EN BANC

A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015

RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice endorsed to
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action. The first letter-complaint,1dated March 2, 2009,
was filed by the commissioned notaries public within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty. Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth
C. Tugade (complainants) before the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan
(RTC-Lingayen) against Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing documents without a
commission.
In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a notarial office along Alvear Street
East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and
Dagupan City without the requisite notarial commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never
commissioned as Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City.
Instead, he applied and was commissioned to perform notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison
of the RTC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial
commission, however, was never renewed upon expiration. Complainants presented evidence supporting
their allegations such as the pictures of Atty. Siapnos law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents to
prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of notarization in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1)
Addendum to Loan and Mortgage Agreement2 showing that the Promissory Note was notarized before Atty.
Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale, 3 dated January 24, 2008, notarized in
Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons Re: Given Name and Date of
Birth,4 dated January 6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan City; and (4) Acknowledgement of Debt, 5 dated January
24, 2008, notarized in Dagupan City.
Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial authority to his secretaries, Mina
Bautista (Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas (Arenas), who wrote legal instruments and signed the documents
on his behalf.
On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA)6 which, in turn, indorsed the same to the OBC.
The second letter-complaint7 was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against Atty. Pedro L. Santos (Atty.
Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his drivers license and he executed an affidavit of loss which
was notarized by Atty. Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied for authentication when presented
before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos was not commissioned to perform notarial
commission within the City of Manila.
The third letter-complaint8 came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain Atty. Evelyn who was
holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmarias Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and
signing documents for and on behalf of several lawyers.
In its Resolution,9 dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC-Lingayen to
conduct a formal investigation on the complaint against Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros
(Judge Ros) of the RTC-Manila to conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation of the Notarial Law
by Atty. Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn, and thereafter, to submit a report and
recommendation thereon.
Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno
With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge conducted a hearing wherein the

complainants affirmed the allegations in their letter-complaint. For his part, Atty. Siapno denied the
accusations and averred that the law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista and
Arenas were not his secretaries.10
In her Report and Recommendation,11 the Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was issued a notarial
commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004
and February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006. His commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and
he was not issued another commission thereafter. The Executive Judge found Atty. Siapno to have violated
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed notarial functions without commission and
recommended that he be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the recommended penalty.
A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that Atty. Siapno indeed maintained
a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth
Tugade. It was also proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial
commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:
Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the
first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary
public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform
notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he was not
commissioned in the said places to perform such act.
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is
invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public.12 It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document
into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only
his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times. 13
In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing documents
outside their territorial jurisdiction or with an expired commission. In the case of Nunga v. Viray,14 a lawyer
was suspended by the Court for three (3) years for notarizing an instrument without a commission.
In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,15 the respondent was likewise suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years and was permanently barred from being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing
several documents after the expiration of his commission. In the more recent case of Laquindanum v.
Quintana,16 the Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was disqualified from being commissioned
as notary public for a period of two (2) years because he notarized documents outside the area of his
commission, and with an expired commission.
Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work in Ligayen, Natividad and
Dagupan City in the province of Pangasinan without the requisite commission, the Court finds the
recommended penalty insufficient. Instead, Atty. Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as notary
public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn
In a letter,17 dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed the Court that he could not have complied with the
June 9, 2009 and August 4, 2009 orders of the Court because he was no longer the Executive Judge of the
RTC-Manila at that time. To date, no formal investigation has been conducted on the alleged violation of
Atty. Santos and the reported illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered

to RE-DOCKET the same as separate administrative cases.

The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting capacity, is ordered to
conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty
(60) days from receipt of copy of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his
receipt of a copy of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court
Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the
personal files of the respondent.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is
ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate administrative cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and
Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

ATTY. FLORITA S.
LINCO,Complainant,

A.C. No. 7241

[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]

Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:

- versus -

ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL,

Respondent.

October 17, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint dated June 6, 2005 filed
by Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform
his duty as a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over their
property.
1

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty.
Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the registered owner of a parcel of land with
improvements, consisting of 126 square meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase IA, B, C & D, Valley View Executive Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public
for Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation allegedly executed by her
husband in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment
thereof also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee,
allegedly personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that
complainants husband died on July 29, 2003.
2

Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds

of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 2005 and issued a new
TCT No. 29251 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.
4

Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's
reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her
children's rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty and
candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.
In his Answer, respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of
donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David
T. Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an
emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence
located atGuenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent
6

was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with
him.
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly,
but was articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of
donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed
that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence
along with the witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a
document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead
told Algodonand Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at
their convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same.
On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office
and informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was
then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have consented as
he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject
deed of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.
During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established
that indeed the deed of donation was presented to respondent on July 8,
2003. Respondent, likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared the
deed of donation, he, however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation
only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty.Linco died.
7

On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation, the IBP-Commission on

Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
9

The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor
appeared before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just
ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day
after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent should know that the
parties who signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to
the deed and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation

was notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the
acknowledgement portion of the said deed of donation where respondent
acknowledged that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before me is false. This
act of respondent is also violative of the Attorney's Oath to obey the laws and do no
falsehood.
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he
be disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215, the IBP-Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
10

Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.

11

On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of
IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for
reconsideration and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require
complainant to file her comment.
12

In her Compliance, complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything
new in his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the
recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law
and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus, should be
sanctioned for his infractions.
13

On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for

reconsideration, the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that
the instant complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication.
RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.

There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that

Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July
30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day
before he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized the
document after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was
allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the
time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from
proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation.
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to
accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously
appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of
donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was
notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested
that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet
obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because
the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and
violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a
lawyer.
We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of
the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Respondent should not notarize
a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein.
14

15

Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance
attached to the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document; thus, making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is
by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies

and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a
notary public and appended to a private instrument.
16

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, again, a notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to
do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest. Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public
resulted not only in damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the
donation but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore,
be held liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
17

18

In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon, respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a

notary public, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the
practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same
penalty.
19

WHEREFORE, for

breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional

Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D.
LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He isDISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary
Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to
report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine when his suspension
shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this
Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
CORAZON T. NEVADA,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 7591

Present:

- versus -

ATTY. RODOLFO D. CASUGA,

Respondent.

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:
March 20, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Corazon T. Nevada (Nevada) seeks the disbarment of Atty. Rodolfo D.

Casuga (Casuga) for alleged violation of his lawyers oath and the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules).

The Facts
Nevada is the principal stockholder of C.T. Nevada & Sons, Inc., a family
corporation which operates the Mt. Crest Hotel located at Legarda
Road, Baguio City (the Hotel).
In
her
affidavit-complaint[1] dated
June
28,
2007,
with
annexes, Nevada alleges that she and Casuga are members of the One in Jesus
Christ Church, a religious group which counts the latter as one of its
elders. According to Nevada, she has allowed the use of one of the Hotels
functions rooms for church services. And in time, Casuga was able to gain her trust
and confidence.
Nevada further alleges that unbeknownst to her, Casuga, sometime in 2006,
started to represent himself as the administrator of the Hotel. In fact, on March 1,
2006, he entered into a contract of lease [2] with a certain Jung Jong Chul (Chul)
covering an office space in the Hotel. Notably, Casuga signed the lease contract
over the printed name of one Edwin T. Nevada and notarized the document
himself.
Annex B[3] of the affidavit-complaint is a notarized letter dated May 15,
2007, wherein Chul attested that he gave Casuga, upon contract signing, the
amount of ninety thousand pesos (PhP 90,000) as rental deposit for the office
space. The amount thus deposited, so Nevada claims, was never turned over to her
or to C.T. Nevada & Sons, Inc.
Nevada adds that, in the course of their acquaintanceship, Casuga was able
to acquire from her several pieces of jewelry: a K diamond solitaire ring, earrings
with three (3) diamonds each and a ring with three (3) diamonds, with an aggregate
value of three hundred thousand pesos (PhP 300,000), and a solid gold Rolex

watch with diamond dials valued at twelve thousand US dollars (USD 12,000).
Casuga took possession of the valuables purportedly with the obligation of selling
them and to remit any proceeds toNevada. However, despite repeated demands
by Nevada for Casuga to return the valuables or otherwise remit the proceeds of
the sale, no jewelry or money was ever returned.
In compliance with a directive from the Court, Casuga submitted an
Affidavit[4] dated December 5, 2007, as comment on the administrative complaint.
In it, Casuga claims that Nevada informally instituted him as the administrator of
the Hotel in a limited capacity but denied receiving the PhP 90,000 from Chul.
With regard to the pieces of jewelry and the Rolex watch, Casuga stated
that Nevada actually pawned them in a pawnshop and that she later asked his wife
to redeem them using their own money. Thereafter,Nevada asked Casugas wife to
sell the valuables and reimburse herself from the proceeds of the sale.
By Resolution of July 2, 2008, the Court, thru the Office of the Bar
Confidant, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation/decision. The case was docketed as CBD
Case No. 7591 entitled Corazon T. Nevada v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Casuga.
On September 22, 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), thru
Commisioner Norberto B. Ruiz, issued and sent out a Notice of Mandatory
Conference directing the parties to appear before it on October 23, 2008. On that
date, only Nevada showed up, prompting the designated commissioner to reset the
conference to November 25, 2008, with a warning that he, Casuga, will be declared
in default and the case submitted for resolution should he again fail to
appear. November 25, 2008 came, but onlyNevada was present at the conference.
Thus, CBD Case No. 7591 was submitted for resolution on the basis of Nevadas
Position Paper dated December 3, 2008 and the evidence she submitted consisting
of, among others, twenty-one (21) official rental receipts Casuga issued to at least
two (2) lessors of the Hotel.
Results of the Investigation
In its Report and Recommendation[5] dated January 14, 2009, the IBP CBD
found Casuga guilty of the charges against him, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered it is hereby recommended

that Casuga be suspended for one (1) year for gross misconduct,
violation of the notarial law and infidelity in the custody of monies,
jewelries and a Rolex watch which pertain to the complainant and the
family corporation.

The IBP Board of Governors later adopted and approved the CBDs Report
and Recommendation, with modification, as indicated in Resolution No. XIX2010-461 dated August 28, 2010, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above
entitled case x x x; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Casugas violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for misappropriation of his client[s] funds and jewelries,
for violation of the Notarial Law when he signed as a party to a lease
contract and notarized the same and also taking into consideration the
gravity of the offense committed, Atty. Rodolfo D. Casuga is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for four (4) years. In addition,
Atty. Casuga is Suspended or Disqualified from reappointment as Notary
Public for two (2) years and Ordered to Return the amount of
P90,000.00, jewelries amounting to P300,000.00 and the Rolex watch
valued at $12,000.00 or its equivalent to Mr. Jung Jong Chul, otherwise
his Suspension shall continue.

The CBD Report and Recommendation and a copy of Resolution No. XIX2010-461 were subsequently forwarded to the Court along with the records of the
case.
In the meantime, Nevada, upon receipt of a copy of Resolution No. XIX2010-461, wrote and asked the IBP Board of Governors to rectify said resolution.
Instead of the return of the amount of PhP 90,000, the jewelry and the Rolex watch
or their monetary value to Chul, as directed in the resolution, Nevada requested the
return to be made in her favor. The letter-request of Nevada had remained not acted
upon owing obviously to the fact that the records of the case have been transmitted
to the Court in the interim.

The Issues
The principal but simple issues in this case pivot on the guilt of Casuga for the
charges detailed or implied in the basic complaint; and the propriety of the return
to Nevada of the items, or their money value, and the amount subject of the case.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the CBDs inculpatory findings, as endorsed by the IBP Board of
Governors, and the recommended upgrading of penalties, as shown in Resolution
No. XIX-2010-461, but subject to the modification as shall be discussed.
Casuga is guilty of gross misconduct for misrepresenting himself
In re Horrilleno[6] defined gross misconduct in the following wise:
The grounds for removal of a judge of first instance under
Philippine law are two: (1) Serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency. The
latter ground is not involved in these proceedings. As to the first, the law
provides that sufficient cause must exist in the judgment of the Supreme
Court involving serious misconduct. The adjective is serious; that is,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The noun is
misconduct; that is, a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer. The word misconduct implies a
wrongful intention and not a mere error or judgment. For serious
misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the
judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention
to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules. (Lawlor vs. People [1874], 74 Ill., 228; Citizens' Insurance Co.
vs. Marsh [1861], 41 Pa., 386; Miller vs. Roby [1880], 9 Neb., 471;
Smith vs. Cutler [1833], 10 Wend. [N.Y.], 590; U.S. vs. Warner [1848],
28 Fed. Cas. No. 16643; In re Tighe [1904], 89 N.Y. Supra., 719.)
(Emphasis supplied.)

The above definition was to be reiterated in Ajeno v. Judge Inserto,[7] where the
Court wrote:

In the case of In re [Horrilleno], 43 Phil. 212, this Court

previously ruled that For serious misconduct to exist, there must be
reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were
corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in
persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.

Of similar tenor is the definition provided in Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong:[8]

x x x The respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct
defined as the transgression of some established or definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the
corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known
legal rules x x x.

