Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
2 PHILOSOPHY
lectual categories (such as causality). Assuming the content of these forms and categories to be qualities of the
world as it exists independently of our perceptual access,
according to Kant, spawns seductive but senseless metaphysical beliefs (for example, extending the concept of
causality beyond possible experience results in unveriable speculation about a rst cause). Deleuze inverts
2.1 Metaphysics
the Kantian arrangement: experience exceeds our concepts by presenting novelty, and this raw experience of
Deleuzes main philosophical project in the works he dierence actualizes an idea, unfettered by our prior catwrote prior to his collaborations with Guattari can egories, forcing us to invent new ways of thinking (see
be baldly summarized as an inversion of the tradi- below, Epistemology).
tional metaphysical relationship between identity and
dierence. Traditionally, dierence is seen as deriva- Simultaneously, Deleuze claims that being is univocal,
tive from identity: e.g., to say that X is dierent from i.e., that all of its senses are armed in one voice.
Y assumes some X and Y with at least relatively stable Deleuze borrows the doctrine of ontological univocity
identities (as in Platos forms). To the contrary, Deleuze from the medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus. In meclaims that all identities are eects of dierence. Identi- dieval disputes over the nature of God, many eminent theties are neither logically nor metaphysically prior to dif- ologians and philosophers (such as Thomas Aquinas) held
ference, Deleuze argues, given that there exist dier- that when one says that God is good, Gods goodness
ences of nature between things of the same genus.[17] is only analogous to human goodness. Scotus argued to
That is, not only are no two things ever the same, the cat- the contrary that when one says that God is good, the
egories we use to identify individuals in the rst place goodness in question is exactly the same sort of goodderive from dierences. Apparent identities such as X ness that is meant when one says Jane is good. That is,
are composed of endless series of dierences, where X God only diers from us in degree, and properties such
= the dierence between x and x'", and x'" = the dif- as goodness, power, reason, and so forth are univocally
ference between..., and so forth. Dierence, in other applied, regardless of whether one is talking about God,
words, goes all the way down. To confront reality hon- a person, or a ea.
estly, Deleuze argues, we must grasp beings exactly as Deleuze adapts the doctrine of univocity to claim that
they are, and concepts of identity (forms, categories, re- being is, univocally, dierence. With univocity, howsemblances, unities of apperception, predicates, etc.) fail ever, it is not the dierences which are and must be: it
to attain what he calls dierence in itself. If philoso- is being which is Dierence, in the sense that it is said
phy has a positive and direct relation to things, it is only of dierence. Moreover, it is not we who are univocal
insofar as philosophy claims to grasp the thing itself, ac- in a Being which is not; it is we and our individuality
cording to what it is, in its dierence from everything it which remains equivocal in and for a univocal Being.[22]
is not, in other words, in its internal dierence.[18]
Here Deleuze at once echoes and inverts Spinoza, who
Like Kant and Bergson, Deleuze considers traditional no- maintained that everything that exists is a modication of
tions of space and time as unifying forms imposed by the one substance, God or Nature. For Deleuze, there is
the subject. He therefore concludes that pure dier- no one substance, only an always-dierentiating process,
ence is non-spatio-temporal; it is an idea, what Deleuze an origami cosmos, always folding, unfolding, refolding.
in the paradoxical forcalls the virtual. (The coinage refers to Prousts def- Deleuze summarizes this ontology
[23]
mula
"pluralism
=
monism".
inition of what is constant in both the past and the
present: real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.[19] ) While Deleuzes virtual ideas supercially resemble Plato's forms and Kants ideas of pure
reason, they are not originals or models, nor do they transcend possible experience; instead they are the conditions of actual experience, the internal dierence in itself.
The concept they [the conditions] form is identical to its
object.[20] A Deleuzean idea or concept of dierence is
therefore not a wraith-like abstraction of an experienced
thing, it is a real system of dierential relations that creates actual spaces, times, and sensations.[21]
Dierence and Repetition (1968) is Deleuzes most sustained and systematic attempt to work out the details of
such a metaphysics, but his other works develop similar
ideas. In Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962), for example,
reality is a play of forces; in Anti-Oedipus (1972), a "body
without organs"; in What is Philosophy? (1991), a "plane
of immanence" or chaosmos.
