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Date:

North European LNG Infrastructure Project:


A feasibility study for an LNG filling station infrastructure

2012-04-02

and test of recommendations.

Task leader:

Report:

Danish Maritime Authority

Appendices

Appendices

List of Appendices
Appendix 1 Green House Gas Emissions from the Maritime Sector
Appendix 2 Shipping Activities in the SECA area based on AIS-data Compilations
Appendix 3 Ship Cost Analysis
Appendix 4 LNG Infrastructure in Northern Europe
Appendix 5 LNG Terminal Cost Data and Calculations
Appendix 6 Future Land-based Gas Demand in the Study Area and National Gas Policies
Appendix 7 Port Descriptions
Appendix 8 Overall Bunker Technology
Appendix 9 Safety Aspects/Risk Assessment
Appendix 10 Port and Terminal Aspects on LNG Bunkering
Appendix 11 Examples of Operational Guidelines
Appendix 12 Hazard Identification Workshop
Appendix 13 Preventive and Mitigating Measures at LNG Terminals
Appendix 14 Permit Process and Public Consultation

1
Appendix 1
Green House Gas Emissions from the Maritime Sector
Table of Contents
1.

Initiatives on Reducing Green House Gas Emissions ...................3

2.

Studies made on Carbon Footprint in Maritime Freight Transport4

3.

The LCA Methology and Data Availability .....................................5

4.

Calculating Emissions ...................................................................6

-3-

Appendix 1 Green House Gas Emissions from the


Maritime Sector
The maritime sector is the fifth largest contributor to air pollution and carbon emissions, and with an
increasing global trade the need to address these emissions is of great importance 1. Different initiatives are
ongoing to reduce emission through fuel switch, engine changes or end-of-pipe technologies.
So far there is no binding reporting system for emissions within the maritime sector, and it has not been
involved in any trading scheme for green house gas emissions. Aviation is expected to be included in the
European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) within the coming years and a discussion is taking place
within the International Maritime Organization (IMO) whether the maritime sector should follow the same
path. There are however a number of difficulties that has to be taken into consideration for this to be
possible. The European Commission Joint Research Center Institute concluded in a recent report that
Developing a regional (European) Emission Trading Scheme for international shipping is a
challenging task given the constraints which regulate the international legal framework of the
maritime sector. Indeed, any EU environmental policy regulating air emissions from maritime
transport has to comply with the International Law of the Sea and, in particular, with the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) to which the EU is signatory.2
The EU has recently suggested the maritime sector to be included in the EU ETS from 2013 if an
international agreement to reduce Green house gas (GHG) emissions is not made.
Alternative approaches are being discussed as well. For example it has been suggested to introduce a tax on
maritime fuel on an international level. The major part of the GHG emissions from the maritime sector
emerges from the fuel usage, and thereby this method would be an incentive for more efficient usage of fuel.

1.

Initiatives on Reducing Green House Gas Emissions

Since no binding agreements have been decided for the maritime sector to reduce the green house gas
emissions, a number of voluntary initiatives have been started. These are mainly driven by consumers of
fright services, to encourage ship owners to register their emissions. One such initiative is the Clean
Shipping Index Project3. This index is developed as an online tool for cargo ship owner so that they can get a
picture of the environmental performance of different shipping companies. The companies answer questions
about their ships and trough an index they are compared to other companies as well as the current state of the
art. Except for carbon dioxide, the index also covers other environmental hazards such as chemicals, NOX
and SOX.
Another initiative, aiming at integrating environmentally and socially responsible business principles into
transportation management, is the Clean Cargo Working Group.4 The group consists of more than 25
multinational manufacturers, accounting for more than 60 percent of the global container transport. Within
the collaboration the members can access tools for measuring and reducing the environmental impact of
1

European Commission, 2010, EUR 24602 EN, Regulating Air Emissions from Ships The State of the Art on Methodologies,
Technologies and Policy Options
2
Ibid.
3
http://www.cleanshippingproject.se
4
http://www.bsr.org

-4-

goods transportation and benchmarking their own activities against industry performance. The Intermodal
Emissions Calculator developed by the group calculates the emissions from moving goods and is developed
consistent with the WRI5 GHG Protocol methodology.
The IMO has developed a standard for measuring the carbon emissions compared to transported distance.
This is called the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and is proposed to be used when building new
ships. By setting a limit for the EEDI of a ship, the amount of fuel that it consumes is controlled and thereby
the carbon emissions are limited. Except being limited to new ships the formula is designed to be used on
larger ships that transport cargo. Critics argue that the EEDI has a low value for ships that are slow and big
even though this is not necessarily the most efficient way to reduce emissions.

2.

Studies made on Carbon Footprint in Maritime Freight


Transport

Several studies have been made on carbon footprint of maritime freight transport, usually with the aim to
compare logistics options. Leonardi and Browne6 compare the GHG emissions of several international
shipping lines for supply chains of chosen furniture and food products. The GHG efficiencies of the supply
chains are expressed in gram CO2 equivalents per kilogram of product (g CO2e/kg). Leonardi and Browne
state that there is a data gap in the statistics of maritime fuel use data. One conclusion is that for both product
groups in the different international supply chains, the relative importance of the maritime sector appears to
be rather high, depending on the assumptions for the final consumer leg.
In the method of Leonardi and Browne, an emission factor is used to convert heavy fuel oil (HFO) into
carbon dioxide equivalents. In this factor some indirect effects of emissions generated for bringing the fuel to
the filling station is included, which is about 13% of the combustion emission factor.
Another study7, by Bengtsson et al., compares LNG to three other fossil marine fuels. The fuels are
compared regarding the life cycle emissions and assess the environmental performance of the fuels from
Well-To-Propeller using Life Cycle Assessment (LCA). The fuels are HFO, MGO (marine gas oil), Gas-ToLiquid (GTL) and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). In the study two exhaust abatement techniques are studied
as well, open-loop scrubber and selective catalytic reduction (SCR).The study states that LNG and other
alternatives that comply with SECA 2015 and Tier III NOx requirement decrease the acidification and
eutrophication potential with 78-90% in a life cycle perspective compared to HFO. Regarding the global
warming potential the use of LNG does not decrease the impact more than 8-20%, depending mainly on the
magnitude of the methane slip from the gas engine.
Bengtsson et al. refers to other studies claiming that LNG reduces the direct combustion emissions of CO 2
with 25% due to higher hydrogen-to-carbon ratio than diesel oils, but the effect on GHG emissions is
counteracted by a possible methane (CH4) slip.
The studied system included extraction of raw materials, production and transportation, bunkering, storage
and combustion of fuels for the transportation of cargo, i.e. from well-to-propeller. The compared unit was
the transportation of one tonne cargo one km with a Roll-on/Roll-off (RoRo) vessel.

World Resources Institute, www.ghgprotocol.org


Leonardi, Jacques and Browne Michael, University of Westminster, Department of Transport Studies; Method for Assessing the
Carbon Footprint of Maritime Freight Transport: European Case Study and Results, abstract to 14th Annual Logistics research
Network Conference 9th-11th September 2009, Cardiff.
7
Bengtsson et al; Life cycle assessment of marine fuels - A comparative study of four fossil fuels for marine propulsion, Gteborgs
universitet, 2011
6

-5-

The CH4 emissions were substantially higher for the two LNG fuelled alternatives in the study, about 4 times
than the other investigated alternatives. This is primarily due to the CH4 slip from the gas engine, which is a
technical problem that may be reduced with a catalytic converter.
Some of the conclusions of Bengtsson et al.s study were that the tank-to-propeller phase of marine
transportation has the highest impact on the total life cycle performance, representing 50-99% depending on
impact category and fuel alternative. Another result was that the Global Warming Potential (GWP) of LNG
when considering the whole life cycle emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O is of the same order of magnitude as
for the fuels used today in the shipping industry. Emission factors used in the study as well as a summary of
the results is given in the tables below.
In a report supported by the Dutch Maritime Innovation Programme (MIP) 8 a case study is carried out to
investigate the environmental aspects of using LNG as a fuel for three different types of ships. The GHG
emission comparison included three LNG chains and three diesel fuel chains. The report states that the green
house gas emissions primarily are dependent on the carbon content of the fuel and the efficiency of the
engine. Though, for the three studied cases the engine efficiency for the LNG is only about 1% lower than
for diesel, consequently the green house gas emissions are expressed in the study in g/MJ fuel energy.
The results of the MIP-report shows Well-to-Propeller greenhouse gas emissions for one of the LNG chains
10% lower than the diesel fuel chains. Further improvement is possible, it says, by lowering the relatively
high methane emissions of the engines. A conclusion in this report is also that further greenhouse gas
emission reductions are possible by biofuels. LNG can be replaced by bio-LNG or LBG (Liquefied Bio Gas)
without any impact on maintenance. Diesel can be replaced by biodiesel, Hydrotreated Vegetable Oil
(HVO), Pure Plant Oil (PPO) or possibly pyrolysis liquid, but these fuels may require engine adaptations and
increase maintenance.

3.

The LCA Methology and Data Availability

LCA is a tool for environmental assessment of products and services that addresses the potential impact in a
cradle-to-grave perspective. There are two types of LCA, attributional and consequential.
Attributional strives to be as complete as possible accounting for all environmental impacts of a product,
while Consequential LCAs strive to describe the environmental consequences of alternative courses of
action. The most commonly used is the Consequential and it only includes the parts of the life cycle that
differs between the alternatives.
The European Commission Joint Research centre on LCA Tools, Services and Data has published a life
cycle inventory database, the ELCD core database, where life cycle inventory data for European heavy fuel
oil and light fuel oil production are available. These data sets represent Cradle-To-Gate, which covers
exploration, processing, transportation and refinery of HFO and MGO. Distribution from refinery to harbor
is not included in these data sets. The allocation in the ELCD core database is based on energy content (i.e.
mass and lower heating value) and allocation is made after each sub-process in the refinery.
LNG life cycle data for extraction, processing and pipeline transportation of natural gas are available in the
CPM database. The data are representative for natural gas from the North Sea in 1991. In the study by
Bengtsson et al. the data are chosen despite their age, because they are assessed to be representative for the
region and extensive.

Verbeek, Ruud et al., Environmental and Economic aspects of using LNG as a fuel for shipping in The Netherlands, TNO-RPT2011-00166, 2011

-6-

The distribution scenarios in Bengtsson et al.s study are transportation from the North Sea or from Qatar as
representative for transportation of LNG from North Africa.

4.

Calculating Emissions

In the below tables, specific fuel consumption and emissions factors for different fuels are accounted for as
they are described in the Bengtsson et al, 2011. The study has used LCA methodology as basis for
calculation.
Table 1 Specific fuel consumptions (g/kWh) and emission factors (g/MJ) with different fuels
HFO
MGO
Baseline

Specific fuel consumption (g/kWh)

Changes
with
scrubber

Baseline

Alt. Data

Baseline

Changes
with
scrubber

183

203

40,4

43

48

43

0,1

78

74

57

74

CO

0,13

0,13

0,28

0,24

0,13

CH4

0,0005

0,0005

0,28

0,56

0,0005

NOX

1,6

1,5

0,17

0,36

1,5

0,06

0,06

0,1

0,06

N2O

0,004

0,004

0,004

NH3

0,0003

0,0003

0,0003

0,093

0,034

0,009

0,004

0,034

0,05

Sulphur content in the fuel (%)

217

Changes
with
scrubber

GTL

203[35]

Lower heating value (MJ/kg)

213[35]

Baseline

LNG

Emission factors (g/MJ)


CO2

NMVOC

PM10
SO2
Source; Bengtsson et al 2011.

0,5

0,05

0,23

0,0029

0,23

0,0029

-7-

Table 2 Summary of LCA results for different fuels


Energy use

Global warming

Acidification

Eutrophication

0,53

43

0,82

0,1

Well-to-tank

0,04

4,2

0,03

0,0012

Tank-to-propeller

0,49

39

0,8

0,103

0,54

44

0,62

0,11

Well-to-tank

0,04

4,3

0,03

0,0013

Tank-to-propeller

0,5

40

0,59

0,11

0,58

42

0,58

0,1

Well-to-tank

0,08

4,5

0,03

0,0013

Tank-to-propeller

0,5

37

0,55

0,098

0,79

48

0,59

0,1

Well-to-tank

0,29

10

0,06

0,006

Tank-to-propeller

0,5

37

0,53

0,0975

Fuel alternatives complying with SECA requirements 2010


HFO

Fuel alternatives complying with SECA requirements 2015


HFO

MGO

GTL

Fuel alternatives complying with SECA requirements 2015 and Tier III
MGO with SCR

0,6

43

0,14

0,02

Well-to-tank

0,1

6,1

0,04

0,0022

Tank-to-propeller

0,5

37

0,1

0,015

0,81

49

0,15

0,022

Well-to-tank

0,31

12

0,07

0,0069

Tank-to-propeller

0,5

37

0,08

0,015

0,57

38

0,08

0,01

Well-to-tank

0,05

4,8

0,02

0,0011

Tank-to-propeller

0,52

33

0,06

0,012

0,61

40

0,08

0,01

Well-to-tank

0,09

0,02

0,0013

Tank-to-propeller

0,52

33

0,06

0,012

GTL with SCR

LNG from North sea

LNG from Qatar

Source : Bengtsson et al, 2011

2
Appendix 2
Shipping Activities in the SECA area based on AIS-data
Compilations
Table of Contents
1.

Modeling LNG Demand ............................................................................. 2

1.1

Input to the Model ......................................................................................................................... 2

1.2

Calculation Methodology .............................................................................................................. 3

1.3

Results ........................................................................................................................................... 6

-2-

Appendix 2 Shipping Activities in the SECA area


based on AIS-data Compilations
1.

Modeling LNG Demand

1.1

Input to the Model

IHS Fairplay has provided input for a bottom-up model used for LNG demand assessments in Chapter 8
based on AIS data on ship movements for the year 2010. The movements are calculated into fuel use using
the below four steps and at the end of this appendix, a part of the resulting data is displayed in a printout
from an excel-sheet named fuelcons per segment.
For each of the 75 ship type segmnets, and per a number of sub-categories (age, geographical apperance) a
fuel consumption is calculated the calculation divides into four steps:
1. Fill main engine power used:
a. Fill power based on the calculated average speed of the vessel

b. Double check that no value exceeds the ships maximum power outtake by more than 10%.
2. Fill auxiliary engine power used:
a. Auxiliary engine power is used when a ship is lying still, i.e. travelling at an average speed
of less than 0.2 knots. There are two different situations for when a ship is still: either it is at
anchor at sea, or at berth in a port. The table below shows the percentages of the aux engine
installed power that is used while the ship is either at berth or anchored.
Activity
Vessel type
At Berth
Anchored
Oil tanker
30%
30%
Chemical tanker
50%
30%
LPG
50%
30%
LNG
50%
30%
Other tanker
50%
30%
Bulker
30%
30%
General cargo
25%
25%
Other dry cargo
25%
25%
Container
25%
25%
Vehicle
50%
50%
Ro-ro
50%
50%
Ferry
65%
65%
Cruise
65%
65%
Yacht
65%
65%
Offshore
50%
30%
Service
50%
30%
Fishing
25%
25%
Miscellaneous
25%
25%

-3-

b. The auxiliary power use is calculated in two steps, one for each type of situation, and the
value is set to 0 when a ship is Active, or travelling at sea. The auxiliary power needed while
the ship is at sea is calculated as an additional load on the main engine.
3. The energy used, in kWh, is calculated for both main and auxiliary engines as the average Power
used times the time in hours since the previous sighting of the vessel in AIS. The calculation is done
separately for Main and Auxiliary engines. This is where the previous calculations were missing a
parenthesis, which caused the Main Engine power to be multiplied by 1, no matter how many hours
were listed in the AIS system, and causing the total energy, fuel consumption and CO2 emissions to
be undervalued.
4. Each vessel has a value for its fuel consumption by kWh of energy generated by its engines, i.e.
g/kWh. These values are then multiplied by the number of kWh to produce total fuel consumption in
grams.
In the input data, the ships operating in SECA were divided into 20 main categories and each category was
divided in 2-8 sub categories depending on ship size or use. The data was categorized in all in all 75 sub
categories, as can be seen in e.g. the two leftmost columns in Table 1 below. Each sub category was then
split into bands with ships of the same age (the bands having a width of five years). For each sub category
and age band, the number of ships trafficing the SECA were given. Also, the average fuel consumption were
given, as shown in the section Fuelcons per segment in the input data tables at the end of this appendix.
The data was given (at this level of detail) for SECA as a whole, and also divided into four geographical
areas: the English Channel, the North Sea, Skagerrak/Kattegat (including resund and Blt) and the Baltic
Sea, see the above-mentioned input tables below. Finally, the data was shown divided into three parts: ships
that spent 100 % of their time within the SECA, ships spending more than 50 % but less than 100 % within
SECA, and ships that spent more than 0 % but less than 50 % of the time within SECA.
In addition to this, the average installed power for each sub category was assumed to be the same as the
world average for that particular sub category, see the very last table of this appendix (named Global Fleet
2010, Average kW). The installed power for each ship was also used to calculate the fuel consumption,
which is explained in more detail at the end of this appendix.

1.2

Calculation Methodology

For each combination of ship sub category, age band, geographical area and share of time within SECA, the
annualized life cycle cost for the three compliance strategies could be calculated for retrofitted ships as well
as new builds. That is, the cost of compliance is calculated regarding each combination of sub category and
age band as one unit since only their total fuel consumption is known. This means that the preferred
compliance strategy is the same for all ships in a sub category and age band.
The calculations of life cycle costs are made by using fuel price forecasts developed in Chapter 7 as well as
costs of retrofitting and new builds as described in Chapter 4.
This is possible since the investment and operational costs are assumed to be a function of installed power
and fuel consumption only. The capital cost is annualized assuming a ship life time of 25 years. This means
that for retrofitting ships, the economic lifetime of the investment is the remaining life time of the ship (i.e.
25 years minus actual age).
In the manner described above, three annualized life cycle costs for the ships in each sub category and age
band are calculated: the cost of the LNG strategy, the HFO strategy and the MGO strategy. Before these
three costs are compared to find the least-cost strategy for each ship sub category, the MGO life cycle costs

-4-

are decreased by 5 %. This is done in order to reflect the fact that shipowners can be slightly more inclined to
choose the MGO strategy than is motivated from a strictly economic point of view since it is the strategy
which is closest to running as usual no new technology needs to be taken on board (scrubbers) and no
new infrastructure with uncertain fuel availability to worry about (LNG).
For the LNG strategy, the life cycle costs are also modified to reflect that some sub categories of ships will
be more inclined to choose the LNG strategy and some will be less inclined. The LNG life cycle cost for sub
categories that are assessed to be early adopters of LNG are decreased by up to 10 %, whereas the LNG life
cycle cost for sub categories that are assessed to be slow in changing to LNG are increased by up to 20 %.
The factors used as just described are called resistance to change to LNG and range from 5 % to 20 % in
2015 and from -10 % to +10 % in 2020 and are shown in Table 1 below2. As can be seen from the table, the
factors are different for new builds compared to retrofitting, and sub categories with fixed routes like ferries
and Roro are considered to be more likely to adapt to LNG operation (i.e. their resistance to change to LNG
is negative, meaning that their LNG life cycle cost is decreased before compared to the HFO and MGO life
cycle costs).
Table 1 Resistance to change to LNG for each sub category 2020
Category

Sub category

Retrofit
resistance
to LNG
2020

New build
resistance
to LNG

01 Crude

A 200,000+ dwt

10 %

5%

01 Crude

B 120 -199,999 dwt

10 %

5%

01 Crude

C 60 -119,999 dwt

10 %

5%

01 Crude

D 10 -59,999 dwt

10 %

5%

01 Crude

E -9,999 dwt

10 %

5%

02 Products

A 60,000+ dwt

10 %

5%

02 Products

B 20 -59,999 dwt

10 %

5%

02 Products

C 10 -19,999 dwt

10 %

5%

02 Products

D 5 -9,999 dwt

10 %

5%

02 Products

E -4,999 dwt

10 %

5%

03 Chemical/Products

A 20,000+ dwt

10 %

5%

03 Chemical/Products

B 10 -19,999 dwt

10 %

5%

03 Chemical/Products

C 5 -9,999 dwt

10 %

5%

03 Chemical/Products

D -4,999 dwt

10 %

5%

04 Pure Chemical

A 20,000+ dwt

10 %

5%

04 Pure Chemical

B 10 -19,999 dwt

10 %

5%

04 Pure Chemical

C 5 -9,999 dwt

10 %

5%

04 Pure Chemical

D -4,999 dwt

10 %

5%

The table shows retrofit resistance in 2020. For, 2015 add 10 %. Resistance in the case of new builds is assumed to be the same in
2015 as in 2020.

-5-

05 LPG

A 50,000+ cbm

10 %

5%

05 LPG

B -49,999 cbm

10 %

5%

06 LNG

A 200,000+ cbm

-5 %

-10 %

06 LNG

B -199,999 cbm

-5 %

-10 %

07 Other tanker

A Tank Barge

10 %

5%

07 Other tanker

B Other

10 %

5%

08 Bulker

A 200,000+ dwt

10 %

5%

08 Bulker

B 100 -199,999 dwt

10 %

5%

08 Bulker

C 60 -99,999 dwt

10 %

5%

08 Bulker

D 35 -59,999 dwt

10 %

5%

08 Bulker

E 10 -34,999 dwt

10 %

5%

08 Bulker

F -9,999 dwt

10 %

5%

09 General cargo

A 10,000+ dwt

10 %

5%

09 General cargo

B 10,000+ dwt, 100+ TEU

10 %

5%

09 General cargo

C -9,999 dwt, 100+ TEU

10 %

5%

09 General cargo

D 5 -9,999 dwt

10 %

5%

09 General cargo

E -4,999 dwt

10 %

5%

10 Other dry

A Reefer

10 %

5%

10 Other dry

B Dry Barge

10 %

5%

10 Other dry

C Special

10 %

5%

11 Container

A 8,000+ teu

10 %

5%

11 Container

B 5 -7,999 teu

10 %

5%

11 Container

C 3 -4,999 teu

10 %

5%

11 Container

D 2 -2,999 teu

10 %

5%

11 Container

E 1 -1,999 teu

10 %

5%

11 Container

F -999 teu

10 %

5%

12 Vehicle

A 4,000+ ceu

10 %

5%

12 Vehicle

B -3,999 ceu

10 %

5%

13 Roro

A 2,000+ lm

-5 %

-10 %

13 Roro

B -1,999 lm

-5 %

-10 %

14 Ferry

A Pax Only, 25kn+

-5 %

-10 %

14 Ferry

B Pax Only, <25kn

-5 %

-10 %

14 Ferry

C RoPax, 25kn+

-5 %

-10 %

14 Ferry

D RoPax, <25kn

-5 %

-10 %

14 Ferry

E Overnight

-5 %

-10 %

15 Cruise

A 1,000+ low berths

-5 %

-10 %

15 Cruise

B -999 low berths

-5 %

-10 %

-6-

16 Yacht

Yacht

10 %

5%

17 Offshore

A Crew/Supply Vessel

5%

0%

17 Offshore

B Platform Supply Ship

5%

0%

17 Offshore

C Offshore Tug/Supply Ship

5%

0%

17 Offshore

D Anchor Handling Tug Supply

5%

0%

17 Offshore

E Support/safety

5%

0%

17 Offshore

F Pipe (various)

5%

0%

17 Offshore

G Drilling

5%

0%

17 Offshore

H Platform & Storage

5%

0%

18 Service

A Research

5%

0%

18 Service

B Tug

5%

0%

18 Service

C Dredging

5%

0%

18 Service

D SAR & Patrol

5%

0%

18 Service

E Workboats

5%

0%

18 Service

F Other

5%

0%

19 Fishing

A Fishing

5%

0%

19 Fishing

B Trawlers

5%

0%

19 Fishing

C Other

5%

0%

20 Miscellaneous

A Pontoon

5%

0%

20 Miscellaneous

B Other

5%

0%

The economic lifetime of the ships is assumed to be 25 years. There are however a large number of ships that
are older than 25 years, and the new builds are modeled to replace those ships. The rate of new builds is
assumed to be 4 % per year and the phase-out of old ships 2 %. Consequently, the ship growth is assumed to
be 2 % per year.
Further, it is assumed that 75 % of the ships spending 50 % to 99 % of their time within SECA bunker in
SECA. The corresponding proportion for ships spending between 1 % to 49 % of their time within SECA is
assumed to be 25 %. These shares are assumed to be the same for all sub categories. Finally, the weighted
average cost of capital was set at 10 %.
Using these assumptions, the least cost strategy can be determined for each sub category and age band. That
is, for each sub category and age band an LNG demand can be calculated (which is 0 if HFO or MGO is the
least cost solution) and the total LNG demand is then the sum for all sub categories and age bands.

1.3

Results

Most of the results are presented as tables and graphs in the main report. In addition, the following table
shows the demand from fixed traffic (e.g. Roro, ferries etc) per sub region, for the case where the MGO
and LNG prices are from their respective central level, i.e. 885 /tonne MGO and 610 /tonne LNG
(Scenario 2). Such information is usefuel when considering the need for and geographic location of
terminals.

-7-

Table 2 LNG demand (tonnes/year) from traffic with fixed routes


English
Channel

North Sea

Skagerak/
Kattegatt

Baltic Sea

Total

2015

90 000

380 000

470 000

520 000

1 460 000

2020

130 000

550 000

650 000

720 000

2 050 000

2030

160 000

770 000

900 000

1 080 000

2 910 000

This demand is built up from conversion of old ships and new builds. The proportions of old ships that it
would be economically viable to retrofit by 2020 are shown in Figure 1.
70%

Conversion rates

60%

Remaining life 1 - 5 years

50%
Remaining life 6 - 10 years

40%
30%

Remaining life 11 - 15
years

20%
10%

Remaining life 16 - 20
years

0%

Remaining life 21 - 25
years

3
4
5
Fuel price scenario

Figure 1 Share of fuel that it is economically viable to be shift to LNG by means of retrofitting existing ships by 2020

Fuelcons per segment

1 504

1 600
692
7 936
1 235
2 231
860
10 874
3 176
38 922
13 200
20 374
1 149
2 951
8 759
18 869

71 027
378 269
32 962
968

45 669
5 266
8 797
6 526
17 568
228 972
303 347
134 158
71 352
4 697
6 924
11 312
17 874
8 288
102 085

95 518
77 103
648
8 489
3 414
362 483
106 462
45 850
11 349
8 923
6 992
8 852
3 601
19 798
52 726
6 417

4 001

14 166

23 752

10 927

9 600
19 242

17

15 102
9 168
19 348
8 530
125 113
4 765
42 345
482
170

37 330
4 950
58 772
34 243
6 898
13 533
417 001
26 234
145 456
39 026
222

854

2 665

172 888
222 113

27 159
515 239
154 458
7 003
18 246
116 070
311 950
1 065 700
8 468
848
3 037
403
80 883
7 668
14 925
38 977
5 634
8 209
9 381
10 127
107 915
75 436
14 151
21 522
38 743
5 851
1 138

423
979
3 429 773

111 993
184 513
177 037
190 536
8 794
43 137
197 653
234 553
43 724
38 912
184 244
0
19 149
460 082

324 382
8 322
338 671
33 116
244 884
90 059
100 087
248 169
64 777
3 111
184 014
80 851
70 455
128 199
61 739
115 657
26 578
1 579
43
815
440
18 325
0
31 680
7 126
226 606
35 932
37 743
252 404
16 939
68 943
15 840
12 620
158
49
47 461
8 740
5 508
1 358
73 856
16 644
36 697
21 612
22 076
10 485
3 244
4 621
9 784
3 333
7 626
4 683
46 817
9 834
40 000
10 629
5 367
483
20 822
6 725
10 377
4 894
8 385
3 212
597
50 585
632
15 725
516
4 256
1 464
14 844
3 378 431 5 275 762

12 083 966

1
0
0
1
2
1
2
1
4
54
1
10
7
21
0
1
3
12
0
12
0
0
0
5
0
1
0
0
5
9
6
3
113
4
150
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
30
60
0
7
50
42
27
96
21
167
101
1
7
24
2
134
19
25
105
6
7
8
42
390
102
47
69
64
46
51
19
15
15
2 232

0
19
65
7
0
18
5
5
10
24
57
122
85
70
2
2
8
22
5
65
0
3
0
9
0
0
8
2
21
37
4
10
520
23
383
36
1
3
0
0
3
14
27
99
2
21
24
38
8
6
3
19
32
3
10
24
1
79
8
78
73
15
6
5
18
142
38
14
34
12
30
56
21
9
32
2 655

14 014

78
153
329
48
1
144
134
2
9
23
692
289
135
57
26
28
19
11
34
136
13
53
0
19
30
256
456
607
570
48
142
493
804
142
263
362
0
59
216
188
247
215
112
94
322
63
41
48
6
5
0
12
29
47
52
66
7
46
8
65
92
13
7
3
21
100
36
9
19
19
54
136
38
3
23
9 127

4,12

4,38
0,95
21,74
1,69
6,11
0,59
0,55
8,70
10,66
5,17
2,66
3,15
2,70
2,00
4,31

8,94
5,35
2,71
6,95
2,89
4,82
1,79
2,01
11,01
6,81
4,32
2,79
6,43
9,49
3,87
2,23
4,54
4,30
12,94

2,19

3,33

0,05

8,28
2,79
8,83
7,79
3,03
3,26
0,77
1,32
0,47
2,34
0,00

15,79
10,14
10,63
28,23
10,08
0,71
0,52
15,14
5,12
28,91
23,20
0,33
0,35
0,55
1,65
1,11
1,64
1,02
2,57
3,21
3,21
0,66
0,76
2,03
0,82
0,85
1,66
0,35
0,06
0,00
0,08
0,18

12,78
6,78
7,67
2,54
4,72
3,71
2,20
3,12
1,04
2,97
0,61
2,43

7,60
6,48
9,14
6,87
4,26
10,55
14,63
8,34
0,54
0,37
16,73
4,57
19,40
34,47
4,64
1,81
0,43
1,65
1,89
2,59
1,38
4,03
1,48
5,36
1,16
0,90
2,88
1,05
1,68
2,37
0,77
0,03
0,08
0,16
0,13

C 1% to 49% in SECA

B 50% to 99% in SECA

A 100% in SECA

ton/(ship*day)
C 1% to 49% in SECA

A 100% in SECA

41 185

62 029
126 829
6 921

B 50% to 99% in SECA

Number of ships
C 1% to 49% in SECA

LRFR_Size
A 200,000+ dwt
B 120 -199,999 dwt
C 60 -119,999 dwt
D 10 -59,999 dwt
E -9,999 dwt
A 60,000+ dwt
B 20 -59,999 dwt
C 10 -19,999 dwt
D 5 -9,999 dwt
E -4,999 dwt
A 20,000+ dwt
B 10 -19,999 dwt
C 5 -9,999 dwt
D -4,999 dwt
A 20,000+ dwt
B 10 -19,999 dwt
C 5 -9,999 dwt
D -4,999 dwt
A 50,000+ cbm
B -49,999 cbm
A 200,000+ cbm
B -199,999 cbm
A Tank Barge
B Other
A 200,000+ dwt
B 100 -199,999 dwt
C 60 -99,999 dwt
D 35 -59,999 dwt
E 10 -34,999 dwt
F -9,999 dwt
A 10,000+ dwt
B 10,000+ dwt, 100+ TEU
C -9,999 dwt, 100+ TEU
D 5 -9,999 dwt
E -4,999 dwt
A Reefer
B Dry Barge
C Special
A 8,000+ teu
B 5 -7,999 teu
C 3 -4,999 teu
D 2 -2,999 teu
E 1 -1,999 teu
F -999 teu
A 4,000+ ceu
B -3,999 ceu
A 2,000+ lm
B -1,999 lm
A Pax Only, 25kn+
B Pax Only, <25kn
C RoPax, 25kn+
D RoPax, <25kn
E Overnight
A 1,000+ low berths
B -999 low berths
Yacht
A Crew/Supply Vessel
B Platform Supply Ship
C Offshore Tug/Supply Ship
D Anchor Handling Tug Supply
E Support/safety
F Pipe (various)
G Drilling
H Platform & Storage
A Research
B Tug
C Dredging
D SAR & Patrol
E Workboats
F Other
A Fishing
B Trawlers
C Other
A Pontoon
B Other

A 100% in SECA

LRFR_Type
01 Crude
01 Crude
01 Crude
01 Crude
01 Crude
02 Products
02 Products
02 Products
02 Products
02 Products
03 Chemical/Products
03 Chemical/Products
03 Chemical/Products
03 Chemical/Products
04 Pure Chemical
04 Pure Chemical
04 Pure Chemical
04 Pure Chemical
05 LPG
05 LPG
06 LNG
06 LNG
07 Other tanker
07 Other tanker
08 Bulker
08 Bulker
08 Bulker
08 Bulker
08 Bulker
08 Bulker
09 General cargo
09 General cargo
09 General cargo
09 General cargo
09 General cargo
10 Other dry
10 Other dry
10 Other dry
11 Container
11 Container
11 Container
11 Container
11 Container
11 Container
12 Vehicle
12 Vehicle
13 Roro
13 Roro
14 Ferry
14 Ferry
14 Ferry
14 Ferry
14 Ferry
15 Cruise
15 Cruise
16 Yacht
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
18 Service
18 Service
18 Service
18 Service
18 Service
18 Service
19 Fishing
19 Fishing
19 Fishing
20 Miscellaneous
20 Miscellaneous

B 50% to 99% in SECA

Fuel (ton/year)

1,45
1,27
3,15
1,88
2,65
1,82
1,58
0,89
2,58
0,41
1,44
1,01
0,93
0,55
0,94
0,68
1,28
0,90
1,60
1,06
1,35
1,23
1,38
1,76
1,20
1,11
0,80
0,92
0,50
0,83
1,10
0,80
0,84
0,41
1,39
0,89
5,84
4,73
3,76
3,12
2,45
1,89
1,57
3,06
4,13
1,52
0,02
0,24
1,63
3,39
14,71
3,63
0,52
0,02
0,52
0,47
0,70
0,64
2,21
1,81
3,04
0,61
0,27
0,81
0,15
0,97
0,71
0,16
1,02
1,13
3,89
1,77

Global Fleet 2010, Average kW


LRFR_SuperType

LRFR_Type

LRFR_Size

1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
1. Tanker
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
2. Bulker & GC
3. Container & Roro
3. Container & Roro
3. Container & Roro
3. Container & Roro
3. Container & Roro
3. Container & Roro
3. Container & Roro
3. Container & Roro
3. Container & Roro
3. Container & Roro
4. Passenger
4. Passenger
4. Passenger
4. Passenger
4. Passenger
4. Passenger
4. Passenger
4. Passenger
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.
5. Misc.

01 Crude
01 Crude
01 Crude
01 Crude
01 Crude
02 Products
02 Products
02 Products
02 Products
02 Products
03 Chemical/Products
03 Chemical/Products
03 Chemical/Products
03 Chemical/Products
04 Pure Chemical
04 Pure Chemical
04 Pure Chemical
04 Pure Chemical
05 LPG
05 LPG
06 LNG
06 LNG
07 Other tanker
07 Other tanker
08 Bulker
08 Bulker
08 Bulker
08 Bulker
08 Bulker
08 Bulker
09 General cargo
09 General cargo
09 General cargo
09 General cargo
09 General cargo
10 Other dry
10 Other dry
10 Other dry
11 Container
11 Container
11 Container
11 Container
11 Container
11 Container
12 Vehicle
12 Vehicle
13 Roro
13 Roro
14 Ferry
14 Ferry
14 Ferry
14 Ferry
14 Ferry
15 Cruise
15 Cruise
16 Yacht
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
17 Offshore
18 Service
18 Service
18 Service
18 Service
18 Service
18 Service
19 Fishing
19 Fishing
19 Fishing
20 Miscellaneous
20 Miscellaneous

A 200,000+ dwt
B 120 -199,999 dwt
C 60 -119,999 dwt
D 10 -59,999 dwt
E -9,999 dwt
A 60,000+ dwt
B 20 -59,999 dwt
C 10 -19,999 dwt
D 5 -9,999 dwt
E -4,999 dwt
A 20,000+ dwt
B 10 -19,999 dwt
C 5 -9,999 dwt
D -4,999 dwt
A 20,000+ dwt
B 10 -19,999 dwt
C 5 -9,999 dwt
D -4,999 dwt
A 50,000+ cbm
B -49,999 cbm
A 200,000+ cbm
B -199,999 cbm
A Tank Barge
B Other
A 200,000+ dwt
B 100 -199,999 dwt
C 60 -99,999 dwt
D 35 -59,999 dwt
E 10 -34,999 dwt
F -9,999 dwt
A 10,000+ dwt
B 10,000+ dwt, 100+ TEU
C -9,999 dwt, 100+ TEU
D 5 -9,999 dwt
E -4,999 dwt
A Reefer
B Dry Barge
C Special
A 8,000+ teu
B 5 -7,999 teu
C 3 -4,999 teu
D 2 -2,999 teu
E 1 -1,999 teu
F -999 teu
A 4,000+ ceu
B -3,999 ceu
A 2,000+ lm
B -1,999 lm
A Pax Only, 25kn+
B Pax Only, <25kn
C RoPax, 25kn+
D RoPax, <25kn
E Overnight
A 1,000+ low berths
B -999 low berths
Yacht
A Crew/Supply Vessel
B Platform Supply Ship
C Offshore Tug/Supply Ship
D Anchor Handling Tug Supply
E Support/safety
F Pipe (various)
G Drilling
H Platform & Storage
A Research
B Tug
C Dredging
D SAR & Patrol
E Workboats
F Other
A Fishing
B Trawlers
C Other
A Pontoon
B Other

Average kW

26 356
17 642
12 785
8 031
1 866
12 881
8 661
4 266
2 715
1 045
9 079
5 154
3 209
1 729
8 897
5 064
3 088
1 060
13 146
3 467
37 360
26 608
26
1 571
19 533
15 891
10 070
8 367
6 252
1 536
5 629
7 723
2 645
2 803
880
4 775
726
6 391
68 661
55 655
35 784
21 437
12 330
5 660
13 820
8 292
16 622
2 630
3 135
1 245
23 214
2 922
14 968
48 146
4 932
2 512
2 716
2 811
3 410
5 567
3 576
7 207
10 108
15 844
2 138
1 947
2 896
2 857
1 789
2 743
702
957
1 287
2 394
10 630

3
Appendix 3
Ship Cost Analysis
Table of Contents
1.

Investment Costs ..................................................................................... 3

2.

Studied Ship Types ................................................................................... 5

2.1

RoPax / RoRo Vessels .......................................................................................... 5

2.2

Coastal Tankers/Chemical tankers/Bulk Carriers ................................................. 6

2.3

Container Ship (700-800 TEU) ............................................................................ 8

2.4

Fishing Vessels ..................................................................................................... 9

3.

Investment Cost Results ........................................................................ 10

4.

Operational and Other Costs.................................................................. 10

-3-

Appendix 3 Ship Cost Analysis


Investment costs and operational costs for the fuel alternatives (HFO, MGO, LNG and Dual Fuel) are
presented in this appendix. The costs are described as specific costs but also in real terms for four typical
vessels.
The four typical vessels, two RoPax/RoRo vessels of different size, a Coastal tanker/Chemical tanker/Bulk
carrier, a container ship (700-800 TEU) are also described in this Appendix. A fishing vessel is also
presented as it in a more distant future may become a category of ships adapted to LNG.

1.

Investment Costs

The investment costs (including installation costs) for scrubbers, SCR/EGR, engines, generators and electric
system were estimated based on the main engine power and auxiliary engine power, using rules of thumb
for the relation between investment and engine power (/kW), see below. The data was provided by MAN
Diesel & Turbo and Wrtsil. Since the choice of fuel is in focus in this study, only machinery-related costs
are included. The machinery-related investment cost is a substantial part of the total investment cost for the
whole ship. For example, for the new coastal tanker and container ship, it constitutes roughly 30 % of the
total investment.
In order to comply with NOx Tier III, SCR or EGR is included in the investment costs when operating with
HFO, MGO and Dual Fuel with 2-stroke engine.
Table 1 Assumed investment costs
INVESTMENT COSTS

Retrofit

New
builds

HFO/Scrubber
Investment scrubber (incl waste storage)

/kWmain

150

150

Investment SCR (incl installation new built)

/kWmain+aux

45

45

Investment engine

/kWmain

180

Investment Generators, Electric system, Propulsion,


Steering

/kWaux

240

Installation cost scrubber

/kWmain

225

Installation cost SCR/EGR


Table continues on the next page.

/kWmain+aux

180

-4-

MGO
Investment motor conversion/fuel cooler/fuel pumps

130 000

100 000

Investment SCR (incl installation new built)

/kWmain+aux

45

45

Installation cost SCR/EGR

/kWmain+aux

Investment engine

/kWmain

180

Investment Generators, Electric system, (Propulsion,


Steering)

/kWaux

240

Investment gas engine

/kWmain

350

Investment Generators, Electric system, (Propulsion,


Steering)

/kWaux

400

Investment LNG fuel gas supply system + tank

/kWmain

245

Investment conversion HFO -> LNG

/kWmain

175

Installation cost

/kWmain+aux

150

LNG: Spark ignition 4-stroke

245

100

LNG: 4-stroke dual fuel


Investment gas engine for dual fuel

/kWmain

350

Investment Generators, Electric system, (Propulsion,


Steering)

/kWaux

400

Investment LNG fuel gas supply system + tank

/kWmain

245

Investment conversion HFO -> LNG

/kWmain

175

Installation cost

/kWmain+aux

150

245

100

LNG: 2-stroke high-pressure diesel dual fuel


Investment dual fuel engine

/kWmain

Investment SCR (incl installation new built)

/kWmain+aux

45

Installation cost SCR/EGR

/kWmain+aux

Investment Generators, Electric system, Propulsion,


Steering

/kWaux

Investment LNG fuel gas supply system + tank

/kWmain

245

Investment conversion HFO --> LNG/HFO

/kWmain

40

280
45

400
245

Installation cost
/kWmain+aux
150
100
The auxiliary engine is assumed to be 20 % of the main engines installed power, apart from the spark ignition 4-stroke case where a figure of 40 %
is assumed.

-5-

2.

Studied Ship Types

Four typical vessels were chosen to illustrate the cost of retrofitting and building new ships complying with
the future SECA regulations. The vessel types are to be seen as examples of each type category but huge
variations exist in all categories and in all respects.
The four typical vessels are two RoPax/RoRo vessels of different sizes, a Coastal tanker/Chemical
tanker/Bulk carrier, and a container ship (700-800 TEU). A fishing vessel is also presented as it in a more
distant future may become an category of ships interested in LNG. The typical ships have been selected to be
representative of the traffic in SECA and since they are possible LNG adopters.

2.1

RoPax / RoRo Vessels

Figure 1 RoPax vessel


Source, DNV, 2011
Table 2 RoPax RoRo Vessel properties
Dimensions

Energy demand

Approx length

165 m

Estimated main engine power

2 x 2,700 kW9

Approx breadth

24 m

Estimated bunkering volume

65-125 m3LNG

Deadweight

4,200 tonnes

Bunkering frequency

2-3 days

Available bunkering time

1-2 hours

Amount LNG /year (and vessel)

2,700 tonnes10

Available bunkering positions:


Parallel activities:

At quay by dedicated bunker vessel


Bunker stations on both sides of vessel
Embarkation / disembarkation of passengers on quay side
Loading/unloading of vehicles
Oil bunkering
Stores loading

Notes
As these types of vessels are often combined passenger/cargo vessels they handle both passengers and rolling
cargoes such as trailers, trucks and cars. The berth is often situated in a city port and this type of vessel is
thus suitable for improving environmental status in coastal areas. Because the routes are clearly defined, the
amount of fuel to bunker is also easy to estimate, making it possible to optimize fuel tanks. Since the routes

21 000 kW installed power for the main engines in the big RoRo type ship
9 800 tonnes/year for the big RoRo type ship

10

-6-

are fixed the demand for LNG will be stable, making LNG an extra viable option for these kinds of ship.
Consequently also retrofitting are expected.
Issues to be considered are:
Short bunkering time;
Passengers embarking / disembarking at the same time as bunkering;
The engines may be either of dual-fuel type or pure gas type;
Use LNG cryogenic properties in HVAC process.
Bunkering of a RoPax or RoRo vessel will most likely be done by a type of bunkering barge/vessel (STS). A
ship of this type has dedicated berths along its route and a fixed bunkering system might therefore be
feasible. It should be noted that special safety precautions are necessary since parallel activities such as cargo
and passenger handling are likely to be performed simultaneously during bunkering operations. STS
bunkering solutions have some advantages since the bunkering can be carried out on the opposite side to
cargo handling, which reduces the risk of interference between the cargo handling and the bunkering
operation.
Table 3 Example of orders of RoPax vessels with LNG propulsion
Company

Country

Type of vessel

Delivery

INCAT

Australia

High-speed catamaran ferry

2012

Torghatten Nord

Norway

Express ferries

2012 (earliest)

Viking Line

Sweden

Cruise ferry

2013

Although these vessels are more costly, the environmental profile can be a strong reason for longer pay-off
time compared to other ship types.

2.2

Coastal Tankers/Chemical Tankers/Bulk Carriers

Figure 2 Bulk carrier


Source: DNV, 2011

Figure 3 Dual fuel Retrofit of Chemical Tanker BIT VIKING


Source: GL/Wrtsil

-7-

Table 4 Coastal Tankers/Bulk Carriers properties


Dimensions

Energy demand

Approx length

125-180 m

Estimated main engine power

8,500 kW

Approx breadth

20-27 m

Estimated bunkering volume

500-1,000 m3 LNG

Deadweight

10,000-25,000
tonnes

Bunkering frequency

Every 10- 14 days

Available bunkering time

8-12 hours

Amount LNG /year (and vessel)

3,200 tonnes

Available bunkering positions:


Parallel activities:

At quay by dedicated bunker vessel


Loading/unloading of cargo
Oil bunkering
Stores loading

Notes
Operations over short and medium distances are most common. As each bunker moment will require 5001,000 m3 LNG a bunker vessel would probably be the most practicable and effective bunker solution for
these kinds of vessels.
Points to be considered are:
Range requirements;
Trading pattern;
The requirements of parallel activities such as cargo handling;
Placement of LNG tank(s);
The engine(s) will probably be of dual-fuel type.
Coastal tankers may also be retrofitted since the tanks are preferably located on open deck to avoid
restricting cargo capacity. The available space on deck is however often very limited for bulk carriers.
The Bit Viking will be powered by a dual-fuel engine. Both tanks are located on open deck to avoid
restricting cargo capacity.
Table 5 Example of orders with LNG propulsion
Company

Country

Type of vessel

Delivery

NSK Shipping

Norway

General cargo vessel

2012

Tarbit Shipping

Sweden

Chemical Tanker Bit Viking (Retrofit)

2011

-8-

2.3

Container Ship (700-800 TEU)

Figure 4 Container ship


Source: DNV, 2011
Table 6 Container ship properties
Dimensions

Energy demand

Approx length

135 m

Estimated main engine power

8,000 kW

Approx breadth

20 m

Estimated bunkering volume

500-700 m3 LNG

Deadweight

9,000 tonnes

Bunkering frequency

Every 10 days

Available bunkering time

6-12 hours

Amount LNG /year (and vessel)

4,500 tonnes

Available bunkering positions:


Parallel activities:

At quay by dedicated bunker vessel


Loading / unloading of cargo
Oil bunkering
Stores loading

Notes
Shipping along coastlines and on short sea routes motivates this type of vessel. However, mainly fuel price
will affect decisions on LNG propulsion.
Fixed timetables contribute to regular port visits but due to cargo, different berths in the container port.
Depending on container capacity of the vessel, turnaround times while in port could be a bottleneck for the
bunker operation. A bunker vessel solution is the most likely solution for flexibility and capacity reasons.
Points to be considered are:
Short bunkering time due to short turnaround time in port;
The requirements for parallel activities such as cargo handling;
Range requirements;
Trading pattern;
Placement of LNG tank(s) preferably on open deck, but cargo space can be considered;
The engine(s) will probably be of dual-fuel type.
One option might be to use a number of LNG tanks placed in containers instead of fixed storage tanks. The
bunkering process would then consist of replacing empty tank containers during loading/unloading of cargo,
hence solving the problem with the location of tanks. However, this limits the load-carrying capacity.
This type of vessel has substantial auxiliary power engines which can be interesting to run on LNG.

-9-

Table 7 Example of orders for a Container vessel with LNG auxiliary power
Company

Country

Type of vessel

Delivery

Stefan Patjens

Germany

5.000 TEU Containership (retrofit)

On hold

Both new builds and retrofits are possible, for example GL has a concept with retrofitting the CV Neptun
1200 design.

2.4

Fishing Vessels

Figure 5 Fishing Vessel


Source: DNV, 2011
Table 8 Fishing Vessel properties
Dimensions

Energy demand

Approx length

70 m

Estimated main engine power

5.000 kW

Approx breadth

15 m

Estimated bunkering volume

800 m3 LNG

Deadweight

1,200 tonnes

Bunkering Frequency

21-25 days

Available bunkering time

10-12 hours

Amount LNG /year (and vessel)

2,500 tonnes

Available bunkering positions:


Parallel activities:

From land based LNG terminal or by bunker vessel.


Cargo unloading, Oil bunkering

Notes
As fishing vessels usually have long sea passages, bunkering frequency is low. Depending on what facilities
they utilize in the harbour for landing their cargo, the best solutions ought to be a pipeline/intermediate tank
solution or bunkering via a bunker vessel. For smaller fishing vessels, tank trucks are probably the most
suitable solution.
Points to be considered are:
The range requirements;
Availability of LNG close to normal operations area/home port;
Tank placement;
Using LNG as cooling media for cargo storage;
The engine will probably be of dual-fuel type.

- 10 -

These vessels will most likely be new builds, but some cases may be suitable for retrofitting. One interesting
aspect is whether the cold LNG can be used for cooling or freezing the cargo in connection with using it as
fuel. This could lower the total power consumption, which further strengthens the economic arguments for
investment.
At the time of writing, there are no known fishing vessels with LNG propulsion in operation or on order.
According to DNV, the first order for LNG powered fishing vessel will be placed soon. A fishing vessels is
however not used as representative type ship in the calculations since they traditionally run on MGO.

3.

Investment Cost Results

The calculated investment costs are shown in the table below for the three strategies HFO, MGO and LNG12
and for the different ship types studied.
Table 9 Investment costs for the studied cases (in thousand Euro).
Retrofit

New buildings

RoRo

Coastal
tanker

Container
ship

Big
RoRo

RoRo

Coastal
tanker

Container
ship

Big
RoRo

HFO

2 300

3 700

3 400

9 000

3 300

5 100

4 800

12 600

MGO

500

700

600

1 500

1 600

2 500

2 400

6 000

LNG

3 200

5 100

4 800

12 600

4 300

6 800

6 400

16 700

From the table it can be observed that LNG is 35 to 45% more expensive than the HFO solution both
regarding retrofit and new buildings. The investment costs for the MGO alternative is only 20 % or less of
the HFO solution at retrofit and around 50 % at new building.

4.

Operational and Other Costs

Generally there are no significant differences in the operational costs (apart from fuel costs) for the different
fuel alternatives. Additional equipment, such as scrubbers in the HFO alternative and SCR/EGR, induces
however extra operating costs.
Specific operational costs for scrubbers has been estimated based on energy production (main engine power
[kW] * time at sea [hours/year]). Estimated specific cost for scrubbers is 0.0025 /kWhmain and for SCR
0.007 /kWhmain.
For the demand analyses in Chapter 8, personnel costs were collected from the Drewry report16 and indirect
costs for education was added by scaling an assumed education cost of 50,000 $/year for a ship operating
6,000 hours. (However as stated above , the maintenance cost, personnel costs and indirect costs are more or
less similar for all fuel alternatives and therefore do not affect the demand situation.)
The reduction in cargo space (which also can be regarded as a cost) was examined within a GL study of the
retrofit from HFO to LNG of the CV Neptun 1200 design. Due to the LNG tank dimensions, the container

12
16

The LNG option with the least life cycle cost is shown in the tables in this chapter.
Drewry: Ship Operating Costs Annual Review and Forecast (2011)

- 11 -

capacity of 1,284 TEU would be reduced by 48 TEU to 1,236 TEU18 (a reduction of 4 %). Lost cargo space
is probably extra relevant for container vessels in the other ship types studied it may be easier to find free
space to use for LNG tanks.
Another example is shown by the worlds first retrofit of a seagoing vessel, the tanker Bit Viking. The two
LNG fuel tanks with a capacity of 500 m3 LNG each are located on deck with no actual reduction in cargo
capacity. Due to the properties of LNG and natural gas, special requirements for the tanks and the fuel
supply system need to be fulfilled.

18

GL Scholz & Plump

4
Appendix 4
LNG Infrastructure in Northern Europe
Table of Contents
1

LNG Liquefaction Plants in Northern Europe .............................................. 2

LNG Shipping ............................................................................................... 3

Existing and Planned and Proposed LNG Import Terminals in Northern Europe

-2-

Appendix 4 LNG Infrastructure in Northern Europe


This appendix contains details of the LNG infrastructure in Northern Europe, including a list of the current
LNG vessels in the world.

LNG Liquefaction Plants in Northern Europe

In the LNG liquefaction plant, gas is received via pipelines (raw gas). The gas is liquefied and stored as
LNG. During liquefaction, contaminants found in natural gas are removed to avoid freezing and damaging
equipment when the gas is cooled to LNG temperature (-162C) and to meet pipeline specifications at the
delivery point. The liquefaction process entails cooling the clean feed gas by means of refrigerants. The
liquefaction plant may consist of several parallel units, so called trains. The LNG is finally stored in storage
tanks and can be loaded and shipped for further use and transportation.
The liquefaction capacity in Northern Europe is limited. Most of the worlds capacity is located in other parts
of the world, for example Qatar (26 %), Indonesia, (13 %), Malaysia (9 %) and Nigeria (8 %). However
there are nine liquefaction plants, which are described in Table 1 and Table 2 below.
Table 1 Existing LNG production plants in the SECA
Country

Site

Operator

Liquefaction
capacity,

Small-scale
export/Bunker
facilities

Tonnes LNG, 000s


Existing plants
Norway

Snhvit, Melkya

Norway

Tjeldbergodden

Norway

Kollsnes

Gasnor

120

Norway

Karmy

Gasnor

20

Norway

Risavika

Skangass

300

Finland

Skldvik

Gasum

20

Russia

St. Petersburg I

Gazprom

7,5

Russia

St. Petersburg II

Gazprom

Russia

St Petersburg III

Gazprom

2,5

Source: Gasnor and Gazprom

Statoil Hydro

4 300
20
Existing

Existing

-3-

Table 2 Planned and proposed production plants in Northern Europe


Planned and proposed plants

Country

Site

Small-scale
export/Bunker
facilities
Operator

Liquefaction
Capacity

Start-up

Tonnes LNG,
000s

Planned/
proposed

Russia

Kaliningrad I

Gazprom

25

2012

Planned

Russia

Vyborg/Grefswald

Gazprom

1 000

2016

Proposed

Proposed

Russia

Kaliningrad II

Gazprom

200

2017

Proposed

Proposed

Russia

Shtokman-Teriberka

Gazprom

7 500

2017

Planned

Source: Gazprom

LNG Shipping

LNG is shipped in LNG carriers from the liquefaction plants to large LNG receiving terminals. LNG tankers
are double-hulled vessels specially designed and insulated to prevent leakage or rupture in an accident. The
LNG is stored in a special containment system within the inner hull where it is kept at atmospheric pressure
and cryogenic temperature. Typical LNG carriers have a loading capacity from 145,000 to more than
200,000 m3of LNG. Most (53 %) of the LNG carriers have been built since 2005, which shows a rapid
expansion of the LNG market. As many of the new built vessels are large vessels with a loading capacity
higher than 200,000 m3, the average size of LNG vessels has increased in recent years. There are only about
20 small and medium sized LNG vessels in the world today, which are shown in the table below.

-4-

Table 3 Small and medium sized LNG vessels in the world


Name of Ship

Built

Dead Weight

Tank capacity
m3

Status

TELLIER

Jan-74

21 301

40 000

In service

AMAN BINTULU

Oct-93

11 001

18 928

In service

SURYA AKI

Feb-96

11 612

19 474

In service

AMAN SENDAI

May-97

10 957

18 928

In service

AMAN HAKATA

Nov-98

10 951

18 800

In service

SURYA SATSUMA

Oct-00

12 493

23 096

In service

SHINJU MARU NO. 1

Jul-03

1 781

2 513

In service

PIONEER KNUTSEN

Mar-04

817

1 100

In service

NORTH PIONEER

Nov-05

1 938

2 500

In service

SUN ARROWS

Nov-07

11 142

19 100

In service

SHINJU MARU NO. 2

Oct-08

1 781

2 513

In service

KAKUREI MARU

Nov-08

1 801

2 512

In service

CORAL METHANE

Apr-09

6 150

7 500

In service

NORGAS INNOVATION

Jan-10

10 630

10 000

In service

NORGAR CREATION

Jul-10

10 429

10 000

In service

NORGAS INVENTION

Jan-11

10 441

10 000

In service

NORGAS UNIKUM

Jun-11

12 210

12 000

In service

NORGAS CONCEPTION

Aug-11

10 500

10 000

In service

BAHRAIN VISION

Oct-11

12 600

12 000

In service

DINGHENG JIANGSU 2007-003

Feb-12

12 600

12 000

Being built

DINGHENG JIANGSU 2007-004

Jun-12

12 600

12 000

Ordered

MEYER WERFT 665


Source: SSPA

Dec-12

8 000

15 600

Ordered

-5-

Existing, Planned and Proposed LNG Import Terminals


in Northern Europe

The map shows the location of the LNG terminals and the tables in the Appendix gives detailed information
of each facility. The existing terminals in Norway are shown in a separate table due to the large number of
terminals. The existing and proposed production plants are also shown in the map.
It must be noticed that there are on-going discussions about establishing LNG terminals at several other
locations within the area, for example in Helsingborg, Sundsvall (Sweden), Hirtshals (Denmark), Oslo,
Mongstad, Helgelandsbase (Norway) and Silae (Estonia). Discussions are also going on with a view to
establishing small scale LNG bunker facilities in the Netherlands1. These projects are not shown on the map
or listed in the tables below.

Figure 1 Existing, planned and proposed LNG terminals and productions plants
Source: Gas Infrastructure Europe, 2011, Gasnor, Gazprom. Note: Gazproms proposed production plants will be either in Vyborg or Greifswald
.
1

Gasnor Nov 2011

-6

Table 4 Existing LNG terminals in Europe 2011


Nr on
map

Country

Name of terminal

Storage
capacity
(m3 LNG, 000s)

No of
tanks

Send-out
capacity (bcm/y
NG )

Operator

Source of import

Small-scale
export/bunkering
facilities

Belgium

Zeebrgge

2011: 380

2011: 9

Fluxyx LNG

Qatar, Egypt, Norway,


Trinidad&Tobago, Nigeria

Proposed

Gasunie, Vopak

(Start up in Sep 2011)

Proposed

2016: 540
2

The Netherlands

Gate terminal,
Rotterdam

2016: 12

2011: 540

2011: 3

2011: 12

2014/15: 720

2014: 4

2014/15: 16

United Kingdom

Isle of Grain

1 000

19.5

Grain LNG

Algeria, Egypt, Qatar,


Trinidad&Tobago, Norway, Australia

United Kingdom

South Hook

775

21.00

South Hook LNG


Terminal
Company Ltd

Qatar

United Kingdom

Dragon

320

6.00

Dragon LNG

Various

United Kingdom

Teesside

4.60

Excelerate
Energy

Trinidad& Tobago

Sweden

Nynshamn

20

0.18

AGA

Norway

Source: Gas Infrastructure Europe, 2011

Proposed

-7-

Table 5 Existing small-scale LNG terminals in Norway


No
on

Location

Operator

Storage
capacity
( m3 LNG,
000s)

Map

Small
scale
Export/
Bunker
facilities

No
on

Location

Operator

Storage
capacity

Existing

29

Halhjem

Gasnor

1 000

(m3 LNG,
000s)

Map

Fredrikstad

Skangass

6 500

Sarpsborg

Skagerrak
Naturgass

117

30

Bergen

Gasnor

23

10

Askim

Skangass

250

31

Bergen

Gasnor

23

11

Oslo

Hafslund

500

32

Bergen

Gasnor

54

12

Tnsberg

Skagerrak
Naturgass

105

33

Bergen

Gasnor

60

13

Skien

Skagerrak
Naturgass

125

34

gotnes CCB

Gasnor

500

14

Bamle

Skagerrak
Naturgass

78

35

Bergen

Gasnor

78

15

Porsgrunn

Skagerrak
Naturgass

850

36

Hyanger

Gasnor

480

16

Risr

Skagerrak
Naturgass

78

37

Flor

Gasnor

250

17

Vennesla

Skagerrak
Naturgass

250

38

Flor

Saga
Fjordbase

500

18

Lista

Gasnor

1 250

39

Nordfjordeid

Gasnor

20

19

Sirevg

Gasnor

78

40

Vedde

Naturgass
Mre

78

20

Sokndal

Gasnor

250

41

lesund

Naturgass
Mre

60

21

Vigrestad

Gasnor

25

42

Brattvg

Naturgass
Mre

21

22

Nrb

Gasnor

21

43

Tresfjord

Naturgass
Mre

25

23

Bryne

Gasnor

21

44

Sunndalsr
a

Gasnor

1 500

24

Oltedal

Gasnor

78

45

Trondheim

Gasnor

60

25

Aksdal

Gasnor

21

46

Malvik

Gasnor

46

26

Stord

SKL
Naturgass

105

47

lesund

Naturgass
Mre

1 000

27

Husnes

Gasnor

250

48

Mosjen

Gasnor

3 500

28

Odda

Gasnor

250

49

Bod

Barents
Naturgass

Source: Gasnor 2011

127

Small
scale
Export/
Bunker
facilities

Existing

Existing

Existing

-8-

Table 6 Planned and proposed terminals in northern Europe


No
in
map

Country

Location

Planned/
proposed

50

United
Kingdom

Anglesey,
Almwch
offshore

Proposed

51

United
Kingdom

Port-Meridian
(FSRU)

52

United
Kingdom

53

Startup

Storage
capacity

Send-out
capacity

Operator

Small scale
Export/ Bunker
facilities

(1,000 m3
of LNG)

(Bcm NG
per year)

13

Canatxx

Proposed

2013+

Hoegh LNG

Canvey Island

Proposed

2014+

240

5.4

Calor Gas

France

Dunkerque

Planned

2014

380-570

13

Dunkerque LNG/
EdF/Total/Fluxys

54

Germany

Wilmershafen

Proposed

320

10.8

DTFG (E.ON)

55

Germany

Wilmershafen

Proposed

2013+

5.2

RWE, Excelerate

56

Germany

Brunsbttel

Proposed

2014

1-10

Gasnor

57

Germany

Rostock

Proposed

Small-scale

Vopak, Gasunie,
VNG

58

Sweden

Lysekil

Planned

20

Nordic
Preem

59

Sweden

Gteborg

Proposed

2013

10

Gteborg Energi

Proposed

60

Poland

Swinoujscie

Planned

2014

2014:320

2014: 5

Polski LNG

Proposed

Future:480

Future: 7.5
3

Klaipeda nafta

Proposed

Proposed

LNG,

Proposed

61

Lithuania

Klaipeda

Proposed

2014

62

Latvia

Ventspils/ Riga

Proposed

63

Estonia

Padilski

Proposed

2015

320

Balti Gas

Proposed

64

Finland

bo/Turku

Proposed

2015

20

Gasum

Proposed

65
Finland
Porvoo
Proposed
2017
150-300
Up to 4
Gasum
Proposed
Note: Planned terminals are terminals where investment decisions have been taken. Source: Gas Infrastructure Europe 2011, Gasnor 2012.

