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FIRST DIVISION

INDUSTRIAL TIMBER G.R. No. 164518


CORPORATION, INDUSTRIAL
PLYWOOD GROUP CORPORATION,
TOMAS TANGSOC, JR., LORENZO
TANGSOC and TOMAS TAN,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairman),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
VIRGILIO ABABON, IGNACIO
ABACAJEN, ANGELINA ABAYABAY, EDITH ABREA, SAMUEL
ABREA,
BIENVENIDO
ACILO,
RODRIGO ACILO, VICTOR ACILO,
ARTURO
ADVINCULA,
GERTRUDES AMPARO, VIRGILIO
ANTONIO,
MILA
ARQUITA,
PRUDENCIO ARQUITA, ALBERT
ATON, WARLITA AUTIDA, ALICIA
AWITAN, LEOPOLDO AYATON,
ARTURO BALBOTEN, DANILO
BANATE, LOLITA BATAN, RAMIL
BUTALON,
CARMILITA
CAINGLES, VICENTE CAHARIAN,
BENEDICTA
CAJIPE,
FELIPE
CALLANO, ALFREDO CARILLO,
NILA CARILLO, ALGER CORBETA,
GREGORIO DABALOS, TERESITA
DABALOS,
VENERANDO
DALAUTA,
RICARDO
DANGCULOS,
MONTANO
DAPROSA,
LUISITO
DIAZ,
FELIZARDO DUMULAO, EDITHA
DUMANON, ALFREDO FAELNAR,
RAUL FORTUN, MAXIMO GALLA,
ANGELES GALUPO, PERFECTO
GAMBE, VERGINITA GANGCA,

RUPERTO GORGONIO, ROMEO


HERRERO, SERGIO HORO-HORO,
FRANCISCO IBARRA, ABRAHAM
JALE,
DANDY
LABITAD,
ANTONINA LAMBANG, ERNESTO
LAUSA,
VICTORIA
LOOD,
NEMESIO LOPE, JR., ESCARLITO
MADLOS, MARCOS MAKINANO,
REMEGIO MAKINANO, VICENTE
MAKINANO,
REYNALDO
MASUHAY, HELEN MARATAS,
ELIZABETH
MENDOZA,
GUILBERTA MONTEROSO, GILDA
NAVALTA,
PILAR
NAVARRO,
SIMPORIANO NUEZ, JR., ELISEO
ORONGAN, ARMANDO OROPA,
ASUNCION OROPA, JOSE EDWIN
OROPA, BALDEMAR PAGALAN,
BARTOLOME PAGALAN, DAMASO
PALOMA,
MANALO
PLAZA,
JEREMIAS PELAEZ, FRANCISCO
PICARDAL, HERMINIA PUBLICO,
ROMULO QUINTOS, FIDEL QUITA,
FELICIANO RANADA, RODOLFO
RARU,
LEAN
CILDRIC
RODRIGUEZ,
SAMUEL
SAROMINES, NATIVIDAD SIGNAR,
CHERRIE SON, SAMUEL TAGUPA,
VICTOR
TAGUPA,
BRIGIDA
TABANAO, PEDRO TABANAO,
ROBERTO TABANAO, MARIA TAN,
RONNIE TAN, TOLENTINO TEE,
ROGELIO
TAMADA,
MINDA
TUMAOB and ROBERTO TUTOR,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
VIRGILIO ABABON, IGNACIO G.R. No. 164965
ABACAJEN, ANGELINA ABAYABAY, EDITH ABREA, SAMUEL
ABREA,
BIENVENIDO
ACILO,
RODRIGO ACILO, VICTOR ACILO,

