EN BANC

[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and VIOLETA GADDAO y
CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y
Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged
with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[1] The information reads:
"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable
Court,
the
above-named
accused,
conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and
without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to
another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting
tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows:
In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District,
Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom),
received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one
"Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City.
The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust
operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the
Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E.
Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the
PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for
the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha
composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso
Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as
members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseurbuyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as
perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the
North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00
to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set
aside P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred
peso bills[3]-- as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price
of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked
the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police
blotter.[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI
introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of
marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills
worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at
the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the
marijuana from his associate.[5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the
agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team
were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in
plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith
arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They
frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry,
"Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate
named "Neneth."[6] "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house
nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman
inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate.[7] SPO1 Badua
asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over
"Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a
carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's
flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in
plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to
the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused,
PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box.
He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10)
bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered
the marked bills from "Neneth." [8] The policemen arrested "Neneth."
They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents
and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at
headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is
Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y
Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from
"Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were
examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. [9] The bricks, eleven (11) in

all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various

weights totalling 7,641.08 grams.[10]
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old
carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the
morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid
newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain
"Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men
questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing
any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and
accused him of being a pusher in their community. When accusedappellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside
and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5)
minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in
and took them to "Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one
answered. One of the men, later identified as PO3 Manlangit,
pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and
looked around the house for about three minutes. Accusedappellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came
out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from
the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was
not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time,
surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house, three men were
already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door,
overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. Turning
towards them, Doria saw a box on top of the table. The box was
open and had something inside. PO3 Manlangit ordered him and
Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. They were
brought to police headquarters where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused,
Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He
said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the
neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to
Violeta, Totoy's wife.[11]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor,
claimed that on December 5, 1995, she was at her house at Daang
Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five
(5) children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins
Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day,
accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan
de sal for her children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a
housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke
her children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school
at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son,
Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at
home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson
remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for
about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the way,
they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping
water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly
appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and took
her to her house. She found out later that the man was PO3
Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other
persons. They asked her about a box on top of the table. This was
the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a
piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its
contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and its
contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused
Florencio Doria was a friend of her husband, and that her husband
never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She
denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that
marked bills were found in her person.[12]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City
convicted the accused-appellants. The trial court found the
existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced
both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00
each. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO
@ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been
established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both CONVICTED of
the present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act
No. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425
and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA
555, the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten

million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of

Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:
'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated
crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or
more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one
another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.'
the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences)
said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y
CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P500,000.00)
each
without
subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be
turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI for destruction in
accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused
DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to
the Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to
the Supreme Court for mandatory review.
SO ORDERED."[13]
Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors,
thus:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN
THEIR
TESTIMONIES
WERE
SHOT
WITH
DISCREPANCIES,
INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE
MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE
THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS
THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND
DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE." [14]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE
THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE
ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY
CAME FROM ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO
REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND
SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY
IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE
POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY
WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN
THE EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME,
NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE
MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT."[15]
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity
of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant
Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accusedappellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the
admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust
operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed
by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in
the act of the commission of an offense.[16] Entrapment has received
judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to constitutional
and legal safeguards.[17]
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created
twentieth-century American doctrine that evolved from the
increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection
of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses. [18] Entrapment
sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the
formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement
of criminal law.[19] It also took off from a spontaneous moral
revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile

innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise
resist.[20]
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a
generally negative meaning because it is understood as the
inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for
the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him.
[21]
The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice
Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,[22] the first Supreme Court
decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the
conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his
procurement of its commission by one who would not have
perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the
officer."[23] It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion,
trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the
agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin
of the criminal design in the minds of the government officials
rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime is
the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer. [24]
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of
entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate
the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment
the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the
"seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career.
[25]
Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the
entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of
the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment
and no conviction may be had.[26] Where, however, the criminal
intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal
offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for
the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity
for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary
to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be
convicted.[27] The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices
to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense[28] that can be raised
by an accused and partakes of the nature of a confession and
avoidance.[29] It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the
burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government
induced him to commit the offense. Once established, the burden
shifts to the government to show otherwise. [30] When entrapment is
raised as a defense, American federal courts and a majority of state
courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down
in Sorrells v. United States[31] to determine whether entrapment
actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's
predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and
inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.[32] All
relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his
past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his
reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before
the crime.[33] The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's
propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's
misconduct[34] and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a
"trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary
criminal."[35] If the accused was found to have been ready and
willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the
entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly
persuasive inducement.[36] Some states, however, have adopted the
"objective" test.[37] This test was first authoritatively laid down in
the case of Grossman v. State[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of
Alaska. Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by
judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the
nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police
conduct.[39] The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by
government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his
predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to
deter unlawful police conduct.[40]The test of entrapment is whether
the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a
normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and
willing, to commit the offense; [41] for purposes of this test, it is
presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the
temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple
opportunity to act unlawfully. [42] Official conduct that merely offers
such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct, such
as badgering, cajoling or importuning, [43] or appeals to sentiments
such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are
not.[44] Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to
convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside
the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been

established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to

bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced." To some extent,
this reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted
by condoning law enforcement improprieties. [45] Hence, the
transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the
accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to
the officer's inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the
difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are considered in
judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would be on a
normal person.[46]
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been
criticized and objected to. It is claimed that the "subjective" test
creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e., if the court determines that an
accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of
police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed
impermissible.[47] Delving into the accused's character and
predisposition obscures the more important task of judging police
behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the
possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general
disposition were, the accused might not have committed the
particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements.
[48]
On the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates
entirely the need for considering a particular accused's
predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police,
may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the
conduct of the police and their agents was proper. [49] The
undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic
offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a criminal
syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy. [50]
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to
entrapment. Some states in the United States now combine both
the "subjective" and "objective" tests.[51] In Cruz v. State,[52] the
Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police
conduct must first be determined. If this objective test is satisfied,
then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to
commit the crime.[53] In Baca v. State,[54] the New Mexico Supreme
Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a
criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of
entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the
crime for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the
standards of proper investigation.[55] The hybrid approaches
combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests
alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law
enforcers while apprehending the accused caught in flagrante
delicto. In United States v. Phelps,[56] we acquitted the accused from
the offense of smoking opium after finding that the government
employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the
crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that
Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon
say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's
testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact
that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince
him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this
drug.[57] The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most
reprehensible."[58] In People v. Abella,[59] we acquitted the accused of
the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the
apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The
police officer offered "a tempting price, xxx a very high one"
causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was
inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer
and that outside of his testimony, there was no evidence sufficient
to convict the accused.[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng,
[61]
we convicted the accused after finding that there was no
inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated
that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the
introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had
already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled
that the apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import
opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an
understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better
assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the
surreptitious importers.[62]
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se
Tieng[63] we first laid down the distinction between entrapment visa-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,[64] we held:
"ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. -- While it has been said that
the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of
instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while

instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been

condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from
being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no
defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal
act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to
expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act
were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially
is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind
habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective
will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free
from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an
agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no
defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the
original design was formed independently of such agent; and where
a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the
owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to
do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is
nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to
a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was
made by a 'spotter,' detective, or hired informer; but there are
cases holding the contrary." [65]
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of
the Court of Appeals. In People v. Galicia,[66] the appellate court
declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and
instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused
into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a coprincipal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the
peace officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. [67] In People v. Tan
Tiong,[68] the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is
no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker." [69]
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v.
Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v. Tiu Ua.
[70]
Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is
instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal. [71]
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the
American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or inducement in
Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a
defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is a defense
and is considered an absolutory cause.[72] To determine whether
there is entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly
examined the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the
predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective"
test first applied in United States v. Phelps has been followed in a
series of similar cases.[73] Nevertheless, adopting the "objective"
approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the
"subjective" test. In People v. Boholst,[74] we applied both tests by
examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation
and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the
notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also
considered accused's previous convictions of other crimes [75] and
held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded
gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely,
the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and
did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v.
Yutuc[76] thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven
to be very material in anti-narcotics operations. In recent years, it
has become common practice for law enforcement officers and
agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment
procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like
anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes.[77] They are rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the
affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala
prohibita.[78] They are not the traditional type of criminal law such
as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with
crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. [79] Laws
defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not
against particular individuals, but against public order.[80] Violation is
deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally
unattended with any particular harm to a definite person. [81] These
offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many
devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any
member of the public, no matter how furiously he condemns
acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the
law. It is necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and
punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary

action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own

officials. This means that the police must be present at the time the
offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through
informants, spies or stool pigeons.[82]
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice
legislation, the confidential informant system breeds abominable
abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police
in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept
payment from these persons who deceive the police. The informant
himself may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty
criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that
government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses
underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an
inspiring one.[83] Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with
unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. Like the
informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion-harassment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report
an accomplishment to their superiors. This Court has taken judicial
notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases [84] where we
observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law
enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly
unsuspecting provincial hicks.[85] The use of shady underworld
characters as informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs
may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant
persons, and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug
deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding
drug cases.[86]Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy,
although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer,
become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession
and the unlawful search.As well put by the Supreme Court of
California in People v. Barraza,[87]
"[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal
search and seizures, wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and
the third degree, it is a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring
from common motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and
scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister sophism
that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal
classes,' justifies the employment of illegal means." [88]
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of
regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement
agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied
restraint. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the
presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights
of the individual.[89] It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of
their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through
lawless enforcement.[90] Courts should not allow themselves to be
used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent
person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.[91]
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust
operations demands that the details of the purported transaction
must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the
initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer
to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject
of the sale.[92] The manner by which the initial contact was made,
whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the
drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the
illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer,
must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that lawabiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time,
however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable
courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the
crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency,
recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be
considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the
predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they
are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential
informant who initially contacted accused-appellant Doria. At the
pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3
Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit
handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance
payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was
apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of
marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward
and categorical manner and his credibility was not crumpled on

cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's

testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua,
his back-up security. The non-presentation of the confidential
informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and
preserve their invaluable service to the police. [93] It is well-settled
that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling
prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the arresting officers, [94] or there are reasons to
believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely
against the appellant,[95] or that only the informant was the poseurbuyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, [96] the
testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely
be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness
testimonies.[97] There is no need to present the informant in court
where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by
prosecution witnesses.[98]
The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's
testimonies and the other police officers' testimonies are minor and
do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution
evidence. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not
a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the prosecution
proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in
consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of
marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was actually identified by
PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants'
apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of
marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box
lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the
carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought
before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant
Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and
marked in court. Thus:
"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the
court, how were you able to identify that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which
contained the eleven pieces of marijuana brick we
confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box...
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:
Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning
considering the fact that we are now dealing with eleven
items when the question posed to the witness was what
was handed to him by Jun?
COURT So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling
out item after item from the box showed to him and
brought in front of him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the
eleven bricks?
x x x.
A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.
Q Point to the court, where are those markings?
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to
CLM and the signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the
basic question of the fiscal as to what was handed to him
by the accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this
Honorable Court, your Honor, despite reconsideration.
COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the
appreciation of what it has done to the court.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.
A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect
Jun, sir.
COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure
that is not "tikoy?"
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What makes you so sure?
A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit
"A" which I marked before I brought it to the PCCL, your
Honor.
Q What are you sure of?

