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CIA in the Congo By Godfrey Mwakikagile

Note of Victor E. Rosez: This is not completely correct, I refer to the papers of Pierre Davister Mobutu did this and put the blame of the massacre on Lumumba. Pierre Davister told him to never mention this publicallythis was a part of a well-constructed purpose to demonize Lumumba with the intention to remove him from his post as Prime-Minister.

Note of Victor E. Rosez: one had to consider that the same advisor of Mobutu, Pierre Davister, organized the High-Jacking of the plane of Tshombe on the order of Mobutu, kidnapping which was executed by Bodenan.

A la découverte d’une page de l’histoire politique du Congo Kinshasa :

Chapitre documents du massacre de Bakwanga

Pierre Davister ,Kestergat,Brassinne,Dr Kamanyi, Dr Mpuila

1)

Documents privés de Victor Rosez

Bonjour Zacharie, Comment va? Veux-tu bien mettre sur le site que l'Udps-Canada vient de créer, la confirmation que j'apporte dans mon petit texte ci-après à l'intention du Dr Kamanyi, en appui à la mise au point du Dr Mpuila sur le massacre de Bakwanga? Cela parce que je ne suis pas connecté au site "groupes Kasaï Yahoo" animé par Kasonga Zadain à Bruxelles. Au fait le Dr Mpuila démontre (référence à l'appui) que c'est Mobutu qui avait commandé l'opération de ces massacres, à l'insu de Lumumba.

Bonjour Dr Kamanyi, Notre souci à tous c'est justement de connaître la vérité sur des faits historiques marquants de notre pays. Je confirme la mise au point faite par le Dr Mpuila par rapport au massacre de Bakwanga. En effet, plus d'un document que nous avions lu au sein de la commission des assassinats politiques de la CNS l'attestent. Je rappelle que j'étais le rapporteur général de cette commission, avant de me faire remplacer par le Dr Kabamba Mbwebwe, à la suite de ma nomination comme membre du gouvernement Tshisekedi. Il importe de retenir par ailleurs qu'à l'issue des dits massacres, Mobutu s'en félicitait devant Pierre Davister en ces termes :

"Je les ai (les Baluba) massacrés comme des mouches".

Et Davister va réagir en demandant à son interlocuteur de ne plus jamais répéter cela qui risquait de dédouaner Lumumba de ce drame, dont la communauté internationale tenait mordicus à lui faire porter les responsabilités, (pour pouvoir bien sûr accélérer le processus de son élimination physique).

Words of Mobutu:

"I slain them (Balubas) like flies."

Davister will respond to Mobutu by asking him for never repeat this openly because this could erase the fault and responsabilities of Lumumba in this tragedy, the international community was determined that Lumumba must bear these responsibilities (to accelerate the course of his physical elimination ).

Voilà ce que j'en sais et qui me paraît véridique. Bonne journée. P.G. Kapita Shabangi.

2)

Dans plusieurs cas d’assassinats massifs ayant endeuillé le peuple congolais pendant la période trouble des indépendances, très souvent le nom de Patrice Emery Lumumba s’y est toujours retrouvé mêlé à tort ou à travers. Et parmi les cas les plus frappants, se trouve les massacres de Bakwanga où plusieurs peuples balubas furent massacrés par les troupes de l’Anc. Selon les historiens, les Nations Unies avaient été amené à qualifier ces massacres du véritable génocide. Le docteur François Tshipamba Mpuila nous livre le fruit de ses recherches qui incrimine feu président Mobutu cité comme celui ayant ordonné tous ces massacres.

Le docteur François Tshipamba Mpuila nous livre sa réflexion sur l’identité du vrai et du seul auteur du drame congolais depuis l’accession du pays à l’indépendance jusqu’à la veille de l’entrée des hommes de Laurent Désiré Kabila à Kinshasa. Se considérant lui-même comme l’homme seul, effectivement à la lecture de ces différents ouvrages cités par le docteur François Tshipamba Mpuila , feu Maréchal Mobutu a toujours agi seul dans toutes ses actions tant politiques, sécuritaires que celles ayant conduit à des assassinats.

Massacres de Bakwanga : Réhabilitation de Patrice Emery Lumumba

Jusqu’à ce jour, nombreux Baluba originaires du Kasaï Oriental (Congo/Kinshasa) dont je suis originaire moi-même - sont convaincus que c’est M. Patrice Emery Lumumba, en sa qualité du Premier Ministre et du Ministre de la Défense du Premier Gouvernement Congolais (1960) qui avait ordonné l’envoi des troupes de l’Armée Nationale Congolaise (A.N.C.) dans le Sud-Kasaï Sécessionniste pour réduire la Sécession et massacrer les Baluba. L’ONU avait même qualifié ces massacres d’un véritable génocide.

Ces massacres sont notamment à la base d’une hostilité séculaire tacite, latente ou parfois ouverte entre les Baluba et les Batetela.

Est-ce que cette conviction est fondée sur les faits historiques réels et irréfutables ou sommes- nous, nous tous, victimes et otages d’une manipulation et d’une falsification historique ?

A notre niveau des cadres du pays, amis de la vérité et ses vecteurs ainsi que phares, encadreurs et mobilisateurs de nos populations, nous ne devons pas nous contenter des conjectures, des rumeurs, des vérités approximatives ni accepter de cheminer dans la cohorte des victimes et otages de la manipulation et de l’intoxication falsificatrice, mensongère et meurtrière, d’où qu’elle vienne et qui entretient et véhicule à tort des

haines, des divisions et des conflits latents ou ouverts dans la population favorables aux intérêts des ennemis internes et externes de notre Peuple et de notre Patrie.

Nous avons le devoir d’interroger l’histoire, de faire la relecture des faits, de recouper les faits, de restaurer la vérité historique et d’aider nos populations à découvrir et à connaître la vérité, à adopter des comportements conséquents et à tisser des relations fondées sur cette vérité objective.

Nombreux auteurs affirment que la responsabilité des massacres de Bakwanga incombe à Mobutu qui avait ordonné l’opération et non à Patrice Emery Lumumba. Je cite, ici, parmi ces auteurs, les auteurs ci-après : Jacques Brassinne, Jean Kestergat, Pierre Davister et Jules Chomé.

Voici ce qui est écrit dans le livre de MM. Jacques Brassinne et Jean Kestergat, intitulé Qui a tué Patrice Lumumba ? (Editions Duculot, 1991), p. 55 :

En réalité la principale responsabilité du massacre repose probablement sur Mobutu, qui était chef d’état-major. Certes, il n’a sûrement pas ordonné les massacres, mais c’est lui qui a organisé l’opération, se vantant d’ailleurs de l’avoir fait seul, en dehors de tout conseiller militaire. M. Pierre Davister, confident privilégié du colonel Mobutu, a confié à l’époque à l’un des auteurs de ce livre, Jean Kestergat, que Mobutu avait dit avoir organisé tout seul l’opération. A quoi Davister répondit : Joseph, ne te vante jamais de cela. Le Conseil fut entendu.

Mais la seule responsabilité est celle d’une troupe indisciplinée qui va d’ailleurs se mutiner à nouveau après la reprise de Bakwanga. On l’a vu déjà.

C’est le même Mobutu qui avait décrété le cessez-le-feu au Katanga lorsque les troupes de l’A.N.C. étaient en train de réduire la Sécession katangaise.

M. Jules Chomé l’affirme dans son livre intitulé « L’ascension de Mobutu », p. 57-58 (Editions complexe, 1974) :

C’est le colonel Mobutu qui ordonnera le cessez-le-feu. Son biographe, Francis Monheim

(Mobutu seul, p

Sud-Kasaï : « Sans consulter personne, il donne l’ordre à ses troupes de revenir à Léopoldville. Le Commandant en Chef, Lundula, ignorait tout. Se trouvant à Luluabourg, il

voit donc revenir ses hommes… Il se rend aussitôt dans la capitale et va voir Lumumba. Celui-ci, tout entier à sa conférence des Etats Africains, ignore tout de la décision de Mobutu. Il convoque son chef d’état-major :

115) le reconnaît expressément en ce qui concerne les opérations au

Je suis ministre de la Défense nationale, dit-il à Mobutu, et je ne suis au courant de rien. Vous, vous n’êtes qu’un simple colonel et vous ordonnez le cessez-le-feu sans même consulter votre commandant en chef, le général Lundula.

Lundula n’était pas à Léo, répond Mobutu, je ne pouvais donc pas le consulter. Quant à moi, j’ai pris mes responsabilités.

Le coup d’Etat militaire du 24 novembre 1965 et l’établissement de la dictature : Mobutu vers la conquête du pouvoir absolu

Non seulement c’est Mobutu qui était le Vrai Maître de la situation politique, militaire et sécuritaire du Congo depuis 1960, mais il devenait aussi le Maître absolu, officiel et public de son avenir :

Davister, quelques semaines après le coup d’Etat, l’a affirmé : « L’avenir du Congo devenait mobutiste » (Spécial, 3 février 1966).

Bref : Il existe trop de faits et trop de textes selon lesquels c’est Mobutu qui, depuis 1960 jusqu’en 1997 (le 16 mai 1997 : la défaite militaire de l’armée de Mobutu et la fuite de Mobutu vers le Maroc via le Togo) était le Vrai Maître de la situation au Congo (politique, militaire, économique, sécuritaire…). C’est lui qui ordonnait les opérations militaires, qui les organisait, qui ordonnait le cessez-le-feu… sans se référer ni au Président de la République, ni Premier Ministre, ni au Ministre de la Défense, ni au Commandant en Chef de l’Armée :

1) Faits :

- Coup d’Etat militaire du 14 septembre 1960 contre les institutions étatiques issus de la Loi Fondamentale et neutralisation des gouvernants démocratiquement issus aux élections de 1960 ;

- Réquisition des Etudiants Congolais de partout pour former le Gouvernement des Etats

Généraux ;

- Soutien à M. Tshombe, à la Sécession katangaise et à sa consolidation contre tous ceux

qui voulaient la réduire ;

- Appel des Mercenaires pour tenter de réduire la révolte armée et populaire armée

conduite par MM. Pierre Mulele et Gaston Soumialot pour tenter de restaurer la légitimité

issue des élections de Mai 1960 ;

- Coup d’Etat militaire du 24 novembre 1965…

3)

In het web van Mobutu.

De ontvoering van Moïse Tshombe in juni 1967 is een van de onopgeloste politieke misdaden van de twintigste eeuw. Niemand lijkt nog geïnteresseerd in de Congolese leider. Behalve de documentairemaker Bert Govaerts, die een nieuwe poging ondernam om de zaak uit te spitten. In 2003 zond Histories al een documentaire uit over de Congolese politicus Moïse Tshombe, die president werd van het ,,onafhankelijke'' Katanga, een staat die niemand wilde erkennen. Het programma eindigde toen met het einde van de Katangese secessie, in januari 1963, en het begin van Tshombe's eerste ballingschap. De nieuwe documentaire begint bij zijn wonderbaarlijke comeback in de Congolese politiek in 1964. Omdat er complete chaos dreigde, werd Tshombe teruggehaald. Zijn populariteit steeg zienderogen en hij won in 1965 zonder veel moeite de eerste ,,democratische'' parlementsverkiezingen. Dat was niet naar de zin van president Kasavubu, die Tshombe met een juridische smoes opzijschoof. Kort daarna greep generaal Joseph Mobutu de macht. Vanuit Spanje organiseerde Tshombe het militaire verzet tegen Mobutu, maar de operatie mislukte en Mobutu liet hem ter dood veroordelen. Op 27 juni 1967

maakte Tshombe met de Franse ,,zakenman'' Francis Bodenan een uitstapje naar Ibiza. Op de terugweg kaapte Bodenan zijn eigen vlieguig en dwong de piloten om koers te zetten naar Algerije. In Algiers werden alle inzittenden gearresteerd. Na twee jaar huisarrest bezweek Tshombe er aan een hartaanval. De dader van de ontvoering is bekend, Francis Bodenan, maar men weet niet wie zijn opdrachtgevers waren. Govaerts dook in het Tshombe-dossier van de Belgische Staatsveiligheid en sprak met Larry Devlin, lange tijd chef van het CIA-station in Congo, die alle betrokkenheid ontkent. Hij reisde naar Algerije, maar de autoriteiten weigerden er elke medewerking en hij kreeg geen inreisvisum om de getuigen te ondervragen. ,,De huidige president Bouteflika was destijds als minister van Buitenlandse Zaken dan ook nauw bij de zaak betrokken'', zegt Govaerts. Het vliegtuigje vond hij wel terug. De Hawker-Siddeley HS-125 staat al vele jaren aan de ketting te rotten op het vliegveld van Lagos. ,,Leuk voor de reconstructie van de kidnapping'', stelt Govaerts, die de volledige waarheid niet boven water heeft gekregen. In zijn zoektocht dook wel meermaals de figuur van wijlen Pierre Davister op, een oud-journalist van het Franstalige weekblad Pourquoi Pas en uitgever van het weekblad Spécial . Hij was een vertrouweling van Tshombe, maar na de machtsgreep van Mobutu veranderde hij het geweer van schouder. ,,Hij had er alle belang bij dat Mobutu aan de macht bleef, zodat hij in Congo zijn media-imperium verder kon uitbouwen'', stelt Govaerts.

Enkele opmerkelijke ontmoetingen doen vermoeden dat Pierre Davister de opdracht gaf voor de kidnapping.

Lien: biographie partielle Pierre Davister:

Uit De Standaard, 29 september 2005

et autres:

http://archive.indymedia.be/news/2002/11/38741.html

FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII

CIA’s Covert Operations in the Congo, 1960–1968:

Insights from Newly Declassified Documents

David Robarge

A comprehensive set of primary sources about CIA activities in the Congo has not been available until now.

From 1960 to 1968, CIA conduct- ed a series of fast-paced, multifaceted covert action (CA) operations in the newly independent Republic of the Congo (the Democratic Republic of the Congo today) to stabilize the government and minimize communist influence in a strategically vital, re- source-rich location in central Africa. The overall program—the largest in the CIA’s history up until then—com- prised activities dealing with regime change, political action, propaganda, air and marine operations, and arms interdiction, as well as support to a spectacular hostage rescue mission. By the time the operations ended, CIA had spent nearly $12 million (over $80 million today) in accom- plishing the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations’ objec- tive of establishing a pro-Western leadership in the Congo. President Jo- seph Mobutu, who became permanent head of state in 1965 after serving in that capacity de facto at various times, was a reliable and staunchly anticommunist ally of Washington’s until his overthrow in 1997.

Some elements of the program, particularly the notorious assassi- nation plot against Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba that was exten- sively recounted in 1975 in one of the Church Committee’s reports, have been described in open sources. However, besides the documentary excerpts in that report, limited releas-

es in the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, and random items on the Internet and in other compilations, a comprehensive set of primary sources about CIA activities in the Congo has not been available until now. FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968 1 is the newest in a series of retrospective volumes from the State Department’s Office of the Historian (HO) to compensate for the lack of CA-related material in previously published collections about countries and time periods when CIA covert interventions were an indispensable, and often widely recognized, element of US foreign policy. a

After scholars, the media, and some members of Congress pillo- ried HO for publishing a volume on Iran for 1951–54 that contained no documents about the CIA-engineered regime-change operation in 1953, 2 Congress in October 1991 passed a statute mandating that FRUS was to

a. The first intelligence-related retro- spective volume was FRUS, 1952–1954, Guatemala (Government Printing Office, 2003). It contained documents about the CIA’s regime-change operations there that were not in FRUS, 1952–1954, Volume IV, American Republics (Government Printing Office, 1983). Forthcoming collections on intelligence will deal with the 1953 coup in Iran and the US Intelligence Community during 1955–61.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII

Congo, 1960–1968 provides essential material for under- standing how the United States and its Congolese allies prevented the “Bloc feast” from happening.

be “a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity” and ordering “other depart- ments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government…[to] cooperate with the Office of the His- torian by providing full and complete access to the records pertinent to United States foreign policy deci- sions and actions and by providing copies of selected records” older than 25 years. 3

Notwithstanding the new law and

DCI R. James Woolsey’s pledge in

1993 to seek declassification review of 11 covert actions, including in the Congo, the two FRUS volumes published in the early 1990s on that country for 1958 through 1963 con- tained very few documents about the Agency’s CA operations there—even on the Lumumba assassination plot. 4 In the case of the first volume, the FRUS editors decided not to delay publication by seeking additional records under the access require- ments of the just-enacted FRUS law. In the second, HO and CIA were still working out how to implement those

requirements, taking into account the Agency’s concerns about protecting sources and methods and the fact that its records management prac-

tices were not designed to facilitate

scholarly research. Serious interagen- cy difficulties over HO access to and

CIA review of CA-related documents

arose over the next few years but were mostly resolved by the early 2000s in an interagency agreement.

The new procedures in that agree- ment facilitated the completion of the

volume discussed here, which was held up after HO’s outside advisory committee in 1997 questioned the completeness and accuracy of the previous collections on the Congo. HO originally conceived Congo, 1960–1968 as a volume document- ing US policy during the Johnson presidency, but, at the committee’s suggestion, it postponed publication to incorporate relevant CA material missing from previous compendia.

The collection is well worth the wait, and specialists are making use of it already. a In no other single source will scholars find a richer compilation of intelligence and policy documents that, when used in conjunction with the two earlier volumes, helps underscore why the fate of the Congo, as well as the other newly independent nations in Africa, drew so much attention from US na- tional security decisionmakers then. Before 1960, when, in British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s famous phrase, “the wind of change” began blowing over the continent, the So- viet Union, China, and their proxies had paid little attention to it.

By early 1965, however, commu- nist countries had established over 100 diplomatic, consular, and trade

a. On 4 March 2014, HO and the Cold War International History Project cosponsored a half-day symposium at the Woodrow Wilson Center titled “New Evidence: The

Congo Crisis and Its Aftermath, 1960- 1968” and featuring the new volume. This reviewer was one of the participants. Details can be found on the Wilson Center website at http://www.wilsoncenter.

org/event/new-evidence-the-congo-cri-

sis-and-aftermath-1960-1968.

missions; extended over $850 million in economic grants and credits; set up front organizations, cover entities, agents of influence, and clandestine assets; and provided assistance to anti-Western groups directly and through their allies. The Congo—for- merly a Belgian colony, one-quarter the size of the United States, with immense natural wealth and strate- gically situated in a now-contested region—was a Cold War prize of the first order. “If Congo deteriorates and Western influence fades rapidly,” the chief of CIA’s Africa Division (AF) wrote in June 1960, 10 days before the Congo gained its independence, the “Bloc will have a feast and will not need to work very hard for it.” 5

Congo, 1960–1968 provides essential material for understanding how the United States and its Congo- lese allies prevented the “feast” from happening. The volume contains 582 documents and editorial notes and is divided roughly into two sections. The first, covering 1960 to 1963, depicts the Congo’s political crisis and the extensive influence of CIA covert actions to remove Lumumba from power and then to encourage allegiance to the Leopoldville gov- ernment—especially the pervasive use of money to buy loyalties within leadership circles. The second part, covering 1964 to 1968, describes the continuation of the political action programs and the expansion of paramilitary and air support to the Congolese government in its effort to quell provincial rebellions, some of them communist-aided.

Over one-third of the sources in the volume are from CIA, and over 40 percent pertain to CA (the rest are about diplomacy, policy, and military matters). A number of the editorial

FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII

notes usefully summarize heavily redacted documents or paraphrase intelligence information that other- wise might not have survived the review process in raw form. In both the documents and the notes, the editors helpfully have used bracketed insertions to indicate names, titles, or agencies in place of cryptonyms that were not declassified. Similarly, in cases when more than one individual whose name cannot be declassified is mentioned in a document, they have been designated as “[Identity 1],” “[Identity 2],” and so forth for clar- ity—a much better procedure than repetitively using “[less than one line declassified].”

A More Nuanced View of the Situation

The documents from early 1960 at the inception of the covert program show CIA’s nuanced view of the Congo’s unsettled internal situation and the Agency’s fashioning of sensi- ble operational objectives to achieve the Eisenhower administration’s goal of regime change. 6 President Dwight Eisenhower clearly expressed his dis- quiet over developments in postcolo- nial Africa at a meeting with senior advisers in August 1960:

The President observed that in the last twelve months, the world has developed a kind of ferment greater than he could remember in recent times. The Communists are trying to take control of this, and have succeeded to the extent that… in many cases [people] are now saying that the Communists are thinking of the common man while the United States is ded-

icated to supporting outmoded regimes. 7

CIA operations officers under- stood the challenges facing them as they dealt with a population of 14 million divided into over 200 ethnic groups and four major tribes, with fewer than 20 Congolese college graduates in the entire country, led by a government heavily dependent on the former Belgian colonialists to maintain infrastructure, services, and security, with an army that was poor- ly trained, inadequately equipped, and badly led, and a fractured political structure consisting of four semi-autonomous regions and a weak and factious “central” government in the capital of Leopoldville (Kinshasa today). The US ambassador in the early 1960s, Clare Timberlake, sym- pathized with the Agency officers he worked with: “Every time I look at this truly discouraging mess, I shud- der over the painfully slow, frustrat- ing and costly job ahead for the UN and US if the Congo is to really be helped. On the other hand, we can’t let go of this bull’s tail.” 8

One of the most valuable contri- butions Congo, 1960–1968 is likely to make is moving scholarship past its prevailing fixation on Lumum- ba and toward an examination of CIA’s multiyear, multifarious covert program and the complexities of planning and implementing it. The volume provides additional detail about the assassination plot against Lumumba and his eventual death at the hands of tribal rivals abetted by their Belgian allies, substantiating the findings of a Belgian parliamentary inquiry in 2001. a9 Beyond that, for

a. The inquiry concluded that Belgium wanted Lumumba arrested and, not being

students of intelligence operations, the collection demonstrates the wide range of “soft” and “hard” covert initiatives CIA undertook in an often rapidly changing operational environ- ment.

CIA’s program initially focused on removing Lumumba, not only through assassination if necessary but also with an array of nonlethal un- dertakings that showed the Agency’s clear understanding of the Congo’s political dynamics. The activities included contacts with oppositionists who were working to oust Lumumba with parliamentary action; payments to army commander Mobutu to ensure the loyalty of key officers and the support of legislative leaders; street demonstrations; and “black” broadcasts from a radio station in nearby Brazzaville, across the border in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to encourage a revolt against Lumumba.

