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School of Law

Compilation of
Questions and Suggested Answers

Book 1
(Persons, Family Relations, & Adoption)

Submitted by:
CIVIL LAW (Weekday & Weekend) CLASS
(A.Y. 2015-2016)

Submitted to:
ATTY. JENNOH TEQUILLO
Civil Law Review Professor

December 17, 2015

Table of Content
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS.........................................................................1
Persons and Family Relations..................................................................................1
Eulogio vs. Bell, Sr......................................................................................1
Geronimo vs. Santos....................................................................................4
Vaas vs. Vaas............................................................................................6
Aranas vs. Mercado.....................................................................................8
Avenido vs. Avenido,....................................................................................9
Lim vs. Equitable PCI Bank......................................................................10
Del Socorro vs. Van Wilsen........................................................................11
Willaware Products Corporation vs. Jesichris Manufacturing Corporation
...................................................................................................................13
Ardiente vs. Spouses Pastorfide................................................................15
Republic vs. Encelan.................................................................................16
Tan vs. Andrade.........................................................................................18
Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy.......................................................................20
Republic vs. Naceda..................................................................................21
Capili vs. People........................................................................................23
Republic vs. Cantor...................................................................................25
Spouses Gaditano vs. San Miguel Corporation........................................27
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen.........................................................................29
People vs. Odtuhan....................................................................................31
Republic vs. Albios....................................................................................33
Salas, Jr. vs. Aguila...................................................................................35
Ventura, Jr. vs. Spouses Abuda..................................................................37
Lim-Lua vs. Lua.........................................................................................39
Mendoza vs. Republic................................................................................40
Republic vs. Court of Appeals...................................................................42
Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr.............................................................43
Nollora vs. People.....................................................................................45
Remo vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs.......................................................47
HUMAN RELATIONS....................................................................................................49
Arts. 19-21.............................................................................................................49
Alano vs. Magud-Logmao.........................................................................49
Effectivity of Laws................................................................................................51
Spouses Dacudao vs. Gonzales.................................................................51
Presumptive Death.................................................................................................52
Republic vs. Villanueva.............................................................................52
Republic vs. Granada................................................................................53
Unjust Enrichment.................................................................................................55
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. vs. Legaspi...................................55
Who is a Juridical Person......................................................................................57

S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation vs. Parada


...................................................................................................................57
FAMILY RELATIONS....................................................................................................59
Annulment of Judgment; Affidavit of Reappearance............................................59
Santos vs. Santos.......................................................................................59
Annulment under Art. 45 (5).................................................................................61
Alcazar vs. Alcazar....................................................................................61
Child Custody........................................................................................................63
Dacasin vs. Dacasin..................................................................................63
Conjugal Property; Liquidation; Disposition.........................................................64
Heirs of Protacio Go vs. Servacio.............................................................64
Co-ownership.........................................................................................................66
Borromeo vs. Descallar.............................................................................66
Foreign Divorce.....................................................................................................68
Republic vs. Orbecido III..........................................................................68
Funeral...................................................................................................................69
Valino vs. Adriano.....................................................................................69
Judicial Separation of Absolute Community Property..........................................71
Noveras vs. Noveras..................................................................................71
Legal Separation; Forfeiture..................................................................................73
Quiao vs. Quiao.........................................................................................73
Legal Spouse..........................................................................................................74
Social Security Commission vs. Azote.......................................................74
Marriage.................................................................................................................76
Ocampo vs. Ocampo..................................................................................76
Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luna.................................................................78
Ando vs. Department of Foreign Affairs...................................................80
Abbas vs. Abbas.........................................................................................82
Fujiki vs. Marinay.....................................................................................84
Iwasawa vs. Gangan..................................................................................86
Marriage Contracts; Cancellation of Entries.........................................................87
Republic vs. Olaybar.................................................................................87
Marriage; Psychological Incapacity......................................................................89
Mallilin vs. Jamesolamin...........................................................................89
Parental Authority..................................................................................................91
Beckett vs. Sarmiento................................................................................91
Paternity and Filiation............................................................................................93
Aguilar vs. Siasat.......................................................................................93
Salas vs. Matusalem..................................................................................94
Probative Value of Contrato Marimonial Issued by the Church to Prove The Fact
Marriage.................................................................................................................96
Cercado-Siga vs. Cercade, Jr....................................................................96
Property Relations.................................................................................................98
Barrido vs. Nonato....................................................................................98
Property Relations; Absolute Community Property Regime...............................100
Nobleza vs. Nuega...................................................................................100

Psychological Incapacity.....................................................................................102
Kalaw vs. Fernandez...............................................................................102
Republic vs. De Gracia...........................................................................104
Republic vs. Encelan...............................................................................105
Requisites of Marriage; Exception......................................................................107
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Necessario...................................107
Surname of Illegitimate Children.........................................................................110
Grande vs. Antonio..................................................................................110
Void ab initio Marriage; Property Relations........................................................112
Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr...............................................................112

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS


Persons and Family Relations

I.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Eulogio vs. Bell, Sr.


G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015

Contributor

: Quiron, Maria Cristina


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Ana, Bobby and Cesar Rodriguez (Rodriguez siblings) are the unmarried children of Sps.
Mary and Robert Rodriguez. They lodged a complaint against the Sps. Edward and Mary
Garcia for annulment of contract of sale executed by their parents Spouses Rodriguez
over their 350 square-meter residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of the
title obtained by Sps. Garcia by virtue of the Deed.
The RTC granted the Rodriguez siblings prayer, that the sale of the subject house and lot
under the Deed of Sale is only an equitable mortgage in favor of Sps. Garcia. However,
the mortgage cannot bind the property in question being violative of Family Code, its
encumbrance not having been consented to in writing by a majority of the beneficiaries
who are the plaintiffs (siblings) herein. The said equitable mortgage is deemed to be an
unsecured mortgage for which the Sps. Rodriguez as mortgagor are liable to the
Defendant Sps. Garcia in the amount of P1,000,000.00 plus 12% interest.
Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals but the decision was
affirmed in toto. The Rodriguez family appealed the case to the Supreme Court to
question their liability of P1,000,000.00 plus interest. The Court, however dismissed
their Petition for failure to show reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.
Thereafter, entry of judgment was made and a writ of execution was issued. Their family
home was levied on execution. The RTC used the present value of the property as its
actual value.
a) Can a family home be sold on execution under Art. 160 of the Family Code?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in
Article 153 of the Family Code. It has been said that the family home is a real right that is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. Articles 155 and 160 of the Family
Code specify the exceptions mentioned in Aticle 153, to wit:
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material
for the construction of the building.
ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those
mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more
than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court
which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the
property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the
actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by
law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds
the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent
voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting
the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the
beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be
considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157,
and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be
delivered to the judgment debtor.
Related to the foregoing is Article 157 of the Family Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at
the time of its constitution, the amount of three hundred thousand pesos in
urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such
amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.

In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this
Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall
be the basis of evaluation.
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered
cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally
required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas.

II.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Geronimo vs. Santos


G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015

Contributor

: Jurolan, Marymar
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Sebastian Miguel, claimed in Court to be the only child of deceased Rodolfo and
Natividad Cario. He declared that with the death of his parents, the property consisting
of one-half of the parcel of land and belonging to his parents was passed on to him by the
law on intestacy. Rodrigo Cario, sibling of Rodolfo, contested the claim on the ground
that the deceased spouses were childless and took in as their ward Sebastian who was in
truth, the child of Natividad's sister. He claimed that the birth certificate of Sebastian was
a simulated document. Rodrigo was able to obtain a copy of the Sebastians alleged birth
certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in
the box date of birth was erased and the name of the informant. However, the Court ruled
that Sebastian is the legal heir - being the legitimate child - of the deceased spouses. It
found that Sebastian's filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which
was presented in evidence. The Court dismissed the claim of petitioner that the birth
certificate appeared to have been tampered, specifically on the entries pertaining to the
date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant. Furthermore it held that
Rodrigo failed to adduce evidence to explain how the erasures were done. In the absence
of such contrary evidence, the Court relied on the prima facie presumption of the veracity
and regularity of the birth certificate as a public document. Is the Courts ruling correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the Courts ruling is not correct.
Under Art. 172 of the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the problem given, the filiation of Sebastian is not at issue. Rodrigo does not claim that
Sebastian is not the legitimate child of the deceased spouses. What Rodrigo alleges is that
Sebastian is not the child of the deceased spouses at all. The birth certificate of Sebastian

would show that it was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to his date of birth
and the name of the informant. Despite these glaring erasures, the court still relied on the
prima facie presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate. The
concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by the court does not sufficiently
establish the one crucial fact: that Sebastian is indeed a child of the deceased spouses.
Furthermore, a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by
the interested parties.

III.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Vaas vs. Vaas


G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015

Contributor

: Corbo, Rhobie
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Carrie is a high class socialite who loves to party every night. Basically she loves the
limelight. Gerald on the other hand, was a timid, handsome guy who works as a Civil
Engineer in Kepco International. The two met over a common friends birthday party.
The two got along well and eventually got romantically involved. After a month, they got
married in 1999 when Carrie was already pregnant. Unfortunately, their baby died at
childbirth In March, 2006, Carrie left the household and did not return. Gerald later found
out that she left for Dubai to work there. Gerald then filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. In it, he alleged that during their cohabitation, Carrie was extremely, jealous,
outgoing and prone to making any pretext to leave the house; she enjoyed night life,
drank and smoked heavily even when she was pregnant and refused to perform household
chores, traits which she did not exhibit during their whirlwind courtship. She did not
show any remorse for the death of their child, lived as if single, self-centered, selfish and
immature.
Based on the facts given, are Carries traits be considered as evidence for psychological
incapacity, thus warranting the grant for petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. While Gerald and Carrie possess incompatible personalities, the latters acts and
traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological

incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some
psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.