A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one

alias Jun, sir.
Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the
investigator and before we brought it to the PCCL, your
Honor.
x x x.
PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white
plastic bag and this be marked as Exhibit "D?"
COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."
Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then
the other letters and figures on this plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and
the time and this Exhibit "A."
Q How about this one?
A I don't know who made this marking, sir.
PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this
morning.
Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the
one who made these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was
enclosed...
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that
enclosure where it appears D-394-95, also Exhibit "A," etc.
etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to
make it of record that there are other entries included in
the enclosure.
COURT Noted. The court saw it.
Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of
paper, with a newspaper wrapping with a piece of paper
inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL"
be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the
contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
x x x.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up,
because according to Jun the money which I gave him was
in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house
of Neneth, sir.x x x."[99]
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of
marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner of
Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper
and white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and
"D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970)
grams.[100]
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3
Manlangit and his team waited for almost one hour for appellant
Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he
"paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on
the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at
bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There
is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there
must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the
prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.
[101]
Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the
marijuana from the accused-appellant.[102]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three
instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.x x x."[103]

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested

without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in
the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended
in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police
are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant.[104]
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her
person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and
marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial
warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[105] The rule is,
however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a
warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in
the following instances:[106] (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;
[107]
(2) search of a moving motor vehicle; [108] (3) search in violation
of customs laws;[109] (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; [110] (5)
when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.[111]
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested
without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of
marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a
search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not
necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the
search was an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall
under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting
officer, however shows otherwise:
"ATTY VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be
no basis for that question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the
contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there
will be no basis for that question.
COURT There is. Answer.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up,
because according to Jun the money which I gave him was
in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house
of Neneth, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.
Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to
give us the buy-bust money, sir.
Q You mentioned "him?"
A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked
money which Jun gave her, sir.
Q And what happened?
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding
this buy-bust money, sir.
x x x."[112]
SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:
Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling
Neneth?
A To arrest her, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of
Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth was there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?
A She was `sa bandang poso.'
Q Carrying a baby?
A No, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling
Neneth and saw her outside the house, she was not
committing any crime, she was just outside the house?
A No, sir.
Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just
outside the house doing her daily chores. Am I correct?
A I just saw her outside, sir.

Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest

her. That is correct, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to
you SPO1 Manlangit approached her?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached
her?
A Yes, sir.
Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever
by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place, you were just in the
side lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing,
because precisely according to you your role in this buybust operation was as a back-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs.
Neneth?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
A I don't know, sir.
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?
PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money,
there's no testimony on that.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest
answer. According to the records, the amount of P1,600.00
was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's
right?
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the
fact that you were not the one who retrieved the money
from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
A I saw it, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling
Neneth, sir.
Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the
person of Aling Neneth. Is that what you are trying to tell
the Court?
A No, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ: I am through with this witness, your Honor." [113]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the
buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a)
of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the
finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant
Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot
pursuit."[114] In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the
policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under
the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in
arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion." [115] The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. [116] A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.[117]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the
alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit,
however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria
named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as
to where the marked money was.[118] Appellant Doria did not point
to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as
the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao

conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria

may have left the money in her house,[119] with or without her
knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accusedappellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable
grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is
no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest
had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person
arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is
legally objectionable.[120]
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was
illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the
subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be
deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the
question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of
marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a
search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. [121] The "plain
view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.[122] The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area.[123] In the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused.[124] The object must be open to eye and
hand[125] and its discovery inadvertent.[126]
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is
plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is
inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore
cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the
contents are in plain view and may be seized. [127] In other words, if
the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from
its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the
article is deemed in plain view.[128] It must be immediately apparent
to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. [129]
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on
cross-examination as follows:
"ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth
was inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q This carton, according to you was under a table?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
A Yes, sir.
Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?
A It was open, sir. Not like that.
COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a
carton box.
A Like this, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR
One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with
the contents visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And got hold of this carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?

A I asked her, what's this...

Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before
getting the carton?
A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the
buy-bust money and he asked "Sa iyo galing ang
marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.
Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias
Jun?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth
was not yet frisked, is it not [sic]?
A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.
Q Who got hold of this?
A I was the one, sir.
Q You were the one who got this?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged
buy-bust money was already retrieved by Badua?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not have any search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to
validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao was in possession of the
buy-bust money because according to you, you did not
know whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust
money from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far was this from the door?
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.
Q Under the table according to you?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Somewhere here?
A It's far, sir.
PROSECUTOR
May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?
A Here, sir.
Q What you see is a carton?
A Yes, sir, with plastic.
Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?"
A Yes, sir.
Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is all that you saw?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
For the record, your Honor...
Q You were only able to verify according to you...
PROSECUTOR
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece
of plastic. By reading it...
ATTY. VALDEZ
That's a piece of plastic.
PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote... this is not a piece of plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size
of the plastic. A piece of plastic may be big or a small one,
for record purposes.
COURT
Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.
Q The only reason according to you, you were able to... Look at
this, no even Superman... I withdraw that. Not even a man
with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And
according to the Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Siopao?
A Yes, sir.
Q Canned goods?
A Yes, sir.
Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?
A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ...
Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking
you what it could possibly be.

A It's the same plastic, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you
voluntarily saying the information. Let the prosecutor do
that for you.
COURT
Continue. Next question.x x x."[130]
PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's
house because they were led there by appellant Doria. The Narcom
agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao
until appellant Doria named her and led them to her. [131] Standing
by the door of appellant Gaddao's house, PO3 Manlangit had a view
of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the
dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was
partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure
that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself
checked and marked the said contents.[132] On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be
marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buybust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the
plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly
manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of
marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper
and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. [133] PO3
Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents
of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know
exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant
Gaddao about its contents.[134] It was not immediately apparent to
PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The
marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite
search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. [135] It
was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and
never considered by the trial court.[136]
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of
marijuana[137] was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao
does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime
charged.[138]Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,[139] viz:
"The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government
against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law
enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But
as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than
the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty
of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection
the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of highhandedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. Order
is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again,
said, 'I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself." [140]
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes
the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of
a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.-- The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. x x x."
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is
material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between
the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the
drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.[141] The
prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration
of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and
delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3
Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed
to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accusedappellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There being no mitigating

or aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion

perpetua must be imposed.[142]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case
No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121572. March 31, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEL
ELAMPARO Y FONTANILLA, accused-appellant. E-xsm
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On May 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
[1]
convicted appellant of the crime of illegal possession of drugs,
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering
him to pay a fine of P9,000,000.00.
As summarized by the solicitor General, the facts of this case which
we find to be supported by the records are as follows: [2]
"On February 12, 1995, at about 5:00 in the morning, prosecution
witness Police Officer Romeo Baldonado, while attending to his
duties as supervising policeman of the Kalookan Police Station,
received a report from an informant that some people are selling
shabu and marijuana somewhere at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City
(TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 3; TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 3). Said
informant stated that he himself succeeded in buying said drugs
(ibid., p. 3).
Hence, Police Officer Baldonado formed a buy-bust operation
team with himself as team leader and Police Officers Ernesto
Andala, Ronielo Reantillo and Bismark Gaviola as members (TSN,
April 4, 1995, p. 4). Said team proceeded to the area reported to
at Progreso P. Gomez, Bagong Barrio, Kalookan City at around
5:45 in the morning of the same day (ibid., p. 3). Ky-le
Upon arrival at the area, prosecution witness Gaviola, together
with the informant asset stood at the corner of P. Gomez Street,
Bagong barrio, Kalookan City, since the said spot was identified
to be the market or where the buyers of marijuana await a runner
(seller). Thereafter, a runner later identified to be Erwin Spencer
approached the poseur-buyer, Gaviola, who was asked Iiscore ba
kayo (TSN, April 5, 1995, p. 22). Having answered, Iiscore kami,
Spencer then left and returned after five minutes with the
marijuana (ibid., p. 22). Gaviola then handed over the marked
money and arrested Spencer, but who freed himself and ran
(TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 7).
Then, the buy-bust team pursued Spencer, who ran inside a
bungalow-type house with steel gate (ibid., p. 8). Having trapped
Spencer inside the house, the police officers frisked him and
recovered the marked money (ibid., p. 9). The police officers
likewise found appellant repacking five (5) bricks of marijuana
wrapped in a newspaper on top of the round table inside the
houses sala (TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 7). Appellant was then
arrested and he confessed that the source of the marijuana was
Benguet (TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 10).

Spencer and appellant were later taken to the precinct where

they were delivered to the inquest fiscal for further investigation
(TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 8). The arresting officers then executed
an affidavit on the incident and made a request for the National
Bureau of Investigation to conduct examination of the drugs
seized (TSN, May 3, 1995, p. 2). The NBI Report confirmed the
drugs seized to be marijuana weighing five (5) kilos (ibid., p. 3)."
On February 15, 1995, the City Prosecutor charged appellant with
the crime of illegal possession of drugs under the following
Information:[3]
"That on or about the 12th day of February 1995 in Kalookan City,
M.M. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without having been authorized by law,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control 5.208 kgs. of Marijuana, knowing
the same to be a prohibited drugs (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW." Ky-calr
On March 1, 1995, appellant, duly
oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.[4]

assisted

by

counsel de

During trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses (1) PO2

Bismark Gaviola, the poseur-buyer, (2) SPO2 Romeo Baldonado, one
of the police officers who took part in the buy-bust operation, and
(3) Juliet Gelacio Mahilum, a forensic chemist at the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI). Mahilum testified that she conducted three
types of examination on the five (5) bricks of marijuana flowering
tops (chemical examination, microscopic examination, and
chromatographic examination) and that each of the five (5) bricks
gave positive results for marijuana.[5]
For the defense, appellant and Angelo Bernales, a boarder at
appellants house, testified. Their version of the incident is as
follows:[6]
"JOEL ELAMPARO y FONTANILLA, the accused herein, gave a very
different version of the incident. At around 6:00 to 7:30 in the
morning of February 12, 1995, he was at their house when
somebody knocked at their door. His father opened the same and
was informed that somebody was looking for him. He went out
and saw Erwin Spencer with handcuffs and being held by an
arresting officer. He likewise sighted PO3 Bismark Gaviola holding
a big box. When he persistently questioned Erwin Spencer as to
why he was arrested, the arresting officers got mad at him
prompting them to likewise bring him to the police station where
he was detained. The arresting officers demanded the amount of
P15,000.00 for his release. He remained in jail as he refused to
accede to their demand. On the other hand, Erwin Spencer was
released two (2) days after they were jailed for the latter gave
money to the police officers. (TSN, pp. 1-8, May 9, 1995). Calr-ky
ANGELO BERNALE (sic), a student, testified that he is renting a
small room at the accused (sic) house located at No. 2 P. Gomez
St., Bagong Barrio, Kalookan City. On February 12, 1995, at about
6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning he was about to go out of the
accused (sic) house to bring breakfast to his father when he
sighted Erwin Spencer in handcuffs, in the company of three
policemen one of whom was holding a box. Then he saw the
policemen knocked at the door of the accused (sic) house. Shortly
thereafter, the accused was taken away by the policemen."
After trial, the court rendered its decision, [7] disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused JOEL

