Mecano vs. COA (G.R. No. 103982.

December 11, 1992)

ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.
FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioners claim on the
ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason
that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion
No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its
entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative
Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioners claim for benefits.
RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must
be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to
repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a
substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against
inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.
BLAS F. OPLE v.RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER
CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which
the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner
Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz
(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and
(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997,
petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government
agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April
8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308
Ruling:
YES
Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the
justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator,
petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality
of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules
yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No.
308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a
notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced
that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system.
All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe formality of the
rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that wetighten the rule on standing is not a
commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ASSO. OF LDB EMPLOYEES and GARCIA
G.R. No. 120319
October 6, 1995
FACTS: From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an
arbitration case to resolve the following issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and the MOA on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers. Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary
Arbitrator, received ALDBEs Position Paper ; LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the
Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.
Without LDBs Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from
enforcing the same.
ISSUE: WON a voluntary arbiters decision is appealable to the CA and not the SC
HELD: the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.
YES
The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter. The (d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executoryunless appealed to the Commission Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the
decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the SC itself on a petition
for certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the CA. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an
unnecessary burden upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise that thejudgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of
parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero,et
al., this Court ruled that a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functionsacts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Under these rulings, it
follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but
independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of RTC s and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948.
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial
agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a quasi-judicial instrumentality.
An instrumentality is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms governmental agency or instrumentality are
synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or function
is performed. The word instrumentality, with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental
power for the performance of a state function. An individual person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the
settling of an estate, in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, and a
trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions
therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term instrumentality in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of
B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec.
9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein.
It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which
is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions
to the CA under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A
fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the CA, in line with the
procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions
enumerated therein.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is
deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the RTC for the
province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction.
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the RTC. Consequently, in a petition
for certiorari from that award or decision, the CA must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC. As a matter of policy, this
Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.
NOTES:
1. In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the basis
of evidence and arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final
and binding. Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.
Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and
are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. 1The essence of arbitration remains since a
resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the parties, but in
compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally appointed by the government.
Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in
their collective agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and binding resolution. 2Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be
complied with by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by
both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for
that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case.
Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrators decision.
2. Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators
over
(1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and
(2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes.

On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases:
. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employeremployee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS

249 SCRA 538
October 25 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by Presidential Decree No. 272 dated August 9, 1973 in order, to develop and
promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years, and when ISAs
original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years.
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation, which is itself an entity
wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an
integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of
the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City and
reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSCs.
Since certain portions of the public land subject matter of Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer
plant owned by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated16 November 1982, was issued
directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC s
present occupancy rights on the subject land. LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach
an agreement within a period of 60 days from the date of the LOI, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D.
No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject
public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC.
Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term.
HELD:
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical personality but did not possess general
or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be
a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. ISA may thus be properly regarded
as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines.
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of
that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying
some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified
successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the
consequences of such expiry must be looked for in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the
Corporation Code. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties,
functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence
assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some
other entity or agency of the Republic.
In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic
of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings
as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA's statutory term did
not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.
GR No. 86995

03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the
publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro
Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on
December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted
their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on
December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just
cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December
12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the
defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project. The
defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary

injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended
that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the
building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the
subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the
state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated
fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second,
the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses
to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or
supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional
amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds
and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities
present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the
case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
EUGENIO vs. CSC et al
G.R. No. 115863
March 31, 1995
FACTS: . Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES)
Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I,
Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes
in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:
Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall
now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has
been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB
HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside
NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974 . It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB
was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and
abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the
General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the
source of its power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which
enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commissions power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control
as enumerated in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission.
As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up
executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment,
CESB was notmade to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of
attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy and program coordination. This is clearly
etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department
represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting
rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which
shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.
NOTES:

Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.
Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director,
and may have such divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the
organization as the need arises.
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission shall have the following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive

(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement

(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman

and two (2) members

(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards

(3) The Office of Legal Affairs

(4) The Office of Planning and Management
(5) The Central Administrative Office.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation

(10) The Office of Human Resource Development

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs
(14) The Office of Retirement
(15) The Regional and Field Offices.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Crisostomo vs. CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996)
FACTS:
Crisostomo was appointed the President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC) by the President of the Philippines. During his
incumbency, two administrative charges were filed against him for illegal use of government vehicles, misappropriation of construction
materials, oppression and harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty before the Office of the President. Likewise, he was
also charged with violation of Anti-Grant and Corrupt Practices Act with the Tanodbayan. As such, he was preventively suspended and
Dr. Mateo was designated as the officer-in-charge in his place. Meanwhile, Pres. Marcos passed PD 1341 converting PCC into PUP with
Mateo as President. Crisostomo was later acquitted and his administrative charges were dismissed.
ISSUE: Did PD 1314 abolish PCC?
HELD:
PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the PCC into what is now PUP. What took place was a change in the academic status of the
educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence, the change in its name, the expansion of its curriculum offerings and changes in
its structure and organization.
As a general rule, when the purpose of the lawmaking authority is to abolish the office and create a new one, he says so. In the instant
case, PD 1314 merely states that PCC is converted into the PUP. In addition, the law does not state that the lands, buildings and
equipment owned by the PCC were being transferred to the PUP but only that they stand transferred to it. Stand transferred
simply means, for example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the
institution.
Bagaoisan vs Nat'l Tobacco Administration.
G.R. No. 152845 :
August 5, 2003.
DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY MADRIAGA, SHIRLY TAGABAN, RICARDO SARANDI, SUSAN IMPERIAL, BENJAMIN DEMDEM, RODOLFO DAGA,
EDGARDO BACLIG, GREGORIO LABAYAN, HILARIO JEREZ, and MARIA CORAZON CUANANG, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION, represented by ANTONIO DE GUZMAN and PERLITA BAULA, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
1. The petitioner was terminated from their position in the national tobacco administration as a result of the executive order issued by
president Estrada which mandates for the stream lining of the national tobacco administration, a government agency under the
department of agriculture.
2. The petitioners filed a letter of appeal to the civil service commission to recall the OSSP.
3. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with prohibition an mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and a
temporary restrainingorder with the regional trial court of Batak to prevent the respondent from enforcing the notice of termination and
from ousting the petitioners in their respective offices.
4. The regional trial court issued an order ordering the national tobacco administration to appoint the petitioner to the ossp to position
similar to the one that they hold before.
5. The national tobacco administration appealed to the court of appeals, who reversed the decision of the RTC.
6. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the reorganization of the national tobacco administration is valid true issuance of executive order by the president.
According to the supreme court, the president has the power to reorganized an office to achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency as
provided under executive
order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which provides that activities of executive agencies may be scaled down if it is no longer
essential for the
delivery of public service.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are DENIED for lack of merit.
Let entry of judgment be made in due course. No costs.
Sinon v. CSC
November 5, 1992
ELISEO A. SINON, petitioner, vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE REORGANIZATION APPEALS BOARD and JUANA BANAN,
respondents.
Campos, Jr., J.

NATURE: Petition for certiorari to enjoin the execution of CSC resolutions.

FACTS

Position in issue: Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO), Region II, Cagayan

Contesting parties: Incumbent MAO Juana Banan and erstwhile-Fisheries Extension Specialist II Eliseo Sinon (who was under
the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources)

Jan. 30, 1987 The Ministry of Agriculture and Food was reorganized into the Department of Agriculture (DA).
o

Additionally, EO 116 was issued, calling for the evaluation of employees for the 29 MAO positions in Cagayan.

To protect the security of tenure of Civil Service members in government reorganization, RA 6656 was passed,
creating Placement Committees in the reorganized government agencies and departments.

In the ranking made by the DA Placement Committee (PC), Sinon came in 29th of 29. Banan was not included in the list. She
thus filed an appeal with the DA Reorganization Appeals Board (DARAB), wherein she asked for the re-evaluation of the 29
candidates in the PCs list.

Aug. 23, 1989 Upon re-evaluation, DARAB issued a new ranking. Banan came out 29th, ousting Sinon. The DARAB resolution
containing the new ranking was duly signed and approved by the DA Secretary.

Aug. 30, 1989 Despite his removal from the list, Sinon was appointed MAO on the basis of the original PC evaluation. His
appointment was approved by the DA Regional Director.

Nov. 22, 1989 Sinon appealed to the CSC. His appeal was granted for two main reasons:
o

The DARAB failed to file a timely Comment

The evaluation of employees qualifications is a question of fact which the appointing authority or his assisting PC is in
a better position to determine.

Mar. 19, 1990 Banan filed an MR, asserting that she is more qualified than Sinon; and that the DARAB ranking should prevail
over the PC ranking because the DARAB ranking was approved by the DA Secretary who is the agency head. CSC granted the
MR and gave due course to Banans appointment.

Mar. 21, 1991 Sinon filed an MR of the resolution giving due course to Banans appointment; denied. Hence the present
petition.

ISSUE (HELD): W/N the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing and reevaluating Sinons rating or qualification (NO)

RATIO
SINONS ARGUMENTS

He had obtained a permanent appointment on Aug. 30, 1989 with the approval of the DA Regional Director.

CSC exceeded its review power when it downgraded his score from 60.66% to 57.66% and changed Banans score from
57.32% to 59.32%. This amounts to an encroachment on the exclusive power of appointment.

CSC directed the appointing authority to appoint their own substitute when it gave due course to Banans appointment.