Respondent Casuga represented himself as a duly-authorized representative

of Nevada when in fact he was not. Casuga admitted signing the subject contract of
lease, but claimed that he was duly authorized to do so by Nevada. However,
Casuga failed to adduce an iota of evidence to prove that he was indeed so
authorized. One who alleges the existence of an agency relationship must prove
such fact. The Court ruled in Yun Kwan Byung v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation,[9] The law makes no presumption of agency and proving its
existence, nature and extent is incumbent upon the person alleging it.
Plainly enough, Casuga is guilty of misrepresentation, when he made it
appear that he was authorized to enter into a contract of lease in behalf of Nevada
when, in fact, he was not. Furthermore, the records reveal that Casuga received the
rentals by virtue of the contract of lease, benefitting from his misrepresentation.
Chuls notarized letter of May 15, 2007 sufficiently shows that Casuga indeed
received PhP 90,000 as rental deposit from Chul. In his affidavit-comment dated
December 5, 2007, Casuga denied having received such amount, alleging that a
certain Pastor Oh, who purportedly introduced him to Chul, received the money.
However, Casuga again failed to adduce a single piece of evidence to support his
contention. A bare denial must fail in light of the positive assertion of Chul, who
appears to have no ulterior motive to incriminate Casuga.

In Tan v. Gumba,[10] the respondent lawyer similarly misrepresented herself to have

been authorized to sell a parcel of land by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA). By virtue of the SPA, the lawyer was able to obtain a loan from the
complainant, secured by the said parcel of land through an open deed of sale.
When the respondent lawyer defaulted in the payment of the loan, it turned out that
the SPA only authorized the lawyer to mortgage the property to a bank. Thus, the
complainant could not register the deed of sale with the register of deeds and could
not recover the amount that he loaned to the lawyer. In that case, the Court ruled:
Here, respondents actions clearly show that she deceived
complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and
false representations and taking advantage of her education and
complainants ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant,
he would have never granted the loan to respondent were it not for
respondents misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the
property and if respondent had not led him to believe that he could
register the open deed of sale if she fails to pay the loan. By her misdeed,
respondent has eroded not only complainants perception of the legal
profession but the publics perception as well. Her actions constitute
gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined, following Section
27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, by maintaining an office within the Hotel, taking

advantage of his apparent close relationship to Nevada, and through the use of
false representations, Casuga led Chul to believe that he was the administrator of
the Hotel, when in fact he was not. By doing so, he made it appear that he was duly
authorized to enter into contracts for the Hotel and to receive rentals from its
occupants. His fraudulent scheme enabled Casuga to collect rentals from the
occupants of the Hotel, Chul in particular, which he did not transmit to Nevada.
Worse still, Casuga obtained money belonging to the Hotel. Following the
principle laid down in Tan, Casugas misrepresentation properly constitutes gross
misconduct for which he must be disciplined.
Notably, in Tan, the respondent lawyer was held guilty of misconduct and
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Casuga also violated Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility

With regard to the jewelry and watch entrusted to him, Casuga alleged
that Nevada pawned them and thereafter instructed Casugas wife to redeem them
with the latters money. He added that Nevada then instructed his wife to sell the
valuables and use the proceeds to reimburse herself for the redemption price.
Again, however, Casugas allegations are unsupported by a single shred of
evidence. Pawnshop receipts would have provided the best evidence under the
circumstances. But they were not presented, too.
Moreover, Casugas admission that the valuables are indeed in his
possession, without any adequate reason, supports Nevadas version of the story.
Casugas failure to return such property or remit the proceeds of the sale is a blatant
violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). The
Codes Canon 16 and Rule 16.3 state:
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his profession.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the
funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his
lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his
client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

Having been tasked to sell such valuables, Casuga was duty-bound to return them
upon Nevadas demand. His failure to do so renders him subject to disciplinary
action. To be sure, he cannot use, as a defense, the lack of a lawyer-client
relationship as an exonerating factor. In Barcenas v. Alvero,[11] the Court suspended
a lawyer from the practice of law for two (2) years after he failed to account for or
return PhP 300,000 that was entrusted to him for deposit with the courts. The Court
ruled:
From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of
lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives money from a client for
a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if

he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to his client. x x x
Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the
funds and properties of his client in the course of his professional
employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they become
due, or (b) upon demand. x x x
[Respondent] Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that
there existed no attorney-client relationship between him and
Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship
existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be
removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him.
Atty. Alveros failure to immediately account for and return
the money when due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in
him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and
warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It gave rise to the
presumption that he converted the money for his own use, and this act
constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct and gross unethical behavior for which he may be
suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court x x
x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Having failed to return, upon demand, the items entrusted to him by Nevada or
remit the proceeds of the sale, Casuga violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.03 of the
Code.
In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit,[12] the Court suspended a lawyer from the
practice of law for two (2) years for failing to account for the money and properties
of his client. Similarly, in Small v. Banares,[13] a lawyer was also suspended from
the practice of law for two (2) years, as he failed to return the money of his client
that he was holding in trust and for failing to file an answer to the complaint and

his refusal to appear at the mandatory conference before the IBP. Thus, the same
penalty should be imposed upon Casuga.
Casuga violated the Notarial Rules
The Notarial Rules, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, provides in its Rule IV, Section 1(c) and
Sec. 3(a) when a notary public may sign a document in behalf of another person,
thus:
SEC. 1. Powers. x x x
xxxx
(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is
physically unable to sign or make a mark on an instrument or document
if:
(1) the notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or
make a mark to sign on his behalf;
(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence
of two disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the instrument or
document;
(3) both witnesses sign their own names;
(4) the notary public writes below his signature: Signature
affixed by notary in presence of (names and addresses of person
and two (2) witnesses);
(5) the notary public
acknowledgment or jurat.

notarizes

his

signature

by

On the other hand, the succeeding Sec. 3(a) disqualifies a notary public from
performing a notarial act if he or she is a party to the instrument or document that
is to be notarized.
None of the requirements contained in Rule IV, Sec. 1(c), as would justify a
notary signing in behalf of a contracting party, was complied with in this case.
Moreover, Casugas act of affixing his signature above the printed name Edwin T.

Nevada, without any qualification, veritably made him a party to the contract of
lease in question. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain
violation of the aforequoted Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of the Notarial Rules, for which he
can be disciplinarily sanctioned provided under Rule XI, Sec. 1(b)(10) of the
Notarial Rules, which provides:
SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions. x x x.
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission
of, or impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any notary
public who:
(10) knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act
prohibited or mandated by these Rules;

Aside from being a violation of the Notarial Rules, Casugas aforementioned act
partakes of malpractice of law and misconduct punishable under the ensuing Sec.
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, x x
x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

So it was that in Lanuzo v. Bongon[14] the Court suspended a notary public

from the practice of law for one (1) year for violation of the Notarial Rules. This
was on top of the penalty of disqualification from being commissioned as a notary
public for two (2) years.
In Dela Cruz v. Zabala,[15] the Court adjudged the respondent notary public guilty
of gross negligence for failing to require the parties to be physically present before
him. In revoking the erring notarys commission, the Court, in Dela Cruz, stressed
the significance of notarization and proceeded to define the heavy burden that goes
when a lawyer is commissioned as a notary public. The Court wrote:

x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It

is invested with substantive public interest. It must be underscored that x
x x notarization x x x converts a private document into a public
document making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of authenticity thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, a notary public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of x
x x duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined.
xxxx
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the
affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are
facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to.
Otherwise, their representatives names should appear in the said
documents as the ones who executed the same.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against
any illegal or immoral arrangements. By affixing his notarial seal on the
instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private
document into a public document. x x x As a lawyer commissioned to be
a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties
with faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an
oath in an acknowledgment or jurat. Simply put, such responsibility is
incumbent upon him, he must now accept the commensurate
consequences of his professional indiscretion. [16] x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)

The recommended penalty must be modified

Considering the various infractions Casuga committed, as discussed above, the
aggregate penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors of suspension
from the practice of law for four (4) years was correct. It hews with prevailing
jurisprudence as cited above. However, Casugas disqualification from
reappointment as notary public for two (2) years should match his suspension from
the practice of law. The disqualification should accordingly be increased to four (4)

years, since only a lawyer in good standing can be granted the commission of a
notary public.
The desired disbarment of Casuga, however, is too severe a sanction to
impose under the premises; it cannot be granted. The penalty of disbarment shall
be meted out only when the lawyers misconduct borders on the criminal and/or is
committed under scandalous circumstance.[17]
The money, jewelry and Rolex watch should be returned to Nevada
Nevadas plea that the rental deposit of PhP 90,000, the pieces of jewelry
worth PhP 300,000, and the Rolex watch valued at USD 12,000 or its equivalent in
Philippine Peso should be ordered returned to her instead of to Jung Jong Chul is
well-taken. We need not belabor the fact that Chul has no right whatsoever over the
amount or property mentioned above.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Rodolfo D. Casuga GUILTY of gross
misconduct for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Notarial Rules. He is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of four (4) years
from the practice of law. The notarial commission of Atty. Casuga, if still existing,
is hereby REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as
Notary Public also for four (4) years. Additionally, he is ordered to return the
amount of PhP 90,000, the pieces of jewelrysubject of this case or their equivalent
of PhP 300,000, and the Rolex watch valued at USD 12,000 or its equivalent in
Philippine Peso to Corazon T. Nevada within thirty (30) days from finality of this
Decision; otherwise, he shall be cited for contempt. Lastly, Atty. Casuga is warned
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to the personal record of Atty. Rodolfo D. Casuga as a member of the
Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all trial courts for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9514

April 10, 2013

BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard N. Jandoquile against
respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr.
The Facts of the case are not disputed.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit2 signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas
Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty.
Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the notarial
act3 per Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
xxxx
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of
the principal4 within the fourth civil degree.
Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the complaintaffidavit to show their valid identification cards.
In his comment5 to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but admitted Jandoquiles
material allegations. The issue, according to Atty. Revilla, Jr., is whether the single act of notarizing
the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not
requiring them to present valid identification cards is a ground for disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr.
submits that his act is not a ground for disbarment. He also says that he acts as counsel of the three
affiants; thus, he should be considered more as counsel than as a notary public when he notarized
their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present valid identification cards since he
knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas and Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while
Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family.
Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to resolve the case instead of
referring it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. We agree with him, however, that his violation is not a sufficient ground
for disbarment.

Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is beyond dispute. Atty. Revilla, Jr.
readily admitted that he notarized the complaint-affidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil
degree of affinity. Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him
from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act, since two of the affiants or
principals are his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Given the clear provision of the
disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse notarizing the
document. We cannot agree with his proposition that we consider him to have acted more as
counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he notarized the complaint-affidavit. The notarial
certificate6 at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his signature as a notary public, with a
notarial commission valid until December 31, 2012.
He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants.
On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable. If the notary
public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards.
This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in
person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to
the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs
the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before
the notary public as to such instrument or document. In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of
Atty. Revilla, Jr.s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his wifes sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is
the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants personally. Thus,
he was justified in no longer requiring them to show valid identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is
not without fault for failing to indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement
was included therein that he knows the three affiants personally.7 Let it be impressed that Atty.
Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-affidavit of his relatives within the fourth
civil degree of affinity. While he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt him
from liability for violating the disqualification rule.
As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a sufficient ground to disbar him. To our mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr.
did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other
serious ground for disbarment under Section 27,8 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. We recall the case
of Maria v. Cortez9 where we reprimanded Cortez and disqualified him from being commissioned as
notary public for six months. We were convinced that said punishment, which is less severe than
disbarment, would already suffice as sanction for Cortezs violation. In Cortez, we noted the
prohibition in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice that a person shall not
perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in
the notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization and (2) is not personally known to the
notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through a competent evidence of identity.
Cortez had notarized a special power of attorney without having the alleged signatories appear
before him. In imposing the less severe punishment, we were mindful that removal from the Bar
should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe such as reprimand, temporary
suspension or fine would accomplish the end desired.
1wphi1

Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed by Atty. Revilla, Jr., we
are in agreement that a punishment less severe than disbarment would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from
being commissioned as a notary public, or from performing any notarial act if he is presently
commissioned as a notary public, for a period of three (3) months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further
DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through an affidavit, once the period of his disqualification has
lapsed.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and A.C. No. 9081

MAXIMO A. GLINDO,
Complainants, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ.
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA, Promulgated:
Respondent. October 12, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa

(Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaa (Omaa).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with violation of her oath as a
lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife

Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could legally
live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaa then
prepared a document entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay (contract) which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
BAYAN NG GUMACA
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino,

may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at
may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso,Gumaca, Quezon, at
COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunodsunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkas
undo ng mga sumusunod:

1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mg

a buhay ng walang pakialaman,
kung kayat bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasa
ma sa buhay;
2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa,
14 na taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa,
11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa,
10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama saaming dalaw
a. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang ama,
Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa
at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena;
3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipagaral sa kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang
ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral.
Sa pasukan sila aymaaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siy
a ay naninirahan;
4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dala
wa tuwing may pagkakataon;

5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Ald

rin at ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay pupunan n
g ina;
6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas
stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloo
b kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;

7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa

mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at
hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd) (Sgd)
ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA
Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA

Notary Public
PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97
Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;

Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of
the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions.
However,Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of
most of the property they acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law
graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaa was not valid.
Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint

against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaa alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She
denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and
requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was
illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the
office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document.
Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the
contract. Omaa presented Marantals Sinumpaang Salaysay (affidavit) to support her
allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaa further
presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Pea, acknowledging that she
notarized the document without Omaas knowledge, consent, and authority.

