Notes on Kantian Ethics

Deontological (or duty-oriented) theories of ethics (e.g., divine- command theory,

Kantian formalism) assume that the first task of ethics is to determine what we are
obligated to do. By doing our duty, we do what is valuable (not the other way around).
Divine-command theory says that something is good for no other reason than that God
commands it. Kant's ethics is called formalism because it focuses on the form or
structure of a moral judgment (the fact that all moral directives have the form "you ought
to do X"). The fundamental aim of Kant's ethical theory is to determine how a command
can be a moral command with a particularly obligating character.
Kant's Ethics

According to Kant there are several problems with consequentialism

o According to the consequentialist, no act (no matter how evil or cruel) is
right or wrong in itself
o If we are already inclined to do an act because we naturally seek to
produce good consequences (e.g., pleasure, happiness), then we are not
acting freely and therefore not morally responsibly
o Because of differences in their experiences and backgrounds, people differ
as to what are good consequences; therefore, we can never achieve
agreement on the end of moral behavior or on an ulitmate criterion for
making such decisions
o The consequences of our actions are often out of our control, so we cannot
be held responsible for those consequences or have our actions judged
based on them

Morality is not based on hypothetical imperatives (if you want X--where X is, for
example, happiness--then do Y) but rather on a categorical imperative (you must
do X, regardless). If morality were hypothetical and people differed in their social
and personal goals (as they do), then their means for attaining those goals (e.g.,
morality) would differ as well. But morality should be the kind of thing which
does not vary from individual to individual, because otherwise there would be no
point in providing a reason for behavior other than that it is simply what one
wants to do. In other words, it would be to acknowledge that there is no reason
for acting one way rather than another. But because we are rational beings, we
can give reasons for what we do, and we can act based on those reasons rather
than acting simply because we want to.

According to Kant, the fundamental rational principle of moral argument or

reasoning is the categorical imperative: you should act, regardless of your own

aims or purposes, only on maxims (general ways of acting) that you could will
that everyone else also adopts. To test the maxim for universalizability, you have
to ask whether the universal adoption of such a way of acting would be (1)
consistent (i.e., possible) or (2) acceptable to rational beings.
A maxim such as "lie when you can get away with it" cannot be universalized
consistently (i.e., without contradiction) because, if people lied when they thought
they could get away with it, you would never know when anyone was telling you
the truth; in such a world, there would be no way to tell the truth from a lie, so its
universalization would generate a contradiction. Another example of this same
point: the universalization of "steal when you can" would create a world in which
no one's property would any longer truly be rightfully his or hers; but if there is
no private property any more, there can be no stealing either, since stealing means
taking someone's private property.
Kant recognizes that it is necessary to add the second test of universalizability
(acceptability) because there are maxims that can be universalized without
contradiction (e.g., "Help out people only when you benefit from it") which are
not universally acceptable. That is, it is possible to imagine a selfish world where
no one helps out others except for personal gain; however, such a world would not
be acceptable to everyone, and the fact that it does not have universal
acceptability makes it a maxim on which no moral action can be based.
[Note how Kant's Categorical Imperative is different from the Golden Rule ("Do unto
others as you would have them to unto you"): it is not based on what you want but on
what is necessary for any being to act rationally (that is, universally, without
consideration of his/her own self-interest).]

Being rational means being able to act based on motives that are universally
defensible. Thus to act as a human being is not to act as a slave to one's instincts
or passions or as a result of social causes but as ends-in- themselves. Human
beings can act out of respect for doing something because it is the rational thing to
do, and when they do this they are acting for the sake of doing their duty; and this
is what being moral means, acting on the basis of a "good will." In this way, they
are authors of their actions (autonomous) and are morally responsible for their
intentions, not the consequences of actions.

Morality presumes the existence of rational persons. A society of autonomous,

rational persons is a kingdom of ends, a society in which each individual has
dignity, intrinsic worth, and is considered fully responsible for his or her choices
in the making of universal law. [But if everything is valuable only in terms of
moral beings, then what about nature?--Answer: value is meaningful only in terms
of freely chosen ends.] The possibility for rationality makes humans morally
significant, but that does not indicate specific morally justifiable ways to act.