, 1987,
the trial court rendered a decision in favor of PHILROCK and ordered REPACOM and the Board of
Liquidators- (1) to reimburse Philrock for the expenses it had invested and incurred (2) to pay
Philrock compensatory damages for unrealized profits from May, 1966 and up to December 31,
1983, (3) to pay Philrock reimbursement for the expenses incurred in storage and maintenance of
the rock pulverizing plant at Philrock's plant site, (4) to pay Philrock exemplary damages,
Attorneys fee and costs of the suit.
A judgment against the State, in a case where it consents to be sued, simply implies that the
Legislature will recognize the judgment as final and make provision for its satisfaction. The Court of
appeals correctly annulled and set aside the writs of execution and garnishment issued by the trial
court against the funds of the Board of Liquidators in the PNB. Funds should be appropriated by the
legislature for the specific purpose of satisfying the judgment in favor of PHILROCK before said
judgment may be paid.
5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO FELICIANO and

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
G.R. No. 70853, March 12, 1987
On May 14, 1987, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the State, filed a notice of appeal and an
opposition to the "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal" on the ground that the funds sought to be
garnished by PHILROCK are public funds, hence, exempt from attachment and execution Judge
Natividad Adduru-Santillan issued a Writ of Execution. An order of Garnishment was served to PNB
against the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquidators to satisfy the judgment of
P 34,894,607.45 in favor of PHILROCK. On May 25, 1987, the Board of filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition in the Court of Appeals, where Court of Appeals set aside the writ of execution,
hence this petition for review.
DOCTRINE:
The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery
of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private
person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. By its caption and its allegation and
prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not
permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Board of Liquidators, as a government agency without juridical capacity, may
be sued and held liable as litigators of REPACOM
HELD:
The Board of Liquidators is a government agency under the direct supervision of the President of
the Republic created by EO 372, dated November 24, 1950. Pursuant to PDs Nos. 629 and 635-A, it
is tasked with the specific duty of administering the assets and paying the liabilities of the defunct
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985
reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI which dismissed the
complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land on the ground of non-suability of the State. On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a
complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in
the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract
of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that
Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to
the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon plaintiff's purchase of the
property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and
caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on
October 24, 1954; that on November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement
and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of
Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land
Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in
question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the
private property of plaintiff and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be
declared the rightful and true owner; that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of
his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to
cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.
On August 29, 1970, the trial court, through Judge Rafael S. Sison, rendered a decision declaring
Lot No. 1 to be the private property of the plaintiff, and declaring said lot excluded from the NARRA
settlement reservation. The court declared the rest of the property claimed by plaintiff, i.e. Lots 2,
3 and 4, reverted to the public domain. The case was reopened to allow intervenors to present
their evidence. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff went to the Intermediate Appellate
Court on a petition for certiorari. Said petition was, however, denied by the Intermediate Appellate
Court, and petitioners brought the matter to this Court in G.R. No. 36163, which was denied on May
3, 1973 Consequently, the case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. Upon
denial of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff again went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on
petition for certiorari. On April 30, 1985, the respondent appellate court rendered its decision
reversing the order of Judge Lising and remanding the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings. Hence this petition.
The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90
can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being
a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi
juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must
emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the
legislative body.
6. MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., vs CUSTOMS ARRASTRE

SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS,
G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966
DOCTRINE:
The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does
not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an
incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from
suit extended to such government entity.
FACTS:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in November
of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment arrived at the Port
of Manila on April 10, 1963, and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service,
the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre
Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section III of Article XVI or the doctrine of State immunity applies to this case
HELD:
The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has
impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is
claimed to be usurping a piece of property. By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the
complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted,
except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication
through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. The failure of the petitioner to
assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a quo, as
alleged by private respondent, is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by
the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings."
On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the
undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages. On April 20, 1964 the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the
law, defendants cannot be sued. After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964,
dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of
Customs is suable. Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the defendants'
suability under the facts stated.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance with no personality of its
own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of

assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs
duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is
a necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed
and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of
merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities
and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And
this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable
place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires
arrastre operations.
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary
incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in
the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform
its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted
as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public policy,
cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General
Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the
conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed.
which took effect on June 22, 1957. Del Mar also asked for compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages.
The PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar pension from the United States
Government effectively barred him from claiming and receiving from the Philippine Government
the monthly life pension granted him as well as the monthly allowances he claimed for his five
living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age. The PVA also asserted that it is
discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the pension sought by del Mar. In addition, it
alleged that the action of del Mar was premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies before invoking judicial intervention, and that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to
try the case as del Mar demand partakes of a money claim against the PVA a mere agency of
the Philippine Government and, in effect, of a suit against the Government which is not suitable
without its consent. The PVA thus prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment upholding del Mar claims. Hence, the present
appeal by the PVA.
ISSUE:
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.
So ordered.
7. QUIRICO DEL MAR vs.THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

G.R. No. L-27299, June 27, 1973
DOCTRINE
In such actions, which, in effect, constitute suits against the Government, the court has no option
but to dismiss them. Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a
claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to
release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit
of the said claimant.
FACTS:
On June 20, 1964, Quirico del Mar filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu petition
for mandamus against the Philippine Veterans Administration to compel the latter to continue
paying him monthly life pension of P50 from the date of its cancellation in March 1950 to June 20,
1957, and thereafter, or from June 22 1957 his monthly life pension, as increased by Republic Act
1920, of P100 and to pay to him as well the monthly living allowance of P10 for each of his
unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, pursuant to the said Republic Act 1920
HELD:
As a general proposition, the rule well-settled in this jurisdiction on the immunity of the
Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse
consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property."
Needless to state, in such actions, which, in effect, constitute suits against the Government, the
court has no option but to dismiss them. Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no
application where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his
statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by
statute for the benefit of the said claimant. As clearly discernible from the circumstances, the case
at bar falls under the exception.
The principle recognizing the necessity of vesting administrative authorities with the power to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to effectual its policies,
provided such rules and regulations conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute
as well purport to carry into effect its general policies, constitutes well established doctrine in this
jurisdiction.
The PVA's pretense that del Mar case falls under the clause of section 9 of Republic Act 65, as
amended, which excepts those who "are actually receiving a similar pension from other
Government funds" from the coverage of said section 9 predicated upon its interpretation that
the phrase other Government funds" includes funds of the United States Government fails to
persuade this Court as a valid argument to justify its cancellation of del Mar monthly life pension.

The record of the case at bar being completely bereft of any indication to show the suspension by
the President of the Philippines pursuant to section 20 of Republic Act 65, amended of the
operation of any of the provisions of the said statute, this Court perforce must uphold del Mar
claims.
8. TRADERS ROYAL BANK vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 68514, December 17, 1990
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine of state immunity from suits is constitutionally recognized and is germane to the
concept of sovereignty. As such, the doctrine may be waived by general or special law. Immunity
from suit may also be waived by an implied consent to be sued as when, through its officers and
agents, the state enters into a contract in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose. By doing
so, the state descends to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the
very act of entering into such contract.
FACTS:
On April 9, 1981, Traders, a banking institution operating under Philippine laws, entered into a loan
agreement with the NMPC, a government instrumentality tasked with the function of disseminating
government information, programs and policies, represented by Director Gregorio S. Cendaa, and
the PSI, a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, represented by its
president, Romeo G. Jalosjos.
Under the loan agreement, Traders approved a credit accommodation in the amount of two million
five hundred twenty thousand pesos (P2,520,000) in favor of NMPC and PSI through a domestic
stand-by letter of credit to guarantee payment of the coverage or broadcast rights for the 1981
season of the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA). Among the conditions imposed were that
NMPC and PSI would deposit with Traders all collections obtained from the sponsoring companies
and that during the term of said letter of credit they would maintain in their current account with
the bank a balance of at least P500,000 or 20% of the face value of the letter of credit.
As of July 27, 1981, the PBA had actually drawn against said letter of credit the total amount of
P340,000. Inasmuch as NMPC and PSI did not make any payments on their obligation nor did they
comply with the conditions aforecited, Traders filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay
City a complaint against NMPC and PSI to collect the whole amount of P2,520,000 (Civil Case No.
9303-P). Alleging therein that the defendants were selling or disposing of substantial portions of
their assets. Traders prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The lower court
issued the writ prayed for after Traders filed a bond of P2,520,000.
Pursuant to said writ, the deputy sheriff of Rizal collected an aggregate amount of P1,046,816.75
from the PSI whose president, Jalosjos, thereafter requested Traders through a letter that said
amount be considered as partial payment of defendants' principal obligation, interest and
attorney's fees. Traders acceded to the request and through a manifestation, prayed the court to
issue an order in the tenor of Jalosjos' request. 6 Said prayer was granted by the lower court.
A few months later, the NMPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a motion to dismiss
the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the NMPC, being an entity under the Office of the
President performing governmental functions, cannot be sued without its consent.
On September 21, 1982, the lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the strength of the ruling
in Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America that the state may be sued without its
consent if it entered into a contract with a private person. In its answer to the complaint, NMPC
reiterated its contention that it was immune from suit and alleged that the claim should have been
filed with the Commission on Audit pursuant to Article XII, D, Section 2(1) of the 1973 Constitution
and Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code of the Philippines). It
filed a cross-claim against PSI alleging that it merely acted as a guarantor of PSI in the loan
agreement considering that it had appointed PSI as production manager and exclusive marketing
manager for the 1979, 1980 and 1981 PBA seasons.
The bond was thereafter renewed and pre-trial of the case was set. In the meantime, the deputy
sheriff garnished the collection from the sponsoring companies in the amount of P1,391,699.57
and another P420,189.27 from NMPC's account with Traders for a total of P1,811,888.84.
Before the trial, NMPC, through private counsel, filed another motion to dismiss reiterating the
stand of the Office of the Solicitor General on NMPC's immunity from suit. Traders opposed the
motion asserting that the lower court has jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the case and
that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The NMPC, through private
counsel, filed a reply to the opposition.
On January 5, 1984, the lower court issued an order stating that "to maintain the authoritative
dignity" of the court, the order of September 21, 1982 denying the motion to dismiss should be
respected.
Consequently, NMPC filed before the then Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for Certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus alleging that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in denying
the motion to dismiss and in failing to dissolve the writ of attachment on the grounds that
government property cannot be attached, removed, concealed or disposed of and that the
attachment bond of Traders was not renewed. It asserted that if NMPC was at all liable, partial
availment of the letter of credit in the amount of P340,000 was "already more than satisfied" and
that "as regards the undrawn balance, NMPC already terminated the loan agreement and/or
whatever security or guarantee NMPC had previously executed to (sic) said letter of credit." It
prayed that the order denying the motions to dismiss be annulled and that the lower court be
commanded to desist from further proceeding with the case and to dismiss the same and make
permanent the mandatory injunction releasing the garnished moneys of the government.
The appellate court granted the petition in its decision of July 17, 1984. It found that as an
instrumentality of the government under the supervision of the Office of the President, NMPC,
which had not been duly incorporated so as to assume a separate juridical personality of its own,
may not be sued without its consent.
ISSUE:
HELD:
On the issue of suability of the NMPC, the court sided with the petitioner.
The doctrine of state immunity from suits is constitutionally recognized and is germane to the
concept of sovereignty. As such, the doctrine may be waived by general or special law. Immunity
from suit may also be waived by an implied consent to be sued as when, through its officers and
agents, the state enters into a contract in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose. By doing
so, the state descends to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the very
act of entering into such contract.
A problem usually arises when a government entity, though unincorporated and therefore not
possessed of a distinct juridical personality, enters into a contract which, by its nature, is
proprietary in character. Should this transpire, the test of the state's suability is this: "If said nongovernmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no
waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity." 20 In
others words, if the transaction, contract or operation undertaken by the government entity is a
necessary incident of its prime governmental function, said entity is immune from suit.
The general and bare allegation of the NMPC on its non-suability is weak even in the face of its own
admission that it was "in truth and in fact merely acting as guarantor" for PSI. There is, however,
no explanation as to what liabilities the NMPC had as such "guarantor." A reading of the loan
agreement, in fact, reveals that there is no distinction as to the nature of the liability of the PSI and
the NMPC. In the contract, both are referred to collectively as the "clients" and "accountees."
Hence, it can safely be assumed that by the terms of the contract, the NMPC was engaged in a
business undertaking which was certainly beyond its function of disseminating governmental
information.
When the state itself, through the acts of a duly authorized official of an agency, exceeds its
authority, the doctrine may not be invoked as a shield in the same manner that it cannot serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
The NMPC's implied consent to be sued notwithstanding, the trial court did not have the power to
garnish NMPC deposits to answer for any eventual judgment against it. Being public funds, the
deposits are not within the reach of any garnishment or attachment proceedings. There is more
reason to apply said doctrine in this case considering that the waiver of non-suability is only
implied and not expressly allowed by statute.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it considers the
NMPC as immune from suit is hereby reversed and set aside. The writ of attachment issued by the
lower court in Civil Case No. 9303-P against the NMPC deposits with Traders Royal Bank is
immediately lifted and said court is directed to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No.
9303-P.
SO ORDERED.

9. CARMEN FESTEJO vs ISAIAS FERNANDO
G.R. No. L-5156, March 11, 1954
DOCTRINE:
The motion against Isaias Fernando, Director of Public Works in charge and responsible for the
construction of irrigation systems in the Philippines is a directed personally against him, for acts
which he assumed to run on your official concept. The law does not excuse you from responsibility
for the abuses to commit or have committed in the performance of their official duties.
FACTS:
Carmen Festejo, owner of sugar lands, a total of about 9 acres of surface, sued Isaiah Fernando
Director, Bureau of Public Works, as such Director of Public Works is responsible for systems and
irrigation projects and is the official responsible for the construction of irrigation systems in the
country, claiming that the defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without Authority
Obtained from the first Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without first Obtaining a right of way,
and without the consent and Knowledge of the plaintiff, and Against her express objection
unlawfully Took possession of portions of the three parcels of land Described Above, an irrigation
canal and Caused to be Constructed on the Portion of the three parcels of land on or about the
month of February 1951 Being the aggregate area 24.179 square meters to the damage and
prejudice of the plaintiff varied causing her damages.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. The court held that the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on
plaintiff's land, defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside
the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former
condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed
on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land southeasterly of the right
of way innocently.
Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be
sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his
tortious act.
It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise
who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render
himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by
law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his
office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.
In any of the cases referred to this article, whether or not the defendant's acts or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
Separate Opinions (CONCEPCION, J., dissenting)
To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias
Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the Government.
According to said pleading the defendant is "Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works."
The emphasis thus placed upon the allegation that the acts complained of were performed by said
defendant "as Director of the Bureau of Public Works," clearly shows that the designation of his
office was included in the title of the case to indicate that he was being sued in his official capacity.
We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system referred to in the
complaint of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading, is "in
charge" and for which he is "responsible" as Director of the Bureau of Public Works are
established and operated with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must be
appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the construction may have been
undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a property of the
Government. Consequently, in praying that possession of the portions of land occupied by the
irrigation canal involved in the present case be returned to plaintiff therein, and that said land be
restored to its former condition, plaintiff seeks to divest the Government of its possession of said
irrigation canal, and, what is worse, to cause said property of the Government to be removed or
destroyed
10. SHAUF v. CA
Petitioners: Loida Q. Shauf and Jacob Shauf

Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Don E. Detwiler and Anthony Persi
DOCTRINE: If the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it
has not been formally impleaded. However, it is a different matter where the public official is made
to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff
since the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari, wherein petitioners seek to reverse and set aside the
decision of the respondent, CA, in the case entitled Loida Shauf and Jacob Shauf v. Don Detwiler
and Anthony Persi. CA dismissed petitioners complaint for damages filed before the RTC, and its
subsequent resolution denying petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of its aforesaid decision.
The case occurred in the Clark Air Base of the United States. During the time material to the
complaint, private respondent Don Detwiler was civilian personnel officer, while private respondent
Anthony Persi was education director.
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the
United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor in the Base
Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified, and, more importantly, she
had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base for approximately four years at the
time she applied for the same position in 1976.
By reason of her non-selection to the position, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed an equal employment
opportunity complaint against private respondents, for alleged discrimination against the former
by reason of her nationality and sex.
Private respondents, as defendants in Civil Case No. 2783 filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that as officers of the United States Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with
the powers vested in them under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, they are
immune from suit. The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
The parties submitted a Partial Stipulation of Facts in the court, which then rendered judgment in
favor of herein petitioner Loida Q. Shauf. Both parties appealed from the aforecited decision to
respondent Court of Appeals.
As stated at the outset, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court,
dismissed herein petitioners' complaint and denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE/s:
1.
W/N respondents can be sued by virtue of Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution
HELD:
1.
YES.
Petitioners aver that private respondents are being sued in their private capacity for discriminatory
acts performed beyond their authority, hence the instant action is not a suit against the United
States Government which would require its consent.
Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that in filing the case, petitioners sought a judicial
review by a Philippine court of the official actuations of respondents as officials of a military unit of
the U.S. Air Force stationed at Clark Air Base. The acts complained of were done by respondents
while administering the civil service laws of the United States.
The acts sued upon being a governmental activity of respondents, the complaint is barred by the
immunity of the United States, as a foreign sovereign, from suit without its consent and by the
immunity of the officials of the United States armed forces for acts committed in the performance

of their official functions pursuant to the grant to the United States armed forces of rights, power
and authority within the bases under the Military Bases Agreement. It is further contended that the
rule allowing suits against public officers and employees for unauthorized acts, torts and criminal
acts is a rule of domestic law, not of international law. It applies to cases involving the relations
between private suitors and their government or state, not the relations between one government
and another from which springs the doctrine of immunity of a foreign sovereign.
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3,
of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we
have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely
reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to
manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in
the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against
the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the
rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. It is a different matter
where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff.
As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al.
vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.: 20 "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for
the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State
from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State
officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State,
he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional
act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State
within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice.
In the case of Baer, etc. vs. Tizon, etc., et al., 23 it was ruled that:
There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court. Petitioner,
as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic
immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the action
taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents.
Also, in Animos, et al. vs. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, et al., 24 we held that:
". . . it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public
treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded
against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of nonsuability may
appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary
bad to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute
appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. . . .
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from
suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment
they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts
without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.
The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no
exception to this rule. In the case of United States of America, et al. vs. Guinto, etc., et al., ante, 26
we declared:
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of
America blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the
other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they
have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.
11. MINISTERIO v. CFI