After Lumumba fled house arrest in the capital in late November 1960 and was tracked down and killed soon after, 10 Agency CA concen- trated on stabilizing and supporting the government of President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Ministers Cyrille Adoula and Moise Tshombe, with Mobutu as behind-the-scenes power broker. CIA used an extensive assortment of covert techniques to accomplish that objective:

particularly concerned with his physical well-being, took no action to prevent his death even though it knew he probably would be killed. The report specifically denied that the Belgian government ordered Lumumba’s murder but that Belgian advisers to Lumumba’s enemies assisted in making it happen.

FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII

Documents in the collection show that CIA’s political pro- gram was strategically coordinated with overt policies.

• Advice and subsidies to political and tribal leaders.

• Funds to Mobutu to buy the alle- giances of army officers through salary subsidies and purchases of ordnance and communications and transportation equipment.

Payments to agents of influence in the Adoula administration and to sources in the leftist opposition.

• Parliamentary maneuvering aided by covert money.

• Contacts with labor unions and student associations.

• Newspaper subsidies, radio broad- casts, leaflet distributions, and street demonstrations.

Efforts to influence delegations from the United Nations (UN) to adopt positions that favored the Congolese government. 11

The CIA’s program persisted through several political crises in the Congo during 1962–63 and at least can be credited with helping the government survive them. As of mid-1964, however, the US strategic goal of bringing about a broad-based governing coalition with national appeal remained unaccomplished. The replacement of Adoula with Tshombe, who led a different faction, in July 1964 prompted a suspension of political action efforts while the new government established itself and soon became preoccupied with putting down rebel uprisings. By August, insurgents controlled over one-sixth of the country, and the Agency redirected most resources

to reinforcing and rebuilding tribal allegiances in contested areas and in- directly assisting the Congolese army by funding mercenaries in its employ.

For the better part of a year, CIA opted to promote unity rather than division by declining Tshombe’s and other politicians’ approaches for indi- vidual subsidies. By mid-1965, when Tshombe and Kasavubu seemed near- ly beyond reconciliation, the Agency tried to resume its previous political intriguing and buying of access and influence but became frustrated when the embassy resisted. US ability to affect Congolese leaders’ decisions “has never been lower since depar- ture of Lumumba,” Leopoldville Sta- tion wrote in late October. A month later, Mobutu—“our only anchor to the windward” and “the best man… to act as a balance wheel between the contending political leaders,” assert- ed CIA—staged a bloodless coup and took over the government. 12

In Concert with US Policy

Documents in the collection show that CIA’s political program was strategically coordinated with overt policies and benefited from close co- operation between the chief of station (COS) and the ambassador, at least at first, and the COS’s back channel to the Congolese government, partic- ularly with Mobutu. Larry Devlin, COS from July 1960 to May 1963 and July 1965 to June 1967, had pro- ductive relationships with Timberlake and Edmund Guillon, less so with G. McMurtrie Godley, who disap- proved of the station’s machinations

with local leaders. Still, Devlin large- ly had a free hand, and his skill and connections were so valuable that he was brought back as an informal interlocutor with the Congolese gov- ernment between his tours. The State Department noted in 1965 that

from the outset the Congo operation has had to cope with successive crises on a crash basis. The very nature of the problem has meant that great reliance had to be placed on close coordination between the Ambassador and the Station Chief in the expenditure of funds. Both Ambassadors Guillon and Godley appear to have had confidence in the CIA Station Chief and in his conduct of operations. Although courses of action have frequently been discussed between represen- tatives of the Department and CIA, the bulk of the day to day operational decisions were tak- en in the field without reference to the Department. 13

Devlin’s quasi-ambassadorial dealings with Mobutu underscored that the army chief was indispens- able to the Congo’s stability and, by extension, US policy in the Congo and sub-Saharan Africa. Devlin’s fascinating personal and profes- sional interaction with Mobutu, so evocatively described in his memoir, comes through in the official record as well, as does his indirect influence on policy decisions in Washington. The chief of AF wrote in 1967 that Mobutu had

become accustomed and to some degree dependent on the informal channel to the U.S. Government thus provided

FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII

[and] would interpret the ter- mination of this relationship— particularly if termination were more or less coincident with Devlin’s [second] departure— as evidence of a desire on the part of the U.S. Government to disengage from the close and friendly relations that have characterized dealings between the governments for most of the period since 1960.

Godley’s successor, Robert Mc- Bride, whose posting coincided with Devlin’s reassignment, even more strongly disapproved of CIA’s private contacts with Mobutu and other Con- golese leaders and quickly took steps to limit them. Starting from when he arrived at the embassy, the volume contains none of the COS-to-Head- quarters cables of the kind Devlin used to send about his talks with Mobutu because such encounters were no longer allowed. 14

When Mobutu assumed power officially, the political side of the CA program was effectively through, although it did not formally end until early 1966—“The objectives of promoting stability and modera- tion remain the same, but the means needed to pursue these objectives are now different,” the chief of AF wrote then—and a few Congolese politicians continued receiving individual payments well into 1968. 15 Although Washington had preferred to achieve its goal of political order in the Congo through parliamentary means, with a military strongman now in power, it had what it wanted:

a relatively stable, nationally based, politically moderate, pro-Western government in Leopoldville. a16

a. The US government showed its support

Paramilitary Operations

The primary emphasis of the CIA’s program then shifted to sup- pressing rebellions in the eastern provinces through air and maritime paramilitary operations. Congo, 1960–1968 contains many documents that will help scholars appreciate the difficulties in planning and running such activities, especially in a vast territory with very limited communi- cations and transportation infrastruc- tures and proxies of questionable skill and reliability.

CIA’s air operations began modestly in 1962 as a propaganda tactic to raise the Congolese gov- ernment’s prestige and demonstrate its military potential to its citizenry, provincial secessionist leaders, and rebel factions. They grew to provide tactical support to UN peacekeepers, Congolese forces, and mercenaries fighting the insurgents. Eventually the aviation component of the CA program provided aircraft, pilots, and maintenance personnel for the so- called Congolese Air Force (CAF), which existed only because of US assistance. Through the course of the program, the CAF had 11 T-6s, 13 T-28s, 7 B-26s, 2 C-45s, 3 C-46s, 3 Bell helicopters, and 1 Beech twin-engine in its inventory. In total, six CIA officers ran the operations in country, aided by 125 contract maintenance workers employed by the Congolese government and 79 foreign contract pilots, who flew the missions because the Congolese were not reliably trained. Difficulties with supplies, airfield and living condi- tions, communications, and main-

for Mobutu very demonstratively in 1966 and 1967 by forewarning him of coup plots against him, which he quickly put down.

tenance beset the operations, as did staffing issues: the State Department was reluctant to approve positions for Agency personnel, and CIA’s Congo program managers had to compete with counterparts in Southeast Asia trying to build their operations there as the war in Vietnam expanded. 17

CIA launched the first significant CAF air operations in February 1964 against rebels in Kwilu, just north of Leopoldville. Missions against the eastern rebels followed in May. The toughest operations came during late 1965–early 1966, after Chinese- and Cuban-provided weapons and train- ing had improved the rebels’ fighting ability. Some of the CAF sorties were supply airlifts, which the Agency co- ordinated with the State Department and the US Air Force. Besides help- ing suppress the insurgencies, CIA’s aviation program proved vital in the crackdown Mobutu ordered against army mutineers in Katanga in August 1966. In March 1966, the National Security Council (NSC) decided that the Congo should pay for its own air force, and the Agency phased out its involvement during the next 18 months, gradually melding activities with US Air Force operations. b 18 By late 1967, the CAF belonged to the Congolese, who continued, however, to receive assistance from foreign workers.

CIA also assisted Mobutu’s government in quashing the rebels by staging maritime operations on Lake Tanganyika along the Congo’s eastern border and Lake Albert in

b. In late 1967, the Johnson administration authorized CIA to recruit and pay five pilots for 90 days (with a possible 30-day extension) to fly missions assisting the Con- golese government in quelling an uprising of mercenaries on the eastern border.

FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII

DCI John McCone’s role in policymaking comes through clearly in a number of the documents in the volume.

the northeast. Rebels in the region were ferrying Chinese-supplied arms across the two lakes and using them in the ground fighting in the two re- gions, and the covert activities were intended to interdict the shipments. Lake Tanganyika especially was a difficult environment for Agen- cy personnel. It is the longest and second-largest fresh-water lake in the world, stretching for over 400 miles but with an average width of only 30 miles. Monitoring such a lengthy coastline was hard when smugglers could cross the narrow water body relatively quickly. The first CIA team deployed to the area in March 1965 and conducted its first patrol in May. What came to be called the Agency’s “pocket navy” also staged a success- ful amphibious landing operation to deploy Congolese troops against a rebel enclave. 19

To run the maritime activities, seven Agency operations officers and one communicator worked with a va- riety of (initially unreliable) foreign crewmen and a flotilla of six 21-foot Seacrafts, one 75-foot trawler, assort- ed small boats, and—after the lake’s unpredictable weather showed the need for larger, faster vessels—two 50-foot Swifts equipped with radar for night surveillance. The operations had a psychological impact at first, intimidating the rebels and inspiring the Congolese troops, but over time they largely disrupted the weapons shipments and, combined with the Agency’s aerial and other activities, helped tip the tactical balance on the ground in the government’s favor.

In addition to its air and maritime operations, CIA secured the alle-

giance of tribal chiefs in the northeast and got their assistance in cutting off the flow of arms from Sudan and across Lake Albert from Uganda by providing them with covert cash and other forms of aid. The Agency also assisted with paying foreign mercenaries if hard currency was not available locally. As with its support for the CAF, the Agency gradually reduced its level of engagement in maritime activities and in January 1967 turned over its ship inventory to the Congolese. Acting on NSC direction, CIA began phasing out its paramilitary programs in June 1967, withdrawing personnel from all fronts. After the activities ended in late 1968, US aid to the Congolese military only came through the De- fense Department’s Military Assis- tance Program. 20

In late 1964, CIA had to deploy some of its paramilitary capabilities in the Congo to support the rescue of nearly 2,000 Western hostages rebels had seized in Stanleyville (Kisangani today) in August. 21 The two dozen Americans among them included three CIA and two State Department officers. For the next four months, the rebels tormented the hostages while the US government, African lead- ers, and the International Red Cross negotiated for their release. 22

CIA and the Pentagon planned various rescue scenarios without a good feel for what was happening in the area. Among the ideas were drop- ping Belgian paratroopers into Stan- leyville from US aircraft; dispatching an Agency commando team upriver; letting the Congolese army recapture

the city; and inviting in a mixed force from several African nations.

Washington decided on the first and second options. The airborne assault, codenamed DRAGON ROUGE, began at dawn on 24 No- vember. American C-130 transports dropped 340 Belgian paracomman- dos over Stanleyville and landed another 280 at the airport, with the CAF providing air cover. The CIA paramilitary team, which was supposed to be in the city at the same time, encountered resistance from the rebels and arrived a few hours late. The combined force routed the hostage-takers, freed their captives, and secured Stanleyville. The rescu- ers suffered only nine casualties, but the rebels killed or wounded several dozen hostages during the first phase of the mission. Two days later, the United States and Belgium cooper- ated in another operation, DRAGON NOIR, to rescue nearly 400 Western hostages held near Paulis, about 240 miles from Stanleyville (CIA was not involved). After hearing about the at- tack there, the rebels murdered nearly 30 detainees before the rescuers arrived. The Johnson administration then decided not to stage any more such operations (two others, DRAG- ON BLANC and DRAGON VERT, had been planned). 23

The DCI’s Role

DCI John McCone’s role in pol- icymaking comes through clearly in in the volume. A California busi- nessman with some background in intelligence from previous US gov- ernment service and, more important, a reputation as a hard-nosed manager of large international enterprises, Mc-

FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII

Cone came to CIA in late 1961 with a White House mandate to carefully watch over covert operations and avoid another Bay of Pigs debacle. Beyond that, the new DCI believed he should not only be the president’s chief intelligence officer but, when allowed, should proffer advice on foreign policy as well.

McCone was not at all reluctant to do so. He actively participated in the deliberations of the NSC’s covert action planning group, called the Special Group and the 303 Commit- tee during the years of the Congo crisis, and occasionally met with policymakers (President Lyndon Johnson among them) separately. Besides presenting intelligence information, McCone argued for and against policy positions on many issues, including several related to the Congo. He doubted that negoti- ations with the rebels were feasible, opposed suspending air operations against them to signal a willingness to parley, and advocated increasing US aid to Tshombe after he became prime minister.

McCone strongly believed that Washington should support Tshombe despite his use of South African mercenaries and reputation as a front man for Belgian economic interests. “I felt we had no choice except to insure victory for Tshombe,” he told Secretary of State Dean Rusk in early 1965. “I said we should not be deterred from this by the persuasion of do-gooders, by reactions from African states in the United Nations who didn’t like us anyway, or from the vote in the OAU [Organization of African Unity].”

McCone also aggressively defend- ed CIA’s covert activities, rebuffing

The Congo covert action programs had an important or- ganizational impact inside CIA by establishing the reputa- tion and prominence of the new AF Division.

State Department complaints about the Agency’s use of contract pilots and Ambassador Godley’s attempt to control the disbursement of covert funds to Congolese politicians. McCone had also argued in favor of launching all the hostage-rescue operations to show that the United States was engaged in humanitarian activities and not just propping up Tshombe and the Congolese army. 24

The Congo covert action pro- grams had an important organization- al impact inside CIA by establishing the reputation and prominence of the new AF Division in the Directorate of Plans. Formerly paired with the more important Near East area of opera- tions, AF became a division in 1959 and was less than one year old when the Congo became a high-priority CA target. At the time, AF had few stations in sub-Saharan Africa. Most had opened during the previous five years and had very small staffs. As the State Department noted in 1965, “the Agency started from scratch in most [African] countries, laboring under the handicap of the visibility of the white man, few natural cover opportunities…and language and cultural differences.”

The undersized CIA comple- ment at Leopoldville Station, which opened in 1951, had responsibility for covering most of equatorial Africa, an area as large as half of the United States. The station grew rap- idly during the three months after the Congo became independent, and, as with the Agency’s other facilities on the continent, the expansion of covert activities over the next several years forced its growth. Leopoldville soon became one of CIA’s most import-

ant outposts in sub-Saharan Africa, which continued to attract significant attention from policymakers through the 1960s and after. 25

Documents in the volume high- light the prominent role money played in the CIA’s program, not only during the politically unsettled years of the Adoula and Tshombe governments but also after Mobutu took over. If he and the United States agreed that he was the indispensable man, then money became the essen- tial feature of their relationship. In 1965, the State Department observed:

“A legitimate question is whether the wholesale buying of political…lead- ers is a sound basis for establishing a stable government,” and it answered that “in the Congo there appears to have been no feasible alternative.” CIA pointed out in early 1966 that

Mobutu has no political orga- nization which, as an alterna- tive to the U.S. covert funding program, can provide him with the funds needed to ensure his continuation in office. Nor is there any wealthy managerial or commercial class to whom he can turn to finance his political efforts.

Moreover, as Devlin wrote later that year,

Cutting off payments to [Mobu- tu] would almost certainly be interpreted by him as an indication that [USG] no longer supports him. Political repercussions resulting from terminating…payments would be almost as severe as if [USG]

FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII

Over the years, Mobutu proved to be the best geopolitical friend the United States had on the continent, but he also turned into one of the world’s most reviled kleptocrats.

were to cut off [international development] funds.

Although US policymakers want- ed to move “away from slush funds and toward genuine development aid,” when Mobutu asked for more money in late 1968 with few strings attached, he got it because, according to the State Department,

He is the ultimate source of power in Congo…and ready access to him is vital if we hope to continue our long-standing policy of assisting the Congo to unity, stability and economic progress, with the eventual goal of seeing a stable, western-ori- ented government in the heart of Africa.… We do not wish to risk the impairment of access to him which if it occurred would very probably be carried over into contacts throughout the Congolese Government. 26

The CIA Board of National Estimates echoed that view soon after: Mobutu’s “departure, if sudden, would probably result in prolonged political turmoil and a sharp decline in internal security,” not to mention a

significant loss of Agency access and influence in the Congolese govern- ment. COS Leopoldville reported in late 1968 that he had good rapport with Mobutu, who remained the beneficiary of largely open-ended US support through the Cold War despite the corruption and profligacy that were increasingly evident near the end of the Agency’s covert activities.

In mid-1968, Ambassador McBride warned of “the galloping onset of the gold bed syndrome… vaguely and perhaps deliberately reminiscent of a figure on the banks of a more northern river called the Seine.” He was referring to Mobutu’s plan to build three replicas of St. Peter’s Basilica and “five-million dollar Versailles-like parks” and his purchase of a luxury villa in Switzerland for 1 million Swiss francs and, for private use, a British aircraft “fitted with bar, salon etc.” and costing two million pounds. a 27

That Mobutu “has apparently risen in soufflé-like grandiloquence,”

a. The amounts mentioned in 2014 dollars are, respectively, $34.1 million, $1.6 mil- lion, and $32.6 million.

vvv

in McBride’s words, 28 did not trouble Washington then or later. The goals of CIA’s program and US policy were mostly achieved, although not always as originally envisioned. Lumumba was removed from the scene but be- came a revolutionary martyr and an inspiration to anticolonial activists in Africa and elsewhere. Over the years, Mobutu proved to be the best geo- political friend the United States had on the continent, but he also turned into one of the world’s most reviled kleptocrats and drove his country into economic ruin and, ultimately, political chaos.

The Soviet Union was kept out of the Congo but soon moved its anti-Western subversion elsewhere in the region. CIA’s covert activities in the Congo during the 1960s achieved success in the short and medium term but sometimes set in train develop- ments that were not always consistent with democratic values. Those out- comes, which characterize some but by no means most of the Agency’s covert action programs, often result from the policy decisions that follow the completion of the operations and are not necessarily inherent in them. As the documents in Congo, 1960– 1968 show so well, CIA’s activities during that time there exemplify that fact.

FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII

Endnotes

1. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19641968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 19601968 (Government Printing Office, 2013). Quotations from the FRUS volumes in this review are as they appear in print.

2. FRUS, 1952–1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951–1954 (Government Printing Office, 1989).

3. The controversy is well recounted in Department of State, Office of the Historian, Toward “Thorough, Accurate, and Reliable”: A His- tory of the Foreign Relations of the United States Series,” chapters 9 and 10, at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus-history, accessed 19 May 2014.

4. FRUS, 1958–1960, Volume XIV, Africa (Government Printing Office, 1992); FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis (Government Printing Office, 1994).

5. Facts and quote from David Robarge, “CIA during the Congo Crisis: Political Action and Paramilitary Operations, 19601968,” brief- ing package derived from internal studies and documents and cleared for public use by the CIA Publications Review Board on 6 March

2014.

6. See, among others, documents 4 and 5.

7. FRUS, 1958–1960, XIV, document 157.

8. Ibid., document 254.

9. Documents 24, 28, 30, 32, 33, 43, 46, 60, 62, 68, 70, 72, 75, and 76. Footnote cite: “The Conclusions of the Enquiry Committee,” 16 November 2001, at http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/comm/lmb/conclusions.pdf, accessed 20 May 2014.

10. Documents 60, 62, 68, 70, 72, and 75.

11. Documents 8–10, 16, 37, 40, 55, 57, 73, 82, 87, 90, 94, 100, 109, 123, 138, 142, 143, 146, 155, 167, and 170; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.”

12. Documents 169, 186, 209, 219, 223, 241, 253, 301, 371, 394, 407, 417, 419, 420, 430, 434, 442, 450, and 459.

13. Department of State, “Review of 1964 Operations in the AF Area,” undated but c. 1965, FRUS, 19641968, Volume XXIV, Africa (Government Printing Office, 1999), document 191; Congo, 1960–1968, documents 40 note 9, 64, 170, 194, and 217.

14. Documents 19, 48, 101, 119, 122, 191 notes 2 and 3, 192, 194, 446, 448, 454, 498, and 499.

15. Documents 466 and 573.

16. Documents 470, 471, 474, 475, and 490.

17. Documents 71, 123, 124, 127, 168, 171, 219, 237, 272, 427, 440, 462, 483, 544, 546, and 564; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.”

18. Documents 415, 440, 472, 478, 486, 492, 497, and 500; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.” Footnote cite: Documents 544, 546, and 564.

19. “CIA during the Congo Crisis.”

20. Documents 219, 223, 427, 431, 462, 464, 486, 494, and 575; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.”

21. Many documents on the hostage-takings and rescue operations are between pages 338 and 526 of the collection.

22. Two of the hostages have written of their ordeal in books: David Reed, 111 Days in Stanleyville (Harper & Row, 1965); and Michael P.E. Hoyt, Captive in the Congo: A Consul’s Return to the Heart of Darkness (Naval Institute Press, 2000).

23. Thomas P. Odom, Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964, 1965 (Command Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1988); Fred E. Wagoner, Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo (National Defense Universi- ty, 1980).

24. Documents 178, 180, 211, 218 note 3, 289, 362, 369, 373, and 383.

25. “Review of 1964 Operations in the AF Area”; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.”