IV.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Aranas vs. Mercado


G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014

Contributor

: Siega, Mar Teresa


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Emi, a widower entered into a marital union with Terri in the year 1974. Out of such
marriage, they had five children. Emi died intestate on January 1991 and was survived by
his second wife, Terri and their five children; and his two children by his first marriage
namely Frank and Elma.Emi inherited and acquired real as well as personal properties
during his lifetime.
Terri, as administratrix of Emis property submitted an inventory of the estate of Emi,
excluding from such inventory shares of stock which are in her name and which were
paid by her from money derived from the taxicab business which she and her husband
had since 1976 as a conjugal undertaking. Elma, moved that the court direct Terri to
amend the inventory contending that of the shares of stock which were excluded from
the inventory, be included. Is the contention of Elma correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes.
Emi and Terri having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in August
3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains. The shares of stock
which were paid by her from the money derived from the taxicab business which she and
her husband has as a conjugal undertaking, partake of a conjugal character. One- half
thereof or of the value thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her
husband.

V.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Avenido vs. Avenido,


G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

Contributor

: Ygnacio, Marie Angelee


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Eu-janeDoemingo got married to John Doe Marudoon 1942 and they begot 4 children.
Fifteen years later, John Doe left their home and he was nowhere to be found. In 1979,
Eu-jane learned that John Doe got married to a certain LenJoenicia. Eu-jane filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Len on the ground that she (Eujane) is the lawful wife of John Doe. Len argued that her marriage to John Doe was not
bigamous because Eu-jane failed to present her Certificate of Marriage with John Doe.
Eu-janein her defense argued that only a Certification was issued by the Local Civil
Registrar because the records were lost during the Second World War. In addition, Eujane and some witnesses testified to the fact of marriage between her and John Doe. Eujane alleged that such marriage was solemnized in Bohol by the Parish Priest of the said
town. The trial court ruled in favor of Eu-jane relying on the presumption of marriage
to overturn the validity of the second marriage. The marriage between Len and John Doe
was declared void for being bigamous. Is the trial court correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the trial court is correct.
A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. Further, while a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a
marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the
testimonies of the witnesses and the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by
the parish priest.
Therefore, the trial court is correct.

VI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Lim vs. Equitable PCI Bank


G.R. No. 183918, January 15, 2014

Contributor

: Gula, Maria Monica


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A parcel of land acquired by the spouses H & W was mortgaged by H as a security for a
loan obtained by him from XYZ Bank. Is the signature of the wife, W, needed on the
mortgage contract?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Absent any fact that the parcel of land is the exclusive property
of the husband, then the land is presumed to be conjugal property and hence the mortgage
contract must be signed by the wife.

VII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Del Socorro vs. Van Wilsen


G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

Contributor

: Sayson, Gerlyn Mae


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Norma married Erik in Holland. Norma is a Filipino citizen while Erik is a citizen of
Holland. Their marriage was blessed with a son, Rod. The marriage of Norma and Erik
did not last long and a final decree of divorce was issued by the Court of Holland. Erik
promised to support his minor child. Thereafter, Norma and his son came home to the
Philippines but Erik never gave support.
Upon learning that Erik was in the Philippines and married, Norma through a letter,
demanded from Erik to support his son. However, Erik refused to receive the letter. This
act prompted Norma to file a criminal case against Erik in violation of RA 9262 for
unjustified refusal to render support as provided under Art. 195 of the Family Code. Is
Erik obliged to support his minor son under the Philippine law?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Erik has no obligation to support his minor childunder Philippine law.
The Supreme Court ratiocinated that Norma cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil
Code in demanding support from Erik, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 195 of the
New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. Insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that
they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since Erik is a citizen of Holland he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.
However, this does not mean that respondent is not obliged to support his son altogether.
Erik must prove that under the laws of Holland, he is not obliged to support his minor

son. The Supreme Court is not obliged to take judicial notice of the laws of the
Netherlands.

VIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Willaware Products Corporation vs. Jesichris Manufacturing


Corporation
G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014

Contributor

: Macatangay, Maria Theresa


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
X Corp pioneered the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture of automotive
under chassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, and others. Z Corp, on
the other hand, is engaged in the manufacture of kitchenware items made of plastic and
metal. When some of X Corps employees transferred to Z Corp, the former discovered
that Z Corp had been manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with
exactly similar design, same material and colours as X Corps manufactures and
distributes, but at a lower price. X Corp alleged that Z Corp deliberately copied its
product designs thus constituting unfair competition.
What is the difference between the concept of unfair competition under Article 28 of
the NCC and unfair competition covered by intellectual property laws?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293 is a damage suit where the products are
not covered by patent registration.
The concept of unfair competition under Article 28 is very much broader than that
covered by intellectual property laws. Under the present article, which follows the
extended concept of unfair competition in American jurisdictions, the term covers even
cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees,
misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitors
contracts, or any malicious interference with the latters business.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise
to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage. What is being sought to be

prevented is not competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or highhanded
methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn
a living.

IX.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Ardiente vs. Spouses Pastorfide


G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013

Contributor

: Rivera, Clieford
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A sold her house and lot to B. The contract stipulates that the water and power supply of
the said property shall be for the account of B. For four 4 years, the water supply
remained under the name of A. B never complied with stipulation in the contract to
change account under Bs name. B has been delinquent in paying the water bills for 3
months. At the prodding of A, the water district cut off the water supply. Without
receiving notice of the disconnected, B complained at the water district. She was told of
her delinquency and that the disconnection was done at the instance of A, whose name
remained on the account. B paid her delinquency but the water supply was not
reconnected. Aggrived, B filed a case for damages with RTC against A and the water
district. A insisted that she could not be held liable as she had no actual participation in
the disconnection. Should both A and the water district be liable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, both should be liable. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides, every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. As acts which violated the
abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having the Bs water supply
disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of
such intention. On the part of the water district, it is their failure to give prior notice of
the impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent
spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account. Hence,
both of them are liable.

X.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Republic vs. Encelan


G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013

Contributor

: Bacalso, Vernie Rose


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
On June 25, 1979, Raymond married Emily and the union bore two children, Christine
and Jacky. To support his family, Raymond went to work in Canada on April 20, 1984.
On May 28, 1986, Raymond, while still in Canada, learned that Emily had been having
an illicit affair with Alfred Yee. Sometime in 1991, Emily allegedly left the conjugal
home with her children and lived with Alfred. Since then, Raymond and Emily had been
separated. But Raymond continued to provide financial support for Emily and their
children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alfred. On August 15, 1995,
Raymond filed with the RTC a petition against Emily for the declaration of the nullity of
his marriage based on Emilys psychological incapacity. Emily denied that she had an
affair with Alfred. During the trial, Raymond affirmed his allegations of Emilys
infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home. Raymond presented the
psychological evaluation report on Emily prepared by Dr. Diana Victoria of the National
Center for Mental Health. Dr. Victoria found that Emily was not suffering from any
form of major psychiatric illness[,] but had been unable to provide the expectations
expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship; her transferring from one
job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her
impatience in attaining her ambitions; and her refusal to go with her husband abroad
signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship.
Whether or not the marriage is null and void due to psychological incapacity. Support
your answer with specific provisions of law.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity


contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do
not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal
separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.
No evidence on record exists to support Raymonds allegation that Emilys infidelity and
abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.
Marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution
and nullity. It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made
by one party to the other during the marriage.

XI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Tan vs. Andrade


G.R. No. 171904, August 7, 2013

Contributor

: Villamor, Cletus
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Rosario was the registered owner of the four parcels land which she mortgaged to and
subsequently foreclosed by one Simon. When the redemption period was about to expire,
Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and
her son, Proceso Andrade, Jr.for P100,000.00. On July 26, 1983, Proceso, Jr. ceded unto
Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties in consideration of P50,000.00.
The Deed of Assignment was signed by, Henry, one of Rosarios sons. Bobby extended
an Option to Buy the subject properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7:00
in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the same for the sum of P310,000.00. When
Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the subject properties,
thus, the TCTs were issued in his name.
Rosarios children, filed a complaint for reconveyance and annulment of deeds of
conveyance and damages against Bobby before the RTC, they claimed that since the
subject properties were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr., the
subject properties were conjugal in nature. Is the subject properties are conjugal in
nature? Decide with reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No.
Article 160 of the Civil Code38 which states that "[a]ll property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply, the party
invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed
acquired during the marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the

presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing
evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses,
and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. (Citations omitted)
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was
terminated upon the latters death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title
over the subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of
"Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino." Other than their bare
allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject
properties were procured during the coverture of their parents or that the same were
bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosarios declaration that she is the absolute
owner of the disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of salewas not disputed by her
son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the
Court upholds the RTCs findingthat the subject properties were exclusive or sole
properties of Rosario.

XII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy


G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013

Contributor

: Canasa, John Paul


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
AA owned a parcel of land adjacent to the land owned by BB. The latter filed a complaint
before the RTC of Mandaue to enjoin the former from constructing a fence without a
valid permit, in order to present an evidence, BB installed surveillance camera and hired
two persons to take photos on the going constructions which includes business office
without the permit of AA, which the latter prompted to filed an action for injunction and
damages on the alleged violation of their right to privacy. Is the action of AA will
prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the action of AA will prosper, under the jurisprudence, prying into the privacy of
anothers residence, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual
considers as private. In the case at hand, a business office is entitled to the same privacy
when the public is excluded therefrom.

XIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Republic vs. Naceda


G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013

Contributor

: Yray, Rhea
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Roberto married Maria on 22 July 1987. A reading of the Marriage Contract revealed that
at the time of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years and 4 months old. Sometime in
1994, Marina went to Singapore and never returned since then. There was never any
communication between them. Several years after she left, one of their town mates in
Luna, La Union came home from Singapore and told him that the last time she saw his
wife, the latter was already living with a Singaporean husband.
In view of her absence and his desire to remarry, respondent filed with the RTC on 16
May 2002 a Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or absence of
Marina. The RTC granted respondents Petition.
Petitioner (Republic of the Philippines), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed to the Court of Appeals. According to petitioner, respondent failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with the diligence required by law and enough to
give rise to a well-founded belief that she was dead.The CA dismissed the appeal ruling
that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding under the Family Code and is thus governed by Title XI thereof. Article 247
of the Family Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in court proceedings shall
be immediately final and executory.
Is the Court of Appeals decision in ruling that the Republic of the Philippines, in the
petition for declaration of presumptive death had no right to appeal the RTC decision and
cannot question the failure of the Respondent to establish a well-founded belief that his
absentee spouse is dead, correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the ruling of the Court of Appeals is correct. The Republic of the Philippines, in the
petition for declaration of presumptive death had no right to appeal the RTC decision and

it can no longer question the failure of the Respondent to establish a well-founded belief
that his absentee spouse is dead.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.
Hence, the decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned. The Regional Trial
Courts decision in declaring the presumptive death of Maria is FINAL and
EXECUTORY.