ELAMPARO Y FONTANILLA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a
fine of NINE MILLION (P9,000,000.00) PESOS, pursuant to Section
17 of the Death Penalty. With Costs.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant now contends that the trial
court erred in -[8]
I. GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES AND DISREGARDING THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE.
II. FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 [SHOULD BE SEC. 8] OF R.A. 6425.
III. CONTENDING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF
THE OFFENSE CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
MINORITY. Jjs-c
In his brief, appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. He contends that it is highly unusual for arresting
officers to act on an information of an unknown source without
confirming the veracity of the report, and that it is incredible that a
peddler of marijuana would be so brazen as to approach total
strangers and offer to sell them marijuana. Appellant insists that he
was charged with illegal possession of marijuana because he failed
to pay the police officers the amount of P15,000.00 for his release,
unlike Spencer, who paid said amount. Appellant assails the legality
of his arrest inside the house of his father for failure of the
apprehending officers to secure a search warrant. Lastly, appellant
contends that if found guilty, the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority should be appreciated in his favor.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, contends that
further surveillance was unnecessary because the police "asset"
had personal knowledge of the open buying and selling of
"marijuana" in the area, having purchased his "marijuana" a few
hours before reporting the matter to the police. Appellant also
misrepresented himself in saying that Spencer was released
without charges considering that a separate investigation was
conducted against the latter. The OSG contends that appellants
arrest was an incident to a lawful hot pursuit made against Spencer.
Appellant, in the course of the pursuit was surprised in plain view to
be repacking the five (5) bricks of marijuana. The OSG concedes,
however, that the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
should be appreciated in favor of appellant.
Considering the assigned errors and the foregoing contentions, we
find that here the issues pertain, first, to the assessment of
credibility of witnesses; second, the validity of appellants arrest;
and third, the correctness of the penalty imposed by the trial court.
As to the first issue, it is well-settled that the assessment of
credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court which
had an opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor
during their testimonies. Unless the trial court overlooked
substantial facts which would affect the outcome of the case, we
accord the utmost respect to their findings of facts. As compared to
the baseless disclaimers of appellant, the narration of the incident
by the prosecution witnesses appears worthy of belief, coming as it
does from law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly
performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary. [9]Esm

Appellants claims that it is highly suspect that Spencer would offer

to sell marijuana to total strangers. However, in many cases, drug
pushers did sell their prohibited articles to prospective customers,
be they strangers or not, in private as well as in public places, even
in the daytime. Indeed, some drug pushers appear to have become
exceedingly daring, openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters
is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or
the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as
the act constituting sale and delivery of prohibited drugs. [10] As
found a quo, it was the consummated sale between PO2 Gaviola
and Spencer which led to the eventual arrest of appellant.
As to the warrantless search, Section 2 Article III of the 1987
Constitution prohibits a search and seizure without a judicial
warrant. Further, Section 3 thereof provides that any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
However, not being absolute, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is subject to exceptions. Thus, for example,
Section 12 of Rule 126, of the Rules on Criminal procedure, provides
that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for "dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
Five generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless
searches and seizures have also been judicially formulated, viz: (1)
search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by
the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search
and seizure.[11]marinella
Considering its factual milieu, this case falls squarely under
the plain view doctrine. In People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 710-711
(1999), we held that
"Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without
a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain
view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement
officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent."
When Spencer wrenched himself free from the grasp of PO2
Gaviola, he instinctively ran towards the house of appellant. The
members of the buy-bust team were justified in running after him
and entering the house without a search warrant for they were hot
in the heels of a fleeing criminal. Once inside the house, the police
officers cornered Spencer and recovered the buy-bust money from
him. They also caught appellant in flagrante delicto repacking the
marijuana bricks which were in full view on top of a table. PO2
Gaviola testified as to the circumstances of appellants arrest as
follows [12]
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, JR.
Q: Now how were you able to enter the house?

PO2 GAVIOLA: nigel

A: Because the door was already open.
Q: When you entered the house, what happened inside the
house?
A: We saw Joel Elamparo, sir. He was then repacking five (5)
bricks of marijuana wrapped in a newspaper.
Q: Where was it placed, this five (5) packed (sic) of marijuana?
A: It was placed on top of the table, sir.
Q: Was Joel Elamparo alone when you saw him repacking these
five (5) bricks of marijuana?
A: He has some companions in the house, his wife, 2 other
women, his father and there was one man there who was a
boarder.
Q: Now you said that you saw Joel Elamparo repacking five bricks
of marijuana, now who was his companion in repacking the
same?
A: He was alone, sir.
Hence, appellants subsequent arrest was likewise lawful, coming as
it is within the purview of Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;..."
Section 5 (a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante
delicto arrests.[13] Here two elements must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating the he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.[14] Thus, when appellant was seen
repacking the marijuana, the police officers were not only
authorized but also duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant. ella
Although the caption of the Information charges the appellant with
violation of Section 4 of Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, [15] otherwise known as the
death penalty law, which refers to the sale, administration, delivery,
distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs, the body of the
Information charges appellant with the crime of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs under Section 8 of Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. We have held that it is not the
designation of the offense in the Information that is controlling but
the allegations therein which directly apprise the accused of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. [16] Appellant having
been fully apprised of the elements of the crime of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, he may properly be convicted of the
crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
In drug cases, the quantity of prohibited drugs involved is
determinative of the imposable penalty. Section 20 of R.A. No.

6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, provides that

when the quantity of indian hemp or marijuana is 750 grams or
more, as in this case, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00).
Appellant having been born on January 9, 1978, [17] was only 17
years, 1 month, and 3 days old, at the time of the commission of
the crime on February 12, 1995. Beginning with our decision in
People v. Simon,[18] and reiterated in a number of decisions
thereafter, the Court has recognized the suppletory application of
the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to the Dangerous
Drugs Act after the amendment of the latter by Republic Act No.
7659. Appellant being a minor over fifteen and under eighteen at
the time of the commission of the crime, he is entitled to a reduced
penalty due to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
under Article 13 (2) of the Revised Penal code. Article 68 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. Applying the provisions of Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code which prescribes the rules for graduating penalties, the
imposable penalty on appellant is the penalty next lower in degree
immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale. The penalty next lower in degree
than reclusion perpetua is reclusion temporal. There being no
generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty
ofreclusion temporal shall be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree which isprision
mayor. No fine is imposable in this case, for it is imposed as a
conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death.[19]alonzo
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City,
Branch 121, in Criminal Case No. C-48478 (95) finding appellant
JOEL ELAMPARO Y FONTANILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal possession of drugs is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION that he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum, and seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Criminal Law 2- People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro

y Castro
This case is with regard to Art 134 of the R.P.C -Rebellion
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y
Castro
G.R.No. 112235 29November1995 (People vs. Lovedioro 250
SCRA
389)
FACTS
OF
THE
CASE:
Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus
Lucilo while Lucilo was walking along Burgos St. away from Daraga,
Albay Public Market. The victim died on the same day from massive
blood loss. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged
of the crime of murder, and subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro
then appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder
instead of rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecutions principal
witness that Lovedioro was a member of the New Peoples Army.
ISSUES
OF
THE
CASE:
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of
murder,
instead
of
rebellion?
- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of
the crime of rebellion, with either of these elements wanting, the
crime
of
rebellion
does
not
exist.
- Political motive should be established before a person charged
with a common crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the
possible imposable penalty- could benefit from the laws relatively

benign attitude towards political crimes. If no political motive is

established or proved, the accused should be convicted of the
common
crime
and
not
of
rebellion.
- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere
membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of
rebellion
would
not,
by
and
of
itself
suffice.
- The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General,
offered no contribution to the achievement of the NPAs subversive
aims, in fact, there were no known acts of the victims that can be
considered
as
offending
to
the
NPA.
- Evidence shows that Lovedioros allegation of membership to the
N.P.A was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable
upon
him.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision
dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is
hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIAS
LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.

multiple gunshot wounds causing his death, to the damage and

prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of
said decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this
Court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his coaccused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay the
heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs.
Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow
the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing
reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said widow the sum of
Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00)
Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the
said accused.
With costs against the accused.

KAPUNAN, J.:
SO ORDERED.
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St.,
away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly
walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed
the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot
Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot the
fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking
the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle
and fled. 1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by
Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who
claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the
fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as
Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant's father was his first
cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the
latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple
gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the
body. 2 On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the
cause of death as hypovolemic shock.3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of
Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accusedappellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30
o'clock in the afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga,
Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with
Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case No. 5931
before RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others whose true identities
are at present unknown and remain at large, conniving,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common
purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO,
a member of the Daraga Police Station, inflicting upon the latter

Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that
portion of trial court decision finding him guilty of the crime of
murder and not rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness,
Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should have been
charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he
asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a
member of the New People's Army. Additionally, he contends that
because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of
subversive ends," 4 (said killing) should have been deemed
absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal
shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he
avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant in
the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have
been meted only the penalty of prison mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the
crime of murder, the Solicitor General avers that the crime
committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the
defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for
the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive
ends." 5 Moreover, the Solicitor General contends that even if
appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the trial
court had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a
rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as
appellant contends, but reclusion temporal, because Executive
Order
No.
187
as
amended
by
Republic
Act
No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as the
penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in a
rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was
murder and not rebellion.

Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic

Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government
or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. 6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising
against the government. 7 By its very nature, rebellion is essentially
a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which
cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. 8 One
aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts
committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself
because they acquire a political character. This peculiarity was
underscored in the case of People v. Hernandez, 9 thus:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the
political order, as well as such common crimes as may be
committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is
the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippine
Islands or any part thereof," then it becomes stripped of its
"common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the
crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of
the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act,
however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the
crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of
murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder,
it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the
act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive
of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on
the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused,
better than any individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes, 10 this
court stressed that:
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's)
knowledge and since moreover this is an affirmative defense, the
burden is on them to prove, or at least to state, which they could
easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the
deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that
the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt
acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In
fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing,
robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit,
without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime
would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not
be absorbed by the crime rebellion. 11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person
charged with a common crime alleging rebellion in order to
lessen the possible imposable penalty could benefit from the
law's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. Instructive
in
this
regard
is
the
case
of Enrile
v.
Amin, 12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829, 13 for allegedly harboring or

concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the

senator's knowledge that Honasan might have committed a crime.
This Court held, against the prosecution's contention, that rebellion
and violation of P.D 1829 could be tried separately 14 (on the
principle that rebellion is based on the Revised Penal Code while
P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator was
being charged, though punishable under a special law, was
absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related
to the acts for which he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos.
92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor
of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for violation of
P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separate prosecution for
rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however
constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion
cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to
offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance
of the political offense. 15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court
in Enrile vs. Amin further underscored that:
[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is
not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel
Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former
associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the
act is committed with political or social motives, that is in
furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of
the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and
proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and
not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and
mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance
of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People
v. Ompad, Jr., 16 to the instant case is striking. Two witnesses, both
former
NPA
recruits
identified
the
accused
Ompad, alias "Commander Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as
having led three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of
Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel infested area. In
spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was merely charged
with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because political motive
was neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed
was impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political
motive must be alleged in the information. 17 It must be established
by clear and satisfactory evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we
held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter
of mitigation or defense that the accused has the burden of
proving clearly and satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated
assertion of appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being
an informer, and his suspicion that he was one such, is neither
sufficient or adequate to establish that the motivation for the
killing was political, considering appellant's obvious interest in
testifying to that effect. 18
Similarly, in People v. Buco, 19 the Court stressed that accused in
that case failed to establish that the reason for the killing of their
victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced
by the defense therein simply showed that appellant Francisco Buco
was ordered by Tomas Calma, alias "Commander Sol" to kill

municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise

showed that Calma was induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to
order the killing on account of private differences over a ninety (90)
hectare piece of land. The court attributed no political motive for
the killing, though committed by known members of the
Hukbalahap movement. 20
People v. Dasig 21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant
case. There, the Court held that "the act of killing a police officer,
knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance
of a rebellion." In Dasig the Court however noted that the accused,
who was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership
with the NPA but also executed an extrajudicial confession to the
effect that he was a member of an NPA "sparrow unit," a fact to
which even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in
agreement. The Solicitor General's brief in Dasig which this Court
favorably quoted, noted that:
[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's
Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted
government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the
killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. 22
By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different
result in the case at bench. He states that accused-appellant's
belated claims to membership in the NPA were not only
insubstantial but also self serving 23an averment to which, given a
thorough review of the circumstances of the case, we fully agree.
He states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the
NPA, clearly overcame the burden of proving motive or intent. It
was shown that the political motivation for the killing of the
victim was the fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for
the PC. The perpetrators even left a letter card, a drawing on the
body of Ragaul as a warning to others not to follow his example.
It is entirely different in the case at bar where the evidence for
the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and denials
not substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the
killing of victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo. 24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted
in his extrajudicial confession to having participated in the killing of
Lucilo as follows:
Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?
A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three
male person a certainalias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the other
one unknown to me, fetched me and told me to go with them, so
I asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he
stopped/call a passenger jeepney and told me board on said
jeepney. (sic)
Q Please continue.
A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station,
we alighted on said jeep, so we walk towards Daraga Bakery we
stopped walking due to it is raining, when the rain stopped we
continue walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)
Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you
used the road near the bakery where did you proceed?

A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion

continue walking, at more less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my
companion told us as to quote in Bicol dialect, to wit: "AMO NA
YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS" (This is the place towards the
poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead of a small store, my
three (3) companions continue walking towards poblacion, later
on a policeman sporting white T-shirt and a khaki pant was
walking towards me, while the said policeman is nearly
approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman in front of the
small store, when the said policeman fell on the asphalted road,
ALWIN took the service firearm of the said policeman, then we
ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2) companions
commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill
wherein there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the
handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)
Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?
A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard
it radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO. (sic)
Q What is your participation in the group?
A Look-out sir.
Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any?
(sic)
A No more sir. 25
It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial
confession did appellant ever mention that he was a member of the
New People's Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing
which would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant
was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the information
filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain
any mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the
death of SPO3 Lucilo. 26 Even prosecution eyewitness Nestor
Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of October
19, 1992. 27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's
membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an afterthought,
something which the defense merely picked up and followed
through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony on
cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a member of the
NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta
admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA
member. 28 The logical result, of course, was that the trial court did
not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial court,
after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness'
testimony while upholding the rest of it. 29 While disbelieving the
portion of Armenta's testimony on appellant's alleged membership
in the NPA, the trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed
narration about how the crime was committed. 30 Such narration is
even corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity
of the gun wielder, by the testimony of the appellant himself.
In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color attending
the commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability
depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that,
upon the prodding of aliasAlwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA
because
of
the
organization's
goals. 31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he
"had offended our organization," 32 without, however, specifying

what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had been a

member of the NPA for five months before the shooting incident. 33
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's
contentions are couched in terms so general and non-specific 34 that
they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would
have made towards the achievement of the NPA's subversive aims.
SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was never alleged to be an
informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended
the NPA. Against appellant's attempts to shade his participation in
the killing with a political color, the evidence on record leaves the
impression that appellant's bare allegations of membership in the
NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable
upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas,
crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an
ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of
mitigating the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more
than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis
v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of
numerous bandits, or irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a
reality that cannot be ignored or belittled. Their activities, the
killings and acts of destruction and terrorism that they
perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated despite the best
efforts that the Government authorities are exerting, although it
may be true that the insurrectionist groups of the right or the left
no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The
need for more stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement,
cannot be gainsaid. 35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a
political motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied
that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of
murder. 36 It is of no moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor
Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled that the testimony of one
witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. 37 Against
appellant's claims that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony
of one witness, his blood relative, free from any signs of impropriety
or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused. 38Moreover,
neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant.
Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not
preclude conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and
satisfactorily identified appellant as the perpetrator of the
felony. 39 In the case at bench, the strength of the prosecution's
case was furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant's admission
in open court that he and the eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no
grudges against each other.40
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The
attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of
any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime
committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In
the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the
trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with all the accessories provided by law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision
dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is
hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS
happened:

About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellants

were accused of conspiring, confederating and cooperating with
each other, as well as with the thirty-one(31) defendants charged in
the criminal cases of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Theywere
accused of being members of PKP Community Party of the
Philippines which wasactively engaged in an armed rebellion
against the government of the Philippines. With the party of
HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon), they
committed thecrime of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting
plunder, etc., enumerated in 13 attackson government forces or
civilians by HUKS.
2. Crime Committed:
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies
3. Contention of the State:
The government, headed by the Solicitor General, argued that the
gravity of thecrime committed required the denial of bail. Moreover,
the
complex
crime
charged
by
thegovernment against Hernandez has been successfully imposed
with other arrestedcommunist
leaders
and
was
sentenc0]bbbbbbbbbbmed to life imprisonment.
4. Contention of the Accused:
An appeal prosecuted by the defendants regarding the judgment
rendered by theCFI in Manila that rebellion cannot be a complex
crime with murder, arson or robbery.
5. Ruling:
The court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are mere
ingredient of the crime of rebellion as means necessary for the
perpetration of the offense. Such common offense isabsorbed or
inherent of the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts specified in
Article 135constitutes, one single crime it follows that said acts
offer no occasion for the application of Article 48 which requires
therefore the commission of at least two crimes.***
HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE
: Rebellion cannot be complexed with commoncrimes such as
killings, destruction of property, etc., committed on the occasion
and infurtherance thereof. The thinking is not anymore correct more
so that there is no legal basisfor such rule now. Rebellion
constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6025

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., accused, AMADO V.
HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-6026

AMADO

HERNANDEZ

(99

PHIL

515)1.

What

May 30, 1964

May 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

BAYANI ESPIRITU, ET AL., accused, BAYANI ESPIRITU and
TEOPISTA VALERIO, defendants-appellants.

LABRADOR, J.:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P.
Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs.
Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People
vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and
Robberies; the appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz,
Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian
Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr.
were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but
they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R.
No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and
kidnappings; the accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and
Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew
his appeal.
The information filed against defendants Hernandez and others in
Criminal Case No. 15481 alleged:
I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the
said date and continuously thereafter, until the present time, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had
chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the
different parts of the Philippines, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with
the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos.
19071, 14082, 14270, 14315 and 14344 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others
whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said
accused and their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking
officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively
engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines thru act theretofore committed and planned to be
further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines,
and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan"(H.M.B.)
otherwise
or
formerly
known
as
the
"Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain,
cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and
take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise
participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of
removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to
the government and laws thereof as in fact the said "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or "Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly
and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there
making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against
police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent
civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof,
have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting,
plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public
property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so
as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as.
follows, to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on government
forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946, April
10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28,
1949, August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950,
September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950.)
II. That during the period of time and under the same
circumstances herein-above indicated the said accused in the
above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with
several others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
organized, established, led and/or maintained the Congress of

Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on

Labor Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and
chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other
"mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines, as an
active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party
of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and
instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and synchronize its
activities as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or
maintained by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has
in fact fully cooperated in and synchronized its activities with the
activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) and
other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and
effect the complete and permanent success of the abovementioned armed rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines.
The information filed against the defendants in Criminal Case No.
15479, Bayani Espiritu Andres Baisa, Jr. and Teopista Valerio,
alleges:
That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946, and for sometime
prior and subsequent thereto and continuously up to the present
time, in the City of Manila, the seat of the government of the
Republic of the Philippines, which the herein accused have
intended to overthrow, and the place chosen for that purpose as
the nerve center of all their rebellious atrocities in the different
parts of the country, the said accused being then high ranking
officials and/or members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.) and/or of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan" (H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the
"Hukbalahaps" (HUKS), the latter being the armed forces of said
Communist Party of the Philippines; having come to an
agreement with the 29 of the 31 accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
14071, 14082, 14270, 14315, 14344 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila and decided to commit the crime of rebellion, and
therefore, conspiring and confederating with all of the 29 accused
in said criminal cases, acting in accordance with their conspiracy
and in furtherance thereof, together with many others whose
whereabouts and identities are still unknown up to the filing of
this information, and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously promote maintain, cause,
direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan",
(HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) to rise publicly and take Arms
against the Government or otherwise participate therein for the
purpose of overthrowing the same, as in fact, the said "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or Hukbalahap (HUKS) have risen
publicly and taken arms against the Government, by then and
there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against
police, constabulary and army detachment, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith
and in furtherance thereof, by then and there committing wanton
acts of murder, spoilage, looting, arson, kidnappings, planned
destruction of private and public buildings, to create and spread
terrorism in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the
aforesaid purpose, as follows to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen
attacks on Government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6,
1946. August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19,
1947, June 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August 26,
1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and
March 29, 1950).
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered
the decision subject of the present appeals.
APPEAL OF AMADO V. HERNANDEZ