5
Appendix 5
Terminal Cost Data and Calculations
Table of Contents
1

Introduction ................................................................................................. 3

General Assumptions .................................................................................. 3

Methodology ................................................................................................ 3

Cost Components (items) included in Analysis .......................................... 5

Results ......................................................................................................... 7

-3-

Appendix 5 LNG Terminal Cost Data and Calculations


1

Introduction

In order to get a complete picture of the LNG value chain and the costs for supplying LNG, three LNG
terminals of different sizes have been designed and the costs associated with each terminal have been
assessed. This appendix describes how the financial analysis has been done by:
Stating the general calculation assumptions made;
Explaining each cost component that has been included in the analysis;
Describing the methodology used.
Finally, the results are presented (investment costs, operational costs as well as total cost per delivered tonne
LNG). The results are then discussed in the main report. For further description of the three terminal cases
studied, see Chapter 6 in the report. Here the terminals are referred to as I (LNG import terminal), Case II
(medium-sized LNG intermediary terminal with potential passing traffic) and Case III (small LNG
intermediary terminal). In short, the different cases are characterized by having no separate storage tank but a
drawing LNG from an import terminal (Case I), a 20,000 m3 tank (Case II) or two 700 m3 tanks (Case III),
respectively.

General Assumptions

The following general assumptions were used in the calculations:


Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC): 8 %;
The analysis does not consider tax;
Economic lifetime: 20 years for bunker vessels and tank trucks, 40 years for all other items. Time
horizon of investment is 40 years, i.e. after half that time bunker vessels/trucks are replaced with
new ones. Residual values are ignored;
The LNG throughput is calculated in Chapter 6 of the main report and is based on real AIS data
(giving an estimate of the potential of maritime LNG customers). The throughput in Cases I and II is
then assumed to increase in line with the total demand in Price Scenario 2 (described in Chapter 7 of
the main report). In Case III, the demand is assumed to be constant.
It is assumed that LNG prices are set in accordance with the aim of having a pay-back time of ten
years for most of the terminals (Case II and Case III terminals).

Methodology

The investment analysis should be seen as indicative with a high degree of uncertainty. The methodology
used was that a list of cost items needed to build a terminal was defined first, together with the capital and
operational costs for each item. The three terminal Cases were then built/designed by choosing the
necessary items. The table below shows the list of cost items used (leftmost column) whereas the other
columns show if and how many of the respective items that were used when building the three terminal
cases.

-4-

Table 1 Cost items for the different cases


Cost Items
Throughput LNG (m3/yr)

Case I

Case II

Case III

204,000

343,000

52,000

o 700 m3 (thermos tank)

o 20 000 m3

o 50 000 m3

Tank trucks (50 m3) incl filling station

Pipeline and manifold connected to tank

LNG infrastructure on jetty

o 1 000 m3

o 3 000 m3

o 4 000 m3

o 10 000 m3

o 20 000 m3

o Application for the activities

0.5

o Licence costs

0.5

Landbased tanks

Bunkering vessels

Port facilities:
o Jetty / quay
Administrative costs: permission to set up an LNG terminal

Operational costs for terminal

Case I

Case II

Case III

Operation of LNG tank


o 700 m3 (thermostank) [/m3 throughput]

o 20 000 m3 [/m3 throughput]

o Import terminal tank

o 1 000 m3

o 3 000 m3

o 4 000 m3

o 10 000 m3

o 20 000 m3

Operation of tank truck

Operation of pipeline

Maintenance

0.1

10 %

20 %

25 %

0.2

Operation of bunker vessel

Price surcharge compared to LNG price at import port (e.g. feedering)


Administrative personnel

-5-

In the next section the cost of each cost item/component is shown and motivated. Once those costs are
specified, the investment and operational costs for each case are easily calculated. Using the assumed
WACC, the net present value (NPV) for the investments (including re-investments in bunker vessels/trucks)
are calculated. The yearly operational costs are also transformed to net present value costs before added
together. Finally, the NPV investment cost and the sum of NPV for operational cost over 40 years are added
to a total Life Cycle Cost (LCC) cost.
The terminal owner will of course also have revenues from handling the LNG. Assuming that LNG retail
prices are set in a way corresponding to a certain pay-back period for the terminals, a distribution price in
/tonne LNG can be calculated as a function of desired pay-back time.

Cost Components (items) included in Analysis

An overview of the cost of the different items/components included in the analysis can be seen in the table
below. The costs are only estimates, and a few of the costs are further explained/motivated below the table.
Table 2 Estimated investment costs for required items components of the system
Investment costs for terminal items

Cost []

Economic life time

Landbased tanks
o 700 m3 (thermos tank)

7,000,000

40

o 20 000 m3

40,000,000

40

o 50 000 m3

80,000,000

40

Tank trucks (50 m3) incl. filling station

800,000

20

Pipeline and manifold connected to tank

500,000

40

15,000,000

40

o 1 000 m3

20,296,296

20

o 3 000 m3

28,222,222

20

o 4 000 m3

31,619,781

20

o 10 000 m3

40,888,889

20

o 20 000 m3

56,740,741

20

20,000,000

40

LNG infrastructure on jetty


Bunkering vessels

Port facilities:
o Jetty / quay (per berth)

Administrative costs: permission to set up an LNG terminal


o Application for the activities

270,000

o Licence costs
Table continues on the next page.

100,000

-6-

Operational costs for terminal (annual basis)

Cost [/year]

Operation of LNG tank


o 700 m3 [/m3 throughput]

1.0

o 20 000 m3 [/m3 throughput]

1.0

o Import terminal [/m3 throughput]

1.0

o Import terminal (rent to import terminal)

1,400,000

Operation of bunker vessel


o 1 000 m3

1,807,870

o 3 000 m3

2,371,049

o 4 000 m3

2,547,065

o 10 000 m3

3,168,704

o 20 000 m3

3,830,494

Operation of tank truck

40,000

Operation of pipeline

50,000

Maintenance

1,000,000

Transhipment cost from import hub (per million m3


at 1 % price surcharge)

1,984,500

Administrative and other personnel

900,000

The largest investment cost is the tanks and the tank costs have been estimated based on input given by Cryo
AB, Cryonorm and Fluxys. Bunkering vessels is also an important cost, which has been elaborated by White
Smoke Shipping (a joint venture between White Smoke AB and Frederiet AB), based on the following
assumptions: tank type IMO type C, Cyprus flag, ice class no., 355 annual operating days2.
The costs for a jetty (including mooring equipment, etc.) and LNG equipment on the jetty are, like the other
costs, very site-specific, but examples have been given by the Port of Swinoujscie and Fluxys and to some
extent the Port of Antwerp.
White Smoke Shipping also estimated operational costs for the bunkering vessels, also taking into account
the ships fuel costs.
The transport costs (surcharge) from the LNG import port (LNG hub) to the studied case terminals were
estimated to be 10 % (Case I), 20 % (Case II) and 25 % (Case III) of the LNGhub price from Price Scenario 2
in Chapter 7 (i.e. 440 /tonne LNG). These costs can be e.g. costs for LNG feeder vessels transporting the
LNG from the import port to the studied case port. In Case I, which is an import port itself, no feeding is
required and the low price surcharge refelects that LNG prices may vary also between import ports (and the
price projection for the LNGhub price considered Rotterdam prices which are assessed to be lower than in
many other import ports).
An alternative to import and transport LNG as above is of course, when the intermediary terminal can be
connected to an existing CNG network, to install a liquefaction plant at the terminal. From figures given by
2

White Smoke Shipping provided data for all vessels except the 4000 m3 vessel, whose costs were interpolated from the three other
vessels.

-7-

Gasnor this can however generally be regarded as a more expansive solution. Even if there are and will be
specific cases when a liquefaction plant is favorable we have in this report calculated with LNG import and
transport as basis for our analysis.

Results

For the three different terminal cases studied, the results are shown in the table below: the total initial
investment cost, total operational cost, NPV total investment, NPV operational cost, the income needed in
/tonne LNG to reach pay-back times of eight, ten, twelve and fifteen years, respectively.
Table 3 Results for the alternative with constant throughput
Case I

Case II

Case III

Initial total investment cost [million ]

69

137

15

Total operational cost [million /yr]

10

17

3,0

NPV total investment3 [million ]

76

151

16

NPV operational cost [million ]

208

419

39

Needed income to reach 8 years pay-back [/tonne LNG]

136

157

211

18

17

14

118

137

194

13

13

11

107

125

183

Corresponding internal rate of return [%]

11

10

Needed income to reach 15 years pay-back [/tonne LNG]

95

112

172

Corresponding internal rate of return [%]


Needed income to reach 10 years pay-back [/tonne LNG]
Corresponding internal rate of return [%]
Needed income to reach 12 years pay-back [/tonne LNG]

Corresponding internal rate of return [%]

As a comparison, the forecast of LNG hub prices used in this study range between 315 and 570 /tonne
LNG, i.e. the prices calculated in this table should be increased by 315-570 /tonne to show how much the
end user has to pay for the LNG if the costs of the terminal are to be covered.
The internal rate of return is of course directly dependent on chosen pay-back time. It is also very dependent
on the throughput. For example, if the studied terminals which have been dimensioned according to an
LNG demand like in Scenario 2 or 5 (see the main report) would have to meet a demand as in Scenario 1
or 4, the rate of return would be negative (i.e. costs would exceed incomes). If the demand develops as in
Scenario 2 (or 5) until 2020 but then stagnates, the resulting rate of return over the studied 40 year period
decreases to between 9 and 10 % (when prices are set aiming at a pay-back time of ten years).
Comparing Cases I and II it is evident that the total cost is lower in Case I since no separate tank is needed
because the LNG is taken directly from the import terminal. But since Case I has a much lower throughput
than Case II the difference in specific cost is not as high. Other studies show a substantial economy of scale
in the LNG terminal business, based on the fact that the relationship between tank size and tank cost is far
from linear.
3

Including purchase of new bunkering ships etc after 20 years.

-8-

Price for LNG distribution [/tonne]

To conclude, the results from this appendix are that the infrastructure cost would be 120 200 /tonne LNG
if the throughput is assumed to be high either increasing rapidly as in Cases I and II or being high already
from the beginning as in Case III4. These figures are calculated to give pay-back times of around ten years,
which is considered reasonable. It is therefore proposed that the infrastructure be priced at around
170 /tonne LNG to make LNG an attractive option for ship owners. If instead pay-back times of fifteen
years can be accepted for the LNG infrastructure, the specific price can be decreased to 100-170 /tonne
LNG, see Figure 1 below.
300
250

200

Import terminal

150
Intermediary terminal
(medium)

100

Intermediary terminal (small)


50
0
5

10
15
20
Terminal pay-back time [years]

25

Figure 1 The price for LNG distribution as a function of terminals pay-back times for the different cases studied

Case 3, as explained in Chapter 6, has a large share of passenger traffic on fixed lines, which is assumed to consist of early adopters
of LNG.

6
Appendix 6
Future Land Based Gas Demand in the Study Area and
National Gas Policies
Table of Contents
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Belgium ........................................................................................................ 5

1.1

Transit of Gas6

1.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects..6

1.3

Other - Zeebrugge Hub..8

Denmark....................................................................................................... 8

2.1

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects9

2.2

Other: Nord Pool Gas.10

Finland ....................................................................................................... 10

3.1

Transit of Gas.11

3.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects...11

3.3

Other - Small Scale LNG Production Facilities.12

France ........................................................................................................ 12

4.1

Transit of Gas.13

4.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects...13

Germany..................................................................................................... 15

5.1

Transit of Gas..16

5.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects16

The Netherlands ........................................................................................ 16

6.1

Transit of Gas..17

-3-

6.2
7.

8.

9.

10.

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects..18

Norway ....................................................................................................... 18

7.1

Transit of Gas19

7.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects..19

Poland ........................................................................................................ 20

8.1

Transit of Gas.21

8.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects..22

8.3

Other: Prospects for Unconventional Gas.23

Sweden ...................................................................................................... 24

9.1

Transit of Gas24

9.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects..25

9.3

Other: Bio-fuel and Connection to the Nord Stream.25

United Kingdom ...................................................................................... 26

10.1

Transit of Gas27

10.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects..27

11.

Origin of European LNG Imports ............................................................ 29

12.

Forecast of Gas Demand in the Study Area ........................................... 29

13.

12.1

Methodology.30

12.2

Residential and Commercial Sector..30

12.3

Industry.31

12.4

Power Generation.31

12.5

Other.31

12.6

Forecast Findings..32

Forecast of LNG Demand Within the Study Area ................................... 40

13.1

Methodology.40

13.2

Belgium.41

13.3

Denmark41

13.4

France42

13.5

Finland...42

13.6

Germany43

13.7

The Netherlands44

-4-

13.8

Norway..44

13.9

Poland45

13.10

Sweden..46

13.11

United Kingdom46

-5-

Appendix 6 Future Land Based Gas Demand in the


Study Area and National Gas Policies
This appendix includes an analysis of future land based demand of natural gas and LNG in SECA countries.
The analysis also contains descriptions on national gas policies (where they actually exist) in SECA with
specific references of gas supply and LNG import facilities development.

1.

Belgium

Natural gas has made a steadily-growing contribution to primary energy supply by fuel source in Belgium,
having increased from 15.5% in 1973 to 26.3% in 2009 (recent production and consumption is shown in
Table 1. The majority of this gas is imported via pipeline from the Netherlands, the UK, Norway, Russia and
Qatar (see Table 2 and Table 3). According to data published by the Energy Delta Institute, in 2009 Belgium
consumed a total of 17,19 Bcm of natural gas. Of this volume, 44.9% was used by the residential and
commercial sector, 21.6% was used by the industrial sector and 32.9% was used by power plants.
According to data reported in the IEAs Natural Gas Information 2011 report, Belgium had an average
annual rate of change of gas consumption between 2006 and 2009 of 0.65%.1
Table 1 Indigenous gas production and total consumption in Belgium (Bcm)
2007

2008

2009

2010e

Indigenous production

From other sources

Imports

17.5

18.2

21.1

20.8

Exports

0.7

3.6

0.5

Stock changes

0.03

-0.07

0.2

0.2

Statistical difference

-0.16

-0.15

0.001

0.2

17.7

20.3

Total consumption
17.7
17.5
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

Table 2 Belgian gas imports by transportation type between 2007 and 2009, including gas transit.
Transport type

2007

2008

2009

2010e

Pipeline imports (Bcm)

14.8

15.14

13.95

14.42

LNG imports (Bcm)

2.67

2.32

3.0

6.41

16.95

20.83

Total (Bcm)
17.46
17.46
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

Energy Delta Institute, 2011. Country gas profile: Belgium. Received from http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence2/our-services/Country-gas-profiles/country-gas-profile-belgium#t42645

-6-

Table 3 Natural gas imports to Belgium in 2009 by country of origin (Bcm)


Country of origin

Imported volume
(Bcm in 2009)

Netherlands

6.17

Norway

5.36

UK

0.75

Qatar

Russia

0.8

Other
0.7
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

1.1

Transit of Gas

Transit of Algerian LNG, gas from Norway and the Netherlands to France, Italy, Spain, UK, Luxemburg,
and Germany. Since the commencement of operations of the Interconnector in October 1998, gas has
transited through Belgium from the UK to other European countries as well. A new compressor station has
been built in Zeebrugge and from 2007 the gas can flow from Belgium to UK. The new storage tank
increasing the capacity of the LNG Zeebrugge terminal from 4.5 Bcm to 9 Bcm has been completed.
The long-term LNG terminalling Capacity Subscription Agreement signed between Fluxys LNG and Qatar
Terminal Limited on the one hand and Zeebrugge LNG Trading Company Limited on the other hand will
secure capacity for about 4.5 Bcm of natural gas per year at the Fluxys LNG Zeebrugge terminal for a 20year period, beginning in April 2007.

1.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects

Belgium relies entirely on imports for its gas consumption. The current import portfolio is fairly well
diversified by origin and type of supply. The Netherlands and Norway are the principal pipeline suppliers,
while Qatar is the main source of LNG imports (Table 3). The majority of gas imports are based on longterm contracts, while approximately 6% are from the spot market.
Imports from the two most important supply countries will decline from the Netherlands in the medium to
long term and from Norway in a more distant future and this will increase dependence on imports from
Russia and the Middle East.
Market Reforms.
The overall Belgian gas market has been fully liberalised since 1 January 2007 when supplier choice was
granted to all consumers in all the regions. Gas transportation and distribution have been legally unbundled
from import and supply activities. In March 2006 Fluxys was appointed by law as the only operator of the
natural gas transmission grid and the underground gas storage facility, and Fluxys LNG as the operator of the
LNG terminal and the peak-shaving facility. In 2007 and 2008, several other regulatory reforms took place:
the gas transmission and distribution tariff system was amended and the powers of the regulator were
reinforced.
Gas Security Policy
Belgium does not have a specific emergency response policy for natural gas. Currently, it relies on the TSO,
Fluxys, to assure the safety and reliability of the network and to safeguard natural gas supplies. Fluxys is
given the responsibility for maintaining crisis mechanisms through a Royal Decree on public service
obligations related to natural gas (23 October 2002) and a number of other laws and regulations. This

-7-

responsibility includes the requirement to have an emergency plan and a backup plan, to be updated every
two years. It also includes a code of conduct which contains a range of operational and administrative
guidelines for gas network users.
Fluxys has an emergency plan for ensuring the integrity of its grid (maintaining line pressure and gas
quality). In the case of significant loss of gas supply to the Belgian market, the TSO looks to balance the
network by compensating temporarily the loss until the concerned shippers manage to shift their gas supplies
to other entry points. In doing this, it maintains also an interruption plan for cutting supply to end-users
(with a specified hierarchy) for short periods of time.
Belgium is part of the regional Gas Platform that brings together energy ministers from Belgium, Germany,
France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Two working groups operate in the framework of this platform: i)
on market and competitiveness issues, and ii) on security of supply. The objective of the first working group
is to facilitate cross-border trade. The second group focuses on the security of supply. Its working priorities
include transparency on the need for investment; strengthening regional co-operation between TSOs;
clarifying the role of TSOs in security of supply; and developing common open season procedures.
LNG Infrastructures and Projects
Belgium began importing LNG in 1987 when its first regasification terminal opened. The IEAs 2011
Natural Gas Information publication reported that between 2007 and 2009, Belgium imported a growing
volume of LNG (2.67 Bcm in 2007 and 2.997 Bcm in 20092).
The LNG terminal in Zeebrugge is operated by Fluxys LNG, which is owned by Fluxys (93%) and Tractebel
(7%). In 2008, the terminals throughput capacity was doubled to 9 bcm per year by building a fourth storage
tank and additional send-out capacity. Currently, the terminal has an unloading capacity of up to 12 000 m
LNG per hour and can unload 110 LNG cargoes per year. The four storage tanks can hold about three
shiploads of LNG, which can be pumped into the regasification unit and then injected into the grid.
Alternatively, depending on the demand, the LNG can be sent from the storage tanks into LNG tanker trucks
for supplying the peak-shaving facility in the port of Zeebrugge. In July 2008, Fluxys LNG also launched
new LNG loading services in response to requests from terminal users willing to better exploit commercial
opportunities on the LNG market.
The capacities of the LNG terminal are allocated through an open season procedure. Until a new open season
procedure is launched, any remaining unused capacity is allocated according to the first come, first served
rule. Fluxys LNG signed long-term contracts with three terminal users as of 2007: Qatar
Petroleum/ExxonMobil, Distrigaz and Suez LNG Trading. In June 2007, Qatar Petroleum/ExxonMobil
announced its contract had been transferred to EDF Trading for 4.5 years, while Suez LNG Trading
announced in February 2008 that it had subleased part of its capacity to ConocoPhillips. In addition to these
long-term contracts, tankers from Egypt, Nigeria, Trinidad, Malaysia and Qatar deliver spot LNG.
In 2007, Fluxys LNG launched a market consultation (open season) to assess the level of demand for
additional terminal capacity at the Zeebrugge LNG terminal. Depending on the level and the nature of
market interest, Fluxys LNG could increase the existing send-out capacity of the Zeebrugge terminal or add
one or more LNG storage tanks and a second berthing jetty.

Throughout this report, we have specified quantities of LNG in gas phase (measured in Bcm). To convert from LNG (liquid, in
Mcm), to LNG (gas, in Bcm), we multiplied by 600, to convert from LNG (gas, in Bcm), to LNG (liquid, Mcm), we devided by
600. We have also used a conversin factor of 2.2 to convert measurements of LNG from tonnes to cubic meters (to convert from
LNG tonnes to LNG cubic meters, we multiply by 2,2.).

-8-

1.3

Other - Zeebrugge Hub

Zeebrugge serves as a crossroads of two major axes in European natural gas flows, as both the Zeepipe
terminal (natural gas coming from Norway) and the Interconnector terminal (natural gas coming from or
going to the United Kingdom) are situated in the harbour zone. This allows the flow of gas on the east-west
axis from Russia to the United Kingdom and the north-south axis from Norway to Southern Europe. The
Zeebrugge port also has an LNG regasification terminal with a capacity of 9 bcm per year (see below). The
various facilities at Zeebrugge together have an annual throughput capacity of 40 bcm of natural gas, which
represents about 7% of gas consumption in OECD Europe.
Zeebrugge also has a key commercial role in the natural gas trade, as one of Europes major spot markets for
natural gas. It is operated by Fluxyss affiliate Huberator. More than 70 members are active on the hub and
approximately 45.4 bcm of natural gas was traded on the hub in 2008, equivalent to over twice the annual
consumption of Belgium. The churn ratio, i.e. the ratio of traded gas volumes at the hub to the actual
physical volumes exchanged, has been stable at 5 over the past four years. Huberator offers various services,
including title tracking, matching of nominations, allocation and automatic backup service for intra -hub
Zeebrugge trading and Zeebrugge hub trading for onward delivery.
Facing growing competition from the Netherlands virtual market place, the Title Transit Facility (TTF),
Fluxys has taken several measures to enhance liquidity on the Zeebrugge hub in the past years. In February
2008, it launched the ZEE Platform Service, offering unlimited capacity transfers in the Zeebrugge area,
which enables shippers to transfer gas between all entry points (Interconnector terminal, Zeepipe terminal,
LNG terminal and Zeebrugge hub) without capacity limitations. Additionally, interruptible capacity products
for transit and day-ahead capacity-trading for domestic transportation have been introduced, as well as
synergy services between transit and national transportation. In December 2008, Fluxys and GRTgaz, the
French TSO, launched a joint secondary market capacity-trading platform, Capsquare, although its use is still
limited.

2.

Denmark

Natural gas provided just over one fifth of energy supply by fuel source in Denmark in 2009. In 2009 the
country had a total production of natural gas of 7.53 Mtoe, of which it exported 3.58 Mtoe (primarily to the
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden)3. Denmarks natural gas production and consumption data are shown in
Table 4, Table 5and Table 6. According to data reported in the IEAs Natural Gas Information 2011 report,
Denmark had an average annual rate of change of gas consumption between 2006 and 2009 of 4.63%.
Table 4 Indigenous gas production and total consumption in Denmark (Bcm)
2007

2008

2009

2010e

Indigenous production

9.2

10.1

8.4

8.2

From other sources

Imports

0.2

Exports

4.5

5.5

3.5

Stock changes

-0.17

-0.02

-0.05

0.1

Statistical difference

-0.03

-0.05

-0.05

-0.04

4.4

4.9

Total consumption
4.6
4.6
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011
3

IEA, Natural gas Information 2011

-9-

Table 5 Natural gas imports to Denmark by transportation type (Bcm)


Transport type

2008

2009

2010e

Pipeline imports (Bcm)

0.15

LNG imports (Bcm)

0.15

Total (Bcm)
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

Table 6 Natural gas imports to Denmark by country of origin


Country of origin

Imported volume
(Bcm in 2009)

Germany
0.15
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

There were two operational gas storage terminals in Denmark in 2010, which together had a combined
storage capacity of 0.98 Bcm.
Denmark has no LNG facilities at present and no projects have been proposed to be developed in the
country.4
There is no onshore transit of gas.

2.1

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects

Since 1997 Denmark has been fully self-sufficient with natural gas. Denmarks known reserves of natural
gas are situated off-shore in the North Sea, and exploration and production takes place according to licenses
issued by the Danish Energy Agency. Currently, there are 19 producing fields with 87 active production gas
wells. Some newer licenses for exploration cover on-shore areas including the two newest licenses granted
on 5 June 2010.
The natural gas produced at the Nord Sea fields is transported ashore via two pipelines to the Danish gasprocessing facility at Nybro or via the NOGAT pipeline to the Netherlands for divesture in the Dutch market.
Gas Security Policy
Annually the Danish Energy Agency assesses the reserves of natural gas. In June 2010, due to estimated gas
reserves at 105 Bcm, it was anticipated that Denmark for the next 8-10 years will still be a net exporter of
natural gas. Further, Denmarks status as net exporter of natural gas may be extended beyond 2030 due to
improved technical solutions and/or new discoveries.
In October 2010 it became possible to import natural gas from Germany to Denmark, and in order to increase
the security of supply it has been decided to establish a new compressor station that will generally enable
import of natural gas via the pipeline from Jutland to Germany.

Delta Energy Institute, 2011. Country profile: Denmark. Received from: http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence2/our-services/Country-gas-profiles/country-gas-profile-denmark

- 10 -

LNG Infrastructures and Projects


Denmark does not have production of LNG and further, no liquefaction or other LNG facilities are currently
available. However, the Danish energy major, DONG Energy, does own a minority share in the GATE
terminal (an LNG terminal in the Port of Rotterdam, the Netherlands).

2.2

Other: Nord Pool Gas

Denmark is now connected to a gas exchange, Nord Pool Gas. Nord Pool Gas is a newly established
company owned by the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool Spot AS and the Danish Transmission System
Operator, Energinet.dk with a share of 50% each. Nord Pool Gas provides a market place to producers,
distributors, industrial companies, energy companies, trading representatives and large consumers on which
they can buy or sell natural gas on a short term basis. Nord Pool Gas is the central counterparty in all trades
guaranteeing settlement for trade and anonymity for the participants, www.nordpoolspot.com/Nord-PoolGas/.
Most trading still takes place as long-term take-or-pay contracts. Shippers may trade bilaterally on
Energinet.dks Gas Transfer Facility (GTF). For a long time only about 6 percent of the domestic gas
consumption was traded on GTF but this has increased dramatically. Further, the transport customers may
trade virtually on Link4Hubs where capacity on the borders between Denmark, Germany and the
Netherlands may be reserved and ordered.

3.

Finland

The IEA estimates that in 2010 gas provided 10.7% of total primary energy supply in Finland; this was
equivalent to a level of consumption of 4.7 Bcm gas (Table 7). Oil, coal and nuclear power were favored as
the dominant energy supply types by that country.
Of the gas that was consumed in Finland in 2010, the majority (around 64%) was used for power generation.
Between 16% and 17% of the overall gas consumption took place within the industrial and other (see
definition above) sectors. Gas use within the residential and commercial sectors was relatively insignificant
(around 2% of total gas consumption).
Due to their proximity, it is unsurprising that Finish imported gas originates from Russia. Indeed, Finland
does not import gas from any other country.
Total gas imports, specified by transportation type, between 2008 and 2010 are shown in Table 8; this data
was published by the IEA.
Table 7 Gas production and consumption in Finland (Bcm)
2007

2008

2009

2010e

Indigenous production

From other sources

Imports

4.6

4.7

4.3

4.3

Exports

Stock changes

Statistical difference

0.004

0.002

0.001

0.001

4.3

4.3

Total consumption
4.6
4.7
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

- 11 -

Table 8 Imports of gas to Finland, by transportation type


Tansport type

2008

2009

2010e

Pipeline imports (Bcm)

4.74

4.27

4.71

LNG imports (Bcm)

Total (Bcm)
4.74
4.27
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

4.71

Finland did not import any LNG between 2008 and 2010.

3.1

Transit of Gas

There is no transit of gas in Finland.

3.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects

The natural gas market in Finland, gas is relatively isolated and small. Gas is imported and transmission
services are provided solely by Gasum. The company operates an LNG production facility, capable of
producing around 20,000 tonnes of LNG per year; the facility is based in Kilpilati industrial area in Porvoo.
The LNG facility is used as a backup to the Finish gas grid. Currently all Finnish imported gas originates
from Russia. Natural gas supply contract with Gazprom is valid until the end of 2025 and annual contract
volume is up to about 6 bcm.
Market Reforms
Finland has availed itself of the possibility of an exemption allowed by the Natural Gas Directives.
According to the exemption there is neither legal nor operational unbundling of the natural gas transmission
system operator. The TSO, Gasum Oy, is planning to expand its natural gas transmission pipeline to the
western part of Finland where there currently does not exist any gas pipeline.
Gas Security Policy
In natural gas shortage situation substitute fuels and a special propane ait mixing unit of 350 MW can be
used. If the natural gas supply is prevented over an extended period the obligatory storages can be used too.
National Emergency Supply Agency controls for use of obligatory storages in Finland. Total volume of
stockpile fuels and obligatory storages must be at least equal to cover normal consumption of imported fuels
for five months.
According to the amendments to Natural Gas Market Act, the role of the regulator in security of supply
issues is to monitor the balance between supply and demand in natural gas, the quality and maintenance of
networks and measures to cover the peak demand and avoid the supply shortages.
Additionally, the TSO has launched together with Gazprom, Eesti Gaas and Latvijas Gaze a project to
examine the feasibility of constructing a pipeline to link Finnish, Estonian and Latvian natural gas networks.
This new pipeline would enable that the Latvian natural gas storage facilities could be used to improve
reliability in natural gas transmission to Finland. A full scale environmental impact assessment (EIA)
procedure will be carried out, concentrating in to the offshore section of the project.
LNG Infrastructures and Projects
Currently there are no LNG regasification plants in Finland; however Gasum also has plans of establishing a
LNG terminal in Porvoo which would have a storage capacity of 150,000 300,000 cubic meters and a sendout capacity of up to 4 Bcm. This facility is proposed to be established operating in 2017.

- 12 -

3.3

Other - Small Scale LNG Production Facilities

In addition to the LNG production facility based in Kilpilati industrial area in Porvoo, Finland, a second
LNG terminal is being developed in the country.5 Gasum has plans of establishing a LNG terminal in Turku
with a capacity of 20,000 cubic meters. According to Gasum, this facility will be used to supply LNG to the
Viking Line Ferries and for LNG deliveries to industries.

4.

France

Frances use of natural gas has increased consistently in the past decades, providing only 7.5% of primary
energy supply (by fuel source) to the country in 1973 and 15.2% in 20096. In 2009 France had almost no
production of natural gas, relying almost totally on imports to meet its domestic demand. The countries of
origin for importing natural gas are shown in Table 11, and the transportation modes used are detailed in
Table 107. In 2008 33.8% of natural gas used in France was consumed by industry, 55.7% was used by the
residential and commercial sector and 6.7% was used by power plants; the remaining 3.8% was for other
uses8.
Table 9 Gas production and total consumption in France (Bcm)
2007

2008

2009

2010e

Indigenous production

1.1

0.9

0.7

From other sources

Imports

43.8

46.4

47.1

48.9

Exports

0.9

1.3

2.2

2.8

Stock changes

0.5

0.04

-1.3

2.7

Statistical difference

0.1

0.1

-0.2

44.6

49.8

Total consumption
44.4
46.1
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

Table 10 French natural gas imports by transportation type between 2006 and 2009
Transport type

2007

2008

2009

2010e

Pipeline imports (Bcm)

32.57

36.22

37.05

34.89

LNG imports (Bcm)

11.25

10.23

10.07

14.03

Total (Bcm)
43.82
46.45
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

47.12

48.92

Gasum, 2011. Effortless Access to LNG for on-land and offshore uses. Recieved from
http://www.gasum.com/products/lng/Pages/default.aspx
6
Natural Gas Information 2011, IEA
7
Delta Energy Institute, 2011. Country profile: France. Received from: http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence-2/ourservices/Country-gas-profiles/country-gas-profile-france
8
Delta Energy Institute, 2011. Country profile: France. Received from: http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence2/our-services/Country-gas-profiles/country-gas-profile-france

- 13 -

Table 11 Natural gas imports to France by country of origin (in 2009)


Country of origin

Imported volume
(Bcm in 2009)

Norway

14.14

The Netherlands

8.26

Russia

6.4

Algeria

7.04

Nigeria

1.16

Egypt

1.42

Qatar

0.45

Other
8.25
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

According to data reported in the IEAs Natural Gas Information 2011 report, France had an average annual
rate of change of gas consumption between 2006 and 2009 of 0.59%. In the years 2007, 2008 and 2009
France had a relatively steady (but slightly declining) demand for LNG, measured through its volumes of
imported LNG. In particular, in 2009 France imported 10.07 Bcm (it was 11.25 Bcm in 2007). Almost three
quarters of imported LNG was sourced from Algeria, with Egypt and Nigeria also making contributions. A
very small proportion of the imported LNG was sourced from Qatar.

4.1

Transit of Gas

Norwegian gas to Italy and Spain; Nigerian gas to Italy. Transit is set to grow during to the coming years, in
particular to Italy.

4.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects

Gas Security Policy


Energy security is a prominent concern for French energy policy makers. Alerted by the oil shocks to the
dangers of over-reliance on energy imports, the government undertook plans to reduce dependence with the
goal of producing 50% of French energy needs domestically.
As part of the strategy to ensure the security of supply in the gas and electricity sectors, the French
government has also been developing pluri-annual investment plans. These plans identify a range of
indicative targets for the types and amounts of new capacity to be built by 2020.
In the gas sector, the entry into service of the Fos Cavaou LNG terminal and the realization of the
investments projects to increase the gas interconnection capacity between France and Spain (open seasons
2013 and 2015) will significantly contribute to improving the security of supply in France.
LNG Infrastructures and Projects
At the end of 2010, three LNG regasification terminals were operating in France with a total nominal
regasification capacity of 43.3 Mcm LNG per year (comprised of: Fos-sur-Mer - 12 Mcm; Montoir-deBretagne - 17.2 Mcm; and Fos-Cavaou - 14.2 Mcm).4 Four further LNG facilities are proposed to be
constructed in the near future.

- 14 -

The development of a competitive gas market requires that all market players have access, under transparent
and non discriminatory rules. Third party access to LNG terminals is guaranteed by the law of 3 January
2003.
However, the utilisation rate of French terminals (close to 80%) is very high and almost all capacity is
already booked. The regulator, CRE, has asked operators to publish on their websites the information
relating to maximum capacity, available firm capacities and interruptible flows recorded daily. The regulator
has also asked operators to produce a general note describing the methodology of calculation of the
maximum capacity and to supply details of the methodology and calculations leading to these results.
Finally, the regulator has asked the operators to update the schedule on a monthly basis.
In mid-2009, CRE decided to change the terminal access tariffs, and the new tariffs have been applied since
January 2010. The construction of new terminals is open to any player. Two proposed new LNG terminals
are under consideration with a final investment decision expected in 2011 and a start-up date of 2013.

Dunkerque: this project is supported by EDF and the Port of Dunkerque and represents an annual
shipping capacity from 10 bcm to 13 bcm. The project has three storage capacities of 190,000 m3
each;
Fos-sur-Mer: this project is being undertaken by Shell and Vopack. Expected capacity is 8 bcm per
year and it is projected to start operation in 2015. It will have a storage capacity of two tanks of
180,000 m3 with a possibility to add two further storage tanks of the same dimensions. A public
debate was held in 2010 on this project, and following the debate process the companies decided to
continue with their development.

There are also opportunities to expand capacity at existing terminals. At Montoir, two scenarios are
envisaged. The first is to build additional regasification units, which would increase capacity to 2.5 bcm per
year. The second would increase capacity to 16.5 bcm per year by adding a fourth tank. After an open season
held in 2007/08, GDF Suez determined that demand was insufficient to carry out this expansion, but it has
not ruled out the possibility of expanding it in the future. At Fos-Cavaou, opportunities for expansion would
achieve a doubling of capacity. Finally, at the terminal Fos-Tonkin, activity could be extended beyond 2014
to maintain capacity at 5.5 bcm per year (replacement of two small reservoirs with a medium one) or to
expand capacity back to 7 bcm per year.

- 15 -

5.

Germany

Germanys use of natural gas has also increased very significantly since the 1970s, and in 2009 provided
almost one quarter of total primary energy supply. Whilst the country does produce some natural gas for
domestic use, the majority of gas used within the country has been supplied from Russia, the Netherlands
and Norway in recent years for the year 2009) as shown in Table 14.
Table 12 Indigenous production and gas consumption in Germany (Bcm)
2007

2008

2009

2010e

Indigenous production

18.6

16.09

15

13.2

From other sources

Imports

88.4

92

94.6

99.7

Exports

12.2

12.7

11.3

16.2

Stock changes

2.5

0.7

-2.3

3.4

Statistical difference

0.5

-2

2.4

2.7

93.5

97.3

Total consumption
96.8
98.1
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

Table 13 Natural gas imports to Germany by transport type between 2006 and 2009
Transport type

2007

2008

2009

2010e

Pipeline imports (Bcm)

88.36

91.99

94.56

99.66

LNG imports (Bcm)

94.56

99.66

Total (Bcm)
88.36
91.99
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

Table 14 Natural gas imports to Germany by country and origin (in 2009)
Country of origin

Imported volume
(Bcm in 2009)

Netherlands

21.8

Norway

32.49

Russia

35.75

Other
4.52
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

The main uses of natural gas in Germany include consumption by industry (37%), power plants (12.9%) and
consumption in the commercial and residential sectors (44.7%). 5.4% of total gas consumption was for
other uses. In 2009 natural gas was not used within the transportation sector in Germany.
According to data reported in the IEAs Natural Gas Information 2011 report, Germany had an average
annual rate of change of gas consumption between 2006 and 2009 of 2.4%.
Currently, Germany does not have LNG receiving facilities.

- 16 -

5.1

Transit of Gas

Norwegian gas to the Netherlands (and via NL to Belgium, France and the Czech Republic); Russian gas to
France and Switzerland; Dutch gas to Italy and Switzerland.

5.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects

At about 93.5 Bcm (in 2009), Germany is the sixth largest consumer of natural gas worldwide and the
second largest in Europe. Natural gas represents 21.8% of total German energy consumption (2009).
Approximately 16% of gas consumption is covered from domestic production. Proven and probable reserves
amount to 162 bn. m3. 9
Gas Security Policy
Security of supply in Germany is provided, to a significant extent, by its geographical situation in the middle
of the continent. Germany is the major transit country for natural gas in Europe. There are 46,682 km
(29,000 miles) of long distance pipelines and 452,716 km (281,000 miles) of local distribution pipelines. The
transit importance of the country will be enhanced when new pipeline projects are completed. The North
Stream pipeline from Russia through the Baltic Sea will end near Greifswald in Germany and will be able to
transport 55 bcm per year. It will consist of two parallel legs of equal capacity, the first of which is expected
to be completed at the end of 2011, and the second at the end of 2012.
Also the highly developed German storage system may be very helpful to deal with emergency situation.
Germany has the fourth largest capacity in the world (behind the US, Russia and Ukraine) at 20.8 bn. m3, of
which about 40 % is in salt caverns and the remainder in aquifer and depleted gas reservoirs. A further 15.8
bn. m3 of capacity is under construction or planned.
LNG Infrastructures and Projects
Currently in Germany there are no LNG receiving terminals. The construction of an LNG regasification
plant is under consideration, but it is still speculative.
Other - Biogas Feed-in
Important for the development of the gas market in Germany are possible alternatives to using natural gas. In
2009, 27 biogas plants fed in some 1200 GWh into the gas networks. Yet this continues to be well under one
percent of the gas consumed in Germany. Although biogas feed-in is in its infancy, consumers can already
sign supply contracts with a biogas share. In September 2010 the general conditions for biogas feed-in and
transport were improved through the amended Gas Network Access Ordinance,. Biogas feed-in is to be
promoted for a fixed period of ten years by means of avoided, or saved, network charges.

6.

The Netherlands

Natural gas has consistently made a very significant contribution to primary energy supply by energy source
in the Netherlands between the 1970s and the present time. In 2009, gas contributed 45.3 % of primary
energy supply by fuel source in the country10. Dutch natural gas production has remained relatively constant
during the past 40 years as have levels of gas imports which are sourced mainly from Norway, the United
Kingdom and Russia as shown in Table 17. Overall, total consumption of natural gas has consistentlyincreased (but only incrementally) since the 1970s to the present time.

BP Statistical Review, 2010


http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence-2/our-services/Country-gas-profiles/country-gas-profile-norway

10

- 17 -

Table 15 Indigenous production and total consumption of gas in the Netherlands (Bcm)
2007

2008

2009

2010e

Indigenous production

76

83.6

78.7

88.5

From other sources

0.1

0.17

0.16

0.15

Imports

2.8

26.1

25.7

25.7

Exports

55.7

61.7

55.6

59.5

Stock changes

0.03

0.05

0.04

-0.02

Statistical difference

Total consumption

46.5

48.5

48.9

54.9

Table 16 Natural gas imports to the Netherlands by transport type between 2006 and 2009
Transport type

2007

2008

2009

2010e

Pipeline imports (Bcm)

26.09

26.46

25.66

25.75

LNG imports (Bcm)

25.66

25.75

Total (Bcm)
26.09
26.46
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

Table 17 Natural gas imports to the Netherlands by country of origin (in 2009)
Country of origin

Imported volume
(Bcm in 2009)

Denmark

2.5

Germany

0.73

Norway

13.42

United Kingdom

5.83

Russia
3.63
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

According to data reported in the IEAs Natural Gas Information 2011 report, the Netherlands had an
average annual rate of change of gas consumption between 2006 and 2009 of 0.68%.
In 2009, according to the Eurogas Statistical Report, natural gas was primarily used in the Netherlands by the
residential and commercial sectors (44.7%), industry (35.1%) and by power plants (20.2%).
In 2007, 2008 and 2009, the Netherlands did not import any LNG, as shown in Table 16.

6.1

Transit of Gas

Norwegian gas to Belgium and France. Russian gas to the UK. There is possibly other transit, but this cannot
be clearly identified as Gas Transport Services (GTS) has a decoupled entry exit system.

- 18 -

6.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects

Following the discovery in the early 1960s of the Groningen field in the north of the Netherlands - one of
the largest reservoirs in continental Europe - the Netherlands has grown to be one of the major gas countries
in Europe. Broadly 29% of all the European natural gas reserves are located in the Netherlands, accounting at
the end of 2006 for 0.7% of the global natural gas reserves in the world.
At the end of the 1970s, the first outlines became visible of what would later become the Small Field Policy
(SFP). The SFP became the regulatory framework, to optimize production from the small fields (i.e.
smaller than the Groningen field) and to maintain the valuable aspects of the Groningen field as long as
possible.
Market Reforms
In 2005, the activities of N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie (the former national de facto monopolist) have been split
up. The trading activities have been transferred to a new company GasTerra in which the Dutch State (50%)
and Shell and ExxonMobil (each 25%) are the shareholders. High pressure gas transmission is the statutory
responsibility of Gas Transport Services (GTS) a subsidiary of 100% state-owned Gasunie.
Gas Security Policy
A central characteristic of the whole of the North-West European gas market is the strong decline of
domestic production. The Netherlands is not an exception in that respect and is experiencing a decline in
domestic production. Projections show that the yearly increase in imports in the Netherlands in 2020 will be
between 20 and 30 million cubic meters.
It is the policy of the Dutch government to ensure the security of the gas supply in the future by diversifying
supply (LNG, countries of origin). Moreover, the Dutch small fields policy ensures an efficient depletion of
domestic resources by allowing production from small fields to take precedence over production from the
Groningen field.
LNG Infrastructures and Projects
The development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities is accelerating in the Netherlands. Vopak and
Gasunie built the LNG terminal at the Maasvlakte in Rotterdam (Gate-terminal) which was opened and
began operating in September 2011. The terminal has an initial throughput capacity of 12 Bcm (gas)
(equivalent to 20 Mcm (liquid)) per annum and will consist of three storage tanks and two jettys. Annual
throughput capacity can be increased to 16 Bcm (gas). 4Gas is developing an LNG terminal at the
Maasvlakte in Rotterdam (Liongas-terminal) which is planned to be operational during 2012 with an initial
capacity of 9 Bcm (gas). Annual throughput capacity can be increased to 16 Bcm (gas). TAQA Energy B.V.
is planning to build an offshore LNG terminal with a capacity of 12 Bcm (gas) at the Dutch coast near
Rotterdam and Essent, Vopak and GasTerra are planning an LNG-terminal in the Eems harbour.
Additional infrastructure investments are planned to accommodate the increase in transit, in LNG supply and
in new storage facilities (both on the border and at Zuidwending and Bergermeer).

7.

Norway

Natural gas provides around one fifth of total primary energy supply by fuel type in Norway at the present
time. The country is a major producer of natural gas (it produced around 90.6 Mtoe in 2009); of this, most is
exported (85.2 Mtoe in 2009) and the remainder (5.4 Mtoe in 2009) is consumed domestically11. (see Table
18)
11

Delta Energy Institute, 2011. Country gas profile: Norway.

- 19 -

The majority (81% of total national demand in 2008) of gas consumed in Norway is used to power the
extraction of coal, oil and gas, as well as gas used in refineries, coke ovens and gas works.12
According to data reported in the IEAs Natural Gas Information 2011 report, Norway had an average annual
rate of change of gas consumption between 2006 and 2009 of 3.49%. Table 19 shows the total imports of gas
into Norway in 2008 to 2010 by transport type.
Table 18 Indigenous production and gas consumption in Norway (Bcm)
2007

2008

2009

2010e

Indigenous production

91.6

102

106

107

From other sources

Imports

0.006

Exports

85.9

96.4

99.9

100.5

Stock changes

Statistical difference

0.28

-0.08

0.49

0.29

6.1

Total consumption
5.4
5.7
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

Table 19 Natural gas imports to Norway by transport type in 2008 - 2010


Transport type

Pipeline
(Mcm)

imports

LNG imports (Bcm)

2008

2009

2010e

0.006

Total (Bcm)
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

0.006

In 2007, 2008 and 2009, Norway did not import any LNG.

7.1

Transit of Gas

There is no transit of gas in Norway.

7.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects

Norway has the secondlargest reserves of natural gas in Europe, after Russia. Its gas reserves are the
thirdlargest among the OECD member countries, The Norwegian government estimated remaining gas
resources at 4.6 trillion cubic metres (tcm) as of January 2010, of which 60% are discovered and 40% are
undiscovered resources. Threefifths of the discovered resources are located in the North Sea, while those
undiscovered are mostly to be found in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. The BP Statistical Review of World
Energy 2010 puts Norways gas reserves at 2.05 tcm.

http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence-2/our-services/Country-gas-profiles/country-gas-profile-norway
12
Delta Energy Institute, 2011. Country gas profile: Norway. Received from:
http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence-2/our-services/Country-gas-profiles/country-gas-profile-norway

- 20 -

Norway consistently exports almost 95% of its gas production (99.9 bcm in 2009, out of 105.9 bcm
produced). Exports have traditionally been to Europe by direct pipeline (to the United Kingdom, France,
Belgium and Germany). Norway is the secondlargest exporter of gas to Europe, behind Russia but ahead
of Algeria.
Gas Security Policy
According to the government, security of supply is not a concern in the small Norwegian downstream gas
market. Natural gas customers in Norway will always be connected to the electricity grid, thereby supplying
them with energy for various needs. Unlike in many other OECD countries, natural gas is not a key source of
power generation. In 2009, it generated a record of 4 TWh, but this was only 3% of total generation, while
hydropower provided 96%.
However, during the 2002/03 winter, Norway experienced a drought followed by a cold wave, severely
depleting its hydro reserves and making electricity rates rise fourfold in a matter of weeks. In response to
this, Norway's first commercial onshore gasfired power plant was built by Naturkraft at Krst. Of note,
five gas turbines also provide power to Statoils LNG plant from gas from the Snhvit field.
LNG Infrastructures and Projects
In 2007, Norway also launched Europes first LNG export terminal, Snhvit. The terminal has an annual
export capacity of 5.75 bcm of LNG and uses the resources of three gas fields in the Barents Sea Snhvit,
Albatross and Askeladd (240 m to 345 m deep) which lie about 140 km northwest of Hammerfest. As
exploration moves further north into the Norwegian and Barents Seas, transport of LNG or compressed
natural gas (CNG) by ship may become more viable alternatives to traditional pipelines.
In contrast to the large upstream production, the Norwegian downstream natural gas market is very small;
smallscale LNG distribution has become a Norwegian alternative to gas transmission and distribution
networks. Today there are 4 small-scale liquefactions facilities with a total liquefaction capacity of 0.6 Bcm
and 40 LNG reception terminals in operation in Norway. They serve industrial and commercial customers.
Major consumer of LNG in Norway is the shipping industry, accounting for almost 40 % of the LNG market,
followed by the metallurgical industry, consuming approximately 36 % of the LNG.
There is no public or strategic storage of natural gas or LNG in Norway. The Norwegian Water Resources
and Energy Directorate is the regulator for the downstream natural gas market, and Norway has implemented
the relevant EU directives.
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has tasked Enova to operate a support scheme for developing a
domestic infrastructure for natural gas, especially where it brings environmental benefits. Natural gas
distributed as compressed or liquefied provides a flexible and reliable supply of natural gas to many new
users. The support scheme has been designed according to the principles of public service obligations. The
infrastructure projects are announced for public tender and are awarded on the basis of competitive bidding
and negotiations. Projects with a defined geographical coverage area where the bidder supplies gas to
industrial enterprises, transport or shipping will be given priority.

8.

Poland

Polands use of natural gas has almost doubled since the 1970s but its overall contribution to the countrys
total primary energy supply is still relatively low today (accounting for 12.6% in 2010). Data related to the
countrys indigenous production and gas consumption are shown in Table 20.
The residential and commercial sector is the largest consumer of gas in Poland in 2010, followed by the
industrial sector. Overall, the country is estimated to have consumed around 17.2 Bcm of gas in 2010 across

- 21 -

all sectors13. The gas that Poland imports is primarily from Russia, Germany and another non-OECD country
(not named in the IEA data), as shown in Table 22.
Poland did not import any LNG in 2007 and 2008; however, in 2010 it did import 3 Mcm, a very small
amount (equivalent to 0.03% of all Polish gas imports in that year).
Table 20 Indigenous production and gas consumption in Poland (Bcm)
2007

2008

2009

2010e

Indigenous production

5.8

5.9

6.1

From other sources

Imports

10.1

11.2

10

10.9

Exports

0.05

0.04

0.04

0.05

Stock changes

0.3

-0.3

0.25

0.25

Statistical difference

0.25

0.3

0.25

0.26

15.8

17.2

Total consumption
16.2
16.3
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011
Table 21 Import of gas to Poland by transport type
Transport type

2008

2009

2010e

Pipeline imports (Bcm)

11.2

9.95

10.9

LNG imports (Bcm)

0.003

9.95

10.9

Total (Bcm)
11.2
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

Table 22 Natural gas imports to Poland by country of origin in 2010 (estimated by the IEA)
Country of origin

Imported volume
(Bcm in 2009)

Russia

9,.75

Germany

1.13

Other non-OECD
0.006
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

8.1

Transit of Gas

The governmental natural gas transit agreement signed with the Russian Federation on 25 August 1993
regulates transit of gas from the Russian Federation to Western Europe via the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline.
SGT EuRoPol GAZ Joint Stock Company operates the Polish part of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline. Its
stockholders are: POGC (48%), OAO Gazprom (48%) and Gas-Trading Joint Stock Company (4%).

13

IEA Natural Gas Information 2011

- 22 -

8.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects

Poland is a key transit country for Russian gas to Western Europe through the Yamal pipeline. It is keen to
preserve this role. Transmission services are provided only to PGNiG and Gazprom Export.
Thirdparty access to the Yamal pipeline is not offered, which has been a subject of the EU objections.
Encouragingly, the new transit deal signed in October 2010 made OGP GAZSYSTEM the operator of the
Yamal pipeline in Poland. The EC approved this agreement but highlighted the need to ensure that
GAZSYSTEM provides access to the Yamal pipeline on a nondiscriminatory basis. Currently, the flow
of gas through this pipeline is possible only in the EastWest direction.
Market Reforms
In line with the EU Directive 2003/55/EC on Gas Markets, Poland started the process of phased liberalisation
of the domestic gas market. All natural gas final customers became eligible in January 2006, ahead of the
requirement of the EU directive to achieve complete market opening by July 2007.
Despite the market opening, competition grows slowly and the gas market is still largely monopolised. One
of the objectives of the Energy Policy of Poland until 2030 (EPP 2030) is the development of competitive
gas markets. EPP 2030 and its Action Plan stipulate adopting regulatory mechanisms that would stimulate
competition on the gas market.
The Ministry of Economy and the regulator are supposed to develop and introduce measures aiming at the
gradual liberalisation of the gas market, including:

rules of efficient access to gas infrastructure;


the entryexit model for gas transmission;
a virtual balancing/trading gas hub;
a market model which allows effective switching between sellers.
The EPP 2030 also requires the Ministry of Economy and the ERO to devise a roadmap to achieve a
competitive gas market, taking the following issues into account:
o providing infrastructural conditions of competition development, including extension and
modernisation of the transmission and distribution grid and the storage infrastructure taking
into account the thirdparty access (TPA) principle;
o ensuring access to gas infrastructure;
o extending access to gas sources for entities operating on the market.

Gas Security Policy


Diversification of supply sources and routes, development of natural gas infrastructure for such
diversification, expansion of underground storage capacity, extension of the transmission and distribution
systems, increase of domestic gas production and developing gas resources outside Poland are the key
elements of Polands gas security policy. The EPP 2030 and its Action Plan stipulate the following measures
to enhance gas security:

encouraging investment in pipeline infrastructure through appropriate tariff policy;


building a terminal for receiving liquefied natural gas (LNG) and concluding LNG supply contracts;
establishing sustainable management policy for domestic gas resources to allow extension of the
natural gas reserve base in the territory of Poland;
promoting investments which allow extending natural gas extraction in the territory of Poland;
diversifying supplies by building a transmission system for natural gas supplies from the North,
West and South, as well as building connections primarily to meet the requirement of supply sources
diversification;

- 23 -

encouraging Polish companies to win access to natural gas deposits located outside Poland;
supporting investments in infrastructure with the use of European funds;
streamlining the crisis response mechanism;
securing state interests in strategic companies of the gas sector;
creating investment incentives for expanding storage capacity (by appropriate tariff structure and
ensuring return on invested capital).

LNG Infrastructures and Projects


To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, an important role will be played by LNG supplies. The
countrys first LNG terminal is planned to be constructed at winoujcie. Polskie LNG S.A., a 100%
subsidiary of the OGP GAZSYSTEM S.A. (TSO), is to construct, own and operate the LNG terminal. In
the first stage of operation, the LNG terminal will enable the regasification of 2.5 bcm/year (6.8 mcm/d) of
natural gas. Two standardsized containers with a capacity of 160 000 m3 each have been constructed. In
the next stages, it will be possible to increase the dispatch capacity up to 5 bcm/year (13.7 mcm/d), and even
up to 7.5 bcm/year (20.5 mcm/d), depending on gas demand, without the need to increase the area on which
the terminal will be constructed.
In June 2009, Qatargas and PGNiG signed a Sales and Purchase Agreement (SPA) for LNG supply from
Qatar to Poland. Under the SPA, Qatargas will supply 1.5 bcm/year of LNG to PGNiG under the 20year
longterm agreement, starting from 2014. In March 2010, PGNiG signed a regasification services contract
with Polskie LNG according to which Polskie LNG will provide LNG regasification services to PGNiG at
the terminal for a period of 20 years from July 2014. As the operator of the LNG terminal, Polskie LNG will
be expected to provide services to all the other market participants.

8.3

Other: Prospects for Unconventional Gas

Preliminary estimates suggest that Poland could have between 1.4 and 3 trillion cubic metres (tcm) of
unconventional gas; however, it may take between five to ten years before a complete assessment of the
commercialisation of unconventional gas can be made on the basis of the first exploratory drillings that took
place in 2010. The Polish Institute of Geology plans to publish its estimates of unconventional gas resources
by the end of 2011. Several major and independent American oil and gas firms (including ExxonMobil,
ConocoPhillips, Chevron and Marathon) are now exploring for the prospects of shale gas deposits in Poland.
The Ministry of Environment in Poland had granted over 70 concessions for exploration of unconventional
gas in Poland by October 2010.
If the shale gas resources are confirmed, theoretically their largescale exploitation has the potential to
change the energy landscape not only in Poland but in all Europe. However, in practice, exploitation of
unconventional gas can face severe barriers, including limitations on physical access to resources.
Communities in areas with high population density, or in which land is owned in numerous small tracts, may
be unwilling to accommodate drilling on a large scale because of the disruption it would cause and the
increased demands on local infrastructure, in particular transport. Environmental regulations may also be a
major barrier to the development of shale gas resources.

- 24 -

9.

Sweden

Natural gas makes a very small contribution to total primary energy supply in Sweden (only 2.6% of total
primary energy supply in 2009). In the period from the 1970s to 2009 the country did not produce any
natural gas (see Table 23) all consumed gas was imported from Denmark14.
In 2009 in Sweden 47% of natural gas consumption was used in the power generation sector, whilst 38.4%
was used in the industrial sector and 14.6% was used in the residential and commercial sector. According to
data reported in the IEAs Natural Gas Information 2011 report, Sweden had an average annual rate of
change of gas consumption between 2006 and 2009 of 13.1%.
Table 23 Indigenous production and total gas consumption in Sweden (Bcm)
2007

2008

2009

2010e

Indigenous production

From other sources

Imports

0.9

1.2

1.7

Exports

Stock changes

Statistical difference

0.09

0.02

-0.02

1.2

1.7

Total consumption
0.9
0.9
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

Until 2010 Sweden did not import any LNG (as shown in Table 24). However, operations were recently
commenced (in 2011) at the countrys first LNG facility, the (small scale) Nynshamn terminal, which
handles about 225,000 tonnes of LNG per year and has a storage capacity of 20,000 m3. Gteborg Energi has
plans to establish a second LNG terminal in Sweden, the Gteborg facility, : this facility will, according to
todays plans, begin operating in 2013 and will have an annual LNG throughput of 600,000 tonnes LNG per
year and a storage capacity of 10,000 15,000 m3.
Furthermore, two organizations have plans to jointly-establish a terminal of 20 000 m3 storage capacity in
Lysekil in Sweden with an annual throughput of 250 000 tons LNG.
Table 24 Natural gas imports to Sweden by transportation type in 2008 to 2010
Transport type

2008

2009

2010e

Pipeline imports (Bcm)

1.6

LNG imports (Bcm)

Total (Bcm)
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011.

9.1

Transit of Gas

There is no transit of gas in Sweden.

14

IEA Natural Gas Information 2011

1.6

- 25 -

9.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects

The country does not produce any natural gas. The gas grid covers the western coast of Sweden. The
transmission pipeline between Malm and Gteborg has an annual capacity of 2 bcm) though only half of
that capacity is now being used. The capacity could be increased by 30% without substantial cost through
additional compressors. Construction of the natural gas infrastructure is done commercially: the government
does not finance or own any part of the natural gas network. Gas companies have several plans to expand the
Swedish natural gas system to reach both new customers in Sweden and new supplies from abroad. E.ON
Gas.
Gas storage in Sweden is limited to one facility with a volume of 10 million Nm3. The facility is owned by
E.ON Gas Sverige and it is in commercial use since May 2006. For geological and technical reasons, largescale gas storage is not feasible.
Gas Security Policy
Although historically the security of supply has been high, according to the Regulatory Authority, the
Swedish natural gas market can still be considered vulnerable in both the long and short term. There is only a
single supply point, which, together with the lack of any domestic production of this fuel, renders the market
susceptible in the short term to external disruptions. In a longer perspective, Danish gas supplies will
decrease as the supply of gas in the Danish gas fields starts to run out.
In order to deal with the above-mentioned risks and the expected increasing gas demand, a number of
projects concerning extraction, production, storage and import facilities are under way.
LNG Infrastructures and Projects
Operations at Swedens first LNG reception terminal in Nynshamn started in 2011. An LNG reception
terminal is also planned in Gothenburg, primarily in order to supply ships with LNG as a fuel. The plan
includes a gasification plant with a possible capacity of around 200 MW that can feed natural gas to
consumers. This is expected to be ready by 2013.

9.3

Other: Bio-fuel and Connection to the Nord Stream

A gasification plant for bio-fuel is planned in Gothenburg, which should be able to produce 100 MW of gas
of a similar quality to that of natural gas. Production capacity during the first stage is planned to be 20 MW.
The first stage is expected to be completed in 2012 and the second, in 2016.
A second gasification plant is intended to be located in conjunction with the existing natural gas system.
Once in service, in 2016, it may deliver 200 MW of gas, and a first preliminary investment decision may be
taken in 2011.
In the autumn of 2009, the Swedish government decided to grant Nord Stream AG a permit to build a natural
gas pipeline through the Swedish economic zone in the Baltic. The Nord Stream project comprises a gas
pipeline in the Baltic from Russia to the European gas network. It consists of two parallel pipelines that pass
through the economic zones of five countries (Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany).
Construction of the 1,220 kilometre-long gas pipeline has commenced in 2010 and it is expected to come on
line in 2011/12, followed by the second pipeline in 2012/13. Once this happens, total annual capacity will be
fifty-five billion cubic metres.
In the spring of 2010, the Energy Markets Inspectorate approved the governments granting of a permit to
the Norwegian state company Gassco and Swedish Swedegas to build and operate a new pipeline, to be
called Skanled, between Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Scanled is an industrial collaboration that is being
planned by Swedish, Norwegian and Danish actors, and this project envisages the possible laying at sea of a

- 26 -

natural gas pipeline from southern Norway to the Swedish west coast, where three branch pipelines will
connect to the Swedish natural gas network. This project is currently mothballed due to the uncertain
economic situation but it may be resumed once conditions improve.

10.

United Kingdom

Natural gas makes a very significant contribution to the total primary energy supply in the United Kingdom.
In 2010 and 2011 natural gas provided just under half (48.9%) of all primary energy consumption by fuel
type; this contribution of natural gas increased very significantly since the 1970s, where gas contribution to
the primary energy consumption mix in the United Kingdom was relatively insignificant as shown in Figure
1. In 2009, the UK produced 53.7 Mtoe, imported 35.3 Mtoe, and exported 10.6 Mtoe. This meant that there
was an overall gas consumption of 78.4 Mtoe15.
In 2009 and according to the Eurogas Statistical report, 41.5% of natural gas consumption in the UK was
within the residential and commercial sectors, 37.8% was used by power plants, 18.2% was used by industry
and the remaining 2.5% was consumed by other uses.
According to data reported in the IEAs Natural Gas Information 2011 report, the United Kingdom had an
average annual rate of change of gas consumption between 2006 and 2009 of 1.32%.
Table 25 Indigenous production and gas total consumption in the United Kingdom (Bcm)
2007

2008

2009

2010e

Indigenous production

76.1

73.5

62.5

59.7

From other sources

Imports

30.7

37

41.2

53

Exports

11.3

11.2

12.5

15.9

Stock changes

0.5

-0.28

-0.33

1.6

Statistical difference

0.13

0.07

0.13

0.44

90.8

97.9

Total consumption
95.9
99
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

In 2009 the United Kingdom imported 10.1 Bcm of LNG. The majority of this imported volume came from
Qatar, with Algeria and Trinidad and Tobago also making significant contributions. Small volumes of LNG
were also imported from Egypt, Australia and the United States. The volume of imported LNG has increased
very significantly in the past couple years, however, and by summer 2011 LNG imports accounted for almost
two thirds of all gas imports to the country.16

15

IEA Natural Gas Information 2011


UK Department for Energy and Climate Change, 2011. Energy trends September 2011. Received from
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/stats/publications/energy-trends/2871-trends-sep11.pdf
16

- 27 -

Table 26 Natural gas imports to the United Kingdom by transportation type in 2008 to 2010
Transport type

2008

2009

2010e

Pipeline imports (Bcm)

36.17

31.18

34.38

LNG imports (Bcm)

0.82

10.05

18.66

Total (Bcm)
36.99
41.23
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

53.04

Figure 1 The development of total primary energy consumption by fuel in the UK between 1970 and 2010.
17
Source: UK Department for Energy and Climate Change, 2011. Official data

10.1

Transit of Gas

Transit gas to Ireland.