Thus, Deleuze at times refers to his philosophy as a transcendental empiricism, alluding to Kant and Friedrich
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. In Kants transcendental idealism, experience only makes sense when organized by
forms of sensibility (namely, space and time) and intel-
2.2 Epistemology
2.3
Values
3
points of reference such as the speed of light or absolute
zero (which Deleuze calls functives). According to
Deleuze, none of these disciplines enjoy primacy over
the others:[27] they are dierent ways of organizing the
metaphysical ux, separate melodic lines in constant interplay with one another.[28] For example, Deleuze does
not treat cinema as an art representing an external reality, but as an ontological practice that creates dierent
ways of organizing movement and time.[29] Philosophy,
science, and art are equally, and essentially, creative and
practical. Hence, instead of asking traditional questions
of identity such as is it true?" or what is it?", Deleuze
proposes that inquiries should be functional or practical:
what does it do?" or how does it work?"[30]
2.3 Values
In ethics and politics, Deleuze again echoes Spinoza, albeit in a sharply Nietzschean key. In a classical liberal
model of society, morality begins from individuals, who
bear abstract natural rights or duties set by themselves or
a God. Following his rejection of any metaphysics based
on identity, Deleuze criticizes the notion of an individual
as an arresting or halting of dierentiation (as the etymology of the word individual suggests). Guided by
the naturalistic ethics of Spinoza and Nietzsche, Deleuze
instead seeks to understand individuals and their moralities as products of the organization of pre-individual desires and powers. In the two volumes of Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari describe history as
a congealing and regimentation of "desiring-production"
(a concept combining features of Freudian drives and
Marxist labor) into the modern individual (typically neurotic and repressed), the nation-state (a society of continuous control), and capitalism (an anarchy domesticated
into infantilizing commodication). Deleuze, following
Karl Marx, welcomes capitalisms destruction of traditional social hierarchies as liberating, but inveighs against
its homogenization of all values to the aims of the market.
But how does Deleuze square his pessimistic diagnoses
with his ethical naturalism? Deleuze claims that standards of value are internal or immanent: to live well is to
fully express ones power, to go to the limits of ones potential, rather than to judge what exists by non-empirical,
transcendent standards. Modern society still suppresses
dierence and alienates persons from what they can do.
To arm reality, which is a ux of change and dierence, we must overturn established identities and so become all that we can becomethough we cannot know
what that is in advance. The pinnacle of Deleuzean practice, then, is creativity. Herein, perhaps, lies the secret:
to bring into existence and not to judge. If it is so disgusting to judge, it is not because everything is of equal
value, but on the contrary because what has value can be
made or distinguished only by defying judgment. What
expert judgment, in art, could ever bear on the work to
come?"[31]
2.4
3 RECEPTION
Deleuzes interpretations
In The Mask of Enlightenment (1995), Stanley Rosen objects to Deleuzes interpretation of Nietzsches eternal return.[47]
In Deleuze: The Clamor of Being (1997), Alain Badiou
claims that Deleuzes metaphysics only apparently embraces plurality and diversity, remaining at bottom relentlessly monist. Badiou further argues that, in practical
matters, Deleuzes monism entails an ascetic, aristocratic
fatalism akin to ancient Stoicism.[48]
In Reconsidering Dierence (1997), Todd May argues
that Deleuzes claim that dierence is ontologically primary ultimately contradicts his embrace of immanence,
i.e., his monism. However, May believes that Deleuze
can discard the primacy-of-dierence thesis, and accept
a Wittgensteinian holism without signicantly altering his
practical philosophy.[49]
5
his philosophical system. (But see above, Deleuzes interpretations.) Sokal and Bricmont state that they don't object to metaphorical reasoning, including with mathematical concepts, but mathematical and scientic terms are
useful only insofar as they are precise. They give examples of mathematical concepts being abused by taking
them out of their intended meaning; rendering the idea
into normal language reduces it to banality, truism or nonsense. In their opinion, Deleuze and Guattari used mathematical concepts about which the typical reader might be
not knowledgeable, and thus served to display erudition
rather than enlightening the reader. Sokal and Bricmont
state that they only dealt with the abuse of mathematical
and scientic concepts and explicitly suspend judgment
about Deleuzes wider contributions.[50]
In Organs without Bodies (2003), Slavoj iek claims that
Deleuzes ontology oscillates between materialism and
idealism,[51] and that the Deleuze of Anti-Oedipus (arguably Deleuzes worst book),[52] the political Deleuze
under the "'bad' inuence of Guattari, ends up, despite
protestations to the contrary, as the ideologist of late
capitalism.[53] iek also calls Deleuze to task for allegedly reducing the subject to just another substance
and thereby failing to grasp the nothingness that, according to Lacan and iek, denes subjectivity.[54]
In Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (2006), Peter Hallward argues that Deleuzes insistence that being is necessarily creative and alwaysdierentiating entails that his philosophy can oer no insight into, and is supremely indierent to, the material,
actual conditions of existence. Thus Hallward claims that
Deleuzes thought is literally other-worldly, aiming only at
a passive contemplation of the dissolution of all identity
into the theophanic self-creation of nature.