ARTURO
ADVINCULA,
GERTRUDES
AMPARO,
MILA
ARQUITA, VIRGILIO ANTONIO,
PRUDENCIO ARQUITA,
ALBERT ATON, WARLITA AUDITA,
ALICIA
AWITAN,
LEOPOLDO
AYATON, ARTURO BALBOTEN,
DANILO BANATE, LOLITA BATAN,
RAMIL BUTALON, CARMELITA
CAINGLES, VICENTE CAHARIAN,
BENEDICTA
CAJIPE,
FELIPE
CALLANO, ALFREDO CARILLO,
NILA
CARILLO,
ALGIER
CORBETA, GREGORIO DABALOS,
TERESITA
DABALOS,
VENERANDO
DALAUTA,
RICARDO
DANGCULOS,
MONTANO DAPROSA, LUISITO
DIAZ, FELIZARDO DUMULAO,
EDITHA DUMANON, ALFREDO
FAELNAR,
RAUL
FORTUN,
MAXIMO
GALLA,
ANGELES
GALUPO, PERFECTO GAMBE,
VIRGINITA GANGCA, RUPERTO
GORGONIO, ROMEO HERRERO,
SERGIO HOR-HORO, FRANCISCO
IBARRA, ABRAHAM JALE, DANDY
LABITAD, ANTONINA LAMBANG,
ERNESTO
LAUSA,
VICTORIA
LOOD, NEMESIO LOPE, JR.,
ESCARLITO MADLOS, MARCOS
MAKINANO,
REMEGIO
MAKINANO,
VICENTE
MAKINANO,
REYNALDO
MAHUSAY, HELEN MARATAS,
ELIZABETH
MENDOZA,
GUILBERTA MONTEROSO, GILDA
NAVALTA,
PILAR
NAVARRO,
SIMPORIANO NUEZ, JR., ELISEO
ORONGAN, ARMANDO OROPA,
ASUNCION OROPA, JOSE EDWIN
OROPA, BALDEMAR PAGALAN,

BARTOLOME PAGALAN, DAMASO


PALOMA,
MANALO
PLAZA,
JEREMIAS PELAEZ, FRANCISCO
PICARDAL, HERMINIA PUBLICO,
ROMULO QUINTOS, FIDEL QUITA,
FELICIANO RANADA, RODOLFO
RARU,
LEAN
CILDRIC
RODRIGUEZ,
SAMUEL
SAROMINES, NATIVIDAD SIGNAR,
CHERRIE SON, SAMUEL TAGUPA,
VICTOR
TAGUPA,
BRIGIDA
TABANAO, PEDRO TABANAO,
ROBERTO TABANAO,
MARIA
TAN,
RONNIE
TAN,
TOLENTINO
TEE,
ROGELIO
TAMADA, MINDA TUMAOB, and
ROBERTO TUTOR,
Petitioners,
- versus THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORPORATION,
INDUSTRIAL PLYWOOD GROUP
CORPORATION, TOMAS TANGSOC,
JR., LORENZO TANGSOC and Promulgated:
TOMAS TAN,
Respondents. January 25, 2006
x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are two petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. G.R. No. 164518 assails the October 21, 2002 Decision of the
[1]

Court of Appeals, in CA-GR. SP No. 51966, which set aside the May 24,
1995 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), as
[2]

well as the July 16, 2004 Resolution denying its motion for
[3]

reconsideration. G.R. No. 164965 assails only the July 16, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied their partial motion for
reconsideration. These cases were consolidated because they arose out of
the same facts set forth below.
Industrial Plywood Group Corporation (IPGC) is the owner of a plywood
plant located at Agusan, Pequeo, Butuan City, leased to Industrial Timber
Corporation (ITC) on August 30, 1985 for a period of five years.
[4]

Thereafter, ITC commenced operation of the plywood plant and hired

387 workers.
On March 16, 1990, ITC notified the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and its workers that effective March 19, 1990 it
will undergo a no plant operation due to lack of raw materials and will
resume only after it can secure logs for milling.