26. Documents 54, 65, 77, 102, 109, 219, 227, 462, 485, 501, and 578; “Review of 1964 Operations in the AF Area.”

27. Documents 577, 579, and 581.

28. Document 581.

vvv

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Breaking the Rules: The CIA and Counterinsurgency in the Congo

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Jeffrey H. Michaels

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Internat ional Journal of Intell igence and CounterIntel ligence, 25: 130–159, 2012 Copyrig ht # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0885-0607 print = 1521-0561 online DOI: 10.1080/0 8850607.2012 .623018

= 1521-0561 online DOI: 10.1080/0 8850607.2012 .623018 JEFFREY H. MICHAELS Breaking the Rules: The CIA and

JEFFREY H. MICHAELS

Breaking the Rules: The CIA and Counterinsurgency in the Congo

1964–1965

A good deal of recent scholarship and official discourse on the role of United States intelligence in the area of counterinsurgency has focused on the finer point s o f intell igence analysis in support of large-sca le military operati ons. 1 T h e a s s u m p t i o n u n d e r l y i n g t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e i s t h e i d e a t h a t i n t e l l i g e n c e s e r v i c e s w i l l p l a y a s u b o r d i n a t e r o l e t o t h e m i l i t a r y i n t h e c o n d u c t o f c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y o p e r a t i o n s . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , g i v e n t h e l e v e l o f a t t e n t i o n d e v o t e d t o t h e o n g o i n g o p e r a t i o n s i n A f g h a n i s t a n a n d I r a q , w h i c h i t s e l f i s d u e i n l a r g e p a r t t o t h e a m o u n t o f n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s d e v o t e d t o t h e s e t w o c o n f l i c t s . O n e c h i e f c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h i s f o c u s i s t o m a r g i n a l i z e t h e s t u d y o f c a s e s i n w h i c h t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t w a n t e d to a s s is t a fr i e n d l y g o v e r n m e n t ’ s c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y e f f o r t s b u t h a s b e e n u n w i l l i n g t o c o n s i d e r a s i g n i f i c a n t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . 2 I n s u c h

D r . J e f f r e y H . M i c h a e l s i s a R e s e a r c h A s s o c i a t e i n t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f W a r S t u d i e s a t K i n g ’ s C o l l e g e L o n d o n , w h e r e h e c o o r d i n a t e s a n E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l R e s ea r c h C o u n ci l ( E S RC ) - s p o n so re d p ro je ct h e a d e d b y P r o fe s s o r S ir L a w r e n c e F r e e d ma n t i t l e d ‘ ‘ S t r a te g i c S c r ip t s f o r t h e 2 1 s t C e n t u r y . ’ ’ E a r l i e r , h e w a s a L e c t u r e r w i t h t h e A i r P o w e r S t u d i e s D i v i s i o n o f t h e c o l l e g e ’ s De fe nc e S t u d ie s De p a r tm e n t. H o l de r o f a P h .D . i n W a r S tu d ie s f ro m K i n g’ s Col lege, he has ser ved as an intel lige nce offi cer att ached to the Unit ed Sta tes European Command and the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, consulting for the Office o f N e t A s s e s s m e n t o f t h e O f f i c e o f t h e U . S . S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e . D r . M i c h a e l s ’ s b o o k , S h o c k a n d F l a w e d : T h e D i s c o u r s e T r a p F r o m t h e War on Terror to the Surge, is forthcoming from Palgrave publishing.

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INTERNATIONAL JO URNAL OF INTELLIGENCE

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BR E AKING THE RULES : CIA IN THE CONGO

131

c a s e s , t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y ( C I A ) h a s s e r v e d a s a n i m p o r t a n t

‘ ‘ t o o l ’ ’ o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I n m a n y r e s p e c t s , i t s c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y r o l e differs considerably from that which it would perform if subordinate to the

mil it ary . Ind ee d, thr ough out the C old Wa r, the CIA was inv olv ed in ma ny

c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y o p e r a t i o n s . A n d i n m a n y c a s e s , t h e A g e n c y r a t h e r t h a n

t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y t o o k t h e l e a d . D e s p i t e t h e r e c e n t s u r g e o f i n t e r e s t i n

o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y g e n e r a l l y , m a n y o f t h e s e c a s e s h a v e y e t t o r e c e i v e

c h o l a r l y a t t e n t i o n . I n s t e a d , t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g f o c u s h a s b e e n p l a c e d o n

t h e o n e c a s e w h e r e l a r g e - s c a l e U . S . m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n o c c u r r e d , n a m e l y V i e t n a m , m o s t l i k e l y b e c a u s e t h a t c o n f l i c t i s v i e w e d a s h a v i n g t h e m o s t

‘ ‘ r e l e v a n c e ’ ’ f o r I r a q a n d A f g h a n i s t a n i n t e r m s o f h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t a n d ‘‘lessons learned.’’ 3 But a ‘‘su cce ssfu l’’ cas e o f U.S. coun ter insur gen cy tha t has yet to rec eive m u c h s c h o l a r l y a t t e n t i o n i s t h e C I A ’ s e f f o r t t o c o u n t e r t h e ‘ ‘ S i m b a

r e b e l l i o n ’ ’ i n t h e C o n g o i n 1 9 6 4 – 1 9 6 5 . A m o n g h i s t o r i a n s , i n t e r e s t i n t h e

C I A ’ s r o l e i n t h e C o n g o p r i m a r i l y

a s s a s s i n a t i o n o f C o n g o l e s e P r i m e M i n i s t e r P a t r i c e L u m u m b a , a s w e l l a s

c o n c e r n s i t s c o n n e c t i o n t o t h e

c

s

t h e Ag e n c y ’ s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h J o s e p h M o b u t u . 4 A l t h o u g h m a n y in s t a n c e s

o f C I A a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g t h e S i m b a r e b e l l i o n h a v e b e e n d i s c u s s e d i n

r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r e v e n t s , s u c h a s t h e r o l e

a n t i - C a s t r o C u b a n s f i g h t i n g i n A f r i c a , t h e A g e n c y ’ s i n v o l v e m e n t h a s n o t

o f b o t h p r o - C a s t r o a n d

b e e n s t u d i e d e i t h e r a s a s u b j e c t i n i t s o w n r i g h t , o r t h r o u g h a

c

o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y l e n s . 5 T h i s l a c k o f i n t e r e s t i s a l l t h e m o r e s u r p r i s i n g

g

i v e n t h e i n c r e a s i n g a m o u n t o f d e c l a s s i f i e d m a t e r i a l a n d n u m b e r o f

memoirs becoming available on the subject. 6 Yet this case is noteworthy from a counterinsurgency perspective in several i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t s . F i r s t , i t r e p r e s e n t e d a c a s e w h e r e t h e U .S . g o v e r n me n t w a s s u p p o r t i n g a w e a k a n d d i p l o m a t i c a l l y i s o l a t e d f r i e n d l y g o v e r n m e n t

a g a i n s t a n i n s u r g e n c y s u p p o r t e d b y n u m e r o u s o u t s i d e p o w e r s , i n c l u d i n g

t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d C h i n a . S e c o n d , t h e C o n g o ’ s e n o r m o u s p h y s i c a l s i z e

and the div erse nat ure of it s popu lation of fi fteen mil lion, combi ned with a w e a k a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a p p a r a t u s , w o r k e d a g a i n s t t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f c e n t r a l

u t h o r i t y . T h i r d , t h e i n s u r g e n c y i t s e l f , t h o u g h r i f e w i t h i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s ,

e v e r t h e l e s s n u m b e r e d i n t h e t e n s o f t h o u s a n d s o f m e n u n d e r a r m s , a

n

a

f i g u r e t h a t w a s a t l e a s t e q u a l t o , i f n o t g r e a t e r t h a n , t h e g o v e r n m e n t for ces , a n d wi thi n a ma tt er of mo nt hs the in sur gen ts co nq uer ed mo re th an

o n e - t h i r d o f t h e C o n g o . F o u r t h , t h e d u r a t i o n o f t h e c o n f l i c t d e f i e d

e x p e c t a t i o n s o f b e i n g a l o n g w a r , w i t h t h e i n s u r g e n c y e f f e c t i v e l y d e f e a t e d within two years. Last, the CIA’s activities in the Congo broke all the rules

o

f t e n d i s c u s s e d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e r o l e o f i n t e l l i g e n c e i n c o n t e m p o r a r y

c

o n f l i c t s . M o s t n o t a b l y , r a t h e r t h a n t h e C I A b e i n g u s e d t o e n a b l e U . S .

m i l i t a r y f o r c e s t o c o n d u c t c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y , t h e C I A w a s u s e d t o e n s u r e

t h a t t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y w o u l d n o t b e c o m e i n v o l v e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , o n e o f

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the chief functions of the CIA in the Congo was to support proxy forces who would fight the insurgency on America’s behalf.

THE SIMBA REBELLION

Among the many reasons an insurgency erupted in the Congo in 1964 were government corruption and incompetence, poor economic conditions, and a

l a c k o f o p p o r t u n i t y . T h e i n s u r g e n c y i t s e l f w a s n o t a u n i f i e d u p r i s i n g , b u t

i n s t e a d c o n s i s t e d o f s e v e r a l l o o s e l y c o o r d i n a t e d c o m p o n e n t s . T h e f i r s t

r e b e l l i o n , b e g a n i n J a n u a r y 1 9 6 4 i n K w i l u P r o v i n c e , w a s l e d b y P i e r r e Mu l e le , w h o h a d p re v i o u s l y se r v e d i n L u mu mb a ’ s g o v e r n me n t a s Mi n is t e r

o f E d u c a t i o n . F o l l o w i n g L u m u m b a ’ s d e a t h ,

a m b a s s a d o r f o r t h e s e c e s s i o n i s t S t a n l e y v i l l e - b a s e d r e g i m e o f A n t o i n e

Giz eng a, tho ugh this had cea sed to exist by early 196 2. As a pol itic al exi le ,

M u l e l e t r a v e l e d t o C h i n a , w h e r e h e w a s g i v e n i n s t r u c t i o n i n g u e r r i l l a

w a r f a r e , b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g t o t h e C o n g o i n J u l y 1 9 6 3 . B a s e d i n K w i l u P r o v i n c e , w i t h a p o p u l a t i o n o f r o u g h l y o n e m i l l i o n , M u l e l e s p e n t t h e re ma i n d e r o f the y ea r or ga n iz i ng a r eb el li o n . T he Kw il u re b e l l i on r efl ec te d

M u l e l e s e r v e d a s a n

a m i x o f M a o i s t a p p r o a c h e s t o g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e , C o m m u n i s t

i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , a n d t r a d i t i o n a l m a g i c . M u l e l e ’ s p o o r l y a r m e d f o l l o w e r s

b e l i e v e d h e w a s i n v u l n e r a b l e t o b u l l e t s , a n d w o u l d r u s h i n t o b a t t l e sho uti ng ‘‘ ma i Mul el e’ ’ (wat er of Mul el e) in the b e l i e f tha t the b ull ets fi re d

a t t h e m w o u l d t u r n t o w a t e r . 7 Wi t h i n a m o n t h a ft e r s t a rt i n g t h e r eb el l i o n ,

M u l e l e ’ s g u e r r i l l a s c o n t r o l l e d a n a r e a r o u g h l y t h e s i z e o f B e l g i u m . 8

A l t h o u g h m e a s u r i n g t h e s i z e o f t h i s i n s u r g e n c y i s d i f f i c u l t , e s t i m a t e s f r o m

t

h a t p e r i o d s u g g e s t i t n u m b e r e d b e t w e e n

1 0 , 0 0 0 – 2 0 , 0 0 0 i n s u r g e n t s ,

s

u p p o r t e d b y a b o u t o n e - t e n t h o f t h e K w i l u p o p u l a t i o n . 9 I n t h e f i r s t

m o n t h s o f t h e r e b e l l i o n , t h e i n s u r g e n c y s c o r e d s e v e r a l n o t a b l e s u c c e s s e s

a g a i n s t t h e C o n g o l e s e N a t i o n a l A r m y ( A N C ) . T h i s p r o m p t e d t h e

C o n g o l e s e g o v e r n m e n t t o d i s p a t c h r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , w h o s u b s e q u e n t l y

p r o c e e d e d t o w a g e a s c o r c h e d - e a r t h c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t t h e r e b e l s . B y A p r i l

1 9 6 4 , t h e A N C s l o w l y r e g a i n e d t h e t a c t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e , a l t h o u g h a n o t h e r year-and-a-half would pass before the rebellion was defeated. 10 W h i l e a s i g n i f i c a n t a m o u n t o f A N C r e s o u r c e s w e r e b e i n g c o m m i t t e d t o Kwil u, reb elli ons bro ke out in oth er are as as wel l. Fol lowing the cl osing of

t

h e C o n g o l e s e p a r l i a m e n t i n 1 9 6 3 , a n u m b e r o f C o n g o l e s e p o l i t i c i a n s f l e d

t

o B r a z z a v i l l e , a c r o s s t h e r i v e r f r o m L e o p o l d v i l l e , a n d f o r m e d a

t h e C o m i t e´ N a t i o n a l e d e L i b e r a t i o n

( C N L ) . 1 1 B e g i n n i n g i n A p r i l 1 9 6 4 , t h e C N L , h e a d e d b y C h r i s t o p h e Gb e n y e , w o u l d b e c o m e t h e p o li t i c a l a n d d i p l o ma t i c f a c e o f th e i n s u r g e n c y b a s e d i n t h e e a s t e r n C o n g o . A m o n g t h e s e n i o r C N L o f f i c i a l s w e r e i t s

g o v e r n m e n t - i n - e x i l e

k n o w n a s

‘ ‘ D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r ’ ’ G a s t o n S o u m i a l o t a n d ‘ ‘ F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r ’ ’ T h o m a s Kanza. Laurent Kabila, then in his mid-20s, was also working for the CNL.

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B e g i n n i n g i n M a y 1 9 6 4 , t h e C N L w a s r e p o r t e d l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r

c o n d u c t i n g a s u c c e s s i o n o f a n t i - g o v e r n m e n t p l a s t i c - b o m b e x p l o s i o n s i n

L e o p o l d v i l l e . B u t

w i d e s p r e a d g r i e v a n c e s i n t h e e a s t e r n C o n g o i n o r d e r t o r e c r u i t t h o u s a n d s of sup por ter s to w age an ins urg en cy. From his bas e i n Buru n di, Soumi alo t l a u n c h e d a r e b e l l i o n i n t h e U v i r a r e g i o n o f K i v u p r o v i n c e . A t a b o u t t h e

s a m e t i m e , K a b i l a o r g a n i z e d r e b e l f o r c e s f r o m a m o n g t h e t o w n s o n t h e western shores of Lake Tanganyika. 12 These two CNL-led rebellions would l a t e r m e r g e w i t h t h e ‘ ‘ P o p u l a r A r m y ’ ’ h e a d e d b y ‘ ‘ G e n e r a l ’ ’ N i c o l a s Olenga . Initial ly, Ole nga’s ‘‘Popula r Army’ ’ lacke d a polit ical organi zation.

F o l l o w i n g t h e i r c a p t u r e o f S t a n l e y v i l l e i n e a r l y A u g u s t , h o w e v e r , G b e n y e a n d S o u m i a l o t s i m p l y a t t a c h e d t h e m s e l v e s t o O l e n g a ’ s f o r c e s a n d c r e a t e d the ‘‘People’s Republic of the Congo,’’ with Stanleyville its capital. 13 U n l i k e M u l e l e ’ s r e b e l l i o n i n K w i l u p r o v i n c e , t h e r e b e l s i n t h e e a s t e r n C o n g o w e r e c o n s i d e r a b l y b e t t e r a r m e d . N u m e r o u s a c c o u n t s s u g g e s t t h i s f o r c e w a s e q u i p p e d w i t h a m u l t i t u d e o f d i f f e r e n t w e a p o n s , r a n g i n g f r o m spe ars to aut om ati c ri f l es, ma chi nes g uns , mort ars , a n d ant i- tan k w eap ons . D u e t o t h e i r g e o g r a p h i c p r o x i m i t y t o c o u n t r i e s t h a t w e r e s y m p a t h e t i c t o t h e r e b e l c a u s e , t h e y w e r e a b l e t o r e c e i v e f o r e i g n a r m s s h i p m e n t s . 1 4 F r o m Ap r i l t h r o u g h S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 4 , t h e e a s t e r n r e b e l l i o n w o u l d g r a d u a l l y t a k e co ntr ol of mo re th an on e- th ir d o f t he C on g o . Ye t, the r a p id gr o w t h o f t he i n s u r g e n c y a l s o me a n t t h a t t h e r e b e l l e a d e r s d i d n o t h a v e t i m e t o f o r m a n o r g a n i z a t i o n c a p a b l e o f a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e c o n q u e r e d t e r r i t o r y . H a v i n g i n i t i a l l y g a i n e d e n o r m o u s s u p p o r t b y e x p l o i t i n g p o p u l a r g r i e v a n c e s , t h e r e b e l l i o n b r o u g h t w i t h i t ‘ ‘ t e r r o r a n d m a l a d m i n i s t r a t io n f a r s u r p a s s i n g t h e misdeeds of past Congolese administrators.’’ 15 The fal l of Sta nle yv ille , a nd spe ci fi cal ly th e cap tur e of f i v e U.S . cons ula r p e r s o n n e l w o r k i n g t h e r e , t h r e e o f w h o m w e r e C I A e m p l o y e e s , c o n v i n c e d U. S. po li cy ma ke rs th at urg en t a cti on wa s req uir ed to re ve rse th e s it u ati o n . Th e d e gre e to w hic h t h e si t uat ion wa s v i ewe d a s a cri s is w as evi d e n t in a 6

t h a t s t a t e d :

A u g u s t 1 9 6 4 N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ( N S C ) m e m o

a c h i e v e m e n t w a s t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f

t h e i r t r u e

‘ ‘ S t a n l e y v i l l e i s i n r e b e l h a n d s . A l l o f E a s t e r n C o n g o m a y g o i n n e x t s e v e r a l d a y s ; K a t a n g a , L e o p o l d v i l l e , a n d e n t i r e C e n t r a l G o v e r n m e n t m a y c o l l a p s e i n n e x t s e v e r a l w e e k s . ’ ’ 1 6 F r o m t h a t p o i n t o n , A m e r i c a n a n d B e l g i a n m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e w o u l d b e i n c r e a s i n g l y f o r t h c o m i n g , a n d w i t h t h e a r r i v a l o f f o r e i g n m e r c e n a r i e s , t h e r e b e l l i o n w o u l d b e g r a d u a l l y d r i v e n back. 17

THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGO

Unlike President John F. Kennedy, who sought to raise the profile of Africa in U.S. foreign policy, President Lyndon B. Johnson sought as best he could to keep Africa ‘‘off the agenda.’’ 18 Prior to the rebel capture of Stanleyville,

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t h e C o n g o h a d r e c e i v e d s i g n i f i c a n t a t t e n t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e S t a t e

D e p a r t m e n t , b u t h a d n o t r e a c h e d a p o i n t o f p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s i n w h i c h t h e

J o h n s o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f e a r e d i t c o u l d h a v e n e g a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n s f o r t h e

u p c o m i n g 1 9 6 4 p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . 1 9 S i m i l a r t o t h e D w i g h t D .

E i s e n h o w e r a n d K e n n e d y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , U . S . p o l i c y t o w a r d t h e C o n g o

u

n d e r J o h n s o n w a s p r e d i c a t e d o n t h e p e r c e i v e d n e e d t o m a i n t a i n a

p

r o - W e s t e r n g o v e r n m e n t i n p o w e r , f e a r i n g t h a t a C o n g o l e s e g o v e r n m e n t

t h a t h a d c l o s e r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e C o m m u n i s t b l o c w o u l d h a v e n e g a t i v e

re p er c u s s i o n s f or t he We s t . Th is c on c er n o v e r t he C o n g o w a s no t si mp l y a

f e a r t h a t i t s m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s c o u l d b e d e n i e d t o W e s t e r n m a r k e t s . 2 0

R a t h e r , t h e p r i n c i p a l f e a r w a s t h a t a ‘ ‘ r a d i c a l ’ ’ t a k e o v e r o f t h e C o n g o ,

o l l o w i n g t h e r i s e o f o t h e r ‘ ‘ r a d i c a l A f r i c a n ’ ’ g o v e r n m e n t s , w o u l d h a v e a

f

d

o m i n o e f f e c t t h a t w o u l d u n d e r m i n e R h o d e s i a a n d t h e P o r t u g u e s e h o l d

o

v e r A n g o l a a n d M o z a m b i q u e , a n d i s o l a t e S o u t h A f r i c a . S i m i l a r t o

V i e t n a m , t h e C o n g o w a s d i s c u r s i v e l y c o n s t r u c t e d a s t h e k e y ‘ ‘ d o m i n o ’ ’ i n

Africa. By Augus t 196 4, the Vie tnam -style domi no think ing w a s qui te evi dent in

t h e d i s c o u r s e o f s e n i o r U . S . p o l i c y m a k e r s . A t a n 1 1 A u g u s t N S C m e e t i n g

d e d i c a t e d t o t h e C o n g o c r i s i s , o n e o f t h e m a i n c o n c e r n s e x p r e s s e d w a s

t h a t , e v e n i f t h e r e b e l l i o n w e r e p r i n c i p a l l y r o o t e d i n t r i b a l c o n f l i c t , t h e Ch ine se and ‘‘ C o m m u nis ts ’’ w oul d pro fi t f r o m the ir vic tor y. 22 T h e h ead of

t h e U . S . S t r i k e C o m m a n d , G e n e r a l P a u l A d a m s , e x p r e s s e d e v e n m o r e

e x t r e m e v i e w s . H e w r o t e t h a t t h e C o n g o ’ s ‘ ‘ l o s s t o c o m m u n i s t c o n t r o l

w o u l d b e a p o l i t i c a l

j e o p a r d i z e U . S . n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s t h r o u g h o u t a l l o f A f r i c a s o u t h o f t h e

S a h a r a , a n d c o u l d i n t i m e l e a d t o a c o m m u n i s t d o m i n a t e d b l a c k A f r i c a . ’ ’

Ad am s e ve n w en t s o fa r a s to s u g g es t t h a t t h e C om m u n is t b a c k in g f o r t he i n s u r g e n c y ‘ ‘ i s e v i d e n c i n g i t s e l f a s a d o u b l e e n v e l o p m e n t o f t h e C o n g o . ’ ’ 2 3

A s C I A p a r a m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r R i c h a r d H o l m n o t e d , ‘ ‘ T h e S i m b a s , a r a g t a g

bun ch of il li ter ate d is s i dent s, cer tai nly were n’t com mu nis ts . B ut the y pos e d

21

c a t a s t r o p h e . T h e i m p a c t o f s u c h a l o s s c o u l d

a

t h r e a t t o t h e p r o - W e s t e r n [ M o i s e ] T s h o m b e g o v e r n me n t i n L e o p o l d v i l l e .

T

h u s t h e y g a i n e d t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , C h i n a , a n d t h e i r

mi ni o n s . A nd th a t p r o m p t e d d e t er m i n a t io n fr o m t h e Un i te d St a te s a n d i t s

a l l i e s t o p r o v i d e a l l s u p p o r t p o s s i b l e t o T s h o m b e a n d h i s g o v e r n m e n t . I t

w

a s t h a t s i m p l e

’ ’ 2 4 I n d e e d , d e s p i t e e v i d e n c e f r o m t h e I n t e l l i g e n c e

C

o m m u n i t y s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e r e b e l s w e r e n o t ‘ ‘ C o m m u n i s t - c o n t r o l l e d , ’ ’

senior policymakers continued to act as if they were.