Petitioners: Angel Ministerio and Asuncion Sadaya
Respondents: The Court of First Instance of Cebu, et. al.
DOCTRINE: The government is immune from suit without its consent. Nor is it indispensable that
it be the party proceeded against. It is a different matter where the public official is made to
account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff.
Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a
suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.
FACTS:
What is before this Court for determination in this appeal by certiorari to review a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. The lower court, relying on what it considered to be authoritative
precedents, held that petitioners could not sue defendants, Public Highway Commissioner and the
Auditor General, in their capacity as public officials without thereby violating the principle of
government immunity from suit without its consent. Lower court thereby dismissed the suit. The
matter was then elevated to the Supreme Court. This Court arrives at a different conclusion, and
sustains the right of the plaintiff to file a suit of this character. Accordingly, we reverse.
Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu in1966, sought
the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, alleging that in 1927, the National
Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and
used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just
compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of
repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public
Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It was further
alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved Resolution
No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a
total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was amended on 1966 in the sense that the
remedy prayed for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of
the just compensation.
In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now
Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality
was one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been
shown.
On 1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the
registered owners of Lot 647-B of the Banilad estate and more particularly described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters; That the National
Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the
widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No.
90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B
is still in the possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of the Gorordo
Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid the value of the land
which is being utilized for public use."
The lower court decision now under review was promulgated on January 30, 1969. As is evident
from the excerpt to be cited, the plea that the suit was against the government without its consent
having been manifested met with a favorable response. Thus: "It is uncontroverted that the land in
question is used by the National Government for road purposes. No evidence was presented
whether or not there was an agreement or contract between the government and the original
owner and whether payment was paid or not to the original owner of the land. It may be presumed
that when the land was taken by the government the payment of its value was made thereafter
and no satisfactory explanation was given why this case was filed only in 1966. But granting that
no compensation was given to the owner of the land, the case is undoubtedly against the National
Government and there is no showing that the government has consented to be sued in this case. It

may be contended that the present case is brought against the Public Highway Commissioner and
the Auditor General and not against the National Government. Considering that the herein
defendants are sued in their official capacity the action is one against the National Government
who should have been made a party in this case, but, as stated before, with its consent."
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs, now petitioners, seeking the just compensation to which they are entitled
under the Constitution for the expropriation of their property necessary for the widening of a
street, no condemnation proceeding having been filed, could sue defendants Public Highway
Commissioner and the Auditor General, in their capacity as public officials without thereby
violating the principle of government immunity from suit without its consent.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of January 30, 1969 dismissing the complaint is reversed
and the case remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.
The decision of the lower court cannot stand.
1. The government is immune from suit without its consent. Nor is it indispensable that
it be the party proceeded against. If it appears that the action, would in fact hold it liable, the
doctrine calls for application. It follows then that even if the defendants named were public
officials, such a principle could still be an effective bar. This is clearly so where a litigation would
result in a financial responsibility for the government, whether in the disbursements of funds or
loss of property. Under such circumstances, the liability of the official sued is not personal. The
party that could be adversely affected is government. Hence the defense of non-suability may be
interposed.
So it has been categorically set forth in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez: "However, and this is important,
where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the
property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government,
then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it
cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said
Government."
2. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as
such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth
by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications v. Aligean: "Inasmuch as the
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have
been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an
action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property
rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he
does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may
not be sued without its consent."
Accordingly, the lower court decision is reversed so that the court may proceed with the complaint
and determine the compensation to which petitioners are entitled, taking into account the ruling in
the above Alfonso case: "As to the value of the property, although the plaintiff claims the present
market value thereof, the rule is that to determine due compensation for lands appropriated by the
Government, the basis should be the price or value at the time that it was taken from the owner
and appropriated by the Government."
12. SYQUIA v. ALMEDA-LOPEZ
Petitioners: Pedro Syquia, Gonzalo Syquia, Leopoldo Syquia

Respondents: Natividad Almeda-Lopez, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, Conrado V. Sanchez,
Judge of CFI Manila, George F. Moore, et.al.
DOCTRINE: A private citizen claiming title and right of possession of a certain property may, to
recover possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government who
are said to be illegally witholding the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents
claim that they are acting for the Government, and the court may entertain such a suit although
the Government itself is not included as a partydefendant. In such a case the officials or agents
asserting rightful possession must prove and justify their claim before the courts, when it is made
to appear in the suit against them that the title and right of possession is in the private citizen.
However, where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of
the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the
Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself, and,
consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of
said Government.
FACTS:
The plaintiffs named Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint
owners of three apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as the North Syquia
Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments.
About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed three lease contracts, one for each of
the three apartments, in favor of the United States. The term or period for the three leases was to
be "for the duration of the war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the United
States of America." The apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of the
U. S. armed forces stationed in the Manila area.
In March 1947, when these court proceedings were commenced, George F. Moore was the
Commanding General of the U. S. Army in the Manila Theatre, and was said to control the
occupancy of the said apartment houses and had authority in the name of the United States
Government to assign officers of the U. S. Army to said apartments or to order said officers to
vacate the same. Erland A. Tillman was the Chief, Real Estate Division, Office of the District
Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila, who, under the command of defendant Moore was in direct charge
and control of the lease and occupancy of said three apartment buildings.
Under the theory that said leases terminated six months after September 2, 1945, when Japan
surrendered, plaintiffs sometime in March, 1946, approached the predecessors in office of
defendants Moore and Tillman and requested the return of the apartment buildings to them, but
were advised that the U. S. Army wanted to continue occupying the premises. On May 11, 1946,
said plaintiffs requested the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to renegotiate said leases,
execute lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those
payable under the old contracts. The predecessors in office of Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946,
refused to execute new leases. Not being in conformity with the continuance of the old leases
because of the alleged comparatively low rentals being paid thereunder, plaintiffs formally
requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and to release the apartment buildings on June 28,
1946. Tillman refused to comply with the request. Because of the alleged representation and
assurance that the U.S. Government would vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, the
plaintiffs took no further steps to secure possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly
rentals tendered by the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman on the basis of a month to
month lease subject to cancellation upon thirty days notice.
Because of the failure to comply with the alleged representation and assurance that the three
apartment buildings will be vacated, plaintiffs served formal notice upon defendants Moore and
Tillman and 64 other army officers or members of the United States Armed Forces who were then
occupying apartments in said three buildings, demanding: (a) cancellation of said leases; (b)
increase in rentals to P300 per month per apartment effective thirty days from notice; (c)
execution of new leases for the three or any one or two of the said apartment buildings for a
definite term, otherwise, (d) release of said apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in
the event of the failure to comply with the foregoing demands.
The thirty-day period having expired without any of the defendants having complied with plaintiffs'
demands, the plaintiffs commenced the present action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form
of an action for unlawful detainer (desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons
occupying apartments in the three buildings.
Acting upon a motion to dismiss filed through the Special Assistant of the Judge Advocate,
Philippine Ryukus Command on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants
and over the subject matter of the action, because the real party in interest was the U.S.
Government and not the individual defendants named in the complaint, and that the complaint did

not state a cause of action, and that the municipal court of Manila found that the war between the
United States of America and her allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other, had not
yet terminated and, consequently, the period or term of the three leases had not yet expired; that
under the well settled rule of International Law, a foreign government like the United States
Government cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent; that it was clear
from the allegations of the complaint that although the United States of America has not been
named therein as defendant, it is nevertheless the real defendant in this case, as the parties
named as defendants are officers of the United States Army and were occupying the buildings in
question as such and pursuant to orders received from that Government.
The municipal court dismissed the action with costs against the plaintiffs with the suggestion or
opinion that a citizen of the Philippines, who feels aggrieved by the acts of the Government of a
foreign country has the right to demand that the Philippine Government study his claim and if
found meritorious, take such diplomatic steps as may be necessary for the vindication of rights of
that citizen, and that the matter included or involved in the action should be a proper subject
matter of representations between the Government of the Government of the United States of
America and the Philippines. Not being satisfied with the order, plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Manila, where the motion to dismiss was renewed.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, affirmed the order of the municipal court dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint. It conceded that under the doctrine laid down in the case of U. S. vs. Lee, 106 U. S., 196
and affirmed in the case of Tindal vs. Wesley, 167 U. S., 204 ordinarily, courts have jurisdiction
over cases where private parties sue to recover possession of property being held by officers or
agents acting in the name of the U. S. Government even though no suit can be brought against the
Government itself, but inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the present case are bringing this action
against officers and agents of the U. S. Government not only to recover the possession of the three
apartment houses supposedly being held illegally by them in the name of their government, but
also to collect back rents, not only at the rate agreed upon in the lease contracts entered into by
the United States of America but in excess of said rate, to say nothing of the damages claimed, as
a result of which, a judgment in these proceedings may become a charge against the U. S.
Treasury, then under the rule laid down in the case of Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. the present suit
must be regarded as one against the United States Government itself, which cannot be sued
without its consent, specially by citizens of another country.
The plaintiffs as petitioners have brought this case before us on a petition for a writ of mandamus
seeking to order the Municipal Court of Manila to take jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners
demand the return of the apartments, and as a matter of fact, said apartments were actually
vacated and were received by the plaintiff-owners. Petitioners contend that although the return of
the apartment renders the case moot, they are still entitled to collect rents and damages, which
have not yet been paid. The counsel for the petitioners informed this court that petitioners had
already received the U. S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific the sum of P109,895 as rentals for
the three apartments, but with the reservation that said acceptance should not be construed as
jeopardizing the rights of the petitioners in the case now pending in the courts of the Philippines or
their rights against the U. S. Government with respect to the three apartment houses. In view of
this last petition, counsel for respondents alleging that both respondent Moore and Tillman had
long left the Islands for other Army assignments, and now that both the possession of the three
apartments in question as well as the rentals for their occupation have already been received by
the petitioners renew their motion for dismissal on the ground that this case has now become
moot. Because the prime purpose of the action had been achieved, namely, the recovery of the
possession of the premises, apart from the fact that the rentals amounting to P109,895 had been
paid to the petitioners and accepted by them though under reservations, this Court may now well
dismiss the present proceedings on the ground that the questions involved therein have become
academic and moot. Counsel for the petitioners however, insists that a decision be rendered on the
merits, particularly on the question of jurisdiction of the municipal court over the original action,
not only for the satisfaction of the parties involved but also to serve as a guide in future cases
involving cases of similar nature.
ISSUE:
W/N the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case involving contracts of lease entered into
between the Government of the US, and Filipino citizens regarding properties of the latter
HELD:
We shall concede as correctly did the Court of First Instance, that following the doctrine laid down
in the cases of U. S. vs. Lee and U. S. vs. Tindal, supra, a private citizen claiming title and right of
possession of a certain property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as individuals,
officers and agents of the Government who are said to be illegally witholding the same from him ,
though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government, and the
court may entertain such a suit although the Government itself is not included as a partydefendant. In such a case the officials or agents asserting rightful possession must prove and
justify their claim before the courts, when it is made to appear in the suit against them that the
title and right of possession is in the private citizen. However, and this is important, where the
judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the
property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the
Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself,
and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with
the consent of said Government.
From a careful study of this case, considering the facts involved therein as well as those of public
knowledge of which we take judicial cognizance, we are convinced that the real party in
interest as defendant in the original case is the United States of America. The lessee in
each of the three lease agreements was the United States of America and the lease agreement her
officials acting as her agents executed themselves in her name.
We cannot see how the defendants and respondents Moore and Tillman could be held individually
responsible for the payments of rentals or damages in relation to the occupancy of the apartment
houses in question. Both of these army officials had no intervention whatsoever in the execution
neither of the lease agreements nor in the initial occupancy of the premises both of which were
effected through the intervention of and at the instance of their predecessors in office. As to the
army officers who actually occupied the apartments involved, there is less reason for holding them
personally liable for rentals and supposed damages as sought by the plaintiffs. It must be
remembered that these army officers when coming to their station in Manila were not given the
choice of their dwellings. They were merely assigned quarters in the apartment buildings in
question. Said assignments or billets may well be regarded as orders, and all that those officers did
was to obey them, and, accordingly, occupied the rooms assigned to them.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party
defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America; that any
judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by
defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U. S.
Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on what
we have already stated, the present action must be considered as one against the U. S.
Government. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of
Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The U. S.
Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit, which is essentially against her,
though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
Government without the latter's consent but it is of citizen filing an action against a foreign
government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of
jurisdiction of the courts of his country.
In conclusion we find that the Municipal Court of Manila committed no error in dismissing
the case for lack of jurisdiction and that the Court of First Instance acted correctly in
affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal. Case dismissed, without pronouncement
as to costs.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The petition must be granted. There is no question that the Municipal Court of Manila had and has
completed jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case initiated by petitioners. That
jurisdiction is the same whether the true defendants are those specifically mentioned in the
complaint or the Government of the United States. The contention that the Government of the
United States of America is the real party defendant does not appear to be supported either by the
pleadings or by the text of the contract of lease in question. If said government is the real property
defendant and had intended to impugn the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila, it must
have done so through its diplomatic representative in the Philippines, i. e., the American
Ambassador. It does not appear that the American Ambassador had intervened in the case in any
way and we believe no one appearing in the case has the legal personality to represent said
government.
In the hypothesis that the Government of the United States of America is the lessee in the contract
in question and, therefore, should be considered as the real party defendant in the ejectment case,
10

that simple fact does not deprive our courts of justice of their jurisdiction to try any legal litigation
relating to said contract of lease. The very fact that the government of the United States of
America had entered into a private contract with private citizens of the Philippines and the deed
executed in our country concerns real property located in Manila, place said government, for
purposes of the jurisdiction of our courts, on the same legal level of the lessors.
Although, generally, foreign governments are beyond the jurisdiction of domestic courts of justice,
such rule is inapplicable to cases in which the foreign government enters into private contracts
with the citizens of the court's jurisdiction. A contrary view would simply run against all principles
of decency and violative of all tenets of morals. Once a foreign government enters into a private
contract with the private citizens of another country, such foreign government cannot shield its
non-performance or contravention of the terms of the contract under the cloak of non-jurisdiction.
13. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO v. JUDGE FIRME

Petitioner: Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
Respondent: Hon. Judge Romeo N. Firme, Juana Rimando-Banina, et.al.
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be
sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent. Express consent may be embodied in
a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the government enters into business
contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State
files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. Municipal corporations are suable because
their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally
not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction seeking the nullification or modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by the
respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First
Instance of La Union, in a civil case, entitled "Juana Rimando Bania, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et
al." and the decision ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig
to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages consisting of the
loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees and costs of suit and dismissing the
complaint against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing under and in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N.
Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La
Union. While private respondents Juana Rimando-Bania, Laureano Bania, Jr., Sor Marietta Bania,
Montano Bania, Orja Bania and Lydia R. Bania are heirs of the deceased Laureano Bania Sr.
and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107- Bg before the aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger
jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and
sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several
passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras
and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the
aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump
truck of petitioner.
Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by respondent
judge. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action,
non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and
driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision. The trial court rendered a
decision wherein defendants, Municipality of San Fernando and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay
jointly and severally, the plaintiff heirs.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was dismissed by respondent judge. Finally, the
respondent judge issued an order providing that if defendants municipality and Bislig further wish
to pursue the matter disposed of in the order, such should be elevated to a higher court in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition. Petitioner maintains that the respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision. On the other hand, private respondents controvert
the position of the petitioner and allege that the petition is devoid of merit, utterly lacking the
good faith, which is indispensable in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In addition, the private
respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every court, including respondent court,
has the inherent power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice.
ISSUE/s:
1.
W/N the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and
failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss
2.
W/N the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee (the test of liability
of the municipality depends on W/N the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions)
HELD:
1. YES. The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its
judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of
the municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision he
held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee. The doctrine of
non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to
wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent." Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is
that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued . Consent takes the form of
express or implied consent. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law .
The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising
from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the
government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the
level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself
to a counterclaim. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of
the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued.
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent
of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance
that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be
held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the
state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."
2. NO. Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they
exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties
pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such
capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a
public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other
capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their
existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance
of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and
not for the state or sovereign power." It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless,
they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they
were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely
gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized
by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way
to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal
streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.
11

Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office. We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos
Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or
maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are
admittedly governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who
was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the
passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay
monetary compensation.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's dereliction in failing to
resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. But said judge
exceeded his jurisdiction when it ruled on the issue of liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby
modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents.
14. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION
Petitioner: Dept. of Agriculture
Respondent: NLRC
DOCTRINE: In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is
found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon
any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as
a basis of civil action between private parties.
Implied consent is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening
itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself
of its sovereign immunity. The State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii (sovereign
and governmental acts of the government). The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction
was filed by the petitioner with the NLRC, Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued
was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and
that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto
should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also pointed out that the
attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental
functions to the prejudice of the public good.
NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution allowing petitioner to source for funds in order to satisfy
the judgment. In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming
jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has
disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. The private respondents, on the
other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a
service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
HELD:
1.
FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the Resolution, dated
27 November 1991, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de
Oro City, denying the petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin
permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro. City Sheriff from
enforcing the decision of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and
executing on petitioner's property.
On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution, commanding the City Sheriff to
enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. Forthwith, or on 19
July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the petitioner. These units
were put under the custody of the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public
auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first.
NO. The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law
waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where
the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money
claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. The claims of private
respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar
other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act
No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . . . Pursuant, however,
to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No.
1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
In Carabao, Inc., vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission, we ruled:
(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under
Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law
waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the general limitation expressed in
Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any
Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in
Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly
observed."
The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards, the same terms and
conditions were also made to apply to another contract between the same parties. Pursuant to
their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the
petitioner. On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint
for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, before the Regional
Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan
Security Agency.
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and
severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant
security guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory.
W/N the NLRC had jurisdiction over money claim against petitioner
W/N the Department of Agriculture had impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency
We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No.
327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State. The Labor code,
in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the
prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with
the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
2.
YES. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences
litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract . In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied
upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification.
Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its
sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.In the Unites
States of America vs. Ruiz, where the questioned transaction dealt with improvements
on the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay, we held that the State immunity
now extends only to acts jure imperii (sovereign and governmental acts of the
12

government). The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state
may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to
have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It
does not apply where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted
to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for not
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments , is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is
nullified, and the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and
implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor
Arbiter against said petitioner.
15. PNR v. IAC
Petitioners: Philippine National Railways and Honorio Cabardo

Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court and Baliwag Transit, Inc.
DOCTRINE: The acquiescence of the State to be sued can be manifested expressly through a
general or special law, or indicated implicitly, as when the State commences litigation for the
purpose of asserting an affirmative relief or when it enters into a contract. When the State
participates in a covenant, it is deemed to have descended from its superior position to the level of
an ordinary citizen and thus virtually opens itself to judicial process. Of course, We realize that this
Court qualified this form of consent only to those contracts concluded in a proprietary capacity and
therefore immunity will attach for those contracts entered into in a governmental capacity. The
correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune
from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity
was organized." although the State may own the stock or property of such a corporation, for by
engaging in business operations through a corporation the State divests itself so far of its
sovereign character, and by implicating consents to suits against the corporation. The point is that
when the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is
to be treated like any other private corporation.
FACTS:
The case originally started from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant Philippine
National Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La Union and bound for Manila and a
passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to Hagonoy, Bulacan, from Manila, but
upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the
afternoon of August 10, 1974, got stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing
damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three (53)
others suffered physical injuries. Baliwag alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in
operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights,
flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that would pass through the
crossing, filed the instant action for Damages against PNR. PNR, in their Answer traversed the
material allegation of the Complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was
caused by the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo
Hughes.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on a partial stipulation of facts and issues which as
amplified at the continuation of the pre-trial conference, are as follows:

1 That plaintiff is a duly constituted corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission engaged in the business of transportation and operating public utility buses for the
public;
2 That defendant Philippine National Railways is a purely government owned and controlled
corporation duly registered and existing virtue of Presidential Decree No. 741, with capacity to sue
and be sued, and is likewise engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by trains and buses
and that, it operates a train line between San Fernando, La Union and Manila particularly
Passenger Express Train with Body No. 73, passing along the intersection of Barrio Balungao,
Calumpit, Bulacan, in going to San Fernando, La Union from Manila and return;
3. That on August 10, 1974, at about 1:20 o'clock in the afternoon, a Baliuag Transit Bus was
driven by its authorized driver Romeo Hughes and PNR was operated by Train Engineer Honorio
Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado and at the railroad intersection at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit,
Bulacan, said passenger train hit and bumped the right mid portion of the plaintiff's passenger bus,
while the rear portion of said bus was at the railroad track and its direction was towards Hagonoy,
Bulacan at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon;
4. That at the time of the collision there was a slight rainfall in the vicinity of the scene of the
accident and that there was at said intersection no bars, semaphores, and signal lights that would
warn the public of the approaching train that was about to pass through the intersection and
likewise there was no warning devices to passing trains showing that they were about to pass an
intersection in going to Manila from San Fernando, La Union and back;
5. That on account of said collision, the Baliuag Transit Bus driven by Romeo Hughes was damaged
and eighteen (18) of its passengers died and the rest who were more than fifty three (53)
passengers suffered physical injuries;
6. That after the investigation the Chief of Police of Calumpit, Bulacan, filed a criminal case of
Reckless Imprudence Causing Multiple Homicide with Multiple Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property against Romeo Hughes y Parfan, driver of the Baliuag Transit bus; while the train Engineer
Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado was not included as an accused in said case, although his
train was the one that hit and bumped the right rear portion of the said bus;
7. That immediately after the said accident Major Manuel A. Macam, Chief of the Municipal Police of
Calumpit, Bulacan, together with some of his policemen conducted an investigation of the
accident;
8. That at the railroad crossing in Calumpit, Bulacan where the accident took place there is no
railroad crossing bar, however, during the pre-war days there was a railroad crossing bar at said
intersection; that, however, there was only one sign of railroad crossing "Stop, Look and Listen"
placed on a concrete slab and attached to a concrete post existing at the approach of the railroad
track from the Highway going towards Hagonoy, Bulacan and that after the said railroad track
there was a designated jeep parking area at the right side in the direction from the Highway to
Hagonoy Bulacan;
9. That the train No. 73 driven by Train Engineer Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado stopped
after passing the railroad crossing at a distance of about 50 meters from the said intersection after
the collision on August, 1974;
10. That the expected time of arrival of said Train No. 73 in Manila was 2:41 P.M. and its departure
time from San Fernando, La Union was 9:00 A.M. and its expected arrival at Calumpit, Bulacan was
1:41 P.M. with no stop at Calumpit, Bulacan.
IAC rendered judgment against PNR ordering thus to pay damages. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
W/N PNR enjoys immunity from suit
HELD:
NO. Respondent court initially noted that an exculpation of this nature that was raised for the first
time on appeal may no longer be entertained in view of the proscription under Section 2, Rule 9 of
the Revised Rules of Court, apart from the fact that the lawyer of petitioner agreed to stipulate
inter alia that the railroad company had capacity to sue and be sued. This being so, respondent
court continued, PNR was perforce estopped from disavowing the prejudicial repercussion of an
admission in judicio. Even as the laws governing the creation and rehabilitation of the PNR were
entirely mute on its power to sue and be sued, respondent court nonetheless opined that such
prerogative was implied from the general power to transact business pertinent or indispensable to
the attainment of the goals of the railroad company. Thus, respondent court utilized the doctrine of
implied powers announced in National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, Sr. and Philippine Airlines,
13

