Child Soldiers

CHILD SOLDIERS
Global Report 2008
COALIT ION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIER S

Girl soldiers and others gathered at a
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) event
in Tila, Rolpa district, Nepal.
Cover photo © Marcus Bleasdale 2005
The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers was formed in May 1998 by leading non-
governmental organizations to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers, both boys
and girls, to secure their demobilization, and to promote their reintegration into their
communities. It works to achieve this through advocacy and public education, research
and monitoring, and network development and capacity building.
The Coalition’s Steering Committee members are: Amnesty International, Defence for
Children International, Human Rights Watch, International Federation Terre des Hommes,
International Save the Children Alliance, Jesuit Refugee Service, and the Quaker United
Nations Office – Geneva. The Coalition has regional representatives in Africa, the
Americas, Asia and the Middle East and national networks in about 30 countries. The
Coalition unites local, national and international organizations, as well as youth, experts
and concerned individuals from every region of the world.
COALIT ION TO STO P T H E U S E O F C H I L D S O L D I E R S
www.child-soldiers.org
Child
Soldiers
Global
Report
2008
This report covers the period from

April 2004 to October 2007.
Countries/situations where children were recruited
or used in hostilities – April 2004 to October 2007
First published in 2008 by
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
9 Marshalsea Road (4th floor)
London SE1 1EP
United Kingdom
www.child-soldiers.org
© Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers

ISBN 978-0-9541624-5-0
Original language: English
Text and cover design: www.intertype.com
Printed in the United Kingdom by Bell and Bain

Contents
World Map 2 the Grenadines, St Kitts Guinea 156

Acknowledgements 7 & Nevis, St Lucia 86 Guinea-Bissau 159
Preface 9 Central African Guyana 161
Introduction 12 Republic 88 Haiti 162
Afghanistan 40 Chad 91 Holy See 165
Albania 43 Chile 95 Honduras 166
Algeria 44 China 97 Hungary 167
Andorra 45 Colombia 99 Iceland 168
Angola 46 Comoros 106 India 169
Antigua and Barbuda 48 Congo, Democratic Indonesia 173
Argentina 49 Republic of the 106 Iran 176
Armenia 51 Congo, Republic of 113 Iraq 178
Australia 52 Costa Rica 115 Ireland 181
Austria 54 Côte d’Ivoire 116 Israel 184
Azerbaijan 56 Croatia 122 Italy 188
Bahamas 57 Cuba 124 Jamaica 189
Bahrain 58 Cyprus 125 Japan 191
Bangladesh 58 Czech Republic 127 Jordan 192
Barbados 61 Denmark 128 Kazakhstan 194
Belarus 62 Djibouti 129 Kenya 196
Belgium 63 Dominican Republic 130 Korea, Democratic People’s
Belize 64 Ecuador 131 Republic of 198
Benin 65 Egypt 134 Korea, Republic of 200
Bhutan 66 El Salvador 135 Kuwait 201
Bolivia 67 Equatorial Guinea 136 Kyrgyzstan 202
Bosnia-Herzegovina 70 Eritrea 137 Laos 204
Botswana 71 Estonia 140 Latvia 206
Brazil 72 Ethiopia 141 Lebanon 207
Brunei Darussalam 74 Fiji 144 Lesotho 210
Bulgaria 75 Finland 145 Liberia 211
Burkina faso 76 France 146 Libya 217
Burundi 77 Gabon 147 Liechtenstein 218
Cambodia 81 Gambia 148 Lithuania 219
Cameroon 84 Georgia 149 Luxembourg 221
Canada 84 Germany 151 Macedonia 222
Cape Verde 86 Ghana 152 Madagascar 223
Caribbean (Dominica, Greece 153 Malawi 224
Grenada, St Vincent & Guatemala 154 Malaysia 225
CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008

Maldives 226 Qatar 282 Ukraine 351
Mali 227 Romania 283 United Arab Emirates 353
Malta 228 Russian Federation 284 United Kingdom 354
Mauritania 229 Rwanda 288 United States of
Mauritius 230 San Marino 290 America 358
Mexico 231 Sao Tome and Uruguay 362
Moldova 233 Principe 291 Uzbekistan 363
Monaco 235 Saudi Arabia 292 Venezuela 366
Mongolia 236 Senegal 293 Viet Nam 368
Montenegro 237 Serbia 294 Yemen 370
Morocco and Western Seychelles 295 Zambia 371
Sahara 238 Sierra Leone 297 Zimbabwe 372
Mozambique 239 Singapore 302 Summary of selected
Myanmar 240 Slovakia 303 international
Namibia 245 Slovenia 303 treaties 375
Nepal 246 Solomon Islands 304 Optional Protocol 378
Netherlands 250 Somalia 305 UN Resolution 1612 383
New Zealand 251 South Africa 308 Child soldiers 2008:
Nicaragua 252 Spain 310 data summary 389
Niger 253 Sri Lanka 311 Methodology, terms
Nigeria 255 Sudan 315 and definitions 410
Norway 257 Suriname 321 Glossary and explanatory
Occupied Palestinian Swaziland 322 notes 413
Territory 258 Sweden 323
Oman 262 Switzerland 324
Pacific Islands (Cook Is, Syria 326
Kiribati, Marchall Is, Taiwan 328
Micronesia, Nauru, Tajikistan 329
Niue, Palau, Samoa, Tanzania 331
Tuvalu, Vanuatu) 263 Thailand 333
Pakistan 266 Timor-Leste 335
Panama 268 Togo 337
Papua New Guinea 269 Tonga 339
Paraguay 271 Trinidad and Tobago 340
Peru 274 Tunisia 341
Philippines 276 Turkey 342
Poland 280 Turkmenistan 344
Portugal 281 Uganda 345
Acknowledgements
This report covers the period from April data summary chart which appears at the
2004 to October 2007. It contains detailed end of the report.
information on child soldier recruitment I would also like to thank editors
and use in 197 countries. Where relevant, Maggie Maloney, Sarah Pennington and
information is provided on disarmament, Philippa Youngman; and Maggie Maloney
demobilization and reintegration programs, and Philippa Youngman for copy-editing
and on justice and accountability measures the report. Country entries were researched
to address the problem. and drafted by a team of consultants. They
The project and the research were co- were Daniel Alberman, Lana Baydas, Emma
ordinated by consultant Donna Guest. The Blower, Marisé Castro, Alison Dilworth,
introduction was written by Coalition staff Mary Durran, Marjorie Farquharson,
member Lucia Withers, with contributions Sara Hamood, Catherine Hunter, Steve
from Victoria Forbes Adam and Brian Kibble, Don Lieber, Sarah Maguire,
Phillips. Coalition staff members Enrique Anoushka Marashilian, Roland Marchal,
Restoy, Lucia Withers and Heloise Ruaudel Ingrid Massagé, Matthew Naumann, Josh
and consultant Laura Fine reviewed and Ounsted, Sandrine Perrot, Brian Phillips,
revised draft entries for Africa, Asia and Hugh Poulton, Claudia Ricca, Kerry Smith-
the Middle East; Martin Nagler and intern Jeffreys and Lars Waldorf.
Chantal Scholten compiled large quantities Coalition members in Colombia,
of data to support the process. Regional France, Italy, Philippines, Spain and the
staff Dee Brillenburg Wurth, Emma De Vise United States researched and drafted their
and Ryan Silverio provided information, country entries. Information was provided
comments and reviews on entries for by national coalition members and partners
west Africa, the Great Lakes and south- in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic
east Asia respectively. Ryan Silverio also Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia,
researched and drafted a number of entries. Israel, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian
Carissa Lopez and Heloise Ruaudel were Territory, Thailand, Uganda, the United
responsible for the cover design and States and Venezuela.
photographs respectively, and Enrique I am grateful to staff at the Office of
Restoy co-ordinated the translations. the Special Representative of the Secretary-
Invaluable administrative support, General for children and armed conflict, to
fundraising and financial management UN staff in relevant peacekeeping missions,
were provided throughout by Coalition staff and to UNICEF in New York and in field
members Andrew Lowton, Carissa Lopez offices around the world. They provided
and Carol Steel. A special debt of gratitude invaluable information, commentary and
is owed to Ratna Jhaveri, who spent many support throughout the duration of this
hours revising and updating numerous project. Thanks are due in particular to
complex entries as well as compiling the staff working on Central African Republic,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti,
Iceland, Indonesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, time and expertise to the project, to
Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri James and Sonia Nesbitt and to numerous
Lanka, Thailand and Zimbabwe. other organizations and individuals who
I would like to thank Salvatore Sagues supported the research and production
and Sara Dezaley for French translations, process.
the Permanent Peace Movement for Arabic The governments of Canada, France,
translations and Blue Box for Spanish Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
translations. I thank Martyn Partridge and Sweden and Switzerland provided financial
Francis McInally at Intertype for their invalu- support. Oakdale Trust, the Allan and Nesta
able support during the production process, Ferguson Charitable Trust and the Tides
and Beatriz Bellorin and Ian Wren for their Foundation also supported this project.
photographic expertise. Their continued support for the work of
We are grateful for the long-standing the Child Soldiers Coalition is greatly
support of Coalition Steering Committee appreciated.
members Jo Becker, Rachel and Derek This report is dedicated to child
Brett and Martin Macpherson. Thanks are soldiers and their children.
additionally owed to Robert Freer, David
Buchbinder, Linda Dowdney, Francesca Dr Victoria Forbes Adam
Pizzutelli, Halya Senyk and Maisy Director
Weicherding, who generously donated London April 2008

Preface
Child soldiers. Two simple words. But they impressive and unprecedented number of
describe a world of atrocities committed international instruments are in place to
against children and sometimes by children. support efforts to “stop the use of child
Committed in many different countries soldiers”. They testify to an emerging global
and often hidden from the public eye. We consensus on this damaging practice. The
know how devastating these experiences Optional Protocol on the involvement of
are for children – thanks to the courage children in armed conflict has been ratified
and determination of those who have by 120 states; special war crime tribunals
spoken out and called on the international and the International Criminal Court are
community to take action on their behalf. becoming a more important means for
This Global Report, the third produced bringing the perpetrators of crimes against
by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child children to justice. The Security Council
Soldiers, elaborates on progress over the has established a working group to closely
past four years, confirming for example, monitor developments in states where child
that tens of thousands of child soldiers soldiers are used and the UN has devoted
have been demobilized during this period. substantial resources to this problem.
But as this meticulously documented Most recently, the Paris Principles and
report shows, tens of thousands more Guidelines on children associated with
have remained in or been newly recruited armed forces and armed groups have been
and used in armed conflicts – primarily by endorsed by 66 governments – they have
non-state armed groups, but also by some pledged to work for the release of all child
national armies. Governments have failed to soldiers from fighting forces, and to support
prevent the use of children by proxy forces programs which genuinely address the
and child soldiers who have escaped or complex needs of returning child soldiers.
been captured have been used as spies or In short, a rich body of international
sources of intelligence rather than provided instruments exists. Our challenge is to
with rehabilitation and reintegration ensure they are used to maximum effect.
support. Numerous governments persist in This will involve well-coordinated and multi-
recruiting under-18 year olds into national faceted actions by a wide range of actors,
armies, exposing them to military discipline, the exertion of pressure where it is needed,
hazardous activity, bullying, abuse and and sustained funding for programs to
possible deployment to war zones. assist returning child soldiers and other
There is an urgent need to increase war-affected children. Ultimately, success
all our efforts to prevent and eradicate the will depend on addressing root causes and
recruitment and use of children in armed building societies where the rights and
conflict. dignity of all children are upheld.
The Global Report 2008 shows Last but not least, organizations
that achieving this goal is far from easy. like the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Nevertheless, there is reason for hope. An Soldiers have played a vital role in the

global movement to definitively end child This Global Report is an important
soldiering. For ten years the Coalition has record of progress made and the many
served as an independent global monitor obstacles yet to be overcome. May it inspire
for child soldiers; they have tirelessly us all to renew our efforts so that one day in
advocated for the right of all children to the near future we can shout: “Children are
protection from military exploitation; and free from involvement in war at last!”
they have substantially contributed to the
policy and human rights agenda regarding
child soldiers. Their partnerships with Professor Jaap E. Doek
grassroots organizations working with and Chairperson
for children in conflict zones have greatly Committee on the Rights of the Child
enriched all our knowledge of the realities 2001 to 2007
on the ground, and the challenges to be met
if we are to achieve our goals.
10 CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008

© Private source 2004
Ethnic Wa child soldier in the ceasefire group, the United Wa State Army, at a Wa region
checkpoint, Shan State, northern Myanmar
CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008 11

INTRODUCTION
Child soldiers: progress,

but too little
We feel different because of the way other children look at us; it seems
as if we are not children born from this land. They view us as though we
come from a different place.
You cannot be completely happy with all these wounds – both in your
body and in your mind.1
Four years is a long time in a child’s life. trend is more the result of conflicts ending
Much can happen that will touch the rest of than the impact of initiatives to end child
their lives for good or for ill. Some children soldier recruitment and use. Indeed, where
may live their lives in situations of peace armed conflict does exist, child soldiers
and security. For countless others war will almost certainly be involved. The
continues to be all too real. Over this aspect majority of these children are in non-state
of the adult world they have little say and armed groups, but the record of some
no control. governments is also little improved.
Four years is sufficient for substantial The figures for conflict do not
developments in the life of a global reveal the whole picture. The military
movement. The last Global Report was recruitment of children (under-18s) and
published by the Coalition to Stop the Use their use in hostilities is a much larger
of Child Soldiers (Coalition) in November phenomenon, that still takes place in one
2004; since then the movement to end the form or another in at least 86 countries
use of child soldiers has seen continued and territories worldwide. This includes
progress towards a universal consensus unlawful recruitment by armed groups,
against their use in hostilities, witnessed by forcible recruitment by government forces,
the fact that over three-quarters of states recruitment or use of children into militias
have now signed, ratified or acceded to the or other groups associated with armed
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the forces, their use as spies, as well as legal
Rights of the Child on the involvement of recruitment into peacetime armies.
children in armed conflict. The findings make it clear that, despite
On the ground, the consensus would the high level of international attention on
appear to be reflected most clearly by the issue, the impact of that attention is
a decrease in the number of conflicts in yet to be felt by many children who are, or
which children are directly involved – from are at risk of becoming, child soldiers. They
27 in 2004 to 17 by the end of 2007. The have reinforced the fact that a complex
Coalition’s research for this Global Report range of co-ordinated responses by multiple
shows, however, that that this downward actors are required to achieve the goal

of preventing children’s involvement in
armed conflict, obtaining their release and Overview
supporting successful reintegration. This
will involve a more explicit recognition International efforts continue
of child soldiers on the agendas of those
involved in a whole range of initiatives, The international framework to protect
from conflict prevention, peacemaking and children from involvement in armed forces
mediation through to peace-building and and groups has been reinforced and efforts
longer-term development. have focused increasingly on field-level
Ultimately, if, over the next four years, implementation.
the international community is to make The first important steps towards
good its promise to protect children from establishing individual criminal
military exploitation, the level of political responsibility for those who recruit and use
will, the amount of human and financial children in hostilities have been taken. War
resources, the adherence to established crimes charges relating to the conscription,
best practice and the quantity as well enlistment and active participation in
as the quality of collaborative effort hostilities of children under 15 years old
and imaginative endeavour must all be have been issued by the International
multiplied. Criminal Court (ICC) against members of
armed groups in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC) and Uganda. A landmark
in international justice was forged by the
conviction in 2007 by the Special Court
for Sierra Leone of four people on charges
that included the recruitment and use of
children during the civil war. The pursuit of
justice has also been furthered by the work
of truth commissions in Sierra Leone, Timor-
Leste and recently Liberia, all of which have
addressed the issue of child soldiers.
The Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the involvement of children in armed
conflict (Optional Protocol) – the most
specific prohibition of child soldiers under
international law – has now been ratified
by 120 states, up from 77 in mid-2004.
The United Nations (UN) Committee on
the Rights of the Child began to examine
state party reports on the Optional Protocol
implementation in January 2005. Their
concluding observations are generating an
increased momentum towards developing
modalities for protecting children from
military recruitment and use, as well as
providing an insight into further measures

that many governments must take if they Defence Policy (ESDP) operations and
are to achieve this goal. mission planning. The African Union (AU)
Building on previous actions, the UN renewed its calls for its member states to
Security Council adopted resolutions 1539 ratify the African Charter on the Rights and
(2004) and 1612 (2005) calling for the Welfare of the Child by the end of 2008 and
establishment of a monitoring and reporting to enact relevant implementing legislation
mechanism on children and armed conflict. by 2010. The Charter requires state parties
Now set up in around a dozen countries, inter alia to refrain from recruiting children
the mechanism is tasked with documenting and to ensure that they do not take direct
six categories of grave abuse against part in hostilities.3
children, including recruitment and use of On the ground, tens of thousands of
child soldiers, in the situations of armed child soldiers have been released from
conflict listed in the annexes of the UN armies and armed groups since 2004 as
Secretary-General’s regular reports on the long-running conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa
topic. A Security Council working group on have ended. A major initiative to gather
children and armed conflict was set up in and compile accumulated experience
2005 to review reports submitted under from the demobilization, disarmament
the mechanism and to monitor progress and reintegration (DDR) of child soldiers
in the development and implementation around the world culminated in the Paris
of time-bound action plans by warring Principles and Guidelines on children
parties to end their recruitment and use associated with armed forces or armed
of child soldiers. The working group has groups (Paris Principles). Endorsed by 66
issued conclusions based on the reports, governments at ministerial meetings in
transmitted letters and appeals to parties February and October in 2007, including
engaged in violations, and taken a range of many from conflict-affected countries, the
other actions on situations where abuses Paris Principles offer guidance on protecting
against children have been committed. children from recruitment and on providing
The first actions by the Security effective assistance to those already
Council to apply targeted measures against involved with armed groups or forces.
individuals specifically for recruiting and The large-scale recruitment and
using children were taken in 2006, when a deployment of children by government
travel ban was imposed on an armed group forces in countries such as Burundi, Côte
leader in Côte d’Ivoire. A Security Council d’Ivoire, Guinea and Liberia ceased with the
resolution the same year sought to subject end of conflicts. More than half of countries
to travel bans and asset freezing leaders worldwide have set the minimum age at
in the DRC who recruited or used child which an individual can enter the military,
soldiers.2 including for training, at 18.
Regional bodies have also continued to In response to international pressure
focus attention on this issue. The European and local initiatives, several armed groups
Union’s (EU) 2003 Guidelines on children have committed themselves to ending the
and armed conflict were given practical recruitment and use of children. Groups
direction by an implementation strategy in Côte d’Ivoire and Sri Lanka are working
issued in 2006. The same year a checklist with the UN to develop and implement
on integration and protection of children time-bound action plans to release children
was adopted to ensure that child rights and prevent their recruitment. Ethnic armed
and protection concerns are systematically groups in Myanmar have agreed to do
addressed in European Security and likewise.

Real protection requires redoubling methods, and the varied environments
of effort in which they operate militate against
generic solutions. Effective strategies
While the general direction is positive, the must be multifaceted and context-specific.
pace of progress is slow and its impact Above all, they must address root causes.
is not yet felt by the tens of thousands of Poor governance and its effects, including
children in the ranks of fighting forces. The impoverishment, inequality, discrimination
international framework offers little real and human rights abuses, are all known
protection for countless others who are at to contribute to the risk that children will
risk of recruitment and use in conflict. be recruited by armed groups. While such
The Coalition has documented conditions persist, children will remain
information on 21 countries or territories vulnerable to involvement in armed forces
where children were deployed to areas of and groups.
conflict between April 2004 and October The number of governments that
2007. Within this period conflicts ended in deployed children in combat or other
two of the 21 – Indonesia and Nepal – and frontline duties in their armed forces has
so too did child soldier use there. Although not significantly decreased since 2004.
this is fewer than the preceding four years, Children have been used in armed conflict
the Coalition’s research reveals a number of by government forces in nine situations
disturbing findings that make it clear that compared with 10 in the previous four-year
the efforts to date have been insufficient. period. The most notable offender remains
The first of these findings is perhaps Myanmar, whose armed forces, engaged in
the most stark. It is this: when armed long-running counter-insurgency operations
conflict breaks out, reignites or intensifies, against a range of ethnic armed groups, are
children will almost inevitably become believed to contain thousands of children.
involved as soldiers. The Central African Children were also reported to have
Republic, Chad, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan been used in hostilities in Chad, the DRC,
(Darfur) are all cases in point. Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Additionally,
Next, efforts to demobilize children Palestinian children were used on several
during conflict have met with only limited occasions by defence forces in Israel as
success. Peace remains the main hope human shields. There were reports of child
for securing the release of child soldiers soldier use by Yemeni armed forces in
from armed forces and groups, a fact fighting in 2007. A few under-18s in the UK
that further reinforces the importance of armed forces were sent to Iraq.
child protection being integral to peace The flouting of international standards
negotiations, as well as the need for explicit by governments extends beyond official
provisions relating to child soldiers in armed forces. Children in at least 14
ceasefire and peace agreements. countries have been recruited into auxiliary
The impact of efforts to end child forces linked to national armies; into local-
soldier recruitment and use by armed level civilian defence groups established
groups has been similarly limited. Armed to support counter-insurgency operations;
groups in at least 24 countries located in or into militias and armed groups acting
every region of the world were known to as proxies for government forces. In at
have recruited under-18s and many have least eight countries children were used as
used them in hostilities. Many have proved spies and for other intelligence-gathering
resistant to pressure and persuasion. purposes, placing them at risk of reprisals
Their widely diverse characters, aims and and ignoring government responsibilities

to provide protection and reintegration suffer stigmatization and rejection by their
assistance. families and communities.
Universal responsibilities under
the Optional Protocol to protect children
Governments which used child soldiers
against recruitment and to promote the
in armed conflict between April 2004
recovery and reintegration of former child
and October 2007.
soldiers have yet to be fully realized. When
Chad former child soldiers flee their country
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) of origin, asylum processes and special
Israel measures facilitating their recognition
Myanmar as refugees are frequently lacking in
Somalia destination countries, as is the provision
Sudan & Southern Sudan of adequate services for their recovery and
Uganda social reintegration. The legal framework to
Yemen criminalize the recruitment and use of child
Additionally, the United Kingdom soldiers and to establish extraterritorial
deployed under-18s to Iraq where they jurisdiction over such crimes is also far from
were exposed to risk of hostilities complete.
Finally, many state parties have
undermined the spirit, if not the letter,
Despite growing knowledge of best
of the Optional Protocol by continuing to
practices for the disarmament,
target under-18s for military recruitment.
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of
While a number of states have raised the
child soldiers, lessons learned from past
age of voluntary military recruitment within
efforts have continued to be overlooked in
the past four years, at least 63 countries
the implementation of official programs.
permitted the voluntary recruitment of
In many DDR processes the needs of child
children by their armed forces; 26 were
soldiers were not prioritized and in some
known to have under-18s in the ranks.
were entirely overlooked. Reintegration
Others introduced children, often at a very
programs were frequently not tailored to
young age, to military culture through
their specific needs and have suffered from
military training in schools, cadet corps and
chronic under-funding.
various other youth initiatives.
The repetition of mistakes has been
Placing children’s rights ahead of
acute in relation to girls. The special needs
military needs requires far-reaching shifts
and vulnerabilities of girls affected by
in values and attitudes. Until it is accepted
armed conflict have long been recognized,
that childhood extends to 18, and that the
yet they are not well served by DDR
spirit of the Protocol expects more of states
processes. The vast majority of girls
than just amending the age of conscription,
associated with fighting forces do not
children will continue to be at risk of
participate in official DDR programs and
becoming soldiers, especially in times of
are not catered for in post-demobilization
crisis.
support. Specialized medical care for
physical injury resulting from rape or
sexually transmitted diseases is rarely
available. Girl mothers and their children,
often born of rape, are known to be
particularly vulnerable, but continue to