10.2

National Gas Policy and LNG Infrastructures and Projects

The UK is currently the worlds eighth largest producer of natural gas, with approximately 2.3% of the
worlds total production, and the third largest producer of natural gas in Europe after Russia and Norway.
The UKs proven reserves of natural gas as of the end of 2009 stood at 292 bcm, the vast majority of which
are located in the UK sector of the North Sea (the United Kingdom Continental Shelf) with the largest
concentration of natural gas production stemming from the Scottish Area Gas Evacuation system.
Gas Security Policy
In view of the forecast decline in production of the UKs indigenous natural gas, new interconnector
pipelines have been developed to facilitate increased imports of natural gas from Europe, among these is an
17

UK Department for Energy and Climate Change, 2011. Energy consumption in the United Kingdom: 2011. Received from
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/stats/publications/energy-consumption/2324-overall-energy-consumption-in-the-uk-since1970.pdf

- 28 -

interconnector from Balgzand in the Netherlands to Bacton (the BBL interconnector) (15 bcm per annum
import capacity) and a pipeline linking the Ormen Lange gas field in the Norwegian continental shelf to
Britain (25 bcm per annum import capacity).
With a view to increasing diversity of import sources, several LNG import terminals are also being
developed to enable large-scale LNG imports into the UK.
LNG Infrastructures and Projects
To date, the following LNG import terminal projects have been completed:

Grain LNG - this LNG importation and regasification terminal on the Isle of Grain was
commissioned in 2005 and was the UKs first LNG import facility. It is owned and operated by
National Grid Grain LNG Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of National Grid plc (National
Grid). The terminals 3.3 mtpa initial capacity is contracted to BP and Sonatrach. A subsequent
expansion increased import capacity to 9.8 mtpa and the 6.5 mtpa expansion capacity is contracted to
Sonatrach, Centrica and GDF Suez. A further 5 mtpa expansion has been announced and is expected
to be complete by the end of 2011.
GasPort LNG Excelerate Energys 4 bcm world-first dockside LNG regasification terminal at
Teesside received its first shipment of LNG in February 2007. The facility enables LNG to be
converted into gas while still aboard the ship and delivered to shore as gas.
South Hook LNG - Qatar Petroleum (67.5 per cent.), ExxonMobil Qatargas (II) Limited (24.15 per
cent.) and Totals (8.35 per cent.) 11 bcm LNG import terminal at Milford Haven. Phase 2 of the
project provided an additional 10 bcm.
Dragon LNG, BG Group (50 per cent.), Petronas (30 per cent.) and 4Gas (20 per cent.) LNG import
and storage terminal at Milford Haven received its commissioning cargo in July 2009 and had a
start-up capacity of 6 bcm. The terminals entire send out capacity is expected to be taken by BG and
Petronas.

There are also a further three LNG import terminals proposed in the UK including:

Canvey LNG - Calor Gas and two Japanese-based companies, LNG Japan Corporation and Osaka
Gas, are proposing to reopen the Canvey Island LPG facility as an LNG import terminal with a
planned capacity of 5.4 bcm per day. Construction was due to start in 2007/2008, with terminal
operations hoped for 2010, however initial planning permission was refused. An appeal was lodged
in March 2007.
Amlwch LNG - Canataxx acquired a chemical facility at Amlwch on Anglesey Island with the
intention of importing LNG. Planning approval has been granted and the terminal is estimated to
provide 20 bcm of import capacity commencing between 2013 and 2015.
Port Meridian LNG - Port Meridian Energy Limited, a wholly owned UK subsidiary of Hegh LNG
AS, is proposing to construct a deep water port LNG receiving terminal offshore Barrow-in-Furness,
Cumbria. The proposal is awaiting Department of Energy and Climate Change (the DECC) and
Barrow Borough Council consents.

In order to guarantee security of supply, a key role is also played by storage facilities, both LNG storage and
underground storage.
The UK has four small-scale LNG storage facilities strategically located across the UK (Glenmavis,
Avonmouth, Dynevor Arms and Partington). These facilities are designed only to address winter peak
demand requirements and are not suitable for large-scale LNG imports.
There are gas storage facilities located in the UK, most notably the offshore Rough field storage facility
(owned and operated by Centrica, with storage capacity of 3,340 million cubic metres (mcm)). Other
depleted field gas storage facilities are located at Humbly Grove (Star Energy, 300 mcm) and Hatfield Moor

- 29 -

(Scottish Power, 120 mcm). Smaller onshore salt cavity storage facilities are located at Holehouse Farm
(Energy Merchants Gas Storage, 40 mcm) and Hornsea (Scottish and Southern Energy, 330 mcm).
Aldbrough (StatoilHydro/Scottish and Southern Energy, 420 mcm) is currently being commissioned and
planning approval has been granted for Aldbrough II (StatoilHydro/Scottish and Southern Energy, 400
mcm).
Construction is currently underway on a number of other gas storage facilities, including at Isle of Portland
(Portland Gas Ltd, 1 bcm by 2014), Stublach (Ineos Enterprises, 400 mcm by 2013),

11.

Origin of European LNG Imports

LNG demand in Europe is growing strongly. In recent years major increases in the volume of LNG delivered
to Europe have been seen (admittedly this increase was from an initially relatively low level). In particular,
in 2009 almost one fifth (19%) of net European gas imports were delivered in the form of LNG (81% was
via pipeline);18 this was a significant increase on LNG imports the previous year, which accounted for only
13% of all net European imports.
25000
20000
15000
10000

2007

5000

2008

2009

Figure 2 LNG imports to Europe by country of origin in 2007, 2008 and 2009
Source: IEA, 2011. Natural Gas Information 2011

It can be seen from Figure 2 that the major countries importing into Europe are Algeria, Nigeria and Qatar.
However, the data presented in Figure 2 represent imports throughout the whole continent. In the following
sections we describe the prevailing import, export and consumption trends for the specific individual
countries within the area that this study is immediately concerned with.

12.

Forecast of Gas Demand in the Study Area

In this section includes a description of the methodology used and results of the forecast of gas consumption
in countries within the study area out to 2020.

18

Eurogas, 2010. Eurogas Statistical Report 2010.

- 30 -

12.1

Methodology

The methodology used in forecasting future natural gas consumption within Europe is based on two
components, namely:
1) The International Energy Agencys forecast that between 2010 and 2013 European gas consumption
will dip from the trends that prevailed before the economic crisis; and
2) The assumption that post-2013, European gas consumption will recover and stabilize around the
consumption levels experienced in the 2000s (pre-economic crisis).
The International Energy Agency has forecast European gas consumption in the 2011, 2012 and 2013 in its
Medium-Term Oil and Gas Markets 2010 report: this is the consumption forecast during the years impacted
by the economic crisis in the continent.
The organization groups natural gas consumption within four categories, namely:

Residential and commercial sector;


Industry;
Power generation sector (also referred to as the transformation sector); and
Other (which includes the transportation sector, gas use in the energy sector and distribution system
losses).

The most significant influence on the consumption forecast is the projected level of economic activity
(growth). This is particularly the case with regard to the forecasts in the industrial and power generation
sectors, and, to a lesser extent, within the residential sector. Economic growth has a more indirect and
delayed impact on the level of demand for natural gas within the residential sector because despite some
forecast change in residential energy consumption (due to energy efficiency improvements, for example)
fuel-switching decisions, which are related to decisions on investment in new heating systems, are taken over
long time periods (ten years or so).
Forecasts of future gas consumption within the industrial sector are based on production levels (economic
growth) and price. Industrial sector consumption forecasts also incorporate gas demand forecasts for the
production of fertilizer and demand from transport (through drawing on the historical evolution of the
number of natural gas vehicles).
The power generation sectors forecast of future gas consumption is also based on drawing from a variety of
assumptions and forecasts of other factors. Specifically, the key influences on future consumption within this
sector are electricity generation, the growth of low-carbon generation (which is must-run generation), and
investment decisions for new generation capacity. Weather and climatic patterns, and specifically major
anomalies in rainfall and temperature, will also have a noticeable impact on future gas consumption within
the power generation sector.
The IEA consumption forecast runs to 2013. The forecast is based on the following assumptions for
consumption within each of the four gas use sectors. Within this study, we propose to use the same
assumptions, and where appropriate, extend the assumptions out to forecast to 2020. Where appropriate, and
based on our understanding of likely trends within the market and related to gas use, we will specify any
changes in assumptions we make during the period 2013 to 2020.

12.2

Residential and Commercial Sector

Gas consumption in this sector in Europe is forecast to remain relatively stable overall, as shown in Table 27.
This is due to the combination of two main factors. The first factor is that the number of gas users within the

- 31 -

sector has grown considerably in recent years and is set to remain on this trend into future years. The second
point is that individual consumption of gas is falling as a general trend, due to advances in building energy
use efficiency, improved insulation and efficiency improvements in gas-burning technologies (primarily
heating boilers).
Table 27 European residential and commercial sector forecast of gas consumption (2011 2013)
Forecast demand (% change on previous year)
2011

2012

2013

- 3.6%
No change
+ 0.2%
Source: IEA, Medium-term oil and gas markets, 2010

12.3

Industry

Gas consumption within the industrial sector is set to remain relatively constant compared to 2010
consumption levels. This is due primarily to the global slowdown in economic activity following the onset of
the global financial crisis towards the end of last decade. The use of fertilizer also decreased substantially,
which has contributed to the forecast flat-lining of gas demand in the industrial sector in the near-term
future. The forecasted changes in demand (annually) are shown in Table 28.
Table 28 European gas consumption forecast of the industrial sector (2011 2013)
Forecast demand (% change on previous year)
2011

2012

2013

+ 3.2%
+ 3.4%
+ 3.3%
Source: IEA, Medium-term oil and gas markets, 2010

12.4

Power Generation

Whilst there will be considerable growth in the contribution of renewable energy generation to the European
energy generation capacity, the use of fossil fuel generation is anticipated to remain dominant. Specifically,
the use of gas-fired power generation plants is expected to increase as gas increasingly establishes itself as a
cross-over, stepping-stone fuel on the route to a low-carbon energy future. Table 29 shows the substantial
annual increases in forecast gas consumption by this sector. The use of coal-fired power generation will
decrease, and the use of nuclear power is likely to be shaped by potential changes in public and government
approval for nuclear following the Fukushima disaster earlier in 2011: different countries will likely adopt
different positions on nuclear power and their future use of it). In Europe, the expected change in annual gas
consumption for power generation is shown in Table 29.
Table 29 Forecast of gas consumption by the European power generation sector
Forecast demand (% change on previous year)
2011

2012

2013

- 0.57%
+ 3.6%
+ 2.3%
Source: IEA, Medium-term oil and gas markets, 2010

12.5

Other

It is anticipated that gas consumption within this sector will increase at a relatively slow rate overall. This
slight increase in demand will be due principally to two trends. The first is the sustained, although relatively
low level, growth in the use of vehicles fuelled by natural gas on European roads. In the very near-term
future the use of gas-fuelled vehicles is expected to remain a niche market but governments will have

- 32 -

strong incentives to promote this market (reducing vehicle CO2 emissions, increasingly energy security of
transport, reducing other pollutant emissions from transport, and developing new vehicle industry clusters,
etc.). Within the energy sector, natural gas is used within oil and gas extraction activities. This use of natural
gas is anticipated to increase only very slightly within Europe in the period between 2010 and 2013. In the
United Kingdom specifically, the use of natural gas in energy-related activities is anticipated to decline
markedly.
Table 30 Forecast annual change in gas consumption by the other sector in Europe
Forecast demand (% change on previous year)
2011

2012

2013

+ 1.3%
+ 1.3%
+ 1.3%
Source: IEA, Medium-term oil and gas markets 2010

In forecasting future consumption within each country included in the study area and within each of the four
above-described sectors, we have used gas consumption in 2010 as a starting point for each countrys
forecast of consumption in each year from 2014 onwards. The level of gas consumption within each country
in 2010 was taken from a different IEA report: Natural Gas Information 2011. The proportion of natural gas
consumption within each market sector is shown in Figure 3, based on data reported by the IEA.
10

35

Residential &
commercial
Industry

35

Power generation
Other
20

Figure 3 Proportional breakdown of total natural gas consumption by the four key gas-consuming sectors in 2010 (%)
Source: IEA, Medium-term oil and gas markets, 2010

Our forecast of gas consumption to 2020 assumes that in each year from 2014 onwards, the consumption
growth rates (between 2004 and 2009) experienced by each country included within this are recovered.
These growth rates are applied to from 2014 onwards. In order to forecast consumption in 2014, we applied
the growth rates to the 2013 consumption level published for each country in the IEAs Medium-Term Oil
and Gas Market report.

12.6

Forecast Findings

The levels of natural gas consumption forecast for each country included within the study area are described
in this section of the report.
In the period out to 2020 gas consumption is forecast to increase in Belgium, France, Finland, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden; however, it should be noted that Finland, Norway and Sweden
currently have very low levels of total gas consumption compared to other countries within the study area

- 33 -

and the forecast consumption increases are also relatively small. It is predicted that consumption will decline
in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom.
Whilst the driving factors for declining gas consumption in the above-mentioned countries will vary
depending on each individual country, some general factors can be identified as contributing to the trend,
including:

Reducing levels of industry activity and output;


The increasing contribution of renewable energy generation to the total energy portfolio of countries
(and the subsequent decline in gas-powered energy generation);
Reductions in demand for energy, especially within the residential and commercial sectors due to the
effectiveness of energy efficiency initiatives; and
The increasing cost of extracting natural gas resources from North Sea deposits / reserves, making
their extraction increasingly-attractive only when other energy fuel prices are high.

Belgium
The forecast of gas consumption in Belgium out to 2020 is shown numerically in Table 31 and graphically in
Figure 4. It can be seen that the power generation sector has the fastest-growing level of gas consumption
during the forecast period.
Table 31 Gas consumption forecast in Belgium by sector
Gas consumption (Bcm)
Sector

2010

2015

2020

Res. & commercial

7,1

6,4

6,6

Industry

5,4

6,0

6,1

Power generation

6,7

7,1

7,2

Other

0,0

0,0

0,0

20,7

21,1

Total
20,3
Source: AFinternal analysis

24000

Other

Consumption
Bcm

Power
generation

12000

Industry

Residential
&
commercial

0
2010

2015
Year

2020

Figure 4 Forecast of gas consumption in Belgium to 2020 by sector


Source: AF internal analysis

- 34 -

Denmark
Danish gas consumption is forecast to develop as shown in Table 32 and Figure 5. It is clear that gas
consumption is in decline overall throughout the forecast period.
Table 32 Gas consumption forecast in Denmark by sector
Gas consumption (Bcm)
Sector

2010

2015

2020

Res. & commercial

1.3

1.2

1.0

Industry

1.0

1.03

0.9

Power generation

2.6

2.6

2.4

Other

4.8

4.3

Total
4.9
Source: AF-internal analysis

6000
Other
Consumption
(Mcm)

Power
generation

3000
Industry

Residential &
commercial
0
2010

2015

2020

Year
Figure 5 Forecast of gas consumption in Denmark to 2020 by sector
Source: AF internal analysis

France
Gas consumption in France in the period to 2020 is forecast to be as shown in Table 33 and Figure 6.
Table 33 Gas consumption forecast in France by sector
Gas consumption (Bcm)
Sector

2010

2015

2020

Res. & commercial

31.0

27.7

26.9

Industry

8.8

9.6

9.3

Power generation

8.5

8.8

8.6

Other

1.5

1.5

1.5

47.6

46.3

Total
49.8
Source: AF-internal analysis

- 35 -

Other

60000
Consumption
(Mcm)
45000

Power
generation

30000

Industry

15000

Residential &
commercial

0
2010

2015
2020
Year
Figure 6 Forecast of gas consumption in France by sector to 2020
Source: AF internal analysis

Finland
The levels of consumption of gas within each sector forecast to 2020 can be viewed in Table 34 and Figure
7. It is clear that Finland has a relatively low level of gas use compared to most other countries within this
analysis, and consumption is set to decrease in each market sector to 2020.
Table 34 Gas consumption forecast in Finland by sector
Gas consumption (Bcm)
Sector

2010

2015

2020

Res. & commercial

0.096

0.09

0.096

Industry

0.729

0.8

0.89

Power generation

2.77

2.98

3.21

Other

0.72

0.77

0.83

Total
4.31
Source: AF internal analysis

4.67

5.03

5500

Other

Consumption
(Mcm)
3500

Power
generation
Industry

1500

-500

2010

2015

2020

Year
Figure 7 Forecast of gas consumption in Finland by sector to 2020
Source: AF internal analysis

Residential
and
commercial

- 36 -

Germany
Our gas consumption forecast for Germany is shown in Table 35 and Figure 8. Overall it can be seen that the
volume of gas consumed in Germany is forecast to decrease out to 2020. This is mainly due to our
expectation that the country will continue to increase its share of renewable energy generation within its
energy portfolio, as well as improvements in energy efficiency (reduced demand for energy) and a reduction
in the level of industrial activity.
It is interesting to note, however, that whilst it is beyond the scope of this consumption forecast, we
understand that gas consumption in Germany will increase substantially from 2022 onwards. This is due to
the countrys objective of phasing-out the use of all nuclear power generation by that date, and the
subsequent role that gas is expected to play in helping to supply the power that would have been provided by
nuclear power generation.
Table 35 Gas consumption forecast in Germany by sector
Gas consumption (Bcm)
Sector

2010

2015

2020

Res. & commercial

53.08

46.82

44.35

Industry

20.01

21.58

20.44

Power generation

21.94

22.65

21.45

Other

2.31

2.35

2.22

93.39

88.47

Total
97.33
Source: AF internal analysis

105000
Other

90000
Consumption
(Mcm)
75000
60000

Power
generation

45000

Industry

30000
15000

Residential &
commercial

0
2010

2015
2020
Year
Figure 8 Forecast of gas consumption in Germany by sector to 2020
Source: AF internal analysis

The Netherlands
Gas consumption in the Netherlands is forecast to decline in the period out to 2020, as shown in Table 36
and Figure 9. Consumption in the industrial and power generation sectors appears to follow a bell-shaped
curve between 2010 and 2020: this is due to the relatively-low level of consumption in these sectors in 2010
through the effects of the global economic crisis. Consumption is expected to increase significantly between
2010 and 2014, before declining at a steady rate (due to energy efficiency improvements and the increasing
contribution of renewable generation to the total energy mix).

- 37 -

Table 36 Gas consumption forecast in the Netherlands by sector


Gas consumption (Bcm)
Sector

2010

2015

2020

Res. & commercial

22.33

19.46

17.89

Industry

7.48

8.21

8.13

Power generation

19.68

21.56

23.69

Other

5.38

5.6

5.6

54.82

55.3

Total
54.87
Source: AF internal analysis

60000
Consumption
45000
(Mcm)

Other
Power generation

30000

Industry
15000
Residential &
commercial

0
2010

2015

2020

Year
Figure 9 Forecast of gas consumption in the Netherlands by sector to 2020
Source: AF internal analysis

Norway
Overall, Norway is forecast to have low levels of gas consumption in each sector, compared to other
countries considered in this study. The main use of gas in Norway is within the category other: this is
primarily due to Norways use of gas to power technologies used in the exploration and production of
hydrocarbons (the countrys extensive oil and gas activities). Norways forecast consumption of gas is shown
in Table 37 and Figure 10.
Table 37 Gas consumption forecast in Norway by sector
Gas consumption (Bcm)
Sector

2010

2015

2020

Res. & commercial

0.045

0.04

0.04

Industry

0.025

0.28

0.28

Power generation

0.8

0.85

0.86

Other

5.01

5.22

5.24

Total
6.13
Source: AF internal analysis

6.28

6.00

- 38 -

7000
Other
Consumption
(Mcm)

Power
generation
Industry
Residential &
commercial

0
2010

2015

2020

Year
Figure 10 Forecast of gas consumption in Norway by sector to 2020
Source: AF internal analysis

Poland
Consumption of natural gas in Poland is set to grow from a level of 17,2 Bcm in 2010, to 17,75 Bcm in 2015
and 18,9 Bcm in 2020. Consumption is forecast to dip within the residential and commercial sector in the
10-year period to 2020. The industrial sectors use of gas will show the largest relative growth of the sectors
considered here, increasing by just over one fifth of its 2010 level by 2020. Polands forecasted consumption
of gas to 2020 by sector is shown in Table 38 and Figure 11.
Table 38 Gas consumption forecast in Poland by sector
Gas consumption (Bcm)
Sector

2010

2015

2020

Res. & commercial

7.1

6.59

7.04

Industry

4.22

4.77

5.11

Power generation

2.13

2.31

2.47

Other

3.74

3.99

4.27

17.66

18.89

Total
17.2
Source: AF internal analysis
20000

Other
15000
Consumption
(Mcm)

Power generation
10000
Industry
5000
Residential &
commercial

0
2010

2015

2020

Year
Figure 11 Forecast of gas consumption in Poland by sector to 2020
Source: AF internal analysis

Sweden
Gas consumption in Sweden is low compared to other countries within this analysis. However, Swedish
consumption is forecast to grow, mainly in the power generation sector. The very low level of consumption

- 39 -

in the residential and commercial sector is low because only a small number of municipalities is connected
to the gas grid.19
Our forecast of consumption is shown in Table 39 and Figure 12.
Table 39 Gas consumption forecast in Sweden by sector
Gas consumption (Bcm)
Sector

2010

2015

2020

Res. & commercial

0.2

0.21

0.24

Industry

0.61

0.73

0.83

Power generation

0.82

0.92

1.08

Other

0.03

0.03

0.04

Total
1.67
Source: AF internal analysis

1.87

2.18

3000
Other
Consumption
(Mcm)

Power
generation
1500
Industry
Residential &
commercial
0
2010

2015

2020

Year
Figure 12 Forecast of gas consumption in Sweden by sector
Source: AF internal analysis

United Kingdom
Gas consumption in the United Kingdom is forecast to decline slightly in the period out to 2020, as shown in
Table 40 and Figure 13. The main consuming sector of gas in the country will remain the residential and
commercial sector. The use of gas by industry is small.
The decline in the use of gas is expected to be driven by a variety of factors, including: declining North Sea
gas extraction outputs, the increasing contribution of renewable energy generation, energy efficiency
improvements (contributing to a relative reduction in energy demand) and the further decline in the intensity
(output) of industrial activity within the country.

19

Business Insights, 2010. The Western European gas market Outlook 2010. Country profiles of supply, demand, regulation and
infrastructure.

- 40 -

Table 40 Gas consumption forecast in the United Kingdom by sector


Gas consumption (Bcm)
Sector

2010

2015

2020

Res. & commercial

40.6

36.4

36.4

Industry

11.1

12.1

11.7

Power generation

37.1

38.5

37.2

Other

9.2

9.4

9.1

96.4

94.3

Total
98.0
Source: AF internal analysis
120000

Other

100000

Consumption
(Mcm)

80000

Power
generation

60000

Industry

40000
Residential &
commercial

20000
0
2010

2015

2020

Figure 13 Forecast of gas consumption in the United Kingdom by sector to 2020


Source: AF internal analysis

13.
13.1

Forecast of LNG Demand Within the Study Area


Methodology

We have forecasted LNG demand to the year 2020 within each country in the study area. The forecast gave
consideration to a range of factors that will shape LNG demand and LNG availability within each country in
the future. In particular, our methodology accounted for the availabilities and sizes (and any planned future
expansion or contraction) of existing LNG infrastructures within the study area.
The forecast of future LNG demand also accounted for speculative and planned LNG infrastructures, which
are either proposed to be developed or are currently under development. For each country, an analysis was
undertaken of planned LNG infrastructure developments within the forecast period, and the likely timing of
development completion of infrastructures, as well as their size (capacity) was accounted for within country
demand forecasts.
In order to develop a realistic forecast of the development of LNG infrastructure and LNG demand within
the study area, various credible information sources were consulted, including recent publications by both
the International Energy Agency and the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (a leading
LNG industry body); we have also drawn on our understanding of the LNG market and undertaken some in-

- 41 -

house analysis of the potential future development LNG infrastructure and markets within the study area. In
this section we provide the results of our forecast of future LNG demand by country.

13.2

Belgium

Our forecast of Belgian LNG demand is stated in Table 41. LNG demand is also displayed graphically in
Figure 14, where we have shown the forecast of future demand for pipeline-delivered gas, for comparison
purposes.
Table 41 Forecast of LNG demand in Belgium
2010

2015

2020

LNG (gas phase) demand in Bcm

6.4

7.8

8.8

(Mcm, liquid phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

(10.7)

(13)

(14.7)

20

15
Demand
10
(Bcm)

Pipeline
LNG

0
2010

2015

2020

Figure 14 Forecast of LNG demand in Belgium (in Bcm, gas phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

13.3

Denmark

Our forecast of Danish LNG demand is stated in Table 42. LNG demand is also displayed graphically in
Figure 15, where we have shown the forecast of future demand for pipeline-delivered gas, for comparison
purposes.
Table 42 Forecast of LNG demand in Denmark

LNG (gas phase) demand in Bcm

(Mcm, liquid phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

2010

2015

2020

0.5

(0.83)

- 42 -

6
5
4
Demand
3
(Bcm)
2

Pipeline
LNG

1
0
2010

2015

2020

Figure 15 Forecast of LNG demand in Denmark (in Bcm, gas phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

13.4

France

Our forecast of French LNG demand is stated in Table 43. LNG demand is also displayed graphically in
Figure 16, where we have shown the forecast of future demand for pipeline-delivered gas, for comparison
purposes.
Table 43 Forecast of LNG demand in France
2010

2015

2020

LNG (gas phase) demand in Bcm

14.0

16.7

19.3

(Mcm, liquid phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

(23.3)

(27,8)

(32.2)

40

30
Demand
20
(Bcm)

Pipeline
LNG

10

0
2010

2015

2020

Figure 16 Forecast of LNG demand in France (in Bcm, gas phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

13.5

Finland

Our forecast of Finnish LNG demand is stated in Table 44. LNG demand is also displayed graphically in
Figure 17, where we have shown the forecast of future demand for pipeline-delivered gas, for comparison
purposes.

- 43 -

Table 44 Forecast of LNG demand in Finland

LNG (gas phase) demand in Bcm

2010

2015

2020

(Mcm, liquid phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

(3.33)

5
4
Demand
(Bcm)

Pipeline

LNG

1
0
2010

2015

2020

Figure 17 Forecast of LNG demand in Finland (in Bcm, gas phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

13.6

Germany

Our forecast of German LNG demand is stated in Table 45. LNG demand is also displayed graphically in
Figure 18, where we have shown the forecast of future demand for pipeline-delivered gas, for comparison
purposes.
Table 45 Forecast of German LNG demand

LNG (gas phase) demand in Bcm

2010

2015

2020

7.1

(Mcm, liquid phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

(11.8)

120
100
80
Demand
60
(Bcm)
40

Pipeline
LNG

20
0
2010

2015

Figure 18 Forecast of LNG demand in Germany (in Bcm, gas phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

2020

- 44 -

13.7

The Netherlands

Our forecast of Dutch LNG demand is stated in Table 36. LNG demand is also displayed graphically in
Figure 19, where we have shown the forecast of future demand for pipeline-delivered gas, for comparison
purposes.
Table 46 Forecast of LNG demand in the Netherlands

LNG (gas phase) demand in Bcm

2010

2015

2020

10

(10)

(16.7)

(Mcm, liquid phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

60
50
40
Demand
30
(Bcm)
20

Pipeline
LNG

10
0
2010

2015

2020

Figure 19 Forecast of LNG demand in the Netherlands (in Bcm, gas phase)
Source: AF Analysis, 2011

13.8

Norway

As the LNG market in Norway differs from the other countries in SECA, a separate forecast has been made
for Norway by Gasnor, which is decribed below.
As the maritime sector is accounting for almost 40 % of the total LNG consumption in Norway, the
development in this sector is essential for the future LNG demand. The fuel market is driven by
environmental economy issue caused by regulations of both domestic and international statutory regulations,
of which the International Maritime Organizations (IMOs) new sulphur limits for shipping in SECA is of
vital importance. The Norwegian Shipowners' Association (NSA) has in an investigation carried out during
2009 concluded that LNG has the greatest potential for reduction of emissions to air.
A maritime cluster of ship-owners in Norway is today world class leader in construction and management of
off-shore service- vessels consuming LNG. As a result of that, there are today 22 LNG ships (including
several ferries) in operation and orders of another 21 new vessels and 4 planned conversions.
Norway is preparing for an expansion of oil and gas off-shore-activity in the northern part of the Norwegian
Sea and into the Barents Sea Region. This has led to a governmental funding of several research and
development programs examining the demographic, environmental and economic consequences. As a part of
this a further effort in adaption of new LNG facilities are discussed. The ongoing world-spreading financial
crisis and the influence in extraction shale gas in countries which used to import LNG has reduced the
netback* value (NBV) for exporting natural gas. This may strengthen the possibility of gas processing
industry, including construction of new LNG facilities in the years to come, most likely in the end of period
until 2020.

- 45 -

LNG in industry
Considering a trend of increasing oil prices and expactations on a stricter emission tax-regime also in
maritime sector, a raise in consumption of LNG in Norway is forecasted. As a whole the Norwegian LNG
market is most likely to continue to grow, first of all as an alternative fuel in the maritime sector, but a
growth is also expected in the process industry, above all within the manufactures of basic metals.
Estimate of Norwegian future LNG demand is based on a maritime linear raise from a 3 % share of the sea
transport today to approximately 30 %20 in 2020, given a continued public stimulation and contribution in
Nox-reducing effort. Furthermore the estimate includes a 1,5 % increase a year in industrial sector during the
same time.
Table 47 Forecast of LNG demand in Norway
2010

2015

2020

LNG (gas phase) demand in Bcm

0.2

0.5

0.7

(Mcm, liquid phase)


Source: Gasnor, 2011

(0.3)

(0.9)

(1.1)

Dependent on when the producers of LNG will reach their production capacity limits, the estimate concludes
that there probably will be LNG imports in Norway in the period out to 2020.

13.9

Poland

Our forecast of LNG demand in Poland is stated in Table 48. LNG demand is also displayed graphically in
Figure 20, where we have shown the forecast of future demand for pipeline-delivered gas, for comparison
purposes.
Table 48 Forecast of LNG demand in Poland

LNG (gas phase) demand in Bcm

2010

2015

2020

(3.3)

(5.0)

(Mcm, liquid phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

20
15
Demand
(Bcm) 10

Pipeline
LNG

5
0
2010

2015

2020

Figure 20 Forecast of LNG demand in Poland (in Bcm, gas phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

20

Estimate of DNV and Marintek if a successful accomplishment of The Business Sectors NOx Fund in the whole period

- 46 -

13.10

Sweden

Our forecast of Swedish LNG demand is stated in Table 49. LNG demand is also displayed graphically in
Figure 21, where we have shown the forecast of future demand for pipeline-delivered gas, for comparison
purposes.
Table 49 Forecast of Swedish LNG demand

LNG (gas phase) demand in Bcm

2010

2015

2020

0.4

0.7

(0.7)

(1.2)

(Mcm, liquid phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

2
1,5
Demand
(Bcm)

Pipeline

LNG
0,5
0
2010

2015

2020

Figure 21 Forecast of Swedish LNG demand (in Bcm, gas phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

13.11

United Kingdom

Our forecast of LNG demand in the United Kingdom is stated in Table 50. LNG demand is also displayed
graphically in Figure 22, where we have shown the forecast of future demand for pipeline-delivered gas, for
comparison purposes.
Table 50 Forecast of LNG demand in the United Kingdom
2010

2015

2020

LNG (gas phase) demand in Bcm

18,7

38.3

41.1

(Mcm, liquid phase)


Source: AF Analysis, 2011

(31.1)

(63.8)

(68.5)

- 47 -

60

40
Demand
(Bcm)

Pipeline
LNG

20

0
2010

2015

2020

Figure 22 Forecast of LNG demand in the United Kingdom (in Bcm, gas phase)
Source: AF Analysis, 2011

7
Appendix 7
Port descriptions
Table of Contents
1.

Port of Hirtshals, Denmark .......................................................................... 2

1.1
2.

3.

Port of Zeebrugge, Belgium ......................................................................... 5

2.1

Public Financing and Management Structure in the Port of Zeebrugge..6

2.2

LNG Terminal..7

Szczecin and winoujcie Seaport, Poland ................................................ 9

3.1
4.

LNG terminal.12

Port of Rotterdam, the Netherlands .......................................................... 14

4.1
5.

LNG Terminal at the Port of Hirtshals4

LNG Terminal at the Port of Rotterdam16

Ports in Sweden ......................................................................................... 18

5.1

Introduction18

5.2

The Governance Structure.18

5.3

Regulation for Maritime LNG...20

5.4

Port of Gothenburg20

5.5

Port of Nynshamn24

-2-

Appendix 7 Port Descriptions


This appendix contains short port descriptions for a selection of ports in the SECA. Most of the ports are
included as in-kind contributors in the project, except for the two Swedish ports. The port of Nynshamn is
selected since this port is different from many other ports since it is not a bunkering facility but (so far)
intended for land-based used of LNG.

1.

Port of Hirtshals, Denmark

The Port of Hirtshals is located on the northwest coast of Denmark. The port is a natural junction for linking
traffic from destinations in the North Atlantic, the Baltic, Central and Southern Europe and the Scandinavian
Peninsula.
The ports development as a freight port is primarily focused on transit freight in the form of containers and
Ro-Ro. The Port of Hirtshals is also a fishing port. Some key facts about the port can be found in Table 1.
Table 1 Facts about the Port of Hirtshals, 2011
Facts about the port:
4.5 kilometres quay
0.75 million square metres
3 Ro-Ro ramps
1.4 million of tonnes of cargo
18 employees
Source: www.portofhirtshals.dk, 2011

The Port of Hirtshals is a self-controlled, municipally owned port. The municipality therefore has the right to
appoint the board of directors but the rights of the municipality end there. The board has the full right to
make all decisions relating to the development and operation of the port.
The main financial indicators for the Port of Hirtshals can be found in Table 2.
Table 2 The main financial indicators for the Port of Hirtshals. (DKK millions)
2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

Net sales

56

51

52

54

60

62

Costs

29

31

31

34

29

26

Operating profit

27

19

21

20

33

35

Profit
after
net
financial income

1.3

0.6

3.4

5.1

17

7.5

537

528

509

475

452

Balance sheet total


535
Source: www.portofhirtshals.dk, 2011

The port is an independent economic unit with self-financed investments, including maintenance, operation
and development of the port. The Port of Hirtshals only invests in port infrastructure and the operators invest
in superstructure. Since there is no national regulation of port fees, the port makes all decisions on port fees
and services provided by the port. The port operates under market conditions and is subject to the Danish
Companies Act. A schematic figure of the governance structure in the port of Hirtshals is presented in Figure
1.

-3-

Figure 1 Schematic figure of the governance structure of the port of Hirtshals

The number of stakeholders in the Port of Hirtshals is very limited. The Port Authority operates and
maintains the port and has full responsibility for. However, both the breakwater and the access roads and
railway are maintained by the state Table 3 shows an overview of investment responsibilities at the Port of
Hirtshals.
Table 3 Port investment responsibilities for the port of Hirtshals
Category

Element

Land development
Maritime infrastructure

Port Authority
Exterior breakwater

Government

Others

Port Authority

Port infrastructure
Port Superstructure

Port Authority
Linkspans, pavement

Port Authority

Others

Private

Public utilities
Infrastructure links

Maritime maintenance

Port services

Responsibility

Municipality, government
Access railway

Region

Access roads

Government, municipality

Exterior breakwater

Government

Others

Port Authority

Cargo handling

Private

Pilotage, towing
Source: Port of Hirtshals, www.portofhirtshals.dk, 2011

Port Authority

-4-

1.1

LNG Terminal at the Port of Hirtshals

In relation to the establishment of an LNG terminal, the Port of Hirtshals is cooperating with the Norwegian
gas company Gasnor, with whom it has signed a letter of intent concerning future plans. Gasnor will own
and operate the LNG terminal and will deliver LNG to the terminal with its own ships (similar to the system
at Gasnors existing LNG terminal in Norway). As operator, Gasnor will manage the LNG terminal and sell
and deliver LNG from the terminal to the end user. The terminal throughput is planned to be at least
60 000 m3, facilitating a tank of 5 000 to 10 000 m3.
To the Port of Hirtshals knowledge, there are no special subsidies or taxation related to the LNG terminal
and all sanctions must be obtained by the municipality and government institutions.
An assessment must be made of environmental impact taking all matters related to the LNG terminal into
consideration. This evaluation will take about two years. From a legal point of view, the terminal will be
treated like any other gas facility. The environmental sanction for the terminal must be obtained by the
operator, but in practice the port will assist the operator with activities related to obtain the sanctions related
to the operations.

-5-

2.

Port of Zeebrugge, Belgium

The Port of Zeebrugge has an ideal location to serve the markets of continental Europe as well as the British
Isles. It is a young seaport with modern port equipment suitable for the largest ships. The present structure of
the port dates from as recently as 1985. The emergence of the roll-on/roll-off technologies, containerisation
and the increase in scale of the ships convinced the Belgian government in the 1970s to develop the coastal
port into a deep-sea port. An extensive outer port, a new sea lock with entry to an inner port resulted in a
tripling of the total cargo traffic from 14 million tons in 1985 to 45 million tons in 2009. The location of the
port of Zeebrugge is shown in Figure 2.
The Port of Zeebrugge is also one of the fastest growing ports in the range of ports between Le Havre and
Hamburg, which together handle more than a billion tons of cargo a year. Over barely a couple of decades,
Zeebrugge has become one of the most important entry ports to the European market. The main financial
indicators for the Port of Zeebrugge can be found in Table 4.

Figure 2 Location of the Port of Zeebrgge


Source: The Port of Zeebrgge, 2011.

-6-

Table 4 The main financial indicators for the Port of Zeebrugge. (EUR millions)
2010

2009

2008

2007

61.0

57.9

58.1

Operating profit

14.8

13.2

13.4

11.6

Profit
after
net
financial income

18.2

15.5

17.1

14.6

295

277

254

Net sales
Costs

Balance sheet total


320
Source: www.zeebruggeport.be, 2011

2.1
Public Financing and Management Structure in the Port of
Zeebrugge
The Port of Zeebrugge is managed by the Port Authority/MBZ nv. This company is an autonomous company
regulated by public law, the city of Bruges being the main shareholder. The company was established in
1895. The Port Authority determines the port policy and is responsible for the technical, nautical and
commercial aspects of the ports management. A schematic figure of the governance structure in the Port of
Zeebrugge is presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3 Port governance in the port of Zeebrgge

The Port Authority is responsible for major infrastructure such as the construction of quay walls and jetties,
terrain, paving and road works. The maintenance of this infrastructure also lies within its competence. Port
terrains are given to private operators through concessions. The private companies load and unload their
clients ships and offer storage facilities. In addition to the concessions, the Port Authority has two other
main sources of revenue: the duty on vessel tonnage and the duty on a vessels cargo. Control of the

-7-

maritime traffic, operation of the bridges and locks and surveillance and security within the port borders are
the responsibility of the Harbour Masters Office. In addition, the Port Authority gives advice to
customers on the development of their port activities. The Port Authority is also assigned to determine the
ports strategy and optimise the opening-up of the port. Investment responsibilities for the port are shown in
Table 5.
Table 5 Investment responsibilities in the port of Zeebrgge
Category

Element

Responsibility

Maritime access and basic


infrastructure

Construction and maintenance of maritime


access and basic infrastructure

Government

Port infrastructure

Quay walls, docks

Government (20 %)
Port Authority (80 %

Locks

Government & Port Authority

Port superstructure

Warehouses, terminal and office buildings

Private

Port services

Technical-nautical services related to public


interest (traffic-regulation, security and
protection of the environment)

Government, Port Authority

Cargo handling

Private

Fire-fighting, police

Government, Municipality, Port


Authority

Public utilities
Source: The port of Zeebrugge.

2.2

LNG Terminal

Zeebrugge has a reception terminal for ships carrying LNG and at the same is as a crossroads of two major
axes in European natural gas flows: the east-west axis from Russia to the United Kingdom and the northsouth axis from Norway to Southern Europe. Zeebrugge also has a key commercial role in the natural gas
trade: the Zeebrugge Hub is one of Europes leading international natural gas spot markets.

Figure 4 The port of Zeebrgge, the LNG terminal area is marked in green

-8-

Natural gas suppliers are interested in extra capacity at the terminal since it allows them to boost their gas
exports via Zeebrugge to other European countries, specifically the United Kingdom, which has been
importing increasingly larger quantities of natural gas as of 2005-2006.

Figure 5 Picture of the port of Zeebrugge

In the outer port of Zeebrugge, work has begun on the LNG dam for the construction of the second LNG
jetty. The work is being executed by the contractor MBG and will take about 12 months to complete. The
superstructure with the loading and unloading arms is planned for late 2012. The jetty will be built just
across the Fluxys terminal on the eastern breakwater. Thanks to these investments, LNG carriers ranging
from smallish ships of 7,500 m3 up to Q-flex ships of 217,000 m3 will now also be able to berth. At the new
jetty, liquefied natural gas can be both loaded and unloaded. The port has also recently been granted an
environmental permit to handle large Q-Max ships. These vessels load up to 265,000 m3 of liquefied natural
gas and have a length of 345 metres and a width of 55 metres. The Q-Max ships berth at the existing jetty.
As a leading gas hub, with an annual throughput capacity of 50 billion m3, Zeebrugge is responding to this
trend. A public private partnership of Fluxys, Flanders and the Port of Zeebrugge has been established to
finance the LNG Terminal project.

-9-

3.

Szczecin and winoujcie Seaport, Poland

Szczecin and winoujcie are universal seaports managed by Szczecin and winoujcie Seaports Authority.
They are located on the northeast coast of Poland. The location of the two ports is shown in the map in
Figure 6.

Figure 6 Map of the Szczecin and winoujcie Seaports


Source: www.port.szczecin.pl/

The ports of Szczecin and winoujcie are vital to the Polish maritime economy as well as to the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Eastern Germany.
The enterprise is a public utility and its range of economic activity is specified by law and encompasses:
management of property and port infrastructure;
forecasting, programming and planning of the development of ports;
construction, extension, maintenance and modernization of the port infrastructure;
obtaining real estate for port development needs;
services connected with use of the port infrastructure;
assurance of access to port facilities receiving waste from ships for the purpose of delivery to
salvage or disposal.
A schematic figure of the governance structure in the two ports is presented in Figure 7.

- 10 -

Minister of
National Treasury

Minister of
Infrastructure

Represents National
Treasury interests in to the
Port Authorities (ports of
primary standing). Accepts
all property changes in those
ports.

Maritime safety
Environmental protection
Rescue services
Building and maintenance of
sea border crossings
Building and maintenance of
sea access infrastructure to
the ports

Maritime
Offices:
Gdask
Gdynia
Szczecin

Municipalities

Ports of primary standing


Public companies with
shares of Government and
Municipality.
Gdask
Gdynia
Szczecin winoujscie

Municipalised
Darowo
Elblag
Koobrzeg
Stpnica

Non Municipalised
the rest of local ports

Ports of secondary standing

Description:
Supervisory body
Shares in public company

Figure 7 General structure of Polish sea ports management.


Source: Public financing and charging practices of seaports in the EU, ISL 2006.

winoujcie is a popular tourist destination and health resort, as well as the biggest Polish dry bulk terminal
and one of the most important ferry terminals on the south-north axis along the shortest route linking
Scandinavia with Central and Southern Europe, and along the Baltic maritime route linking Russia and
Finland with Western Europe. It is situated mainly on the islands of Usedom and Wolin, but also occupies
smaller islands where transport between them is provided by regular ferries. The port approach channel is 32
nautical miles long and 14m deep with a width varying between 180 and 200m.
winoujcie and Szczecin seaports together create one of the largest port complexes on the Baltic. The Port
of winoujcies main advantage is its strategic location on the shortest route from Scandinavia to Central
and Southern Europe and across the Baltic from Russia and Finland to Germany and Western Europe.
Further advantages of winoujcie are its excellent connection with Berlin via the inland waterway network
and with the European river waterway system and extensive undeveloped land available for the extension of
the ports in terms of transshipment, storage capacity and port industry.

- 11 -

Table 6 Port investment activities for the Szczecin and winoujcie Seaports
Category

Element

Responsibility

Land development

Development of new port areas

Port Authority / Government

Maritime infrastructure

Capital dredging

Government / Port Authority

Sea locks, dams & exterior breakwaters

Government

VTS/Radar

Government

Light buoys & navigational aids

Government

Land reclamation

Port Authority / Government

Internal locks, docks, quays, light buoys &


navigational aids, river berth & harbour
basin dredging

Port Authority

Port infrastructure

Main railways on the port area

State Railway

Port superstructure

Pavements, warehouses, sheds, cranes


& gantries, link-spans, pontoons, terminal
& office buildings, leasing/renting

Leased to private operators by Port


Authority or build by private operators

Public utilities

Fire fighting, police, pollution control

Municipality/Port
Authority/Government

Infrastructure links

Railways

State Railway

Roads in area, canals in area

Port Authority

Tunnels & bridges in area

National government
Port Authority

Maritime infrastructure maintenance

Port Authority

Maintenance of port infrastructure and


superstructure

Port Authority

Cargo handling

Private

Port maintenance

Port services

Technical-nautical services
Private
Source: Public financing and charging practices of seaports in the EU ISL, 2006.

winoujcies cargo handling capacity amounts to approx. 12 million tons yearly. The port infrastructure
allows for containerised cargo and other intermodal transport units traffic. The container terminals handling
capacity is 50,000 TEU.
The development program of ZMPSiS SA (Szczecin and winoujcie Seaports Authority) will focus on
activities in three areas up until 2015 (not including investment in the new LNG terminal):

Improvement of the transportation infrastructure in Szczecin and winoujcie ports for efficient and
safe service of land transport vehicles;
Modernization and extension of the hydrotechnical infrastructure;
Assurance of fire safety in the ports.

The objective of the Szczecin and winoujcie Seaports Authority is to attract investors interested in
financing, building and operating terminals as well as creating port industry. The Authority therefore
provides access infrastructure, including quays, roads and rail tracks, as well technical infrastructure
(electricity, telecommunication, water, sewage, etc.). Additionally, the port provides land designated for
preferential long-term lease. At the same time, the Ports Authority offers its support for project development.

- 12 -

3.1

LNG terminal

The LNG terminal will be built on the right bank of the wina River in the Warszw district, within the area
which has been earmarked for harbour development for many years. The project site covers approximately
40 ha. Figure 8 shows a map of the area earmarked for the LNG terminal.
The terminal will accept up to 5 billion cubic metres of natural gas a year. Depending on the growing
demand for gas, it will be possible to expand the terminal up to a throughput of 7.5 billion m3, without the
need to enlarge the site. The winoujcie LNG terminal will have two 160 thousand cu m tanks.

Figure 8 Map of the area earmarked for the LNG terminal


Source: www.port.szczecin.pl/

On 20 August 2009, a cooperation agreement was concluded between Polskie LNG sp. z o.o., the Gas
Transmission Operator GAZ-SYSTEM S.A., the Maritime Authority in Szczecin and the Board of the
Morskie Porty Szczecin i winoujcie S.A.1 The agreement defines the principles of cooperation of the
parties, with the main focus on the material scope and schedules for individual sub-projects. Upon their
completion the LNG terminal in winoujcie will be commissioned in June 2014.
Responsibility for the LNG terminal in winoujcie is distributed as follows:

Polish LNG (PLNG) overall project, terminal operator, shore regasification terminal;
Port Authority Szczecin-winoujcie quay owner, mooring, ship platform, linesman;
Maritime Office in Szczecin (Polish Maritime Authority) exterior breakwater, navigational issues,
VTS, markings, navigational safety;
Maritime University of Szczecin consultant in navigational and safety aspects, training of ship and
shore personnel.

Morskie Porty Szczecin i winoujcie = The ports of Szczecin and winoujcie

- 13 -

The LNG project will be executed by four entities as defined in the LNG Terminal Act namely:

3.2

Polskie LNG Construction and subsequent operation of the LNG terminal;


Maritime Office in winoujcie construction and subsequent maintenance of infrastructure to
ensure access to the external port, including a new breakwater plus overall maritime traffic control;
Szczecin and winoujcie Seaports Authority construction of port infrastructure, including a
special berth/jetty for the LNG carrier ships infrastructure and subsequent handling of the LNG
carriers within the new harbour and jetty areas;
GAZ-SYSTEM construction and subsequent operation of the approx. 6 km connection gas pipeline
and 74 km gas transmission pipeline connecting the terminal with the transmission grid and
coordination of the LNG project.

New Pipeline

The European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) have decided to co-fund, together with GAZSYSTEM, the construction of a gas pipeline from the LNG terminal in winoujcie to Goleniw in Poland
and a gas compressor station in Goleniw. The pipeline will connect the LNG terminal with the Polish
transmission network in Goleniw. The total project, due to be finalized in 2013, is worth EUR 100 million
and both parties contribute 50 % of the costs. The benefit from the project will be greater energy security in
both Poland and other countries in the region.

3.3

Charging in the Szczecin and winoujcie Seaports

Private operators that use land and other facilities in the port area are charged for doing so by the Port
Authority. Charges paid by private customers to private operators are fixed by the operators on a market
basis. All supplies such as electricity and heating are provided to the objects through the Port Authority.
Vessel operators pay charges for vessel operations based on the Port Tariff adopted by the Szczecin and
winoujcie Seaports Authority. Included in the tariff are:
Tonnage dues collected for a vessel calling at and leaving the port, transit through the port area and
waste collection from a vessel for recovery or disposal (within separately determined waste limits).
The tonnage dues are collected by the Port Authority as defined by law;
Quay dues, collected by the Port Authority, for a vessels use of quays;
Passenger dues, collected, by the Port Authority, for embarkation or disembarkation of passengers.

- 14 -

4.

Port of Rotterdam, the Netherlands

The port of Rotterdam is located on the estuary of the Rhine and the Maas on the east coast of the
Netherlands. As a result, efficient and economical transport by inland vessel is possible deep into the heart of
Europe. Feeder and short-sea ships connect Rotterdam by sea with more than 200 European ports; often with
several departures a day. Facts about the port of Rotterdam can be found in Table 7.
Table 7 Facts about the Port of Rotterdam, figures from 2010
Facts about the port:
100,000 inland vessels
34,000 ocean going vessels
10,0000 hectares
90,000 employees
11 million TEUs of containers
294,000 tonnes of bulk goods
135,000 tonnes of general cargo
430 million tonnes of cargo
Source: www.portofrotterdam.com, 2011

Figure 9 Port of Rotterdam


Source: www.portofrotterdam.com, 2011

Figure 10 The Port of Rotterdam


Source: www.portofrotterdam.com, 2011

- 15 -

The Port of Rotterdam has the greatest cargo throughput of all European ports and ranks fourth in the world.
The main financial indicators for the Port of Rotterdam can be found in Table 8.
Table 8 The main financial indicators for the Port of Rotterdam. (In millions of Euro)
2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

Net sales

551

519

525

488

455

Costs

235

222

224

220

198

Operating profit

316

297

208

181

174

154

144

151

114

120

445

341

190

252

231

2,678

2,548

2,430

Profit
after
financial income
Investments

net

Balance sheet total


3,280
3,088
Source: www.portofrotterdam.com, 2011

The Port of Rotterdam Authority is investing in the development of new port sites, in particular Maasvlakte
2, public infrastructure such as roads in the port area, and customer-specific infrastructure, particularly quay
walls and jetties.
Table 9 Port investment responsibilities for the port of Rotterdam
Category

Element

Responsibility

Land development

Development of new port areas

Port Authority

Maritime

Capital dredging

Government/ Port Authority

infrastructure

Sea locks, dams & exterior


breakwaters

Government 66 %

VTS/Radar

Government 66 %

Port Authority 33 %
Port Authority 33 %

Light buoys & navigational aids

Government

Port

Land reclamation

Port Authority/ Government

infrastructure

Internal locks, docks, quays, light


buoys & navigational aids,

Port Authority

River berths & harbour basin dredging


Port

Pavements, warehouses, sheds,


cranes and gantries, link-spans,
pontoons, terminal and office
buildings, leasing/renting

Private

superstructure

Public utilities

Firefighting, police, pollution control

Municipality/ Port Authority/


Government

Infrastructure

Railways & metro links in area

State railway company


Municipality

Roads & canals in area

Government / Port Authority

Tunnels & bridges in area

Government / Port Authority

Port

Maritime infrastructure maintenance

Port Authority

maintenance

Maintenance of port infrastructure and


superstructure

Port Authority

Port services

Cargo handling

Private

links

Technical-nautical services
Private
Source: Public financing and charging practices of seaports in the EU ISL, 2006 updated by the authors from various sources

In order to handle shipping as efficiently as possible, the Port Authority maintains the waterways at a certain
depth and invests in a traffic management system, traffic control centres, and patrol vessels. Immediately to
the west of the existing port area, the port of Rotterdam is constructing Maasvlakte 2, increasing the port size

- 16 -

by 20 %. The realisation of most of the project has a total contract value of 1.1 billion and is the largest
contract the Port of Rotterdam Authority has ever awarded. Roughly speaking, Maasvlakte 2 is being
constructed in two phases. The first phase (2008-2015) involves reclamation of the first 700 hectares. The
second phase (2015-2030) concerns the site preparation of the remaining 300 hectares. The second phase
will start when there is sufficient demand. The port investment responsibilities for the port of Rotterdam can
be found in Figure 11 and the governance structure in Table 9.

Figure 11 Governance structure of the port of Rotterdam


Source Public financing and charging practices of seaports in the EU ISL, 2006 updated by the authors from various sources

4.1

LNG Terminal at the Port of Rotterdam

The GATE (Gas Access To Europe) Terminal is located on the Maasvlakte in Rotterdam and is the first
import terminal for liquefied natural gas in the Netherlands. The terminal has an initial throughput capacity
of 12 billion m3 (bcm) a year consisting of three storage tanks and two jetties. Annual throughput capacity
can be increased to 16 bcm in the future, by a possible expansion with a fourth tank. The terminal dovetails
with Dutch and European energy policies, built on the pillars of strategic diversification of LNG supplies,
sustainability, safety and environmental awareness. The founding partners of the GATE terminal are Royal
Vopak N.V. (Vopak) and N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie (Gasunie). The partnership brings together the product
expertise of gas in Gasunie and the tank terminalling storage expertise of mass liquid product of Vopak. The
current capacity is contracted to four customers, Dong Energy, EconGas, E.ON Ruhrgas and Essent.

- 17 -

The terminals functions are: receipt, a buffer between receipt and continuous supply of natural gas,
regasification and supply. Imported LNG will be regasified and stored under pressure at the terminal before
it is supplied at a constant rate to the Dutch transmission network. The total project costs for the LNG
terminal are about 900 million.

Figure 12 The GATE Terminal, in the Port of Rotterdam


Source: www.portofrotterdam.com, 2011

The LNG terminal with its storage tanks and regasification plant is built on a newly reclaimed 35 hectare site
directly to the south of Maasvlakte in Rotterdam, close to the port entrance on the North Sea coast. The
location provides easy access to LNG carriers and all auxiliary and handling facilities are available. The
Rotterdam location also provides easy access to the nearby natural gas market in northwest Europe. Synergy
will be generated with industrial complexes in the direct vicinity, for example through the use of residual
heat. GATE has entered into a contract with E.ON, for example, to take residual heat from the nearby E.ON
power station.

4.2

Small-scale LNG Terminal

Vopak and Gasunie are developing a small-scale LNG facility at the Port of Rotterdam as a spin-off from
GATE Terminal. This includes creating infrastructure to enable (re)loading for new LNG markets. Vopak
and Gasunie aim to facilitate the small-scale LNG services. They define small-scale LNG as the distribution
and consumption of LNG in volumes from 50-20,000 m3 via break bulk activities. Break bulk activity is the
process of loading LNG from a (large) LNG terminal (e.g. Gate) into LNG break bulk vessels of 7,50020,000 m3 and LNG bunker barges from 500 up to 1,000 m3 and 50 m3 trucks. The capacity is estimated to
be around 3 million m3 LNG for barges and sea going vessels plus 100 000 m3 for trucks.

- 18 -

5.

Ports in Sweden

5.1

Introduction

In 2010, the five largest public ports (Gothenburg, Trelleborg, Malm, Lule and Helsingborg) jointly
account for 56 % (80.1 million tonnes) of the total 143.5 million tonnes of freight. Passenger traffic is
another extensive area for the ports of Sweden, with 27 million passengers using the Swedish seaport
facilities in 2010.

5.2

The Governance Structure

The Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications is responsible for all issues regarding transport and
infrastructure. The maritime sector, fairways and ports are part of the responsibilities. In June 2011, the
Swedish Sea and Water Authority was established and will implement a coherent Swedish policy for sea and
water issues in Sweden. The objective of the Maritime Policy is that the sea and its natural resources must be
managed in a sustainable fashion.
Policies concerning the maritime sector are implemented by the Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA), a
public enterprise in the transport sector. The SMA is responsible for vessel traffic service, maintenance,
service and planning of the Swedish fairways as well as maritime search and rescue and icebreaking.
However, in April 2010 the Swedish Transport Administration was established, taking over the long-term
infrastructure planning and other issues of national importance from the SMA.
In Sweden, two models of seaport governance co-exist. In a small number of seaports the municipal port
management is separate from the stevedoring company. Several seaports are administered (in whole or in
part) by municipally owned corporations referred as Port Authorities, which also provide cargo handling
services.
A Port Authority may own both the land and its facilities, own the facilities but rent the land, or rent both
from the municipality. The industry-owned ports are usually owned by one or more industrial companies and
mainly handle the owners' products. In general, all ports in Sweden operate under market conditions and are
subject to the Swedish Companies Act.
Even though the Port Authority does not receive any direct subsidy from the municipality or the state, there
is a close link between the municipality and its Port Authority.
The pilotage services are compulsory and are exclusively provided by the SMA. Mooring, tugging and
ancillary services are provided by private operators or in some cases by the Port Authority. The Port
Authority also provides the stevedoring services, except in some special cases where they are carried out by
the operators personnel under supervision of the Port Authoritys staff. A schematic figure of the
governance structure in Swedens ports is shown in Figure 13.

- 19 -

National Government
Municipalities
Swedish Maritime
Administration

Swedish Transport
Administration

Fairway Maintenance
Navigation services

Dues

Fees
Tugging, Mooring
Ancillary services

Service
Providers

Fees

Terminal Services

THC

Port Investment & management

Port Dues

Integrated Port Companies

Long term
infrastructure

Ship operators, Cargo owners

Figure 13 Governance structure of the ports of Sweden.


THC = Terminal Handling Charges

The fairway dues in Sweden consist of two parts, one based on the vessels gross tonnage and the other on
the amount of cargo loaded and unloaded. The gross tonnage based portion is differentiated in relation to the
vessels sulphur and nitrogen oxide emissions.
The sulphur-related fairway dues are based on the sulphur content in a vessels bunkers. Normally, the
sulphur fee is 0.70 SEK/GT2 (all types of vessels), but if the sulphur level in a vessels bunkers are less than
0.5 % a discounted fee applies. In order to receive this discount, a valid certificate from the SMA is required.
The sulphur fee is presented in Table 10.
Table 10 The sulphur fee [SEK/GT]
Sulphur content

Sulphur fee

(% by mass)

(SEK/GT )

0.0 0.2
0.21 0.5
0.51

0.00
0.20
0.70

Source: www.sjofartsverket.se, 2011

The fairway dues can be reduced if the vessels NOx emission level is lower than 10 g/kWh. As with the
sulphur fee, a valid certificate from the SMA is required. The discounts for the different emission levels are
shown in Table 11.

GT= unit of the vessels gross tonnage.

- 20 -

Table 11 The discount on the fairway due, depending on the NOx emissions levels
Emission level,

Passenger vessels

Cruising vessels

Other vessels

(g NOx/kWh)

(SEK/GT)

(SEK/GT)

(SEK/GT)

0 0.5

0.51 1

0.15

0.03

0.25

1.01-2

0.4

0.08

0.61

2.01-3

0.63

0.16

0.77

3.01-4

0.77

0.24

0.93

4.01-5

0.91

0.32

1.09

5.01-6

1.05

0.40

1.25

6.01-7

1.19

0.48

1.41

7.01-8

1.33

0.56

1.57

8.01-9

1.47

0.64

1.73

9.01-10

1.61

0.72

1.89

0.80

2.05

10.011.80
Source: www.sjofartsverket.se, 2011

5.3

Regulation for Maritime LNG

The responsibility for LNG regulations is divided between two authorities: the Swedish Civil Contingencies
Agency for land and the Swedish Transport Administration for the sea. The interface lies at the quayside,
where the vessel and its equipment fall under the responsibility of the Swedish Transport Administration and
the remainder under the responsibility of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. Because the bunkering
will take place in the interface between the two authorities, there is a great need for transparency and
continuity between the two authorities.

5.4

Port of Gothenburg

The Port of Gothenburg is Scandinavias largest port and an important transshipment port. The Port of
Gothenburg is located at the mouth of the Gta River, on the west coast of Sweden.

Figure 14 The port of Gothenburg


Source: www.goteborg.se and www.portgot.se, 2011

Cargo from outside Europe and heading to a Nordic country other than Sweden represents 10-15 % of the
cargo transiting the port. In recent years, the Port of Gothenburg has expanded, for example with a rebuilt
fairway in 2004 and a new logistics park in 2010.

- 21 -

In February 2010, the company Gteborgs Hamn AB was divided into one municipally owned company
(Gteborgs Hamnbolag AB) and three terminal companies run by external operators. Gteborgs Hamnbolag
acts as the Port Authority / Landlord and is responsible for the infrastructure of the port. The reasons for the
restructuring were several and included:
Adapt to the structure of the world market;
Enable the Port of Gothenburg to focus on the ports strategic role as the hub of northen Europe;
Decrease the commercial risk and free resources for long-term investments in theinfra structure of
the port.
The three terminals are the Skandia Container terminal, the lvsborg Ro-Ro terminal and the Gothenburg
Car Terminal. The new owner of the lvsborg Ro-Ro terminal are DFDS and C.Ports (a sister company of
the Belgian shipping company Cobelfret), while the new owners of the Gothenburg Car Terminal are Logent
AB. The Skandia container terminal has recently been bought by APM Terminals, a member of the Danish
group AP Moller-Maersk. As the Port Authority, the Port of Gothenburg will
Facilitate the real estate and quays;
Facilitate the infrastructure;
Support ship to ship LNG bunkering by developing regulations;
Facilitate the exchange of knowledge (bunkering, procedures and safety);
Market LNG as a ship fuel;
Provide port tariff incentives.
The port of Gothenburg owns both the land and the facilities. The main financial indicators for the Port of
Gothenburg can be found inTable 12.
Table 12 The main financial indicators for the Port of Gothenburg. (SEK millions)
2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

Net sales

1.506

1.640

1.568

1.503

1.325

Costs

1.478

1.552

1.457

1.330

1.154

Operating profit

82

111

192

195

203

Profit
after
net
financial income

43

75

154

159

165

Balance sheet total

3.076

3.038

3.121

2.988

2.880

164

127

234

360

Investments
145
Source: www.portgot.se, 2011

The line between the responsibilities of the SMA, Swedish Transport Administration and the seaports are
sometimes not really fixed. For instance, in 2010 an agreement was reached between the Port of Gothenburg
and the Swedish Transport Agency, whereby the Port of Gothenburg will refrain from 96,000 m2 without
payment. The land will be used to rebuild a road (road number 155), which will increase accessibility to the
Port of Gothenburg. Table 13 shows an overview of the investment responsibilities at the Port of
Gothenburg.

