[G.R. No. 152195.

January 31, 2005]

PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S.
LAWAS, Administratrix of His Estate, petitioner, vs. ATTY.
PACIFICO S. PELAEZ, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 43758 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Danao City, Branch 25, in Civil Case No. SF-175.
On December 6, 1972, private respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed
a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, for the recovery of
possession and ownership of his one-half (1/2) undivided share of
several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration (T.D.) Nos.
28199, 18197, 18193 and 28316; his undivided one-third (1/3)
share in several other lots covered by T.D. Nos. 28304, 35090,
18228, 28310, 26308, 28714, 28311, 28312 and 28299 (all located
in Danao, Cebu); and for the partition thereof among the coowners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SF-175.
The eleven (11) lots were among the twenty-five (25) parcels of
land which the private respondents mother, Dulce Sepulveda,
inherited from her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda under the
Project of Partition[2] dated April 16, 1937 submitted by Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. as the administrator of the formers estate, duly
approved by the then CFI of Cebu in Special Proceeding No. 778-0.
Under the said deed, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. appeared to be the
owner of an undivided portion of Lot No. 28199, while his brother
and Dulces uncle Santiago Sepulveda, was the undivided owner of
one-half (1/2) of the parcels of land covered by T.D. Nos. 18197,
18193 and 28316. Dulce and her uncles, Pedro and Santiago, were
likewise indicated therein as the co-owners of the eleven other
parcels of land, each with an undivided one-third (1/3) share
thereof.
In his complaint, the private respondent alleged that his mother
Dulce died intestate on March 2, 1944, and aside from himself, was
survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota
Sepulveda. Dulces grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died intestate on
October 25, 1920,[3] and Dulce was then only about four years old.
According to the private respondent, his grandmother Carlota
repeatedly demanded the delivery of her mothers share in the
eleven (11) parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. who by then
was the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, refused to do so. Dulce,
likewise, later demanded the delivery of her share in the eleven
parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. still refused, claiming that
he needed to continue to possess the property to reap the produce

therefrom which he used for the payment of the realty taxes on the
subject properties. The private respondent alleged that he himself
demanded the delivery of his mothers share in the subject
properties on so many occasions, the last of which was in 1972, to
no avail.
The private respondent further narrated that his granduncle
executed an affidavit[4] on November 28, 1961, stating that he was
the sole heir of Dionisia when she died intestate on June 5, 1921,
when, in fact, the latter was survived by her three sons, Santiago,
Pedro and Vicente. Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. also executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale[5] on July 24, 1968 over the property covered by T.D.
No. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) in favor of the City of Danao for
P7,492.00. According to the private respondent, his granduncle
received this amount without his (private respondents) knowledge.
The private respondent prayed that, after due hearing, judgment
be rendered in his favor, thus:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of ONE-HALF (1/2)
portion of the TWO (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of
the complaint;
2. Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of the ONE-THIRD (1/3)
portion of the NINE (9) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of
the complaint;
3. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latters ONETHIRD (1/3) share of the SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
NINETY-TWO PESOS (P7,492.00) representing the purchase price of
the parcel of land described in paragraph 3(a) of the complaint with
interest thereon until the amount is fully paid;
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-HALF (1/2)
portion belonging to the plaintiff of the TWO (2) parcels of land
described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
2. Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-THIRD (1/3)
portion belonging to the plaintiff of the remaining EIGHT (8) parcels
of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
COMMON TO THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff exemplary damages
the amount of which is left to the discretion of this Honorable Court;
3. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latters share
of the fruits of the ELEVEN (11) parcels of land subject-matter of
this complaint, the value of which will be proven during the trial;
4. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual litigation
expenses, the value of which will be proven during the trial;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fee in the amount of

TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00);

6. Granting to the plaintiff such other reliefs and remedies as he
may be entitled to in accordance with law and equity. [6]
In his answer to the complaint, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. admitted
having executed a deed of sale over the parcel of land covered by
T.D. No. 19804 in favor of Danao City, but averred that the latter
failed to pay the purchase price thereof; besides, the private
respondent had no right to share in the proceeds of the said sale.
He likewise denied having received any demand for the delivery of
Dulces share of the subject properties from the latters mother
Carlota, or from the private respondent.
During the trial, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. died intestate. A petition for
the settlement of his estate was filed on May 8, 1975 with the RTC
of Cebu, docketed as Special Proceeding No. SF-37. His daughter,
petitioner Socorro Sepulveda Lawas, was appointed administratrix
of his estate in July 1976. In compliance with the decision of this
Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals,[7] docketed as G.R. No. L-45809
and promulgated on December 12, 1986, the deceased was
substituted by the petitioner.
To prove the delivery of Dulces share under the project of partition,
the petitioner presented the Affidavit of Consolidation she executed
in October 1940 covering thirteen (13) of the twenty-five (25)
parcels of land which were deeded to her under the Project of
Partition,[8] as well as the Order[9] dated March 24, 1962 of the then
CFI in Special Proceeding No. 778-R, denying Carlotas motion for
the reconstitution of the records of the said case, and for the
delivery of Dulces share in the eleven parcels of land. The court
likewise declared therein that Dulce, through her grandchildren and
her mother, Carlota, had already received her share of the estate
from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as early as January 10, 1938.
According to the petitioner, Dulce and Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. had a
verbal agreement wherein the eleven parcels of land covered by
the complaint would serve as the latters compensation for his
services as administrator of Dionisias estate. Thus, upon the
termination of Special Proceeding No. 778-0, and subsequent to the
distribution of the shares of Dionisias heirs, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr.
then became the sole owner of Dulces shares.
The petitioner likewise adduced evidence that Santiago Sepulveda
died intestate and was survived by his wife, Paz Velez Sepulveda
and their then minor children.[10] It was pointed out that the private
respondent failed to implead Paz Sepulveda and her minor children
as parties-defendants in the complaint.
It was further claimed that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. declared the
property covered by T.D. No. 18199 [11] under his name for taxation
purposes since the beginning of 1948. [12] It was likewise alleged
that the eleven (11) parcels of land deeded to Dulce under the

Project of Partition had been declared for taxation purposes under

the name of Pedro Sepulveda since 1974, and that he and his heirs
paid the realty taxes thereon.[13]
On June 7, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment [14] in favor of the
private respondent. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against the defendant by declaring that the
plaintiff is legally and rightfully entitled to the one half (1/2) portion
of the two (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the
Complaint and to the one third (1/3) portion of the nine (9) parcels
of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as co-owner
thereof, and ordering the partition and segregation of the said one
half (1/2) portion of the said two (2) parcels of land and of the said
one third (1/3) portion of the nine (9) parcels of land, and in the
partition thereof, the mechanics of partition outlined in Rule 69 of
the Revised Rules of Court must be followed (Magallon vs. Montejo,
146 SCRA 282); ordering the defendant Socorro Lawas, as
administratrix of the Estate of Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., to deliver to
plaintiff the latters one third (1/3) share of the P7,492.00
representing the purchase price of the parcel of land sold to Danao
City with interest of twelve [per] centum (12%) per annum
(Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260) from the date of filing of the
Complaint until the amount due to plaintiff is fully paid, to pay
attorneys fees to plaintiffs attorney in the sum of P10,000.00, and
to pay the costs. The counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The trial court ruled that the private respondents action for
reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed
when the complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in the
proceeds of the sale of the property to Danao City; and that the
partition of the subject property among the adjudicatees thereof
was in order.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered
judgment on January 31, 2002, affirming the appealed decision with
modification.
The petitioner now comes to the Court via a petition for review on
certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred as follows:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE INCORRECT APPLICATION
OF ART. 494 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT A TRUST RELATIONSHIP WAS
CREATED BETWEEN HEREIN RESPONDENT AND PEDRO SEPULVEDA
[SR.].
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE LAWS ON
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES TO THE FACTS AS PROVEN IN THE
CASE AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENT.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FINDING OF

