SHIRLEY TOLEDO and ROSIE DAJAC vs.

JUDGE KALLOS
Facts: Prior to his appointment as a judge, Judge Kallos was complainants counsel of record in a Civil
Case involving the recovery of hereditary shares with damages. On 25 March 1979, a judgment was
rendered ordering the defendants to, among other things, turn over to herein complainants, the plaintiffs
therein, the possession and ownership of the total area of 4,514 square meters of "lot 2082 Albay
Cadastre." On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executor.
In 2002, the respondent filed in the same action, a Civil Case for the issuance of an order constituting in
his favor an attorneys lien to the extent of one-third over the lot awarded in favor of the complainants
representing his attorneys fee. He based his motion on a written contingency agreement on attorneys
fees for professional services rendered whereby he is entitled to one-third share of what would be
awarded to the complainants. He claimed that this agreement had already been implemented when "one
of the three (3) lots levied upon by the sheriff to answer for the award of damages was given to (him) as
his one-third share while the other two lots went to the plaintiffs as their two-third share.
Later, the complainants filed a complaint praying for three things. First, they pray for an order directing
the respondent to stop demanding his "1/3 share attorneys fees. Second, the recovery of the property
involved in said Deed of Absolute Sale. Lastly, the removal of the respondent from his position as RTC
judge for his alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge.
Issues:
1.WON respondent has the right to demand his attorneys fees.
Held: Yes. Respondent judge was, indeed, complainants counsel in a Civil Case and he should therefore
be compensated for his services. The act of demanding payment for his attorneys fees is not a ground for
administrative liability.Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility A lawyer shall charge only
fair and reasonable fees.As what constitute fair and reasonable fees in this case is not yet certain. The
respondents claim for attorneys fees was still being litigated in a Civil Case.Thus, said reasonable fees is
not yet certain.
As a lawyer, it is but just that he be fairly compensated for his services. And his filing of a claim for
attorneys fees in a Civil Case was an appropriate legal remedy. Considering the pendency of such claim,
the suspension of the determination of the instant administrative complaint until the rendition of a final
judicial ruling on the matter of respondents attorneys fees is just proper. In other words, the complaint is
not yet ripe for administrative evaluation. The hearing on the matter being conducted by the trial court
should be allowed to run its course as that court is the appropriate forum for a ruling on the dispute.
Here,the duty of the court is not only to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see
that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees.
2. WON respondent Judge be removed from his position as RTC judge for his alleged abusive conduct
unbecoming a judge
Held:No. There was no evidence presented to prove respondents alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a
judge. Here, the respondent was not yet a judge when the assailed action or conduct was allegedly
committed by him. As such, and to that extent, there is no reason to bind him by the strict standards of the
Code of Judicial Conduct for acts committed as counsel to a case prior to his appointment as a judge.
SC: the instant administrative complaint was DISMISSED for being premature and for lack of merit.

Armovit v. CA
Facts: Atty. Raymundo Armovit filed a petition for his claim of attorneys fee against Bengson.
Armovit was the counsel of Bengson in a complaint against GSIS for an extrajudicial foreclosure
of their properties, and agreed to pay Armovit P15,000.00 as initial compensation and 20%
contingent fee. After favorable judgment was rendered to them, Armovit wasgiven P 300,000
instead of P 552,000 which is the 20% of the P2,760,000 that was recovered from the said
case, andassured that the balance is forthcoming. But Bengson did not pay the balance and
averred to the court that the P300,000 was the final payment. Armovit appealed that there is
nothing in the evidence receipt that shows that P 300,000 wasthe full payment of the agreed

contingent fee.Issue: Whether or not Armovits claim of attorneys fee is reasonable.Held:

Armovits claim of attorneys fee is reasonable for it is stipulated in the agreement with Bengson
that he will be given20% of contingent fee, and since the case obtained favorable judgment, the
agreement must therefore be followed. AContingent Fee Contract is an agreement in writing in
which the lawyers professional fee, usually a fixed percentage of whatmay be recovered in the
action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation; and if in case the client acted in
badfaith and refuse to pay what is due to the lawyer then the lawyer is entitled to recover the full
amount as fixed in a validwritten agreement. Thus, the petition of Armovit is granted and
Bengson is ordered to pay P252,000.00 as balance of thecontingent fee.

I.

LAWYERS

Entitlement to Attorneys Fees

RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO AND AFRICA vs.

EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, PHILS., INC.
G.R. No. 104600, July 2, 1999

FACTS:
Eastern Telecommunications, Phils., Inc. (ETPI) represented by the law firm
SAGA, filed with the Regional Trial court a complaint for the recovery or revenue shares
against PLDT. Atty. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm, appeared for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount. The latter was
dissolved and the junior partners formed RADA, which took over as counsel in the case for
ETPI. ETPI signed a retainer agreement with counsel wherein it was stated that in cases of
collection or judicial action, our attorneys fees shall be 15% of the amounts collected or the
value of the property acquired or liability saved. The retainer agreement was terminated in
1988. the next day, RADA filed a notice of attorneys lien. In its notice, RADA informed the court
that there were negotiations toward a compromise between ETPI and PLDT.
In 1990, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and the same was entered as
a judgment. The petitioner (RADA) filed a motion for the enforcement of attorneys lien.

ISSUE:

Is RADA entitled to the awards of attorneys fees they are claiming?

HELD:
RADA is entitled to attorneys fees but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
court of origin for the determination of the amount of attorneys fees to which the petitioner is
entitled.
Atty. Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until ETPI terminated the law firms
services in 1988. Petitioners claim for attorneys fees hinges on two grounds: first, the fact that
Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was working for SAGA, and second, the
retainer agreement.
Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional services. A lawyer has the right
to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client, which compensation must be
reasonable. A lawyer would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise
stated, the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit basis.