Trans.
Bibliography
By Gilles Deleuze
Empirisme et subjectivit (1953). Trans. Empiricism
and Subjectivity (1991).
Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962). Trans. Nietzsche
and Philosophy (1983).
La philosophie critique de Kant (1963).
Kants Critical Philosophy (1983).
Trans.
in Pure Immanence
Nietzsche (1965).
(2001).
Trans.
Trans.
7
Capitalisme et Schizophrnie 2. Mille Plateaux
(1980). Trans. A Thousand Plateaus (1987).
Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? (1991). Trans. What
Is Philosophy? (1994).
Documentary
L'Abcdaire de Gilles Deleuze, with Claire Parnet,
produced by Pierre-Andr Boutang. ditions Montparnasse.
See also
Deleuze and Guattari
Gilbert Simondon's theory of individuation
Minority (philosophy)
Percept
Problem of future contingents
Virtuality (philosophy)
moment and at a distance in time, because of which common quality the noise of the spoon upon the plate, the unevenness of the paving-stones, the taste of the madeleine,
imposed the past upon the present and made me hesitate
as to which time I was existing in. Of a truth, the being
within me which sensed this impression, sensed what it
had in common in former days and now, sensed its extratemporal character, a being which only appeared when
through the medium of the identity of present and past,
it found itself in the only setting in which it could exist
and enjoy the essence of things, that is, outside Time.
[...] Nothing but a moment of the past? Much more
perhaps; something which being common to the past and
the present, is more essential than both. [...] a marvellous expedient of nature had caused a sensation to ash to
mesound of a spoon and of a hammer, uneven pavingstonessimultaneously in the past which permitted my
imagination to grasp it and in the present in which the
shock to my senses caused by the noise had eected a
contact between the dreams of the imagination and that
of which they are habitually deprived, namely, the idea
of existenceand thanks to that stratagem had permitted that being within me to secure, to isolate and to render static for the duration of a lightning ash that which
it can never wholly grasp, a fraction of Time in its pure
essence. When, with such a shudder of happiness, I heard
the sound common, at once, to the spoon touching the
plate, to the hammer striking the wheel, to the unevenness
of the paving-stones in the courtyard of the Guermantes
mansion and the Baptistry of St. Marks, it was because
that being within me can only be nourished on the essence
of things and nds in them alone its subsistence and its delight. It languishes in the observation by the senses of the
present sterilised by the intelligence awaiting a future constructed by the will out of fragments of the past and the
present from which it removes still more reality, keeping
that only which serves the narrow human aim of utilitarian purposes. But let a sound, a scent already heard and
breathed in the past be heard and breathed anew, simultaneously in the present and in the past, real without being actual, ideal without being abstract, then instantly the
permanent and characteristic essence hidden in things is
freed and our true being which has for long seemed dead
but was not so in other ways awakes and revives, thanks
to this celestial nourishment.