Interestingly, the domino thinking evident in high-level discussions on the

C o n g o w a s a c c o m p a n i e d b y a s t r o n g d e s i r e b y t h e s e o f f i c i a l s t o a v o i d

‘ ‘ a n o t h e r V i e t n a m . ’ ’ D e s p i t e t h e t a l k o f f a l l i n g d o m i n o e s , U . S . p o l i c y t o

m a i n t a i n t h e s t a b i l i t y o f t h e C o n g o i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s w a s l i m i t e d , a n d

c

o n s i s t e d m a i n l y o f C I A p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s , w h i c h i n 1 9 6 3 w e r e

e

x p a n d e d t o i n c l u d e a p a r a m i l i t a r y p r o g r a m t o s u p p l y a h a n d f u l o f p i l o t s

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fo r th e C o n g o l e s e a ir fo r c e . U. S . p o l i c y a l s o c o n s is t e d o f a r e l a ti v e ly s m a l l

m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e p r o g r a m a i m e d a t i m p r o v i n g

C o n g o l e s e A r m y . B y t h e s t a r t o f t h e S i m b a r e b e l l i o n , h o w e v e r , t h e A N C

w a s n o t c o n s i d e r e d f i t f o r t h a t p u r p o s e . W h a t e v e r v a l u e J o s e p h M o b u t u m a y h a v e l a t e r h a d a s P r e s i d e n t o f t h e C o n g o , h i s t e n u r e a s A N C c h i e f w a s c o n s i d e r e d t o b e s o m e w h a t d i s a s t r o u s . T h e U . S . A r m y a t t a c h e´

d e s c r i b e d M o b u t u a s ‘ ‘ d o u b t f u l l y m i l i t a r i l y c a p a b l e t o s i m u l t a n e o u s l y

command two platoons.’’ 25 A t t h i s t i m e , t h e J o h n s o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s r e l u c t a n t t o c o m m i t U . S . m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . I n A u g u s t , a r e q u e s t b y C o n g o l e s e P r i m e M i n i s t e r Tsh om be and ANC hea d M o but u t o dep loy thr ee U. S. air b orn e b a t t ali ons

t o r e t a k e S t a n l e y v i ll e , Al b e r t v i l l e , a n d U v i r a , a n d t o d i s p a t c h U . S . S p e c i a l

F o r c e s , w a s r e j e c t e d o u t o f h a n d . 2 6 A t t h e 1 1 A u g u s t N S C m e e t i n g , o n e

s e n i o r o f f i c i a l e x p r e s s e d t h e v i e w t h a t ‘ ‘ d i r e c t A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y

i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e C o n g o s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d o n l y a s a n e x t r e m e l a s t

r e s o r t . ’ ’ C h a i r m a n o f t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f ( J S C ) G e n e r a l E a r l e

W h e e l e r c o n c u r r e d , n o t i n g t h a t w a s a l s o ‘ ‘ t h e l o n g h e l d v i e w o f t h e J C S . ’ ’

D e s p i t e t a k i n g s e r i o u s m i l i t a r y a c t i o n o f f t h e t a b l e , J o h n s o n n e v e r t h e l e s s

t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e

o

b s e r v e d t h a t ‘ ‘ t i m e i s r u n n i n g o u t a n d t h e C o n g o m u s t b e s a v e d . ’ ’ 2 7 I n

d

u e c o u r s e , a U . S . m i l i t a r y t a s k f o r c e w a s d e p l o y e d , c o n s i s t i n g o f f o u r

C- 1 3 0 s , th r e e t ro o p- ca r ry i n g h e li c o pt e rs , an d s o me f i f t y p a r a tr oo p e r s f r o m

t

h e 8 2 n d A i r b o r n e D i v i s i o n w h o w e r e m a i n l y u s e d t o p r o v i d e l o g i s t i c s

s

u p p o r t t o t h e A N C . 2 8 A d d i t i o n a l m i l i t a r y o p t i o n s w e r e a l s o c o n s i d e r e d ,

t

h o u g h e v e n i n t h e w o r s t - c a s e s c e n a r i o s b e i n g c o n t e m p l a t e d , U . S . m i l i t a r y

i

n t e r v e n t i o n w a s t o c o n s i s t o f i n d i r e c t a d v i s o r y e f f o r t s r a t h e r t h a n d i r e c t

c

o m b a t . F o r i n s t a n c e , G e n e r a l A d a m s w r o t e t o W h e e l e r t h a t ‘ ‘ T h i s

c

o m m a n d a p p r e c i a t e s c u r r e n t U . S . p o l i c y t o m a i n t a i n A m e r i c a n s u p p o r t

a

n d a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e C o n g o a t a m i n i m u m l e v e l a n d t o i n s u r e t h a t U . S .

m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l d o n o t b e c o m e i n t e n t i o n a l l y i n v o l v e d i n c o m b a t a n d co mb a t su p p o r t o p e r a t io n s .’ ’ Ye t A d a ms al so b e li e v ed t ha t di sp a t c h i ng s ix

to twe lv e U.S . mil it ary tea ms num ber ing t e n to tw e l v e off ic ers and enl is ted me n e a c h ‘ ‘c o u l d r ap i d ly c ha n g e t h e c u r re n t m i l it a r y s i t u a ti o n . ’ ’ 2 9 In o t he r word s, from the U.S. mil itar y’s poi nt of view , w agi ng coun ter insur gen cy in

t h e C o n g o w a s t o c o n s i s t o f a v e r y s m a l l m i l i t a r y c o m m i t m e n t , c e r t a i n l y

i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h V i e t n a m , b u t n o t t o o d i s s i m i l a r f r o m

U . S .

counterinsurgency assistance elsewhere. 30 I n Au g u s t 1 9 6 4 , t h e U . S . w a s s t il l m o n t h s a w a y f r o m d e p l o y i n g c o m b a t

t r o o p s t o V i e t n a m , t h o u g h i t d i d h a v e a s i g n i f i c a n t a d v i s o r y p r e s e n c e a t that ti me. And yet , even at this early st age, Wa shington ’s polic ymakers felt

t h a t e v e n t h e U . S . a d v i s o r y p r e s e n c e i n V i e t n a m w a s t o o g r e a t a

com mi tm e nt to b e r e pli c ate d e l s e w her e. Th rou gh ou t t his pe ri o d , nu me ro u s

r e f e r e n c e s w e r e m a d e b y U . S . o f f i c i a l s t h a t t h e C o n g o d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e

a n ‘ ‘ A f r i c a n V i e t n a m . ’ ’ 3 1 T h e s h a d o w o f V i e t n a m h u n g o v e r U . S . p o l i c y

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t o w a r d s t h e C o n g o i n t w o p r i n c i p a l w a y s : f i r s t , U . S . c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y

e f f o r t s w e r e t o c o n s i s t o f a n ‘ ‘ a u s t e r e p r o g r a m ’ ’ d u e t o t h e p e r c e i v e d

l i m i t e d m i l i t a r y r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e f o r d e p l o y m e n t t o t h e C o n g o . 3 2

Second, U.S. public opi nion was hostile to the not ion of potenti ally getting

i n v o l v e d i n a ‘ ‘ l o n g d r a w n o u t i n d e c i s i v e c a m p a i g n s u c h a s w e h a v e i n

S o u t h V i e t n a m t o d a y , ’ ’ a n d t h i s h a d a n e g a t i v e i m p a c t o n U . S .

policymak ers who might other wise have consi dered militar y interve ntion as

a l e g i t i m a t e o p t i o n . 3 3 T h e u p s h o t o f t h i s a t t i t u d e w a s t h a t p o l i c y m a k e r s were more willing to opt for a covert intervent ion in which the CIA, rather than the U.S. military, took the lead. G i v e n t h e A N C ’ s w e a k n e s s , a n d n o t w a n t i n g t h e U . S . t o g e t d i r e c t l y

in vo lv e d , t h e J oh n so n a d m i n is tr at io n w as in it ia ll y q u i t e wi ll i n g t o a cc ep t a

B e l g i a n m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n t o s t a b i l i z e t h e s i t u a t i o n . W h e n i t b e c a m e

u n w i l l i n g t o u n d e r t a k e a m i l i t a r y

e v i d e n t t h a t t h e B e l g i a n s

i n t e r v e n t i o n , t h e d e c i s i o n w a s t a k e n t o s u p p o r t t h e c r e a t i o n o f a u n i t o f

f o r e i g n m e r c e n a r i e s . W h i l e W a s h i n g t o n p o l i c y m a k e r s r e a l i z e d t h e

i n e v i t a b l e fa ll o u t f r o m su p p o r t i n g w h i t e me r c e n a r i e s i n A f r i c a , t h is o p ti o n

w a s s t i l l p r e f e r a b l e t o a U . S . m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . A s o n e p o l i c y m a k e r

n o t e d i n e a r l y A u g u s t 1 9 6 4 , t h e s i t u a t i o n ‘ ‘ i s b a s i c a l l y p o w e r v a c u u m ,

c o u l d p r o b a b l y b e r e t r i e v e d b y s m a l l s e c u r i t y f o r c e ( i d e a l l y w h i t e , a t a

m i n i m u m w h i t e - l e d a n d , i f r e a l l y g o o d , a s f e w a s 1 , 0 0 0 ) . ’ ’ H e w e n t o n t o

s a y t h a t t h e U . S . s h o u l d h e l p t h e ‘ ‘ C o n g o l e s e i n e v e r y w a y t o o r g a n i z e a mercenary-led force.’’ 34

w e r e

THE CIA’S COVERT INTERVENTION IN THE CONGO

From the Congo gaining its independence from Belgium in 1960 to the start

o f t h e S i m b a r e b e l l i o n i n 1 9 6 4 , C I A p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e n e w

c o u n t r y c a n b e d i v i d e d i n t o t w o d i s t i n c t p e r i o d s : t h e o v e r t h r o w o f P a t r i c e

Lumumba and the events leading to his execution in January 1961, and the

A

g e n c y ’ s

e f f o r t s t h e r e a f t e r t o ‘ ‘ s u p p o r t t h e l e g i t i m a t e C o n g o l e s e

G

o v e r n m e n t i n t h e h o p e s o f b r i n g i n g

s t a b i l i t y t o t h e C o n g o a n d

f r u s t r a t i n g C o m m u n i s t e f f o r t s . ’ ’ 3 5 T h r o u g h o u t t h e s e y e a r s , C I A c o v e r t

o p e r a t i o n s i n A f r i c a w e r e s t i l l ‘ ‘ r e l a t i v e l y n e w , ’ ’ a n d b e c a u s e t h e C o n g o

w a s a B e l g i a n c o l o n y , b o t h a n e w A m e r i c a n E m b a s s y a n d a n e w C I A

s

t a t i o n h a d t o b e d e v e l o p e d a f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e . 3 6 I n d u e c o u r s e , U . S .

c

o n s u l a t e s w o u l d b e o p e n e d i n S t a n l e y v i l l e a n d B u k a v u , w i t h t h e

v

i c e - c o n s u l p o s i t i o n b e i n g o c c u p i e d b y a C I A o f f i c e r . 3 7 T h e C I A ’ s A f r i c a

D

i v i s i o n w a s a l s o i n i t s i n f a n c y a t t h i s t i m e . A l t h o u g h b y t h e 1 9 7 0 s i t

w

o u l d e v e n t u a l l y g r o w i n t o a l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n , i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s , i t s

‘‘successes’’ in the Congo were the result of a handful of operatives. 38

The CIA’s role in the overthrow of Lumumba, including the part played by

C I A S t a t i o n C h i e f L a w r e n c e De v l i n , h a s b e e n w e l l c o v e r e d e l s e w h e r e , a n d

INTERNATIONAL JO URNAL OF INTELLIGENCE

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BR E AKING THE RULES : CIA IN THE CONGO

137

d o e s n ’ t n e e d f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t i o n h e r e . 3 9 P a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e p e r i o d t h a t

f o l l o w e d L u m u m b a ’ s d e a t h , t h e C I A e s t a b l i s h e d c l o s e r e l a t i o n s w i t h s e v e r a l k e y f i g u r e s i n t h e C o n g o l e s e g o v e r n m e n t , i n f o r m a l l y r e f e r r e d t o a s

th e B i n z a Gr o u p , a nd a ls o p la y e d an i m p o rt an t ro le i n e s t a b li s h i ng C y r i l l e

Adoula as Lumumba’s successor as Prime Minister. 40 The Agency provided

c o v e r t f u n d i n g f o r A d o u l a t o b u y t h e s u p p o r t o f p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y

l e a d e r s . 4 1 I n t e r m s o f t h e C I A ’ s d e a l i n g s w i t h M o b u t u , w h o w a s i n i t i a l l y

h e a d o f t h e C o n g o l e s e a r m y a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y P r e s i d e n t o f t h e C o n g o

( Z a i r e ) f r o m 1 9 6 5 – 1 9 9 7 , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s q u i t e c l o s e . 4 2 A c c o r d i n g t o Devlin, ‘‘I met Mobutu almost daily, often over breakfast on the terrace of

h i s h o m e . ’ ’ 4 3 E v e n t h e C I A c o n t r a c t a v i a t o r E d D e a r b o r n h a d a c l o s e

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h M o b u t u . 4 4 S i m i l a r l y , t h e C I A a l s o w o r k e d q u i t e c l o s e l y

w i t h V i c t o r N e n d a k a , t h e h e a d o f C o n g o s t a t e s e c u r i t y . T h u s , a t t h e t i m e

o f t h e S i m b a r e b e l l i o n , t h e C I A ’ s C o n g o s t a t i o n h a d d i r e c t a c c e s s a n d a

c l o s e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e C o n g o l e s e m i l i t a r y a n d

security forces. 45 Within weeks of the rebel capture of Stanleyville, and at the instigation of

W a s h i n g t o n a n d B r u s s e l s , T s h o m b e b e g a n h i r i n g a m e r c e n a r y f o r c e t o

bolster the ANC’s counte rinsu rgency effor ts . I n the course of the foll owing

y e a r , t h e C I A w o u l d w o r k c l o s e l y w i t h t h e m e r c e n a r i e s . F o r m e r B r i t i s h A r m y o f f i c e r a n d e x - K a t a n g a m e r c e n a r y M i k e H o a r e w a s h i r e d t o l e a d t h i s m e r c e n a r y f o r c e , w h i c h h e n a m e d ‘ ‘ 5 C o m m a n d o . ’ ’ 4 6 T h e C o n g o coun ter ins u rge ncy cam pai gn th at fol lowe d can be bro ken int o th ree phas es

in w h ic h H o a re ’ s me r c en a r i es s p e a r he a d e d AN C a tt ac k s a g a i n s t r e b el -h e ld

a

r e a s , a l l t h e w h i l e b e i n g s u p p o r t e d b y t h e C I A . I n t h e f i r s t p h a s e , t h e

c

o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t s

s e t o u t t o r e c a p t u r e S t a n l e y v i l l e , c u l m i n a t i n g i n

O p e r a t i o n D r a g o n R o u g e i n N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 4 . I n t h e s e c o n d p h a s e , t h e

ga in s f r o m th e fi rs t p h a se w e re c o n s o l id a t e d , w it h th e m e r ce na r i e s p u s h in g

i n t o t h e n o r t h e a s t C o n g o a n d c a p t u r i n g t o w n s a l o n g t h e U g a n d a n a n d

S u d a n e s e b o r d e r s t h a t h a d b e e n u s e d b y t h e r e b e l s t o b r i n g i n s u p p l i e s

f r o m a b r o a d . T h e f i n a l p h a s e c o n s i s t e d o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s a t t a c k o n t h e r e b e l - h e l d F i z i B a r a k a p o c k e t i n t h e a u t u m n o f 1 9 6 5 . T h e C I A p l a y e d a

crucial role in each of these phases of the counterinsurgency.

Relationship with Mercenaries

Over the course of the Simba rebellion, both the CIA and the U.S. military attache´ in Leopoldville developed a close, albeit covert, working relationship

w i t h t h e m e rc e n a r i es , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h H o a r e . T h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u r s e o f t h e

c o n f l i c t , H o a r e ’ s 5 C o m m a n d o n e v e r a m o u n t e d t o m o r e t h a n s e v e r a l

h u n d r e d m e r c e n a r i e s a t a n y o n e t i m e , t h e m a j o r i t y o f w h o m w e r e S o u t h

A f r i c a n s a n d R h o d e s i a n s . T e c h n i c a l l y , t h e u n i t w a s s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e

A N C c o m m a n d s t r u c t u r e , w i t h H o a r e ’ s n o m i n a l s u p e r i o r s b e i n g A N C

AND C O UNTERINTELLIGENCE

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h e a d J o s e p h M o b u t u a n d C o l o n e l F r e d e r i c V a n d e w a l l e , a B e l g i a n A r m y o f f i c e r o n l o a n t o t h e C o n g o l e s e g o v e r n m e n t . 4 7 I n p r a c t i c e , H o a r e w a s g i v e n s i g n i f i c a n t l e e w a y t o c o n d u c t h i s o w n o p e r a t i o n s , t h o u g h w i t h i n a

st rateg ic fr amewo rk dev el oped by Vande wal le . A sep ara te Fre nch- spe aking

u n i t c a l l e d ‘ ‘ 6 C o m m a n d o ’ ’ w a s a l s o f o r m e d , b u t i t s m a i n d u t i e s w e r e t o

ga rr is o n ca ptu re d to wn s an d b o ls te r th e A N C ’s ran k s . Whi l e U. S . off ic i als m a i n t a i n e d c o n t a c t s w i t h t h i s u n i t a s w e l l , t h e C I A ’ s r e l a t i o n s w i t h 6 C o m m a n d o r a n k e d c o n s i d e r a b l y l o w e r t h a n i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h 5 Commando, which was at the forefront of the counterinsurgency operation. Officially, the U.S. government wanted to avoid being seen as having any

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e m e r c e n a r i e s . T h i s p o i n t w a s m a d e e x p l i c i t i n a n

E m b a s s y c a b l e t h a t s t a t e d , ‘ ‘ F o r p u b l i c c o n s u m p t i o n b e l i e v e w e m u s t

c

o n t i n u e t a k e ‘ n o c o m m e n t ’ l i n e o n a l l a s p e c t s o f m e r c e n a r y

p

r o b l e m

O v e r t l y a t l a s t , U . S . r e p s s h o u l d k e e p a s f a r a w a y f r o m

me r c e n a r i e s a s p o s si b l e. ’’ At t h e s a me t im e, h o w e v e r, a v e r y d i f f e re n t v i ew

w a s t o b e h e l d i n t e r n a l l y . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e s a m e c a b l e , ‘ ‘ F o r p u r p o s e s o f

o r i e n t i n g o u r o w n t h i n k i n g , i t s e e m s t o u s i m p o r t a n t t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t

s e c u r i t y h a s d e t e r i o r a t e d i n

m e r c e n a r i e s o r d i r e c t i n t e r v e n t i o n b y n o n - A f r i c a n m i l i t a r y u n i t s c a n s a v e

C o n g o t o

[ t h e ] p o i n t [ t h a t ] o n l y w h i t e

d

a y . P e r f e c t b u t u n l i k e l y s o l u t i o n w o u l d b e f o r m e r c e n a r i e s t o c o m e i n

q

u i c k l y a n d q u i e t l y , r e - e s t a b l i s h p e a c e , a n d t h e n g e t o u t . ’ ’ 4 8 O n c e t h e

d

e c i s i o n w a s m a d e t o s u p p o r t a m e r c e n a r y f o r c e i n t h e C o n g o ,

t h e

q

u e s t i o n a r o s e o f h o w t o p a y f o r t h e m , g i v e n t h e p o o r s t a t e o f C o n g o l e s e

g

o v e r n m e n t f i n a n c e s . B y

V a n d e w a l l e ’ s a c c o u n t , C I A S t a t i o n C h i e f

B e n j a m i n H i l t o n C u s h i n g o f f e r e d t o c o v e r t l y f i n a n c e t h e m e r c e n a r i e s ,

a l t h o u g h t h e l i k e l i h o o d i s t h a t i n t h e e n d t h e f u n d s w e r e m a d e a v a i l a b l e

through an overt increase of the military assistance budget. 49

T h e Ame ri ca n r el at ion shi p w it h the me rc ena ri e s th at eve ntu all y em e r ged

w a s a c o v e r t a n d h i g h l y e f f e c t i v e p a r t n e r s h i p . T h i s w a s n o t p r e d e t e r m i n e d

h o w e v e r . I n d e e d , i n i t i a l U . S . a s s e s s m e n t s o f t h e m e r c e n a r y s u p p o r t t o t h e

r

e t a k i n g o f A l b e r t v i l l e i n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 4 w e r e h i g h l y c r i t i c a l o f H o a r e ’ s

c

o m p e t e n c e . 5 0 O v e r t i m e , t h i s v i e w c h a n g e d c o m p l e t e l y , a n d w i t h i n a f e w

m o n t h s t h e r e a f t e r , d u r i n g w h i c h 5 C o m m a n d o c o n d u c t e d a n u m b e r o f

s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e S i m b a s , c u l m i n a t i n g i n t h e i r d r i v e t o

S t a n l e y v i l l e , C I A a n a l y s t s l a v i s h e d c o n s i d e r a b l e p r a i s e o n H o a r e . A t t h e

w o r k i n g l e v e l , a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p e m e r g e d , r e f l e c t e d i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e C I A h a d p r o v i d e d a i r s u p p o r t t o t h e m e r c e n a r i e s , a n d l a t e r m a r i t i m e

s

u p p o r t a s w e l l , w i t h t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y p r o v i d i n g l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t a n d

s

t r a t e g i c l i f t . T o b e e f f e c t i v e a t p r o v id i n g c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t , f o r i n s t a n c e , a

g

o o d w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s e s s e n t i a l . S i g n i f i c a n t

i n t e l l i g e n c e

c

o l l a b o r a t i o n a l s o o c c u r r e d , w i t h t h e m e r c e n a r i e s p r o v i d i n g U . S . o f f i c i a l s

w it h i n t el l i g e n c e a c q u i r e d f ro m t he i r o p e r a t io n s , as w e ll a s s u p p l y i n g t h e m wi th c apt u red Sov ie t a nd Ch ine s e ar ms. Ho are per s ona ll y b ri efe d C IA an d

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military officials on numerous occasions. 51 Moreover, while the CIA air and

n a v a l a s s e t s w e r e p l a c e d u n d e r H o a r e ’ s c o m m a n d in o r d e r t o f a c i l i t a t e h i s

o p e r a t i o n s , H o a r e i n t u r n a l s o f a c i l i t a t e d C I A i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n i n areas controlled by 5 Commando. 52 T h i s c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s n o t s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f m u t u a l i n t e r e s t .