After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant

Amado V. Hernandez, the following: (1) that he is a member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases,
namely, Victor or Soliman; (2) that he was furnished copies of
"Titis", a Communist publication, as well as other publications of the
Party; (3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of
Labor Organizations; (4) that he had close connections with the
Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous
communications with its leaders and its members; (5) that he
furnished a mimeographing machine used by the Communist Party,
as well as clothes and supplies for the military operations of the
Huks; (6) that he had contacted well-known Communists coming to
the Philippines and had gone abroad to the WFTU conference
Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the CLO, etc. Evidence was also
received by the court that Hernandez made various speeches
encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement in the
provinces.
The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the
Communist Party and the Congress of Labor Organizations, of which
Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was organized
by Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo
Saulo, Mariano Balgos, Guillermo Capadocia, etc.
We will now consider the nature and character of both the
testimonial as well as the documentary evidence, independently of
each other, to find out if the said evidence supports the findings of
the court.
Testimonial Evidence
Amado V. Hernandez took the oath as member of the Communist
Party in the month of October, 1947, at the offices of the Congress
of Labor Organizations at 2070 Azcarraga in the presence of
Guillermo Capadocia, Ramon Espiritu, Pedro Castro, Andres Balsa,
etc. As a Communist he was given the pseudonyms of Victor and
Soliman, and received copies of the Communist paper "Titis". He
made various speeches on the following dates and occasions:
(1) On August 29, 1948 before the Democratic Peace Rally of the
CLO at Plaza Miranda, in which he announced that the people will
soon meet their dear comrade in the person of Comrade Luis
Taruc.
(2) On September 4, 1948 he conferred with Hindu Khomal
Goufar at the Escolta, at which occasion Balgos told Goufar that
the PKM, CLO and the Huks are in one effort that the PKM are the
peasants in the field and the Huks are the armed forces of the
Communist Party; and the CLO falls under the TUD of the
Communist Party. 1wph1.t
(3) On October 2, 1948 he went abroad to attend the Second
Annual Convention of the World Federation of Trade Unions and
after arrival from abroad a dinner was given to him by the people
of Gagalangin, at which Hernandez delivered a speech and he
said that he preferred to go with the Huks because he felt safer
with them than with the authorities of the Government.
(4) In April, 1949, he made a speech before a group of tenants in
Malabon attacking the frauds in the 1947 elections, graft and
corruption in the elections and that if improvement cannot be
made by the ballots, they could be made by bullets; and enjoined
the people to go to the hills and join Luis Taruc the head of the
dissidents in the Philippines.

(5) On October 2, 1949 he delivered a speech on the occasion of

the commemoration of the World Peace at the CLO headquarters
at 330 P. Campa. He attacked the city mayor and incited the
people to go to Balintawak and see Bonifacio there and thereafter
join four comrades under the leadership of Luis Taruc.
(6) On October 16, 1949 he delivered a speech before a
convention of the unemployed at 330 P. Campa. He asked the
unemployed to approve a resolution urging the Government to
give them jobs. In conclusion he said that if the Government fails
to give them jobs the only way out was to join the revolutionary
forces fighting in the hills. He further said that Mao Tse Tung,
leader of the People's Army in China, drove Chiang Kai Shek from
his country, and that Luis Taruc was also being chased by
Government forces run by puppets like Quirino, etc.
(7) On January 13, 1950 there was another meeting at 330 P.
Campa. In his talk Hernandez expressed regret that two foremost
leaders of the CLO, Balgos and Capadocia, had gone to the field
to join the liberation army of the HMB, justifying their going out
and becoming heroes by fighting in the fields against
Government forces until the ultimate goal is achieved.
The above evidence was testified to by Florentino Diolata who was
the official photographer of the CLO since August, 1948.
On the tie-up between the Communist Party and the CLO Guillermo
Calayag, a Communist and a Huk from 1942 to 1950, explained:
(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the
president government by force of aims and violence; thru armed
revolution and replace it with the so-called dictatorship of the
proletariat the Communist Party carries its program of armed
overthrow of the present government by organizing the HMB and
other forms of organization's such as the CLO, PKM, union
organizations, and the professional and intellectual group; the
CLO was organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the
Communist Party.
(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee
and the Central Committee of the CLO were also top ranking
officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by the TUD
- the vital undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives
coming from the organizational bureau of the Communist Party
can be discussed within the CLO especially the Executive
Committee. And it is a fact that since a good majority of the
members of the Executive Committee are party members, there
is no time, there is no single time that those directives and
decisions of the organizational department, thru the TUD are
being objected to by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These
directives refer to how the CLO will conduct its functions. The
executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused
Amado V. Hernandez.
(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of
armed overthrow of the present government and its replacement
by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of propaganda by propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary
aid, clothing, medicine and other forms of material help to the
HMB. This role is manifested in the very constitution of the CLO
itself which expounded the theory of classless society and the
eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2, page 18 of the
CLO Constitution contained in the Fourth Annual Convention
Souvenir Program of the CLO Exh. "V-1579"). Thru propaganda,
the CLO promoted the aims of Communist Party and
disseminated Communist ideas by:

(a) The conspicuous display of the portrait or, pictures of

Crisanto Evangelista (Exh. V-1662), founder of Communism
in the Philippines, in the session hall of the CLO headquarters
at 2070 Azcarraga and then at 330 P. Campa;
(b) The distribution of foreign communist reading materials
such as the World Federation of Trade Union Magazine,
International Union of Students magazine, Voice magazine of
the marine cooks of the CLO, World Committee of the
Defenders of the Peace magazine, Free Bulgaria magazine,
Soviet Russia Today magazine and World Federation of
Democratic Youth magazine (Exhs. V-911, V-907, V-910, V899, V-912, V-853, W-996 and V-967);
(c) The publication and distribution of some local subversive
publications such as the "Titis", "Bisig", Kidlat", which are
Communist Party organs; "The Philippine Labor Demands
Justice" and "Hands Off Korea" authored by accused Amado
V. Hernandez;
(d) Principles of Communism were also propagated thru
lectures, meetings, and by means of organization of
committees in the educational department as well as
researches in the Worker's Institute of the CLO.
(4) The CLO also helped carry out the program of the Communist
Party thru infiltration of party members and selected leaders of
the HMB within the trade unions under the control of the CLO. The
Communist Party thru the CLO assigned Communist Party leaders
and organizers to different factories in order to organize unions.
After the organization of the union, it will affiliate itself with the
CLO thru the Communist leaders and the CLO in turn, will register
said union with the Department of Labor; and the orientation and
indoctrination of the workers is continued in the line of class
struggle. After this orientation and infiltration of the Communist
Party members and selected leaders of the HMB with the trade
unions under the control of the CLO is already achieved and the
group made strong enough to carry out its aims, they will begin
the sporadic strikes and the liquidation of anti-labor elements and
anti-Communist elements and will create a so-called
revolutionary crisis. That revolutionary crisis will be done for the
party to give directives to the HMB who are fighting in the
countrysides and made them come to the city gates. The entry of
the HMB is being paved by the simultaneous and sporadic strikes,
by ultimate general strikes thru the management of the CLO.
Important Documents Submitted at Trial
1. Documents which proved that Amado V. Hernandez used the
aliases "Victor", or was referred to as "Victor" or "Soliman".
(a) Letter dated April 23, 1950 (signed) by Victor addressed to
Julie telling the latter of his sympathies for other communists,
describing his experiences with Communists abroad, telling
Julie to dispose of materials that may be sent by Victor. (Exh. D2001-2004)
(b) "Paano Maisasagawa, etc." mentions different groups of
labor unions of which Victor heads one group, consisting of the
MRRCO, PTLD, PGWU, EMWU and IRWU (Exh. C-2001-2008)
Cadres assigned to different industries. (Exh. V-40-41)
(c) Handwritten certificate of Honofre Mangila states that he
knew Amado Hernandez as Victor from co-party members Hugo
and Ely. (Exh. LL)

(d) Letter of Elias to Ka Eto requesting the latter to deliver

attached letter to Victor. (Exh. 1103)
(e) Saulo's letter about his escape, asks Victor why his press
statement was not published in the newspapers. (Exh. C-362)
Letter was however published by Hernandez in the Daily Mirror.
(f) Letter of Taruc to Maclang directing the latter to give copy of
Huk Story to Victor. (Exh. D-463-64)
(g) Notes of Salome Cruz, Huk courier, stating that she went to
Soliman at Pampanga St. to bring to the latter communications
from the Communist Party. (Exh. D-1203) That Soliman was
given copies of "Titis". (Exh. D-1209)
(h) SEC directions to Politburo members, Soliman not to be
involved with Nacionalista Rebels. (Exh. F-92-93. SEC)
(i) Letter of SEC to Politburo reporting that Saulo be sent out
and Soliman has "tendencies of careerism and tendency to
want to deal with leaders of the party"; that he should be asked
to choose to go underground or fight legally. (Exh. F-562)
(j) Explanation given by Hernandez why he did not join Saulo in
going underground. (Exh. V-87) (1) His election as councilor
until December, 1951. (Exhs. V-42, W-9) (2) His election as
President of CLO until August of following year. (Exhs. V-42, W9)
2. Letters and Messages of Hernandez.
(a) To Lyden Henry and Harry Reich, tells Huks still fighting.
(Exh. V-80)
(b) To SOBSI Jakarta that Filipinos are joining other
communist countries of the East. (Exh. V-82)
(c) Press release on Saulo's disappearance published by Amado
Hernandez. (Exh. W-116-120)
(d) To Hugh and Eddie, July 8, 1949 Extends greetings to
National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, states that labor
has one common struggle "the liberation of all the peoples
from the chains of tyranny, fascism and imperialism". (Exh. V259)
(e) To Kas. Pablo and Estrada - talks of the fight - fight of labor.
(Exh. V-85-89)
(f) Appeal to the Women and Asia. (Exh. V-5-10)
(g) Letter to Julie (Exh. V-2001-2004)
(h) Letter to Chan Lieu - states that leaders during the war are
being persecuted, like Taruc. Tells of reward of P100,000.00 on
Taruc's head. (Exh. X-85-88)
(i) Letter to John Gates of the Daily Worker condemns Wall
Street
maneuvers;
corruption
and
graft
in
Quirino
administration, etc. (Exh. V-83)
(j) Cablegram: CLO join ILWU commends Harry Bridges, US
Communist. (Exh. V-79)