- 22 -

Table 13 Port investment responsibilities for the port of Gothenburg


Category

Element

Responsibility

Land development

Port Authority

Maritime

Development of new port areas

SMA

infrastructure

Capital dredging

Port Authority

Sea locks, dams & exterior breakwaters

SMA

VTS/Radar

Port Authority within the port


SMA outside the port

Port

Light buoys & navigational aids

Port Authority

infrastructure

Land reclamation

Port Authority

Port

Internal locks, docks, quays, light buoys &


navigational aids,

Port Authority

superstructure

river berths & harbour basin dredging


Public utilities

Pavement, warehouses, sheds, cranes and


gantries, Link-spans, pontoons, terminal and office
buildings, Leasing/renting

Municipality /SMA

Infrastructure

Firefighting, police, pollution control

Swedish Transport Administration

Port

Railways in area

Port Authority within the port

maintenance

Roads in area

SMA outside the port

links

Canals in area
Maritime infrastructure maintenance
Port services

Maintenance
of
superstructure

port

infrastructure

Port Authority
and

Private

Cargo handling
Source: ISL Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics (2006), updated by the authors from various sources

5.4.1
LNG Terminal at the Port of Gothenburg.
Gothenburg Energy (GE), in cooperation with the Port of Gothenburg, called LNG GOT, is trying to
introduce LNG as a ship fuel in Gothenburg. A new terminal with a planned volume of 10,000 m3 will be
built. Their main objective is to construct a terminal which will be able to receive deliveries of liquefied
natural gas for further delivery to bunker boats which will supply the vessels.3 The planned LNG terminal
will be located at Skarvikshamnen and use the existing quay. Today, Skarvikshamnen is among other things
an oil and gas depot for PREEM. The structure of the new terminal has not yet been finalised but
Gothenburg Energy will most likely be responsible for investment in the terminal itself while the Port of
Gothenburg will make the land and quays for the terminal available. The Port of Gothenburg will also make
the investments for rebuilding and dredging the quay.

www.lnggot.com

- 23 -

Figure 15 The port of Gothenburg, with the planned LNG terminal at Skarvikshamnen in the green circle

All permit applications are the responsibility of the authority in charge and according to Magnus Witting,
CEO of LNG GOT, this will be finalised in 2013. The terminal will be completed approximately 18 months
after all necessary permits have been approved, which is planned for the third quarter of 2014. The total
investment cost for the terminal will be around SEK 500 million (EUR 55 million).
The main task of the LNG terminal is to supply bunkering vessels with LNG. The terminal will also supply
bunkering trucks with LNG, for transportation to industry or inland bunkering terminals for vehicles. Also
small vessels, like small passenger ferries, will be able to fuel at the terminal. The plan is also to make it
possible to deliver LNG to the CHP plant (Rya Kraftvrmeverk) in Gothenburg, for peak saving capacity.
In the future it may also be possible to bunker LNG using the railway, since there is an existing spur to the
quay area.
5.4.2
Other Environmental Work in the Port of Gothenburg
The Port of Gothenburg charges an additional fee for vessels using a fuel with more than 0.5 % sulphur; for
2011 this additional fee is 0.10 SEK/GT4. In 2012, this will double and for vessels using a fuel with more
than 0.21 % sulphur (but less than 0.5) an additional fee of 0.10 SEK/GT will be charged. See Table 14 for
an overview of the sulphur fees. The port recently introduced an incentive of up to 250,000 SEK for shipping
companies using fuel with a maximum of 0.1 % sulphur (including LNG).
Table 14 The additional port fee for vessel using fuel with sulphur
% sulphur

Present fee

Fee from 1/1 2011

(SEK/GT4)

(SEK/GT)

0.20

0.21-0.5

0.10

<0.5
0.10
Source: www.portgot.se, 2011

0.20

Vessels that have reduced their nitrogen oxide emissions to less than 10 g/kWh will receive a reduction in
the port fee. The reduction scheme is shown in Table 15.

GT= unit of the vessels gross tonnage.

- 24 -

Table 15 The port fee reduction for vessels reducing NOx emissions
Emission

Reduced fee

(gr NOx/kWh)

(SEK/GT4)

6.0-9.9

0.05

2.0-5.9

0.10

0-1.9
0.20
Source: www.portgot.se, 2011

Via TEN-T, the European Commission has granted the Port of Gothenburg, together with rhus and Tallinn,
SEK 218 million to resolve the bottlenecks in the infrastructure at the port and install information and safety
systems. For the Port of Gothenburg, its total of SEK 101 million will be used to improve road and rail
access to the port. This will be done in cooperation with the Swedish Transport Administration and Skandia
Container Terminal.
The Port of Gothenburg is also involved in Cleantech CNSS, the Clean North Sea Shipping Project, together
with 18 other participants from Sweden, Norway, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and UK. The project
aims to reduce air pollution and greenhouse gas emission by looking into available technology and the
implementation of cost effective and cleaner energy supply infrastructure to ships in harbours/ports at sea.5
The project will run from 2010 until 2013 and has a budget of EUR 4 million. The Port of Gothenburg has
the role of package leader for WP 4, Clean Shipping Technology.

5.5

Port of Nynshamn

Nynshamn is located approximately 60 km south of Stockholm on the east coast of Sweden. Nynshamn
has a unique location in the heart of the Baltic region and is close to the fast-growing capital.

Figure 16Arial view over the port of Nynshamn.


Source:www.nynashamn.se, 2011

www.cnss.no

- 25 -

The Port of Nynshamn is a fully owned subsidiary of the Ports of Stockholm. The Ports of Stockholm is
owned by the City of Stockholm. Table 16 shows the main financial indicators for the Ports of Stockholm.
Table 16 The main financial indicators for the Ports of Stockholm
2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

Net sales

633.4

656.2

657.4

640.7

638.6

Costs

536

615

598

564

581

Operating profit

97.6

56.6

59.2

93.1

74.4

Profit after net financial


income, SEK millions

71.5

35.8

42.8

80.3

65.4

Investments

327.5

250.2

255

125.6

46.4

Balance sheet total

1, 459

1, 261

1,101

921

866

Sales for the port of


Nynshamn
Source: Stockholms hamnar, 2011.

57.2

50.5

46.6

44.7

44.4

The Port of Nynshamn is a modern passenger and Ro-Ro port and operates services to Visby and the
destinations of Gdansk and Ventpils.
The Port of Nynshamn can also receive the larger international cruise liners that are unable or unwilling to
navigate the archipelago into Stockholm. The port is a modern passenger and freight port with three quays.
Equipment at the port includes

Five towing vehicles;


Two forklift-trucks with a lifting capacity of between 4.8 and 8 metric tons;
A wheel loader with a lifting capacity of 5 metric tons;
One container truck with a lifting capacity of 41 metric tons.

5.5.1
LNG Terminal at the Port of Nynshamn
The LNG terminal in Nynshamn was officially opened in May 2011 but the first ship carrying LNG had
already arrived in Nynshamn two months earlier. The shipment, the first of its kind in Sweden, came from
Norway.

Figure 17 The LNG terminal at Norviksudden in Nynshamn


Source: www.mynewsdesk.com, 2011

- 26 -

The LNG terminal is the first in Sweden and is for unloading LNG from vessels and storing LNG. The
terminal has a storage capacity of 20,000 m3 LNG. This terminal is different from the one planned at the Port
of Gothenburg, mainly in the sense that in Nynshamn the LNG is treated as cargo while in Gothenburg the
LNG will be treated as fuel. The guidelines and rules are therefore different. The LNG terminal in
Nynshamn is owned by AGA GAS. The LNG stored at the Nynshamn terminal will be used as a cleaner
and more efficient alternative to LPG and fuel oil.
Plans exist to upgrade the Nynshamn terminal to make it possible to unload LNG to bunkering vessels for
fuelling other vessels. This will be a relatively small investment compared to the initial investment, which
was valued at around SEK 1.3 billion6.

www.nynashamn.se

8
Appendix 8
Overall Bunkering Technology
Table of Contents
1.

2.

3.

Bunker supply .............................................................................................. 4

1.1

Bunker vessel........................................................................................................ 4

1.2

Trailer ................................................................................................................... 5

1.3

Fixed installation .................................................................................................. 6

1.4

Mobile container solution ..................................................................................... 7

1.5

Bunkering barge / artificial island ........................................................................ 8

LNG Piping ................................................................................................. 10

2.1

Brief description of possible solutions ............................................................... 10

2.2

Technology 1# and 2#: Two different techniques for insulation ........................ 10

Valves ........................................................................................................ 13

3.1
4.

5.

Hoses and Handling ................................................................................... 14

4.1

Possible technical solutions ................................................................................ 14

4.2

Handling of Hoses .............................................................................................. 16

Loading Arms ............................................................................................. 19

5.1
6.

Possible technical solutions ................................................................................ 13

Possible technical solutions ................................................................................ 19

Connectors and Couplings ........................................................................ 21

-2-

6.1
7.

8.

9.

Possible technical solutions ................................................................................ 21

Safety Management ................................................................................... 26

7.1

ESD System and Communication ...................................................................... 26

7.2

Regulations for Bunkering system onboard a gas fuelled ship ........................... 27

7.3

General ............................................................................................................... 27

7.4

Emergency Shutdown System ............................................................................ 27

7.5

Control and Monitoring ...................................................................................... 28

7.6

ESD..................................................................................................................... 29

7.7

Possible technical solutions ................................................................................ 29

7.8

Optional data link. .............................................................................................. 32

7.9

Choice of link system ......................................................................................... 33

Gas detection ............................................................................................ 34

8.1

Possible technical solutions ................................................................................ 34

8.2

Comparing overview of gas detectors ................................................................ 39

8.3

Market overview ................................................................................................. 39

8.4

Comparing the systems ....................................................................................... 39

Other safety systems ................................................................................ 40

9.1

Recommendation for safety system .................................................................... 40

-3-

Appendix 8 Overall Bunkering Technology


The outcome from the bunker solution analysis will provide a detailed overview of solutions for bunkering
of LNG.
For each part of the transfer chain a number of attributes related to the solution is analysed. The overall
ambition is to establish maturity of solutions and need for development. This will enable a suggested
technology deign to cater for the LNG bunkering requirements.

Figure 1 Bunkering transfer chain


Source: Courtesey of Mikael Johansson, DNV Advisory Services

A further description of the logistic chain system and included components is made in the text below.
LNG bunkering could be arranged either by a hose or by a loading/unloading arm as the flexible element
between the ship and shore or ship-to-ship. In the above chain the break away coupling is the safety device
for disassembly in case of emergency. This chain is a manually connected and disconnected chain.
For bunkering chains with arms the automatic connection and release is arranged by a hydraulic coupler. The
coupler could be quickly released by hydraulic pressure, either activated from a push button by the bunkering
superintendent or automatically triggered by the emergency release system.
The components and its functions are described in the text below.

-4-

1.

Bunker supply

1.1

Bunker vessel

Logistic chain unit

Bunker vessel 2500 m3

Figure 2 LNG Bunker Vessel


Source: FKAB

Brief description

Bunker vessel that transport LNG from the main or local storage tank to the bunkering site.
The bunker vessel can also receive LNG from a feeder vessel nearby the bunkering site.
Bunkering to end user is done directly from the bunker vessel through a flexible hose. Can
also be used as a feeder vessel for short distances, depending on the operational
limitations.

Technology maturity/
experience

Ship to ship bunkering in small scale has not yet been carried out.

References

LNG bunkering with ship to ship transfer has not yet been carried out, only large scale
transfers between LNG carriers. The LNG Ship to Ship (STS) bunkering procedure (report)
addresses this topic thoroughly.

Unit interface with


logistic chain

From: Intermediate storage


To: Storage on vessel

Infrastructure

Economic
aspects;

Efficient transportation and bunkering of large volumes of LNG, but investment


costs are high (see costs for feeder vessel);

Space / site
requirements
& size;

High flexibility;

Eliminates the need for designated LNG bunkering zones on shore. Less likely to
interfere with cargo operations or passenger boarding;

Can also be used as feeder vessel if designed for e.g. open water operation.

Scalability &
flexibility.

Limitations / Feasibility

High investment costs require a certain LNG volume to be economically viable. This is the
most likely way to bunker large volumes of LNG within a short time frame. This is
particularly relevant for ships such as ferries and RoPax operating on fixed timetables with
short turn around time in port.

Associated risks

Mainly fire and explosion related to leakage of LNG or grounding and collisions. Often
bunkering will take place close to residential areas. Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) should
be considered a risk, though proof of harm or damage from RPT has not yet been put
forward.

Applicable rules &


regulations

IGC code, local port regulations, IGF code (will also cover bunkering operations)

-5-

1.2

Trailer

Logistic chain unit

Truck and trailer


for local
distribution
(30 - 80 m3)

Figure 3 Truck and trailer for LNG distribution


Source: Gasum OY

Brief description

Transportation of LNG in tanks that are carried on trucks. Trucks can be used both for
distribution within a port, and for longer ranges.

Technology maturity /
experience

Proven and mature technology, trucks have been used for distribution of LNG in USA since
1969. LNG distribution by truck for marine use has been carried out since 2001 in Norway.

References

Currently using trucks for LNG distribution in the Nordic countries: Gasum, Barents Naturgass
(BNG), Gasnor, Nordic LNG/Skangass, AGA

Unit interface with logistic


chain

From: LNG storage terminal

Infrastructure

Truck and trailer:

Economic aspects;

To: End users and ships to be bunkered

Example of costs:

350,000 500,000 Euro (Norway and Sweden) for typical 55 m 3 size;

Approx. 650,000 Euro (Sweden) for 80 m3 size (current road weight restrictions of
60 tonnes total limits the maximum LNG volume to 65 m 3).

Space / site
requirements & size;

A flexible way to transport LNG on land and in port, however in general poor economy of scale
and high unit transportation costs.

Scalability &
flexibility.

Can function as backup system for bunkering barge or feeder vessel due to e.g. severe ice
conditions

Limitations / Feasibility

Low capacity per unit and limited by road access.

Associated risks

Fire and explosions related to leakage of LNG as well as fatal accidents.

Applicable rules & regulations

Road transport regulations such as The European Agreement concerning International Carriage
of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), national road transport regulations and limitations

-6-

1.3

Fixed installation

Logistic chain unit

Bunkering from fixed


land based tank
(10 - 1,000 m3 per tank)

Figure 4 LNG storage tank


Source: Courtesey of Liquiline AS

Brief description

The LNG is stored in permanent storage systems and transported to the ship through pipes. A
flexible hose to connect the ship with the land based system is needed. There will be a safety
zone around the tanks, which can be of concrete type or double walled vacuum insulated type.

Technology maturity /
experience

Transfer of LNG between ships/trucks and stationary tanks are well proven technology, both
large and small scale. For bunkering of ships specifically; the LNG tanks at Halhjem quay (see
picture above).

References

Halhjem, Norway (bunkering of ferries), Flor, Norway (bunkering of offshore vessel), LNG
import/export terminals world wide, small industrial terminals in the Nordic countries.

Unit interface with logistic


chain

From: Intermediate storage


To: Storage on vessel

Infrastructure

Economic aspects;

Examples of actual budgeted LNG storage and bunkering facility costs:

5,000-10,000 m3: Euro 12 24 million;

3,500 m3: Euro 10 million;

1,000 m3: Euro 2 million;

500 m3: Euro 2 million.

Space / site
requirements & size;

A permanent LNG storage terminal at the bunkering site is required

Scalability &
flexibility.

Can be used in large scale, system is not mobile

Limitations / Feasibility

The storage tanks have to be located in close proximity to the bunkering site.

Associated risks

Mainly fire and explosion related to leakage of LNG or grounding and collisions. Often bunkering
will take place close to residential areas. Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) should be considered a
risk, though proof of harm or damage from RPT has not yet been put forward.

Applicable rules &


regulations

Local/national port regulations, Pressure Equipment Directive (PED), EN 1473 and EN 1474,
ISO/FDIS 28460, NFPA 59A, EN 14620, ISO 31010, ISO 17776.

-7-

1.4

Mobile container solution

Delivery and storage of LNG in mobile container tanks is a flexible feeder option which gives a quick startup of the market in areas where no other LNG infrastructure is available.

Figure 5 LNG transport tank, ISO container 20'


Source: Chart-Ferox, DE

The LNG storage tank is installed in a sturdy frame as a mobile container of ISO standard size, normally
called 20' or 40'. This type of unit is approved for transportation under internationally accepted regulations:
The IMO Code for Dangerous Goods, the IMDG at sea respectively the ADR for road transport. The
containers could be handled by ship-to-shore gantry cranes in port terminals and loaded to ADR trucks and
semi trailers for delivery to LNG-users, e g bunkering of LNG in small ports.
Normally the containers are fully equipped for connection to site installations and loading/unloading of
LNG. When used as storage tanks in land installations the location shall follow the same regulations as for
siting of a standard LNG storage tank.
The containers could also be delivered to and used on board of ships for storage of LNG, instead of normal
bunkering, according to proposal by Wrtsil, see below. This option is of course very valuable when there is
limited space in the machinery area of ships but it will on the other hand occupy space on deck area.

-8-

Figure 6 Location of ISO container on ship


Source: Wrtsil Diesel, Finland

This type of tank could be used both as storage tank on shore for bunkering of ships and could be bunkered
on shore and transported onto the ship and used as storage tank for LNG to the ship.

1.5

Bunkering barge / artificial island

In most European ports the available area as well as surroundings are already utilized and other new
activities more than LNG bunkering are waiting for getting access. Location of one import terminal for LNG
bunkering could be sufficient for most ports but the competition on the market would also involve more than
on actor for LNG distribution. Therefore a bunkering barge including LNG storage tanks and
unloading/offloading facilities could be a valuable option for promoting LNG bunker facilities when no
alternatives ashore are available.
The main advantage of this option is therefore that there are no surroundings to inflict with. This would give
a quicker time for permittance to the location and, as most of the installations could be completed in
workshop and barge is brought to the site as a unit, also time for completion will be shorter compared to the
construction on shore.

-9-

Figure 7 Study of LNG transfer between ship and barge


Source: Keppel Offshore & Marine Technology Center

Both the option for mobile tank as will as the bunker barge are just mentioned as flexible solutions but they
are not detailed further in this report. Anyway the same technology of piping, hose or arm as well as quick
connectors and break-away couplings are also applicable for these two installation options.

- 10 -

2.

LNG Piping

2.1

Brief description of possible solutions

o LNG piping design has to consider risk of boil off from heat leaks and varming of pipes due to ambient
conditions. Possibility for ship to ship transfer will provide short piping installations compared to land
installations.
Pipe installation shall consider use of expansion and contraction loops for the temperature variations between
the pre-cooling and sub-cooling before start op pumping and the drain and purging and inspections after
tests.
Steel grade SS304L (equivalent to EN 10 216-5 grade EN 1.4306) is the most commonly used LNG piping
material. Piping components such as reducers and bends are also easily available in this grade. Piping design
includes stress calculation for sustained loads and thermal expansion and pipe sizes to be chosen
accordingly. As a guideline the piping schedule shall not be smaller than 10S for LNG transfer installations.
Welding is carried out by qualified welders according to ASME IX or EN 287-1 according to a qualified
welding procedure similar to other austenitic stainless steels and qualified according to ASME IX or EN ISO
15614-1. Suitable filler metal is type 308L, available for weld methods 111 and 141.
Mechanical and thermal insulation of stainless steel piping could be chosen as a foam based or a powder
insulation techniques such as perlite. Insulation media containing isocyanate shall be avoided as this material
has consequencies for work environment on site. When the prefabricated pipes are produced the insulation
will be built up with in-between layers to prevent moisture and slip into next layer. During process
temperature variations the pipe and the contact insulation layer expand differently and this shall be taken into
consideration in the design by the insulation manufacturer and the site insulation contractor.

2.2
Technology 1# and 2#: Two different techniques for
insulation
The heat leak coefficient shall be considered during the pipe design stage and assessed in evaluation between
manufacturers and different type of insulation techniques. The acceptable heat leak coefficent shall be agreed
in advance and guaranteed by the installation contractor and verified after heat leak tests at site. For efficient
installation on site the pipes shall be prefabricated and preinsulated with as correct lengths as possible and
also bends with extended weld ends shall be preinsulated from works. Then foaming is made only on site
welds which gives the safest and the most economical installations.
Technology #1
LNG Bunker pipe.1
This system is a pre-insulated, polyuretan foam pipe-in-pipe design, where the inner pipe is stainless steel
SS304L. The inner pipe filled with media moves axially due to temperature variations on the jacket of high
density polyethylene which is sliding on the outer protective pipe. The pipe sections shall be prefabricated in
correct lengths and field welds or flange connections will be foamed on site.
The below picture shows a prefab item to be used in a LNG piping system.
1

www.lr-marine.dk

- 11 -

Figure 8 Prefabricated LNG piping spool, with insulation and outer jacket
Source: LR Marine, DK

Technology #2
Vacuum insulated pipes2
Vacuum insulated pipes consists of an inner medium pipe in grade SS304L and a thermal radiation shield
coated on. This pipe is surrounded by a vacuum space contained by a jacket, protective, pipe.
With this techniques the number of expansions joints can be reduced when expansion bellows are
prefabricated in the inner medium pipe and included in the containment of the jacket pipe.
The vacuum insulation in the space between the medium pipe and the jacket pipe effectively reduces the
conductive and the convective heat transfer rate from the cryogen pipe to the outside and further the layers of
insulation reflects the radiation from the jacket pipe to the inner pipe. The vacuum in the void space is
supervised and alarm will alert if vacuum is reduced. The jacket pipe also works a second barrier of
protection against any LNG gas leaks.

www.chart-ind.com, www.phpk.com

- 12 -

Figure 9 Vacuum insulation of pipe spool


Source: PHPK

Technology #3
INVAR3

Figure 10 Pipe Installation with Invar grade, 10 and 28


Source: Osaka Gas

The invar piping, an alloy of 64 % Fe and 36 % Ni, has been developed to cope with the linear expansions of
pipelines in SS304L. The coefficient of linear expansion for Invar is only 10 % of the austenitic stainless
steel coefficient which means that the piping construction could be carried out without expansion loops but
with the same methods of insulation (polyurethane respectively vacuum insulation). The invar alloy has
similar yield strength as the austenitic stainless steeels but lower tensile limit. Filler metal for welding is
developed and available as Nilo CF36.4

3
4

www.osakagas.co.jp
See further on the web place http://www.rolledalloys.com/products/nickel-alloys/invar-36

- 13 -

With this technology it is possible to construct in-ground cryogen pipelines, so called pipe in pipe, where
numbers of expansion joints could be reduced.5

3.

Valves

3.1

Possible technical solutions

Valves in the LNG transfer system are used for opening/closing and shut-off purposes:
to disconnect a section of piping for service and maintenance by manually operated valves;
to start or finish a normal operation sequence by automatically controlled valves;
for emergency shut-off purposes.
Minimum valve rating for LNG transfer system, 16 bar operating pressure, should be PN16 or 150 lbs but it
is recommended not to choose lower pressure class than PN40 or 300 lbs.
Applicable valve material grades are stainless steel forgings SS304 and castings such as CF3M and CF8M.
Valve seats in PTFE or metal seated for valves that shall be fire proof.
Valves bigger than 1 (DN25) shall be CE-marked according to the EU directives, mainly 97/23/EC, PED,
which includes also reference to applicable standards in the design and manufacturing. Type testing of LNG
valves for use at lowest design temperature is specified and performed according to EN 12567 (which
replaces the former national standard BS 6364).
Valve actuators need CE-marking according to machinery directive and actuators and sparking devices need
CE-marking according to ATEX.
Technology #1
Valco SNRI and Westad valves6.
Ball valves AMRI Danais7.
Ball valves and butterfly valves are used for normal operation sequencies.
Technology #2
Globe valve8.
Globe valve provided with pneumatic actuator.
For installations 2 (DN50) and smaller valves are available in brass and with threaded ends.

see web place


http://mobile.technip.com/sites/default/files/technip/publications/attachments/Marine_LNG_transfer_facilities_WEB.pdf
6
http://www.valcogroup.no/
7
www.amrivalves.com
8
www.herose.com

- 14 -

Technology #3
Mogas ESD/Hipps system9
Arrangement of valves for ESD between a high pressure and low pressure system. The trigger will shut off
minimum two valves to create a safe disruption in flow and minimize possibility for leaks.

Figure 11 Principal lay-out of ESD / Hipps system


Source: Mogas

4.

Hoses and Handling

4.1

Possible technical solutions

Cryogenic hoses are available for LNG services and especially developed for STS transfer in off-shore
conditions respectively for loading/unloading of road truck to LNG satellite stations.
Below are described some of the developments for hose dimensions 16 (DN400) and smaller.
Technology #1
Bluewater and DSM Dyneema Composite Cryogenic hose.10
Developed for Ship-to-ship transfer with high axial strength and special end fittings for load bearing and
sealing.
Design for 8 (DN200) sufficient for design pressure =20 bar and Burst test = 100 bar.
LNG transfer capacity: 1250 m3/h.

www.mogas.com
www.bluewater.com

10

- 15 -

Figure 12 Composite Cryogenic hose with special end fitting reinforcement


Source: Bluewater DSM Dyneema

Technology #2.1
Gutteling composite hoses11
Composite, multilayer LNG ship-to-ship transfer hose, available in 6-16 for design pressure 10 bar and
burst pressure exceeding 100 bar. Type tests performed at cryogen conditions according to EN 13766, IMO
IGC Code and EN 1474-2.
Normal end connections by flanges, ANSI B16.5 150 lbs or 300 lbs.

Figure 13 Full scale test of 8 DN200 composite hose


Source: Gutteling NL

11

www.gutteling.nl

- 16 -

Technology #2.2
Trelleline LNG floating hose, from 12 (DN300)
Design based on API 17K and EN 1474-212

Figure 14 LNG transfer hose, floating service


Source: Trelleborg AB

Technology #3
Tergoflex Gas 200 White
Composite hose with inner and outer wires of stainless steel and multiple layers of polyamide fabrics.13

Figure 15 Composite hose in operation with cryogen service


Source: Tergo AB

4.2

Handling of Hoses

4.2.1
General
Handling of hoses in ship to ship bunkering, side by side, as well as from ship to shore shall normally be
done by use of marine cranes, built on deck of ship or on shore. The cranes shall be designed for operation in
ATEX environment, i e risk of sparks during operation shall be eliminated in design. For placing of hose one
by one the use of boom or jib crane is sufficient. For installation of several hoses either a gantry crane with
spreader shall be used or a telescopic crane as this is useful both to lance the hose over to the receiving ship
and to keep the hose in position during bunkering.

12
13

www.trelleborg.com
www.tergo.se

- 17 -

Figure 16 Boom crane with yoke adapted for use with single hose
Source: Mechan, UK

Figure 17 Anti-two-block system. This prevents contact sparks between boom or fly jib heads.
Source: Robry, AU

4.2.2
Connection and positioning for bunkering
Use of single hose, 1 och 1, is state-of-the art today in small bunkering operations, mainly from truck to
ship. For increase in bunkering capacity there will be need of using more than one hose and increase the size
of the hose. This will be valid both for the normal bunkering in liquid phase as well as in return of gas phase
to avoid back pressure build up or even too high pressure causing relief valve to open.
In offshore LNG transfer systems hoses are only suspended in each of the ends, see picture below, while the
mid part of the hose will be free hanging between the ships or the bunkering platform and the ship.

- 18 -

Figure 18 Connection of composite hose to a ship manifold


Source: Technip

Minimum required bending radius of cryogen hose for use with LNG is relatively small, about 1 m, for
DN200 (8). Anyway the utilized bending radius is one of the key factor for estimation of life time of hoses
so normally a bigger bending radius than minimum required gives a longer interval between change of hoses,
normally estimated to be two years between exchange.
Reliable operation of hoses is a key issue for the success of LNG as a ship fuel. A crack in the hose is one of
the worst case scenario inputs for the risk assessment for LNG bunkering. The main defect prevention
method is the low utilisation of design pressure during operation. As the operation pressure during bunkering
is estimated not to exceed 6 bar and the pressure rating for the cryogen hoses in composite material is in the
range of 12-20 bar, the utilisation is less then 50 % of allowable values as long as the hoses are handled
correctly. Moreover there is an inherent safety in design to cope with any extremely high pressure peaks due
to mishaps and ESD shut down incidences. Peak pressures up to 70 bar have been recorded during such
incidents with LNG, but the composite hoses shall be type tested to prove stability without leaking up to
100 bar. Such burst test is one of the requirement according to the current standard for cryogen hoses, EN
13766, and such proof tests are certified by the classification societies.
For handling in port terminals use of winch as well as keeping the hose free hanging in full length is a risk
point for several reasons. Therefore there is need for technology development both how to lance the hoses
over to the ship to be bunkered as well as to keep the hose in position during bunkering. This type of
handling will both avoid excessing stresses in the hose in the connection point in each end and it will keep
the hose in a safe position well over the minimum bending radius all the time. A proposal for this is shown
on the picture below.

- 19 -

Figure 19 Telescopic cranes lancing and holding hoses during operation.


Source: Palfinger, Austria

Need for technical development


To improve possibilities for use of hose together with quick connect / disconnect valves in port terminals or
in ship to ship transfer of LNG the following technical items have to be developed and tested:

Supporting structure or crane arm to bring, hold and take back the bunkering hose or hoses to the
ship to be bunkered;
Protective doors or flaps to maintain the suspended hose or hoses between the ships inside a shaded
and non accessible area during LNG bunkering;
The supporting structure to keep the hoses in a non accessible area when not in use, awaiting new
bunkering. On top of the structure the safety relief valve is located in offshore applications. A
suitable position when fuelling in port terminals to be found to avoid methane release after
bunkering.

5.

Loading Arms

5.1

Possible technical solutions

Marine LNG loading/unloading arms are mainly developed and in use for transfer in import/export LNG
terminals with pipe sizes ranging from 12 (DN300) and bigger. The equipment includes control units for
automatic or semi-automatic connections between ship and port installations and ESD and disconnection
devices for quick release in case of incidents occur. Loading arms in smaller sizes and suitable for bunkering
ship-to-ship are under development by suppliers.
For transfers to and from road tankers are available and in use similar type of loading arms. These are
designed for manual connection and disconnection.
The loading arm consists of movement alarm supervision system, emergency release system (ERS),
hydraulic or manual quick disconnector, electrical insulation flanges, nitrogen purge and drain line
connections, counter weights, swivel joints (see below), vacuum breaker and normally one line for liqiud
transfer and the second line for vapour return.

- 20 -

Technology #1
Loading arm for loading/unloading of road tankers.14
The loading arms could be used in the connection between truck and ship in order to reduce imposed forces
and moments into the piping or to the road truck due to movement in the ships.
This type of loading arm is installed on the ground and could be used for connection to a ship from a road
tanker. Small size loading arms are connceted and disconnected manually. For vapour return a separate arm
is necessary.

Figure 20 Loading arm for loading/unloading of trucks


Source: Emco Wheaton

Technology #2
Swivel joints15
An important part of the loading arms are the svivel joints which are installed in the pipe system to protect
the piping from torsional stresses when the installation is connected to a ship.
For LNG systems it is important that the bearings in the swivel are embedded in order not to get into contact
with the low temperature media. The picture below shows an example of swivel for cryogen use.

Figure 21 Swivel joint for cryogen service


Source: FMC Chiksan

Another manufacturer who has made research and type test of LNG marine arms including swivel system
and quick connect/disconnect couplers is Kanon in Holland. The specifications for use in LNG transfer
system meets the requirements of OCIMF, International Marine forum guidelines for marine loading arms
and EN1474-1. The tests are performed under supervision of Lloyds as notified body. 16

14

www.emcowheaton.com
www.fmctechnologies.com
16
See webplace www.kanon.nl
15

- 21 -

Technology #3
Marine loading arms17
Transfer of LNG ship-to-ship with assistance of loading arm is in development. The picture below is an
arrangement by a German manufacturer to meet the future demand of fuelling ships from a bunker ship. The
estimated arm dimensions are 3 to 6 (DN80 to DN150) and with included vapour return system.
The loading arm is equipped with ERS for quick disconnection in case of an emergency. At such occations
the shut off is arranged by ESD valves on each side of the arm. After release the arm is depressurized and
purged.

Figure 22 Marine loading/unloading arm for use on ship for ship to ship LNG transfer
Source: SVT Schwelm

6.

Connectors and Couplings

6.1

Possible technical solutions

Technology #1.1
Quick connections for small transfers, about 175 litres/min (50 GPM).18
For LNG transfer from road tankers to storage tanks which normally are performed with hose connections
and piping in size 1 (DN25). This nozzle is connected with the hose from the road tanker and is fitted by
hand to the receptacle as normally fitted on the storage tank or to a transfer pipe.

17
18

www.svt-gmbh.com
http://www.jccarternozzles.com

- 22 -

Figure 23 LNG fuelling nozzle for road tankers and small transfers, 50 Gallons per minute, about 1 m3/h

The similar design is available from Parker which is in use i a for fuelling of LNG vehicles.19

Figure 24 LNG fuelling nozzle and receptacle, Parker Kodiak serie 1, about 1 m3/h

A swivel is integrated in the nozzle which enhances the connect/disconnect action.


The design of the receptable to allow for use of other manufacturer nozzles.
Technology #1.2
Dry Gas Couplings for small transfers.20
These hose couplings in sizes between 1 to 4, DN25 DN100, are developed for handling LPG during
filling of storage tanks from a road tanker or railcar. As the couplings are dry the operator is not exposed to
gases when putting together or relaese the couplings. The devices are under development by Mann-Tec and
by other manufacturers for use in cryogen service, for LNG. Normal pressure rating of the couplings is 150
lbs or 25 bar, available in stainless steel and aluminium.

Figure 25 Dry Disconnect coupling, DDC


Source: Mann-Tek, Mariestad, Sweden

19 www.c-global.com/Alternative_fuel.htm
20
www.mann-tek.com

- 23 -

Technology #2.1
Break-away couplings.21
These break-away couplings are installed on each side of hose or marine arm to disconnect LNG flow in case
of emergency. The break is released by hydraulic pressure. These valves are available for sizes 1 (DN25
and above in pressure class 300 lbs or PN40. Steel grade is 316L and seals are low temperature PTFE.

Figure 26 Break-away couplings, supported by hydraulic pressure for stopping LNG transfer at trigger by emergency release system ERS
Source: HPFLAP, UK

Technology #2.2
Break-away couplings are in use for i a LNG transfer systems road tanker to storage tank. The coupling will
stop the flow and disconnect the truck from the storage tank inlet piping in case of emergency when a preset
value of maximum force in the pipe would occur, for instance if the road tanker is moved from its position
during the LNG transfer operation. The internals of the coupling are developed in order to provide almost a
drip free disconnection. 22

Figure 27. Break-away coupling, up to 8, DN200, max working pressure 26 bar


Source: Alpha Process Controls, homepage

When used for emergency shut down the trigger is achieved by communication from the ESD system by
means of a steel wire. When the wire is strapped it means that the road tanker is moving to the outer reach of
the parked position and the flow will stop. In case of further movement of the tanker, the pull in the wire will
cause the coupling to separate, i e similar to ESD 2.
The design of the couplings for use in road tanker system and piping system for a storage tank is based on
requirements for CE-marking according to PED, pressure equipment directive 97/23/EC. The normal design
21
22

www.hpflap.com
http://www.alphaprocess.co.uk/

- 24 -

standard is ASME VIII and corresponding piping code ASME B31.3. These standards are also referred as
design codes in the OCIMF Design and Construction Specification for marine loading arms, 1999.
Technology #3.1
Marine couplings with integrated valves and couplers.23

Figure 28 Marine loading arm with integrated valves and coupler


Source: MIB Italiana

This MIB Italiana quick connect / disconnect coupler is available in sizes from 2 (DN50), 150 or 300 lbs,
and upwards for cryogen service. The coupler connects hoses to and from vessel manifolds and is
hydraulically operated.
Coupler assemblies with double ball or butterfly valves with external release system is also available. This
system gives a dry disconnect both at normal or emergency release situations.

23

www.mibitaliana.it

- 25 -

Technology #3.2
Hydraulically operated coupler.24

Figure 29 Hydraulically operated coupler


Source: Kanon, NL

This hydraulically operated quick connect / disconnect coupler is designed by Kanon, Holland. The unit is
being tested for capturing mating flanges in distance of about 50 mm thus enhancing connections for LNG
transfer ship-to-ship by remote control.
Function of Dry break coupler respectively ERS valves installed for refuelling or bunkering systems:

During normal operations the dry break coupler is used for connections / disconnection of the
transfer hose to the refuelled / bunkered ship;
In case of emergency the ERS break away disconnects the hose from the refuelled / bunkered ship.
In small hoses the heavy movement itself creats a pulling force which release the coupler. In bigger
system the heavy move is triggering an alarm which force an hydraulic pressure to release the
coupler;
Shut off valves are closing on each side of the hose and after stop the hose is purged and emptied.

Discussion
One example of qualifying methods and equipment of transferring LNG for use i a in nearshore
environments is the ALLS project, The Amplitude-LNG Transfer System.25 In this project the use of
cryogenic flexibles were qualified according to LNG industrial standards, a o OCIMF Design and
Construction Specification, EN 1474 and qualification procedures from classification societies such as Det
norske Veritas and Bureau Veritas.
The project included four packages, regarding hoses, couplings, support structure and the control system.
24
25

www.kanon.nl
see www.igu.org and reference to Amsterdam conference 2006.

- 26 -

These packages are well in-line what needs to be qualified for use of LNG as a maritime fuel in ships.
Therefore it is recommended that the further qualification of quick connect / disconnect couplings,
emergency release couplings and guiding and alignment devices for use of smaller couplings, probably in the
range of 2 (DN50) to 12 (DN300) will be tested and qualified for use according to the same type of
programme and that the classification societies are invited for type approval certification of these
components.

7.

Safety Management

7.1

ESD System and Communication

Table 1 ESD system and communication


Logistic chain unit

Bunker station

Brief description

All ships loading or discharging LNG shall have an ESD system. Linked systems
are recommended to avoid damaged pipes by surge pressure on ESD valve
closing.

Technology maturity /
experience

Extensive experience of different systems from GAS loading and discharging


terminals

References

LNG terminals, LPG terminals other Gas terminals.

Unit interface with logistic


chain

Electric, pneumatic or fibre optic connector

Infrastructure

Economic aspects;

Space / site
requirements & size;

ESD system can be designed based on the on-board requirements. Larger


volumes of LNG might require more complex onboard ESD. The Link is quite
simple and is not expected to add significant costs to the total bunker station
investment. For small scale bunkering maybe the ESD link can be by-passed.
ESD system requires minimal space. Ordinary electronic isolation. ESD link
intrinsic safe.
Scalable from the small to large. The smallest maybe bypass the ESD link.

Scalability &
flexibility.

Limitations / Feasibility

?????????????????????????????????????????

Associated risks

Shut down due to poor ESD link connection


Unlinked ESD shut down may damage pipes by extensive surge pressure

Applicable rules &


regulations

SIGTTO guidelines
Class rules

Liquefied gas carriers recommendations are found in the IGC code. For a gas fuelled ships not all
recommendations for loading a LNGC is applicable for bunkering LNG, but many of the recommendations
are applicable also for Loading small amounts of LNG as bunker fuel. One system applicable is the ESD
(Emergency shutdown) system. The aim with this chapter is do make a summary of the class rules for
bunkering and the commonly used ESD systems. Finally a suggestion for ESD link for bunkering will be
made and motivated.

- 27 -

7.2
Regulations for Bunkering system onboard a gas fuelled
ship
The vessels Class rules will in detail specify the requirements for the on board systems. The filling station
system must fit with most vessels regardless of classification society.
The complete details must be found in each class society rules, below is a short summary of SIGTTO
guidelines and ABS Guide for propulsion and auxiliary systems for gas-fuelled ships.
Detailed instruction manuals are to be provided onboard, covering the operations, safety and maintenance
requirements and occupational health hazards relevant to the use of gas as fuel.

7.3

7.4

General
The bunkering system is to be arranged so that no gas is discharged to air during the gas storage tank
filling operations;
A manually operated stop valve and a remote operated shutdown valve in series, or a combined
manually operated and remote valve, are to be fitted in every bunkering line close to the bunker
supplier connecting point. It is to be possible to release the remote operated valve in the control
location for bunkering operations and/or another safe location;
Means are to be provided for draining the liquid from the bunkering pipes at bunkering completion;
Bunkering lines are to be arranged for inerting and gas freeing. During operation of the vessel the
bunkering pipes are to be gas free.

Emergency Shutdown System


An emergency shutdown system is to be fitted to stop bunker flow in the event of an emergency. The
design of the ESD system is to avoid the potential generation of surge pressures within bunker
transfer pipe work;
The ESD system is to be activated by the manual and automatic inputs listed in Table 1. Any
additional inputs should only be included in the ESD system if it can be shown their inclusion does
not reduce the integrity and reliability of the system overall;
A functional flow chart of the ESD system and related systems is to be provided in the fuel
bunkering control station and on the bridge;
One ESD valve is to be provided at each manifold connection. The ESD valve may also be the
remote operated valve required;
ESD valves are to be remotely operated, be of the fail closed type (closed on loss of actuating
power), are to be capable of local manual closure and have positive indication of the actual valve
position;
ESD valves in liquid piping systems are to close fully and smoothly under all service conditions
within 30 seconds of actuation. Information about the closure time of the valves and their operating
characteristics is to be available onboard, and the closing time is to be verifiable and reproducible;
The closing time of the valve referred to, (i.e., time from shutdown signal initiation to complete
valve closure) is not to be greater than:

where:
U = ullage volume at operating signal level, in m3
LR = maximum loading rate agreed between ship and bunker supplier, in m3/h

- 28 -

The loading rate is to be adjusted to limit surge pressure on valve closure to an acceptable level, taking into
account the loading hose or arm, the ship and the bunker supplier piping systems where relevant.

7.5

Control and Monitoring


Control of bunkering is to be possible from a safe location in regard to bunkering operations. At this
location the tank pressure and tank level are to be monitored. Overfill alarm and automatic shutdown
is also to be indicated at this location;
A local reading pressure gauge is to be fitted between the stop valve and the connection to the
bunker supplier at each bunker pipe;
Pressure gauges are to be fitted to gas pump discharge lines and to the bunkering lines;
An independent ESD system is to be operational during bunker operations and is to be controllable
from both the bunker supplier and the receiving ship to enable a safe shut down in the event of an
emergency during bunker delivery. The ESD actions are to be coordinated;
As a minimum, the ESD system is to be capable of manual operation by a single control on the
bridge, the safe control position required above and at least two strategic positions around the bunker
loading area.

The monitoring and safety shutdowns for the fuel bunkering system are to be in accordance with Section 4,
Table 1, of the ABS Guide.
Table 2 in the ABS Guide shows the alarms required on board (class ABS) and which of these shall trigger
ESD.
Table 2 The required parameters to monitor and alarm limits
Source: ABS
Monitored Parameters

Alarm

Automatic Shutdown of
the Manifold ESD Valves
(1)

Gas detection at enclosed or semi enclosed bunker


station above 20 % LEL

Gas detection at enclosed or semi enclosed bunker


station above 40 % LEL

Fire detection at bunker station

Fire detection in gas fuel storage room, compressor room


or fuel preparation rooms

Loss of ventilation in ducting around the gas bunkering


lines

Gas detection in ducting around gas bunkering lines


above 20 % LEL

Gas detection in ducting around gas bunkering lines


above 40 % LEL

High level in gas storage tank

High pressure in gas storage tank

Manual ESD shutdowns

Manual or automatic ESD signal from bunker supplier


Loss of ESD valve motive power

(2)

- 29 -

Notes
1 ESD signal and automatic activation of the ESD valves on the bunker receiving ship to activate automatic
shutdown of the ESD valves and supply pumps at the bunker supplier.
2 ESD valves are to be of fail closed type
Source (ABS)

7.6

ESD

Figure 30 Principle of the ESD system for a LNGC.


The extra route, labelled ESD in this example, is to allow LNG carriers to maintain a path for the safe disposal of vapour by avoiding unnecessary
disruption to gas burning or the GCU.
Source: SIGTTO

7.7

Possible technical solutions

Technology #1 Unlinked bunkering


If investigations reveal that, under normal and emergency operating conditions, the risk of damage by surge
is judged by all parties to be tolerable, then transfer with an unlinked shut down system could be considered
acceptable. Operators should be aware that changes to a plant design or to operating procedures may
invalidate the original studies that led to the decision not to fit a linked system. A formal review should be
performed if changes have taken place (SIGTTO 2009)
The above exception opens for bunkering without a linked system, a method that might be suitable for
bunkering of small volumes and low flow rates. Still an onboard ESD system (unlinked) need to be installed
and in use.

- 30 -

Technology #2 SIGTTO Electric Link system


This system was the result of a collaborative effort by SIGTTO members to produce a standardised,
intrinsically safe (IS) delay-free ESD link using standard components as described in Recommendations and
Guidelines for Linked Ship/Shore Emergency Shut-down of Liquefied Gas Cargo Transfer. The system is
available as a package from Measurement Technology Ltd (MTL), although because standard interface
components are used, other manufacturers are free to produce a compatible link. The advantages of the
system are that it provides an ESD-1 signal in both directions; arming the link requires resetting in a
particular sequence. The whole system is designed and certificated to ensure its intrinsic-safety is not
compromised and it incorporates features for testing and fault indication. The standard kit includes a
pendant extension unit intended as an interim measure for use where no alternative ESD ship/shore link is
available.
They are generally used in LPG and chemical gas transfer operations where many LPG carriers in the
international trades are so fitted.
Although the system has been installed in a few LNG carriers to maximise spot trading advantages, none of
the major international LNG projects have adopted the SIGTTO link as the primary system and, to date, the
use of this system within the LNG sector has been limited to the Norwegian LNG coastal network, operating
small LNG carriers. LNG projects generally require telephone signals, and sometimes other data, to be sent
via the ship/shore link. While the SIGTTO link has advantages over other electric link systems in terms of
assured intrinsic-safety and standardisation, the system is limited to ESD functions and is not able to pass
other signals, a factor which will have effectively ruled it out as a candidate for selection by new LNG
projects.
However, as only two of the five pins in the international connector are required for the ESD function, a
pair of spare cores could be made available for other functions while still allowing compatibility with
existing installations. Now that intrinsically-safe multiplexers are readily available it may be feasible to use
this technology to pass a variety of data signals via the unused spare. IS-multiplexers with up to 64 channels
are already in use in the gas industry, hence the potential exists to expand the use of the SIGTTO link for
telephony and data transfer. If there is sufficient support within the industry for enhancing the SIGTTO Link
in this way, it should be developed as a collaborative effort to ensure that equipment and selection of data
channels is standardized.

Figure 31 Wiring of SIGTTO Electric link system


Source: SIGTTO

- 31 -

Technology #3 Fibre-Optic Ship/Shore Link System


The first optical fibre link system was developed by Sumitomo in association with Furukawa, and came into
commercial use at Japanese LNG terminals in time for the start-up of the Australian North West Shelf
project in 1989. A compatible system was later developed by SeaTechnik, initially to supply markets outside
Japan.
The system uses a 6-core fibre-optic cable; two used for an ESD-1 signal in each direction; two cores used
with a multiplexer to provide four data channels; two cores spare. One of the data channels is normally
reserved for mooring load monitoring and the other three for telephones.
Compatible fibre-optic systems are used in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, India, Middle East,
Africa, UK and the US. Until 2009, about 90 % of all LNG carriers and 65 % of all LNG terminals had links
based on this system.
Technology #4 Pyle National Electric System
One electric system to be used was introduced by the El Paso Corporation in 1976 for the Bethouia, Algeria
to Cove Point LNG project. The cable, comprising 16 shielded pairs, was connected at each end using PyleNational AF series explosionproof control connectors. This system was subsequently adopted by other
terminals receiving LNG from Algeria.
These systems are primarily in use in the Atlantic Basin, Europe and Mediterranean ports but may also be
found in addition to alternative systems in ports in West Africa, the Middle East and India. Up until 2009
about 70 % of all LNG carriers and 50 % of LNG terminals had systems based on the Pyle-National cable
connection.
The original configuration provided for ESD-1 signals in each direction and three telephone connections, as
well as continuity loops and various other signals that were peculiar to individual berths. Regrettably, there
are now numerous idiosyncratic pin configurations in use at many terminals.
Although variations in pin configurations generally could be accommodated with dedicated ships in liner
trades, ship/shore links based on the Pyle-National connector have now been adopted at over forty-five LNG
terminals. It has also been adapted to suit systems on many more LNG carriers, many of which are engaged
in cross-trading so, despite the efforts of one particular supplier to standardise, compatibility is becoming
increasingly difficult with the burgeoning LNG trade. Without any overall control there is also the danger of
insufficient regard to limiting energy in telephone connections, for example. (SIGTTO)
Technology #5 Miyaki Electric System
This electric system was first installed at the start-up of the Malaysia LNG project in 1983. The original
system, installed at the export terminal at Bintulu and the Japanese receiving terminals at Sodegaura,
Higashi-Ohgishima and Futtsu, comprised of three cables each connected by a colour-coded Miyaki Denki
21-E-PT explosion-proof connector. One connector was used for ESD and the other two for telephones. The
ESD link originally operated only in the ship to shore direction at the loading terminal, and in the opposite
direction at the discharge terminals, but it was subsequently modified to provide signals in both directions at
Bintulu and in some Japanese terminals. The fibre-optic system was later adopted as the primary ship/shore
link for this project, the Miyaki link being retained only as a back-up system. In Japan, this design of ESD
link is still in use for some LPG projects.
However, Miyaki Denki 21-E-PT connectors were also used when Korea began importing Indonesian LNG
into Pyeong Taek in 1986. Only two cables are used in the Korean terminals and the pin configuration is
different to that used for the Malaysia/Japan project. One connector provides an ESD-1 shutdown signal
(shore ship direction only), the other connector is used for telephones. (SIGTTO)

- 32 -

Technology #6 Pneumatic ESD Link system


The earliest ship/shore links used in LNG projects were simple pneumatic umbilical links, an air hose
coupled directly into the ships air security system. Such systems are inherently slow in operation, suffer
from problems caused by dirt or moisture and it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve accurate and
repeatable timing. The designer must be aware that the diameter of the pipework and dump valve can
significantly influence the closing time.
These drawbacks have led to the development of electronic ESD systems with fibreoptic or various
intrinsically-safe electric systems providing the ship/shore link.
However, despite its disadvantages, having a pneumatic link is better than having no ESD link at all.
(SIGTTO 2009)
Technology #7 Radio Ship/Shore Link System
The original ship/shore link at Withnell Bay LNG Terminal comprised two radio links, one for ESD and one
for telecommunications. The system provided the same functionality as the fibre-optic system already
installed on the dedicated North West Shelf ships. Both radio systems proved unreliable and, eventually,
were un-maintainable. The system was abandoned and replaced by a SeaTechnik fibre-optic link system in
2003.
Radio ship/shore ESD links are generally considered unsuitable for the following reasons:

7.8

Radio regulatory regimes differ considerably around the world and the continuing commercial
demand for bandwidth require existing allocations to change from time to time, often at short notice.
The unlicensed low-power UHF bandwidths in the 430MHz region have very limited bandwidth for
other than ESD signals and the rapid growth of simple commercial and domestic applications leads
to failures due to local interference. This is less of a problem in remote desert export terminal areas
than for the import terminals which are often located in industrialised and populous areas.
The presently unregulated UHF bandwidths in the 2.4GHz region have much wider bandwidth
capability but the demands on bandwidth for both simple and complex applications, such as WiFi
radio LAN networks, are growing exponentially.
The duplex (bi-directional) ESD has to be fail-safe but with a response time of 500 ms or less. The
consequences of a spurious trip are commercially and operationally severe particularly for LNG
transfers.

Optional data link.

The ESD link only require one shut down signal. For a more efficient bunkering operation data transfer is an
interesting option.
The above described links all but pneumatic and SIGGTO link have lines for telephone, some links also
provide data links. The SIGGTO link however have 2 spare lines that can be used for data exchange and
telephone by use of for example DSL technology, multiplexer or a serial line.
Data to be shared is for example but not limited to. Note that the ESD-1 Signal is hardwired.

- 33 -

Table 3 Examples of data to be exchanged using data link


Receiver to filling station

Filling station to receiver

Number of bunker tanks

LNG flow

Bunker tank(s) ullage

LNG temperature

Bunker tank(s) pressure

LNG pressure

Bunker tank(s) temperatures

LNG transferred volume

Vapour return flow

Valve status

Vapour return temperature

Pump status

Vapour return pressure

Mooring line tensions

Bunker related alarms


Trim and List
Valve status
Start Controlled Shut down.

Controlled shut down finished

Since the IAS onboard receiver and in the bunkering station will be of different brands, type and age. It is
very important to make a standard of how data is shared

7.9

Choice of link system

Reading above ESD link descriptions two strong candidates for bunkering appear. These are fibre-optic ESD
link and the SIGTTO ESD link.
7.9.1

Motives to use the SIGTTO link for bunkering.


The link is used for Norwegian coastal LNG network, experience on small LNGC in the size of a
large LNG bunker vessel is present;
It is an open standard connector and a flexible solution there the pure ESD can be mandatory and
voluntary serial line interface can be implemented for the spare pins;
The link is widely used for LPG and chemical gas transfer operations, so the technology is proven
and safe;
The connector and the cable are simple and affordable for even the smallest operators.

7.9.2

Motives to not use the SIGTTO link for bunkering


Limited experience for LNGC use;
Data exchange limited.

7.9.3

Motives to use Fibre-Optical ESD link system


Widely used standard for LNG;
Very good for data communication;
Standard pin configuration;
Optical link totally reduce the risk of electric sparks.

7.9.4

Motives not to use Fibre-Optic


Expensive solution;
Splicing fibre-optics require special tools and knowledge.

- 34 -

Based on above analyze this project recommend the use of the SIGTTO ESD link with optional data
exchange on the spare lines in the 5 pin connector.

8.

Gas detection

Table 4 Properties of gas detectors


Logistic chain unit

Onboard alarm and monitoring system


Bunker station alarm and monitoring system

Brief description

Gas detectors (HC detectors) shall be mounted in various places, for example
inside the outer wall and double wall piping, and in any location there a gas
leakage is possible and ventilation is limited.

Technology maturity /
experience

IR
Laser
Catalytic

References

Gas terminals, gas users.

Unit interface with logistic


chain

Input to ESD system.

Infrastructure

Economic aspects;

Space / site
requirements & size;

Scalability &
flexibility.

Well known technology, sensors available on open market. Sensors might need
to be class approved.

Sensors for gas detection take no significant space.

Larger installation will probably need more sensors.


Limitations / Feasibility

NA

Associated risks

Detector failure

Applicable rules &


regulations

Class rules, sigtto guidelines.

8.1

Possible technical solutions

Gas detection can be made in many ways. Long time ago coal miners bring canaries into the mine. In case of
gas is present the canary stop singing and eventually die in the presence of life threatening gases. Later on,
chemically infused paper changing colour in the presence of a gas was used. Nowadays electronic gas
detectors are available with high accuracy, repeatability and availability.

- 35 -

Technology #1 Infrared26
Gas sensing by the Infrared (IR) detection method is based upon the absorption of infrared radiation at
specific wavelengths as it passes through a volume of gas. General Monitors IR detection technology
incorporates a light source and a light detector that measures the intensity of two different wavelengths, one
at the absorption wavelength and one outside the absorption wavelength. If a gas intervenes between the
source and the detector, the level of radiation falling on the detector is reduced and can be continuously
monitored. Gas concentration is determined by comparing the relative values between the two wavelengths.
Infrared gas detection is based upon the ability of some gases to absorb IR radiation. It is generally
understood that almost all hydrocarbons absorb IR at approximately 3.4 micrometers and at this region H2O
and CO2 are relatively transparent. It follows, therefore, that a dedicated spectrometer operating at this
wavelength could be used to detect combustible hydrocarbons in the air.
In IR point detectors, there is a fixed path length between the IR source and the IR detector (Figure 32).
The path length is typically short (a few inches) and the gas concentration is assumed uniform across the
path. With a fixed path length, the measurement of IR beam absorption by the gas being measured can be
expressed directly (% LEL in this case). Thus, a point IR detector is capable of giving a true measurement of
gas concentration at the point of detection. Open path IR detectors, as opposed to point detectors, expand the
gas sampling path from a few inches up to 100 meters to monitor large facilities for gas clouds.

Figure 32 Example of Infrared gas detector, IR2100 Point detector optical scheme
Source: General Monitors

Advantages
The major advantages of IR gas detectors are:
Immunity to contamination and poisoning;
Fail-to-safe operation;
No routine calibration;
Ability to operate in the absence of oxygen or in enriched oxygen;
Ability to operate in continuous presence of gas.

26

General Monitors, Combustible Gas Safety Monitoring: Infrared vs. Catalytic Gas Detectors

- 36 -

With the sophisticated optical designs currently in use, IR detectors are factory calibrated and are virtually
maintenance free. They are particularly desirable where detectors must be located in inaccessible areas.
Maintenance is limited to periodic cleaning of the optical windows to help ensure dependable performance.
Disadvantages
The limiting factors in IR technology are:
The initial higher cost per point. IR detectors in the past have been more expensive than catalytic
detectors at initial purchase, but they are rapidly coming down in price to cost parity with catalytic
detectors;
Higher spare parts cost;
The gas to be measured must be infrared active, such as a hydrocarbon;
Gases that do not absorb IR energy (such as hydrogen) are not detectable;
High humidity, dusty and/or corrosive field environments can increase IR detector maintenance
costs;
Routine calibration to a different gas is not practical;
A relatively large volume of gas is required for response testing;
Ambient temperature for detector use is limited to 70C;
Does not perform well for multiple gas applications;
Cannot replace the IR source in the field must be returned to factory for repair.
Technology #2 Laser27
Every gas is composed of atoms or molecules. These molecules have various frequencies or wavelengths at
which they resonate or vibrate. These are known as the absorption wavelengths because when the molecules
absorb a portion of the light energy, they vibrate at these wavelengths. Because molecules of other gases are
different, these gases absorb light at different wavelengths from the target gas. Wavelengths for gas detection
are chosen in regions that the absorption of the target gas does not interfere with the absorption wavelength
of any other gases that may be present.
A laser beam can be chosen which operates at a specific absorption wavelength for this target gas. The laser
operating wavelength is kept stable by housing it in a temperature controlled box. A fluctuating (saw-tooth)
current is used to drive the laser and this causes the wavelength to change slightly so that the laser scans
across the absorption wavelength. The laser beam has a signal superimposed on it at a different frequency.
Figure 33 The principle of Laser gas detectors.
Source: Boreal Laser Inc.

When the gas molecule is struck by the laser beam, the molecule is induced to vibrate. These vibrations
affect the laser beam by changing this superimposed frequency. This difference is detected by a receiver in
the instrument, after the laser beam is reflected back. The difference in the superimposed signal, together
with the intensity of the returning beam, is used by a computer to obtain a measurement of the target gas
concentration.

27

Boreal Laser

- 37 -

Figure 33 The principle of Laser gas detectors.


Source: Boreal Laser Inc.

The laser operates in the Near Infra-Red spectrum (1,300 to 1,700 nano meters) and cannot be seen with the
eye. It has a line width of about 0.3 nm and is concentrated and very intense. For the same power output, it is
able to penetrate dust and steam better than a visible laser. The laser beam is transmitted to a retro reflector
made with a special type of corner cube arrangement. This causes the signal to be reflected directly back to
the detector in the transmitter enclosure. With the appropriate number of reflectors, path lengths up to 1 km
can be traversed.
Advantages
Because of the very narrow 0.3 nm line width of the laser emission, there is no interference from
other gases;
Response times are in the order 1 second. This allow for fine resolution/control when making
process measurements;
The intense laser light concentrated at the absorption wavelength enables path lengths up to 1 km to
be measured;
An average measurement is taken over the total path so that a narrow plume of gas has less chance of
escaping detection;
The range of measurement can be up to 4 orders of magnitude, enabling concentrations of 0.1 ppm to
1,000 ppm to be measured;
Because of the internal reference cell, the system is self calibrating;
There is no poisoning or degradation of the instrument with long term exposure to a gas;
Can easily be conformed to be Intrinsically Safe;
Low maintenance and low operating costs;
Reliable technology.
Disadvantages
Only one gas can be measured with each instrument;
When heavy dust, steam or fog blocks the laser beam, the system will not be able to take
measurements. This is also the case when a person or vehicle blocks the path.
Technology #3 Catalytic28
Catalytic (or electrocatalytic) detectors are based on a highly responsive technology with over 39 years of
proven field experience. They are single-point detectors for combustible gas detection. Based upon the
simple principle that as combustible gas oxidizes it produces heat and the sensor converts the temperature
change via a standard Wheatstone Bridge-type temperature transducer to a sensor signal. The sensor
components consist of a pair of platinum heating coils embedded in a catalyst. Since the reactants are all
28

General Monitors, Combustible Gas Safety Monitoring: Infrared vs. Catalytic Gas Detectors

- 38 -

gaseous, the reaction takes place on the surface of this element with the combustible gases reacting
exothermically with oxygen in the air to raise its temperature. This results in a change of resistance within
the embedded coil, which is linearly proportional to gas concentration.
Advantages
The major advantages of catalytic detectors are that they are:
Robust;
Simple to operate;
Easy to install, calibrate and use;
Long lived with a low life-cycle cost;
Proven technology with exceptional reliability and predictability;
Immensely flexible with application;
Easily calibrated individually to gases such as hydrogen which cannot be detected using infrared
absorption.
Disadvantages
The limiting factors in catalytic detector technology are that:
Catalysts can become poisoned or inactive due to contamination;
The only means of identifying detector sensitivity loss due to catalytic poisons is by checking with
the appropriate gas on a routine basis and recalibrating as required;
When a sensor is located in an area known to contain potential poisons, it should be calibrated at
regular intervals and the results should be logged. The interval between calibrations should be
recommended by the manufacturer and then verified in the field;
Requires oxygen for detection;
Prolonged exposure to high concentrations of combustible gas may degrade sensor performance.
Technology #4 ultrasonic or acoustic gas leak detector29
Ultrasonic gas leak detectors respond to the ultrasonic noise, which pressurised gas leaks generate.
Therefore, they detect leaks instantly in a radius up to 20 m from the detector without having to wait for an
explosive gas cloud to build up and without being affected by wind conditions.
Instead of measuring a concentration level in LEL, the ultrasonic (acoustic) gas leak detection method is
based on the so called leak rate. This makes detection more reliable and efficient as it is possible to verify the
performance of the detection system.

29

Gassonic

- 39 -

8.2

Comparing overview of gas detectors

Table 5 Properties of the different gas detector types


Area

Infrared

Laser

Catalitic

Ultrasonic

Space requirement

Low

Low

Low

Low

Weight

Low

Low

Low

Low

Power requirement

Low

Low

Low

Low

Safety distances

No

No

No

No

Material requirements

NA

NA

NA

NA

Ventilation
requirements

NA

NA

NA

NA

Overview of
dimensions available

NA

NA

NA

NA

Maintenance and
inspection
requirements (cost)

Low

Low

Low

Low

Maintenance and
inspection
requirements
(unavailability in 5
year period)

Low

Low

Low

Low

8.3

Market overview

Table 6 Market overview of gas detetors


Area

Infrared

Laser

Catalitic

Ultrasonic

Supplier base

Several Global

Several Global

Several Global

One or a few

Low to moderate

Moderate

Low

Geographical
Cost

8.4

Comparing the systems

The IR detectors range from spot detection to open air gas cloud detection in up to 100 meter. Laser
detectors can detect gas in even larger distances. The catalytic detectors need direct contact with the gas. The
ultrasonic detectors does not measure gas concentration as the other s do, instead a leakage is detected very
early by the sound.
For a bunkering operation leakage detectors of different types might be useable. In closed compartments and
between walls of double wall pipes Catalytic or IR detectors seems like a suitable solution. For leakage
detection in open air, for example over the bunkering couplings, Infrared, Laser or ultrasonic might be
suitable.

- 40 -

9.

Other safety systems

Table 7 Properties of Integrated Automation System


Logistic chain unit

Onboard receiving vessel

Brief description

Alarm and monitoring systems are used to monitor ships engines, tanks, valves
and piping status etc. according to each vessels specification and class rules.
System handling analogue and digital signals. Some systems also include
control.

Technology maturity /
experience

Experience from most merchant ships in operation

References
Unit interface with logistic
chain

Signals to ESD system or integrated ESD system


Signals to/from ESD Link

Infrastructure

Economic aspects;

System in place onboard most ships. Signals to ESD system cause


additional cost. Additional sensors and signals for monitoring LNG
tanks and fuel systems;

Space / site
requirements & size;

The extra occupied space is limited to one or a few cabinets for I/O
modules.

Scalability &
flexibility.

Scalable, the more signals needed add some I/O modules and
cabinets.

Limitations / Feasibility

Small consumers might not have an alarm and monitoring system.

Associated risks

System error, systems are redundant.

Applicable rules &


regulations

Class rules.

9.1

Recommendation for safety system

Bunker station and receiving vessel shall have ESD system, all bunker stations shall have possibility to
connect a linked ESD system based on the SIGTTO Link. ESD link connection based on SIGTTO link is
strongly recommended for all LNG powered vessel.
A voluntary data and telephone link, based on multi channel multiplexers is recommended to implement for
the spare lines in the SIGTTO link. This link is to exchange the most important data for a fast, safe and
reliable bunkering.
Motives to have a physical link is based on the poor experience with the wireless systems, and the simplicity
of a pre break away arrangement by simply have some tension on the connector making it disconnect before
the maximum motion envelope for the breakaway coupling is exceeded.
The onboard system will be
Various sensors;
Separate ESD system or ESD implemented in Integrated Automation system;
ESD link connector.

- 41 -

The filling station systems will be


Various Sensors;
ESD system;
ESD link connector;
(Communication equipment);
Gas leakage detector for the LNG Hose and break away couplings.

9
Appendix 9
Safety Aspects/Risk Assessment
Table of Contents
1.

2.

