THE GAME OF SATYAGRAHA

Ever heard of Game Theory??Many of us might be new to it.

Game theory is "the study of mathematical models of conflict and
cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. Game theory is
mainly used in economics, political science, and psychology, as well as logic,
computer science, and biology. Originally, it addressed zero-sum games, in
which one person's gains result in losses for the other participants. Today, game
theory applies to a wide range of behavioral relations, and is now an umbrella
term for the science of logical decision making in humans, animals, and
computers. (ref. Wikipedia) .
Let us keep aside Game Theory for a while. Let us talk about Gandhiji!!!
Dear readers, you might be wondering how suddenly Gandhiji came into
picture? Your confusion and queries are genuine which will get an answer
shortly.
Gandhi, The Father of Nation as we address him, has a very prominent
place in our history books for his significant role in our freedom struggle. But
that one thing which makes him stand up above others was the use of his
famous weapon for the struggle SATYAGRAHA.
Satyagraha is often seen as the hope of the future, a long-awaited means of
peaceful conflict resolution. There is no denying that satyagraha has been
successful. Yet the question of why and how satyagraha works has not been
dealt with analytically. How could such a tactic work at all in this era of socalled power politics? How can a group get what it wants by inflicting
punishment not on the enemy but on itself ? What are the analytic features of
satyagraha as a tactic? These questions are important, for even if Gandhi the
saint cannot be analyzed (or even imitated), perhaps Gandhi the tactician can.
And here the game theory comes into picture. Since we are new to game theory,
we will understand it through examples and then we will head on to analyze the
success of Satyagraha.
1.Two-Party Conflict: An example:

FIG.1 represents the matrix model of game

theory.We will first understand how this matrix
is interpreted or read.
Let us assume that two groups (maybe business
or political groups) A and B are in conflict.To be
in conflict means that the interests of both
groups are at least partially opposed and the
choice of one group affects the choice of
another.Suppose A has two choices I & II and B
FIG.
1 upper
FIG.1,

has i & ii. In

right-hand number in each of the four cells represent
A's profits or gains and the lower left-hand number, B's profits or gains. For
now, we assume that A is given the chance to choose first .If A goes with choice
I,(observe 1st column) then it is wise for B to go with choice i because when A
chooses I ,the profit for B is 2 if it goes with I and just 1 if it goes with ii.
Similarly, if A chooses II, (observe 2nd column) then B has more profit if it goes
with ii (2 >1). Given B the chance to choose first, the choice of A will be
affected in similar manner as per its gains. This is how we read the matrix
model of game theory. Now let us consider another example to understand it
further.
Let us consider two business rivals A &B
and each of them wants to setup new
company in say Delhi. Following are the
given facts:
1) Both A & B knows that the other is
opening a unit too.
2) There are two choices for each of themNorth Delhi & South Delhi.
3) Company will have more profits if it is
FIG.2
setup in North Delhi .
Let the gains of A and B be as given in FIG.2 matrix. The question of who
'chooses first' is crucial. Now, if A begins building first in the north, then
1) A gets the desirable northern site. However, if B also builds in north then
competition is right next door for A which A would not want at any cost as it
would lower As gain (FIG.2).
2) Thus, one way of preventing B from building in the north is by threatening
B that if B builds his unit in the north, A will somehow lower his gains.
However, it may be difficult to make B believe such a thing as it may turn
out to be expensive for A to lower the gains of B (e.g. cost of bombs).To
make such a threat believable, A must make B believe that he doesnt care
for his own gains, come what may he is going to choose the north and not
let B build there. To avoid any counter-tactic by B, A must see to it that B

believes that As motivation is not strategic but a matter of (non-economic)