(k) Communication of Hernandez to CLO at MRRCO Praises

Balgos and Capadocia for joining the Huks. (Exhs. V-12-22, V289)
(l) "Philippine labor Demands Justice" Attacks czars of Wall
Street and U.S. Army and Government. (Exh. V-94) .
(m) Letter to Taruc June 28, 1948.-States solidarity among
the CLO Huks and PKM. Attacks North Atlantic Pact. Praises Mao
Tse Tung (contained in Exh. V-94)
(n) "Philippines Is Not A Paradise" States of a delegation to
Roxas attacking unemployment. (Exh. V-90-93)
(o) Article "Progressive Philippines" (Exh. V-287)
(p) Article "Hands Off Korea" (Exhs. V-488-494, 495-501,
509-515, W-25-26)
(q) "Limang Buwang Balak Sa Pagpapalakas Ng Organisasyon".
(Exh. X-35-38)
(r) Press statement of Hernandez opposes acceptance of
decorations from Greece by Romulo. (Exh. V-72)
3. Other Activities of Hernandez.
(a) Hernandez received clothes from Pres. Lines thru P. Campa,
which clothes he sent to the field. Letters show of sending of
supplies to Huks. (Exh. S-383)
(b) Hernandez was asked to furnish portable typewriter, which
he did furnish to Huks. (Exh. C-364)
(c) Hernandez brought Taruc's letter about facts and incidents
about Huks to Bulosan for inclusion in Bulosan's book. (Exh. FF1)
(d) Had conference with Kumar Goshal a Hindu, about the Huks
and their armed forces. (Photographs, Exhs. X-6 RR-54-55A)
(e) Supervised taking of pictures of sons of Capadocia and
Joven. (Photographs, Exhs. T-1, RR-136-138A)
(f) Had knowledge of the going underground of Capadocia and
Balgos and issued press release about their going
underground. (Exh. F-91)
(g) Victor mentioned to continue as contact for Chino. (Exh. C362)
(h) Taruc's letter to Maclang shows that Soliman had sent 7
lessons to Taruc. (Exh. D-451-451-A)

Committee of the Party and a new GHQ, under which on September

29, 1950 the SEC organized a special warfare division, with a
technological division; (3) that on May 5, 1950 a body known as the
National Intelligence Division was created, to gather essential
military intelligence and, in general, all information useful for the
conduct of the armed struggle (4) that a National Finance
Committee was also organized as a part of the Politburo and
answerable to it; (5) that the country was divided into 10 Recos, the
10th Reco comprising the Manila and suburbs command; (6) that
since November, 1949 the CPP had declared the existence of a
revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone
underground and the CPP is leading the armed struggle for national
liberation, and called on the people to organize guerrillas and
coordinate with the HMB on the decisive struggle and final
overthrow of the imperialist government; (7) that in accordance
with such plan the CPP prepared plans for expansion and
development not only of the Party but also of the HMB; the
expansion of the cadres from 3,600 in July 1950 to 56,000 in
September 1951, the HMB from 10,800 in July 1950 to 172,000 in
September 1951, et seq.
Around the month of January, 1950 it was decided by the CPP to
intensify HMB military operations for political purposes. The
Politburo sanctioned the attacks made by the Huks on the
anniversary of the HMB on March 25, 1950. The HMB attacks that
were reported to the PB were those made in May, 1946; June, 1946;
April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; August 25, 1950;
August 26, 1950; October 15 and 17, 1950; May 6, 1946; August 6,
1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; April 29, 1949;
August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; September 12, 1950; March 26,
1950; March 29, 1950.
The theory of the prosecution, as stated in the lower court's
decision, is as follows:
The evidence does not show that the defendants in these cases
now before this Court had taken a direct part in those raids and in
the commission of the crimes that had been committed. It is not,
however, the theory of the prosecution that they in fact had
direct participation in the commission of the same but rather that
the defendants in these cases have cooperated, conspired and
confederated with the Communist Party in the prosecution and
successful accomplishment of the aims and purposes of the said
Party thru the organization called the CLO (Congress of Labor
Organizations).
The Court found that the CLO is independent and separate from the
CPP, organized under the same pattern as the CPP, having its own
National Congress, a Central Committee (which acts in the absence
of and in representation of the National Congress), an Executive
Committee (which acts when the National Congress and the
Executive Committee are not in session), and seven permanent
Committees, namely, of Organization, Unemployment and Public
Relations, Different Strikes and Pickets, Finance, Auditing,
Legislation and Political Action. Members of the Communist Party
dominate the committees of the CLO. The supposed tie-up between
CPP and the CLO of which Hernandez was the President, is
described by the court below in finding, thus:

(i) Associated with fellow ranking Communist leaders.

The Court upon consideration of the evidence submitted, found (1)
that the Communist Party was fully organized as a party and in
order to carry out its aims and policies a established a National
Congress, a Central Committee (CC), Politburo PB, Secretariat
(SEC), Organization Bureau (OB), and National Courier or
Communication Division (NCD), each body performing functions
indicated in their respective names; (2) that in a meeting held on
August 11, 1950 the SEC discussed the creation of a Military

Just how the CLO coordinates its functions with the Communist
Party organ under which it operates was explained by witness
Guillermo S. Calayag, one-time ranking member of the Communist
Party and the CLO who typewrites the "Patnubay sa Education" from
a handwritten draft of Capadocia, which is one of the texts used in
the Worker's institute of the CLO. According to him, the CLO plays
its role by means of propaganda, giving monetary aid, clothing,
medicine and other material forms of help to the HMB, which
constitutes the armed forces of the Communist Party. Propaganda is

done by lectures, meetings, and the organization of committees of

the educational department as well as researches at the CLO
Worker's Institute.
Another way of helping the Communist Party of the Philippines is
by allowing the Communist Party leaders to act as organizers in
the different factories in forming a union. These Party Members
help workers in the factories to agitate for the eradication of
social classes and ultimately effect the total emancipation of the
working classes thru the establishment of the so-called
dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the duty of these Communist
Party members to indoctrinate uninitiated workers in the union to
become proselytes of the Communist Party ideology. After the
right number is secured and a union is formed under a
communist leader, this union is affiliated with the CLO and this in
turn registers the same with the Department of Labor. The
orientation and indoctrination of the masses is continued with the
help of the CLO. The primary objective of the CLO is to create
what is called a revolutionary crisis. It seeks to attain this
objective by first making demands from the employers for
concessions which become more and more unreasonable until
the employers would find it difficult to grant the same. Then a
strike is declared. But the strikes are only preparation for the
ultimate attainment of the Communist goal of armed overthrow
of the government. After the workers in the factories have
already struck in general at the behest of the Communist Party
thru the CLO a critical point is reached when a signal is given for
the armed forces of the Communist Party, the HMB, to intervene
and carry the revolution now being conducted outside to within
the city.
On the basis of the above findings, the court below found
Hernandez guilty as principal of the crime charged against him and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount
of the costs.
Our study of the testimonial and documentary evidence, especially
those cited by the Court in its decision and by the Solicitor General
in his brief, discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, as a Communist, was an active advocate of the
principles of Communism, frequently exhorting his hearers to follow
the footsteps of Taruc and join the uprising of the laboring classes
against capitalism and more specifically against America and the
Quirino administration, which he dubbed as a regime of puppets of
American imperialism. But beyond the open advocacy of
Communistic Theory there appears no evidence that he actually
participated in the actual conspiracy to overthrow by force the
constituted authority.
Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO. As such, what was
his relation to the rebellion? If, as testified to by Guillermo S.
Calayag, the CLO plays merely the role of propagation by lectures,
meetings and organization of committees of education by
Communists; if, as stated, the CLO merely allowed Communist Party
leaders to act as organizers in the different factories, to indoctrinate
the CLO members into the Communist Party and proselytize them
to the Communist ideology; if, as also indicated by Calayag, the
CLO purports to attain the ultimate overthrow of the Government
first by making demands from employers for concessions until the
employers find it difficult to grant the same, at which time a strike
is declared; if it is only after the various strikes have been carried
out and a crisis is thereby developed among the laboring class, that
the Communist forces would intervene and carry the revolution it
is apparent that the CLO was merely a stepping stone in the
preparation of the laborers for the Communist' ultimate revolution.
In other words, the CLO had no function but that of indoctrination
and preparation of the members for the uprising that would come.

It was only a preparatory organization prior to revolution, not the

revolution itself. The leader of the CLO therefore, namely
Hernandez, cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or
of the actual uprising subject of the accusation. Hernandez, as
President of the CLO therefore, by his presidency and leadership of
the CLO cannot be considered as having actually risen up in arms in
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines, or taken part in
the conspiracy to commit the rebellion as charged against him in
the present case; he was merely a propagandist and indoctrinator
of Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring to commit the
actual rebellion by the mere fact of his presidency of the CLO.
The court below declares that since November 1949 the Communist
Party of the Philippines had declared the existence of the
revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone
underground, with the CPP leading the struggle for national
integration and that in the month of January 1950, it was decided
by the said Party to intensify the HMB military operations for
political purposes. The court implicates the appellant Hernandez as
a co-conspirator in this resolution or acts of the Communist Party by
his mere membership thereto. We find this conclusion unwarranted.
The seditious speeches of Hernandez took place before November,
1949 when the CPP went underground. The court below has not
been able to point out, nor have We been able to find among all
acts attributed to Hernandez, any single fact or act of his from
which it may be inferred that he took part in the deliberations
declaring the existence of a revolutionary situation, or that he had
gone underground. As a matter of fact the prosecution's evidence is
to the effect that Hernandez refused to go underground preferring
to engage in what they consider the legal battle for the cause.
We have also looked into the different documents which have been
presented at the time of the trial and which were confiscated from
the office of the Politburo of the Communist Party. The speeches of
Hernandez were delivered before the declaration by the Communist
Party of a state of revolutionary situation in 1949. Neither was it
shown that Hernandez was a member of the Executive Committee,
or of the SEC, or of the Politburo of the Communist Party; so NO
presumption can arise that he had taken part in the accord or
conspiracy declaring a revolution. In short, there has been no
evidence, direct or indirect, to relate or connect the appellant
Hernandez with the uprising or the resolution to continue or
maintain said uprising, his participation in the deliberations leading
to the uprising being inferred only from the fact that he was a
communist.
The practice among the top Communists, as declared by the trial
court appears to have been for important members, if they intend
actually to join the rebellion, to go underground, which meant
leaving the city, disappearing from sight and/or secretly joining the
forces in the field.
The document, Exhibit F-562, which is quoted in the decision,
contains the directive of the SEC of September 1, 1950, to Saulo
and Hernandez, which reads:
11. In view of the new developments in the city, send out Elias
who prefers to work outside. Present problem of fighting legally to
Com. Soliman. If Soliman is prepared for martyrdom, retain him
to fight legally. If not, send him out with Elias. Same goes with
Com. Mino and other relatively exposed mass leaders.
And the lower court itself found that whereas Saulo went
underground and joined the underground forces outside the City,
Hernandez remained in the City, engaged in the work of
propaganda, making speeches and causing the publication of such
matters as the Communist Party leaders directed him to publish.