Historical Experience of Accidents with LNG Bunkering of Ships ............. 3

1.1

Safety Records of LNG Incidents ......................................................................... 3

1.2

Shipping Incidents ................................................................................................ 3

1.3

Land Based Incidents............................................................................................ 6

Categories of Outcomes after LNG Release ............................................... 9

2.1

Cryogenic Damage ............................................................................................... 9

2.2

Asphyxiation......................................................................................................... 9

2.3

Pool Fire ............................................................................................................. 10

2.4

Vapour Cloud Fire .............................................................................................. 10

2.5

Explosions .......................................................................................................... 10

2.6

Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) ............................................................................ 10

3.

Event Tree Consequences from Spills to Water, Vessel, and Quayside Area

4.

Ship to Ship Bunkering: Evaluation of High Rate Scenarios ................... 13

4.1

Hard Collision or Contact Involving Bunkering Vessel ..................................... 13

4.2

Hard Collision Damage Bunkering Port Assembly of LNG Vessel ................... 14

4.3

Small Releases from Bunkering Lines or Valves During ESD Activation ........ 15

11

-2-

5.

Risks Imposed by Factors Related to Managerial and Organisational Aspects

6.

Sabotage and Terror Attacks .................................................................... 17

16

-3-

Appendix 9 Safety Aspects/Risk Assessment


1.

Historical Experience of Accidents with LNG


Bunkering of Ships

Compilation and statistical analysis of historical accident data often provide valuable background data for the
hazard identification process when maritime safety issues are addressed. For the area of LNG bunkering,
however, the area is new and only limited experience has been gained from a few years of operations and
trial applications. In Norway a number of passenger vessels, ferries and other vessels are operated with LNG
fuel and various types of land based LNG bunkering facilities are installed with tanks or arranged by mobile
LNG road tankers. So far no accidents have been reported from Norwegian LNG bunkering facilities or
bunkering operations and no records or statistics are available from existing incident reporting systems and
routines. In Norway 22 ships are supplied with LNG and 15,000 bunker operations are conducted annually.
In total more than 50,000 LNG operations have taken place without any incidents with significant LNG
release.
Large scale LNG handling and transportation of LNG in import/export LNG carriers are established in many
areas of the world and some risk experience is gained and reflected in accident statistics, related case
description and investigations. From statistical analysis of LNG carrier accidents with and without spillage of
LNG cargo it has been shown that the accident frequency decreased significantly during the period from
1964 to 1995. From the recorded accidents with LNG carriers during the period 1995 to 2005, the statistics
indicate that only about one tenth of the accidents were related to LNG specific incidents like failure of cargo
containment or incidents while loading/unloading1.

1.1

Safety Records of LNG Incidents

LNG transports and operation of LNG facilities have had over 60 years of development. During this time
there have been some incidents, but not one major general public fatality in the world has been caused by
LNG operations. In almost all accidents involving LNG resulting in explosions, confinement of LNG
vapours has had a large impact. New LNG technology has been incorporated into the design and operating
procedures of LNG facilities and/or government regulations.
The likelihood of a scenario leading to the total loss of containment involving an LNG tanker or a large LNG
storage tank must be considered in conjunction with the potential hazards such events pose and their impact
on the public. Safety precautions require that LNG facilities have secondary containment for LNG tanks and
LNG transfer facilities. In addition, the facility must maintain exclusion zones to protect the public from
potential thermal radiation and flammable vapour dispersion hazards.

1.2

Shipping Incidents

Few incidents have occurred involving maritime transport of LNG and there is insufficient statistical data
available to draw conclusions specific for LNG carriers. Collected data indicate that incidents rarely are
related to LNG as a cargo but rather to incidents related to shipping in general, applicable to all vessel types.

Maritime Safety Committee, 2007. Formal Safety Assessment LNG Carriers. .[online]. International Maritime Organization.
Available at: http://www.safedor.org/resources/MSC_83-INF-3.pdf [Accessed 11 Nov 2011].

-4-

Table 1 Ship accidents involving LNG shipping.


Serious accidents 1995 -2009

No. of acc.

% of total

Killed/
Missing

Pollution
verified

Collision

50

26 %

Contact

4%

Fire/Explosion

26

13 %

29

Foundered

14

7%

24

Hull/Mchy. Damage

63

32 %

1%

33

17 %

195

100 %

53

14

Miscellaneous
Wrecked/Stranded
Total

Some of the reported incidents and accidents that have occurred when handling LNG at sea are listed below.
Statistical comparison between oil carriers and gas carriers indicate that LNG vessels generally are less
incident-prone. There is a slightly higher incident frequency for oil carriers but it is difficult to conclude that
oil carriers are more incident-prone. Membrane tankers have four barriers: outer hull, inner hull, primary
LNG container, and secondary LNG containment.

2009: Puerto Rico - Matthew grounded but no spill;


2008: Everett, MA - Catalunya Spirit carrying 138 000 m3 LNG lost its propulsion system making
the vessel drift for hours;
2006: Elba Island - LNG tanker Golar Freeze was pulled 5 m from the pier by a surge from a passing
ship;
2002: Gibraltar - Norman Lady was struck by a submarine which was rising to periscope depth,
causing minor damage to the outer hull;
1989: Skikda, Algeria - ship was blown from its docking berth during severe winds. Loading arms
had not been drained and LNG spilled on deck causing fracture;
1985: LNG spilled on deck on Isabella due to a cargo tank overflow causing severe cracking of the
steelwork;
1980: En route to Japan - LNG Libras propeller shaft fractured with a full LNG cargo;
1979: Gibraltar - El Paso Paul Kayser, grounded onto rocks causing hull damage. No loss of cargo
occurred;
1979: Japan - LNG Taurus, 125 000 m3 capacity, grounded onto rocks. No cargo loss;
1979: Everett, MA - LNG spill on steel cover of cargo tank caused cracking of the steel plate;
1979: Mostafa Ben Boulaid, Cove Point - A check valve failed during unloading, releasing LNG and
causing some minor fracture of the deck plating.

Additional information on the accidents summarised above are listed in Table 1.

-5-

Table 2 Maritime accidents involving LNG shipping.


Incident
year

Vessel name
and/or place

Status

Consequence

Tank type

Comment

1965

Cinderella

Loading

Fractures

Overfilling resulting in tank cover and deck


fractures

1965

Methane Princess

Disconnecting
after
discharge

Deck fracture

Valve leakage leading to deck fracture

1969

Polar Alaska

Transportation

LNG vapour
release

Violent sloshing of LNG in refrigerated tank


en route to Alaska caused cable tray to
break loose. This in turn slashed thin
membrane cargo tank wall releasing
contents. No fire or explosion reported.

1971

Descartes

Mechanical
problems

LNG vapour
release

Gas leak from tank, faulty connection


between tank dome and membrane wall.
Crew reportedly tried to conceal leak from
authorities. Mechanical failure.

1976

At Guayaquil,
Ecuador

Unloading

> 50 people
injured

A short circuit on unloading tanker ignited


LNG vapor. A series of explosions
destroyed five natural gas tanks and
wrecked Shell Oil Co jetty over three
hours before fire fighters helped by light
rain managed to keep fire under control.

1977

LNG Delta

Loading at
terminal

1 killed

Membrane

Aluminum valve failure on contact with


cryogenic temperatures. Wrong aluminum
alloy on replacement valve. LNG release
but no vapor ignition.

1977

LNG Aquarius

Loading

LNG spill

Moss

Tank overfilled while loading

1979

Mostafa Ben
Boulaid

Unloading

Fracture of the
deck plating due
to LNG spill

Membrane

A check valve failed when unloading,


releasing LNG and causing some minor
fracture of the deck plating. Activation of
the ESD system and water spray system
kept the incident from propagating.

1979

Hoegh Galleon

Unloading

LNG spill

Moss

Valve leakage. Tank cover plate fractures.

1979

Pollenger, Everett,
MA

LNG spill

Cracking of steel
plate

1985

Isabella

Unloading

LNG spill

1989

Loading

27 fatalities?

LNG spill on steel cover of cargo tank


caused cracking of the steel plate
Membrane

LNG spilled on deck due to a cargo tank


overflow causing severe cracking of the
steelwork. The cause was failure of a
cargo valve during unloading
During loading of 17,000 tonnes of
liquefied natural gas (LNG), the vessel
broke free in heavy weather damaging 4
loading arms. A small leakage of the
product occurred. The vessel dragged its
anchors in the early hours, and was
battered by force 10 winds and smashed
to the break water. Out of a crew of 29
only two survived the incident.

-6-

Incident
year

Vessel name
and/or place

Status

Consequence

Tank type

Comment

1989

Tellier

Alongside
shore facility,
loading

Damage to
equipment,
several injuries

Membrane

Broke moorings. Hull and deck fractures.


Wind blew ship from its berth at Skikda,
Algeria. Cargo transfer arms sheared.
Piping on ship heavily damaged. No LNG
released; cargo transfer had been
stopped. No PERC system8. According to
some verbal accounts of this incident, LNG
was released from the cargo transfer arms.
Broke moorings whilst loading at Skikda in
heavy weather on 15.2.89. Hull and deck
damaged.

1990

Bachir Chihani

1996

LNG Portovenere

In sea trials
(Empty)

6 dead

2001

Khannur

Unloading

Damage to dome

Moss

Minor leak of cargo reported just before


discharging; damage to dome reported,
overpressurisation of tank suspected.

2002

Mostefa Ben
Boulaid

Unloading

Cracked deck
due to spillage

Membrane

A spillage resulting in a cracked deck.


Thought to be human error as the alarm
that should alert personnel had been
isolated. No injuries.

2006

Golar Freeze

Unloading

Emergency
disconnect

940 foot LNG tanker was pulled 15 feet


from the pier by a surge from a passing
ship. An emergency disconnect coupling
on the terminal unloading arm prevented
any release. All safety procedures and
equipment worked as planned although
dock gangway was damaged as well as
some mooring lines.

2008

Catalunya Spirit

Mechanical
problems

Drifting

Loss of propulsion system due to computer


failure making the vessel adrift for hours
about 25 miles east of Provincetown on
Cape Cod before being tied to four
tugboats.

1.3

Sustained structural cracks allegedly


caused by stressing and fatigue in inner
hull.
Had fire break out in engine room about
13 nautical miles off Genoa. Fire quickly
brought under control and extinguished.
Damage minor. In tow. Engine room fire
during sea trials near Genoa, Italy. CO2
fire extinguishing system discharged
before engine room was evacuated. Five
technicians and one ABS surveyor died.

Land Based Incidents

Some well-known land based incidents are listed below. Many of them involve vapor release that was ignited
leading to sometimes severe consequences. It is essential to minimize leakage of LNG vapor in case of
release and to keep LNG activities separated from other activities. Combustion/ventilation air intake
equipment, flammable refrigerants and liquids need to be on a safe distance. Released LNG vapor cannot
travel far without being ignited. Explosions and fire usually cause further damage to equipment and facilities.
When handling LNG and other cryogenic substances material needs to withstand the low temperatures.
Stainless steel and nickel steel (9 %) are often used and as a safety precaution primary and secondary
containment systems are used to contain potential LNG spills on-site. If a leak occurs, the hazard depends on
both the amount of energy release and the release rate. Explosion energy causes a shock wave that travels
outwards and can cause severe damage to people and property.

-7-

Skikda, Algeria, 2004: 27 killed, 5 injured;


Bontang, Indonesia, 1983: 3 killed;
Cave Point, US, 1979: 1 killed , 1 injured;
Camel Plants, Algeria, 1977: 1 killed;
Staten Island, US, 1973: 40 killed;
Portland, US 1968: 4 killed;
Raunheim, Germany 1966 : 1 killed, 75 injured;
Cleveland, US, 1944: 128 killed and 225 injured.

Additional information on the accidents summarised above are listed in Table 3.


Table 3 Land based accidents involving LNG.
Incident
year

Place

Status

Consequence

Comment

1944

Cleveland,
Ohio, US

Construction
failur e

128 killed and 225


injured

A LNG storage tank failed, releasing LNG. The


liquid overflowed the partial dikes designed to
contain piping spills and the vapor cloud was
ignited. A second spherical tank failed after 20 min
of fire exposure increasing the duration of the
accident. It is estimated that the damage from the
pool fire itself extended about 0,5 miles around the
failed tank.

1966

Raunheim,
Germany

Accidental
venting

1 killed, 75 injured

LNG was being passed through a vaporizer that


used a liquid level controller to operate below its
maximum capacity of 4000 kg. The liquid level failed
and as a result around 500 kg of LNG was vented
out of the vaporizer. The resulting vapor cloud
drifted towards the control room resulting in fire and
explosion.

1968

Portland, US

Human/
technical
malfunction

4 killed

The LNG tank was made up of aluminum with


perlite insulation annulus and a steel outer shell.
Natural gas from inlet lines leaked into the inner
tank through a pipeline connection that was
supposed to have been closed off by a blind flange
and valve. The blind flange had been removed to
allow some testing and the valve had been slightly
opened, but not re-closed. As a result natural gas
accumulated inside the tank and was ignited by an
unspecified source.

1971

LNG Palmaria

Unloading into
storage tank

Tank roof damage due


to roll over

First documented LNG Rollover incident. Tank


developed a sudden increase in pressure. LNG
Vapor discharged from the tank safety valves and
vents. Tank roof slightly damaged but without
ignition.

1972

Quebec,
Canada

Human/technical
malfunction

5 injured

The plant used a nitrogen system for a variety of


control operations and also for de-riming or
defrosting of compressors. The valves on the
nitrogen line were opened during defrosting and
were left open after completing the operation.
Natural entered the nitrogen system and entered the
control room through instrument connections at the
control panel. The natural gas was ignited when one
of the workers lit a cigarette.

-8-

Incident
year

Place

Status

Consequence

Comment

1973

Staten Island,
NY, US

Human/technical
malfunction

40 killed

A NG storage tank was emptied, warmed and


purged of the combustible gases and with inert
nitrogen, and then filled with fresh recirculating air.
Repair and augmentation work was being
performed on the tank when a fire swept through the
tank. The overpressure caused by hot combustion
products in the tank fractured the tank roof and 40
workers were trapped when the roof collapsed.
They died of asphyxiation.

1977

Arzew, Algeria

On terminal

1 killed

A terminal worker on the LNG export terminal at


Arzew was frozen to death during a ship-loading
operation. A large-diameter valve ruptured, causing
the worker to be sprayed by LNG. The death was
caused by the low temperature of the LNG liquid,
and the spilled LNG did not ignite. Thus, the fatality
was not onboard the ship, but on shore. Aluminum
valve failure on contact with cryogenic
temperatures. Wrong aluminum alloy on
replacement valve. LNG released but no vapor
ignition.

1978

Das Island,
Persian Gulf

On terminal

LNG spill

A bottom pipe connection of an LNG tank failed


resulting in a LNG spill inside the LNG tank
containment. The liquid flow was stopped by closing
the internal valve designed for such a service. A
large vapor cloud was formed and it dissipated
without igniting.

1979

Cave Point, US

LNG vapor in
substation

1 killed, 1 injured

LNG leakage through an inadvertently overtightened LNG pump electrical penetration seal.
LNG vaporized, passed through 200 feet of
electrical conduit and entered the substation. The
natural gas air mixture was ignited by the normal
arcing contacts of a circular breaker, resulting in an
explosion. Since natural gas was never expected in
this substation, no gas detectors had been installed
in the building.

1983

Bontang,
Indonesia

Overpressure

3 killed

A blind left in the flare line led to over-pressurization


of the main liquefaction column a vertical shelland-tube exchanger. The over-pressure led to
failure of the heat exchanger and debris were
projected 50 m away killing 3 workers. The ensuing
fire was extinguished in about 30 minutes.

1985

Pinson,
Alabama

Loading vessel

6 injured

The welds on a patch plate on a small aluminum


vessel failed while receiving LNG. The plate was
propelled into a building that contained the control
room, boiler and offices. Some of the windows in the
control room were blown inward. The escaping gas
from the failed vessel ignited.

1987

Nevada

Test site

Vapor release

A large-scale test involving spills of LNG on water


resulted in a vapor cloud that accidentally ignited
following a series of RPTs. The duration of the fire
was 30 seconds and the flames were 20 feet above
the ground.

1988

Everett

On terminal

Vapor release

Approximately 114 m3 LNG were spilled through


blown flange gaskets during an interruption of LNG
transfer. The spill was contained in a small area
according to safety precautions. A stable
atmosphere in the night prevented the vapor cloud
from spreading far.

-9-

Incident
year

Place

Status

Consequence

Comment

1989

Thurley, UK

Human/technical
malfunction

2 workers received
burns on their hands and
faces

Valves on a vaporizer had been opened for draining


out natural gas. One of the drain valves was left
open. As a result LNG was released into the
atmosphere as a high pressure jet. The resulting
vapor cloud ignited about 30 sec later covering an
area of 40 * 25 m

1993

Bontang,
Indonesia

Leakage to sewer
system

Vapor release

LNG leak occurred in the open run-down line during


a pipe modification project. LNG entered an
underground concrete sewer system and underwent
a rapid vapor expansion that ruptured the pipes

2004

Skikda, Algeria

Explosion and fire

27 killed, 5 injured

Preliminary findings suggest that there was a cold


hydrocarbon leak that occurred at Liquefaction Train
40 and was pulled into a high pressure steam boiler
by the combustion air fan. The gas-air mixture in the
boiler firebox ignited and resulted in fire and
explosion. A hydrocarbon leak in the plant formed a
vapor cloud which was drawn into a nearby boiler by
its air-inlet fan. The boiler then exploded causing
additional damage to the LNG facilities. There were
reports of an explosion and fireball in addition to a
major fire.

2.

Categories of Outcomes after LNG Release

Immediately following an LNG release, there is the potential for a range of different outcomes and types of
consequences, depending on the direct receiving environment and the behaviour of the LNG. If there is an
immediate ignition source, the LNG can begin to burn as a pool fire. With a delayed ignition source, there
could be a vapour cloud fire that has the potential to burn back to the source if the release continues.
Releases over water will behave differently to releases over land due to high heat transfer rates between the
LNG and water. Releases to a ship or quay could result in cryogenic damage to structures and also cryogenic
burns if humans come in contact with the cold liquid. There is also the potential for the LNG vapour to
replace oxygen in enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces and result in asphyxiation. A short description of initial
outcomes and safety concerns following a release are as follows:

2.1

Cryogenic Damage

This refers to the damage caused by the contact of the cold liquid with humans or with ship or infrastructure
materials. Contact with skin can result in cryogenic burns. Lung damage from breathing the cold vapours is
also possible. The LNG can cause damage to ship structures on contact, resulting in embrittlement and/or
fracture of metals and materials that are not designed for such cold temperatures.

2.2

Asphyxiation

Released LNG could be an asphyxiant for ships crew, nearby passengers, bunker boat crew, emergency
response crew, and others in the vicinity if the gas reaches concentrations where it replaces enough air that
there is a deficiency of oxygen. This could occur in enclosed spaces or if there is a large release close to
people. Hightower et al. (2004), in their study of large LNG spills, note that this is considered to be less of a
concern than potential fire.

- 10 -

2.3

Pool Fire

This occurs if there is immediate ignition of the released LNG. As the pool of liquid begins to evaporate, the
mixture of LNG vapour and air above the pool will burn when ignited, when the concentration of natural gas
vapour is within the flammable range. The evaporating pool of LNG continues to provide fuel to the fire.
The LNG vapour is flammable when it is within the range of 5 % to 15 % mixture with air. At a
concentration less than 5 %, the lower flammability limit (LFL), there is insufficient natural gas as fuel to
burn. At a concentration greater 15 %, the upper flammability limit (UFL), there is not enough oxygen in the
mixture to support combustion. For spills resulting from events such as an impact, it is likely that there will
be a pool fire because many of these types of events will provide an ignition source (impact of metal on
metal).

2.4

Vapour Cloud Fire

This occurs if there is delayed ignition of the vapour cloud after release. A vapour cloud within the
flammable range (5 % to 15 % natural gas) comes into contact with an ignition source away from the initial
source of release, resulting in a fire. An ignited vapour cloud can burn back to the source of release, either as
a fire ball if the vapour is mixed with air in a way that the fuel can rapidly be consumed, or as a slower
burn, referred to as a flash fire (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006)2. These fires generate relatively low pressures and
thus there is a low potential for pressure damages.

2.5

Explosions

LNG in its liquid state is not explosive (IMO; Hightower et al. 2004). Certain conditions may, however,
result in damaging overpressure from a vapour cloud fire. These include having a confined fuel-air cloud in
spaces such as a ships hull or tank, which may occur in some scenarios (Hightower et al., 2004). Detonation
is noted to be possible where there is a high degree of confinement, strong mixing with air, and large ignition
sources (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006).

2.6

Rapid Phase Transition (RPT)

This phenomenon can occur when the very cold LNG comes into contact with water, which is much warmer.
Explosive boiling results as the liquid transitions quickly into a gas, and shock waves and overpressure can
result, similar to an explosion. Combustion is not involved; RPT is considered a physical or mechanical
expansion with a high pressure energy release (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006). Hightower et al. (2004) report that
effects will be limited to the area near the spill source. Experimental studies described in a review by LuketaHanlin (2006), found that when RPTs were produced during the spills, most occurred early and were
generally located near the spill point. Delayed RPTs were observed in a few cases. Luketa-Hanlin (2006)
stated that the occurrence of RPTs appeared to correlate with water temperature and depth of penetration of
the LNG into the water.
As noted above, spills over water behave differently to spills over land. The figure below is a simplified
representation of the possible outcomes of a spill over water, showing parameters that affect the outcome.

Luketa-Hanlin, A. 2006. A review of large-scale LNG spills: Experiments and modeling. Journal of Hazardous Materials, A132
(2006), 119-140.

- 11 -

Figure 1 Possible outcome of LNG spill over water.


Source: Luketa-Hanlin, 2006.

An unconfined spill of LNG onto water will spread and boil at a very high rate (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006). For a
spill confined on calm water, there may be some ice formation, but for unconfined spills only small amounts
of ice formation have been observed, due to the large heat source provided by the water and the turbulent
interface (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006). There is a high vaporization rate that is maintained due to contact with the
water, which is at a much higher temperature. The high vaporization rate leads to a greater distance to the
lower flammable limit (LFL) of the vapour cloud. The vapour formed is initially denser than the surrounding
air because it has a lower temperature. The vapour cloud from unconfined spills is stated to travel at roughly
the wind speed before becoming buoyant and dispersing. Luketa-Hanlin (2006) states that the length of the
vapour cloud will be much greater than its width because the wind will elongate the cloud. Vapour
concentrations are highest near the spill and then gradually decrease to the lower flammability limit at the
edge of the cloud.

3.

Event Tree Consequences from Spills to Water,


Vessel, and Quayside Area

Event trees are considered a standard risk assessment technique that can be used to build a risk model, as
stated in the IMOs Formal Safety Assessment guidelines (IMO, 2002). Together with fault trees, they can be
used to construct a Risk Contribution Tree. The event tree is used for describing and quantifying
consequences from an initiating event. In the case of LNG bunkering, the initiating event resulting in
consequences is considered to be release of LNG. Causes and contributing factors for this release are
portrayed on the fault tree side, where release of LNG is considered to be the top event.
An event tree is developed using a branching technique to portray alternative chains of events from an
initiating event to final consequences. It is valuable for showing how events can develop to more serious
consequences and is useful for identifying where safeguards may be put in place to mitigate outcomes.
Figure 2 shows a basic event tree developed for the release of LNG on water.

- 12 -

Release of LNG

Immediate
Ignition?

Pressure wave Delayed


(RPT)?
Ignition?

Outcome

YES
p1

Pool Fire

f
YES
p2

NO
1 - p1

NO
1 - p2

YES
p3

Vapour cloud fire,


overpressure (RPT)

NO
1 - p3

overpressure (RPT)

YES
p3

Vapour cloud fire,

NO
1 - p3

Possible asphyxiation
danger

possibly with pool fire

Figure 2 Event Tree of Spill of LNG to water, showing general outcome categories.

Quantification of the event tree shown above requires a frequency or estimated probability for the initiating
event of release of LNG. As noted in Section 1, there have not been any spills or releases from LNG
bunkering activities to date. Because these activities have been quite limited, there is insufficient information
to establish a probability based on historical accident statistics. A discussion of each branch point question is
as follows:
Immediate ignition?
If there is an ignition source immediately following release of the LNG, a pool fire will develop. High
impact causes for a release, such as a puncture of a tank or a pipe due to a falling or impacting object, will
likely create a spark or ignition source. Other release causes, such as valve failure or incorrect connections,
are unlikely in themselves to create a spark. Ronza et al. (2007)3 recently analysed a major marine accident
database, the U.S. Marine Investigations Module (MINMOD) to estimate ignition and explosion probability
data in the event of a release of a flammable material for maritime transportation. Although there were
34,477 spills considered for a period from 1992 2001, only 96 of these involved LNG and natural gas. For
land transport, the Hazardous Materials Incident Report System (HMIRS) had records for 22 spills during
the period 1993 to 2004. Only one fire involving LNG (without explosion) was found in the two databases.
Ronza et al. (2007) considered that there was insufficient data to estimate a probability of ignition after a
release for LNG.
Pressure wave?
For a spill of LNG on water, there is the possibility of rapid phase transition (RPT). There has been no
recorded incident involving this from an actual spill. RPTs occurring during unconfined LNG spill tests are
described in Luketa-Hanlin (2006). For a set of tests conducted in Maplin Sands, England, in 1980, LuketaHanlin describes how an RPT was observed in one of ten instantaneous release tests. The RPT damaged the
barge that was loaded with LNG for the test. According to Luketa-Hanlin (2006) a series of tests conducted
by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory at China Lake, California, referred to as the Coyote Test
Series is the only large-scale test carried specifically to study RPTs. Six out of 18 tests in this test series
were reported to have produced RPTs.
3

Ronza, A., Vlchez, J.A., and Casal, J., 2007. Using transportation accident databases to investigate ignition and explosion
probabilities of flammable spills. Journal of Hazardous Materials 146, pp.106-123.

- 13 -

Delayed ignition?
Delayed ignition will result in the formation of vapour cloud fire. Ronza et al. (2007) state that the greater
the release, the larger the area covered by the ignitable cloud and the higher the probability of it finding an
ignition source. Their analysis of incidents involving LNG transport, as described above, did not uncover
sufficient data to estimate probabilities for immediate or delayed ignition given a spill.
Releases of LNG on to land or to a ship structure will have a slightly different set of outcomes to those on
water. There is not the potential for RPT, as exists for spills to water, and the released LNG has the potential
to cause cryogenic damage to the ship or the quayside or to human tissue if there is contact, as portrayed in
the outcome categories of the event tree in Figure 3. If the release takes place near an enclosed or semienclosed area, there is also the potential for the LNG vapour to accumulate. Within a confined area, there is
the potential for overpressure and explosive effects if the vapour cloud is ignited. Without ignition, there is
the potential for asphyxiation of any people present, because the LNG vapour will replace the air, resulting in
oxygen deficiency.
Release of LNG

Immediate
Ignition?

Delayed
Ignition?

Confined
Area? (blast)

YES
p1

Outcome
Pool Fire

f
YES
p2

NO
1 - p1

NO
1 - p2

YES
p3

Fire and Explosion

NO
1 - p3

Vapour cloud fire,

YES
p3

Cryogenic damage,

NO
1 - p3

Cryogenic damage

possibly also pool fire

possible asphyxiation

Figure 3 Event tree of spill of LNG to land or on ship structure, showing general outcome categories.

4.

Ship to Ship Bunkering: Evaluation of High Rate


Scenarios

Some of the high-ranked hazards identified in the hazard identification process are described in more detail,
using a risk contribution tree approach to portray contributing factors and potential consequences.

4.1

Hard Collision or Contact Involving Bunkering Vessel

From the hazard identification, the potential for errors resulting in a collision causing damage to the bunker
vessel was identified and assigned a risk index 6 which placed it within the ALARP zone. It was considered
that the probability of a collision producing a hole in the bunker tanks was very small, but if such an event
did occur the consequences would be quite large due to the large volume of LNG that could potentially be
released.

- 14 -

Manoeuvring
Error

Technical
Failure

- No collision
- Minor collision
- Hard collision:
- ship damage
- damage to ship and
tank but no breach
- significant tank
impact causing breach
(considered low prob.)

Immediate
Ignition?

Pressure
wave
(RPT)?

Delayed
Ignition?

YES
p1 (> 0.7)
Release
of LNG

Outcome
Pool Fire

f
YES
p2

NO
1 - p1

NO
1 - p2

YES
p3

Vapour cloud fire,


overpressure (RPT)

NO
1 - p3

overpressure (RPT)

YES
p3

Vapour cloud fire,

NO
1 - p3

Possible asphyxiation
danger

possibly with pool fire

Figure 4 Risk Contribution Tree for hard collision causing breach of bunker tanks during bunker vessel approach and mooring.

As shown in figure above, manoeuvring errors or technical failures such as engine failure or rudder failure
have the potential to occur, and if corrective measures are not taken this could result in a collision with the
ship to be bunkered or with the quayside. If there is sufficient speed, there could be a high enough impact to
cause a breach of the LNG tank. This is considered to be a very low probability event. To date, although
there have been groundings and collisions of LNG carriers, as detailed in the Formal Safety Assessment
study of LNG carriers, (IMO, 2007), there has not been a single release from a ships cargo tank as a result
of this type of accident. Some of the accidents were described as hard contact or involved damage to the
outer hull. It is considered very unlikely that an impact resulting in the breach of a bunker ship tank would
occur. IMO regulations stipulate minimum inboard distances from the ships side plating to the location of
the cargo tank, and this provides extra protection in the event of a collision.
If in fact a release of LNG occurs following a collision, it is most likely that immediate ignition would occur,
due to the energy of the collision producing sparks. Thus, a pool fire would develop. Damages from the fire
would depend on the LNG release rate, which is dependent on the size of the hole. A worst case scenario
would involve a passenger vessel in the near vicinity of the bunker ship.

4.2
Hard Collision Damage Bunkering Port Assembly of LNG
Vessel
Damage to the bunkering system and valves on the receiving vessel (the LNG fuelled vessel) was also
identified in the hazard identification process as a potential scenario resulting in release of LNG, and was
assigned a risk index of 5. It was considered that immediate ignition of released gas would be quite likely, as
shown in the figure below, due to the impact energy. The potential amount of LNG spilled would be limited
to that which is present in the piping system, and would not involve release from bunker tanks.

- 15 -

Manoeuvring
Error

Technical
Failure

Extreme
wind or
waves

- No collision
- Minor collision
- Hard collision:
- ship damage
- damage to ship and
bunker port but no
breach
- damage to bunker
port valves causing
release (.low prob.)

Immediate
Ignition?

Delayed
Ignition?

YES
p1 (> 0.7)
Release
of LNG

Outcome
Pool Fire

f
NO
1 - p1

YES
p2

Vapour cloud fire,

NO
1 - p2

Possible cryogenic
damage

possibly with pool fire

Figure 5 Risk contribution tree for hard collision resulting in damage to bunkering port assembly of LNG fuelled vessel.

Due to the small amount that could be released for such a scenario, possible outcomes were limited to a
small pool fire, a small vapour cloud fire, and possible cryogenic damage to ship structures.

4.3
Small Releases from Bunkering Lines or Valves During
ESD Activation
Small releases from bunkering lines and valves during bunkering operations, from a range of causes such as
human error, incorrect connect/disconnect procedures, valve failures, external causes, or managerial failures
were identified as a risk in the hazard identification process. These small releases have the potential to result
in pool fires, vapour cloud fires, cryogenic damage, or potentially asphyxiation if within an enclosed area, as
show in the figure below.
The identified small release hazards, where LNG is released from leaking flanges, valves, hoses or pipes in
the bunkering line, are relatively similar for all of the three studied bunkering concepts. The main
differences, and the main reason why they are differently ranked, are related to the bunkering volumes, flow
rates and pipe dimensions. In general, the highest consequence ranking figures are indicated for the ship to
ship bunkering concept which is assumed to operate at higher flow rates than the truck to ship and land based
bunkering concepts. The figure is thus considered representative for all the three bunkering concepts but it
should, however, be noted that the magnitude of the potential final consequences of the respective outcome
branches in the schematic event tree are highly dependent on the quantity of released LNG.

- 16 -

Figure 6 Risk contribution tree for small LNG releases from bunkering or valves during ship to ship bunkering operation.

Although there have been no releases to date recorded for bunkering activities, there have been releases
identified during loading and unloading activities on LNG carriers. These accidents have been documented
in the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) of LNG carriers reported to IMO (IMO, 2007). For 12 release
accidents reported during loading and unloading activities in the IMO FSA, only one had subsequent ignition
of LNG. This occurred in 1976 in Ecuador and resulted in the destruction of 5 natural gas tanks (IMO, 2007).
Other releases were significantly smaller many resulted in some cryogenic damage to deck structures. In
total 21 releases of LNG cargo from LNG carriers were recorded due to all causes for the period 1964 to
2005, and only one resulted in ignition and fire. In addition there were 4 small fires due to lightning strikes
on vent risers. Thus, in the figure above, the probability of immediate ignition is noted to be less than 0.10.
The study by Ronza et al. (2007) of releases of LNG and natural gas reported in the U.S. databases found
that for a total of 118 releases to land (22) or marine environments (96), only one resulted in fire. Thus
maximum probability of 0.10 for immediate ignition and 0.05 for delayed ignition are shown in Figure 6. It
should be noted that this assumption is based on limited data, due to the small number of reported releases.

5.

Risks Imposed by Factors Related to Managerial


and Organisational Aspects

In the HAZID process a number of high ranked hazards and potential accident scenarios related to
managerial and organisational factors were identified. Economic stress, expectations of rapid and efficient
bunkering operations with a limited number of staff were mentioned as factors that can trigger human errors.
In contrast to the small releases during bunkering discussed in the section above, the risk index figures
indicated for the truck to ship and land based bunkering concepts were equally high as for the ship to ship
bunkering concept for this category of risk factors. In this case less severe consequences due to smaller LNG
quantities may be counterbalanced by higher potential exposure of personnel, cargo handling and other
conflicting activities on the quay side where the truck to ship and land based bunkering concepts are
conducted.
The concern related to managerial and organisational issues demonstrated by the HAZID team, stresses the
importance of well-established safety organisations, safety procedures, and well trained and committed staff
in adequate number.

- 17 -

6.

Sabotage and Terror Attacks

Sabotage and terror attacks directed towards LNG storage tanks and bunkering facilities was identified as a
scenario resulting in an LNG release. This issue was discussed by Melham et al. (2005)4 who stated that
possible feared scenarios include breaching of an LNG ship or storage tank using an explosive charge. They
state that available data show that it is not possible to detonate LNG vapours unless there are fractions of
ethane and propane greater than 20 %. Melham et al. (2005) conclude that the most likely result of breaching
an LNG tank with an explosive charge is a large pool fire, as portrayed in a simplified diagram in the figure
below.

Attack on LNG bunker


boat, tank or vehicle
causing breach in tank,
p=?

Release
of LNG

Immediate
Ignition

Pool Fire

Figure 7 Simplified Chain Events Resulting from Attack on an LNG bunker tank.

The main hazards from the pool fire would remain localized in the area of the pool, suggested to be up to two
pool diameters from the edge of the flame.

Melham, G.A., Kalelkar, A.S., Saraf, S., and H. Ozog. 2005. Managing LNG Risks: Separating the Facts from the Myths .[online].
Salem, NH: ioMosaic Corporation. Available at: http://www.iomosaic.com/docs/whitepapers/Managing_LNG_Risks.pdf [Accessed
3 May 2011].

10
Appendix 10
Port and Terminal Aspects on LNG Bunkering
Table of Contents
1. Schematic System of Loading, Discharging and Transit in a Port with LNG
Vessels/Barges ................................................................................................... 5

1.1

Vessel Transiting in the Port Arrival ................................................................. 5

1.2

Loading and Discharging of LNG at a Terminal .................................................. 6

1.3

Vessel Transiting in the Port Departure............................................................. 9

2. Small Scale LNG implementation of ISO 28460:2010 Installation and equipment


for LNG ship to shore interface and port operations .................................... 10

2.1

Limitations .......................................................................................................... 10

2.2

General Observations ......................................................................................... 10

2.3

Chapter 7, Jetty ................................................................................................... 11

2.4

Chapter 8, Marine Operations ............................................................................ 11

2.5

Chapter 9, Hazardous Areas and Electrical Safety ............................................. 20

2.6

Chapter 10, Security ........................................................................................... 20

2.7

Chapter 11, Hazard Management ....................................................................... 20

2.8

Chapter 12, Access and Egress ........................................................................... 21

2.9

Chapter 13, Onshore Power Supply .................................................................... 21

2.9

Chapter 14, Ship/Shore Communications ........................................................... 21

2.11

Chapter 15, Cargo Transfer ................................................................................ 22

-3-

2.12

Chapter 16, Custody Transfer ............................................................................. 24

2.13

Chapter 17, Provision and Training of Staff ....................................................... 24

-4-

Appendix 10 Port and Terminal Aspects on LNG


Bunkering
Figure 1 shows the process of when a vessel arrives to a port until the vessel leaves the port area again. The
scope of this appendix includes LNG vessels transiting a port and berthing, loading and discharging LNG at
a terminal.

Figure 1 Scope of port and terminal perspective.

In Figure 2 a schematic figure over this process can be seen with number reference to Figure 1.
Import terminal
Import, production or
intermediate terminal

Loading of feeder
vessel or bunker
vessel/barge

Other ship traffic


and port
characteristics
Figure 2 Schematic figure over terminals, transport and bunkering.

Transit of feeder
vessel or bunker
vessel/barge in the
port area

Intermediate
LNG terminal

-5-

1.

Schematic System of Loading, Discharging and Transit


in a Port with LNG Vessels/Barges

An overview of the process described in Figure 1 and Figure 2 is given below to facilitate the understanding
of the various operational phases. This is also the basis for the discussion in the next section where the ISO
standard 28420:2010 is addressed from an LNG bunkering perspective.

1.1

Vessel Transiting in the Port Arrival

The use of LNG as ship fuel and traffic with LNG feeder and LNG bunker vessels/barges in a port means
that a new category of dangerous cargo is introduced in the port. The transportation of dangerous cargo is
well regulated and liquid flammable gases like LNG is one category included in the regulative framework.
Experience from ports where LNG bunkering and traffic with LNG bunker vessels take place or are planned,
shows that existing regulative framework and standards for tranportation of dangerous cargo is considered to
ensure basic safety requirements and that there is no need for specific port by-laws or national regulations to
regulate the traffic with LNG bunker vessels/barges1.
This leads to the conclusion that port by-laws or national legislation should have the same rules/regulations
for traffic with LNG Carrier as for other vessels or barges carrying dangerous cargo. Some examples of areas
where specific regulations and standards apply to ships carrying dangerous cargo such as LNG are:
Pilotage;
Use of tugs;
Use of VTS;
Anchorages.
These aspects will affect how ports can adapt to small scale LNG Carriers2 and facilitate implementation of
LNG bunkering possibilities in a port or terminal.
1.1.1

Before Entering the Port Area

Weather
Weather conditions in the port shall be checked and no transit in the port is to be done outside given weather
restrictions.
Pilot
If a pilot is compulsory, the pilot will board the vessel at the pilot boarding area.
NOTE:
A pilot will be required as per local requirements, the same requirements as for any vessel carrying
dangerous goods. This means that a pilot may not always be on board and thus when a pilot is mentioned
below, the captain or an officer of the vessel may perform this duty.
Passage planning
The vessel shall have a passage plan prepared for the port transit.

NMD (Norwegian Maritime Directorate) http://www.sjofartsdir.no/no/Aktuelt/Tillater-transport-av-nedkjolte-gasser/


and Rotterdam Port presentation October 21st
2
Vessels classified under IGC Code/GC Code/ Gas Code for existing gas carriers;

-6-

Reporting
On entering the reporting area the vessel shall report to VTS (Vessel Traffic Centre) or, if no VTS is present,
let surrounding traffic know the vessels intention and planned route.
1.1.2
Transit in the Port Area
The vessel then transits the port at a safe speed. The VTS (if present) gives information/advice about other
traffic. There may be a moving safety zone around the vessel, normally around 50 meters, where other
vessels may not enter.
The vessel keeps its planned route laid out in the passage planning.
The following points should be taken into account when transiting:
Current;
Wind loads;
Squat and bank effects;
Tidal range;
Waves and swell;
Ice;
Visibility.
1.1.3

Arriving at the Terminal

Tugs
The number and power of the tugs should be such that they can safely moor/unmoor the LNG vessel.
Tugs can be replaced by equipping the vessel with for example a bowthruster and/or other means of
enhanced manoeuvring equipment on-board.
NOTE:
Tugs are not always needed and thus when mentioned below it is assumed to be a situation where tugs are
required.
Mooring and manoeuvring to jetty
The vessel is manoeuvred to the jetty with tugs or by use of own vessels equipment

1.2

Loading and Discharging of LNG at a Terminal

A more technical description on how a vessel and terminal is operated during loading/discharging is given in
this chapter. The first section (starting with 0) describes loading of LNG. The system of discharging LNG is
very similar to the loading procedure and will not be described more in detail. The most important difference
is that the pumping of LNG is done from shore side when loading and ship side when discharging.
1.2.1
Pre Loading Operations
Assuming that a vessel is securely moored (vessel movements will be described later) alongside the berth, a
number of procedures must be completed before cargo loading operations can commence. This section
outlines the procedures to be followed to ensure that both the terminal and the vessel are ready to commence
cargo operations.

-7-

Custody Transfer Prior to Loading


Prior to connecting cargo loading arms/hoses the quantity of cargo heel (if any) remaining on the vessel shall
be measured.
ESD Cable Connection
The terminal will supply a Ship to Shore Link cable which is passed across to the ship and connected.
It should be recognised that LNG vessels commonly refer to the emergency shutdown system (ESD) as ESD
1 and the emergency release system (ERS) as ESD 2. This terminology is typically used in communications
between LNG carriers and terminals during operations.
Emergency Shutdown System (ESD 1)
The function of the emergency shutdown (ESD) system is to safely stop and isolate the transfer of LNG and
vapour between ship and shore.
Emergency Release System (ESD 2)3
The function of the emergency release system (ERS) is to protect the transfer arms/hoses by disconnecting
them, prior to the ship drifting out of their design envelope.
NOTE:
There may be occasions where the ERS (ESD 2) system is not used but rather a break away coupling to fill
the same safety functionality. Below the word ERS and/or (ESD 2) will be used but this also includes a break
away coupling.This means that a similar explanation like this is needed in the beginning of the document.
Communication Test
Communications ship to shore shall be tested with all means of communication available.
Connection of Arms/Hoses
The vapour return will be connected first followed by the liquid arms/hoses.
NOTE:
There may be occasions where a vapour return is not needed and thus not connected. This note is valid for all
following sections where vapour return is mentioned.
Cargo Arms/Hoses Pressure Test
With larger feeder vessels there may be a need for pressure test of the system. If this is the case, following
connection the liquid and vapour arms/hoses shall be pressure tested using nitrogen.
ESD Test
The ESD system shall be tested to prove satisfactory operation of the terminal and ship systems.
Safety Checks
In conjunction with a responsible ships officer, the terminal representative shall carry out a pre-loading
operation safety check of the vessel to ensure that, from a safety perspective, the vessel and terminal are
ready to commence loading operations.
Ship/Shore Safety Checklist
Following the safety inspection the terminal and vessel representatives shall complete the Ship-to-Shore
Safety Checklist.
3

Marine transfer arms shall be used for the transfer of LNG between ship and shore. These shall be equippedwith powered
emergency release couplings according to EN 1474.

-8-

1.2.2

Cargo Handling

Vapour Return to Shore Line Up Normal Loading


The vapour ESD valve on the vessel is opened, followed by opening the vapour return valve on the loading
jetty.
Liquid Arm/Hose Cooldown Line Up
On completion of line up the terminal representative shall confirm with both the terminal and the vessel that
they are ready to commence cooldown operations.
Liquid Arm/Hose and Ship Line Cooldown
The liquid arm/hose cooldown must be conducted in alignment with the manufacturers specific
requirements. The terminal representative will control the cooldown operation, liaising with the vessel.
Cargo Loading Operation
The terminal and vessel are to line up in readiness for cargo loading operations. The terminal and vessel will
confirm that the loading line up is complete. When the vessels officer confirms that the ship is ready to
receive cargo the terminal representative shall request the terminal to commence loading at a slow rate.
A check will be made on the vessel cargo system, including the manifold and loading arms/hoses, to ensure
that there are no liquid or vapour leaks, prior to ramping up the flow rate.
The loading operation will be under the direct control of the vessel duty officer and the terminal operator will
respond accordingly. Communications will be directly between the vessel duty officer and the terminal
operator until completion of loading.
Cargo Ramp Down (Topping Off) will be at a slower loading rate.
Loading Completed
When loading is near completion the ship will give a signal to stop loading. The terminal will confirm that
the loading pumps have been stopped and the shore liquid loading arm valves are shut.
Draining and Purging of Liquid Arms/Hoses
The liquid arms/hoses should be drained and purged with nitrogen sequentially.
Purging Liquid Arms/Hoses
Upon completion of the draining procedure the arm/hose should be purged, normally with nitrogen, until a
satisfactory hydrocarbon content is achieved.
Purging Vapour Return Arm
The vapour return arm/hose remains open to shore throughout the liquid arm draining procedure. The vapour
arm/hose should be purged, normally with nitrogen, until satisfactory hydrocarbon content is achieved.
1.2.3

Post Loading Operations

Disconnection of Loading and Vapour Return Arms/Hoses


On completion of draining and purging, the cargo arms/hoses can be disconnected. ESD Cable
Disconnection shall be done.
Custody Transfer Post Loading
Once the cargo arms/hoses and ESD cable have been disconnected, the quantity of cargo loaded onto the
vessel shall be measured.

-9-

1.3

Vessel Transiting in the Port Departure

This section describes the vessel movements from the jetty to another location outside the port or to another
vessel for bunkering (see Figure 2).
1.3.1

Before Unmooring

Weather
Weather conditions in the port shall be checked and no transit in the port is to be done outside given weather
restrictions.
Pilot
If a pilot is compulsory, the pilot will board the vessel before leaving the berth.
Passage Planning
The vessel shall have a passage plan prepared for the port transit
Tugs
The number and power of the tugs should be such that they can safely moor/unmoor the LNG vessel.
Tugs can be replaced by equipping the vessel with for example a bowthruster and/or other means of
enhanced manoeuvring equipment on-board.
NOTE:
Tugs are not always needed and thus when mentioned below it is assumed to be a situation where tugs are
required.
Reporting
Before unmooring, the vessel shall report to VTS (Vessel Traffic Centre) or if no VTS is present, let
surrounding traffic know the vessels intention and planned route.
1.3.2

Transiting the Port

Unmooring and Manoeuvring from Jetty


The vessel let all the lines go. At some terminals there are quick release hooks and if so, they are
manoeuvred to let go the lines, if not, the lines will be let go by hand.
The vessel is manoeuvred from the jetty with tugs or by use of own vessels equipment
Transit
Same as arrival.
1.3.3
Leaving the Port Area
If tugboats and pilots are used, these will leave the vessel and normal seagoing routines are used thereafter.

- 10 -

2.

Small Scale LNG implementation of ISO 28460:2010


Installation and equipment for LNG ship to shore
interface and port operations

The ISO 28460:2010 standard limitations are:


This International Standard applies only to conventional onshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals
and to the handling of LNGC's in international trade. However, it can provide guidance for offshore and
coastal operations.
This section is intended to follow the ISO standard as far as possible together with SIGTTO guidelines. The
structure follows that of the 28460:2010 standard and where nothing else is stated, the ISO 28460:2010
standard shall be used. The SIGTTO Site Selection and Design for LNG ports and Jetties (Information paper
14) have already been taken into account when forming the ISO 28460:2010 standard and will not be
mentioned here.
Where the ISO 28460:2010 standard is found not to be fully suitable with smalland medium scale LNG
applications, a discussion on why there might be a need for additional or clarifying text is done in each case
and there will also be an aim to find one or more technical or operational solution to these.

2.1

Limitations

Focusing only on the ISO 28460:2010 standard, it is assumed that the current version is a carefully produced
and correct document. This means that no comments or discussions around why a certain text is valid in
respect to small or medium scale LNG are made. Only text that this project considers to be conflicting or
needs clarification with respect to small and medium scale LNG will be discussed further.
Chapter 1 to 6 in the standard are regarded as introduction and information and are all relevant to small scale
LNG shipping.

2.2

General Observations

The following are general remarks to be noted and changed in the standard in order to be applicable to small
scale LNG.
2.2.1
Hoses or Loading Arms
The loading and discharging of LNG may be done with use of hoses or loading arms. The use of hoses is
generally accepted by all involved parties.
2.2.2
ESD and ERS
A system with a break away coupling shall be designed in such way that it initiates an ESD 1 before
breaking away and that it automatically shuts of valves so that minimum spillage is achieved (See G.1.2.1
Pre Loading Operations, ESD Cable Connection).
This general remark is applicable to all the text below and ISO standard even if a certain point in the ISO
standard has not been pointed out.
The below Chapters refers to the ISO 28460:2010 Standard Chapters.

- 11 -

2.3

Chapter 7, Jetty

2.3.1
Section 7.1 Siting of Jetty
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.3.2
Section 7.2 Multi-Product Berths
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.3.3
Section 7.3 Vapour Return System
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
NOTE:
The project team can see that there might be situations in very small applications where a vapor return does
not need to be connected when loading/discharging. But this is probably a minor problem and will not be
addressed here further.
Further in the next section it is stated that vessels should not normally discharge unless vapor arm is
connected. It is the discussed that the tank pressure can be maintained by vaporizers. However, on a smaller
vessel, normally a type C tank is installed and pressure can be maintained without vaporizers.
The project does not propose any change to section 7.3, but assume that the above is inside of what is
permitted by the ISO standard.

2.4

Chapter 8, Marine Operations

2.4.1
Section 8.1 General
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.4.2
Section 8.2.1 Passage Planning
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
NOTE:
The statement: There shall be an exchange of information between ship's master and pilot in safe water
prior to commencing the port transit. does not imply that there must be a pilot on board.
2.4.3
Section 8.2.2 Moving Safety Zones
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.

- 12 -

NOTE:
This section is much more applicable to large scale LNG Carriers. However, the project team does not see
any need to change this text.
The project team does assume that the normal application of this section for small scale LNG is that local
requirements are set up for a port for all LNGC.
2.4.4
Section 8.2.3 Limiting Environmental Conditions for Operations
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
NOTE:
It is stated that: Real-time wind speed and direction at the berth should be available to the vessel prior to
berthing and while alongside. This does not need a change, but it must be noted that the word should,
must not be read as shall by authorities especially in small scale applications and small scale jetties.
2.4.5
Section 8.2.4 Anchorages
Anchorages are used by vessels that wait for their jetty/berth to be available.
The ISO 28460 standard states: no anchorage dedicated for use by laden LNG carriers shall be located in a
position where there is a risk of collision with large-displacement vessels travelling at speed. The research
among in kind contributors have given at hand that there are ports where this is not possible or feasible to
achieve. However it is of outmost importance to plan for anchorage areas. International regulations do not
adequately cover the safe navigation of ships in anchorage areas fully.
There must be acceptance of the fact that defined and restricted anchorages need some form of traffic control
or advice and that ships should be allocated anchor positions. Ports need to make a survey of the ships using
their anchorages and then plan and/or re-design. Anchorages should be separated by ship size with separate
areas for coastal, medium and large vessels. Anchorage positions within these areas should be allocated with
a radius based on the size and manoeuvring limitations of the ships assigned to them. The anchorages should
be clear of through traffic routes and there must be a clear approach channel that is restricted to vessels using
the pilotage service and that extends seaward beyond the furthest limits of the anchorages. The pilotage area
should be clear of the approach channel and the anchorages.

Figure 3 Bunker barge approaching an anchored vessel seen from a pilot boat
Photo: J. Gahnstrm

- 13 -

It is the joint opinion of the project that it must be the intention for all ports to do what is practically possible
to establish anchorages as outlined in the current ISO standard.
RECOMMENDATION
Solution Proposal 1
Change the wording in the first paragraph of section 8.2.4 to:
No anchorage dedicated for use by laden LNG carriers should be located in a position where there is a risk
of collision with large-displacement vessels travelling at speed.
This alters the shall to a should and makes it possible for LNGC to enter ports where it is not possible to
arrange for such anchorage.
2.4.6
Section 8.3.2 Vessel Traffic Services
In the standard it is stated that:
A vessel traffic service shall be provided in accordance with the requirements and recommendations of
SOLAS chapter V (Safety of Navigation).
A service designed to improve the safety and efficiency of vessel traffic and to protect the environment.
The service should have the capability to interact with the traffic and respond to traffic situations developing
in the VTS area.4
The conclusion this report draws is that a VTS may not be an efficient solution in some ports and terminals.
IMO Resolution A.867(20), produced a set of standards for implementing VTS and for training VTS
Operators, and further appointed International Association of Lighthouse Authorities(IALA) to produce
more detailed recommendations and guidelines for VTS.
It is this projects opinion that the need for a VTS shall be determined by using the process as outlined in the
IALA VTS Manual5. A vessel traffic Service, when implemented, shall be provided in accordance with the
requirements and recommendations of SOLAS chapter V 6and the IALA VTS Manual7.
RECOMMENDATION
Solution Proposal 1
Change the wording in the standard to:
The need for a VTS shall be determined by using the process as outlined in the IALA VTS MANUAL. A
vessel traffic service should be provided in accordance with the requirements and recommendations of
SOLAS chapter V (Safety of Navigation).
Solution Proposal 2
Change the wording in the standard to:
4

Definition of VTS from IALA VTS Manual (4th edition, 2008)


IALA VTS Manual (4th edition, 2008)
6
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea(SOLAS),-1974.aspx
7
IALA VTS Manual (4th edition, 2008)
5

- 14 -

The need for a VTS shall be determined by using the process as outlined in the IALA VTS MANUAL.
2.4.7

A short Description of Various Tug Types and how they can act in
Emergency Situations.

Figure 4 Voith Schneider tractor tug with large fin and Azimuth Stern drive(ASD) tractor tug.
Source:Gray.D (2006)

The conventional and tractor type tugs have different characteristic modes of applying forces in the event of
an emergency. Conventional tugs apply corrective forces by pushing on the tanker hull either on the side or
on the transom. In braking, a conventional tug will back down on a headline running to the tankers stern.
Tractor tugs primarily apply corrective forces with a line, either by indirect or direct pulling. When using the
indirect mode, a tractor tug sets its hull at an angle to direction of motion and thus can develop significant lift
and drag forces to augment the power of the propellers. The indirect mode is most effective at higher speeds,
generally above 6 knots. The tug will switch to the direct mode for speeds through the water less than
approximately 6 knots. Tractor tugs are also capable of pushing directly on the hull. The three primary
operating modes of the conventional and tractor tug types are described below in Figure 5.

Figure 5 Emergency assist modes of Conventional and Tractor Tugs.


Source: Gray, D (2006)

- 15 -

A tugboat is used to assist a vessel in its maneuvering to and from its jetty. An escort tug is made fast from
the port entrance until the vessel is safely alongside as a safety precaution acting as a tug boat only when the
vessel is maneuvering.
Escort Tug8
The capacity to perform as an 'emergency rudder' for assisted vessels is not only produced by the tug's
propellers, but also by the hydrodynamic forces derived from the tug's hull form. Escort tugs typically have
an independently certified steering pull at 10 knots which is about twice as high as the tugs bollard pull.
This is achieved by using indirect steering as outlined in Figure 5 above.
When the tug is acting as an 'emergency rudder' quick manoeuvring and the ability to shift quickly from
starboard to port side of the ship maintaining the right tension in the towline at all times is of vital
importance.
The ability to generate forces is a function of the tugs hull type, size, rudders, fin, horsepower, shafting,
propeller size and configuration, stability and freeboard.
Normally Voith Schneider tractor tugs with large fins are used as escort tugs, however ASD tractor tugs may
also be used but with lower efficiency than outlined above. The two tug boat types are seen in Figure 4.

Figure 6 Escort towing excercise.


Source:Buksr og Berging AS (2008)

2.4.8
Section 8.3.3 Tugs
This Section in the standard will need a change. In the standard it is mentioned that The number and power
of the tugs should be such that they can safely berth the LNG carrier if one of the tugs or the LNG carrier
loses propulsive power or steerage, at the maximum operational weather conditions permitted for berthing.
Escort towage philosophy should consider the risks of grounding or collision through loss of steerage or
power by the LNG carrier.
8

Partly from Buksr og Berging AS (2008)

- 16 -

Tugboats used by the small and medium scale LNGC is not a must. The text implies that there should be
ways to safely berth the vessel. One solution to safely berth a small and medium scale LNGC is by use of
tugs, others may include sophisticated propulsion systems, thrusters etc. Also, the standard mentions the use
of escort towage. The projects opinion is that the wording does not imply that escort towage shall be used;
rather that LNGC shall consider the risks of grounding or collision through loss of steerage or power. Other
means of reducing the risks of grounding or collision through loss of steerage or power exist and can be used
in small scale applications.
RECOMMENDATION
Solution Proposal 1
a) The number and power of the tugs should be such that they can safely berth the LNG carrier if one
of the tugs or the LNG carrier loses propulsive power or steerage, at the maximum operational
weather conditions permitted for berthing. The LNG carrier may be equipped in a way that the use
of tugs, subject to port and national regulations, is not needed for a safe maneuver.
b) The risks of grounding or collision through loss of steerage or power by the LNG carrier shall be
considered and means of reducing the risk should be introduced. Escort towage may be one
solution.
2.4.9
Section 8.3.4 Pilotage
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
NOTE:
There are some places in the document where pilotage is mentioned and this note is to discuss pilotage in
general terms. Maritime pilots provide an essential and unique service to the shipping industry.
Their principal role is to9:
Provide critical independent local knowledge and navigational information to vessels;
Bring the highest level of shiphandling skills to manoeuvre vessels within their port.
As pointed out above, LNG Carriers should be under the same rules as any other carrier transporting
dangerous goods. This is valid for small and medium scale carriers as well. For the marine pilots this gives at
hand that rules for if and when a marine pilot shall be on-board the LNG Carrier should be determined by the
port regulations for vessels/barges of the same size carrying dangerous goods.

From IMPA, The International Maritime Pilots' Association

- 17 -

Figure 7 Pilot on his way on board a vessel.


Photo: J. Gahnstrm

Pilot Exemption Certificates (PEC)


The Pilot Exemption Certificate is a document that shows that the holder on board is qualified to sail in
specified fairways or areas with the specified vessel without a pilot. The pilot exemption certificate can be
issued to a shipmaster. The ability for a shipmaster to apply for and receive a PEC should be according to
national and port regulations on any ship carrying dangerous goods.
2.4.10
Section 8.4.1 Berth Area
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
NOTE:
The last section of 8.4.1 could be strengthen to include those propulsion systems that may be used by smaller
LNGC such as azipod thrusters and other propulsion systems that may cause hazards when maneuvering. It
is however concluded by the project team that the limitations and dangers with such systems now are
widespread and thus not necessary to repeat here.
2.4.11
Section 8.4.2 Restricted Areas in the Vicinity of the Berth
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.4.12
Section 8.4.3 Berthing and Mooring Aids
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
NOTE:
Some of the berthing and mooring aids would possibly give very misleading information if applied in small
scale LNG. An example is speed of approach indication. This since large LNG carriers approach the berth
parallel to the jetty and normally with smaller scale ship you come in with a small angle.

- 18 -

2.4.13
Section 8.4.4 Fenders
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
NOTE:
The layout of a small scale jetty and the large scale jetty may differ hugely, meaning that the fender layout
vary much. But the text would not contradict small scale LNG terminals and their layout.
2.4.14
Section 8.4.5 Mooring Arrangements
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of text is
necessary.
In the standard it is stated that:
The ship's mooring operation shall be controlled by the ship's master, assisted by the pilot and the terminal
representatives positioned on the jetty.
It must be clarified that a pilot will not always be onboard small LNGC, especially valid for LNG bunker
vessels. The use of pilots should be in line of a ports normal routines for vessels transporting dangerous
cargo, see also Chapter 0.
In the standard it is stated that:
The management of the mooring arrangements is of utmost importance to ensure that the ship remains
secure in its position relative to the transfer arms envelope.
When a small LNGC discharges to a small terminal/tank, loading arms may not at always be installed but
hoses may be used.
In the standard it is stated that:
The ship's mooring equipment should be as given in OCIMF. At exposed locations where significant ship
motions occur, the tail length of 11 m might not be adequate and can lead to immediate tensile failure or, in
the long term, to fatigue failure. Longer tails can be required for such locations.
A tail length of 11 m or longer on a very small ship is not acceptable. OCIMF guidelines are valid but for
each size of ships.
In the standard it is stated that:
An emergency towing-off pennant (fire-wire), if required by the terminal or port authority, should be rigged
by the ship at both bow and stern with the eye of the wire rope maintained just above sea level to facilitate
easy connection by tugs in the event of an emergency (see ISGOTT, section 26.4, OCIMF)
OCIMF has published a position paper which recommended the elimination of the Emergency Towing Off
Pennants (ETOPS), commonly known as "Fire Wires" from ISGOTT and the ISGOTT Checklist since it is
not an essential piece of equipment for vessel's safety. OCIMF commenced a study in 2002 on the ETOPS
effectiveness. The study revealed that whereas since 1967, no instances had been documented where the
ETOPS had been used, some seventeen hundreds injuries to personnel, both minor and serious, had occurred
when handling large steel "fire wires". Efforts were made to determine a lighter rope of fiber construction
with strength equivalent to steel wire rope, however, a consensus was not reached and in 2007, a risk
assessment by Lloyds Register was commissioned. The Lloyds Register's assessment concluded that the use
of ETOPS should no longer be recommended and this was accepted by OCIMF.

- 19 -

NOTE:
This is not adopted by all terminals and berths and therefore one should check with terminals or berths
whether they require fire wires to be deployed or not.

RECOMMENDATION
Solution Proposal 1
Wording in standard to be changed to:
The ship's mooring operation shall be controlled by the ship's master, and when applicable, assisted by the
pilot and the terminal representatives positioned on the jetty.
Solution Proposal 2
Wording in standard to be changed to:
The management of the mooring arrangements is of utmost importance to ensure that the ship remains
secure in its position relative to the transfer equipment (transfer arms or hoses).
Solution Proposal 3
Wording in standard to be changed to:
The ship's mooring equipment should be as given in OCIMF. At exposed locations where significant ship
motions occur, the tail length might not be adequate and can lead to immediate tensile failure or, in the long
term, to fatigue failure. Longer tails can be required for such locations.
Solution Proposal 4
Wording in standard to be changed to
An emergency towing-off pennant (fire-wire), if required by the terminal or port authority, should be rigged
by the ship at both bow and stern with the eye of the wire rope maintained just above sea level to facilitate
easy connection by tugs in the event of an emergency (Note: the use of fire wires is no longer recommended
by OCIMF)
2.4.15
Section 8.4.6 Winches or Capstans
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.4.16
Section 8.4.7 Mooring Hook Release System
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of text is
necessary.
In the standard it is stated that:
Quick-release mooring hooks shall be provided. It may not always be suitable for small scale applications
to use Quick-release mooring hooks, especially in very small terminals.
RECOMMENDATION
Solution Proposal 1
Wording in standard to be changed to:
Quick-release mooring hooks shall be provided for jetties designed and/or used for vessels larger
than 5.000 DWT. For smaller vessels, quick-release mooring hooks should be considered.

- 20 -

2.4.17
Section 8.4.8 Ship's Manifold Arrangement
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.4.18
Section 8.4.9 Cargo Strainers
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.4.19
Section 8.4.10 Bunkering and Storing
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.

2.5

Chapter 9, Hazardous Areas and Electrical Safety

2.5.1
Section 9.1 Jetty's Electrical Safety
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.5.2
Section 9.2 Insulating Flanges
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.

2.6

Chapter 10, Security

The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.

2.7

Chapter 11, Hazard Management

The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary except for in 11.2.3 as outlined below.
2.7.1
Section 11.2.3 Fire Fighting
In the standard it is stated that:
A minimum of one tug with water monitors meeting national or local requirements shall be available.
Where there are no national or local regulations, a tug meeting the FiFi 101 requirements of a recognized
classification society is recommended.
It may not always be suitable for small scale applications to have a tugboat available. Look for example at
Norway where small remote terminals are present and no tug available.