XIV.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Capili vs. People


G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013

Contributor

: Cataquis, Jasmine Rawen


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Ador and Carmen is a newly married couple. They had a simple church wedding on
October 19, 2011 where they promised to cherish and remain faithful to each other until
their last breath. They lived together in Antipolo City and had one child, Jun-jun. Early
on their marriage, Ador would always come home early from work and spend time with
Carmen and Jun-jun. However, Ador gradually became busy because of his work which
requires him to stay in his office and there were also nights that Ador would not come
home. Carmen paid no attention to this. But the situation only grew worse when Ador
would not come home for weeks with no sort of communication. On November 18, 2013,
it was found that Ador had contracted a second marriage with Glenda Barrios. Hurt
beyond repair, Carmen filed a bigamy case against Ador before the RTC Antipolo.
Having known of the fact, Ador filed with the RTC Pasig to declare his marriage with
Glenda as void and filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in RTC Antipolo alleging that
there is a pending case for the declaration of nullity of his subsequent marriage; and that
if the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of
bigamy. During the pre-trial, the RTC Pasig declared the second marriage void. Hence,
Ador filed a Motion to Dismiss the charge of bigamy in RTC Antipolo.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature
does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Jurisprudence is
replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy,
even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as
the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
Furthermore, the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

XV.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Republic vs. Cantor


G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013

Contributor

: Jordan, Rebecca
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Maria and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband
and wife in their conjugal dwelling. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent
quarrel and after their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time
that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard
anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerrys disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition for her husbands declaration of presumptive
death, claiming that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead.She
alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-inlaw, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry,
she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients directory whenever she went to a
hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to
file the petition in court. Whether the Maria had a well-founded belief that Jerry is
already dead?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No.Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death,imposes a stricter standard of the requirement of "wellfounded belief ".Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the
law), lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.The present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse Is already dead. It requires exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one).

In the present case, First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It
can be inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of
the patients directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a
diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily
directed to look for him.
Second, she did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the
authorities to look for him.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends,
who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she
allegedly made inquiries, were not even named
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondents claim that
she conducted a diligent search.

XVI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Spouses Gaditano vs. San Miguel Corporation


G.R. No. 188767, July 24, 2013

Contributor

: Nalia, Ellen
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Beer Corporation filed a case against spouses Arnel Yu and Rosanne Yu for violation of
B.P. 22 and estafa because the check paid by the spouses signed by Rosanne and drawn
against Arnels BDO Current Account was ishonour d for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. On the other hand, the spouses filed an action for specific performance
and damages against BDO, Beer Corporation and Monica Go. The spouses alleged that
BDO unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts; that their obligation to Beer
Corporation had been extinguished by payment; and that Monica Go who borrowed
money from the spouses issued a forged check as payment leading to its ishonour and the
eventual garnishment of their savings account.
The spouses assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to
the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa.
The Secretary of the Department of Justice suspends the preliminary investigation on the
ground of prejudicial question. This was however reversed by the Court of Appeals.
It is argued that the appellate court overlooked the fact that the spouses had an automatic
transfer arrangement with BDO, such that funds from the savings account were
automatically transferred to their checking account whenever a check they issued was
presented for payment.
Is the ruling of the Court of Appeals valid? Decide with reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the ruling of the Court of Appeals is valid.
Under Article 36 of the New Civil Code, prejudicial questions, which must be decided
before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by

rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in
conflict with the provisions of this Code.
In the case of SPOUSES GADITANO, vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, G.R. No.
188767, July 24, 2013, the court declared that there is no prejudicial question in a
criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 and estafa and a civil case involving an action for
specific performance and damages by citing Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure: The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
These equally apply in the case at hand. The material facts surrounding the civil case bear
no relation to the criminal investigation being conducted by the prosecutor. The
prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of another check. Beer
Corporation is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check leading to its
dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners savings account.
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares BDO liable for the unlawful garnishment
of the spouses savings account, petitioners cannot be automatically adjudged free from
criminal liability for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, because the mere issuance of
worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in
itself the offense.

XVII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen


G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

Contributor

: Avenido, Anna Mae


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
The love of Susana and Mario bore them a child name Samantha. At that time, Susana
and Mario were both single and capacitated to marry but decided to just live together as
common law husband and wife. However, their love faded and they decided to part ways.
Susana has the custody of Samantha. Mario, on the other hand, married Angela and had
children with her. After fifteen years, Mario died intestate.
Samantha then filed for a Petition for Letters of Administration for the Estate of her
father claiming that she is the natural child of Mario having been conceived and born at
the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Susana impugned
the validity of Marios marriage to Angela by claiming that it was bigamous. Angela
married Mario despite the subsistence of the formers marriage with one Felipe.
Can Samantha question the validity of the marriage of Angela and Mario? Decide with
reason
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Samantha can question the validity of the marriage of Angela and Mario.
In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A
void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
There is no doubt that Samantha, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
fathers marriage to Angela, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the
death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably,
Samantha, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute

nullity of the void marriage of Mario and Angela, and the death of either party to the said
marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.

XVIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: People vs. Odtuhan


G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013

Contributor

: Guma, Israel
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Popoy and Basha got married in 1990. Basha went to abroad for work. 5 years later,
Popoy, fell in love with another woman and thus contracted marriage with Majarot.
Thereafter, Popoy then filed a complaint before the RTC for judicial declaration of nullity
of his 1st marriage on the ground that there was no valid marriage license. The court
granted Popoys petition and declared that his 1st marriage was void ab initio. Upon
learning, Basha enraged that Popoy and her will no longer have a second chance, filed a
case for Bigamy against Popoy. Popoy then filed for the quashal of the information on the
ground that he did not commit the crime of Bigamy since his 1st has been judicially
declared void. Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Popoy is guilty of bigamy. Article 40 of the Family Code clearly provides that the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground of defense. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of
nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. Since Popoy contracted
his second marriage without first securing a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage, it is clear then that he is guilty of bigamy. It is true even if the first marriage is
subsequently declared void ab initio as long as one contracted marriage before its
declaration of nullity.
RESEARCHERS NOTE:
However, the doctrine enunciated in MORIGO v. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 145226, February
6, 2004) may be considered as an exception. In said case, the court has ruled that the

mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy.

XIX.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Republic vs. Albios


G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013

Contributor

: Labella, Margaret
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
To acquire American citizenship, Liberty Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an
American, before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch-59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC).
Two years later, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated
and never lived as husband and wife because they never had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. In
declaring the respondents marriage void, the Regional Trial Court explained that the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be
legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the Albios to acquire American
citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the Court of Appeals ruled that the essential requisite
of consent was lacking. It held that Albios marriage as akin to a marriage in jest, defined
in the case of United States v. Rubenstein, as a pretended marriage, legal in form but
entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status,
and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. With no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated,
defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the present case does not fall
within the concept of a marriage in jest, and emphasized that consent was not lacking
between Albios and Fringer. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
The OSG contends that there was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
Is the Solicitor Generals contention meritorious? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if
it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be
rendered futile.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. For
consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code,
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious
or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature
of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
In the case at bar, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. That their consent
was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage.
Although the avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the
couple to establish a conjugal and family life, the possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify
a marriage freely entered into. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences,
and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage
may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is
no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so
long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate
their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. Although the Court views with disdain the Albioss attempt to
utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, it cannot declare the marriage void. Hence,
though the her marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

XX.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Salas, Jr. vs. Aguila


G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013

Contributor

: Perias, Christine Joymarie


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
On 1995 Brad married Angie and have a daughter named Elena. Brad left Angie and
Elena, the conjugal dwelling place and no longer communicated. On 2005 Angie filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they "have no conjugal properties
whatsoever." On March 2010, the marriage was declared void but on June 2010 Angie
filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that she discovered:
(a) two 200-square-meter parcels of land with improvements located in Cebu City,
(b) a 108-square-meter parcel of land with improvement in Lapu2x City.
The registered owner of the Discovered Properties is "Brad Celos married to Miley
Celos." The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered on 1999 and 2005. Brad
filed an Opposition to the Manifestation alleging that there is no conjugal property to be
partitioned based on Angies petition. According to Brad, Angies statement was a judicial
admission and was not made through palpable mistake. Brad claimed that Angie waived
her right to the Discovered Properties.
Will Angies claim prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Pursuant to the Rules, even upon entry of judgment granting the annulment of
marriage, the court can proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
conjugal partnership of gains if it has not been judicially adjudicated upon, as in this case.
The Discovered Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and
distributed between Brad and Angie. The statement is not a judicial admission; the
petition (of nullity) was filed on 2005 but Angie found the Discovered Properties before
the promulgation of the decision. Angie was palpably mistaken in her petition and it

would be unfair to punish her over a matter that she had no knowledge of at the time she
made the admission.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
Where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, it was that
the properties acquired during the union of the parties, would be governed by coownership.

XXI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Ventura, Jr. vs. Spouses Abuda


G.R. No. 202932, October 23, 2013

Contributor

: Digaum, Lucks Mae


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Yani and Rosie got married. Yani is a widower while unknown him, Rosie was previously
marriage to Cris who, at the time of their marriage, was still alive and well. The couple
didnt have a child of their own however, they have a child from their previous marriages
namely, Crissy (Yanis daughter) and Cross (Rosies son) respectively. Cross eventually
got married to Luz and they have a son named Cross Jr.
Subsequently, Yani bought a portion of a lot the title of which was issued in the name of
the Yani married to Rosie. Later on, his daughter, Crissy bought the remaining portion of
the lot with which the father and daughter operated a business until Yani got sick. He then
sold his portion to his daughter in order to cover for his medical expenses until his death.
Two years after his death, Rosie passed away.
Luz, upon discovering the said sale, filed a case in behalf of her son, Cross Jr. with the
RTC for Annulment of Deed of Sale against Crissy on the ground of forgery and that the
property is co-owned by Yani and Rosie. This was opposed by Crissy alleging that the
marriage between Rosie and her father, Yani, was null and void from the beginning due to
the fact that Rosies first marriage was still subsisting. Thus, neither Rosie and her heirs
can claim interest over the property bought by her and her father. She further alleged that
the said property is solely owned by her father as Rosie did not contribute in the
acquisition of the said property. If you are the RTC Judge, how will you decide the case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the RTC Judge, I will decide the case in favor of Crissy and dismiss the case
filed by Luz.
Art.148.In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each
other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint

contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in


proportion to their respective contributions. Xxx
Applying the above provision in this case, Yani and Rosie are incapacitated to marry each
other at the time of the celebration of their marriage as Rosie and Crosss marriage was
still subsisting. Thus, law on cohabitation shall apply.
In cases of cohabitation, only those properties acquired by their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In this case, it was shown that Yani bought the said property and
have it titled in his name alone. There was no showing that Rosie had actually contributed
either money, property or industry in the acquisition of said property. What was
sufficiently shown was that Crissy paid for the amortization of the property in behalf of
his father. Thus, the said property is not commonly owned by Yani and Rosie but is
owned solely by Yani alone.