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 25 IN DANAO CITY THAT

PAYMENT WAS MADE BY DANAO CITY FOR ONE (1) OF THE ELEVEN
(11) PARCELS INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND OF WHICH HEREIN
RESPONDENT SHOULD BE PAID BY PETITIONER ONE THIRD (1/3) OF
THE PURCHASE PRICE.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND A SHARE IN THE RENTS AND PROFITS
OF THE ELEVEN (11) PARCELS TO HEREIN RESPONDENT.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT ATTORNEYS FEES ARE TO BE
AWARDED AND EVEN INCREASING THE AMOUNT THEREOF. [16]
The petition is granted for the sole reason that the respondent
failed to implead as parties, all the indispensable parties in his
complaint.
As gleaned from the material averments of the complaint and the
reliefs prayed for therein, the private respondent, as plaintiff
therein, sought the recovery of the ownership and possession of
the ten (10) parcels of land and the partition thereof; and for the
payment of his share in the proceeds of the sale of the property
which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. sold to Danao City amounting to
P7,492.00, which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. claimed was left unpaid. It
appears that when the private respondent filed the complaint, his
father, Rodolfo Pelaez, was still alive. Thus, when his mother Dulce
Pelaez died intestate on March 2, 1944, she was survived by her
husband Rodolfo and their son, the private respondent. Under
Article 996 of the New Civil Code,[17] Rodolfo Pelaez, as surviving
spouse, is entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that
corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children
who has not received any betterment. The rights of the
usufructuary are provided in Articles 471 to 490 of the old Civil
Code.[18] In Gamis v. Court of Appeals,[19] we held that:
Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving
spouse is a forced heir and entitled to a share in usufruct in the
estate of the deceased spouse equal to that which by way of
legitime corresponds or belongs to each of the legitimate children
or descendants who have not been bettered or have not received
any share in the one-third share destined for betterment. The right
of the surviving spouse to have a share in usufruct in the estate of
the deceased spouse is provided by law of which such spouse
cannot be deprived and which cannot be ignored. Of course, the
spouse may waive it but the waiver must be express.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action
for partition, all persons interested in the property shall be joined
as defendants.
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A person
having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as

in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other
persons interested in the property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property
are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie
without the joinder of the said parties. [20] The mere fact that Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership between him and
the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for
partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a coowner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his
lawful shares.[21] As the Court ruled in De Mesa v. Court of Appeals:
[22]

The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is

concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership
in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise
legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all
the parties interested in the property. This phase may end in a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition
either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is
legally prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that partition is
proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in
order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree,
make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed
upon by all the parties. In either case, whether the action is
dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a
final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree
upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition
shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may
also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval
by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity
to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or
parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits
of the real estate in question.[23]
In the present action, the private respondent, as the plaintiff in the
trial court, failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his
father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely,
Paz Sepulveda and their children; and the City of Danao which
purchased the property covered by T.D. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090)
from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay

for the purchase price of the property.

Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a
share in usufruct, equal to the share of the respondent in the
subject properties. There is no showing that Rodolfo Pelaez had
waived his right to usufruct.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine
qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an
indispensable party is not before the court that the action should
be dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is mandated to implead all the
indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
as to those present.[24] One who is a party to a case is not bound by
any decision of the court, otherwise, he will be deprived of his right
to due process. Without the presence of all the other heirs as
plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and
grant relief in favor of the private respondent. The failure of the
private respondent to implead the other heirs as parties-plaintiffs
constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate
courts exercise of judicial power over the said case, and rendered
any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity.[25]
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.[26] Hence, the trial court should have ordered the dismissal
of the complaint.[27]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
43758 and of the Regional Trial Court are SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court is ORDERED to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83982 January 12, 1990

JESUS C. JAKIHACA, petitioner,
vs.
SPS. LILIA AQUINO and APOLONIO AQUINO, JOSE TORALDE,
and HON. EMMA CENIDOZA-ONA, respondents.
Romeo C. San Pedro for petitioner.

Juan R. Moreno for respondents.

PARAS, J.:
On September 10, 1986, petitioner Jesus Jakihaca filed an
ejectment suit against respondents-spouses Lilia Aquino and
Apolonio Aquino, and Jose Toralde before the Municipal Trial Court of
San Mateo, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 616, on account of the
latter's refusal to remove their houses which they have allegedly
illegally constructed without the knowledge and consent and
against the will of the former on a residential land situated in
Buntong Palay, Ampid, San Mateo, covered by TCT No. N-103650,
despite verbal demand.
Initially, the matter was referred to the Barangay Captain of Ampid,
San Mateo, Rizal, for conciliation processes pursuant to the
requirements of P.D. No. 1508. But due to repeated refusal of
respondents to appear before the Barangay Lupon, the Lupon
Chairman and Secretary thereafter issued a "certification to file
action."
Served with summons pursuant to the Rules on Summary
Procedure, the defendants on November 3, 1986 filed an answer
with Special and Affirmative Defenses alleging among others, that
there was a verbal contract of tenancy between the defendants and
the former owner of the land in question which they planted to fruit
bearing trees and devoted the same primarily to rice and corn
products, and so therefore, they can not be ejected under the Land
Reform Law more particularly P.D. No. 1 from this land which they
had occupied and cultivated for more than ten (10) years with the
consent of the former owner Gloria Gener. In addition, they said
that there is no showing that the case was first brought to the
attention of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for certification that
this case is proper for trial before said Court.
On December 22, 1987, the respondent trial court found that the
private respondents are not agricultural tenant-farmers of the land
in question, either through 'its former owner Gloria Gener or
through the present owner-petitioner Jesus Jakihaca that private
respondents entered the premises some 10 to 20 years ago and
built their houses thereon by tolerance from the former owner
Gloria Gener and as such they are bound by their implied promise
that they will vacate the land upon demand. Private respondents
were ordered to: (1) remove their respective houses on the portion
of the land occupied by them and surrender possession thereof to
the petitioner; (2) pay the petitioner jointly and severally the
amount of P 3,000.00 for attorney's fees; and (3) reimburse the
petitioner for the cost of the suit. Their claim for moral and
exemplary damages was dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal by the private respondents to the Regional Trial Court,

said appellate court on April 8, 1988 dismissed the case on the

ground that the lower court acted without jurisdiction as the
complaint shows nothing when the verbal demand to remove the
houses on the lot of the petitioner was made on the private
respondents. (Decision of the RTC, p. 13, Rollo).
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal on April 21, 1988 which was denied on June 25, 1988. Not
satisfied, this petition was filed on July 12, 1988. On March 15,
1989, this Court in a minute resolution gave due course to the
petition.
Petitioner claims that the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing
Civil Case No. 616 for lack of jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court. On the other hand, private respondents contended that the
petition was filed out of time; that the petition was filed with the
wrong court; that the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action; and that there was no allegation in
the complaint of prior physical possession of the land by the
petitioner.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The records show that the complaint explicitly alleged that "plaintiff
verbally asked the defendants to remove their houses on the lot of
the former but the latter refused and still refuse to do so without
just and lawful grounds." (p. 44, Rollo) Such is sufficient compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements, in accordance with the
doctrine laid down in the case of Hautea v. Magallon, 12 SCRA 514,
to wit:
An allegation in an original complaint for illegal detainer that in
spite of demands made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused
to restore the land, is considered sufficient compliance with the
jurisdictional requirement of previous demand.
As to whether or not the demand was brought within the one year
period, this We have to say. As a general rule, jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case may be objected to at any stage of the
proceeding even on appeal, but this is not without exception. In the
case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 30, cited in Tejones v.
Cironella, 159 SCRA 104, We held:
It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative
relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.
Upon this same principle is what we said . . . to the effect that we
frown upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case
for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction.
Nowhere in the Answer of respondents contain an allegation
attacking the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court based on the
issue on demand. Again, in PNB v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