Governments Additionally, there were reports that
Palestinian children have been used on
several occasions by the Israeli Defense
and Forces as human shields. In the Philippines
children were reported to be in paramilitary
international units used to support counter-insurgency

efforts. In Yemen, there are unconfirmed
law: a measure reports that untrained children as young

as 15 were given weapons and sent to
the front against an armed group in early
of progress 2007. Additionally, a few British under-18s
were sent to Iraq as recently as mid-2005.
Although most were swiftly removed, they
Almost two-thirds of the world’s states
were, in the meantime, exposed to risk of
have ratified the Optional Protocol, and
hostilities.
others have prohibited the recruitment
and use of child soldiers in domestic law
or regulations. However, the gap between State responsibility at arm’s length
what governments say and what they do The responsibility of governments extends
remains wide. beyond their official armed forces to militias
and armed groups which they support or
Children sent to war which act as proxy forces.
In Sudan, for example, responsibility
A small number of states persist not only
for ending the widespread use in hostilities
in recruiting children but also in exposing
of children by the government-backed
them to the physical and psychological
Janjaweed militias rests squarely with
dangers of combat. Despite repeated
the Sudanese authorities. The Sudanese
denials by the government, there is
government’s support for armed groups
evidence that Myanmar continues to recruit
in Chad and the Chadian government’s
large numbers of children into its armed
backing for armed groups in Sudan also
forces – often forcibly through intimidation,
render these governments responsible for
coercion and violence – and to use them in
the recruitment and use of child soldiers
a range of combat and non-combat roles. In
by these groups. The government in Sri
Chad, children were among those rounded
Lanka cannot escape responsibility for the
up in hasty manpower drives in 2006 and
abduction of children by the Karuna Group,
deployed to defend the capital against
a breakaway group of the Liberation Tigers
armed groups; in Somalia, the Transitional
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that was linked to
Federal Government allegedly recruited
government armed forces. Likewise, the
and used children during intense fighting
government of Côte d’Ivoire is accountable
for control of Mogadishu in late 2006; in
for recruitment of children in 2004 and 2005
Sudan, children have been used in Darfur
by pro-government militias, many of them
by the Sudan Armed Forces and in the
former child soldiers from Liberia.
south of the country by the Sudan People’s
Local-level civilian defence groups
Liberation Army (SPLA); and in Uganda,
established to support counter-insurgency
children who escaped from the Lord’s
efforts also demand attention. Informally
Resistance Army (LRA), or were captured or
structured and in some cases unregulated
released from it, were pressured to join the
by law, such groups include village-level
government defence forces to fight the LRA.

self-defence forces in Chad; anti-Maoist periods and subjected to torture or ill-
village defence forces in India; self-defence treatment.
committees in Peru; civilian volunteer Scores of children, some as young
organizations and village defence groups as nine, have been detained in Burundi
in the Philippines; and local defence on suspicion of collaboration with the
units in Uganda. Often located in remote National Liberation Forces (FNL). Some
areas, such groups may escape scrutiny were reportedly severely beaten – one
and accountability for crimes committed, 16-year-old alleged to have been a member
including the recruitment and use of of the FNL youth wing was believed to have
children. been unlawfully killed while in custody.
In Israel hundreds of Palestinian children
have been held under military provisions;
Countries where children were recruited
incidents of ill-treatment and torture were
and used by paramilitaries, militias,
reportedly common. In one case, a 16-year-
civilian defence forces or armed groups
old boy was held in solitary confinement for
linked to, supported by, or acting as
35 days in 2007 and pressured to become
proxies for governments.
an informant. In the Philippines, detailed
Chad Myanmar policies on the treatment of rescued,
Colombia Peru captured or surrendered child soldiers
Côte d’Ivoire Philippines by the security forces are not always
DRC Sri Lanka implemented, and children have been
India Sudan detained beyond the officially sanctioned
Iran Uganda time-limits and in some cases ill-treated. In
Libya both Myanmar and the DRC, child soldiers
who have escaped from armed forces have
In addition, several thousand children been charged with desertion and sentenced
and youth received training in to terms of imprisonment. In the DRC a
paramilitary skills in Zimbabwe’s youth few children convicted of military offences
militias. remained in prison under sentence of death,
in contravention of international law.
Child soldiers in detention In Iraq hundreds of children accused of
security violations were detained in Multi-
In many situations child soldiers associated National Force – Iraq facilities – where there
with armed groups and captured by were reports of abuse – as well as in Iraqi-run
government forces have been treated facilities. In its “war on terror”, the United
solely as adversaries rather than as States of America (USA) has designated
children. Contrary to the principle that a number of children, some as young as
child soldiers should be treated first and 13, as “enemy combatants” – a status, as
foremost as victims in need of support and used by the USA, that is unrecognized in
assistance for reintegration, some have international law. Several under-18-year-
been detained solely on the basis of their olds were transferred from US custody in
alleged association with armed groups, or for Afghanistan to indefinite military detention
desertion and other military offences while in the US Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay in
in armed forces. International standards Cuba. One such individual is Omar Khadr,
of juvenile justice and the right to fair trial a Canadian national shot and captured in
have been violated in situations where child a firefight with US forces in Afghanistan
soldiers have been detained for prolonged in 2002. He has alleged that he was ill-

treated in US custody in Afghanistan and – to promote the development and well-
Guantánamo. Six years on he is facing trial being of the child.
before a military commission for offences Of the 120 states that have ratified the
allegedly committed in 2002 when he was Protocol, almost two thirds have committed
15. In its case against him, the prosecution themselves in their declarations to set
suggested that Khadr had become involved the compulsory and minimum voluntary
with al-Qaeda when he was just 10 years old. recruitment ages at 18 or higher. In the past
From the start, Omar Khadr and four years the minimum age for voluntary
others like him should have been treated recruitment into the armed forces has
primarily as children and as victims. Their been raised to 18 in Chile, Italy, Jordan,
treatment should focus on maximizing the the Maldives, Sierra Leone, Slovenia and
potential of the individual for successful South Korea. In Nepal, a law that permitted
social reintegration. Accountability for any recruitment of under-18s was declared null
criminal acts that may have been committed and void by the Supreme Court.
can be a part of this, but any process to However, a number of states whose
this end must take full account of the age commitment to stopping the use of child
of the child at the time of involvement with soldiers is otherwise not in doubt continue
an armed group, and not allow the pursuit to assert their need to target 16- and
of punishment to blind the prosecuting 17-year-olds for voluntary recruitment
authorities to the responsibility of others in into their own forces. Some openly insist
his or her predicament. on placing the manpower requirements
The use of children – often captured of their armed forces ahead of children’s
or escaped from armed forces – as spies or rights. Calls to raise the minimum age of
informants similarly violates basic human voluntary recruitment to 18 have been
rights principles for the protection of resisted by armed forces in Australia, New
children. It also contravenes government Zealand and the United Kingdom, on the
obligations to assist in the recovery of child grounds that it would adversely affect the
soldiers and, moreover, exposes children availability of recruits. In the USA, following
to risks of reprisals. Yet this practice is a dramatic fall in the number of under-18s
known to have been carried out by armed joining the military and general recruitment
forces in Burundi, Colombia, the DRC, India, shortfalls, increased enlistment bonuses
Indonesia, Israel, Nepal and Uganda during were introduced and minimum educational
the reporting period. standards for recruits lowered.
Recruitment age Government armed forces which

While ensuring that under-18s do not take used children as spies, informants or
a direct part in hostilities is an essential messengers.
component of the pledge to prevent child Burundi Indonesia
soldiering, the Optional Protocol demands Colombia Israel
more. As its Preamble spells out, its goal DRC Nepal
is the “continuous improvement of the India Uganda
situation of children without distinction”.
This suggests the need for serious reflection
Resistance to the spirit of the Optional
on whether the inclusion of under-18s in
Protocol in the interests of filling the ranks
military forces satisfies the ultimate goal
raises questions about the value assigned
of the Convention and its Optional Protocol
to child protection. Active targeting of

children – often from deprived backgrounds is to prove durable when put to the test by
with fewer educational or vocational conflict, crisis or emergency.
options – undermines official claims that Military values are often inculcated in
such recruitment is genuinely voluntary. the educational and recreational settings
Elsewhere, a stated intention to where children’s physical and intellectual
recruit only those above the age of 18 is formation takes place. At one extreme,
undermined by the absence of measures to a “military first” policy is reported to
determine the age of recruits. Registration translate into the equivalent of some 12
at birth is the right of every child and is weeks annually of drills and other military
the first of many essential measures that training for North Korean secondary-school
a state must take to build a framework students. But military culture and training
of protection around children. Low permeate school life elsewhere. Military
birth registration is most prevalent in training is compulsory for school children in
war-affected and heavily indebted poor countries including China, Fiji, Kyrgyzstan,
countries – precisely those countries where the Russian Federation, United Arab
children are most at risk of recruitment and Emirates and Venezuela. The presence of
use by armed forces. cadet corps within schools, for example in
The risk of inadvertent under-age Antigua and Barbuda, the United Kingdom
recruitment of children because of low and the USA, may also introduce militarism
birth registration rates was noted in into places of development and learning.
countries such as Bangladesh, Botswana, The Optional Protocol permits the
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Kenya admission of under-18s into schools
and Zambia. In Paraguay the lack of birth operated by or under the control of the
registration procedures has facilitated the military, but requires them to operate in
forced conscription of children as young accordance with Articles 28 and 29 of the
as 12 years old. Elsewhere, for example Convention on the Rights of the Child.
in Afghanistan and Yemen, inadequate Primary or secondary education is provided
verification procedures to determine the in military-run schools in countries such as
age of new recruits has meant that under- Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Egypt, Honduras,
age soldiers were likely to be serving in Israel, Kazakhstan, Nicaragua, Peru, the
security forces. Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Ukraine
and Viet Nam. In some military schools
A shift in culture is called for children wear military uniforms, live in
military-style barracks and are subject to
By late 2007 the UN Committee on the military discipline. Some offer a standard
Rights of the Child had examined initial school curriculum, while others provide a
reports from 28 state parties to the narrow education involving hard physical
Optional Protocol. The examinations have drill and weapons handling. It is true that in
revealed much about the attitudes of these many cases these schools fill gaps in state
countries to childhood and how far a state education and children from poor families
is willing to go to protect children from particularly can stand to benefit. However,
under-age recruitment and involvement in states must not be allowed to sidestep
conflict. The Committee’s work shows that their obligation to provide every child with
the implementation of the Protocol requires an education consistent with the aims
more than changes to legislation. Values enshrined in the Convention.
have to be entrenched if legislative progress There is also a variety of youth
initiatives which may not sit comfortably

with the Optional Protocol. The Committee human rights should be considered outside
on the Rights of the Child suggested that the sphere of moral and legal concern
Norway’s voluntary youth program, the – regardless of where those abuses have
Home Guard, could not be regarded as taken place. Building on other human
genuinely conforming to the spirit of the rights treaties, the Optional Protocol
Protocol, despite a range of safeguards requires state parties to commit resources,
prohibiting practical military training for energies and political will to a recovery
under-18s. Youth initiatives elsewhere do and rehabilitation agenda for former child
not even incorporate such safeguards. soldiers and to ensure accountability
In Australia, Georgia, Sweden, the USA for those who recruit and use children
and Uzbekistan, for example, a variety of in hostilities. That agenda encompasses
patriot camps, cadet corps and military and responsive and responsible asylum
sporting competitions and the like involve procedures, international assistance to and
military drills, weapons handling and, in co-operation with countries where children
some cases, the use of weapons. Such have been active participants in armed
activities cast doubt on claims that these conflict, and the establishment of robust
programs motivate young people to be legal protections against the recruitment of
better citizens and make a wholly positive children and their use in hostilities.
contribution to youth development. When former child soldiers seek
Children attending military schools asylum, the values of global responsibility
or participating in such initiatives are, for are put to the test and many states the
the most part, under no formal obligation world over are found lacking. Problems
to enlist. It is nonetheless apparent that identified by the Committee on the Rights
early exposure to military life can be of the Child include failure to identify
used to facilitate military recruitment. children who may have been recruited or
In Kazakhstan, for example, of the used in hostilities, failure to recognize this
approximately 4,000 children studying in form of persecution as a basis for granting
military schools in 2005–6, some 65 per refugee status, absence of systematic data
cent went on to join the army. In the USA collection, deficient training of immigration
an estimated 40 per cent of students who officials and other relevant professionals,
graduate from high school with two or more and inadequate services. In these
years in the Junior Reserve Officer Training circumstances former child soldiers can be
Corp, open to children from 14 upwards, left without support in a strange country.
eventually enlist in the military. Children They are also at risk of forcible return and,
from 12 to 15 years old, many of them in countries where children seeking asylum
orphans, who enter cadet schools in the are detained, such as Italy and Australia,
Russian Federation have no legal means of of detention. State parties, many of them
reversing either their decision to attend the in Europe, have been put on notice by
school or the undertaking to do vocational the Committee that progress is expected
military work on graduation. towards developing asylum procedures that
are sensitive to former child soldiers and
A global responsibility putting in place special measures to assist
them.
The Optional Protocol embraces values The Committee has also closely
of global responsibility that promote the scrutinized domestic laws that explicitly
universality of human rights. Neither prohibit the involvement of under-18s in
victim nor perpetrator of serious abuses of hostilities and under-age recruitment,

including third-party recruitment of under-
18s for military activity. It has given similar Armed groups:
scrutiny to laws to establish extraterritorial
jurisdiction for crimes of under-age
recruitment and use of child soldiers,
confronting the
including the incorporation into domestic
law of the relevant provisions of the Rome challenge
Statute of the ICC.
While many governments have policies While fewer states are recruiting and using
prohibiting the recruitment and use of child soldiers, when it comes to non-state
children, very few have explicitly prohibited armed groups the news is far less positive.
by law the violation of these provisions of Despite some examples of progress,
the Optional Protocol. Australia, Belgium the bigger picture remains essentially
and Germany are among a small number unaltered: the recruitment and use of
of countries that have introduced criminal boys and girls by armed groups remains
penalties for individuals who conscript, widespread.
enlist or use children under the age of 15 at The uses to which children are put by
home and abroad. In Norway, Sweden and armed groups remained largely unchanged.
the USA, such legislation was pending. In In Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African
the case of Norway it was proposed that Republic and Colombia, for example,
conscripting or enlisting children under under-18s have been used as combatants
the age of 18 could be prosecuted as a war and in other front-line duties. Here and
crime – a standard higher than the age limit elsewhere armed groups also employed
of 15 contained in the Rome Statute. Where children in a range of support roles from
legislation exists some states have limited cooking and portering to carrying messages
its application, for example to times of and acting as lookouts and spies. Girls are
war and armed conflict, or to apply only to reported to have been raped and subjected
crimes committed within the borders of the to other forms of sexual violence and
state against or by its own nationals. The exploitation including by the Revolutionary
enactment of legislation that criminalizes Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the
child recruitment and use both nationally Armed Forces of the New Forces (FAFN)
and extraterritorially is essential in in Côte d’Ivoire, various armed groups in
establishing the legal framework necessary the DRC, and the LRA in northern Uganda.
to end impunity for this crime. On occasion, children have been used by
Even in states which have yet to militant groups in suicide attacks in Iraq, as
become parties to the Optional Protocol this well as in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
progressive standard can be a useful basis until late 2004. This phenomenon has also
for dialogue about conceptions of childhood recently emerged in both Afghanistan and
and why children should not be seen as Pakistan. In situations such as those in
acceptable participants in armed conflict Haiti, Kenya and Nigeria, children have been
by either governments or non-state actors. active players in political violence through
In countries where governments seek to their membership of criminal gangs whose
justify inaction on grounds of inadequate services are intermittently employed by
resources, those measures in the Protocol politicians and other actors for political
more dependent on political will than cash ends.
for their realization can be emphasized.

Positive developments government, workshops and advocacy
with armed groups conducted by a local
An end to conflicts in Angola, Liberia and non-governmental organization (NGO) has
Sierra Leone in the last decade brought a contributed to changing attitudes.
halt to the massive recruitment and use
of children by armed groups there. Peace
Armed groups continue to recruit
agreements in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the
children
DRC, Nepal and Southern Sudan have also
delivered significant reductions in such Despite progress, the overall picture is
recruitment, if not in all cases a total end to one of armed groups that have ignored
the practice. international law and standards, that
Peace processes aside, the impact of renege on commitments, are resistant to
measures aimed at preventing and ending pressure and persuasion, or have so far
the recruitment and use of children by proved to be beyond the reach of efforts to
armed groups has been limited, reaching end the involvement of children in conflict
only a few groups and benefiting relatively and political violence.
small numbers of children. While the value The examples are many. The LTTE
of such measures is undeniable, it must has repeatedly been condemned for its
be recognized that more needs to be done recruitment and use of children. Yet as Sri
to bring about demonstrable change in Lanka descends once again into all-out
conflict-affected countries. war, the LTTE is reported to be recruiting
The UN-led monitoring and reporting and re-recruiting children, albeit in fewer
mechanism has significantly increased numbers than previously, despite its
available data on abuses against children repeated commitments to end the practice.
committed by armed groups, as well as The LRA, notorious for abducting and
armed forces, in selected situations.4 The brutalizing thousands of boys and girls
principle of engagement with armed groups during the 22-year-long conflict in northern
for child protection purposes is now widely Uganda, has steadfastly ignored appeals to
accepted and has yielded some positive release children even though peace talks
results. Armed groups in Côte d’Ivoire and are taking place. In the DRC, groups loyal
Sri Lanka have agreed to UN-sponsored to Laurent Nkunda, a former commander
action plans to end their recruitment of of the Rwanda-backed Congolese Rally for
child soldiers and to demobilize the children Democracy (RCD-Goma), have continued to
already in their ranks. Two armed groups in deploy children in hostilities against various
Myanmar have committed to end the use of other armed groups. Some of the children
child soldiers and another has expressed had been recruited from refugee camps in
willingness to enter into discussions with Rwanda. In Colombia, where peace efforts
UNICEF. have stalled, several thousand children
At grass-roots level, initiatives remain within the ranks of FARC and the
aimed at building awareness of children’s National Liberation Army (ELN) with little
rights among armed groups and the apparent prospect of release.
communities that surround them have Other groups operating in little-known
demonstrated potential to impact on the conflicts have largely escaped international
policy and practices of some groups. A scrutiny and action. In Thailand, for
case in point is in relation to ethnic armed example, the separatist group National
groups in Myanmar, where, although Revolution Front-Coordinate (BRN-C),
the work of the UN was impeded by the responsible for much of the spiralling

violence in the southern provinces since The limits of existing approaches
early 2004, is reported to use under-18s
in various roles including propaganda Existing strategies have been remarkably
and support for military operations. In effective in establishing a broad consensus
India, despite a reported increase in child that armed forces are unsuitable places for
recruitment by Maoist groups since 2005, children. But it is clear that many armed
and persistent reports of child soldier use groups have not joined this consensus. Tens
by armed groups in Jammu and Kashmir and of thousands of children have continued
northeastern states, the issue has to date to be recruited and used by such groups,
largely escaped national or international and to be put at risk of death, injury and
scrutiny. sexual violence. Thousands more remain
at risk of recruitment. Changing this reality
requires a critical analysis of the limits of
Countries where there were child existing approaches and the development
soldiers in non-state armed groups. of strategies to address underlying causes
as well as symptoms.
Afghanistan Lebanon
The international legal framework
Bhutan Liberia
prohibits the recruitment and use of
Burundi Myanmar
under-18s by non-state armed groups and
Central African Nepal
criminalizes the recruitment and use of
Republic Nigeria
under-15s by state and non-state forces
Chad Pakistan
alike. This framework should underpin any
Colombia Philippines
strategy. Indeed, some armed groups have
Côte d’Ivoire Somalia
proved willing to commit to international
DRC Sri Lanka
standards and a few have acted on such
India Sudan
commitments by releasing under-18s and
Indonesia Thailand
ending further recruitment. The threat of
Iraq Uganda
prosecution of individuals who recruit and
Israel/Occupied
use children – far more of a reality in 2008
Palestinian
than it was in 2004 – should contribute
Territory
to awareness among members of armed
groups of the potential consequences of
Solutions have proved elusive in relation
their criminal conduct.
to groups involved in protracted low-level
However, some armed groups and
conflicts, where child soldiers have been
their leaders appear to attach little value
recruited and used over many years. Such
to international law and display little
groups include the New People’s Army
inclination to adhere to it. The military
(NPA) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
imperatives of the group and the political,
(MILF) in the Philippines. More challenging
economic and social factors that drive
still are numerous irregular groups – often
conflicts and cause children to enlist – often
with obscure goals and opaque command
underpinned by local cultural attitudes
structures – that fragment, fracture and
towards the age of majority – can outweigh
shift alliances and whose activities are
legal and moral arguments. And, while it is
often as criminal as they are political. Such
premature to assess the future deterrent
groups are characteristic of the conflicts in
effect of prosecutions by international
the Central African Republic and Chad and
courts, members of many armed groups
are appearing in Colombia.
will, in all likelihood, continue to regard

themselves as beyond the reach of child recruitment. Community interventions
international justice and remain confident with armed groups have in some cases
that national-level prosecutions are succeeded in obtaining the release of
unlikely. children or reducing levels of recruitment.
The public naming of certain armed Wherever possible community involvement
groups in the UN Secretary-General’s should be actively encouraged and
regular reports to the Security Council on supported. However, in situations such
children and armed conflict has encouraged as Iraq, Sri Lanka and southern Thailand,
several groups to renounce the practice and civil society organization and action
co-operate with the UN to prevent it. The are rendered ineffective by insecurity
monitoring and reporting mechanism has and violence. Moreover, where boys are
prompted more systematic data collection, considered adults at puberty or where
focused attention and resources on Islamist doctrine is strong, community
selected situations and created entry points members may not oppose children’s
for dialogue by humanitarian actors. association with armed groups.
Undoubtedly more could be achieved. There are no quick or easy solutions.
For example, the Security Council could, Armed groups have widely varying
through its working group, apply more characters, ideologies, aims, capacities and
pressure on parties listed in the annexes to constituencies, and they operate in diverse,
the Secretary-General’s report to develop often rapidly changing and frequently
and implement action plans. It could also insecure environments. Strategies must
be bolder in its application of measures, take into account that what may be
including, when appropriate, targeted effective in influencing one group may have
measures, in particular in relation to little impact on another. Strategies must
those parties, the majority of which are also reflect the complex web of relations,
armed groups, identified in each of the five including regional and international links,
annexes so far published. International surrounding such groups. Armed groups
condemnation can have a powerful effect in Chad, the DRC and Sudan, for example,
and the threat of sanctions or other enjoy the material or political support of
targeted measures may at least limit the neighbouring governments, some of which
extent of child recruitment. However, are in turn recipients of economic and
the full effect of such measures can only development aid from second governments
be achieved when combined with the or donor bodies. Pressure can be exerted
concerted efforts of a whole range of on such governments and donors to use
national and international government what influence they have to encourage
and non-government actors working in a compliance with human rights standards
co-ordinated fashion to persuade parties and international humanitarian law.
to conflict to end the practice, to monitor
and support their implementation of Addressing the root causes
commitments and to design and implement
policies to prevent future recruitment. Efforts to influence the policies and
Expectations of the role of behaviour of armed groups should continue
communities must be similarly qualified. wherever possible and appropriate. Direct
Communities are essential to understanding and indirect engagement, advocacy,
why children are recruited and how they targeted measures and prosecutions can
can be protected. Engagement with all have an effect. Greater attention must
communities can help build resistance to be paid, however, to questions of where

children are recruited by armed groups and, Governments and societies that fail to
critically, why. prioritize the promotion and protection of
While the conditions facilitating child children’s rights – economic, social and
recruitment persist, as they do in countless cultural, as well as civil and political – share
countries worldwide, it will remain easy responsibility for driving children into the
for armed groups to exploit children. ranks of armed groups.
Many children have few alternatives to, or As with recruitment into armed forces,
defences against, joining armed groups. education merits particular attention
When hostilities are ongoing, poverty, – schools can be part of the problem as well
social dislocation and other environmental as part of the solution. Denied an adequate
factors create conditions of extreme education, school leavers are unequipped
vulnerability to recruitment. Children in for employment in the modern world and
refugee camps, the internally displaced, more vulnerable to recruitment by armed
children separated from their families and groups.
children among the rural poor and in urban Schools are convenient sites for
slums are at higher risk. Changing conflict recruitment of children, often forced and en
dynamics may exacerbate the risks. For masse – a deplorable abuse. There is also
example, intensified recruitment drives increasing evidence that schools are used
by armed groups have taken place in by armed groups to indoctrinate children,
Burundi, Nepal and Southern Sudan prior encourage volunteers and identify suitable
to ceasefire and disarmament agreements. candidates for training and recruitment. In
Protection strategies should, as a matter both Bangladesh and Pakistan there are
of course, target identifiably vulnerable reports that children have been recruited
children and respond to changes which may by armed groups from madrasas (Islamic
impact on child recruitment patterns. religious schools). In the case of Pakistan,
Action to prevent recruitment should such children have been involved in suicide
not only be triggered by conflict. The attacks both at home and across the border
Optional Protocol requires states to take in Afghanistan. In southern Thailand,
all feasible measures to prevent armed schools and mosques are thought to be
groups recruiting and using under-18s. The used to indoctrinate children from the age
first step is to criminalize such practices of six in a version of history and Islam that
in domestic law. Beyond this, durable supports BRN-C’s political and military aims
protection means changing the conditions and encourages teenage “volunteerism”.
that make recruitment possible or virtually Youth summer camps and other out-of-
inevitable, as is the case in situations school activities are reportedly organized by
such as the Central African Republic, Chad armed groups in Lebanon and the Occupied
and Somalia. Ineffective government, the Palestinian Territory, which, while not
absence of legal protections for children necessarily overtly military, can generate
and lack of effective institutions to enforce links and loyalties to the armed groups.
them, poverty, discrimination, political and The risk of education becoming a
social exclusion, lack of access to education recruitment tool in the hands of armed
and vocational training and limited groups is heightened in situations where
livelihood prospects set the conditions for the public schooling system is inadequate.
recruitment. Children are also more likely to In these circumstances, unregulated
be drawn to armed groups by experiences alternatives offering narrow curricula can
of human rights violations or other forms flourish, with, in some cases, sectarian or
of violence, including domestic violence. Islamist content. In Indonesia, an innovative

approach is being taken to tackle the
problem in Central Sulawesi where the Disarmament,
armed Islamist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
had significant influence in certain religious
boarding schools. The authorities are
demobilization
embarking on an experiment to establish
a model religious school to encourage and
students away from radical schools and
reduce their vulnerability to recruitment reintegration
by militant groups.5 While it is too early to
judge its success, and despite questions Several major disarmament, demobilization
over the transparency and equity of the and reintegration (DDR) programs for adults
program, this type of approach merits and children have drawn to a close in the past
consideration. four years, resulting in the release of tens of
While governments have primary thousands of children. Many thousands more
responsibility for ensuring child protection have escaped, been captured or have found
and preventing their recruitment into their own way home. Efforts have continued
armed groups, it should be a priority for all to release children from fighting forces and
those engaged in human rights protection, to support their reintegration in countries
humanitarian work, development, conflict such as Afghanistan, Colombia and Sri Lanka,
prevention and post-conflict peace-building. where hostilities are ongoing. New DDR
It should feature explicitly in the mandates initiatives for children have been established,
of all involved. It is only through collective including in the Central African Republic
endeavour that robust and durable barriers and Chad. Overall, however, DDR efforts are
will be erected that effectively protect inadequate, and many children have failed to
children from being recruited into armed receive the assistance needed to successfully
groups. return to their families and communities.
The majority of DDR programs in
the last decade have been carried out
in sub-Saharan Africa with support from
peacekeeping operations. From these and
other experiences, a wealth of knowledge
exists on the identity of girls and boys in
fighting forces, and their needs and priorities
when returning to civilian life. While the
Paris Principles encapsulate much that has
been learned over recent years about how
to achieve successful DDR for children, this
knowledge has yet to be fully applied.
Demobilization during conflict