principle. When B believes that A doesn't care about maximizing his gains,
then any strategic ploys B himself might try will seem to B to be in vain. A
perfect threat, then, steals the first move in a game like Fig. 2 and thereby
yields the optimal result for the threatener. It involves convincing the
opponent that the course of action I is the only real choice one has, because
one is motivated by higher principles (economic irrationality) and/or
because one lowers other gains, thus making it irrational even from the point
of view of gain maximizing to do other than I.
3) Now, when A builds in the north, he cannot build in the south also because
his gain has reduced due to the expenses put in to build company in north.
Thus, we say that A is committed to the north. Realising this, B is now sure
that if he builds in the south, A will not come there to disturb him. Thus, B
considers it wise to build in south and get gain of 2 rather than building in
the north along with A and getting a profit of only 1.
SATYAGRAHA & GAME THEORY::
1] Aspects of Gandhis Satyagraha::Conflict Models
1.1] Come what may, we wont obey you
Disobeying an unjust law :A commitment or a threat
Let us now examine Gandhi's
satyagraha by means of this sort of
two-player model. The two players in
our first archetypal game are Gandhi
(and his followers) and the government. The choices of action will vary
from in-stance to instance, but they
will fall into some-thing like the
pattern in Fig.3. Let us discuss this
matrix, cell by cell. Suppose this is the
case of a citizen (Gandhi) who believes he must disobey an unjust law(e.g. the
salt tax) and a government which feels it must enforce the laws.
a) Upper left-hand cell :This cell is the best result for the Govt..The Govt.
enforces the unjust law(and profit of 2 gained via punishment or
imprisonment of those breaking the laws) and the citizens obey it(and incurs
a loss shown by -1)
b) Upper right-hand cell :This cell is the worst for both the players. Gandhi and
his followers will be punished for disobeying the law(shown by negative gain
-3) and the Govt. will have the cost of carrying out its 'threat' of enforcing the
law plus the disutility of a number of citizens refusing to participate in the
body politic.-2 is circlced because this is a very crucial number and may
increase with the increase in the number of satyagrahis.

c) Lower left-hand cell: is irrelevant, since it is quite unlikely. (The -2 for the
citizen is predicated on the assumption that if laws are not enforced for other
citizens, it would be economically foolish for one to follow the law).
d) Lower right-hand cell: This is the best outcome for the citizen, for he forces
the Govt. not to enforce an objectionable law and he does not have to obey it.
The -1 for the Govt. occurs be-cause it is presumably forced to take costly
steps in changing the law.
This matrix is pregnant with strategic possibilities. If either player can steal
the first move, he can assure his optimal profit. The Govt., by its very nature as
enforcer of the law, has a commitment to i. But the citizen also has room to
maneuver. If he can credibly commit himself to II, he makes the government
choose between a gain of -2 (for 'enforce') and a -1 (for 'don't enforce'); if the
government is a profit maximizer, it is rational for it not to enforce.
Can the citizen make a credible commitment? Can he believably threaten the
Govt. to disobey the law? We saw in Fig. 2 how a believable threat is
established by appearing 'irrational' from the point of view of the profits. One
means to this end is to make the choice of action appear to come from higher
principles. This is possible because of Gandhis weapon-Satyagraha.
First, satyagraha was derived from 'higher principles'. It was not just a
politically expedient, strategic tool. Gandhi wrote, 'Satyagraha is self-suffering
and not inflicting violence on others. For satyagraha and its off-shoots, NonCooperation and Civil Resistance, are nothing but names for the law of
suffering.' Thus, it is not difficult for Gandhi to make the Govt. believe that his
non-violent protests against the unjust law is based on his principles and he
doesnt care for his profit. This would make the Govt. think twice before
enforcing the law.
1.2] Do or die - Gandhi's fasts as coercive threats :
Gandhi also employed a second sort of
threat. After he became a popular
symbol throughout India and the world,
he often went on fasts which compelled
his opponents to act quickly and as he
pleased, or else have his death on their
hands. These fasts committed Gandhi to
a course of action and left the next
move - and the responsibility for his life
- to the opponent. Thus, the other
player's choice was not just one of
issues and their 'profits, but one of