XXII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Lim-Lua vs. Lua


G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013

Contributor

: Parawan, Eula
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with B. In her prayer for
support pendente lite for herself and her two children, A sought the amount of
P5OO,OOO.OO. After due hearing, the trial court issued an Order granting support
pendente lite. B filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that A is not entitled to
spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling
from their children and B has continued to support the family for their sustenance and
well-being in accordance with familys social and financial standing. Should certain
expenses already incurred by B be deducted from the total support owing to petitioner
and her children?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. The amount of support
may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.

XXIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Mendoza vs. Republic


G.R. No. 157649, November 12, 2012

Contributor

: Tejano, Misaellee
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Arabelle and Dominic got married while still in college because the former got pregnant.
During their marriage, Dominic was jobless for most of the time while Arabelle became
the familys bread winner. Dominic had extra marital affairs, repeatedly borrowed money
without repaying them and threatened to commit suicide when Arabelle refused to
reconcile.
Arabelle filed a petition for the declaration of the nullity of marriage with Dominic based
on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Arabelle presented
Dr. Rose Samson who testified that Dominic was inadequate, immature and irresponsible
with antisocial attitude and lifestyle based on her interviews with the petitioner and other
people. The RTC granted the petition. The Office of Solicitor General opposed arguing
that Dominic was not examined in person and the expert witnesss testimony is only
persuasive not conclusive upon the court.
Is the presentation of expert opinion and actual examination of a person an indispensable
requirement in petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However,
such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact,
if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological

incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned


need not be resorted to.

XXIV.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Republic vs. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012

Contributor

: Parilla, Dave Edward Velasquez


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Eduardo and Amor fell in love and got married. However, Eduardo filed a petition for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Amor on the ground of Psychological
Incapacity. He alleged that engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly
refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with
neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter;
that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since
1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Diego, her
paramour.
Will Eduardos suit prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Eduardos suit will not prosper. The acts complained of do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove the commission of those acts or the
existence of his abnormal behavior. It must be shown that those acts or that behavior was
manifestation of a seropus mental disorder and that it is the root cause why she was not
able to perform the essential duties of married life.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not
merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b)
the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act,
the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and
education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a
married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness.

XXV.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr.


G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012

Contributor

: Legaspo, Marje
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Efren and Mely got married in 1985. In 1998, the spouses were accused of murder. The
court acquitted Efren, however, it found Mely gulity as charged. The court awarded
damages to the family of the victim. The judgment then became final and executory.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of
the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Mely.
Efren then questions the said writ claiming that the properties levied were conjugal
assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
Can the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Mely be levied and executed upon for
the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Although the spouses were married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of
gains as stipulated in the Civil Code, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal
partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under
the Civil Code.
Article 122 stipulates that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the
fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage,
that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound
should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the

liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purpose above-mentioned.
Hence, the civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on Mely may be
enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121
of the Family Code have been covered.

XXVI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Nollora vs. People


G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011

Contributor

: Imperial, Christine
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
The First Wife testified that she and accused Husband met in Saudi Arabia while she was
working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. He courted her
and on April 6, 1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Church [sic] in SapangPalay,
San Jose del Monte. While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband
has another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and
returned to the Philippines Upon arrival in the Philippines, the First Wife learned that
indeed, Husband contracted a second marriage with Second Wife on December 8, when
she secured a certification as to the civil status of Husband from the National Statistics
Office (NSO). The Husband admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, with The
Wives. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10,
1992, even before he contracted the first marriage. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly
entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.
During trial, the husband explained that in his Marriage Contract with the First Wife, it is
indicated that he was a Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware why it was
placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage Contract with the Second Wife, the
religion Catholic was also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a
Muslim since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that
he was single despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret.
Was the 2nd marriage bigamous? May the husbands religious affiliation be used as a
defense?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes.
Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that [i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or

this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the
Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply. Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue
here. Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages were solemnized according to Muslim
law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from
liability for the crime of bigamy.
Under Art 349 of the RPC, the marriage is bigamous and pursuant to Art 35 of the Family
Code, it is void ab initio. Nolloras religious affiliation is inapplicable here. Neither of his
marriages were solemnized under the Muslim Law. The SC ruled that his two marriages
were not conducted according to the Code of Muslim. Hence, his religious affiliation may
not be used as a defense.

XXVII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons & Family Relations

Source

: Remo vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs


G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010

Contributor

: Dacudao, Ron Juko


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport
was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner is married to Francisco R. Rallonza and
the following entries appear in her passport: Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia
as her given name, and Remo as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of
her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her
passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), with a request to revert to her
maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.The DFA denied the request.
According to the DFA, the use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if
the married name has not been used in previous application.
Petitioner argued that in the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD HER
HUSBANDS SURNAME, OR
(2) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBANDS SURNAME,
OR
(3) HER HUSBANDS FULL NAME, BUT PREFIXING A WORD
INDICATING THAT SHE IS HIS WIFE, SUCH AS MRS.
Hence, the use of the word may in the above provision indicates that the use of the
husbands surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. Clearly, a married
woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the
ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only
any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage.
Is Petitioner correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Petitioner is mistaken. Section 5(d) of RA 8239 limits the instances when a married
woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport. These
instances are death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage. The
conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5(D) of RA 8329 is more
imagined than real. RA 8329, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not
prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in
recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for
the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her
husbands surname.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands
surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands
surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using
her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously
using her maiden name.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport,
she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in
Section 5(D) of RA 8329. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioners marriage to her husband
subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise
stated, a married womans reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on
the severance of the marriage.

HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21

XXVIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Human Relations; Arts. 19-21

Source

: Alano vs. Magud-Logmao


G.R. No. 175540, April 7, 2014

Contributor

: Calvo, Mario Dennis


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Angelito Logmao was brought to the Western District Medical Center by sidewalk
vendors who allegedly saw him fall at the Cubao City overpass, wherein he was
identified in the patients data sheet as Arnelito Lumogso. Considering his deteriorating
condition and the hospital has no vacancy, he was transferred to National Kidney
Institute. He was not accompanied by any relatives, thus Jennifer, the transplant
coordinator was instructed to locate his family or relatives, she contacted several
television and radio stations and sought the assistance of the PNP to locate the
whereabouts of Angelitos family, but no one showed at the Institute. He was pronounced
dead due to the severity of brain injury. Dr. Ona, the Chairman of the Department of
Surgery made a request from Dr. Alano, the Executive Director of the Hospital for an
authority to remove the organs of Angelito for organ transplantation which has been
approved by Dr. Alano in a Memorandum which provides that as long as the requisites
has been complied and with approval of NBI, the removal of organs may be done.
Angelitos organs were removed and were used for organ transplantation in the Hospital.
The National Kidney Institute announced in their press release the successful organ
transplantation and a cousin of Angelito heard on the radio that the donor was a certain
Arnelito Lugmoso. Because of this discovery, Zenaida, Angelitos mother filed a
complaint for damages against Dr. Alano and several doctors of NKI alleging that they
conspired to remove the organs of Angelito while the latter was still alive. Only Dr. Alano
was held liable for damages by the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision with modification, by reducing the award of moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees. Is Dr. Alano liable for damages for authorizing the removal of the
organs of Angelito?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, to be entitled to damages, under the Civil Code, negligence must be proven.Dr. Alano
is not negligent, he gave authorization for the removal of some of the internal organs to
be transplanted to other patients, he did so in accordance with the law, i.e., giving his
subordinates instructions to exert all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of
kin of respondent's son. Announcements were made through radio and television, the
assistance of police authorities was sought, and the NBI was notified. There can be no
cavil that he employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to reach
the relatives of the deceased. He did not violate the rights of the respondent under the law
thus having exercised due diligence in the performance of his duties, he is not liable for
damages for the death and removal of organs of Angelito.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article
19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an
action for damages undereither Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper".

Effectivity of Laws

XXIX.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Human Relations; Effectivity of Laws

Source

: Spouses Dacudao vs. Gonzales


G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013

Contributor

: Logroo, Joseph Alfie


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Dacudao filed a syndicated estafa case against Legacy Group in the office of City
Prosecutor Davao Ciy in February 6, 2009. On March 18, 2009 DOJ Secretary issued
DO No. 182 directing all City Prosecutors to forward all cases filed against Legacy
Group to DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Aggrieved by such turn of
events, Dacudaofiled via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to
Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. He claimed that DO
No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of
laws with retroactive effect. Is Dacudao correct in his petition that DO No. 182 violates
the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist,
and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a
remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create
new rights or take away vested rights but operates only in furtherance of the remedy or
the confirmation already existing rights. The retroactive application is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, no vested right generally attaches
to or arises from procedural law.

Presumptive Death

XXX.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Human Relations; Presumptive Death

Source

: Republic vs. Villanueva


G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015

Contributor

: Esmea, Kimberly Marie


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
How shall a well-founded belief be established?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A well-founded belief may be established upon a showing of proper and honest-togoodness inquiries and eorts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's whereabouts but,
more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. This strict
standard approach ensures that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws in
light of the State's policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Courts
should never allow procedural shortcuts but instead should see to it that the stricter
standard required by the Family Code is met.