S i g n i f i c a n t e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t b o t h s i d e s v i e w e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n m o r e p e r s o n a l t e r m s . B o t h C I A a n d U . S . m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l s b a s e d i n

L e o p o l d v i l l e h e l d H o a r e i n h i g h r e g a r d . I n o n e o f h i s r e p o r t s , t h e U . S .

m i l i t a r y a t t a c h e´ i n L e o p o l d v i l l e , C o l o n e l K n u t R a u d s t e i n , o b s e r v e d :

‘ ‘ T s h o m b e s u p p o r t e r s m o s t f o r t u n a t e i n h a v i n g m a n o f H o a r e ’ s

t e m p e r a m e n t , c h a r a c t e r , a n d c a p a b i l i t y i n h i s p o s i t i o n . H e [ i s ] s o m e w h a t amu sed [at ] b ei ng tab b e d a So uth Afr ic an a s he cl aim s B ri t c it iz ens hip and cond u cts him sel f as t y pic al up per cl a ss Bri ton pro u d of Iri s h ext rac ti on. ’’ 53

L a r r y D e v l i n , w h o i n J u l y 1 9 6 5 r e p l a c e d C u s h i n g a s S t a t i o n C h i e f , a l s o

e n j o y e d g o o d r e l a t i o n s w i t h H o a r e , w h o m h e r e f e r r e d t o a s a ‘ ‘ g e n t l e m e n

a dv e n t u r e r . ’ ’ 54 I n h i s m e m o i r s , D e vl i n w r o te , ‘ ‘ W el l - ed u c a t e d , a r t i c u l a t e , a man of tremendous charm, Mike Hoare had pro ven himsel f t o b e a seri ous

a n d c a p a b l e s o l d i e r , a f a r c r y f r o m t h e ‘ M a d M i k e ’ i m a g e c r e a t e d b y t h e m e d i a . M i k e h a d d a s h a n d p i z z a z z . H e r e a d C h r i s t o p h e r M a r l o w e a n d

S h a k e s p e a r e , h e t o l d g r e a t s t o r i e s t h a t m a d e y o u r h a i r s t a n d o n e n d , a n d

w a s a m a n o f i n t e g r i t y a n d d i g n i t y . W e b e c a m e g o o d f r i e n d s , a

h e

f r i e n d s h i p t h a t h a s l a s t e d o v e r t h e y e a r s . ’ ’ 5 5 F o l l o w i n g H o a r e ’ s d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e C o n g o i n l a t e 1 9 6 5 a f t e r t h e r e b e l l i o n h a d b e e n d e f e a t e d , t h e CIA’s relati ons with the mercenaries qui ckly deter iorated . Not only did the

p

e r s o n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e me r c e n a r y l e a d e r s h i p a n d t h e C I A b r e a k

d

o w n , b u t t h e A g e n c y ’ s m a i n o b j e c t i v e i n t h e C o n g o , n a m e l y t o s u p p o r t

st ab i li ty g e n er a ll y, a n d P r es id e n t M o b ut u i n p a rt i c u la r , to o k p r io ri ty , w i t h

the mercenaries becoming a source of instability. 56

The ‘‘Instant Air Force’’

A r g u a b l y t h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n t h e C I A m a d e t o t h e C o n g o campaign was the creat ion of what The New York Time s call ed an ‘‘inst ant

a i r f o r c e . ’ ’ 5 7 T h e a i r f o r c e i t s e l f w o u l d u l t i m a t e l y i n c l u d e s e v e r a l t y p e s o f Worl d W a r II- era air cra ft fl own ma inl y b y ant i- Cast ro C uban exi le s. Thei r

c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e c a m p a i g n w o u l d i n c l u d e p r o v i d i n g a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e ,

c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t , a i r i n t e r d i c t i o n , a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l o p e r a t i o n s m i s s i o n s . A l t h o u g h t h e C I A ’ s C o n g o a i r f o r c e d i d n o t d e f e a t t h e i n s u r g e n c y o n i t s

o w n , t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t f o r c e s c o u l d h a v e s u c c e e d e d w i t h o u t i t i s

inconceivable. W h i l e l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e o r i g i n a l d e c i s i o n t o e m p l o y C u b a n e x i l e

p i l o t s f o r t h e C o n g o i s a v a i l a b l e , t h e r e i s l i t t l e d o u b t a b o u t t h e d a t e .

A c c o r d i n g t o n u m e r o u s s o u r c e s , t h e f i r s t C u b a n e x i l e p i l o t s w e r e s e n t t o

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the Congo in 1963, months before the start of the Simba rebellion. 58 Within

t h e C I A , t h e a i r b r a n c h o f t h e S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s D i v i s i o n i n t h e D e p u t y

D i r e c t o r a t e o f P l a n s ( D D P ) o r g a n i z e d t h i s o p e r a t i o n . T h i s u n i t a l s o h a d

exp erie nce org anizi ng CIA air activ itie s i n A s i a and aga ins t Cast ro’ s C uba.

T h e C u b a n e x i l e s w e r e v e t e r a n s o f t h e B a y o f P i g s , s o m e o f w h o m h a d

a l s o s e r v e d a s p i l o t s f o r t h e C u b a n A i r F o r c e u n d e r t h e n - P r e s i d e n t

F u l g e n c i o B a t i s t a , w h i l e o t h e r s h a d j o i n e d t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y a f t e r t h e B a y

o f P i g s a n d w e r e t h e n g i v e n h o n o r a b l e d i s c h a r g e s t o f i g h t i n t h e C o n g o . 5 9

A C I A p r o p r i e t a r y c o m p a n y , t h e C a r i b b e a n M a r i n e A e r o C o r p o r a t i o n

( C a r a ma r ) , w a s s e t u p i n M i a m i t o h i r e t h e p i l o t s , i n i t i a l l y t o f l y u n a r m e d

T-6 training aircraft that had been donated to the Congo by Italy. 60 H i r i n g t h e C u b a n s h a d t w o p r i n c i p a l a d v a n t a g e s . F i r s t , t h e y w e r e i d e a l

fr om a c ov ert o p e r a ti o ns p ers pe cti ve si nc e t he y we r e n o t U. S. ci ti z e n s , a n d

the ref o r e the U. S. go ver nm ent co uld cl aim ‘‘ pla usi b l e deni a bil it y.’ ’ Sec on d,

a

s i t b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y a p p a r e n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y ’ s

d

e a t h , t h a t t h e U . S . w o u l d n o t s u p p o r t a n i n v a s i o n o f C u b a , a n d d u e t o

t h e c o n c e r n t h a t t h e C u b a n e x i l e s w o u l d m o u n t r o g u e o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t

C a st ro if le ft to th e ir o w n de v ic e s, Wa sh in g t on fe l t th a t t h e C o n g o w a s a n

i d e a l p l a c e t o s e n d t h e e x i l e s , t e l l i n g t h e m t h e y w o u l d b e f i g h t i n g

Communism there. 61 Initially, at least two American pilots were contracted to fly in the Congo. As of June 1964, CIA contract aviators Ed Dearborn and Don Coney were flying close air support mis sions for the ANC. Curiously, even though they

were nomi n all y work ing for the C IA, li tt le att em pt was made to kee p t h ei r pre sence a secre t. An arti cle in Time ma gaz ine inc luded the real names and

b a c k g r o u n d o f D e a r b o r n a n d C o n e y , s u g g e s t i n g t h e y w e r e n o t p r o v i d e d

wit h a n off icia l cov er. The art icle als o noted tha t aft er bei ng quest ion ed by

n e w s me n , t h e U . S . E m b a s s y i n L eo p o ld v i l l e at fi r s t de n ie d t h a t Am e r i ca n s

w e r e i n v o l v e d , a n d t h e n l a t e r a d m i t t e d t h a t n o A m e r i c a n s w o u l d b e directly involved in fighting henceforth. Both Americans were reassigned to

s u p p o r t i n g t h e C u b a n e x i l e p i l o t s , b u t n o t t h e m s e l v e s f l y i n g . E m b a s s y

o

f f i c i a l s a l s o d i s a s s o c i a t e d t h e m s e l v e s f r o m t h e C u b a n s , w h o t h e y c l a i m e d

h

a d b e e n h i r e d b y t h e C o n g o l e s e g o v e r n m e n t . 6 2 A s o n e E m b a s s y c a b l e

n

o t e d , ‘ ‘ A l t h o u g h a l o t w i l l b e s a i d a b o u t C u b a n s b e i n g U . S . m e r c e n a r i e s ,

w e w i l l w a n t t o c o n t i n u e t o s a y a s l i t t l e a s p o s s i b l e a n d r e f e r a l l i n q u i r i e s t o G O C [ G o v e r n m e n t o f C o n g o ] , w i t h w h o m p i l o t s h a v e c o n t r a c t s . ’ ’ 6 3

De s p i t e t h e d e n i a l s , t h e f o r e ig n p r e s s , s u c h a s t h e S o v i e t T AS S , a c c u r a t e l y

reported on the pilots being recruited in Miami and working for the CIA. 64 P r i o r t o t h e C o n g o , t h e C I A a l r e a d y h a d s o m e e x p e r i e n c e a n d a n

o r g a n i z a t i o n a l m e c h a n i s m t h a t c o u l d p r o v i d e a i r c r a f t f o r t h i s t y p e o f

c o v e r t o p e r a t i o n . 6 5 A s i n d i c a t e d , t h e u n a r m e d H a r v a r d T - 6 a i r c r a f t f l o w n

b y t h e C u b a n e x i l e s w e r e o r i g i n a l l y d o n a t e d b y I t a l y . A s t h e r e b e l l i o n i n Kw i lu P r o v i n c e g a i n e d t ra c t i o n in e a r l y 1 9 6 4 , a d e c is i o n w a s t a k e n t o a rm

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the T-6s and to fly combat support missions. 66 The CIA modified the T-6s to

c a r r y a i r - t o - g r o u n d r o c k e t s a n d . 3 0 c a l i b e r m a c h i n e g u n s . B u t b e c a u s e t h e

h

a l f - d o z e n T - 6 s w e r e n o t c o n s i d e r e d s u f f i c i e n t t o c o u n t e r t h e r e b e l

a

d v a n c e , t h e C I A p r o p r i e t a r y f i r m I n t e r m o u n t a i n A v i a t i o n , i n t h e s p r i n g

o

f 1 9 6 4 p r o v i d e d

T - 2 8 t w o - s e a t e r f i g h t e r - b o m b e r s t h a t w e r e a n

i

m p r o v e m e n t o v e r t h e T - 6 s i n s p e e d , r a n g e ( 3 0 0 m i l e s ) , a n d f i r e p o w e r .

T h o u g h n o m i n a l l y a t r a i n i n g p l a n e , t h e T - 2 8 s w e r e e q u i p p e d w i t h . 5 0

c

a l i b e r m a c h i n e

g u n s ,

5 0 0 - p o u n d b o m b s a n d

r o c k e t s . F o l l o w i n g

S

t a n l e y v i l l e ’ s

c a p t u r e , C I A o f f i c i a l s , i n c l u d i n g

D i r e c t o r

o f C e n t r a l

I n t e l l i g e n c e J o h n M c C o n e a n d D e p u t y D i r e c t o r f o r P l a n s R i c h a r d H e l m s ,

d e c i d e d t o i n c r e a s e t h e C I A a i r c o n t i n g e n t o f T - 2 8 s a n d t o a d d B - 2 6 K

bo mb er s t o i ts fl e et. Th e B - 26K , a WW II tw in- eng in e b om b er, h a d g r eat er range than the T-28, thereby allowing it to reach Stanleyville. At its height,

t h e C I A a i r f o r c e i n t h e C o n g o w o u l d i n c l u d e t h i r t e e n T - 2 8 s a n d s e v e n

B - 2 6 K b o m b e r s , a s w e l l a s C - 4 7 t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t , t w o s m a l l t w i n - e n g i n e

liaison planes, and H-21 helicopters. 67 Having provided both aircraft and pilots, the CIA then needed to provide

g r o u n d m a i n t e n a n c e c r e w s t o s e r v i c e t h e a i r c r a f t . T h i s w a s a c h i e v e d b y

s e t t i n g u p a n o t h e r p r o p r i e t a r y c o m p a n y b a s e d i n L i e c h t e n s t e i n . T h i s f i r m,

g i v e n t h e n a m e W e s t e r n I n t e r n a t i o n a l G r o u n d M a i n t e n a n c e O r g a n i z a t i o n ( W I G M O ) , w o u l d e m p l o y a t l e a s t 1 5 0 E u r o p e a n a i r c r a f t t e c h n i c i a n s o n

o n e - y e a r c o n t r a c t s . A t t h e h e i g h t o f t h e

t e c h n i c i a n s , b a s e d a t f o u r o r f i v e a i r f i e l d s i n t h e C o n g o , w e r e o v e r s e e n b y

C I A o f f i c e r s . A c c o r d i n g t o a B r i t i s h r e p o r t , t h e t e c h n i c i a n s a t o n e o f t h e

a i r f i e l d s w e r e u n d e r t h e s u p e r v i s i o n o f a r e t i r e d U . S . A i r F o r c e c o l o n e l . A l s o s t a t i o n e d a t t h e a i r f i e l d w a s a C I A c o m m u n i c a t i o n s m a n n a m e d

‘ ‘ M i t c h . ’ ’ 6 8 O t h e r a c c o u n t s s i m i l a r l y c o n f i r m t h e p r e s e n c e o f C I A a i r

operations officers at forward bases such as Bunia and Paulis. 69 D e s p i t e t h e i r d i f f e r e n t b a c k g r o u n d s , n a t i o n a l i t i e s , a n d l a n g u a g e s , t h e C I A a i r co n t r o ll er s a n d t h ei r C ub a n e x i le p il o t s w o r k e d r em a r ka b l y w e l l

r e b e l l i o n , t h e W I G M O

wit h H o are ’s merc ena ri es. Ap art fr om a few cas es of fr ie nd ly fi re , H o are noted that the air–ground coordination was highly effective in supporting

5 C o m m a n d o s p e a r h e a d s . 7 0 A p a r t f r o m H o a r e ’ s m e m o i r s , w h i c h g i v e

h

i g h p r a i s e t o t h e C I A a i r s u p p o r t , a s e p a r a t e a n a l y s i s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n

t

h a t l e d t o t h e r e c a p t u r e o f S t a n l e y v i l l e i n N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 4 n o t e d t h a t

‘‘

C I A a i r cr a f t t e r r if i ed t h e S im ba s , w h o le a r n ed t h a t t h e i r m a g ic d i d n ot

p

r o t e c t t h e m f r o m . 5 0 - c a l i b e r m a c h i n e g u n s o r r o c k e t s . B o t h T s h o m b e

a

n d M o b u t u g r a s p e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t i n t h e i r

cam pai gn a gai nst th e reb el s . ’ ’ 71 Th at the Cu ban p i l ots we re ear n ing the ir

p

a y w a s e v i d e n t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t , i n N o v e m b e r – D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 4 , s o m e

o

f t h e p i l o t s h a d p u t i n 1 7 0 h o u r s o f f l y i n g t i m e i n o n e m o n t h , a n

mo u n t t h a t w a s e x p e c te d t o i n c r e a s e r a t h e r t h a n d e c r e a s e a f t e r D r a g o n Rouge. 72

a

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JEFFREY H. MI CHAELS

T

h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e C I A a i r f o r c e t o t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y c a n n o t b e

u

n d e r s t a t e d .

F i r s t , i t p r o v i d e d t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t s w i t h

a n a i r

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e c a p a b i l i t y , b o t h f r o m a t a c t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e i n s u p p o r t o f adv anc ing col um ns, as wel l as bei ng a ble to s uppl y int el li gen c e fr om whic h t o p l a n o p e r a t i o n s . 7 3 S e c o n d , i t g a v e t h e A N C a n d 5 C o m m a n d o a c l o s e

a i r s u p p o r t c a p a b i l i t y . 7 4 W i t h o u t t h i s c a p a b i l i t y , t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y

c a m p a i g n c o u l d n o t c o n c e i v a b l y h a v e s u c c e e d e d , a t l e a s t n o t i n t h e r e l a ti v e l y s h o rt ti m e p e r io d i t d i d . A s H o a r e ma k es q ui t e c l e a r i n h i s b o o k

o n t h e C o n g o c a m p a i g n , t h e ‘ ‘ f l y i n g a r t i l l e r y ’ ’ p r o v i d e d t o 5 C o m m a n d o

b y t h e C u b a n e x i l e s p r o v e d a d e c i s i v e f o r c e m u l t i p l i e r i n m a n y b a t t l e s , giv en h i s own u nit ’s mode st st ren gth . D u r i n g Dr agon Ro uge , the d rop pin g

o f B e l g i a n p a r a t r o o p e r s f r o m U . S . C - 1 3 0 s w a s p r e c e d e d b y t w o B - 2 6 K s

t h a t c o n d u c t e d s t r a f i n g r u n s o n S i m b a p o s i t i o n s . 7 5 I n t h i s s e n s e , t h e a i r fo r c e f a c il i ta t ed co u n te r i ns u rg e n t b a t tl ef ie ld su c c e s s e s, a n d d id so in a w ay t h a t m i n i m i z e d c a s u a l t i e s a m o n g t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t s . T h i r d , t h e C I A

p l a n e s n o t o n l y c o n d u c t e d p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e t h r o u g h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l

m e a n s o f d r o p p i n g l e a f l e t s , b u t t h e i r v e r y p r e s e n c e w a s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l

w e a p o n i n i t s o w n r i g h t . A s t h e s e n i o r N S C o f f i c i a l r e s p o n s i b l e f o r A f r ic a

noted, the ‘‘relatively heavily armed B-26Ks represent such an escalation of

a n y t h i n g e v e r e x p e r i e n c e d i n t h i s p a r t o f A f r i c a t h a t t h e y h a v e c a u s e d a

pr of ou nd p sy c h olo gi ca l s ho ck .’ ’ 7 6 Ch e G u e v a r a als o n o t e d t ha t d e s pi t e t h e planes being ‘‘antiqua ted,’’ that ‘‘th is littl e air force is sowing terror among t h e C o n g o l e s e c o m r a d e s . ’ ’ 7 7 F o u r t h , i t a l l o w e d t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t s t o conduct interdiction missions against insurgent supply lines. 78 For instance, t h e T - 2 8 t h a t c r a s h e d o n 1 7 F e b r u a r y 1 9 6 5 w i t h C I A p a r a m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r

R i c h a r d H o l m o n b o a r d w a s c o n d u c t i n g a n a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s e a r c h f o r

rebel arms crossing the Sudan border. 79

Negative Side Effects

Among the ironies of the CIA air force’s ‘‘success’’ against the rebels was its

p

o s s i b l e p r o v o c a t i o n o r a t t h e v e r y l e a s t e x a c e r b a t i o n o f t h e S t a n l e y v i l l e

h

o s t a g e c r i s i s . S u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t n o t o n l y d i d t h e r e b e l s

b

l a m e t h e a i r a t t a c k s o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a s o p p o s e d t o B e l g i u m , a n d

t h a t t h e A m e r i c a n s c a p t u r e d i n S t a n l e y v i l l e w e r e t r e a t e d w o r s e t h a n t h e

E u r o p e a n s a s a r e s u l t , b u t a l s o t h a t t h e h o s t a g e s m a y h a v e b e e n r e l e a s e d

i n e x c h a n g e f o r a s s u r a n c e s t h a t t h e a i r f o r c e w o u l d b e g r o u n d e d . 8 0 A n i n t e r n a l N S C m e m o r a n d u m n o t e d t h a t t h e ‘ ‘ r e b e l l e a d e r s h i p h a s m a d e i t c l e a r t h a t t h e o f f i c i a l A m e r i c a n s a r e h o s t a g e a g a i n s t a i r a t t a c k s o n

S t a n l e y v i l l e ( t h e y a p p a r e n t l y d o n ’ t b l a m e o r t h r e a t e n E u r o p e a n s ) . ’ ’ 8 1 M i c h a e l H o y t , t h e U . S . C o n s u l i n S t a n l e y v i l l e b e i n g h e l d h o s t a g e , w a s

t h a t f u r t h e r a i r

a l l o w e d t o s e n d a c a b l e w a r n i n g W a s h i n g t o n

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r e c o n n a i s s a n c e o f t h e S t a n l e y v i l l e a r e a w o u l d p r o v o k e r e b e l r e t a l i a t i o n

agains t the Ameri can hos tages . Simi larl y, foll owin g air st rikes aga inst rebel

t a r g e t s i n O c t o b e r , t h e r e b e l s r e p e a t e d l y t h r e a t e n e d t o k i l l t h e h o s t a g e s ,

a n d i n s o m e c a s e s d i d e x e c u t e E u r o p e a n h o s t a g e s . 8 2 A l s o n o t e w o r t h y i s

t h a t r e b e l F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r K a n z a s u g g e s t e d t h e r e b e l s m i g h t f r e e t h e

hostages if the U.S. grounded its air force. 83 Clearly, the air attacks had proved a considerable irritant to the rebels, and for the U.S. leadership, their success was a troubling conundrum. The CIA’s

air force was a ‘‘deniable’’ covert operation, and a very successful one at that. T o h a v e w i t h d r a w n t h e a i r f o r c e a t t h a t t i m e w o u l d a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y h a v e

c h a n g e d t h e c o u r s e o f t h e c o n f l i c t , a l l o w i n g t h e r e b e l s t o r e g a i n t h e initiati ve. Yet, continuing the air operat ions incre ased the risk to American

l i v e s . I n t h e e n d , t h e U . S . d e c i d e d t h a t b o t h t h e C o n g o a n d t h e h o s t a g e s

c o u l d b e ‘ ‘ s a v e d , ’ ’ a n d t h a t a s h o r t - t e r m m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n t o f r e e t h e

a l l o w t h e a i r

operations to proceed. Following Dragon Rouge, the CIA air force continued to increase in size,

a d d i n g a d d i t i o n a l B - 2 6 K s , a n d t h e y r e m a i n e d a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e

c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y u n t i l t h e c o l l a p s e o f t h e r e b e l l i o n i n l a t e 1 9 6 5 . I n t h e aft erm a t h of th e r e b e l l ion , t he ai r f orc e rem a ine d in pla ce , m o s t l i k el y a s a det err ent and h edg e aga ins t the p oss ibi lity o f a res urg enc e i n reb el ac tivi ty.

B y m i d - 1 9 6 6 , t h e a i r f o r c e h a d b e e n r e d u c e d t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w e l v e Cuban pilots and 100 WIGMO personnel. The operation was finally closed d o w n i n m i d - 1 9 6 7 . B y t h i s t i m e , t h e n e e d f o r f o r e i g n p i l o t s d e c l i n e d a s Congolese pilots started returning from European military schools. 84

h o s t a g e s c o u l d r e m o v e t h e m f r o m t h e e q u a t i o n a n d

STANLEYVILLE

The capture of Stanleyville created a crisis for policymakers in Washington.