Espinosa later submitted a Karagdagang Salaysay stating that Omaa arrived at his
residence together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized
the contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in her office when the contract was
notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that
Espinosas desistance did not put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found
that Omaaviolated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaa had failed to exercise due diligence
in the performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the
requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense
of Omaa who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract

but then later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD
found:

Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its
authorship, thereby revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit,
which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the practice
of law and for two years as a notary public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Omaa filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors

denied Omaas motion for reconsideration.
The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and
Espinosas Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the
conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a
notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership,3 which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer
was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as:
notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a
concubine and allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from
each other;5 ratifying a document entitled Legal Separation where the couple agreed to
be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and
obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they
might have against each other;6 preparing a document authorizing a married couple
who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action
which each may have against the other; 7 and preparing a document declaring the
conjugal partnership dissolved.8

We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized
the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself notarized the contract.
Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only
showed Omaas negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary
public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries 9 or any
member of his staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void
document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully well that
the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy.
Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics
of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from the practice of law for
ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaas notarial commission, if still existing,
and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaas personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
JESSICA C. UY,

A.C. No. 6505

Complainant,
Present:

- versus -

TINGA, J.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Acting Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. EMMANUEL P. SAO,
Respondent.

September 11, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed[1] by complainant Jessica C. Uy against respondent

Atty. Emmanuel P. Sao for allegedly notarizing several documents despite the
expiration of his commission.
Respondent was the counsel for a certain Pablo Burgos, an intervenor in a
civil case docketed as EJF-01-03-10 for Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage.[2] In
the course of the proceedings, respondent introduced before the trial court, certain
documents, including a Deed of Absolute Sale[3] which he notarized on December
7, 2001 under Doc. No. 376, Page No. 73, Book No. V, Series of 2001.
It appeared, however, in a letter[4] dated February 9, 2004 of Atty. Blanche
Astilla-Salino, Clerk of Court VI, that no notarial commission was issued to
respondent for the years 2000-2001 and 2001-2002. Hence, the instant
administrative case.
Respondent, for his part, admitted that he was not issued a notarial
commission during the aforesaid period; yet, he performed notarial works. He,
however, explained that he applied, through a representative, for a notarial
commission in the year 1998 and was commissioned as such from 1998 to 1999.
[5]
In 2000, he applied for the renewal of his commission, again through an office
aide, who later informed him that his application was approved. [6] By virtue of said
representation, respondent resumed his notarial work; only to find out later that he
was not given a new commission.[7] He exerted earnest efforts in locating the

whereabouts of the office aide but to no avail. Having acted on the mistaken belief
that he still had his notarial commission, respondent pleaded that he be excused
and given clemency for this fiasco and be allowed to correct and make amends.[8]
In a Resolution[9] dated December 8, 2004, we referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On September 1, 2005, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted
her report and recommendation,[10] the pertinent portion of which reads:
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION:
From the facts and evidence presented, we find sufficient proof to
warrant disciplinary action against the respondent. Notarizing documents
after the lawyers commission as notary public had expired is malpractice
and gross misconduct (Flores vs. Lozada, 21 SCRA 1267). Respondents
explanation that he was made to believe by his agent that his commission
has been filed and approved cannot be accepted for to rule otherwise will
be to enable irresponsible lawyers to avoid disciplinary action by simply
attributing the problem to his aide/secretary or employee (Gutierrez vs.
Zulueta, 187 SCRA 607).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby recommend that
respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL SAO be SUSPENDED for a period of
SIX MONTHS from receipt hereof from the practice [of] his profession
as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[11]

Per Resolution No. XVII-2006-115 dated March 20, 2006, the IBP Board of
Governors modified the report and recommendation of Commissioner VillanuevaMaala by increasing the recommended period of suspension from six (6) months to
one (1) year. In addition, the Board resolved to revoke respondents notarial
commission and disqualified him from reappointment as notary public for a period
of two (2) years.

We agree with the IBPs conclusion, finding respondent guilty of

malpractice, warranting disciplinary action. We, however, find the penalty
recommended by the Board of Governors to be too harsh; instead, we sustain the
Investigating Commissioners recommendation.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.[12]
The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty
and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this
end, a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which
might lessen, in any degree, the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.[13]
Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not
an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified and authorized may act as notaries public. It
must be underscored that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.[14]
Respondent admitted that he applied for a notarial commission in 1998. Such
application, according to him, was facilitated by a representative. In renewing his
commission for 2000 until 2002, he again relied on the assistance offered by an
office aide. It appears from respondents Comment that he, in fact, did not
personally know the said office aide; yet, he completely relied on his
representation that this office aide would facilitate respondents renewal of his
notarial commission. At the very least, respondent should have demanded from the
office aide documentary proofs of the approval of his commission. Besides,
respondent could have easily verified the aides representation at the office of the
Executive Judge. His actuation clearly shows disregard of the requirements for the

issuance of notarial commission. His effort in shifting the responsibility to the

office aide does not strike the Court as the kind of diligence properly required of a
member of the bar in performing his duties as notary public.[15]
To be sure, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public
must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a
lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefor as
reprehensible, constituting as it does, not only malpractice, but also the crime of
falsification of public documents. For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has
sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the
notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.
[16]

Time and again, we have held that where the notarization of a document is done by
a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or
commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. One
who is performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the
lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by
making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath
similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By
acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer
likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold
at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.[17]
As to the appropriate penalty, considering the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, and based on jurisprudence on this matter, suspension for six (6)
months is adequate.
Complainant in the instant case presented only one document showing respondents
unauthorized notarization. However, by respondents own admission, he had been
placed in a mistaken belief that his commission was renewed from 2000 to
2002. During this two-year period, it seems entirely possible that he had similarly
notarized, without legal authority, other still unidentified documents.[18]

In Buensuceso v. Barrera,[19] Atty. Joelito Barrera was administratively sanctioned

for committing acts of unauthorized notarization. As in the instant case, Atty.
Barrera claimed that he was unaware of said lack of authority, and he shifted the
blame to his secretary to whom he had entrusted the task of making sure that his
notarial commission would be renewed. Though only five documents were
presented to prove his culpability, considering that more than twelve (12) years had
lapsed, and it was possible that similar documents had been unlawfully notarized,
the Court suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one year.
In the instant case, since only two years had lapsed prior to the discovery of the
unauthorized act, six-month suspension suffices.
An attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to
suspend him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney, and thus, to
protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than
to punish an attorney.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Emmanuel P. Sao is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. In
addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is HEREBY REVOKED, and he
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2)
years. He is furtherWARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the
Court Administrator, as well as the IBP, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
recorded in the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
LORENZO D. BRENNISEN,
A.C. No. 7481
Complainant,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.
- versus LEONARDO-DE CASTRO.
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI,
Respondent. VILLARAMA, JR.
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ
Promulgated:
April 24, 2012
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by
complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen against respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi for
deceit and gross misconduct in violation of his lawyer's oath.
The Facts
Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Dionisio,
Paraaque City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21176 [2] of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. Being a resident of the United States
of America (USA), he entrusted the administration of the subject property to
respondent, together with the corresponding owner's duplicate title.

Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent, through a spurious Special

Power of Attorney (SPA)[3] dated February 22, 1989, mortgaged and subsequently
sold the subject property to one Roberto Ho (Ho), as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale[4] dated November 15, 2001. As a result, TCT No. 21176 was
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 150814[5] issued in favor of Ho.

Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint
against respondent for having violated his oath as a lawyer, causing him damage
and prejudice.

In his counter-affidavit,[6] respondent denied any formal lawyer-client relationship

between him and the complainant, claiming to have merely extended his services
for free. He also denied receiving money from the complainant for the purpose of
paying the real estate taxes on the property. Further, he averred that it was his
former office assistants, a certain Boy Roque (Roque) and one Danilo Diaz (Diaz),
who offered the subject property to Ho as collateral for a loan. Nevertheless,
respondent admitted to having confirmed the spurious SPA in his favor already
annotated at the back of TCT No. 21176 upon the prodding of Roque and Diaz, and
because he was also in need of money at that time.Hence, he signed the real estate
mortgage and received his proportionate share of P130,000.00 from the proceeds
of the loan, which he asserted to have fully settled.

Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ho and
insisted that it was a forgery. Nonetheless, he sought complainant's forgiveness and
promised to repay the value of the subject property.

In the Resolution[7] dated July 16, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The Action and Recommendation of the IBP

During the mandatory conference held on October 21, 2008, the parties stipulated
on the following matters:
1. That complainant is the owner of a property covered by TCT
No. 21176 (45228) of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque;
2. Respondent was in possession of the Owner's Duplicate
Certificate of the property of the complainant;
3. The property of the complainant was mortgaged to a certain
Roberto Ho;
4. The title to the property of complainant was cancelled in year
2000 and a new one, TCT No. 150814 was issued in favor of
Mr. Roberto Ho;
5. The Special Power of Attorney dated 24 February 1989 in
favor of Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is spurious and was not
signed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen;
6. That respondent received Php100,000.00 of the mortgage loan
secured by the mortgagee on the aforementioned property of
complainant;
7. That respondent did not inform the complainant about the
unauthorized mortgage and sale of his property;
8. That respondent has a loan obligation to Mr. Roberto Ho;
9. That respondent has not yet filed any case against the person
whom he claims to have falsified his signature;
10.

That respondent did not notify the complainant that the

owner's copy of TCT No. 21176 was stolen and was taken out
from his office.[8]

In its Report[9] dated July 10, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD), through Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa, found that respondent had
undeniably mortgaged and sold the property of his client without the latter's
knowledge or consent, facilitated by the use of a falsified SPA. Hence, in addition
to his possible criminal liability for falsification, the IBP-CBD deduced that
respondent violated various provisions of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility and accordingly recommended that he be disbarred and his name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of
Commissioner De Mesa through Resolution No. XIX-2011-248[10] as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A' and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent
guilty of falsification; making or using falsified documents; and
for benefiting from the proceed[s] of his dishonest acts, Atty.
Ramon U. Contawi is hereby DISBARRED.

The Issue

The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath
when he mortgaged and sold complainant's property, which was entrusted to him,
without the latter's consent.

The Court's Ruling

After a punctilious examination of the records, the Court concurs with the findings
and recommendation of Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors

that respondent acted with deceit when, through the use of a falsified document, he
effected the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his client's property for his personal
benefit.
Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's property without his knowledge
or consent, and partook of the proceeds of the sale for his own benefit. His
contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then financiallyincapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and
implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's signature reflected thereon
was forged. As aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent
transactions involving the subject property were effected using the owner's
duplicate title, which was in respondent's safekeeping and custody during
complainant's absence.

Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors correctly

recommended his disbarment for violations of the pertinent provisions of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Canon 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client which may come into his possession.
Canon 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from client.
Canon 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand.
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

In Sabayle v. Tandayag,[11] the Court disbarred one of the respondent lawyers and
ordered his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys on the grounds of serious
dishonesty and professional misconduct. The respondent lawyer knowingly
participated in a false and simulated transaction not only by notarizing a spurious
Deed of Sale, but also and even worse sharing in the profits of the specious
transaction by acquiring half of the property subject of the Deed of Sale.

In Flores v. Chua,[12] the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer for having
deliberately made false representations that the vendor appeared personally before
him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. He was found guilty of grave
misconduct.

In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability
to discharge the bounden duties of a member of the legal profession. He failed to
prove himself worthy of the privilege to practice law and to live up to the exacting
standards demanded of the members of the bar. It bears to stress that [t]he practice
of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability.[13]

Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-client

relationship between him and complainant will not serve to mitigate his liability.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's
private or professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[14]

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of disbarment
proper in this case, as recommended by Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board
of Governors.Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may

be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the

Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, xxx or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice xxx
(emphasis supplied)

The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, is required.[15] Having carefully scrutinized the records of
this case, the Court therefore finds that the standard of substantial evidence has
been more than satisfied.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, having clearly

violated his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Responsibility through
his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name
ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal
record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7919

October 8, 2014

DOMADO DISOMIMBA SULTAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CASAN MACABANDING, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed on May 14, 2008 before the Office of the Bar Confidant by
Domado Disomimba Sultan (complainant) against Atty. Casan Macabanding (respondent) for
allegedly having notarized a falsified affidavit.
1

The Facts
According to the complainant, he ran for the position of Mayor for the Municipality of Buadipuso
Buntong, Lanao del Sur in 2007. He filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) dated March 29, 2007
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for the May 14, 2007 elections. Thereafter, an
Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor (Affidavit of Withdrawal)
dated April 10, 2007 was notarized and submitted by the respondent to the COMELEC, withdrawing
the complainants candidacy without the latters knowledge or authorization.
2

When the complainant learned of this, he wrote a letter dated April 18, 2007 and submitted an
Affidavit to Mamangcoday Colangcag (Colangcag), Acting Election Officer of the COMELEC in
Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao del Sur. The complainant alleged that he neither executed the Affidavit of
Withdrawal nor authorized anybody to prepare a document to withdraw his COC. He asked that the
withdrawal be ignored and that his name be retained on the list of candidates.
4

On May 16, 2007, the complainant filed a petition with the COMELEC to count the votes cast in his
favor. The complainant also filed a criminal complaint on May 17, 2007 withthe Prosecutors Office of
Marawi City against Abdulmojib Moti Mariano (Mariano) who was another candidate for the
mayoralty position,the respondent, and Colangcag for Falsification of Public
Documents. Information was thereby filed against the respondent and Colangcag which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 5842-08 in the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Sur, Marawi City.
6

Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division found merit in the complainants petition and ordered
the reinstatement of his name in the list of candidates for the position of mayor in its
Resolution dated June 12, 2007. All votes cast in favor of the complainant were also counted. Thus,
Mariano elevated the matter to the COMELEC en banc, which issued a subpoenarequiring the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to study the signature appearing on the Affidavit ofWithdrawal.
Subsequently, the NBI transmitted its Questioned Documents Report No. 428-907 to the COMELEC
en banc, stating that the signature in the Affidavit of
8

Withdrawal and the specimen signatures of the complainant were not written by one and the same
person.
10

On May 14, 2008, the complainant filed the present administrative complaint against the respondent
with prayer for his disbarment. After the respondent filed his comment on the complaint, the case
was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline for
investigation, report and recommendation.
11

12

The respondent countered that the instant administrative case was filed against him as political
harassment because his family supported the complainants opponent, Mariano. He admitted that
he notarized the affidavit after it was signed by the complainant voluntarily and in the presence of
witnesses and thereafter, submitted the same to the COMELEC. However, the complainant changed
his mind when Mariano, who was the only remaining mayoralty candidate, refused to pay millions of
pesos to the complainant. The respondent withheld the identity of the witnesses allegedly to avoid
problems within their family.
13

14

On July 1, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and

Recommendation, recommending "that the respondent be suspended from the active practice of
law for six (6) months and two (2) years as notary public."
15

16

On May 15, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-297 adopting the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner:
17

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable lawsand rules, and considering respondents irregular
notarization and submission of complainants Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy to
the COMELEC without complainants knowledge and authorization, Atty. Casan Macabanding is
hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6) months and SUSPENDEDfrom being
commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) years.
18

The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the IBP Board of Governors denied inits
Resolution No. XX-2014-76 dated March 8, 2014 for being a mere reiteration of matters already
threshed out and taken into consideration.
19

20

21

Issue
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE BASED ON THE
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT.
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty imposed.
The complainant presented the findings of the NBI which are hereunder reproduced:
FINDINGS:
Laboratory and scientific comparative examination of the specimens submitted, under stereoscopic
microscope and magnifying lenses, with the aid of photographic enlargements (Comparison charts),
reveal that there exist fundamental, significant differences in writing characteristics/habits between
the questioned signature "DOMADO DISOMIMBA" (written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on one
hand, and the sample specimen signatures "DOMADO DISOMIMBA" (written in Arabic
characters/alphabet), on the other hand, such as in:
- Structural pattern of characters/elements
- Direction of strokes
- Proportion characteristics

- Other minute identifying details

CONCLUSION:
Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned signature "DOMADO DISOMIMBA" (written in
Arabic characters/alphabet), on one hand, and the sample specimen signatures "DOMADO
DISOMIMBA" (written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on the other hand, WERE NOT WRITTEN by
one and the same person. (Underscoring and emphasis in the original)
22

The respondent maintained that the NBI officer who examined the complainants signature is not an
expert in Arabic language and thus, could not give an expert opinion regarding a signature written in
Arabic language.
23

On this score, the Court refers to Mayor Abdulmojib Moti Mariano v. Commission on Elections and
Domado Disomimba Sultan, wherein the Court resolved with finality the dismissal of Marianos
petition before the Court alleging that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the complainants reinstatement in the list of mayoralty
candidates.
24

Marianos petition challenged the issuances of the COMELEC which were anchored on its finding
that the affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy imputed to the complainant was forged. It was dismissed
by the Court in the Resolution dated August 19, 2008. OnOctober 9, 2008, the complainant was then
proclaimed as the duly-elected mayor of Buadiposo Buntong, Lanao del Sur, having obtained the
highest number of votes (4,078). Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the
COMELECs failure to avail of the services of anArabic expert was tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion. The Court denied the motion and addressed the issue raised in this wise:
25

Contrary to petitioners basic stance, a handwriting expert does not have to be a linguist at the same
time.To be credible, a handwriting expert need not be familiar with the language used in the
document subject of his examination. The nature of his examination involves the study and
comparison of strokes, the depth and pressure points of the alleged forgery, as compared to the
specimen or original handwriting or signatures. (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
26

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of

evidence. In Rodica v. Lazaro, the Court expounded:
27

In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr., this Court reiterated its oft[-] repeated ruling that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to clearly prove her allegations by preponderant evidence. Elaborating on the
required quantum ofproof, this Court declared thus:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to
or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the
following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying,

their intelligence, their means and opportunity ofknowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
x x x x (Citation omitted)
28

The complainant adduced preponderantevidence that his signature was indeed forged in an affidavit
which the respondent notarized and submitted to the COMELEC. Consequently, the respondent
should be held administratively liable for his action. "Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also
commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at
all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." "It should be noted that a notary publics
function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are
impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A notary public exercises duties calling for
carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most
importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves tobe part of illegal transactions." In fact,
the respondent admitted that the affidavit was notarized in his office without the presence of the
complainant.
1wphi1

29

30

31

In Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, the respondent therein was suspended from the
practice of law for one year; his notarial commission was revoked and he was also disqualified from
reappointment as notary public for a period of two years for notarizing an affidavit of loss without the
presence of the party acknowledging the document.
32

The same sanctions were imposed against the erring lawyer in Agbulos v. Viray, where the
respondent therein admitted "that not only did he prepare and notarize the subject affidavit but he
likewise notarized the same without the affiants personal appearance. He explained that he did so
merely upon the assurance of his client Dollente that the document was executed by complainant."
33

34

In Isenhardt v. Real, the respondent therein was subjected to similar penalties when he notarized a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) supposedly executed by the complainant. It was proven by
documentary evidence that the complainant was in Germany at that time and therefore could not
have appeared before the respondentto have the SPA notarized.
35

The complainant in Linco v. Lacebal filed an administrative case against the respondent notary
public for notarizing a deed of donation despite the latters knowledge that the purported donor had
already passed away on an earlier date. For this reason, the respondents notarial commission was
revoked and he was disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
years. Furthermore,he was suspended from the practice of law for one year. Thus, based on
prevailing jurisprudence, the penalties meted out against a lawyer commissioned as a notary public
who fails to discharge his duties as such are: the revocation of notarial commission, disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the
practice of law for one year.
36

WHEREFORE, Atty. Casan Macabanding is found administratively liable for misconduct and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. Further, his notarial commission, if any, is
REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2)
years, with a stem warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt
with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to
enable it to determine when the revocation of his notarial commission and his disqualification from
being commissioned as notary public shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the
personal records of Atty. Casan Macabanding.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10695, March 18, 2015
CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Crescenciano M. Pitogo (Pitogo) purchased a motorcycle from Emcor, Inc. However, Emcor, Inc. allegedly
failed to cause the registration of the motorcycle under his name. Pitogo, thus, filed a Civil Complaint before
the Regional Trial Court against EMCOR, Inc.1
The motorcycle was eventually registered in Pitogos name based on three (3) documents notarized by
respondent Atty. Joselito Troy Suello (Suello).2 The documents indicate that they are registered in Suellos
notarial register as follows:

1. Deed of Assignment between

Maria P. Ponce / Rogelio
Ponce and EMCOR, Inc.
2. Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage between Maria P.
Ponce and Mariza G. Ono-on
3. Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage between Mariza
G. Ono-on and Crescenciano M.
Pitogo

Doc. No. 436;

Book No. 83;
Page No. 88;
Series of 20093
Doc. No. 437,
Page No. 88;
Book No. 83,
Series of 20094
Doc. No. 235;
Page No. 85;
Book No. 83;
Series of 20095

Pitogo obtained a copy of the three (3) documents from the Land Transportation Office, Danao City, Cebu.
On August 3, 2009, he went to Suellos office to have them certified. Pitogo claims that when he called
Suello the next day to tell him about the importance of these documents to his civil case, Suello disowned
the documents.6 Suello instead ordered his secretary to give Pitogo a copy of his notarial register.7

In the letter dated August 7, 2009, Pitogo reiterated to Suello that the documents were important in his civil
case pending before the Regional Trial Court. He requested Suello to certify the authenticity and veracity of
the three (3) documents he obtained from the Land Transportation Office. 8 He wanted to determine if the
documents were duly notarized by Suello or were merely fabricated. 9 Pitogo did not receive a reply from
Suello.10
On September 10, 2009, Pitogo filed his Affidavit-Complaint against Suello before the Cebu Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Pitogo alleges that there were discrepancies between the three (3)
documents notarized by Suello and Suellos entries in his notarial register.11
Specifically, Pitogo claims that Suellos notarial register showed that the above entries pertain to the
following documents:
a. Doc. No. 436: Deed of Absolute Sale of Mr. Roel D. Rago; 12
b. Doc. No. 437: Deed of Absolute Sale of Mrs. Conchita Pitogo Tautho; 13
c. Doc. No. 235: Contract to Sell of BF Property Development Corporation. 14
In his Answer to the Affidavit-Complaint, Suello denies having notarized the three (3) documents obtained
from the Land Transportation Office.15 He denies the allegation that he disowned the documents. 16 He
admits that he certified the documents as true copies.17
In his Position Paper, Suello explains that it was his secretary who certified Pitogos documents on August 3,
2009.18 Pitogo called Suello the next day to ask for a certification. 19 When he advised Pitogo that he can get
it at his office after verifying the documents, Pitogo informed him that his secretary already certified them as
true copies.20 Suello told Pitogo that his secretary was not given such authority.21
Suello also claims that Pitogo threatened to file an administrative case against him if he did not issue a
certification stating whether the documents were really notarized by him or were fabricated. 22 According to
Suello, Pitogo needed the certification that the three (3) documents used to register the motorcycle under
his name were fabricated so he could claim P1.7 million in damages for EMCOR, Inc.s alleged nonregistration of his motorcycle.23 Pitogos claim against EMCOR, Inc. was apparently mooted by the
registration of the motorcycle under his name.
On January 10, 2012, Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended Suellos suspension from the active practice of law for six (6)
months, as well as the revocation of his commission as a notary public. He also recommended Suellos
disqualification as notary public for two (2) years.24
On April 15, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the Resolution adopting
and approving the findings of Commissioner Almeydas recommendation but further recommended to
increase the penalty of disqualification as notary public to four (4) years, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A, and finding the recommendation fully supported by
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering respondent violated the Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Joselito Troy Suellos Notarial Commission is
hereby REVOKED immediately if presently commissioned and DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Public for four (4) years.25 (Emphasis in the original)
Suello filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 15, 2013 Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors Resolution based on the ground that the penalty imposed on him was excessive:
1. That the sanction imposed is excessive. The respondent realizes that the mere existence of those
documents with his notarization makes him inevitably answerable for them. Regardless how unaware he
may be of how these came about, he is still the only one to answer for them. Not the complainant and not
any party who may have access to his office implements to do this. It made him aware of the need review
his procedure to avoid these mistakes. Respondent however finds the sanction against him is much too
excessive and respectfully invokes the following, to wit:

A.

This is the first infraction lodged against him in his 15 years of practice.

B.

The respondent is not in bad faith and has no dishonest or selfish motive.

C.

There is no actual or potential injury caused to any private party; 26

Suello also apologized for his oversight:

2. That substantial justice has not been done. The respondent completely understands that this matter only
pertains to him and his liability and not about anybody or anything else. His indignation distracted him to
the mistaken belief that the complainants dubious motives would not merit his complaint attention because
he did not come with clean hands. After being properly reminded, the respondent realizes his mistake and
respectfully apologizes for his oversight to this Honorable Commission. The respondent finds it however
grossly unjust that he is imposed with such sanction for resisting to accommodate and be a part of the
unscrupulous undertaking sought to be accomplished motivating the complaint which is much bigger
wrong.27
On May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the Resolution partially
granting Suellos Motion for Reconsideration, thus:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration under Resolution No. XX-2013416 dated April 15, 2013. However the Board DEEMED it judicious to reduce the penalty imposed on Atty.
Joselito Troy Suello from DISQUALIFICATION from reappointment as Notary Public from four (4) years to
two (2) years. The IMMEDIATE REVOCATION of his Notarial Commission, if existing, under said Resolution
stands.28 (Emphasis in the original)
After reviewing the case records and considering the parties submissions, this court adopts the findings of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in its May 3, 2014 Resolution but modifies the
penalties imposed upon respondent Atty. Joselito Troy Suello.
Respondent is administratively liable for his negligence in keeping and maintaining his notarial register.
Recording every notarial act in the notarial register is required under Rule VI the Notarial Rules, 29 thus:
Sec. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. (a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial
register at the time of the notarization the following:
(1) The entry number and page number;
(2) The date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) The type of notarial act;
(4) The title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5) The name and address of each principal;
(6) The competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is not personally known to
the notary;
(7) The name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the persons identity;
(8) The fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) The address where the notarization was performed if not in the notarys regular place of work or
business; and
(10) Any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.
....
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document
the page/s of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
Failure to properly record entries in the notarial register is also a ground for revocation of notarial
commission:
SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions. . . . .