[5]

Meanwhile, IPGC notified ITC of the expiration of the lease contract in


August 1990 and its intention not to renew the same.
On June 26, 1990, ITC notified the DOLE and its workers of the
plants shutdown due to the non-renewal of anti-pollution permit that
expired in April 1990. This fact and the alleged lack of logs for milling
[6]

constrained ITC to lay off all its workers until further notice. This was
followed by a final notice of closure or cessation of business operations
on August 17, 1990 with an advice for all the workers to collect the
benefits due them under the law and CBA.

[7]

On October 15, 1990, IPGC took over the plywood plant after it
was issued a Wood Processing Plant Permit No. WPR-1004-081791-042,
[8]

which included the anti-pollution permit, by the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) coincidentally on the same


day the ITC ceased operation of the plant.
This prompted Virgilio Ababon, et al. to file a complaint against
ITC and IPGC for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and damages.
They alleged, among others, that the cessation of ITCs operation was
intended to bust the union and that both corporations are one and the
same entity being controlled by one owner.
On January 20, 1992, after requiring both parties to submit their
respective position papers, Labor Arbiter Irving A. Petilla rendered a
decision which refused to pierce the veil of corporate fiction for lack of
evidence to prove that it was used to perpetuate fraud or illegal act;
upheld the validity of the closure; and ordered ITC to pay separation pay
of month for every year of service. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondent Industrial Timber Corporation (ITC) to pay herein
ninety-seven individual complainants their separation pay at the rate of
one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service, a fraction of at
least six (6) months to be considered as one whole year, reckoned until
August 1990.
All other claims of complainants are hereby ordered
DISMISSED for want of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[9]

Ababon, et al. appealed to the NLRC. On May 20, 1993, the NLRC set
aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the reinstatement of
the employees to their former positions, and the payment of full back
wages, damages and attorneys fees.

[10]

ITC and IPGC filed a Motion for Reconsideration through JRS, a private
courier, on June 24, 1993. However, it was dismissed for being filed out
[11]

of time having been filed only on the date of actual receipt by the NLRC
on June 29, 1993, three days after the last day of the reglamentary period.
[12]

Thus, they filed a Petition for Relief from Resolution, which was
[13]

treated as a second motion for reconsideration by the NLRC and


dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution dated September 29, 1994.

[14]

From said dismissal, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the


Supreme

Court. Subsequently,
[15]

they

filed

Reconsideration/Second Petition for Relief with the NLRC.

Motion

for

[16]

On December 7, 1994, the Supreme Court dismissed the Notice of


Appeal for being a wrong mode of appeal from the NLRC decision. On
[17]

the other hand, the NLRC granted the Second Petition for Relief and set
aside all its prior decision and resolutions. The dispositive portion of the
May 24, 1995 decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Commission dated May 10, 1993
and its subsequent resolutions dated June 22, 1994 and September 29,
1994 are Set Aside and Vacated. Accordingly, the appeal of
complainants is Dismissed for lack of merit and the decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated January 20, 1992 is Reinstated and hereby
Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

[18]

On October 2, 1995, Virgilio Ababon, et al. filed a Petition for Certiorari


with the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 121977.

[19]

However, pursuant to our ruling in St. Martins Funeral Home v. NLRC,

we referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.

[20]

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting


aside the May 24, 1995 decision of the NLRC and reinstated its May 20,
1993 decision and September 29, 1993 resolution, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated May
24, 1995 of the National Labor Relations Commission is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE, with the result that its decision dated May 20, 1993
and resolution dated September 29, 1994 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

[21]

Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were
denied, hence, the present consolidated petitions for review based on the
following assigned errors:
In G.R. No. 164518
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIBERALLY APPLYING
THE RULES OF PROCEDURE WITH RESPECT TO
RESPONDENTS BUT BEING RIGID IN ITS APPLICATION AS
REGARDS PETITIONERS.
[22]

In G.R. No. 164965


WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPLY SECTION
279 OF THE LABOR CODE AS AMENDED BY RA 6715 TO
MODIFY THE DECISION OF 20 MAY 1993 WITH RESPECT TO
BACKWAGES FOR PETITIONERS.
[23]