Inc. (91 Phil. 203 [1952]), to the effect that the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the
faculty to transact private business. At any rate, respondent court characterized the railroad
company as a private entity created not to discharge a governmental function but, among other
things, to operate a transport service which is essentially a business concern, and thus barred from
invoking immunity from suit.
The bone of contention for exculpation is premised on the familiar maxim in political law that the
State, by virtue of its sovereign nature and as reaffirmed by constitutional precept, is insulated
from suits without its consent (Article 16, Section 3, 1987 Constitution). However, equally
conceded is the legal proposition that the acquiescence of the State to be sued can be manifested
expressly through a general or special law, or indicated implicitly, as when the State commences
litigation for the purpose of asserting an affirmative relief or when it enters into a contract . When
the State participates in a covenant, it is deemed to have descended from its superior position to
the level of an ordinary citizen and thus virtually opens itself to judicial process. Of course, We
realize that this Court qualified this form of consent only to those contracts concluded in
a proprietary capacity and therefore immunity will attach for those contracts entered
into in a governmental capacity, following the ruling in the 1985 case of United States of
America vs. Ruiz. But the restrictive interpretation laid down therein is of no practical worth nor
can it give rise to herein petitioner PNR's exoneration since the case of Malong vs. Philippine
National Railways, decided three months after Ruiz was promulgated, was categorical enough to
specify that the Philippine National Railways "is not performing any governmental
function"
In Malong, Justice Aquino, speaking for the Court en banc, declared:The Manila Railroad
Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a common carrier, was not immune from suit under
Act No. 1510, its charter which provides:
Sec. 4. General powers. The Philippine National Railways shall have the following general
powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary,
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation Law.
(This refers to Sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad corporations, not reproduced
in the Corporation Code.)
Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be
sued in its corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law provides that every corporation
has the power to sue and be sued in any court.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. The public service would be hindered, and public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen
and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper
administration of the Government.
Furthermore, Malong continued to hold that:
. . . in the instant case the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR
which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not
become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles 1732 to 1766
of the Civil Code on common carriers.
The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are
immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for
which the entity was organized." Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which
they have assumed to act in a private or nongovernmental capacity are not suits against the State.
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a
private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the
State for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary
business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits
against the State. The latter is true, although the State may own the stock or property of such a
corporation, for by engaging in business operations through a corporation the State
divests itself so far of its sovereign character , and by implicating consents to suits against
the corporation. The point is that when the government enters into a commercial business
it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private
corporation. By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation,
the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations. When the State acts in
its proprietary capacity, it is amenable to all the rules of law which bind private
individuals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of respondent court
AFFIRMED.
16. REPUBLIC v. SANDOVAL
Petitioners: RP, et. al.

Respondents: Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, RTC of Manila, et. al.
DOCTRINE: Whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the
cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the
Commission is merely a preliminary venue. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way
bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and, executory. This is
precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body. Whatever acts or utterances that then
President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived
its immunity from suit.
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:
(1) When the Republic is sued by name;
(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that
ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official
functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they
exceeded their authority.
FACTS:
This case originated from the so called Mendiola massacre wherein 12 rallyists were killed and
several others were injured. The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of
encampment by members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then
Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR). The farmers and their sympathizers
presented their demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its
national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands. After days of negotiation,
Minister Alvarez, in a meeting with Tadeo and his leaders, advised the latter to instead wait for the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and just allow the government to implement its
comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo, however, countered by saying that he did not believe
in the Constitution and that a genuine land reform cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled
Congress. On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to Malacaang to air their
demands. Before the march started, Tadeo talked to the press and TV media. The farmers then
proceeded to march to Malacaang, from Quezon Memorial Circle, at 10:00 a.m. They were later
joined by members of other sectoral organizations. OPLAN YELLOW was put into effect. Task Force
Nazareno under the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the vicinity of Malacaang.
The civil disturbance control units of the Western Police District under Police Brigadier General
Alfredo S. Lim were also activated. Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was
heavily infiltrated by CPP/NPA elements and that an insurrection was impending. The threat
seemed grave as there were also reports that San Beda College and Centro Escolar University
would be forcibly occupied. The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000.
From C.M. Recto Avenue, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place between
the marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this moment that a clash occurred and, borrowing
the words of the Commission "pandemonium broke loose". After the clash, twelve (12) marchers
were officially confirmed dead, although according to Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he
was not able to give the name and address of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded by
gunshots and twelve (12) sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers. In
the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order
No. 11 (A.O. 11, for brevity), which created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. A.O. 11 stated that
the Commission was created precisely for the "purpose of conducting an investigation of the
disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola
Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila.
From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four
14

unidentified, uniformed individuals, shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of
the marchers. In connection with this, it was the Commission's recommendation that the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be tasked to undertake investigations regarding the identities of
those who actually fired their guns that resulted in the death of or injury to the victims of the
incident. The Commission also suggested that all the commissioned officers of both the Western
Police District and the INP Field Force, who were armed during the incident, be prosecuted for
violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of
1985. The Commission's recommendation also included the prosecution of the marchers, for
carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose identities have yet to be established. As for Jaime
Tadeo, the Commission said that he should be prosecuted both for violation of paragraph (a),
Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 for holding the rally without a permit and for violation of
Article 142, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code for inciting to sedition. As for the other
specified officers, for their failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the
dispersal operations in Mendiola, administrative sanctions were recommended to be imposed. The
last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased and
wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was this
portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the government.
Notwithstanding such recommendation, the victims received no concrete form of compensation.
Thus, on July 27, 1987, herein petitioners, (Caylao group) filed a formal letter of demand for
compensation from the Government. Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the
State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the
recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims
of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then President Aquino in the
aftermath of the killings, the State has consented to be sued.
ISSUE:
W/N the State waived its immunity from suit
HELD:
NO. This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the
deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that
liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states
that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will conduct an "investigation
of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11
provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads:
1 Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of any offense and
of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on
preliminary investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper
court.
In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as
the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim.
Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. Whatever recommendation it makes
cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having
become final and, executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or
said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit .
The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was
an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners (Caylao group),
"it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people". Moreover, petitioners rely on
President Aquino's speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the
rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can
it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.
Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such
consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:
(1) When the Republic is sued by name;
(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate
liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the
government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were
discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased
to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings,
there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the
members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P.
Blg. 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. As early as 1954 ,
this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public
agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. Until recently
in 1991, this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by
any other official of the Republic. The military and police forces were deployed to ensure that the
rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the safety of the very people that they
are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that they fired at
the unruly crowd to disperse the latter. While it is true that nothing is better settled than the
general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts
except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release
them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the
government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the
relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the
affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even
though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title
of the state and as its agents and servants. This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high
position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another." The
inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed
the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line
with the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, herein public officials, having been
found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for
damages.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders, the instant petitions are hereby
DISMISSED.
17. REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA v. VINZON
Petitioner: The Republic of Indonesia, His Excellency Ambassador Soeratmin, and Minister
Counsellor Azhari Kasim
Respondent: Jamez Vinzon, doing business under the name and style of Vinzon Trade & Services
DOCTRINE: The immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts
jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. The mere entering into a
contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of
whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. If
the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it
has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii. Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action
arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a
specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution entitled "The Republic of Indonesia, His Excellency Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counselor Azhari Kasim v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 145, Makati City,
and James Vinzon, doing business under the name and style of Vinzon Trade and Services."
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon
Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration,
maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the
Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipment covered by
the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water
15

heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective
for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by
giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry.
Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or before
August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the
discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was
expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of
Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondents work and services
unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement.
Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000.
Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to
terminate the agreement.
On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful.
Respondent cites various circumstances which purportedly negated petitioners alleged
dissatisfaction over respondents services. Hence, on December 15, 2000, respondent filed a
complaint against petitioners docketed as Civil Case No. 18203 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 145. On February 20, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the
Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot
be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador
Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity. In turn, respondent
filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia
has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in
the Maintenance Agreement:
"Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to
the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines."
Respondents Opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor
Kasim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for tortious acts done with malice and
bad faith.
On May 17, 2001, the trial court denied herein petitioners Motion to Dismiss. It likewise denied the
Motion for Reconsideration subsequently filed. The trial courts denial of the Motion to Dismiss was
brought up to the Court of Appeals by herein petitioners in a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Said petition alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Republic of
Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction
of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim
waived their immunity from suit. On May 30, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed
decision denying the petition for lack of merit. On August 16, 2002, it denied herein petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
HELD:
1.
2.
W/N the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts decision that petitioners
have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementioned provision
in the Maintenance Agreement
W/N petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued
herein in their private capacities
YES. International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity,
independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land
under Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be
sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence
and equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders v. Veridiano II, the practical justification
for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States,
the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The rules of
International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The
increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely
connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new
concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. Apropos the present
case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis.
Such act is only the start of the inquiry. If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a
business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so
engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is
in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.
Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal
action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of
the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a
waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language
not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision
may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts,
or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine
laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle
recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by
way of settling the case, except to dismiss it. Submission by a foreign state to local
jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary
implication. We find no such waiver in this case. Respondent concedes that the
establishment of a diplomatic mission is a sovereign function.1On the other hand, he
argues that the actual physical maintenance of the premises of the diplomatic mission,
such as the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment, is no longer a sovereign function of
the State. We disagree. There is no dispute that the establishment of a
diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely
establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic
mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of
the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that
petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it
entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air
conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor
pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian
ambassador. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, submits the view that, "the
Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge
of its governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its
immunity from suit." As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent,
the Solicitor General states that it "was not a waiver of their immunity from suit
but a mere stipulation that in the event they do waive their immunity,
Philippine laws shall govern the resolution of any legal action arising out of
the agreement and the proper court in Makati City shall be the agreed venue
thereof.
YES. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides:
xxx
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of
the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and
administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending
State for the purposes of the mission;
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved
as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on
behalf of the sending State;
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by
the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
xxx
The act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in
terminating the Maintenance Agreement is not covered by the exceptions
provided in the abovementioned provision.
The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but
said provision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in
16

any professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case
herein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint in Civil Case No. 18203 against petitioners
is DISMISSED.
18. GTZ v. CA
Petitioner: German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Anne Nicolay, et. al.
Respondent: Hon. Court of Appeals, et. al.
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of immunity from suits is available to foreign States insofar as they are
sought to be sued in the courts of the local State, necessary as it is to avoid "unduly vexing the
peace of nations."
Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against one of its entities, it
must be ascertained whether or not the State, as the principal that may ultimately be held liable,
has given its consent to be sued. This ascertainment will depend in the first instance on whether
the government agency impleaded is incorporated or unincorporated. If the agency is
incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its
charter says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing . State immunity from
suit may be waived by general or special law. The special law can take the form of the original
charter of the incorporated government agency.
FACTS:
On 7 September 1971, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of
the Philippines ratified an Agreement which affirmed the common commitment of both
governments to promote jointly a project called, Social Health Insurance Networking and
Empowerment (SHINE), which was designed to "enable Philippine familiesespecially poor onesto
maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality." In the arraignment, both
governments likewise named their respective implementing organizations for SHINE. The German
government "charged GTZ, Eschborn, with the implementation of its contributions.
The Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. The Order cited, among others,
that GTZ was a private corporation which entered into an employment contract; and that GTZ had
failed to secure from the DFA a certification as to its diplomatic status. GTZ filed with the Labor
Arbiter a "Reiterating Motion to Dismiss," again praying that the Motion to Dismiss be granted on
the jurisdictional ground, and reprising the arguments for dismissal it had earlier raised. No action
was taken by the Labor Arbiter on this new motion. Instead, on 15 October 2001, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a Decision granting the complaint for illegal dismissal.
Hence, This petition.
ISSUE:
W/N GTZ enjoys immunity from suit
HELD:
NO. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether
the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is
not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested
by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act
jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in
Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that "the State may not be sued without its
consent." Who or what consists of "the State"? For one, the doctrine is available to foreign States
insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State, necessary as it is to avoid
"unduly vexing the peace of nations."
If the instant suit had been brought directly against the Federal Republic of Germany, there would
be no doubt that it is a suit brought against a State, and the only necessary inquiry is whether said
State had consented to be sued. However, the present suit was brought against GTZ. It is
necessary for us to understand what precisely are the parameters of the legal personality of GTZ.
Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE. In
September of 1999, Anne Nicolay (Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project
Manager. Disagreements eventually arose between Nicolay and private regarding the course
Nicolay was taking in the implementation of SHINE different from her predecessors.
Counsel for GTZ characterizes GTZ as "the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany," a depiction similarly adopted by the OSG. Assuming that characterization is
correct, it does not automatically invest GTZ with the ability to invoke State immunity from suit.
The distinction lies in whether the agency is incorporated or unincorporated.
Private respondents then addressed a letter to Nicolay addressing several issues. The letter ended
with these ominous words: The issues that we [the private respondents] have stated here are
very crucial to us in working for the project. We could no longer find any reason to stay with the
project unless ALL of these issues be addressed immediately and appropriately.
The following lucid discussion from Justice Isagani Cruz is pertinent:

Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against one of its entities, it
must be ascertained whether or not the State, as the principal that may ultimately be held liable,
has given its consent to be sued. This ascertainment will depend in the first instance on whether
the government agency impleaded is incorporated or unincorporated.
An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate juridical
personality, like the Social Security System, the University of the Philippines, and the City of
Manila. By contrast, the unincorporated agency is so called because it has no separate juridical
personality but is merged in the general machinery of the government, like the Department of
Justice, the Bureau of Mines and the Government Printing Office.
If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that
it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing. State
immunity from suit may be waived by general or special law. The special law can take the form of
the original charter of the incorporated government agency.
In response, Nicolay wrote each of the private respondents a letter which states: You have firmly
and unequivocally stated in the last paragraph of your 8th June 2000 letter that you and the five
other staff "could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be
addressed immediately and appropriately." Under the foregoing premises and circumstances, it is
now imperative that I am to accept your resignation, which I expect to receive as soon as
possible.
Private respondents replied with a common letter, clarifying that their earlier letter was not
intended as a resignation letter. Nicolay sent them a letter, informing them of the pre-termination
of their contracts of employment on the grounds of "serious and gross insubordination, among
others, resulting to loss of confidence and trust." Private respondents then filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the governmental
functions and sovereign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This was
opposed by private respondents with the arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification
that it was immune from suit from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and that it was GTZ and not
the German government, which had implemented the SHINE Project and entered into the contracts
of employment.
GTZ had not supplied any evidence defining its legal nature beyond that of the bare descriptive
"implementing agency." The term by itself does not supply whether GTZ is incorporated or
unincorporated, whether it is owned by the German state or by private interests, whether it has
juridical personality independent of the German government or none at all. GTZ itself provides a
more helpful clue, inadvertently, through its own official Internet website. This self-description of
GTZ in its own official website gives further cause for pause in adopting petitioners argument that
GTZ is entitled to immunity from suit because it is "an implementing agency." The above-quoted
statement does not dispute the characterization of GTZ as an "implementing agency of the Federal
Republic of Germany," yet it bolsters the notion that as a company organized under private law, it
has a legal personality independent of that of the Federal Republic of Germany.
17

The Federal Republic of Germany, in its own official website, also makes reference to GTZ and
describes it in this manner:
x x x Going by the principle of "sustainable development," the German Technical Cooperation
(Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH, GTZ) takes on non-profit projects
in international "technical cooperation." The GTZ is a private company owned by the Federal
Republic of Germany.
Taking the description on face value, the apparent equivalent under Philippine law is that of a
corporation organized under the Corporation Code but owned by the Philippine government, or a
government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter. And it bears notice that
Section 36 of the Corporate Code states that "[e]very corporation incorporated under this Code has
the power and capacity x x x to sue and be sued in its corporate name."
It is entirely possible that under German law, an entity such as GTZ or particularly GTZ itself has
not been vested or has been specifically deprived the power and capacity to sue and/or be sued.
Yet in the proceedings below and before this Court, GTZ has failed to establish that under German
law, it has not consented to be sued despite it being owned by the Federal Republic of Germany.
We adhere to the rule that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a
particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines, and following
the most intelligent assumption we can gather, GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or
controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the Corporation
Code, has expressly consented to be sued. At the very least, like the Labor Arbiter and the
Court of Appeals, this Court has no basis in fact to conclude or presume that GTZ enjoys immunity
from suit.
Our ruling in Holy See v. Del Rosario provided a template on how a foreign entity desiring to invoke
State immunity from suit could duly prove such immunity before our local courts. The principles
enunciated in that case were derived from public international law. We stated then:
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or
diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued
to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. In the Philippines, the practice is
for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive
endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. However, had GTZ obtained such
certification from the DFA, it would have provided factual basis for its claim of immunity . We do not
see any evidence that the DFA, the office of the executive branch in charge of our diplomatic
relations, has indeed endorsed GTZs claim of immunity. It may be possible that GTZ tried, but
failed to secure such certification, due to the same concerns that we have discussed herein.
Nowhere in the Comment of the OSG is it manifested that the DFA has endorsed GTZs claim, or
that the OSG had solicited the DFAs views on the issue. The Comment filed by the OSG does not
inspire the same degree of confidence as a certification from the DFA would have elicited.
The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with
satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals
acted within proper bounds when they refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune
by dismissing the complaint against it.
This decision should not be seen as deviation from the more common methodology employed in
ascertaining whether a party enjoys State immunity from suit, one which focuses on the particular
functions exercised by the party and determines whether these are proprietary or sovereign in
nature. The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most
important barometer for testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should apply . At
the same time, our Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its
withholding of consent; hence, the laws and circumstances pertaining to the creation and legal
personality of an instrumentality or agency invoking immunity remain relevant. Consent to be
sued, as exhibited in this decision, is often conferred by the very same statute or general law
creating the instrumentality or agency.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
19. CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP) V.