XXXI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Human Relations; Presumptive Death

Source

: Republic vs. Granada


G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012

Contributor

: Gutierrez II, Cedric


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Jane and Josephus got married in 1995. In 1996, after being fired from his job, Josephus
went to Papua New Guinea to seek greener pasture and landed a job as a sales man in a
department store. From that time, Jane was not able to receive communication from him.
Jane asked Josephus family on his whereabouts but none of them could give any definite
answer. No other efforts were made by Jane to locate Josephus.
After 10 years of waiting, Jane filed a petition declaring Josephus presumptively dead.
The Regional Trial Court declared Josephus presumptively dead but was appealed by the
Office of the Solicitor General alleging that Jane failed to prove her well founded belief
that Josephus was already dead. The appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
Was the appeal proper? Did the RTC err in the grant of petition for declaration of
presumptive death based on the efforts made by Jane?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the appeal was improper.
The law provides that a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code
is a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code. Taken together,
Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court
therein shall be immediately final and executory.
In this case, the Regional Trial Court has already given its verdict and cannot be remedied
by mere notice of appeal.
The RTC erred in granting the decision in favor of Jane.

Jurisprudence provides that spouse present is burdened to prove that his spouse has been
absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define
what is meant by a well-grounded belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the
doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence
which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a
determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the
character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually
control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to
explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence
evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on
a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of
the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
In the case at bar, Jane did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. In
short, Jane was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. If she were, she
would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from
other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized
mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
However, the decision of the RTC is final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable.

Unjust Enrichment
XXXII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Human Relations; Unjust Enrichment

Source

: Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. vs. Legaspi


G.R. No. 202791, June 10, 2013

Contributor

: Apatan, Rosane
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Leandro was employed as a seaman by PTC, Inc. While on board the vessel he suffered
illness and thus was repatriated. He filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for full and
permanent disability compensation against PTC, Inc. The LA awarded US$80,000.00
based on the ITF Cruise Ship Model Agreement, not on the CBA which is only
US$60,000.00. This decision was affirmed by the NLRC. During the hearing on the
motion for execution before the NLRC, PTC, Inc. agreed to pay respondent
US$81,320.00. The terms and conditions of said payment were embodied in the Receipt
of Judgment Award with Undertaking, wherein Leandro acknowledged receipt of the said
amount and undertook to return it to PTC, Inc. in the event the latters petition for
certiorari would be granted, without prejudice to Leandros right to appeal.
The CA granted PTC, Incs petition and modified the assailed resolutions of the NLRC,
awarding only US$60,000.00 pursuant to the CBA. Can PTC, Inc. now recover from
Leandro the amount it paid in excess of US$60,000.00? State the principle in Civil Law.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Since the agreement was voluntarily entered into by Leandro and PTC, Inc. and
represented a reasonable settlement, it is binding on both of them and may not later be
disowned simply because of a change of mind. Leandro agreed to the stipulation that he
would return the amount paid to him in the event that the petition for certiorari would be
granted. Since the petition was indeed granted by the CA, Leandro must comply with the
condition to return the excess amount. To allow now him to retain the excess money
judgment would amount to his unjust enrichment to the prejudice of PTC, Inc.
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration
of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or

equitable obligation to account for them. To be entitled to remuneration, one must confer
benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of
reconveyance. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of
restitution. There is unjust enrichment when: (1.) A person is unjustly benefited; and (2.)
Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
In the present case, petitioner paid respondent US$81,320.00 pursuant to the writ of
execution. CA Decision, however, modified the final resolution of the NLRC and
awarded only US$60,000.00 to Leandro. If allowed to return the excess, Leandro would
have been unjustly benefited to the prejudice and expense of PTC, Inc.

Who is a Juridical Person


XXXIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Human Relations; Who is a Juridical


Person

Source

: S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation vs.


Parada
G.R. No. 183804, September 11, 2013

Contributor

: Tabada, Ian Rene


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Sunrise Corporation, bought lighting materials from Z Company, a sole proprietorship
owned by EZ. Despite repeated demands, Sunshine Corporation defaulted in its payment.
EZ filed a suit in the RTC to collect the outstanding balance of P90,000. Sunrise
Corporation filed a motion to implead Z Company, alleging that Z company is the real
party in interest of the case filed by EZ.
Is Z Company a real party in interest to be impleaded as a party-plaintiff?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that only natural or juridical
persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case. Article 44 of the New
Civil Code enumerates who are juridical persons:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or
purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and
distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

Z Company is merely the DTI-registered trade name or style of the respondent by which
he conducted his business. As such, it does not exist as a separate entity apart from its
owner, and therefore it has no separate juridical personality to sue or be sued. As the sole
proprietor of Z Company, there is no question that the respondent is the real party in
interest who stood to be directly benefited or injured by the judgment in the complaint.
There is then no necessity for Z Company to be impleaded as a party-plaintiff, since the
complaint was already filed in the name of its proprietor, EZ. To heed the petitioners
sophistic reasoning is to permit a dubious technicality to frustrate the ends of substantial
justice.

FAMILY RELATIONS
Annulment of Judgment; Affidavit of Reappearance

XXXIV.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Annulment of


Judgment; Affidavit of Reappearance

Source

: Santos vs. Santos


G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014

Contributor

: Armenion, Ramy
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Grace
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Rudy, had filed a petition for
declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage. Rudy
remarried on September 17, 2008. Grace claimed that she learned about Rudy's petition
only sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies. On November 17, 2008, Grace
filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Rudy, despite his
knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of
Tarlac City. Grace does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the
termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. Rudy
argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it
cannot be availed when there are other remedies available. Rudy added that Grace could
always file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the subsequent marriage. Is the
remedy of petition for annulment of judgment proper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The petition for annulment of judgment is proper. Annulment of judgment is the
remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final,
and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner."

The filing of affidavit of reappearance is not a sufficient remedy. The filing of an affidavit
of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to
the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively
dead. In this case, Grace does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely
the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects.
Subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
"children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of
the spouses in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages." If it is terminated by
mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring
presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. Therefore, reappearance is
not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not
nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage.

Annulment under Art. 45 (5)

XXXV.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Annulment under Art.


45 (5)

Source

: Alcazar vs. Alcazar


G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009

Contributor

: Sumampong-Espejo, Marietes
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Meriam and Igoy got married in Mindoro, a week after being together (living as husband
and wife), they left for Manila as Meriam is working there. However, when they arrived
in Manila her husband did not live with her in the apartment rented by Meriam. He
preferred to live with his brother in Quezon. Much more to her surprised, Igoy left to
work in Saudi Arabia without her knowledge and consent a month after their marriage.
No communication by mail or phone happened. After two years, Meriam knew from a
friend that her husband returned home but it proceeded directly to his home town in
Mindoro and lived there without communicating.
This prompted Meriam to file for annulment on the ground that respondent was
physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause
for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner
and respondent. This was corroborated by the clinical psychologist as witness. The latter
presented the following psychological evaluation of respondent as suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in
proportion and incurable by any treatment. The root cause of respondents personality
disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years with predisposing psychosocial
factors that influenced his development. Hence, he is unable to develop relationship with
other beyond this need. There is no capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others. The
psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as it
already existed long before he entered into marriage. The witness recommends the
declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent.
However, the court dismissed the petition and declared the marriage valid.

Was the court correct in dismissing the petition considering that such marriage was not
consummated and the witness psychiatrist testified that respondent is suffering from a
personality disorder that is beyond cure?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the
complete act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part
of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the
anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears
arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by
psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the
spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.
In the case at bar, the petitioner failed to establish that respondent was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even
admitted that she and respondent had been living as husband and wife after their wedding
and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on
respondents part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioners marriage to
respondent. Therefore the court was correct in dismissing the case and maintaining that
the marriage of petitioner and respondent is valid.

Child Custody

XXXVI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Child Custody

Source

: Dacasin vs. Dacasin


G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010

Contributor

: Repaso, Jurdelyn
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Richard , a US Citizen, and Maine, a Filipina, married in the United States. They gave
birth to Ram. Years later, Richard filed for divorce and the US Court granted them a
Decree of Absolute Divorce granting the sole custody of Ram, their 2-year-old son to
Maine. Maine went back to the Philippines with Ram. In consideration of a lifetime
support of 10 Million Pesos, Maine signed a Joint Custody Agreement with Richard
allowing him to have custody of Ram every weekend from Saturday until Sunday. One
day, Maine refused to let Richard see their son since Richard failed to give some
demands of Maine. Richard went to court and seek to enforce their agreement. Is the
Joint Custody Agreement between Richard and Maine valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The Joint Custody Agreement between Richard and Maine is void for being contrary
to law. In the case of Dacasin vs. Dacasin, the Supreme Court ruled that the Agreement is
void because it contravenes Art 213 of the Family Code which provides that, no child
under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to
law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by
the father. In the case at bar, at the time of the execution of said agreement, Maine is no
longer married to Richard and hence, both signed the agreement as parties who were
complete strangers to each other. The legal custody of a child is a matter of law and not a
matter of stipulation. Hence, the Joint Custody Agreement is void.

Conjugal Property; Liquidation; Disposition

XXXVII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Conjugal Property;


Liquidation; Disposition

Source

: Heirs of Protacio Go vs. Servacio


G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011

Contributor

: Patatag, Arnel
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
In 1976, Protacio acquired a parcel of land with an area of 17,140 sq.m. In 1987, Marta,
Protracios wife, died leaving him and their children. In 1999, Protacio and one of his
son sold portion of the lot 5,560 sq.m. The herein petitioners, the other heirs of Marta,
questioned the sale positing that the property sold was a conjugal property and so the sale
of the property without prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio and
Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Was the contention
of the petitioners correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse
without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not
necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial
partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior
liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
In other words, the alienation made by the surviving spouse of a portion of the
community property is not wholly void ab initio despite Article 103 of the Family Code,
and shall be valid to the extent of what will be allotted, in the final partition, to the
vendor. And rightly so, because why invalidate the sale by the surviving spouse of a
portion of the community property that will eventually be his/her share in the final
partition? Practically there is no reason for that view and it would be absurd.