10

A FiFi 1 is:
Diesel Engine Driven or Electric Motor Driven Fire Pumps: 2X1200m3/h or one 2400m3/h, Fire Monitors:2X1200m3/h@120m and a Remote
Control System

- 21 -

RECOMMENDATION
Solution Proposal 1
Wording in standard to be changed to:
A minimum of one tug with water monitors meeting national or local requirements shall be available for
jetties designed and/or used for vessels larger than 5.000 DWT. Where there are no national or local
regulations, a tug meeting the FiFi 1 requirements of a recognized classification society is recommended.

2.8

Chapter 12, Access and Egress

2.8.1
Section 12.1 General
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.8.2
Section 12.2 Normal Access and Egress
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
NOTE:
In the standard it is stated:
In normal circumstances, access shall be provided by a gangway from the jetty.
The assumption is that the wording In normal circumstances can be interpreted in such way that for smallscale application, the normal case is not to have a fixed gangway on the jetty. However, if that assumption is
wrong, a change of this text is needed. Normal for small vessels is to have a gangway on-board so that safe
access between ship and shore side can be obtained.
2.8.3
Section 12.3 Emergency Access and Egress
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.

2.9

Chapter 13, Onshore Power Supply

The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.

2.9

Chapter 14, Ship/Shore Communications

2.10.1
Section 14.1 General
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
NOTE:
That the ERS signal mentioned here should be considered when discussing section 15.3.3 below.
Further note the General remarks above.

- 22 -

2.9.1

Section 14.2 Voice Communications

2.10.3
Section 14.2.1 For Emergency
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of text is
necessary.
In the standard it is stated that:
An emergency telephone (hot line) shall be provided to link the ship to the control room.
This text implies that there always is a control room at the terminal and that there always will be a hotline
phone to this control room.
It is the project teams assumption that this hot line is a phone line seperated from all other communication
mentioned above, and in chapter 15 of the standard. With already double or tripled communication between
ship and shore, and the relatively small distance between ship and terminal, the project team can see that this
safety measurement is not necessary for small scale applications.
RECOMMENDATION
Solution Proposal 1
Wording in standard to be changed to:
For vessels above 5000 DWT, an emergency telephone (hot line) shall be provided to link the ship to
the terminal (usually the control room). For smaller vessels, means of emergency communication shall be
established.
2.10.4
Section 14.2.2 For Normal Operations
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.10.5
Section 14.3 Data Communications
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.10.6
Section 14.4 Emergency Shut-Down Signal
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary. j

2.11

Chapter 15, Cargo Transfer

2.11.1

Section 15.1 Pre-Cargo-Transfer Meeting

2.11.2
Section 15.1.1 Meeting
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.

- 23 -

2.11.3
Section 15.1.2 Information Exchange
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.11.4
Section 15.1.3 Post-Cargo-Transfer Meeting
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.11.5

Section15.2 Marine Transfer Arms

2.11.6
Section 15.2.1 General
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
NOTE:
For the transfer of small quantities of LNG, hoses may be used if the total volume of LNG in the hose
transfer system does not exceed 0,5 m3 and the length of hoses does not exceed 15 m.
2.11.7
Section 15.2.2 Conditions to be Fulfilled Prior to the Transfer of LNG
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is necessary.
In the standard it is stated in a bullet point list:
The vapour arm should be connected first;
The arms shall be inerted and leak-tested prior to the introduction of LNG;
A function test of the ERS may be undertaken by the terminal;
Systems, including the transfer arms, shall be cooled down to avoid excessive thermal stresses.
The above bullet points will not always be applicable to small-scale LNG terminals and the explanations
why are:

The use of arms is not always needed; hoses may also be used, especially in very small applications.
Furthermore, in very small applications when discharging to IMO type-C tanks, the use of vapour
arms/hoses may not be needed at all. As an example, trucks have no vapour return hose. See General
remarks;
The use of arms is not always needed; hoses may also be used, especially in very small applications;
The use of arms is not always needed; hoses may also be used, especially in very small applications.
It is not always an ERS is fitted, it may be ERC as the technical solution for emergency release of
arms/hoses;
The use of arms is not always needed; hoses may also be used, especially in very small applications.

RECOMMENDATION
Solution Proposal 1
Wording in standard to be changed to:
The vapour arm/hose(when applicable) should be connected first;
The arms/hoses shall be inerted and leak-tested prior to the introduction of LNG;

- 24 -

A function test of the ERS/ERC may be undertaken by the terminal;


Systems, including the transfer arms/hoses, shall be cooled down to avoid excessive thermal
stresses.

2.11.8
Section 15.2.3 Cargo Transfer Operations
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.11.9
Section 15.2.4 Normal Disconnection
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
NOTE:
Please note the General remarks.
2.11.10

Section 15.3 Emergency Shut-Down and Emergency Release Systems

2.11.11 Section 15.3.1 General


The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is necessary. See General notes in the beginning of this chapter for information on what needs to be changed.
2.11.12 Emergency Shut-Down System
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.
2.11.13 Emergency Release System
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is necessary. See General notes in the beginning of this chapter for information on what needs to be changed.
2.11.14 Section 15.4 Safety and Maintenance of ESD, ERS and QC/DC Systems
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.

2.12

Chapter 16, Custody Transfer

The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.

2.13

Chapter 17, Provision and Training of Staff

2.13.1
Section 17.1 Staff for the Terminal
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is not necessary.

- 25 -

2.13.2
Section 17.2 Coordination
The project team has carefully considered this text and come to the conclusion that a change of the standard
is necessary.
In the standard it is stated:
Pre-operational full mission bridge training, using simulators should be undertaken, involving, at a
minimum, pilots and tug masters.
For operations such as bunkering full mission training of small vessels in very varying situations is not
possible, the scope is to large. A more general approach is needed and should be included in the standard
pilot and master training.
RECOMMENDATION
Solution Proposal 1
Wording in standard to be changed to:
Pre-operational training of masters and pilots should be undertaken.

11
Appendix 11 Examples of Operational Guidelines for
LNG Bunkering
Table of Contents
1.

2.

3.

Operational Guidelines for STS Bunkering of LNG ..................................... 5

1.1

Introduction .......................................................................................................... 5

1.2

Pre Bunkering Operations .................................................................................... 5

1.3

Mooring ................................................................................................................ 6

1.4

Connection of Hoses/arms .................................................................................... 7

1.5

Safety Inspection .................................................................................................. 8

1.6

Pre-Transfer Check List........................................................................................ 8

1.7

Operations during bunkering ................................................................................ 8

1.8

Bunkering ............................................................................................................. 8

1.9

Operations after Bunkering .................................................................................. 9

Operational Guidelines for TTS Bunkering of LNG ..................................... 9

2.1

Introduction .......................................................................................................... 9

2.2

Parking ................................................................................................................ 10

2.3

Operations During Bunkering ............................................................................ 11

2.4

Bunkering ........................................................................................................... 11

2.5

Operations after Bunkering ................................................................................ 12

Operational Guidelines for ITPS Bunkering of LNG .................................. 12

3.1

Mooring Operation ............................................................................................. 12

-2-

3.2

Mooring Lines Supervision ................................................................................ 12

3.3

ESD Cable Connection ....................................................................................... 12

3.4

Operations during Bunkering ............................................................................. 14

3.5

Bunkering ........................................................................................................... 14

3.6

Operations after Bunkering ................................................................................ 15

3.7

Unmooring .......................................................................................................... 15

4. Detailed Description of the Evaluation of SIGTTO LNG Ship to Ship Transfer


Guidelines Introduction and General Principles.............................................. 16

5.

6.

7.

4.1

Introduction ........................................................................................................ 16

4.2

General Conclusions and Recommendations ..................................................... 16

4.3

Comments of Evaluation .................................................................................... 17

LNG Ship to Ship Transfer Guidelines ....................................................... 17

5.1

Purpose ............................................................................................................... 17

5.2

Scope .................................................................................................................. 17

5.3

At sea .................................................................................................................. 17

5.4

Risk Management ............................................................................................... 17

5.5

Control of operations .......................................................................................... 18

5.6

Duties of Personnel Carrying out STS Transfer Operations............................... 18

5.7

Training .............................................................................................................. 19

5.8

Security ............................................................................................................... 19

Conditions and Requirements ................................................................... 19

6.1

Ship Compatibility (Confirmation list) ............................................................... 19

6.2

Approval from Authorities ................................................................................. 19

6.3

Transfer Area ...................................................................................................... 19

6.4

Weather conditions ............................................................................................. 19

Safety ......................................................................................................... 19

-3-

7.1

General ............................................................................................................... 19

7.2

Checklists ........................................................................................................... 20

7.3

Safety During Cargo Operation .......................................................................... 20

7.4

Emergency Shut Down (ESD) Systems ............................................................. 20

7.5

Actions in case of Infringement of Safety .......................................................... 21

7.6

Helicopter Operation .......................................................................................... 21

8.

Communication .......................................................................................... 21

8.1

Language ............................................................................................................ 21

8.2

Information Required from the Ship................................................................... 21

8.3

Navigational Warnings ....................................................................................... 21

8.4

Communication During Approach, Mooring, Cargo Transfer and Unmooring operations

8.5

Procedures for Communication Failure .............................................................. 21

9.

Operational Preparations before Manoeuvring ......................................... 22

10.

Manoeuvring and Mooring ...................................................................... 22

11.

Procedures alongside ............................................................................. 22

11.1

22

Cargo Transfer operation .................................................................................................... 22


11.2

Cargo Documentation and Custody Transfer Requirements .............................. 23

11.3

Operation after Completion of Cargo Transfer .................................................. 23

12.

Unmooring .............................................................................................. 23

13.

Equipment .............................................................................................. 24

13.1

Fenders ............................................................................................................... 24

13.2

Cargo Transfer Equipment ................................................................................. 24

13.3

Mooring Equipment ............................................................................................ 25

13.4

Personnel Transfers ............................................................................................ 25

21

-4-

13.5

Lighting .............................................................................................................. 25

13.6

Ancillary Equipment........................................................................................... 25

14.

Emergency planning ............................................................................... 25

-5-

Appendix 11 Examples of Operational Guidelines for


LNG Bunkering
1.

Operational Guidelines for STS Bunkering of


LNG

1.1

Introduction

Descriptions of possible ways to operate LNG bunkering STS are, in this Appendix, built on the following:
Large scale LNG loading and discharging operational priciples;
SMTF Joint Industry LNG STS Guidelines;
SIGTTO LNG STS Guidelines.
For a detailed review of the SIGTTO LNG STS Guidelines see Chapter 4.
Much of the analysis conducted within this feasibility study is parallel to other initiatives working on similar
tasks such as the ISO TC67/WG10 LNG marine fuel committee. This project is however still a work in
progress and there can only be assumptions on what effects the result will have on bunkering procedures.

1.2

Pre Bunkering Operations

The following sections on bunkering describes a normal bunkering operation ship to ship to clarify the
operational and technical aspects on bunkering a vessel to give a better understanding on technical,
operational and safety issues.
The starting point is before the ships are moored alongside each other.
Before the first STS LNG bunkering, a lighten approval or mutual agreed procedure should be reached,
including information and documents exchange, ship-ship interface compatibility study, mooring plan,
operational and safety procedures.
1.2.1

Preparations

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Safety zone on receiving ship activated and checked;


Fire equipment on both ships checked and ready for use;
Personal protection equipment on both ships checked and prepared for use;
Check the weather conditions:
Current;
Wind loads;
Squat and bank effects;
Tidal range;
Waves and swell;
Ice;
Visibility.

-6-

1.2.2
LNG Tank System Check
Both ships must check the LNG tanks regarding temperature and pressure prior to bunkering and note this on
the pre-transfer bunker.
1.2.3
Mooring Equipment Check
Lines, fenders, winch and other mooring equipment is to be visually checked for wear or damages.
1.2.4
Bunker Hose/arm Check
Bunker hoses/arms are to be visually checked for wear or damages and that the hose markings are correct for
the actual transfer operation.
Oil Bunkering
In case the bunker vessel carries both LNG and conventional fuel; perform a pre oil bunker check.
1.2.4
Check-List before Bunkering LNG
Fill out the checklists.
1.2.5
Establish Communications
Establish communication between the ships.
1.2.6
Mooring Plan
The receiving ship shall be able to supply mooring layout of the receiving ship. A mooring plan, showing
number of lines and fenders and their locations shall be agreed upon before making berth.
Voice communication may be used.
1.2.7
Fender Positioning
Fenders to be rigged to the bunkering vessel according to mooring plan before coming alongside the
receiving ship.

1.3

Mooring

1.3.1
Mooring Operation
Manoeuvre alongside the receiving ship in a safe way.
Mooring is completed when all mooring lines are connected according to the mooring plan and tensioned to
ensure that the bunker ship is safely secured to the receiving ship.
1.3.2
Mooring Lines Supervision
Mooring lines are to be under supervision during the operation.

-7-

1.3.3

ESD Cable Connection

The terminal or bunkering vessel will supply a Ship Shore Link cable which is passed across to the ship and
connected.
It should be recognised that LNG vessels commonly refer to the emergency shutdown system (ESD) as
ESD 1 and the emergency release system (ERS) as ESD 2. This terminology is typically used in
communications between LNG carriers and Terminals during operations.
NOTE:
The ERS (ESD 2) system may be substituted by a break away coupling to fill the same safety functionality.
Below the word ERS and/or (ESD 2) will be used but this also includes a break away coupling arrangement.
Communication test
Communications Ship - shore shall be tested with all means of communication available.

1.4

Connection of Hoses/arms

Dedicated bunker ships may be fitted with specialised handling equipment, but a rather common way would
be to use a crane to deliver bunker hoses from the bunker ship to the receiving ship.
The use of quick connections shall be used as soon as standards are available and equipment is available on
the market.
1.4.1
Connection of Arms/hoses
The vapour return will be connected first followed by the LNG liquid arms/hoses.
If applicable; the oil bunker hoses/arms are to be clearly colour-marked so that there will be no risk of using
an incorrect hose type.
NOTE:
There may be occasions where a vapour return is not needed and thus not connected. This note is valid for all
places below where vapour return is mentioned.
1.4.2
Purging with Inert Gas
All lines have to be purged with inert gas to make sure that all moisture is removed.
1.4.3
Cargo arms/hoses Pressure Test
With larger bunker vessels there may be a need for pressure test of the system. If this is the case, following
connection, the liquid and vapour arms/hoses shall be pressure tested using inert gas.
1.4.4
ESD Test
The ESD system shall be tested to prove satisfactory operation of the receiving vessel and bunker vessel
systems.
1.4.5
Bunker Hose Supervision
Bunker hoses are to be under supervision during the operation. Suitable measures to prevent breakaway due
to ship movements have to be taken.

-8-

1.5

Safety Inspection

Both vessels shall carry out a pre-bunker operation safety check of the vessel to ensure that, from a safety
perspective, the vessels are ready to commence bunkering operations.

1.6

Pre-Transfer Check List

Following the safety inspection the representatives for both vessels shall complete the bunker safety
checklist.
No bunker operation is to begin until this check-list is signed and returned to the bunker ship. The checklists
will also clearly state the quantities of fuel to be transferred, cool down needed, the transfer rate, start and
topping up rate and max pressure at manifold.

1.7

Operations during bunkering

1.7.1
Vapour Return to Shore Line up Normal Loading
On the receiving vessel the vapour ESD valve is opened. On the bunker vessel the vapour return valve is
opened.
1.7.2
Liquid Arm/hose and Ship Line Cool down
The liquid arm/hose cool down must be conducted as needed. The bunker vessel will control the cool down
operation, liaising with the vessel.
1.7.3
Line up of Cargo System
The bunker vessel and receiving vessel are to line up in readiness for bunkering operations. The terminal and
vessel will confirm that the loading line up is complete.

1.8

Bunkering

1.8.1
Start Bunkering
When the receiving vessel confirms that the vessel is ready for bunkering operation, the bunker vessel should
commence loading at a slow rate due to a further tightness check.
The thightness check will be made on the receiving vessels bunker system, including the manifold and
loading arms/hoses, to ensure that there are no liquid or vapour leaks, prior to ramping up the flow rate.
Ramp up cargo pump rate in a controlled manner until agreed rate.
The loading operation will be under the direct control of the receiving vessel checking filling levels and
pressure of the LNG fuel tanks. The bunker vessel will respond accordingly.
1.8.2
Pump Stop Sequence
Cargo Ramp Down (Topping Off) will be at a slower loading rate.

-9-

The cargo pumps shall be ramped down to an agreed topping up rate when the agreed quantity is almost
reached. The receiving ship operator is to signal, by VHF or communication link to the bunker ship when to
stop or else the bunker ship will stop when the agreed amount of LNG is transferred.
The bunker vessel will confirm that the pumps have been stopped and the shore liquid loading arm/hose
valves are shut.

1.9

Operations after Bunkering

1.9.1
Draining and Purging of Liquid arms/hoses
The liquid arms/hoses should be drained and purged with inert gas sequentially as needed.
1.9.2
Purging Liquid arms/hoses
Upon completion of the draining procedure the arm/hose should be purged, normally with inert gas until
satisfactory hydrocarbon content is achieved.
1.9.3
Purging Vapour Return Arm
The vapour return arm/hose remains open throughout the liquid arm draining procedure. The vapour
arm/hose should be purged, normally with inert gas until satisfactory hydrocarbon content is achieved.
1.9.4
Disconnection of bunker and Vapour Return arms/hoses
On completion of draining and purging, the cargo arms/hoses can be disconnected.
ESD cable disconnection
Shall be done.
Delivery of bunker document
The bunker ship is to deliver a document clearly stating the quantity and quality of fuel transferred, signed by
the responsible officer.
1.9.5

Unmooring

1.9.6
Manoeuvring
The bunker ship must have constant monitoring of surrounding traffic positions during unmooring and
departure.

2.

2.1

Operational Guidelines for TTS Bunkering of


LNG
Introduction

This section describes a possible way to operate LNG bunkering TTS.

- 10 -

2.2

Parking

2.2.1
Parking Operation
Parking alongside the receiving ship in a safe way is completed when the truck engine is stopped and an
interim fence declaring the safety zone is established.
2.2.2
ESD Cable Connection
The ship will supply a Ship Shore Link cable which is passed across to the truck and connected.
It should be recognised that LNG vessels commonly refer to the emergency shutdown system (ESD) as ESD
1 and the emergency release system (ERS) as ESD 2. This terminology is typically used in communications
during operations.
NOTE:
The ERS (ESD 2) system may be substituted by a break away coupling to fill the same safety functionality.
Below the word ERS and/or (ESD 2) will be used but this also includes a break away coupling arrangement.
2.2.3
Communication Test
Communications Ship - shore shall be tested with all means of communication available.
2.2.4
Connection of Hoses
There is no use of quick connections for trucks.
2.2.5
Connection of Hoses
The vapour return will be connected first followed by the LNG liquid hoses.
NOTE:
There may be occasions where a vapour return is not needed and thus not connected. This note is valid for all
places below where vapour return is mentioned.
2.2.6
Bunker Hose Supervision
Bunker hoses are to be under supervision during the operation. Suitable measures to prevent breakaway due
to ship movements have to be taken.
2.2.7
Purging with Inert Gas
All lines have to be purged with inert gas to make sure that all moisture is removed.
2.2.8
Pressure Test/ Safety Inspection
During the purging the hoses are inspected and also the pressure test is performed.
2.2.9
ESD Test
The ESD system shall be tested to prove satisfactory operation of the receiving vessel and truck systems.

- 11 -

2.2.10
Pre-Transfer Check List
Following the safety inspection the representatives for both the vessel and the truck shall complete the
bunker safety checklist.
No bunker operation is to begin until this check-list is signed and returned to the truck. The checklists will
also clearly stating the quantities of fuel to be transferred.

2.3

Operations During Bunkering

2.3.1
Vapour Return to Shore Line Up Normal Loading
On the receiving vessel the vapour ESD valve is opened on the truck, the vapour return valve is opened.
2.3.2

Liquid hose and Ship Line Cool down

The liquid hose cool down must be conducted as needed. The truck will control the cool down operation,
liaising with the vessel.
2.3.3
Line up of Cargo System
The truck and receiving vessel are to line up in readiness for bunkering operations. The truck and vessel will
confirm that the loading line up is complete.

2.4

Bunkering

2.4.1
Start Bunkering
When the receiving vessel confirms that the vessel is ready for bunkering operation, the truck should
commence loading at a slow rate.
A check will be made on the receiving vessels bunker system, including the manifold and loading hoses, to
ensure that there are no liquid or vapour leaks, prior to ramping up the flow rate.
The loading operation will be under the direct control of the receiving vessel and the truck driver will
respond accordingly.
2.4.2
Pump Stop Sequence
Cargo Ramp Down (Topping Off) will be at a slower loading rate.
The cargo pumps shall be ramped down to an agreed topping up rate when the agreed quantity is almost
reached. The receiving ship operator is to signal, by VHF or communication link to the truck when to stop or
else the truck will stop when the agreed amount of LNG is transferred.
The truck will confirm that the pumps have been stopped and the shore liquid loading hose valves are shut.

- 12 -

2.5

Operations after Bunkering

2.5.1
Draining and Purging of Liquid hoses
The liquid hoses should be drained and purged with inert gas sequentially as needed.
2.5.2

Purging Liquid hoses

Upon completion of the draining procedure the hose should be purged, normally with inert gas, until
satisfactory hydrocarbon content is achieved.
2.5.3
Purging Vapour Return Arm
The vapour return hose remains open throughout the liquid arm draining procedure. The vapour hose should
be purged, normally with inert gas until satisfactory hydrocarbon content is achieved.
2.5.4
Disconnection of bunker and Vapour Return hoses
On completion of draining and purging, the cargo hoses can be disconnected.
2.5.5
ESD Cable Disconnection
Shall be done.
2.5.6
Delivery of Bunker Document
The truck is to deliver a document clearly stating the quantity and quality of fuel transferred, signed by the
driver.

3.

3.1

Operational Guidelines for ITPS Bunkering of


LNG
Mooring Operation

Manoeuvre the receiving ship to the quay in a safe way.


Mooring is completed when all mooring lines are connected according to the mooring plan and tensioned to
ensure that the receiving ship is safely secured to the quay.

3.2

Mooring Lines Supervision

Mooring lines are to be under supervision during the operation.

3.3

ESD Cable Connection

The terminal will supply a Ship Shore Link cable which is passed across to the ship and connected.

- 13 -

It should be recognised that LNG vessels commonly refer to the emergency shutdown system (ESD) as ESD
1 and the emergency release system (ERS) as ESD 2. This terminology is typically used in communications
between LNG carriers and Terminals during operations.
NOTE:
The ERS (ESD 2) system may be substituted by a break away coupling to fill the same safety functionality.
Below the word ERS and/or (ESD 2) will be used but this also includes a break away coupling arrangement.
3.3.1
Communication Test
Communications Ship - shore shall be tested with all means of communication available.
3.3.2
Connection of Hoses/arms
Terminals may be fitted with specialised handling equipment, but a rather common way would be to use a
crane to deliver bunker hoses from the terminal to the receiving ship.
The use of quick connections shall be used as soon as standards are available and equipment is available on
the market.
3.3.3
Connection of Arms/hoses
The vapour return will be connected first, followed by the LNG liquid arms/hoses.
If applicable; the oil bunker hoses/arms are to be clearly colour-marked so that there will be no risk of using
an incorrect hose type.
NOTE:
There may be occasions where a vapour return is not needed and thus not connected. This note is valid for all
places below where vapour return is mentioned.
3.3.4
Cargo arms/hoses Pressure Test
With larger vessels there may be a need for pressure test of the system. If this is the case, following
connection, the liquid and vapour arms/hoses shall be pressure tested using inert gas.

3.3.5
Bunker Hose Supervision
Bunker hoses are to be under supervision during the operation. Suitable measures to prevent breakaway due
to ship movements have to be taken.
3.3.6
Purging with Inert Gas
All lines have to be purged with inert gas to make sure that all moisture is removed.
3.3.7
Safety Inspection
During the purging of arms/ hoses an inspected is also performed.
3.3.8
ESD Test
The ESD system shall be tested to prove satisfactory operation of the receiving vessel and terminal systems.

- 14 -

3.3.9
Pre-Transfer Check List
Following the safety inspection the representatives for both the vessel and the terminal shall complete the
bunker safety checklist.
No bunker operation is to begin until this check-list is signed and returned to the terminal. The checklists will
also clearly stating the quantities of fuel to be transferred.

3.4

Operations during Bunkering

3.4.1
Vapour Return to Shore Line Up Normal Loading
On the receiving vessel the vapour ESD valve is opened. On the terminal side the vapour return valve is
opened.
3.4.2
Liquid hose and Ship Line Cool down
The liquid hose cool down must be conducted as needed. The terminal will control the cool down operation,
liaising with the vessel.
Line up of cargo system
The terminal and the receiving vessel are to line up in readiness for bunkering operations. The terminal and
vessel will confirm that the loading line up is complete.

3.5

Bunkering

3.5.1
Start Bunkering
When the receiving vessel confirms that the vessel is ready for bunkering operation, the terminal should
commence loading at a slow rate.
A check will be made on the receiving vessels bunker system, including the manifold and loading hoses, to
ensure that there are no liquid or vapour leaks, prior to ramping up the flow rate.
The loading operation will be under the direct control of the receiving vessel and the terminal will respond
accordingly.
3.5.2
Pump Stop Sequence
Cargo Ramp Down (Topping Off) will be at a slower loading rate.
The cargo pumps shall be ramped down to an agreed topping up rate when the agreed quantity is almost
reached. The receiving ship operator is to signal, by VHF or communication link to the terminal operator
when to stop or else the terminal will stop when the agreed amount of LNG is transferred.
The terminal will confirm that the pumps have been stopped and the shore liquid loading hose valves are
shut.

- 15 -

3.6

Operations after Bunkering

3.6.1
Draining and Purging of Liquid hoses
The liquid hoses should be drained and purged with inert gas sequentially as needed.
3.6.2
Purging Liquid hoses
Upon completion of the draining procedure the hose should be purged, normally with inert gas, until
satisfactory hydrocarbon content is achieved.
3.6.3
Purging Vapour Return Arm
The vapour return hose remains open throughout the liquid arm draining procedure. The vapour hose should
be purged, normally with inert gas, until satisfactory hydrocarbon content is achieved.
3.6.4
Disconnection of bunker and Vapour Return hoses
On completion of draining and purging, the cargo hoses can be disconnected.
3.6.5
ESD Cable Disconnection
Shall be done.
3.6.6
Delivery of Bunker Document
The terminal is to deliver a document clearly stating the quantity and quality of fuel transferred, signed by
the terminal operator.

3.7

Unmooring

3.7.1
Manoeuvring
The receiving ship must have constant monitoring of surrounding traffic positions during unmooring and
departure.

- 16 -

4.

4.1

Detailed Description of the Evaluation of


SIGTTO LNG Ship to Ship Transfer Guidelines
Introduction and General Principles
Introduction

4.1.1
Background
This is an evaluation of the applicability in relation to ship to ship bunkering operation of LNG of the First
edition of LNG Ship to Ship Transfer Guidelines produced by SIGTTO and published by Witherby
Seamanship in 2011. Parallel to the evaluated documents F/SSPA has also used the LNG ship to Ship
bunkering procedure published by Swedish Marine Technology Forum in 2010 as reference.

4.2

General Conclusions and Recommendations

The SIGTTO guidelines are developed to be used for STS transfer operations between commercially
operated LNG carriers. At a first glance these guidelines seem to be the perfect guideline to use when doing
STS LNG bunkering operation between bunker and commercial vessels. To understand why the SIGTTO
guideline is only partly applicably it is necessary to understand some of the basic differences between LNG
STS transfer operation, commercially operated large LNG carriers and a bunker vessels and gas fuelled
vessels.
The type of operation the SIGTTO guidelines are produced to address is between two large LNG carriers.
The decision to do this kind of operation is often made over a relative long time before the actual operation is
performed. Therefore there is usually a lot of time to plan the STS operation in advance. For a typical LNG
carrier the annual number of STS operation is very limited, and even for the ones involved, it is unusual to
do more than one operation per month.
Based on these typical operating procedures the SIGTTO guidelines handle each STS operation as a single
entity that should be planed and performed according to the guidelines. For each operation the SIGTTO
guidelines recommend activities such as risk assessment, compatibility evaluations and navigational
planning. They also recommend up to 5 different checklists to be used during planning and realisation of the
STS operation.
When defining the operating procedures for STS LNG bunkering operation you have to take the present STS
FO1 bunkering activities as staring point. These operationa are characterised of short lead times, high
flexibility both in time, location, quality and volume and the work on-board a typical bunkering vessel is
very much hands on solving problems when they occurs. It is not unusual that a bunker vessel does more
than 5 cargo operations per day and the preparation time for each operation is limited.
These characteristic differences in operating procedures between LNG STS cargo operation and STS LNG
bunkering operation also identifies the main topic that makes the SIGTTO guidelines only partly applicable
when it comes to STS LNG Bunkering operation. A guideline for LNG STS Bunkering operation has to
reduce the necessary preparations for each cargo operation to a minimum. The only way of achieving this is
1

Fuel Oil

- 17 -

a much higher level of standardisation of connections, communication systems, ESD systems, mooring
arrangements etc. than the SIGTTO guidelines offer.
If this not is done there is a significant risk that STS LNG bunkering either becomes too complicated and
time consuming to be competitive, or that the probability of handling failure might increase due to short time
schedules for bunkering.

4.3

Comments of Evaluation

The SIGTTO guidelines are evaluated chapter by chapter and paragraph by paragraph in 5 LNG Ship to Ship
Transfer Guidelines. In the document it is stated what parts are applicable when regarding STS LNG
Bunkering operation and what parts are not. For each part that is considered not applicable or partly
applicable a short comment on why and in what direction a development is necessary is stated.
Throughout the evaluation referrals are made to the LNGBG2. The purpose of these referrals is to identify
parts of the evaluated guidelines where a more LNG STS bunkering specific approach is deemed necessary.
It is recommended to develop such guidelines in an international context with, in relation to the SIGTTO
guidelines, a much higher level of standardisation of operational and technical requirements for both the
delivering and receiving vessels.
It is also recommended that the LNGBG includes a defined methodology to develop local supplements to the
LNGBG. The purpose of these local supplements is to meet potential hazards related to the specific local
circumstances valid for a specific LNG bunkering area. Such area could be a specific quay or position but
also a port, designated bunker area or within a specific countrys economic zone.

5.

LNG Ship to Ship Transfer Guidelines

All headings in this section correspond to the same in the SIGTTO LNG Ship to Ship Transfer Guidelines.

5.1

Purpose

Not applicable
Applicable in principle but have to be redefined in relation to LNG STS bunkering operation.

5.2

Scope

Not applicable
The scope is the STS LNG Cargo transfer. The transfer of LNG as a fuel is not mentioned.

5.3

At sea

Applicable

5.4

Risk Management

Not applicable
2

Standardised LNG STS Bunkering Guidelines to be developed

- 18 -

The section recommends that a risk assessment is done for each single operation. This will not be possible
for LNG STS bunkering operations. When doing LNG STS bunkering a more general approach to the risk
assessment is necessary and this should be included in the LNGBG.
The reason for this is that it is necessary to reduce the preparation before and after each bunkering operation
to make the LNG STS bunkering feasible and competitive. To be able to do this without increasing the risks
levels for STS LNG bunkering it is necessary that a lot of the issues that should be risk assessed according to
the SIGTTO guidelines is standardised instead both when it comes to technical as well as operation aspects.

5.5

Control of operations

5.5.1
General
Applicable
5.5.2
Safe Watch keeping
1 and 2 not applicable.
A more general approach is necessary with predefined operational requirements for both the receiving and
delivering vessel. Most of the issues that is recommended in the SIGTTO guidelines to be discussed in a
conference prior to the actual operation has to be predefined since there will be impossible to perform such
conference prior to each bunkering operation. It is recommended that these suggestions are included in the
LNGBG.
3 Applicable
5.5.3
Manning for STS Transfer Operations
Not applicable
Most of the content of the paragraph is relevant also for STS LNG bunkering operations but the minimum
levels have to be adjusted to a more relevant level. For a small bunker vessel a minimum requirement is
probably one officer at the bridge/cargo control station and one deck hand by the gas manifold.
Note also that the STCW convention will not be compulsory for all types of bunker vessels which may deem
a more detailed definition of the requirements.

5.6

Duties of Personnel Carrying out STS Transfer Operations

5.6.1
Person in Overall Advisory Control
Not applicable
The section is not applicable even if most of the content is necessary to consider also for LNG STS
bunkering operations and be addressed in the LNGBG.
The division of responsibilities during a LNG STS bunkering operation has to be clearly defined in LNGBG.
Today the formal responsibility of a FO bunkering procedure lies at the master of the receiving vessel even if
it is in general the master of the bunkering vessel that is involved and supervises the bunkering operation. It
is suggested that the formal responsibility lies at the master of the bunker vessel since he will be the most
experienced officer when it comes to perform STS bunkering operation.

- 19 -

5.7

Training

Not applicable
Applicable in principle but have to be more general in its setting. Now it is written in relation to each single
cargo operation. To be developed in the LNGBG.

5.8

Security

Not applicable
Applicable in principle but must be defined in a much more general way dealing with STS transfer operation
in general and not for a specific operation. To be developed in the LNGBG.
The security matters for an LNG STS fuel transfer should be the same as for STS oil bunkering.

6.

Conditions and Requirements

6.1

Ship Compatibility (Confirmation list)

Not applicable
A much more general approach is necessary and for several of the issues addressed, standardisation has to
replace the assessment. To be developed in the LNGBG.

6.2

Approval from Authorities

1 Applicable
2 Not applicable
Applicable in principle but the communication methods used have to be very simple and efficient and may
not reduce flexibility in time and location. Shall be addressed in LNGBG.

6.3

Transfer Area

1 Applicable
2 Not applicable
The addressed issues have to be covered in the LNGBG and the mainly in the local supplements.

6.4

Weather conditions

Not applicable
Weather conditions must be addressed in the LNGBG with specific limits defined both in the general part
and in the local supplements.

7.

Safety

7.1

General

1 Applicable
2 Not applicable

- 20 -

All the referrals in the SIGTTO guidelines are relevant as a starting point but to make LNG bunkering
efficient and simple it is recommended that the relevant parts of the documents referred to is included in the
LNGBG.

7.2

Checklists

Not applicable
Note specific comments on each checklist

7.3

Safety During Cargo Operation

Not applicable
Applicable in principle but need to be performed with a scheduled interval instead of doing it prior to each
operation. To be covered in the LNGBG.
No formal risk assessments should be necessary for each cargo operation (with reference to 1.4). Instead
these things have to be covered in the LNGBG.
7.3.1
Cargo Leakage
Not Applicable
Applicable in principle but the most likely scenario is that the bunkering operation is suspended if a leak is
identified. When the leak is identified and fixed a new bunkering operation is initiated. To be covered in the
LNGBG.

7.4

Emergency Shut Down (ESD) Systems

General comment for section 3.4


The principles used in the described ESD system shall be used also for an LNG bunkering ESD system but
communication links and principal functionally of ERS systems have to be standardised. To be defined in the
LNGBG. Also consider Sect 9.2.10 and 9.2 and Ch. 10 of the SMTF procedures.
7.4.1
Linked ESD system
Not applicable
A solution based on a standardised communication protocol is necessary to create efficient and safe
bunkering operations. A minimum level shall be required for all LNG bunkering operations but with
possibilities for additional features if necessary. Especially for high speed bunkering or bunkering operation
where the receiving vessel use non pressurised fuel tanks additional information have to be communicated
between the bunker vessel and the receiving vessel. These standards are to be included in the LNGBG.
The SIGTTO document ESD Arrangements and Linked Ship/Shore System may be used as reference for
the development of a LNG Bunkering ESD system but it has to be further evaluated.
7.4.2
ESD system compatibility, Connection and Use
Not applicable
It is recommended that the need for the suggested assessments should be avoided through standardisation.
7.4.3
Emergency release system
Applicable

- 21 -

The ERS should be designed in a manner that the amount of spill is minimized.
7.4.4
Electrical Isolation
Not applicable
Applicable in principle but minimum measures have to be further developed and standardised to avoid risks
of electrical arching and similar during bunkering operations. This should be included in the LNGBG.
7.4.5
Testing of ESD Systems
Not applicable
The complete ESD systems shall be tested regularly and the procedures and frequencys has to be defined in
the LNGBG. The testing has to be integrated in the ships SMS system.

7.5

Actions in case of Infringement of Safety

Applicable

7.6

Helicopter Operation

Applicable

8.

Communication

Applicable

8.1

Language

Applicable

8.2

Information Required from the Ship

See comments on checklists

8.3

Navigational Warnings

Not applicable
The demands for the broadcast of navigational warning prior to bunkering operations have to be regulated in
the local supplements to the LNGBG.

8.4

Communication During Approach, Mooring, Cargo Transfer


and Unmooring operations

Not applicable
Applicable in principle but suitable means of communication needs to be defined in the LNGBG. Also note
comments on checklists.

8.5

Procedures for Communication Failure

Not applicable

- 22 -

Applicable in principle but suitable actions if a communication failure occurs needs to be defined in the
LNGBG.

9.

Operational Preparations before Manoeuvring

Not applicable
In principle not relevant in relation to bunkering operation since bunkering is more of continuous operations
and that the preparation for the next operation is on-going continuously on the bunker vessel. No special
chapter of the topic is necessary in the LNGBG.

10.

Manoeuvring and Mooring

Not applicable
The OCIMF/ICS Ship to Ship Transfer Guide (Petroleum) 4th edition may be used as starting point when
developing the manoeuvring and Mooring section of the LNGBG but also Ch. 5 in the SMTF procedures
should be considered. Standardisation of some basic requirements is recommended such as mooring bollard
positioning on the receiving vessels.

11.

Procedures alongside

Not applicable
Applicable in principle but has performed in a standardised more efficient way defined in the LNGBG. It is
also necessary to use more thorough procedures for first bunkering operation between to specific vessels in
relation to repeated bunkering operations. Also consider the Ch. 6 of the SMTF procedures.

11.1

Cargo Transfer operation

General comment to section 7.1


It is difficult to generate any clear recommendations for the usability of section 7.1 since there are a lot of
different solutions available to handle the LNG transfer between a bunker vessel and a gas fuelled vessel.
Aspects such as tank types, normal tank pressures, vapour handling, flaring, LNG circulation; design of fuel
system etc. will influence how the operations have to be performed. At the same time this is the key to fast,
efficient and safe STS LNG bunkering.
11.1.1
Vapour Management
Not Applicable
Applicable in principle. Note that for most LNG bunkering operation where the receiving vessels use Type C
tanks as fuel tanks the amount of vapour is limited which will simplify both operation and custody transfer
arrangements.
11.1.2
Line Inerting (After connection)
Not applicable
A more general approach is necessary based on design of bunker vessel as well as receiving vessel.
Depending on how vessels are operated and designed purging may not be necessary at all. Also the
development of the IGF and IGC code may interfere with the requirements of line inerting.

- 23 -

11.1.3
Transfer Line Cool Down
Not applicable
A more general approach is necessary based on design of bunker vessel as well as reciving vessel.
Depending on how vessels are operated and designed cooling down processes may not be necessary at all.
Also the development of the IGF and IGC code may interfere with the requirements of cooling down
processes.
11.1.4
Control of Cargo Transfer
Not applicable
See Sect 1.6.1 as reference.
11.1.5
Vessel Motion and Weather Criterias
Not applicable
The risk of sloshing is considered to be infinite when it comes to bunkering operation and therefore the
section is not applicable.
11.1.6
Topping off
Not applicable
Applicable in principle but has to be more adapted to bunkering. To be developed in the LNGBG.
11.1.7
Completion of Cargo Transfer and Purging of Cargo Transfer lines
Not applicable
A more general approach is necessary based on design of bunker vessel as well as receiving vessel.
Depending on how vessels are operated and designed purging after bunkering may not be necessary at all.
Also the development of the IGF code may influence the demand for purging cargo lines. Also consider the
SMTF bunkering procedures Ch. 7.

11.2

Cargo Documentation and Custody Transfer Requirements

The topic of bunkering documentation and custody transfer requirements is of great importance on relation to
bunkering but is also an area with great challenges. In one end is the demand for simple and efficient
operation and in the other ends is the requirements from the ship owners to know what has been delivered.
Issus such as LNG quality, vapour handling and continuous measurements has to be further developed in
relation to the LNGBG. Also consider SMTF procedures Sect. 8.9.

11.3

Operation after Completion of Cargo Transfer

Applicable

12.

Unmooring

Not applicable
The OCIMF/ICS Ship to Ship Transfer Guide (Petroleum) 4th edition may be used as starting point when
developing the unmooring section of the LNGBG but also Ch. 7 in the SMTF procedures should be
considered.

- 24 -

13.

Equipment

13.1

Fenders

Not applicable
Applicable in principle but have to be simplified and more general. Also see SMTF procedures Sect. 5.5 as
well as 8.4 for reference.

13.2

Cargo Transfer Equipment

Applicable
13.2.1
Cargo Transfer Hose
Not applicable
The most likely scenario is that the cargo transfer hose is supplied by the bunker vessel. In principle the rest
of the section is applicable but the significant high number of operations has to be considered when defining
intervals for testing etc. in the LNGBG.
13.2.2
Hose Size and Lengths
Applicable
13.2.3
Marking and Documentation
Applicable
13.2.4
Cargo Transfer Hard arm
Applicable
13.2.5
Additional Hull Protection
Not applicable
Applicable in principle but a more general approach is necessary. General HAZID work should find the
relevant recommendation when it comes to this question. To be clarified in the LNGBG.
13.2.6
ERS Activation Location
Applicable
13.2.7
Hose Handling after ERS Release
Applicable
13.2.8
Dead ship ERS Activation
Applicable
13.2.9
Transfer System Inspection and Testing
Not applicable

- 25 -

The frequency of inspection and testing has to be developed in relation to the much higher frequency of
operation in LNG bunkering operations. This is to be included in the LNGBG. Also consider the SMTF
procedures sect 3.8 and 8.1.5.

13.3

Mooring Equipment

Not applicable
The requirements for mooring equipment should be standardised and included in the LNGBG. Also consider
the SMTF procedures Ch. 5 and sect 8.4 for reference.

13.4

Personnel Transfers

Not applicable
Have to be further evolved depending on how operations are performed. Today it is quite common that the
crew of the bunker vessel connect the bunker hoses and therefore safe means of personnel transfer is
necessary.

13.5

Lighting

Applicable

13.6

Ancillary Equipment

Applicable

14.

Emergency planning

Applicable
Appendix A.
LNG STS Transfer Example Compatibility Questionnaire
Not applicable
The content in the questionnaire is relevant but have to be adjusted to LNG bunkering operation. Lot of the
questions can be excluded or simplified if a higher degree of standardisation is applied for LNG bunkering.
A compatibility questionnaire for LNG bunkering should only be necessary to fill in before the first
bunkering operation takes place between two specific vessels. To be included in the LNGBG.
Appendix B.
Checklist No. 1
Not applicable
Has to be adjusted to LNG Bunkering to achieve efficient and safe LNG Bunkering operations. Some
questions should be moved into the compatibility questionnaire instead and a combined checklist to be
produced combining Checklist 1, 2, 3 and 4. Also consider the SMTF procedures as reference.
Appendix C.
Not applicable

Checklist No. 2

- 26 -

Has to be adjusted to LNG Bunkering to achieve efficient and safe LNG Bunkering operations. Some
questions should be moved into the Compatibility questionnaire instead and a combined checklist to be
produced combining Checklist 1, 2, 3 and 4. Also consider the SMTF procedures as reference.
Appendix D.
Checklist No. 3
Not applicable
Has to be adjusted to LNG Bunkering to achieve efficient and safe LNG Bunkering operations. Some
questions should be moved into the Compatibility questionnaire instead and a combined checklist to be
produced combining Checklist 1, 2, 3 and 4. Also consider the SMTF procedures as reference.
Appendix E.
Checklist No. 4
Not applicable
Has to be adjusted to LNG Bunkering to achieve efficient and safe LNG Bunkering operations. Some
questions should be moved into the Compatibility questionnaire instead and a combined checklist to be
produced combining Checklist 1, 2, 3 and 4. Also consider the SMTF procedures as reference.
Appendix F.
Checklist No 5
Not applicable
Has to be adjusted to LNG Bunkering to achieve efficient and safe LNG Bunkering operations. Some
questions should be moved into the Compatibility questionnaire instead. Also consider the SMTF procedures
as reference.
Appendix G.
Applicable

Example Risk Register

12
Appendix 12
Hazard Identification Workshop
Table of Contents
1.

HAZID Process ......................................................................................... 2

1.1

Objectives and Methodology of the HAZID Workshop....................................... 2

1.2

Participants in the HAZID Workshop .................................................................. 3

1.3

Classification of Probabilities and Consequences ................................................ 5

1.4

HAZID Forms ...................................................................................................... 6

1.5

Additional HAZID Notes ................................................................................... 29

-2-

Appendix 12
1.

Hazard Identification Workshop

HAZID Process

A hazard identification (HAZID) workshop was conducted at SSPA Sweden process on 12-13
September 2011. In addition to the SSPA consultant team, 19 representatives from IKC organisations,
authorities and other organisations also took part.

1.1

Objectives and Methodology of the HAZID Workshop

The objectives of the HAZID workshop were to:


Identify hazards associated with LNG handling and distribution in the port and with the
bunkering process;
Rank the identified hazards in order to identify areas to be subjected to specific consideration
and further analysis for the LNG bunker infrastructure development.
The workshop was conducted as a structured brainstorming where a number of operational phases and
potential accident scenarios were discussed from a what-if perspective. A generic port,
accommodating different port activities and ship traffic ranging from small passenger boats and RoRo
ferries to large container vessels and tankers, was considered in order to cover different types of
bunkering ports. For the purposes of this study, risks related to aspects of human life and health were
primarily considered and hazards and accident scenarios that may lead to release of LNG were
specifically addressed.
The scope of the HAZID was divided into three different operational phases:
1. Loading and unloading of the bunker feeder vessel at an intermediary storage facility;
2. Transit of bunker feeder vessel or bunker vessel/barge in the port area;
3. Bunkering operations (STS, TTS and PTS).
For the TTS bunkering concept, only safety aspects related to the bunkering phase were addressed in
the study. The loading of LNG tank trucks is considered as well established technique and road traffic
with LNG trucks is subject to detailed national and local safety regulations.
The three operational phases listed above and the various bunkering concepts discussed are illustrated
in Figure 1.

-3-

Figure 1 The various operational phases addressed in the HAZID session

1.2

Participants in the HAZID Workshop

The following participants were actively involved in HAZID workshop:


Table 1 Participants at the Hazid workshop
Name

Organisation

Lars Langfeldt

GL Germanischer Lloyd

Johan Algell

Swedish Maritime Forum

Chris Underwood

(day 2 only)

MAN Diesel & Turbo, Denmark

Tessa Major

Port of Antwerp

Marnix Delee

Port of Antwerp

Cees Boon

Port of Rotterdam

Lysak Stanislav

Gasum Oy Finland

Aki Huomo

(day 2 only)

Gasum Oy Finland

Marco Andreola

Rolls-Royce Italia

Amed Van Herreweghe

Port of Zebrugge

-4-

Kager P.C.A.

(day 1 only)

Gasunie

Gunter Sattler

Baltic Energy Forum

Trond Arne Pedersen

Gasnor Norway

Klas Ljungmark

Swedish Transport Agency

Saeed Mohebbi

Swedish Transport Agency

Sten Sundberg

Finnish Transport Safety Agency

Jogvan Joanesarson

Lauritzen Kosan A/S

Michael Guhle

Lauritzen Kosan A/S

Colin Beall

Shell Intl. Trading and Shipping

The participants represent a wide range of expertise on LNG have a lot of valuable experience on
safety issues regarding LNG handling.
The schedule for the HAZID workshop is shown in the list below:
Day 1, focus on LNG handling and distribution in the port
Welcome address, presentation of participants and project overview. Introduction to LNG accidents,
statistics, cases and potential scenarios, HAZID methodology and workshop instructions.
1. Loading of feeder or bunker vessel at a large LNG terminal or intermediary storage facilities siting, capacity, parallel operations.
2. Distribution of LNG by feeder vessels or bunker vessels - transit in port area, port
characteristics
Day 2, focus on LNG bunkering operations and handling onboard
3. Bunkering operations - various optional bunker concepts
- Bunkering from bunker boat approach/departure, parallel operations
- Bunkering from tank truck - access roads, safety zones, parallel operations
- Bunkering from fixed quayside facilities filling stations, gas up, purging
Summarising and concluding session comparative risk ranking, effectiveness of identified risk
control measures, completion of HAZID forms.

-5-

1.3

Classification of Probabilities and Consequences

In order to facilitate the estimation of probability and consequence classification figures, the following
scheme was presented and applied by the HAZID team members. It was, however, noted that the study
basically is a qualitative assessment and the quantitative figures in the scheme should only be
considered as rough indications on the magnitude to guide and uniform the team members in their
estimations.
Table 2 Probability categories
Category

Expected return period1


one large port

Frequency of incident
(LNG bunkering globally)

5 Frequent

< 1 month

More than 100 times per year

4 Very likely

1 month 1 year

10 to 100 times per year

3 Likely

1 5 year

1 to 10 times per year

2 Possible

5 20 year

Once per 1 to 10 years

1 Unlikely

> 20 year

Less than once per 10 years

Table 3 Consequence categories


Category

1 Negligible

2 Minor

3 Medium

4 Major/
significant

5 Catastrophic/
major

Consequences on
human life and
health

Minimal no
impact or injuries

Medical
treatment
required for one
or few employee/
crew members

Serious injuries
resulting in lost
work for one or a
few employee/ crew
members

Single fatality for


employee or
crew member

Multiple fatalities for


employee, crew
member or third
party

LNG spill

Minimal spill

Small spill

Potential fire

Fire scenario

Vapour cloud fire

Description

Environmental risks associated with spills and release of cargo as well as economic risks to assets and
production losses are often also attributed with corresponding consequence scales. For the purpose of
this study on LNG bunkering issues, however, risks related to other aspects than human life and health
are considered to be of secondary importance and were thus not specifically addressed.

Expected reoccurence time of accident event

-6-

1.4

HAZID Forms

The completed HAZID sheets are found in the table below. Probability and consequence figures are
not indicated for all listed hazards. Many of the identified hazards rather describe specific safety issues
and point out areas where risk control measures are important. In order to make the probability and
consequence indexing relevant, the listed hazard should be formulated with a clear-cut accident
scenario with specific cause and outcome.
None of the hazards and safety issues raised during the HAZID workshop has been omitted and the list
is also complemented by a number of hazards that have been identified during other similar HAZID
workshops concerning LNG bunkering.

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

Operational phase 1

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Orgisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Loading of feeder and bunker vessel in bunker boat terminals or intermediate storage facilities

1.1

Overfilling

Human

Small spill and deck cracking.


Potential tank damage due to
surge pressure from pump.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), automatic stop: there


are existing procedures that are well-established. High level
alarm (topic for IGC code).

1.2

Emergency Release
System (ERS) activation
due to motions

Surge from passing ship

Small release of LNG,


determine volume based on
pipe diameter, for conservative
purposes use 28 second time
for shut down. Model to
determine dispersion, estimate
exclusion zone. The credible
volume of release needs to be
determined.

Exclusion zone size based on the credible volume of release.

1.3

ERS activation due to


motions

Extreme weather wind

As above.

Exclusion zone sized based on the credible volume of release.

1.4

Ignition sources within


exclusion zone

Human error, lack of


awareness on leisure
vessels

Ignition in the event of a leak.

Exclusion zone designed to be limited to the breadth of the


bunkering vessel

1.5

Fire in import terminal

Tank/pipeline failure

Excessive thermal heat,


cascading

Standard operating procedures for suspension of operations.

1.6

Fire/Explosion in
machine spaces of
vessels and LNG system

Gas release trough vent


mast due to system
overpressure

Vent-mast will be used for handling overpressure in system.


Needs to be managed safely. Safe break-away, controlled
flaring of excess overpressure and vapor return system

1.7

Rupture of the filling line

Technical failure, human


error

1.8

Training, qualification of
crews on smaller
vessels: adherence to
codes (STCW certified
crew not required);
vessel design standards.

Format of existing
regulations

1.9

Unclear split in
responsibility between
the supplier and receiver

Human, organizational
factors

1.10

Hazards due to
regulation gaps

Unclear guidelines and


regulations

Siting of facility to reduce chance of surge and wash wakes


from passing vessels.

Training and certification for the crew for smaller vessels to be


required

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

1.11

Mismatch of BOG (Boil


off Gas) connection

Organizational

Leakage

1.12

Too quick cool down


phase

Human

Leakage

1.13

Fluids under pressure

<10 bar (jet / squirt of


LNG) causing personal
injuries

1.14

Passing vessel collides


with ship being loaded

Navigational error, rudder


failure

1.15

Collision with tug at


LNGC

1.16

Inadequate design,
location or identification
of manual controls

1.17

Inadequate design or
location of visual display
units and warning signs

Hull damage, cargo leakage,


pool fire

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

ESD

SOP, ESD

Strict supervision of bunkering, visual control (override),


stainless steel shield/tray, investigate range and energy.

Exclusion zone, traffic restrictions

Siting at safe distance from import jetty


Lack of Ergonomic design
reducing operability and
maintainability. Reduced
possibility for
manual/visual control due
to poor design/solution.

Formation of ice due to


cryogenic transfer.

Operational routines to check for ice and slipping hazards.


Need/possibility for visual inspection tools and technology.
Clear standard for marking of controls and equipment with
standardised user communication regime. Insulation of
equipment
Establish guidelines for warning signs and
communication

1.18

Hazards due to deviation


from correct operating
procedures

Generated by erroneous
human intervention

1.19

Hazards due to errors of


maintenance

Erroneous human
intervention

Lack/loss of communication

Establish checklist to ensure communication, controlled shut


down of operation in cases of loss of communication

1.20

Health and safety


problems for land based
crew

Cold climate, bad weather,


darkness, polar stress

Delayed actions, human


errors, safety slips. Loss of
productivity, Injuries or
fatalities, safety concern

Provide sufficient shelter, equipment, training, procedures,


audits, winterization

1.21

Personnel falling into


water

Human or technical failure

Emergency situation, rescue


operations. Serious injury or
fatality

Self-rescue procedures, emergency preparedness

1.22

Failure in mooring quick


release

Technical failure

Safety concern

Hydraulics affected, oil viscosity, High modulus synthetic


ropes. Use individual mechanical quick release hooks.

Safety precautions/routines and testing before transfer jointly


with receiving vessel. Clear communications regarding tank fill
in addition to control systems.

RI

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

1.23

Communication
problems between
vessels and land based
personnel

Human failure, linguistic


problems

Delay in mooring operations

Procedures, mooring arrangements approved. Ship-shore


meeting, qualification, alarms, mooring line studies with the
vessels. Mooring planning.

1.24

Failing in preparing
arrangements for
emergency situations,
mainly fire

Bad training or procedures

Ship being unprepared for a


fire scenario leading to
secondary consequences

1.25

Not maintaining the


safety zone, other
vessels entering the
safety zone

Human failure,
manoeuvring failure of
other vessel

Safety concern

Failure of mooring
adjustment during
loading or tide variation

Human failure, technical


failure or external
influences

Causing high movements in


LNG transfer system

1.27

Failure in ballast
handling, control or
monitoring

Technical failure, human


error

Causing high movements or


displacement movements in
LNG transfer system.

1.28

Lightning

Meteorological conditions

1.29

All day darkness

Polar night

1.26

Safety concern

Collision with moored vessel

VTS, logistics and communication, limited access to port,


safety zones, restrictions
Patrol boat to secure the area

Safety concern, Crew injuries,


fatalities

Operational restrictions related to weather and wave


conditions. Vessel must be kept in the right position and
moorings must be adjusted accordingly with the ship being
loaded/unloaded Alarm routines. Crew awareness.
FMEA of system. Operational procedures. Alarm routines.

Standard procedures requiring stop in normal operations if the


lightning is too close; stop in pumping
Risk of fatigue of all personnel,
bad
Visibility. Reduced
performance and
awareness of all personnel

1.30

Avalanche or rock fall at


quay

Snow onshore and


external factors

Causing large wave when


hitting the water inside the jetty
and moored vessel. Damage
to vessels and infrastructure

Study about onshore snow problems.


Study about onshore snow problems.
Study about onshore snow problems.

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

Operational phase 2
2.1

Collisions with other


vessels in the port area

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Distribution of LNG by feeder vessels or by bunker boats in the port area


As for other collisions:
extreme weather, currents,
human error, other traffic,
technical failure, blackout

Worst case: collision will not


damage the containment if it
has been built according to
code. A release is a very
unlikely consequence.

Avoid crossing traffic, nautical safety zone the same as for


other vessels (Rotterdam handles LNG the same as other
ships); tug assistance only required for large vessels (not
feeders and bunker boats). Currently no special requirements
applied to LNG vessels.
Escort tugs: Location specific requirements, as for other
vessels
Moving safety zones: as applicable to other dangerous cargo
vessels (50 metre distance in Dutch regulations)
Location of tank; distance to outer shell
Tank type considerations (atmospheric or pressure vessels)

2.2

Hard collision ship/quay


side

Leakage from bunker


vessel, damaged cargo
containment

Multiple fatalities, crew, pax,


third party

Training Procedures Design

2.3

Fire involving the oil


cargo/fuel on a multipurpose bunkering
vessel (both oil and LNG
on board)

Equipment failure (e.g. in


engine room)

Flaring and venting of LNG


from tank relief valves

Tank designs, standard for dual-purpose bunkering vessels,


emergency response (fire brigade preparedness)

2.4

Allision: bridges, jetties,


infrastructure

Blackout (technical),
extreme weather, currents,
human error, other traffic

Possible damage to vent mast.


Similar to collision,
containment should not be
damaged

Escort tugs: Location specific requirements, as for other


vessels

2.5

Grounding

Blackout (technical),
extreme weather, currents,
human error, other traffic

Grounding will not damage the


containment if it has been built
according to code. A release is
a very unlikely consequence.

Escort tugs: Location specific requirements, as for other


vessels

Hard contact; relatively high probability but leakage probability


extremely low. Normal consequences; buckling damage of hull
plating of LNG fuelled vessel

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

2.6

Longer term blackout

Equipment failure

Pressure build up, required


venting: case studies show
that the pressure can be
handled for many days without
venting (one example for a
3000 4000 capacity feeder,
A-type containment showed 20
days before venting) (another
real-life example of 14 days
with no venting for a type C
containment).

2.7

Communication error

Misunderstanding with
VTS communication

Vessel entering unprepared


into the

2.8

Un-identified hazards in
nautical charts

Bad updates of nautical


charts, malfunctioning
navigational aids.
Unidentified Cable routing,
Wrecks in the area,
Bombs

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Port. Safety hazard to the


carrier and the port.

Procedures for permission to enter port with defined borders,


Communication, Notice of arrival, when entering notice of
readiness, Closed port, Holding zones and anchoring areas
defined, pilotage, restriction to other traffic, Use of escort tugs,
Defined approach corridor

Unsafe navigation, collision or


grounding

Update nautical maps, pilotage regulations, check and update


existing aids to navigation

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

2.9

Interaction with leisure


vessels

Forced to maneuvering on
short distances

2.10

Fire/Explosion in
machine spaces of
vessels and LNG system

Gas release trough vent


mast due to system
overpressure

2.11

Hazards due to errors of


maintenance

Erroneous human
intervention

Lack/loss of communication

Establish checklist to ensure communication, controlled shut


down of operation in cases of loss of communication

2.12

Health and safety


problems for land based
crew

Cold climate, bad weather,


darkness, polar stress

Delayed actions, human


errors, safety slips. Loss of
productivity, Injuries or
fatalities, safety concern

Provide sufficient shelter, equipment, training, procedures,


audits, winterization

2.13

Personell falling into


water

Human or technical failure

Emergency situation, rescue


operations. Serious injury or
fatality

Self-rescue procedures, emergency preparedness

Vent-mast will be used for handling overpressure in system.


Needs to be managed safely. Safe break-away, controlled
flaring of excess overpressure and vapor return system

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

2.14

Low visibility

Snow storms and fog

Navigational failure causing


collision or grounding

2.15

Technical failure of other


ship equipment and
onboard systems

Loss of nitrogen supply


system for the insulation
space, Lose equipment
(tower) in the tank,
Leakage in first barrier of
membrane, Failure of boiloff compressors, Loss of
power in steam
turbine/boiler system,
Green water effects and
transient vibrations,
Leakage causing damage
to structure, Loss of
heaters in cofferdams

This may lead to leakage of


LNG in tank system and may
cause a loss of cargo, too high
boil-off rate causing pressure
to rise, ship being unable to
sail, structural problems and
wear and tear on the crew.
Provided LNG leaks out of the
tank and into other
compartments or systems, this
may cause damage to these
arrangements/ systems if they
are not designed to absorb the
cold LNG fluid. Losing heaters
may cause a too low
temperature in the cofferdams
and secondary effects of this.
Due to the heat variations on
both sides of the cofferdams
this is a hot spot for corrosion.

RI

Limits for bad visibility in the harbour for entering vessels,


Independent and redundant systems for navigating in the bay,
radar, repeaters, range finders, DGPS, redundant radar,
control room with good view, etc.

The main action is to have a maintenance system on board


with regular inspections and reports

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

Operational phase 3a
3a.1

3a.2

Leakage

Leakage from
connection

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

With risk control measures: Drip tray, require training and


designated responsibility for crew member responsible for
bunkering, water curtain on the deck (climate dependent)

Use quick release connections

Bunkering from fixed quayside facilities (PTS)


Connection (technical),
human error due to a lot of
manual handling

Technical

Brittle fracture of deck if to


deck, LNG release

LNG release (small)

3a.3

Build up of vapour

No vapour return line

Vapour release

Require vapour return line

3a.4

Ignition source within the


area from nearby
passengers

Mobile phones, cigarettes,


violation of exclusion zone

Ignition if there is a leak

Establish and enforce suitable exclusion zone

3a.5

Electrical bonding

3a.6

Lack of coordination
between shore side
bunkering and ship
personal

Response time can be


longer due to distance to
source

Longer time to respond to a


leak, larger possibility of a
release

3a.7

Non-standardised
technology

Different suppliers of
equipment, difficult to
achieve a standadrised
approach and cooperation

Potentially more human errors


leading to release

3a.8

Non-adherence to
regulations

Lack of enforcement,
human error on
enforcement side

3a.9

Insufficient safety
systems as compared to
large scale system

3a.10

Roll-over

5 (atmos.
Tank), (no
RCM), 1
with vapour
return line

1 (if a wind
mast is
present)

Require trained personnel for ship-side, perhaps one on ship


and one on shore

Use standardized technology and systems, and this will


facilitate standardized training. Start with the technology and
safety systems for the large gas carriers and operations, and
scale it down.

Use insulated flanges (current requirement for gas carriers)

Training of enforcement officers


Review the larger scale systems and apply to the smaller
scale. Examples: ESD communication system between the
supplier and the vessel
Consequence if it occurs is the
generation of large quantity of
vapour, has only occurred a
few times on land

Safety systems, communication. Consider tank types: problem


with atmospheric tanks, but is it with Type C

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

3a.11

Ineffective purging

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Can lead to overpressure in


the pipe, possible rupture
without venting.

Standard procedures (downscale from large scale technology).

RI

Exclusion zone, traffic restrictions

Ensure clear guidelines on lifting restrictions and potential


guards during bunker operation on receiving vessel. Bunker
station protection.

Leakage due to motion/tearing


of hoses
Delay in mooring operations,
slippery
3a.12

Inadequate mooring

Surge, low temperatures

Winterized and sheltered boats, redundancy of equipment,


number of mooring boats

and stiff ropes

Injury to personnel, safety


concern
Fire/Explosion in
machine spaces of
vessels and LNG system

Gas release trough Vent

3a.13

3a.14

Hazards due to
regulation gaps

Unclear guidelines and


regulations

3a.15

Passing vessel collides


with ship being loaded

Navigational error, rudder


failure

3a.16

Dropped object due to


internal lifts

pipe/hose rupture

3a.17

Inadequate design,
location or identification
of manual controls

Lack of Ergonomic design


reducing operability and
maintainability. Reduced
possibility for
manual/visual control due
to poor design/solution.

3a.18

Inadequate design or
location of visual display
units and warning signs

3a.19

Hazards due to deviation


from correct operating
procedures

Vent-mast will be used for handling overpressure in system.


Needs to be managed safely. Safe break-away, controlled
flaring of excess overpressure and vapor return system

mast due to system


overpressure

Hull damage, cargo leakage,


pool fire

Formation of ice due to


cryogenic transfer.