SANTAMARIA
G.R. No. 185572
Ponente: Sereno
February 7, 2012

Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of
the act involvedwhether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions. Although China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) CNMEG
claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not
consented to be sued under Chinese law.
Facts:
Petition for Review on certiorari and prayer for issuance of a TRO assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (CNMEG) entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by
chairperson Ren Hongbin and by president Jose L. Cortes, Jr., respectively
The Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the Philippines
(DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
AUG 30 MOU
China agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Credit to the Philippine government to
finance the Northrail Project
China designated EXIM Bank = lender, Philippine government designated DOF =
borrower
Agreement: EXIMBank to extend an amount not exceeding USD 400,000 in favour of
DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5 year grace period,and at the rate of 3% per annum
Ambassador Wang (China to the Philippines) wrote a letter to DOF Secretary Camacho informing
him that the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project was CNMEG and 3 months after, an
Contract Agreement between Northrail and CNMEG was executed
The Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into another financial agreement, again to
extend the Preferential Buyers Credit
A Civil Case (Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion for
Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance
of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO) was filed by the
respondents against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of
Budget and Management, the National Economic Development Authority and Northrail
Respondents alleged that the Contract and Loan Agreements were void being contrary to the
Constitution, the Government Procurement Reform Act (R.A. 9184), the Government Auditing
Code (PD 1445), and the Administrative Code (EO 292)
A hearing was set for the issuance of injunctive reliefs by the RTC to which CNMEG filed a Motion
to Dismiss because of a Chinese government agent is immune from suit and that the project was
an executive agreement, but was denied. CNMEG filed a Motion to Reconsider but this was also
denied. Consequently, CNMEG filed a petition for certiorari to the CA but was denied, hence this
petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not CNMEG is entitled to immunity
2. Whether or not the Contract Agreement is an executive agreement
18

Held:
1. No, CNMEG is not entitled to immunity. The Loan Agreement contains an express waiver of
immunity from suit. Also, the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways is in pursuit of
a purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business. Thus, CNMEG is
engaged in a proprietary activity and not a governmental function. CNMEG also failed to
adduce evidence that it is immune from suit under Chinese law.State immunity from suit may
be waived by general or special law. The special law can take the form of the original charter
of the incorporated government agency. Jurisprudence is replete with examples of
incorporated government agencies which were ruled not entitled to invoke immunity from
suit, owing to provisions in their charters manifesting their consent to be sued. CNMEG also
failed to present a certification from the DFA which would have been the best proof of
immunity of suit. [However, the Court is not precluded form making an inquiry into the
intrinsic correctness of such certification, if produced.] Lastly, CNMEG, in its Contract
Agreement, stated in its conditions that an agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration
may be construed as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit.
2. No, the contract is not an executive agreement. The agreement was entered into by Northrail
and CNMEG and not by the Philippines and China. They are personalities distinct and separate
from the Philippine and Chinese governments, respectively. Also, CNMEG did not act as an
agent of the Chinese government but as a state-owned corporation, not necessarily (it was
not explicitly stated in the Ambassadors letter) engaged in the performance of sovereign
functions on behalf of China. The Contract Agreement is to be governed by Philippine law as
explicitly stated in Article 2 of the Conditions of Contract of the Contract Agreement. The
parties have effectively conceded that their rights and obligations are not governed
international law since Philippine law shall be applicable.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED.CNMEGs prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic.
20. SHELL V. JALOS ET AL.

G.R. No. 179918
Ponente: Abad
February 7, 2012

Shells primary obligation under the contract is not to represent the Philippine government for the
purpose of transacting business with third persons; Its contractual commitment is to develop and
manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State.
Facts:
Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell) and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service
Contract 38 for the purpose of exploring and extracting petroleum in northwestern Palawan
2 years later, the Malampaya Natural Gas Project was initiated, aimed at developing the natural
gas in the Camago-Malampaya area. A pipeline (504 km) was then constructed from Shells
prodution platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas, crossing the Oriental Mindoro Sea.
In 2003, respondents filed a complaint for damages before the RTC. They claimed that get were
all subsistence fishermen whose livelihood was adversely affected by the construction and
operation of the natural gas pipeline, evidenced by fewer fish catch (due to the disturbance of
the marine life) resulting in the decline of their average net income per month.
Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
action and that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary jurisdiction over pollution
cases (Shell had classified the complaint as such)
Shell claimed it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the States
consent, stating that under the Service Contract, it had merely served as an agent of the
Philippine government. The complaint against shell also failed to state a cause of action.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, although it ruled that the action was actually pollution-related
and should be brought to the PAB first.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA reversed the order and upheld
the jurisdiction of the RTC over the action. The claim for damages was based on a quasi-delict
over which the regular courts have jurisdiction since Shell was being sued for construction and
operation of the pipeline and not for committing pollution.
The CA also rejected Shells assertion that the suit was actually against the State, adding that
the State should be deemed to have given its consent to be sued when it entered into the
contract with Shell. The CA held that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable wrong
since the petitioners invoked their right to fish the sea and earn a living, which Shell had the
obligation to respect.
Shell moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence this petition for review under Rule 45
Issues:
1. Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the
PAB
2. Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action against Shell
3. Whether or not the suit is actually against the State and is barred under the doctrine of state
immunity
Held:
1. Yes. The petitioners contended that their action was due to the construction and operation of the
pipeline which disrupted their livelihood and that they werent suing for pollution but their claim is
that the emissions from the pipeline resulted in the detrimental effects to their livelihood. Pollutionrelated cases must be filed with the PAB. The parties may appeal the PABs decision to the CA. But
pending prior determination by the PAB, courts cannot take cognizance of the complaint. Resort
must first be made to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) which is the agency possessed of
expertise in determining pollution-related matters before filing the complaint before the regular
courts.
2. Yes. The complaint satisfied the elements giving rise to a cause of action: 1) A right existing in
favour of the plantiff, 2) A duty on the part of the defendant to respect the plantiffs right, and 3)
An act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right. First, Jalos, et al undoubtedly had the
right to the preferential use of marine and fishing resources which is guaranteed by no less than
the Constitution. Second, Shell had the correlative duty to refrain from acts or omissions that could
impair Jalos, et als use and enjoyment of the bounties of the seas. Lastly, Shells construction and
operation of the pipeline, which is an act of physical intrusion into the marine environment, is said
to have disrupted and impaired the natural habitat of fish and resulted in considerable reduction of
fish catch and income for Jalos, et al. Therefore, the construction and operation of the pipeline,
may, in itself, be a wrongful act that could be the basis of the petitioners cause of action. The
Court ruled that there is no need for the complaint to be established in detail the causal link of the
construction and operation of the pipeline and the fish decline, and loss of income. The test for
determining the sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether the complaint alleges facts
which, if true, would justify the relief demanded.
3. No. The suit is not actually against the State because Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, but rather a service contractor. It does not follow that Shell has become the States
agent given their appointment as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum operations in the
Camago-Malampayo area. hells primary obligation under the contract is not to represent the
Philippine government for the purpose of transacting business with third persons. Rather, its
contractual commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the
State.Shell is not an agent of the State and may thus be sued before that body for any damages
caused by its operations
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Efren Jalos, et als complaint for damages against Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. is
ordered DISMISSED without prejudice to its refiling with the Pollution Adjudication Board or PAB.
19

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this Petition.
21. BAER V. TIZON

G.R. No. L-24294
May 3, 1974
Ponente: Fernando
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of immunity from suit without its consent is applicable.
Held:
1. Yes. The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is
appropriate.

A foreign government acting through its naval commanding officer is immune from suit relative to
the performance of an important public Junction of any government, the defense and security of its
naval base in the Philippines granted under a treaty. The invocation of the doctrine of immunity
from suit of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate.
Facts:
Respondent Edgardo Gener (plaintiff) filed a complaint for injunction with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Bataan against petitioner Donald Baer, Commander of the United States Naval
Base in Olongapo praying for a preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with
his logging operations.
Respondent Gener alleged that he was engaged in the logging business in area situated in Barrio
Mabayo, Municipalitiy of Morong, Bataan and that the American Naval Base authorities stopped
his operations.
Respondent Judge Tito V. Tizon issued a restraining order against petitioner.
Petitioners counsel entered his appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of
respondent judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its
consent. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss reiterating the aforementioned ground.
Petitioner pointed out that he is the chief or head of an agency or instrumentality of the United
States of America, with the subject matter of the action being official acts done by him for and in
behalf of the United States of America. It was added that in directing the cessation of logging
operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base, petitioner was entirely within the scope
of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the security of the Naval Base and of the
installations therein being the first concern and most important duty of the Commander of the
Base.
Respondent filed his opposition relying on the principle that "a private citizen claiming title and
right of possession of certain property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as
individuals, officers and agents of the Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the
same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the
Government."
Petitioner made a written offer of documentary evidence, including certified copies of telegrams
of the Forestry Director to Forestry personnel in Balanga, Bataan dated January 8, and January
11, 1965, directing immediate investigation of illegal timber cutting in Bataan and calling
attention to the fact that the records of the office show no new renewal of timber license or
temporary extension permits.
Despite thereof, respondent Judge issued an order granting respondent Gener's application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the
opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. What was sought by private respondent
and what was granted by respondent Judge amounted to an interference with the performance of
the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers possessed by him under
the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to
cases which would result in a pecuniary charge against the sovereign or would require the doing of
an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly
and immediately to the most important public function of any government - the defense of the
state is equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative act."
2. There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court.
Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess
diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the
action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents. Thus, after the
Military Bases Agreement, in Miquiabas v. Commanding General and Dizon v. The Commanding
General of the Philippine-Ryukus Command, both of them being habeas corpus petitions, there
was no question as to the submission to jurisdiction of the respondents. As a matter of fact,
inMiquiabas v. Commanding General, the immediate release of the petitioner was ordered, it being
apparent that the general court martial appointed by respondent Commanding General was
without jurisdiction to try petitioner. Thereafter, in the cited cases of Syquia, Marquez Lim,
and Johnson, the parties proceeded against were American army commanding officers stationed in
the Philippines. The insuperable obstacle to the jurisdiction of respondent Judge is that a foreign
sovereign without its consent is haled into court in connection with acts performed by it pursuant
to treaty provisions and thus impressed with a governmental character.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, nullifying and setting aside the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 2984 of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan. The injunction issued by this Court on March 18, 1965 enjoining the
enforcement of the aforesaid writ of preliminary injunction of respondent Judge is hereby made
permanent. Costs against private respondent Edgardo Gener.
22. US V. RUIZ
G.R. No. L-35645
May 22, 1985
Ponente: Abad Santos

In suits against a foreign government, a distinction must he made between acts jure imperil and
acts jure gestionis. As to the former, the State immunity prevails. States may be sued only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions. Infrastructure projects of U.S. Naval Base in
Subic involve governmental functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval
20

base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
Facts:
This a Petition for Review to set aside certain orders and restrain respondent judge from trying
Civil Case No. 779M of CFI of Rizal.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for Repair offender
system and Repair typhoon damages. Respondent Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the
invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the
US.
In June 1972, respondent Eligio De Guzman & Co received a letter stating therein that they did
not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval
Station in Subic Bay and that the projects has been awarded to third parties.
Respondent company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William
I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. In its
complaint, respondent company orders the defendants (herein petitioners) to allow them to
perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer
possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The respondent company also asked for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into
contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants,
the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as
agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her
consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint.
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign &
governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense
of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. The
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract
by a State but the legal nature of the act pursuant to Syquia vs. Lopez case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside
and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
23. ARIGO V. SWIFT

G.R. No. 206510
Ponente: Villarama, Jr.
September 16, 2014

This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without the formers consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which
distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity
extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. The waiver of State immunity under the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
Facts:
Subsequently, the defendants (herein petitioners) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with an
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the same.
The trial court denied petitioners motion and issued the writ. The petitioner moved twice to
reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition .
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December
2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel to
enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for
the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty. On January 6, 2013,
the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel
in Okinawa, Japan.
Issue:
Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions
may invoke state immunity.
Held:
Yes. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are
not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground
on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or
oil.
21

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect
the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
The Supreme Courts considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding
of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan. The Court also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, the Court cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages,
including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that
deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment to the petition, petitioners also filed a
motion for early resolution and motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby
DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
24. CARABAO, INC. V. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-29304
September 30, 1970
Ponente: Teehankee
Respondents' Consolidated Comment. In their consolidated comment with
opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and production orders,
respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of
Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were
already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3) the petition
improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America; and ( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US
Government as regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with the executive
branch.

Money claims against the government are to be made in accordance with Com Act 327. The Court
has so indicated in a number of cases that claimants have to prosecute their money claims against
the Government under Com. Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law
waiving the States immunity from suit, subject to the general limitation expressed in Section 7
thereof that no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the
Government of the Philippines, and that the conditions provided in Com. Act 324 for filing money
claims against the Government must be strictly allowed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any
pleading or manifestation in this case.
2. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.
Facts:
Held:
1. No. The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment
against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
2. No. The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.
This is an Appeal on questions of law from the lower Court's order of dismissal of the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff had filed a complaint to recover the sum of Php 238,500.00 representing the unpaid
price of 300 units of fire extinguishers sold and delivered by it to defendant Agricultural
Productivity Commission.
It alleged that it had presented on June 14, 1967 a claim for payment of the sum with the Auditor
General, but that since the latter had failed to decide the claim within two (2) months from date
22

of its presentation which should have been by August 13, 1967, it had acquired the right under
Act No. 3083 to file the original action for collection in the lower court.
Defendants moved for the dismissal of the case principally on the ground of the lower court's
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, alleging that under sections 2 and 3, Article XI of the
Philippine Constitution, creating the General Auditing Office as a constitutional office and
defining its functions, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 327 enacted in 1938 as an
implementing law, and under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court, the settlement of money
claims against the Government of the Philippines has been placed under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Auditor General to the exclusion of courts of first instance, while the Supreme
Court is vested with appellate jurisdiction over the Auditor General's decision involving claims of
private persons or entities.
The lower court sustained defendants' dismissal motion and declared itself without jurisdiction to
hear the case.
Upon plaintiff's filing of its motion for reconsideration of December 9, 1967, defendants further
brought out the fact that on October 6, 1967, the Auditor General had rendered his decision
denying plaintiff's claim on the ground that the alleged purchase order relied upon by plaintiff
was null and void, since there was no obligating instrument as required by law, besides
mentioning the grossly exorbitant price of P795.00 for each fire extinguisher as compared to the
Director of Supply Coordination's approved purchases of the same fire extinguisher at the price
of P199.00, each.
No. The inaction by the Auditor General for the sixty-day period now provided by Commonwealth
Act 327 (exclusive of Sundays and holidays) and of time consumed in referring the matter to other
persons or officers no longer entitles the claimant to file a direct suit in court, as he was formerly
authorized under Act 3083 in the event of the Auditor General's failure to decide within a flat
period of two months. Since the Constitution and Commonwealth Act 327 expressly enjoin the
Auditor General to act on and decide the claim within the fixed 60-day period, a claimant's remedy
is to institute mandamus proceedings to compel the rendition of a decision by the Auditor General
in the event of such inaction.
The courts of first instance no longer have the original jurisdiction to act on such claims, which
actions, under section 4 of Act 3083 now discarded, "shall be governed by the same rules of
procedure, both original and appellate, as if the litigants were private parties" since exclusive
original jurisdiction under Article XI of the Constitution and the implementing Act, Commonwealth
Act 327 is vested in the Auditor General, and appellate jurisdiction is vested in the President in
cases of accountable officers, and in the Supreme Court in cases of private persons and entities
upon proper and timely petitions for review.
The Court has so indicated in a number of cases that claimants have to prosecute their money
claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now
merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the general limitation
expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any
Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in
Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.
As prayed for by defendants-appellees, plaintiff-appellant is ordered to remove immediately the
300 units of fire extinguishers from the warehouse of appellee Agricultural Productivity
Commission.
25. US V. GUINTO
G.R. No. 76607
The lower court having maintained its dismissal order, plaintiff instituted the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether plaintiff had the clear right to institute its direct action in the lower court upon the Auditor
General's failure to decide its claim within two months from the date of its presentation, and that
the lower court's jurisdiction which had thus attached could no longer be displaced,
notwithstanding the Auditor General's subsequent adverse decision of October 6, 1967.
February 26, 1990
Ponente: Cruz
When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party, and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
Rule on waiver, not applicable when the contract entered into involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity. Express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the
government but must be effected through a duly enacted statute. By entering into an employment
contract with Geno-ve in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit.
These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state
immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to
dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
Facts:
Held:
USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607) Here, the private respondents are suing several officers
of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them
23

for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The
respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had
included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a
rebidding.
USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470) In this case, Genove filed a complaint for damages for
his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air
Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into
the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club
manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators,
which unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.
USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018) Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was
arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF
officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed against
Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge,
Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against
petitioners claiming that it was because of the latters acts that he lost his job.
USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258) A complaint for damages was filed by private
respondents against petitioners (US military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by
the former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on
them. The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but
resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done
by them in the performance of their official duties.
Held:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without
such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law
under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states,
such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally
impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the
level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its
implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket
immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners
claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as
agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial
acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity
(governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US
government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have
directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity
of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions
were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further
proceedings.
In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature
of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as they were
operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government
can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the
discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from
suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was
nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite
properly in terminating Genoves employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.
In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official
functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the
complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly
impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what
actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were really
discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident
occurred.The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve
the conflicting claims of the parties.
WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as
follows:
1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed
with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated
December 11, 1986, is LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is DISMISSED. The
temporary restraining order dated October 14, 1987, is made permanent.
4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to proceed
with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order dated
October 27, 1987, is LIFTED.
24

him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may
thereafter arise.
26. REPUBLIC V. PURISIMA

G.R. No. L-36084
August 31, 1977
Ponente: Fernando

The doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent applies to the Rice and Corn
Administration. The consent to be sued to be effective must come from, the State through a
statute, not through any agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration.
Facts:
Defendant Rice and Corn Administration filed a motion to dismiss in the sala of respondent Judge
where a pending civil suit for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of
contract filed by the plaintiff Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. It was alleged in the said motion the
doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its
consent.
At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration,Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service where
Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim
against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless
consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions.
Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion
to dismiss.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judges decision is valid.
Held:
No. The State may not be sued without its consent.
"The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the
[1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase
Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law
on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to
problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business
pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought
alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They
could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of
having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final
adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington
Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it
has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of
injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective
appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination
of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it
has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of
constitutional law."
Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the private
respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which, according to
The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted
statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and
Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner for certiorari is granted and the resolution of October 4, 1972 denying
the motion to dismiss filed by the Rice and Corn Administration nullified and set aside and the
petitioner for prohibition is likewise granted restraining respondent Judge from acting on civil Case
No. 79082 pending in his sala except for the purpose of ordering its dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued on February 8, 1973 by this Court is made
permanent terminating this case. Costs against Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
27. PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. V. LICHAUCO

G.R. No. 142362
Ponente: Tinga
May 3, 2006

The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an
officer of the government by a private citizen which would result in a charge against or financial
liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself although it has not
been formally impleaded; Government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being
sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit or if the
liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his/her
duties.
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc.(PASI) was established by a consortium of private
telecommunications carriers which in 1994 entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with
the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a
Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. The Philippine Government, through the DOTC, was
tasked under the MOU to secure from the international telecommunication Union the required
orbital slots and frequency assignments for the Philippine satellite.
The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International Telecommunication
Union two orbital slots, designated as 161 East Longitute and 153 East Longitude, for Philippine
satellites. PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official
Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine
oribital slots to PASI for its satellites. Secretary lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter confirming the
Philippine Governments assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its
satellites.
PASI averred that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine Government, it
proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites
including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital. However, respondent Lichauco, then
DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly embarked on a crusade to malign the
name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.
Aggrieved by Lichaucos action, PASI and De Guzman instituted a civil complaint against
Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC. The complaint, alleging three causes of
action, was for injunction, declaration of nullity of award and damages. The third cause of
action, for damages imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged crusade to malign
the name of plaintiff De Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.
Lichauco file a Motion to Dismiss. In her Motion to Dismiss, Lichauco asserts that she is being
sued for issuing the aforementioned Notice of Offer, which fell within her official functions as
DOTC Undersecretary for Communications. She claims that it was Secretary Lagdameo who
authorized her to offer orbital slot 153 East Longitude for bidding, and she thus acted well
25

within the scope of her authority to advise and assist the DOTC Secretary in the formulation and
implementation of department objectives and policies.
Issue: Whether Lichauco may validly invoke state immunity from suit to secure the outright
dismissal of petitioners' complaint warrants closer examination.
Held:
No. As to the first two (2) causes of action, the Court rules that the defense of state immunity from
suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the
State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or
financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers
attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the
nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally
sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit would have been considered as one
against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government
agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as one against the State.
But neither circumstance obtains in this case.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 February
2000 is SET ASIDE and the Order dated 14 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to try and decide the case on the merits
with deliberate dispatch. No costs.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.
PPA's monies, facilities and assets are government properties. Ergo, they are exempt from
execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.
PPA is a government instrumentality charged with carrying out governmental functions through the
management, supervision, control and regulation of major ports of the country. It is an attached
agency of the Department of Transportation and Communication pursuant to PD 505.
Therefore, an undeniable conclusion is that the funds of PPA partake of government funds, and
such may not be garnished absent an allocation by its Board or by statutory grant. If the PPA funds
cannot be garnished and its properties, being government properties, cannot be levied via a writ of
execution pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court likewise cannot grant discretionary
execution pending appeal, as it would run afoul of the established jurisprudence that government
properties are exempt from execution. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
28. CURATA vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