(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate administrative
sanctions upon, any notary public who:
....
(2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts[.] 30
Notarial acts give private documents a badge of authenticity that the public relies on when they encounter
written documents and engage in written transactions. Hence, all notaries public are duty-bound to protect
the integrity of notarial acts by ensuring that they perform their duties with utmost care. This court
explained in Bote v. Judge Eduardo:31
A notarial register is prima facie evidence of the facts there stated. It has the presumption of regularity and
to contradict the veracity of the entry, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant. . . .
....
. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with such substantial public
interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. For this reason, notaries must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined.32
Hence, when respondent negligently failed to enter the details of the three (3) documents on his notarial
register, he cast doubt on the authenticity of complainants documents. He also cast doubt on the credibility
of the notarial register and the notarial process. He violated not only the Notarial Rules but also the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to promote respect for law and legal processes. 33
Respondent also appears to have committed a falsehood in the pleadings he submitted. In his Answer to
complainants Affidavit-Complaint, respondent claimed that he certified complainants documents as true
copies.34 Later, in his Position Paper, he passed the blame to his secretary.35 This violates the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which prohibits lawyers from engaging in dishonest and unlawful conduct. 36
Respondents secretary cannot be blamed for the erroneous entries in the notarial register. The notarial
commission is a license held personally by the notary public. It cannot be further delegated. It is the
notary public alone who is personally responsible for the correctness of the entries in his or her notarial
register.37 Respondents apparent remorse may assuage the injury done privately, but it does not change
the nature of the violation.
Besides, respondents remorse was displayed after a penalty was recommended by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors. It was not motivated by a realization of a wrong committed on an individual
but only by a desire to temper the penalty. It came too late.
In Agadan, et al. v. Atty. Kilaan,38 the same violations of Notarial Rules and Code of Professional
Responsibility were meted with the penalty of one-year suspension of notarial commission and three-month
suspension from the practice of law.39 We find the same penalties proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Joselito Troy Suello GUILTY of violating Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months and is STERNLY WARNED that any similar
violation will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission is immediately revoked if presently
commissioned. He is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
MARISA

BACATAN

WILLIAMS

A.C. No. 6882

and ORLANDO VERAR RIAN, JR.

Petitioners,

- versus -

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
December 24, 2008

ATTY. RODRIGO ICAO,

Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Maria Bacatan Williams and Orlando Verar Rian, Jr. (petitioners)
administratively charge Atty. Rodrigo Icao (respondent) for violation of the Notarial
Law and for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct unbecoming of an
attorney.[1]
In their Joint-Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment,[2] petitioners allege that on
May 23, 2002, respondent notarized a Declaration of Heirship and Partition [3] (the
document) making it appear that three of its signatories Lucia Briones, Ramon
Verar, and Martin Umbac signed it in his presence when in truth they did not. In
support of their allegation, they gave the following details, quoted verbatim:
Proof that Attorney Icao was not present when the
DECLARATION was actually signed came to light on June 3, 2003
during the trial in Criminal Case No. 3051 held at MCTC Bacong,
Negros Oriental when, in his sworn testimony, Francisco B. Ventolero,
one of the six signers, said that he was the one to carry the document
from one signer to the next to get their signatures. x x x
Additional support that the document was not signed in
attendance with Attorney Icao is found where the participants declared

they signed the document on 14 January 2002 in Bacong as opposed to

the acknowledgment where Attorney Icao declares that they signed the
document on 23 May 2002 in Dumaguete City.
It is also apparent that Lucia Briones did not sign with Attorney
Icao in attendance since her Community Tax Certificate was not
recorded, nor was any notation made as to how she was identified. In
addition, her printed signature (L. Briones) on page #2 is quite different
from her written signature (Felicidad Briones) on page #1 and
#3 suggesting further that the signing was not attended by Attorney
Icao. In addition, it is commonly known amongst the participants
that Lucia Briones lived in Cotabato for 20+ years before she died in
2004. It was equally known that she was deathly sick in 2002 which
explains why Francisco B. Ventolero had to take the document to
Cotabato for her signature.
The style of the signatures of Francisco and Desiderio Ventolero
also appear not to be under the guidance of a legal expert since the
family name of Ventolero is used on page #2 while the family name of
Briones is used on page #1 and #3. An attorney would never
knowing[ly] allow such an inconsistency in a legal document. Bouncing
back and forth from one family name to another and from a written
signature on page #2 to thumbmarks on page #1 and #3 also seem to be
highly irregular for a document supposedly signed in front of a lawyer.
[4]
(Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners additionally charge respondent to have conspired with Atty. Rudy

T. Enriquez (Atty. Enriquez), one of the signatories to, in the falsification, of the
document.[5]
In his Comment,[6] respondent, admitting that the document was not executed
in his presence, claims that before he notarized it, the parties thereto appeared
before him and he ascertained their identities as well as of those of their
witnesses; that he explained to them the contents of the document which they
acknowledged to be true and correct; that all the parties acknowledged before him
that the signatures appearing thereon were theirs and that they executed the same
freely and voluntarily; that he did not find in the document anything contrary to
law, morals and public policy since at the time of the notarization, the signatories

were accompanied by their counsel, Atty. Enriquez; that he did not require the
presentation of other documents to support the document as he was not privy to its
preparation; and that petitioners complaint had already prescribed under Section 1,
Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the IBP under which a complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys prescribes in two years from the date of the professional misconduct.
Respondent attached to his Comment a Joint Affidavit [7] of Ramon Ventolero
Verar, Martin Umbac, and Desiderio Briones Ventolero, who are among the
signatories to the document, in which they attested to having appeared before
respondent to acknowledge as theirs the signatures they had previously affixed
thereon.
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[8] While a mandatory conference/hearing
was set on April 24, 2007,[9] petitioners requested that the case be resolved on the
basis of the parties position papers.[10]
In his Report and Recommendation,[11] IBP Commissioner Edmund T. Espina
(Espina), brushing aside respondents defense of prescription, citing Calo v.
Degamo[12]which held that disbarment proceedings do not prescribe, found
respondent guilty of violation of the Notarial Law.
Espina thereupon recommended that respondent be reprimanded, with
warning that similar acts in the future would merit severe penalty.
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of December 14, 2007, resolved
to dismiss the case, viz:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. [13] (Italics
and emphasis in the original)

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[14] averring that:

The Commission on Bar Discipline [sic] must have made an error

by dismissing this case for lack of merit considering that Commissioner
Espina stated on page #7 of his report and recommendation that, The
manner on which all the parties signed the document is highly irregular
and questionable. Furthermore, on page #8 the Commissioner
added, Sad to say, respondent miserably failed to refute the allegations
against him[15] (Italics and underscoring in the original),

which motion the IBP forwarded to the Court.

The Court finds for petitioners.
On the technical issue of prescription, Frias v. Bautista-Lozada,[16] holds that
that prescription does not lie in administrative proceedings against lawyers.
x x x As early as 1967, we have held that the defense of
prescription does not lie in administrative proceedings against
lawyers. And in the 2004 case of Heck v. Santos,[17] we declared that an
administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe.
xxxx
The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of
administrative proceedings against lawyers from this Court which has
the inherent power to regulate, supervise and control the practice of law
in the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its delegated power to
entertain administrative complaints against lawyers, the CBD-IBP
should be guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court.
Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of
the CBD-IBP which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of
administrative complaints against lawyers runs afoul of the settled ruling
of this Corut. It should therefore be struck down as void and of no legal
effect for being ultra vires.[18]

On the merits. The document does not bear the residence certificate number
of Lucia Briones, one of the signatories. In notarizing it without recording Lucias
residence certificate, respondent violated the Notarial Law then effective[19] which
required the notary public to certify that a party to the instrument which was
acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place and date of
issue as part of the certification.[20] This formality is mandatory and cannot be
neglected, failure to comply with which results in the revocation of a notarys
commission.[21]
By respondents admission, the signatories to the document did not personally
sign it in his presence. He, however, claims that they appeared before him and
confirmed their identities and acknowledged that the signatures appearing thereon
were theirs. If indeed the heirs-signatories and their witnesses had personally
appeared before respondent, it is beyond comprehension why he did not ask them to
affix their signatures in his presence. By such omission, he failed to heed his duty
as a notary public to demand that the document for notarization be signed in his
presence.[22]
More. The document contained false statements. Thus, it listed the
signatories counsel, Atty. Enriquez, as one of the six heirs of Aurea Briones, albeit
he is merely the legal counsel of the heirs.[23] The Joint Affidavit respondent
attached to his Comment stating that there were five, not six, heirs should have
readily alerted him of such falsity.
Still more. The document states that Aurea Briones Ventolero died ab
intestato during the Second World War. The death certificate of the deceased on file
at the Civil Registry states, however, that she died on July 12, 1998.[24] And the
document states that the six signatories are heirs of Aurea Briones, whereas in the
Joint Affidavit attached to respondents Comment, the three signatories-affiants
claim that they are, as well as of the deceased Aurea Briones husband Ciriaco
Ventolero, heirs of Aurea Briones.
Records show that Atty. Enriquez had in fact been previously suspended from
the practice of law for two years for his complicity in executing the same
document.[25]

In notarizing a document containing false statements, respondent failed to

discharge his duty to inform himself of the facts to which he intended to certify and
to take part in no illegal enterprise.[26]
It bears recalling that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.
It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notary public. [28] As a notarial document is by
law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties, lest the
confidence of the public in the integrity of the document will be undermined.[29]
[27]

No concrete evidence being appreciated from the records in support of the

charge of complicity in the falsification of the document, the same must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Atty. Rodrigo Icao is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law and from his commission as a notary public
for a period of one year, effective immediately, with warning that a commission of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4191

June 10, 2013

ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts violative of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.

On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Pea, former head of the Records Department of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 against respondent Atty.
Christina C. Paterno. Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot
7-C, Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244,2Register of Deeds of Marikina, with an eight-door apartment
constructed thereon. She personally knew respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno, as respondent was
her lawyer in a legal separation case, which she filed against her husband in 1974, and the
aforementioned property was her share in their property settlement. Complainant stated that she
also knew personally one Estrella D. Kraus, as she was respondent's trusted employee who did
secretarial work for respondent. Estrella Kraus was always there whenever she visited respondent in
connection with her cases.
Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986, respondent suggested that she (complainant)
apply for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses on her property for sale to interested buyers,
and that her property be offered as collateral. Respondent assured complainant that she would work
out the speedy processing and release of the loan. Complainant agreed, but since she had a
balance on her loan with the GSIS, respondent lent her the sum of P27,000.00, without any interest,
to pay the said loan. When her title was released by the GSIS, complainant entrusted it to
respondent who would handle the preparation of documents for the loan and follow-up the same,
and complainant gave respondent the authority for this purpose. From time to time, complainant
inquired about the application for the loan, but respondent always assured her that she was still
preparing the documents required by the bank. Because of her assurances, complainant did not
bother to check on her property, relying on respondent's words that she would handle speedily the
preparation of her application.
Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she discovered that her apartment
was already demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed on her property,
which she later learned was already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought her property from
Estrella D. Kraus. Complainant immediately confronted respondent about what she discovered, but
respondent just brushed her aside and ignored her. After verification, complainant learned that her
property was sold on November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and respondent was
the Notary Public before whom the sale was acknowledged.3Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.,
through its Managing Partner, Estrella D. Kraus, sold the same to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13,
1989.4
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company,
Ltd., and that she neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor appeared before respondent to
acknowledge the sale. She alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her property to Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd. using her trusted employee, Estrella D. Kraus, as the instrument in the sale,
and that her signature was forged, as she did not sign any deed selling her property to anyone.
In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D. Kraus never worked in any capacity in her law
office, and that Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus (Spouses Kraus), were her clients. Respondent
denied that she suggested that complainant should apply for a loan from a bank to construct
townhouses. She said that it was the complainant, on the contrary, who requested her (respondent)
to look for somebody who could help her raise the money she needed to complete the amortization
of her property, which was mortgaged with the GSIS and was about to be foreclosed. Respondent
stated that she was the one who introduced complainant to the Spouses Kraus when they were both
in her office. In the course of their conversation, complainant offered the property, subject matter of
this case, to the Spouses Kraus. The Spouses Kraus were interested, and got the telephone number
of complainant. Thereafter, complainant told respondent that she accompanied the Spouses Kraus
to the site of her property and the Office of the Register of Deeds. After about three weeks, the

Spouses Kraus called up respondent to tell her that they had reached an agreement with
complainant, and they requested respondent to prepare the deed of sale in favor of their company,
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. Thereafter, complainant and the Spouses Kraus went to
respondent's office where complainant signed the Deed of Sale after she received Sixty-Seven
Thousand Pesos (P67,000.00) from the Spouses Kraus. Respondent alleged that complainant took
hold of the Deed of Sale, as the understanding was that the complainant would, in the meantime,
work for the release of the mortgage, and, thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of title,
together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses Kraus who would then pay complainant the balance
of the agreed price. Complainant allegedly told respondent that she would inform respondent when
the transaction was completed so that the Deed of Sale could be recorded in the Notarial Book.
Thereafter, respondent claimed that she had no knowledge of what transpired between complainant
and the Spouses Kraus. Respondent stated that she was never entrusted with complainant's
certificate of title to her property in Marikina (TCT No. N-61244). Moreover, it was only complainant
who negotiated the sale of her property in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. According to
respondent, complainant's inaction for eight years to verify what happened to her property only
meant that she had actually sold the same, and that she concocted her story when she saw the
prospect of her property had she held on to it. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case.
On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a Reply,6 belying respondent's allegations and affirming the
veracity of her complaint.
On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and recommendation.7 On April 18, 1996, complainant moved that hearings be
scheduled by the Commission on Bar Discipline. On November 8, 1999, the case was set for its
initial hearing, and hearings were conducted from March 21, 2000 to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for the
reception of respondent's evidence were set, but supervening events caused their postponement.
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence,8 which was opposed by complainant. The
Investigating Commissioner denied respondent's prayer for the outright dismissal of the complaint,
and directed respondent to present her evidence on October 24, 2001. 9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to testify and bring the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated November 11, 1986, which caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in the name of
complainant and the issuance of a new title to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. However, the Register
of Deeds failed to appear on March 1, 2002. During the hearing held on July 29, 2003, respondent's
counsel presented a certification10 from Records Officer Ma. Corazon Gaspar of the Register of
Deeds of Marikina City, which certification stated that a copy of the Deed of Sale executed by Anita
C. Pea in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., covering a parcel of land in Marikina, could not
be located from the general file of the registry and that the same may be considered lost. Hearings
continued until 2005. On February 17, 2005, respondent was directed by the Investigating
Commissioner to formally offer her evidence and to submit her memorandum.
Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the IBP on
the ground that the criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36,
which estafa case was anchored on the same facts as the administrative case, had been dismissed
in a Decision11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 94-138567. The RTC held that the case
for estafa could not prosper against the accused Atty. Christina C. Paterno, respondent herein, for
insufficiency of evidence to secure conviction beyond reasonable doubt, considering the absence of
the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof that would show that Anita Pea's signature therein
was forged and the transfer of the land was made through fraudulent documents.