Demobilization of child soldiers during
conflict presents the greatest of challenges.
Despite the best efforts of UN agencies,
NGOs and others, large-scale releases of

children from armed forces or groups have child recruitment in 2005 to bolster fighting
rarely taken place before hostilities end. strength and negotiating power prior to their
Difficulties in gaining access and integration into the army of Southern Sudan.
lack of security pose major obstacles to These and other difficulties should not
releasing child soldiers during conflict. The prevent efforts to release children from armed
murder in July 2006 of an NGO worker in groups or to deploy international human
the DRC – killed while seeking the release rights monitors if no other protection is likely
of child soldiers in North Kivu – highlighted to be effective. However, reality dictates
the risks for human rights defenders. In that an end to conflict will produce the most
Chad and Colombia continued fighting has concrete results, reinforcing the urgent need
prevented children from returning to their for peaceful settlements and the inclusion of
families. Many have been forced to remain specific DDR provisions for child soldiers in
in transit centres or institutional care for peace agreements. Exemptions from future
months after being released. conscription of those who served as children
The record suggests that when armed should also be included in such texts.
conflict persists, political and military
imperatives are likely to dictate the ebb Girl soldiers – still excluded
and flow of recruitment, but consistently
applied pressure can bring about some There is wide recognition of the involvement
improvement. In Sri Lanka, an action plan of girls in fighting forces, in combat and
in 2003, the threat of targeted measures non-combat roles and as victims of sexual
and ongoing dialogue with the LTTE have slavery, rape and other forms of sexual
resulted in reduced rates of recruitment violence. Repeated Security Council
and release of under-18s. Nevertheless, resolutions have highlighted the need to
recruitment patterns were at least in part take into account the special needs and
determined by conflict dynamics and the vulnerabilities of girls affected by armed
LTTE’s own training cycles. Difficulties in conflict, including girls involved in fighting
verifying the situation of those released forces.6 The importance of considering the
have also persisted. In Chad, where requirements of girls during DDR processes
an estimated 7,000 to 10,000 children was explicitly reaffirmed by the Paris
remained in armed forces and groups by Principles in 2007.
October 2007, an agreement by the Chadian The existence of girl soldiers became
government to release children from the evident in the aftermath of armed conflicts
national army resulted in the release in Angola and Mozambique in the 1990s,
of several hundred children. However, and girl soldiers have been present in
further releases have been hampered by virtually every non-international conflict
obstructions to UNICEF’s access to most since. Yet figures from national DDR
military installations. Recruitment by all programs reflect extraordinarily low figures
fighting forces has continued, fluctuating for girls’ participation, with average levels
according to military needs. of between 8 and 15 per cent of those girls.
In other situations armed groups In Liberia some 3,000 girl soldiers were
have placed unacceptable conditions on officially demobilized through the formal
the release of children. In the DRC, for DDR process that ended in November
example, Ituri-based armed groups have 2004. However, as many as 8,000 were
refused to release children unless demands excluded or did not register and received
for amnesties are met by the government. no subsequent support. A similar situation
Militias associated with the SPLA increased occurred in the DRC, where only 3,000 girls

(about 15 per cent of the total number of the demobilization stage, many girls remain
girls estimated to have been involved in outside the orbit of reintegration support.
the conflict) were officially demobilized It is recognized that returning girl
by the end of 2006 as the national DDR soldiers have multiple needs, including
program drew to a close. Thousands of girls specialized medical care for physical
who returned home informally received no injury resulting from rape or infection
reintegration support. from sexually transmitted diseases and
psychosocial support to address the reality
Government armed forces known to have of rape and the further trauma of rejection
had children in their ranks. by family or community. Returning girls
may equally need support over whether
Armenia Jordan to leave or remain in relationships formed
Australia Luxembourg in the ranks. Girl mothers and babies who
Austria Myanmar are born of rape in situations such as the
Bangladesh Netherlands DRC, Liberia and Uganda are especially
Barbados New Zealand vulnerable to rejection.
Bolivia Paraguay The needs of girl soldiers must be
Canada Russian Federation seen within broader contexts of entrenched
Chad Somalia and complex gender discrimination and
Cuba Sudan inequalities. These precede armed conflict,
Democratic Uganda facilitate human rights abuses against
Republic of the United Kingdom women and girls during hostilities and
Congo United States persist in its aftermath. Attention must
Germany of America be paid to the fact that some girl soldiers
Guatemala Yemen enlist to escape sexual abuse, enforced
Ireland marriage or a life of domestic servitude. The
context-specific characteristics of gender
The reasons why girls have not participated discrimination, sexual exploitation and
in formal DDR processes are complex. Girls abuse require careful analysis to identify
in many conflicts in Africa have been held the particular vulnerabilities of girls and the
back, as they perform useful support roles types of discrimination in the communities
or are regarded as “wives”. The LRA, for to which they return. Awareness of these
example, has refused to release some 2,000 realities has to be matched by programs to
women and children on the grounds that identify girls through less formal channels
they are wives and children of fighters. Girls and to support their reintegration without
themselves may not wish to be identified returning them to further stigmatization,
as child soldiers for fear of rejection by violence or exploitation.
families and communities, having been
deemed to have “lost value” through Addressing the needs of children
involvement in sexual activity. As a result, during DDR
many have returned to their communities
informally with their complex medical, An oft-repeated error has been the failure to
psychosocial and economic needs unmet. acknowledge and act on the well-established
The military orientation of many DDR fact that many children do not register for
programs – entailing formal registration formal DDR programs. Fearing stigmatization,
and identification as part of a fighting force thousands of child soldiers – particularly
– itself presents a major obstacle to the girls – choose not to reveal their identity as
participation of girl soldiers. Overlooked at soldiers by registering for DDR. The problem

can be compounded by local dynamics. In generated by giving children cash packages,
Colombia, for example, restrictive criteria for demobilized children were reportedly
accessing the government-run DDR program provided with cash payments designed for
has effectively excluded many former child adult combatants. NGOs noted community
soldiers, including many of those discharged resentment of returning child soldiers.
by their commanders or who escaped and In Nepal and elsewhere it is necessary
found their own way home. In the DRC, for all actors involved to examine why agreed
anecdotal evidence from 2007 suggests that principles for children’s DDR have continued
some child soldiers were abandoned en route to be overlooked and to develop mechanisms
to demobilization centres by commanders to ensure that this is avoided in future.
fearing prosecution for child recruitment.
Children who fought across borders are Long-term support for reintegration
especially vulnerable. For example, of some
2,000 Guinean children believed to have The reintegration of child soldiers is a
been involved in armed conflict in Liberia only long-term process which aims to give
29 were formally demobilized and repatriated returning child soldiers viable alternatives
to Guinea. to involvement in armed conflict and to
Experience has additionally shown that help them resume life in the community.
the reintegration needs of both girls and Elements of reintegration are well
boys are best served by programs based understood and include family reunification
in communities, which aim to support a (or alternative living arrangements if
wide range of war-affected children. Such reunification is not possible), psychosocial
programs can militate against further support, education, vocational training
stigmatization and resentment of child and income-generation projects. Yet
soldiers and, by addressing broader needs, sustained funding for long-term support is
contribute more effectively to post-conflict rarely available. Lack of funding combined
recovery of the children, their families and with poor planning and a tendency to
communities. This lesson has not, however, privilege demobilization over longer-term
been consistently applied. reintegration objectives, have continued
As peace or ceasefire agreements are to undermine children’s prospects of
negotiated, the pressure to end hostilities successfully returning to civilian life.
and disarm combatants drives the pace and An artificial division of labour and
substance of DDR planning, and short-term funding between the emergency phase,
solutions derived from adult DDR have post-conflict recovery and development can
on occasion prevailed over longer-term contribute to failed reintegration. Funding
community-based programs. For example, for national DDR programs has typically
best-practice principles for children’s DDR been provided for immediate post-conflict
were apparently overlooked in Nepal, demobilization and short-term reintegration
where hundreds of child soldiers remained support, normally for a one-year period.
in cantonments for over a year after a While child protection agencies have
peace agreement between the government provided localized support for reintegration
and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) programs beyond the initial DDR process,
(Maoist). Community-based programs funding for longer-term support is rarely
were too few and too late to assist all the available on the scale it is needed.
children associated with the CPN (Maoist) Inadequate provision for long-term
armed wing. Despite lessons learned from reintegration has been reported from
Liberia and Sudan on the sort of problems Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia

and Southern Sudan. In Guinea about 350 and results in DDR programs that do not
members of government-backed civilian include provisions for children.
militias (adults and children) active in 2000– In the Central African Republic, for
1 had completed training by 2004 as part example, only 26 children (almost all boys)
of a demobilization program. Thousands were among over 7,500 combatants who
of others, many recruited as children, had went through a three-year DDR program
not benefited from the program because that ended in early 2007, despite it being
of lack of funds. In the DRC, the impact known that larger numbers of children had
of delayed, unpredictable and short-term participated in the armed conflict there. In
funding, combined with poor planning and Indonesia, the DDR program that followed
mismanagement, resulted in some 14,000 the 2005 peace agreement in Aceh made no
former child soldiers being excluded from provision for the release and reintegration of
reintegration support. By the end of 2006, child soldiers, despite evidence that children
some four years after the start of the were actively involved in both the Indonesian
program, close to half of the total 30,000 armed forces and the armed opposition
children demobilized had not received group, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).
reintegration assistance and international Elsewhere, the failure of governments
funding had virtually ceased. to acknowledge the problem, or in some
If the reintegration needs of former cases their outright denial, means that there
child soldiers are to be seriously addressed, is no provision to assist the release of or
these well-documented lessons must be support for former child soldiers. In Myanmar,
learned. More resources should be directed despite the establishment of a Committee
at community-based programs which for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of
are sensitive to the needs of returning Under-age Children and other government-
child soldiers but designed to benefit all proclaimed initiatives to stop recruitment,
conflict-affected children. In relation to the authorities have so far not permitted
girls, carefully designed gender-specific independent verification of how many
outreach programs, to include provision for children reside within the ranks of its armed
the babies and children of girl soldiers, and forces. Additionally, no DDR arrangements
backed by dedicated financial resources, exist for children associated with armed
must be integral to DDR programming from groups in Myanmar. In countries such as
the start, along with funding for sustained India, Thailand and Uganda, despite reported
reintegration to address their complex recruitment and use of children by armed
physical, psychosocial and economic needs. groups, there is no official support for release
and reintegration of children. Support, where
Child soldiers: a blind spot in DDR it exists, is provided by NGOs.
Evidence suggests that children are
Despite the accumulated knowledge, the likely to be involved in armed conflict
conceptualization of fighting forces as when it exists. This should be reflected in
comprising adult male combatants has DDR planning from the outset. All future
continued to result in the design of DDR DDR efforts must be closely monitored by
eligibility criteria that exclude girls and those involved, including governments,
children who do not carry arms. This reveals a donors and international bodies involved
lack of awareness by adult DDR planners that in designing and implementing programs
children (both boys and girls) were involved to ensure that agreed and well-tested
in particular conflicts in a multitude of roles principles are applied.

Ending of which have addressed the issue of
child soldiers. In so doing they have given
children and young people a platform to tell
impunity their own stories and have contributed to a
broader understanding of the experiences
of child soldiers, of how to assist their
The international community’s commitment
recovery and of how to protect children in
to taking action against individuals who
the future.
recruit and use child soldiers has been
clearly demonstrated through the efforts
of the ICC and the Special Court for Sierra The importance of national
Leone. investigations and prosecutions
The inclusion of charges of forcible The ICC and other ad hoc international
recruitment and use of children in the first or hybrid courts (combined national–
ever arrest warrants issued in 2005 by international courts) will continue to play
the ICC – against senior members of the an important role in situations where
LRA – gives due recognition to one of the national authorities lack the capacity or
defining crimes committed in the course will to prosecute war crimes and other
of the Uganda conflict. The first ICC trial, grave violations of human rights. However,
that of the Congolese armed-group leader, if prosecutions are not to be limited to a
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, on charges of few individuals in a handful of countries,
enlisting, conscripting and using children national-level processes in domestic courts
under the age of 15 for active participation must be encouraged and supported.
in hostilities, marks the beginning of the Justice-sector reform in the context
journey towards justice for former child of international peace-building efforts has
soldiers there. received increasing attention in recent
Convictions by the Special Court years. However, examples of national-level
for Sierra Leone in June 2007 of three prosecutions in relation to child soldiers
members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary are rare. In one of only two cases where a
Council (AFRC) represented the first ever national trial is known to have taken place
convictions before an international court it proved unsatisfactory. Observers of the
on charges relating to the recruitment 2006 military trial in the DRC of the former
and use of children. A fourth guilty verdict armed group leader Jean-Pierre Biyoyo for
was handed down to a member of the de facto child recruitment reported that
government-backed Civilian Defence Forces the tribunal was unable to guarantee the
(CDF) in August the same year, while the physical or psychosocial protection of child
trial of members of the Revolutionary victims or witnesses, and that children
United Front (RUF) for crimes including present at the hearings were exposed to
the enlistment of children was ongoing. risk.7 On a positive note, in the ongoing trial
The Special Court’s prosecution of Charles in the DRC of a former commander of a local
Taylor, the former Liberian president and defence group (Mai-Mai) on charges that
the principal backer of the RUF, is another include the recruitment of children, various
departure, marking the first time a former measures are reported to have been put in
head of state has been brought to trial for place to assist children participating in the
the crime of recruiting children. trial while protecting their identities.
Abuses committed against children National-level trials in countries
have also emerged as a matter for where already weak justice systems have
consideration by truth commissions, several

been further degraded by conflict require penalties – in no circumstances should the
substantial technical and financial support death penalty be applied. As yet there is no
if international standards are to be met. guarantee that these conditions will be met.
This is particularly so if children, including
former child soldiers, are involved in The scope of prosecutions
proceedings.
Political will is equally important. Prosecutions should not, by focusing
Amnesties or deals struck to reward solely on the recruitment and use of child
individuals with positions in the government soldiers, exclude other crimes committed
or armed forces can undermine efforts to against children. Such an approach
tackle impunity. In Colombia, for example, risks stigmatizing child soldiers and
there were fears that legislation protecting ignores the wider abuses experienced
former government-backed paramilitaries by children in conflict situations. It is on
from disclosing information about their these grounds that some have questioned
activities could protect members of the the exclusive child-soldier focus of the
paramilitaries from being held accountable ICC’s charges against Thomas Lubanga.
for their crimes, including child-soldier After all, the Union of Congolese Patriots
recruitment and use. Amnesties for crimes (UPC/L), the armed group he led, is
under international law should be opposed widely acknowledged to have committed
in all circumstances. numerous other serious crimes against
Issues of domestic capacity and children, as well as adults, including
political will are central to the viability murder, torture and sexual violence. A
of the agreement on accountability and broader range of charges is contained in
reconciliation signed in June 2007 by the the subsequent ICC indictments against two
Ugandan government and the LRA and other Congolese suspects, Germain Katanga
elaborated in a February 2008 annex and Matieu Ngudjolo Chui.
to that agreement. Under the terms Child soldiers frequently experience a
of the agreement a special division of profoundly traumatizing array of abuses,
the Ugandan High Court will prosecute including ill-treatment and torture, rape and
those responsible for war crimes or other other sexual violence. Many other children
widespread or systematic crimes against suffer similar abuses in armed conflict.
civilians. Proposed as an alternative to The full spectrum of child victims and
the prosecution of LRA leaders by the ICC, the abuses they endure, including sexual
which the LRA has consistently cited as violence, must be addressed by justice
an obstacle to peace, a nationally based processes.
process could have some benefits. If the
parties to the conflict prove genuinely Truth commissions and other non-
committed to pursuing accountability, judicial approaches
the agreement offers the prospect of
Truth commissions, now an established
both peace and justice. Critically, it could
element of transitional justice, have
also pave the way for the release of the
increasingly recognized the importance
estimated 2,000 women and children
of addressing children. Intended to
believed to remain in LRA camps in the
complement rather than provide an
eastern DRC and southern Sudan. However,
alternative to trials, the non-judicial, less
if domestic trials are to complement the
formal, more participatory nature of truth
ICC credibly, they must satisfy international
commissions is seen to be particularly
fair trial standards and apply appropriate
suited to the involvement of children

and to addressing crimes that have been on the circumstances that led to the
committed against them. The courtroom systematic and widespread use by fighting
can be an intimidating forum for children forces of girls and boys from Liberia and
and few can participate in formal justice neighbouring countries.
processes. Their stories are frequently The mandates of truth commissions
not told, at least not in their own words, should make specific reference to the
and their experiences are often not investigation of abuses against children,
well documented or understood. Truth including, where appropriate, the issue of
commissions also look to the causes child soldiers. Those working with children
and consequences of abuses, and can affected by armed conflict or on related
recommend reform and economic and social issues should be consulted from the outset.
measures aimed at repairing damage that At the same time, careful consideration
can also address broader notions of justice. should be given to whether and how
Several truth commissions have former child soldiers should participate
devoted chapters to children in their final in consultations around the design and
reports. The Truth and Reconciliation implementation of a truth commission
Commission for Sierra Leone was, however, and in providing information to it. Specific
the first with an explicit mandate to pay efforts and special arrangements are
“special attention” to the experiences of needed to ensure that the voices of girls
children during the conflict8 and the first in who have been associated with fighting
which children participated. Its final report, forces are heard and their concerns
released in October 2004, testified to the addressed.
legion of legal, institutional and policy The role of other non-judicial
failures that had combined to make children accountability mechanisms in addressing
vulnerable, and directed a spotlight on impunity also merits further consideration.
where reform efforts should be focused. For example, in the context of security and
Subsequently, the report of the broader institutional reform, vetting should
Commission for Reception, Truth and remove from the armed forces (or other
Reconciliation for Timor-Leste, that public office) individuals responsible for
investigated human rights violations recruiting and using children. As part of
committed in Timor between 1974 and 1999, broader institutional reform efforts, vetting
revealed previously little-known information for these and other crimes can contribute
about the extent of the involvement of towards preventing further abuses.
Timorese children, in particular in the Similarly, within deliberations on the design
Indonesian occupying forces and its of reparations programs, consideration of
associated paramilitary and militia groups child soldiers within the broader category of
– crimes for which no one has been held child victims should be included.
accountable.
The Truth and Reconciliation Ensuring children’s best interests
Commission of Liberia began its work
in June 2006 with a specific mandate Those designing and implementing
to address the issue of child soldiers. accountability strategies must be alert
Already several former child soldiers have to the impact of justice processes on the
testified to the Commission, and special broader security and protection needs
children’s hearings are planned. Its work of current or former child soldiers. Good
represents an important opportunity practice on the involvement and protection
for national and international reflection of child victims and witnesses in war crimes

Countries where the minimum age for voluntary recruitment was under 18 including
for training purposes or as cadets.
Armenia France Netherlands

Australia Germany New Zealand
Austria Guinea-Bissau Pakistan
Azerbaijan Guyana Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh Hungary Paraguay
Barbados India Peru
Belarus Iran Philippines
Bolivia Ireland Poland
Brazil Israel Russian Federation
Brunei Darussalam Jamaica Sao Tome and Principe
Burundi Kazakhstan Seychelles
Cameroon Kenya Singapore
Canada Korea, (Democratic Tanzania
Cape Verde People’s Republic of ) Tonga
Chad Kyrgyzstan Trinidad and Tobago
China Lebanon Turkmenistan
Cuba Libya United Kingdom
Cyprus Luxembourg United States of America
Dominican Republic Malaysia Viet Nam
Ecuador Malta Zambia
Egypt Mexico
El Salvador Moldova
trials and truth commissions is emerging, prospects for social reintegration must
and important initiatives to capture and also be addressed. Again, this relationship
build on them are under way.9 But there is insufficiently understood, but the
are specific considerations in the case responsible promotion of justice initiatives
of child soldiers that have yet to be fully requires a full understanding of their
acknowledged or properly addressed. impact, short- and long-term, on all victims,
The physical security of children is of including child soldiers.
paramount concern. This applies particularly In addition to questions around the
to children who are still in the ranks of benefits and risks of former child soldiers
armed groups or forces when prosecutions participating in court proceedings or truth
or other accountability processes are commissions, there are broader issues to
pending. The dilemmas are evident in be explored. These include whether and
Uganda, where the ICC indictments against how accountability processes help children
LRA leaders have been seen by some as to make sense of their experiences, to
representing an obstacle to the signing of a what extent their expectations of justice
peace deal and thereby delaying the release are fulfilled, and whether trials, truth-
of children still in the ranks of the LRA. seeking or other accountability mechanisms
The effects of accountability processes promote understanding and acceptance
on children involved in conflict and their of former child soldiers by communities.