A l t h o u g h t h e r e b e l l i o n w a s n o t i n i t i a l l y d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t f o r e i g n e r s ,

i d e a t h a t U . S . p l a n e s a n d

m e r c e n a r i e s w e r e f i g h t i n g w i t h c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t f o r c e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y ,

t h e A m e r i c a n c o n s u l a r o f f i c i a l s a t S t a n l e y v i l l e w o u l d b e h e l d a s h o s t a g e s . Shortly after their capture, the CIA began contemplating different methods to se c u r e t h ei r r e le as e o r es c a p e , a nd t h e C IA ’ s f o r m e r C o n g o c hi e f , L a r ry D e v l i n , w a s r e c a l l e d t o a s s i s t i n t h e s e e f f o r t s . 8 5 T h e f i r s t a t t e m p t a t a

‘ ‘ G e n e r a l ’ ’ O l e n g a w a s f i x a t e d o n t h e

r e s c u e , k n o w n a s O p e r a t i o n F l a g P o l e , c a l l e d f o r t h e C I A a n d m i l i t a r y

a

h e l i c o p t e r r e s c u e m i s s i o n . T o b e s t a g e d o u t o f L i s a l a , a T - 2 8 w o u l d s t r a f e

t h e a r e a a r o u n d t h e U . S . c o n s u l a t e i n S t a n l e y v i l l e w i t h m a c h i n e g u n f i r e

an d r o c k et s, a f te r w hi c h h e li c op te r s w o u ld e x tr a ct t h e c o n su la t e st af f. B u t, befor e it coul d b e put int o effec t, thi s operat ion was can celed . The town of L i s a l a w a s a b o u t t o b e t a k e n o v e r b y t h e r e b e l s , m a k i n g i t s u s e a s a

p e r s o n n e l b a s e d a t t h e E m b a s s y i n L e o p o l d v i l l e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n

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forward operating base untenable. Also, Consul Hoyt informed the Embassy

t h a t o n e o f t h e C I A c o m m u n i c a t i o n s m e n w a s n o t a t t h e C o n s u l a t e b u t

h

i d i n g e l s e w h e r e i n t h e c i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , O l e n g a h a d j u s t a r r i v e d i n

S

t a n l e y v i l l e a n d d e m a n d e d a m e e t i n g w i t h t h e c o n s u l a r c o r p s , t h e r e b y

r a i s i n g t h e p r o s p e c t t h a t H o y t c o u l d n e g o t i a t e t h e r e l e a s e o f h i s s t a f f ,

a l t h o u g h i t s o o n b e c a m e a p p a r e n t t h a t O l e n g a h a d n o i n t e n t i o n o f releasing them. 86

A more diplomatic method involved the dispatch of Devlin in late August

to meet with rebel political leader Christophe Gbenye, whom he had known

while station chief. Gbenye was traveling abroad at the time. The hope was

t h a t D e v l i n c o u l d m e e t h i m w h i l e h e w a s t r a n s i t i n g B u r u n d i b a c k t o

S t a n l e y v i l l e . D e v l i n t r a v e l e d f r o m W a s h i n g t o n t o B u j u m b u r a a n d b r i e f l y

m e t w i t h G b e n y e . H o w e v e r , G b e n y e w a s n o n - c o m m i t t a l t o t h e i d e a o f

p u s h i n g f o r t h e r e l e a s e o f t h e U S o f f i c i a l s , m o s t l i k e l y b e c a u s e h e w i e l d e d

l i t t le i n f l u e n c e o v e r G e n e r a l Ol e n g a , th e ma n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n c a r c e r a t i n g

them. 87

In the course of the next couple of months, the CIA considered additional

re scu e o pti o n s a n d e nsu re d t h a t the as set s t o c o nd uct a res cue w oul d b e i n pla ce. As no ted , the dec is i on to dis pat ch the B-2 6K s w a s inf l uenc ed b y th e

n

e e d t o h a v e a n a i r c r a f t c a p a b l e o f f l y i n g t o S t a n l e y v i l l e . T h e C I A a l s o

d

i s p a t c h e d a t e a m o f s e v e n t e e n C u b a n e x i l e s l e d b y p a r a m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r

W i l l i a m ‘ ‘ R i p ’ ’ R o b e r t s o n . D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , t h e A g e n c y d e v e l o p e d

n

u m e r o u s p l a n s f o r a r e s c u e a t t e m p t , b u t D C I H e l m s e x p r e s s e d t h e

o

p i n i o n t h a t t h e c h a n c e s f o r s u c c e s s w e r e ‘ ‘ l o u s y . ’ ’ 8 8 O n e o f t h e p l a n s ,

c

a l l e d O p e r a t i o n L o w B e a m , e n v i s a g e d R o b e r t s o n ’ s t e a m g o i n g u p t h e

C o n g o R i v e r i n m o t o r b o a t s a n d c o n d u c t i n g a n i g h t t i m e r e s c u e , b u t i t w a s

abandoned as impractical. 89 T h e r e s u l t o f t h e s e f a i l e d a t t e m p t s a t r e s c u e , c o m b i n e d w i t h a l a c k o f

suc ces s i n n ego ti ati ng t h e h ost a ges ’ rel e ase , le d the Joh nso n a d min is tr a t i o n to rel uct ant ly sup por t a mil it ary op era tio n. In lat e Octo b er, a s gove rnm ent

for ces gra dua lly dro ve bac k the ins urg en ts , h undr eds of Bel gia n s a n d more t h a n a d o z e n o t h e r A m e r i c a n s r e s i d i n g i n S t a n l e y v i l l e w e r e p l a c e d u n d e r

a r r e s t , j o i n i n g t h e U. S . c o n s u l a r o f f i c i a l s i n c a p t i v i t y . T h i s a c t i o n l e d b o t h t h e U . S . a n d B e l g i a n g o v e r n m e n t s t o f o r m u l a t e a c o m b i n e d r e s c u e p l a n .

T h e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n t h e y d e v i s e d , c o d e n a m e d D r a g o n R o u g e , c o n s is t e d

o

f U . S . C - 1 3 0 s t r a n s p o r t i n g a b a t t a l i o n o f B e l g i a n p a r a t r o o p e r s t o

S

t a n l e y v i l l e w h o w o u l d a t t e m p t t o r e s c u e t h e h o s t a g e s . T h i s a i r b o r n e

o

p e r a t i o n w a s t o b e c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h a g r o u n d a d v a n c e b y t h e A N C

s p e a r h e a d e d b y 5 C o m m a n d o . C o l o n e l V a n d e w a l l e w a s g i v e n t h e o v e r a l l

c o l u m n s w o u l d i n c l u d e

c o m m a n d o f t h i s f o r c e . O n e o f t h e A N C

R o b e r t s o n a n d t h e C u b a n e x i l e s , w h o s e a s s i g n m e n t

w a s t o e n t e r

S t a n l e y v i l l e a n d r e s c u e t h e A m e r i c a n h o s t a g e s . B y o n e a c c o u n t , a l l t h e

C u b a n e x i l e s h a d b e a r d s a n d w e r e w e a r i n g d a r k w o o l c a p s . V a n d e w a l l e

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observed that the Cubans brought their own vehicles, and had an impressive amount of firepower, with at least three personal weapons for each man. 90 As they were expected to be among the first in the column to enter the city, they were placed under Hoare’s command immediately prior to the final advance

o n S t a n l e y v i l l e . A c c o r d i n g t o H o a r e , ‘ ‘ I s t o p p e d t o t a l k t o a t r u c k l o a d o f

C u b a n s w h o h a d j u s t j o i n e d m e . I c a l l e d t h e m 5 8 C o m m a n d o a n d t h e y

we re pr ou d o f th e ti tl e. Th ey w e r e a s to ug h a b u n c h o f m e n as I ha v e e v e r

h a d t h e h o n o u r t o c o m m a n d . T h e i r l e a d e r w a s a r e m a r k a b l e m a n a n d t h e

most dedicated soldier I have known.’’ 91 On 2 4 No v e m be r 1 964 , D r a gon Ro u g e com me n ced . F oll o w i n g air st ri k e s

b y t h e B - 2 6 K s , B e l g i a n p a r a t r o o p s w e r e d r o p p e d f r o m t h e C - 1 3 0 s a n d

sec ure d the air p ort bef ore ent eri ng Sta nle yvi ll e. By the tim e the par a t r oops

h

a d f o u g h t t h e i r w a y i n t o t h e c i t y , t h e S i m b a s h a d k i l l e d s o m e f if t y o f t h e

h

o s t a g e s , i n c l u d i n g a n A m e r i c a n m i s s i o n a r y . T h e g r o u n d f o r c e t h a t

c o n t a i n e d t h e C I A u n i t a r r i v e d s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r . H a v i n g s e c u r e d t h e

A m e r i c a n c o n s u l a r o f f i c i a l s , R o b e r t s o n a n d t h e C u b a n e x i l e s s e t a b o u t rescuing other U.S. missionaries in the area. In the aftermath of the rescue, t h i s u n i t w a s w i t h d r a w n f r o m t h e C o n g o . 9 2 Al t h o u g h t h e r i s k w a s p r e s e n t

o f A m e r i c a n m i s s i o n a r i e s e l s e w h e r e i n t h e C o n g o b e i n g k i l l e d b y t h e

S i m b a s , t h e W h i t e H o u s e r e c o r d n o t e d t h a t P r e s i d e n t J o h n s o n ‘ ‘ d o e s n ’ t w a n t t o g e t t i e d i n o n t h e C o n g o a n d h a v e a n o t h e r K o r e a , a n o t h e r

V ie t n a m, j u st be c a u s e of so m e b o dy w a n de r i n g ar o u n d s ea r c h i n g f o r ‘J e su s

C h r i s t . ’ ’ ’ 9 3 A s s u c h , h e w a s u n w i l l i n g t o s a n c t i o n f u r t h e r A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t i n r e s c u e o p e r a t i o n s , a p a r t f r o m t h e t r a n s p o r t o f t h e B e l g i a n paratroops to the city of Paulis as part of Operation Dragon Noir.

MARITIME ASSISTANCE

With 5 Com mando and the ANC havi ng close d off the C ongo bor der with U g a n d a a n d S u d a n i n t h e s p r i n g 1 9 6 5 , t h e o n e m a j o r s u p p l y r o u t e t h a t

r

e m a i n e d f o r t h e r e b e l s w a s f r o m T a n z a n i a a c r o s s L a k e T a n g a n y i k a . A s

t

h e n u m b e r o f s u p p l i e s r e a c h i n g t h e r e b e l s a l o n g t h i s r o u t e s t e a d i l y

i n c r e a s e d , t h e C I A w a s d e t e r m i n e d t o i n t e r d i c t t h e a r m s f l o w . T o d o s o w o u l d n e c e s s i t a t e c r e a t i n g a m a r i t i m e p a t r o l f o r t h e C o n g o l e s e govern ment . Thi s tas k was giv en to Thomas Cline s, the depu ty head of the D D P ’ s S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s D i v i s i o n m a r i t i m e b r a n c h . C l i n e s f a c e d t w o

p r o b l e m s : h o w t o t r a n s p o r t s u i t a b l e m a r i t i m e c r a f t i n t o t h e m i d d l e o f

Afr ic a, and to fi nd cre ws to man th em. Th e firs t p rob le m w as sol ved when

a n i d e a , p r o p o s e d b y C I A c o n t r a c t a g e n t E d w i n W i l s o n , w a s t o c u t t h e

b o a t s i n t o s e c t i o n s , t r a n s p o r t t h e m b y C - 1 3 0 s t o t h e l a k e s i d e c i t y o f

A l b e r t v i l l e , a n d t h e n r e a s s e m b l e t h e m . 9 4 T h e t y p e o f b o a t t h a t w a s

e v e n t u a l l y s e n t w a s t h e U . S . N a v y p a t r o l c r a f t c a l l e d t h e S w i f t b o a t .

S e v e r a l o f t h e s e b o a t s w e r e b e i n g u s e d a t t h e t i m e b y C u b a n e x i l e s b a s e d

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o u t o f N i c a r a g u a . T h i s b o a t w a s f i f t y f e e t l o n g a n d w a s a r m e d w i t h t h r e e h e a v y m a c h i n e g u n s a s w e l l a s a n 8 1 m m m o r t a r . D u e t o t h e a b s e n c e o f

t ra i n ed C o n g o le s e t o o p e r a t e t h e b o a t s , t h e C I A c o n t r a c t e d s i x te e n C u b a n

e x i l e s w h o h a d p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e l a u n c h i n g s e a b o r n e a t t a c k s a g a i n s t

C u b a n t a r g e t s a n d a l s o t o o k t h e b o a t s t h e y w e r e u s i n g . 9 5 A n a d d i t i o n a l

t h i r t y s a i l o r s f r o m 5 C o m m a n d o w e r e g i v e n t r a i n i n g b y t h e C u b a n s . U . S .

N a v y S E A L L i e u t e n a n t J a m e s H a w e s w a s b r o u g h t f r o m V i e t n a m a n d

p l a c e d i n c h a r ge of t h is u n it , w h i c h r e p or t e d d i re ct l y to t h e C IA s ta ti on in

L e o p o l d v i l l e . 9 6 I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e h a l f d o z e n o r s o S w i f t b o a t s , t h e

m a r i t i m e p a t r o l i n c l u d e d s e v e r a l t r o o p - c a r r y i n g b a r g e s . T h e C I A a l s o

p r o v i d e d r a d a r a n d a r m a m e n t s f o r t h e B e l g i a n s t e a m e r E r m a n s , t h e s h i p

that would eventually become Hoare’s ‘‘flagship.’’ 97 Although the maritime patrol had been constituted nearly a year after the reb el lio n beg an, it b eca me inc rea si ngl y eff ecti ve in pre ven ting Sim ba tr aff ic

o

n t h e l a k e , w h e r e a s t h i s t r a f f i c h a d p r e v i o u s l y b e e n r e l a t i v e l y

u

n e n c u m b e r e d a p a r t f r o m t h e o c c a s i o n a l a i r a t t a c k . 9 8 N e v e r t h e l e s s , w h e n

a

t t e m p ti n g t o p r e v e n t E r n e s t o ( C h e ) G u e v a r a ’ s f o r c e o f C u b a n s a n d o t h e r

S

i m b a s f r o m c r o s s i n g i n t o t h e C o n g o f r o m T a n z a n i a , t h e m a r i t i m e f o r c e

w a s c l e a r l y i n a d e q u a t e t o t h e t a s k , t h o u g h C h e n o t e d t h a t t h e m a r i t i m e

p

r e s e n c e d i d c a u s e t h e m s o m e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n m a k i n g t h e c r o s s i n g . 9 9 I n

d d i t i o n t o t h e l a k e p a t r o l , t h e m a r i t i m e f o r c e p l a y e d a c r i t i c a l r o l e i n t h e l a s t m o n t h s o f t h e w a r , w h e n o p e r a t i o n s w e r e c o n d u c t e d t o e l i m i n a t e t h e

a

S

i m b a m o u n t a i n b a s t i o n k n o w n a s t h e F i z i - B a r a k a p o c k e t , w h i c h w a s

d

e f e n d e d b y s o m e 5 , 0 0 0 r e b e l s p l u s m o r e t h a n 1 0 0 C u b a n s u n d e r C h e

Gu e v a r a . 1 0 0 B e ca us e i t s e x c el le n t d e f e n s iv e lo ca ti o n ma d e a la n d o p e r at i o n ‘ ‘ i m p r a c t i c a b l e , ’ ’ H o a r e d e c i d e d t o l a u n c h a c o m b i n e d a i r , a m p h i b i o u s ,

a n d l a n d o p e r a t i o n , i n w h i c h t h e m a r i t i m e f o r c e b o a t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e Erm ans , wo uld be em plo yed for an am phi b iou s lan din g o f 200 me rce na rie s to the enemy’s rear, with the B-26Ks providing air cover. 101

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Apart from the reconnaissance carried out by its ‘‘air force,’’ CIA intelligence collection in the Congo was reliant mainly upon its intelligence relationships

w i t h s e n i o r C o n g o l e s e o f f i c i a l s s u c h a s M o b u t u a n d V i c t o r N e n d a k a , t h u s

g

i v i n g i t a c c e s s t o i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t e d b y t h e A N C a n d t h e C o n g o l e s e

S

uˆ r e t e´ . T h e C I A a l s o w o r k e d c l o s e l y w i t h V a n d e w a l l e a n d t h e B e l g i a n

m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n , a n d w i t h H o a r e a n d 5 C o m m a n d o . P r i o r t o t h e c a p t u r e

o f S t a n l e y v i l l e , t h e C I A c h i e f t h e r e , D a v i d G r i n w i s , h a d a c l o s e w o r k i n g

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e A N C ’ s i n t e l l i g e n c e s e c t i o n . H e a l s o a p p e a r s t o h a v e

h

a d a n u m b e r o f a g e n t s r e p o r t i n g t o h i m , b u t w i t h t h e c i t y ’ s f a l l , t h i s

n

e t w o r k c o l l a p s e d . 1 0 2 N o e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e C I A w a s a b l e t o

r e c r u i t a n y s p i e s w i t h i n t h e S i m b a r a n k s , o r t h a t t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d a h i g h

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p

r i o r i t y f o r t h e C I A s t a t i o n . I n d e e d , a s a s t a t i o n p r i o r i t y , i n t e l l i g e n c e

c

o l l e c t i o n s e e m e d t o r a n k b e l o w

t h e p a r a m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s b e i n g

c

o n d u c t e d , o r p u t s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t l y , i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n w a s o f t e n

t r e a t e d a s b e i n g n e c e s s a r y t o s u p p o r t o p e r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s r a t h e r t h a n t o enhance policymakers’ understanding of the conflict. 103 T h e r e c r u i t i n g a n d r u n n i n g o f a g e n t s d o e s n o t s e e m t o h a v e b e e n a

s i g n i f i c a n t f u n c t i o n o f t h e S t a t i o n , a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y b e c a u s e t h e A g e n c y Sta t ion was it sel f q u it e s m a l l a n d it s off ic ers wer e p r eoc c upi ed ma in ly w it h hand lin g the bu rgeo nin g par amil itar y oper ati ons . T o the ext ent tha t age nts

w e r e r u n , t h e y w e r e o f f i c i a l s i n t h e C o n g o l e s e g o v e r n m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n i n t h e r e b e l l i o n . 1 0 4 M o r e o v e r , m a n y o f t h e C I A o f f i c e r s a s s i g n e d t o t h e Congo in 1964–1965 had littl e o r n o experie nce working in Afric a. Richard

H o l m , a s s i g n e d i n l a t e 1 9 6 4 t o r e p l a c e G r i n w i s a s t h e C I A c h i e f i n

S

t a n l e y v i l l e a n d t a s k e d w i t h c o l l e c t i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e o n t h e ‘ ‘ p r e s e n c e ,

a

c t i v i t i e s , a n d s u p p l y l i n e s o f t h e S i m b a u n i t s , ’ ’ h a d j u s t r e t u r n e d f r o m a

p

a r a m i l i t a r y p o s t i n g i n L a o s a n d T h a i l a n d , a f t e r w h i c h h e s e r v e d a s h o r t

period of time working on North Africa issues. 105 T h i s l a c k o f A f r i c a b a c k g r o u n d w a s t r u e , n o t o n l y f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n s

o f f i c e r s a s s i g n e d t o t h e C o n g o , b u t a l s o f o r t h e a n a l y s t s w o r k i n g o n t h e

C o n g o a t C I A H e a d q u a r t e r s i n L a n g l e y , V i r g i n i a . F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e l e a d

a n a l y s t w o r k i n g o n C o n g o i s s u e s d u r i n g t h e r e b e l l i o n w a s S a m A d a m s , a

j u n i o r i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r w i t h n o A f r i c a b a c k g r o u n d . F o r t u n a t e l y f o r t h e

C I A , A d a m s p r o v e d t o b e a f i r s t - r a t e a n a l y s t w h o w a s a b l e t o k e e p

p o l i c y m a k e r s r e g u l a r l y i n f o r m e d o f C o n g o d e v e l o p m e n t s . 1 0 6 I m m e d i a t e l y

a f t e r S ta n l e y v i ll e ’ s f a l l , t h e C o n g o d e s k w a s t a s k e d w it h p r o d u c i n g a d a i l y

s i t u a t i o n r e p o r t , a l t h o u g h t h i s l a t e r c h a n g e d t o a w e e k l y r e p o r t . 1 0 7 T h e s e

r e p o r t s c o v e r e d a f u l l r a n g e o f t o p i c s , s u c h a s C o n g o l e s e p o l i t i c a l

d e v e l o p m e n t s , t h e C o n g o ’ s r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r c o u n t r i e s a n d w i t h t h e

O r g a n i z a t i o n o f A f r i c a n U n i t y ( O A U ) , u p d a t e s o n m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s ,

i n f o r ma t i o n o n t h e r e b e l s b o t h i n s i d e t h e C o n g o a n d a b r o a d , i n f o r m a t i o n

o n t h e C o n g o l e s e m i l i t a r y a n d m e r c e n a r i e s , a n d r e p o r t i n g o n

de li v e ri e s to t h e r e be l s , a m o n g m a n y o t h e r is su es . In a d di t i o n t o p r o v i d i n g

a n a l y s i s o f d e v e l o p m e n t s i n s i d e t h e C o n g o , o t h e r c o u n t r y d e s k s w e r e a l s o tasked with providing intelligence on outside support to the rebels.

a r m s

CIA Priorities

A key intelligence task was to track arms shipments to the rebels. Intelligence

o n t h i s s u b j e c t w a s u s e d n o t o n l y f o r a s s e s s m e n t s o f r e b e l s t r e n g t h , b u t

perhap s more impo rt antly , t o targe t the sup ply conv oys. By knowing when

a r m s s h i p m e n t s h a d a r r i v e d i n n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s , t h e C I A ’ s a i r f o r c e

c o u l d b e g i v e n w a r n i n g a n d d i r e c t e d t o i n t e r c e p t t h e m o n c e t h e y e n t e r e d t h e C o n g o . 1 0 8 B u t t h e A g e n c y ’ s s u c c e s s i n t r a c k i n g t h e s e s h i p m e n t s i s

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q u e s t i o n a b l e . F o r i n s t a n c e , a s o f l a t e F e b r u a r y 1 9 6 5 , a s e n i o r S t a t e

D e p a r t m e n t o f f i c i a l a t t a c h e d t o t h e C o n g o W o r k i n g G r o u p r e q u e s t e d i n t e l l i g e n c e f r o m B r i t a i n o n a r m s s u p p l i e s a r r i v i n g v i a T a n z a n i a a n d

U g a n d a , c o m p l a i n i n g t h a t U . S . i n t e l l i g e n c e o n t h i s s u b j e c t w a s t h i n . 1 0 9 Ultima tely, the arms shipm ents cea sed, not bec ause of any CIA act ion, but

a f t e r 5 C o m m a n d o a n d t h e A N C c l o s e d o f f t h e b o r d e r w i t h U g a n d a a n d

S u d a n . H a v i n g c l o s e d o f f t h i s m a i n s u p p l y r o u t e , r e b e l s u p p l i e s h a d t o b e ferried across Lake Tanganyika from Tanzania. 110

Sev eral addit ional collect ion and analysi s priorit ies sho uld be mentioned .