Operational routines to check for ice and slipping hazards.


Need/possibility for visual inspection tools and technology.
Clear standard for marking of controls and equipment with
standardised user communication regime. Insulation of
equipment

Establish guidelines for warning signs and


communication
Generated by erroneous
human intervention

Safety precautions/routines and testing before transfer jointly


with receiving vessel. Clear communications regarding tank fill
in addition to control systems.

Id No.

3a.20

3a.21

3a.22

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Hazards due to errors of


maintenance

Erroneous human
intervention

Lack/loss of communication

Establish checklist to ensure communication, controlled shut


down of operation in cases of loss of communication

Health and safety


problems for land based
crew

Cold climate, bad weather,


darkness, polar stress

Personnel falling into


water

Human or technical failure

Delayed actions, human


errors, safety slips. Loss of
productivity, Injuries or
fatalities, safety concern
Emergency situation, rescue
operations. Serious injury or
fatality

Provide sufficient shelter, equipment, training, procedures,


audits, winterization

Self-rescue procedures, emergency preparedness

Ice produced due to


humidity and cryogenic
3a.23

Unsafe operation in
extreme hot/cold
environments

3a.24

Snow/ice load

3a.25

Leakage from long pipes


under ground

3a.26

3a.27

3a.28

Ensure clear guidelines on how to assess ice load on bunker


station equipment as well as connection equipment (flexible
hoses). Stress and load calculation for bunker station and
equipment needed as well as connection equipment (flexible
hoses). Thermal fatigue.Safe breakaway solutions

transfer causing pipe/hose


rupture. Ambient
conditions causing
material damage and
potential spills
Rain/load and ice
formation causing
pipe/hose rupture

Ensure clear guidelines on how to assess ice load on bunker


station equipment as well as connection equipment (flexible
hoses).

Procedures, training,
detection system
connected to ESD

Emergency shutdown, ESD system


Hard to detect 700 m max without recirculation of LNG for
cooling down (ALB)

Blackout in land based


bunker facilities

Design ESD to shut down if electronics fail

Earthquake Damage of
underground pipes

Icing, ice accretion on


pipes and valves in
humid environment may
pose extra load, may
block ESD functions and
ice may fall off onto crew
or staff

Design ESD, seismographic data


Due to ESD-systems only LNG in the pipe at the time of the
earthquake will be spilled. Depends on geological aspects

Single injuries

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

3a.29

ice accretion due to


protective water
spraying to prevent
embrittlement

Steel plating areas prone


to crack by embrittlement if
exposed to LNG may be
replaced by stainless
steel.

3a.30

Emergency onshore

Technical or human
failure, Fire on the jetty

3a.31

Escape ways ashore


blockaded

Emergency

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Preparation for quick


emergency departure. Leaving
berth partially loaded

Redundancy in mooring lines, quick release, Escort tug in


attendance, Emergency departure procedure to be detailed

Delayed evacuation
Redundancy in escape ways. Extra gangways, rescue vessel.
Injuries and fatalities

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

Operational phase 3b

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Shore manifold for more than one truck, so then only one
connection to the ship.

Bunkering from road tanker (TTS)

3b.1

No vapour return on
trucks

Not standard.

The tank has to already be in


use.

3b.2

More connections and


disconnections with one
operation

Several trucks are


required to provide the
necessary volume

Higher potential for


connect/disconnect errors and
release

3b.3

Lack of standardization
of connections

(See 3a.7)

Use standardized technology and systems, and this will


facilitate standardized training. Start with the technology and
safety systems for the large gas carriers and operations, and
scale it down.

3b.4

Other traffic loading and


unloading (passenger
cars)

Human error, space issue


at RoPax terminals,
difficult to check drivers of
passenger vessels, cant
restrict cargo loading
during bunkering

Fencing, watch keeping around bunkering truck

3b.5

ESD must be able to


initiate from both sides

3b.6

Need supervision on
both sides (ship and
trucks)

3b.7

Lack of enforcement of
the safety zone

Unclear designation of
safety zone

3b.8

Drop of cargo onto tank,


loading lines (e.g.
container twist locks)

Commercial pressures for


quick operations

3b.9

No ESD systems on
truck

3b.10

Venting system on truck

Risk of overfilling

Have ESD on the truck as well.

Assign responsibility to driver for safety zone around the truck.


Set up temporary markers around the truck.
Release of LNG due to
dropped objects.

Require coordination of loading operations and bunkering, in


terms of areas, but probably not acceptable to restrict cargo
loading during bunkering. Technical measures to reduce
damage.
Driver training, requirement for constant supervision. Consider
specification and design for new trucks ESD.

Venting of gas during


loading/unloading operations;
problem if gas vapour enters
the ships engine air intake.
The amount, distance and
weather are factors for
estimating consequences.

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Speed adjustment,
studded tyres, training

Single injuries

Truck driver may be injured during collision or when over quay


side

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

3b.11

Mistakes or icy roads


and collision between
truck and ship, or truck
over quay side may
cause damage to bunker
port/station facilities or to
truck.

3b.12

Lack of support of
bunkering hose

3b.13

Truck driving away with


hose still connected

3b.14

Ship sailing with hose


still connected

Fire/Explosion in
machine spaces of
vessels and LNG system

Gas release trough Vent

3b.15

3b.16

Hazards due to
regulation gaps

Unclear guidelines and


regulations

3b.17

Passing vessel collides


with ship being loaded

Navigational error, rudder


failure

3b.18

Dropped object due to


internal lifts

pipe/hose rupture

Ensure clear guidelines on lifting restrictions and potential


guards during bunker operation on receiving vessel. Bunker
station protection.

3b.19

Inadequate design,
location or identification
of manual controls

Lack of Ergonomic design


reducing operability and
maintainability. Reduced
possibility for
manual/visual control due
to poor design/solution.

Operational routines to check for ice and slipping hazards.


Need/possibility for visual inspection tools and technology.
Clear standard for marking of controls and equipment with
standardised user communication regime. Insulation of
equipment

3b.20

Inadequate design or
location of visual display
units and warning signs

If ESD activates, the hose


connection will be damaged
and may leak, hose may whip
and injure people

Vent-mast will be used for handling overpressure in system.


Needs to be managed safely. Safe break-away, controlled
flaring of excess overpressure and vapor return system

mast due to system


overpressure

Hull damage, cargo leakage,


pool fire

Formation of ice due to


cryogenic transfer.

Exclusion zone, traffic restrictions

Establish guidelines for warning signs and communication

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event, accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

3b.21

Hazards due to deviation


from correct operating
procedures

Generated by erroneous
human intervention

Safety precautions/routines and testing before transfer jointly


with receiving vessel. Clear communications regarding tank fill
in addition to control systems.

3b.22

Hazards due to errors of


maintenance

Erroneous human
intervention

Lack/loss of communication

Establish checklist to ensure communication, controlled shut


down of operation in cases of loss of communication

3b.23

Health and safety


problems for land
based crew

Cold climate, bad


weather, darkness, polar
stress

Delayed actions, human


errors, safety slips. Loss of
productivity, Injuries or
fatalities, safety concern

Provide sufficient shelter, equipment, training, procedures,


audits, winterization

3b.24

Personnel falling into


water

Human or technical
failure

Emergency situation, rescue


operations. Serious injury or
fatality

Self-rescue procedures, emergency preparedness

3b.25

Fire in port facilities


affecting bunkering
operations

Forced departure leading


to incidents

3b.26

Unsafe operation in
extreme hot/cold
environments

Ice produced due to


humidity and cryogenic
transfer causing pipe/hose
rupture. Ambient
conditions causing
material damage and
potential spills

Ensure clear guidelines on how to assess ice load on bunker


station equipment as well as connection equipment (flexible
hoses). Stress and load calculation for bunker station and
equipment needed as well as connection equipment (flexible
hoses). Thermal fatigue.Safe breakaway solutions

3b.27

Snow/ice load

Rain/load and ice


formation causing
pipe/hose rupture

Ensure clear guidelines on how to assess ice load on bunker


station equipment as well as connection equipment (flexible
hoses).

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event,
accident

Operational phase 3c

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Bunkering from bunker vessel (STS)

Loss of control of bunker


vessel or poor control of
bunker vessel speed
close to quay

Human or technical failure


onboard, Tugboat failure,
Blackout vessel,
unawareness

3c.2

Difficulties with mooring,


mooring lines, and nonstandardization.

Variability with existing


ships, many different
systems.

3c.3

Relative motion between


ships

Possible weather
conditions

3c.4

Leak from pipes during


transfer. Confined
spaces between vessels

3c.5

Filling level in Type C


tanks is likely different
every time you load the
vessel

3c.1

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

Different pressures,
conditions

Too high speed at fender


contact, inappropriate offset
and angle at contact.
Rupture of the fender, damage
on the ship, potential
grounding + berth destruction

LNG spill due to rupture of


hose

Good fenders absorbing berthing energy up to certain landing


speed, berthing angle, berthing energy, delay radar, berthing
time and speed, Training, experience, thresholds definition,
dolphins independent from platform to limit impact, control by
local reference station through DGPS. Reserve capacity
Design mooring points from the beginning for new ships,
taking into account the bunkering system. Difficult to
standardize for existing ships. Recommendation that there
should be adequate means of support for the hose, put in
procedures.

2 (with
conventional
mooring)

3 (assuming a
dry break
coupling is
installed)

Possible use of fenders, flexible connections, lines between


ships, good seamanship?

Cracking of deck structure if to


deck, or spill to water, possible
rapid phase transition. Could
have more impact for cruise
vessels.

Confined spaces between vessels: require some distance.


Keep in mind cruise vessels, exclusion zone, location of
smoking lounges, balconies. Siting of bunkering station

Overfilling, LNG will enter vent


line, LNG release from the
vent line. Potential surge
pressure from pump.

Guidelines to tell people in the operation about the problem.


If loading rate from pump is highetr than LNG flow through
vent line, surge pressure peak may damage tank or vent
valves.

Damage to hoses and pipes


on deck, worst case scenario
is tank rupture (open sea more
likely for tank rupture due to
higher speeds quite low
speeds inside the port)

ESD systems should operate to close valves, and this would


limit release of LNG, location of tank, distance from tank to
outer shell

3c.6

Collision, bunker vessel

3c.7

Collision, bunker vessel


sinks

3c.8

Collision, receiving
vessel

Damage to hoses and pipes


on deck

3c.9

Items from larger


vessels falling on to
hoses.

Damage to hoses, damage to


instrumentation lines, valves,
possible release

ESD systems should operate to close valves, and this would


limit release of LNG, location of tank, distance from tank to
outer shell

Restrict lifting operations, cover the filling boxes. For new


buildings of vessels, design so there is no activities above the
bunkering

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event,
accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

3c.10

Rupture of transfer hose

3c.11

Excessive forces, stress


on valves, hoses and
pipes

3c.12

ESD shut down times,


volume released from an
ESD

3c.13

No responsibility for
enforcement of rules for
bunkering in
international waters

3c.14

Surge from passing


vessels, vessels
maneuvering in the
vicinity within the port

3c.15

Fire/Explosion in
machine spaces of
vessels and LNG
system

Gas release trough Vent


mast due to system
overpressure

3c.16

Hazards due to
regulation gaps

Unclear guidelines and


regulations

3c.17

Passing vessel collides


with ship being loaded

Navigational error, rudder


failure

3c.18

Dropped object due to


internal lifts

pipe/hose rupture

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Release of LNG

Add protection around the hose, e.g. required double-walled


hoses. Current hoses can withstand a lot. Considered that it
had been demonstrated that the hoses can withstand the
crush and impact. Hoses designed for 100 bar now. Some felt
that would not result in a gain.

Crane failure handling


hoses

Release of LNG

Different bunkering rate,


standardization issues

ESD works with different times


and volumes, will have larger
releases with higher bunkering
rates

Consider flow rate, time, and size of hoses when setting


bunkering rates, ESD times. Could use dry release couplings
for instantaneous shutdown. Use multiple hoses. Design for
instantaneous shutdown on both vessels is technically
possible.
Establish a standard and guidelines. ISO guidelines being
drafted may identify and cover gaps.

Vent-mast will be used for handling overpressure in system.


Needs to be managed safely. Safe break-away, controlled
flaring of excess overpressure and vapor return system

Hull damage, cargo leakage,


pool fire

Exclusion zone, traffic restrictions


Ensure clear guidelines on lifting restrictions and potential
guards during bunker operation on receiving vessel. Bunker
station protection.

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event,
accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

3c.19

Inadequate design,
location or identification
of manual controls

Lack of Ergonomic design


reducing operability and
maintainability. Reduced
possibility for
manual/visual control due
to poor design/solution.

Formation of ice due to


cryogenic transfer.

Operational routines to check for ice and slipping hazards.


Need/possibility for visual inspection tools and technology.
Clear standard for marking of controls and equipment with
standardised user communication regime. Insulation of
equipment

3c.20

Inadequate design or
location of visual display
units and warning signs

3c.21

Hazards due to
deviation from correct
operating procedures

Generated by erroneous
human intervention

3c.22

Hazards due to errors of


maintenance

Erroneous human
intervention

Lack/loss of communication

Establish checklist to ensure communication, controlled shut


down of operation in cases of loss of communication

3c.23

Health and safety


problems for land based
crew

Cold climate, bad weather,


darkness, polar stress

Delayed actions, human


errors, safety slips. Loss of
productivity, Injuries or
fatalities, safety concern

Provide sufficient shelter, equipment, training, procedures,


audits, winterization

3c.24

Personnel falling into


water

Human or technical failure

Emergency situation, rescue


operations. Serious injury or
fatality

Self-rescue procedures, emergency preparedness

3c.25

Fire/Explosion in
machine spaces and
LNG system

LNG leakage between


vessels: Risk for gas
accumulating between
vessels and possibility for
ignition/explosion

The quantities required for gas


accumulation and the nature
of this should be further
assessed.

Strict supervision of bunkering, visual inspection of equipment


and active leak detection. Safe break-away, Dry disconnection
coupling, Multiple transfer hoses to reduce leak size, Pipe-inpipe (ex. Flexible hose)

3c.26

Releasing moor lines in


wrong order

Technical or human failure

Unsafe operation in
extreme hot/cold
environments

Ice produced due to


humidity and cryogenic
transfer causing pipe/hose
rupture. Ambient
conditions causing
material damage and
potential spills

3c.27

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Establish guidelines for warning signs and communication


Safety precautions/routines and testing before transfer jointly
with receiving vessel. Clear communications regarding tank fill
in addition to control systems.

Loss of operational control


Safety concern
Ensure clear guidelines on how to assess ice load on bunker
station equipment as well as connection equipment (flexible
hoses). Stress and load calculation for bunker station and
equipment needed as well as connection equipment (flexible
hoses). Thermal fatigue. Safe breakaway solutions

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event,
accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

3c.28

Snow/ice load

Rain/load and ice


formation causing
pipe/hose rupture

3c.29

3c.30

Weather forecast and/or


prediction of available
operational weather
window are inaccurate
or of poor quality

Inadequate safety
organisation and lack of
safety awareness may
contribute to
maneuvering error and
hard collision

Stress on crew
3c.31

3c.32

3c.33

Wind, rain, flooding,


waves. Inaccurate
observations, lack of
meteorological
measurement stations or
information not available

Parallel passenger
handling. Passengers
throwing objects down
on the bunker vessel on
or smoking near the
bunker station may pose
hazards.
Parallel car/trailer
handling may pose
hazards as potential
ignition sources.

Expectations of rapid
bunker operations, under
manning, inadequate
safety policies or Lack of
vetting procedures may
trigger unsafe procedures.

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Ensure clear guidelines on how to assess ice load on bunker


station equipment as well as connection equipment (flexible
hoses).
Waves from other
vessels/natural waves causing
pipe/hose rupture. Interrupted
berthing plans. Exceeding of
operational weather limits.
Premature departure. LNG
carrier has to leave with partial
cargo Serious damage to the
vessel. Failure with loss of
LNG containment.

Clear guidelines on how to assess wave


load on bunker station equipment as well as connection
equipment (flexible hoses). Refer to current regulations for
normal bunkering operations and fendering. Operational
restrictions well defined weather windows
Pilot-Office and Port authority should be co-located for fast
decision-making

Single fatalities

Ensure adequate safety management by effective regulative,


inspection, vetting mechanisms etc. Emergency procedures,
water spraying, fire fighting

Injuries, crew and onshore


personnel

Competition between bunker deliverers may trigger unsafe


cost cuts. Bunker ships may become substandard ships when
sold on a second hand market.

Protected bunker stations onboard. Smoking restrictions or


roped-off areas during bunkering
Safety barriers on bunkering vessel during bunkering

high awareness/training
Potential ignition sources Trailers with dangerous cargo or
packaged dangerous cargo cause potential conflicts in terms
of separation schemes and stowing requirements.

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event,
accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

3c.34

Leakage of dangerous
cargo from containers
may pose hazards if
occurring close to
bunker station.

Depending on dangerous
cargo, corrosion is a risk
factor leading to possible
leakage of LNG and
possible ignition

3c.35

Successive escalation of
e.g. engine room fire,
ignition of LNG fuel on
board, exploding tanks,
damage to bunker ship,
fire in quay buildings etc.

Multiple fatalities,
passengers, crew, third
parties.

3c.36

Difficult to arrange large


safety zones if zones
encircles other quay
areas and ships

3c.37

Liquid LNG left in the


vapor return lines

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Training, protected location of bunkering stations,


documentation of cargo
Safety walls

Holistic safety approaches


Well established preparedness
onshore can limit casualties

May create high pressure


when evaporated

Established fire fighting, emergency preparedness and


response organisation a shore.

Design vapor return systems to prevent any return of liquid


phase

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event,
accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

Operational phase 3d

Bunkering from bunker vessel at anchorage at sea

3d.1

Ship motions

Possible weather
conditions

3d.2

Additional transit time


and movement of
bunker vessel in and out
of the port.

3d.3

Breakage of filling line

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Restrictions regarding conditions, movements for bunkering.

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Longer response time of


emergency services in
the event of an incident.

3d.4

Collision from external


vessels, higher speeds
than port case.

Fire/Explosion in
machine spaces of
vessels and LNG
system

Gas release trough Vent

3d.5

3d.6

Hazards due to
regulation gaps

Unclear guidelines and


regulations

3d.7

Inadequate design,
location or identification
of manual controls

Lack of Ergonomic design


reducing operability and
maintainability. Reduced
possibility for
manual/visual control due
to poor design/solution.

3d.8

Inadequate design or
location of visual display
units and warning signs

Increased risk of accident.


Lower potential for human
consequences due to lower
population exposure.

Vent-mast will be used for handling overpressure in system.


Needs to be managed safely. Safe break-away, controlled
flaring of excess overpressure and vapor return system

mast due to system


overpressure

Formation of ice due to


cryogenic transfer.

Operational routines to check for ice and slipping hazards.


Need/possibility for visual inspection tools and technology.
Clear standard for marking of controls and equipment with
standardised user communication regime. Insulation of
equipment
Establish guidelines for warning signs and
communication

3d.9

Hazards due to
deviation from correct
operating procedures

Generated by erroneous
human intervention

3d.10

Hazards due to errors of


maintenance

Erroneous human
intervention

Safety precautions/routines and testing before transfer jointly


with receiving vessel. Clear communications regarding tank fill
in addition to control systems.
Lack/loss of communication

Establish checklist to ensure communication, controlled shut


down of operation in cases of loss of communication

Id No.

3d.11

3d.12

HAZARD
Type of event,
accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Health and safety


problems for land based
crew

Cold climate, bad weather,


darkness, polar stress

Delayed actions, human


errors, safety slips. Loss of
productivity, Injuries or
fatalities, safety concern

Provide sufficient shelter, equipment, training, procedures,


audits, winterization

Personnel falling into


water

Human or technical failure

Emergency situation, rescue


operations. Serious injury or
fatality
Waves from other vessels
causing pipe/hose rupture
Natural waves causing
pipe/hose rupture

3d.13

Weather forecast and/or


prediction of available
operational weather
window are inaccurate
or of poor quality

3d.14

Failure starting up boiloff system and


arrangements for
handling surplus gas

3d.15

Failure to weigh anchor,


stucked anchor, broken
cable, loss of anchor
and chain

3d.16

Learning phase,
procedures not detailed

Wind,rain,flooding,waves
Inaccurate observations,
lack of meteorological
measurement stations or
information not available

Bad maintenance

Seabed condition, depth

Single fatalities
Interrupted berthing plans.
Exceeding of operational
weather limits. Premature
departure. LNG carrier has to
leave with partial cargo
Serious damage to the vessel.
Failure with loss of LNG
containment.

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Self-rescue procedures, emergency preparedness

Ensure clear guidelines on how to assess wave load on


bunker station equipment as well as connection equipment
(flexible hoses). Refer to current regulations for normal
bunkering operations and fendering.
Technology o Stress and load calculation for bunker station
equipment as well as connection equipment (flexible hoses).
Design. Operational restrictions well defined weather
windows
Pilot-Office and Port authority should be co-located for fast
decision-making

Pressure build up and gas


venting, a process that can
become critical.
Problems to leave the
anchorage area
Safety concern, unsafe
operation with missing anchor

Lack of experience from


similar operations and
facilities

Failing to have adequate


procedures and training
systems may lead to technical,
safety and operational
problems onboard and ashore.

Id No.

HAZARD
Type of event,
accident

Operational phase 3e

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

Bunkering with RoRo or LoLo Containers

3e.1

More connections
required.

A number of containers
are on board.

3e.2

Proximity to other
vehicles and cargoes in
the case of RoRo
vessels.

3e.3

Risk associated with


lifting on a full container
of gas.

3e.4

Failure of lashing
systems

3e.5

Complicated venting
system, as each tank
will have its own vent.

3e.6

Ship engines are


running off the system of
the containers during the
bunkering

3e.7

Inadequate design,
location or identification
of manual controls

3e.8

Inadequate design or
location of visual display
units and warning signs

3e.9

Hazards due to
deviation from correct
operating procedures

Generated by erroneous
human intervention

3e.10

Hazards due to errors of


maintenance

Erroneous human
intervention

Higher probability of release


due to more connections.

Consider when and who would do the connections to the


containers on board. Crew need to be trained regarding
procedures.
Note that the LNG would be considered as fuel, not as IMDG
cargo. Would need to develop requirements and rules.

Establish procedures for switching between tanks.

Lack of Ergonomic design


reducing operability and
maintainability. Reduced
possibility for
manual/visual control due
to poor design/solution.

Formation of ice due to


cryogenic transfer.

Operational routines to check for ice and slipping hazards.


Need/possibility for visual inspection tools and technology.
Clear standard for marking of controls and equipment with
standardised user communication regime. Insulation of
equipment

Establish guidelines for warning signs and communication


Safety precautions/routines and testing before transfer jointly
with receiving vessel. Clear communications regarding tank fill
in addition to control systems.
Lack/loss of communication

Establish checklist to ensure communication, controlled shut


down of operation in cases of loss of communication

Id No.

3e.11

3e.12

HAZARD
Type of event,
accident

CAUSE
Human, Technical,
Extern, Organisational

OUTCOME
LNG release, Fire, Damage,
Fatalities

RISK CONTROL MEASURES


Established/Potential
Operational, Technical, Regulatory

Health and safety


problems for land based
crew

Cold climate, bad weather,


darkness, polar stress

Delayed actions, human


errors, safety slips. Loss of
productivity, Injuries or
fatalities, safety concern

Provide sufficient shelter, equipment, training, procedures,


audits, winterization

Personnel falling into


water

Human or technical failure

Emergency situation, rescue


operations. Serious injury or
fatality

Self-rescue procedures, emergency preparedness

Probability
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Consequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RI

- 29 -

1.5

Additional HAZID Notes

Some of the specific safety issues discussed during the HAZID workshop is summarized below:
Definition of LNG scale:
Definitions of scale for the purpose of this HAZID were set as follows:
In terms of loading pipe diameter:
Large: Greater than 16 inch (for unloading larger vessels);
Medium: 7, 8 to 15 inch;
Small: 2 to 7 inches (2 inch diameter required for trucks).
In terms of vessel capacity:
Large: Greater than 50,000 (it was agreed that Q-max type vessels were out of scope for this
study);
Feeders: 10,000 to 50,000;
Ordinnary: 1,000 to 7,000;
Small: 200 to 500 (multi-purpose bunker).
Loading Arm Requirement:
Loading arms are required in the ISO standard for large scale LNG. Colin Beall stated that the ISO standards
currently being developed for LNG bunkering do not require the loading arm, but require the same safety
functionalities if a hose is used. For example it must be supported, quick release requirements, etc.
Vapour Return:
Is this a necessity for smaller scale? - Even in the smaller terminals in Norway, there is always a vapour
return but it is not always used. For the Viking project in Stockholm there is an attempt to design without
requiring vapour return. It requires additional time.
Credible Volume of Release:
This should be estimated based on pipe diameter and the time required for shutdown. Most systems are set to
shut down in 28 seconds. The minimum is 20 seconds and the maximum is 30 seconds. There are different
types of valves on the market and some can have faster shut down times. Time is needed to first detect the
leak and then to shut the valves.
Overfilling:
Would the risk be the same for smaller vessels? There are more frequent operations at a facility when using
smaller vessels, but there are standard procedures to avoid this.
Proximity of other vessels to bunkering operations:
Most ports and terminals have policies regarding this. Enforcement and checking is a question. A solution is
to keep the exclusion zone within the breadth of the supply vessel.
Regulations:
Discussion regarding existing regulations and their applicability to small and medium scale LNG highlighted
the fact that the IGF code will not cover bunkering operations on anything else than large scale. The
upcoming ISO guidelines on bunkering will take the form of a technical specification and are expected
within 2 years time. It they were in the form of a standard the time line would be longer. It may be possible
to get a review copy of draft specifications, which are expected in a few months.

- 30 -

Standardisation and Training:


The importance of having a standardization among suppliers and for systems on board was stressed. This
would also facilitate the development of training programs. The standards should be similar to those for large
gas carriers.
Bunkering while loading goods and passengers:
Risks include dropped cargo and containers, and passengers not adhering to safety zones. It was noted that
there had been one dropped container on a bunkering vessel during the last five years in Rotterdam, so it is a
possibility. It was felt that the tanks could withstand this type of impact, but that valves and control systems
could be damaged. Protecting the sensitive areas could be a solution, as well as limiting lifting activities
above the bunkering ports.
Categories for ranking probability and consequences:
Bjrn Forsman presented the proposed probability and consequence categories to be used. It was noted that
the consequences should be related to the LNG release from the incident. There was discussion about
whether the consequence evaluation should be limited to human effects (safety) or should also include
damage to assets. Colin Beale showed the categories used in Shells risk assessment matrix, which included
four categories of consequences: people, assets, environment, and reputation. A scale of 0 to 5 was used for
each of the consequence categories.
The ranking was determined to be limited to human consequences. It should consider probability and
consequences for a generic port.
Wrap Up Discussion:
When asked for an identification of the most important overall issues, the following were proposed:
Training of personnel;
Lack of rules and guidelines;
Standardization (this can be linked to training and regulations).
The importance of allowing parallel cargo and passenger handling to proceed while bunkering LNG was
identified. The main reason being to maintain economic viability to be able to compete with conventional
bunker fuels.
Another issue was the requirement to have 2 people on board a bunker vessel, even when it is empty (with
tanks not cleaned), due to class 1 cargo requirements. This is not the same situation for road tankers, which
may be left parked with no driver on board when empty (tanks not cleaned).

13
Appendix 13 Preventive and Mitigating Measures at
LNG Terminals
Table of Contents
1.

Preventive and Migitating Measures at LNG Terminals...........................2

1.1

Preventive Measures in the Loading/Discharging Phase ...................................... 2

1.2

Mitigating Measures in the Loading/Discharging Phase ...................................... 2

1.3

Preventive Measures for Feeder/Bunker Vessels in Transit ................................. 3

1.4

Mitigating Measures for Feeder/Bunker Vessels in Transit ................................. 6

1.5

Preventive Measures for LNG Bunkering ............................................................ 6

1.6

Mitigating Measures for LNG Bunkering: ......................................................... 10

-2-

Appendix 13 Preventive and Mitigating Measures at


LNG Terminals
1.

Preventive and Migitating Measures at LNG


Terminals

1.1

Preventive Measures in the Loading/Discharging Phase

Handling LNG requires certain knowledge and awareness regarding its characteristics, both for preventative
and mitigating measures in all three operational aspects. This section lists different aspects that are
applicable for the loading/discharging of vessels at a terminal, but some of the aspects are more general,
hence applicable for the two other operational phases. Among the preventive measurements, as to avoid
release of LNG, are maintenance, inspections, choice of quality materials and surveillance systems.
1.1.1
Training
All personnel working with LNG operations must be educated, trained and certified for working with
liquefied flammable gases. Relevant education and training records for all crew members must be available
upon request from the port authority, safety inspectorate or the other ship. Regular safety drills regarding
fire, smoke and the handling of loss of communication should be performed regularly and documented
according to the ISM (International Safety Management) Code 2002 by IMO. The training aspect is
important, not only from a preventative, but also mitigating view. Both damage limitation and
routines/maintenance regarding prevention of injuries should be considered. Procedures for deviation
control, surveillance, detection, preparedness, emergency practices together with routines for inerting,
pressure control and spill surveillance must be in place. See also 1.5.8 Training.
1.1.2
Communications
An important factor to take into account is the interface for effective communication and the protocol for
who is in charge of which part of the operation. This is especially important for LNG operations since an
increase in pressure in the system can be a potential risk factor (see 1.5.5 Communications).
1.1.3
Design Requirements
Strict demands on the integrity of tank containment are required to prevent spill. The design of the bunker
vessel/barge shall minimize the risk of leakage in case of collision (with other vessel or quay), however,
there are special demands on equipment and safety in general when handling LNG; proper dimensioning of
equipment and systems, automatic shutdown in case of power outage or overload etc. A third party
validation is required to ensure technical integrity.
Fire and gas safeguards may be compared to similar activities in the offshore and process industry.

1.2

Mitigating Measures in the Loading/Discharging Phase

1.2.1
Emergency Preparedness
Thorough emergency preparedness plans are established in all LNG import terminals and the loading
/discharging of LNG feeder and LNG bunker vessels should be incorporated in the plans if the terminals are

-3-

located in the same area. SIGTTO has published an overall guidance document for the emergency
managements of all incidents that may occur in LNG terminals2. Traditional Emergency preparedness
planning assumes that the terminal and the ship provide response equipment to meet their own needs each
being exclusive of each other. In case of a fire accident in the shore side facilities the ship shall depart;
however, in case of a fire accident on board, staying at the berth normally provides better chances for
firefighting assistance but the risk of fire spreading to the land-based facilities must also be considered and
prevented.

1.3

Preventive Measures for Feeder/Bunker Vessels in Transit

1.3.1
The Use of Vessel Traffic Services
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) can be explained as A service designed to improve the safety and
efficiency of vessel traffic and to protect the environment. The service should have the capability to interact
with the traffic and respond to traffic situations developing in the VTS area.3
The ISO 28460:2010 standard states that it is compulsory to use a VTS4. The conclusion drawn in this report
is that a VTS may not be an efficient solution in very small ports/terminals. IMO Resolution A.867(20)
produced a set of standards for implementing VTS and for training VTS operators, and further commissioned
the International Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) to produce more detailed recommendations
and guidelines for VTS.
It is suggested that the need for a VTS shall be determined by using the process as outlined in the IALA VTS
Manual5. A VTS, when implemented, shall be provided in accordance with the requirements and
recommendations of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), chapter V 6, and the
IALA VTS Manual7.
1.3.2
Procedures for LNG Vessels Transferring in a Port
Aspects concerning how to adapt existing large-scale LNG standards and best practices for ports and
fairways to small- and medium scale LNG carriers8 are the key issue to be addressed. The ISO 28460:2010
standard, which is intended for large scale9 terminals has been reviewed, and recommendations are given so
that it will also be applicable to smaller terminals and ports. Appendix G includes a full review of the ISO
28460:2010 standard and what needs to be done to increase its appropriateness for small and medium scale
LNG.10 The appendix provides a deeper systematic description of loading LNG at a terminal and a LNG
vessel transiting the port.
An essential point to address when introducing a new hazardous cargo in ports and terminals is how to treat
this new substance. In many ports, LNG is such a new, and in many respects, unknown substance. An LNG
carrier should be subject to the same rules and regulations as any ship/barge carrying hazardous goods in a
port or terminal11.
2

A Guide to Contingency Planning for Marine Terminals Handling Liquefied Bulk Gases. SIGTTO

Definition of VTS from IALA VTS Manual (4th edition, 2008)


A vessel traffic service (VTS) is a marine traffic monitoring system
5
IALA VTS Manual (4th edition, 2008).
6
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea(SOLAS),-1974.aspx.
7
IALA VTS Manual (4th edition, 2008).
8
In this section the use of the term LNG Carrier (LNGC) is used as in the ISO 28460:2010 standard. An LNG carrier is any carrier
that transports LNG as a cargo on water, for example a ship or a barge.
9
For the ISO standard the limitations are: This International Standard applies only to conventional onshore liquefied natural gas
(LNG) terminals and to the handling of LNGCs in international trade. However, it can provide guidance for offshore and coastal
operations.
10
Done in cooperation with in-kind contributors; Gasnor, Port of Rotterdam, Port of Zeebrgge, Port of Hirtshals, Lauritzen Kosan.
11
NMD (Norwegian Maritime Directorate) http://www.sjofartsdir.no/no/Aktuelt/Tillater-transport-av-nedkjolte-gasser/ & Rotterdam
Port presentation October 21st 2011.
4

-4-

This leads to the conclusion that port by-laws or national legislation should have the same rules/regulations
for a LNG carrier as for other vessels or barges carrying hazardous goods. Some examples of areas that may
be affected are the following:
Pilotage;
Use of tugs;
Use of VTS;
Anchorages.
This will affect how ports can adapt to small-scale LNG carriers12 and help with a smoother implementation
of LNG in a port or terminal.
Tug boats 13
The number and power of the tugs should be such that they can safely berth the LNG carrier if one of the
tugs or the LNG carrier loses propulsive power or steerage, at the maximum operational weather conditions
permitted for berthing. The LNG carrier may be equipped in a way that the use of tugs is not needed for safe
manoeuvring of the LNG carrier.
Escort tugs14
The risk of grounding or collision through loss of steerage or power by the LNG carrier15 shall be considered
and means of reducing the risk should be introduced.
Escort towage may be one solution for reducing the risk of grounding or collision through loss of steerage or
power. If an escort tug is used the OCIMF 16 recommendations for ships- fittings for use with tugs shall
apply.
Other means of reducing the risk of grounding or collision may be with advanced propulsion systems and
with duplication of propulsion and steering systems.

12

Vessels classified under IGC Code/GC Code/ Gas Code for existing gas carriers;
An ISO 28460:2010 standard requirement
14
See appendix for a definition
15
In this section the use of the term LNG Carrier (LNGC) is used as in the ISO 28460:2010 standard. An LNG carrier is any carrier
that transports LNG as a cargo on water, for example a ship or barge.
16
The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
13

-5-

Figure 1 Escort tug making fast at strong point of oil tank


Photo: Johan Gahnstrm

Figure 2 Pilot climbing on board a vessel


Photo: Johan Gahnstrm

Marine Pilots
Marine pilots provide an essential and unique service to the shipping industry.
Their principal role is to:17
Provide critical independent local knowledge and navigational information to vessels;
Bring the highest level of ship handling skills to manoeuvre vessels within their port.
As pointed out earlier in this chapter a small and medium scaled LNG carrier should be subject to the same
rules as any other carrier transporting hazardous goods. For the marine pilots, this means that rules for if and
when a marine pilot shall be on-board the LNG carrier should be determined by the port regulations for
ships/barges of the same size carrying hazardous goods.
Pilot Exemption Certificates
A Pilot Exemption Certificate (PEC) is a document that shows that the holder on board is qualified to sail in
specified fairways or areas with the specified vessel without a pilot. The pilot exemption certificate can be
issued to a shipmaster. The possibility for a shipmaster to apply for and receive a PEC should be laid down
in national and port regulations for any ship carrying dangerous goods.
Anchorages Dedicated for Use by LNG Carriers
Anchorages are used by vessels that wait for their jetty/berth to be available. The ISO 28460 standard states:
No anchorage dedicated for use by laden LNG carriers shall be located in a position where there is a risk of
collision with large-displacement vessels travelling at speed. Some in-kind contributors have indicated that
there are ports in which this is not possible or feasible to achieve. However, it is of utmost importance to
plan for anchorage areas.
International regulations do not adequately cover the safe navigation of ships in anchorage areas. There must
be in acceptance of the fact that defined and restricted anchorages need some form of traffic control or advice
17

From IMPA, The International Maritime Pilots' Association

-6-

and that ships should be allocated anchor positions. Ports need to make a survey of the ships using their
anchorages and then plan and/or re-design accordingly.
Weather Restrictions:
Weather restrictions should be set. Such restrictions may include:
Current;
Wind loads;
Tidal range;
Waves and swell;
Ice.

1.4

Mitigating Measures for Feeder/Bunker Vessels in Transit

All normal mitigating procedures are normally already in place in a port. LNG vessels transiting a port are all
designed and built to IGC code or the equivalent to IGC in inland waterways. This means that all vessels are
designed to meet criteria to be maneuvering in ports and terminals already from the design.
1.4.1
Firefighting Equipment18
In the ISO 28460:2010 standard it is stated that:
A minimum of one tug with water monitors meeting national or local requirements shall be available.
Where there are no national or local regulations, a tug meeting the FiFi 19 requirements of a recognized
classification society is recommended.
It may not always be suitable for small scale applications to have a tugboat available. Look for example at
Norway where small remote terminals are present and no tug is available.
1.4.2
Emergency Preparedness
An emergency plan in case of LNG or gas leak shall be prepared and followed in case of emergency.

1.5

Preventive Measures for LNG Bunkering

1.5.1
Checklists
Stringent procedures including a detailed checklist for different steps of the bunkering operations are
important preventive measures. They may include:
CHECK-LIST BEFORE BUNKERING (each ship);
CHECK-LIST PRE-TRANSFER (both ships);
CHECK-LIST AFTER BUNKERING (each ship).
Each ship is to have internal check-lists for procedures before and after bunkering. For bunker operation
there shall be a common check-list that is to be filled out and signed by responsible operators on both ships
before any operation is commenced. This ensures correct installations and couplings between
equipment/systems, including functioning control and safety systems, for both bunker vessel and receiving
vessel. Safety routines, measures and testing together with receiving part are required before transfer of LNG
can be initiated.
18

An ISO 28460:2010 Standard requirement


A FiFi 1 is:Diesel Engine Driven or Electric Motor Driven Fire Pumps: 2X1200m3/h or one 2400m3/h, Fire
Monitors:2X1200m3/h@120m and a Remote Control System
19

-7-

Checklists for maintenance plans, service and procedures, regular control and replacement of equipment etc.
are also favorable with regards to safety and control reasons.
1.5.2

Ship Compatibility

Before commencement of any bunkering operation, it must be checked and cleared that mooring and
bunkering equipment are compatible in design so that the bunker operation can be conducted in a safe
manner. Following points are to be confirmed by communication:
Possibility for safe mooring;
The relative freeboard difference;
Type and size of hose connections;
Connection order of the manifolds;
1.5.3

Mooring and Unmooring

After permission to moor the bunker vessel/barge alongside the receiving vessel is granted, the approach
manoeuvring can commence. A constant monitoring of weather conditions, waves and swell, tidal
conditions, surrounding traffic positions and receiving ship movement is to be performed during approach.
1.5.4
Weather Limit for Bunkering Operations
Weather restrictions for LNG bunkering operations, should be established.
Such restrictions may include:
Current;
Wind loads;
Tidal range;
Waves and swell;
Light conditions and visibility;
Ice conditions.
1.5.5
Communications
Areas of responsibility must be well defined, on the feeder/bunker vessel or barge, as well as at the terminal
or the receiving vessel. According to best practice regarding bunkering of traditional fuels, the commander
on the receiving vessel always has outmost responsibility for the bunkering operation and before bunkering
begins shall designate a person responsible for, if needed, termination of transfer.
Everyone participating in the bunkering process is required to take necessary safety precautions within their
respective field of activity to avoid spill of bunker fuel. This regards all operational phases and requires well
established communication an exchange of information from surveillance sensors, especially when
bunkering ship to ship.
Practice when bunkering traditional fuels in Sweden today have certain conditions20:
Hose connections must be controlled continuously regarding leakage;
Only hoses with leak check certificates, less than 12 months old, are to be used;
Hoses may not be used more than 5 years;
Hoses with visible damage and wear are not allowed to be used;
During the entire bunkering operation well established communication shall be maintained between
the bunkering vessel/truck and the receiving vessel;
The fuel level in the tanks must be surveyed very closely;
20

http://www.hamnenshamnar.se

-8-

Vessels loading/unloading gas in bulk shall have at least two security guards per vessel.
1.5.6
Multiple Hoses or Pipe in Pipe
Multiple hoses may reduce the potential spill volume in case of a hose leakage. If this approach is applied,
the probability of a hose leakage will increase in proportion to the number of hoses, but at the same time the
affected area and safety zone may be reduced significantly because of smaller credible spill volume. Hence
the overall risk may be reduced.
1.5.7
Quick Connectors and Swivels
The flexible part between the bunker station (STS, TTS or TPS) and the LNG receiving vessel is one of the
important matters that has to be assessed carefully for the specific installation depending on the frequency of
use, manpower available and demand of transfer capacity.
Standard flanges21 are in use for fitting necessary reducers on the ship manifold and for the connection
device between manifold on ship and bunkering hose or arm. In the standards22 the requirements for more
appropriate equipment for frequent, easier and safer bunker operations are outlined. Due to the new demand
from LNG bunkering and for use in new environments other than offshore and LNG cargo, the design
standards have to be amended. The design criteria and abilities for components in the logistic chain of
bunkering are elaborated in Appendix 8.
For a more safe and convenient work environment in LNG terminals while bunkering it is important to
replace bolted flanges with quick connecting/disconnect coupling, QC/DC, between the loading arm or hose
and the ships presentation flanges. These manual connectors or powered couplers shall be so called Dry
Disconnect Couplings (DDC) minimizing the release of LNG into working environment both at connection
and afterwards when disconnecting. Small size couplings could be manually operated; also, manual support
by winch is available for medium sizes, but when installing hoses or arms of 8 or larger, hydraulic operation
should be chosen.

Figure 3 Example of a Dry Disconnect Couplings (DDC) that automatically closes when turned and disconnected

To avoid problems with stiff and heavy mounting of the connection bunker station (STS, TTS or TPS) and
the ship to be bunkered swivel joints are also necessary. These are ball bearing supported connectors that
facilitates smooth joining of pipe and hose or arm. During the bunkering operation the swivel prevents
torsional stresses to get into the manifold and piping when movement is created by the ship.
21

SIGTTO / OCIMF Recommendations, chapter 6 (1994)


OCIMF Design and Construction Specification for Marine Loading Arms, 1999 and EN1474: Design and testing of
Loading/Unloading arm, 2008.
22

-9-

1.5.8
Training
It is of outmost importance that all personnel are well trained and prepared for the operation that they are
conducting. Today, the crew of an LNG bunkering vessel would need the same competence as the crew of a
large IGC tanker, a competence which few have and which takes time to achieve. One way of solving this
would be to change the criteria for training, possibly referring to the smaller amounts that are handled on a
bunker vessel.
In Norway instructions are provided by the Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD) as to how training
should be performed for crew members on LNG fuelled vessels. The instructions clearly state that all crew
members should do a basic training and the training is only allowed by qualified personnel. The training
program is approved by the NMD.
Training and procedures for crew members regarding emergency preparedness includes how to safely
shutdown transfers if communication is lost, manual and automatic, managing control system, several safety
levels with integrated systems, backup systems, redundant power supply and manual operation status,
routines for break away in case of fire, etc.
1.5.9
Procedures and Guidelines for LNG bunkering
Ship to Ship (STS) bunkering is an important operation in a maritime LNG bunkering infrastructure, since it
is the most widely applicable bunkering solution. Compared to existing LNG handling, however, STS
bunkering is a new type of operation that is done in a different manner, and hence this is the area with the
largest need for new operational guidelines. STS is also the main area for on-going studies and projects, even
though previous studies, for instance SMTF (2010), has showed that it is feasible even in passage handling
parallel to LNG bunkering.
Bunkering LNG via pipeline or terminal (TPS) is very similar to existing operations at larger terminals.
There is most likely a closed area with well trained personnel on the shore side, which means that there is
less need for introducing new operational guidelines or standards. Truck to ship bunkering is per definition
relatively small operations and a large share of responsibility is normally put on the truck driver. However, if
bunkering of LNG is done during cargo operations or passengers embarking/disembarking, there will be a
need for new guidelines here as well.
Evaluation of SIGTTO LNG Ship to Ship Transfer Guidelines23
In June 2011, ISO started a committee within ISO/TC67 with the objective to establish an international
standard for systems and equipment required when delivering LNG as fuel for ships. So far the committee
has just begun its work, but the results will have a crucial impact on how LNG as bunker fuel will be
delivered in an effective and safe way.
Currently however, there are no existing guidelines for LNG Ship-to-Ship bunkering. SIGTTO, however, has
issued guidelines that describe ship-to-ship transfer of LNG as a cargo. Since these guidelines are often
referred to when LNG bunkering is considered, an evaluation has been made in order to show whether these
guidelines are applicable also for bunkering and, if so, what parts can or cannot be used. The detailed
evaluation can be found in Appendix H. In the same appendix, a standard operating procedure is outlined for
all types of bunkering (STS,TPS and PTS).
The SIGTTO guidelines have been developed for use in STS24 transfer operations between commercially
operated LNG carriers. At first glance, the guidelines seem to be the perfect for STS LNG bunkering
23

The First edition of LNG Ship to Ship Transfer Guidelines produced by SIGTTO and published by Witherby Seamanship in 2011

- 10 -

operations. To understand why the SIGTTO guidelines are only partly applicable, it is necessary to
understand some of the basic differences between an LNG STS transfer operation and commercially
operated LNG carriers and between a bunker vessel and a gas-fuelled vessel.
The type of operation the SIGTTO guidelines have been produced to support is between two large LNG
carriers. The decision to do this kind of operation is usually taken a long time before the actual operation is
performed. There is therefore usually a lot of time to plan the STS operation in advance. The annual number
of STS operations for a typical large LNG vessel is also very limited and for most vessels involved, more
than one operation a month is unusual.
Based on this typical MO25 the SIGTTO guidelines handle each STS operation as a single entity that should
be planned and performed according to the guidelines. For each operation the SIGTTO guidelines
recommend activities such as risk assessment, compatibility evaluations and navigational planning. They
also recommend up to five different checklists to be used during planning and realisation of the STS
operation.
When defining the MO for STS LNG bunkering operation it is necessary to use the present STS fuel oil
bunkering activities as a starting point. These operations are characterised by short lead times, high
flexibility in time, location, quality and volumes and the work on board a bunkering vessel is very much
hands on, solving problems as they occur. It is not unusual for a bunker vessel to perform more than five
cargo operations per day and the preparation time for each operation is limited.
These characteristic differences in MO between LNG STS cargo operation and STS LNG bunkering
operation also identify the main topic that makes the SIGTTO guidelines only partly applicable when it
comes to STS LNG bunkering operations.

1.6

Mitigating Measures for LNG Bunkering:

1.6.1
Emergency Systems
It should be recognised that LNG vessels commonly refer to the emergency shutdown (ESD) system as ESD
1 and the emergency release system (ERS) as ESD 2. This terminology is typically used in communications
between LNG carriers and terminals during operations but in this work ESD and ERS is used.
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) System
The function of the emergency shutdown (ESD) system is to safely stop the transfer of LNG and vapour and
bring the system to a safe, static condition.
Bunker station and receiving vessel shall have an ESD system for bunkering operations, and all bunker
stations shall have the possibility to connect a linked ESD system based on the SIGTTO Link26, which is
further emphasised also in Recommendation no. 4.
It is recommended that a data and telephone link, based on multi-channel multiplexers be implemented for
the spare lines in the SIGTTO link. The multiplexer is meant to exchange the most important data for fast,
safe and reliable bunkering, loading and discharging.
Motives for having a physical link are based on the poor experience of the wireless systems, and the
simplicity of a pre-breakaway arrangement by simply having some tension on the connector, causing it to
disconnect before the maximum motion envelope for the breakaway coupling is exceeded.
24

Ship to Ship
Modus Operandi (Normal routines)
26
ESD ARRANGEMENTS & Linked Ship/shore Systems for Liquefied Gas Carriers, SIGTTO(2009)
25

- 11 -

- 12 -

This applies to LNG bunkering:


Ship to Ship, at quay or at sea (STS);
Tank truck to Ship (TTS);
LNG terminal to ship via pipeline (TPS).
Emergency Release System (ERS) or Emergency Break away Coupling (EBC)
The function of the ERS or EBC is to protect the transfer arms/hoses by disconnecting them, prior to the
vessel drifting out of its design envelope. The system may be an emergency break away coupling (EBC) to
fill the same functionality as the emergency release system (the vessel drifting out of its design envelope). A
system with an ERS or EBC shall be designed in such a way that it initiates an ESD before breaking away
and that it automatically shuts off valves so that spillage is minimal. An ESD or EBC shall be fitted in all
applications for LNG bunkering.
This applies to LNG bunkering:
Ship to ship, at quay or at sea (STS);
Tank truck to ship (TTS);
LNG terminal to ship via pipeline (TPS).
This is specifically written in Recommendation no. 5.

Figure 4 Example of Safe Breakaway Couplin (SBC) If pulled apart the hose ends are closed and the ESD will be activated.

1.6.2
Venting of Gas in Case of High Pressure in Tanks
Due to the boil off gas when handling LNG, a smaller amount of gas will inevitably always be vented. This
can be done under controlled procedures and does not affect safety levels. Other occasions when venting is
necessary is when pressure in the system is high, forcing safety valves to release some gas. The vented gas is
collected and released in at a safe venting position.
While this is a safety aspect that may be necessary, it is an issue that may be difficult to accept from the point
of view of safety or the environment, considering that natural gas is a strong greenhouse gas. To minimize
the greenhouse effect it is recommended that the vented gas should be flared (combustion). It is not,
however seenas an alternative during normal bunkering procedures. Gas already mixed with air is an
exception and should not be flared or exposed to any source of ignition.

- 13 -

1.6.3

Gas Detectors and Leakage Detection

Classifying societies demand some kind of gas or leakage detectors. Gas detectors (HC detectors) shall be
mounted in various places, for example inside the outer wall and double wall piping, and in any location
where leakage is possible in combination with limited ventilation (close to hoses and couplings). There are
several types of detectors in use: IR, Laser and Catalytic. The detectors are linked to an ESD system
providing information in case of a leak, limiting the risk of hose rupture and possible larger spills as a
consequence. The different sensors might need class approval but they are available technology and can be
found in open markets.
Leakage indicators are another way to detect leaks. One method measures pressure and flow on each side of
the transfer hose. If there is a difference in the pressure it can mean there is a leak. Acoustic methods detect
both LNG and gas leakage and they can also use temperature differences to detect leaks.
1.6.4

Dribble Free Coupling

The aim of the dribble free coupling is that minimum gas can be released when detaching bunker hoses after
bunkering. Normally this mitigating measure releases a minimum amount of methane, but does not affect
environmental or safety concerns.
1.6.5
Water Curtain or Design for Protection of Ships Side Structure
A low-pressure water curtain, is to be fitted under the bunkering station to provide for additional protection
of the hull steel and the ships side structure. In situations where bunkering is done in winter conditions other
designs are needed since water will freeze.
The spill trays arranged at the respective bunker stations of the bunker vessel and the receiving vessel shall
be isolated and drained overboard via retractable pipes or hoses that prevent the LNG to wet and cool the
hull side plating.
1.6.6
Ventilation
The bunkering station and manifold are to be located on the open deck so that sufficient natural ventilation is
provided. Alternatively closed or semi-enclosed bunkering stations may be used subject to the provision of
effective mechanical ventilation. The bunkering station is to be physically separated or structurally shielded
from adjacent normally manned areas such as accommodation, cargo/working deck and control stations (see
1.6.2 Venting of Gas in Case of High Pressure in Tanks
1.6.7
Separation of LNG Bunkering and Safety Distances
The safety distance is the minimum separation between a hazard source (a potential LNG leakage source)
and an object (human, building, area where many people are, important infrastructure element) that need to
be protected against hazard exposure. The safety distance will mitigate the effect of a credible incident and
prevent a minor incident from escalating into a larger incident.
Different categories of personnel, public and activities are entitled to expect different levels of protection.
Areal zones determined from safety distances are often divided into different zones for different categories of
people e.g. 1st person, 2nd person and 3rd person.
The zones are typically delimitated based on the level of expected thermal radiation from credible release
and fire scenarios or the extent of the LFL and UFL concentrations of a dispersed vapour cloud.
In many cases it is, however, not practicable to establish and apply safety distances that would provide
protection from all possible accident events. Therefore an assessment of the frequency of potential accidental
events must be considered when the event scenario, to be used as a basis for determining the safety distances,
is defined.

- 14 -

Loading operations of the bunker vessel or an LNG feeder take place at medium size jetties located close to
or within existing LNG import terminals. Siting considerations and safety distances are determined similarly
as for the large scale activities and with consideration to possible accumulated risks from multiple hazard
sources and potential cascading accident consequences.
For the transit phase of the bunker vessel or feeder from the loading site to the receiving LNG fuelled vessels
or to intermediary LNG storage tanks in the port, the vessels may be exposed to collision and grounding
risks. Depending on the port and traffic characteristics, port authorities and other safety authorities may
regulate the bunker vessel traffic and port access based on potential accidental LNG releases caused by
collision or grounding scenarios and the associated consequences considered in relation to safety distances
between potential release/fire sites and the surrounding urban environment with residential areas, important
infrastructure elements and populated areas. The probability of collision or grounding scenarios with
breakage and release of LNG from the cargo tanks is very low and such worst case scenarios are generally
not considered for the determination of safety distances for the bunkering operation e.g., when the bunker
vessel is moored alongside an LNG receiving vessel.
A maximum credible LNG release or design incident case during bunkering operations shall be identified as
a basis for determination of the safety distances for the various modes of bunkering respectively.
1.6.8
Safety Distances during LNG Bunkering Operations
The staff that is directly involved in the bunkering operations, connecting the hoses etc. are specifically
trained in safety issues, are aware of the hazards and are in a position where they can control the bunkering
operations. The crew on board the bunker vessel and other personnel involved in the bunkering operation are
also aware of the hazards and know what to do in case of an emergency. The general public outside the
bunkering terminal area and if there are ship passengers on board the ship or in the terminal area, they are not
supposed to be aware of possible hazards and have not made a deliberate choice to enter an area with specific
hazards. Based on this categorisation it may be relevant to define the levels of safety zone according to the
list below:
First party designated bunkering operation staff and have access to this innermost zone surrounding the
hazard source with bunker manifolds, bunker hoses and vapour return lines during bunkering operations. In
this exclusion zone, no other staff has access during bunkering and it is also an Ex-zone where only Exclassified equipment may be installed and used.
Second party crew and personnel with specific safety training have access to the zone surrounding the
innermost exclusion zone.
Third party general public in areas surrounding the bunkering terminal, ship passengers and personnel
temporarily present in the bunker terminal area.
Comparison of different potential consequences from LNG release accidents shows that it is normally the
potential thermal radiation from various fire scenarios that govern the needed safety distances. Other
potential release consequences are usually more local and affect a lesser number of people.
The level of thermal radiation defining the zoning of required safety distances for different categories of 1 st,
2nd and 3rd person differs somewhat from country to country. The figures listed below give an example of
frequently used damage levels for different heat flux levels applicable for LNG fire scenarios27.
5 kW/m2 causes first degree burns to 50% of a population for a 30-second exposure;
12 kW/m2 causes second degree burns to 50% of a population for a 30-second exposure;
27

Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage, CPR 16E. The Netherlands, 1992.

- 15 -

15 kW/m2 causes death to 50% of a population for a 30-second exposure.


It should be noted that the protection of clothing is not taken into consideration for the figures listed above.
In case of LNG release scenarios with delayed ignition the safety distances are normally based on the
downwind vapour cloud dispersion distance to the lower flammability level (LFL).
For the crosswind dispersion distance LFL is often used depending on the accuracy of the calculation
model applied. Only outdoor population present within the flammable boundaries between LFL and UFL is
assumed to perish due to the following:
Short exposure to very high thermal radiation fluxes from the vapour cloud fire;
Direct flame contact;
Secondary fires of clothing;
Inhalation of hot combustion products.
It is assumed that people inside buildings at the time of the flash fire will not be injured. It is also assumed
that people inside buildings that are ignited by flash fire or a pool fire will be able to escape from the burning
structure without direct thermal impact injuries. This is because the flash fire will ignite buildings from the
outside and it will take some time for the fires to penetrate inside28.
There is well established guidance on risk analysis and safety implications of large scale LNG spills over
water29 and a similar approach may also be applied for small scale LNG bunkering and potential release of
LNG. The stepwise approach below may describe how hazard distances may be calculated and applied for
defining appropriate safety distances for the various modes of bunkering. The concept of defining a
maximum credible LNG release or design incident case during bunkering operations is a vital part of the
approach.
1. Mode of bunkering: Is it an STS, TTS or TPS bunkering?
The three defined optional bunkering modes differ in many aspects and may be treated differently.
2. Bunkering risk characteristics: Which factors affect the risk?
Potential LNG releases during bunkering is assumed that the following variables are important
scaling factors:
- The LNG flow in the bunkering hoses (m3/h);
- The number parallel LNG bunkering hoses (-);
- The diameter of the LNG hose between ESD valves (m);
- The length of the LNG hoses between ESD valves (m);
- The ESD time including leak detection and valve closing (s);
- The duration of the bunkering operation (h).
The pumping pressure and pressure difference between the delivering and receiving tanks may also
influence potential leakage characteristics. The total quantity of LNG in the bunker vessel and in the
receiving vessel is not a main factor as long as tank rupture is not considered a credible accident. The
number of hoses and to some extent the duration of the bunkering operation may influence the
probability of an LNG leakage incident.
3. Maximum credible LNG release: What is the design incident case?
Define credible accident scenarios and associated released quantities of LNG. Scenarios to be tested
and compared may include:
- Guillotine hose burst;
28
29

Melham G.A. et al. Understand LNG Fire Hazards. ioMosaic, US 2007.


Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large LNG Spill ower Water. Sandia report SAND2004-6258, US 2004.

- 16 -

- Partial hose burst, leakage from hose crack;


- Leakage from flange, bursted sealing.
4. Model the spill scenario: What happens to the released LNG?
Define the characteristics of the release scenario in terms of:
- Spilled quantity, duration, position, phase, composition, etc.;
- Spill location deck/ground/water, pool size, vaporization rate;
- Representative weather conditions such as wind, temp, humidity, etc.
5. Identify possible fire scenarios: Will the released LNG ignite?
Depending on the spill scenario characteristics, different types of fire or vapour dispersion scenarios
may result from the release:
- Pool fire by immediate ignition of released LNG;
- Delayed ignition of vapour cloud and flash fire that burns back to the original release source or
pool;
- Flame jet from a one or two phase leakage in hose or flange.
6. Compute thermal radiation from fire: What areas may be affected?
Apply established calculation models (solid flame theory or CFD) to compute the maximum radius
of heat flux threshold levels for the pool fire scenarios and jet flame scenarios. Plot the isoline
contours, e.g., 5, 12 or 15 kW/m2 in a map/aerial photo and consider potential heat shielding or
barrier effects from building, ship freeboard side, etc.
7. Compute LFL/UFL of vapour cloud: How far may flammable gas spread?
Apply established calculation models for vapour dispersion and cloud formation to compute the
maximum radius (or downwind and crosswind extent) of LFL and UFL concentrations threshold
levels of the vaporized LNG cloud. Plot the LFL (half LFL for a crosswind section) and UFL isoline
contours in a map/aerial photo and consider potential vapour spreading barrier effects from building,
ship freeboard side, etc.
8. Define an outer safety zone for 3rd person: Where is public access allowed?
Based on the calculated isoline, e.g., 5 kW/m2, define a zone in which 3rd person and general public
will only have limited access during bunkering operations. People, buildings and infrastructure
elements outside this zone will not be exposed to hazards from any credible LNG release and fire
accident.
9. Define an inner safety zone for 2nd person: Where is crew access allowed?
Based on the calculated isolines, e.g., 12 kW/m2 and for the LFL, define a zone in which only crew
members and other 2nd persons with specific LNG bunkering safety training may have access to
during bunkering operations.
10. Define an Ex-zone for 1st person: Where are only bunker operators allowed?
Define an innermost exclusion zone around the bunkering station on board the receiving vessel and
around the bunker hoses and manifolds of the bunker vessel in which only Ex-classified equipment
are allowed and where only the designated bunkering staff is allowed to enter during bunkering
operations.
The described approach may be applicable for STS, TTS or PTS bunkering modes but the calculation models
may need to be adapted or selected with regard to the recipient of a potential LNG spill water, ground or
deck, hull barrier effect etc. The dominating scaling factors with regard to the spill consequences and hazard
distance from a potential spill are, however, the bunkering rate (LNG flow per hose) and the ESD time.

- 17 -

The quantity of LNG released for the defined credible accident scenario will directly influence the hazard
distances and safety zones needed for each of the analysed credible LNG release scenarios. In order to enable
parallel passenger or cargo handling during bunkering operations it is therefore crucial to design the
bunkering solution systems to allow shortest possible ESD time.
Figure 5 below schematically illustrates, for a STS bunkering situation, how the computed hazard distances
can be used to define safety zones at different levels to regulate the access of different personnel categories
and location of the bunkering site in relation to other industrial activities, infrastructure elements and
residential areas.
The outlined approach for defining safety zones will generate different results depending on the bunkering
mode and the performance characteristics of the technical equipment. The shielding effects of heat radiation
from ship hull sides or buildings will vary significantly depending on the bunkering mode and the size
relation of the bunker vessel and the receiving vessel. If the receiving vessel is a Ro-Ro ferry with high
freeboard bunkering from a bunker vessel moored alongside on the outside of the Ro-Ro vessel, the ship may
protect the quay area on the mooring side from heat in case of a pool fire at the bunker hose. If the LNG
fuelled vessel is e.g. an inland vessel or a small tanker with its bunkering manifolds on deck close to the
wheelhouse, there will be little shielding effects.
For a TTS or PTS bunkering operation, however, the quay area between the tank truck or quayside manifold
and the ship will be the centre of a possible fire in released LNG spill and passengers may need to be
protected by enclosed gangways. Such an enclosed gangway designed to resist heat flux may serve as a
bridge through a risk exposed zone into the protected passenger areas on board the ship. Unprotected
stevedores and crew may also need some protective shields and dedicated escape ways from the quay area
adjacent to the bunkering operation while crane operators and vehicle drivers gain some protection from their
cabins and vehicles. All possible ignition sources must of course be kept outside the innermost exclusion
zone of Ex-classified requirements.
Parallel passenger or cargo handling during bunkering requires bunkering techniques minimizing the amount
of LNG release for the credible design release accident cases. Only if developed bunkering techniques,
equipment and procedures will prove that any credible LNG spill is small enough not to pose any hazard that
impede parallel passenger and cargo handling, it is likely that requirements on safety zones for LNG
bunkering may be generalised and formulated in terms of specific distances in meters. Until safe
standardised bunkering techniques, equipment and procedures are fully established, the determination of
adequate safety zones will probably be based on a case by case assessment with due consideration of the
bunker mode, its scale, the vessels concerned and the bunkering and its surroundings.

- 18 -

Figure 5 Schematic illustration how minimum safety zones during LNG bunkering may be defined based on computed hazard distances for
maximum credible LNG release and fire scenarios.

1.6.9
Examples of Safety Distance Requirements from Other LNG Industry Sectors
Established safety zones for large industrial LNG facilities vary much from several hundreds of meters down
to some ten meters. The safety zones for LNG tank trucks and filling stations for LNG fuelled trucks are
usually small often only a few meters. For land-based LNG storage tanks there are some national guidelines
and rules regulating safety distances and separation. These rules generally prescribe safety distances in the
same order of magnitude.
Figure 6 illustrates an example from Norwegian national regulations30 regarding on land establishment of
LNG storage tanks.