That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact which is further

corroborated by the following reasons (excuses) given by him for
not going underground, namely (1) that his term of councilor of the
City of Manila was to extend to December, 1951; and (2) that he
was elected President of the CLO for a term which was to end the
year 1951.
As a matter of fact the SEC gave instructions to Hernandez not to
be involved with Nacionalista Rebels, and reported to the Politburo
that Hernandez "has tendencies of careerism, and tending to want
to deal with leaders of the Nacionalista Party instead of following
CPP organizational procedures."
The court below further found that Hernandez had been furnishing
supplies for the Huks in the field. But the very document dated
December 3, 1949, Exhibit D-420422, cited in the decision (printed,
p. 49), is to the effect that clothes and shoes that Hernandez was
supposed to have sent have not been received. It is true that some
clothes had been sent thru him to the field, but these clothes had
come from a crew member of a ship of the American President
Lines. He also, upon request, sent a portable typewriter to the SEC
or Politburo. Furthermore, a certain Niagara Duplicating machine
received by Hernandez from one Rolland Scott Bullard a crew
member of the SS President Cleveland, appease later to have been
forwarded by him to the officers of the SEC or the Politburo.
Lastly, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to
send notes to appellant Hernandez, who in turn issued press
releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts in
this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he
appears to have limited his actions as a Communist.
The acts of the appellant as thus explained and analyzed fall under
the category of acts of propaganda, but do not prove that he
actually and in fact conspired with the leaders of the Communist
Party in the uprising or in the actual rebellion, for which acts he is
charged in the information. And his refusal to go underground
because of his political commitments occasioned by his term of
election as president of the CLO and the impressions caused by his
acts on the Communist leaders, to the effect that he was in direct
communication or understanding with the Nacionalista Party to
which he was affiliated, creates in Us the reasonable doubt that it
was not his Communistic leanings but his political ambitions, that
motivated his speeches sympathizing with the Huks. For which
reason We hold that the evidence submitted fails to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he has conspired in the instigation of the
rebellion for which he is held to account in this criminal case.

agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the

working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins
of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or
intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist,
merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a
Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of
Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually
considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment.
Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising,
war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion. Borrowing the language of the Supreme Court of the
United States:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of
punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by
reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other
concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow),
that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the
concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without
more, in an organization engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now
said, has not heretofore been recognized by this Court to be such
a relationship. ... .
What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even
when accompanied by the elements of knowledge and specific
intent, affords an insufficient quantum of participation in the
organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently
significant form of aid and encouragement to permit the
imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be
recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an
illegal organization, by that "act" alone need be doing nothing
more than signifying his assent to its purposes and activities on
one hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort of moral
encouragement which comes from the knowledge that others
believe in what the organization is doing. It may indeed be
argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the
concrete, practical impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is
lent for instance by a commitment on the part of the conspirator
to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as
distinguished from a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a
criminal enterprise by the very fact of his membership without
thereby necessarily committing himself to further it by any act or
course of conduct whatever. (Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203, 6 L. ed. 782)

ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or

insurrection. The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion
or insurrection shall be punished, respectively, by prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not
exceed 5,000 pesos, and by prision correccional in its medium
period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.

The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be

the propagation of improvement of conditions of labor through his
organization, the CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and
active president, has communistic tendencies, its activity refers to
the strengthening of the unity and cooperation between labor
elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet
indoctrinated in the need of an actual war with or against
Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it
is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in
connection with the CLO and other trade unions, were impelled and
fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his
political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the
labor union of which he was the head was impelled by an actual
desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to advance
his political aspirations.

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle

is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless
transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very
nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is
insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and
positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an

Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are

concerned, We have not found, nor has any particular act on his
part been pointed to Us, which would indicate that he had
advocated action or the use of force in securing the ends of
Communism. True it is, he had friends among the leaders of the
Communist Party, and especially the heads of the rebellion, but this

The question that next comes up for resolution is: Does his or
anyone's membership in the Communist Party per se render
Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal
Code? The pertinent provision reads:

notwithstanding, evidence is wanting to show that he ever attended

their meetings, or collaborated and conspired with said leaders in
planning and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing the
cause thereof. Insofar as the furnishing of the mimeograph machine
and clothes is concerned, it appears that he acted merely as an
intermediary, who passed said machine and clothes on to others. It
does not appear that he himself furnished funds or material help of
his own to the members of the rebellion or to the forces of the
rebellion in the field.
But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in
spite of the apparent desire of the chief of the rebellion, is clear
proof of his non-participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to
foster the rebellion or the uprising.
We next consider the question as to whether the fact that
Hernandez delivered speeches of propaganda in favor of
Communism and in favor of rebellion can be considered as a
criminal act of conspiracy to commit rebellion as defined in the law.
In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches
favoring Communism would not make him guilty of conspiracy,
because there was no evidence that the hearers of his speeches of
propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the
purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government
as envisaged by the principles of Communism. To this effect is the
following comment of Viada:
CUESTION 10. El que hace propaganda entre sus convecinos,
induciendoles a que el dia que se anunciara la subasta de
consumes se echaran a la calle para conseguir aunque fuera
preciso acudir a la fuerza el reparto entre los vecinos ricos
solamente, sera responsable de un delito de conspiracion para la
sedicion? El Tribunal Supreme ha resuelto la negative al casar
cierta sentencia de la Audiencia de Valencia, que entendio lo
contrario: "Considerando que, con areglo a lo que dispone el art.
4. del Codigo Penal, hay conspiracion cuando dos o mas personas
se conciertan para la execution de un delito y resuelven
cmeterlo; y no constando que existiera ese concierto en cuanto a
los hechos que se refieren en la tercera pregunta del veredicto,
pues en ella solo se habla de los actos de induccion que el
procesado realizo, sin expresar el efecto que la mismo produjo en
el animo de las personas a quienes se dirigian, ni si estas
aceptaron o no lo que se las propuso, resulta evidence que faltan
los clementos integrantes de la conspiracion, etc." (Se. de 5 de
Julio de 1907, Gaceta de 7 de Enero de 1909.) (Viada, Tomo I,
Codigo Penal, p. 152)
In view of all the above circumstances We find that there is no
concrete evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant (Hernandez) actually participated in the rebellion or in
any act of conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion.
We are constrained, in view of these circumstances, to absolve, as
We hereby absolve, the appellant Amado V. Hernandez from the
crime charged, with a proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
APPEAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the
crime of rebellion as charged in the information and were each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.
Legal Considerations. Before proceeding to consider the appeals
of the other defendants, it is believed useful if not necessary to lay
dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of their
criminal responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin

with, as We have exhaustively discussed in relation to the appeal of

Hernandez, we do not believe that mere membership in the
Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of
rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere
membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract
theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and
that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with
action or advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy
to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the
same.
On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies
participation in an actual uprising or rebellion to secure, as the
Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from
thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates
uprising and the use of force, and by such membership he agrees
or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party.
Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders
the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by
law.
And when a Huk member, not content with his membership, does
anything to promote the ends of the rebellion like soliciting
contributions, or acting as courier, he thereby becomes guilty of
conspiracy, unless he takes to the field and joins in the rebellion or
uprising, in which latter case he commits rebellion.
In U.S. v. Vergara, infra, the defendants organized a secret society
commonly known as the "Katipunan", the purpose of which was to
overthrow the government by force. Each of the defendants on
various times solicited funds from the people of Mexico, Pampanga.
The Court held that the defendants were guilty of conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection and not of rebellion or
insurrection itself. Thus, the Court ruled that:
From the evidence adduced in this case we are of the opinion that
the said defendants are guilty, not of inciting, setting or foot, or
assisting or engaging in rebellion, but rather of the crime of
conspiring to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the
Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands, and
therefore we find that said defendants, and each of them, did,
together with others, in the months of February and March, 1903,
in the Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, conspire to
overthrow, put down, and to destroy by force the Government of
the United States in the Philippine Islands. (U.S. v. Vergara, et al.,
3 Phil. 432, 434.)
JUAN J. CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist with various aliases, a
member of the Central Committee of the CLO member of the
Central Committee of the CPP and as such committed to the
establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat To the same
effect is the testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
There is no evidence to connect him with the rebellion or to the
conspiracy to commit rebellion. He should therefore be absolved of
the charges contained in the information.
AMADO RACANDAY
The trial court found him guilty as a Communist, a Secretary and
Executive Committee member of the CLO a communications center
of the Communist Party, having been found in possession of letters
from Federico Maclang to Salome Cruz, and solicitor of contributions
for the Huks.

Racanday admits being a member of the Executive Committee of

the CLO Editor of the Kidlat of the Government Workers Union,
receiving copies of the Titis. Calayag testified that he was a
member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
entrusted with the duty of receiving directives of the Regional
Committee of the Communist Party.
The letters found in his possession are dated February 14, 1950,
before the Communist Party went underground. We have been
unable to find the evidence upon which the court bases its
conclusion that he received contributions for the Huks. With these
circumstances in mind, We are not convinced beyond reasonable
doubt that as a Communist he took part in the conspiracy among
the officials of the Communist Party to take part and support the
rebellion of the Huks.
We are, therefore, constrained to absolve him of the charges filed
against him.
GENARO DE LA CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist since 1945, an officer of an
organized Communist branch in Pasay City, a member of the
Central Committee and Treasurer of the CLO. He admitted his
membership and his position as member of the executive
committee and treasurer of the CLO these facts being corroborated
by the witness Guillermo Calayag.
His membership in the Communist Party dates as far back as the
year 1945. As a communist, Genaro de la Cruz received quotas and
monetary contributions coming from the areas under his
jurisdiction, and one time he made a receipt from a member from
Caloocan at the CLO headquarters at Azcarraga signing the receipt
as "Gonzalo" which is one of his aliases. He also distributed copies
of the "Titis" magazine. `
While his membership in the Communist Party plus his having
received contributions for the party indicate that he is an active
member, it was not shown that the contributions that he received
from Communist Party members were received around the year
1950 when the Central Committee of the Communist Party had
already agreed to conspire and go underground and support the
Huk rebellion. Under these circumstances We cannot find him guilty
of conspiracy to commit rebellion because of the lack of evidence to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
JULIAN LUMANOG
The court found him to be an organizer of HMB among the mill
workers, solicited contributions for the HMB and Central Committee
member of the CLO as per Testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
He admitted that he joined the Communist Party because he was
made to believe that the Party is for the welfare of the laborers. He
also admitted being a member of the Central Committee of the CLO
Calayag testified that Lumanog organized the HMB units of the
Communist Party in the Lumber Unions and attended a Communist
meeting held by Maclang.
Domingo Clarin testified that he (Julian Lumanog) used to give the
money collected by him to one Nicasio Pamintuan, one of the
members of the HMB Special Unit Trigger Squad) in Manila for the
use of the said unit.
Considering that the HMB was engaged in a rebellion to overthrow
the government, it is evident that by giving his contributions he

