Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Columbia University
Version of record first published: 21 Nov 2012.
To cite this article: Bastian Matteo Scianna (2012): Reporting Atrocities: Archibald Reiss in Serbia,
1914--1918, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 25:4, 596-617
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2012.730395
INTRODUCTION
When, in August 1914, hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia broke
out, the latters Chief of Staff, Radomir Putnik, was on holiday in an Austrian
spa town.1 He had with him the keys to the safe containing Serbias war
1
I am indebted to Dennis Showalter for this anecdote, in the same, War in the East
and Balkans, 191418 (pp. 6681) here p. 69, in J. Horne, A Companion to World War I ,
Chichester, U.K., 2010.
Bastian Matteo Scianna is pursuing the M.A./MSc dual degree in International and World
History at Columbia University and the London School of Economics and Political Science.
His research interests are the development of strategic thought, irregularity in warfare and the
current European Defense Project.
Address correspondence to Bastian Matteo Scianna, Columbia University and LSE,
Margaretehnhof 37, 67316 Carlsberg, Germany. E-mail: bs2710@columbia.edu
596
Reporting Atrocities
597
More details can be found in Z. Levental, Rodolphe Archibald Reiss, Lausanne, LAge dhomme,
1992, p. 13f.
3
Ibid., pp. 15, 161.
4
Ibid., p. 110.
5
B. Alexander, The Genesis of the Civilian, Leiden Journal of International Law, 20 (2007,
pp. 359376, here p. 363. Best, G., Restraints on war by land before 1945 (1738), here p. 30, in Howard,
M, Andreopoulos, G.J. & Shulman, M.R The Laws of War: Constraints on warfare in the Western World
(New Haven: Yale University Press 1994).
598
B. M. Scianna
Ibid., p. 365.
S. Neitzel and D. Horath, Entfesselter Kampf oder gezhmte Kriegsfhrung?, p. 12, in S. Neitzel,
S. D. Horath, Kriegsgreuel Paderborn, Schningh, 2008.
8
Ibid., p.15.
9
J. Verhey, The Spirit of 1914 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 11.
10
Z. Levental, Rodolphe Archibald Reiss, p. 33.
11
Ibid, p. 34.
7
Reporting Atrocities
599
army was recovering from the hardships suffered in blood and treasure.12
After all, for towns like Valjevo, it was the third war in three years.13 Reiss
seems to be mainly driven by idealistic ideas of investigating on a larger
scale and aspiring to communicate his findings to a global audience to
become a public voice of reason and un figure historique de lhumanisme.14
Consequently, he was in contact with three newspapers before his departure.
He was also driven by what Levental describes as haine contre lui-meme
in rejecting his own German identity and arguing against German militarism
(and by this, against his two brothers who became decorated war heroes in
Imperial Germany). So one can see a certain personality split of the world
renowned scholar: rejecting his original identity and looking for a meaning and a sense of belonging somewhere. This leads to the fact that he
seems totally uninterested in strategy or tactics but focuses more on portraying personal tragedies in war, mainly la mentalit des simples soldats
whose camaraderie fascinated him and created a long lasting passion and
connection to Serbia and its people.15
Arriving in Serbia, Reiss tried to visit as many front line sites as possible.
By interrogating captured Austrian as well as Serbian soldiers and civilians
he tried to get as much information as possible. He is certainly in his element
when he describes the use of explosive bullets by the Austrians. He found
whole boxes of them which had devastating effects on the human body, as
a limb which has been struck by an explosive bullet is always lost.16 In total,
there were 117 cases of wounds caused by explosive bullets at the sixth
reserve hospital of Valievo in nine days and Austrian POWs testimonies
showed that these explosives were only distributed in December after the
defeats of Iadar and Tzer and, additionally, the soldiers explained that they
did not have any knowledge of them before the war.17 This is an example
where Reiss used his professional background to show that the Austrian
reasoning of using these explosives as artillery range marking was merely a
bad excuse. His own tests show that the marking function is inefficient as not
enough smoke was produced; moreover, as most soldiers were hit directly
by these bullets, there was no smoke or any fire at all that could be used by
the Austrian artillery.18 Thereby, his professional analysis could debunk the
excuse of the Austrians for using banned ammunition.
In October, Reiss visited Belgrade, which by then had been subject to
36 days and nights of bombardment. The Old Fortress is described by him
12
Showalter, War in the East and the Balkans 191418 (pp. 6681), here p. 69 in J. Horne, A
Companion to World War I
13
R. A. Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War in Serbia: Personal Investigations of a Neutral Paris,
A. Colin, 1915, p. 47.
14
Ibid., pp. 29, 42.
15
Ibid., p. 46.
16
Ibid., pp. 4, 7.
17
Ibid., p. 8.
18
Ibid., pp. 910.
600
B. M. Scianna
as being more of a museum than a real fortification. He adds that during the
bombing the shells were aimed at private houses, Government buildings
and factories without any distinction and that over sixty state buildings and
640 private houses were struck by the projectiles whereas the latter often
were not even close to any valuable targets.19 The arbitrary shelling of the
town included the University, the national museum and hospitals which Reiss
saw as an outright violation of the Hague conventions and as a clear sign that
the Austro-Hungarians sought to destroy the civil population of Belgrade.20
However, he himself gives the data that after this 36 day bombardment, only
25 civilians had died and 126 wounded, which hardly a number that hints at
exterminatory intents. However, he admired the courage of the people who
continued to live their everyday lives under such conditions.21
Along the same line, he reported from Sabac22 and Lesnica on
October 22, both open towns without any military installations that were
shelled without any necessity. They are mutually portrayed as rich towns
with many beautiful houses now in ruins and with the population fleeing.
The major of the town Petkovica, Pantelia Maric, is quoted in his report
as saying that the burning was deliberately organized by the invading army.
He declare[d] that the Austro-Hungarian soldiers had with them little tin pots.
They painted with the contents of these pots the houses which they wished
to set on fire and then set a light to them with matches.23 In general, all
the towns where troops passed had been destroyed and all objects of value
ha[d] been carried away and safes broken open.24
Apart from bombarding the town, Sabac was also the site of many
atrocities against combatants and non-combatants. What Reiss described in
his pamphlet is mainly the killing of wounded or immediately captured
Serbian soldiers by the Austrians.25 The Hungarian soldiers under Lt. Nagj
of the 37th Hungarian regiment were proven to have cut the throats of the
wounded with their knives and bayonets and to have shot prisoners.26 The
Serbian soldier Mladen Simic reported that he was in the trenches with many
other killed and wounded when the Austrians arrived. They finished off the
wounded.27 Reiss also manages to give a good sense of the chaotic situation of attack and counter-attack around Sabac during this period. Citing
a Serbian report from 13 October: Near the Schtipliane river, the Austrians
took prisoners about 10 wounded men of the 3rd supernumerary regiment.
19
Ibid., p. 11.
Ibid., p. 12.
21
Z. Levental, Rodolphe Archibald Reiss, p. 60.
22
Also written Chabatz.
23
Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War in Serbia, p.13.
24
Ibid., p. 39f, with more than a thousand safes only in Sabac.
25
Ibid., p. 13, he used fictitious initials for the names of my Austro-Hungarian witnesses to avoid
the disagreeable consequences which would otherwise ensue when they return to their country.
26
Ibid., p. 14.
27
Ibid.
20
Reporting Atrocities
601
The wounds of these men were dressed. When the Austrians found themselves obliged to leave their positions in consequence of the attack of the
2nd battalion of the 3rd Serbian regiment, they shot the wounded in order
not to let them be retaken alive by the Serbs.28 This plays into the factor of
perceived military necessity and calculated number games.
Reports from Austrian sources show a similar picture of chaos, frustration and slaughter. The unexpectedly strong resistance by the Serbs led to
confusion and aggravation which often resulted in friendly fire in the poorly
and hastily organized offensives.29 Especially during the hectic Austrian
retreat, which Kisch described as witches Sabbath,
hundreds of injured and sick men were left by the river bank, some fighting to get across the pontoons, hundreds drowning.30 The inexperienced
Austrian troops, without a systematic organization, lack of officer initiative and poor training31 , advanced into an unfavorable territory against
a battle-hardened enemy that was defending its home soil problems
of logistics and sustainability were neglected and became the key for
the military catastrophe in this terrain.32 The Austrian army devoted great
attention to morale and to willpower in their training and doctrine. This
unrealistic belief in overcoming material or physical obstacles by sheer
willpower explains the spirit of the offensive33
Additionally, the Habsburg soldiers had in mind an expectation of cruelty, irregularity, treason and barbarity awaiting them and reports show this
mix of anxiety and tension in entering terra incognita.34 Where civilians
took up arms to defend themselves and turned into semi-combatants this
28
Ibid., p. 15.
R. Jerbek, Potiorek: General im Schatten von Sarajevo Graz, Verlag Styria, 1991, pp. 121123, 142.
30
Cited in A. Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 141.
31
L. Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Htzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse Boston, Humanities Press,
2000, p.200.
32
G.E. Rothenberg, The Austro-Hungarian Campaign against Serbia in 1914, Journal of Military
History 53 (1989) pp.127146, 137, 144.
33
Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Htzendorf , pp. 39, 5456 and also V. R. Berghahn, Europa
im Zeitalter der Weltkriege : die Entfesselung und Entgrenzung der Gewalt Frankfurt am Main, Fischer
Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002, e.g., p. 119.
34
See exemplary herefore the report in Jerabek, Potiorek, pp. 12728: Man hatte sich das lange
nicht so schwer vorgestellt. Die Truppe sah sich absonderlich neuen Elementen gegenber einer schier
unertrglichen Hitze, einem durchaus fremdartigen Gelnde voller Fallstricke . . . dann einem immer
unsichtbaren, beraschend und gespensterhaft auftretenden Feinde, der sich listig und sichtlich von der
Bevlkerung benachrichtigt und untersttzt, jedem Zugriffe entzog. Hier trug jeder Bauer ein Gewehr
oder die Soldaten Bauernkleider und selbst von Weibern und Kindern erzhlte man sich feindselige
oder grausame Akte gegen unsere liegengebliebenen Verwundeten. In jedes Unternhemen mischten sich
berraschung und Verrat immer musste man auf Feuer, Hinterhalt und berfall gefasst sein, nie gab es
eine ruhige Nacht. Diese seelische Spannung war schwerer zu ertragen, als Hunger und Durst. Das war
kein ehrlicher Feind, der immer aus Verstecken schoss. Dazu schwere blutige Verluste . . . Vor allem fehlte
ein sichtbarer, positiver Erfolg . . . [eigene Truppen] 75% Nichtaktive . . . Besonders im Gefecht ging es nicht
in dem Tempo, das man vom Manverfelde gewohnt war. Dazu gab es da und dort eine kleine Panik, bei
der man inne wurde, da es Grenzen fr vernunft, Fhrung und Kommandogewalt gab. . . . So hatte
29
602
B. M. Scianna
This included even children of five to the oldest men, as in the massacre of
twelve primary school children in Dobric in August.41 Some of these atrocities
were committed on Habsburg soil, e.g., in the village of Sirmia and other
towns in Bosnia; notably often the accused regiments were Hungarian.42
These testimonies from Austrian sources show the willingness to commit
crimes by some soldiers, and their obedience in following higher orders for
man sich das Debut in Serbien nicht vorgestellt. Die Stimmung war vielfach verdrossen und dster, das
Vertrauen gegenseitig erschttert.
35
R. A. Reiss, Le traitement des prisonniers et des blesss par les Austro-Germano-Bulgares; rsultats
de lenqute excute sur le front de Salonique Paris, B. Grasset, 1919, p. 5.
36
Ibid., pp. 7, 8, 1718 (One of these prisoners was Ivo Andric.).
37
Ibid., p. 11.
38
Ibid., p. 28.
39
Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War, p. 16.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid., pp. 17, 1920.
42
Ibid., pp. 18, 20.
Reporting Atrocities
603
such crimes, as Reiss laid out in the order by General Horststein, which
stated that:
K.u.K. 9 Korps Kommando. R. No 32. Ruma, 14th August 1914, Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid., p. 21.
45
Ibid., p. 26.
46
Ibid., pp. 3031, also Jerabek, Potiorek, p. 164 cites this account from Austrian sources in the following way: Im Garten der Kirche sah ich einen groen Haufen Leichen, circa 80 Stck. Auf meine
Frage, was das sei, sagte mir Lt.Gf. Esterhazy, dass das erschossene Civilgefangene sind, die heute
Vormittag niedergemacht wurden. Er kam gerade dazu, wie so gegen 11h v.M. die auf der Strasse vor
der Kirche befindlichen Truppen auf diese Gefangenen ein wildes Feuer erffneten. Er kommandierte
sofort das Feuer einstellen und zog einen das ganze Vorgehen passiv zusehenden Infanteriekadett zur
Verantwortung, der sich damit entschuldigte, dass soeben ein ihm unbekannter General mit einem Auto
vorbeigefahren sei, der den Befehl erteilte, dass man von den Gefangenen, die auf die Nachricht, dass
die Serben in der Nhe seien und die Stadt beschiessen, unruhig geworden sinddie Bulgaren ausscheiden und die anderen niedermachen soll. Die Truppen hatten das gehrt und darauf sofort zu feuern
angefangen.
44
604
B. M. Scianna
without first having it tasted, which gives an interesting insight into the suspicious mind and the fear of treason on the Habsburg side.47 In Lesnica,
Reiss discovered a pit with 109 dead peasants who were bound together
with a rope and encircled by wire, then shot and immediately buried with
some still alive.48 In Prnjavor, there were reports that people had to yell
Long live Emperor Francis Josephus before their execution, and the people
of this town erected a monument for Reiss after the war to honor his reports
on their suffering.49
In total, he accounts for 1308 dead civilians where he had been and an
additional 2280 missing persons; consequently he argued that the number
of civilians killed in the invaded territory must amount to between three and
four thousand.50 This plays into the overall notion of high Serbian wartime
casualties given its relative small population. In comparison, Horne and
Kramer account for 6400 dead civilians in Belgium and France during the
German invasion. Among these victims were plenty of women and children,
(i.e., people who could hardly bear arms, but who were often tortured and
mutilated and either).
shot, killed by the bayonet, their throats were cut with knives, they were
violated and then killed, stoned to death, hanged, beaten to death with
the butt-end of rifles or sticks, disemboweled, burnt alive, or their legs or
arms were cut or torn off, their ears or noses cut off, their eyes put out,
their breasts cut off, their skin cut in strips or flesh torn from the bone;
lastly a little girl of three months was thrown to the pigs.51
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
Reporting Atrocities
605
customs of war and wearing openly marked uniforms or other signias that
define the person as a combatant.
Reiss often linked the Austrian atrocities to the Rape of Belgium and
states that les Allemands en Belgique nont pas agi autrement.54 He compared the Austrian methods to Bethmann-Hollwegs dictum that necessity
knows no law and criticized heavily this neglect of civilians rights.55 Similar
patterns of violence indeed evolved, as the trauma of combat and ideological
and cultural predispositions56 were certainly a major cause in the Austrian
case too. Additionally, the idea of countering any form of irregular resistance with the harshest means possible can be linked to Belgium, and the
Habsburgs clearly showed the same fear of irregulars who viewed warfare as an extension of politics, or worse, of revolution.57 This plays into
the argument of Jonathan Gumz who sees the Habsburgs waging a counterrevolutionary war between a nationalizing state and a national, bureaucratic,
absolutist Empire.58
Even the Austrian high command realized that the treatment was too
harsh and the Army issued an order to conduct war in line with the Hague
conventions even though Serbia was not a signatory. Moreover, an outright total war would undermine the jus publicum Europaem (Schmitt) and
endanger the overthrow of the old order.59 However, in the same decree
it is also stated that in case of violations of the Hague conventions by the
Serbians harsh reprisals (schrfste Repressalien) should be exercised. Some
villages, especially in Syrmia, had been pillaged and destroyed to such a
degree that the Austrian troops could not find shelter in the villages during
their December retreat.60 These shortages often resulted in a fight for food
between soldiers and civilians.61
Apart from simply showing evidence, Reiss tried to answer the question of why this happened and if there was a certain plan to exterminate
the Serbian population. The main causes were portrayed in the fact that
the idea of a greater Serbia and an independent Serbian state blocked the
way of the Habsburgs to Salonika and undermined its stand and influence
in the Balkans.62 Furthermore, the Serbian appeal attracted Slavs within the
54
R. A. Reiss, Rponses aux accusations austro-hongroises contreles Serbes contenues dans les deux
recueils de tmoignages concernant les actes de violation du droit des gens commis par les tats en guerre
avec lAutriche-Hongrie Lausanne, Payot & Co., 1918, p.10.
55
R. A. Reiss, Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War Committed by the Austro-Bulgaro-Germans;
Letters of a Criminologist on the Serbian Macedonian Front, London, G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1919, p. 5.
56
J. Horne, and A. Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914 : A History of Denial, New Haven, Yale
University Press, 2001, p.419.
57
Ibid., p. 421.
58
J. E. Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 19141918, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.7.
59
Ibid., p. 22f.
60
Jerabek, Potiorek, p.163.
61
Ibid., p. 165.
62
Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War, p. 44.
606
B. M. Scianna
Ibid., p. 45.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 46.
Ibid.
Reporting Atrocities
607
conducted if possible until the queue has passed through, and they will
be executed without any question if a single shot is fired on the troops in
the neighborhood. The officers and soldiers will keep a rigorous watch
over every inhabitant and will not allow him to put his hand in his pocket,
which probably conceals a weapon . . . No sermon is to be permitted
on any condition . . . Every inhabitant who is found outside a village,
especially in the woods, will be looked upon as a member of a band who
has hidden his weapons, which we have no time to look for. Such people
are to be executed if they appear in the slightest degree suspicious.67
Reiss correctly noted that between a third and one half of some Serbian
regiments never received any uniforms and that there was an idea of collective responsibility; thus the punishment of innocent bystanders is against
the Hague conventions and he saw this as an incitement to murder. The
document shows also the lines between taking enemy soldiers captive and
taking arbitrarily civilians as hostages were already blurred.
Interestingly, he somehow justifies the animal like behavior of the rank
and file as being brain-washed by propaganda and following higher orders.
The encounter with the satanically portrayed unknown, in combination with
no efforts on behalf of the officers to restrain the will or nature of men, led to
this vicious cycle of ever increasing violence and a normalizing process that
went with it. The ordinary men, as they were mainly described as slaughtering persons on one side, fascinated him on the Serbian side. Particularly in a
report from Valjevo he portrayed how the wounded were brave and showed
great morale and how recovering soldiers would step out of the hospital to
make room and get up pour se retrouver au mileu de ses camarades.68 This
passion for camaraderie has to be seen as the main reason for his decision
to stay with the Serbian army the following year. However, Reiss was not
alone in supporting Serbia in its glorious fight, as many individuals developed a fascination and attached to the struggle attributes of independence,
ambition, and intrepidity.69
608
B. M. Scianna
noticeable silence in his writings and he did not cover this setback at all. The
retreat was harsh and costly for everyone. As the diary of the British RearAdmiral Troubridge, who was a member of this retreat, shows, the treatment
of the POW did not always have priority in such chaotic circumstances when
everyone was on his own. He accounted that the situation of the unfortunate Austrian prisoners is truly dreadful. Yesterday snow all day and to-day it
freezes. They are all half-starved, many with bare feet and wandering about
in such a state of misery as makes ones heart bled for them, poor wretches
they were so much better off before this second invasion.71 Many of
these prisoners were handed over to the Italians who transported them to
the uninhabited island of Asinara, close to Sardinia, where the malnutrition,
bad housing, and poor sanitary conditions led to the death of 1,50037,000.72
The episode shows a similar neglect of needs for POWs under which many
Serbians also suffered in Austrian custody.
Reiss argued against slaughter narratives and cruelties committed by
Serbian soldiers and civilians by hinting at the modern weapons that demolish corpses to an extent that had been simply unknown before.73 Therefore,
he fits into the picture with other war reporters who were shocked by
the new means of mass killings and could not explain the results. Reiss
conducted interviews with numerous soldiers from both sides to prove the
accusations wrong and to show that the Central Powers never had testimony
for their claims and most of the incidents were merely myths.74
However, he devoted most of his time to address in polemics the Swiss
and global audiences call for intervention and the lack of toleration for the
Austrian-Hungarian practices of war. In a letter to the Consel Fdral in the
Gazette de Lausanne he wrote that,
Larme Potiorek a voulu faire une guerre dextermination et les troupes
dinvasion daujourdhui suivent lexemple and therefore la voix de la
petite Suisse a encore une certain valeur dans le monde et elle sera encore
plus puissante quand on verra quelle defend courageusement les lois de
lhumanit et le droit international.75
His calls for more Swiss action spurred resistance in a country that was
split internally between neutrality and regionally differing sympathy for
the different sides. Hence, the just naturalized citizen Reiss became subject of numerous attacks in newspapers when he returned to Switzerland
71
Diary entry from November 18th 1915 in C. Fryer, The destruction of Serbia in 1915, New York,
Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 171.
72
Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, p. 142 names the number of 1,5007,000, explains in his
appendix (p. 368) that Italian reports speak of up to 37,000 deaths.
73
Reiss, Responses aux accusations Austro-Hongroises contre les Serbes, p.13.
74
Reiss, Responses aux accusations Austro-Hongroises contre les Serbes, pp. 21, 23, 35, 45.
75
Levental, Rodolphe Archibalde Reiss, p. 79.
Reporting Atrocities
609
after the costly retreat. He was reminded that his brothers were fighting for
Wilhelmine Germany and his Teutonic call for action marked an insult to
Swiss neutrality.76
This dont tell us what to do reaction is also embodied by the pamphlet
of Erwin Janischfeld (Kultur, ein Schreiben an die gesittete Welt und drei
Briefe an Professor Reiss in Lausanne, 1915) in which he accuses the Serbian
soldiers of similar war crimes, demands Reiss to return to Lausanne and
write not only one-sided descriptions, as Janischfeld had seen the Russians
doing even worse things in the East.77 Carl Spitteler stressed the fact that
even though the Serbs are viewed as heroic people of culture, nous nous
placerons au vritable point de vue neuter, au point de vue Suisse.78 To prevent a further internal division, Paul Seippel and Fernand Feyler presented
the view that there should not be a special feeling of solidarity for small
countries like Serbia, as strict neutrality should be upheld as a state but that
a back door should be opened, and vice versa si un Etat est neutre, cela
ne veut pas dire que ses citoyens doivent aussi etre neuters!.79 Reiss replied
to these critiques by stating that devant la crime, personne ne doit rester
neutre.80
Another case Reiss portrayed was the Austrian attempts to reach out to
their nationals in Switzerland, as they sent summons for ethnic Serbian residents and refugees to a military inspection.81 Thereby the Austrians neglected
their rights and almost the existence of a Serbian state simply because they
occupied it at this point in time. The question for Reiss remained what
Switzerland could do to stop these practices on their soil and whether there
was a willingness to do anything against this practice at all. Reiss however continued his call for more protection of the rights of civilians and
a stronger role to be played by Switzerland. Notably, expanding his view
beyond Serbia, he had already called for protection of other nations that
viennent dexterminer dune facon que lesprit a peine concevoir, une autre
petite nation: celle des Armniens.82
In 1916 he remained a skeptic about the Serbian ability to rebuild her
army quickly, but already in May he noted that 150,000 soldats serbes se
battront de nouveau pour reconqurir leur pays and the subsequent victory
of Kajmakcalan marked the reentry of Serbian troops on their home soil.83
Even though he arrived too late to be part of it, he described it again in very
heroic terms, depicting limage apocaliptique du champ de bataille with a
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
610
B. M. Scianna
Ibid., p. 105108.
R.C. Hall,. The Balkan Wars, 19121913, London, Routledge, 2000, p.132.
86
K. Boeckh, Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg : Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische
Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan, Mnchen, R. Oldenbourg, 1996, pp. 160161.
87
Ibid., p.137.
85
Reporting Atrocities
611
chased from their homes and shot like rats. The Serb soldiers delighted
in telling me of the manhunts they conducted.88
The young Trotsky reported from the war and interestingly also put an
emphasis on Turkish suffering.89 He cites a young Serbian soldier accounting that the killing of prisoners is due partly to desire for vengeance for
disappointed hopes . . . but mainly it is due to the simple calculation one
enemy less, one danger the less.90 Taking prisoners would have required
extra guards and food, thus depriving an ill-fed army of additional resources
and reducing the available manpower to sustain the military effort. Analyzing
the atrocities and the irregular forces, he concludes that the comitadjis were
worse than you can possibly imagine.91
The fact that the war remained mostly one of movement led to a
frequent change in territory possession and it was often during retreat
that violence against civilians would erupt. After the war, different commissions in the countries blamed the other side for committing atrocities
and large reports and documentations were filed.92 Also, the internationalization through the Carnegie report marked a new step in propaganda
warfare. For the first time in Balkan history an international commission conducted research on war crimes and was at least able to conduct interviews
in Macedonia and Thrace. The Report of the International Commission to
Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars was published only
months before the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. It stressed
the equal responsibility and guilt of all states and also handles financial,
social and moral aspects.93 Nonetheless, the crimes during the wars had the
character of a competition who is best at denationalizing his neighbor
but stopped somewhere short of genocide94 ; yet, they were left unpunished, which Paul Mojzes described as a bad omen for the consequent
development of the Balkans.95
Many of the atrocious policies of war returned during the First World
War when the enemies faced again after a short breathing space. In early
1917, Reiss extensively covered the advance of the Serbian army; being an
active soldier himself now devoted to defend Serbia, he could report on
88
Ibid., p. 157.
L. G. Trotsky, The Balkan Wars, 191213: The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky, New York,
Monad Press, 1980, pp. 285287.
90
Ibid., p. 119.
91
Ibid., p. 120.
92
See Zaimis, Atrocits Bulgares en Macdoine or Les Cruauts Bulgares en Macedone Orientale et
en Thrace and the Subsequent Bulgarian Replies.
93
For reports in The Times and Frankfurter Zeitung that also stress the mutual character of atrocities,
see Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, p. 137.
94
Ibid., p. 139.
95
P. Mojzes, Balkan Genocides : Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century, Lanham,
Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 2011, p. 40.
89
612
B. M. Scianna
Reporting Atrocities
613
Ibid., pp. 108109, in total 17 killed and 26 injured; he provides all the names and ages.
Ibid., p. 114.
Ibid.
Falkenhayn in a report to the Chancellor, in Mitrovic, Serbias Great War, p. 126.
Reiss, Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War, p. 17.
Ibid., pp. 17, 75.
Ibid., pp. 7071.
Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid., pp. 4849, as late as November 1917.
614
B. M. Scianna
Ibid., p. 79f.
Reiss, Traitement des prisonniers et des blesses par les Germano-Bulgares, p. 32.
Ibid., pp. 3335.
Ibid., pp. 41, 44, 47, 56, 58.
Josef Sramek, Diary of a Prisoner in World War I , p.15f, 50.
Reiss, Traitement des prisonniers et des blesses par les German-Bulgares, p. 84.
Ibid., pp. 7778.
Reiss, Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War, p. 20.
Ibid., p. 90, he also states that the even the Turks maltreated better.
Ibid., p. 89.
Reporting Atrocities
615
supply from the Entente which did not permit food relief out of fear that the
Central powers could intercept it.122 So not even the famine resulted in an
outcry from the neutrals and Reiss blamed them:
long war has made the neutrals forget how to be roused. Coal, flour,
sugar, etc., matter more to them than the unspeakable sufferings of a
whole people. And yet I am certain that a vigorous act of protest on the
part of the neutrals would compel these barbarians to pay a little more
attention to the rules of modern civilization, since one cannot speak of
even the most elementary rules of humanity to these soulless creatures.