SINONS AUG. 30, 1989 APPOINTMENT DID NOT CONFER PERMANENT STATUS

It was subject to the condition that there is no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against
the appointment, nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment.

CAB: Banans pending request for re-evaluation meant that Sinons appointment has not been completed yet. It also cannot be
said that the appointment cured the subsequent adverse recommendation by the DARAB.

The creation of an appeal mechanism for appointments under EO 116, RA 6656 (which created the Placement Committees),
and OP Circular dated Oct. 2, 1987 implies that it is impossible to give the status of finality to any appointment until
all protests or oppositions are duly heard.

As correctly noted by the OSG, the DARAB findings were signed and approved by the DA Secretary, who, as the agency head, is
the appointing authority.

FUNCTION OF PLACEMENT COMMITTEES IS TO ASSIST THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY, I.E., DISCRETIONARY BUT SUBJECT TO REEVALUATION BY DARAB

RA 6656, which created the Placement Committees, was intended to protect the security of tenure of Civil Service officers and
employees in the implementation of government reorganization.

Under 6 of that law, Placement Committees were created in each department or agency, to assist the appointing authority in
the judicious selection and placement of personnel.

To assist vs. To recommend: Assisting denotes a contribution of effort towards a common ultimate purpose while
recommending denotes representation of approval; it implies the idea that another has the final decision.

Clearly, the Placement Committee was charged with the duty of exercising the same discretionary functions as the appointing
authority in the judicious selection and placement of personnel when the law empowered it to "assist" the appointing
authority.

RA 6656 also allows any officer or employee aggrieved by the appointments to appeal to the appointing authority and further
to the CSC (if not satisfied). Under Presidential Circular dated Oct. 2, 1987, the Reorganization Appeals Boards were created to
supplement the provisions of RA 6656.

There is no GAD in the fact that the DARAB is capable of re-evaluating and reversing the PC findings. The DARAB did not
disregard the PC findings. These were re-evaluated and the DARAB findings were submitted to and approved by the DA
Secretary. The CSC upheld the DARAB findings. Based on these circumstances, the rulings in Luego v. CSC and allied cases is
inapplicable.

CSC DID NOT ORDER APPOINTMENT OF BANAN; ACT WAS OF MERE AFFIRMATION

There was no statement in the assailed CSC resolution directing Banans appointment. It was simply an affirmation of Banans
appointment as recommended by DARAB and approved by the DA Secretary.

This is in compliance with 4 of RA 6656 which mandates that officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall
be given preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former
positions.

Also, the term incumbent officer and the privileges generally accorded to them would more aptly refer to Banan and not to
Sinon whose appointment was never confirmed completely. There is no dispute that the position of MAO in the old staffing
pattern is most comparable to the MAO in the new staffing pattern.

PURPOSE OF REORGANIZATION: Restructuring the bureaucracy's organizational and functional setup, to make it more viable in terms of
the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and make it more responsive to the needs of its public clientele, as authorized by law.