life or death for a great man. In this way, Gandhi's fasts greatly affected the
opponent's gains. The effect of the fasting strategy on Fig. 3 is shown in Fig. 4.
To the opponent this action appears irrational, for Gandhi is risking the large
negative gain of death; but Gandhi's character and previous actions made even
this commitment believable. And Gandhi's large following made Govt.
responsibility for his death a very undesirable gain indeed. Thus, as a profit
maximizer, the Govt. must avoid the -10 gain assured by i and follow Gandhi's
instructions to do ii. The opponent could not afford to let him die because the
consequences would be really bad.
2] Mind Games - Social and psychological aspects of successful satyagraha::
In the above examples, the profit numbers depend upon the players and
social characteristics. What are such features which make satyagraha
successful?
Following psychological features are necessary for satyagraha to be a success1) First, he should be a maximizer i.e. ones opponent should be a person who is
concerned about his profits. In our case, the British Govt. really cared for its
loss and gain and hence in many situations, though unwillingly, surrendered
to the demands of Gandhiji and his followers. If this wasnt the case, then
satyagraha would be equivalent to suicide.
2) Second feature is potential sympathy for the plight of the protestor.
Communication is one key. Without wide publicity and public support, the
threats, especially of the coercive second type discussed above, would lose
their veiled violence and thus their ability to lower the opponent's profits.
Gandhi thought all men were potentially sympathetic. Some such sympathy is
necessary for satyagraha's success.
3) The satyagrahi himself should have certain characteristics if he is to succeed.
First, it is important that his movement have a large popular base. However
Gandhi was not quite clear about this because his opinion was that a handful
of strong satyagrahis was enough to lead the non-violence movement. While
Gandhiji may be right with this thought, we have seen the circled -2 in Fig.2
which depends upon the number of disobedients. If the number of satyagrahis
are less, the Govt. can easily conquer them in the long run. Thus, the number
of disobedients can affect the movement's success.
4) The movement should contain true believers. It is a rare person who can
threaten to lay down his life for a principle he doesn't believe in, no matter
how strategic. Gandhi's satyagraha was 'derived' from a number of sources.
One of the important aspects of Gandhi's position and its success was its
religious origin: this origin made satyagraha more credible, and it made it

easier to attract a large popular following of true believers by connecting the

tactics with the religion of the masses.
5) The movement must act as a single player. Unity of will is necessary in order
to make absolute commitments; the satyagrahi movement must appear
unwavering both in its principles and its composition. Such unity re-quires
dynamic, preferably charismatic, leadership like Gandhi's.
In our matrix models, such above mentioned psychological features of a
satyagrahi and his opponent can lead to a successful satyagraha.However, our
matrix model also brings out certain flaws of satyagraha which is discussed in
brief below .
Gandhi said that in satyagraha, there is no compulsion or violence. However,
our Fig.2 matrix model clearly says that the Govt., fearing Gandhis fast unto
death, was compelled to surrender to his demands.In other words,it was kind of
a political blackmail. The other case of contradiction to Gandhis non-violent
movement was many of the boycotts, sit-downs, marches,etc inflicted property
damage even to innocent third parties. Thus Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence seems contradicted by the 'violent' nature of some of his tactics.
However, the idea of satyagraha being non-violent had a crucial role in our
matrices. Even if satyagraha was 'violent', then, the fact that it was thought to be
non-violent is the important thing in understanding why it worked.
CONCLUSION:
In our analysis, then, we have not passed judgement on Gandhi; we have
analyzed the effectiveness of satyagraha as a tactic of political change and what
the logic of this tactic qua tactic implies. In the process, we may have missed
Gandhi's greatness. But we have not mislocated it. Now, dear readers, hopefully
your earlier queries as to how game theory (mathematics) and Gandhiji are
related are solved. This one discussed above is one of the many applications of
game theory. Hope it was interesting!!!
(Note for readers: The above analysis using game theory is a part taken from the
journal Gandhis Non-violence as a Tactic by Robert E. Klitgaard. Those who
wish to to study the above case in detail can go to
jpr.sagepub.com/content/8/2/143.full.pdf to download the journal)