Through understanding how accountability Moreover, it is reasonable to ask whether
processes affect the lives of child soldiers absolving children of responsibility for
(many of whom are young adults before crimes they have committed is necessarily
such processes begin) and the communities in the best interests of the child. In at
around them, the potential for justice least some cases, where the individual
mechanisms to contribute positively to their was clearly in control of their actions,
reintegration can be maximized and risk of and not coerced, drugged, or forced into
harm kept to a minimum. committing atrocities, acknowledgement
and atonement, including in some instances
Children and criminal responsibility prosecution, might be an important part of
personal recovery. It may also contribute to
Accountability for serious crimes committed their acceptance by families, communities
by child soldiers remains a contentious and society at large.
issue. While the ICC does not have Protecting the rights of former child
jurisdiction over under-18s and other soldiers in justice processes and improving
international tribunals have chosen not their chances of successful reintegration
to apply it, the question remains whether require the issue of criminal accountability
children should generally be exempt from to be confronted. A clear distinction must
having to account for human rights abuses be drawn between this exploration of
committed in their capacity as members of accountability and the pursuit of national
an armed force or group. security agendas that ignore juvenile justice
Truth commissions in Sierra Leone standards and the best interests of the
and Timor-Leste have addressed the issue child. The framework for the accountability
of child perpetrators. The Sierra Leone discussion and appropriate action already
commission treated all children equally, as exists in the international standards on
victims of war, but also examined the “dual juvenile justice, with their emphasis on
identities” of child soldiers as both victims objectives of rehabilitation and restorative
and perpetrators. It emphasized that it justice, and the accumulated best practice
was not seeking to explore guilt, but to from this field. In addition, the experience
understand how children came to carry out of former child soldiers, including those
violations, what motivated them, whether who have participated – as victims, as
they had the capacity to understand their perpetrators or as both – in transitional
actions, and how such crimes might be justice processes, whether judicial, non-
prevented in the future. judicial or traditional/customary, must
Recognizing that child soldiers inform the debates. The views of victims,
are first and foremost victims of grave as well as of members of communities to
abuses of human rights, and prioritizing which child soldiers have been or will be
the prosecution of those who unlawfully returned, must also be taken into account.
recruited and used them, is essential. Truth
commissions in particular can contribute
to understanding the full impact of this
crime and to the design of more effective
strategies to assist former child soldiers in
making their way back into society.
However, victims who have suffered
abuses at the hands of a child soldier also
have a right to justice and reparations.10

Benchmarks for monitored in their implementation of
such plans.
• The inclusion in all ceasefire and
change peace agreements of provisions for the
immediate disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration of child soldiers.
In four years’ time the Optional Protocol
• The inclusion of provisions for children
will have been in force for a decade. The
in the design of official DDR programs
next four years cannot be allowed to
and the consistent application of the
go by without more progress to show.
Paris Principles in the implementation
The ultimate judges of that progress
of all DDR initiatives, taking account
will be children whose lives are blighted
of context-specific needs and realities.
by their involvement in conflict and for
The inclusion as a matter of course
whom international attention is of little
of specialized culturally appropriate
comfort unless it changes their individual
programs for girls, and the building into
circumstances for the better. As the children
donor planning of long-term financial
quoted at the beginning of this introduction
support for reintegration.
indicate, the damage resulting from the
• The establishment by governments in
experience of being a child soldier may
countries with child soldiers (but no
never be fully repaired. However, much can
peacekeeping operation) of programs to
be done to lessen it. A great deal can also
identify and release such children and
be done to prevent other children from ever
support their reintegration.
suffering the same experience.
• The development of multi-faceted,
The task is most urgent in situations
multi-agency strategies to prevent child
of armed conflict, but if the recruitment and
recruitment and use by armed groups,
use of child soldiers is to be definitively
involving legal, institutional, social,
ended there must be global recognition
economic and cultural measures in all
that armed forces are no place for a child.
high-risk situations including countries
On this basis, the Coalition is opposed to
affected by conflict and those where
the military recruitment or use of any girl or
armed groups operate or where conflict
boy under the age of 18. The benchmarks
is possible.
against which the progress over the next
• The explicit criminalization in domestic
four years towards this goal will be judged
law of underage recruitment (i.e.
include:
conscription and enlistment) and use
• A complete end to the use of children
of any persons under the age of 18
in hostilities in any capacity by
to participate in hostilities and the
government armed forces and by
establishment of universal jurisdiction
any forces linked to or supported by
for such crimes.
governments including auxiliaries,
• Progress towards the systematic
militias and civilian defence
investigation and prosecution by
organizations.
national and international courts of
• A significant increase in the numbers
individuals suspected of recruiting
of non-state armed groups that have
and using children in armed forces and
developed action plans to prevent the
groups. Where relevant this crime would
recruitment of under-18s and the release
also be addressed by other transitional
of children within their ranks; these
justice processes, including truth
armed groups are being supported and
commissions, reparations and vetting.

• The establishment of effective measures 10 See, for example, Report of Diane Orentlicher,
independent expert to update the Set of
for refugee, asylum-seeking and migrant Principles to combat impunity, Updated Set of
children in destination countries to Principles for the protection and promotion of
protect those who may have been human rights through action to combat impunity,
and Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for
recruited or used in hostilities. the protection and promotion of human rights
This includes ensuring their early through action to combat impunity, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005; and
identification and providing them with UN Declaration of Basic Principles of justice for
culturally and child-sensitive assistance victims of crime and abuse of power, UN Doc.
for their physical and psychological A/RES/40/34, 29 November 1985.
recovery and their social reintegration.

• A significant increase in the number
of countries that have abandoned
domestic provisions that allow children
to be legally recruited into the armed
forces at the age of 16 or 17 and have
adopted a “straight-18” standard for all
forms of military recruitment.
1 Quotations from two boy (15 and 17 years old)

former members of the Lord’s Resistance Army
in Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,
“Returning Home – Children’s Perspectives on
Reintegration: A Case Study of Children Abducted
by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Teso, Eastern
Uganda”, February 2008.
2 Security Council Resolution 1698 (2006).
3 Call for Accelerated Action on the Implementation
of the Plan of Action Towards Africa Fit for
Children (2008–2012), Second Pan-African Forum
on Children: Mid-Term Review, 29 October–2
November 2007, Cairo, Egypt.
4 The monitoring and reporting mechanism is
established in situations that feature in Annex
I or II of the Secretary-General’s reports on
children and armed conflict. Annex I countries
(situations of armed conflict on the agenda of the
Security Council) are subject to the monitoring
and reporting mechanism. Annex II countries
(situations of armed conflict not on the agenda
of the Security Council) are only subject to it if
the relevant government agrees to participate
voluntarily.
5 International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Tackling
Radicalism in Poso”, 22 January 2008.
6 Security Council Resolutions 1314 (2000), 1325
(2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003).
7 See Redress Trust “Victims, Perpetrators or
Heroes? Child Soldiers before the International
Criminal Court”, September 2006, www.redress.
org. Jean-Pierre Biyoyo subsequently escaped
from prison and returned to Bukavu as part of an
official DRC armed forces delegation.
8 Truth Commission Act 2000, Part III (2(b)).
9 See, for example, UNICEF Innocenti Research
Centre, Expert Discussion on Transitional Justice
and Children, 10–12 November 2005, Background
Documents and Outcome Document.

© Jonathan Hyams
Former girl soldier, abducted by the LRA, sitting with two of her children in the army’s
Child Protection Unit before being handed over to a reintegration organization, Gulu,
northern Uganda, 2007

from operations by the Taleban and other armed
A FGHANI STAN groups. In 2006 more than 4,000 people were
reported to have died as a result of the conflict,
Afghanistan one third of them civilians.4 There was a sharp
increase in 2006 in civilian deaths from insurgent
Population: 29.9 million (15.8 million under 18) attacks, including deliberate attacks on civilian
Government armed forces: 50,000 targets.5 President Karzai, the Afghanistan
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC),
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 the UN and non-governmental organizations
Voting age: 18 (NGOs) all expressed concern over civilian
Optional Protocol: acceded 24 September 2003 casualties resulting from coalition forces and
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): NATO/ISAF operations.6 ISAF publicly stated that
civilian casualties were its single biggest failure
CRC, ICC
in 2006 and measures would be taken to reduce
There were anecdotal reports of under-18s them.7
There was a significant increase in suicide
serving in the armed forces. There were attacks in 2006 and 2007 which were reported
reports of the use of children as suicide to have been carried out by anti-government
bombers by anti-government elements elements, including al-Qaeda, the Taleban and
including the Taleban, and of both forcible Hizb-e Islami. A study by UNAMA concluded that
the bombers “appear to be young (sometimes
and voluntary recruitment by the Taleban children), poor, uneducated, easily influenced
of children in southern provinces and parts by recruiters and drawn heavily from madrasas
of Pakistan. (Islamic religious schools) across the border in
Pakistan”.8
There was a sharp rise in attacks on teachers,
Context students and schools in the first half of 2006. In
Presidential elections were held in October 2004 2006 over 200 schools were burned, attacked
and Hamid Karzai was subsequently declared or partially destroyed, at least 15 teachers killed
president. National Assembly elections were held and some 200,000 students affected by school
in September 2005. Early in 2006 the Afghan closures.9 Although reduced from earlier levels,
government and the international community there were still many attacks on schools and
committed themselves to the Afghanistan threats to teachers and students in 2007.10
Compact, a strategic framework for the rebuilding In 2006 the government launched a National
of Afghanistan. Close to 50,000 international Strategy for Children at Risk. Designed by the
troops remained in Afghanistan: 39,500 under Ministry of Martyrs, Disabled and Social Affairs,
the NATO-led International Security Assistance with the support of UNICEF and other partners,
Force (ISAF) and nearly 10,000 under the US-led it was intended to improve care for vulnerable
coalition forces.1 The UN Assistance Mission children and their families.11
in Afghanistan (UNAMA) continued to provide
support to the government including on the Government
peace process, the implementation of the
Afghanistan Compact, and human rights. National recruitment legislation and
Resurgent Taleban forces challenged
government control in many of the southern
practice
provinces and gained full control in some Afghanistan’s declaration on acceding to the
districts. In other areas commanders against Optional Protocol stated that “according to
whom there were credible allegations of grave the Decree No. 20 dated 25 May 2003 on the
human rights abuses and who controlled armed voluntary enrolment to the Afghan National Army
militias became further entrenched, and some … the minimum age for recruitment of Afghan
were elected to parliament.2 Citizen to an active military service is limited by
Weak government and an increase in the age of 22 to 28. All recruitments of personnel
insurgency, in particular in the southern in the Afghan National Army is voluntary and is
provinces, diverted time and resources from not forced or coerced”.12 A presidential decree
development and reconstruction programs and (No. 97) issued in December 2003 amended the
led to disillusionment among many Afghans, minimum age of recruitment into the ANA to 18.
which was reported to have fuelled recruitment There was anecdotal evidence of the recruitment
to and support for armed groups.3 of under-18s by the ANA and unconfirmed reports
There were concerns over the increasing of under-18s falsifying their identification records
number of civilian casualties resulting both to join.13
from operations against insurgents by coalition The minimum recruitment age for the Afghan
forces and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Police (ANP) was 18. There were reports
that ill-equipped and under-trained ANP were

used inappropriately as a fighting force to tackle documented the cases of children aged 15 and
insurgency.14 In September 2006 a presidential 16 who had been tricked, promised money and
decree officially established the Afghan National forced into becoming suicide bombers.25
Auxiliary Police (ANAP) in a scheme covering In April 2007 the Taleban released a video
124 districts in 21 mainly southern and eastern of a 12-year-old boy beheading a Pakistani man
A—E
provinces. ANAP recruits were reportedly accused of spying. Asked why they used a boy, a
provided with only ten days’ training and given Taleban official was reported as saying, “We want
weapons and a salary equivalent to ordinary to tell the non-Muslims that our youngsters are
police. Concerns were raised that the ANAP also Mujahideens [holy warriors] and fight with us
scheme conferred an official status on privately against you … These youngsters will be our Holy
owned and operated militias and that there were War commanders in the future and continue the
inadequate command and control structures jihad for freedom. Islam allow boys and women
in place to supervise them.15 A reportedly lax to do jihad against occupying non-Muslim troops
approach to recruitment and vetting meant that and their spies and puppets.”26
it was impossible to rule out the recruitment of In 2006 it was widely reported that the
under-18s into the ANP and ANAP. There were Taleban Rule Book (issued by the Taleban
reports of the “informal” recruitment of children command during Ramadan in 2006) included
by ANP commanders to perform duties in police as its Rule 19 that “Mujahideen are not allowed
check posts in Kandahar province.16 to take young boys with no facial hair onto the
battlefield or into their private quarters.”27
Children had been detained by US forces
Armed groups at Bagram airbase in the past,28 but it was not
A number of armed groups were involved in possible to verify whether children continued
insurgency including tribal factions, criminal to be detained there. There were concerns
networks and groups ideologically opposed to at the apparent absence of any mechanisms
the government, including the Taleban and the among international and national armed forces
Hizb-e Islami. Most armed groups had been to determine the age of detainees.29 Detainees
responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers were generally transferred by NATO forces to the
during the previous period of conflict.17 National Directorate of Security (NDS) but access
There were reports of both forcible and to those detainees was severely restricted.30
voluntary recruitment by the Taleban of children
in southern provinces and parts of Pakistan,18 as
well as reports of the increasing use of children Disarmament, demobilization
by the Taleban as messengers, couriers and and reintegration (DDR)
fighters.19 There were unconfirmed reports that
the Taleban had issued a statement early in A community-based demobilization and
2007 claiming that they did not recruit or use reintegration program, established by UNICEF in
children, in response to allegations by NATO collaboration with NGOs, the Ministry of Labour
forces that they were using children as human and Social Affairs, and the National Commission
shields in provinces in the south. National and for Disarmament, Demobilization and
international agencies were reportedly unable to Reintegration, which was launched in February
independently verify the allegations of the use of 2004, continued to facilitate demobilization
children as human shields.20 through the support of the local demobilization
In June 2007 it was reported that a 12-year-old and reintegration committees in their respective
boy wearing an explosive vest had been picked communities. As of June 2007 reintegration
up by ISAF forces in Ghazni province. He had support was being provided in 29 provinces to a
reportedly been instructed by armed insurgents total of 12,590 war-affected and at-risk children,
to target an ISAF patrol in the area.21 In the same including 5,042 former child soldiers, combining
month ISAF claimed to have defused an explosive information education, skills training, life skills
vest placed on a six-year-old who had been told and psychosocial support.31
to attack army forces in Ghazni province.22 In
response, a Taleban spokesman denied the use Developments
of child soldiers, saying it was against Islamic
and humanitarian law and that the report was At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,
propaganda.23 In July 2007 it was reported that Afghanistan and 58 other states endorsed the
a 14-year-old boy from Pakistan was detained Paris Commitments to protect children from
wearing an explosive vest to target a provincial unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces
governor of Khost province. He claimed to have or armed groups and the Paris Principles and
been forced at gunpoint by the Taleban, while guidelines on children associated with armed
at a madrasa in Pakistan, to put on the vest and forces or armed groups. The documents
attack the governor. He was publicly pardoned reaffirmed international standards and
by President Karzai and reportedly returned to operational principles for protecting and assisting
Pakistan.24 A study by UNAMA of suicide attacks child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global

consultation jointly sponsored by the French 25 UNAMA, above note 8, refers to the cases of
government and UNICEF. Amir, aged 15, and Ghulam, aged 16, who were
interviewed by UNAMA staff in detention, held on
charges of involvement in suicide attacks.
1 Report of the UN Secretary-General on the
situation in Afghanistan and its implications 26 “Taliban video of boy executioner causes anger”,
for international peace and security, UN Doc. Reuters, 26 April 2007, at www.alertnet.org.
A/62/345-S2007/555, 21 September 2007. 27 Henry Schuster, “The Taliban’s rules”, CNN,
2 International Crisis Group (ICG), Afghanistan’s 7 December 2006.
New Legislature: Making Democracy Work, Asia 28 See, for example, Amnesty International
Report No. 116, 15 May 2006, www.crisisgroup. (AI), USA: Human dignity denied: Torture
org. and accountability in the war on terror (AMR
3 ICG, Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, Asia 51/145/2004), 27 October 2004.
Briefing No. 59, 29 January 2007. 29 Confidential source, September 2007.
4 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human 30 The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Rights on the situation of human rights in Commission (AIHRC) and five countries
Afghanistan, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/98, 5 March contributing troops to NATO forces (Canada,
2007. Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and the
5 Human Rights Watch (HRW), The Human United Kingdom), were party to memorandums
Cost: Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in of understanding which ensured that a list
Afghanistan, April 2007. of detainees handed over to the National
Directorate of Security (NDS) would be provided
6 See, for example, Report of the High
to the AIHRC. However, as of September 2007
Commissioner for Human Rights, above note
these lists did not contain information about
4, and “Backlash from Afghan Civilian Deaths”,
the age of the detainees. AIHRC access to NDS
Time, 23 June 2007.
detainees was limited. Confidential source,
7 Report of the Secretary-General on the September 2007.
situation in Afghanistan and its implications
31 Confidential source, August 2007.
for international peace and security, UN Doc.
A/61/799–S/2007/152, 15 March 2007.
8 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),
Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001–2007),
September 2007, www.unama-afg.org.
9 Report of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, above note 4.
10 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 1.
11 US Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices 2006.
12 Declaration on accession to the Optional
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
13 US Department of State, above note 11.
14 ICG, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, Asia Report
No. 138, 30 August 2007.
15 Ibid.
16 Confidential source.
17 UNICEF, Rapid Assessment on the Situation of
Child Soldiers in Afghanistan, July 2003, cited in
Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004.
18 “Afghanistan: Civilians paying the price in Taliban
conflict”, IRIN, 16 July 2007; “Recruiting Taleban
‘child soldiers’”, BBC News, 12 June 2007.
19 Confidential source.
21 Confidential source, June 2007.
22 “Nato accuses Taliban of using children in suicide
missions”, Guardian, 23 June 2007.
23 “Six-Year-Old Afghan Boy Foils Taliban Plot to Use
Him in Suicide Attack on Americans”, Associated
Press, 25 June 2007.
24 “Boy forced by Taliban to become would-be
bomber is pardoned”, Guardian, 16 July 2007.

London stated that the Optional Protocol on the
A LBANIA involvement of children in armed conflict was
under evaluation and that Albania would “soon”
Republic of Albania adhere to it.7 However, by October 2007 Albania
had not yet done so.
A—E
Population: 3.1 million (1.0 million under 18)
Government armed forces: 11,000 1 Communication from embassy of Albania,
Compulsory recruitment age: 19 London, 10 April 2007.
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 2 ��
Law No. 9487 of 6 March 2006, Article 1, www.
��
Voting age: 18 qpz.gov.al.
Optional Protocol: not signed 3 ��
Communication from embassy of Albania,
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): London, June 2004.
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 4 Ministry of Defence, www.mod.gov.al.
5 Communication from embassy, above note 3.
There were no reports of under-18s serving
6 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
in the armed forces. Consideration of report submitted by Albania,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/
Add.249, 31 March 2005.
Government 7 Communication from embassy, above note 1.
National recruitment legislation and
practice
The constitution required all citizens to
participate in the defence of the state.
Conscientious objectors were required to perform
alternative service (Article 166).
Under the 2003 Law on Military Service in
the Republic of Albania, the minimum age for
military duty was 19 although in cases of general
or partial mobilization by law or by presidential
decree the age could be lowered to 18. The
length of duty was 12 months or only one month
for university graduates.1 Under a law passed in
2006, university graduates were exempted from
compulsory service.2
The minimum age for voluntary service was
18.3
Military training and military schools

Military training was offered at the Academy of
Defence “Spiro Moisiu”, the Military University
“Skenderbej”, and an academy for non-
commissioned officers. The Academy of Defence
was the armed forces’ highest military teaching
and scientific institution, and trained military
leaders for all levels of command in the three
armed services.4
There was no military training within the
general education system, and no dedicated
military educational establishment for under-
18s or youth organizations with a military
orientation.5
Developments
International standards
In January 2005 the Albanian delegation informed
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
of Albania’s intention to ratify the Optional
Protocols, and the Committee urged Albania to
do so.6 In April 2007 the Albanian embassy in

A LGERIA Government
People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria
practice
Population: 32.9 million (12.0 million under 18) The legal basis for conscription into the regular
Government armed forces: 137,500 armed forces remained the National Service
Compulsory recruitment age: 19 Code. Algerian men were liable for 18 months’
Voluntary recruitment age: unclear compulsory conscription between the ages of 19
Voting age: 18 and 30, and an additional six months’ service as
Optional Protocol: not signed a reservist up to the age of 50. Some 375,000
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): young men were estimated as reaching military
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC service age annually.7 Evading conscription
was punishable by a five-year prison sentence
Although the voluntary recruitment age in accordance with Article 254 of the Algerian
Military Justice Code.8
remained unclear, children did not appear The minimum age for voluntary recruitment
to have been recruited into government into the armed forces or paramilitary forces was
armed forces. unclear.9
Context Armed groups

Algeria continued to be affected by the legacy of Paramilitaries and militias
violent internal conflict of the 1990s which, by
As part of its National Reconciliation initiative
the end of 2006, had claimed over 200,000 lives.
the government began dismantling government-
A process of National Reconciliation was under
allied paramilitary groups and local militias. In
way, under which the government introduced
May 2004 the Algerian government endorsed the
amnesty measures, exemptions and impunity
demobilizing of half the 300,000 members of the
for past human rights abuses by government
Legitimate Defence Force (GLD), the self-defence
forces and former armed group members.1
militias established in 1997 under Executive
Fighting between armed groups and government
Decree.10
security forces persisted and violence continued
throughout 2007.2 The government continued its Armed opposition groups
military campaign against armed groups which it
claimed were aligned with al-Qaeda, and carried In May 2007 the purported leader of al-Qaeda
out search operations in which alleged armed in the Islamic Maghreb released a recorded
group members were killed. There were concerns statement urging the youth of Algeria to join
that women and children related to armed group “the growing rank of martyrs”.11 It was not known
members were also killed.3 whether armed groups recruited or used under-
The Salafist Group for Preaching and 18s.
Combat (Groupe Salafiste de Predication et de
Combat, GSPC), an offshoot of the now defunct Developments
Armed Islamic Group (Groupe islamique armé,
GIA), announced in September 2006 that it In October 2005 the UN Committee on the Rights
had joined forces with al-Qaeda and at the of the Child expressed serious concern over the
start of 2007 officially renamed itself as the alleged cases of persons under 18 years of age
al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb. being used by government-allied paramilitary
This was accompanied by increased attacks forces and armed political groups, and over
against commercial and military targets in deficiencies in the birth registration system for
2007.4 Following the April 2007 suicide bomb children belonging to nomadic minorities. The
attacks claimed by the GSPC in Algiers, in which Committee expressed deep concern over the
some 30 people were killed, an estimated 80 situation of Western Saharan children living in
Algerian men, many of whom were thought to refugee camps in Algeria.12
have received training in Iraq, were arrested by A bill on child protection (Code de protection
Algerian authorities.5 de l’enfant) was introduced and was expected
According to press reports, there were to harmonize existing laws pertaining to the
incidents in 2006 involving the kidnapping and protection and promotion of child rights.13
rape of girls by armed groups. In May 2006 the
bodies of 22 children were found in the province 1 “Algeria”, Amnesty International Report 2007.
of Jijel. They were alleged to have been used as 2 “Algeria violence death toll jumps in September
human shields by the GSPC.6 – reports”, Reuters, 1 October 2007.
3 “Algeria”, above note 1.