DOCTRINE: Philippine Ports Authoritys monies, facilities and assets are government properties.
Ergo, they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.
FACTS:
Executive Order No. (EO) 385, Series of 1989, and EO 431, Series of 1990, delineated the BPZ and
placed it under the PPA for administrative jurisdiction of its proper zoning, planning, development,
and utilization. Pursuant thereto, the PPA instituted on October 14, 1999 a Complaint 22 for
expropriation of 185 lots before the RTC of Batangas City. Owned by some 231 individuals or
entities, the 185 lots, with a total area of about 1,298,340 square meters, were intended for the
development of Phase II of the BPZ.
On July 10, 2000, the RTC issued the first compensation order, which pegged the just
compensation at PhP 5,500 per square meter in favor of the Dimayacyac Group. Alleging that
almost all of the group members were of advanced age, the trial court, upon motion, issued the
July 24, 2000 Order that granted the execution pending appeal. On July 31, 2000, another order
ensued, directing the issuance of the writ of execution. On August 2 and 3, 2000, respondent
Sheriff Rolando D. Quino served Notices of Garnishment on LBP.
On August 10, 2000, PPA filed a "Notice of Appeal with Motion for Extension of Time to File Record
on Appeal and Pay Appeal Fee." Within the period of extension requested, PPA filed its Record on
Appeal on August 25, 2000. On the same day, August 25, the RTC issued an Order denying PPA's
Notice of Appeal from the July 10, 2000 Order (First Compensation Order) on the ground of nonpayment of appeal fee. In its August 28, 2000 Order, the RTC denied PPA's Record on Appeal. On
September 18, 2000, the RTC denied PPA's Motion for Reconsideration of the August 25, 2000 RTC
order.
Thus, in CA-G.R. SP No. 60314, PPA challenged the execution pending appeal of the July 24, 2000
Order, the July 31, 2000 Order which issued the writ of execution and the August 2 and 3, 2000
Notices of Garnishment. In its supplemental petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 60314, PPA assailed the
August 25, 2000 Order which denied PPA's motion for extension of time to file Record on Appeal
and pay the appeal fee, the August 28, 2000 Order which denied the PPA's record on appeal and
the September 18, 2000 Order which denied PPA's motion for reconsideration.
29. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIZON
DOCTRINE: The University of the Philippines (UP) is a government instrumentality, performing the
States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education.
FACTS:
UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders), represented by its President and General
Manager Servillano dela Cruz, for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of
the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los
Baos (UPLB).
In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three progress
billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The third
billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA).
Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders
and dela Cruz to sue the UP and its co- respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to
recover various damages.
The sheriff served notices of garnishment on the UPs depository banks. The UP assailed said
garnishment of funds through and urgent motion to quash the notices of garnishment; and a
motion to quash the writ of execution. Stern Builders and dela Cruz motion for issuance of release
order.
ISSUE: Whether or not government funds may be seized to satisfy the writ of execution
HELD:
26

ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of UP are subject to garnishment
With the loss of the owners copy of OCT No. 2204, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri filed a petition for
the issuance of another owners duplicate. The heirs then executed an extrajudicial settlement
adjudicating the property among themselves. They claimed that they were entitled to payment of
rentals plus the value of the property. The ATO countered that the heirs were not entitled to any
payment, either of the value of the land or of the rentals because the property had been sold to its
predecessor, the defunct Civil Aeronautics Administration for P0.70 per square meter. The ATO
claimed that even if it failed to obtain title in its name, it had been declaring the property for
taxation purposes.
HELD:
UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting
quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special
funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by
Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the
possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking
institution, constitute a special trust fund, the disbursement of which should always be aligned
with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA.
Presidential Decree No. 1445 defines a trust fund as a fund that officially comes in the
possession of an agency of the government or of a public officer as trustee, agent or administrator,
or that is received for the fulfillment of some obligation. A trust fund may be utilized only for the
specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received.
The trial court promulgated a Decision ordering the ATO to pay rentals and the value of the land at
P89 per square meter. The ATO appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
erred in fixing the value of the property on the basis of its present value.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be sued while it exercises it power of eminent domain
HELD:
Eminent domain or expropriation is the inherent right of the state to condemn private property to
public use upon payment of just compensation. A number of circumstances must be present in the
taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the
entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority ; (4) the property must
be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners private property was converted into an airport by
respondent ATO. As a consequence, petitioners were completely deprived of beneficial use and
enjoyment of their property. Clearly, there was taking in the concept of expropriation as early as
1948 when the airport was constructed on petitioners private land.
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income
accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment
of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the
subject of the RTCs writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the
UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution
against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.
30. HEIRS OF MATEO

TRANPORTATION OFFICE
PIDACAN
AND
ROMANA
BIGO
vs.
AIR
DOCTRINE: The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial

function.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1935, spouses Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo acquired under the homestead
provision of Act No. 2874 a parcel of land consisting of about 22 hectares situated in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. Patent No. 33883 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2204 were issued
on the land, in the names of the Pidacan spouses.
As a rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is reckoned from the
time of taking. In this case, however, application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice.
Note that the ATO had been using petitioners property as airport since 1948 without having
instituted the proper expropriation proceedings. To peg the value of the property at the time of
taking in 1948, despite the exponential increase in its value considering the lapse of over half a
century, would be iniquitous. We cannot allow the ATO to conveniently invoke the right of eminent
domain to take advantage of the ridiculously low value of the property at the time of taking that it
arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of petitioners.
In this particular case, justice and fairness dictate that the appropriate reckoning point for the
valuation of petitioners property is when the trial court made its order of expropriation in 2001. As
for the fair value of the subject property, we believe that the amount arrived at by the
commissioners appointed by the trial court, P304.39 per square meter, constitutes just
compensation to petitioners.
Petition GRANTED.
Sec. 4: The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed
force which shall undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law. It
shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.
In 1948, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (now Air Transportation Office or ATO) used a portion
of the said property as an airport. Upon the death of the Pidacan spouses in 1974, the ATO
constructed a perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the property. The ATO also
lengthened, widened, and cemented the airports runway.
The spouses heirs namely, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda. de Robles
demanded from ATO the payment of the value of the property as well as rentals for the use of the
occupied premises. However, they were told that payment could not be made because the
property was still in their parents name.
27

Sec. 5: (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to
uphold and defend this Constitution.
(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness
of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their
duty.
(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and
benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed
forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military
shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except
to vote.
(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be
appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any
of their subsidiaries.
(5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their
service.
(6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be
recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable.
(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed
three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by
the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty.
Sec. 6: The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be
national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a
national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units
in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
31. PATROLMAN OSCAR QUILONA vs. THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL

FACTS:
Oscar Quilana, a policeman assigned at the Western Police District (WPD), was charged before
respondent General Court Martial with the crime of murder on two (2) counts, under Article 248 of
the RPC.
Petitioner through his counsel wrote a letter to President Corazon C. Aquino, expressing his desire
to be tried by a civilian court and sought a waiver of a military jurisdiction, for the reason, among
others, that the "enactment of the Philippine National Police Law creates his honest belief that he
should now be under the actual and real jurisdiction of a civilian court.
At the scheduled arraignment, petitioner's counsel manifested to respondent General Court Martial
his client's desire not to be arraigned and to be tried by a civilian court, furnishing respondent
court martial a copy of petitioner's letter to the President. The petitioner's arraignment was reset.
On 28 December 1990, the petitioner filed a motion to inhibit respondent court martial from
proceeding with his arraignment and that his case be investigated by a civilian prosecutor or tried
by a civilian court. Although the said motion was set by petitioner-movant for oral argument on 3
January 1991, respondent court martial decided to have it argued on 28 December 1990 the
very day it was filed. And after a ten-minute closed-door deliberation among members thereof, it
resumed session where it denied the petitioner's motion. Thereafter, it proceeded to read the
charges and specifications to petitioner. Notwithstanding the petitioner's refusal to enter a plea,
respondent court martial entered to him a "Plea of Not Guilty" and set the trial of the case on 25
January 1991.
Petitioner has filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order, alleging that respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
his motion for inhibition and that there is no appeal, nor any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru the present petition for the protection of his
rights pending the resolution of this petition, and after due hearing, let judgment be rendered
annulling the arraignment of the accused and/or annulling the proceedings taken by respondents
on December 18, 1990 as the law requires, prohibiting respondents from trying petitioner.
Acting upon the petition, the Court on 17 January 1991, resolved to implead the People of the
Philippines as party respondent and require the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.
Petitioner filed with this Court an URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
RESTRAINING ORDER which the court granted directing the respondents to CEASE and DESIST from
trying and/or proceeding with the trial of the petitioner
Acting on the petition as well as the comment of the Solicitor General, the Court resolved to (1)
treat the respondents' comment as answer to the petition; (2) give due course to the petition; and
(3) consider this case calendared for deliberation. Hence, this decision.
ISSUE: W/N The the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for inhibition
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
RA 6975 created the Philippine National Police (PNP) and took effect on 1 January 1991, provides:
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts; Provided, That the courts-martial
appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP
members who have already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon
by the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise
known as the Articles of War, as amended by Executive Order No. 178, otherwise
known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, that criminal cases
against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the
effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial
prosecutor or municipal trial court judge. (Emphasis supplied)
At this juncture, it will be recalled that Although RA 6975 was not yet in effect when petitioner was
arraigned on 28 December 1990, nevertheless, respondent court martial knew or should have
known that the said Act had already been signed or approved by the President on 13 December
1990 and that the same was published in two (2) national newspaper of general circulation on 17
December 1990 and that it would take effect on 1 January 1991. It is precisely for this reason that
respondent court martial decided to have the petitioner's motion to inhibit argued on 28 December
1990 and thereafter arraigned the petitioner on the same day despite his vehement refusal to
enter a plea.
Clearly, under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, respondent court
martial acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to or excess of jurisdiction in
proceeding with the arraignment of the petitioner on 28 December 1990.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his comment
Section 46 should be read in the light of the policy of the State declared under Section
2 of the act, which says:
Sec. 2 Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
promote peace and order, ensure public safety and further strengthen local
government capability aimed towards the effective delivery of the basic services to
the citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient and competent police
force that is national police force that is national in scope and civilian in character.
Towards this end, the State shall bolster a system of coordination and cooperation
among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement and
public safety agencies created under this Act.
The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the
performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall be
paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any position
thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
28

The civilian character with which the PNP is expressly invested is declared by RA 6975 as
paramount, and, in line therewith, the law mandates the transfer of criminal cases against its
members to civilian courts.
xxx xxx xxx
By closing its eyes to the provisions of Sections 2 and 46, indelicately asserting its
military jurisdiction rather than letting go of the case to civilian jurisdiction to
effectuate and give flesh to the avowed policy and intent of the law, respondent Court
committed grave abuse of discretion.
The petition is GRANTED.
32. CARPIO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DOCTRINE: The police force not being integrated with the military is not a part of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
FACTS:
Congress passed RA 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES" as the consolidated version of House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463.
Petitioner as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar sworn to defend the Constitution,
filed the petition now at bar on December 20, 1990, seeking this Court's declaration of
unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer for temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6975 derogated the power of control of the NAPOLCOM over the PNP
HELD:
there is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under
this very same provision, it is clear that the local executives are only acting as representatives of
the NAPOLCOM. . . . As such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in
the exercise of their functions under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM,
their acts are valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM." It is significant to note that the local
officials, as NAPOLCOM representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles
(those who meet the general qualifications for appointment to the PNP) to be recommended by
PNP officials.
The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the "People's Law Enforcement Boards" (or
the PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the commission's power of
control over the PNP
As a disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citizen's complaints against erring
officers and members of the PNP, the establishment of PLEBs in every city, and municipality would
all the more help professionalize the police force.
Petition was hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
33. MENDOZA vs. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION

FACTS:
This case stemmed from the affidavit-complaint for illegal arrest, illegal detention, physical
injuries, and robbery filed by Teodoro V. Conti against PO3 William M. Mendoza, now petitioner, and
PO2 Angelita Ramos. Both were members of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
Petitioners were charge with grave misconduct.
PNP Regional Director Oscar T. Aquino rendered a Decision finding the two policemen guilty as
charged and ordering their dismissal from the service.
Petitioners claim that they were denied due ptoces and interposed an appeal to the Regional
Appellate Board (RAB) of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), National Capital Region.
RAB rendered its Decision affirming the Decision of the PNP Regional Director.
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Makati City a petition for
certiorari, docketed as Special Civil Case No. 96-074. In his petition, he alleged that he was denied
due process and prayed that the RAB Decision dated August 23, 1993 and Resolution dated
December 17, 1993 be annulled.
RAB, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion to dismiss the petition,
contending that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies; that before seeking
judicial intervention, he should have first appealed the RAB Decision to the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), then to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC); and that contrary to petitioners claim, he was accorded due process during the
administrative proceedings before the RAB.
RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of merit, holding that as an exception to the rule
on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party may go directly to the court where x x x the
controverted acts were allegedly performed without or in excess of jurisdiction for utter disregard
of due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals, in rendering its challenged Decision, committed grave error
of law in dismissing Special Civil Action No. 96-074 on the ground that he failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies.
HELD:
The petition must fail.
petitioner, as stated earlier, did not file his comment on the RABs petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. And when the said court rendered the assailed Decision granting the petition and
dismissing petitioners petition in Special Civil Action No. 96-074, he again did not interpose a
motion for reconsideration thereof. He did not even explain why he failed to do so. Certainly, this is
not the normal actuation of a party who claims so aggrieved by an adverse court decision. Such
omissions by petitioner indicate that his cause lacks merit and his appeal is frivolous.
The importance of a motion for reconsideration cannot be overemphasized. We have held that
such motion is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings.[5] The filing of a motion for reconsideration will give the court the opportunity to either
(a) correct the error/s imputed to it or (b) clarify and strengthened its ruling on the issue and
hopefully convince the movant of his wrong position.
Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as The Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990, provides:
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. The disciplinary action imposed upon a
member of the PNP shall be final and executory; Provided, That a disciplinary
action imposed by the Regional Director or by the PLEB involving demotion
or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the Regional Appellate
Board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision:
Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP
involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, That, the Regional
or National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of
the Regional Appellate Board to act on the appeal within said period shall render
the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of
an appeal by either party with the Secretary. (Underscoring supplied)
Decision of the PNP Regional Director imposing upon a PNP member the administrative penalty of
dismissal from the service is appealable to the RAB. From the RAB Decision, the aggrieved party
may then appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. in the event the Secretary renders an unfavorable
decision, petitioner may still elevate his case to the Civil Service Commission.
29

Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution provides that the State shall establish and maintain one
police force which shall be civilian in character. Consequently, the PNP falls under the civil service
pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX-B, also of the Constitution, which states:
Section 2. (1). The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
Corollarily, Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. The Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department
[DILG].
Section 47 of the Civil Service Law provides inter alia that in cases where the decision rendered by
a bureau or office is appealable to the Civil Service Commission, the same may initially be
appealed to the Department and finally to the Commission.
Petitioners failure to exhaust all administrative remedies is fatal to his cause. It is elementary that
where, as here, a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should first be
resorted to. We thus find that the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, did not commit a
reversible error.
The instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED.
Sec. 7: The State shall provide immediate and adequate care, benefits, and other
forms of assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their
surviving spouses and orphans. Funds shall be provided therefor and due
consideration shall be given them in the disposition of agricultural lands of the
public domain and, in appropriate cases, in the utilization of natural resources.
Sec. 8: The State shall, from time to time, review to increase the pensions and
other benefits due to retirees of both the government and the private sectors.
34. RE: APPLICATION FOR SURVIVORSHIP PENSION BENEFITS UNDER

REPUBLIC ACT 9946 OF MRS. PACITA A. GRUBA, SURVIVING SPOUSE
OF THE LATE MANUEL K. GRUBA, FORMER CTA ASSOCIATE JUDGE
DOCTRINE: Providing retroactivity to judges and justices who died while in service conforms with
the doctrine that retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of
persons intended to be benefited.
FACTS:
The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba, Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba (Mrs. Gruba), applied for
retirement/gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 910.
The court approved the application filed by Mrs. Gruba. The five-year lump sum retirement benefit
under Republic Act No. 910 was remitted to the Government Service Insurance System effective
June 26, 1996. A total of P1,486,500.00, representing the five-year lump sum gratuity due to Judge
Gruba, was paid to his heirs.
Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No. 9946. Republic Act No. 9946
provided for more benefits, including survivorship pension benefits, among others. The law also
provides a retroactivity provision.
Mrs. Gruba applied for survivorship pension benefits under Republic Act No. 9946. 5 In a Resolution
dated January 17, 2012, this Court approved the application of Mrs. Gruba. She received
P1,026,748.00 for survivorship pension benefits from January 1, 2011 to April 2012.
The Supreme Court revoked the Resolution dated January 17, 2012 and directed the Court of Tax
Appeals to discontinue the payment of the survivorship pension benefits to Mrs. Gruba. However,
this Court stated that Mrs. Gruba was not required to refund the survivorship pension benefits
received
ISSUE:
1.
2.
3.
Whether Republic Act No. 9946 applies to Judge Gruba

Whether the heirs of Judge Gruba are entitled to the 10-year lump sum gratuity benefits
under Republic Act No. 9946;
Whether Mrs. Gruba is entitled to survivorship pension benefits under the same law.
HELD:
In 2010, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9946, otherwise known as An Act Granting Additional
Retirement, Survivorship, and Other Benefits to Members of the Judiciary, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 910. Republic Act No. 9946 introduced major innovations for retirement
of the members of the Judiciary. The first change made was the inclusion of additional allowances
in the computation for monthly pensions and gratuity payments. Second, the service requirement
for compulsory and optional retirement was modified. Under Republic Act No. 9946, only 15 years
in the Judiciary and any other branch of government are required. For optional retirement, the last
three (3) years must be rendered continuously in the Judiciary. The third major innovation of the
law is that non-compliance with the service requirement will entitle the retiree to a monthly
pension pro-rated to the number of years rendered in government. The fourth major innovation is
the benefits given to justices or judges who contracted permanent disability or partial permanent
disability during incumbency.
1. YES. RA 9946 applies retroactively to those who died or were killed whil they were in
government service
RA 9946 provides for a retroactivity clause in Section 4, adding Section 3-B to RA 910:
SEC. 3-B. The benefits under this Act shall be granted to all those who have
retired prior to the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the benefits shall be
applicable only to the members of the Judiciary: Provided, further, That the
benefits to be granted shall be prospective. (Emphasis supplied)
Providing retroactivity to judges and justices who died while in service conforms with the doctrine
that retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of persons intended to
be benefited. "[T]he liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in
order that the efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced."
Ensuring the welfare of families dependent on government employees is achieved in the changes
made in Republic Act No. 9946. It will be consistent with the humanitarian purposes of the law if
the law is made retroactive to benefit the heirs of judges and justices who passed away prior to the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946.
Judge Gruba who passed away prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946 is still covered by
the law by virtue of Section 3-B. "Retired" here is not construed in the strict dictionary definition
but in its more rational sense of discontinuance of service due to causes beyond ones control. It
should include the cessation of work due to natural causes such as death. Therefore, the death of
Judge Gruba produces effects under Republic Act No. 9946 for his family.
2. YES. The heirs of Judge Gruba are entitled to death gratuity benefits under RA 9946 Section 2
Under Republic Act No. 9946, Section 2 provides for death benefits under varying circumstances.
The provision contemplates three scenarios. First, if a justice or judge dies while in service,
regardless of his or her age and length of service, his or her heirs are entitled to a five (5)-year
lump sum of gratuity. Second, if a justice or judge dies of natural causes while in service,
regardless of his or her age, but has rendered at least 15 years in government service, his or her
heirs are entitled to a 10-year lump sum of gratuity. Finally, if a justice or judge is killed
intentionally and the death is considered work-related, regardless of his or her age, but has
rendered at least five (5) years in government service, his or her heirs are entitled to a 10-year
lump sum of gratuity.
30