DISPOSITION: Denied

LUIS B. DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. DBP and CSC, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior Training and Career Development Officer on permanent status from 1979 to
December 1986. With the passage of E.O. No. 81 and Board Resolution No. 304-87, DBP undertook the evaluation and comparative
assessment of all its personnel under the CSC approved New Performance Appraisal System, a peer and control rating process which
served as an assessment tool of DBP's screening process.
Petitioner Domingo was issued a temporary appointment on January 2, 1987 for a period of one (1) year, which was renewed for
another period up to November 30, 1988. Thereafter, in a memorandum dated November 23, 1988 issued by the Final Review
Committee, petitioner got a performance rating of "below average," by reason of which his appointment was "made to lapse."
Consequently, petitioner filed with the CSC a verified complaint against DBP for illegal dismissal. He alleged that his dismissal
constituted a violation of the Civil Service Law against the issuance of temporary appointments to permanent employees, as well as of
his right to security of tenure and due process.
On November 27, 1989, CSC issued a resolution directing the reappointment of Mr. Domingo as Senior Training and Career Development
Officer or any such equivalent rank under the staffing pattern of DBP. The order for reappointment was premised on the findings of the
CSC that the action of the DBP to issue temporary appointments to all DBP personnel in order to allow for the maximum flexibility in
evaluating the performance of incumbents is not in accord with civil service law rules. Accordingly, to issue a temporary appointment to
one who has been on permanent status before will deprive the employee of benefits accorded to permanent employees and will
adversely affect his security of tenure."
DBP filed a motion for reconsideration on December 27, 1989 alleging that the issuance of temporary appointments to all the DBP
employees was purely an interim arrangement; that in spite of the temporary appointment, they continued to enjoy the salary,
allowances and other benefits corresponding to permanent employees; that there can be no impairment of herein petitioner's security
of tenure since the new DBP charter expressly provides that "qualified personnel of the bank may be appointed to appropriate positions
in the new staffing pattern and those not so appointed are deemed separated from the service;" that petitioner was evaluated and
comparatively assessed under a rating system approved by the respondent commission; and that petitioner cannot claim that he was
denied due process of law considering that, although several appeals were received by the Final Review Committee from other
employees similarly situated, herein petitioner never appealed his rating or the extension of his temporary appointment although he
was advised to do so by his direct supervisor.
On April 10, 1990, CSC rendered the questioned resolution setting aside its previous decision and affirming the separation of herein
petitioner. Hence this petition.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the reorganization implemented by DBP is valid as it violates petitioner's right to security of tenure; and (2)
Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of due process.
RULING: (1) Yes, the reorganization implemented by the DBP is valid. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if
it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.
No less than the Constitution itself in Section 16 of the Transitory Provisions, together with Sections 33 and 34 of Executive Order No. 81
and Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6656, support this conclusion with the declaration that all those not so appointed in the
implementation of said reorganization shall be deemed separated from the service with the concomitant recognition of their entitlement
to appropriate separation benefits and/or retirement plans of the reorganized government agency.
Thus, it can safely be concluded that indeed the reorganization was attended by good faith, ergo, valid. The dismissal of herein
petitioner is a removal for cause which, therefore, does not violate his security of tenure.
(2) Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 provides that "no officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid
cause and after due notice and hearing." There is no question that while dismissal due to a bona fide reorganization is recognized as a
valid cause, this does not justify a detraction from the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing. However, it is equally true and it is
a basic rule of due process that "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the
lack of opportunity to be heard." There is no violation of procedural due process even where no hearing was conducted for as long as
the party was given a chance to present his evidence and defend himself.
The records show that petitioner, although several appeals were received by the Final Review Committee from other employees
similarly situated, never appealed his rating or the extension of his temporary appointment although he was advised to do so by his
direct supervisor. Consequently, petitioner cannot, by his own inaction, legally claim that he was denied due process of law.
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, respondent.
G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, RR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.,
petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondent.
G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:
FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch
formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered
and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine
for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation;

The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;

The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and even
exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.

It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc
Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.
With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating
team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
CHREA vs.CHR
G.R. No. 155336
November 25, 2004
FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions
Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for
said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM
secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a
memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of
the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR,
requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution and reversedthe recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the
upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the
upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal
autonomy.
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission
without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?
HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National Capital
Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are disallowed.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other
Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall establish andadminister a unified Compensation and
Position Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the
coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to administer means to control
or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public
affairs, as to administer the government of the state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent
case of PRA v. Buag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees
without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position
classification system of the national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the compensation and benefits of its
employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by
virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of its personnel should
not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the
matter. Rather, the DBMs function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of
the law, specifically, that PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758. )
3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to
implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under
the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the preparation of a national
resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of
accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of
government operations, administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness
and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla
positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced
by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it
has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such
enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the CAs Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But
the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional
Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include
only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29
thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human
Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution,
Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional
Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing,
act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is
implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom
from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in
accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time. 22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and
Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman,
which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it
with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically
mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but
merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal
autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy
notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with
the DBM on its standpoint, thusBeing a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions
without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures
of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised
within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known
as the Compensation Standardization Law.
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 that the implementation
hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws. 26
NOTES:
1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there exists no official written record in the
Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its
president has the authority to sue the CHR.
On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file
employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level
positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test.
Indeed, the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the Commissions savings or that portion of its
budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file,
are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREAs request to
affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREAs personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA
when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled
jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,
as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of providing equal pay for substantially equal
work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions, the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and
upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies
upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized
unless provided by law or directed by the President. Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance
Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHRs proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to
Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this
would change the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The
interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily
controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

Banda v. Ermita
G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010
FACTS:
President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285by, inter alia, removing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office) over the printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing

services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier
be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378
also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their
security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the
executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter
still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for
the gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE:
Whether EO 378 is constitutional.
HELD
YES
J. Leonardo-de Castro
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with the Presidents constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Executive Order No. 292 or the
Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the
President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit: The President, subject to the policy in the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency
directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of
the President. To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the
departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionallycreated or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive
department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
J. Carpio:
RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all the procurement activities of the government including the acquisition of
items, supplies, materials, and general support services x x x which may be needed in the transaction of the public businesses or in
the pursuit of any government x x x activity save for limited transactions. By opening governments procurement of standard and
accountable forms to competitive bidding (except for documents crucial to the conduct of clean elections which has to be printed solely
by government), EO 378 merely implements RA 9184s principle of promoting competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to
enable private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding.
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc v Securities and Exchange Commission
14 SCRA 620 (1965)
FACTS:
The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. permission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for
trading on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange. Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc.
Contends that the Commission has no power to impose it and that anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust. The Commissions
order or resolution would make impossible, for all practical purposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, such that its
permission amounted to prohibition.
Issue:
Does the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question?
Held:
None.
1.Test for determining the existence of authority.
The commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule against double listing. It suggests that the power is necessary
for the execution of the functions vested in it. It argues that said rule was approved by the Department Head before the war and it is
not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. The approval of the Department, by itself, adds no weight in judicial litigation.
The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission from imposing a prohibition but whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit.
2.Commission without power to impose prohibition.
The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule which results in discrimination and violation of constitutional
rights. It is fundamental thatan administrative officer has such powers as are expressly granted to him by statute, and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the license of Makati Stock Exchange is approved without such condition against double
listing.
Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. v. Dominguez
G.R. No. 85439 January 13, 1992
Davide, Jr., J.
Facts:
Petitioners questopn the validity of the order of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over
by the Department of Agriculture of the management of the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Departments regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D.
No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a Management Committee which shall assume the
management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3) the disbandment of the Board of Directors, and (4) the turn over of all assets,
properties and records of the KBMBPM the Management Committee.
The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM
requesting the Department for assistance in the removal of the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general
membership of the cooperative and that the ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors shows
that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175, LOI 23, the Circulars issued by
DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also professed therein that the Order was issued by the Department in the
exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113.

Issue:
Whether or not the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is illegal
Held:
Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the procedure for the removal of directors or
officers of cooperatives, thus:
An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by a vote of majority of the members entitled to vote at an annual
or special general assembly. The person involved shall have an opportunity to be heard.
A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPMs by-laws, reads:
Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. Any elected director or committee member may be removed from office for
cause by a majority vote of the members in good standing present at the annual or special general assembly called for the purpose
after having been given the opportunity to be heard at the assembly.
Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual general assembly and a special general assembly.
Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that
the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision,
petitioners cannot be deprived of that right.
The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members of
the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D.
No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to:
(1) generally oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but
without interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take
such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other
forms of mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them.
The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the bylaws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have
known better than to disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM and an ongoing audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have, expressly or impliedly. We cannot
concede to the proposition of the Office of the Solicitor General that the Secretarys power under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No.
175 above quoted to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative includes the milder authority of suspending
officers and calling for the election of new officers. Firstly, neither suspension nor cancellation includes the take-over and ouster of
incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have expressly so stated. Secondly, even granting that the law intended
such as postulated, there is the requirement of a hearing. None was conducted.
JAWORSKI vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 144463 - January 14, 2004
FACTS:
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under PD No.
1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors approved an instrument denominated as Grant of Authority and Agreement for the
Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the
authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local
and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensure
the integrity and fairness of the games. On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia LI. Reyes, and SAGE,
represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document.
Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commended its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run
basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner Senator Robert Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games,
Amusement and Sports, filed the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He
maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to
operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, to operate
gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at
the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to realspace. Further, he argues that the internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation of PAGCORs
franchise, under Section 14 of PD No. 1869 which provides: Place. The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or
games of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x.
Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of the authorized gambling activities
enumerated under Section 10 of PD No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain
gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Republic of the Philippines. He contends that internet gambling could not have been included within the commonly accepted definition
of gambling casinos, clubs or other recreation or amusement places as these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space
where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to another entity such as SAGE.
RULING:
No.
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be
exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by

public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is Congress
that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it
may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the
grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same
charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot
delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to
show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that since ADC has no franchise from
Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the
City of Manila. By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not ride on PAGCORs franchise if it were
to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.
Cooperative Development Authority vs Dolefil Agrarian Beneficiaries Coop Inc., 385 SCRA 552
FACTS:
Sometime in the later part of 1997, the CDA received from certain members of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative,
Inc. (DARBCI for brevity), an agrarian reform cooperative that owns 8,860 hectares of land in Polomolok, South Cotabato, several
complaints alleging mismanagement and/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the then incumbent officers and members of the
board of directors of the cooperative, some of whom are herein private respondents.
The complaints led the CDA to act according to its function and issued a freeze order on the DARBCI funds and creating management
committee to manage the affairs of the said cooperative.
ISSUE:
At the core of the instant petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, 13th Division, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 47933
promulgated on September 9, 1998 and its Resolution2 dated February 9, 1999 is the issue of whether or not petitioner Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA for brevity) is vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The orders, resolutions, memoranda and any other acts
rendered by petitioner Cooperative Development Authority in CDA-CO Case No. 97-011 are hereby declared null and void ab initio for
lack of quasi-judicial authority of petitioner to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes; and the petitioner is hereby ordered to cease and
desist from taking any further proceedings therein; and
2. In the interest of justice, the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated February 9, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No.
47933, insofar as it nullified the elections of the members of the Board of Directors and Officers of DARBCI held during the general
assembly of the DARBCI members on July 12, 1998, is hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Pelaez vs. Auditor General

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the seat of government within
any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing
funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the
RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio,
how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the President.
Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that
through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which would mean that the President may
exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper
delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately
precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character not
administrative (not executive).
ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE
January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public
respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of
judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray
despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the
simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals
In 1980, ECO Management Corporation (ECO) obtained loans amounting to about P26 million from Land Bank. ECO defaulted in its
payment but in 1981, ECO submitted a Payment Plan with the hope of restructuring its loan. The plan was rejected and Land Bank sued
ECO. It impleaded Emmanuel C. Oate, the majority stockholder of ECO who is serving as the Chairman and treasurer of ECO.
The trial court ruled in favor of Land Bank but Oate was absolved from liabilities. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
Land Bank appealed as it wanted Oate to be personally liable on the following grounds (among others): a) ECO stands for Emmanuel
C. Oate, b) Oate is the majority stockholder, c) ECO was formed ostensibly to allow Oate to acquire loans from Land Bank which he
used for his personal advantage, d) Oate holds two positions in the corporation, and e) ECO never held any board meeting which just
shows only Oate was in control of the corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Oate should be held personally.
HELD: No. Land Bank was not able to produce sufficient evidence to prove its claim. A corporation, upon coming into existence, is
invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those persons composing it as well as from any other legal entity to which
it may be related. The corporate fiction is only disregarded when the fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, defend crime, confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues, perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law. This is likewise
true where the corporate entity is being used as an alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of
another corporate entity. None of the foregoing was proved by Land Bank.
The mere fact that Oate owned the majority of the shares of ECO is not a ground to conclude that Oate and ECO is one and the same.
Mere ownership by a single stockholder of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not by itself sufficient reason for
disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.
Anent the issue of the corporate name, the fact that Oates initials coincide with the corporate name ECO is not sufficient to disregard
the corporate fiction. Even if ECO does stand for Emmanuel C. Oate, it does not mean that the said corporation is merely a dummy
of Oate. A corporation may assume any name provided it is lawful. There is nothing illegal in a corporation acquiring the name or as in
this case, the initials of one of its shareholders.
CIR v. CA, ROH Auto
(BIR Rules and Regulations)
Facts:
EO41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's taxes
and taxes on business, for the taxable years1981 to 1985. Availing itself of the amnesty, R.O.H. Auto Products filed, tax amnesty returns
and paid the amnesty taxes due. Prior to this availment, CIR assessed the ROH deficiency income and business taxes in an aggregate
amount of P1,410,157.71.ROH wrote back to state that since it had been able to avail itself of the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax notice
should forthwith be cancelled and withdrawn. The request was denied by the Commissioner on the ground that Revenue Memorandum
Order No. 4-87, dated 09February 1987, implementing Executive Order No. 41, had construed the amnesty coverage to include only
assessments issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue after the promulgation of the executive order on 22 August 1986 and not to
assessments theretofore made.
ISSUE:
Is ROH covered by the tax amnesty?
YES.
Was the CIRs position correct?
NO.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. The added exception urged by petitioner Commissioner based on Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, further restricting the scope
of the amnesty clearly amounts to an act of administrative legislation quite contrary to the mandate of the law which the regulation
ought to implement.
2. The authority of the Secretary of Finance, in conjunction with the CIR, to promulgate rules and regulations for the enforcement of
internal revenue laws cannot be controverted. Neither can it be disputed that such rules and regulations, as well as administrative
opinions and rulings, ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts. Much more fundamental than either of the above,
however, is that all such issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and
implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.
3. If, as the Commissioner argues, EO 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed prior to 22 August
1986, the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the
executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted
by it
Holding: CA affirmed.
Commissioner v. CA
(G.R. # 119761; 08-29-1996)
Facts:
1. RA 7654 was enacted by Congress on June 10, 1993 and took effect July 3, 1993.It amended partly Sec. 142 (c) of the NIRC

2. Fortune Tobacco manufactured the following cigarette brands: Hope, More and Champion. Prior to RA 7654, these 3 brands were
considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax of 20 to 45%. Applying the amendment and nothing else, (see footnote below)
the 3 brands should fall under Sec 142 (c) (2)NIRC and be taxed at 20 to 45%.
3. However, on July 1, 1993, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Revenue Memorandum Circular37-93whichreclassified
the 3 brands as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. There classification was
before RA 7654 took effect.
4. In effect, the memo circular subjected the 3 brands to the provisions of Sec 142 (c) (1) NIRC imposing upon these brands a rate of
55% instead of just 20 to 45% under Sec 142 (c) (2)NIRC.
5. There was no notice and hearing. CIR argued that the memo circular was merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR which did not
require notice and hearing.
Issue:
WON RMC 37-93 was valid and enforceable No; lack of notice and hearing violated due process required for promulgated rules.
Moreover, it infringed on uniformity of taxation / equal protection since other local cigarettes bearing foreign brands had not been
included within the scope of the memo circular.
Ratio:
1.

2.
3.

Contrary to petitioners contention, the memo was not a mere interpretative rule but a legislative rule in the nature of subordinate
legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. Promulgated legislative rules must be
published.
On the other hand, interpretative rules only provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
BIR, in reclassifying the 3 brands and raising their applicable tax rate, did not simply interpret RA 7654 but legislated under its
quasi-legislative authority.

BELLOSILLO separate opinion: the administrative issuance was notquasi-legislative but quasi-judicial. Due process should still
beobserved of course but use Ang Tibay v. CIR
Public Schools District Supervisors Association v.s. De Jesus
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act 2001, became a law on August 11, 2001, in
accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to
promulgate the implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days after the approval of the Act, provided that the principle of
shared governance shall be fully implemented within two (2) years after such approval.
On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public school district supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of its
officers and members, filed the instant petition for prohibition and mandamus, alleging that:
I. THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN REMOVING PETITIONERS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER ELEMENTARY
SCHOOLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS (SCHOOL HEADS) WITHIN HIS/HER DISTRICT AND CONVERTING HIS/HER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TO
THAT OF PERFORMING STAFF FUNCTION FOR THE DIVISION OFFICE PER SECTION 5.1 RULE V OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003) IS A GROSS VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 THE
GOVERNANCE OF BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.
II. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 AS PROMULGATED UNDER DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF
2003 EXPANDED THE LAW AND INCLUDED PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE
SUBJECT LAW.
III. THE DOWNGRADING OF SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OR THE NEGLECT OR REFUSAL OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT TO UPGRADE THE SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF
PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT TO A RESPECTABLE LEVEL OF SALARY GRADE HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE PRINCIPALS DESPITE CLEAR
INTENTION OF R.A. 9155 TO RETAIN THE POSITION OF PSDS IN THE HIERARCHY OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGERS AND OFFICERS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.
Issues:
1) Whether or not District Supervisor shall not exercise administrative supervision over the Elementary School Principals (ESPs) and
Secondary School Principals (SSPs).
2) Whether or not Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI, Section 6.2,
paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of 2003 are constitutional.
Rulings:
1) A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors have no administrative supervision over the school heads;
their responsibility is limited to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit:
(1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning
centers in the district or cluster thereof;
(2) Curricula supervision; and
(3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This
rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine
its terms to those expressly mentioned.
2) The court reviewed the IRR and found that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The provisions merely
reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and
responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both
teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads. A school head is a person responsible for the administrative and
instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation
of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning centers.
TAADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was

necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval,
or in any other date, without its previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve
if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement
for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION vs THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR ANDEMPLOYMENT
FACTS :Philsa is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985,
private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the
amount ofP5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric
P. Leyson. After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They
then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were
allegedly made to sign a second contract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of
some of their benefits and privileges. They were again allegedly forced by their foreign employer to sign a third contract which
increased their work hours from 48hours to60hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they
refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to the
Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees
and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the
POEA against petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan. On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the
employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated August 31, 1988 ordering respondent PHILSA to
pay complainants, jointly and severally with its principal Al-Hejailan.
In a decision dated July 26, 1989 , the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of
salary deductions and differentials. The awards to private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that these were not raised
in the complaint filed by private respondents. Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989decision of the NLRC to the Supreme
Court in a petition for review for certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No. 89089.However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989,
the petition was dismissed outright for "insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular
No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questioned resolution dated August 23, 1989." Almost simultaneous with
the promulgation of the August 31, 1988decision of the POEA on private respondents' money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order
dated August 29, 1988resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents' complaint. In this Order, the POEA found
petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction. Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of
the POEA thru the LRO suspending or canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to the Ministry
(now Department) of Labor and Employment. Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed the
August 31, 1988Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, in an Order dated September 13, 1991, public respondent
Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed into to the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was
likewise denied in an Order dated November25, 1991.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which
enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.2. Whether or not the public
respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion inholding petitioner liable for illegal
deductions/withholding of salaries for the Supreme Court itself has already absolved petitioner from this charge.
HELD
1. No. The administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No.
2, Series of 1983has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be
enforced. The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority
holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in T aadavs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs.
Torres, the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong
agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the
said circulars may not be enforced or implemented. Our pronouncement inT aadavs. T uvera is clear and categorical. Administrative
rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only
exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Administrative Circular No. 2,Series of 1983has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.

2. Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents
arising from employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that
petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims of private respondents,
may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of
private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is without
prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate Order."
The fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does
not mean that it is likewise absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or
withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively
liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of salary.

CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS

FACTS: : IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 04-92), LIMITING THE TERM OF APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS
TO ONE YEAR SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION
ON AUGUST 12, 1992, RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS ASSOCIATION AND THE MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT.
ALBERTO C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92
ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO.
04-92ON
MARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C. CORONA, DISMISSED THE
APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER
RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK DISREGARD OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF
THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS A DEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE
WITHOUT PROPER OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS
OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN ADMINISTRATIVE
BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING
THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS READILY APPARENT
THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ENJOY THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY
RETIREMENT
Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Sec. of Education, Culture and Sports, G.R. No. 78385
August 31, 1987
Facts: The DECS, as recommended by the Task Force on Private Higher Education and through respondent Secretary issued Dep Order
No. 37, a modification of a previous Department Order, authorizing the 10% to 15% increase in school fees. Petitioner opposed and
alleged in a petition that said order was issued without any legal basis arguing that authority of DECS to regulate school fees does not
always include the power to increase the same.
Sec. 57 (3) of BP Blg. 232 (The Education Act of 1982), vests the DECS with the power to regulate the educational system; and Sec. 70
of the same act grants the DECS the power to issue rules which are likewise necessary to discharge its functions and duties under the
law.
The respondent Secretary maintains that the increase in tuition and other school fees is urgent and necessary.
Issue: WON the fixing of school fees through department order by DECS is a valid delegation of legislative power.
Held: Yes. Power granted to the educational department to regulate the educational system includes the power to prescribe school fees.
In the absence of a statue stating otherwise, this power include the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has
been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS.

NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY vs. MASADA SECURITY AGENCY, INC.

FACTS:
Respondent MASADA Security Agency, Inc., entered into a contract[3]to provide security services to the various
offices, warehouses and installations of NFA within the scope of the NFA Region I
The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board issued several wage orders mandating increases in the daily
wage rate.
Respondent requested NFA for a corresponding upward adjustment in the monthly contract rate consisting of the
increases in the daily minimum wage of the security guards as well as the corresponding raise in their overtime pay,
holiday pay, 13th month pay, holiday and rest day pay. It also claimed increases in Social Security System (SSS) and Pagibig premiums as well as in the administrative costs and margin. NFA, however, granted the request only with respect to
the increase in the daily wage by multiplying the amount of the mandated increase by 30 days and denied the same
with respect to the adjustments in the other benefits and remunerations computed on the basis of the daily wage.
The trial court rendered a decision [13] in favor of respondent holding that NFA is liable to pay the security guards
wage related benefits pursuant to RA 6727, because the basis of the computation of said benefits, like overtime pay,
holiday pay, SSS and Pag-ibig premium, is the increased minimum wage. It also found NFA liable for the consequential
adjustments in administrative costs and margin.
NFA claims that its additional liability under the aforecited provision is limited only to the payment of the increment
in the statutory minimum wage rate, i.e., the rate for a regular eight (8) hour work day.
ISSUE: WON the satisfaction of NFAs Obligation is limited to the payment of the increased statutory minimum wage
rates. YES!
RULING:
Based on the foregoing interpretation of Section 6 of RA 6727, the parties may enter into stipulations increasing the
liability of the principal. So long as the minimum obligation of the principal, i.e., payment of the increased statutory
minimum wage is complied with, the Wage Rationalization Act is not violated.
In the instant case, Article IV.4 of the service contract provides:

IV.4. In the event of a legislated increase in the minimum wage of security guards and/or in the PADPAO rate, the
AGENCY may negotiate for an adjustment in the contract price. Any adjustment shall be applicable only to the
increment, based on published and circulated rates and not on mere certification.
Par 3 of NFA Memorandum AO-98-03- states:
3. For purposes of wage adjustments, consider only the rate based on the wage Order issued by the Regional
Tripartite Wage Productivity Board (RTWPB). Unless otherwise provided in the Wage Order issued by the
RTWPB, the wage adjustment shall be limited to the increment in the legislated minimum wage; [32]
The parties therefore acknowledged the application to their contract of the wage orders issued by the RTWPB
pursuant to RA 6727. There being no assumption by NFA of a greater liability than that mandated by Section 6 of the
Act, its obligation is limited to the payment of the increased statutory minimum wage rates which, as admitted by
respondent, had already been satisfied by NFA.
Under Article 1231 of the Civil Code, one of the modes of extinguishing an obligation is by payment. Having
discharged its obligation to respondent, NFA no longer have a duty that will give rise to a correlative legal right of
respondent. The latters complaint for collection of remuneration and benefits other than the increased minimum wage
rate, should therefore be dismissed for lack of cause of action.