4 “Al Qaeda: profile in north Africa”, BBC News,
11 December 2007; “Violence ahead of Algeria AND O R R A
polls”, BBC News, 14 May 2007.
5 “Echoes of past as Algeria probes Iraq bomb Principality of Andorra
link”, Reuters, 25 April 2007.
A—E
Population: 67,000 (12,000 under 18)
6 US State Department, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, Algeria, 6 March 2007, http:// Government armed forces: none
www.state.gov. Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable
7 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Algeria”, World Voluntary recruitment age: not applicable
Factbook 2007, www.cia.gov. Voting age: 18
8 UK Home Office, Border and Immigration Agency, Optional Protocol: ratified 30 April 2001
Country of Origin Information Report, Algeria, 2 Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
November 2007, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk. CRC, ICC
9 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Consideration of report submitted by Algeria, The defence of Andorra was the
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/ responsibility of France and Spain; Andorra
Add.269, 12 October 2005. had no armed forces.
10 Hugh Roberts, Demilitarizing Algeria, Carnegie
Paper No. 86, Carnegie Endowment, May 2007,
www.carnegieendowment.org. Government
11 “Algeria bombing video released”, Al Jazeera, 8
May 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net. National recruitment legislation and
12 Concluding observations, above note 9. practice
13 Ibid. Andorra had no armed forces; neighbouring
France and Spain had responsibility for its
defence.1 There was no possibility that Andorran
citizens would be recruited into the French or
Spanish armed forces.2 Only the Andorran police
and customs services were authorized to carry
arms, and the minimum ages for recruitment
into these services were 19 and 18 respectively.
A special unit of forest wardens employed by
the Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment,
who on occasion provided back-up for the police
and the fire brigade, was also permitted to
carry weapons in strictly limited circumstances.
Those recruited to serve as forest wardens were
between the ages of 18 and 35.3
Developments
Following its examination in January 2006 of
Andorra’s initial report on the Optional Protocol,
recommended that the Andorran government
adopt provisions that would allow extraterritorial
jurisdiction for the crime of conscripting or
enlisting children under the age of 15 into the
armed forces or armed groups, or compelling
their active participation in hostilities.4
1 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country

Profile: Andorra, www.fco.gov.uk.
2 Report of the NGO Group for the Convention on
the Rights of the Child/Liaison Unit, Child Rights
Information Network, www.crin.org.
3 Initial report of Andorra to the UN Committee on
the Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol,
UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/AND/1, 14 July 2005.
4 Report of the NGO Group, above note 2.

into the armed forces.7 Political and military
A N GOL A tension continued and in May 2007 sporadic
small-scale attacks by FLEC forces that had
Republic of Angola remained active increased.8 On 1 August 2007
they changed their name to the Liberation Front
Population: 15.9 million (8.5 million under 18) of the State (as opposed to ‘Enclave’) of Cabinda.
Government armed forces: 107,000
Compulsory recruitment age: 20
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 for men, 20 for
Government
women National recruitment legislation and
Voting age: 18 practice
Optional Protocol: acceded 11 October 2007
Under the constitution it was the right and
Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
highest duty of every citizen to defend the
CRC, GC AP I, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC country, military service was compulsory, and the
manner in which it was fulfilled was established
Child soldiers were used extensively by law. Under Law 1/93, military service was
during the 27-year civil war by both compulsory for all men aged between 20 and
government armed forces and the armed 45. Women over 20 could also volunteer to join.
opposition group UNITA (União Nacional Recruitment started at 18, with registration under
para a Independência Total de Angola, the military census. Those who failed to register
were subject to unspecified sanctions, which in
National Union for the Total Independence practice amounted to the payment of fines.
of Angola), and were also used by the Under Article 8.3 of Law 1/93, the National
armed separatist Cabinda Liberation Assembly was empowered to decree the
Front (Frente de Liberação do Enclave de military call-up of citizens from the age of 18
in the case of a national emergency and at the
Cabinda, FLEC). There were no reports of request of the Council of Ministers. The law
under-18s currently being recruited into also stipulated that military service was for two
the armed forces. years, but the National Assembly could extend
or reduce the term by a year if needed and if
“conditions of service permit”. The law provided
Context for conscientious objectors to perform civilian
Stability increased following the April 2002 service. Decree No. 40/96 of 13 December 1996,
signing of the Luena Peace Accords by the on the application of military service, established
government and UNITA. An estimated 4.5 million a minimum age of 18 for the voluntary
people were internally displaced during the recruitment of men.
conflict and some 450,000 fled to neighbouring Recruitment into the armed forces was
countries.1 By December 2006 a UN refugee suspended during 2002 and 2003 but resumed
repatriation program had resulted in the return in 2004.9 Former child soldiers were exempt from
of over 400,000 refugees,2 but an estimated compulsory military service, although they could
100,000 people remained internally displaced.3 still be recruited on a voluntary basis.10
Low-intensity fighting continued in the oil-rich
province of Cabinda between government forces Child recruitment and deployment
and armed factions of the FLEC.4 In August 2004 From late 2002 there were no reports of children
FLEC-FAC (Forças Armadas de Cabinda, Cabindan being recruited into the armed forces or being
Armed Forces) and FLEC-Renovada (Renewed) used by the armed forces in the fighting in
merged, and with the Catholic Church and civil Cabinda.11
society groups formed the Cabindan Forum
for Dialogue (Forum Cabindés para o Diálogo,
FCD). FCD-led negotiations with the government
Armed groups
resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Both FLEC-FAC and FLEC-Renovada had recruited
Understanding for Peace and Reconciliation for children during the war, some as young as eight,
the province of Cabinda in August 2006. However, and at least 30 per cent of them were girls.12 More
the agreement was rejected by a majority of the recent information on the recruitment of children
groups in the FCD.5 by FLEC was not available.
The memorandum provided for special
status for Cabinda and an amnesty for military
crimes and crimes against the security of the Disarmament, demobilization
state committed in the context of the armed and reintegration (DDR)
conflict in that province.6 It also provided for the
demobilization and integration of FLEC troops The demobilization and reintegration of former
UNITA fighters was completed by December

2005, by which time almost 100,000 combatants Angolan authorities denied the reports, but
had been demobilized. Thousands benefited from confirmed that the government had agreed to a
government programs of social reintegration, request by the DRC to help train its police and
particularly in agricultural projects. In March army.22
2007, 30,000 soldiers in the armed forces were
A—E
also demobilized. 13 In total, around 300,000
government and former UNITA soldiers had been
demobilized since the first peace agreement of Angola acceded to the Optional Protocol on the
May 1991.14 involvement of children in armed conflict on 11
The quartering (provision of lodgings) of FLEC October 2007. The accompanying declaration
soldiers was declared completed in November stated that “the inclusion of persons in the
2006 with the cantonment and disarming of Angolan Army, as appropriate, is done upon their
between 500 and 1,800 soldiers.15 There were reaching 20 years of age, and the minimum age
no reports that child soldiers were among them. for voluntary enlistment is 18 years”.23
Ammunition and hundreds of weapons were
decommissioned and destroyed in January 1 World Bank, “Angola: Emergency Demobilization
2007 when FLEC’s military organization was and Reintegration Project, February 2003”,
formally dismantled. Of its members, 615 were Report No. PID 11534, www worldbank.org.
incorporated into the Angolan armed forces, 113 2 Embassy of the Republic of Angola in the United
joined the Angolan National Police and 131 were Kingdom, Angola News, No. 120, December
either retired or returned to civilian life.16 No 2006–January 2007.
information was provided on specific packages 3 US State Department, Country Reports on Human
for the social reintegration of those demobilized. Rights Practices, Angola – 2006, Bureau of
The “Post-war Child Protection Strategy” Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 6 March
adopted by the government in 2002 ended in 2007.
2006. The program involved the reintegration into 4 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Angola”, Human
society of more than 3,000 children, including Rights Watch World Report 2005.
former child soldiers. The children received skills
5 Semánario Angolense, 4 September 2006.
training, assistance with civil registration and
access to social assistance.17 6 Ibinda, 26 October 2006, www.ibinda.org.
Despite attempts by the police to collect 7 Amnesty International Report 2007.
weapons left over from the war, the number 8 Jornal Apostolado, 30 July 2007.
of weapons in civilian hands as of March 2006 9 Order issued by the Minister of Defence, read on
was estimated at between 2.5 and 4 million.18 Rádio Nacional de Angola on 5 January 2004 and
Landmines remained a threat, particularly to quoted by the BBC.
children, who continued to be killed and maimed, 10 Minister of Social Welfare, Mesa Redonda sobre
albeit to a lesser extent in recent years. Non- os desafíos da Protecção da Crianza, no Processo
governmental organizations working on mine de Reintegração, 7 March 2003.
clearance estimated that there were 500,000 11 HRW, Forgotten Fighters: Child Soldiers in
landmines still to clear.19 On 31 May 2007 the Angola, April 2003.
government announced that it had completed the 12 Institute of Security Studies, Country Profiles:
destruction of its 83,557 stockpiled landmines in Angola, 8 November 2002, www.iss.co.za.
accordance with the Ottawa Convention.20
13 Jornal de Angola, 8 December 2005; Agora, 24
March 2007; and Angola News, above note 2, No.
Developments 123, April 2007.
14 A Capital, 28 April–5 May 2007.
Angola presented its initial report to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child on 4 June 15 Figures vary. For instance, Jornal de Angola, 5
2004. In considering the report, the Committee October and 11 November 2006, and Angola
welcomed Angola’s efforts to strengthen the Press Agency, 10 November 2006, refer to 500
soldiers. Another report by Jornal de Angola on
protection of children’s rights. It also welcomed
28 November 2006 refers to 1,804 soldiers.
the ratification in 2001 of the ILO Minimum Age
Convention 138 and the ILO Worst Forms of 16 Angola News, above note 2, No. 120, December
Child Labour Convention 182 and of the African 2006–January 2007.
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 17 Confidential source, February 2007.
in July 2003. The Committee expressed concern 18 IRIN, 13 March 2006, quoting the Pretoria-based
about the inadequate attention given to the Institute of Security Studies.
plight of child soldiers, especially girls, in the 19 US State Department, Country Reports on
context of the disarmament, demobilization and Human Rights Practices, Angola – 2005, Bureau
reintegration of combatants.21 of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 8
In June 2004 it was widely reported that March 2006; Initial report of Angola to the UN
Angolan troops had been deployed in the Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The CRC/C/3/Add.66, 10 August 2004.

20 Angola News, above note 2, No. 120, December
2006–January 2007; EFE (Spanish Press Agency), ANTIG UA A N D
31 May 2007.
Consideration of report submitted by Angola,
BARB U DA
Add.246, 1 October 2004.
Antigua and Barbuda
22 Radio France Internationale (RFI) on 8 June 2004, Population: 81,000 (27,000 under 18)
quoted by the BBC; AFP, 25 June 2004. Government armed forces: 170
23 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
of the Child on the involvement of children in (see text)
armed conflict, www2.ohchr.org.
Voluntary recruitment age: 18
Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: not signed
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
There were no reports of under-18s in the

armed forces.
Government
practice
There was no conscription into the Antigua and
Barbuda Defence Force, and no legal basis for
compulsory military service during states of
emergency.1 Under the 1981 Defence Act, nobody
under the age of 18 could be enlisted into the
regular armed forces, but the Governor-General
had powers to call up men for national service
and to set the age at which they could be called
up.2 The 1981 Act was amended by the Defence
Act 2003, No. 10 of 2006.3

The armed forces managed National Cadet
Corps units in secondary-schools, providing
physical training, basic military skills, discipline
and academic and technical guidance, and
promoting national service and patriotism. The
government announced in September 2006 that
it was considering making enrolment in the corps
compulsory for every student in the first and
second years of secondary-school.4
Developments
In November 2004 the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child recommended that Antigua
and Barbuda ratify the Optional Protocol.5
1 1967 Emergency Powers Act, Chapter 147, www.

laws.gov.ag.
2 1981 Defence Act, Chapter 132, Sections 15(2) and
161.
3 International Labour Organization, www.ilo.org/
(natlex database).

4 Prime Minister W. Baldwin Spencer, speech at
the Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force 25th Argentina
Anniversary Banquet, 2 September 2006, www.
antigua.gov.ag. Argentine Republic
A—E
Consideration of initial report submitted by Population: 38.7 million (12.3 million under 18)
Antigua and Barbuda, Concluding observations, Government armed forces: 71,700
UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.247, 3 November 2004. Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
(see text)
Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: ratified 10 September 2002

armed forces.
Government
practice
Compulsory military service had been replaced
by voluntary enrolment in 1994, although
the government retained powers to restore
conscription in an emergency.1 Volunteers to
the armed forces were on renewable two-year
contracts.2 They had to be 18–24 years old and to
have seven years of basic education. Those under
21 were required to have parental consent.3
If the number of volunteers failed to meet
the quota of recruits for a particular year,
Congress could authorize the conscription for
up to 12 months of citizens who turned 18 that
year.4 In such circumstances, conscientious
objectors could carry out an alternative form of
social service. In an armed conflict, the whole
population had to support the war effort with
non-military service.5
In June 2006, Decree 727 regulating the
National Defence Law established a clearer line
of civilian command over the armed forces and in
the development of defence policies.6 The armed
forces could respond to external threats only and
were excluded from internal security operations
related to drug trafficking and terrorism.

Each branch of the armed forces had its own
primary, secondary and training schools. The
army had seven primary and secondary-schools
around the country, which offered the national
curriculum as well as military instruction.7
Candidates for officer training at the
National Military College had to have completed
secondary education and were usually about 17
or 18 years old. They needed parental consent
if they were under 21. Women could take
courses that included artillery, engineering,

communications and logistics. Students were 12 Comando de Educacion y doctrina, www.coedoc.
allowed to leave the college without penalty.8 ejercito.mil.ar; see also Global Report 2004,
Candidates to the Military Aviation School above note 6.
had to be aged 16–22 and to have completed
their secondary education. Officers graduated
after four years as second lieutenants (alférez).9
Those seeking to enrol at the Military Naval
School had to be at least in their final secondary
school year (typically aged 17) and have parental
consent if under 21.10
Candidates to the non-commissioned officers’
air force school had to be aged 16–22, have
parental consent if under 21 and have completed
their secondary education. Graduates received
the rank of corporal (cabo) after two years’
training.11
Boys and girls aged 11–15 could enrol in
military high schools (liceos militares) run by the
armed forces. The schools provided a general
education, with military instruction for students
in their last two years.12
Developments
In October 2007 Argentina endorsed the Paris
Commitments to protect children from unlawful
recruitment or use by armed forces or armed
groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines
on children associated with armed forces or
armed groups. The two documents, which were
previously endorsed by 59 states at a February
2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, reaffirmed
international standards and operational
principles for the protection of and assistance to
child soldiers, following a wide-ranging global
consultation jointly sponsored by the French
government and UNICEF.
1 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales

(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,
Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latina
y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Argentina, August
2006, www.flacso.cl.
2 FLACSO, above note 1.
3 Ejército Argentino, Servicio Militar Voluntario,
Soldado voluntario, www.ejercito.mil.ar.
4 Ley del Servicio Militar Voluntario, No. 24429,
Articles 19, 20 and 21.
5 Ley de Defensa Nacional, No. 23554.
6 FLACSO, above note 1; see also Child Soldiers:
Global Report 2004
8 Colegio Militar de la Nación, Preguntas
frecuentes, www.colegiomilitar.mil.ar.
9 Escuela de Aviación Militar, Incorporacion y
educacion, www.fuerzaaerea.mil.ar.
10 Escuela Naval Militar, www.escuelanaval.mil.ar.
11 Escuela de Suboficiales de la Fuerza Aérea,
Información General, Condiciones y Programas de
Ingreso, www.esfa.iua.edu.ar.

the judge who ordered their release was removed
A RMENIA from his post.6 The three soldiers submitted an
application to the European Court of Human
Republic of Armenia Rights, complaining of ill-treatment during
questioning and unlawful detention. The Court’s
A—E
Population: 3.0 million (819,000 under 18) decision as to the admissibility of the case was
Government armed forces: 43,600 still under consideration at the end of October
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 2007.7
Voluntary recruitment age: 18; 16–17 as a cadet The Law on Alternative Service, which gave
Voting age: 18 legal recognition to conscientious objection,
Optional Protocol: ratified 30 September 2005 entered into force in July 2004.8 A government
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): order of 9 July 2006 made available just 45 places
for alternative service and a further 300 non-
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
armed military positions.9 Many conscientious
There were no reports of under-18s on objectors, mainly Jehovah’s Witnesses, refused
to enlist for alternative service on the grounds
active duty in the armed forces, but c��
adets that it was controlled by the military and not a
under 18 in military higher education were fully civilian alternative.10 In 2006, 40 Jehovah’s
considered to be military personnel��
. Under Witnesses were convicted for their refusal to do
a pilot scheme children as young as 11 military service and by May 2007 over 70 were in
prison.11
received weapons training in school. The army of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
(NKR), which was not internationally recognized
Context as an independent state, was estimated
at 18,500–20,000, of whom over half were
Negotiations with Azerbaijan continued under reportedly citizens of Armenia and included
the auspices of the Organization for Security and Armenian army conscripts.12
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to end the dispute
over the status of the enclave of Nagorno- Military training and military schools
Karabakh.1 The government insisted that the
M��
ilitary training was compulsory for school
people in the enclave had to be guaranteed the
students aged about 16–18. Boys and girls in
right to exist within safe borders and that a link
grades 8 and 9 in weekly classes learned how to
with Armenia had to be maintained.2
handle automatic weapons. Girls could begin a
nursing course from grade 9.13
Government In 2006 in one school in a poor suburb of
Yerevan, the capital, military training started
National recruitment legislation and much earlier. A class of 18 boys and six girls
practice aged 11 and 12, many of whom were orphans,
were chosen to pilot military training for pre-
Military service was regulated by the 1998 Law on
adolescents, with the stated aim of improving
Military Duty and the 2002 Law on Performance
school discipline. They were taught by a former
��
of Military Service. Conscription was provided for
paratrooper��
to march, handle automatic weapons
in the constitution. The 1998 Law on Military Duty
and use combat skills��
. The
��
Ministry of Education
(Article 11.1) stated that male citizens between
and Science reportedly planned to extend
the ages of 18 and 27 were liable for call-up
the course to 11 other “special schools” with
in peacetime. In 2005 the law was amended
disadvantaged pupils around the country, and
to oblige graduates of military educational
to allow children who wanted military careers to
institutions to sign up for professional military
transfer to those schools.14
service or else to refund the costs of their
Military training after secondary-school was
education.3
provided through officer training at the Vazgen
There were reports of physical and mental
Sarkizyan Military Institute, the Military Aviation
abuse, murder and rape of army conscripts.4
Institute, and the Military Medical Faculty of
Three soldiers who in 2005 had been convicted
Yerevan Medical University. Cadets could be
of killing two fellow conscripts in December
accepted for military higher education from the
2003 had their sentences increased in May
year they turned 17. During their studies, they
2006 from 15 years’ to life imprisonment by the
were considered to be military personnel, with
Court of Appeal. One of them stated that military
all the corresponding rights and duties.15 The
investigators beat him and threatened him with
inclusion of under-18s among this group was not
rape, coercing him into signing a confession in
explicitly mentioned in Armenia’s declaration on
which he named the two others as accomplices.5
ratifying the Optional Protocol.
The three, who had consistently maintained
their innocence, were released by the Court of
Cassation in December 2006. Shortly afterwards
C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 5 1
Developments AUST R A L I A
Australia
Armenia ratified the Optional Protocol in
September 2005, stating in its declaration that Population: 20.2 million (4.8 million under 18)
under Armenian law citizens under 18 could not Government armed forces: 51,600
be called on for either obligatory or contractual Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
(voluntary) military service.16 Voluntary recruitment age: 17
In January 2006 Armenia ratified the ILO Voting age: 18
Minimum Age Convention 138 and the ILO Worst
Forms of Child Labour Convention 182.
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 182
* Titles of non-English-language sources have been
translated by the Coalition.
As of mid-2007, there were nearly 500
1 “��
Armenian, Azerbaijan Envoys Meet over
Nagorno-Karabakh”, Radio
��
Free Europe/Radio
under-18s serving in the armed forces,
Liberty (RFE/RL), 14
��
March 2007, www.rferl.org. including girls.
2 Armenia ��
Country Profile, BBC News, 4 March
2007. Context
3 Confidential sources, April 2007.
4 ��
“��
Violence in the Ranks: Army conscript says Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel
he was raped by comrades”, ArmeniaNow,
��
��
17 participated in a major government crackdown,
February 2006, www.armenianow.com. which included forced medical examinations for
children, on reported widespread child abuse
5 Human Rights Watch World Report 2007.
among Aboriginal communities in 2007. This
6 Gayane Abrahamyan, “Free at last: struggle to in turn prompted fears among the community
prove soldiers’ innocence ends with surprise
members of a return to former assimilation
victory in court”, ArmeniaNow, 12 January 2007.
policies that saw a “stolen generation” of
7 Arayik Zalyan, Razmik Sargsyan and Musa children forcibly removed and placed with non-
Serobyan v. Armenia (Application Nos 36894/04 Aboriginal families.1
and 3521/07), European Court of Human Rights,
In July 2005 the government abandoned
admissibility hearing 11 October 2007, www.echr.
its policy of detaining child asylum seekers in
coe.int.
high-security facilities, but unaccompanied
8 Marc Stolwijk, The Right to Conscientious children continued to be detained under guard,
Objection in Europe: A Review of the Current
and criticism of the government’s asylum and
Situation, Quaker Council for European Affairs,
immigration policies continued.2
April 2005, www.quaker.org/qcea/coreport.
9 Confidential sources, above note 3.
10 Emil Danielyan, “New alternative service falls flat Government
in Armenia”, Eurasianet, 10 March 2006, www.
eurasianet.org. National recruitment legislation
11 International Helsinki Federation, Human and practice
Rights in the OSCE Region: Armenia, 27 March There was no conscription in Australia, but the
2007, www.ihf-hr.org (IHF reports); Felix Corley, 1903 Defence Act allowed for its introduction in
“Armenia, 72 religious prisoners of conscience time of war by a proclamation approved by both
is new record”, Forum 18 News Service, 2 May houses of parliament (Section 60). The minimum
2007, www.forum18.org.
conscription age was specified as 18 (Section
12 International Crisis Group (ICG), Nagorno- 59). The legal basis for voluntary recruitment
Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground, was provided by the Defence Act (Article 34), the
Europe Report No. 166, 14 September 2005, www. Naval Defence Act 1910 (Article 24) and the 1923
crisisgroup.org.
Air Force Act (Article 4E).3
13 Confidential sources, above note 3. The Defence Instructions of 2005 specified 17
14 ��
Gegham Vardanian, “Armenian pupils march to as the minimum voluntary recruitment age for all
new step”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting three armed forces (Article 4). However, children
(IWPR), 20 July 2006, www.iwpr.net; Armenian
�� could apply to join the armed forces at 16 years
Helsinki Federation, above note 11. and 6 months. Children from the age of ten were
15 ��
“Armenian National Army – 15 years old”, encouraged to register their details with an
Respublika Armeniya, 31 January 2007, online service that could put them in contact with
www.ra.am. armed forces recruitment officers. The Defence
16 Declaration on accession to the Optional Instructions stated that all personnel wishing to
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. join the armed forces had to present an original