In all these scenarios, the law dispenses with the requirement of the judges or justices retirement
for the surviving heirs to receive benefits upon the judges or justices demise. This is an
improvement from the benefits given under Republic Act No. 910. The law became more attuned
to the reality that death can occur anytime during the tenure of a judge or justice. It recognized
the risks judges and justices face in dispensing their duties and responsibilities, risks similar to
those experienced by members of law enforcement or the military. The law provides for
contingencies for judges and justices who unexpectedly left their loved ones who depended on
them for support and sustenance.
Judge Grubas death follows the second scenario under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9946. He died
due to natural causes while serving the Judiciary. He rendered 16 years, six (6) months, and 21
days in government service, thereby complying with the 15-year service requirement under the
law. His heirs became entitled to a lump sum of 10 years gratuity computed on the basis of the
highest monthly salary, plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation, and
other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation
allowance.
31
Sec. 11: (1) The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, whollyowned and managed by such citizens.The Congress shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies in commercial mass media when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed.
(2) The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be
regulated by law for the protection of consumers and the promotion of the
general welfare.
Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least seventy per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed
to engage in the advertising industry.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in
such industry shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital
thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of such entities must
be citizens of the Philippines.
3. NO. Mrs. Gruba is no qualified for survivorship benefits under Sec. 3 of RA 9946
When Mrs. Gruba applied for benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, she was not claiming additional
gratuity benefits. She was invoking the second paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 910 as
amended by Republic Act No. 9946, thus:
Upon the death of a Justice or Judge of any court in the Judiciary, if such Justice or Judge has
retired, or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, the surviving legitimate spouse
shall be entitled to receive all the retirement benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would
have received had the Justice or Judge not died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive
such retirement benefits until the surviving spouses death or remarriage.
According to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9946, survivorship pension benefits are given to
surviving spouses of retired judges or justices or surviving spouses of judges or justices who are
eligible to retire optionally. This means that for the spouse to qualify for survivorship pension, the
deceased judge or justice must (1) be at least 60 years old, (2) have rendered at least fifteen years
in the Judiciary or in any other branch of government, and in the case of eligibility for optional
retirement, (3) have served the last three years continuously in the Judiciary.
When the judge or justice is neither retired nor eligible to retire, his or her surviving spouse is not
entitled to those benefits. This was the reason behind our Resolution dated November 27, 2012,
wherein we revoked the approval of Mrs. Grubas application for survivorship pension benefits.
Despite the fact that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to receive survivorship pension, she no longer
needs to return the survivorship pension benefits she received from January 2011 to April 2012
amounting to P1,026,748.00. This Court, in the past, have decided pro hac vice that a surviving
spouse who received survivorship pension benefits in good faith no longer needs to refund such
pensions.
Sec. 9: The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.
Sec. 10: The State shall provide the policy environment for the full development of
Filipino capability and the emergence of communication structures suitable to the
needs and aspirations of the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out
of, and across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects the freedom of
speech and of the press.
Sec. 12: The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on
policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of
which shall come from such communities.
ARTICLE XVII: AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

35. IMBONG vs. COMELEC

DOCTRINE: Implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise
of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action.
FACTS:
These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A.
No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar,
taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it
prejudices their rights as such candidates.
On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to
propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative
district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the
second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4
amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall
be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according
to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be
entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of
members of the House of Representatives,"
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132,
implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No.

4914.
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions
embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the
constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds
advanced by petitioner Gonzales.
ISSUES:
1.
Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the
parameters of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?
HELD:
The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether
elective or appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as
officers and employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the
date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the
grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of and in consonance with the
prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due
process or of the equal protection of the law.
propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution;
that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations
shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who
shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the
purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the
people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the
Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local
circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7
of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the
petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions
concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND
SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely
and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the
implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No.
6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such
implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the
constitution, they are valid.
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it
is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will
be formally filed with the COMELEC.
CONSTITUTIONAL
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda within five days.
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the
following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact,
Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional
Amendments by Peoples Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24
November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments.
(2) It is true that RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates
that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege
speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: There is not a single word in that law which
can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such
implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
36. SANTIAGO v. COMELEC

DOCTRINE: If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,
considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.
FACTS:
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative.
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he
and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly
The COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order directing Delfin to cause the publication of
the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution. At the
hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the petitioners, on that same day, filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
32

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate.
Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for
whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
We agree that RA 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the
House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills. Senate Bill No. 17 solely dealt with
initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The
Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a
draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of
Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is RA 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right? No.
1.
Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is
silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or
resolutions.
2.
It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments
to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that
Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage
of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the
other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution.
3.
While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local
Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended RA 6735 to
fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and
local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national
in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III
(Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not
based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
37. LAMBINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DOCTRINE
Peoples Initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution
and not to its revision. The people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to
propose amendments.
PETITION: Consolidated petitions on the Resolution of the COMELEC denying due course to an
initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS
- The Lambino Group (TLG) began to start getting signatures for an initiative to change the 1987
Constitution: had the support of 6.3M 12% of all registered voters with each legislative
district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters.
- TLG: change the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article 6 and Sections 1-4 of
Article 7 and add Article 18 entitled Transitory Provisions
- These proposed changes will shift the Bicameral-Presidential System to a UnicameralParliamentary form of government.
- TLG filed a petition to the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under Section 5(b) and c[2] and section 7[3] of RA 6735 of the Initiative and Referendum
Act
- COMELEC denied the petition of TLG for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions.
- COMELEC: RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution (Santiago v. COMELEC)
- TLG: COMELEC committed GAD because the Ruling in Santiago is not a binding precedent and only
binding upon the parties.
- OSG joined causes with TLG urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling.
- OSG: RA 6735: temporary devises to implement the system of initiative.
- Opposing Intervenors challenged:
o
TLGs standing to file the petition
o
Validity of the signature gathering and verification process
o
TLGs compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting
an initiative petition under Section 2, Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution
o
Nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided
under Section 2, Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution
o
TLGs compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative
petitions to only one subject
ISSUE
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative
HELD
- TLG miserable failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a
peoples initiative and because of this alone it warrants that the petition be dismissed.
- COMELEC did not commit GAD
1.
THE INITIATIVE PETITION DOES NOT COMPLY WITH SECTION 2, ARTICLE 17 OF
THE CONSTITUTION ON DIRECT PROPOSAL BY THE PEOPLE.
o
Section 2, Art. 17: governing Constitutional provision that allows a peoples
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
o
The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before"
they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated "before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must " prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature."
o
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author
and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in
a petition.
o
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
o
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
33

o
o
o
o
o
2.
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to

prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing.
"An initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and
effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading"
which renders the initiative void.
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of TLGs proposed changes
in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the
signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
when they formulated the initiative clause in Sec. 2, Art. 17 of the Constitution.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from
February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the
petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC
The great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did
not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have
known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:
The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus
members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely
The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its

members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to
call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim
Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office;
Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to
the Constitution.
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in TLGs
signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that
they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly
controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed
changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature
sheets.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the
members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition.
However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the
proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not
after they have signed the petition.
In short, TLGs initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally
fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition
THE INITIATIVE VIOLATES SECTION 2, ARTICLE 17 OF THE CONSTITUTION

DISALLOWING REVISION THROUGH INITIATIVES.
o
Peoples Initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the
Constitution and not to its revision.
o
Article 17 discusses three modes of amending the Constitution:
2/3 vote of all the members of Congress
Constitutional Convention
Peoples Initiative
o
Art. 17 Sec. 1 refers to he first and second modes applied to any amendment or
revision to the constitution while Sec. 2 referring to the third mode only applies to
amendments to the Constitution.
o
This distinction was intentional as shown in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
o
o
o
o
o
o
The people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments.
Revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the
people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose.
To call what petitioners want an amendment is inaccurate.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be
submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the
requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be
proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Art. 7, Sec 1.
Amendment: addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will
effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed/adds, reduces or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved/affects only the specific provision being amended
Revision: contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution/ change that alters
the basic principle in the Constitution or the substantial entirety of the Constitution
as when the change affects substantial provisions of the Constitutions/affects
several provisions
TWO PART TEST IN DETERMINING W/O IT IS A REVISION OR AMENDMENT:
(CALIFORNA COURT DEVELOPED)
Quantitative Test: asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in

its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions.
The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not
consider the degree of the change.
Qualitative Test: inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
"accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision." Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.
Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes
"change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and
the system of check and balances."
Under both tests, TLG initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, TLG proposed changes overhaul two articles -Article
6 on the Legislature and Article 7 on the Executive - affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and
from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
Change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution
thus a shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision.
Father Bernas: An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific
and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to
improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that
are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention
and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions
of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to
determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a
switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a
switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on
other important provisions of the Constitution.
People's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for
amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of
the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only
result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that TLGs initiative is a revision
and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and
34

unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article 17 of the
Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to amendments to
this Constitution
PETITION DISMISSED.
38. DEL ROSARIO V. CARBONELL

DOCTRINE
Constitutional Law; Congress sitting as a constituent Assembly has the sole power either to
propose amendments or to call a convention for the purpose.The charge of petitioner that
Congress abdicated its power as a constituent body to propose amendments in favor of the
Constitutional Convention, is refuted by Art. XV of the Constitution which authorizes Congress
sitting as a Constituent Assembly either to propose amendments or to call a convention for the
purpose. The choice of either alternative is solely committed to Congress, which cannot be
inquired into nor interfered with by this Tribunal, the same being purely a political question.
PETITION: Entire R.A. No. 6132 be declared unconstitutional
FACTS
- The petition does not contain sufficient averments as to the particular right of the petitioner that
may be affected by any provision of the law
- Petitioner: Temporary staff writer of the Weekly Nation Magazine, a permanent international
Research Officer of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization since October 5, 1957 and as such
is on home leave and awaiting recall and re-instatement to his post in Bangkok, Thailand by
the Department of Foreign Affairs
- Does not indicate that he is a prospective candidate or is a member of any political party or any
civic, religious, professional, or labor organization whose rights may be impaired by Sec. 6(A),
par. 5 and Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, which he challenges as oppressive.
- Petitioner assails the appropriation of twenty-nine million pesos in Sec. 21 of the law as simply a
waste of public funds, because there is no time limit for the duration of the Constitutional
Convention, which may dissipate its time in pointless discussion without reaching any
consensus or conclusion and thus degenerate into a Debating Club, Unlimited,
- He expressed his interests as a tax payer.
ISSUE
Whether or Not R.A. No. 6132 An Act Implementing Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Two as
Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling
for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for Proportional Representation Therein and Other
Details Relating to the Election of Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention,
Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other
Purposes is unconstitutional.
HELD
The charge of petitioner that Congress abdicated its power as a constituent body to propose
amendments in favor of the Constitutional Convention, is refuted by Art. XV of the Constitution
which authorizes Congress sitting as a Constituent Assembly either to propose amendments or to
call a convention for the purpose. The choice of either alternative is solely committed to Congress,
which cannot be inquired into nor interfered with by this Tribunal the same being purely a political
question.
Likewise, whether there is necessity for amending the Constitution is also addressed to the
wise judgment of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, against which the Court cannot pit
its own judgment.
Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an
ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted
to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about
the validity of the new Constitution.
The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one by the
Constitutional Convention called in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, respectively, of 1967 and 1969,
because under Sec. 6(A), par. 5, of the law, a candidate may include a concise statement of his
principal constitutional reforms, programs or policies, is no argument against the validity of the law
because amendment includes the revision or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any
rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would
become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.
This Court, in a decision dated September 11, 1970 in the cases of Imbong vs. Ferrer, et al.
and Gonzales vs. Ferrer, et al., G.R. Nos. L-32432 and L-32443, held that neither R.A. No. 6132 nor
its Sections 2, 5 and 8(a), paragraph one, can be declared unconstitutional.
This Court also sustained the validity of Sec. 4 and the second paragraph of Sec. 8(a) of R.A.
No. 6132 in a decision dated September 3, 1970.
The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implicit in the call for the convention
itself, whose raison detre is to revise the present Constitution.
39. TOLENTINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DOCTRINE:
The courts may review the validity of an act of the constitutional convention proposing a
particular amendment to the Constitution. There should be no more doubt regarding the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention called for the
purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at par with the former.
A constitutional convention is supreme within the domain of its legitimate authority. A
revolutionary convention, which drafts the first, Constitution of an entirely new government born
either of war or liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing government
or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup detat is completely without restraint and omnipotent.
The current constitutional convention, however, came into being only by virtue of the provisions of
the present Constitution.
True it is that once convened, this convention became endowed with extraordinary powers
generally beyond the control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of
such powers can be coextensive only with the purpose for which the convention was called and as
it is self-evident that the amendments it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the
Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of
the convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds.
The present Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts, the
existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that assembly.
While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the performance of its task to propose
amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other
authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or
members can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
deny anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws
PETITION: Restrain COMELEC from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971 at
which the proposed constitutional amendment reducing the voting age in Sec 1 of Art 5 of the
Constitution of the Philippines to 18 years shall be submitted for ratification by the people
pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent
implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without force and effect in so far as
they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of COMELEC performed to
be done by it in obedience to the aforementioned Convention resolutions to be null and void, for
being violating of the Constitution of the Philippines. IN SHORT, prohibition from
implementing Organic Resolution no. 1 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the
Constitutional Convention and the COMELEC.
FACTS
- Constitutional Convention (ConCon) of 1971 was established because of two resolutions of the
Congress and for the purpose to propose amendments to the Constitution.
- ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1: A Resolution Amending Section One of Article 5 of the
Constitution of the Philippines as to Lower the Voting Age to 18
o
SECTION 1: SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES
NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE 18 YEARS OR OVER AND
35

ARE ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR ONE YEAR AND IN THE MUNICIPALITY WHEREIN THEY
PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS PRECEDING THE ELECTION.
o
SECTION 2: THE AMENDMENT SHALL BE VALID AS APRT OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE PHILIPPINES WHEN APPROVED BY A MAJORY OF THE VOTES CAST IN A
PLEBISCITE TO COINCIDE WITH THE LOCAL ELECTIONS IN NOVEMBER 1971.
Pres. Macapagal called on COMELEC to aid the Convention in implanting OR1
COMELEC agreed to hold the plebiscite on the condition that:
o
ConCon undertake the printing of separate official ballots, election returns,
and tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;
o
ConCon adopts its own security measures for printing and shipment of ballots
and election forms
o
Ballots and election forms will be delivered on time to COMELEC
ISSUE
Whether or not there was any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article 5 of the Constitution,
which was violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1.
HELD
-
The Supreme Court held that there was a limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article 5
of the Constitution which was violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a
plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1, and it was the
condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in a single election or
plebiscite.
the Supreme Court held that as Section 1 of Article 5 of the Constitution distinctly states
that Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose
may propose amendments to this Constitution, there is no limit as to the number of
amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. However, the same Section
1 limits the number of election or plebiscite that may be held to ratify any amendment
or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention,
to only one, as the said constitutional provision definitely provides that such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of
the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification.
Moreover, all the proposed amendments must be submitted to the people for ratification
at the same time, not separately from each and all of the other amendments, because
the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable
as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately
formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights,
liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of
the people, on the other. This harmony can be achieved only if the people can study with
deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and
or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability an
intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
As the amendment proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite was only the first
amendment the Convention proposed, the plebiscite being called for the purpose of
submitting the same for ratification of the people was not authorized by Section 1 of
Article 5 of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent
COMELEC in that direction were null and void.
40. PLANAS V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DOCTRINE
The Convention was legally free to postulate any amendment it may deem fit to propose. not only
because the Convention exercised sovereign powers delegated thereto by the people (although
insofar only as the determination of the proposals to be made and formulated by said body is
concerned) but, also, because said proposals cannot be valid as part of our Fundamental Law
unless and until "approved by the majority of the votes cast at an election at which"' said
proposals "are submitted to the people for their ratification," as provided in Section 1 of Art. 15 of
the 1935 Constitution.
PETITION: Enjoin the implementation of PD No. 73 because the President does not have the
legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, such power being lodged
exclusively in the Congress, and there was no proper submission to the people of said Proposed
Constitution set for January 15, 1973.
FACTS
- In 1967, the Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2 (amended by Resolution No. 4),
calling for a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said
Resolution No. 2 was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132 and the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was formally constituted.
- September 21, 1972: while the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session, then President
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law.
- November 29: the Convention approved its proposed constitution. The next day the president
issued Presidential Decree No. 73 (PD 73) submitting to the people for ratification or
rejection the proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification on January 15, 1973.
- December 7: Chito Planas filed this petition and substantially identical actions were filed.
- December 17: The president issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation
No. 1081 for the purpose of free and open debate on the proposed constitution.
- On December 23, the president issued General Order No. 20 which directed that the January 15,
1973 plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution be postponed until
further notice.
- The Court refrained from deciding on the Plebiscite cases
- Main objection to PD73: the president does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite
and appropriate funds thereof, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of
the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the president.
- January 12, 1973: petitioners filed an urgent motion praying that said case be decided as soon as
possible preferable not later than January 15, 1973
- It was alleged that the President has issued Presidential Decree No. 86 organizing the so-called
Citizens Assemblies to be consulted on certain public questions. The petitioners assert that the
question added in the last list of questions to be asked to the Citizens Assemblies, namely
Do you approve of the New Constitution? in relation to the question following it: Do you still
want a plebiscite to call to ratify the new Constitution? would be an attempt to by-pass the
Court before which the question of the validity of the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution is
pending.
- Specifically, petitioners fear that if an affirmative answer to the two questions will be reported then
the Courts and the entire nation will be confronted with a fait accompli which has been
attained in a highly unconstitutional and undemocratic manner, the fait accompli being the
supposed expression of the people 'ratifying' the proposed Constitution.
- Petitioners asked the court to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting and reporting on the voting on
the answers to the questions posed to the Citizens Assemblies, otherwise, what will arise is a
constitutional crisis wherein a conflict will arise between those who maintain that the 1935
Constitution is still in force, on the one hand, and those who will maintain that it has been
superseded by the proposed Constitution, on the other.
- While the case for the urgent motion filed by petitioners was being heard, the Secretary of
Justice delivered to Justice Concpecion a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been
signed by the President. The said Proclamation No. 1102 proclaimed that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified by
an overwhelming majority of all the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect
ISSUES
1.
2.
3.
Whether or not the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree
No. 73.
Whether or not the 1971 Constitution Convention has the authority to pass the proposed
Constitution.
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue Presidential Decree No. 73.
36

4.
5.
6.
HELD
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 73 is valid.