Besides, the law requires that the requirement of prior liquidation must not prejudice
vested right. In this case the buyer already acquired the interest of the seller Protacio and
one of his childred, as they themselves are heirs, who became the co-owners with the
petitioners pending liquidation of Martas estate.
Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of the 17,140 square-meter
conjugal lot is certainly mush (sic) less than what vendors Protacio Go and his son Rito
B. Go will eventually get as their share in the final partition of the property. So the sale is
still valid.

Co-ownership

XXXVIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Co-ownership

Source

: Borromeo vs. Descallar


G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009

Contributor

: De los Santos, Naiza Mae


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Walter, a German citizen who was assigned to work in a company here in the Philippines,
met Myrna, a Filipina who was separated mother with two boys, in a hotel where the
latter works. Walter befriended Myrna and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need
of additional income to support her children, she agreed. The two fell in love and decided
to live together, so Walter then bought a house and lot in Cebu City. In the contract, the
two of them were referred to as buyers but the title was issued in Myrnas name alone.
After a few years, their relationship ended and Walter then decided to sell the house and
lot to Carlo. When the latter tried to register the deed of absolute sale, he found out that
the property was registered in the name of Myrna and the same has already been
mortgaged. Subsequently, Carlo filed an action for reconveyance. In her answer, Myrna
stated that she owns the property since it was registered in her name, the same was
acquired during their cohabitation, and Walter, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire
or own real property in the Philippines. Would Carlos action prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
YES. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise
capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case, Myrna was still
legally married to another when she and Walter lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to
be able to claim any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution
do not apply.

Walter solely and exclusively used his own funds to buy the property. The mere
registration of the title under the name of Myrna does not confer upon her absolute
ownership against convincing evidence that the property was financed exclusively by
Walter. Thus, the sale of the property to Carlo is valid. Consequently, the action for
reconveyance would prosper.

Foreign Divorce

XXXIX.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Foreign Divorce

Source

: Republic vs. Orbecido III


G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

Contributor

: Bernaldez, Josephus
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
On May 24, 1981, Cedric married Maikee. Their marriage was blessed with a son and
daughter Kristoph and Kim. In1986, Maikee left for the US bringing along their son
Kristoph. A few years later, Maikee became a naturalized as an American citizen. In
2000, Cedric learned that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married an
American. Thereafter, Cedric filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Rule on thepetition.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The petition shall be granted. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is there after validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
The said provision of law seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are Filipino citizen and a foreigner. It however
also applies to the instant case where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry.
Thus, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Funeral

XL.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Funeral

Source

: Valino vs. Adriano


G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014

Contributor

: Bautista, Mel-Lisanina
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
The marriage of the Legal Wife and her Husband, a lawyer, did not last long and they
separated. Eventually, The Husband met The Other Woman, a former client, where he
found true love and the meaning of forever.
20 years after, The Husband passed away. Because he was living at the time of his death
with The Other Woman, the latter made arrangements for his burial at her family
mausoleum. The Legal Wife, who was in states, pleaded with her to delay the burial so
her family can view the remains but her request was not heeded. The remains of The
Husband was then buried.
The Legal Wife filed an action for damages with a prayer that the remains of Husband be
transferred to the family plot in another cemetery against The Other Woman.
Who between The Legal Wife and The Other Woman is entitled to the remains of The
Husband?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The weight of legal provisions puts the responsibility of the burial with The Legal Wife.
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of
a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support,
under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of
brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants,
the paternal shall have a better right.

Art. 199 of the Family Code states: Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants
in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters.
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to The Legal Wife, she being the surviving legal wife of The Husband. The
fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when
he died has no controlling significance.

Judicial Separation of Absolute Community Property

XLI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Judicial Separation of


Absolute Community Property2

Source

: Noveras vs. Noveras


G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014

Contributor

: Ramirez, Gemma
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Spouses Noveras were former Filipino citizens who later acquired American citizenship.
Due to alleged abandonment and infidelity of the husband, the wife filed for divorce
which the California court granted and awarded her all their properties in the US. The
wife then filed a petition for judicial separation of the conjugal properties in the
Philippines anchored on her husbands abandonment and their having been separated in
fact for at least one year where reconciliation was highly improbable.
Should the petition for the judicial separation of the conjugal properties be granted?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the petition for the judicial separation of the conjugal properties should be granted.
As a general rule any modification in the marriage settlement must be made before the
celebration of marriage. An exception to the rule is allowed provided the modification is
judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided by law.
Thus, Art. 135 of the Family Code provides that any of the following shall be considered
sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
1.
That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction;
2.
Judicially declared an absentee;
3.
Loss of parental authority has been decreed by the court;

4.
Has abandoned petitioner or failed to comply with his or her obligations to
the family
5.
The spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements has been abused that power and
6.
At the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated n fact for at
least 1 year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the instant case, the spouses having been separated in fact for at least one year where
reconciliation is highly improbable, is a sufficient cause for the grant of judicial
separation of property.

Legal Separation; Forfeiture

XLII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Legal Separation;


Forfeiture

Source

: Quiao vs. Quiao


G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012

Contributor

: Ocat, Mylene
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A and B tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977 wherein the operative law was the Civil
Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386). A and B did not agree on a marriage settlement;
hence, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains. As time passes by, A committed repeated physical violence
to B. Hence, their marital relationship turned sour and B decided to file legal separation
against A on August 3, 1989. If the case will prosper, what law shall govern on the
dissolution of their conjugal property?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Article 129 of the Family Code will be used on the dissolution of conjugal partnership of
gains of A and B. The rationale behind the prospective application of law is that, at the
time of the dissolution of A and Bs marriage, the operative law is already the Family
Code. Thus, the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article
63(2) of the Family Code.

Legal Spouse

XLIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Legal Spouse

Source

: Social Security Commission vs. Azote


G.R. No. 209741, April 15, 2015

Contributor

: Amores, Ernesto Miguel


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
On June 19, 1992, Nadine and James, a member of the Social Security System (SSS),
were married in civil rites at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City, Albay
(RTC). Their union produced six children. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form
E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older children as designated beneficiaries.
Thereafter or on September 7, 2001, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS
designating his three younger children as additional beneficiaries.
On January 13, 2005, James passed away. Shortly thereafter, Nadine filed her claim for
death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It appeared, however,
from the SSS records that James had earlier submitted another Form E-4 on November 5,
1982 with a different set of beneficiaries, namely: Katherine, as his spouse; and Daniel,
as dependent. Consequently, Nadines claim was denied. The SSC said that the National
Statistics Office (NSO) records revealed that the marriage of James to Katherine was
registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it opined that James' marriage to Nadine was
not valid as there was no showing that his first marriage had been annulled or dissolved.
The SSC stated that there must be a judicial determination of nullity of a previous
marriage before a party could enter into a second marriage.
Nadine did not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of James was either
annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Katherines presumptive
death before her marriage to James.
Under Section 8 (e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282, the amendatory law of R.A. No. 1161 or
the "Social Security Law", only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to
be the beneficiary of the latter's SS benefits.

Nadine wants to file a case and comes to you seeking your advice. Can she claim the
death benefits of James as the legal spouse of the latter?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, she cannot claim the death benefits of James.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, a marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Moreover, under the same code and prevailing jurisprudence, it has been established that
there must be a judicial determination of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
could enter into a second marriage.
In the case at bar, Nadine failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the
impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to James.
Since Nadine was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member,
she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of James.
Furthermore, the existence of two Form E-4s designating, on two different dates, two
different women as his spouse is already an indication that only one of them can be the
legal spouse. As can be gleaned from the certification issued by the NSO, there is no
doubt that James married Katherine in 1982. Nadine cannot be considered as the legal
spouse of James as their marriage took place during the existence of a previously
contracted marriage. For said reason, the denial of Nadine's claim by the SSC was
correct.

Marriage

XLIV.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Marriage

Source

: Ocampo vs. Ocampo


G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015

Contributor

: Udtohan, Liljoy
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Maria and Juan got married on 1978. Maria filed for a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The court granted the petition.
The court further ordered that their properties belong to them on a 50-50 sharing. Maria
appealed contending that Juan is not entitled to his share because he did not help in the
management of their businesses and because of his psychological perversity as well as
bad faith.
a.
What property relations govern marriages that are declared void due to
psychological incapacity?
b.

Is Juan still entitled to his share in their properties?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
A void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of
the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by

them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
b)

YES. Juan is still entitled to his share in their properties.

The law provides, in the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party
who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
In this case, while it may be true that management of the businesses may have been
actively undertaken by Maria, it cannot be gainsaid that she was able to do so without the
invaluable help of Juan. Furthermore, attempts to establish Juan as an irresponsible and
unfaithful husband, as well as family man failed to fully convince that he should be
punished by depriving him of his share of the conjugal property because of his
indiscretion.

XLV.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Marriage

Source

: Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luna


G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014

Contributor

: Solon, Roger Benjamin


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
J and E, both Filipinos are married and they have two children. After several years of
marriage they decided to live apart and separate their property. Later on J, traveled to a
foreign country, Tropico and obtained a divorce decree from his marriage with E in the
proper court. On the same day, he married S in the same country. Afterwards, they
returned to the Philippines and lived as husband and wife.
Since J was an attorney he purchased a condominium unit for his law firm. A few years
later, the law firm was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned. Js share was
. J formed another law firm with C as a partner and used his portion of the
condominium unit as their law office. The firm lasted until J died years later.
The share of J in the condominium unit became the subject of the complaint filed by S
against the heirs of J. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired
during the existence of the marriage between J and S through their joint efforts that since
they had no children, S became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of J.
The decisions of both the RTC and CA both favored the Heirs of J so S appealed to the
Supreme Court. Is the marriage between J and S valid? If so, is S entitled to any of the
property under litigation?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the marriage between J and S is void for being bigamous. It is true that the court in
Tropicana issued a divorce decree dissolving the first marriage of J and E. Conformably
with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did
not dissolve the marriage between J and E, which subsisted up to the time of his death.
Thus the second marriage is void.

No, she is not. Due to the second marriage between J and S being void ab initio by virtue
of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership. Whoever alleges co-ownership has the burden of
proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it is essential for S to
offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation
of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in
her favor.
Consequently S is not entitled to Js share of the condominium.

XLVI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Marriage

Source

: Ando vs. Department of Foreign Affairs


G.R. No. 195432, August 27, 2014

Contributor

: Ygana, Angeline
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Barbie Doll married Lee Minho a Japanese National, in a civil wedding solemnized at
Candaba, Pampanga. However after a few years of marriage Lee Minho sought in Japan,
and was validly granted under Japanese laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with
Barbie Doll. The said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil
Registry of Manila. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry
and that by such she reverted to her single status, Barbie Doll married Masatomi Y. Ando
on 13 September 2005 in a civil wedding. So Barbie Doll applied for the renewal of her
Philippine passport to indicate her surname with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she
was told at the Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her until
the former marriage is declared annulled. She filed a declaratory relief against the DFA
and the same was denied by the court for no cause of action because she is still married
with Lee Minho and failed to obtain judicial recognition of divorce decree. Is the court
correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No.
As a rule, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven and like any other fact.
Furthermore, Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239.

SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women shall be


made in accordance with the following provisions:
xxx
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must present a
certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy
or consular post which has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by
the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.

XLVII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Marriage

Source

: Abbas vs. Abbas


G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013

Contributor

: Araas, Nia Grace


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
You are a Family Court judge and before you is a Petition for the Declaration of
Annulment of Marriage (under Article 35 of the Family Code) filed by Syed against
Gloria. Syed claims that he arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9,
1993, he was at his mother-in-laws residence in Manila, when suddenly his mother-inlaw arrived with a Reverend and a lawyer. He was told by the latter that he must undergo
a ceremony, which one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines. Although he
did not know the real nature of such ceremony, he still proceeded and both he and Gloria
signed a document. It was only until later that Gloria told him that the ceremony was a
marriage ceremony. Shocked, Syed confirmed that he never applied for marriage license.
So he went to the Municipal Civil Registrar and the latter issued a certification that the
marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, was the
number of another marriage license issued to a different couple. Gloria on the other hand
presented witnesses who testified that the marriage license was given to them the day
before the actual wedding, and that it was previously secured by a certain Qualin but the
latter never explained how he had obtained it. Gloria was not able to present the actual
marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. Gloria claims that no
diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative
value. Gloria relies on Article 4 of the Family Code that, An irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.On the basis of
the evidence presented, will you grant the petition of Syed to declare the marriage void?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
YES, if I were the Family Court judge presiding the case. I will grant the petition. There
is NO MERE IRREGULARITY of obtaining a marriage license in this case, but an exact
LACK of marriage license.

Art. 3 of the Family Code states that, a valid marriage license is one of the formal
requisites of a valid marriage. Furthermore, Art. 4 of the same law mentions that, The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). Art. 35 further states that, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter, shall be void from the
beginning.
The certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.In the Rules of
Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. Gloria has failed to discharge that
burden, and hence the conclusion that no valid marriage license was issued. Article 35(3)
of the Family Code further provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void
from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27
to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51. In the case at bar, this marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a
marriage license, is void ab initio.

XLVIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Marriage

Source

: Fujiki vs. Marinay


G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

Contributor

: Manuales, Eisone Brix


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Jumego (Japanese) married Jumega (Filipino) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004.
Eventually, they got separated.
On 15 May 2008, Jumega married Jumel another Japanese national in Quezon City,
Philippines without dissolving her first marriage. Jumel brought Jumega to Japan.
However, Jumega allegedly suffered physical abuse from Jumel. She left Jumel and
started to contact Jumego.
Jumega met Jumego in Japan and they re-established their relationship. In 2010, Jumego
helped Jumega obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Jumega and Jumel void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Jumego filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).
The RTC immediately dismissed the petition, ruling that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife as
provided under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Does Jumego have the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of
a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"it

refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or
the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.

XLIX.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Marriage

Source

: Iwasawa vs. Gangan


G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013

Contributor

: Mamao, Arief
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Naruto, a Japanese national, met Sarah in his visits to the Philippines. Sarah introduced
herself as "single" and "has never married before." Eventually, they got married and after
their wedding, the couple resided in Japan. Sarah confessed to him that she received news
that her previous husband passed away. This prompted Naruto to file a petition for the
declaration of his marriage to Sarah as null and void on the ground that their marriage is
bigamous. During trial, aside from his testimony, Naruto also offered in evidence the
Certificate of Marriage between Sarah and Peter issued by the National Statistics Office
(NSO). The court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove Sarah's prior existing
valid marriage to another man because he did not present the records custodian of the
NSO. Is the ruling of the court tenable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The ruling of the court is untenable. There is no question that the documentary evidence
submitted by Naruto is a public document.
As provided in the Civil Code: ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness. Thus, the court erred when it disregarded said documents
on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO
who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of
authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said
documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Marriage Contracts; Cancellation of Entries

L.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Marriage Contracts;


Cancellation of Entries

Source

: Republic vs. Olaybar


G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014

Contributor

: Isidro, Dalisay
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of
five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain
Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) in Cebu City. Olaybar has never contracted any marriage with
anyone, she did not know the alleged husband, and the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers.
Olaybar filed with the RTC a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
Contract, under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, especially the entries in the wife portion
thereof impleading the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as the alleged husband,
as parties to the case. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the
petition, which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings. Respondent presented as witness an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who
confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but
claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a
document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was
forged.
The petition was granted by the RTC but the Solicitor General insisted that granting the
cancellation of "all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract," is in
effect declaring the marriage void ab initio in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.
Is the Solicitor General correct? Why?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. It was clearly established that, as Olaybar claimed in her petition, no such marriage
was celebrated.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage is necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369). In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing
his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show
the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no
marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties
had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures
were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth
as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the
marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

Marriage; Psychological Incapacity

LI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations;


Psychological Incapacity

Family

Source

: Mallilin vs. Jamesolamin


G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015

Contributor

: Jaen, Bea Marie

Relations;

Marriage;

-xxxxPROBLEM:
H filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, W was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity
and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential
obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent during their
marriage when W exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency
of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes
demanding obligation of a wife and a mother as shown by the following circumstances:
(1) it was H who did the cleaning of the room because W did not know how to keep
order; (2) it was Ws mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who
washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was
also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and
looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) H
received anonymous letters reporting W loitering with male students; (6) when H was not
home, W would receive male visitors; (7) a certain K slept in their house when H was
away; and (6) W would contract loans without his knowledge.
Should the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage be granted based on Art. 36 of
the Family Code?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The petition should be dismissed. The allegations of H failed to establish the
psychological incapacity of W for psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 of
the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)

incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only
emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Parental Authority

LII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Parental Authority

Source

: Beckett vs. Sarmiento


A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, January 30, 2013

Contributor

: Tirol, Mark Jason


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Becket, an Australian national was married to Eltesa, a Filipina. In 2001, their marriage
begot them a child and named him Geoffrey Becket Jr. However, the marriage did not last
long as series of events which materialized into suits were filed. Eltesa charged Becket
with a violation of RA 7610 and filed an action for a declaration of nullity of their
marriage. On his part, Becket filed a criminal case for adultery against Eltesa. The case
was raffled to the sala of Judge Sarmiento. However, a compromise agreement was
entered into which contains among others, that all civil and criminal actions filed will be
dropped upon the assumption of parental custody of Beckett over Geoffrey with the grant
of visitorial rights to Eltesa.
Does the parental custody of a child grant the parent chosen by the court a permanent
right thereto?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No.
In all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the
latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override
procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in
this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age
when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect,
enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an
atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development.

Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr., in favor of his
mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description
of the legal situation engendered by the Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the
child not to be returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to
jurisprudential command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child.

Paternity and Filiation

LIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Paternity and


Filiation

Source

: Aguilar vs. Siasat


G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015

Contributor

: Solatorio, Carol
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Mr A does not have birth certificate nor a final judgment declaring him to have been
legally adopted by Mr B. However, Mr A introduced as evidence a document -- SSS
Form E-1 to prove that he is the son of Mr B. Is the intervention of the court required?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, said document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
and it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval. Article 172 par. 2 of the Family Code is applicable as filiation may be
proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required.

LIV.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Paternity and


Filiation

Source

: Salas vs. Matusalem


G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013

Contributor

: Trias, Parker
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint
for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cabanatuan City.
Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was
born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as
she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented
an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their
child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement. Before delivery,
petitioner even walked her at the hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying he had
not done this to his wife. She filled out the form for the child's birth certificate and wrote
all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the
hospital bills and drove her baby home and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors
and Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner rented. However, when
respondent refused the offer of petitioner's family to take the child from her, petitioner
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends.
Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still
petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Petitioner now denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no
other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the
delivery of said child, unaware of respondent's chicanery and deceit designed to
"scandalize" him in exchange for financial favor.
GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES ABOVE, IS THE RESPONDENTS EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT HER SON CHRISTIAN PAULO IS THE
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF PETITIONER?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1)
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1)
The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2)
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the
name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it
was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she
claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
The court held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had
a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth
certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a
recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to
the alleged father.
The rest of respondent's documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters,
hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented
apartment unit. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father
are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. Showing petitioner and respondent inside
the rented apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of
Christian Paulo, petitioner's financial support while respondent lived in Murillo's
apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with details,
do not approximate the "overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial"
presented in Ilano case.
In sum, it was hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not
competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondent's evidence failed to establish
Christian Paulo's filiation to petitioner. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high
standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation.

Probative Value of Contrato Marimonial Issued by the Church to


Prove The Fact Marriage

LV.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Probative Value of


Contrato Marimonial Issued by the Church to Prove The Fact Marriage

Source

: Cercado-Siga vs. Cercade, Jr.


G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

Contributor

: Baquero, Hope Cesely


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Simplicia and Ligaya claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and
Benita Castillo and alleged that during the lifetime of their parents, their father acquired
by gratuitous title a parcel of land Binangonan, Rizal. They claimed that upon the death
of their father Vicente and by virtue of intestate succession, ownership over the subject
land pertained to them as heirs; that upon the death of Benita, her share was acquired by
petitioners by operation of law. Sometime in September 1998, they read from a
newspaper a notice that the estate of Vicente and a certain Leonora has been
extrajudicially settled by their heirs, Vicente, Jr., Manuela and Maria. Upon verification,
they were furnished a copy of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate (Deed) executed
and signed by the latter. Simplicia and Ligaya insist that Vicente and Leonora were not
married or if they were so married, then said marriage was null and void by reason of the
subsisting marriage of their parents, Vicente and Benita. Simplicia and Ligaya prayed for
the declaration of the Deed as null and void. In support of the existence of the alleged
first marriage, petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato Matrimonial, issued by Iglesia
Filipina Independiente church. The heirs submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a
private document and the fact that marriages are required to be registered in the local
civil registrar does not ipso facto make it a public document. Does the marriage contract
or Contrato Matrimonial issued by the church has probative value to prove the fact of
marriage?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

In the case of SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA AND LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON, vs.