143 SCRA 305, We held:

While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from
exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception
thereto, they instead invoke the very same jurisdiction by filing an
answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they
participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent
Planas. Upon that premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily. (p. 48, Rollo)
Another reason for the lower court's lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter as alleged by the respondents in their answer to the
complaint filed with the Municipal Trial Court, was that said court
has no jurisdiction to try the case as they are tenants-farmers and
that as such they cannot be ejected from their farmholdings
without a certification by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform that the
case is proper for hearing. On the other hand, petitioners argue
that when the Municipal Trial Court required them to submit their
respective position papers, respondent did not raise this particular
issue anymore but instead centered on the issue of actual
possession and the elements of forcible entry and illegal detainer.
Petitioners, in their position paper, attached the report of Mr.
Maines of the Agrarian Office which categorically states that there
is no evidence whatsoever to show that the subject land is devoted
to the production of rice and corn; that the occupants are not
sharing with the present landowner, hence, they are classified as
illegal occupants; that the subject land is not tenanted, not devoted
to the production of palay and/or corn, hence, not covered by P.D.
No-27 or the Operation Land Transfer of the government (p. 47,
Rollo). Considering the report of said office, the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal was
proper.
Respondents contend that the petition was filed out of time. They
allege that when petitioner received the decision of the Regional
Trial Court on April 20, 1988 and the appeal to this Court was filed
only on July 12, 1988 or only after a 3 month period, such appeal
was definitely outside the 15 day reglementary period within which
to appeal. Respondents added that the motion for reconsideration
filed with said Regional Trial Court did not stop the running of the
period within which to validly file his appeal. The instant case,
being an ejectment case was prosecuted under the Rule on
Summary Procedure where it expressly prohibits a Motion for
Reconsideration. (Memorandum for private respondents, p. 49,
Rollo).
Respondents are in error. The Rule on Summary Procedure applies
only in cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal

Trial Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Summary procedures have no application to cases before the
Regional Trial Courts. Hence, when the respondents appealed the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the
applicable rules are those of the latter court.
Respondents likewise contend that the petition was filed with the
wrong court. Again, they are mistaken.
In the case of Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 643, We held that the final
judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court in an appeal from the
final judgment or order of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals through a petition for review in accordance with
Section 22 of the Interim Rules, or to the Supreme Court through a
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim Rules. Clearly, the
petitioners filed this appeal with a proper court.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision dated April 8, 1988 and the order dated June 25, 1988
both of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, in
Civil Case No. 415, are hereby SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, dated December 22, 1987
in Civil Case No. 616 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 75676 August 29, 1990

MANUEL CO KENG KIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
Special Cases Division) and PLAZA
respondents.
Rogelio L. Orio for petitioner.
Perfecto V. Fernandez for private respondent.

COURT (Fourth
ARCADE, Inc.,

FERNAN, C.J.:
The legal issue raised in this petition is whether the notice to
vacate required to be served on the lessee under Section 2, Rule 70
of the Revised Rules of Court in order to confer jurisdiction on the
Metropolitan Trial Court in an action for ejectment, may be served
by registered mail.
On February 23, 1982, a complaint for ejectment against petitioner
Manuel Co Keng Kian was filed by private respondent Plaza Arcade,
Inc., alleging that despite the expiration of the written contract of
lease over a portion of the ground floor of the former Manila Times
Building, petitioner refused to vacate the premises and to pay the
monthly rentals notwithstanding receipt of several letters of
demand, the last of which was sent to petitioner by registered mail.
During the pendency of the trial before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila or on August 27, 1982, petitioner voluntarily vacated the
disputed premises, turning over the key to the clerk of court but
without paying the accrued rent.
On May 17, 1984, the inferior court rendered its judgment

dismissing the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction. It refused to

give probative value to the three letters of demand to vacate which
were all sent to petitioner and which he refused to receive. The
court held that since none of the demand letters was served (1)
personally, or (2) by written notice of such demand upon a person
found on the premises, or (3) by posting such notice on the
premises if no person can be found thereon pursuant to the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there was no
valid demand. If none was made, the case came within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Metropolitan Trial
Court. Whereupon, it ordered Plaza Arcade, Inc. to pay petitioner
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and another P5,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.
Plaza Arcade, Inc. appealed to the Regional Trial Court which
initially reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but on
motion for reconsideration by petitioner, affirmed the dismissal of
the ejectment case in its order of October 9, 1985. 1
A petition for review was filed with the then Intermediate Appellate
Court. In its decision dated July 3, 1988 the Appellate Court
overturned the appealed order of the trial court which had earlier
sustained the dismissal of the ejectment case. Motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the aforesaid decision of the
Appellate Court was elevated to this Court on a petition for review
on certiorari.
In reversing the dismissal order, the Appellate Court took the lower
courts to task for taking a rather constricted view of Section 2, Rule
70, and declaring that the service of demand letters to vacate on
the lessee is strictly limited to the three (3) modes enumerated
therein. They failed to note the common practice of serving said
notices on the tenant by registered mail with return card so that
the registry receipt and the receipt thereof by the addressee
through the return card could be presented in evidence to prove
the fact of delivery, in the event of a litigation.
We agree and in our opinion the facts in the instant case indicate
personal service on the lessee. In arriving at this conclusion, we
have been greatly aided by respondent's citation of American cases
which, by and large, represents a practical, if not realistic, approach
to the problem.
In the cases of Nunlist vs. Motter, 2 and Gehring vs. Swoll 3 the
Court held that where the notice to leave the premises is
transmitted by registered mail with a return card and thereafter the
receipt bearing the signature of the defendant was returned, a
prima facie case is established of the fact of delivery of said notice
to the defendant personally by the Postal Office Department
although he refused to accept the same. 4 Indeed, notice by
registered mail is considered an effective service on the person

concerned. It cannot be avoided by the mere expediency of

declining to accept delivery after notification thereof. The service is
deemed complete regardless of such refusal to accept if the
addressee fails to claim his mail from the postal office after the
lapse of five (5) days from the date of the first notice of the
postmaster. 5
In conclusion, we stress that the notice to vacate the leased
premises, required by the Rules to be served on the tenant before a
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action can be commenced
against him, may be served by registered mail. This is a substantial
compliance with the modes of service enumerated under Section 2,
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer are summary in nature because they involve a
disturbance of social order which must be abated as promptly as
possible without any undue reliance on technical and procedural
rules which only cause delays. In the ultimate analysis, it matters
not how the notice to vacate was conveyed, so long as the lessee
or his agent has personally received the written demand, whether
handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a messenger or even a
postman. The undisputed facts in the instant case show that the
Manila Times Publishing Company, through its manager, had
informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc. was the new owner of the
subject building; that on October 18, 1979, a demand letter was
sent to petitioner advising him to leave the premises but petitioner
refused to receive the letter; that a second demand on January 12,
1981 elicited the same reaction; that a final demand dated
November 16, 1981 was sent to petitioner by registered mail which
he again refused. And even on the supposition that there was no
personal service as claimed by petitioner, this could only be due to
petitioner's blatant attempts at evasion which compelled the new
landlord to resort to registered mail. The Court cannot countenance
an unfair situation where the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers
further injustice by the unwarranted delay resulting from the
obstinate refusal of the defendant to acknowledge the existence of
a valid demand.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the dismissal
order of the trial court is affirmed. Civil Case No. 071279-CV is
hereby ordered reinstated in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 7. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
petitioner.
So ordered.