[20] Desert Islands, p. 36.
[21] See The Method of Dramatization in Desert Islands, and
Actual and Virtual in Dialogues II.
[22] Dierence and Repetition, p. 39.
[23] A Thousand Plateaus, p. 20.
[24] Desert Islands, p. 262.
[25] Negotiations, p. 136.
[43] See, for example, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory (Guilford Press, 1991), which devotes a
chapter to Deleuze and Guattari.
[44] See, e.g., Simon Glendinning, The Idea of Continental
Philosophy (Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 54.
[45] Descombes, Vincent (1998). Modern French Philosophy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 155, 175
178. ISBN 0-521-29672-2.
[46] Barry Smith (ed.), European Philosophy and the American
Academy, p. 34.
[47] Rosen, Stanley (1995). The Mask of Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. ixx. ISBN 0521-49546-6.
[48] Badiou, Alain (2000). Deleuze: the clamor of being. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota. ISBN 0-81663139-5.
[49] May, Todd (1997-07-01). Reconsidering Dierence:
Nancy, Derrida, Levinas, and Deleuze. Pennsylvania State
Univ Pr. ISBN 978-0-271-01657-3.
[50] Alan Sokal; Jean Bricmont (29 October 1999).
Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse
of Science. St Martins Press (ny). pp. 2225, 154169.
ISBN 978-0-312-20407-5.
[51] Slavoj iek, Organs without Bodies, pp. 19-32, esp. p.
21: Is this opposition not, yet again, that of materialism versus idealism? In Deleuze, this means The Logic of
Sense versus Anti-Oedipus. See also p. 28 for Deleuzes
oscillation between the two models of becoming.
[52] iek, p. 21
[53] iek, pp. 32, 20, and 184.
[54] iek, p. 68: This brings us to the topic of the subject
that, according to Lacan, emerges in the interstice of the
'minimal dierence,' in the minimal gap between two signiers. In this sense, the subject is 'a nothingness, a void,
which exists.' ... This, then, is what Deleuze seems to get
wrong in his reduction of the subject to (just another) substance. Far from belonging to the level of actualization, of
distinct entities in the order of constituted reality, the dimension of the 'subject' designates the reemergence of the
virtual within the order of actuality. 'Subject' names the
unique space of the explosion of virtuality within constituted reality.
External links
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Gilles
Deleuze", by Daniel Smith & John Protevi.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Deleuze", by Jon Roe.
Gilles
EXTERNAL LINKS
9.1
Text
Gilles Deleuze Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilles_Deleuze?oldid=702356522 Contributors: Eloquence, Bryan Derksen, Rgamble, PierreAbbat, Kurt Jansson, Zoe, Greg Godwin, Paul Barlow, Jahsonic, Radicalsubversiv, Snoyes, Ijon, Sir Paul, Poor Yorick, Big
iron, Raven in Orbit, Charles Matthews, Wik, Buridan, Jackson~enwiki, Rbellin, Carbuncle, MK~enwiki, Donarreiskoer, Fredrik, Mirv,
Blainster, Aetheling, Mcdonald928, Zigger, Pteron, Bacchiad, Lichtconlon, Manuel Anastcio, Paulbunyan, Phil Sandifer, OwenBlacker,
Tothebarricades.tk, FrozenUmbrella, Lumidek, Esperant, Lucidish, D6, Simonides, Buyg, Discospinster, Alex Golub, Guanabot, JimR,
