G.R. No.

141910

August 6, 2002

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT M. EROLES,
respondents.
FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on June 18,
1994, 30 units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard its Isuzu truck driven
by Lambert Eroles, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While
traversing the North Diversion Road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol,
Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep
canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered cargoes
(P204,450.00) to Concepcion Industries, Inc.,. Being subrogee of CIIs rights &
interests, FGU, in turn, sought reimbursement from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed
the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach of contract of carriage
against GPS and Eroles with the RTC. In its answer, respondents asserted that
GPS was only the exclusive hauler of CII since 1988, and it was not so engaged in
business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of
damage was purely accidental.
GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on
the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on April 30, 1996. It subsequently
dismissed the complaint holding that GPS was not a common carrier defined
under the law & existing jurisprudence. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration having been denied, FGU interposed an appeal to the CA. The CA
rejected the FGUs appeal & ruled in favor of GPS. It also denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR IS APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
HELD:
Res ipsa loquitur holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the latters management and the accident is
such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those
who have its management/control use proper care. In the absence of the
defendants explanation, it affords reasonable evidence that the accident arose
from want of care. It is not a rule of substantive law and does not create an

independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a

mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the
plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim
simply places the burden of going forward with the proof on the defendant.
However, resort to the doctrine may only be allowed when:
(a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence;
(b) other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence (includes
the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons); and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendants duty to the
plaintiff.
Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to
one of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.
Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of
negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not
from the nature of the relation of the parties. Nevertheless, for the doctrine to
apply, the requirement that responsible causes (other than those due to
defendants conduct) must first be eliminated should be understood as being
confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the
presumption of negligence in culpa contractual immediately attaches by a failure
of the covenant or its tenor.
On the other hand, while the truck driver, whose civil liability is predicated on
culpa acquiliana, can be said to have been in control & management of the
vehicle, it is not equally shown that the accident has been exclusively due to his
negligence. If it were so, the negligence could allow res ipsa loquitur to properly
work against him. However, clearly this is not the case.
G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. and BIENVENIDO S. PASCUAL,
Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III and PRIMITIVA B. SARANGAYA,
Respondents.
FACTS:
In 1986, Spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya erected
Super A Building, a semi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey commercial building
fronting the provincial road of Santiago, Isabela. It has three doors which were
leased out. On the left side of the commercial building stood the office of the
Matsushita Electric Philippine Corporation (Matsushita).

In 1988, Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. through its branch manager Bienvenido
Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door beside the Matsushita
office. It was converted into a two door so he had a garage where he parked a
company car 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina which he used to supervise
different towns.
On July 7, 1988, Pascual went to San Fernando, Pampanga leaving the car. Three
days later, when he returned and warmed up the car, it made an odd sound. On
the second try, there was again an odd sound and a small flames came out of its
engine so he was startled, stopped the car, went out and pushed it out of the
garage. Soon, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and burned the whole
garage where he was trapped so he suffered burns in the face, legs and arms.
The spouses were busy watching TV when they heard two loud explosions, smelt
of gasoline and fire burned all their belongings. The city fire marshall investigated
and concluded that the fire was accidental. Spouses filed a complaint against
Pascual for gross negligence and Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc for lacking the
required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee.
The trial court ruled that Pascual and Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc are liable
jointly and solidarily. Pascual was held liable under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The appellate court affirmed but modified the amount of damages.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR IS APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
HELD:
Yes, the doctrine is applicable in the instant case. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin
phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." It
relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or
establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not
on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence
and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is
lacking.
The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of
the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having
no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms. In such
instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to
establish negligence.
The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant
who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the
incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendants responsibility to show that
there was no negligence on his part.

To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
the following requisites must concur:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge
and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily
occur unless there is negligence. "Ordinary" refers to the usual course of events.
Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a
normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is
revved. Hence, in this case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the
accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, the
inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and
responsible for the accident.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act, use
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same
situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof
that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and condition required)
revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year-old
car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other
defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle,
the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the
car.
G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988
PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and
TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, he and a
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the
right side of the National Highway. Defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel
Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and
hospitalized. Due to said injuries, his left leg was amputated so he had to use
crutches to walk. Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of

the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. Defendant said
that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-inlaw law of the driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly being
repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane towards
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the
incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the
early warning device. Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew the
responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving, he checked the truck. The truck
owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped the truck being
repaired by Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the same was at a stop
position. From the evidence presented, it has been established clearly that the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel
Serrano. Serrano also testified that, When I was a few meters away, I saw the
truck which was loaded with round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it
did not function with my many attempts. I have found out later that the fluid
pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function.
Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to the
driver of parked truck as negligent, and says that absent such proof of care, it
would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of
negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his
helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR IS APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
HELD:
No. Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence maybe established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine
is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere
procedural convenience. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of
proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when
and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available. So, it is inapplicable where plaintiff has
knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence
which is the cause of the injury, or where theres direct evidence as to
the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances
attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. And once the actual cause of injury
is established beyond controversy, no presumptions will be involved and
the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference
of defendant's liability can reasonably be made,whatever the source of the
evidence. In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and
convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant driver.