or certified copy of their birth certificate to their to cadet schemes, “members of which are not
recruiting officer (Article 5) and that all under-18s recruited into, and are therefore not members of,
had to have the written informed consent of their the ADF”.9
parents or guardians (Article 6). All applicants The Australian Defence Force Cadets
wishing to join the armed forces had to be fully describes itself as a “community-based youth
A—E
informed of the nature of their future duties and development organization” of 22,000 cadets
responsibilities (Article 7), and the recruitment of and 2,100 cadet staff in 475 units and squadrons
all children had to be genuinely voluntary (Article across Australia, funded by the government
8).4 through the Department of Defence. The
The Defence Instructions stated that the minimum age of recruitment is 12 years and 6
armed forces had to take “all feasible measures” months for navy and army cadets, and 13 for
to ensure that under-18s did not participate in air force cadets. Training included weapons
hostilities (Article 10), and outlined a number handling. The cadet force was considered a path
of limited safeguards, including that under-18s to a defence career, and “a safe and fun military-
should not be deployed in areas of operations like experience”.10
where there was a likelihood of hostile action
“to the maximum extent possible, and where Child recruitment and deployment
it will not adversely impact on the conduct of As of 27 July 2007, there were a total of 486
operations” (Article 11). However, a commander under-18s serving in the armed forces, including
was not obliged to remove an under-18 from 62 girls. The government stated that it had no
direct participation in hostilities in certain record of children being deployed into areas of
circumstances, including “where it would operations.11
prejudice the effectiveness of the mission”
(Article 13).5
Australia’s declaration on ratification of Disarmament, demobilization,
the Optional Protocol in 2006 stated that the
minimum age of voluntary recruitment was 17;
and reintegration (DDR)
that proper documentation of age and informed The government was providing Australian
consent of parents or guardians of under-18s $200,000 to help UNICEF and the UN Special
were required; that all applicants be fully Representative for Children and Armed Conflict
informed of their duties and responsibilities; and undertake the ten-year strategic review of the
that recruiting officers had to be satisfied that 1996 Machel study, “The Impact of Armed Conflict
applications for enlistment of under-18s were on on Children”.12
a “genuinely voluntary basis”.6
Following ratification of the Optional Protocol,
the Criminal Code Act (1995) was amended in
Developments
2007 to provide for a series of criminal penalties International standards
for individuals who used, conscripted or enlisted
children under the age of 15 into the national Australia ratified the Optional Protocol in
armed forces or under the age of 18 into a force September 2006, the Rome Statute of the
or group other than the national armed forces International Criminal Court in July 2002 and ILO
in both international or non-international armed Convention 182 in December 2006.13
conflicts.7
In October 2005 the Defence Force 1 Reuters, “Australia’s Aborigines fear losing
Ombudsman released the report from his children”, 26 June 2007.
investigation into the management and 2 Children out of Detention, www.chilout.org/;
administration of under-age personnel in the Mary Crock, Seeking Asylum Alone: Australia,
armed forces. It included a recommendation that Harvard, 2006, www.humanrights.harvard.edu.
the forces undertake an analysis of the costs 3 Commonwealth of Australia Law, www.comlaw.
and benefits of accepting children for enlistment gov.au.
in the ADF, with a view to determining whether 4 Department of Defence, “Recruitment and
the enlistment age should be raised to 18 years. employment of members under 18 years in the
The Defence Department disagreed with the Australian Defence Force”, Defence Instructions
recommendation, claiming that to raise the (General), 4 July 2005; “Underage candidates”;
minimum age would “severely restrict the quality “Recruitment and employment of members
and quantity of recruits”.8 under 18 years in the Australian Defence Force”,
Defence Instructions (General), 4 July 2005; all at
Military training and military schools www.defencejobs.gov.au.
In its declaration on ratification of the Optional 5 Department of Defence, “Recruitment and
Protocol in 2006, Australia stated that the employment of members under 18 years in the
minimum voluntary recruitment age of 17 did Australian Defence Force”, above note 4.
not apply to military schools. Nor did it apply 6 Declaration on ratification of the Optional
7 Commonwealth of Australia Law, above note 3.
8 Commonwealth and Defence Force Ombudsman, AUST R I A
“Australian Defence Force: management of
service personnel under the age of 18 years”, Republic of Austria
October 2005, www.comb.gov.au.
9 Declaration, above note 6. Population: 8.2 million (1.6 million under 18)
10 Department of Defence, Defence Force Cadets,
www.cadetnet.gov.au. Compulsory recruitment age: 18
11 Child Soldiers Coalition correspondence with Voluntary recruitment age: 17 (training only)
Ministry of Defence, October 2007. Voting age: 18
12 Ibid. Optional Protocol: ratified 1 February 2002
13 Ratification of the Optional Protocol, above note Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
6; ICC Assembly of States Parties, www.icc-cpi. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, IL0 182
int/; International Labour Standards, www.ilo.org
(ilolex database). Voluntary recruitment was allowed for
17-year-olds. The precise number of under-
18s in the armed forces was not available.
Legislation ruled out the participation of
under-18s in active service.
Government
practice
The constitution and the 1990 National Defence
Act provided the basis for compulsory military
service.1 According to the National Defence Act,
all Austrian men were required to register for
compulsory military service during the calendar
year in which they became 18. Recruitment orders
could not be served earlier than six months
following the decision on fitness for service by a
recruitment commission. The National Defence
Act also allowed for voluntary recruitment to the
Austrian armed forces at the age of 17 – although
the explicit consent of parents or guardians was
required. Volunteers under 18 could enter the
armed forces for training purposes only, and
any deployment overseas of 17-year-olds was
prohibited. The Act on Dispatching of Soldiers for
Assistance Abroad allowed for voluntary requests
for international deployment to be made only
at the age of 19. According to a 2003 National
Defence Act amendment, women could volunteer
for military training and “functional services”
in the armed forces, but were prohibited from
participation in armed conflict.2 The length
of ordinary military service was currently six
months. Precise figures on the number of
volunteers under the age of 18 currently serving
in the armed forces were unavailable, but the
current figure was believed to be very low.3 A
2001 amendment to the National Defence Act
explicitly banned “the direct participation of
persons under the age of 18 in direct hostilities”.
According to the Austrian government, “the
term ‘direct participation’ is interpreted in a
restrictive manner and does not include acts
such as gathering and transmission of military

information, transportation of arms and groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on
munitions, provision of supplies, etc.”.4 children associated with armed forces or armed
The Austrian Penal Code “prohibits and groups. The documents reaffirmed international
criminalizes the recruitment and use of persons standards and operational principles for
of any age in hostilities by armed groups that are protecting and assisting child soldiers and
A—E
distinct from the armed forces”.5 followed a wide-ranging global consultation
jointly sponsored by the French government and
Military training and military schools UNICEF.
Although the Austrian government stated
that there were no schools in the country 1 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Right
directly operated by the armed forces, the to Conscientious Objection to Military Service in
Militaerrealgymnasium, located in Wiener Europe: A Review of the Current Situation, April
Neustadt, “offers students from age 14 a higher 2005.
secondary education with a specialization in 2 Initial report of Austria to the UN Committee on
natural sciences and a military-led boarding the Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol
school. The school is supervised by the general to the Convention on the Rights on the Child on
school authorities in all relevant aspects. The the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, UN
boarding school is governed by internal rules Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/AUT/1, 8 July 2004.
under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of 3 Information from the defence attaché, Austrian
Defence.”6 embassy, London, September 2007.
Although it was not an exclusive aim, 4 Initial report, above note 2.
preparation for a military career as an officer 5 Ibid.
was certainly one of the institution’s stated 6 Ibid.
purposes. The government stated that the
students of the school were not considered to be 7 Ibid.
members of the armed forces, and emphasized 8 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
that the pursuit of a military career following Consideration of report submitted by Austria
graduation was not compulsory.7 In its January on the Optional Protocol on the Involvement
2005 examination of Austria’s initial report on of Children in Armed Conflict, Concluding
observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/CO/2,
implementation of the Optional Protocol, the
January 2005.
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted
that students at the school were referred to as 9 Initial report, above note 2.
“cadets”. The Committee went on to request
the following: “With regard to incentives for
recruitment, and in light of the fact that a
significant proportion of new recruits in the
armed forces come from the cadet forces, the
Committee requests the State party, in its next
report, to include more detailed information and
statistics on its military school and the cadet
forces … and on recruitment activities undertaken
by the armed forces within the cadet forces.”8
In its report to the Committee, the government
stated that training in international law and the
rights of the child was being included in the
preparation of Austrian soldiers for overseas
missions. Austrian peacekeepers were also given
particular instruction relevant to the place of their
deployment – as in the case of two armed forces
personnel whose preparatory training included
specific attention to the issue of child soldiers
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
curriculum of the Militaerrealgymnasium also
included instruction in the basics of international
humanitarian law.9
Developments
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,
Austria and 58 other states endorsed the Paris
C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 55
reported that in practice 17-year-olds who had
A Z ERBAIJAN graduated from military secondary-schools could
go straight into military service.6
Republic of Azerbaijan The direct participation of children aged
under 15 in military action was prohibited. T��he
Population: 8.4 million (2.7 million under 18) recruitment of minors into the armed forces
Government armed forces: 66,740 was treated as a violation of international
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 humanitarian law and punishable under Article
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 (as a cadet school 116 of the Criminal Code.7
student) Advocates of military reform raised concerns
Voting age: 18 that the rights of soldiers,
��
cadets and even
Optional Protocol: ratified 3 July 2002 officers were violated in the military.��
Living
conditions were poor, with a reported rise in
suicides and criminality. In early 2007 it was
CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182 reported that during the previous year there had
been about 200 cases of corruption or violence
Under-18s could volunteer to join the against soldiers. Conscripts’ housing, annual
armed forces as cadets at military school��. leave and salaries were reported to have been
arbitrarily withheld or withdrawn in some cases.
Context A group researching military and security issues
reported that in 2006, in contrast to previous
Negotiations with Armenia continued under years, the majority of casualties in Azerbaijan’s
the auspices of the Organization for Security army were non-battlefield-related – 75 per
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to end the cent were the result of suicide or bullying. In
dispute over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.1 December 2006 three soldiers were reported
Azerbaijan’s oil wealth was channelled into the to have fled across the front line into Armenian
military to bring its forces up to NATO standards captivity to escape physical abuse and bullying in
and to counterbalance Armenia’s armed forces. the Azerbaijani army.8
Military spending rose from US$135 million
in 2003 to US$700 million in 2006, and was Military training and military schools
projected to increase further.2 Two military secondary-schools admitted
pupils after eight years of education.9 The first
Government was founded in the 1970s; the second, in the
Nakhichevan enclave, was opened in 2004.10
National recruitment legislation and Children could enter the schools at 14 years
practice of age. Graduates were expected to go on to
study at military higher-education institutions to
The November 1992 Law on Military Service set become officers, but those who did not could join
the age of conscription at 18. Boys at the age the army as ordinary soldiers.11 Three Supreme
of 16 were usually required to have a medical Military Schools for the army, navy and air force
examination, and at the age of 18 were called up.3 and the Academy of National Security accepted
Recruitment legislation was amended in pupils aged 17–19 as cadets who were considered
December 2006 to ensure a larger pool of to be members of the armed forces. The schools
conscripts. Matriculating students and people offered courses based on NATO standards.12
caring for disabled relatives no longer had the
right to defer military service. Eighteen-year-olds
who did not register for conscription could face Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
criminal charges. Compulsory military service
was increased from 12 to 18 months, with call-ups
(NKR)
four times a year, rather than twice as previously. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) had
District military commissioners, reorganized its own laws and armed forces, but remained
on a regional basis, were to answer directly unrecognized internationally. The strength of the
to the president, rather than the Ministry of army was estimated at 18,500–20,000, of whom
Defence. Conscripts could be assigned to other over half were reportedly citizens of Armenia.13
government departments, such as the Ministries The remainder were largely conscripts.
of Justice or Emergency Situations, in addition to The NKR constitution required citizens to
the armed forces. The new system was to be fully do compulsory military service (Article 57).
implemented by 2010.4 Conscription and voluntary recruitment were
According to Azerbaijan’s declaration on regulated by the Law on Military Service, as
ratifying the Optional Protocol in 2002, 17- amended in 2006, and the Law on Military
year-olds could voluntarily enter active military Obligations of 2001. The Law on Military
service while at military cadet schools.5 Non- Obligations stipulated that all male citizens at
governmental organizations (NGOs) in Azerbaijan the age of 16 submit to a medical examination

(Articles 5 and 11). Those who passed had to
carry out two years’ military service between the Bahamas
ages of 18 and 27.
The minimum age for voluntary recruitment Commonwealth of the Bahamas
was also 18. Men could become professional
A—E
soldiers on completing military service. Women Population: 323,000 (108,000 under 18)
could also sign up voluntarily.14 Government armed forces: 900
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
* Titles of non-English-language sources have been Voluntary recruitment age: 18
translated by the Coalition.� Voting age: 18
1 “��
Armenian, Azerbaijan envoys meet over Optional Protocol: not signed
Nagorno-Karabakh”, Radio��
Free Europe/Radio Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Liberty (RFE/RL), 14��
March 2007, www.rferl.org. CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
2 Speech of President Ilham Aliyev at Graduation
Ceremony at Heydar Aliyev High Military School, No information was available on under-18s
23 June 2006, in UNDP Azerbaijan Development in the security forces.
Bulletin, Issue No. 39, July 2006, www.un-
az.org/undp; Adalat Bargarar, “Azerbaijan boosts
military”, Institute of War and Peace Reporting Government
(IWPR), 7 July 2005, www.iwpr.net; Jasur
Mamedov, “Azerbaijan tiptoes towards NATO”, National recruitment legislation and
IWPR, 23 November 2006.
practice
3 Marc Stolwijk, The Right to Conscientious
Objection in Europe: A Review of the Current The armed forces were responsible for defence
Situation, Quaker Council for European Affairs, and protection, the provision of disaster relief,
April 2005, www.quaker.org/qcea/coreport. and, in conjunction with other law enforcement
4 B.��
Safarov��
��
, “Parliament passed amendments to agencies, the maintenance of order.1 The age
the law on the basics of conscription”, Ekho, for recruitment into the armed forces under the
26 December��
��
2006, www.echo-az.com;
�� Defence Act was 18.2 There was no conscription.
J. Mazakhiroglu, “Military Commissioners’ Offices In times of imminent danger of invasion or
will be Abolished”, Armeyskoe Zerkalo, other emergency, the Governor-General could
30 December 2006, www.zerkalo.az. order that the police force be liable for military
5 Declaration on accession to the Optional service.3 The minimum age of recruitment to the
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. police was 18.4 However, the Bahamas stated
6 Confidential sources, March 2007. in its initial report to the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child that under the Police Act the
7 Second periodic report of Azerbaijan to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. recruitment age was 16 years.5
CRC/C/83/Add.13, 7 April 2005.
8 Adalat Bargarar, above note 2; Jasur Mamedov, Developments
“Army abuse claims in Azerbaijan”, IWPR,
8 March 2007; Liz Fuller, “Azerbaijan: Military has In March 2005 the UN Committee on the Rights of
Cash, but no Security Doctrine”, RFE/RL��
��, the Child recommended that the Bahamas ratify
2 February 2006. the Optional Protocol.6
10 “Executive Order of President of Azerbaijan on 1 Defence Act, Chapter 211.
founding military lyceum named after Heydar 2 Initial report of Bahamas to the Committee on the
Aliyev”, Azerbaijan, No. 49, 27 February 2004, at Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.50, 28
www.vescc.com. January 2004.
11 Confidential sources, above note 6. 3 Police Force (Military Service) Act, Chapter 207.
12 J.��
Sumerinli��
��
, “Reforms in the Army are a long-term 4 Police Act, Chapter 205.
process”, Voennoe Zerkalo, undated, http://old. 5 Initial report, above note 2.
zerkalo.az; Ministry of National Security, “The 6 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
role of the Ministry of National Security in Consideration of initial report submitted by
NATO–Azerbaijan cooperation”, Diplomacy and Bahamas, Concluding observations, UN Doc.
Law, No. 1 (007), April 2007, www.mns.gov.az. CRC/C/15/Add.253, 31 March 2005.
13 International Crisis Group (ICG), Nagorno-
Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground,
Europe Report No. 166, 14 September 2005,
www.crisisgroup.org.
14 Confidential sources, Nagorno Karabakh, March
2007.
bahrain BANG L A D E S H
Kingdom of Bahrain People’s Republic of Bangladesh
Population: 727,000 (232,000 under 18) Population: 141.8 million (59.4 million under 18)
Government armed forces: 11,200 Government armed forces: 126,500
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
Voluntary recruitment age: unclear Voluntary recruitment age: 16 (air force); 17
Voting age: 20 (army and navy); 18 (paramilitary and auxiliary
Optional Protocol: acceded 21 September 2004 forces)
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): Voting age: 18
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182 Optional Protocol: ratified 6 September 2000
Non-commissioned officers, technicians CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182
and specialized personnel could
apparently join the army as cadets from Under-18s were reported to be serving
the age of 15 and as regular soldiers at in the armed forces. Despite government
17. However, Bahrain’s declaration on assertions to the contrary a number of
its accession to the Optional Protocol armed groups were known to be operating
stated that the minimum age for voluntary in the country, and there were allegations
recruitment was 18. that some had recruited children.
Government Context
Following a series of bombings in 63 districts in
National recruitment legislation and August 2005, the government cracked down on
practice Islamist groups. Hundreds of arrests were carried
While military service was not compulsory, out and several Islamist organizations – including
according to Article 30 of the constitution, the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB),
“defending [the state] shall be the duty of every Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and
citizen. Military service is an honour for the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) – were banned.1
citizens and regulated by law.” In January 2007 a state of emergency was
The government had stated in its 2001 Initial declared by the president. Imminent elections
Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the were cancelled following widespread political
Child that “Legislative Decree No. 23 of 1979 … violence. A military-backed caretaker government
stipulates that recruits into the ranks must not took power; it banned political rallies and other
be under 17 or over 35 years of age, except in the political activity and began a campaign against
case of non-commissioned officers, technicians corrupt politicians and organized crime under
and specialized personnel who can be recruited which thousands of people were detained.
from the age of 15 (as cadets) to the age of 40”,1 Observers voiced concern that the slow
while Article 3 of the decree stated that the age implementation of the 1997 Peace Accord in
limit could be disregarded in times of necessity. the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) threatened the
However, Bahrain’s declaration on its accession return of organized violence. Non-governmental
to the Optional Protocol stated that the minimum organizations (NGOs) concerned with child rights
age for voluntary recruitment was 18.2 feared that such violence would involve children.2
In May 2007 the CHT Affairs Ministry Advisory
Committee held its first meeting for six years to
Developments discuss implementation of the Accord.3
India continued to allege that numerous
International standards separatist groups active in northeast India were
Bahrain acceded to the Optional Protocol on 21 operating from inside Bangladesh’s borders.
September 2004. In early 2007 the caretaker government of
Bangladesh appeared to acknowledge this and
1 Initial report by Bahrain to the UN Committee said that it would take action against them.4
on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/11/ According to the government in 2005, a
Add.24, 23 July 2001. National Child Labour Policy had been drafted,
2 Declaration by Bahrain on accession to the but not finalized, which would remove anomalies
Optional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. in legislation, fix a uniform age for admission
to work, and simplify and consolidate all legal
provisions for the progressive elimination of child

labour, including its worst forms.5 A Baseline naval training was from 15 months to two years.
Survey conducted by the International Labour The training period was the same for recruits of
Organization (ILO) in 2005 estimated that there all ages, including those under the age of 18, who
were 532,000 child workers aged 5–17 engaged on completing training were required to perform
in hazardous labour.6 the same duties as other soldiers.14
A—E
The age of criminal responsibility was raised Ten cadet colleges (including one girls’
from seven to nine years. UNICEF commented college) enrolled children from the age of 12 and
that “for children in conflict with the law, provided military and academic instruction. The
rehabilitation instead of punishment is yet to Defence Ministry and the Bangladesh Army had a
become the main aim”.7 Under the 1974 Children direct role in the operation of these colleges, and
Act “child” and “youthful offender” were defined a high number of students were said to join the
as a person under the age of 16, so that children armed forces on leaving.15
between the ages of 16 and 18 were treated as
adults.
Armed groups
In its initial report to the Committee on the Rights
Government of the Child on implementation of the Optional
National recruitment legislation and Protocol, the government stated that “There is
no armed group in Bangladeshi territory, so the
practice question of involving under-18s in such a group
There was no provision for compulsory does not arise”.16 However, a number of armed
recruitment into the armed or paramilitary groups were operating in the country, and there
forces. There was no legislation governing the were widespread allegations that many of them
minimum age for recruitment and deployment, had recruited children.17
but according to the government the minimum
age of recruitment into the army and navy was Islamist groups
17 years, and 16 for the air force.8 The minimum There were fears that the spread of madrasas
age for recruitment into Bangladesh’s armed (Islamic religious schools) might make children
paramilitary and auxiliary forces, including the more susceptible to recruitment by militant
Bangladesh Rifles and the Ansars, was 18.9 The Islamist groups. The Committee on the Rights of
government maintained that there was no scope the Child expressed concern about the possible
for any person to be employed for actual service military training given to children in unregistered
or combat duty in the defence services, internal madrasas from a very young age.18 Concrete
security services or paramilitary forces before evidence of child recruitment by Islamist groups
attaining the age of 18, because those recruited was scarce, but non-governmental organizations
below that age were required to undergo periods (NGOs) reported that they considered incidents
of training (although in the case of the army, the of child recruitment to be common. In the Khulna
government indicated that training was for a and Rajshahi districts, some teachers in the
period of only nine months).10 privately owned unregistered madrasas were
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child accused of providing under-age activists to the
expressed concern about the reportedly high JMB, which was involved in the serial bombings
number of children under 18 who enrolled in the of August 2005. It was also alleged that children
armed forces and the difficulty of determining aged 12–15 were working for the JMJB, not only as
the real age of recruits.11 Recruitment information couriers but also to carry and set off bombs.19
issued by the Army of Bangladesh specified the It was reported that most members of the
need for education certificates, a nationality JMB, including district and regional commanders,
certificate and a certificate of parental consent, who had been arrested were barely 18–20 and
but not a birth certificate. The birth registration that two of those arrested in 2005 had been
rate was reported as 10 per cent (having been 16. Most of the boys were said to have been
7 per cent in 2003).12 The Committee also recruited from madrasas.20 A report in the local
expressed concern about the lack of mandatory media further claimed that another militant
parental consent except for recruits to the air group, Hizbut Tawhid, which believed in a jihad to
force, and the lack of measures to ensure that establish Islamic rule globally, said that groups
recruitment of under-18s was genuinely voluntary of 6–11 “skilled mujahids” currently operated in
and well informed.13 almost every district in the country to persuade
children to join in preparation for an armed jihad.
Military training and military schools Financial incentives were offered in some cases,
According to information provided by the while others received a mobile phone. The report
government to the Committee on the Rights of claimed that most children who joined were
the Child, durations of training varied from one acting against their parents’ wishes.21
branch of the armed forces to another. Army
training lasted nine months and the duration of
Maoist groups 3 “CHT leaders for full implementation of peace
accord”, Daily Star, 29 May 2007.
In southwest Bangladesh, factions of the banned
4 “No refuge to Indian insurgents: Bangladesh”,
Maoist Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP)
Rediff.net, 3 March 2007.
were reported to have recruited children aged 13–
16 to make and plant bombs and throw grenades. 5 Initial report of Bangladesh to the UN Committee
Party operatives were reported to have targeted on the Rights of the Child on implementation of
the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
children from slum areas and families of victims
BGD/1, 14 July 2005.
of political violence for recruitment. A number of
such children were reported to have been killed 6 International Labour Organization (ILO),
by police in “crossfire” in 2004 and 2005. 22 International Programme on the Elimination of
Child Labour (IPEC), cited in US Department
Criminal gangs of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices 2006.
Primary research on recruitment of children by 7 UNICEF: Juvenile Justice in Bangladesh, undated,
criminal gangs (known as mastans) was scarce, www.unicef.org/bangladesh.
but some child rights NGOs claimed that poor
8 Initial report, above note 5.
children were being used for drugs trafficking
and arms carrying in slum areas of Dhaka. 9 Ibid.
The increasing availability of small arms made 10 Answers by the State Party to the questions
under-age slum and street children increasingly asked by the Committee on the Rights of the
vulnerable to recruitment by gangs.23 Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/BGD/Q/1/Add.1.
Consideration of report submitted by Bangladesh
Disarmament, demobilization on implementation of the Optional Protocol,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
and reintegration (DDR) BGD/CO/1, January 2006.
There was no formal disarmament, 12 ��
Response to the issues raised by the Committee
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process on the Rights of the Child related to the report
for children involved in the conflict in the submitted by the Government of Bangladesh on
Chittagong Hill Tracts. With the government the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
having reported to the Committee on the Rights Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
of the Child that there were 1,947 persons with Prostitution and Child Pornography in 2007, UN
“some sort of combatant background”, the Doc.��
CRC/C/OPSC/BGD/Q/1/Add.1.
Committee expressed concern about the lack of 13 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above note
information about programs for DDR, in particular 11; Answers by State Party, above note 10.
for children who had been involved in the 14 Initial report, above note 5.
Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict, taking into account 15 Information from websites of a number of cadet
that involvement in armed conflict produces schools, including www.acocweb.com.
long-term consequences requiring psychosocial 16 Initial report, above note 5.
assistance.24
17 Lata Hogg, above note 2.
18 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above note
Developments 11.
Bangladesh’s initial report on implementation 19 Lata Hogg, above note 2.
of the Optional Protocol referred to a number 20 “Militants found teenagers easy to brainwash”,
of plans and policies for the protection of Daily Star, 16 March 2006.
children, which focused on child trafficking, birth 21 “Turning into a militant”, Daily Star, 22 August
registration and juvenile justice, but included no 2005.
policies for the protection of children involved in 22 “Outlawed parties recruiting slum boys, street
armed conflict.25 urchins”, Daily Star, 24 July 2005.
23 Lata Hogg, above note 2.
1 International Crisis Group (ICG), Bangladesh 24 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above note
Today, Asia
��
Report No. 121, 23 October 2006, 11; Answers by State Party, above note 10.
www.crisisgroup.org. 25 Initial report, above note 5.
2 Charu Lata Hogg, Child Recruitment in South
Asian Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis of Sri
Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh, London: Chatham
House and Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers, 2006. (An edited extract from the report,
Child Recruitment in South Asian Conflicts:
Bangladesh, issued by the Coalition in April 2007,
is available at www.child-soldiers.org.).

1 Latin American School of Social Sciences
B ARBADO S (FLACSO), Security and Citizenship Program,
Latin America and the Caribbean Security Sector
Barbados Report, Country case study: Barbados, October
A—E
Population: 270,000 (63,000 under 18) 2 Information from Coalition source.
Government armed forces: 600 3 FLACSO, above note 1.
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription 4 Information from Coalition source.
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (younger with 5 FLACSO, above note 1.
parental consent) 6 Royal Barbados Police Force, Human Resources,
Voting age: 18 Recruitment, www.barbadospolice.gov.bb.
Optional Protocol: not signed 7 The Regional Security System comprises Antigua
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada,
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines; see www.rss.org.bb.
Under-18s could enlist with parental 8 Information from Coalition source.
consent. In 2007 there was reportedly one 9 Ibid�.
under-18 in the armed forces.
Government
practice
The Barbados Defence Force comprised regular
and reserve forces, a cadet corps and the
coastguard. There was no conscription, and
volunteers for enlistment to the regular and
reserve force had to be at least 18. However,
the Defence Act also allowed the possibility for
under-18s to enlist with the consent of parents
or legal guardians (Chapter 159, Article 19.2).1 In
2007 there was one under-18 in the regular force
who enlisted with parental consent at 17 years
and 9 months.2
The 12-year term of service could be partly
served in the reserve.3 Enlistment in the regular
force could be for an initial period of six years,
with two three-year increments.4
Under the Police Act, the police force had to
perform military duties in addition to maintaining
law and order (Section II.5).5 In 2006 there were
nearly 1,500 police constables. Regular and
special police constables had to be at least 19 to
join the force.6

Initial and further training was conducted locally.
Additional training was provided regionally by
Jamaica, Trinidad, Belize, the Regional Security
System7 and the French Forces of the Antilles.
Training was also provided by the United
Kingdom, the USA, Canada and, more recently,
the People’s Republic of China.8
In 2006 there were around 1,360 members
of the Barbados Cadet Corps in 22 units in
secondary-schools. Students could enrol in the
cadet corps from the age of 11. Cadet training
included leadership and character-building, band
training, sea cadet training, adventure training,
archery, paramedical and first aid, and catering.9

prohibited from obeying orders that would
B E L ARUS “contravene the international obligations of
Belarus” (Article 3). 3
Republic of Belarus
Pupils at the Suvorov Military College in Minsk
Government armed forces: 72,900 were entitled to the social benefits of military
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 servicemen under the Law on the Status of
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (men), 19 Military Servicemen and Servicewomen. Their
(women); 17 (training); 16 (as cadets with rights to holidays and medical benefits were
parental consent) set down by the Ministry of Defence (Articles
Voting age: 18 12 and 13). They were obliged to accept military
Optional Protocol: acceded 25 January 2006 discipline, which included “mastering military
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): skills; being continually alert to new military
techniques and technology; and looking after
military property” (Article 20).
Under-18s entering military training The Suvorov Military College was open to
boys from the age of 13, who were often the
institutions from the age of 13 were sons of existing officers.4 It prepared cadets
entitled to the social benefits of military aged 15–16 for fast-track admission to Higher
servicemen and obliged to accept military Military Education Institutes. These institutes,
discipline. intended for students aged 17–21, trained
officers with a specialist profile for each armed
service or combat arm. Around 60 per cent of
Context their curriculum was devoted to military service
and weaponry. Successful students graduated
In 2006 the National Commission on the Rights
with a university diploma and the rank of junior
of the Child was restructured so that it could
lieutenant.
monitor the government’s implementation of the
Outside Minsk, the government could set
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It had
up local branch institutions that were designed
powers to request information from state bodies
to give boys a military grounding and accepted
and other organizations, and official bodies were
pupils from the age of seven years through to 16
required to implement its decisions.1
(Law on the Status of Military Servicemen and
The government declared 2007 the Year of
Servicewomen, Article 27).
the Child as part of a four-year program focused
on children in the period 2006–10. The program
included provisions on adoption and marriage, Developments
but not on military service.
Government Belarus acceded to the Optional Protocol in
January 2006. Its declaration stated that the
National recruitment legislation and age for voluntary recruitment was 18, with the
exception of those who, with parental consent,
practice entered a military academy as a cadet at 17 or
Under the 1992 Law on Military Obligations and during the year they turned 17.5
Military Service, between January and April every
year boys aged 16 had to register for the draft 1 Presidential Decree, No. 675, 16 November 2006,
(Article 14). Military call-up applied to all male National Legal Internet Portal of the Republic of
citizens between the ages of 18 and 27 years Belarus, http://pravo.by.
(Article 30). Conscription was for 18 months, or
2 Law on Military Obligations and Military Service,
12 months for graduates of higher education. No. 2/1247 of 1992, most recently amended by
College students could defer their service until Law No. 50-Z19, July 2006, at www.mod.mil.
the end of their studies. Training contracts in by/zakonzak.html.
military-technical professions were available
3 Law on the Status of Military Servicemen and
to boys from the age of 17 (Article 26) and Servicewomen, No. 1939-XII of 13 November
professional contracts in the army, navy and air 1992, at www.mod.mil.by/zakonzak.html.
force were available to men from the age of 18
4 Ministry of Defence, www.mod.mil.by/vv/msvu1.
and women from the age of 19 (Article 42).2
html.
Under the Law on the Status of Military
Servicemen and Servicewomen, military 5 Declaration on accession to the Optional
personnel were under an obligation to observe
the constitution of Belarus, its laws and the
orders of their superiors (Article 20). They were

placed on extraterritorial jurisdiction by the 2003
B ELGIUM act, whereby there could be no prosecutions of
serious violations of international humanitarian
Kingdom of Belgium law without the establishment of a clear link
connecting the violations with Belgium.4 In April
A—E
Population: 10.4 million (2.1 million under 18) 2006 the Belgian senate adopted a detailed
Government armed forces: 39,700 resolution calling on the government to make
Compulsory recruitment age: 17 (conscription children in armed conflict a policy priority.
suspended)
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 Military training and military schools
Voting age: 18 Individuals who applied successfully to become
Optional Protocol: ratified 6 May 2002 career non-commissioned officers in the armed
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): forces could from the age of 16 complete their
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 secondary education in a non-commissioned
officers’ college. Those who applied successfully
Belgium backed a “straight-18” position, to become a career officer candidate and wished
to attend the Royal Military Academy had first
but had yet to amend its national to have completed their secondary education
legislation to exclude the possibility of and would generally be 17 or 18 years of age on
under-18s serving in the armed forces. entering the academy, where courses were at
Legislation ruled out the deployment of university level. Although there was no specific
under-18s in hostilities at all times. legislation in place concerning the military
status of students under 18 in these institutions
(including their status in a time of armed
Government conflict), the government emphasized that, in
accordance with a March 2003 act concerning
National recruitment legislation and military recruitment, no such mobilization would
practice be possible for those who had not already
completed their secondary education.5 According
Although compulsory military service as such to the government, “the question of protecting
no longer existed in Belgium, the Consolidated children in armed conflicts is addressed in
Military Service Acts of 1962 had not yet been the training given to all military personnel. It
repealed; the Acts allowed for the conscription is brought to the attention of all categories of
of individuals at 18 or 19 into the armed forces personnel on several occasions during basic and
in peacetime, and permitted conscription into in-service training courses on the law of armed
the recruitment reserve at 17 in wartime.1 In June conflict.”6
2006 the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child called on the government to “repeal all
laws that allow the recruitment of persons under Developments
the age of 18 into the armed forces in time of In June 2006 the Committee on the Rights
war”.2 Following on from Belgium’s declaration of the Child made particular note of the fact
on ratification of the Optional Protocol in May that Belgium was a “country of destination”
2002, the minimum age for voluntary recruitment for children migrating or seeking asylum from
into the Belgian Armed Forces was now 18. war-affected areas. The Committee praised
Furthermore, the declaration contained an the efforts of the Belgian Red Cross, working
absolute prohibition on the participation of alongside the Federal Agency for the Reception of
any individual under 18 in armed engagement Asylum Seekers, to offer social and psychological
of any kind or in peacekeeping operations in support to such children. However, the
times of both war and peace (1962 legislation Committee called on the authorities greatly to
notwithstanding).3 The conscription or enlistment expand its efforts to provide specific services
of children under the age of 15 into the armed for child refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants
forces or armed groups, as well as compelling who might have been participants in or victims of
children to play an active role in hostilities, hostilities in their countries of origin.7
were criminalized in the Act of 5 August 2003, At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
and could now be prosecuted as war crimes. In Paris, Belgium and 58 other states endorsed
June 2006 the Committee on the Rights of the the Paris Commitments to protect children
Child welcomed the fact that “children who have from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
been recruited into national armed forces or forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
who have been used for active participation in and guidelines on children associated with
hostilities while they were under the age of 15 armed forces or armed groups. The documents
can obtain direct access to the Belgian courts if reaffirmed international standards and
there is a link between Belgium and the crime”. operational principles for protecting and assisting
However, the Committee regretted the limits

child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
consultation jointly sponsored by the French BELIZ E
Belize
1 Initial report of Belgium to the UN Committee on
the Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights on the Child on Government armed forces: 1,100 (estimate)
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, UN Compulsory recruitment age: not specified
Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/BEL/1, 15 August 2005. Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (see text)
2 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Voting age: 18
Consideration of the initial report submitted Optional Protocol: ratified 1 December 2003
by Belgium, Concluding observations, UN Doc. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
CRC/C/OPAC/BEL/CO/1, 9 June 2006.
4 Concluding observations, above note 2. There were no reports of under-18s in the
5 Initial report, above note 1. armed forces.
6 Written replies of the Belgian Government
concerning the list of issues to be taken up in
consideration of the initial report of Belgium Government
to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on National recruitment legislation and
the Rights on the Child on the Involvement of practice
Children in Armed Conflict, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
The Belize Defence Force consisted of a regular
BEL/Q/1/Add.1, 3 April 2006.
force, a volunteer element and a reserve.1 Belize
7 Concluding observations, above note 2. declared on ratifying the Optional Protocol that 16
was the minimum age for voluntary recruitment
to any military service, but the Defence Act
(Section 16) provided that no under-18s could
be enlisted into the regular force.2 However, the
Governor-General could make regulations for the
call-up that specified the age and numbers of
conscripts (Section 167). In addition, the Defence
Regulations did not specify what steps recruiting
officers should take in order to satisfy themselves
that recruits were 18.3 There was no minimum
age for joining the police force, which could be
deployed in the service of the armed forces in
time of war or emergency.4
Many members of the Police Youth Cadet
Corps went on to join not only the police force
but also the armed forces.5 Originally established
in 1994 to “rehabilitate troubled young men”,
the corps was part of the community policing
program and was aimed at boys and girls aged
between 8 and 17. In 2006 it numbered some 800
members.6
1 Defence Act (Chapter 135).

2 Ibid., Section 16(2), cited in Second periodic
report of Belize to the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.29,
13 July 2004 and Committee on the Rights of the
child, Consideration of second periodic report
submitted by Belize, Concluding observations,
UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.252, 31 March 2005.
3 Defence Act – Subsidiary Laws, Defence (Regular
Force Enlistment and Service) Regulations.
4 Police Act (Chapter 138), Section 5.
5 “Cadet Corps holds camp at Benque”, Channel 5,
www.channel5belize.com, 13 July 2004.
6 “Police Cadet Corps enjoy sports camp”, Channel
5, above note 5, 21 April 2006.

B ENIN UNICEF.
Republic of Benin International standards

Benin ratified the Optional Protocol in January
A—E
2005.
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
Voting age: 18 2 Initial report of Benin to the UN Committee on the
Optional Protocol: ratified 31 January 2005 Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.52, 4
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): July 1997.
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC 3 Loi no. 2007-27 portant institution du Service
Militaire d’Intérêt National; Gouvernement du
There were no reports of under-18s in the Bénin, Conseil des ministres no. 26/PR/SGG/
armed forces. Com/2007, 19 October 2007.
4 “Le service militaire est désormais obligatoire
pour les jeunes Béninois”, PANAPRESS, 24
Government September 2007, at www.jeuneafrique.com.
5 “Bientôt 3000 jeunes enseignants pour réveiller
National recruitment legislation and l’école béninoise”, Fraternité (Cotonou), Bénin,
practice 22 October 2007, at http://fr.allafrica.com.
The 1990 constitution stated that the defence
of the nation and its territorial integrity was the
duty of all citizens, and that military service was
compulsory under the terms set down by law
(Article 32). Recruitment to the armed forces
was governed by Law No. 63-5 of 30 May 1963,
as amended by Ordinance No. 75-77 of 28
November 1975.
Benin’s declaration on ratifying the Optional
Protocol stated that the minimum age for
voluntary recruitment into the armed forces or
gendarmerie was 18, and that applicants had
to submit a birth certificate and a certificate of
school attendance.1 Previously it had stated to
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child that
the age for voluntary and compulsory recruitment
was 21.2
A new law on national service came into
effect in October 2007.3 It provided that
citizens between 18 and 35 would be liable for
compulsory selection for military service in the
national interest.4 Recruits, who had to have
higher-education diplomas, would undertake
military training before being deployed in sectors
deemed to be in the national interest, including
education and health.5
Developments
Benin and 58 other states endorsed the Paris
groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on
children associated with armed forces or armed
groups. The documents reaffirmed international
standards and operational principles for
protecting and assisting child soldiers and
followed a wide-ranging global consultation

leaders in favour of resettlement, and others
B H UTAN who opposed it and who continued to campaign
for a return to Bhutan. In late May 2007 the
Kingdom of Bhutan tension resulted in violence in one of the camps,
when two teenage refugees died and others
Population: unclear1 were injured. A third refugee was killed in a
Government armed forces: 9,0002 confrontation with Indian police forces around
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription the same time, when thousands of refugees
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 attempted to march across the border into
Voting age: 183 India on their way back to Bhutan. The march
Optional Protocol: signed 15 September 2005 was allegedly planned to coincide with a mock
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): election organized by the Bhutan government as
part of an educational exercise in the run-up to
CRC
the 2008 elections.7 It was reportedly organized
There were no reports of under-18s in by the Bhutan Movement Steering Committee,
consisting of three political parties in exile
government armed forces, but armed (the Bhutan People’s Party, the Druk National
political groups were recruiting from Congress and the Gorkha National Liberation
among refugees in eastern Nepal and there Front).8
were reportedly many children among
them. Government
Context practice
In December 2006 King Jigme Singye Wangchuk The minimum age for recruitment into the military
stepped down and handed over the crown to was 18.9 During the 87th session of the National
his son, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck. The Assembly in June 2007, the commander of the
king had given up some of his absolute powers army confirmed that the army strength was just
in 1998 and directed that a written constitution over 9,000 soldiers, and announced that it was to
should be drafted and elections held. As of mid- be reduced to around 8,000 by the end of 2008.10
2007 a draft constitution was in circulation and
political parties had started to register. Elections
were scheduled for 2008. Armed groups
Tension in south-east Bhutan decreased During the National Assembly’s 87th session,
after military operations in 2003 and 2004 in June 2007, it decided that recruitment and
against three armed separatist groups from training of militias should start by the beginning
north-east India – the United Liberation Front of 2008. This was an apparent reversal of a
of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Front of decision made during a 2005 Assembly session
Bodoland and Kamtapur Liberation Organization not to proceed with the recruitment of voluntary
– who had set up camps in Bhutan. During that militias, but to strengthen the army instead. The
period it was reported by Bhutanese and Indian Assembly also resolved that the Royal Bhutan
officials that 30 camps had been destroyed and Army should decide the age limit, qualifications
650 combatants killed or taken into custody. and training centre for the militia training.11
Bhutanese authorities also said that up to 65,000 According to the government, by mid-2007 full
local people had been moved for their safety. details of the upcoming recruitment process had
There were further unconfirmed reports that not been finalized. The government also stated
Bhutanese civilians suspected of supporting that none of the 700 militia volunteers recruited
these groups had been arrested and tortured.4 earlier, in 2003, remained active.12
Family members of ULFA members, including There were reports of increased activity
27 children reportedly captured during the by two armed political groups, the Bhutan
operation, were said by the government to have Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) (BCP)
been handed over to Indian civil authorities.5 with its youth wing, the Bhutan Revolutionary
More than 100,000 refugees from southern Youth (BRY); and the Bhutan Tiger Force (BTF) in
Bhutan had remained in refugee camps in eastern southern Bhutan in early 2007. The main political
Nepal since the early 1990s. In October 2006 the objective of both groups was the repatriation of
United States (USA) offered to resettle 60,000 of the refugees from camps in eastern Nepal. Both
the refugees. Several other countries expressed groups were said to be recruiting in the refugee
similar interest. In this context the UN refugee camps, including from among children younger
agency UNHCR started a mass campaign to than 16 years old.13 Recruitment was reported to
inform refugees of their individual right to choose be most common from Beldangi 1 and 2 camps.
resettlement, and the relevant procedures.6 There were further reports of weapons training
There was tension in the camps between refugee for new recruits in the forests near these camps.

According to government sources, the BCP had a
recruitment campaign inside Bhutan. B oliv ia
Both the BTF and the BRY allegedly claimed
responsibility for planting several explosive Republic of Bolivia
devices in Phuentsholing town, Samtse district in
A—E
early 2007.14 Thirteen people were arrested in this Population: 9.2 million (4.1 million under 18)
regard and were awaiting trial under the National Government armed forces: 46,100
Security Act and the Penal Code.15 The explosions Compulsory recruitment age: 19
were allegedly planned to coincide with the mock Voluntary recruitment age: 15 (for pre-military
election organized by the government in the run- service)
up to the 2008 elections. Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: acceded 22 December 2004
Developments Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Bhutan signed the Optional Protocol in In July 2004 it was reported that under-18s
September 2005. had been conscripted illegally to support
anti-narcotics operations in Chapare.
1 Estimates of the population vary widely even
among different agencies in the UN system. The
Bhutanese government’s population and housing Context
census gives a figure of 672,425 (2005); the
President Evo Morales Ayma took office in
Ministry of Labour and Human Resources gives
January 2006 and implemented wide-ranging
a figure of 537,900 (October 2006) (cited in
Kuensel, Bhutan’s national newspaper, 20 June reforms. He established a constituent assembly
2007). The UN statistics division gives a figure to write a new constitution to replace the 1967
of 658,500 (2007), and the World Bank gives a constitution and aimed at giving more power
similar figure, of 0.6 million (2006). Other UN to the indigenous majority.1 In May and June
agencies, however, notably the WHO, UNICEF and 2007 the assembly approved several articles
the UNDP, give figures in the region of 2 million. of the new constitution, including a ban on
UNICEF’s State of the World’s Children 2007 (the armed groups separate from the armed forces
source of the population data used in the entries and the police and the requirement for all men
throughout this global report) gives a figure of and women, with or without military training, to
2.2 million (983,000 under 18). defend the nation in case of war.2
2 “Militia should start in 2008”, Kuensel Online,
16 June 2007, www.kuenselonline.com.
Government
3 Election Commission of Bhutan, “Bhutan Voter
Guide”, 21 August 2006, www.election-bhutan. National recruitment legislation and
org.bt/VG/english.pdf.
practice
4 Amnesty International Report 2005.
5 Correspondence to Coalition from Permanent According to the 1967 constitution, every person
Mission of Bhutan to the UN at Geneva, 17 July had to carry out all military and civilian service
2007. required by the nation for its development,
defence and conservation.
6 “Refugees must be free to choose own solution
in Nepal, says Guterres”, UNHCR News Stories, Fewer than one third of the Bolivian armed
23 May 2007, www.unhcr.org. forces were professional soldiers. The rest were
conscripts recruited twice a year, mainly from
7 “Bhutan refugees give 15-day ultimatum to
rural areas.3 Around 15,000 conscripts were
India”, Times of India, 30 May 2007.
recruited every year.4 Military service was obliga-
8 Coalition interview, Kathmandu, July 2007. tory for men from the age of 19.5 Proof of having
9 Second periodic report of Bhutan to the UN completed military service or voluntary pre-mili-
Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2007, UN tary service was essential to gain a university or
Doc. CRC/C/BTN/2, 16 July 2007. professional degree and, for males aged 17–55,
10 “Militia should start in 2008”, above note 2. to travel abroad.6
11 Ibid. In case of war or emergency, women aged
12 Permanent Mission of Bhutan, above note 5. 19–35 with no children would be required to
13 Coalition interviews, Kathmandu, July 2007. join the Female Auxiliary Service for up to two
years to carry out production activities. In case of
14 “Tight security in Bhutan after bomb found in
emergency, girls in the last three years of second-
border town”, Hindustan Times, 25 April 2007,
www.hindustantimes.com. ary-school (typically from age 16) could volunteer
to join the Female Auxiliary Service.7
15 “Communist Party members involved in subversive
Compulsory military service could be post-
activities”, Kuensel Online, 13 June 2007.
poned for an individual living abroad or studying,

or who had a verified medical condition. Men tions of society, with the aim of training 60,000
supporting elderly parents or whose fathers had conscripts by 2010 and preparing them for the
died in international armed conflict or during employment market on leaving the service.20
military service, theology students, the mentally Young men and women aged 15–19 with basic
incapacitated and married or widowed men with secondary education could also do voluntary
children were exempted.8 pre-military service, involving literacy and other
Living conditions for conscripts were poor and training courses, and attending military instruc-
resources meagre. In February 2006 the Defence tion every Saturday and during holidays for 12
Minister reported that the food budget was only months. 21 In Sucre alone, 1,200 young men and
3 bolivianos (US$0.30) per soldier per day.9 women volunteered to do pre-military service
In May 2007 President Evo Morales promised in 2005.22 Since military service gave conscripts
thousands of dollars in funding for the armed access to training and education they might not
forces to renew their infrastructure and improve have elsewhere, voluntary pre-military service
basic services, as part of the national program was an attractive option for some young people.
“Bolivia changes, Evo delivers” (Bolivia Cambia,
Evo Cumple).10 Child recruitment and deployment
According to reports, the government was In July 2004 the government acknowledged to
considering a new compulsory military service the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child that
law, after the Constitutional Court (Tribunal youngsters between 14 and 17 had been found
Constitucional) in January 2006 declared doing military service. It also reported that many
Decree 7755 (1966) on military service to be cases had been discovered of conscript labour
unconstitutional.11 being exploited for private gain and of conscripts
According to the government there was no being subjected to ill-treatment which could
domestic legislation on children in armed conflict result in irreversible injuries.23
“because there are no child refugees and there is In 2005 human rights organizations reported
no armed conflict in Bolivia”. There were no legal that hundreds of children in the Chapare region
provisions regarding children’s participation in and border areas continued to be subjected to
hostilities.12 violence and harassment by law-enforcement of-
ficials, in the context of anti-drug trafficking and
Military training and military schools coca leaf eradication operations.24 Homes were
The army had five basic training institutions, broken into and schools taken over and used as
including the Military College, the Sergeants’ military encampments. The government reported
Military School (Escuela Militar de Sargentos del that under-18s had been conscripted illegally to
Ejército, EMSE) and the Military School (Liceo support anti-narcotics operations in Chapare.25
Militar). The Military College accepted students Local non-governmental organizations
aged 17–21 who had completed or were in the (NGOs) organized training courses on child rights
last two years of secondary education.13 It had an for members of the Rural Patrol Mobile Units
enrolment of around 800, of whom 10 per cent (Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural, UMOPAR),
were women.14 rural police assigned to the area, and army and
Secondary school graduates could apply to police officers of the Joint Task Forces (Fuerza
become cadets at the Navy Military School from de Tarea Conjunta, combined units of army and
age 16. From the second semester onwards, police officers working on coca leaf eradication in
cadets participated in joint training exercises with Chapare).26 In 2004 greater powers were given to
the Argentine and Peruvian navies. Cadets com- seven local ombudsmen’s offices in the region to
pleting one or more years of study were deemed improve the situation of children and adolescents
to have fulfilled their military obligations.15 affected by the violence.27
From 2003, female cadets were allowed into
military schools as day students, specializing in
logistics and administration.16
Developments
In 2005 the government offered for the first On reviewing Bolivia’s third periodic report, the
time scholarships to members of indigenous Committee on the Rights of the Child criticized
communities to attend the Military College.17 the lack of specific procedures for providing
Twenty students from indigenous communities special care and assistance to refugee children,
were enrolled in July 2005.18 In 2006 five women particularly those who were unaccompanied
were among the 25 new indigenous cadets. As or separated, and urged the government to
part of an equal-opportunities project, indig- establish a fully functioning and comprehensive
enous cadets took a seven-month academic refugee status-determination mechanism, with
program before joining the school’s regular specific procedures for minors.28
program.19
In May 2007 the government announced the International standards
creation of 25 technological military institutes to Bolivia acceded to the Optional Protocol in
offer training and education to the poorer sec- December 2004. Its declaration stated that 18

was the minimum age for conscription and that 20 “Sesenta mil conscriptos tendrán formación
voluntary pre-military service was available for técnica”, El Diario, February 2007, www.eldiario.
young people from the age of 17. The declaration net.
made no mention of the possibility for 15-year- 21 Resdal, Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en
olds to do voluntary pre-military service. América Latina, Bolivia, 2005; Servicio Militar,
A—E
Servicio Premilitar, www.mindef.gov.bo.
1 “Push for new Bolivia constitution”, BBC News, 22 “Más de 1,200 premilitares cerraron importante
6 August 2006. ciclo”, Correo del Sur, 25 September 2005,
www.correodelsur.net.
2 Asamblea Constituyente, Comisión No. 21,
Seguridad y Defensa Nacional, Artículos 23 Third periodic report, above note 12.
Aprobados para la nueva Constitución Política del 24 Defence for Children International (Bolivia),
Estado, www.constituyente.bo. Supplementary report to Bolivia’s third periodic
3 Juan Ramón Quintana Taborga, “Documento report on the implementation of the UN
de análisis: La gestión política de la Defensa Convention on the Rights of the Child, 10 January
Nacional en Bolivia”, Resdal, Atlas Comparativo 2005, at www.crin.org.
de la Defensa en América Latina, Bolivia, 2005, 25 Third periodic report, above note 12 .
www.resdal.org. 26 Defence for Children International,
4 “2,500 soldados culminan el servicio militar Supplementary report.
obligatorio”, Los Tiempos, 16 January 2005, 27 Third periodic report, above note 12.
www.lostiempos.com.
5 Ley Servicio Nacional Defensa, Articulo 22, cited Consideration of third periodic report submitted
at Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Servicio by Bolivia, Concluding observations, UN Doc.
militar, Disposiciones legales, www.mindef.gov. CRC/C/15/Add.256, 11 February 2005.
bo.
6 Servicio Militar, Disposiciones Legales, www.
mindef.gov.bo.
y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Bolivia, October
8 Ibid.
9 “Ministro comprueba la vida precaria de los
soldados”, La Prensa, 22 February 2006,
www.laprensa.com.bo.
10 “Evo ofrece $US50 mil para cada unidad militar”,
Los Tiempos, 20 May 2007.
11 “Servicio militar es inconstitucional”, Los
Tiempos, 8 February 2006.
12 Third periodic report of Bolivia to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
CRC/C/125/Add.2, 16 July 2004.
14 “Otros 25 jóvenes indígenas en la carrera militar”,
BolPress, 13 August 2006, www.bolpress.com.
15 Escuela Naval Militar, Admisión, www.armada.mil.
bo.
16 “La igualdad de género llegó al liceo militar”,
Bolivia Hoy, 4 February 2003, www.boliviahoy.
com.
17 “El Ejército será pionero con cadetes indígenas
becados”, La Prensa, 1 February 2005, at
Canadian Defence Academy website, www.acd.
forces.gc.ca.
18 “Lanzan programa piloto denominado ‘Igualdad
de Oportunidades’”, La Prensa, 26 July 2005, at
Canadian Defence Academy website, above note
17.
19 “Otros 25 jóvenes indígenas en la carrera
militar”, BolPress.