30

DSB Norway 2004. Temaveiledning om gassanlegg. Direktoratet for samfunsskkerhet og beredskap

- 19 -

Distance [m]

Figure 6 Example of Norwegian guidelines on separation distances from a 15 m3 LNG storage tank and surrounding infrastructure
elements including residential houses.

For a storage tank volume of 100 m3 the distances in Figure 6 should be increased by 5 m. In Sweden similar
corresponding regulations are issued by Swedish National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables 31 and
these guidelines have also been applied for an LNG leakage case to compute the relation between distance
and thermal heat radiation. The diagram in Figure 7 below shows how the heat flux levels decline with
increasing distance from a fire at a leaking LNG pipe flange of size that may be used for TTS or PTS
bunkering concepts.
From the Netherlands an example of a 40 m3 LNG tank at a truck filling station maintain a safety distance of
35 m and a corresponding zone is also suggested for an LNG filling station with corresponding tank
capacity, designed to serve as an LNG filling station for inland barges. In Moskenes ferry boat terminal, the
land-based LNG bunker tanks are located with a safety distance of 30 m to public road and 25 m to
buildings.

31

Swedish National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables: Cisterner, gasklockor, bergrum och rrledningar fr brandfarlig gas.
SIFS2000:4.

- 20 -

Figure 7 Example of relation between heat radiation and distance from a fire32.
The example scenario is of a leaking LNG pipe flange that may be used as a basis for defining of safety distances

32

Claesson, A. (2011). Tolkning av begreppet betryggande i lagstiftning om brandfarliga och explosiva varor med fokus p
betryggande avstnd, Report 5367, Lund 2011. Lund: Department of Fire Safety Engineering and Systems Safety Lund University,
Sweden.

14
Appendix 14 Permit Process and Public Consultation
Table of Contents
1. National Regulations concerning Permits for LNG Facilities . 4
1.1

Belgium...................................................................................................... 4

1.2

Denmark .................................................................................................... 5

1.3

Finland ....................................................................................................... 7

1.4

France ........................................................................................................ 8

1.5

Germany .................................................................................................. 12

1.6

The Netherlands ....................................................................................... 15

1.7

Norway .................................................................................................... 16

1.8

Poland ...................................................................................................... 18

1.9

Sweden ..................................................................................................... 19

1.10

United Kingdom ...................................................................................... 21

2. Experiences of Consultation Process within the SECA Area25


2.1

LNG Terminal in the Port of Zeebrgge, Belgium.................................. 25

2.2

Porvoo LNG Plant, Finland ..................................................................... 25

-3-

2.3

LNG terminal in the Port of Rotterdam, Netherlands.............................. 26

2.4

Lista, Kollsnes and Mosjen, Norway..................................................... 27

3. LNG Terminal in Swinoujscie, Poland ................................... 27


4. Nynshamn, Stockholm and Gothenburg, Sweden .............. 28
5. Grain LNG, the United Kingdom ............................................. 29

-4-

Appendix 14 Permit Process and Public Consultation


This appendix contains information of national regulations concerning the permit process and public
consultation in SECA concerning LNG facilities. The appendix also contains the views and experiences of
work with public awareness issues in the countries within SECA with experiences from establishing LNG
terminal infrastructures. The material has been gathered through interviews, written comments and a
literature review. It has to be noted that most of the experiences of the permit procedure today in SECA is
valid for large scale LNG import terminals. So far, Norway is the only country (and Sweden to a limited
extent) which has experience of handling permit process for small and medium scale LNG terminals and
bunker facilities.

1.

National Regulations concerning Permits for


LNG Facilities

Public consultation is an essential part of the permit process for LNG facilities in Europe. This is partly
based on the implementation of the EIA Directive and the Seveso II Directive. In this chapter national
regulations with a focus on permit processes and public consultation in SECA are described.

1.1

Belgium

In Belgium there is currently one large scale LNG terminal in Zeebrugge. This terminal is directly connected
to the gas network in the West-European region: United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, Luxemburg,
Norway and the Netherlands.
Permits Required
The following permits are required for LNG terminals in Belgium:

Environmental permit
Storage permit
Handling permit
Building permit

EIA Directive and Seveso II Directive


The EIA and Seveso II Directive are both implemented in the Belgium legislations. Each of the three
constituent regions of Belgium: the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels region, has its own environmental
permits policy. In case of LNG for maritime purposes, only the Flemish region is relevant, because it is the
only region directly connected to the sea.
EIA Directive
In the Flemish policy for environmental permits, in Annex 2 of Vlarem (art. 4.3.2, 2 and 3) there is a list
of categories of projects which are submitted to draw up an EIA ( in Dutch: a MER, milieueffectenrapport),which among other things includes the following categories:
energy companies
storage facilities of natural gas above ground with a capacity equal to or larger than 100.000 m
In the EIA, the direct effects of the project on the environment are estimated and reported.

-5-

Seveso Directive
The Seveso II Directive is implemented in the Flemish legislation as a Cooperation Agreement (in Dutch:
Samenwerkingsakkoord, SWA). In accordance with the Seveso II Directive, there are two treshold values for
hazardous substances in the Flemish legislation, a low and a high threshold value. For natural gas these
values are 50 tonnes (low, equivalent to 110 m3 ) and 200 tonnes (high, equivalent to 440 m3). For both low
and high threshold facilities an announcement to the coordinating department must be made. This department
will estimate possible domino-effects.
High threshold facilities are required to:
perform an announcement (art. 8 of the SWA);
draw up a prevention policy and a security management system to execute this policy (art. 10 of the
SWA);
present a security report (the SWA-VR, art. 12 of the SWA));
suffice to the demands regarding to the emergency planning zones for external emergency planning
(art. 16 of the SWA);
deliver an ambient security report for the Flemish environmental permits procedure (in Dutch:
omgevingsveiligheidsrapport, OVR).
Low Treshold facilities are required to
perform an announcement (art. 8 of the SWA);
formulate a prevention policy for severe accidents en and execute this policy actively (art. 9 of the
SWA);
draw op an internal emergency plan (art. 15, 1 of the SWA).
Involvement of the Public, Regional and Local Authorities
Consultation with the public or with organizations representing public groups is part of the environmental
permitting process. The federal public service for national affaires has developed a website with an overview
of and information about Seveso-facilities in Belgium (http://www.seveso.be) Information about both low
and high threshold facilities, locations of the Seveso facilities in Belgium and what to do in case of alarm
procedures, is available for all citizens.
In the Flemish Legislation for Environmental Permits (in dutch: Vlarem II), storage or transfer facilities for
natural gas larger than 10.000 m (Vlarem II rub.16.9.a.3) are determined as class 1 facilities. The
environmental permits for class 1 facilities are treated by the Provincial Commission for Environmental
Permitting (dutch acronym: PMVC). This Commission will further ask relevant regional, provincial and
federal official agencies for advice.
Duration
The duration of the permit process varies, depending on the gathering of advices and public investigation,
but normally the process is finished within 12 months.

1.2

Denmark

Denmark does not yet have any LNG import terminals (February 2012). There is therefore as yet no
experience of the approval and public consultation processes concerning LNG terminals in Denmark.
Permit Required
The following permits are required for LNG terminals:

Environmental Permit

-6-

A company that handles LNG in quantities above 50 tonnes (equivalent to 110 m3), which means
that it is obliged to be approved in accordance with Decree on control of risk for major accidents
and dangerous goods (BEK 1666 af 14/12/2006), will also be obliged to apply for environmental
approval in accordance with the Decree on approval of listed establishment (BEK 1640 af
13/12/2006). The approval process is handled by the local municipalities.
Handling of dangerous goods
Permit according to BEK 1666 af 14/12/2006 as described above.
Building permit
A final building permit is necessary from the local municipality. The building permit can not be
given, and the construction can thus not start, until all other permissions have been given.
Other
An EIA obliged facility is required to be included in the municipal planning as described above.

Duration
The environmental screening process will take at least 6 months and the whole process until final approval
will take between one and two years. However, there are no examples and thus no precedence of an approval
process for LNG storage facilities in Denmark.
Experience from other gas projects and projects involving potentially hazardous substances indicates that
local attitudes can vary significantly from project to project. According to previous experience proper safety
distances to residential areas / public areas are essential.
The Seveso and EIA Directives
The EIA Directive is implemented in national Danish legislation in the Decree on assessment of some public
and private establishments impact on environment (BEK 1510, 15/12/10).
LNG storages will always be obliged to undergo and EIA screening This means that the local municipality
must assess whether the storage facility can be expected to have a significant impact on the environment. If
the municipality assesses that the storage facility can have a significant effect on the environment it will be
obliged to undergo a full EIA examination and be included in the public municipal planning before
construction can start. A facility with over 200 tonnes will by default be obliged to undergo a full EIA
examination.
The environmental screening process will assess the storage facility according to a number of criteria
including dimensions, cumulation, potential pollution and public inconvenience, as well as risk and potential
impact of accidents.
The Seveso II directive is implemented in the Decree on control of risk for major accidents and dangerous
goods (BEK 1666 af 14/12/2006). According to the decree, an LNG storage facility is obliged to seek
approval according to column 2 for a facility with 50-200 tonnes of LNG (equivalent to 110-440 m3), and
approval according to column 3 for a facility with over 200 tonnes of LNG. BEK 1666 set rules for
contamination risks and preparedness in case of accidents. Facilities with less than 50 tonnes are not by
default considered to be risky operations and will only be obliged to follow local fire authority rules.
The regional environment centre is the coordinating authority in this approval process, which also includes
the local municipality, the Danish emergency management agency and the Danish working environment
agency.
Public Consultation Process
The result of the environmental screening are to be published but no public consultation is required during
the environmental screening. If an LNG storage facility is obliged to undergo a full EIA examination, the

-7-

handling of the case will be coordinated by a regional environmental centre and the process will always
include public hearings. Final approval authorities are the municipalities, see above for the authorities
involved.

1.3

Finland

Finland has one small scale LNG production plant.


Permits Required
The following permits are required for LNG storage facilities in Finland:

Environmental permit according to the Environmental Protection Act 86/2000 and Decree
169/2000. According to Decree 169/2000, an environmental permit shall be required in respect of
the following activities:
o storage, use or disposal of chemicals or fuels:
o fuel stations for the distribution of liquid fuels where the capacity of the storage tank is at least
10 m3, or other facilities for the storage of liquid fuels or dangerous chemicals in liquid form
capable of holding at least 100 m3 of such chemicals.
The permit is applied from the Regional State Administrative Agency (Southern-Finland).

Storage/ handling permit Permit is needed according to the Act on industrial handling and storage
of dangerous chemicals 390/2005 (based on the Seveso Directive) and Decree on natural gas
(551/2009). The permit is applied for from the Finnish Safety Authority (TUKES). Processing of the
application is estimated to take some months and the permit has to be applied for in good time before
construction work begins.

Building permit according to national Building code (132/1999) Precondition for the permit is that
there is a town plan allowing the terminal to be located at the planned site. The permit is applied for
from the local authority. Processing of the application is estimated to take some months. Finnish
legislation includes a right for close neighbours to appeal during the permitting process. Appeals and
their handling may increase the permitting time. However, the project may be continued during the
appeal handling process at the investors own risk.

EIA Directive
The requirements for the environmental impact assessment (EIA) have been transposed to the Finnish Act
(468/1994) and Decree (713/2006) on Environmental Impact Assessments. It is the competent authority that
decides if an EIA is required on a case-by-case-basis. If the authority decides that an EIA has to be
considered in more detail, there is a formal process including hearings for making the decision on the need
for EIA and this process will take some months.
The list of projects requiring EIA in the Decree on EIA states the following criteria for EIA requirement for
the following projects:
the transmission and storage of energy and materials;
stores for oil, petrochemical products and chemical products when the total volume of the storage
tanks for these substances is at least 50,000 cubic metres
If the volume of the tank is below the above mentioned limit, the need for an EIA still has nonetheless to be
checked with the Finnish authorities since in addition to the criteria in the list of in the Decree, the an EIA
could might be required in individual cases, if the project will probably have significant adverse
environmental impact comparable in type and extent to that of the projects referred to in the list presented in
the Decree, also taking into account the combined impact of different projects. The EIA requirement will

-8-

also depend on the sites considered. If the EIA procedure is required, other permits for the project can not be
received, before the EIA is accomplished has been completed.
Public consultation
EIA in Finland is carried out in two phases, with relevant hearings in both phases. In the first phase a plan for
the impact assessment and communication with the interest groups is presented and in the second phase the
assessment is carried out.
Seveso II Directive
Based on the Seveso II Directive, regulations concerning the prevention of accident hazards have been
transposed into Finnish chemicals legislation: in Law 390/2005. Act on the Safe Handling and Storage of
Dangerous Chemicals and Explosives (390/2005), and the Decree on the Industrial Handling and Storage of
Dangerous Chemicals (59/1999). In addition to this, there is special legislation for LPG, natural gas and
explosives. The directive has also been transposed into the Land Use Planning and Building Act (132/99)
and the Rescue Act (468/2003).
All operators of establishments coming under the scope of the Directive, (storage of more than 50 tonnes of
LNG) need to send a notification to the competent authority, the Rescue Authority for small scale
establishments and TUKES for large scale establishments. They also have to establish a major accident
prevention policy. Operators of upper tier establishments (more than 200 tonnes of LNG) need to establish a
safety report, a safety management system and an emergency plan.
Duration
Processing time for the environmental permit from application until issued is approx. 8-10 months. If an EIA
is required the procedure will take approximately twelve months

1.4

France

France has three LNG terminals (Fos Tonkin, Montoir; and Fos-Cavaou) in operation and one under
construction (Dunkerque).
Permits Required
The following permits are needed when establishing LNG facilities in France:

Environmental permit is required for LNG facilities with a capacity above 50 tonnes (equivalent to
110 m3), and facilities with a capacity above 200 tonnes (equivalent to 440 m3) are required to
obtain a permit with public easement. These installations must be subject to a public enquiry, an
impact study, risk assessment, health & safety study, and draw up an on-site emergency response
plan;
Storage permit is needed the European Committee for Standardisation specifies the requirements
that must be met to allow the storage of volumes of LNG above 200 tonnes, through EN1473
Installation and equipment for LNG design of onshore equipment;
Handling of dangerous goods the requirement to obtain permits for this issue is covered mainly by
the Law of 30 July on preventing technological and natural risks and providing compensation for
damages;
Building permit building and planning permits must be obtained in accordance with the French
Planning Code; and

-9-

Other Permits (with public easement) are required for risk assessments for LNG installations, as
enacted through a series of legislation, the most recent law passed on 26 December 20061.

EIA Directive and Seveso II Directive


The procedures that are generally followed by a developer in attempting to develop an LNG facility in
France are shown schematically in Figure 1.
Technical
Studies
Decision of
port authority

Administrative
authorisations
Public
consultation
and debate

Commencement
of construction
works

Commissioning
of LNG facility

Submission of
applications for
authorisations

Figure 1 Overview of LNG infrastructure permitting process in France2

Briefly, the LNG permitting process in France begins with the decision of the port authority to allow an LNG
infrastructure investment within its port jurisdiction. Following the port authoritys decision, technical
(including environmental) studies will be undertaken in parallel with a public debate over the proposed
project. These activities typically take up to two years. The findings or conclusions of the public debate are
fed into the ongoing technical studies together with information about the documents submitted to the
relevant administrative organisation for authorisation to progress with the project.
The administrative organisation will carry out an analysis of the technical assessment findings, public
consultation and debate, and the formal application. Drawing on these considerations, a final decision on
whether to authorise a construction or not will be provided. If an affirmative decision to award a permit is
made, construction works of the infrastructure can be commenced.
There is typically a six month period between the provision of an authorisation decision and the
commencement of construction activities. Construction works may take up to two and a half years to be
completed. When the construction works have been completed, the LNG facility will be commissioned and
begin operating.
This procedure for obtaining permission to build and operate an LNG facility in France is a description of the
tasks required by 2003-8 French law of 3 January 2003, which was modified and completed by law 2004803 of 9 August 2004. This law is the key piece of legislation governing LNG infrastructure permitting in
France, in accordance with the French Planning Code.
EIA Directive
France was the first European country to enshrine in law the principle of conducting an impact assessment of
a project prior to its implementation. The requirement to complete an environmental impact assessment in
1

International Group of Natural Gas Importers. LNG Information Paper 4. Managing LNG risks operational integrity, regulations,
codes, and industry organisations. Received from http://www.giignl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/LNG_Safety/4%20Operational%20Integrity%208.28.09%20Final%20HQ.pdf
2
CRE, 2008. The regulation of LNG terminals in France. Summary report by the working group. Received from
http://gttm.cre.fr/080414Rapport_GTTM_UK.pdf

- 10 -

France was made through Decree 77-393 of 28 March 1977, as amended, and also through the Decree of 12
October 19773.
The French legal framework for Environmental Impact Assessment process has been substantially altered in
2010 and 2011. On 13 July 2010 a framework law on EIA in France was adopted and published, viz. Loi
portant engagement national pour lenvironnement. This framework law is accessible to be viewed online in
French4.
France has implemented the following guidance documents, which are relevant to LNG projects, (issued by
the Ministry of Ecology), for the EIA process:

Guide: preliminary scoping of the impact assessment, 2005; and


Methodological guide for assessing impacts of infrastructures and planning projects and programmes
on Natura 2000 sites, 2004.

In France, all projects that are screened and deemed as requiring an EIA are published in the countrys
official national official papers (or Journaux officiels). There are no formal specifications regarding the
scope of a projects Environmental Impact Statement, and the competent authority is not obliged to specify
the range of information to be supplied by a developer for a proposed project5.
The average duration of the key components of the EIA process in France was reported by the European
Commission Directorate General Energy as:

Scoping 1.5 months;


Public consultation 4 months; and
Final decision 2 months6.

Seveso II Directive
France implemented the Seveso II Directive into its national legal framework through the order of 10 May
2000 relative to the prevention of major accidents which involve substances or preparations present in certain
categories of permit-holding classified installations for environmental protection. The requirements that
must be implemented by operators (for major accident prevention) are implemented through French Circular
of 10 May 20007.
The French Circular of 10 May 2000 is applied as a key priority of the French Inspectorate of Classified
Installations, under the authority of the Prefects. The French Ministry of Ecology has classified projects with
major accident risk, potential nuisance and hazards break down depending on their level of importance. It
has also developed a website listing the facilities that are covered by the Seveso II requirements8.

EU Law, 2011. Environmental law. Rereived from http://www.eulaw.egov.bg/DocumentDisplay.aspx?ID=172113


Assemblee Nationale, 2010. Received from
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/engagement_environnement.asp
5
European Commission. Directive 85/337/EEC: Report. Retreived from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/eia-studies-andreports/5years.pdf
6
DG Energy, 2010. Report composed by: GHK, 2010. Collection of information and data to support the Impact Assessment study of
the review of the EIA. Received from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/collection_data.pdf
European Commission, 2009. Study concerning the report on the application and effectiveness of the EIA Directive. Received from
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/eia_study_june_09.pdf
7
French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and Planning, 2011. Inspection des Installations Classees.
Received from http://installationsclassees.ecologie.gouv.fr/SEVESO-sites.html
8
http://www.seveso.ecologie.gouv.fr
4

- 11 -

Involvement of the Public, Regional and Local Authorities


France specifies that a period of one month or more than one month must be made available for the
consultation phase of a proposed project9.
Public Debate
The regulation for public debate in France concerning potential LNG facilities is French law 2004-803 of 9
August 2004. In France, any project which creates or extends port infrastructure with a cost of more than
150 million and/or has a surface area above 250 hectares must be referred to the countrys National Public
Debate Commission (the CNDP). The CNDP organises the debate through setting up a special commission
for the specific project.
The nature and to some extent, the outcome, of public debates on port infrastructure in France are likely to be
shaped by the fact that the debates are held relatively early within the overall project process. Specifically, at
the time of the debate, the proposed projects technical and environmental assessments will not have been
completed, and a range of questions about the project may not be answerable. This has potential to fuel
public distrust of project sponsors and authorities and to sway public opinion of the specific project.
Public debates in France regarding proposed LNG projects have typically focused on the following main
topics:

The future role of gas within the energy mix;


The advantages of attracting private sector investment in LNG terminals in terms of improving
competition and the subsequent benefits for customers;
Minimisation of environmental impacts;
Safety and industrial risks;
Visual impacts of projects and buildings; and
Impacts on tourism within the area.10

Legal Review
French law allows organisations to open proceedings for administrative and judicial review (justice in
environmental matters) through general law. Environmental NGOs are granted a privileged status in law in
making a formal complaint over a potential project, in France.
A review of the implementation of the EIA Directive in Member States undertaken by the European
Commission found that the costs associated with bringing a complaint were judged to be an obstacle to
access to justice in France. This analysis also concluded that in France, review procedures contesting the
quality of the EIA procedure are frequent and that especially for larger projects, the concluding findings of
an EIA are likely to be challenged or argue that the alternative options have not been adequately considered.
Review cases resulting from the low quality level of EIA reports in France are frequent11.

European Commission, 2009. Study concerning the report on the application and effectiveness of the EIA Directive. Received from
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/eia_study_june_09.pdf
10
CRE, 2008. The regulation of LNG terminals in France. Summary report by the working group. Received from
http://gttm.cre.fr/080414Rapport_GTTM_UK.pdf
11
European Commission. Directive 85/337/EEC: Report. Received from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/eia-studies-andreports/5years.pdf

- 12 -

Duration
As described above, the typical durations of the various component parts of the LNG infrastructure
permitting process in France are:

Period of technical assessments up to 2 years in total;


Environmental impact assessment around 7.5 months;
Project authorisation period up to six months; and

These durations should be taken as a guideline and it should be understood that, depending on a variety of
factors, including the size of the facility and the other external factors, the duration of the different permitting
process components is likely to vary considerably between different projects.

1.5

Germany

Germany does not yet have any LNG re-gasification terminals (October 2011). A number of terminals have
been planned but activity has been suspended. Most recently, E.ON Ruhrgas announced on 8 August 2011
that it had indefinitely postponed the construction of an LNG terminal at Wilhelmshaven12. E.ON had
already been granted official authorisation to build the LNG terminal. The permit was originally obtained
back in the 1970s by Ruhrgas, now a subsidiary of E.ON, with a view to importing Algerian gas - a project
that was later shelved.
Permits Required
Environmental Permit an EIA would normally be required for the building permit and/or spatial
planning process.
Storage permit considered as part of the building permit. Betriebssicherheitsverordnung
(BetrSichV) Ordinance on Industrial Safety and Health applies.
Handling of dangerous goods considered as part of the building permit.
Betriebssicherheitsverordnung (BetrSichV) Ordinance on Industrial Safety and Health applies.
Building permit the building permit is granted if the project complies with the planning and
building regulation law as well as with all other applicable laws (such as environmental laws).
Other? LNG facilities would be subject to the provisions of the Energy Act and of regulations
adopted under it such as the Gas Grid Access Ordinance.
EIA Directive and Seveso II Directive
Germany is a federation consisting of 16 States or Lnder. The relation between the national federal
administration and the states is regulated within the so-called basic law (Grundgesetz). Land use planning
in Germany is regulated within a number of statutes at federal and state level.
The responsibility for public construction law in Germany is divided between federal and state governments.
Building Permits and Spatial Planning
In Germany, two processes need to be completed by the developer. The first is Spatial Planning, which aims
to identify an appropriate location for the project and is administered by an authority on a state (Lnder)
level. The second process is the Building Permit, which results in the issuing of a permit for the construction
and operation of the project. This is administered by an authority on state (Lnder) level but usually not the
same authority as the one responsible for the Spatial Planning process. There are just these two successive
processes for receiving permission13.
12

http://www.nwzonline.de/Region/Stadt/Wilhelmshaven/Artikel/2664973/Aus-f%FCr-weiteres-Fl%FCssig-Erdgas-Projekt.html
Permitting procedures for energy infrastructure projects in the EU: evaluation and legal recommendations, European Commission
Directorate-General for Energy Berlin/Brussels, July 31, 2011, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants
13

- 13 -

An application for a building permit must be submitted to the local building authority or the building
supervisory authority (Bauamt). The application must include a detailed plan of the project, accompanied by
necessary supporting documentation such as site plan, construction drawings, building specifications, and,
where applicable, documentation regarding heating, noise prevention, and fire protection plans. The
documentation required for the application must also be presented to adjacent property owners. An
application for a license may be refused if the particular site is not suitable for the desired land use under the
Spatial Plan.
German law recognizes the principle of procedural merger. In order to simplify and coordinate the permit
procedure, the emission control permit application procedure also includes the building permit process.
Repeat procedures are therefore avoided and there is only one contact partner for the applicant14.
There are no specific authorisation requirements relating to LNG facilities. Permits would be required as for
any other industrial facility.
EIA Directive
In Germany, the EIA Directive 337/85/EEC is transposed in the Environmental Impact Assessment Act
(UVPG), the Federal Mining Act (BBergG) and the relevant ordinance on EIA (UVP-V Bergbau), the
Building Code (BauGB), the Federal Regional Planning Act (ROG), and the law of the German Lnder15.
Environmental impact assessment is integrated into the procedures for the authorisation of projects. The need
for an EIA within the spatial planning procedure is decided by Lnder regulation. Since March 2010, Federal
legislation requires an EIA for the spatial planning procedure, if not already required by Lnder legislation.
The EIA Act defines that if an EIA has taken place within the spatial planning procedure, the EIA within the
subsequent authorisation procedure can be restricted to additional impacts or other significant impacts16.
The impacts on the environment have to be investigated and described early on. On the basis of appropriate
documentation, the public and authorities with environmental responsibilities may give their opinion on the
project and the likely environmental impacts. In the case of projects with possible transboundary impacts, the
public and the authorities of the affected other country may also participate in the procedure.
A negative EIA does not necessarily prevent the project. The authority responsible for authorising the project
takes into account the outcome of the EIA when deciding whether to approve the project, along with
information resulting from this process including comments by the public and relevant authorities.
Seveso II Directive
The Major Accident Ordinance (StrfallV) implements the Seveso II Directive in federal legislation17. The
tolerability of risks under the German Major Accident Ordinance is governed by the concept that
establishments may only carry out their hazardous activities if they are able to demonstrate that hazardous
effects from an accident may be reasonably excluded. This is based on technical regulation and expert
judgments18. This is a form of consequence based deterministic approach. Probabilistic risk assessment as

14

http://www.gtai.com/homepage/investment-guide-to-germany/the-legal-framework/planning-and-building/
http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/umweltrecht-e/uvp.htm
16
GHK, Collection of information and data to support the Impact Assessment study of the review of the EIA Directive Final
Report, September 2010
17
Consultation distances: Considering industrial risks in land-use planning in Germany, The Hague, 12th November 2010, Thomas
Hackbusch, LUBW State Institute for the Environment, Measurements and Nature Conservation
18
Translating the risk of major accidents into opportune safety distances from dangerous establishments: recent developments of the
European regulation as deriving from selected national practices, Claudia Basta, Michalis Christou, Michael Struckl and Ben Ale
15

- 14 -

carried out in the Netherlands and the UK does not have an equivalent use in Germany. Generally the
consequence- based approach refers to pre-selected worst credible or representative scenarios19.
Establishments which fall under the requirements of the Major Accident Ordinance (StrfallV) are required
to be designed and operated according to the state of the art in safety technology. The application of this
principle should imply that the risks of effects of an accident outside of the establishment are negligible. The
German Hazardous Incidents Commission (SFK) and the German Technical Committee for Plant Safety
(TAA) have been replaced by the Commission on Plant Safety (KAS) which provides recommendations. The
recommendations act as guidance and their application is left to the individual State which, where justified,
may adopt other values.
Sites that fall under the Major Accident Ordinance (StrfallV) are also audited at least every 12 months for
compliance.
The Federal Pollution Protection Act ( 50 "Planning") (BImSchG) provides the rules for granting licenses
for potentially polluting or hazardous installations or activities according to the Annex of the 4th Ordinance
for the Implementation of the Federal Act. The competent authority is the Federal Ministry for the
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety.
Involvement of the Public, Regional and Local Authorities
The permitting process is led by regional organisations at state (Lnder) level. Public opinion is taken into
consideration when granting authorisations. In Germany, members of the public may be involved in the
scoping phase by the competent authority on a case-by-case-basis. Furthermore, the public has to be
informed of the result of any screening that took place20.
Stakeholders are formally involved in the Spatial Planning process, which starts with an official Scoping,
followed by the preparation of the application documents and a public consultation. Everybody is allowed to
participate in this part of the Spatial Planning process. Stakeholders are generally only informed about
projects within the formal requirements of the procedure and the possibility of involvement is usually
announced via a small notice in regional newspapers. Therefore, actual participation by stakeholders in the
initial stages is very low as stakeholders are often not fully aware that they are potentially affected by the
project subject to the spatial planning. Only later on, when environmental NGOs in some cases mobilise the
general public, do stakeholders become more involved. Insufficient stakeholder involvement in the initial
stages of the permitting procedure results in a high volume of comments later on and subsequently a large
number of appeals21.
An example of better practice is when project developers hold "information trade shows". They rent a large
venue in a potentially affected community and set up different stands for different topics, e.g. land use and
compensation issues, impacts of electromagnetic radiation, impacts on the environment. People can come to
these events and get information specifically pertaining to their area of concern. This enables constructive
discussions with different stakeholder groups.
Duration
In Germany, the overall duration of the procedure is not defined, but the duration of certain process steps has
been fixed by the legislator (e.g. three months for the public consultation), but these are not enforceable.
Delays often occur in process steps for which no duration has been specified, e.g. the decision phase, during
19

Translating the risk of major accidents into opportune safety distances from dangerous establishments: recent developments of the
European regulation as deriving from selected national practices, Claudia Basta, Michalis Christou, Michael Struckl and Ben Ale
20
European Commission, DG ENV, Study concerning the report on the application and effectiveness of the EIA Directive, June 2009
21
Permitting procedures for energy infrastructure projects in the EU: evaluation and legal recommendations, European Commission
Directorate-General for Energy Berlin/Brussels, July 31, 2011, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants

- 15 -

which the authority considers all the arguments and draws up the permit. The introduction of target durations
for the decision by a court would be viewed as limiting the independence of judges. This could be considered
an infringement of Germany's Basic Law (i.e. constitution). As a consequence, it is highly unlikely that such
a measure could be implemented in Germany22.

1.6

The Netherlands

The Netherlands has one large-scale LNG import terminal, located in the Rotterdam harbour area.
Permit required
The following permits are required in the Netherlands:

Environmental permit; For all LNG facilities an environmental permit is required according to the
Environmental Management Act (Wet Milieubeheer).
Storage permit;
Handling permit;
Building permit;

EIA Directive
The EU 85/337 EIA Directive has been implemented in Dutch legislation in 1994 by the Decree for
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA Decree, Dutch acronym Besluit m.e.r.).
According to the EIA Decree, an EIA screening must be executed for LNG facilities. Based on the results of
the EIA screening, a decision is made as to whether an EIA is to be carried out or not. The EIA screening
obligation for LNG storage facilities is based on the consideration that these facilities fall under category
D.25.2 of the Annex, Part D of the EIA Decree: The establishment, modification or extension of a system
intended for above ground storage of natural gas, in cases where the activity relates to a capacity of 100,000
m3 or more. The threshold of 100,000 m3 relates to the gaseous aggregation of methane (at atmospheric
pressure and 11 C), which is about 170 m3 of LNG.
There have been plans of establishing large scale import LNG terminals at three different locations in the
Netherlands and an EIA has been carried out for each terminal, including an assessment of the safety risks,
prior to the final decision making. However, at the moment there are no plans of establishing additional large
scale terminals, besides of the Gate Terminal, in the Netherlands.
The Seveso Directive
The Seveso II Directive is implemented in Dutch legislation by the Decree for Risks of major accidents in
1999 (Major Hazards Decree, Dutch acronym Brzo 99).
LNG falls under the substance category Liquefied extremely flammable gases (including LPG) and natural
gas mentioned in Brzo 99, annex 1, part 1 (the corresponding lower tier is 50 tonnes, the upper tier is 200
tonnes). Above a storage capacity of 200 tonnes a safety report is required.
All planned and existing large and small scale LNG import terminals in Netherlands so far exceed the 200
tonnes tier, which means that these terminals fall/will fall under Brzo 99. The large scale LNG-terminals
have also carried out the required safety reports, including a quantitative risk assessment (QRA). The
decision making process of the planned small scale LNG import terminals is still at an early stage. Safety
22

Permitting procedures for energy infrastructure projects in the EU: evaluation and legal recommendations, European Commission
Directorate-General for Energy Berlin/Brussels, July 31, 2011, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants

- 16 -

reports have therefore not yet been executed. For one planned small scale LNG import terminal an indicative
QRA has been made.
The risk-based standards for external safety are laid down in the Decree for external safety of establishments
(Dutch acronym Bevi). This Decree directly applies to Seveso II-establishments and other specific external
safety relevant facilities like LPG filling stations. It also regulates when a QRA is required to determine
external safety distances. Bevi does not yet apply to LNG filling stations, but it is expected that it will do so
in future. The competent authority can nonetheless decide to apply the Bevi risk standards in the
environmental license for non-Bevi establishments too.
Involvement of the Public, Regional and Local Authorities
Consultation with the public or with organizations representing public groups is part of all decision making
processes according to the EIA Decree, and Brzo 99 and issuing environmental licenses. In EIA and license
issuing procedures the public can actively bring in their points of view, which must be taken into account in
the final decision by the competent authorities.
In Brzo 99 procedures, the competent authority and the Seveso II company are obliged to share the safety
information with the public, with the exception of information that is considered by the company to be
confidential. The competent authority must also inform the public of their assessment of the safety situation
of the Seveso II company. This information will for the most part go together with the information used for
the licensing.
The most relevant risk information of all relevant companies, including Seveso II-companies, is placed on a
publicly accessible internet site (www.risicokaart.nl). This risk information can also be used by professionals
for purposes such as land use planning and incident prevention policy.
The Province or the Municipality (depending on the scale of the activity) is the competent authority for
licensing. The competent authority can ask the national expertise Centre for External Safety for support to
judge a specific risk situation. This Centre is part of the National Institute of Public Health and the
Environment (RIVM) and is mainly financed by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment.
Duration
A system with one single process was recently introduced in the Netherlands. The official duration of the
permit procedure from submission of application documents until decision about the permit is nine to twelve
months. However, it is not yet known how the system will affect the timeline in practice.

1.7

Norway

Norway has about 40 LNG terminals ranging from 20 to 3,500 m3. Note that all the terminals in Norway are
quite small compared to other terminals in Europe. This has to be considered when discussing the applicable
laws and public awareness.
Permits Required
The following permits are needed for LNG facilities in Norway:

Handling and storage permit for handling of dangerous goods in accordance to the following laws:
o LOV 2002-06-14 nr 20: Act on protection against fire, explosion and accidents with
hazardous substances.
o FOR 2005-06-17 nr 672: Ordinance on measures to prevent and limit the consequences of
major chemical accidents (SEVESO II)

- 17 -

Building permit according to the Planning and Building Act (LOV 2008-06-27 nr 71: Lov om
planlegging og byggesaksbehandling)

EIA Directive
The EIA Directive is implemented in Norwegian laws through the Act on Planning and Handling of
Buildings (LOV-2008-06-27-71-4-2 and 14-6) and the Decree on Planning and Handling of Buildings (
FOR-2009-06-26-855).
The list of projects requiring EIA in the Decree on EIA states the following criteria for EIA requirement for
the following projects:

industrial facilities for the transportation of gas with a tube length of more than 20km and a diameter
of more than 15 inches
storage facility with an investment cost of more than 500 million NOK
storage facilities for oil, or petrochemical- or chemical products with a capacity of 200 000 tonnes
or more

If the infrastructure project is below the scope of the EIA Decree, the need for EIA still has to be checked
with the authorities, since the EIA could be required in individual cases, if the project will probably have
significant adverse environmental impact comparable in type and extent to that of the projects referred to in
the Decree, and taking into account the combined impact of different projects. The EIA requirement will
also depend on the sites under consideration. If the EIA procedure is required, other permits for the project
can not be received before the EIA has been completed.
SEVESO II Directive
The Seveso II Directive is implemented in Norway through the regulation Ordinance on measures to prevent
and limit the consequences of major chemical accidents (FOR 2005-06-17 nr 672). The intention of the act is
to prevent and minimize the consequences of big accidents where dangerous chemicals are present.
Involvement of the Public, Local and National Authorities
Public consultation has not been an essential part of the permitting process for the small scale terminals
which have been built.
The public consultations are however applicable for the terminals which are built according to the EIA
Directive. For LNG-projects according to the EIA process the applicant has to elaborate a proposal for a
planning programme (for a plan) or an impact assessment (for a project) to determine the environmental
impact and other impacts of the plan/project.
The proposed planning programmes or impact assessments shall be submitted for consultation to relevant
authorities and interest groups and be presented for the public. The timeframe for comments on the proposal
shall be at least six weeks.
If the authorities concerned have considered that the plan or project may conflict with national or important
regional issues (see 7, paragraph 4), the competent authority shall submit the application to the ministry
before the determination.
Local authorities are involved in both the building permit and the storage and handling permit. National
authorities act as support for the local authorities for terminals with storage capacity under 200 tonnes and as
an authority for storages above 200 tonnes.
Duration
The duration of the permit process varies, but normally the process is completed within 12 months.

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1.8

Poland

Poland has not yet a LNG terminal one is under construction in Swinoujscie and is expected to be into
operation by mid/end of 2014.
Permits required:
An LNG facility requires as minimum the following permits:

Environmental permit according to the Polish Environmental Protection Law (Dz.U.1994, No. 25,
pos 150), which includes an environmental screening process to decide the scope of the EIA and if
an EIA is needed. If an EIA is required, elaboration and approving of the EIA are included in the
permit process.

Building permit according to the Polish Building Law (Dz.U.1994, No. 89, pos. 414). The building
permit will based upon requirements and condition approved in EIA. It will include a full technical
documentation, title insurance to land (or right of use declaration if land belongs to other than the
investor, which is normal in harbour areas in Poland, where State Treasury owns most of areas.

Implementation of EIA Directive


The requirements for the environmental impact assessment (EIA) have been transposed to the Polish
legislation through the Polish Enviromental Protection Law, (Dz.U.1994, No. 25, pos 150), the Polish decree
on Public Hearing and making of EIA (Dz.U.2002, No. 75, pos. 609) and the Act of preparation of EIA
(Dz.U. 2008, No. 199, pos. 127).
Environmental screening is carried out in order to decide the scope of an EIA. Based upon such screening
decision, the requirements for further process is given to investor by the environmental department. The next
step is to carry out an EIA report and go through the public hearing process. The polish legislation has no
threshold value for LNG facilities, it is up to the competent authority to determine whether a project shall be
made subject to an EIA.
Involvement of public, national, local and regional authorities
During EIA screening phase as well as the rest of the EIA process, all bodies are informed about the process
and the local/regional environmental authorities are acting in according to the rules in the Law. In practice
this is done by publication of the documents and the procedure in newspapers, on websites of local and
regional authorities and on the public board of the competent authority.
According to the Enviromental Protection law stakeholders that have legal interest in the planned project, for
example owners of neighbouring activities, must be consulted too.
Seveso II directive
The Seveso II Directive is implemented fully in the Polish Environmental Protection Law (Dz.U.1994, No.
25, pos 150). Application procedure is handled by local and regional entities (city department and regional
directorate for environmental protection).
Duration.
The duration for the process will normally be as follows (but big variations can be seen):
1. EIA-screening 1 to 4 months

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2. EIA procedure incl. hearings 9 to 12 months


3. Building permit procedure 2 to 5 months

1.9

Sweden

Sweden has one LNG terminal, located in Nynshamn 80 km south of Stockholm. There are also proposals
to establish terminals in Gteborg and Lysekil, and applications for environmental permits for these
terminals have been submitted to the competent authority, but no decisions have yet been made.
Permits required
For establishing an LNG facility the following permits are required in Sweden:

Environmental permit according to the Environmental Code. An environmental permit states the
conditions under which an activity may be carried out. Licensing authorities are Environmental
Courts or the County Administrative Boards.
Concession from the Government is required for a storage plant and regasification plant if the plant
is connected to the natural gas pipeline that is used for transmission of natural gas, according the
Natural Gas Act (2005:403). The concession process is handled by the Energy Market inspectorate
and result in permission being granted for the developer to build and operate the plant. Furthermore,
an environmental permit is also required for these kinds of plants, in which safety and environmental
conditions for the plant are stated.
Building permit according to the Planning and Building Act. If the LNG facility is to be established
in an area where there is no detailed development plan or if the establishment of a facility diverges
from the actual plan, a new detailed development plan must be formulated.
Handling permit for explosive and flammable products according to the Act on explosive and
flammable goods. Persons who handle explosive and flammable products need a handling permit.
Permit applications are handled by the local authority in charge of spatial planning and building
permits. The handling permit is often coordinated with the building permit.

Implementation of Seveso Directive


The Seveso Directive (96/82/EC) has been implemented in Sweden through the Act on measures to prevent
and limit the consequences of major chemical accidents (SFS 1999:381 and SFS 1999:382), the Work
Environment Act (SFS 1977:1160), and Civil Protection Act (SFS 2003:778), the Environmental Code (SFS
1998:808), the Ordinance concerning environmentally hazardous activities and the protection of public
health (SFS 1998:899), and the Ordinance on environmental impact assessments (SFS 1998:905).
There are two levels of requirements in the Act on measures to prevent and limit the consequences of major
chemical accidents (SFS 1999:381) in accordance with the Seveso Directive. The lower threshold for LNG is
50 tonnes and the upper level is 200 tonnes. Companies that hold a larger quantity of LNG than 50 ton are
required to send a notification to the county administrative board before starting up operations. The
notification shall include a description of the operation, what hazardous goods will be used, the surroundings
and factors in the surroundings that may impact on safety. In addition to the notification, the operators have
to establish a major accident prevention policy.
According to the Environmental Code, operators who handle less than 200 tonnes but more than 1000 m3 a
year must send a notification to the Local Environmental Board. Note that this is not the same notification as
the one required according to the Seveso-legislation. The notification shall include reference data, drawings

- 20 -

and technical descriptions necessary to evaluate the environmentally hazardous activity. To the extent
necessary the notification shall also include an environmental impact statement.
Operators that hold quantities larger than the upper level, 200 tonnes of LNG, must apply for an
environmental permit. The permit procedure is regulated in the Environmental Code. The implementation of
the Seveso Directive in Sweden resulted in an amendment to the Environmental Code. The amendment
implies that the environmental permit shall include necessary measures to prevent a major chemical accident.
The operator of an establishment above the upper level also needs to establish a safety report, a safety
management system and an emergency plan according to the Seveso legislation.
If an import terminal includes water operations and establishment of jetties which handle ships with a gross
tonnage of at least 1,350 tonnes an environmental permit is also required for these activities according to the
Environmental Code. However, the permit procedure for all activities can be coordinated into one single
procedure.
Implementation of the EIA Directive
The EIA directive is transposed in the Environmental Code (SFS1998:808) and the Ordinance on
Environmental Impact Assessment (1998:905).
According to the Environmental Code, an Environmental Impact Assesment (EIA) must be submitted
together with the permit application. The purpose is to describe the direct and indirect impact of the planned
activity.
An Environmental Impact Assessment is also required for plans and programmes which are anticipated to
have a substantial impact on the environment.
Consultation process
Persons who intend to pursue an activity or apply a measure for which an environmental permit is required
shall consult the county administrative board at an early stage. They shall also consult private individuals
who are likely to be affected and must do so in good time before submitting an application for a permit and
preparing the environmental impact statement that is required. The consultation shall cover the location,
extent and nature of the planned activity and its environmental impact of the activity as well as the content of
the Environmental Impact Assessment.
The county administrative board have to decide whether the establishment which is subject to an EIA may
cause a significant environmental impact. If so, the consultation process will be extended to involve several
authorities as well as NGOs and the general public.
Information to the public
The municipality shall ensure that information on safety measures and on the requisite behaviour in the event
of an accident is provided to persons who may be affected by a major accident originating in an
establishment which is subject to the Seveso-legislation. These requirements are valid for establishments
above the upper threshold.
Duration of the permit process
The duration of the different permit procedures is not defined in Swedish legislation and the duration varies
between different kinds of projects. In general the permitting procedure takes four to five years in Sweden23.
23

Permitting procedures for energy infrastructure projects in the EU: evaluation and legal recommendations, European Commission
Directorate-General for Energy Berlin/Brussels, July 31, 2011, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants

- 21 -

1.10

United Kingdom

The UK has four LNG terminals:


South Hook LNG;
Dragon LNG;
Isle of Grain LNG; and
Teeside Gasport LNG.
Permits Required
In the United Kingdom the following permit are required for LNG facitilities:

Environmental permit Yes, assessment is part of the planning permit.


Storage permit Yes, hazardous substances consent under the Planning (Hazardous Substances)
Regulations 19921. For LNG the threshold is 15 tonnes. If storage is offshore, a separate offshore
storage permit is required. Again, this is assessed with the planning permit.
Handling of dangerous goods Yes, hazardous substances consent under the Planning (Hazardous
Substances) Regulations 19921. For LNG the threshold is 15 tonnes.
Building permit Yes, smaller projects are assessed locally but major energy projects (including
most LNG terminals) are assessed at a national level by the Infrastructure Planning Commission
(IPC).
Other? LNG import terminals are required to comply with EU market rules on reporting, although in
the UK the terminals developed to date have exemptions from third party access rules.

EIA Directive and Seveso II Directive


Planning Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects
In July 2011 the House of Commons debated and approved the six National Policy Statements for Energy
(NPS) under the Planning Act 2008. The Planning Act 2008 was introduced to create a more efficient
planning system for nationally significant infrastructure, including gas supply infrastructure.
The energy NPSs set out national policy against which proposals for major energy projects will be assessed
and decided on by the Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC). In future, if the changes to the Planning
Act 2008 set out in the Localism Bill are made, they will be the primary documents for the new Major
Infrastructure Planning Unit, which will take on the role of the IPC.
The energy NPSs are designed to ensure that England and Wales have a planning system that is rapid,
predictable and accountable. Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate planning systems.
LNG facilities which have a storage capacity of at least 43 million standard cubic metres (Mcm) of gas or
higher or a projected delivery flow rate of at least 4.5 Mcm/day are covered by the National Policy Statement
for Gas Supply Infrastructure and Gas and Oil Pipelines (EN-4), along with the Overarching National Policy
Statement for Energy (EN-1). These planning policy statements provide the primary basis for decisions by
the Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC) on applications it receives for gas supply infrastructure and
gas and oil pipelines. They define a need and urgency for new energy infrastructure to be consented and built
and the need for specific technologies, including LNG facilities.
The planning process for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects:

Pre-application: When the IPC is informed by a developer that they intend to submit an application,
the proposal is added to a Programme of Projects along with the date on which they expect the

- 22 -

application to be submitted. Meanwhile, the developer is expected to be consulting the public over
their proposal and incorporating the comments they receive to improve it.
Acceptance: Once an application is submitted to the IPC, they have 28 days to decide whether to
accept it, including considering whether the right environmental issues have been identified and if
the developers public consultation has been adequate.
Pre-examination: At this stage, the public will be able to register to have their say to the IPC about
the application and provide a summary of their views in writing. Everyone who has registered to
have their say on the proposal will be invited to attend a preliminary meeting run and chaired by an
IPC Commissioner. This stage of the process takes approximately 3 months.
Examination: The IPC has six months to carry out the examination. During this stage, people who
have registered to have their say, are invited to provide more details of their views in writing, they
may also request open floor hearings are held.
Decision: If the relevant National Policy Statement(s) has been designated, the IPC make the
decision on an application within 3 months.
Post decision: If the decision is to grant development consent, a period for legal challenge runs from
the date of the publication of the order (or the statement of reasons if published later).

EIA Directive
There are a number of regulations which implement the EIA directive (85/337/EEC) in the UK, including:

The Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011;
The Marine Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) (Amendment) Regulations 2011; and
The Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2009.

These regulations are updates to earlier implementations of the EIA directive in the UK.
Where the project is considered nationally significant, the IPC is the competent authority for the
purposes of the EIA directive (85/337/EC) and the Habitats directive (92/43/EEC). The IPC will therefore be
responsible for ensuring that the provisions of these EU environmental directives are met. They would make
the decision on whether an EIA is required.
There would be expected to be a requirement for an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to be
undertaken for a proposed LNG facility and, therefore, for an Environmental Statement to be submitted with
the application24. An LNG terminal may require a terrestrial EIA and/or a marine EIA. For example the
South Hook LNG Terminal required a terrestrial EIA for the new terminal and a marine EIA for the
refurbishment of the jetty. Under the EIA Regulations there are formal requirements in terms of the content
of Environmental Statements.
Seveso II Directive
The Seveso II Directive is implemented in Great Britain through the Control of Major Accident Hazards
Regulations 1999 (COMAH). COMAH is the principal legislation covering safety at LNG establishments.
The regulations cover the unloading equipment at the jetty, the site itself, and the outfeed up to the national
gas transmission system. Dangerous substances on the ship are not covered by COMAH but are subject to
the Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 198725.
Major hazards regulation has three main strands:

24
25

BIS - LNG Imports in your area your questions answered (URN 07/125)
HSE: LNG Terminals - Consent and operational issues, http://www.hse.gov.uk/gas/supply/ingterminals.htm#faqs

- 23 -

1. First and foremost major accident prevention at the terminal is achieved through the COMAH
Regulations 1999 (as amended 2005) which requires reasonably practicable measures to be in place
to prevent fires and explosions from the escape of LNG at the terminal. This is achieved through
effective management, process and procedures, and good practice safeguards that are proportionate
to the risks. The terminal's safety reports relates to the actual or anticipated presence of LNG on site
and is required to be reviewed at least every five years.
2. Hazardous Substances Consent is granted by the Hazardous Substances Authority. Consent is part of
the second layer of public safety protection and is a land use planning (LUP) control under the EU
Seveso II Directive. Consents aim to control the development of new major hazard sites to ensure
long-term separation with land in public use and minimise the impact of any major accident on the
surrounding community.
3. Emergency planning is the third layer and is designed to mitigate the consequences of a major
accident through good on and off-site emergency response arrangements.
The COMAH regulations are enforced jointly in England and Wales by a Competent Authority (CA)
comprising the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency (EA). In the case of LNG
establishments HSE is the lead authority26.
An operator who plans to build a new LNG establishment has to submit information to the CA in advance of
construction in the form of a pre-construction safety report (PCSR) 27. Another, similar, report must be sent
to the CA prior before dangerous substances are introduced into the plant - the pre-operations safety report
(POSR)28. The operator has to ensure that the construction and operation of an establishment does not start
until he has received from the CA the conclusions of its examination of the relevant report.
As well as assessing the formal safety reports the CA is required to organise an adequate system of
inspections while the establishment is operational this is developed towards the end of the POSR
assessment. The CA will also investigate incidents and accidents which occur on site. Regular inspection
visits will be made during the construction phase to ensure that the integrity of the plant and equipment is in
accordance with the information provided in the PCSR. The construction activities on site will also be
inspected to check that the operator is doing all that is necessary to ensure the health and safety of those at
work.
Under COMAH, operators of LNG terminals are also required to produce an on-site emergency plan before
the establishment starts to operate and must provide information to the local authority to assist them in their
production of an off-site emergency plan. The plans' objectives are to contain and control incidents to
minimise the effects and to limit damage to persons, the environment and property.
The terminal operator has a duty to prepare and test emergency procedures for dealing with the consequences
of a major accident. The Local Authority must prepare an emergency plan which details how an emergency
relating to a possible major accident in its area will be dealt with.
HSE assesses the risks based on the consent particulars and, in some cases, other plant features which
significantly affect the risk to people and which may need to become conditions of consent. Where consent is
granted, HSE will set a consultation zone around the major hazard site and notify the hazardous substance
26

Scotland the CA comprises HSE and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency
The purpose of the PCSR is to ensure that safety is considered fully at the design stage. The CA is looking to see that safety and
reliability have been incorporated which reduce the risks to As Low As is Reasonably Practicable (the ALARP Principle). Operators
must meet recognised good practice and then look at what more can be done to reduce risks without excessive costs.
28
The POSR must demonstrate that the operator has taken all measures necessary to prevent major accidents and to limit the
consequences to people and the environment of any that do occur
27

- 24 -

authority. Whenever a development is proposed within the consultation zone HSE is consulted for its advice
as to the advisability or otherwise of locating the particular development there.
Where shipping is involved the Hazardous Substances Authority is the lead authority. The functions,
responsibilities and means of co-operation between HSE and Maritime and Coastguard Agency operational
activities are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding between HSE and MCA.
The Hazardous Substances Authority is also is the lead authority for establishments wishing to hold stocks of
certain hazardous substances above a threshold quantity must apply to usually the local planning authority for hazardous substances consent under the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 19921. For LNG
the threshold is 15 tonnes. HSA must consult as to the advisability or otherwise of locating a major hazard
establishment in the location designated.
The example of South Hook mentioned earlier required planning permission and Hazardous Substances
Consent from the Hazardous Substances Authority (in the case Pembrokeshire County Council and
Pembrokeshire Coast National Park Authority).29
Involvement of the Public, Regional and Local Authorities
Public consultation is an essential part of the permitting process. As discussed above, developers are
expected to be consulted and their opinions taken into account before the application is even submitted to the
IPC. For example, Dragon LNG consulted with over 50 organisations for their EIA, including statutory and
non-statutory bodies and local interest groups. Applications can be rejected on the basis of insufficient public
consultation. In addition, the IPC consider views from the public and local and national authorities and
statutory consultees as they review the application.
The statutory (required) consultees depend on the impacts that the project may have.
Once permitted, there is also a requirement to keep the public informed under the COMAH process. People
who live in an area liable to be affected by a major accident at a COMAH site should regularly receive
information about the site, the major accident hazards and the safety measures that are in place. The local
authority should consult the public when it prepares an off-site emergency plan for the site, normally be
carried out through local councillors or especially established groups representing residents in the vicinity of
the site.
Duration
The duration of the planning process varies and can be lengthy. For example the Dragon terminal started
initial studies in 2001, began the planning process in 2002, received planning consents and Hazardous
Substances consent at the end of 2004, there was a subsequent request for a judicial review from a local
protest group, which was overturned in 2005, and the project commenced commercial operations in 2009. In
the past there have been concerns in the energy industry generally about the length and uncertainty of the
planning process.
The new infrastructure planning process is designed to lead to a more open and straightforward system,
where the national need for major energy infrastructure is recognised. It is not yet clear how successful this
will be, particularly as the IPC looks likely to be replaced by a new unit under planning reforms.
At a minimum the current IPC process would take:

29

HSE has published an overview of the consents and required and operational issues for an LNG site, which can be found on the

following link: http://www.hse.gov.uk/gas/supply/ingterminals.htm#faqs

- 25 -

An undefined period for the developer to complete the pre-application process, which includes

public consultation;
28 days for acceptance;
3 months for pre-examination;
6 months for examination;
3 months for decision; and
There is potential for legal challenge, which would extend the process.

Since these are major and complex projects, the above timescales are certainly reasonable. It remains to be
seen whether they are achieved in practice.

2.

Experiences of Consultation Process within the


SECA Area

Below follows the views and experiences of work with public awareness issues in the countries within the
SECA area with experience from establishing LNG terminal infrastructures. The material has been gathered
through interviews and written comments.

2.1

LNG Terminal in the Port of Zeebrgge, Belgium

When the LNG Terminal Zeebrgge was constructed in the 1980s, a great deal of concern was raised about
the safety of LNG. For the construction, an Interministerial Working Group was formed to determine the
procedures and rules to be respected.
In time, people got used to the presence of the LNG Terminal. On a periodic basis, neighbours and the public
can visit the terminal and be informed about the safety rules, procedures, measures etc.
When developing new projects, such as construction of the 4th LNG tank, the Open Rack Vaporiser or the
Second Jetty, few questions were raised by the public on the safety of the projects, or LNG in general. The
authorities on the other hand, remain very demanding on respect of stringent rules and measures, as well as
thorough safety studies.
On the other hand, industries and authorities see the environmental benefits of the use of natural gas in
general, and of LNG as fuel for shipping in particular. The Flemish authorities and harbours certainly try to
promote the use of LNG as fuel for shipping.
Despite the general acceptance of the LNG Terminal in Zeebrgge, the move to small LNG ships, LNG
bunkering, ships filling on LNG will require acceptance by the authorities, based upon proven procedures,
codes and standards etc.

2.2

Porvoo LNG Plant, Finland

Main Experience from Public Awareness and Concerns


People are positive to both natural and biogas as such but most do not know what LNG is. The safety levels
must be very high as there are a lot of people circulating close to the filling station (thousands around
ferries). Norway has shown us that it is possible to handle LNG safely.

- 26 -

The experience from public consultations is that it is generally positive. We stressed the environmental
advantages and how it would be good for the Baltic Sea.
Main Experience Concerning Media Attention
LNG is still a rather exotic phenomenon. The papers wrote a lot about Viking Line when they discussed the
construction of their new LNG ferry. The reactions were mostly positive as it created job opportunities in
Turku.
Interests of Politicians
The Finnish government has given Viking Line financial support for the environmental and innovative
LNG project.
Conclusion and Recommendation
Finland has years of experience from a small LNG production plant in Porvoo which has been in operation
since 1996. The plant is located in a refinery area and there have been no problems concerning public
awareness.
A number of LNG projects are under way in Porvoo and Turku while some are still in the initial planning
phase. There is therefore no experience from these as regards public awareness.
One could argue that the EU should do something similar to motivate such investments. The EU could also
give some support to the countries within SECA as the shipping cost will be higher there to begin with
compared to for example the Mediterranean.

2.3

LNG terminal in the Port of Rotterdam, Netherlands

Main Experience from Public Awareness and Concerns


The general public in the Netherlands is very used to gas, since the country has already been a major gas
producer and exporter for over fifty years. Over 99% of households are connected to the gas grid.
There is still work to be done in the area of Gas/LNG as transportation fuel. The benefits of using LNG, e.g.
as an environmentally friendly fuel, must be communicated to the public. There is no strong public opinion
against LNG today. There are already buses powered by compressed natural gas, and more and more
passenger vehicles are using (bio) CNG as fuel Some trucks also use LNG as fuel and there is one LNG fuel
station, but more to come.
Main Experience concerning Media Attention
The press has thus far been rather quiet.
Involvement of Local Authorities
Gasunie has strong support from the government and the local authorities today.
Interests of Local Politicians
Discussions have begun regarding how to tax LNG as a truck fuel. LNG in the Netherlands is currently taxed
as LPG not as diesel.

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2.4

Lista, Kollsnes and Mosjen, Norway

Main experience from Public Awareness and Concerns


The public often have questions based on their feelings. In general most of the public do not know that
different gases have different properties and characteristics. Their general opinion is that gas may explode.
Their most common questions are:

Is an explosion possible?
What happens if the gas leaks?
An LNG - terminal is a good idea but why place it in my backyard?
Is there not any better location?
Is there a lot of noise from the terminal?

The experience is that when the public gets to know the properties and the characteristics of LNG their
concerns are reduced. The information that
LNG poses a small risk of explosion is particularly important. It cannot be released rapidly enough to cause
the overpressures needed and evaporated LNG mixed with air is only explosive in a confirmed environment,
where the gas is concentration is 5-15 % and a source of ignition is present. Further, there is only a minor
risk of vapours to accumulate near the ground as natural gas is lighter than air and will rise to the
atmosphere.
Main Experience concerning Media Attention
The media is often positive to LNG because they already know about the environmental benefits in the
shipping traffic. Note that in Norway the information of the establishment of the LNG-terminal usually
comes after the information that the ship owner has ordered a new ship and that pollution will decrease.
Involvement of Local Authorities
In Norway the local authorities are involved in granting the building permits and the permit to store and
handle dangerous goods. The local authorities usually get a lot of support from the national DSB authority
for the dangerous goods permit.
Interests of Local Politicians
Local politicians are usually positive. They are basically engaged in the following questions:

3.

Reduce emissions;
Expand the use of natural gas in Norway (many politicians think that it is wrong to export all the gas
and not to use the clean energy in Norway. Only 1% of the gas from the North Sea is used in
Norway;
Employment.

LNG Terminal in Swinoujscie, Poland

Project: Main experience from public awareness and concerns


During the planning process several meetings were held with the public to inform and to answer questions
that the public might have. Most questions were regarding

LNG plant safety;


Construction jobs and business opportunities;

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Public health and safety;


Construction nuisance;
Impacts on beaches and tourism;
Fishing, wildlife and environment;
Overall economic support.

Main Experience concerning Media Attention


All meetings held with the public during the planning stages have been covered by the press.
Involvement of Local Authorities
The Maritime Office in Szczecin is a party in the project as a sponsor and is responsible for the
construction of the new breakwater.
The Municipality in Swinoujscie is positive to the project that will give around 50-60 million PLN in annual
tax revenues excluding tax revenues from employees on the site. The land designated for the LNG terminal
was transferred from the municipality to Ploskie LNG (the terminal operator) in 2009 for the long-term use
of the terminal
Interests of Politicians
The LNG terminal project in Swinoujscie is seen as a project of strategic importance for Poland and
therefore of high importance for the politicians. The plant has been designated a project of strategic
importance and has been part of a larger development project for the harbour. As such the focus has been on
the positive consequences for the area (Poland);
The new breakwater that is to be constructed will be completely financed by the state. The building and
extension of the LNG infrastructure is in accordance with the Energy Policy of Poland until 2030. The
Energy Policy of Poland until 2030 document (adopted by the Council of Ministers on 10 November 2009)
sets out the following primary directions for Polish energy policy:

4.

To improve energy efficiency;


To enhance security of fuel and energy supplies;
To diversify the electricity generation structure by introducing nuclear energy;
To develop the use of renewable energy sources, including biofuels;
To develop competitive fuel and energy markets;
To reduce the environmental impact of the power industry

Nynshamn,
Sweden

Stockholm

and

Gothenburg,

Main Experience from Public Awareness and Concerns


The main experience from public awareness and concerns are mostly the same as seen in Norway. The
public often has questions based on their feelings. In general most people do not know that different gases
have different properties and character. Their general opinion is that gas may explode. Their most common
questions are:

Is explosion possible?
What happens if the gas leaks?

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An LNG-terminal is good but why place it in my backyard?


Is there not any better location?
Is there a lot of noise from the terminal?
Why fossil fuel?
Will the LNG terminal be a terrorist target?

However, when the public get to know the properties and characteristics of LNG their concerns are reduced.
Main Experience concerning Media Attention
The media is often positive to LNG because they already know about the environmental benefits for the ship
traffic. Note that information on the establishment of the LNG terminal usually comes after the information
that the shipowner has ordered a new ship and that pollution will decrease. This was the situation in
Stockholm when it became clear that the new Viking Line ferry had been ordered.
Involvement of Local Authorities
The local authorities are involved in giving the building permit and the permit to store and handle dangerous
goods. The local authorities usually get a lot of support from the national MSB authority for the dangerous
goods permit and the environmental permit.
Interests of Local Politicians
Local politicians are basically engaged in the following questions:

5.

Reduce emissions, but why fossil fuels?


Safety
Business development, i.e. will the harbour be more attractive?
Employment

Grain LNG, the United Kingdom

Main Experience from Public Awareness and Concerns


The site of the new facility was converted and enlarged from an existing LNG storage facility to a import
terminal. The area also had a history of petrochemicals since 1950 and the local community were therefore
more used to having such plant in the vicinity. Notwithstanding this, Grain LNG have actively informed the
local community since 2003 when the construction work began.
Main Experience concerning Media Attention
There has generally been positive recognition due to both the declining of the UK continental shelf gas and
the lower CO2 impact of gas compared to other carbon-based fuels. The operator has contended with
objections from a very small minority using a variety of different media e.g Facebook, internet campaigns
etc in a manner that is not consistent with the formal channels that have dealt with majority views.
Involvement of Local Authorities
Planning permission has been needed to construct the site and Medway council have been a positive partner
in this process albeit looking to National Grid to be a responsible partner in the construction and operation of
the site. As other local heavy industry has shut down we have found the local council supportive of the 1
billion investment made by National Grid.
Interests of Local Politicians
Energy ministers, local members of parliament down to the community council have all been important
stakeholders in agreeing what was built on site. Both the local authorities and the politicians have been

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generally positive recognising the economic benefits the business brings directly or indirectly to the region.
Safety and environmental concerns were taken into account throughout the development of the project,
which helped to allay their concerns.

The Danish Maritime Authority


Copenhagen, March 2012
ISBN: XXXXXXXXXX
Website for the publication www.dma.dk
ISBN: YYYYYYYYYYYY