The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was whether or not there was clear and
preponderant evidence showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility
by (a) deceiving complainant Anita C. Pea; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Engr. Ernesto
Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject property in his name; and (c) knowingly notarizing
a falsified contract of sale.
On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, submitted his
Report and Recommendation finding that respondent betrayed the trust reposed upon her by
complainant by executing a bogus deed of sale while she was entrusted with complainant's
certificate of title, and that respondent also notarized the spurious deed of sale. Commissioner
Sordan stated that there was no evidence showing that respondent actively conspired with any party
or actively participated in the forgery of the signature of complainant. Nevertheless, Commissioner
Sordan stated that complainant's evidence supports the conclusion that her signature on the said
Deed of Sale dated November 11, 1986 was forged.
Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be produced notwithstanding diligent search in the
National Archives and the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Commissioner Sordan stated that the interlocking testimonies of the complainant and her witness,
Maura Orosco, proved that the original copy of the owner's duplicate certificate of title was delivered
to respondent.12 Commissioner Sordan did not give credence to respondent's denial that complainant
handed to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-61244 in November 1986 at the GSIS, as Maura
Orosco, respondent's former client who worked as Records Processor at the GSIS, testified that she
saw complainant give the said title to respondent.
Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the testimony of complainant that she gave respondent her
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as collateral in
constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in the safekeeping of respondent for seven
years.13 Despite repeated demands by complainant, respondent refused to return it. 14 Yet,
respondent assured complainant that she was still the owner.15 Later, complainant discovered that a
new building was erected on her property in January 1994, eight years after she gave the title to
respondent. Respondent argued that it was unfathomable that after eight years, complainant never
took any step to verify the status of her loan application nor visited her property, if it is untrue that
she sold the said property. Complainant explained that respondent kept on assuring her that the
bank required the submission of her title in order to process her loan application. 16
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's land to
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244 with
respect to the sale of the property described therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.
for P200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her presence
inside her office.19 However, respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny if, indeed, she
notarized the instrument in her direct examination, 20 but on cross-examination, she stated that she
was not denying that she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale. 21Estrella Kraus'
affidavit22 supported respondent's defense.
Respondent presented her former employee Basilio T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing by
complainant of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale, and the notarization by respondent of the said
Deed. However, Commissioner Sordan doubted the credibility of Depaudhon, as he affirmed that his
participation in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale was mere recording, but he later affirmed that he
saw the parties sign the Deed of Absolute Sale.23
Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken chain of circumstances, like respondent's testimony
that she saw complainant sign the Deed of Sale before her is proof of respondent's deception.

Respondent's notarization of the disputed deed of sale showed her active role to perpetuate a fraud
to prejudice a party. Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed to exercise the required
diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the alleged party, Anita Pea, appeared before her
and signed the deed when in truth and in fact the said person did not participate in the execution
thereof. Moreover, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries
pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register.
According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross violations of the law made respondent liable for
violation of her oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), 24 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court and Canon 125 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and her
name stricken-off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that the notarial
commission of respondent, if still existing, be revoked, and that respondent be perpetually
disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464, adopting
and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of her oath as a
lawyer, Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Christina C. Paterno is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and her name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Furthermore, respondent's notarial
commission if still existing is Revoked with Perpetual Disqualification from reappointment as a
Notary Public.
The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP insofar as respondent has
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, and agrees with the sanction
imposed.
The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, is different from this administrative case, and each must be disposed of
according to the facts and the law applicable to each case. 26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections
128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is
required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as
in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 30
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a
separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to
establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. An administrative case can proceed
independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and defense
evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the
prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was
committed.32
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers
of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients

may repose confidence.33 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will
exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.34
In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave credence to complainant's testimony that she
gave respondent her owner's copy of the certificate of title to her property as respondent would apply
for a bank loan in complainant's behalf, using the subject property as collateral.
Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco, a former records processor in
complainant's office at the GSIS and also a client of respondent, who stated that she saw
complainant give her title to respondent.35Respondent admitted in her Answer36 that she executed the
Deed of Sale per the request of the Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of Sale was notarized by
respondent as evidenced by Entry No. 15032237 in complainant's title, TCT No. N-61244. As the
Deed of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through no fault of the complainant, nonetheless,
the consequence thereof is failure of complainant to prove her allegation that her signature therein
was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant by facilitating the sale of the property to
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's approval. However, complainant proved that
respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila, National Capital Region her
Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, states that every notary public shall keep a
notarial register,38 and he shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, among others, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct
copy thereof as part of his records, and he shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of
the substance thereof.39
A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the copy of
the entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of the
month next following or the failure of the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the
proper clerk of court.40
In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification, 41 dated February 22,
1994, stating that respondent was duly appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila for the
year 1986, and that respondent has not yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial
Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed and notarized by her.
Hence, a copy of the Notarial Report/Record and the said Deed of Sale could not also be found in
the National Archives per the certification42 of the Archives Division Chief Teresita R. Ignacio for
Director Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of respondent to fulfill her duty as notary public to submit her
notarial register for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the said Deed of Sale that was
notarized by her on the same month is cause for revocation of her commission under Section 249 of
the Notarial Law.43 Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity
the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.44
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended for
any deceit or dishonest act, thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to

take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of complainant's copy of the
certificate of title (TCT No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent who
admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale, which complainant denied having executed or signed, the
important evidence of the alleged forgery of complainant's signature on the Deed of Sale and the
validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy of the Deed of Sale could not be
produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, as it could not be located in the general files of
the registry, and a certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale may be considered
lost.45 Moreover, respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila her Notarial
Report for the month of November 1986,46 including the said Deed of Sale, which was executed on
November 11, 1986. Hence, Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined that it appears that efforts
were exerted to get rid of the copies of the said Deed of Sale to prevent complainant from getting
hold of the document for the purpose of handwriting verification from an expert to prove that her
alleged signature on the Deed of Sale was forged. The failure of respondent to submit to the proper
RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial Register/Report for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the
Deed of Sale, which was notarized by her within that month, has far-reaching implications and grave
consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale and
showed the deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its authenticity. During her
testimony, it was observed by the Investigating Commissioner and reflected in the transcript of
records that respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny that she notarized the said Deed of
Sale.
For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As a
member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law,
pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and the notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing,
is perpetually REVOKED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina C. Paterno from the Roll
of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4179. November 11, 2004]

ALICE
GOKIOCO, complainant,
MATEO, respondent.

vs.

ATTY.

RAFAEL

P.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a complaint filed by Alice Gokioco against Atty. Rafael
P. Mateo for falsification of a public document.
On January 24, 1992, Alice Gokioco filed an Affidavit-Complaint with this
Court alleging that: during the pre-trial conference of civil case Sps. Eustaquio
Gokioco and See Chua-Gokioco vs. Jennifer Gokioco, Sps. Mariano Gokioco
and Alice Gokioco, they discovered that the complaint in said case was
subscribed and sworn to by See Chua-Gokioco before herein respondent on
November 10, 1992; See Chua-Gokioco however, died on October 7, 1992 as
evidenced by the death certificate issued by the local civil registrar;
respondent, a long time counsel for the family, notarized and filed the said
complaint, fully aware of the death of See Chua-Gokioco; this constitutes a
violation of the Revised Penal Code, the Notarial Law, the lawyers oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and warrants respondents
disbarment and/or suspension from the practice of law.[1]
In his comment, Atty. Rafael Mateo denies that he is a long time counsel of
the Gokioco family and explains, as follows: He only transacted with them in
1976 and again in 1992; his law office prepared the complaint for the Gokioco
spouses on September 22, 1992; thereafter, he called See Chua-Gokioco and

her son Francisco to come to his office in Tanay for the reading and
verification of the complaint; respondent forgot, however, the exact date when
this was done which could be anywhere between September 22, 1992 and
October 7, 1992, the date of her death; from the time Mrs. Gokioco left his
office in Tanay up to the time he filed the complaint in court, he was not aware
that Mrs. Gokioco had already died; his office has no telephone and is about
70 kilometers from the residence of the Gokioco family in Caloocan; he
notarized and filed the complaint on November 10, 1992 without any personal
knowledge of the fact of death of Mrs. Gokioco; [2] and, the death of Mrs.
Gokioco was brought to the attention of the court only during the pre-trial
conference on May 18,1993 which ordered Eustaquio to amend the complaint.
On June 27, 1994, the Court issued a resolution referring the instant case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report and
recommendation.[3]
After several hearings, Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III of the IBP
submitted his report dated November 10, 2003, portions of which read as
follows:
In this case, the respondent failed to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law. The respondent
should have entered the fact of See Chua-Gokiocos verification on the date when the
latter actually verified her complaint in the respondents presence, as opposed to the
date when he filed the complaint.
In addition to failing to obey the pertinent portions of the notarial law quoted above,
the respondent also violated his lawyers oath to, inter alia, do no falsehood or consent
to the doing of the same.
The respondent admits that although See Chua-Gokioco signed and subscribed the
civil complaint at an earlier date, the said respondent only entered the fact of the
signing and subscribing of the said complaint much later, that is, on the date of the
filing of the said civil complaint.

The respondent reasons that he delayed the filing of the civil complaint against the
herein complainant and her family because he wanted to make sure that the parties
had the opportunity to amicably settle the issues raised in the civil complaint.
It would have been a simple matter for the respondent to exercise a little
circumspection by ascertaining from Eustaquio and See Chua-Gokioco if any
settlement was agreed on between Eustaquio and See Chua-Gokioco on one hand, and
the herein complainant and her family upon the other, prior to the institution of the
civil complaint in question. In doing so, the respondent would have found out that See
Chua-Gokioco had died.
The respondents arguments to the effect that his office was 70 kilometers away from
his clients residence and that his office did not have a telephone are of no moment.
The respondent had the duty to determine whether or not to file the civil complaint in
question and he should have exhausted all possible means to communicate with his
clients.
Furthermore, the respondents act of making it appear that See Chua-Gokioco verified
the civil complaint on the date of its filing, when in fact she did not, means that the
respondent effectively notarized a document when the affiant was absent. In other
words, the affiant did not sign or subscribe to the said civil complaint in the presence
of the notary public on the date stated in the civil complaint, because on the date
stated the affiant was dead or otherwise absent.
There is no question therefore that the respondent is liable for his misconduct as
follows:
(1) the respondent neglected or otherwise failed to enter in his notarial register
the true date when See Chua-Gokioco signed the verification portion of the
civil complaint against Alice Gokioco, her husband Mariano Gokioco, and their
daughter Jennifer Gokioco;
(2) the respondent neglected or otherwise failed to contact his clients prior to
the filing of the said civil complaint in order to ascertain if his clients wanted to
proceed with the filing of the same; and,
(3) the respondent violated his lawyers oath to obey the laws and do no
falsehood when he made it appear that See Chua-Gokioco personally signed

and executed the civil complaint in question on the date stated in the said civil
complaint in his presence, when in fact she was already dead on the said date or
was otherwise not physically present.
The undersigned commissioner, however, is of the opinion that the respondents
misconduct while serious, is not so gross as to merit disbarment or suspension. From
the record, it appears that the Presiding Judge of RTC Rizal, Branch 79, rather than
citing the respondents misconduct ordered the civil complaint amended.
The damage that was caused to the legal system, to the respondents clients; to Alice
Gokioco, her husband Mariano Gokioco, and their daughter Jennifer Gokioco because
of the respondents misconduct was minimal or was otherwise contained by the
amendment of the civil complaint in question.
Furthermore, the damage that may have been caused by the respondents misconduct is
mitigated by the fact that the respondent had no dishonest or selfish motive in
notarizing the civil complaint despite the fact that the affiant was absent on the date of
its alleged notarization.[4]
He then recommended that:
respondent be reprimanded and warned that any future misconduct on
his part will warrant the imposition of a greater penalty.[5]
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a
resolution as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-50
Adm. Case No. 4179
Alice Gokioco vs.
Atty. Rafael P. Mateo
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case and, finding the recommendation fully

supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that respondent had no dishonest or selfish motive in notarizing the
civil complaint despite the fact that the affiant was absent on the date of its
alleged notarization, Atty. Rafael P. Mateo is hereby REPRIMANDED and
WARNED that any future misconduct on his part will warrant the imposition of
a greater penalty.[6]
While we agree with the findings of the IBP, we find that the penalty of
reprimand is not commensurate to the misconduct committed by respondent.
Respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the CPR when he made it
appear that the complaint of the Gokioco was verified by See Chua on
November 10, 1992.
The verification of the civil case submitted to the trial court states,
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO THIS November 10, 1992, in Tanay, Rizal.
[7]
The death certificate submitted by complainant states however that See
Chua Gokioco died on October 7, 1992.
Rule 10.01 of the CPR holds that:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
The Notarial Law, as provided for in Title IV, Chapter II, Revised
Administrative Code, also states that:
Sec. 245. Notarial Register Every notary public shall keep a register to
be known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his
official acts as notary
Sec. 246. Matters to be entered therein. The notary public shall enter
in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any,
to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the
instrument, the fees collected by him for his services as notary in connection
therewith, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy
thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief

description of the substance thereof and shall give to each entry a consecutive
number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. The notary shall
give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the
instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No
blank line shall be left between entries. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be stressed enough that notaries public should be truthful in
carrying out their functions. They must observe with the highest degree of
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties in order to
preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system.
Courts, agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by notaries public appended to instruments.[8] Their
functions should not be trivialized and they must discharge their powers and
duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.
[9]
With the eroding faith of the public in the integrity of public documents, this
Court will exhort all the more the notaries public to be more circumspect in the
discharge of their duties.[10]
Indeed, faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of
the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. [11] The act of notarization
is invested with substantive public interest such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may perform the duties of notaries public.[12]
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer.
A graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to
obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.[13] He is
mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties, being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Failing in his
duties, he must bear the commensurate consequences.[14]
Sec. 249 of the Notarial Law provides for grounds for the revocation of the
notarial commission, thus:
Sec. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. --- The following derelictions of
duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of
first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:

(a) The failure of the notary to keep a notarial register.

(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his
notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
(c) The failure of the notary to send the copy of the entries to the proper clerk of
Court of First Instance within the first ten days of the month next following.
(d) The failure of the notary to affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of
his commission, as required by law.
(e) The failure of the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the
proper clerk of court.
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula
certificates.
(g) The failure of a notary to make report, within a reasonable time, to the proper
judge of first instance concerning the performance of his duties, as may be
required by such judge.
(h) Any other dereliction or act which shall appear to the judge to constitute good
cause for removal. (Emphasis supplied)

While we agree with the observation of the IBP that there was no proof
that respondent had any dishonest or selfish motive in notarizing the civil
complaint despite the fact that the affiant was absent on the date of its alleged
notarization, we do not agree however that Atty. Mateos conduct deserves a
mere reprimand.
To exculpate himself, respondent claims that he entered the fact of signing
and subscribing of See Chua-Gokioco of the complaint on a later date, that is
the date of its actual filing, because he was hoping that the parties, which
come from the same family, would amicably settle the issues raised in the
complaint.
We are not persuaded. The jurat must truthfully reflect all the information
stated therein since the courts and the public rely on such representations.
There is also no rule stating that the verification be subscribed and sworn to at
exactly the same day as the filing of the complaint. Worth noting also is the
fact that respondent did not raise such explanation in his comment before this

Court dated February 25, 1994,[15] the earliest opportunity he had to put up
such defense, but merely stated the same during the IBP hearing on August
10, 1999.[16]
In Coronado vs. Felongco,[17] respondent lawyer was found guilty of
misconduct and suspended from his commission as notary public for a period
of two months for notarizing a deed, not knowing that the affiant who went to
his office personally and signed the document days before, had already died
at the time he notarized said document. The lack of ill intent on his part and
the fact that it was his first offense merely mitigated his liability.[18]
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct
for which he must be suspended.
We note that this is not the first administrative case filed against
respondent lawyer concerning his commission as a notary public. In Follosco
vs. Mateo,[19] promulgated by this Court on February 3, 2004, respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for three months and his notarial
commission revoked for one year for notarizing documents without the
personal appearance of the affiants. The penalty was only reduced to
prohibition against his commission as a notary public to six months and his
period of suspension from the practice of law deemed already served, thru
this Courts Resolution on June 9, 2004, based on humanitarian reasons and
equity which respondent raised in his motion for reconsideration.
Considering that this is not the first offense committed by respondent in
the exercise of his duties as a notary public, we hold that respondent, in the
present case, should be suspended from the practice of law for six months
and prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for two years.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rafael P. Mateo is SUSPENDED from practice of law
for six (6) months; his incumbent notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED;
and he is prohibited anew from being commissioned as a notary public for two
(2) years, effective immediately, with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Atty.

Rafael P. Mateo in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be
furnished the courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment [1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the

Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe
Marie

Labiano,

representation.

convinced
Respondent

his

clients [2] to

promised

transfer
them

legal

financial

assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce

them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them
text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn

affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail
upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and
utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan
of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card: [6]
Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent,

in

his

defense,

denied

knowing

Labiano

and

authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card. [7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its
report

and

recommendation,[9] found

that

respondent

had

encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating

Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the Rules of Court.
Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded
with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier
penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of
Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to,
including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made
known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL

SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT
OF FACTS.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law
is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise
their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer
to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law,
degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its
ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which
every member of the bar is called.[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE

DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL
BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. [16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the

CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT

MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost

any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and
referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his

answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was

benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation

on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a

more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment
violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled
is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never
denied Labianos connection to his office. [21] Respondent committed
an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He
cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients
as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his

client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers

fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for

surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of

mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he
is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the
clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. [23] Either of
these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement
which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of
the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients
cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes
malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we
adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of
the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including

violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the
sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy
slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate
to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by

petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character
and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use
of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a)

lawyers name;

(b)

name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c)

address;

(d)

telephone number and

(e)

special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial

assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who

already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of

loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure
clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of
their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule
that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating

Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this
resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the

Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

ULEP vs. LEGAL CLINIC (SUPRA)

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief,

Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO,respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON

BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that

appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/5212667.
[1]

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information

Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and
pretended to be an interested party.She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed
that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment
cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided
the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs.
Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which
is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public
Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the
August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of theManila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of
The Philippine Star.
[2]

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as

Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed
an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court.
[3]

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued
that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time
has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute
prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should
be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges
against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal
services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified.
[4]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306, finding
respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court,
and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning
that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP
Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.
[5]

[6]

[7]

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,

which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October
19, 2002
[8]

[9]

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No.
157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated
with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to
manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings. Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25,
2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and
is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and
records thereof. Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental
Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
[10]

[11]

We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.
It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
[12]

venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The
gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves. The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:
[13]

[14]

[15]

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in

which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

[16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained

of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the
advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts
indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised
his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming
that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of
the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. Ten months later, he caused the same
advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.
Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the
Courts authority.
[17]

[18]

What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself

as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly
erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an
institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an

annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of
the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to
do so.
[19]

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether

proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with
the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of
simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of
calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated
in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:
[20]

[21]

[22]

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a
lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity
or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication
of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6622

July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar Confidant,
complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent) with
unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of
fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondents first
marriage was subsisting.1
In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file
a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt
of the record.4
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the
conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They submitted
for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of
fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice. 6
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent
filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August
2005.8
Complainants Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial
consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latters numerous petitions for
corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal
agreement whereby he would be entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged
that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the
corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was
entitled to the amount of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his
work with respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he believes are
due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section
27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy
firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts
to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching
to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients
signed by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts
of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted
a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National
Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage
thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the
second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the
third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. 13
Respondents Defense

In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not
an employee of his law firm Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant
was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the
latters dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases. 16 Respondent also
alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the
sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of
complainant had been paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his
law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the
legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial
aspect of the case such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To
support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated
10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of
the said company.19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a
dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had
been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations
regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts. 21 To the
said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the
Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and
names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three
marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that
took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980. 23 The
second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion, and it took place at
the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987.24 The third Marriage
Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on
7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was
described as single under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or
submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the
opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed
against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent
further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage
Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage
Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion
and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were
purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory
hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not
attend the hearing,30respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for the suspension

of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had
filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be
bearing his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two
(2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125,
was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting. 34 Each of the
Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the
criminal cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding,
the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions
for nullification he had filed with the RTCLaguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the
administrative case against him be submitted for resolution. 36
IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. 37 The first charge, for
dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only
empowered to determine respondents administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to
prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission found
respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal
services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It
failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated. 39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for
violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence
that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latters first
marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission
recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. 41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01 August
2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him
was premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the
marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He
further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed
bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the
annulment of Marriage Contracts.43

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed
their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondents disbarment. 44
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the
rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the formers share in the
fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 45 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees
for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant
solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the
existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share
the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved
may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainants allegations in this case had
not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi &
Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by
respondent to advertise the latters legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the
report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 47 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises,
though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the
lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management,
Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent
as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter
clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would
render legal services related to the formers loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is
considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as
President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related
to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client
relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if
it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08
of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate
this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into
by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these
documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for
resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them. 52 We are not persuaded by his
argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and
fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing
the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance
by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a
matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter
of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing
and satisfactory proof.54In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that
respondent entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions
tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but
1wphi1

denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he
had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the other in Calamba to declare
the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void. 55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the formers marriages to two other women aside from his wife.
For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO,
which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a
person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not
presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil
actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found
that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its
amendment by the Family Code. Respondents regard for marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance
of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while
his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct
which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition
precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly
be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty
and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other
relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of
the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His
acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as
follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral
conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 3967. September 3, 2003]

ARTEMIO
ENDAYA,
OCA, respondent.

complainant,

vs. ATTY.

WILFREDO

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The law is no brooding omnipresence in the sky, so spoke Justice Holmes.

He must have made the statement because invariably the legal system is
encountered in human form, notably through the lawyers. For practical
purposes, the lawyers not only represent the law; they are the law. With their
ubiquitous presence in the social milieu, lawyers have to be responsible. The
problems they create in lawyering become public difficulties. To keep lawyers
responsible underlies the worth of the ethics of lawyering. Indeed, legal ethics
is simply the aesthetic term for professional responsibility.
[1]

The case before us demonstrates once again that when a lawyer violates
his duties to his client, the courts, the legal profession and the public, he
engages in conduct which is both unethical and unprofessional.
This case unfolded with a verified Complaint filed on January 12, 1993 by
complainant Artemio Endaya against respondent Atty. Wifredo Oca for
violation of the lawyers oath and what complainant termed as professional
delinquency or infidelity. The antecedents are:
[2]

[3]

On November 7, 1991, a complaint for unlawful detainer docketed as Civil

Case No. 34-MCTC-T was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Taysan-Lobo, Batangas by Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago
Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez against complainant and his spouse
Patrosenia Endaya.
[4]

On December 13, 1991, the complainant and his wife as defendants in the
case filed their answer which was prepared by a certain Mr. Isaias Ramirez. A
preliminary conference was conducted on January 17, 1992, which
complainant and his wife attended without counsel. During the conference,
complainant categorically admitted that plaintiffs were the declared owners for
taxation purposes of the land involved in the case. Continuation of the
preliminary conference was set on January 31, 1992. Thereafter, complainant
sought the services of the Public Attorneys Office in Batangas City and
respondent was assigned to handle the case for the complainant and his wife.
[5]

At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent appeared as

counsel for complainant and his spouse. He moved for the amendment of the
answer previously filed by complainant and his wife, but his motion was
denied. Thereafter, the court, presided by Acting Trial Court Judge Teodoro
M. Baral, ordered the parties to submit their affidavits and position papers
within ten days from receipt of the order. The court also decreed that thirty
days after receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or upon expiration of
the period for filing the same, judgment shall be rendered on the case.
[6]

[7]

Respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and position paper, as

may be gleaned from the Decision dated March 19, 1992 of the MCTC where
it was noted that only the plaintiffs submitted their affidavits and position
papers.
[8]

Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer

principally on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the real parties-ininterest. The dispositive portion of the Decisionreads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs have no
legal capacity to sue as they are not the real party (sic) in interest, in addition to the
fact that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to
the verbal lease agreement.
SO ORDERED.

[9]

Plaintiffs appealed the Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Batangas City, Branch 1, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No.

3378. On April 10, 1992, the RTC directed the parties to file their respective
memoranda. Once again, respondent failed the complainant and his wife. As
observed by the RTC in its Decision dated September 7, 1992, respondent
did not file the memorandum for his clients, thereby prompting the court to
consider the case as submitted for decision.
[10]

[11]

[12]

In its Decision, the RTC reversed the decision appealed from as it held
that plaintiffs are the co-owners of the property in dispute and as such are
parties-in-interest. It also found that the verbal lease agreement was on a
month-to-month basis and perforce terminable by the plaintiffs at the end of
any given month upon proper notice to the defendants. It also made a finding
that defendants incurred rentals in arrears. The decretal portion of
the Decision reads, thus:
[13]

[14]

[15]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial

Court of Taysan-Lobo dated March 19, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
new one entered, to wit:
Defendants ARTEMIO ENDAYA and PATROSENIA ENDAYA and all persons
claiming under them are hereby ordered to vacate and dismantle their house on the
land subject of the verbal lease agreement at their own expense. The defendants are
likewise ordered to pay the monthly rental of P25.00 from the month of January 1991
to November 1991 and ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS monthly from
December 1991 until the defendants finally vacate and surrender possession of the
subject property to the plaintiffs and to pay attorneys fee in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS.
No pronouncement as to cost.