Whether or not the proclamation of Martial Law should affect the validity of the
plebiscite to vote on the Proposed Constitution.
Whether or not Proclamation No. 1102 is valid.
The Solicitor General contends that the question (validity of Presidential Decree No. 73)
is political in nature and beyond the review of the courts. The Members of the Court are
unanimous that the issue is a justiciable one. Indeed, the contested decree purports to
have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is
manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of
Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the authority
of this Court to review cases involving said issue.
Regardless of the wisdom and moral aspects of the contested provisions of the proposed
Constitution, the Convention was legally free to postulate any amendment it may deem
fit to propose - save perhaps what is or may be inconsistent with what is now known,
particularly in international law, as Jus Cogens - not only because the Convention
exercised sovereign powers delegated thereto by the people (although insofar only as
the determination of the proposals to be made and formulated by said body is
concerned) but, also, because said proposals cannot be valid as part of our Fundamental
Law unless and until "approved by the majority of the votes cast at an election at
which"' said proposals "are submitted to the people for their ratification," as provided in
Section 1 of Art. 15 of the 1935 Constitution.
Unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite
ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be
scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as
the circumstances may justify.
On the validity of the decree itself, six Members of the Court (Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra, Concepcion) are of the opinion that the issue has
become moot and academic, while three Members (Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio)
voted to uphold the validity of said Decree
Justice Concepcion opined that this matter as one intimately and necessarily related to
the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 . This question has not been explicitly raised,
however, in any of the cases under consideration.
Insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion
that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935
Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions
were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the
opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and
that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate
freedom for the purposes contemplated.
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion are
of the opinion that the question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly
raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question.
Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has
been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported
ratification of the Proposed Constitution . . . based on the referendum among Citizens'
Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of
the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate drawback notwithstanding,
"considering all other related relevant circumstances, . . the new Constitution is legally
recognizable and should he recognized as legitimately in force."
Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been
ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it
has no force and effect whatsoever.
Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the
Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any
judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of
fact."
PETITION DISMISSED
41. JAVELLANA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DOCTRINE
It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the Constitution should be
settled by applying the provisions of the Constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification,
or the old Constitution.
PETITION: Nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE

FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
FACTS
- Previously, Congress passed a resolution calling a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The 1971 Constitutional Convention came up with a Proposed Constitution, which
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 73, was submitted to the Filipino people for ratification or
rejection. This spawned a a sequel of cases (hereafter Plebiscite cases) questioning the
validity of PD 73 and the antecedent acts.
- However, pending the hearing of the Plebiscite Cases, the President signed Proclamation No. 1102
which proclaimed that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has
been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the
Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into
effect.
- Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing the Proposed
Constitution. Javellana filed the petition as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter
and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated.
Petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102.
- After deliberating on the cases, the members of the Court agreed that each would write his own
opinion and serve a copy thereof on his colleagues, and this they did. Subsequently, the Court
discussed said opinions and votes were cast thereon.
ISSUES
1.
2.
3.
4.
Whether or not the issue on the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 partake of the nature
of a political, and, hence, non-justiciable question.
Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified conformably to
said Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution.
Whether or not the proposed Constitution aforementioned has been approved by a
majority of the people in the Citizen's Assemblies allegedly held throughout the
Philippines.
Whether or not the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution.
HELD
1.
Political questions refer to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected, it justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of
the contested act, not its wisdom
Considering that Art. XV of the1935 Constitution prescribes the method or procedure for its
amendment, the question of whether or not the Proposed Constitution drafted by the 1971
Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance with said Art. XV is a justiciable and not
a political question
2 & 3.
37

It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the Constitution should be
settled by applying the provisions of the Constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification,
or the old Constitution. Hence, The determination of whether or not the new constitution is now in
force depends upon whether or not the said new Constitution has been ratified in accordance with
the requirements of the 1935 Constitution, upon the authority of which said Constitutional
Convention was called and approved the proposed Constitution.
The plebiscite in the Citizens Assemblies, claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution, is null
and void based on the following reasons:
(a) Unqualified voters allowed to vote
Under the 1935 Constitution, persons below 21 years of age could not exercise the right
of suffrage. Hence, when persons above 15 years but less than 21 years of age were allowed to
vote in the plebiscite, it rendered the proceedings void. And, since there is no means by which the
invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the
qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizens Assemblies must be considered null and void.
(b) Casting of votes not done by ballot
The 1935 Constitution requires "a majority of the votes cast" for a proposed amendment
to be valid. The term "votes cast" has been held to mean ballots cast , and the word cast
means to deposit (the ballot) formally or officially. In short, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
intended the term "votes cast" to mean votes made in writing or choices made on ballots not
orally or by raising hands by the persons taking part in plebiscites. Hence, the viva voce voting in
the Citizens' Assemblies is null and void ab initio
(c) Conducted without COMELEC supervision
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of
COMELEC is void. The Barrio Assemblies took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and
without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or of PD 73. The procedure
followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by
the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of the fundamental
scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of
the people's will.
4.
A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts. Recognition normally connotes
the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members
of Congress does not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed
said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and
of the Law of Public Officers.
Taking into consideration Proclamation No. 1081 which placed the entire Philippines under Martial
Law, the compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither is the Court prepared to declare that the
people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of
Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of
said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people,
under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.
PETITION DISMISSED
42. MITRA JR V. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DOCTRINE
The ruling in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary has already settled the issue that the new
Constitution is valid and now in effect. Rightfully, it is ranked by eminent jurists and academicians
abroad as one of the most significant manifestations of the exercise of the function of judicial
review. Apparently, this awesome and delicate power has implications still not adequately grasped.
By virtue of this prerogative, the Supreme Court either checks or legitimates the acts of a
coordinate department, challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The decision rendered then,
whether one of approval or of rejection, of validity or of unconstitutionality, is controlling.
PETITION: The plea is made for the holding of a plebiscite so that the people may vote on the
ratification of the Constitution, now in force, but as to them still in the stage of proposal.
FACTS
- This case is somewhat similar with Occena and Gonzales cases:
SAME: 1973 Constitution not in force and effect

DIFFERENCE: In this case, Mitra pleas to hold plebiscite to vote on ratification so that the
people may vote on the ratification of the Constitution, now in force, but as to them still
in the stage of proposal.
- Petitioner argued that the 1935 Constitution was suspended by establishment of authoritarian
regime and could be operative again once Martial Law has been lifted.
- The Supreme Court held that petitioners came in wrong forum and that they must uphold
Constitution.
o
o
ISSUE
1.
Whether or not the new Constitution has been effected by the acquiescence of the
people.
HELD
The scholarly opinion of then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, while in dissent, acknowledged
that even without valid ratification, a new Constitution could come into force and effect by the
acquiescence of the people, referring in particular to the leading case of Taylor v. Commonwealth.
Other cases may be cited. There is this excerpt in a separate opinion in Javellana: Independently
of the lack of validity of the ratification of the new Constitution, if it be accepted by the people, in
whom sovereignty resides according to the Constitution, then this Court cannot refuse to yield assent to such a political decision of the utmost gravity, conclusive in its effect. Such a fundamental
principle is meaningless if it does not imply, to follow Laski, that the nation as a whole constitutes
the single center of ultimate reference, necessarily the possessor of that power that is able to
resolve disputes by saying the last word. If the origins of the democratic polity enshrined in the
1935 Constitution with the declaration that the Philippines is a republican state could be traced
back to Athens and to Rome, it is no doubt true, as Mclver pointed out, that only with the
recognition of the nation as the separate political unit in public law is there the juridical recognition
of the people composing it as the source of political authority. From them, as Corwin did stress,
emanate the highest possible embodiment of human will, which is supreme and must be obeyed.
To avoid any confusion and in the interest of clarity, it should be expressed in the manner ordained
by law. Even if such were not the case, however, once it is manifested, it is to be accepted as final
and authoritative. The government which is merely an agency to register its commands has no
choice but to submit. Its officials mubt act accordingly. No agency is exempt from such a duty, not
even this Court. In that sense, the lack of regularity in the method employed to register its wishes
is not fatal in its consequences. Once the fact of acceptance by the people of a new fundamental
law is made evident, the judiciary is left with no choice but to accord it recognition. The obligation
to render obeisance falls on the courts as well. Even petitioners must be aware that aside from
the referendum that led to the ratification of the present Constitution, there was a second one held
on July 27 and 28 in 1973, and another on February 27 and 28 in 1975. The 1976 amendments to
the Constitution were adopted in the referendum held on October 16 and 17 of that year. Then on
December 17, 1977, there was again held a referendum. The fact that the people went to the polls
would be indicative of their acquiescence in the present Constitution. Nor could petitioners be
unaware that two elections have been held under the present Constitution, one for members of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa on April 7, 1978 and the other for local government officials on
January 30, 1980. In the face of the above clearly-manifested recognition of the force and effect of
the present Constitution, by the people, including those in the opposition, it would seem that any
argument to the contrary should be consigned to a well-merited limbo.
PETITION DISMISSED
43. GONZALES V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DOCTRINE
Constitutional law; Power of judicial department to determine allocation of powers between
several departments.The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.
Same; Nature of power to amend the Constitution.The power to amend the Constitution or
to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. It (is a part of the inherent powers of the peopleas the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, such as oursto make, and hence, to amend their own fundamental law.
38

Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants
such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as competent elements of a constituent
assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their authority
does not emanate from the Constitutionthey are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself.
PETITION: RA 4913 AN ACT SUBMITTING TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE FOR APPROVAL THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES PROPOSED BY THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES IN RESOLUTIONS OF BOTH HOUSES NUMBERED ONE AND THREE ADOPTED ON MARCH
SIXTEEN, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVEN is unconstitutional.
FACTS
- On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed Joint Resolutions (a) to
increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as
provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180 to be apportioned among the
several provinces; (b) to call a convention to propose amendments to the present Constitution;
and (c) to amend Section 16, Article VI of the said Constitution so they can become delegates
themselves to the Convention.
- Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA 4913, providing that the amendments to
the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions be submitted, for approval by the
people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
- In this consolidated petition, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and PHILCONSA seek to declare RA
4913 unconstitutional and to restrain COMELEC from holding the plebiscite for the ratification
of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3.
- It is further contested that said resolutions are null and void because: (1) The Members of
Congress, which approved the proposed amendments and the resolutions are, at best, de facto
Congressmen; (2) Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives: propose amendments or
call a convention but may not avail of both at the same time; (3) The election, in which
proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a
special election, not a general election.
ISSUE
1.
2.
3.
4.
Whether or not the issue is justiciable and the court has jurisdiction over the case.
Whether or not the Congress of the Philippines was a de facto Congress, and
consequently, whether or not Congress did not have the authority to pass Resolution
Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and RA 4913.
Whether or not amendments to the constitution can be submitted to the people for
ratification in a general election instead of a special election.
Whether or not the submission of the proposed amendments to the people violates the
due process clause in the Constitution.
HELD
1.
Not a political question
The judicial department is the only constitutional organ, which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates
the Constitution is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.
2. No.
The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.
The power to amend the Constitution lies in the inherent powers of the peopleas the
repository of sovereignty in a republican stateto make, and hence, to amend their own
fundamental law.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly
grants such power. When exercising the same, Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent
assembly.
When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution,
unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from
the Constitutionthey are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution
39
itself.
3. Yes. It can be joined in a General Election
Also, the ratification of the amendments to the Constitution need not necessarily be in a
special election or plebiscite called for that purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be
preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of an election at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification.
To join the ratification of the proposed amendments with an election for candidates to public
office does not render it any less an election at which the proposed amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification. No prohibition being found in the plain terms of the Constitution,
none should be inferred.
5. No.
The term due process in Article I refer only to the provision of fair opportunity but does not
guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of. As long as fair and reasonable
opportunity is given, the due process clause is not infringed.
Article 1 Section 1 (1) of the 1935 Constitution reads: No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws. Due process in this provision refers only to providing fair opportunity. It does not
guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the look-out of the voter and
the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity is given, the due
process clause is not infringed.
The following provisions of the assailed RA 4913 provide for a reasonable and fair opportunity
for voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposed amendments of Congress:
a.
the publication of the proposed amendments in the Official Gazette at least 20
days before the election;
b.
the posting of notices in public buildings not later than 14 October 1967, to
remain posted until after the elections
c.
the placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling places
d.
the provision by the COMELEC of copies of the same in English, Spanish, and
whenever practicable, in the native languages, for free distribution; an
e.
the printing of the proposed amendments at the back of the ballots
f.
The above provisions of RA 4913 also satisfy the constitutional requirement in
Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution that the proposed amendments be
submitted to the people for ratification
The above provisions of RA 4913 also satisfy the constitutional requirement in Article XV
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution that the proposed amendments be submitted to the people for
ratification.
PETITION GRANTED
44. TOLENTINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

** SAME AS NUMBER 39 **
ARTICLE XVIII: TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

45. MMDA V. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION

DOCTRINE

The powers of the MMDA are limited to formulation, coordination, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no provision in its charter
that grants the MMDA police power and/or legislative power.
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective councils that possess legislative power and
police power.
FACTS
- Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila.
- Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City.
- BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
- On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated
December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicles traffic
starting January 2, 1996.
- Actions Filed
o
BAVA: applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order but after due
hearing, trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
o
BAVA: appealed to CA, which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that MMDA has
no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause
the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council
of Makati by ordinance
o
MMDA: filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA
ISSUES
1.
2.
Whether or not the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant
to its regulatory and police powers?
Whether or not the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA
may order the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?
HELD
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are
administrative in nature. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that
grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative
power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not
pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but
unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the
opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The
promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
PETITION DENIED
Sec. 16: Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause
but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March
25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall
be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits
accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their
separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered
for employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities,
or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation,
tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.
46. Dario v. Mison (1989)

DOCTRINE:
In order to be entitled to the benefits granted under SEC 16 of ART 18 of the 1987
Constitution, 2 requisites, one negative and the other positive, must concur, to wit: (1) The
separation must not be for cause, and (2) The separation must be due to any of the 3
situations mentioned above.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Be that as it may, if the
abolition, which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition
takes place and whatever abolition is done, is void ab initio.
FACTS
On March 25, 1989, President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3 DECLARING A NATIONAL
POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY
TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION. On January 30, 1987, she
promulgated Executive Order No. 127, REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE. Among
other offices, EO No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed
a new staffing pattern therefor. On Feb 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.
On Janruary 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a
Memorandum, in the nature of Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive
Orders, prescibing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided that by February 1988,
all employees covered by EO 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of Customs by the
President on reorganization shall be: a) informed of their re-appointment, or b) offered another
position in the same department or agency, or c) informed of their termination. On the same date,
Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with adjudicating
appeals from removals under the above Memorandum. A total of 394 officials and employees of
the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of separation. They filed appeals with the Civil
Service Commission.
On June 30, 1988, the CSC promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of 279 employees.
Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied. Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings.
On June 10, 1988, RA 6656, AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION, was
signed into law, which provided:
SEC 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have
been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or
reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay
for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees,
including casuals and temporary employees, who have been separated pursuant to
reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and
retirement and other benefitsxxx
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs examiners appointed by
Commissioner Mison pursuant to the ostensible reorganization subject of this controversy,
petitioned the Court to contest the validity of the statute. On October 21, 1988, 35 more Customs
officials whom the CSC had ordered reinstated by its June 30 Resolution filed their own petition to
compel Commissioner Mison to comply with the said Resolution.
The Case for the Employees
Cesar Dario (Petitioner), was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs until his
relief on orders of Commissioner Mison on Jan 23, 1988. In essence, he questions the legality of his
dismissal, which he alleges was upon the authority of SEC 59 of EO 127, a provision he claims the
Commissioner could not have legally invoked.
40

Like Dario, Vicente Feria was a Deputy Commissioner at the Bureau until his separation directed
by Commissioner Mison. And Like Dario, he claims that under the 1987 Constitution, he has
acquired security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be covered by SEC 59 of EO 127, having
been appointed on April 22, 1986 - during the effectivity of the Provisional Constitution. He adds
that under EO 39, the Commissioner of Customs has the power to appoint all Bureau personnel,
except those appointed by the president, and that his position, which is that of a Presidential
appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison for purposes of reorganization.
The Case for Mison
Provisions of Section 16, Article 18 explicitly authorize the removal of career civil service
employees "not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution. For this
reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. That
contrary to the employees' argument, SEC 59 of EO127 is applicable (in particular, to Dario and
Feria), in the sense that retention in the Bureau, under the EO, depends on either retention of the
position in the new staffing pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the dismissed
employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered legally separated. Moreover,
Mison proffers that under SEC 59 incumbents are considered on holdover status, "which means
that all those positions were considered vacant."
The Commissioner's two petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of the Civil Service
Commission: (1) the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, reinstating the 265 customs employees
above-stated; (2) the Resolution, dated September 20, 1988, denying reconsideration; and (3) the
Resolution, dated November 16, 1988, reinstating five employees.
ISSUE & RATIO
W/N SEC 16 of ART 18 of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of license upon the
Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an
automatic-vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason. - NO
Since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for automatic vacancies.
We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the Government to
dismiss public servants at a moments notice. If the present Charter envisioned an automatic
vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts have so
stated. Plainly, the concern of SEC 16 is to ensure compensation for victims of constitutional
revamps - whether under the Freedom or existing Constitution - and only secondarily and
impliedly, to allow reorganization.
The provisions benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. The separation
contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No.
3, (2) the reorganization from Feb 2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of career officers tendered in
line with the existing policy and which resignations have been accepted. The phrase not for
cause is clearly and primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees
separated for cause. In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted under SEC 16
of ART 18 of the 1987 Constitution, 2 requisites, one negative and the other positive, must concur,
to wit: (1) The separation must not be for cause, and (2) The separation must be due to any of the
3 situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on
Feb 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to Feb 2, 1987. It can only mean, then, that whatever
reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily, upon
the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that we are
continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary Government had started. We
are through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution - the first stage. We are on the
second stage - that inferred from the provisions of SEC 16 of Article 18 of the permanent basic
document. This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, but is
apparent from the Charters own words. After Feb 2, 1987, incumbent officials and employees have
acquired security of tenure.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Be that as it may, if the abolition, which is
nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever
abolition is done, is void ab initio.
The Court finds that Commissioner Mison did not act in good faith, since that after Feb 2, 1987, no
perceptible restructuying of the Customs hierarchy - except for the change of personnel - has
occurred, which would have justified (all things being equal) the contested dismissals. There is no
showing that legitimate structural changes have been made - or a reorganization actually
undertaken, for that matter - at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office, which would
have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees. There can therefor be no actual
reorganization to speak of but a revamp of personnel pure and simple. The records indeed show
that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced them with 522.
This betrays a clear intent to pack the Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of
the Presidents directive to halt further lay-offs as a consequence of the reorganization. Finally, he
was aware that lay-offs should observe the procedure laid down by EO 17.
DECISION
The resolutions of the CSC are AFFIRMED. Commissioner Mison is ordered to reinstate the
employees separated as a result of his notices dated January 26, 1988. The employees whom
Commissioner Mison may have appointed as replacements are ordered to vacate their posts
subject to the payment of whatever benefits that may be provided by law.
47. Mendoza v. Quisumbing (1990)

DOCTRINE:
There is no dispute over the power to reorganize - whether traditional, progressive, or

whatever adjective is appended to it. The rule of law requires that no government official
should feel free to do as he pleases using only his avowedly sincere intentions and
conscience to guide him. The fundamental standards of fairness embodied in the bona fide
rule cannot be disregarded. More particularly, the auto-limitations imposed by the President
when she proclaimed the Provisional Constitution and issued executive orders as sole law
maker and the standards and restrictions prescribed by the present Constitution and the
Congress established under it, must be obeyed. Absent this compliance, we cannot say that a
reorganization is bona-fide.
It is a paramount principle in Public Officers Law that the power to abolish public offices
vested in the legislature is not absolute. It is subject to the limitations that it be exercised in
good faith, should never be for personal or political reasons, and cannot be implemented in a
manner contrary to law.
FACTS
After the Feb 1986 political upheaval, the political leadership decided to proclaim the formation of
a revolutionary government headed by President Aquino. On Feb 25, 1987, immediately after the
President was sworn into office, she issued Proclamation No. 1, declaring as policy the
reorganization of the government. On March 25, 1986, she promulgated Proclamation No. 3
DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE
PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION. On
March 28, 1986, the President issued Executive Order No. 17 PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE 3 OF THE FREEDOM
CONSTITUTION. Thereafter, the President issued Executive Orders directing the reorganization of
various different departments of the government which affected their employees, one of whom
was Petitioner Fransisco Mendoza.
Petitioner Mendoza was the Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City who, on June 4, 1986,
was reappointed by respondent Quisumbing as such with a PERMANENT status. He has served
the Department of Education for 42 years, moving up the ranks in the public school system. In a
letter dated March 19, 1987, the petitioner received the letter-order informing him that pursuant to
EO 117, which provides for a reorganization of the Department of Sports and Culture (DECS) and
the implementing guidelines thereof, he would be considered separated from the service effective
April 15, 1987, without prejudice to the availment of benefits. The letter particularly stated that
consistent with the mandate of reorganization to achieve grater efficiency and effectiveness, all
incumbent officials/personnel are on holdover status unless advised otherwise. In his place,
41