T r a c k i n g d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t f o r t h e r e b e l s a n d t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t w e r e

b e i n g b r o k e r e d b y t h e O A U w e r e t o p i c s t h a t f e a t u r e p r o m i n e n t l y i n C I A

a n a l y s e s . 1 1 1 P r io r to D r a go n Ro u g e , a n o th e r t op co ll ec ti on pr io ri ty w a s t o

a s c e r t a i n

S t a n l e y v i l l e , a s w e l l a s t o c o l l e c t i n t e l l i g e n c e o n S i m b a d e f e n s e s i n t h a t are a. 11 2 A n um ber of int el li gen ce re por ts gen e rat ed on thi s t opi c were use d

i n t h e p l a n n i n g o f v a r i o u s r e s c u e o p e r a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g D r a g o n R o u g e . 1 1 3

F i n a l l y , t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u r s e o f t h e c o n f l i c t , a n o t h e r o f t h e C I A ’ s m a i n

i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n p r i o r i t i e s w a s t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r o r n o t f o r e i g n

a d v i s o r s w e r e a s s i s t i n g t h e S i m b a s . N u m e r o u s i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s

s u g g e s t e d t h e p r e s e n c e o f C h i n e s e , A l g e r i a n , a n d o t h e r a d v i s e r s o p e r a t i n g i n s i d e t h e C o n g o o r i n o n e o f t h e n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s , a l t h o u g h t h e s e m o s t l y p r o v e d f a l s e . 1 1 4 T h e f e a r a m o n g U . S . o f f i c i a l s w a s t h a t t h e r e b e l s ’

s i n g l e d i s a d v a n t a g e r e l a t e d n o t t o t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e i r a r m a m e n t s , b u t

i n s t e a d t o t h e a b s e n c e o f a n y f o r m a l t r a i n i n g i n g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e . T h e

b e l i e f w a s t h a t o n l y a s m a l l n u m b e r o f a d v i s e r s w o u l d b e n e e d e d t o

t r a n s f o r m t h e S i m b a s i n t o a n e f f e c t i v e m i l i t a r y f o r c e t h a t c o u l d d e f e a t t h e

g o v e r n m e n t f o r c e s . T h e r e f o r e , C I A c o l l e c t o r s a n d a n a l y s t s t r a c k e d t h i s issue closely.

t h e l o c a t i o n a n d c o n d i t i o n o f U . S . c o n s u l a r p e r s o n n e l i n

Shortcomings and Failures

Despite the CIA’s best efforts to accurately assess the conflict, several notable i n t e l l i g e n c e f a i l u r e s o c c u r r e d . F i r s t , p o l i c y m a k e r s w e r e a p p a r e n t l y c a u g h t

u n p r e p a r e d w h e n r e b e l f o r c e s c a p t u r e d S t a n l e y v i l l e . A g e n c y a n a l y s t s w e r e also overoptimistic prior to Dragon Rouge, believing that the rebellion was

o n i t s l a s t l e g s, w h e re a s i n f ac t i t w o u l d c o n t i n u e f or an o t he r y e a r, n o t f o r

t h e l e a s t o f r e a s o n s t h a t t h e U . S . – B e l g i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n h a d r e s u l t e d i n incre ased dip lomatic and militar y sup port for the reb els fr om abr oad. 115 In t h i s r e g a r d , t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e f a i l u r e m o s t o f t e n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e C o n g o was the CIA’s ina bility to le arn of the pre sence of the continge nt of Cuban advisers led by Che Guevara. 116 F o l l o w i n g a n o f f i c i a l t r i p o n b e h a l f o f t h e C u b a n g o v e r n m e n t , i n w h i c h Guevara visi ted eight African countrie s and also traveled to China from 17

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December 1964 to 14 March 1965, he subsequently disappeared from public sight. 117 Despite growing evidence of the presence of Cubans in the Congo in t h e s u m m e r 1 9 6 5 , s u c h a s t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e d i a r y o f a C u b a n k i l l e d

d u r i n g a r a i d a g a i n s t t h e m e r c e n a r i e s , t h e i d e a t h a t a l a r g e n u m b e r o f

Cub ans w ere oper a ti ng in the C on g o fo und few s uppo rt ers in Wa shi n gto n . N o t u n t i l S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 5 , s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e s t a r t o f o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t

t h e F i z i - B a r a k a p o c k e t , d i d t h e e v i d e n c e b e c o m e o v e r w h e l m i n g , a n d t h i s view changed. 118 Re g a r d l e s s o f t h e i m p r o v e d m i l i t a r y p e r f o r m a n c e e n a b l e d b y t h e C u b a n

a d v i s o r s , t h e r e b e l s w e r e q u i c k l y d e f e a t e d i n t h e F i z i - B a r a k a p o c k e t . T h i s m i l i t a r y d e f e a t , c o m b i n e d w i t h a n e w f o u n d d e s i r e o n t h e p a r t o f t h e C o n g o ’ s n e i g h b o r s t o d r o p t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r t h e r e b e l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y f o l l o w i n g t h e 1 3 O c t o b e r r e p l a c e m e n t o f T s h o m b e — w h o w a s d i s l i k e d b y m o s t A f r i c a n l e a d e r s b e c a u s e o f h i s u s e o f w h i t e m e r c e n a r i e s — e f f e c t i v e l y

e n d e d t h e i n s u r g e n c y . I n l a t e N o v e m b e r , M o b u t u w o u l d l a u n c h a c o u p

d ’ e´ t a t a n d a s s u m e t h e p r e s i d e n c y . H e w o u l d r e m a i n p r e s i d e n t , b a c k e d b y t h e U . S . , u n t i l h i m s e l f o v e r t h r o w n i n 1 9 9 7 b y t h e f o r m e r S i m b a l e a d e r Laurent Kabila.

RELUCTANT INTERVENORS

S i m u l t a n e o u s t o W a s h i n g t o n p o l i c y m a k e r s ’ c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a u g m e n t i n g t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y ’ s a d v i s o r y p r e s e n c e i n V i e t n a m w i t h c o m b a t t r o o p s w a s

t h e p e r c e i v e d n e e d t o r e s p o n d t o t h e d e t e r i o r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n i n t h e C o n g o .

T h e c o n c e r n a b o u t f a l l i n g d o m i n o e s i n A s i a l e d t o s i m i l a r c o n c e r n a b o u t

A f r i c a . W i t h a k e y a l l y o n t h e b r i n k o f b e i n g o v e r t h r o w n , t h r e a t e n e d b y

a n i n s u r g e n c y s u p p o r t e d b y t h e S o v i e t B l o c , C h i n a , C u b a , E g y p t , A l g e r i a ,

a n d th e ‘ ‘ r a d i c a l A fr i c a n ’ ’ st a t e s , a co s t l y a n d p o t e n t i a l l y o p e n - e n d e d U. S . m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n m a y h a v e s e e m e d t h e o n l y p l a u s i b l e o p t i o n o f

‘ ‘ s a v i n g ’ ’ t h e C o n g o . I n s t e a d , d e s p i t e f a c i n g s u c h a g r a v e s i t u a t i o n , U . S .

p o l i c y m a k e r s f r o m t h e s t a r t r u l e d o u t A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n .

Wa ry o f ta kin g o n t o o ma ny mi li t ary co mmi tm en ts , the y a ls o fe a r e d b e ing tar ni sh ed w it h t h e ‘‘ ne o-c ol on ia li st ’’ br us h. C o n s e q u e n t l y , l es s o ve rt me a n s

w e r e r e q u i r e d t o a c h i e v e t h e p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e o f m a i n t a i n i n g a f r i e n d l y

g

o v e r n m e n t i n L e o p o l d v i l l e . O p t i n g f o r

a c o v e r t C I A p a r a m i l i t a r y

o

p e r a t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n a n o v e r t U . S . m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n , a l l o w e d t h e

J o h n s o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o n o t o n l y l i m i t U . S . l i a b i l i t y f r o m a p o l i t i c a l ,

d i p l o m a ti c , a n d m il it a r y p e r sp e c t iv e , b u t a l s o e n s u re d th a t t h e co s t s o f th e

c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y m i s s i o n w o u l d b e m i n i m i z e d . M o r e o v e r , a v o i d i n g o v e r t U.S. military interve ntion was predicated on the fear that countries such as

t h e S o v i e t U n i o n o r C h i n a w o u l d r e s p o n d t o t h i s e s c a l a t i o n b y a l s o

b

e c o m i n g h e a v i l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e c o n f l i c t , t h u s c r e a t i n g a q u a g m i r e . A s i t

h

a p p e n e d , o n l y f o l l o w i n g t h e U . S . a i r l i f t o f B e l g i a n p a r a t r o o p e r s d u r i n g

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O p e r a t i o n D r a g o n R o u g e d i d f o r e i g n p o w e r s b e g i n t o m a k e t h e C o n g o a m a j o r p o l i t i c a l i s s u e a n d t o r a d i c a l l y i n c r e a s e t h e i r p r e v i o u s l y m o d e s t support to the rebels. T h e C o n g o v e n t u r e r e p r e s e n t s o n l y o n e o f m a n y ‘ ‘ s u c c e s s f u l ’ ’ C I A - l e d efforts designed to bolster a pro-U.S. government faced with an insurgency without c om mitting a large Ame rican m ilitary for ce . Admittedly, the Congo

‘ ‘ s u c c e s s ’ ’ c a n b e a t t r i b u t e d i n l a r g e p a r t t o a c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e m i l i t a r y vic to ri es a chi eve d by 5 Co mma n do a n d th e ANC, a n d t o the ine pti tu de o f

t h e i n s u r g e n t s i n s e c u r i n g t h e i r g a i n s . Y e t , w i t h o u t C I A a s s i s t a n c e ,

c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g h o w t h e i n s u r g e n c y c o u l d h a v e b e e n d e f e a t e d i s d i f f i c u l t .

T h e C I A p r o v i d e d c r i t i c a l

unav ail abl e to the coun ter ins urg ent s, sho rt of a lar ge mil it ary int erv ent ion . From the perspective of Western counterinsurgency theory, the Congo case

b re a k s ma n y o f th e r u l es th a t w e r e c o ns i d er e d t h e n o r m , in b o th th e ea r ly

1 9 6 0 s a n d t h e c u r r e n t c o n t e x t o f A f g h a n i s t a n a n d I r a q . T h i s t h e o r y i s predic at ed on several p ri nc ip le s, such as th e n ee d to ‘‘win hearts and minds’’ b y ‘ ‘ p r o t e c t i n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n ’ ’ i n t h e f a c e o f i n s u r g e n t ‘ ‘ i n t i m i d a t i o n . ’ ’ These p ri nc ip le s were scarcely, if at all, in ev id en ce in th e Con go.

f o r c e m u l t i p l i e r s t h a t w o u l d h a v e b e e n

The Relevance of Counterinsurgency Theory Counterinsurgency theory is also predi cated on the idea that large numbers

o f s e c u r i t y f o r c e s a r e r e q u i r e d . I n t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s , t h e r a t i o o f 1 0 – 2 0

c

o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t s f o r e v e r y i n s u r g e n t w a s o f t e n t o u t e d a s t h e b a s e l i n e f o r

s

u c c e s s . M o r e r e c e n t l y , t h e

o f f i c i a l m e t r i c h a s b e e n 4 0 – 5 0

cou nte r ins ur gen ts per 1,0 0 0 pe opl e. Aga in, th e C ong o p r ove d a n exc e pti on to th e r u l e , w i t h th e c o u n t e ri ns u r g e nt s n um b e ri n g in th e t en s o f t ho u s an d s

r a t h e r t h a n t h e h u n d r e d s o f t h o u s a n d s . T h e n a s n o w , c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y w a s b e l i e v e d t o b e a p r o c e s s t h a t t o o k m a n y y e a r s . Y e t, i n t h e C o n g o , t h e insurgency lasted less than two years before it was defeated. B y the log ic o f coun ter ins urg en cy the ory , the ‘‘ suc ces s’ ’ a c hie ved in th e C o n g o w o u l d s e e m u n t h i n k a b l e . H o w t h e n t o a c c o u n t f o r i t ? C a n t h e

r e s u l t s b e a t t r i b u t e d m e r e l y t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c o n t e s t o c c u r r e d i n

A f r i c a r a t h e r t h a n S o u t h e a s t A s i a , a n d t h a t p e r h a p s a c u l t u r a l compo nent to coun ter insur gen cy exist s tha t means tha t there are no ‘‘ one

s i z e f i t s a l l ’ ’ a p p r o a c h e s ? L i k e w i s e , c a n g e o g r a p h i c o r t e c h n o l o g i c a l

f a c t o r s b e s a i d t o h a v e p l a y e d a r o l e ? D i d t h e l a c k o f a n o v e r b e a r i n g

b u r e a u c r a c y m e a n t h a t t h e C I A o f f i c e r s i n t h e f i e l d c o u l d ‘ ‘ i n n o v a t e ’ ’

f a s t e r t h a n c o u l d a l a r g e m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n , o r a t l e a s t n o t b e

h a m s tr u n g b y a c o m p l e x c h a i n o f c o m m a n d ? W e r e t h e c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t s

merely lucky? Rather than seeking to answer these questions the main purpose here has been to show that counterinsurgency theorists must first ask these questions

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before suggesting that large-scale U.S. military intervention is the only means by which ‘‘success’’ in counterinsurgency can be achieved, or that ‘‘success’’ is i m p o s s i b l e i f t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e s e r v i c e s p l a y a l e a d i n g r o l e a s o p p o s e d t o a subordinate one. As with any large -scale intervent ion invol ving the U.S. military, theor ists

m u s t a c c o u n t f o r t h e p r o b l e m s c r e a t e d , r a t h e r t h a n so l v e d , b y t a k in g s u c h

a n a p p r o a c h . T h e c a s e s o f V i e t n a m , I r a q , a n d A f g h a n i s t a n

d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t l a r g e m i l i t a r y c o m m i t m e n t s n o t o n l y i n c r e a s e t h e

n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l b u r d e n , r i s k s i g n i f i c a n t c a s u a l t i e s , a n d m a k e

‘ ‘ w i n n i n g o f h e a r t s a n d m i n d s ’ ’ a t h o m e a n d i n t h e h o s t - n a t i o n a m a j o r i s s u e , b u t a l s o c r e a t e o t h e r w i s e a r t i f i c i a l c r e d i b i l i t y i s s u e s a n d t i m e p r e s s u r e s . B y c o n t r a s t , i n c a s e s s u c h a s t h e C o n g o , w h e r e t h e C I A h a s t a k e n t h e l e a d a n d w o r k e d w i t h p r o x y f o r c e s , t h e U . S . l i m i t e d i t s l i a b i l i t y , thereby ensuring that many of these self-generated problems never arose.

t h e

h a v e

REFERENCES

1 One of the most impor tant exampl es of this trend is M ajor Genera l M ichael T. Flynn , Capt ain Matt Pot tinger, and Paul D. Batchel or, Fixing Intel: A Bl ueprint

f o r M a k i n g I n t e l l i g e n c e R e l e v a n t i n A f g h a n i s t a n , C e n t e r f o r a N e w A m e r i c a n

3 - 2 4 ’ s a p p r o a c h t o

intel lige nce, see Gen eral Davi d H . Pet raeu s, Lt . G enera l J a mes F. Amos , LTC J o h n A . N a g l , S a r a h Se w al l , Th e U . S . A r m y = M a r i n e C o r p s Co u n t e r in s u r g e n c y Field M anual (Ch icago: Unive rsity of Chicago Press, 2007 ), pp. 79–135.

2 F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s p o i n t , s e e m y a r t i c l e ‘ ‘ A g e n t s f o r S t a b i l i t y o r C h a o s :

C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g I n t e l l i g e n c e ‘ R e l e v a n c e ’ i n C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y , ’ ’ S t u d i e s i n Confli ct and Terrorism , Vol . 34, No. 3, March 2011, pp. 212–227.

3 T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e f o r o f f i c i a l h i s t o r i e s . S e e M i c h a e l W a r n e r , ‘ ‘ U . S . I n t e l l i g e n c e a n d V i e t n a m : T h e O f f i c i a l V e r s i o n ( s ) , ’ ’ I n t e l l i g e n c e a n d N a t i o n a l Sec urity , Vol . 25, No. 5, 2010, pp. 611–637.

4 S t e p h e n R . W e i s s m a n , A m e r i c a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y i n t h e C o n g o 1 9 6 0 – 1 9 6 4 ( I t h a c a , N Y : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 4 ) ; S e a n K e l l y , A m e r i c a ’ s T y r a n t :

T h e C I A a n d M o b u t u o f Z a i r e ( W a s h i n g t o n , D C : T h e A m e r i c a n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993).

5 F r a n k R . V i l l a f a n a , C o l d W a r i n t h e C o n g o : T h e C o n f r o n t a t i o n o f C u b a n M i l i t a r y F o r c e s , 1 9 6 0 – 1 9 6 7 ( N e w B r u n s w i c k , N J : T r a n s a c t i o n B o o k s , 2 0 0 9 ) ; P i e r o G l e i j e s e s , C o n f l i c t i n g M i s s i o n s : H a v a n a , W a s h i n g t o n , a n d A f r i c a , 1 9 5 9 – 1 9 7 6 (C ha pe l H i ll , N C: T he U n i v e r s i ty of N o r th C ar ol i na P re s s ,

S e c u r i t y , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 0 . F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f F M

2002).

6 L a r r y D e v l i n , C h i e f o f S t a t i o n , C o n g o : F i g h t i n g t h e C o l d W a r i n a H o t Z o n e (New York: Public Aff airs, 2007); Ric hard L. Holm , The Ame rican Agent: M y Li fe i n th e C I A (L ond on: St . E r m in’ s P r e ss, 2 00 3). Un for tu na tel y, th e For e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ( F R U S ) v o l u m e d e a l i n g w i t h t h e C o n g o f r o m 1960–196 8 remains classif ied.

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7 M u l e l e w o u l d s h o o t h i m s e l f w i t h b l a n k c a r t r i d g e s t o a c h i e v e t h i s e f f e c t . H i s f o l l ow e r s w e r e m o s t l y a r m e d w i t h s p e a r s a nd po i s on e d a r r o w s , a l t h o u g h t h e y d i d a l s o e m p l o y c a p t u r e d A N C s m a l l a r m s . B e c a u s e o f i t s i s o l a t i o n , t h e Mulele rebels wer e una ble to receive arms shipm ents from abroad.

8 Step hen L. Weiger t, Tr aditional Rel igion and Guer rilla Warfa re in Modern Af rica (L ondon: Macmi llan Press, 1996), p. 57.

9 Ibid. , p. 6 0 . 1 0 S t e p h e n L . W e i g e r t , T r a d i t i o n a l R e l i g i o n a n d G u e r r i l l a W a r f a r e i n M o d e r n A f r i c a , p p . 5 4 – 6 1 ; R e n e e C . F o x , W i l l y d e C r a e m e r , a n d J e a n - M a r i e R i b e a u c o u r t , ‘ ‘ ‘ T h e S e c o n d I n d e p e n d e n c e ’ : A C a s e S t u d y o f t h e K w i l u R e b e l l i o n i n t h e C o ng o , ’ ’ C o m p a r a t i v e S t u d i e s i n S o c i e t y a n d H i s t o r y , V o l . 8 , N o . 1 , O c t o b e r 1 9 6 5 , p p . 7 8 – 1 0 9 ; C l a u d e E . W e l c h , J r . , ‘ ‘ I d e o l o g i c a l Fou nda tion s o f Revo luti on in Kw ilu, ’’ Af rica n Stu dies Revi ew , Vol . 18, No. 2, S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 5 , p p. 1 1 6 – 1 2 8 ; M a r k T r a ug o t t , ‘ ‘ Th e E c o n o m i c O r i g i n s of th e Kw il u Re be lli on, ’’ Com p ara tive St udie s i n S o cie ty an d His tory , Vol . 2 1, No . 3 , July 1979, pp. 459–479. 1 1 L e o p o l d v i l l e w a s t h e c a p i t a l o f t h e B e l g i a n C o n g o a n d B r a z z a v i l l e w a s t h e c a p i t a l o f t h e F r e n c h C o n g o . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e t w o s t a t e s w o u l d b e r e f e r r e d to as Congo (Leopoldvi lle) and Congo (Brazza v ille).

1 2 M . C r a w f o r d Y o u n g , ‘ ‘ P o s t - I n d e p e n d e n c e P o l i t i c s i n t h e C o n g o , ’ ’ T r a n s i t i o n , No. 26, 1996, p. 39.

13 Major Thomas P. Odom, ‘‘Dragon Opera tions : Host age Resc ues in the Congo , 1964–196 5,’’ Lea venwor th Papers No. 14, Com bat Studies Insti tute, 1988; ‘‘The Congo: With M agic Juice and Lucky Gras s,’’ Time , 1 2 June 1964.

14 M em or a nd u m f o r t h e Pr e si d e nt f r o m B r ub e c k, 1 5 J un e 1 9 6 4 . R e f e r r i n g t o t he r e b e l v i c t o r i e s i n t h e e a s t e r n C o n g o , B r u b e c k o b s e r v e d , ‘ ‘ w e l l - a r m e d t r o o p s a r e b e i ng r o ut e d by P y g m i e s c a r r y i n g s pe a r s a n d m a c h e te s .’ ’ F o r m o r e de t a i l s o n t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e ‘ ‘ P o p u l a r A r m y , ’ ’ s e e M . C r a w f o r d Y o u n g , ‘‘Post -Independ ence Pol itics in the Congo, ’’ p. 40 .