VICKY C. MABANTO, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-04-1533

Petitioner,
- versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
X
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Vicky Mabanto against
Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, charging him with Serious Misconduct,
Inefficiency, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Violation of Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) in
connection with her supersedeas bond in Civil Case No. R-35618.
The antecedents are as follows:[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Complainant was the defendant in Civil Case No. R-35618 for
ejectment. Judgment was rendered against her and she appealed
the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. She
posted a supersedeas bond in the amount of P45,000 to stay the
execution of the judgment.
On February 17, 1997, the RTC resolved the appeal and remanded
the case to the MTCC for re-trial. Complainants counsel filed a
motion to withdraw the supersedeas bond.
On May 19, 1997, complainant learned from the Clerk of
Court of MTCC, Cebu City that respondent, in an Order dated
September 23, 1996, granted plaintiffs ex-parte motion to withdraw
rental deposit under the bond and release the same to plaintiff,
hence, the latter withdrew it on said date. Complainant claimed
that respondent concealed from her and her counsel plaintiffs
motion to release the deposit under the supersedeas bond as they
were not notified of the motion or the approval of the same.
Respondent, in his Comment,[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] denied
having concealed from complainant and her counsel his Order

dated September 23, 2006. Respondent stated that complainants

counsel, Atty. Cynthia M. Matural, was furnished a copy of the
Order. He likewise explained that he directed the release of the
bond upon plaintiffs ex-parte motion because the bond would be
applied to the back rentals owing to the latter. He added that from
the amount of P45,000 withdrawn, P15,000 was returned to the
court by plaintiffs on September 25, 1996, which amount remained
as complainants supersedeas bond.
Complainant replied that she and her counsel never
received a copy of the aforestated motion and order. Her counsel
filed several motions for the release of the supersedeas bond
expecting that the same was still intact. Complainant likewise
insisted that respondent had no basis for issuing the assailed order
because the purpose of the supersedeas bond is to guarantee the
performance of the judgment appealed from if affirmed by the
appellate court, and this did not happen in this case because the
RTC remanded the case for re-trial.
On January 10, 2005, the case was referred to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA).
In a Memorandum dated July 12, 2005, the OCA
recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P2,000 to
be deducted from his retirement benefits. The OCA considered the
fact that no malice attended respondents action, and that the
offense took place prior to the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which imposes a heavier penalty
for gross ignorance of the law.
The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA to be well
taken.
A supersedeas bond in ejectment cases is conditioned
upon the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in
case it be affirmed wholly or in part by the appellate court. It should
therefore subsist as security for the liability of the defendant to the
plaintiff.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Section 19(2) (3), Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires
that all moneys deposited by the defendant to stay execution of the
judgment shall be held until the final disposition of the appeal, and
shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the
judgment. It likewise provides that the plaintiff will be allowed to
withdraw the money when the defendant agrees or fails to oppose
plaintiffs petition. The purpose of this is to avoid damage that the

defendant may suffer if plaintiff should be allowed to withdraw the

money deposited when the plaintiffs right to collect the money is in
issue.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores is found

GUILTY OF GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which he is
FINED P2,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

Here, complainant failed to oppose the motion because of

the lower courts failure to inform her. Indeed, Mr. Jose Legaspi,
Clerk of Court of MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City, stated that
complainant was not notified about the motion to release the
supersedeas bond and the Order allowing the release of the bond.
The court interpreter, Ms. Rebecca L. Alesna, also confirmed that
she prepared the notice for complainant upon the instruction of
respondent but due to inadvertence, she was not able to send the
same to the parties.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]

SO ORDERED.

Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court requires that

adverse parties be served copies of pleadings and processes. A
motion without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties is a
mere scrap of paper.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] In Cui v. Madayag,[if !
supportFootnotes][7][endif]
this Court held that motions that do not contain
proof of service of notice to the other party are not entitled to
judicial cognizance.
Without any proof of service having been made upon
complainant, respondent erred in granting the motion to withdraw
the deposit under the bond, and is, thus, guilty of gross ignorance
of the law.
Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge which is
penalized with either dismissal from service, suspension for three
(3) months without salary and benefits or a fine of not less than
P20,000 but not more than P40,000.
The administrative offense, however, took place prior to
the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by A.M. No. 01-810-SC on September 11, 2001. In Dayawon v. Judge Maximino A.
Badilla,[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] Padua v. Judge Eufemio R. Molina, [if !
supportFootnotes][9][endif]
Dizon v. Judge Demetrio D. Calimag,[if !supportFootnotes]
[10][endif]
and Prosecutor Contreras v. Judge Eddie P. Monserate,[if !
supportFootnotes][11][endif]
citing gross ignorance of the law but taking into
account that no nefarious motive on the part of respondents had
been shown, this Court imposed a fine of P2,000 with a warning.
Thus, consistent with the sanctions imposed in the
aforementioned cases, this Court agrees with the recommendation
of the OCA.

[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1381. January 14, 2002]

FR. ROMELITO GUILLEN, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO K.
CAON, respondent.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
In Civil Case No. 185-H entitled, Barangay Lacasa, Hinatuan,
Surigao del Sur, as represented by Bebiana Sayson, Barangay
Captain vs. Eloy Ampis, et al., Barangay Lacasa sought the eviction
of 40 residents for illegally and unlawfully occupying a 1- hectare
land they claimed to own. In order to prevent said residents from
making repairs, improvements, or construction within the 1-hectare
land, Judge Antonio K. Canon, Presiding Judge of the 7 th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Hinatuan-Tagbina, Surigao del Sur, issued a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 27, 1996. The
residents allegedly continued to disobey said order, thereby
prompting the court to issue three separate orders of arrest all
dated September 5, 1997, against 11 individuals for direct
contempt. These arrest orders became the seed of the present
case.
In a sworn letter-complaint dated September 9, 1997, complainant
Fr. Romelito Guillen, parish priest of San Agustin, Barangay
Poblacion, Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, in his capacity as
representative of the Social Action Center of the Diocese of Tandag,
Surigao del Sur, charged respondent Judge Antonio K. Caon with
issuing unjust orders of arrest and with gross ignorance of the law
relative to the ejectment case. Complainant asserted that the
orders of arrest against the 11 individuals, whose affidavits were
included in his letter-complaint, were defective since: 1) the 11
affiants, except for Abon Lebeste, were not among the 40
defendants in Civil Case No. 185-H; 2) the orders were issued
without any motion to cite affiants in contempt of court and were
issued solely at the courts instance; 3) the orders were issued
without giving affiants notice that they violated the courts orders
and did not give them a chance to explain and defend their actions;
and 4) affiants merely initiated repairs on their nipa huts without
disturbing the status quo sought to be preserved by respondent.
Complainant further contended that respondent acted in an

arbitrary and despotic manner in causing the arrest of affiants who,

as of the writing of the letter-complaint, were still detained at the
Municipal Jail of Hinatuan. Finally, complainant averred that
respondent is no longer physically an mentally fit to sit as presiding
judge since he is almost completely paralyzed, unable to write,
speak, or walk unaided.
In his comment dated February 28, 1998, respondent admitted
having issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on
December 27, 1996 and the three separate orders of arrest all
dated September 5, 1997. He alleged that through an affidavit filed
by the Lacasa Barangay Council on September 5, 1997, he found
that defendants Julie Lisayan and Abon Lebeste had violated said
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the former for having
made major repairs and improvements on her house, and the latter
for having constructed a concrete or hollow-block toilet. The
Barangay kagawads, at their examination following the filing of
their joint affidavit, reported that Abet Antonio, Lino Costan, Ely
Engalan, Eme Suan, Maning Davenes, Celso Davenes, Ronnie
Capunong, Bellie Morales and Carlos Munion had also violated the
aforementioned order upon the prodding and inducement of
Lisayan and Lebeste.
Respondent claimed that these surrounding events were enough
reasons for affiants to be brought to court and to show cause why
they should not be held for contempt. He contended that since Civil
Case 185-H is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
summary issuance of the warrants by virtue of the affidavit filed by
the
Lacasa
Barangay
Council
and
the
aforementioned
circumstances was justified and not unjust, arbitrary, or despotic.
Respondent further claimed that summary hearings were held in
his chambers, and after the parties had given their explanations on
why they should not be held in contempt, he concluded that only
Lisayan and Lebeste had indeed defied the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and not the 9 other affiants. Respondent
subsequently lifted the orders of arrest against these 9 individuals,
while Lisayan and Lebeste were committed at the municipal jail for
3 days as a punitive lesson for their defiance. Respondent also
alleged that the imputation made by complainant that affiants were
all detained as of September 9, 1997 is absolutely bereft of truth. In
fact, the 9 individuals were not even arrested despite the orders of
arrest as seen in the indorsement warrant of arrest issued by the
warrant officer of the Office of the Chief of Police of Hinatuan-PNP
and duly confirmed by a certification from the officer-in-charge of
the same office.
Lastly, respondent disputed complainants allegation that he is no
longer physically and mentally fit to maintain his position, claiming
that he has been regularly attending to his official duties in his

station in Hinatuan every Wednesday an Thursday, in his substation at Tagbina which is 27 kilometers from Hinatuan, every
Friday, and as judge-designate of the 8 th MCTC of Bislig-Lingap at
Bislig which is approximately 55 kilometers from Hinatuan, every
Monday and Tuesday. Respondent claimed that he shuttles through
the poor third-class gravel road which is tattered with potholes
riding in passenger jeeps, or at times, even only on two-wheel
motorcycles. Respondent argued that this weekly travel through
long distances cannot be made by one who is said to be almost
completely paralyzed.
Both complainant and respondent were required by the Court on
February 21, 2000 to manifest whether they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed, but no
response was made by them despite proper service of notice.
Further arguments were, therefore, deemed waived.
In the report and recommendation dated January 19, 2000
submitted by then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, it was
pertinently observed that respondent is liable for issuing unjust
orders of arrest and of gross ignorance of the law.
We agree.
Respondent is liable for issuing unjust orders of arrest in that he
failed to observe the proper procedure laid down in the Rules of
Civil procedure, specifically the provisions on contempt. It must be
noted that affiants were charged with direct contempt for having
violated the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
respondent. This is contrary to Section 1, rule 71 of the Rules of
Court which defines direct contempt as, misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same x x x.
Clearly, the supposed contemptuous acts of affiants fall under the
definition of indirect contempt as explained in the case of Industrial
& Transport Equipment, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission (284 SCRA 144 [1998]), that:
There is no question that disobedience to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a
court or judge constitutes indirect contempt punishable under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, respondent almost simultaneously issued the orders of
arrest after the members of the Barangay Kagawad filed their joint
affidavit and gave their oral report that the persons later disobeyed
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. This is in direct
violation of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides:
After a charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity given to
the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person

guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect

contempt....
The records of the case makes no mention of the fact that prior to
the issuance of the orders of arrest, affiants were given the
opportunity to comment on the charge.
Respondent tried to justify his actions by claiming that affiants were
not deprived of due process since a summary hearing was
conducted in his chambers wherein the individuals were given the
chance to be heard on their positions and justifications on why they
should not be held in contempt. What respondent fails to realize is
that for indirect contempt charges, a different procedure is laid
down by the law. According to Section 4, Rule 71:
If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal
action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its
discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing an decision.
In the instant case, no docketing was done by respondent nor was a
formal hearing conducted as required. Veritably, assuming for the
sake of argument that a proper charge in writing accusing the
affiants with committing acts constituting indirect contempt was
filed, this fact will not cure the proceedings of the taint of
irregularity because the record show that no previous hearing was
afforded to petitioner. To restate what was pointed out earlier, in
cases of indirect contempt, the contemnor may be punished only
after a charge in writing is filed and an opportunity given to the
accused to be heard by himself or counsel, and without a hearing ,
an order citing a person in contempt violates the persons right to
due process (Salome D. Caas vs. Lerio C. Castigador , G.R. No.
139844, December 15, 2000).
Respondents actions also visibly indicate his lack of sufficient grasp
of the law. No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that
a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain professional
competence (Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct). Indeed,
competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an
utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the publics
confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross
ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a
judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in
the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of
incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hands. A
judge must be acquainted with legal norms an precepts as well as
with procedural rules (Jovenal Oporto, Jr. vs. Judge Eddie P.
Monserate, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1109, April 16, 2001). Thus, this court
has consistently held that:
A judge is presumed to know the law an when the law is so

elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the

law (Agunday vs. Tresvalles, 319 SCRA 134 [1999]).
Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law
and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no
one is excused, and surely not a judge (De Austria vs. Beltran, 313
SCRA 443 [1999]).
However, with regard to the question of whether respondent
caused the detention of the 11 affiants as claimed by complainant,
the Court finds for respondent who has indubitably shown that 9 of
11 individuals were not even arrested. Indeed, it can be plainly
seen through the indorsement on the warrant issued by the office
of the chief of police of Hinatuan-PNP on September 8, 1997 that
the 9 individuals were not arrested. This fact is further bolstered by
the certification given by the officer-in-charge of the Hinatuan-PNP
on February 25, 1998 to the effect that the 9 individuals were never
arrested or detained.
As regards respondents physical condition, inasmuch as both
complainant and respondent failed to present medical evidence to
support their respective claims, this Court finds it unnecessary to
discuss the same.
Lastly, it is worthy to note that aside from the instant complaint,
respondent has six other administrative complaints currently
pending before the Office of the Court Administrator.
WHEREFORE, Judge Antonio K. Caon is hereby found guilty
of issuing unjust orders and of gross of ignorance of the law. He is
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 142649. September 13, 2001]

ANTONIO C. SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. NELSON BAYOT, as Presiding Judge, RTC, Pasay City,

Branch 118, and T.N. LAL & CO., LTD., respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Challenged in the petition for review in this case is the
Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of 24 January 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 56549, which dismissed petitioners
special civil action for certiorari for having been filed out of time, as
well as its Resolution of 13 March 2000, denying the motion for
reconsideration of the former.
The record discloses that private respondent T.N. Lal & Co.,
Ltd. filed a petition for indirect contempt against herein petitioner,
Antonio C. San Luis, Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority
(LRTA), before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The petition
was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0480 and raffled to Branch 118
of said court. The action arose from the alleged failure or refusal of
petitioner to comply with the order of 7 April 1999 of Hon. Ernesto
A. Reyes, presiding judge of Branch 111 of said court in Civil Case
No. 97-0423. The order directed the LRTA to immediately restore
the power supply of private respondents sound system in all places,
sites and locations in its area of responsibility within 24 hours from
receipt of the same.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition for indirect
contempt on the ground that it states no cause of action and
private respondent, as petitioner therein, was guilty of forumshopping.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
On 15 July 1999, public respondent Hon. Nelson Bayot,
presiding judge of Branch 118, issued an order, a copy of which
was received by petitioner on 9 August 1999, directing that the
petition for indirect contempt, Civil Case No. 99-0480, be
transferred to Branch 111 for disposition and appropriate action,
since it was that branch which issued the order of 7 April 1999 and
against which the contemptuous act was committed; hence, Branch
111 was in a better position to determine whether or not the order
of 7 April 1999 had been violated. [if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
On 18 August 1999, petitioner moved to reconsider the 15
July 1999 order of Judge Bayot. The latter issued an order on 22
October 1999, stating that the records of the case had already
been transferred to Branch 111 and that he believed the assailed
order was correct and proper. Accordingly, he would not act
anymore on the motion for reconsideration. [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] A
copy of said order was received by petitioner on 8 November 1999.
On 7 January 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In the petition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56549,
petitioner sought to annul Judge Bayots orders of 15 July 1999 and
22 October 1999 on the ground that the latter acted without or in

excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion when he

did not act on petitioners motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration and, instead, transferred the case to Branch 111 of
the court below.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
In its Resolution of 24 January 2000, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time. [if !
supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Forthwith, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration as well as a Motion to Admit Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus and to Relax Strict Rules on Procedure, both of
which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution of 13 March
2000.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Petitioner is now before us, asking for a liberal application of
the procedural rules. He raises the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND MANDAMUS AND CONSEQUENTLY DISMISSED THE SAME FOR
ITS FAILURE TO FILE THE SAID PETITION ON TIME, OVERLOOKING
THE FACT THAT THE FAILURE TO FILE THE SAME WAS DUE TO AN
HONEST MISTAKE AND HUMAN ERROR IN COMPUTING THE PERIOD
FOR FILING THE INSTANT PETITION BY HANDLING COUNSEL.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT CASE IS WARRANTED SO
THAT PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
MANDAMUS WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS COULD
BE REINSTATED AND PROCEED IN DUE COURSE IN
ORDER NOT TO DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF ITS [SIC]
RIGHT TO PROSECUTE HIS CASE BEFORE THE
COURT OF APPEALS SO THAT IT CAN BE DECIDED
ON THE MERITS AND NOT ON ITS TECHNICALITY
ASPECT.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]

On the procedural aspect, we rule in favor of petitioner.

In finding that the petition for certiorari and mandamus was
filed out of time, the Court of Appeals applied Section 4, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by the Resolution of
21 July 1998, which reads:
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. -- The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts

or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise

provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration
in due time after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the
period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the
petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and
in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
The Court of Appeals reckoned the counting of the 60-day
period from petitioners receipt on 9 August 1999 of a copy of the
assailed 15 July 1999 order, considered the interruption of the
running of the period by the filing on 18 August 1999 of the Motion
for Reconsideration, and held that the remaining period resumed to
run on 8 November 1999, the date petitioner received the 22
October 1999 order. Accordingly, petitioner should have filed the
petition on or before 29 December 1999. He filed the petition only
on 7 January 2000, or nine days after the expiration of the period.
It must be pointed out, however, that Section 4, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was subsequently amended in the
Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which took effect on 1
September 2000. As amended, said section reads as follows:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. -- The petition shall be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)
day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to
the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court
of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
Under this amendment, the 60-day period within which to file
the petition starts to run from receipt of notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration, if one is filed. In our decision in Systems
Factors Corporation and Modesto Dean vs. NLRC, et al.,[if !supportFootnotes]

[10][endif]

reiterated in Unity Fishing Development Corp. and/or

Antonio Dee vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] the new
period was made applicable to pending cases, such as in the case
at bar. Settled is the rule that remedial statutes or statutes relating
to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new rights
or take away vested rights but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come
within the purview of the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statutes. Procedural laws are construed to be
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural
laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because
no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
Conformably with Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, the 60day period of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari should be
counted from his receipt on 8 November 1999 of the Resolution of
22 October 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration. Hence,
the petition for certiorari having been filed on 7 January 2000, the
last day of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals should
not have dismissed the same on ground of late filing.
In view of the foregoing, our next logical step would be to
direct the Court of Appeals to resolve on its merit CA-G.R. SP No.
56549 by determining the issue raised therein on whether Judge
Bayot committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in transferring the case for indirect contempt
to Branch 111 of the court below. Such step would, however,
unduly prolong the disposition of the main action. We shall act on
said petition, considering that the lone issue raised is one of law. [if !
supportFootnotes][12][endif]
It is already an accepted rule of procedure for us
to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding,
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. [if !
supportFootnotes][13][endif]
If, based on the records, the pleadings, and other
evidence, the dispute can be resolved by us, we will do so to serve
the ends of justice, instead of remanding the case to the lower
court for further proceedings.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
In his petition for review on certiorari before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56549, petitioner contended that Judge
Bayot committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act on his
motion to dismiss the indirect contempt case and on his motion for
reconsideration, and, instead, referred the case to Branch 111 of
the court below, the court which issued the order subject of the
case for indirect contempt.
The pertinent rules on the matter are Sections 4 and 5, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, which read:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. -- Proceedings for indirect

contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which

the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal
charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt
charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in
the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said
petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless
the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
SEC. 5. Where charge to be filed. -- Where the charge for indirect
contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a
court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed
by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Where such
contempt has been committed against a lower court, the charge
may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place in which the
lower court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted in
such lower court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of
such place in the same manner as provided in section 11 of this
Rule.
In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves
the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as
to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with
which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration,
jurisdiction has been felt to properly rest in only one tribunal at a
time with respect to a given controversy. [if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] Only
the court which rendered the order commanding the doing of a
certain act is vested with the right to determine whether or not the
order has been complied with, or whether a sufficient reason has
been given for noncompliance, and, therefore, whether a contempt
has been committed.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] It is a well-established rule
that the power to determine the existence of contempt of court
rests exclusively with the court contemned. No court is authorized
to punish a contempt against another.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule . . .
is that contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by
the court against whose authority the contempts are charged; the
power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a
court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due
obedience to its judgments, orders and processes and in order that
a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right
to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to

submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would

operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency. [if !supportFootnotes]
[18][endif]

Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides, in effect,

that a charge for indirect contempt must be filed with the court
contemned. Although this provision is permissive in nature, in the
event of concurrent jurisdiction over cases of contempt of court, it
would be a good practice to acknowledge the preferential right of
the court against which the act of contempt was committed to try
and punish the guilty party.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
On the basis of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so
hold that public respondent Judge Nelson Bayot committed no error
and did not act with abuse of discretion in ordering the transfer of
the petition for indirect contempt, Civil Case No. 99-0480, to Branch
111 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, whose order was the
subject of the contempt suit.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 24
January 2000 and 13 March 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56549 are
hereby SET ASIDE. For the reasons set forth above, said case is
ordered DISMISSED, and the orders of public respondent judge
dated 15 July 1999 and 22 October 1999 in Civil Case No. 99-0480
are hereby AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge of Branch 111, Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, shall forthwith conduct the appropriate
proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-0480, including the resolution of
petitioners motion to dismiss the case.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177703

January 28, 2008
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA,
petitioners,
vs.
JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the November 30, 2006 Decision 1
and April 30, 2007 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 93570.
The relevant facts are culled from the records.
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 030010 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Pias City (RTC)
against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners)

for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the

decedent Fidel). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his
first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of
decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S.
Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G.
Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third
(1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or
mortgagees thereon, if any;
2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS is hereby awarded to be reimbursed by the defendants to
the plaintiff;
3. Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.3
The decision became final on March 15, 2004.4
As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the
land covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land), respondent sought
its sale through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it. 5
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the subject land. 6
The public auction sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had
to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the
house (subject house) standing on the subject land. 7 This prompted
respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
for Contempt of Court,8 praying that petitioners be declared in
contempt.
The RTC denied the motion in an Order 9 dated August 30, 2005, for
the reason that petitioners were justified in refusing to have the
subject house included in the auction, thus:
The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house
or improvement erected on the property should not be included in
the auction sale.
A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the
evidence adduced during the ex-parte hearing clearly show that
nothing was mentioned about the house existing on the land
subject matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiff's [respondent's]
initiatory Complaint likewise did not mention anything about the
house. Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house
in its adjudication of the subject land because it was plaintiff
himself who failed to allege the same. It is a well-settled rule that
the court can not give a relief to that which is not alleged and
prayed for in the complaint.
To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory

to the land on which it is built is in effect to add to plaintiff's [a]

right which has never been considered or passed upon during the
trial on the merits.
In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only
the land should be partitioned in accordance to[sic] the
aforementioned Decision as the house can not be said to have been
necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff can not be declared
as a co-owner of the same house without evidence thereof and due
hearing thereon.
The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly
pointed out, judgment must stand even at the risk that it might be
erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of
Court filed by plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration.11
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari12 where he
sought to have the RTC Orders set aside, and prayed that he be
allowed to proceed with the auction of the subject land including
the subject house.
In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for
Certiorari, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated
August 30, 2005 and January 3, 2006 issued by the RTC, in Civil
Case No. SCA 03-0010, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public auction sale of
the subject lot covered by TCT No. 383714, including the
house constructed thereon.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the
same in its Resolution14 of April 30, 2007.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in
holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion for contempt of court.
The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for
reasons other than those advanced by petitioners.
The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for
indirect contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
prescribes the procedure for the institution of proceedings for
indirect contempt, viz:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect
contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which
the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal
charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be

commenced by a verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions
in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or
are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition
for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its
discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphases supplied.)
Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the
requirements for initiating an indirect contempt proceeding are a)
that it be initiated by way of a verified petition and b) that it should
fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for
civil actions. In Regalado v. Go,15 we held:
As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified
petition that has complied with the requirements for the
filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory x x x:
This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper
procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such
proceeding has been classified as special civil action under the
former Rules, the heterogenous practice tolerated by the courts,
has been for any party to file a motion without paying any docket
or lawful fees therefore and without complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the
second paragraph of this amended section.
xxxx
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated
motu propio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court,
all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full
compliance with the requirements therefore and shall be disposed
in accordance with the second paragraph of this section.
xxxx
Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main
case over which the court already acquired jurisdiction, the
rules direct that the petition for contempt be treated
independently of the principal action. Consequently, the
necessary prerequisites for the filing of initiatory
pleadings, such as the filing of a verified petition,
attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and
the payment of the necessary docket fees, must be
faithfully observed.
xxxx
The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical
language. In case where the indirect contempt charge is not

initiated by the courts, the filing of a verified petition which fulfills

the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a prerequisite. Beyond
question now is the mandatory requirement of a verified petition in
initiating an indirect contempt proceeding. Truly, prior to the
amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion
without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings
was tolerated by the courts. At the onset of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be
countenanced.16 (Emphasis ours.)
The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt
proceeding initiated by respondent. The latter did not comply with
any of the mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule 71. He filed a
mere Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, and
not a verified petition. He likewise did not conform with the
requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the
submission of a certification against forum shopping and the
payment of docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have
been dismissed outright by the RTC.
It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the
infirmities in respondent's unverified motion for contempt, in the
end, it dismissed the motion, albeit on substantive grounds. The
trouble is that, in the CA decision assailed herein, the appellate
court committed the same oversight by delving into the merits of
respondent's unverified motion and granting the relief sought
therein. Thus, strictly speaking, the proper disposition of the
present petition ought to be the reversal of the CA decision and the
dismissal of respondent's unverified motion for contempt filed in
the RTC for being in contravention of Section 4, Rule 71.
However, such simplistic disposition will not put an end to the
dispute between the parties. A seed of litigation has already been
sown that will likely sprout into another case between them at a
later time. We refer to the question of whether the subject house
should be included in the public auction of the subject land. Until
this question is finally resolved, there will be no end to litigation
between the parties. We must therefore deal with it squarely, here
and now.
The RTC and the CA differed in their views on whether the public
auction should include the subject house. The RTC excluded the
subject house because respondent never alleged its existence in
his complaint for partition or established his co-ownership thereof. 17
On the other hand, citing Articles 440, 18 44519 and 44620 of the Civil
Code, the CA held that as the deceased owned the subject land, he
also owned the subject house which is a mere accessory to the
land. Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and
are held in co-ownership by his heirs, the parties herein. Hence, the
CA concludes that any decision in the action for partition of said

estate should cover not just the subject land but also the subject
house.21 The CA further pointed out that petitioners themselves
implicitly recognized the inclusion of the subject house in the
partition of the subject land when they proposed in their letter of
August 5, 2004, the following swapping-arrangement:
Sir:
Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only
poor and simple people. We are very much pleased with the
decision of Presiding Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., RTC Br. 254,
Las Pias, on the sharing of one-third (1/3) each of a land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) in Las Pias City.
However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our
residence for more than twenty (20) years, we wish to request that
the 1/3 share of John Nabor C. Arriola be paid by the defendants
depending on the choice of the plaintiff between item (1) or item
(2), detailed as follows:
(1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot located at Baras Rizal x
x x.
(2) Cash of P205,700.00 x x x.
x x x x.22
We agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of
partition for reasons postulated by the CA. We qualify, however,
that this ruling does not necessarily countenance the immediate
and actual partition of the subject house by way of public auction in
view of the suspensive proscription imposed under Article 159 of
The Family Code which will be discussed forthwith.
It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically
alleged in the complaint for partition. Such omission
notwithstanding, the subject house is deemed part of the judgment
of partition for two compelling reasons.
First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil
Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. The
Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA, to wit:
The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated
that since the house constructed on the subject lot was not alleged
in the complaint and its ownership was not passed upon during the
trial on the merits, the court cannot include the house in its
adjudication of the subject lot. The court further stated that it
cannot give a relief to[sic] which is not alleged and prayed for in
the complaint.
We are not persuaded.
To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect render
meaningless the pertinent rule on accession. In general, the right
to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act
on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the
improvements including the house were not alleged in the

complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot

on which they stand, following the principle of accession.
Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this
case includes the house which is permanently attached
thereto, otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the
principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is
permanently attached thereto.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house
was built by the deceased.24 Petitioners never controverted such
claim. There is then no dispute that the subject house is part of the
estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the
latter's heirs, the parties herein, 25 any one of whom, under Article
49426 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of
the subject house.27 Therefore, respondent's recourse to the
partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by the
mere technical omission of said common property from the
complaint for partition.
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while
we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of
the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition
by public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action
for partition involves two phases: first, the declaration of the
existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual
termination of that state of co-ownership through the segregation
of the common property.28 What is settled thus far is only the fact
that the subject house is under the co-ownership of the parties, and
therefore susceptible of partition among them.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as
ordered by the RTC is an entirely different matter, depending on the
exact nature of the subject house.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent
Fidel on his exclusive property.29 Petitioners add that said house has
been their residence for 20 years.30 Taken together, these
averments on record establish that the subject house is a family
home within the contemplation of the provisions of The Family
Code, particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband
and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling
house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it
is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the
time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and
is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

(Emphasis supplied.)
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the
automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its
occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the
judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct
Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the
scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which
the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus,
applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific
portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed
constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma
from the moment they began occupying the same as a family
residence 20 years back.31
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which
it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the
same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The
Family Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary,
and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court
finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home. (Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the
family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves
the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and
unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first,
that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10
years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor
beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot
judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court
finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been
alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling
reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical
segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction
sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the
immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership.
This signifies that even if the family home has passed by
succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to
any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home
into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon
it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the

family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159
to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the
subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at
this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the
parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. 32 Thus, for
10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer
period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the
family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when
no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the
restriction and order the partition of the property.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals33 that a claim for
exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be
set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at
public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of
the subject house although for a different reason.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that
the subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and
partition. The same evidence also establishes that the subject
house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing
have been constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and his
heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be
sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of
Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.
It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no
obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the
subject land covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the
specific area of the family home.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the
November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is
DECLARED part of the co-ownership of the parties John Nabor C.
Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but
EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the period
provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 158971. August 25, 2005]

MARIANO Y. SIY, in his personal capacity, as well as in his
capacity as owner of PHILIPPINE AGRI TRADING CENTER,
petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and ELENA EMBANG, respondents.
RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:
For resolution is private respondent Elena Embangs motion to cite
Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo, counsel of petitioner Mariano Y. Siy, in
contempt of court for delaying this case and impeding the
execution of the judgment rendered herein, in violation of Canon
12[1] and Rule 12.04[2] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of holiday pay and holiday premium pay filed by Embang
against petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center. The labor
arbiter ruled in favor of Embang. The dispositive portion of his
September 29, 2000 decision[3] read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [Embang] to
be a regular employee of the PHIL-AGRI TRADING CENTER and
ordering the latter to reinstate her to her former position and pay
her backwages from the date of her dismissal on February 18, 2000
until her reinstatement which computed as of today amounts to
P37,771.50 (P5881 x 6.5 months) plus 1/12 thereof or the amount
of P3,147.62 as corresponding 13th month pay for the period.
An additional award of 5% of the total award is also rendered since
[,] compelled to litigate [,] [Embang] had to engage the services of
counsel.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On March 8, 2002, the Third Division of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the
decision of the labor arbiter with modification. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of
merit and the Decision dated September 29, 2000 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in [that Mariano Y. Siy] should be
made jointly and severally liable together with Phil. Agri Trading
Center and that [Embang] is entitled only [to] the ten (10%)
percent of his awarded 13th month pay as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[4]
After the NLRC refused to reconsider its March 8, 2002 resolution,
petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of
a petition for certiorari. Finding the petition to be without merit, the
appellate court dismissed the same.[5] The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied. [6]
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before
this Court questioning the CAs decision (dismissing his petition) and
resolution (denying his motion for reconsideration). Since we found
no reversible error on the part of the appellate court, we denied the
petition in our September 22, 2003 resolution. Petitioner sought a
reconsideration of our resolution but we resolved to deny the same
with finality. Thereafter, entry of judgment was made on December
30, 2003.

In accordance with the rules of procedure of the NLRC, Embangs

counsel filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated
February 16, 2004 before the labor arbiter. Subsequently, Atty.
Quevedo entered his appearance for the petitioner and filed a
comment to the motion for writ of execution. [7] He alleged that
Embang rejected the various offers of reinstatement extended to
her by petitioner; hence, she should be entitled to backwages only
up to September 29, 2000, the date of the promulgation of the
labor arbiters decision.
This was followed by a protracted exchange of pleadings and
motions between the parties.[8] Finding that his office was never
informed by petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center of any
intention on their part to reinstate Embang to her former position,
the labor arbiter issued an order dated July 30, 2004 [9] granting the
February 16, 2004 motion and directing that a writ of execution be
issued.
Atty. Quevedo refused to be deterred. He filed an appeal with the
NLRC on August 12, 2004. He insisted that the labor arbiter
committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to specify in his order
that the backwages should be computed until September 29, 2000
only and that no backwages should accrue thereafter because of
Embangs refusal to be reinstated.
Embangs counsel moved to dismiss the appeal. He contended that
the appeal was not perfected because petitioner and Philippine Agri
Trading Center did not post the required cash or surety bond.
Pending the resolution of the appeal, Embang filed the instant
motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.
By way of comment, Atty. Quevedo maintains that he did not delay
the execution of the decision but only sought the consideration of
Embangs refusal to be reinstated in any writ of execution that may
be issued. He claims that such refusal on Embangs part constituted
a supervening event that justified the filing of an appeal
notwithstanding the finality of the decision. He also asserts that an
appeal was the proper remedy to question the July 30, 2004 order
of the labor arbiter.
Meanwhile, the Third Division of the NLRC issued a resolution [10] on
February 28, 2005 resolving not to give due course to the appeal
and to remand the case to the regional arbitration branch for
further proceedings. The NLRC held that the July 30, 2004 order
was not appealable. Despite the denial of the appeal, however,
Atty. Quevedo filed a motion for clarification/partial reconsideration
of the NLRCs February 28, 2005 resolution.
For his obstinacy in refusing to respect a final and executory
judgment, we hold Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.
Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a

willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders but also

conduct tending to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede
the due administration of justice.[11] Under the Rules of Court,
contempt is classified into either direct or indirect contempt. Direct
contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same.
[12]
Indirect contempt is one not committed in the presence of a
court.[13] It is an act done at a distance which tends to belittle,
degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.[14]
Atty. Quevedo should be sanctioned for indirect contempt. Indirect
contempt is committed by a person who commits the following
acts, among others: disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order or judgment of a court;[15] any abuse of or any
unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt; [16] and any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.[17]
We denied with finality the petitioners petition for review on
certiorari almost two years ago. But the decision of the labor arbiter
(affirmed with modification by the NLRC and upheld by the CA and
this Court) remains unsatisfied up to now because of Atty.
Quevedos sly maneuvers on behalf of his client.
Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and
the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy
the fruits of his victory while the other party is obliged to respect
the courts verdict and to comply with it. We reiterate our
pronouncement in Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals:[18]
well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the
controversies.
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical
errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice
to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.
This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions.

Contrary to Atty. Quevedos contention, there existed no

supervening event that would have brought the case outside the
ambit of the general rule on the immutability of final and executory
decisions.
Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment
becomes final and executory or to new circumstances which
develop after judgment acquires finality.[19] The refusal of Embang
to be reinstated happened, assuming it really happened, before
the finality of our September 22, 2003 resolution, i.e., before the
decision of the labor arbiter as modified by the NLRC became final
and executory.
In fact, the issue of the alleged offer of reinstatement and Embangs
rejection of the same was not a new one and had already been
passed upon by the courts. Atty. Quevedo himself admits that
petitioner brought the issue before the CA in his June 6, 2002
petition for certiorari and December 3, 2002 memorandum. The
appellate court brushed it aside and found neither factual nor legal
merit in the petition. The matter was again raised in petitioners
June 3, 2003 motion for reconsideration which was denied on the
ground that the basic issues had already been previously
considered by the court. Embangs alleged refusal to be reinstated
was also alleged in the petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner before this Court. We denied it for failing to show that a
reversible error had been committed by the CA.
Atty. Quevedos client was bound by the finality of our affirmance of
the modified decision of the labor arbiter. He should not have tried,
under the guise of a flimsy appeal to the NLRC, to reopen a case
already decided with finality. Nor should he have raised anew
matters previously considered and issues already laid to rest.
Atty. Quevedos act of filing a baseless appeal with the NLRC was
obviously intended to defeat the implementation of a final and
executory decision. Elementary is the rule that an order granting a
motion for a writ of execution is not appealable. [20] Thus, Atty.
Quevedos deceptively innocent appeal constituted either a willful
disregard or gross ignorance of basic rules of procedure resulting in
the obstruction of justice.
By his acts, Atty. Quevedo has tried to prevent Embang from
enjoying the fruits of her hard earned legal victory. In effect, he has
been tying the hands of justice and preventing it from taking its
due course. His conduct has thwarted the due execution of a final
and executory decision. By appealing an order which he knew to be
unappealable, he abused court processes and hindered the
dispensation of justice. His dilatory tactics were an affront to the
dignity of the Court, clearly constituting indirect contempt.
We note that the ground cited in the motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in
contempt of court was his violation of Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility. While a lawyers violation of

his duties as an officer of the court may also constitute contempt,
the grounds for holding a person in contempt and for holding him
administratively liable for the violation of his lawyers oath are
distinct and separate from each other. They are specified in Rule 71
of the Rules of Court. A finding of contempt on the part of a lawyer
does not preclude the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against
him for his contravention of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus:
x x x the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are
separate and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude
the exercise of the other. A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in
court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the
other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with
the fitness of the courts officer to continue in that office, to
preserve and protect the court and the public from the official
ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The
principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt
is to safeguard the functions of the court [while that] of the
exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure
respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as
judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition of a fine as a penalty
in a contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a
subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same
manner, an attorneys conviction for contempt was not collaterally
estopped by reason of a subsequent disbarment proceeding in
which the court found in his favor on essentially the same facts
leading to conviction. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a
lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt
cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not
be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have
distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is
established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid
down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary
actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139
thereof.
Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish
for contempt and to discipline lawyers are both inherent in the
Supreme Court and are equally incidents of the courts basic power
to oversee the proper administration of justice and the orderly
discharge of judicial functions. As was succinctly expounded in
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, et al.:
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into
play in cases like that before us here: the Courts inherent power to
discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader [than]

the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be

committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of
court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the
contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct
which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme
Courts disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play
whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is
charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for
contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary
authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Courts
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called
upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice

and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly
tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the
administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct
calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and
contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt
power.[21]
We therefore refer the complaint against Atty. Quevedos behavior
to the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for an investigation of his possible liabilities under
Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo is hereby found
GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which a FINE of P30,000 is
imposed upon him, payable in full within five days from receipt of
this resolution.
SO ORDERED.