History will pass judgment upon this lack of courage.123
Before the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly, the Documents relatives aux
violations des Conventions de la haye et du droit international en general,
comises da 19151918 par les Bulgares en Serbie ocupe stated that anyone
unwilling to submit him or herself to the occupiers and become Bulgarian
was tortured, raped, interned, and killed in particularly gruesome manners,
some of which recorded photographically.124
The choice between Bulgarization or being subject to violence is further
outlined by US journalist William Dayton whose testimony affirms that he
brought to light that the Bulgarians indisputably carried out bestiality
most repugnant and of most inhumane nature. Barbarian attitude toward
the civilian population, male or female, old or young, torture, plunder,
blackmail, brigandage, killings and sadism permeate the statements that
we collected. We are especially stressing that nowhere was there even
a trace of investigation. Bulgarians killed and tortured without mercy
whomever they wanted whenever they wanted. . . . They did it systematically and persistently throughout full three years. I am not saying that
every crime was carried out by a command, but I assert that organized
mass killings took place and that this terror, as such was inspired by
Bulgarian leaders and approved by the entire nation, with the clear goal
of Bulgarization of the land by exterminating the population.125
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Cited
Ibid.,
p. 9495.
p. 66.
in Mojzes, Balkan Genocides, pp. 4142.
p. 43.
616
B. M. Scianna
involved in the fighting and found a new home in Serbia, changing his role
from observing as a neutral to reporting from the trenches as a member. His
writings show that in 191415, the Austrian army did commit atrocities on a
large scale. Based on the findings, the nature of this seems to be situational;
excluding Bosnia, there was never an attempt at ethnic cleansing, high level
orders to exterminate the Serbian population, or a fight against Serbianness
per se. The violence was also spurred by mid-level orders and a pre-war,
structural mindset of encountering barbarians and treason. The suspicious
feelings were then combined with high casualties inflicted by a militarily
superior enemy. Frustration and the ide fixe of irregular resistance dominated the causes for atrocities and brutal conduct of war. Certainly, there
was no violence for the sake of violence, where means would have overthrown the ends and deprived war of any positive goal, as Hull argued for
Imperial Germanys evolution in conducting war.126 However, reports from
the Serbian retreat in 1915 show that each side struggled when it came to
properly treating prisoners of war. Further, as Gumz has argued, after an
early phase of chaotic reprisals the Austrians attempted to wage a counterinsurgency campaign to prevent a fully fledged peoples war to save
the monarchical order and restrict the war in regard to its means and ends
to a framework of the ancient rgime and prevent a war of annihilation.
The Bulgarian case is different. Taking into consideration the legacy of
the Balkan Wars, the character of the war from 1915 on and the occupation
had a distinct feature of Bulgarization. Atrocities in regard to targets and to
methods lay along the same lines as in the Austrian case, yet the amount
of victims and the intentions weigh different. Large scale deportations and a
distinct Kulturkampf targeted the very soul of Serbianness and the treatment
of the residents of the occupation zones came close to genocidal actions.127
Leaving aside the question of guilt and reciprocal accusations, both
examples show a change in the normative perception of the civilian and
irregularity. The fact that unconventional troops manifested an immense part
of the fighting capabilities besides the regular army certainly led to a greater
and faster blurring of the lines between combatants and non-combatants.
Besides losing 210,000 men of its armed forces, Serbia suffered an additional
300,000 civilian casualties out of a 3.1 million population.128 Reporters like
Reiss did not strengthen the position or protection of civilians, as the slaughter narratives often led to reciprocal violence. However, the civilian as a
term and legal subject underwent a change from the traditionalist approach
before the war to the codified subject of international law in the inter-bellum
period.
126
I. V. Hull, Absolute Destruction : Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany,
Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 324325.
127
Mojzes, Balkan Genocides, p. 41.
128
Figures from Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, p. 143.
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617