Secretary Quisumbing appiointed Dr. Socorro L. Sering on a permanent status. In the meantime,
the petitioner in a letter, wrote Secretary Quisumbing requesting reconsideration of the letterorder. The letter was forwarded to the Reorganization Appeals Board (RAB). The motion for
reconsideration remained unacted upon, hence the petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction.
ISSUES & RATIO
1.
W/N the various reorganization programs in different agencies and/or departments
of the government implementing the orders issued pursuant to the President s
proclamations were valid.
As stated in Dario v. Mison, et al., there is no dispute over the authority to cary out a valid
reorganization in any branch or agency of Government. Pursuant to the Provisional Constitution
and the various EOs issued by the President when she was the sole law-making authority, the
different departments of Government were authorized to carry on reorganization programs.
From the very start however, the nature and extent of the power to reorganize were circumscribed
by the source of the power itself. The grant of authority was accompanied by guidelines and
limitations. It was never intended that department and agency heads would be vested with
untrammelled and automatic authority to dismiss the millions of government workers on the stroke
of a pen and with the same sweeping power determine under their sole discretion who would be
appointed or reappointed to the vacant positions.
There is no dispute over the power to reorganize - whether traditional, progressive, or whatever
adjective is appended to it. The rule of law requires that no government official should feel free to
do as he pleases using only his avowedly sincere intentions and conscience to guide him. The
fundamental standards of fairness embodied in the bona fide rule cannot be disregarded. More
particularly, the auto-limitations imposed by the President when she proclaimed the Provisional
Constitution and issued executive orders as sole law maker and the standards and restrictions
prescribed by the present Constitution and the Congress established under it, must be obeyed.
Absent this compliance, we cannot say that a reorganization is bona-fide.
It is a paramount principle in Public Officers Law that the power to abolish public offices vested in
the legislature is not absolute. It is subject to the limitations that it be exercised in good faith,
should never be for personal or political reasons, and cannot be implemented in a manner contrary
to law.
The dismissal of all employees and their being placed on hold-over status is particularly
objectionable in the DECS. There could have been no intention to get rid of hundreds of thousands
of school teachers. The use of "reorganization" even under the concept advocated by the Solicitor
General appears trivial if not unnecessary. To use reorganization of the biggest Department in the
government in order to avoid the hassles of bringing administrative charges against Mendoza and
perhaps a few other alleged persona-non-grata like him is precisely what this Court rejects when
we apply the bona-fide rule. One does not burn down a house if his purpose is to roast alleged
pests.
There was grave abuse of discretion when the petitioner's services were terminated by a mere
letter-order on the justification that the petitioner, together with the entire personnel of the DECS,
was only in a hold-over capacity. If the petitioner is guilty of wrongdoing, it is an easy matter to the
charges against him instead of placing the entire DECS on hold-over status in order to run after
him.
The Court is constrained to set aside the reorganizations embodied in these consolidated petitions
because the heads of departments and agencies concerned have chosen to rely on their own
concepts of unlimited discretion and progressive ideas on reorganization instead of showing that
they have faithfully complied with the clear letter and spirit of the 2 Constitutions and the statutes
governing reorganization.
DECISION
Petition GRANTED. The letter-order issued by Quisumbing which terminated the services of
Petitioner Mendoza is SET ASIDE. The successor of the public respondent, the former Lourdes
Quisumbing as Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports is ordered to restore the petitioner to
his position as Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City without loss of seniority rights and
with back salaries reckoned from the date of his termination.
48. Ontiveros v. CA (2001)

DOCTRINE:
[Radio v. Review Committee under Executive Order No. 17] EO17 is a self-limiting act and its
provisions are not only non-penal in nature, but also clearly more favorable than those of Art.
III (2) of the Provisional Constitution. As such, there is no legal nor moral obstacle to the
retrospective application of Executive Order No. 17 to those already separated from the
service on the issuance of this Order, including those whose resignations were accepted or
whose successors have been appointed/designated. (Section 6) In this case, it is clear that
petitioners dismissal came within the coverage of E.O. No. 17, SEC 3(3) and 5. Pursuant to
SEC 2 of the order, the memorandum of dismissal of Minister Gonzales is considered the act
of the then President.
FACTS
Petitioner, Manuel L. Ontiveros, was a Security Officer I in the Investigation and Security Division of
the Ministry of Tourism. On May 26, 1986, he was dismissed from the service for inefficiency,
incompetence, and unauthorized absences by a memorandum issued by Minister of Tourism Jose
Antonio U. Gonzales.
In his appeal letter to the CSC, Director IV Angelito G. Grande responded by informing the
petitioner that jurisdiction over his appeal was vested in the Review Committee created under EO
17, and for that reason his appeal could not be given due course by the CSC. His subsequent
motion for reconsideration was denied by the CSC.
He then filed a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, but his petition, as well as his motion for
reconsideration were denied. The CA ruled that the CSC had no jurisdiction over petitioners
appeal, the proper appellate body being the Review Committee. In addition, the CA held that
review of petitioners dismissal was barred by laches.
ISSUE & RATIO
1. W/N petitioners case falls under the Review Committees jurisdiction
Petitioner argues that his separation from the service was not in consequence of the reorganization
of the government, but was for cause; hence, appeal lies with the CSC. This contention has no
merit. ART 3, SEC 2 of the Provisional Constitution provided that All elective and appointive
officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of 1 year from February 25, 1986.
Petitioner was not dismissed by virtue of a proclamation or executive order, nor by reason of the
designation or appointment and qualification of his successor. It must also be noted that EO 120,
which reorganized the then Ministry of Tourism, was issued by Pres. Aquino only on January 20,
1987, whereas petitioner was dismissed on may 26, 1986.
Radio v. Review Committee under Executive Order No. 17 affirmed the retroactive application of EO
17 to past dismissals. It held that:
[E.O. No. 17] is a self-limiting act and its provisions are not only non-penal in nature, but
also clearly more favorable than those of Art. III (2) of the Provisional Constitution. As
such, there is no legal nor moral obstacle to the retrospective application of Executive
Order No. 17 to those already separated from the service on the issuance of this Order,
including those whose resignations were accepted or whose successors have been
appointed/designated. (Section 6)
In this case, it is clear that petitioners dismissal came within the coverage of EO No. 17, SEC 3(3)
and 5. Pursuant to SEC 2 of the order, the memorandum of dismissal of Minister Gonzales is
considered the act of the President. EO 17 provided grounds for the separation of employees from
the service not to bring their cases under ordinary civil service laws and regulations but to provide
limits on what otherwise would be absolute discretion and thus prevent an abuse of power.
DECISION
42

Decision of the Court of Appeals (Affirmed the dismissal of Ontiveros from the Ministry of Tourism)
is AFFIRMED.
Sec. 25: After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United Stated of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
49. Bayan v. Zamora (2000)

DOCTRINE:
SEC 25, ART 18 disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met: (a) It must be under a treaty; (b) The treaty must be
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) Recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting state.
FACTS
Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the VFA
agreement, alleging that it failed to conform with the constitutional requirements.
On March 14, 1947, The Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases
Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US
military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines
and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on Aug 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties
agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels,
and aircraft.
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines
and the US negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On July 18, 1997,
the US panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell,
met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino, Jr., to
exchance notes on the complementing strategic interest of the US and the Philippines in the AsiaPacific region. Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on the VFA let to a consolidated draft text,
which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and negotiations. Thereafter, then President
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador
Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, Pres. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
ratified the VFA. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchance of Notes
between respondent Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.
The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which
US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines.
ISSUE & RATIO
W/N the requirements of SEC 25, ART 18 were complied with when the Senate gave its
concurrence to the VFA. - YES
SEC 25, ART 18 disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met: (a) It must be under a treaty; (b) The treaty must be
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) Recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first 2 requisites. The concurrence handed by the
senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether
under the general requirement in SEC 21, ART 7 or the specific mandate mentioned in SEC 25, ART
18, the provision in the latter article requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
43
With regard to the 3rd requisite, this Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a
treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement of a treaty.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated
that the US Government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the
USA accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its
obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.
DECISION
Instant petitions are DISMISSED.
Sec. 26: The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation
No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall
remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratification of this
Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the
Congress may extend such period.
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie
case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith
be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this
Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six
months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial
action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance
thereof.
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action
or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.
50. Joya v. PCGG (2003)

DOCTRINE:
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper
party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.6 But the most important are the
first two (2) requisites.
FACTS
On August 14, 1990, President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalina Macaraig, Jr.,
authorized Chairman Mateo A.T. Caperas of the PCGG to sign a Consignment Agreement between
the Republic of the Philippines and Christie, Manson and Woods International Inc., allowing
Christies of New York to auction off 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from
Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila, which were alleged to be part of the ill-gotten
wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives, and cronies.
On October 26, 1990, the Commission on Audit submitted to President Aquino the audit findings
and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement to the effect that: (a) The authority of
former PCGG Chairman Capers to enter into the CA was doubtful of legality; (b) The contract was
highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by
auction in the US; and (d) The assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural
significance, hence their disposal was prohibited by law.
Petitions for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks were denied on
the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that
proper parties had not been impleaded.
On January 11, 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of
$13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE & RATIO
W/N Petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition - NO
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that
there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.6 But the most important are the first 2 requisites.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with the
preservation and protection of the countrys artistic wealth, they have legal personality to restrain
respondents. They claim that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, they have
been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in violation of the
Constitution. Petitioners arguments are avoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law.
The paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila Foundation. The foundations chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos,
while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings
legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has
been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on
exhibit.
The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be
understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on to the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and
just compensation.
note: Other issues no longer discussed on account of petitioners lack of legal standing.
DECISION
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
51. Republic v. Sandiganbayan (1993)

DOCTRINE:
Powers of PCGG do not include performance of acts of ownership
The PCGG is merely a conservator or caretaker which can exercise only powers of
administration over property sequestered, frozen, or provisionally taken over. In the exercise
of its functions, it must consistently bear in mind that it can only do acts and things
necessary to fulfill its mission to conserve and preserve sequestered assets
FACTS
This petition seeks to (1) annul and set aside the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan (June 22,
1989), granting a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the PCGG (Presidential Commission on
Good Government) from proceeding with the projected turnover of PIMECO (Philippine Integrated
Meat Corporation) to the GSIS/MPCP (Meat Packaging Corporation of the Philippines) or to interfere
with its present management and (2) enjoin the PCGG from dismissing or replacing, among others,
its own management team presently operating the PIMECO, except for valid or serious grounds not
attributable to their opposition to the said turnover.
On March 17, 1986, PCGG, on the basis of prima facie evidence, issued an order sequestering
Philippine Integrated Meat Corporation (PIMECO). On July 29, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the PCGG, and pursuant to EO 14 and the Constitution, filed with Sandiganbayan a
Complaint against respondent Jose Peter Sabido . Sabido denied that he was a close business
associate of Ferdinand E. Marcos and that he has not participated in the plunder of the National
Treasury and the other acts stated in the complaint.
On April 28, 1989, Sabido filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Manifestation and Motion stating
that he learned from newspaper reports that the plaintiff through the PCGG intends to turnover the
management, control and possession of PIMECO to the GSIS through its subsidiary MPCP. He
learned from reliable sources that a resolution has been passed by the PCGG to implement the
aforementioned turnover of PIMECO to MPCP.
Before PCGG could file its required comment, Sabido filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
informing respondent Sandiganbayan of a newspaper report that the PCGG has turned over the
management and operation of PIMECO to GSIS/MPCP and that henceforth, all transactions
involving PIMECO must have the written approval of GSIS/MPCP.
Subsequently, the officials and board members of PIMECO labor union filed with the respondent
Court an undated formal communication wherein they appealed to the Court to issue certification
or anything that could attest to the fact that the status quo is maintained, to enable PIMECO to
continue doing business with its suppliers and distributors so that we could continue working and
operating the plant and attain security of tenure and peace of mind pending resolution/decision of
the above-stated case. Respondent Court issued a TRO enjoining the PCGG to cease and desist
from enforcing the contemplated turnover of the management, control, and possession of PIMECO
to the MPCP until further orders.
The respondent Court issued a Resolution granting the writ of preliminary injunction, commanding
the PCGG, its officers, representatives, nominees or agents from proceeding or consummating the
projected turnover of PIMECO to the GSIS/MPCP or to interfere with its present management and
operations, until further orders of this Court, and from replacing, dismissing, demoting,
reassigning, grounding, or otherwise prejudicing the present members of the PCGG management
team in PIMECO, except for valid and serious reasons not attributable to or arising from their
objection or opposition to or activities or statements against the said turnover.
ISSUE & HELD
W/N the projected transfer of management of PIMECO to MCP is unwarranted and
effected or done by the petitioner beyond the scope of the powers vested upon it by
law. - YES
The projected transfer of management of PIMECO to MPCP is unwarranted and was effected or
done by petitioner beyond the scope of the powers vested upon it by law. Such turnover made by
the PCGG is equivalent to the performance of an act of ownership which PCGG cannot exercise.
The PCGG is merely a conservator or caretaker which can exercise only powers of administration
over property sequestered, frozen, or provisionally taken over. In the exercise of its functions, it
must consistently bear in mind that it can only do acts and things necessary to fulfill its mission to
conserve and preserve sequestered assets.
DECISION
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
52. Palm Avenue Holding Co., Inc. v. Sandiganbayan 5th Division

(2014)
DOCTRINE:
[SEC 26, ART 18] The aforesaid provision mandates the Republic to file the corresponding
judicial action or proceedings within a 6 month period (from its ratification on Feb 2, 1987) in
order to maintain sequestration, noncompliance with which would result in the automatic
lifting of the sequestration order. While the writ of sequestration was issued on Oct 27, 1986,
the Palm Companies were impleaded in the case only in 1997, or already a decade from the
ratification of the Constitution in 1987, way beyond the prescription period.
FACTS
Through a writ of sequestration, the PCGG sequestered all the assets, properties, records, and
documents of the palm Companies. These included 16,237,339 Benguet Corporatio shares of
stock, registered in the name of the Palm Companies. The PCGG had relied on a letter from the
Palm Companies Attorney-in-Fact, Jose Sandejas, specifically identifying Benjamin Kokoy
Romualdez, a known crony of former President Marcos, as the beneficial owner of the Benguet
Corporation shares in the Palm Companies name.
44

On Feb 11, 1997, Palm Companies filed an Urgent Motion to Lift the Writ of Sequestration, but was
denied. Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the Palm Companies filed the
petition in GR 173082.
ISSUE & HELD
W/N the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying petitioners motion to lift the writ of sequestration,
notwithstanding the fact that said writ should be deemed automatically lifted pursuant
to SEC 26, ART 18 of the 1987 Constitution for failure to implead petitioners within the
period of 6 months prescribed in the said Constitution. - YES
SEC 26, ART 18 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case.
The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered
with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this
Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed
within 6 months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the
judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance
thereof.
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or
proceeding is commenced as herein provided.
The aforesaid provision mandates the Republic to file the corresponding judicial action or
proceedings within a 6 month period (from its ratification on Feb 2, 1987) in order to maintain
sequestration, noncompliance with which would result in the automatic lifting of the sequestration
order. While the writ of sequestration was issued on Oct 27, 1986, the Palm Companies were
impleaded in the case only in 1997, or already a decade from the ratification of the Constitution in
1987, way beyond the prescription period.
The sequestration order issued against the Palm Companies is therefore deemed automatically
lifted due to the failure of the Republic to commence the proper judicial action or to implead them
therein within the period under the Constitution.
DECISION
Petition GRANTED. Writ of sequestration against against the assets and properties of Palm Avenue
Holding Co., Inc. and Palm Avenue Realty and Development Corporation is consequently LIFTED.
Sec. 27: This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede
all previous Constitutions.
53. De Leon v. Esguerra (1987)

DOCTRINE:
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, the term of office of
6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern. Contrary to the
stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of office of 6 years for
elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should therefore, be
considered as still operative pursuant to SEC 3, ART 18 of the 1987 Constitution
Captain of Brgy. Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was by
authority of the Minister of Local Government. Also on Feb 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor
signed a Memorandum designating Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Lacanienta, Teodoro Medina, Roberto
Paz, and Teresita Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
Petitioners now pray that the subject Memoranda both be declared null and void and that
respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen respectively.
ISSUE & RATIO
W/N the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the
1 year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987. SEC 2, ART 3 of the Provisional Constitution provides:
All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is
made within a period of 1 year from Feb 25, 1986.
While Feb 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the 1 year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by SEC 27, ART 18 of the 1987
Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on SEC 2, ART 3 to designate respondents to the
elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the
autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as a self-reliant communities.
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, the term of office of 6
years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern. Contrary to the stand of
respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of office of 6 years for elective
Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should therefore, be considered as still
operative pursuant to SEC 3, ART 18 of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
SEC 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions,
and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution, shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
DECISION
Memoranda issued by OIC Governor declared to be of no legal force and effect. Writ of Prohibition
granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of
petitioners positions.
FACTS
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay
Rizal, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On Feb 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M. de Leon received a Memorandum signed by respondent OIC
Governor Benjamin Esguerra on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Brgy.
45

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ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

ARTICLE XVI: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 3: The State may not be sued without its consent.

1. VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ,

2. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (METRAN) vs. JOSE

DOCTRINE: STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration can be sued

3. NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION vs. JOSE TEODORO, SR

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO FELICIANO and

CALLEJO. EVANGELISTA. GRIMARES. NARCISO. RAPISTA. VILLAFUERTE | 1C 2019

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

6. MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., vs CUSTOMS ARRASTRE

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

7. QUIRICO DEL MAR vs.THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

CALLEJO. EVANGELISTA. GRIMARES. NARCISO. RAPISTA. VILLAFUERTE | 1C 2019

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

8. TRADERS ROYAL BANK vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

CALLEJO. EVANGELISTA. GRIMARES. NARCISO. RAPISTA. VILLAFUERTE | 1C 2019

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

Petitioners: Loida Q. Shauf and Jacob Shauf

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

11. MINISTERIO v. CFI

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

12. SYQUIA v. ALMEDA-LOPEZ

Petitioners: Pedro Syquia, Gonzalo Syquia, Leopoldo Syquia

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

13. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO v. JUDGE FIRME

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

14. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

15. PNR v. IAC

Petitioners: Philippine National Railways and Honorio Cabardo

amplified at the continuation of the pre-trial conference, are as follows:

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

16. REPUBLIC v. SANDOVAL

Petitioners: RP, et. al.

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

17. REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA v. VINZON

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

The following lucid discussion from Justice Isagani Cruz is pertinent:

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

19. CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP) V.

DOCTRINE: STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

20. SHELL V. JALOS ET AL.

DOCTRINE: STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

21. BAER V. TIZON

DOCTRINE: STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

May 22, 1985

Ponente: Abad Santos

DOCTRINE: STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

23. ARIGO V. SWIFT

September 16, 2014

DOCTRINE: STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

CALLEJO. EVANGELISTA. GRIMARES. NARCISO. RAPISTA. VILLAFUERTE | 1C 2019

ARTICLE XVI ARTICLE XVIII

24. CARABAO, INC. V. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION