J Consum Policy (2011) 34:277287

DOI 10.1007/s10603-011-9160-y
ORIGINAL PAPER

Behavioural Economics: Next Steps

Amitai Etzioni

Received: 9 September 2010 / Accepted: 19 April 2011 /

Published online: 4 May 2011
# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2011

Abstract This essay briefly reviews select key accomplishments of a young field,
behavioural economics, and then turns to suggest additional steps that are called for by
the nature of the subject (economic behaviour) and the approach to its study embodied in
this relatively new field (for a previous such survey, please see Fudenberg (Journal of
Economic Literature, 44:694711, 2006)).
Keywords Behavioural economics

Achievements of Behavioural Economics

A Robust Field
Replication is considered an essential requirement of a robust science. However, in social
science research, this criterion is not often met. Hence, it is a notable achievement of
behavioural economics that its key findings have been successfully replicated.
For instance, in their pioneering 1974 experiment, Tversky and Kahneman found that
responses to an obscure question (they asked subjects what percentage of African nations
were members of the United Nations) were systematically influenced by something that one
would not expect people to be affected by if they were thinking rationally, namely a random
number that had been generated in front of them. When a big number was generated, the
subjects responses were larger on average than when a small number was generated
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). This finding indicates that the perception of an initial
value, even one unrelated to the matter at hand, affects the final judgments of the
participants, a seemingly irrational connection.
The effect demonstrated by this experiment, which the two scholars labeled anchoring
and adjustment, has been replicated using a wide variety of stimuli and subjects. Jacowitz
and Kahneman (1995) found that subjects estimates of a citys population could be
A. Etzioni (*)
Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, The George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: etzioni@gwu.edu

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systematically influenced by an anchoring question: estimates were higher when subjects

were asked to consider whether the city in question had at least five million people, and
they were lower when they were instead asked whether the city had at least 200,000. Russo
and Shoemaker (1989) further demonstrated this effect, finding that when asked to estimate
the date Attila the Hun was defeated in Europe, subjects answers were influenced by an
initial anchor constructed from their phone numbers. Prelec, Ariely, and Loewenstein found
that when subjects wrote down the last two digits of their Social Security numbers next to a
list of items up for auction, those with the highest numbers were willing to bid three times
as much on average than those with the lowest (Ariely 2008).
Behavioural economists have shown that anchoring is not restricted to trivial choices.
Plous (1989) found that subjects estimates of the likelihood of nuclear war were much
lower when they had been first asked if the likelihood was greater or less than 1% than
when they had first been asked if it were greater or less than 99%.
Another effect, which behavioural economists refer to as endowmentthat people
place a higher value on goods they own than on identical ones that they do nothas also
been repeatedly replicated. Kahneman et al. (1991) found that when half the students in a
room were given mugs, and then those with mugs were invited to sell them and those
without were invited to buy them, those with mugs demanded roughly twice as much to
part with their mugs as others were willing to pay for them. Similarly, Franciosi et al.
(1996) found that when subjects could trade mugs for cash and vice versa, those endowed
with mugs were less willing to trade than would be predicted by standard economic theory.
Loewenstein and Kahneman (1991) gave half the students in a room pens and the other
half a token redeemable for an unspecified item. They then asked all the students to rank
the attractiveness of six items, including pens. Last, they gave all the students a choice
between a pen and two chocolate bars. The pen was preferred by 56% of those endowed
with it, and only by 24% of the others. This preference was revealed despite the fact that
when the attractiveness ratings were initially made, the subjects endowed with pens did not
rate them as more attractive than the students not endowed with pens.
In another experiment, Ariely and Carmon phoned students who had participated in a
raffle to win basketball tickets at Duke University. They asked those who had not won a
ticket for the highest amount they would pay to buy one, and asked the students who had
won a ticket for the lowest amount of money for which they would be willing to sell the
ticket. They found that the students who had tickets valued them 14 times higher than those
who did not. This finding shows the power of the endowment effect, given that all the
students involved had camped outside the basketball stadium for multiple nights in order to
participate in the raffle (Ariely 2008).
Given that many other social science findings have not been replicated (either because
no one has tried them or they did not pan out), behavioural economics deserves high marks
in this regard.
Lab and Field
Many behavioural economics studies are conducted as experiments under lab conditions.
This method is preferred by scientists because it allows extraneous variables to be
controlled. However, extensive reliance on lab studies has led some critics to suggest that
behavioural economics key findings may apply onlyor at least much more strongly
under the artificial conditions of the lab, and not in the field (i.e., in real life). For instance,
Steven Levitt and John List (2008, p. 909) wrote there are many reasons to suspect that
[behavioral economics] laboratory findings might fail to generalize to real markets

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ranging from the properties of the situationsuch as the nature and extent of scrutinyto
individual expectations and the type of actor involved.
Recent work in behavioural economics, however, has shown that its findings do hold
outside of the lab. For instance, a study by Madrian and Shea (2001) illustrates how the
status quo biasthat individuals have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo,
because the disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advantages (Kahneman et al.
1991, pp. 19798)and loss aversion shape employee decisions on whether or not to
participate in 401(k) retirement savings programmes. Because of these two biases, many
millions of individuals do not contribute to these saving programmes, even though these
contributions are clearly in their self-interest. In another behavioural economics experiment
conducted in the field, Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) found that neoclassical theory
expectations regarding incentives and punishments did not accurately predict the behaviour
of parents at a day care centre. Furthermore, a number of recent contributions to
behavioural economics rely on field data, including the work of Loewenstein (2004) on
behaviour and volition.
Transparent Methodology
Behavioural economics has achieved its robust findings without resorting to techniques that
entail manipulating the data (in the sense of rearranging them) in ways that often are not
fully transparent. Indeed, behavioural economics ways of supporting its propositions can
be readily examined and vetted, in contrast to some other disciplines that make extensive
use of regression analysis, dummy variables, weighting, and other means of manipulating
datameasures which are often not spelled out in their publications, and which tend to
make it difficult to determine the extent to which the findings might be an artifact of the
ways the data were analysed and presented.1
No Tautologies
The behavioural economics works reviewed for this article avoided the troublesome phrase
must be, as well as other tautological argumentations. Neoclassical economists sometimes
use this phraseor its equivalentsto infer an explanation for a certain behaviour from the
assumptions of their model rather than from the data. Thus, those who commit crimes
must be maximizing their utility when they choose to become criminals. As Paul Rubin
(1980, p. 13) put it, the decision to become a criminal is in principle no different from the
decision to become a bricklayer, carpenter, or, indeed, an economist. The individual
considers the net costs and benefits of each alternative and makes his decision on that
basis. Statements like this, or like Murrays (1984, p. 168) that crime occurs when the
prospective benefits sufficiently outweigh the prospective costs, are not based on
evidence; they are held to be true because to assume otherwise would conflict with the
model. Behavioural economics avoids this kind of tautological reasoning.
For instance, the National Research Council reports that large criminal justice literature dominated by
regression analysis was reviewed and found wanting. According to Richard Berk, there are a great many
regression analysis that reflect only the dimmest understandings about what can be learned from the data
alone. Anything goes as long as SPSS or SAS can be made to run (Berk 2003, pp. 12). Statistician David
Freedman (1995) adds that regression models are widely used by social scientists to make causal inferences;
such models are now almost a routine way of demonstrating counterfactuals. However, the demonstrations
generally turn out to be dependent on a series of untested, even unarticulated, technical assumptions. Under
the circumstances, reliance on model outputs may be quite unjustified.

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These accomplishmentsreplication, transparency, and refraining from tautological

reasoningare all notable achievements. The essay from here on focuses on where
behavioural economics might be further expanded, building on its key premises.

Next Steps
Universalistic, Particularistic, or Oscillating Limitations?
The key thesis of behavioural economicsthat systematic biases are built into peoples
choices which prevent utility maximization (from here on, optimizing choices)is subject
to different interpretations. One can hold that these systematic limitations are found in all
people, are congenital or even wired in (a universalistic interpretation), or that they are
found only among some people (a particularistic interpretation), or that one and the same
person can sometimes optimize and at other times cannot (an oscillating interpretation).
Behavioural economics would benefit if this important issue would be clarified.
Differences about the extent to which people fail to optimize are found not only among
various students of behavioural economics, but even in the work of one and the same
scholar, sometimes even in the same report. For instance, Mullainathan and Thaler (2001)
define behavioural economics as what happens in markets in which some of the agents
display human limitations and complications, seeming to hold a particularistic interpretation. However, in the same article, they seem to favour the universal interpretation when
they write: Since we have only so much brainpower, and only so much time, we cannot be
expected to solve difficult problems optimally, and Bounded rationality reflects the
limited cognitive abilities that constrain human problem solving. Finally, they suggest an
oscillating interpretation as well, stating, Bounded willpower captures the fact that people
sometimes make choices that are not in their long-run interest.
The universal interpretation (that the biases are congenital, expected to prevent all
human beings from optimizing in all but trivial choices such as playing tic-tac-toe)2 is
difficult to square with behavioural economics findings. In many of the studies conducted
revealing systematic biases, a significant proportion of the subjects made the correct, i.e.,
rational, choice.
For instance, Frederick asked students at two elite American universities the following
question: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost? Like other behavioural economists, Frederick highlights the
finding that many of the students gave the wrong answer. Half (47/93) of a group of
Princeton students, and 56% (164/293) of University of Michigan students answered
incorrectly (Kahneman 2003, p. 1450). Note, though, that about half of the students
provided the correct answer. 3 The study of Kridel et al. (1993) of telephone customers
shows that 65% of them would have saved money had they chosen to pay for service by the
call rather than pay a flat rate. However, 35% did choose their service plan correctly. In
another study, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) provided respondents with a description of a
2

According to W. Brian Arthur (1994, p. 406), deductive rationality could apply to a game as simple as tictac-toe, but rational solutions are not found at the depth of checkers, and certainly not at the still modest
depth of chess and go.
3
One may say that this is not an economic choice question in the first place; indeed, it is one of those tricky
questions provided in game shows or high school math games. It reveals though, as Kahneman (2003, p.
1450) pointed out, how lightly the output of associative thinking is monitored: people areoften content to
trust a plausible judgment that quickly comes to mind.

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woman and then asked them to rank the probability of eight possible outcomes regarding
her employment and activities. Eighty-nine percent (89%) of the respondents ranked the
probabilities in an order that violated probability theory. However, 11% of the respondents
did not make this error. In Madrian and Sheas study of enrollment in 401(k) plans, 35% of
the participants did not enroll, even though enrolling was clearly in their self-interest. Yet,
about 65% did enroll.
These data are used to show that people do not make rational choices and that they have
congenital cognitive limitations. However, if giving the wrong answer is evidence of nonrationality, then giving the right answer is an indication of rational choice behaviour. That
is, the same data that show that numerous people choose poorly also show that the universal
interpretation of behavioural economics central thesis is not tenable. For the same reasons,
the oscillating interpretation seems not to hold, as many people are unable to make optimal
choices in all but trivial situations. This suggests that the particularistic interpretation
should be embraced, but this would be true only if individuals who do make an optimizing
choice in a given situation also make it an all other situations. Perhaps one should draw on
still another interpretation, which is next laid out: namely that, while no one chooses
optimally, some people are less rational than others, and the level of rationality can be
enhanced at least to some extent.
Rationality as a Variable
As previously mentioned, a study of 401(k)s shows that 65% of those who could enroll did
so, while 35% did not. As long as the choices are framed so that there are only two options,
the data suffice to show that a large number of people act irrationally (by definition). But
even in the case at hand, most of those who made the correct choice by enrolling in a 401
(k) still did not make the optimal choice. Only a few of the 65% made the choice of
enrolling on the first day they were eligiblethe optimal choice. After 3 months, still less
than 20% had made the rational choice; it took 36 monthsthe loss of years of benefits
for the number to reach 65% (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
These findings allow one to highlight that it would be very fruitful, in the scholarly
sense of the term, to treat rationality not as a dichotomous variable (one either optimizes
or one does not) but as a continuous variable. A dichotomous variable fully suffices if
the central finding of behavioural economics is that the optimization model is not
compatible with the evidence regarding choice behaviour. However, if one is to develop
an alternative model to the neoclassical one, degrees become significant for at least two
major reasons.
First, the concept of degrees of rationality allow one to express the proposition that
peoples decisions are not merely a bit short of optimalsay 92% rational (i.e., they almost
make the optimal choices)but that many are instead much closer to the opposite end of
the continuum, say maybe 12% rational (in the sense that the choices they make are rather
poor when compared to optimal choices).4
Second, this concept calls attention to the value of studying the factors that increase
peoples level of rationalitysuch as education, specialized training, relevant values, and
self-control.5

For a study that explores the degrees of rationality, see Costa-Gomes et al. (2001).
Note that I am not suggesting that one can turn people into optimizers or even high-level rational choosers,
only less irrational choosers.

4
5

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Public Policy Implications

The concept of degrees of rationality has implications for public policy. For instance, if
education, especially training in decision-making, increases the rationality of ones
choicesthis would lead to rather different polices than if future behavioural
economics studies revealed that such training is not very productive, as some studies
already suggest. For example, Eddy (1982) demonstrated that though highly trained,
most physicians (95 out of 100) in his sample were unable to combine two probabilities to
determine the accuracy of a mammography. Other researchers report similar results
(Casscells et al. 1978). Furthermore, Fischhoff (1982) reports that the education experts
receive in their specialty (medical school courses for doctors, courses in finance or
accounting for financial analysts, etc.) does not cause their overconfidence with regard to
the probable accuracy of their decisions and assessments to disappear.
These findings support public policies that build on the liberal choice architecture
suggested by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), which entails making organizational arrangements that help people make better choiceswithout requiring them to process information
or learn to control their loss aversion or other emotions. For instance, allowing them to opt
out of 401(k) programmes rather than requiring them to choose to opt in is one example.
In short, treating rational choices as a continuous variable is productive not only as a
social science concept but also for improving public policies.
Affective/Normative and Macro Variables
An especially promising expansion would be for behavioural economics to greatly extend
its study of the effects of emotions, norms, and values on choice and of the macro social
and cultural variables that significantly influence normative/affective choices. So far,
behavioural economics has focused a great deal on cognitive limitations, although some
attention has been paid to emotions (e.g., loss aversion) (Kahneman et al. 1991; Thaler and
Sunstein 2008), as well as some to normative factors (e.g., social norms) (Ariely 2008).
Granted, if all that one focuses on is peoples inability to optimize, one may be able to
ignore whether the causes are cognitive, affective, or normative ones. However, to
understand the ways these factors work and the ways these factors may be modified, these
variables must be studied separately.
In reference to emotions, Daniel Kahneman (2003, p. 1457) put it especially well when
he noted that, Utility cannot be divorced from emotion A theory of choice that
completely ignores feelings such as the pain of losses and the regret of mistakes is not only
descriptively unrealistic, it also leads to prescriptions that do not maximize the utility of
outcomes as they are actually experienced.
Behavioural economists may wish to pay more mind to a point already made by
Aristotle: people are social animals. People are bound to one another in ways they are
not aware of but that deeply influence one anothers thinking, judgments, and actions.
In most behavioural economics studies to date, individuals are treated as atomized and
are taken out of their social context with no other one provided. And most studies deal
with intra-individual processes and not with interpersonal relations among subjects (for
studies of the social elements of decision-making processes, see Camerer 2003; Cox et
al. 2007; and Sobel 2006).
For instance, the question whether group deliberations make choices more or less
rational remains largely to be broached (Etzioni 1988) (when I raised this issue with a
behavioural economist, he pointed out that behavioural economics is defined as the study of

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the psychology of economic choices. However, the term behaviour implies a broader
definition of the subject. More importantly, an individuals attitudes are not free of social
and cultural influences. Some economists have, in recent years, begun to explore the
rationality of group versus individual decision-making; see, for instance, Sutter 2007).
A brief illustration of the role of social norms in choice behaviour, using behavioural
economics own data, follows: Heyman and Ariely asked students to drag circles across a
computer screen into a box, and then used the number of circles dragged in during a given
time period as a measure of their output. Participants were paid $0.50, $5, or nothing at all,
and dragged an average of 101 circles, 159 circles, and 168 circles, respectively (Ariely
2008). That is, the group that received no pay worked the hardest.
One may at first conclude that social normswhich Heyman and Ariely see as the
motivators in the third experimental conditionadded little to productivity, as only nine
more circles were moved in comparison to the number moved by participants who received
$5. Actually, the social norms affected the move of all the 168 circles in the third condition,
as the subjects were not paid at all. Furthermore, Heyman and Ariely paid their labourers as
they walked in, before they worked, so they had no reason to fear any loss if they did little
work. Hence, clearly, norms motivated them to work, even under what Heyman and Ariely
considered market conditions and not normative ones, possibly because the subjects
believed that a fair days work is owed for a fair days pay, especially when $5 were allotted
rather than $0.50. Finally, social norms function least when the work is routine, repetitive,
and boring and has no social meaning (Etzioni 1975)like dragging circles. Therefore,
there is good reason to suggest that norms are even more powerful under regular work
conditions than this study indicates.
Other studies of the role of norms in affecting cognition and choice behaviour along
behavioural economics lines include Leffords (1946), in which he demonstrated that
normative loading inhibits logical reasoning; Berg et al. (1995) study of trust games,
which found that trust exists even in anonymous, one time economic transactions, and
Gerber et al. (2008) study that shows that mailers with normative and social appeals
affect voter turnout. There are many thousands of such studies conducted by other social
scientists. Behavioural economics would benefit if the implications of these studies for
choice making would be explored and taken into account in future behavioural
economics studies.
Furthermore, the study of behavioural economics could be much expanded by
conducting more cross-cultural studies, to determine the role culture plays in influencing
choice behaviour. In one such study, Levinson and Peng (2006) found that Americans and
Chinese make different economic assumptions when estimating the financial value of
objects over time and that contextual variables, such as whether the objects were presented
as items the actors had lost or gained, had different effects based on the subjects culture.
Additionally, Oyserman and Lees analysis of cross-national literature on the effects of
individualism and collectivism found that studies strongly imply an effect of culture on
cognition but cannot address the question of which aspects of culture matter (Oyserman
and Lee 2008, p. 329), suggesting a major area in which these studies can next be
developed (for a sample of the growing research in this field, see Camerer 2003).
Another way to expand behavioural economics in this direction is to combine group
experiments with personal ones. For instance, we know from earlier studies that the
judgments of individuals, regarding, say, the relative size of objects, are influenced by what
the members of their groups say they are (Asch 1955; Neto 1995; Nicholson et al. 1985).
And behavioural economics has found that individuals assess sizes differently according to
the anchors they personally use; however, these results are typically depicted as

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individual attributes (e.g., an individual compares the cost of a theater ticket to the size of
his bank account, phone number, or social security number). A combined study would
change both the personal anchor and the content of the group pressures (for instance, by
changing the way stooges see the anchor). I expect that such a study will find that people
under group influence are even less rational than free standing individuals. Indeed, some
studies indicate that behaviours such as free-riding are increased by conformityand the
more subjects know of their peers choices, the more likely they are to conform (Carpenter
2004). Other studies show that the desire to conform to societal normsi.e., to appear prorather than anti-socialhelps to explain behaviours which would otherwise be difficult to
comprehend (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008). And still, other research suggests that the
variance of crime rates across time and space is not only affected by the costs and benefits
of crime but also by social factors, including the relations of criminals to their families
(Glaeser et al. 1996).
Beyond simply providing productive areas to mine for more social science findings, such
expansions of behavioural economics would help develop key concepts and assumptions about
human nature. Neoclassical economics tends to reflect the Enlightenment precept which
associates non-rational behaviour, as well as behaviour driven by affect and norms, with
primitive, traditional, or religious modes of thinking and acting. A neo-Romantic view
recognizes that people are much more limited in their intellectual capacities and that there are
sound moral, social, and even economic reasons for choices to be based in part on social bonds,
moral commitments, and traditions and for choices not to be dominated by detached,
disengaged, seemingly factual considerations. The more behavioural economics explores the
affective and normative factors that influence choices, I expect, the more it will be established
that the neo-Romantic model is more realistic.

Paradigm Shift or Reformulation?

Finally, behavioural economics seems ready to clarify whether its findings indicate that the
neoclassical paradigm needs to be and can be reformulated or that a different paradigm is
called for to study economics in particular and choice behaviour in general.
Behavioural economics initially focused on a limited range of choices and did not study
the kind of basic, microeconomic decisions people routinely make: for instance, the reasons
people purchase certain goods but not others, day in, day out; what makes people save
versus increase their debt; and which incentives make them work harder. Behavioural
economics has expanded to encompass more of these choices, but there is much room for
its scope to grow in this direction. As the scope of behavioural economics expands, it will
become impossible to avoid the question of whether behavioural economics seeks to
augment, modify, deeply alter, or replace the basic neoclassical economic paradigm and its
implications for choice behaviour, from decisions on voting to choosing mates.
In this context, it is important to explore the position of Kahneman, the most influential
behavioural economist. The cardinal distinction Kahneman (2003) draws is between
intuitive beliefs and choices and reasoning (avoiding the term rationality altogether).
Intuitive choices are impulsive, immediate, quick, effortless, particularly prone to biases,
slow learning, and emotive. Above all, in my words, they are unexamined. In contrast,
reasoning is deliberative, slow, effortful, and able to correct biases generated by intuitive
choices. However, no claim is made that reasoning even approximates the neoclassical
model of optimization. Particularly important, the data show that most choices are intuitive
and only a few are based on reasoning or corrected by it. In the words of Kahneman (2003,

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p. 1469): The central characteristic of agents is not that they reason poorly but that they
often act intuitively. And the behaviour of these agents is not guided by what they are able
to compute, but by what they happen to see at a given moment.
Kahneman (2003, p. 1449) explicitly states that the combination of intuitive choices
and reasoning provides a paradigm (map) that is distinct from the choice model
assumed in the rational agent models. He adds that psychologists hoped that economics
would draw on their work for some hypotheses and that this happened to some extent.
Kahneman cites in this context a few works by his colleagues in behavioural economics,
but the evidence that neoclassical economics is adapting its core assumptions or models is
rather scant.
Kahneman (2003, p. 1469) adds that even behavioural economics has generally
retained the basic architecture of the rational choice model,6 a valid observation that cries
out for an explanation. Kahneman himself thought that, the model of the agent that has
been here presented has a different architecture (Kahneman 2003, p. 1469), the central
feature of which is that most choices are intuitive and are not corrected by reasoning.
Kahneman answers neoclassical economists criticisms that psychologists have failed to
develop an alternative model by pointing to mid-level generalizations that can and do
explain and predict different phenomena in diverse settings. He also shows that it is a
mistake to suggest that if behaviour is not rational, it would be unpredictable, by
demonstrating that once one embraces the intuitive/reasoning model one can predict what a
person would do (e.g., if a crowd runs in a given direction, a person is much more likely to
join it than to run in the opposite direction) (Kahneman 2003).
As I see it, behavioural economics findings, and those of many other psychological and
sociological studies, show beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) indeed much choice behaviour
is not based on deliberations of any kind7; (b) when reasoning does occur, it is often subject
to the cognitive biases behavioural economics systematically observed and reported; and (c)
both intuitive (or in Ellen Langers [1978] words, mindless) choices and those subject
to deliberations are deeply affected by emotions and norms, and these in turn by social and
cultural factors.8
Hence, a sound paradigm for the study of choice behaviour would assume that people
often make choices that are far from rationalnot just imperfectly rational ones. It would
make non-rational choices its default mode, and it would incorporate and develop
propositions about the conditions under which choices are relatively more driven by
evidence and logical interpretations (e.g., after technical education), without assuming that
people can make optimal (i.e., fully rational) choices in non-trivial matters or even come
close to making such choices.
As this behavioural economics paradigm for the study of microeconomics is
achieved, a similar alternative paradigm should be considered for macroeconomics, a
thesis that cannot be explored within the confines of this article. On both levels, one
should take into account that science progresses when there is a free market in ideas;
when one paradigm can compete with others to establish which provides more reliable
predictions, advances more parsimonious explanations compatible with the evidence,

For instance, Camerer and Loewenstein (2004, p. 3) noted that the work of behavioral economics does not
imply a wholesale rejection of the neoclassical approach.
7
Note, as I mentioned above, that such intuitive behavior is largely shaped by social bonds and normative
culture; therefore, intuition is neither capricious nor random, and points to ways public policies can affect
intuitions and thus choices.
8
See Chapter 6 of Etzioni (1988) on normative-affective factors.
6

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lays foundations for more robust public policies, and provides for ethical precepts that
can be justified. About the last discipline in the world one would expect to shy away
from competition would be neoclassical economics, and there is no principled reason
behavioural economics should shy away from engaging in such a competition between
its paradigm and the neoclassical one.

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