15 Keith W heelock and M. Crawf ord Young, ‘‘The Congo lese Rebel lion of 1964,’ ’ J u n e 1 9 6 5 , i n E r n e s t K . L i n d l e y F i l e s 6 1 – 6 9 , B o x # 4 , L o t 7 1 D 2 7 3 , R G # 5 9 , M L R 5 4 4 1 , N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s , C o l l e g e P a r k , M D . A s t h i s s t u d y n o t e s , t h e G b e n y e r e g i m e w a s a ‘ ‘ p h a n t o m g o v e r n m e n t , r e p l e t e w i t h t i t l e s , b u t l a c k i n g the ability and resourc es to administe r the rebel he ld areas.’’

16 Memorandum for the President from Brubeck, 6 August 1964.

17 ‘‘The Congo: Elation for M oise,’’ Time , 1 1 Septem ber 1 964. 1 8 T e r e n c e L y o n s , ‘ ‘ K e e p i n g A f r i c a o f f t h e A g e n d a , ’ ’ i n W a r r e n I . C o h e n a n d Nan cy Ber nko pf Tu ck er, e ds. , Lyn do n J ohn son Con fron ts the Wo rld: Am e rica n F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1 9 6 3 – 1 9 6 8 ( N e w Y o r k : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 9 4 ) , pp. 245–2 77. 1 9 B y o n e a c c o u n t , t h e W h i t e H o u s e w a s v e r y c a u t i o u s a b o u t t h e e f f e c t o f t h e Co ng o c ris is on th e 1 9 6 4 e le c tio n. Du e t o t he fe ar of Am er ic a n di pl om a t s a nd mis s ion arie s b e ing ki lled in re prisa l atta c ks r esu lti ng fr om th e CIA air a ttac ks , t h e y o r d e r e d a l l a i r a c t i v i t y s t o p p e d i n O c t o b e r . T h e S t a n l e y v i l l e o p e r a t i o n

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w a s a l s o p l a n n e d t o o c c u r a f t e r t h e U . S . e l e c t i o n . S e e S e a n K e l l y , A m e r i c a ’ s Tyrant: The CIA and Mo butu of Zaire , pp. 129, 152.

20 In 1959, the Congo produ ced 9 percen t o f the ‘‘Fre e W orld’s’’ cop per, 49 percent of its cobalt , 6 9 percent of its industrial diamonds , and 6.5 percent of its tin, as wel l a s a number of specialize d meta ls used in the nuc lear and elect rical ind ustry.

S e e S t e p h e n R . W e i s s m a n , A m e r i c a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y i n t h e C o n g o 1 9 6 0 – 1 9 6 4 ,

p. 28.

21 Peter J. Sch raeder, United St ates Foreign Policy Towards Africa : Increment alism, C r i s i s a n d C h a n g e ( C a m b r i d g e , U K : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 9 6 ) , p p . 51 –7 7. Thr oug hou t th i s p e rio d, th e re was c ons i de ra b l e ten s i o n w ith in th e U.S .

g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t s u p p o r t i n g A f r i c a n n a t i on a l i s t s a s o p p o s e d t o t h e i n t e r e s t s of the c olonial and ex-colo nial power s.

2 2 M e m o r a n d u m f r o m B r u b e c k , 1 1 A u g u s t 1 9 6 4 . T h i s d o c u m e n t , a n d

a l l

s u b s e q u e n t d o c u m e n t s t h a t a r e n o t o t h e r w i s e l a b e l e d , w e r e a c q u i r e d v i a t h e Declassi fied Documen ts Reference System .

23 M essage from CINC STRIK E t o J CS, 9 Sep tember 1964.

24 Ric hard L. Holm , The Ameri can Agent: M y Life in the CIA , p. 14.

25 U.S. Arm y atta che´ Leo mess age, 10 Septem ber 1964.

26 M ajor Thomas P. Odom, ‘‘Drago n Opera tions : Hostage Resc ues in the Congo, ’’

p. 8; and Sean Kelly, Ameri ca’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mob utu of Zaire , p . 115.

27 M emorandum for the file s from Bru beck, 11 August 1964.

28 Se an Kell y, Ameri ca’s Tyrant: The CIA and M obutu of Zai re , p . 112.

29 M essage from CINC STRIK E t o J CS, 9 Sep tember 1964.

30 In the mid-1960s , the U.S. was involv ed in at least a doz en coun terinsurgenc ies i n c o u n t r i e s s u c h a s T h a i l a n d a n d C o l o m b i a . B e g i n n i n g i n 1 9 6 2 , t h e U . S .

O v e r s e a s I n t e r n a l D e f e n s e P o l i c y , w h i c h s e r v e d a s t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t ’ s

o u t a n i n t e r - a g e n c y a p p r o a c h t o

c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y i n w h i c h t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y ’ s r o l e w a s m a i n l y l i m i t e d t o indir ect sup ply and advisor y functions.

c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y d o c t r i n e , l a i d

3 1 M a r t i n S t a n i l a n d , ‘ ‘ A f r i c a , t h e A m e r i c a n I n t e l l i g e n t s i a , a n d t h e S h a d o w o f V i e t n a m , ’ ’ P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 9 8 , N o . 4 , W i n t e r 1 9 8 3 – 1 9 8 4 ,

p p . 6 0 2 – 6 0 3 ; L l oy d G ar r is on , ‘ ‘ A n o t h e r V i e t n a m F e a r e d i n C on go , ’’ Th e N ew

Y o r k T i m e s , 1 3 D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 4 ; ‘ ‘ T s h o m b e E m p l o y s M e r c e n a r y P i l o t s : W i l l Fly Bombers Supplied by U.S. ,’’ The Iris h Times , 1 8 August 1964. 3 2 ‘ ‘ T h e m i l it a r y c h i e fs w e r e l o o k i n g a t t he g r ow i n g i n v o l v e m e nt i n V i e t n a m i n

t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e i r o v e r a l l r e s o u r c e s a n d t h e i r a b i l i t y t o d e a l w i t h t r o u b l e

s p o t s a r o u n d t h e w o r l d . T h a t i s w h y t h e y w e r e n o t v e r y i n t e r e s t e d i n

v

o l u n t e e r i n g t o c o m m i t a n y f o r c e s i n a p l a c e l i k e t h e C o n g o . ’ ’ I n t e r v i e w o f

J

o n a t h a n D a y t o n S t o d d a r t , t h e A s s o c i a t i o n f o r D i p l o m a t i c S t u d i e s a n d

T r a i n i n g F o r e i g n A f f a i r s O r a l H i s t o r y P r o j e c t , 1 9 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 . I n 1 9 6 4 ,

S t o d d a r t w a s s e r v i n g a s D e p u t y D i r e c t o r o f t h e N e a r E a s t , S o u t h A s i a a n d

A f r i c a n R e g i o n , O f f i c e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s i n t h e O f f i c e o f t h e

o f D e f e n s e . S e e a l s o c a b l e f r o m G o d l e y t o S E C S T A T E , 3 0

October 1965.

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3 3 P i e r o G l e i j e s e s . C o n f l i c t i n g M i s s i o n s : H a v a n a , W a s h i n g t o n , a n d A f r i c a ,

1 9 5 9 – 1 9 7 6 . T h e

q u o t e r e f e r e n c i n g V i e t n a m

i s f r o m G e n e r a l A d a m s , 9

Se ptembe r 1964.

34 Memorandum for the President from Brubeck, 6 August 1964.

35 FRUS, 1964–196 8 Vol. XXIV , Africa, Document 191.

3 6 I b i d . ; P r i o r t o i n d e p e n d e n c e , t h e U . S . m a i n t a i n e d a C o n s u l a t e G e n e r a l i n

L e o p o l d v i l l e . F o r m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h i s

A m b a s s a d o r O w e n W . R o b e r t s , t h e A s s o c i a t i o n f o r D i p l o m a t i c S t u d i e s a n d

Traini ng For eign Aff airs Oral His tory Pro ject, 11 Febru ary 1991.

p e r i o d , s e e i n t e r v i e w o f

3 7 D u e t o t h e p r e s e n c e o f A m e r i c a n m i n i n g i n t e r e s t s i n K a t a n g a , t h e U . S . h a d maint ained a con sulate in Elizabe thville before indep endence.

38 Accord ing to The New York Times , a t the time of the Simba reb ellion, the CIA station in Leopol dville had ‘‘mushroom ed overnig ht into a virtual embass y and m i n i a t ur e w a r de p a rt m e nt . ’ ’ Se e To m W i c k e r , J oh n W . F i n n e y , M a x F r a nk e l , a n d E . W . K e n w o r t h y , ‘ ‘ H o w C I A P u t ‘ I n s t a n t A i r F o r c e ’ I n t o C o n g o , ’ ’ T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s , 2 5 A p r i l 1 9 6 6 . U p o n h i s r e t u r n t o t h e C o n g o a s t h e n e w

n o t e d t h a t ‘ ‘ T h e C I A o f f i c e w a s

c o n s i d e r a b l y l a r g e r t h a n t h e o n e I h a d l e f t t w o y e a r s p r e v i o u s l y . P a r a m i l i t a r y ope ra tion s ine vita bl y m ean exp an sio n.’’ Lar r y Dev lin, Chi e f of St atio n, Cong o , p . 2 2 7 . B y t h e 1 9 7 0 s , t h e A f r i c a D i v i s i o n w a s s a i d t o h a v e i n c l u d e d 3 0 0

of fic ia ls a nd w o u l d co nt in ue to ex pa nd a s a r e s u lt o f i t s op er at io ns in An g o l a . Re ne Le ma rc ha nd, ‘‘T he CIA in A fri ca : H ow Ce nt ra l? Ho w I nt e lli ge nt ?, ’’ Th e J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n A f r i c a n S t u d i e s , V o l . 1 4 , N o . 3 , 1 9 7 6 , p p . 4 0 1 – 4 2 6 ; J o h n St oc kw e l l , I n Se a r ch o f En e m i es : A C IA St or y (L on don : A nd re D e ut s c h, Lt d. ,

s t a t i o n c h i e f i n J u l y 1 9 6 5 , D e v l i n

1978).

39 Devlin co vers this pe riod in his memoi rs, althoug h numerou s other books have f o c u s e d s q u a r e l y o n t h i s t o p i c . S e e , f o r i n s t a n c e , L u d o d e W i t t e , T h e Assassinat ion of Lumum ba (New York: Ver so, 2002).

40 Th e s e f i g u r e s i n c l u de d J os e p h M ob u t u , V i c t or N e n d a ka , a n d A l be r t N de l e . S e e a l s o T o m W i c k e r e t a l . , ‘ ‘ H o w C I A P u t ‘ I n s t a n t A i r F o r c e ’ I n t o Congo. ’’ Alt hough figures such as Mobu tu had be en involv ed wi th the CIA p r i o r t o L u m u m b a ’ s o v e r t h r o w , t h e s e t i e s b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y c l o s e i n i t s aftermat h. 4 1 T o m W i c k e r e t a l . , ‘ ‘ H o w C I A P u t ‘ I n s t a n t A i r F o r c e ’ I n t o C o n g o ; ’ ’ V i c t o r M a r c h e t t i a n d J o h n D . M a r k s , T h e C I A a n d t h e C u l t o f I n t e l l i g e n c e ( N e w York: Alfred A. Knop f, 19 74), pp. 117–118; FRUS, Documen t 191. 4 2 S e a n K e l l y , A m e r i c a ’ s T y r a n t : T h e C I A a n d M o b u t u o f Z a i r e ; J e r r y P u r e n , Mercenar y Comma nder (Al berton: Gala go Pr ess, 1986), pp. 19 6, 206.

43 Larry Devl in, Chief of Statio n, Congo , p . 232. 4 4 C h r i s t o p h e r R o b b i n s , A i r A m e r i c a : T h e T r u e S t o r y o f t h e C I A ’ s M e r c e n a r y F l i e r s i n C o v e r t O p e r a t i o n s f r o m P r e - W a r C h i n a t o P r e s e n t D a y N i c a r a g u a (Lond on: Corg i Books , 1979), p. 100. 4 5 A s L e w i s H o f f a c k e r , t h e C h i e f o f t h e E m b a s s y ’ s P o l i t i c a l s e c t i o n d u r i n g 1 9 6 2 – 1 9 6 3 , l a t e r n o t e d , ‘ ‘ t h e C I A w a s r u n n i n g m o s t o f t h e s h o w ’ ’ i n t h e

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C o n g o . I n t e r v i e w , A s s o c i a t i o n f o r D i p l o m a t i c S t u d i e s a n d T r a i n i n g F o r e i g n

Affair s Oral His tory Project , 1 7 July 1998.

Se veral years earli er, when Ts hombe ran the ne wly form ed indepen dent ‘‘state ’’

o f K a t a n g a , H o a r e ’ s m e r c e n a r y u n i t w a s c a l l e d ‘ ‘ 4 C o m m a n d o . ’ ’ S e e M i k e

H o a r e , T h e R o a d t o K a l a m a t a : A C o n g o M e r c e n a r y ’ s P e r s o n a l M e m o i r

(Bo ulder, CO: Palad in Press, 2008 ).

Vandew alle’s tim e in the Congo ended foll owing Dragon Rouge.

Cabl e from Embassy Leopol dville to Se cretary of State , 27 August 1964.

Se an Kell y, Ameri ca’s Tyrant: The CIA and M obutu of Zai re , p . 121.

50 CIA memor andu m o n Congo situati on, 4 Septem ber 1964. 5 1 S e e , f o r i n s t a nc e , M e s s a g e f r o m U . S . A r m y a t t a c h e´ L e o p o l d v il l e , 2 D e c e m be r 1 9 6 4 ; R i c h a r d L . H o l m , T h e A m e r i c a n A g e n t : M y L i f e i n t h e C I A , p . 1 8 ; Larry Devlin, Chi ef of Stati on, Cong o , pp. 165, 228–229, 2 49, 255.

49

48

47

46

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

Se

e , f o r i n s ta nc e , R i c h a r d L . H ol m , Th e A m e ri ca n Ag e n t: M y L i fe i n t he CI A ,

p.

18.

M

essage from U.S. Arm y atta che´ Leopoldv ille, 2 Decem be r 1964.

Lar ry Devl in, Chief of Station, Cong o , p . 165.

Ibid ., p. 229.

Ibid ., pp. 253–255; Anthony Mock ler, The New Mercenar ies (Londo n: Sidgw ick

an d Jack son, 1985), pp. 111–161.

Tom W icker et al., ‘‘How CIA Put ‘Instan t Air Force’ Into Congo. ’’

Fr ank R. Villa fana, Cold War in the Cong o , p. 37. Richard Holm notes that the

C u b a n e x i l e p i l o t J u a n P e r o n h a d b e e n s e n t t o t h e C o n g o i n N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 3

a f t e r r e c e i v i n g t r a i n i n g o n t h e T - 6 . D u r i n g h i s C o n g o s e r v i c e , h e a l s o t r a i n e d in t h e T - 2 8 a nd t he C- 4 6. Se e Ric ha rd L. H o l m, ‘ ‘A Pl a n e C r a s h, Res cu e , a n d

R

e c o v e r y — A C l o s e C a l l i n A f r i c a , ’ ’ C e n t e r f o r t h e S t u d y o f I n t e l l i g e n c e ,

H

i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e s , W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , W i n t e r 1 9 9 9 – 2 0 0 0 . I n 1 9 6 3 , t h e

C I A a l s o h i r e d W a l l a c e M o e s s m e r t o s u p e r v i s e a n d t r a i n p i l o t s i n t h e C o n g o .

‘ ‘ O b i t u a r y , W a l l a c e M o e s s m e r , 7 0 ; P i l o t f o r C I A , R e t i r e d N a v y O f f i c e r , ’ ’ S t . L o u i s ( M i s s ou r i ) P o s t - D i s p a t c h , 2 4 O c t o b e r 1 9 9 2 . E d D e a r b o r n a r r i v e d i n t h e C o n g o i n O c t o b e r 1 9 6 3 . S e e C h r i s t o p h e r R o b b i n s , A i r A m e r i c a : T h e Tr ue Story of the CIA’ s M ercenar y Flier s , pp. 99–100.

5 9 Fr a n k R . V il l a fa na , C o l d W a r i n t h e C o n g o , p p . 3 9 – 5 1 ; S e a n K e l l y , Am e r ic a ’ s Tyrant: The CIA and Mob utu of Zaire , p . 115.

6 0 V i c t o r M a r c h e t t i a n d J o h n D . M a r k s , T h e C I A a n d t h e C u l t o f I n t e l l i g e n c e ,

p.

136.

61 ank R. Villa fana, Cold War in the Cong o , p . 38. The process of hiri ng Cuban

Fr

exil e pilot s for the Congo would con tinue until 1967.

62 ‘‘Th e Congo : I s Anyo ne in Cont rol?, ’’ Ti me, 2 6 J une 196 4; M ajor Thom as

P . O d o m , ‘ ‘ D r a g o n O p e r a t i o n s : H o s t a g e R e s c u e s i n t h e C o n g o ,

1 9 6 4 – 1 9 6 5 , ’ ’ F n 1 1 ; S e a n K e l l y , A m e r i c a ’ s T y r a n t : T h e C I A a n d M o b u t u o f Zaire , p . 100.

63 Cabl e from Embassy Leopol dville to Se cretary of State , 27 August 1964.

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64 CIA, The Congo Situation , 25 Augu st 1964. 6 5 V i c t o r M a r c h e t t i a n d J o h n D . M a r k s , T h e C I A a n d t h e C u l t o f I n t e l l i g e n c e , pp. 137–153.

6 6 B e l g i a n A r m y C o l o n e l V a n d e w a l l e a t t r i b u t e d t h e i d e a t o a r m t h e T - 6 s t o t h e CI A s t a t i on c h ie f i n L e o po l d v i ll e . S e e S e a n K e l ly , A m e r i c a ’ s T y r a n t : Th e CI A and Mobutu of Zai re , p . 9 6.

67 Adams, in Piero Gleijes es, Confli cting Missions , pp. 13, 16; Larry Devl in, Chi ef of Stati on , Con go , p. 2 2 5 ; Step hen R. W eiss man , ‘‘C IA Cove rt Ac tion in Zai re a nd A n g o la: Pa tter ns a n d Co n s eq u e n c es ,’’ Pol iti cal Sci en ce Qua rte rly , Vo l. 9 4 , N o . 2 , S u m m e r 1 9 7 9 , p p . 2 6 3 – 2 8 6 . A c c o r d i n g t o J e r r y P u r e n , M e r c e n a r y C o m m a n d e r , p . 2 0 0 , t h e C I A a l s o s u p p l i e d n a p a l m b o m b s t o t h e a i r f o r c e , althoug h this is the only sou rce for this infor mation .

68 FO 1100 = 1 2 . Note on meet ing wi th aircra ft maint enance men. 6 9 A c c o r d i n g t o H o l m , t h e a i r o p e r a t i o n s o f f i c e r a t B u n i a w a s a f o r m e r W W I I P o l i s h f i g h t e r p i l o t n a m e d ‘ ‘ B i g B i l l ’ ’ W y r o z e m s k i . H i s u n i t c o n s i s t e d o f a ‘ ‘ c o u p l e o f C u b a n p i l o t s , t w o m e c h a n i c s , a r a d i o o p e r a t o r , a n d a l o g i s t i c s o f f i c e r . ’ ’ S e e R i c h a r d L . H o l m , T h e A m e r i c a n A g e n t : M y L i f e i n t h e C I A , pp. 25, 27.

70 Se a n Ke lly, Am er ica’ s T y rant : T h e CIA and Mo butu of Zai r e , pp. 96 , 133 –13 4. T w o c a s e s o f f r i e n d l y f i r e a r e r e f e r r e d t o i n M i k e H o a r e , T h e R o a d t o Kal amata , pp. 140, 201.

71 Major Thom as P. Odom, ‘‘D ragon Opera tions ,’’ p. 40.

72 CIA Situat ion in the Congo , 1 6 Decemb er 1964.

73 S e e , f o r i n s t a n c e , M i k e H o a r e , T h e R o a d t o K a l a m a t a , p p . 8 7 , 2 4 6 , a n d M i k e Ho are, Con go W arri o rs (B oul de r, CO: Pal a din Pr e ss, 200 8), p. 3 7 . P r ior to the F i z i - B a r a k a o p e r a t i o n , H o a r e m a d e a p e r s o n a l r e c o n n a i s s a n c e i n o n e o f t h e B - 2 6 K s i n o r d e r t o s e l e c t a b e a c h f o r t h e a m p h i b i o u s l a n d i n g , T h e R o a d t o Kalama ta , p . 255.

74 See for instance: Se an Kell y, Ameri ca’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zai re , p . 1 2 8 ; M i k e H o a r e , C o n g o W a r r i o r s , p p . 1 7 0 – 1 7 1 ; L l o y d G a r r i s o n , ‘ ‘ M e r c e n a r i e s L e a d i n g F i r s t B i g D r i v e o n S t a n l e y v i l l e , ’ ’ T h e N e w Y o r k

N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 4 ; L l o y d G a r r i s o n , ‘ ‘ C o n g o M e r c e n a r i e s G e t

Suppl ies, Food a n d Pay,’’ The New Yor k Times , 10 Novem be r 196 4; ‘‘Con go P l a n e s H i t A l b e r t v i l l e i n S o f t e n i n g U p , ’ ’ T h e W a s h i n g t o n P o s t , 2 7 A u g u s t 1 9 6 4 ; ‘ ‘ 3 C o n g o B - 2 6 ’ s A t t a c k B e s i e g e r s o f a C o l u m n , ’ ’ T h e N e w Y o r k Times , 1 1 February 1965.

75 Sean Kelly, Am erica’s Tyr ant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire , p . 146.

76 Memorandum for Bundy from Bru beck, 5 Octo ber 1964.

77 Er ne s to ‘ ‘C he ’’ G u e v a r a , T he A fri c a n D re a m : The D ia r ie s o f t h e Re v ol u t i o n ar y War in the Cong o (London : The Harvi ll Press, 2001), pp. 184, 229.

78 CIA Intelli gence Memo randum, 30 Decem ber 1964; CIA Situat ion in the Congo Report, 21 Apri l 1965. 7 9 R i c h a r d L . H o l m , ‘ ‘ A P l a n e C r a s h , R e s c u e , a n d R e c o v e r y : A C l o s e C a l l i n Africa. ’’

T i m e s , 6

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81

82

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84

85

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A detai led account of the treatment of the U.S. consular personnel in Stanle yville

can be found in: M ichael P. E. Hoy t, Capt ive in the Cong o: A Cons ul’s Return to

the Heart of Darknes s (Anna polis , MD: Naval Institut e P r ess, 2000).