actually participated in the conspiracy to overthrow the government

and should, therefore, be held liable for such conspiracy, and
should be sentenced accordingly.
FERMIN RODILLAS
The trial court found that Fermin Rodillas was a member of the CPP
and the CLO that his activities consisted in soliciting contributions,
in cash and in kind, from city residents for the use of the HMB,
turning over said collections to the Party; that he has given asylum
to a wanted Hukbalahap at his house at Juan Luna St., Gagalangin,
which house was used as Military post. The above findings of the
court are fully supported by the testimony of Domingo Clarin.
Considering that while he has not actually taken part in the
rebellion, he has shown sympathy with the cause by soliciting
contributions for it and had given shelter to the Huks. We feel that
the court was fully justified in finding him guilty, but We hold that
he should be declared liable merely as a co-conspirator in the crime
of conspiracy to commit rebellion, and should be sentenced
accordingly.
BAYANI ESPIRITU
This appellant was found by the court to be a Communist, he
having admitted membership in the Communist Party since 1945;
that his duties as a Communist was to help in the office of the
National Finance Committee, assorting papers and written
documents; that sometimes he accompanied the purchaser of
medicines, shoes, papers, foodstuffs and clothing to be given to the
Huks; that he is a member of the Communication Division of the
CPP in Manila, in charge of distribution of letters or
communications; that he admits having written to Salome Cruz,
courier of the Communist Party, when he asked for his necessities,
such as money and shoes, etc.
The facts found by the court are sufficiently supported by the
communications and evidence submitted by the prosecution. The
exhibits show that he was in constant communication with the
communists; serving them as courier. His oath as a member of the
Communist Party was submitted in court and in it he admits
obedience to all orders of the Party and to propagate the stability of
the PKP.
Considering that the PKP was engaged in an actual uprising against
the constituted Government and that Bayani Espiritu was in
constant communication with the Communist Party and served it as
courier, We believe that the court was fully justified in finding him
guilty. However, We believe that not having actually taken up arms
in the uprising he may only be declared guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion.
TEOPISTA VALERIO
The court below found that this appellant joined the Communists in
1938 in San Luis, Pampanga, under Casto Alejandrino, who later
became her common-law husband; that her aliases are "Estrella"
and "Star"; that she was found in possession of various documents
written to top Communists like Alejandrino, Lava and Romy, as well
as a letter from Taruc congratulating her for the delivers, of a son.
Jose Taguiang testified that she was a member of the Provincial
Committee of the CPP in Nueva Ecija, later Chairman of the Finance
Department, and then promoted to Finance Officer of the Central
Luzon Committee. Alicia Vergara, a Huk courier, testified that she

delivered letter from the mountains to Teopista Valerie, who was in

turn also a courier.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

Without considering the close relationship that she had with top
Communist Casto Alejandrino, We are satisfied that she herself was,
aside from being a Huk courier, also a Huk, a member of the HMB
from 1942 to 1951. As she was a Communist and at the same time
a member of the HMB, and considering that the HMB was engaged
in an uprising to uproot the legitimate government, there cannot be
any question that she was in conspiracy with the other members of
her Party against the constituted government. We hold, therefore,
that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty
of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
DEFENDANTS NOT INCLUDED IN DECISION
In Crim. Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the charge against
Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P. Balgos, Alfredo B. Saulo and Jacobo
Espino was dismissed because they have not been apprehended at
the time of the trial.
PEOPLE
VS.
EVANGELISTA,
57
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, DISTINGUISHED

PHIL.

354

AND

In the case at bar the prosecution is for actual rebellion which

consists in rising publicly and taking aims against the Government
for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government
or its laws, the territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, etc.,
a crime defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas
Evangelista was charged and convicted for inciting to rebellion
under Art. 138, Revised Penal Code (formerly Sec. 2, Act No. 292).
As the specific charge against appellants is that of rising up in arms
in actual rebellion against the Government, they cannot be held
guilty of inciting the people to arms under Article 138, which is a
different offense.
On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the Anti-subversion
Act, which penalizes membership in any organization or association
committed to subvert the Government, cannot be applied to the
appellants because said Act was approved on June 20, 1957 and
was not in force at the time of the commission of the acts charged
against appellants (committed 1945-1950) ; the Anti-Subversion Act
punishes participation or membership in an organization committed
to overthrow the duly constituted Government, a crime district from
that of actual rebellion with which appellants are charged.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025)
defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado
Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges
contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the
costs de oficio. The defendants-appellants Julian Lumanog and
Fermin Rodillas in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) and
the defendants-appellants Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio in
Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) are hereby found guilty
of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and
punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and
everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for
five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional,
and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay their proportional share of the costs.
So ordered.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner vs. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR
(Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
[Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE,
PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO
LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of
the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL
PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE
PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990

SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E.
PANLILIO, petitioners, vs. PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE
LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND
EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR.,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal
jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage
as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not
the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure,
the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took
issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it
would Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively
conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned
debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite
the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on
the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990,
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National
Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon.
Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103,
in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an
information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe,
State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City
Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with
the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken
to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following
morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of
the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.
Edgardo Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through
counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpusherein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),

alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or

having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in
the statute books;

(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in

furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of
rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion
which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;

(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which

no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process;

(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb

all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not
necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.

(c) denied his right to bail; and

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and
set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5On March 5, 1990, the
Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in
this
case
and
in
G.R.
No.
921647 Which
had
been
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's
co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised
similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does
not fall within the Hernandezruling because-and this is putting it
very simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and
other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen.
Enrile et al.charged murder and frustrated murder committed on
the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise,
the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime
("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary
means for committing another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of
the Hernandez ruling,
and
the
compound
crime
("delito
compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the
same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to
which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6,
1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same
date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice,
cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and
P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated
that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution
on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and
stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both
cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to
Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised
and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the
following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed
in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that
rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be
complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was
suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it
is not offered in his written pleadings;

On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against
abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine
should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood
all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here
persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is
reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent
President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom
Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree
No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into
the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on
the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter
(Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute
offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are
committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum
period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11In thus acting, the
President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as
binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less
than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the
theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to
offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting
the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed
on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four
Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not
entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not
sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust
of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited
clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from
the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why
Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar.
If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes
were punished separately (assuming that this could be done),
the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant,
namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding
P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never
exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of
murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other
words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the
extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to
him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity
with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the
movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the
purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a
penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the

several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the

words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de
delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo
de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.'
(II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p.
2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article
71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our
Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en
el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos,
o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para
cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente
al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite
que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse,
penando separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se
sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro,
Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification
inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the
penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case
when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties
imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The
absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our
mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if
one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no
reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for
each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the
penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose
than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the
penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for
this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When
two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is
deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru
separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each
crime independently from the other, he must suffer the
maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the
separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary
ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandezremains binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an
activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or
innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for
the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions
relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights
and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information
filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense.

Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex

rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that
indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus,
in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the
amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly
committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for
the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the
crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum
penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve
(12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in
conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may
be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime
that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so
far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with
other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore
be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context
of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner
with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been
initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record
shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple
rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a
preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent
prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned
information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to
law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense
different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if
warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant
for petitioner's arrest without first personallydetermining the
existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of
the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is
not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established
procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the
warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after
the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave
the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous
records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said
respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief
period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to
assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does
that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the
light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandezas applicable to
petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the
crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that
must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition

for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting
a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal
venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or
deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be
admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the
weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was
denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court
have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the
Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by
the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime
or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more
than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of
remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would
have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before
the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which
petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went
into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed
error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the
respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were
originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and
should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of
these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the
respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning
and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to
be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify
every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short
that would justify by passing established judicial processes
designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our
courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four
Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the
view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of
its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no
difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest
fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be
perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a
bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been
recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and
thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence
against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a
rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all
apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of
the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined.
The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay
that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to
this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of
the present petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off
it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it
has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the
merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the
view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly

progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial

court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was
denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals
on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer
countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present,
that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the
lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to
and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164)
which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in
factualmilieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles
already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that
warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner
Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared
before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990,
they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the
strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their
constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of
rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies
the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law,
that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by
lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to
whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to
stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this
aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings,
kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these
days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the
military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by socalled rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exceptionthat not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe
from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace
and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an
apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise
the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other
offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such
change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given
time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully,
Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in
this matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine
enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information
filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only,
hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as
a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners
being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both
cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by
said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail
bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No.
92163.

Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

Enrile vs Salazar G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile wasarrested by law enforcement officers led by
Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941.The warrant had issued on an information signed and
earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior
State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor FerdinandR.
Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator
Enrile, thespouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion withmurder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coupattempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.Senator Enrile
was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila,without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrestwarrant. The following
morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal inQuezon City where he was given over to the custody of
the Superintendent of the NorthernPolice District, Brig.
Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.On the same date of February 28, 1990,
Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition forhabeas corpus
herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on
March 2, 1990),alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional
rights.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito
compleio) arising from anoffense being a necessary means for
committing another, which is referred to in the secondclause of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the
Penal Code cannotbe applied in the case at bar. If murder were
not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimeswere punished
separately (assuming that this could be done), the following
penalties would beimposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the
crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000and prision mayor,
in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstancespresent, but never exceeding 12 years of prision
mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder,reclusion temporal in

its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying

circumstancespresent. In other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty couldnot be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would
have to be meted out tohim, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construedin
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable
to the movant.The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged
with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while
technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may
not becomplexed with other offenses committed on the occasion
thereof, must therefore be dismissedas a mere flight of rhetoric.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does
indeedcharge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished
by the Revised Penal Code: simplerebellion.Petitioner finally claims
that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the
Court'sreaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case,
and of the logical and necessarycorollary that the information
against him should be considered as charging only the crime
of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must
now be accepted as a correctproposition. But the question remains:
Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petitionfor habeas
corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to
bail or vindicatingits denial? The criminal case before the
respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking thepetitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The
original jurisdictionto grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invokethat
jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se byreason of the weakness of the evidence
against him. Only after that remedy was denied by thetrial court
should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and
even then, notwithout first applying to the Court of Appeals
if appropriate relief was also available there.The Court reiterates
that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez,
thequestioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce
Enrile and the spouses Rebecco andErlinda Panlilio must be read as
charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitledto
bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier
grant of bail to petitionersbeing merely provisional in character, the
proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded tothe respondent
Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once
bail is fixedby said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond flied with this Courtshall become functus
oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.