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Many philosophers, atheological included, concede that the logical problem of evil has been successfully

defended in several formulations. Analytic exercises that guarantee the conceptual compatibility of one's
definitions, whether of putative divine attributes or of human agency, responsibility, volition or a freeenough will, demonstrate the logical validity of such arguments, called defenses.
We don't have to resolve philosophy of mind interpretations of neuroscience or quantum interpretations of
quantum mechanics or cosmogonic interpretations of cosmology when formulating a valid defense. As
you sagely point out, the explanatory gaps perdure, whatever one's hermeneutic (or ideology).
The fallback strategy for the naysayers, then, introduces --- not logical, but --- evidential problems of evil,
which invite a counter called a theodicy. Rather than argue that a logical defense lacks validity, it hopes to
show, instead, that it's improbable.
I have a visceral discomfort with theodicies, for they seem to trivialize the enormity of evil and
immensity of suffering. Also, from an epistemic perspective, the conjectures and criticisms, due to the
nature of the subject matters (e.g. god concepts and/or philosophies of mind) are too weakly probabilistic
to demonstrate soundness, devolve into ping-ponging plausibilities and implausibilities (the kinetic cyberdynamic that keeps internet forums in perpetual motion).
Regarding top-down causation, you are spot on. As I've said before, I'm metaphysically agnostic, there,
leaning toward a nonreductive physicalism or an emergentist stance that eschews any a priori
supervenience. Even a naturalist conception of a free-enough will could be successfully imported into the
run of the mill free will defense.
As for the old in/determinism, of course, I respect the same explanatory gap that you recognize, not
seeing it as an either-or reality, not a priori conflating the in/determinable with the in/determined,
recognizing that probabilities can refer to epistemic, ontic or epi-ontic states, where stochasticities
(random) and nomicities (law-like) can alternate in layers of complexity, each even emerging from the
other.
All that said, I commend the works of John Cobb, David Ray Griffin, Catherine Keller and Thomas Jay
Oord, for good logical defenses. And I resonate with many Jewish anti-theodicies. I particularly resonate
with what's called a tehomic panentheism, which affirms a creatio ex profundis rather than nihilo, an
exegesis of Genesis that recognizes the tohu bohu as the formless void or abyss or deep or tehom over
which the Spirit was breathed. In my particular conception, the tehom (chaos) would be coeternal,
dynamical, with emergent teloi and its own inviolable logic. Divine power would be supreme but not
absolute, constrained both by its own agapic logic and the tehomic logic, utterly efficacious
eschatologically, while ineluctably unobstrusive, cosmically (the cosmic corresponding to the venn
diagram-like intersection of agapic and tehomic fields), effecting its will thru persuasive influence not
coercive interruption. This would not rule out proleptic (anticipatory) realizations of the divine will
cosmically and temporally.
God would not only not author suffering but would not employ it instrumentally, only transform it and
alleviate or eliminate it per those tehomic and divine logics, which we cannot comprehend. In short, as
with most process theology, absolute omnipotence would be incoherent in a tehomic panentheism.

I take free will as axiomatic and common sensical, nothing I'd bother to argue for anymore than I would
for noncontradiction or against solipsism.

As far as qualifying any putative omnipotence, my panentheism remains vague regarding the precise
nature of any putative tehomic and kenotic/ agapic logics, for example, regarding any boundary and limit
conditions, which would specify limitations as either logical (e.g. Plantinga's approach places no
nonlogical limits).or nonlogical (e.g. some process conceptions). One takeaway from this is that I don't,
therefore, a priori rule out miracles, in general, only insist on a large degree theological skepticism
regarding any given divine intervention, in particular. Under any circumstances, an ensemble of solutions,
formulated cumulative case-like with various core and auxilliary arguments remains necessary because
we can't a priori establish which creatio account successfully refers to kenotic/agapic-cosmic
interactivities, for example, whether a putative eternal nature successfully describes any realities other
than the divine.
The axiological significance of any putative divine attributes for worshipfulness derives, first, from
shared evaluative dispositions, which then inform any normative propositions. Those dispositions reveal
more about a given individual, more often, a culture, than they do about any given god-conception.
Beyond the logical problem, the evidential problem doesn't resolve philosophically through an exchange
of im/plausibilities, but gets "argued" liturgically, employing the dramatic, narrative and lyrical in a
manner that addresses the existential problem, much more robustly, the evidential problem, much more
weakly. The liturgical approach effects an affective attunement to the cosmos by cultivating a shared
evaluative disposition toward it. While eminently actionable, existentially, and defensibly rational,
logically, it is otherwise too weakly warranted epistemically to either evidentially or normatively coerce
either others' beliefs or their actions, at least not without their first inhabiting a given symbol system,
while actively participating in its interpretive community.
Beyond the diverse sophiological trajectories, which cultivate our evaluative dispositions toward cosmos,
others, God and even self, affectively attuning us to these cosmic, tehomic, kenotic-agapic realities, we
enjoy diverse soteriological modes, being oriented, sanctified, nurtured, empowered and saved --ultimately and finally, eschatologically, and temporally and eternally, proleptically (in anticipation). So,
incarnational realities, manifestations, signs & wonders, very much serve as first fruits, down payments,
guarantees, earnest deposits or promises of an eschatological fullness (final telos). In a very real sense,
God's worshipfulness, however one qualifies or even denies ommipotence, has always required a final
victory, if not now, then, if not here, there.

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