VICENTE CERCADO, JR., MANUELA C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C.
ARALAR AND VIOLETA C. BINADAS. G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015, the court
ruled that it is a private document. They are private writings and their authenticity must
therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of
evidence. The marriage contract does not meet the requirement. Ancient documents are
considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might
reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a
legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such
an origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and naturally be,
its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for. Simplicia and
Ligaya failed to authenticate the said Contrato Matrimonial and therefore does not have
the probative value to prove the fact of marriage of their parents. Considering that they
failed to prove the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita, it follows that
they do not have a cause of action in the case for the declaration of nullity of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora.

Property Relations

LVI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Property Relations

Source

: Barrido vs. Nonato


G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014

Contributor

: Melicor, Joreyna Mae


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
X and Y acquired a property consisting of house and lot during their marriage. However,
their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. X asked Y
for partition, but the latter refused, thus, prompting X to file for a partition case. Y, in her
affirmative defense, claimed that the property was sold to their children. What provision
in the Family Code has the application on the spouses' property relations?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Article 147 of the Family Code specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses property relations.
For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.

Property Relations; Absolute Community Property Regime

LVII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Property Relations;


Absolute Community Property Regime

Source

: Nobleza vs. Nuega


G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015

Contributor

: Geli, Cheska Marie


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Basha and Popoy bought a residential lot in Marikina where they plan to build their
home. Subsequently, the two got married and lived in the subject property. One day,
Basha who was then working in Israel as a domestic helper learned that Popoy had
brought home another woman, Trisha, into the family home and had been introducing to
others as his wife. Outraged, Basha filed two cases against Popoy: one for Concubinage
and another for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property. In between the filing of
these cases, Basha learned that Popoy had the intention of selling the subject property.
Basha then advised the interested buyers one of whom was their neighbor Ana of the
existence of the cases that she had filed against Popoy and cautioned her against buying
the subject property until the cases are closed and terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed
of Absolute Sale, Popoy sold the subject property to Ana without Bashas consent in the
amount of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P380,000.00). Was the Deed of
Absolute Sale void in its entirety or void only as to Bashas share and valid as to Popoys
share in the property?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Deed of Absolute Sale is void in its entirety. Under Article 96 of The Family Code
of the Philippines, the said disposition of a communal property is states that in the event
that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. It is clear under the

foregoing provision that Popoy could not sell the subject property without the written
consent of Basha or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the
entire sale is void.

Psychological Incapacity

LVIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Psychological


Incapacity

Source

: Kalaw vs. Fernandez


G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015

Contributor

: Lumantas, Jessa Faith


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Mr. Kalaw filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage against his wife on
the ground of psychological incapacity. He was able to present the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of
respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. The court in its decision granted the
complaint. Respondent then argued the courts decision on the ground that it was not
proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with
the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. Thus, while
there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not proven. Is the wifes contention correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the wifes contention is not correct. In the case of Kalaw vs. Fernandez, the court
ruled that its not the FREQUENCY of the mahjong sessions that would delimit the
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Its the fact that the
respondent-wife should have known that bringing her children along her children of
very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and
other vices that would erode their moral fiber. This, based on the totality of facts in the
case, supports the finding of psychological incapacity.

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did
not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to
expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture
of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act
of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and
escapist desires. The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral
and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and
protect her children.

LIX.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Psychological


Incapacity

Source

: Republic vs. De Gracia


G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014

Contributor

: Maylon, Ron Stephane


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
R, husband and N, wife were married. However, R filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage alleging that N was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations. R furthered that he was just forced to marry her in light of
her accidental pregnancy; that she left the conjugal abode to live with another man, and
married a third man. Dr. Z found both R and N to be psychologically incapacitated
suffering from emotional immaturity. As the judge, would you grant the petition?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. As a judge, I will deny the petition.
Psychological incapacity must be proven within the parameters set by jurisprudence.
Mere allegation of sexual promiscuity and emotional immaturity won't suffice.
In the case given, the facts are insufficient to conclude that N's emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility or even sexual promiscuity cant be equated with psychological
incapacity. Dr. Z's finding does not explain in reasonable detail how N's condition could
be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and incurable within the parameters of
psychological incapacity jurisprudence.

LX.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Psychological


Incapacity

Source

: Republic vs. Encelan


G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013

Contributor

: Tohay , Ada Bonita


-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Alden married Maine and the union bore two children. To support his family, Alden went
to work in Saudi. While there, he learned that Maine was having an illicit affair with
Franco and that she allegedly left the conjugal home and lived with Franco. Alden filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage based on Maine's psychological
incapacity. In support, Alden presented the psychological evaluation report prepared by
Dr. Joey that Maine was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness,"
however, Maine's transferring from one job to another and some problems with coworkers depicts some interpersonal problems. The RTC granted the petition on the
ground that Maine is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Is the RTC's decision correct? Why or Why not?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The decision of the RTC is not correct.
Under the Civil Code, Psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the
celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.
Accordingly, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do
not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
In the given case, Dr. Joeys observation on Maines interpersonal problems with coworkers, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of
her marriage psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Alden.
Moreover, a wifes psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her

professional/work relationship. Workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart


from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their
relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be
compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another.
Thus, the RTCs decision is not correct.

Requisites of Marriage; Exception

LXI.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Requisites of


Marriage; Exception

Source

: Office of the Court Administrator vs. Necessario


A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013

Contributor

: Andales, Ziazel
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
The following couples marriages were solemnized by Judge Malificent on various dates
within the year:
1.
Aladdin and Jasminthe marriage license submitted by Aladdin hasa visible sign
of tampering in the entry related to his place of residence.
2.
Belle and Adam Adam is a foreigner; he submitted a mere affidavit of his
capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy.
3.
Tiana and Naveen in lieu of marriage license, the parties were given a pro forma
affidavit of cohabitation. At the time of their marriage, Tiana was 21 years old.
4.
Rapunzel and Flynn the marriage documents they presented to the judge lacked
the corresponding official receipt for the solemnization fee.
5.
Aurora and Philip their marriage license was issued a week after the
solemnization of their marriage.
Discuss the possible liability of Judge Malificent in solemnizing the marriages as
mentioned. Give pertinent provisions of law to support your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Judge Malificent is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing


marriages with questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting parties is a
foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required
certificate from his embassy and for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has
been paid.
He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34
of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during the
cohabitation and for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
The Family Code provides the requisites for a valid marriage. Articles 3 and 4 of said law
provides:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Primarily, the violation committed by Judge Malificent is with regards to the marriage
licenses requirement.
The ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is not beyond the scope of the
duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that
point to the contrary. The presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license
disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
With regards to a marriage where one contracting party is a foreigner, Article 21 of the
Family Code requires the submission of the certificate of legal capacity to marry from the
embassy of the foreign party.
It follows that Judge Malificent should have been more diligent in reviewing the parties
documents and qualifications. The absence of the required certificates coupled with the
presence of mere affidavit should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the
marriage license issuance.

JudgeMalificents gross ignorance of the law is also evident when she solemnized
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and
with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party.
Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless,
the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
license. The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma
particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period
of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and
not only at the time of the marriage. That is not the case with Tiana who is only a minor
during the start of the cohabitation.
Also, Judge Malificent ignored the clear mandate of the law when she solemnized a
marriage with the marriage license lacking. A marriage solemnized without a marriage
license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license cannot render valid or add even
an iota of validity to the marriage.
It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
Lastly, as to the non-payment of solemnization fee, Judge Malificentfailed to give her
attention to one of the tasks expected and that is to see to it that the solemnization fee is
paid. The payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application
process and even puts a stamp of regularity on the process.

Surname of Illegitimate Children

LXII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Surname of


Illegitimate Children

Source

: Grande vs. Antonio


G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014

Contributor

: Regudo, Marion Thursday


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PROBLEM:
F and M for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although F was at that
time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born:
A and B. The children were not expressly recognized by F as his own in the Record of
Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship eventually turned
sour, and M left for the United States with her two children. This prompted F to file a
Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority,
Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors, and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
F maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by him that he is the
father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-ofthe-child" clause, compels the use by the children of his surname.
M argued that Article 176 of the Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No. (RA)
9255, couched as it is in permissive languagemay not be invoked by a father to compel
the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Art. 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to
use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by

law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children. The clear, unambiguous,
and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers
surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the
surnames by which they will be known.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children
are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of childrens surnames, the
Supreme Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the fathers surname
serves the best interest of the minor child. Fs position that the court can order the minors
to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

Void ab initio Marriage; Property Relations

LXIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Void ab initio


Marriage; Property Relations

Source

: Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.


G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

Contributor

: Maico, Ma. Noelle


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PROBLEM:
Despite being married to Arra, Andrew Ayala (Andrew) developed an intimate and
romantic relationship with April Ang (April), a frequent customer in Andrews carwash
business. When Arra left for Argentina, Andrew and April lived together as husband and
wife. April, belonging to a conservative Chinese family, convinced Andrew to sign a
purported marriage contract assuring him that the said contract would not be registered.
During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired certain real properties.
Unfortunately, the relationship ended four years after when April left for Australia,
bringing their children with her. Andrew then filed a petition for declaration of a nonexistent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that his
marriage to April was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. He also asked for the partition of the properties he acquired with April. A total
of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition.
a) If you are the judge, will you grant the petition? Explain.
b) What rule will govern the property relations of Andrew and April?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) As the judge, I will grant the petition of Andrew.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except
those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, shall be void from the
beginning. In this case, the marriage between Andrew and April was solemnized without
a license. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage

void ab initio. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. The parties just
signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The marriage between
Andrew and April did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
b) The property relations of Andrew and April will be governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
The parties cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.