ITC and IPGC contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
May 24, 1995 decision of the NLRC since its May 20, 1993 decision had
become immutable for their failure to file motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period. While they admit filing their motion for

reconsideration out of time due to excusable negligence of their counsels


secretary, however, they advance that the Court of Appeals should have
relaxed the rules of technicality in the paramount interest of justice, as it
had done so in favor of the employees, and ruled on the merits of the
case; after all, the delay was just three days.
Ordinarily, once a judgment has become final and executory, it can
no longer be disturbed, altered or modified. However, this rule admits of
exceptions in cases of special and exceptional nature as we held
in Industrial
Commission:

Timber

Corporation

v.

National

Labor

Relations

[24]

It is true that after a judgment has become final and executory,


it can no longer be modified or otherwise disturbed. However, this
principle admits of exceptions, as where facts and circumstances
transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust and it
therefore becomes necessary, in the interest of justice, to direct its
modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing
circumstances.

A careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of these


consolidated cases warrants liberality in the application of technical rules
and procedure. We agree with the NLRC that substantial justice is best
served by allowing the petition for relief despite procedural defect of
filing the motion for reconsideration three days late, for to rule otherwise,
a greater injustice would be done to ITC by ordering it to reinstate the
employees to their former positions that no longer exist due to valid and
legitimate cessation of business and pay huge judgment award.

[25]

Moreover, under Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code, the NLRC
may, in the exercise of its appellate powers, correct, amend, or waive any
error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or in form. Further,

Article 221 of the same code provides that in any proceeding before the
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters,the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the
Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

[26]

Also, the rule under Section 14 of Rule VII of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC that a motion for reconsideration of any order,
resolution or decision of the Commission shall not be entertained except
when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is
under oath and filed within 10 calendar days from receipt of the order,
resolution or decision should not be interpreted as to sacrifice substantial
justice to technicality. It should be borne in mind that the real purpose
behind the limitation of the period is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable
delay in the administration of justice, from which the NLRC absolved
ITC and IPGC because the filing of their motion for reconsideration three
days later than the prescribed period was due to excusable negligence.
Indeed, the Court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice requires it because
what should guide judicial action is that a party is given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for
him to lose life, honor, or property on mere technicalities.

[27]

We now come to the main issues of whether Ababon, et al. were illegally
dismissed due to the closure of ITCs business; and whether they are
entitled to separation pay, backwages, and other monetary awards.

Work is a necessity that has economic significance deserving legal


protection. The social justice and protection to labor provisions in the
Constitution dictate so. On the other hand, employers are also accorded
rights and privileges to assure their self-determination and independence,
and reasonable return of capital. This mass of privileges comprises the socalled management prerogatives. Although they may be broad and
unlimited in scope, the State has the right to determine whether an
employer's privilege is exercised in a manner that complies with the legal
requirements and does not offend the protected rights of labor. One of the
rights accorded an employer is the right to close an establishment or
undertaking.

[28]

The right to close the operation of an establishment or undertaking


is one of the authorized causes in terminating employment of workers, the
only limitation being that the closure must not be for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions on termination of employment embodied in
the Labor Code.

Article 283 of the Labor Code provides:


ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.
The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee
due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation
of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In
case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a
separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least
one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In
case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or
cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one-half (1/2) month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six
(6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.

A reading of the foregoing law shows that a partial or total closure or


cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking may either be due
to serious business losses or financial reverses or otherwise. Under the
first kind, the employer must sufficiently and convincingly prove its
allegation of substantial losses, while under the second kind, the
[29]

employer can lawfully close shop anytime as long as cessation of or


[30]

withdrawal from business operations was bona fide in character and not
impelled by a motive to defeat or circumvent the tenurial rights of
employees, and as long as he pays his employees their termination pay
[31]

in the amount corresponding to their length of service. Just as no law


[32]

forces anyone to go into business, no law can compel anybody to


continue the same. It would be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if
a court interferes with management's prerogative to close or cease its
business operations just because the business is not suffering from any

loss or because of the desire to provide the workers continued


employment.