Bender235, Brian0918, Pjrich, Carlon, Chalst, Zenohockey, Whosyourjudas, Rmattson, Kingsindian, Xgoni~enwiki, Knucmo2, ADM,
Mduvekot, Omphaloscope, Ilse@, Kallisys, RyanGerbil10, Woohookitty, Hippalus, SDC, Stefanomione, BD2412, Qwertyus, Josh Parris, Canderson7, Rjwilmsi, Ligulem, FlaBot, Moskvax, Washington Irving, Ffaarr, Pfctdayelise, Chobot, Adoniscik, Bartleby, YurikBot,
Jamesmorrison, Alma Pater, Dobromila, Shanel, Robertvan1, Aeusoes1, LaszloWalrus, BlackAndy, THB, Zwobot, Geremy78~enwiki,
Anarkitekt, Nikkimaria, Closedmouth, Thatbrock, SoberEmu, Sardanaphalus, Attilios, SmackBot, Roger Davies, Bluebot, TimBentley,
Dahn, pa~enwiki, Kaliz, Troyc001, RayAYang, Sadads, Pelegius, Junius49, Constanz, Madsanders, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, OrphanBot, KaiserbBot, Pelicansam, Tsop, Mwtoews, Michael Rogers, Ceoil, Blahm, Byelf2007, Michael David, Afghan Historian, Ser
Amantio di Nicolao, Khazar, John, Lapaz, Minna Sora no Shita, Santa Sangre, Christian Roess, K, Bakunin661, Bryan nelson, Zeusnoos,
Glen fuller, Igni, Adam Keller, Sdorrance, Gregbard, Cydebot, Jasperdoomen, FalloutFan15, Leischa, Nishidani, Thijs!bot, 271828182,
Mime, Hazmat2, Michael roetzel, Apdsouza, Goodlucca, Breakbackmountain, Almanacer, Itafroma, DocFaustRoll, Skomorokh, Matthew
Fennell, Gavia immer, Magioladitis, ***Ria777, Autonomist, Waacstats, Snowded, Extendon, Cailil, Coeepusher, Rickard Vogelberg,
CommonsDelinker, Johnpacklambert, I8gilbertgrape, Dr.crawboney, DadaNeem, KD Tries Again, Rodrigo Illarraga, Inwind, Squids and
Chips, Jonas Mur~enwiki, VolkovBot, TXiKiBoT, GcSwRhIc, Fat Burner, Smicker, Room429, Profronrowe, Viator slovenicus, Corvus
coronoides, Ethicoaestheticist, BobTheTomato, Qrian, Grilledegg, SieBot, Monegasque, Lightmouse, OKBot, Vojvodaen, Le vin blanc,
DionysosProteus, Bjornwireen, Joao Xavier, Pointillist, DragonBot, DerBorg, XLinkBot, Skoojal, Falco528, Good Olfactory, Human
fella, Mjmcm, Tanhabot, Buchanani, IdealisticRealist, Peter Damian (old), AndersBot, Justana, Woland1234, Bguras puppy, Lightbot,
Anticipator, TwinkleJames, Enbowles, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Andreasmperu, Taxisfolder, Jimjohnson2, Anand011892, Dickdock, Funktrane, AnomieBOT, Ump111, Galoubet, Merleus, Citation bot, ArthurBot, LovesMacs, Obersachsebot, Xqbot, Clausgroi, DSisyphBot,
Date delinker, Srich32977, GrouchoBot, Omnipaedista, RibotBOT, FreeKnowledgeCreator, FrescoBot, LucienBOT, Adam9389, D'ohBot,
Senecasigma, Woodenfox, Shanghainese.ua, MondalorBot, SpaceFlight89, Abc518, Elekhh, TobeBot, Declan Clam, Dinamik-bot, Oracleofottawa, LilyKitty, Minimac, RjwilmsiBot, Jowa fan, Zujine, ExistentialBliss, GoingBatty, Mychele Trempetich, F, Jtnystrom, Erianna,
Jacobisq, Rob1parsons, ClueBot NG, Naomi.merritt, AlterBerg, BG19bot, Duina, AvocatoBot, Ostera65, Laughter and Death, Tampio,
Artailicous, Barnabas2000, Fylbecatulous, Anthrophilos, Chrissy9876, Cyberbot II, ChrisGualtieri, Pirhayati, Over9000plateaus, VIAFbot, Jscfk, BornOnThe8thOfJuly, RaphaelQS, Finnusertop, FrantzFanon2000, ColRad85, Filedelinkerbot, Tigercompanion25, Arsik36,
NobleSirStein, Sixstringrocknroll, Durygordonn, Mohanbhan, Incolam, KasparBot, Stram637, Spinozahegel and Anonymous: 295
9.2
Images
9.3
Content license