No.

of Printed Pages : 12

MEC-001

MASTER OF ARTS (ECONOMICS)

Term-End Examination
June, 2015

07836
MEC-001 : MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Maximum Marks : 100

Time : 3 hours

Note : Attempt questions from each section as per

instructions given.
SECTION A
Answer any two questions from this section.
1.

2 x 20=40

Consider a small country with two individuals,

Anita and Babar, and two goods, corn (C) and
chicken (H). Anita and Babar have utility
functions given by
UA= 0.21n C + 0.8 in H,
B
U = 0.8 in C + 0.2 in H.
The economy as a whole is endowed with
100 units of corn and 50 units of chicken.
(a)

Solve for the marginal rates of substitution

between corn and chicken for Anita and
Babar. Show the condition that represents
allocative efficiency in C and H.

(b)

Derive Anita and Babar's demands for

C and H as a function of prices (P) and
income (I).

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2.

(c)

Assume that Anita has an endowment of C

equal to a and an endowment of H equal to
13. Solve for the equilibrium price ratio in
terms of a and 13.

(d)

Suppose Anita has 80 units of corn and

10 units of chicken. Calculate the
quantities consumed by Anita and Babar in
equilibrium.

Suppose the quality of used cars runs from good,

worth 2,900 to sellers and 3,000 to buyers,
down to bad ones worth 1,900 to sellers and
2,000 to buyers. Between these two extremes
are cars of every quantity level, always worth
100 more to buyers than to sellers. Assume
that there are 1001 cars and there is just one car
per increase of 0.10 in quality, i.e., the first car
worth
1,900 to its owner and
2,000 to
buyers, a second worth 1,90010 to its owner
and 2,00010 to buyers and so on. Assume that
the market has inelastic supply and elastic
demand at every level of quality.
(a)

At price p = 1,900, what is the number of

cars that would be offered for sale ?

(b)

At price p, what is the value of buyers of

the average car being sold ? What happens
to demand, if p exceeds 2,100 ?

(c)

What would be the equilibrium price in

such a car market ? How many cars will
change hands ?

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3.

There are two firms in an industry facing market

demand : Q = 3200 1600 P. Their costs are
given as follows :
Firm 1 : TC1 (q1) = 0.25 q1
Firm 2 : TC2 (q2) = 0.5 q2
If firm 1 is a leader and firm 2 a follower, solve
for Stackelberg output levels, market price and
profit levels of the firms.

4.

What is the central contribution of Arrow to the

development of the theory of social welfare ? Do
you agree with his formulation of the theory ?
Give reasons in support of your answer.

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SECTION B
Answer any five questions from this section.

5x12=60

5. Suppose an industry with n = 100 identical firms

faces the inverse demand curve : P = 1000 and
2
50 + (q.1 )
The Ministry of
total cost : TC(qi) =
2
Health declared the product of the industry to be
unhealthy. Consequently, its demand dropped to
P=

6400

. Solve for short-run and long-run

equilibrium price quantity combinations for the

industry.
6. Write short notes on any two of the following :
(a) Envelope Theorem
(b) First Welfare Theorem
Moral Hazard
(c)
7. If the consumer's utility function is given as
1/2 )2,
(x1/2
u(x1 , x2) = 1 + x2
(a)

formulate the expenditure minimisation

problem.

(b)

derive Hicksian demands for x11 and x2.

(c)

derive the expenditure function.

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8.

There are N people living in a village engaged in

fishing (F) and public transport services (T). The
utility function of each of these people is given
as Ui = (fi)2 . T. If the production possibility
frontier is depicted by F2 + 3T2 = 1800, find the
Pareto-optimal provision of T.

9.

Consider the sequential game being played

between two U.S. firms thinking about entering
the Indian market. Firm 1 has a headstart in
completing the legal process and moves first,
choosing whether to enter or not. Firm 2 moves
second and is deciding whether to enter or not.
The profit for each firm is shown in the game tree
below :
Firm 1
Enter

Do not enter

F.

Firm 2
Enter

Do not enter
Enter

(1, 1)

(6, 0)

(2, 4)

Do not enter
(2, 0)

(a)

Find the subgame Perfect Nash

Equilibrium outcome of the game. List the
associated strategies of the two firms.

(b)

How might firm 2 end up with a better

outcome i.e., another Nash Equilibrium ?
Why is this Nash Equilibrium not realistic
as the one in (a) ?

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10. Suppose you face the following lottery. You

earn 1 of 3 possible grades in the examination :
An "A", a "C" or an "F" with the probabilities
2
2 6
.

F 10
A 10
C 10
Assume that your current wealth is 400. If you
receive an "A", you gain 500. However, if you
get an "F", you lose 300. If you receive a "C",
you do not gain or lose anything.
If your utility function is given as u(w) = /(1);74 ,
where w = wealth,
(a) what is your expected utility after the
test ?
(b) what is the certainty equivalent level of
wealth in this test ?
11. Which key features of Williamson's model help in
better understanding of the behaviour of a firm ?
Give details to support your answer.

MEC-001

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MEC-001

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MEC-001

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MEC-001

12

7,500