[33]

In sum, under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements


are necessary for a valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of a
written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month
before the intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of business must
be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of
termination pay amounting to one month pay or at least one-half month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
In these consolidated cases, we find that ITCs closure or cessation
of business was done in good faith and for valid reasons.
The records reveal that the decision to permanently close business
operations was arrived at after a suspension of operation for several
months precipitated by lack of raw materials used for milling operations,
the expiration of the anti-pollution permit in April 1990, and the
termination of the lease contract with IPGC in August 1990 over the
plywood plant at Agusan, Pequeo, Butuan City. We quote with approval
the observation of the Labor Arbiter:
As borne out from the records, respondent ITC actually underwent no
plant operation since 19 March 1990 due to lack of log supply. This
fact is admitted by complainants (Minutes of hearing, 28 October
1991). Since then several subsequent incidents prevented respondent
ITC to resume its business operations e.g. expiration and non-renewal
of the wood processing plant permit, anti-pollution permit, and the
lease contract on the plywood plant. Without the raw materials
respondent ITC has nothing to produce. Without the permits it cannot
lawfully operate the plant. And without the contract of lease
respondent ITC has no option but to cease operation and turn over the
plant to the lessor. (Emphasis supplied)
[34]

Moreover, the lack of raw materials used for milling operations was
affirmed in Industrial Timber Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission as one of the reasons for the valid closure of ITCs Butuan
[35]

Logs Plant in 1989. In said case, we upheld the management prerogative


to close the plant as the only remedy available in order to prevent
imminent heavy losses on account of high production costs, erratic supply
of raw materials, depressed prices and poor market conditions for its
wood products.
In Shoppers Gain Supermarket v. National Labor Relations Commission,
[36]

we held that the non-renewal of petitioner corporations lease contract

and its consequent closure and cessation of operations may be considered


an

event

beyond

petitioners

control,

in

the

nature

of

force majeure situation. As such, it amounts to an authorized cause for


termination of the private respondents.
Having established that ITCs closure of the plywood plant was
done in good faith and that it was due to causes beyond its control, the
conclusion is inevitable that said closure is valid. Consequently,
Ababon, et al. could not have been illegally dismissed to be entitled to
full backwages. Thus, we find it no longer necessary to discuss the issue
regarding the computation of their backwages. However, they are entitled
to separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
Although the closure was done in good faith and for valid reasons, we
find that ITC did not comply with the notice requirement. While an
employer is under no obligation to conduct hearings before effecting
termination of employment due to authorized cause, however, the law
[37]

requires that it must notify the DOLE and its employees at least one
month before the intended date of closure.
In the case at bar, ITC notified its employees and the DOLE of the no
plant operation on March 16, 1990 due to lack of raw materials. This was
followed by a shut down notice dated June 26, 1990 due to the expiration
of the anti-pollution permit. However, this shutdown was only temporary
as ITC assured its employees that they could return to work once the
renewal is acted upon by the DENR. On August 17, 1990, the ITC sent its
employees a final notice of closure or cessation of business operations to
take effect on the same day it was released. We find that this falls short of
the notice requirement for termination of employment due to authorized
cause considering that the DOLE was not furnished and the notice should
have been furnished both the employees and the DOLE at least one
month before the intended date of closure.
In Ariola v. Philex Mining Corporation, we held:
[38]

In Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission and Jaka Food


Processing Corporation v. Pacot, the Court sustained the dismissals for
just cause under Article 282 and for authorized cause under Article 283
of the Labor Code, respectively, despite non-compliance with the
statutory requirement of notice and hearing. The grounds for the
dismissals in those cases, namely, neglect of duty and retrenchment,
remained valid because the non-compliance with the notice and
hearing requirement in the Labor Code did not undermine the validity
of the grounds for the dismissals. Indeed, to invalidate a dismissal
merely because of a procedural defect creates absurdity and runs
counter to public interest. We explained in Agabon:
The unfairness of declaring illegal or ineffectual
dismissals for valid or authorized causes but not
complying with statutory due process may have farreaching consequences.
This would encourage frivolous suits, where even the
most notorious violators of company policy are

rewarded by invoking due process. This also creates


absurd situations where there is a just or authorized
cause for dismissal but a procedural infirmity
invalidates the termination. Let us take for example a
case where the employee is caught stealing or threatens
the lives of his co-employees or has become a criminal,
who has fled and cannot be found, or where serious
business losses demand that operations be ceased in less
than a month. Invalidating the dismissal would not
serve public interest. It could also discourage
investments that can generate employment in the local
economy.

Where the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 of


the Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction should be stiff as the dismissal process was
initiated by the employers exercise of his management prerogative, as
opposed to a dismissal based on a just cause under Article 282 with the
same procedural infirmity where the sanction to be imposed upon the
employer should be tempered as the dismissal process was, in effect,
initiated by an act imputable to the employee.

[39]

In light of the factual circumstances of the cases at bar, we deem it wise


and reasonable to award P50,000.00 to each employee as nominal
damages.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the October 21, 2002 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 51966, which set aside the
May 24, 1995 Decision of the NLRC, as well as the July 16, 2004
Resolution

denying

ITCs

motion

for

reconsideration,

are

hereby REVERSED. The May 24, 1995 Decision of the NLRC


reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding the closure or
cessation

of

ITCs

business

valid,

is AFFIRMED

with

the

MODIFICATIONS that ITC is ordered to pay separation pay equivalent

to one month pay or to at least one-half month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher, and P50,000.00 as nominal damages to each
employee.
SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Rollo (G.R. No. 164518), pp. 41-52. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz and concurred in
by Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Amelita G. Tolentino.
[2]
Id. at 85-101. Penned by Commissioner Musib M. Buat and concurred in by Leon G. Gonzaga, Jr.
Commissioner Oscar N. Abella, dissented.
[1]

Id. at 53-54.
CA rollo, pp. 130-131.
[5]
Id. at 121.
[6]
Id. at 122.
[7]
Id. at 123.
[8]
Id. at 124.
[9]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164518), p. 68.
[10]
Id. at 83-84. Penned by Commissioner Oscar N. Abella and concurred in by Commissioners Leon G.
Gonzaga, Jr. and Musib M. Buat.
[11]
CA rollo, pp. 214-222.
[12]
Id. at 223-225.
[13]
Id. at 227-235.
[14]
Id. at 236-240.
[15]
Id. at 256-259, docketed as G.R. No. 117825.
[16]
Id. at 241.
[17]
Id. at 260.
[18]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164518), p. 100.
[19]
CA rollo, pp. 4-26.
[20]
Id. at 610.
[21]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164518), p. 52.
[22]
Id. at 21.
[23]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164965), p. 22.
[24]
G.R. No. 111985, June 30, 1994, 233 SCRA 597, 601.
[25]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164518), p. 93.
[26]
See Mayon Hotel & Restaurant v. Adana, G.R. No. 157634, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 609, 628.
[27]
Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 160368, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA
792, 801.
[28]
Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098, September 16, 2005, SC E-Library.
[29]
Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 157611, August 9,
2005, SC E-Library.
[30]
Id.
[31]
Danzas Intercontinental, Inc. v. Daguman, G.R. No. 154368, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 382, 393.
[32]
Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, supra note 28.
[33]
Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. NLRC, supra note 29.
[34]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164518), p. 64.
[35]
339 Phil. 395, 401, 404-405 (1997).
[36]
328 Phil. 756, 771 (1996).
[37]
See Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 82249, February 7,
1991, 193 SCRA 665, 676.
[38]
G.R. No. 147756, August 9, 2005, SC E-Library.
[39]
San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, G.R. No. 149011, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 392, 431.
[3]
[4]