[16]

Complainant received a copy of the Decision on October 7, 1992. Two

days later, or on October 9, 1992, complainant confronted respondent with the
adverse decision but the latter denied receipt of a copy thereof. Upon inquiry
with the Branch Clerk of Court, however, complainant found out that
respondent received his copy back on September 14, 1992.
[17]

Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12, 1993 complainant
filed the present administrative complaint against the respondent for
professional delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings
in behalf of the complainant and his spouse. Complainant contends that due
to respondents inaction he lost the opportunity to present his cause and
ultimately the case itself.
[18]

In his Comment dated March 17, 1993, respondent denies that he

committed professional misconduct in violation of his oath, stressing that he
was not the original counsel of complainant and his spouse. He further avers
that when he agreed to represent complainant at the continuation of the
preliminary conference in the main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking
leave of court to file an amended answer because he was made to believe by
the complainant that the answer was prepared by a non-lawyer. Upon
discovering that the answer was in fact the work of a lawyer, forthwith he
asked the court to relieve him as complainants counsel, but he was denied.
He adds that he agreed to file the position paper for the complainant upon the
latters undertaking to provide him with the documents which support the
position that plaintiffs are not the owners of the property in dispute. As
complainant had reneged on his promise, he claims that he deemed it more
prudent not to file any position paper as it would be a repetition of the answer.
He offers the same reason for not filing the memorandum on appeal with the
RTC. Finally, respondent asserts that he fully explained his stand as regards
Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T to the complainant.
[19]

[20]

[21]

Pursuant to our Resolution dated May 10, 1993, complainant filed

his Reply to respondents Comment wherein he merely reiterated his
allegations in the Complaint.
[22]

[23]

On July 28, 1993, this Court directed respondent to file his rejoinder within
ten days from notice of our Resolution. But he failed to do so despite the
lapse of a considerable period of time. This prompted the Court to require
respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt and to file his rejoinder, both within ten (10) days from notice.
[24]

[25]

In his Explanation dated February 28, 1997, respondent admits having

received a copy of the resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder. However, he
asserts that he purposely did not file a rejoinder for he believed in good faith
that a rejoinder to complainants reply is no longer necessary. He professes
that in electing not to file a rejoinder he did not intend to cast disrespect upon
the Court.
[26]

[27]

[28]

On June 16, 1997, we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
for evaluation, report and recommendation.
[29]

In its Report dated February 6, 2001, the Office of the Bar Confidant
found respondent negligent in handling the case of complainant and his wife
and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one
month. The pertinent portions of the Report read, thus:
[30]

It is to be noted that after appearing at the preliminary conference before the

Municipal Circuit Trial Court, respondent was never heard from again. Respondents
seeming indifference to the cause of his client, specially when the case was on appeal,
caused the defeat of herein complainant. Respondent practically abandoned
complainant in the midst of a storm. This is even more made serious of the fact that
respondent, at that time, was assigned at the Public Attorneys Office- a government
entity mandated to provide free and competent legal assistance.
A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not only requires but also entitles him to
deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to
present every defense provided by law to enable the latters cause to succeed. (Miraflor
vs. Hagad, 244 SCRA 106)
....
The facts, however, do not show that respondent employed every legal and honorable
means to advance the cause of his client. Had respondent tried his best, he could have
found some other defenses available to his client; but respondent was either too lazy
or too convinced that his client had a losing case.
....
For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the court, respondent
practically closed the door to the possibility of putting up a fair fight for his client. As
the Court once held, A client is bound by the negligence of his lawyer. (Diaz-Duarte
vs. Ong, 298 SCRA 388)
[31]

However, the Bar Confidant did not find complainant entirely faultless. She
observed, viz:
Respondents allegation that complainant failed in his promise to submit the
documents to support his claim was not denied by complainant; hence, it is deemed
admitted. Complainant is not without fault; for misrepresenting that he could prove
his claim through supporting documents, respondent was made to believe that he had
a strong leg to stand on. A party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he
himself was guilty of neglect. (Macapagal vs. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 491)
[32]

On April 18, 2001, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
Several hearings were set by the IBP but complainant did not appear even
once. Respondent attended five hearings, but he failed to present evidence in
support of his defense, as required by Investigating Commissioner Victor C.

Fernandez. This compelled the latter to make his report on the basis of the
pleadings and evidence forwarded by the Office of the Bar Confidant.
On
October
11,
2002,
Commissioner
Fernandez
issued
his Report wherein he concurred with the findings and recommendation of
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
[33]

In a Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors

adopted the Report of Commissioner Fernandez.
[34]

The Court is convinced that respondent violated the lawyers oath not only
once but a number of times in regard to the handling of his clients cause. The
repeated violations also involve defilement of several Canons in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Right off, the Court notes that respondent attributes his failure to file the
required pleadings for the complainant and his wife invariably to his strong
personal belief that it was unnecessary or futile to file the pleadings. This was
true with respect to the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC level, the
appeal memorandum at the RTC level and the rejoinder at this Courts level. In
the last instance, it took respondent as long as three years, under compulsion
of a show cause order at that, only to manifest his predisposition not to file a
rejoinder after all. In other words, at the root of respondents transgressions is
his seeming stubborn mindset against the acts required of him by the
courts. This intransigent attitude not only belies lack of diligence and
commitment but evinces absence of respect for the authority of this Court and
the other courts involved.
The lawyers oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every
member of the legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyers duties and
responsibilities that any infringement thereof can cause his disbarment,
suspension or other disciplinary action.
[35]

Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and safeguard the
interest of his client. Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct himself to the
best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to his clients. This duty is further stressed in Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that (A) lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence.
[36]

In this case, evidence abound that respondent failed to demonstrate the

required diligence in handling the case of complainant and his spouse. As
found by the Office of the Bar Confidant, after appearing at the second
preliminary conference before the MCTC, respondent had not been heard of
again until he commented on the complaint in this case. Without disputing this
[37]

fact, respondent reasons out that his appearance at the conference was for
the sole purpose of obtaining leave of court to file an amended answer and
that when he failed to obtain it because of complainants fault he asked the
court that he be relieved as counsel. The explanation has undertones of
dishonesty for complainant had engaged respondent for the entire case and
not for just one incident. The alternative conclusion is that respondent did not
know his procedure for under the Rules on Summary Procedure the
amended answer is a prohibited pleading.
[38]

[39]

Even assuming respondent did in fact ask to be relieved, this could not
mean that less was expected from him. Once a lawyer takes the cudgels for a
clients case, he owes it to his client to see the case to the end. This, we
pointed out in Legarda v. Court of Appeals, thus:
[40]

It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants
that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who
fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his clients cause make him unworthy of the
trust reposed on him by the latter.
[41]

Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas, every case a lawyer accepts deserves

his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance
and whether he accepts if for a fee or for free. In other words, whatever the
lawyers reason is for accepting a case, he is duty bound to do his utmost in
prosecuting or defending it.
[42]

Moreover, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyerclient relationship is terminated either by the act of his client or his own act,
with permission of the court. Until such time, the lawyer is expected to do his
best for the interest of his client
[43]

Thus, when respondent was directed to file affidavits and position paper by
the MCTC, and appeal memorandum by the RTC, he had no choice but to
comply. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the
court orders. This constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that (A)
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Respondents failure to file the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC
did not actually prejudice his clients, for the court nevertheless rendered a
decision favorable to them.However, the failure is per se a violation of Rule
18.03.

It was respondents failure to file appeal memorandum before the RTC

which made complainant and his wife suffer as it resulted in their loss of the
case. As found by the Office of the Bar Confidant, to which we fully subscribe,
in not filing the appeal memorandum respondent denied complainant and his
spouse the chance of putting up a fair fight in the dispute. Canon 19prescribes
that (A) lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
He should exert all efforts to avail of the remedies allowed under the
law. Respondent did not do so, thereby even putting to naught the advantage
which his clients apparently gained by prevailing at the MCTC level. Verily,
respondent did not even bother to put up a fight for his clients. Clearly, his
conduct fell short of what Canon 19 requires and breached the trust reposed
in him by his clients.
We cannot sustain respondents excuse in not filing the affidavits and
position paper with the MCTC and the appeal memorandum with the RTC. He
claims that he did not file the required pleadings because complainant failed
to furnish him with evidence that would substantiate complainants allegations
in the answer. He argues that absent the supporting documents, the pleadings
he could have filed would just be a repetition of the answer. However,
respondent admits in his comment that complainant furnished him with the
affidavit of persons purporting to be barangay officials attesting to an alleged
admission by Felomino Hernandez, the brother of the plaintiffs in the unlawful
detainer case, that he had already bought the disputed property. This did not
precipitate respondent into action despite the evidentiary value of the affidavit,
which was executed by disinterested persons. Said affidavit could have
somehow bolstered the claim of complainant and his wife which was upheld
by the MCTC that plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. While
respondent could have thought this affidavit to be without probative value, he
should have left it to the sound judgment of the court to determine whether the
affidavit supports the assertions of his clients. That could have happened had
he filed the required position paper and annexed the affidavit thereto.
[44]

Further, notwithstanding his belief that without the supporting documents

filing the required pleadings would be a futile exercise, still respondent should
have formally and promptly manifested in court his intent not to file the
pleadings to prevent delay in the disposition of the case. Specifically, the
RTC would not have waited as it did for the lapse of three months from June
5,1992, the date when plaintiffs-appellants submitted their appeal
memorandum, before it rendered judgment. Had it known that respondent
would not file the appeal memorandum, the court could have decided the case
much earlier.
[45]

For his failure to inform the court, respondent violated Canon 12, to wit:

Canon 12: A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Respondent likewise failed to demonstrate the candor he owed his
client. Canon 17 provides that (A) lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
When complainant received the RTC decision, he talked to respondent about
it. However, respondent denied knowledge of the decision despite his receipt
thereof as early as September 14, 1992. Obviously, he tried to evade
responsibility for his negligence. In doing so, respondent was untruthful to
complainant and effectively betrayed the trust placed in him by the latter.
[46]

On top of all these is respondents employment as a lawyer of the Public

Attorneys Office which is tasked to provide free legal assistance for indigents
and low-income persons so as to promote the rule of law in the protection of
the rights of the citizenry and the efficient and speedy administration of justice.
Against this backdrop, respondent should have been more judicious in the
performance of his professional obligations. As we held in Vitriola v.
Dasig lawyers in the government are public servants who owe the utmost
fidelity to the public service. Furthermore, a lawyer from the government is not
exempt from observing the degree of diligence required in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 of the Code provides that the canons
shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.
[47]

[48]

At this juncture, it bears stressing that much is demanded from those who
engage in the practice of law because they have a duty not only to their
clients, but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. The lawyers
diligence and dedication to his work and profession not only promote the
interest of his client, it likewise help attain the ends of justice by contributing to
the proper and speedy administration of cases, bring prestige to the bar and
maintain respect to the legal profession.
[49]

The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant

attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts
of the case. In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by this Court
consisted of reprimand, fine of five hundred pesos with warning,
suspension of three months, six months, and even disbarment in
aggravated cases.
[50]

[51]

[52]

[53]

[54]

[55]

The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondents

failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of
the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby

warranting his suspension from the practice of law. At various stages of the
unlawful detainer case, respondent was remiss in the performance of his duty
as counsel.
To reiterate, respondent did not submit the affidavits and position paper
when required by the MCTC. With his resolution not to file the pleadings
already firmed up, he did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in
mockery of the authority of the court. His stubbornness continued at the RTC,
for despite an order to file an appeal memorandum, respondent did not file
any. Neither did he manifest before the court that he would no longer file the
pleading, thus further delaying the proceedings. He had no misgivings about
his deviant behavior, for despite receipt of a copy of the adverse decision by
the RTC he opted not to inform his clients accordingly. Worse, he denied
knowledge of the decision when confronted by the complainant about it.
At this Courts level, respondents stubborn and uncaring demeanor
surfaced again when he did not file a rejoinder to complainants reply.
Respondents story projects in vivid detail his appalling indifference to his
clients cause, deplorable lack of respect for the courts and a brazen disregard
of his duties as a lawyer.
However, we are not unmindful of some facts which extenuate
respondents misconduct. First, when complainant sought the assistance of
respondent as a PAO lawyer, he misrepresented that his answer was
prepared by someone who is not a lawyer. Second, when complainant
showed respondent a copy of their answer with the MCTC, he assured him
that he had strong evidence to support the defense in the answer that
plaintiffs were no longer the owners of the property in dispute. However, all
that he could provide respondent was the affidavit of the barangay officials.
Last but not least, it is of public knowledge that the Public Attorneys Office is
burdened with a heavy caseload.
All things considered, we conclude that suspension for two (2) months
from the practice of law is the proper and just penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca is ordered SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) months from notice, with the warning that a
similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision
be attached to respondents personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) and to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.