expected to continue through the strengthening
B O SNIA- of the Office of the EU Special Representative.5
In June 2007 UN Security Council Resolution
H E RZEGO VINA 1764 reaffirmed the importance of the high
representative in pursuing the implementation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina the Peace Agreement and noted that the Office of
the High Representative would continue to carry
Population: 3.9 million (807,000 under 18) out its mandate, with the aim of closing the office
Government armed forces: 11,900 by 20 June 2008.6
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription Impunity for war crimes and crimes against
(ended 2006) humanity during the 1992–5 war remained
widespread, with thousands of enforced
disappearances still unresolved. Of an estimated
Voting age: 18 2.2 million people displaced by the conflict, more
Optional Protocol: ratified 10 October 2003 than 1 million refugees and internally displaced
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): people from the 1992–5 war were estimated to
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 have returned to their homes.7

in the armed forces.
Government
Context practice
Bosnia-Herzegovina remained divided into two Conscription formally ended on 1 January 2006
semi-autonomous entities, the Republika Srpska under a defence reform law passed by parliament
and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 5 October 2005. The law abolished separate
with a special status granted to the Brcko district. defence ministries for the Republika Srpska
The international community exerted influence and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
over the country’s political process, in particular entities, thus creating a single unified force and
through a high representative with executive in general moving the military closer to NATO
powers nominated by the intergovernmental standards.8 On 5 July 2006 the Presidency – the
body responsible for implementing the 1995 country’s three-member head-of-state body
Dayton Peace Agreement. A European Union consisting of a Bosniac and a Croat elected
(EU)-led peacekeeping force, EUFOR, replaced from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
NATO troops in December 2004. The EU decided and a Serb elected from the Republika Srpska
in March 2007 to reduce EUFOR’s size from – approved the proposals.9
approximately 7,000 troops to 2,500.1 In addition In its declaration on ratifying the Optional
to EUFOR, about 150 NATO troops remained Protocol in October 2003, Bosnia-Herzegovina
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, reportedly to provide stated that voluntary recruitment into the armed
support to the International Criminal Tribunal forces was not permitted for anybody under the
for the former Yugoslavia in detaining people age of 18.10
indicted for war crimes, to combat terrorism and
to assist the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities in Developments
defence reform.2 In 2007 some 200 members
of the EU Police Mission remained in Bosnia- In its 2005 Concluding Observations on Bosnia-
Herzegovina.3 Herzegovina’s initial report on the Convention
In June 2006 the Peace Implementation on the Rights of the Child, the UN Committee on
Council, an intergovernmental body that the Rights of the Child expressed concern that,
monitors implementation of the Dayton Peace although the number was decreasing, between
Agreement, began preparing the closure of 1992 and August 2000 a total of 4,371 people,
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) including about 300 children, had been victims
in June 2007.4 However, in February 2007 the of landmines. There were still 1 million mines in
Peace Implementation Council reviewed this approximately 30,000 minefields throughout the
decision and decided against closing down the country, including around schools and play areas,
OHR in 2007, with the aim of OHR closure by and Red Cross sources reported that 50 children
June 2008 instead. The decision was taken as a were injured every month. The Committee was
result of little progress in reform and because also concerned at the physical and psychological
the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and effects of the armed conflict on child victims.11
Herzegovina had not been fully constituted
following a tense electoral campaign in October 1 EUFOR, 16 March 2007, www.euforbih.org.
2006. The engagement of the international
community in Bosnia-Herzegovina was also

2 Amnesty International (AI), Europe and Central
Asia: Summary of Amnesty International’s B OTS W A N A
concerns in the region, January–June 2006,
1 December 2006, AI Index Number EUR Republic of Botswana
01/017/2006.
A—E
3 EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina website, Population: 1.8 million (800,000 under 18)
16 March 2007, www.eupm.org. Government armed forces: 9,000
4 AI, above note 2. Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
5 http://www.ohr.int. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
6 UN Security Council Resolution 1764(2007), UN Voting age: 18
Doc. S/RES/1764(2007), 29 June 2007. Optional Protocol: ratified 4 October 2004
7 Amnesty International Report 2007. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
8 War Resisters International, “Bosnia to end CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
conscription on 1 January 2006”, CO Update, No.
15, November 2005, www.wri-irg.org. There were no reports of under-18s in the
9 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country armed forces.
Profile, www.fco.gov.uk.
10 Declarations and Reservations to the Optional
Government
11 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, National recruitment legislation and
Consideration of report submitted by Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Concluding Observations, UN Doc. practice
CRC/C/15/Add.260, 21 September 2005. There was no conscription. The Botswana
Defence Force Act of 1977 provided that
recruitment to the armed forces was on a
voluntary basis and that recruits had to appear
to be 18.1
In its 2004 Declaration accompanying
the ratification of the Optional Protocol, the
government confirmed that there was no
conscription into the Defence Force, that
the minimum age for recruitment was 18
and that “recruits are required to present a
national identity card which states their date
of birth, school completion certificate, and
other educational records where necessary. In
addition, all recruits undergo a rigorous medical
examination where pre-pubescence would
be noticed, and any person determined to be
underage is routinely rejected from recruitment.”2
In November 2006 the Botswana Defence
Force announced that it planned to begin the
recruitment of women, and in September 2007
some 30 women were recruited as officer cadets,
who were intended to serve in a variety of non-
combat roles.3
Plans were announced in September 2007
that officer cadets would attend 12 months’
training at the Tanzania Military Academy.4
Both the Penal Code and the Children’s Act
criminalized the abduction of children.5
Developments
In its November 2004 concluding observations,
expressed concern at low birth registration,
particularly in rural areas, and at the extent of
child labour.6

Botswana ratified the Optional Protocol to the
BR A Z I L
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed conflict in Federative Republic of Brazil
October 2004. Population: 186.4 million (62.2 million under 18)
1 Initial Report of Botswana to the Committee on Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (see text)
the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/51/Add.9, Voluntary recruitment age: 17; 16 with parental
27 February 2004.
consent
2 Declaration by Botswana on accession to
Voting age: 16
Optional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
Optional Protocol: ratified 27 January 2004
3 “Botswana: Army rolls out carpet for women”,
IRIN, 22 November 2006; “Women to sweat it out Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
in the army”, Botswana Guardian, 10–16 August CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
2007; “Botswana: BDF Recruits Female Soldiers
Today”, Mmegi/The Reporter (Gaborone), 17 Although 16-year-olds could volunteer
September 2007, http://allafrica.com. to do military service, there was no
4 Mmegi/The Reporter, above note 3, 17 September information on under-18s in the armed
2007.
forces.
5 Initial Report of Botswana, above note 1.
Consideration of report submitted by Botswana, Context
Public security was a major problem, with rioting
Add.242, 3 November 2004.
in overcrowded prisons and generally high
levels of violence, including killings of police, by
criminal gangs.1
Children as young as seven continued to
be involved in drug gangs in urban and rural
areas, often being made responsible for gun
and drug smuggling and distribution.2 Armed
confrontations between urban-based drug
factions killed hundreds of people every year.3
Children’s involvement in drug-based armed
violence was reported in small towns as well as
larger urban areas.4 Children as young as seven
were reported to be armed and selling drugs
in Rio de Janeiro.5 According to one study an
estimated one in five youths was killed within two
years of joining a drug gang.6 Recruitment and
use of children by drug factions was regarded
by some observers as comparable to that by
forces involved in armed conflict: they targeted
particular age groups for recruitment, allocated
them specific functions and standing within
the command structure, and rewarded them
financially.
During 2006 state authorities in Rio de
Janeiro used armoured troop carriers (caveirões)
and deployed troops and tanks in an attempt
to combat drug gangs controlling most of the
city’s shanty towns. There were reports that up
to 92 shanty towns were under the control of
paramilitary-style militias, made up of active and
former police officers acting with the support of
local politicians and community leaders.7

secondary schools. Candidates to officer schools
Government had to be 21–24 years of age, depending on the
National recruitment legislation and branch, and to have completed their secondary
education. Women could only specialize in
practice health, administration or engineering.14 All
A—E
All citizens between 18 and 45 years of age military educational institutions were under
were liable to military duties according to the authority of the Ministry of Education and
the law.8 Individuals had to register with the Research.15
Military Service Board (Junta de Serviço Militar) Candidates to the Agulhas Negras Military
between 1 January and 30 April of the year they Academy (AMAN) first had to attend a course at
turned 18. Between July and September military the Army Cadets Preparatory School (EsPCEx) for
commissions throughout the country selected a year, equivalent to the third year of secondary-
those who would be enlisted into the armed school.16 They had to be at least 16 at the end
forces. Military service law stated that recruits of the year in which they attended EsPCEx, and
for active service or for the reserves must be under-18s needed to have parental consent.17
Brazilians who turned 19 between 1 January and Students were given the rank of second or third
31 December of the year they joined the armed sergeant and, on graduating, were automatically
forces.9 While the law stated this position clearly, registered for AMAN. On entering AMAN, EsPCEx
there appeared, however, to be some ambiguity graduates were considered to be cadets – that
on this point in Brazil’s declaration on ratification is, between second lieutenant and officer
of the Optional Protocol, which seemed to candidate.18
indicate that recruitment could take place at a There were 12 military schools offering
younger age. education to children aged 10–17.19
Military service lasted 12 months and
included military, technical, academic and
vocational instruction. According to some
Developments
analysts it was seen as a source of opportunities At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,
and social progress, and the number of young Brazil and 58 other states endorsed the Paris
men seeking to do military service often Commitments to protect children from unlawful
exceeded the number selected.10 recruitment or use by armed forces or armed
Those with at least three years’ secondary groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on
education could choose to do their military children associated with armed forces or armed
service for one year at reserve officer training groups. The documents reaffirmed international
institutions (Centro de Preparação de Oficiais standards and operational principles for
da Reserva – CPOR, Reserve Officers Training protecting and assisting child soldiers and
Centre, and Núcleo de Preparação de Oficiais da followed a wide-ranging global consultation
Reserva – NPOR, Reserve Officers Training Unit) jointly sponsored by the French government and
and then remain as temporary army officers if UNICEF.
they so wished. Medicine, pharmacy, dentistry
or veterinary students who had been enlisted 1 Amnesty International Report 2006 and 2007.
could delay their entry until completing their 2 “More and younger children in the Brazil’s Mato
studies; they had to register with the military Grosso drug trade”, Comunidad Segura, 19
authorities within a year of graduation and begin October 2007, www.comunidadesegura.org.
active service. On finishing, they could choose to 3 Amnesty International Report 2007.
remain within the armed forces as health-service
4 Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence
officials for a fixed period.11
(COAV), “Youths with guns, increasingly a part of
Reservists could join the Tiros-de-Guerra (TG)
life in Brazil’s small towns”, 9 March 2006, www.
training units in their own municipalities, doing coav.org.br.
military service while continuing their studies or
5 Marcelo Monteiro, “Study shows that children as
jobs. There were more than 200 TGs throughout
young as seven are taking part in Rio drug trade”,
the country.12
COAV, 7 March 2005.
Women were exempt from conscription but
could volunteer for the armed forces. Volunteers 6 “Rio Slums Blighted by Drug Crime”, BBC News,
21 October 2005; “Short lifespan in Rio drug
could do military service from the year they
gangs”, BBC News, 25 November 2006.
turned 17.13 Brazil’s declaration on ratification
of the Optional Protocol stated that volunteers 7 Amnesty International Report 2006 and 2007.
under 17 had to have written parental consent. 8 Decreto No. 57.654, 20 January 1966,
Regulamenta a lei do Serviço Militar, Art. 98.2.a.
Military training and military schools and Art 166.2.5, www.dgp.eb.mil.br.
educational institutions, both facilities for
training soldiers and officers, and primary and

(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía, Brunei
Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latina y
el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Brasil, August 2006, Brunei Darussalam
www.flacso.cl.
10 Ibid. Population: 374,000 (130,000 under 18)
11 Exército Brasileiro, O Serviço Militar, www. Government armed forces: 7,000
exercito.gov.br. Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
12 Ibid. Voluntary recruitment age: 17 and a half
13 FLACSO, above note 9. Voting age: not applicable
14 Ibid. Optional Protocol: not signed
15 Regimento Interno dos Colégios Militares, www. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
cmbh.ensino.eb.br. CRC, GC AP I and II
16 Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras, Ingresso,
www.aman.ensino.eb.br. The minimum voluntary recruitment age
17 Escola Preparatória de Cadetes do Exército, was 17 and a half years, but figures for
Manual Candidato EsPCEx 2007, www.espcex. serving under-18s were not available. The
ensino.eb.br. armed forces included the Boys’ Wing, in
18 Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras, above note which 15- to 17-year-olds could enrol for
16.
training.
19 Exército Brasileiro, Portal de Educação, Educação
Fundamental e Média, www.ensino.eb.br.
Government
practice
There was no conscription. The minimum age of
recruitment into the Royal Brunei Armed Forces
(RBAF) under the Royal Brunei Armed Forces
Act was 17 years and 6 months.1 Section 13 of
the Act allowed for “eligible young persons”
to be enlisted into the armed forces or the
reserves regiment “for the purpose of raising
and maintaining any unit consisting of or
including boy soldiers or boy reservists with
written consent from the boy’s parents, person
with parental rights and powers or the District
Officer”.2

The armed forces had a Boys’ Wing, to which
boys between the ages of 15 and 16 and a half
could apply for selection, designed to be the
training ground for young soldiers who intended
to serve in the RBAF as technical personnel or
military officers. Applicants were required to have
the consent of their parents and their school
principal.3
Those who joined the Boys’ Wing were
provided with full-term higher secondary
education. They were required to undergo a 26-
month basic military training consisting of drills,
shooting skills, map reading, first aid, physical
training and other preparedness for combat.4 It
was unclear whether members of the Boys’ Wing
were considered to be part of the armed forces.

Developments BULG A R I A
On consideration of Brunei’s initial report to the
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on the Republic of Bulgaria
Convention on the Rights of the Child in 2003, the
A—E
Committee had recommended that Brunei ratify Population: 7.7 million (1.4 million under 18)
the Optional Protocol.5 Government armed forces: 51,000
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscription
1 Ministry of Defence, www.mindef.gov.bn. phased out)
2 ��
Initial state party report on the Convention on the Voluntary recruitment age: 18
Rights of the Child, Brunei Darussalam, UN Doc. Voting age: 18
CRC/C/61/Add.5, 13 March 2003. Optional Protocol: ratified 12 February 2002
3 Training Institute, Royal Brunei Armed Forces, Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
www.mindef.gov.bn. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
4 Training Institute, Royal Brunei Armed Forces;
“Passing-out parade of the 26th and 27th intake There were no reports of under-18s in the
of Boys’ Wing recruits”, 9 February 2007; both at armed forces.
www.mindef.gov.bn.
Concluding observations on initial report Government
submitted by Brunei Darussalam, UN Doc. CRC/
C/15/Add.219, 27 October 2003. National recruitment legislation and
practice
Conscription was provided for in the 1991
constitution, which stated that “To defend the
country shall be a duty and a matter of honour of
every Bulgarian citizen” (Article 59), and in the
Law on Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic
of Bulgaria (Article 2).
In December 2006 Bulgaria informed the
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child that
“Persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
Republic of Bulgaria, who are under 18 years of
age, cannot be recruited to serve in the army.
According to article 97, paragraph 1, of the
Defence and Armed Forces Act of the Republic of
Bulgaria, the minimum conscription age is 18, and
the maximum conscription age is 27… Bulgarian
legislation also provides for the possibility of
alternative service (article 84, paragraph 1, of
the Defence and Armed Forces Act) … [T]here are
no cases of participation in armed conflicts of
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Republic
of Bulgaria who are under 18 years of age.”1
Military service lasted nine months, or six months
for graduates.2
The minimum age for voluntary recruitment
was also 18.3
Around one third of Bulgaria’s military
was conscripted.4 A law abolishing military
conscription was approved by parliament on 29
June 2006, to take effect on 1 January 2008.5

Applicants to military colleges had to have a
high school diploma, but there were no specific
age requirements. Secondary-school graduates
under the age of 18 could enter military schools
until they were old enough to perform military
service.6 In its declaration on ratifying the
Optional Protocol in February 2002 Bulgaria

stated that “Persons who have not come of age
shall be trained at military schools subject to the BURK I N A FA S O
conclusion of a training agreement to be signed
by them with the consent of their parents or Burkina Faso
guardians. Having come of age, the trainees shall
sign a training agreement on a regular military Population: 13.2 million (7.2 million under 18)
duty.” Government armed forces: 10,800
Developments Voluntary recruitment age: 18
Voting age: 18
In October 2007 the Committee on the Rights Optional Protocol: ratified 6 July 2007
of the Child recommended that the government Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
explicitly criminalize the recruitment and
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
involvement of children in hostilities in domestic
legislation and ensure extraterritorial jurisdiction There were no reports of under-18s in the
for these crimes when they are committed by or
against a person who is a citizen of or has other armed forces.
links with Bulgaria.7
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Context
Paris, Bulgaria and 58 other states endorsed
the Paris Commitments to protect children A report by a UN international commission of
from unlawful recruitment or use by armed inquiry mandated to investigate allegations
forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles of serious violations of human rights and
and guidelines on children associated with international humanitarian law which occurred
armed forces or armed groups. The documents in Côte d’Ivoire from 19 September 2002 to 15
reaffirmed international standards and October 2004 called for the role of neighbouring
operational principles for protecting and assisting states, including Burkina Faso, to be clarified.
child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global It found neighbouring states to be directly or
consultation jointly sponsored by the French indirectly involved, including through arms
government and UNICEF. transfers, the use of their territories as rear bases
and involvement in a war economy.1
1 Initial report of Bulgaria to the UN Committee on
the Rights of the Child on implementation of the Government
Optional Protocol, UN��
Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/BGR/1,
��
23 January 2007. National recruitment legislation and
2 ��
Communication from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, practice
18 May 2004.
According to the 1991 constitution, “Each citizen
3 Initial report of Bulgaria to the Committee on the
of Burkina Faso is required to contribute to the
Rights of the Child��
, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.29, 12
October 1995. defence and preservation of territorial integrity”
(Article 10).
4 “Bulgaria scraps the draft”, New York Times, 30
Recruitment to the armed forces was
June 2006.
voluntary. Ordinance No. 84-037/CNR/PRES of
5 “Conscription to be dropped off, Bulgarian 17 July 1984, modifying Law No. 49/62/AN, set
Armed Forces to become professional”, Bulgarian the minimum age for recruitment into the armed
National Radio, 29 June 2006, www.bnr.bg.
forces at 20 years. However, Decree No. 2000-
6 Communication from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 374/PRES/PM/DEF of 1 September 2000 allowed
above note 2. for recruitment from the age of 18, provided that
7 Committee on the Rights of the Child, the recruit was unmarried and enjoying full civic
Consideration of report submitted by Bulgaria, rights. Recruits reportedly underwent two years
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ of training before entering into active service.2
BGR/CO/1, 5 October 2007. There were no reports of under-18s in the armed
forces.
National development service (Service
national pour le développement, SND) was
compulsory for all Burkinabès aged between 18
and 30. The SND comprised civic education, basic
education and vocational training.3
Developments
In December 2004 the government wrote to
the Child Soldiers Coalition, stating that while

members of an Ivorian armed political group, the
Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (Mouvement BUR U N D I
patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire, MPCI) might have
been present temporarily in Burkina Faso at Republic of Burundi
some point, they had never received training or
A—E
military equipment of any sort from the Burkina Population: 7.5 million (4.0 million under 18)
government. It also stated that it had repeatedly Government armed forces: 35,000
requested the government of Côte d’Ivoire to take Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
the necessary measures to allow members of the Voluntary recruitment age: 16 (see text)
Ivorian armed forces who had sought refuge in Voting age: 18
Burkina Faso to return home.4 Optional protocol: signed 13 November 2001 (see
text)
In July 2007 Burkina Faso ratified the Optional CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
Protocol. In its Declaration at the time of
ratification, the government stated that the Children were recruited and used by the
minimum age for voluntary recruitment into
the armed forces was 18, that recruitment
armed opposition group FNL. Government
was voluntary, and that proof of age had to be forces continued to use captured child
provided.5 In April 2004 it ratified the Rome soldiers for intelligence-gathering. Scores
Statute of the International Criminal Court. of children accused of membership of or
support for the FNL were illegally detained
1 Rapport de la Commission d’enquête and some were tortured in detention.
internationale sur les allégations de violations
des droits de l’homme en Côte d’Ivoire, http://
fr.wikisource.org. Context
2 Letter received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in response to the Child Soldiers Coalition, Global The 2001 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Report 2004, ref: 004675/MAECR/SG/DAM, 22 Agreement for Burundi was the starting point
December 2004. for a political transition to end more than a
3 Decree No. 99-445/PRES/PM of 7 December decade of civil war. In October 2003 a power-
1999. sharing agreement (Pretoria Agreement) was
signed by the government and the opposition
4 Letter received from the Ministry of Foreign
National Council for the Defence of Democracy
Affairs, above note 2.
– Forces for the Defence of Democracy (Conseil
5 Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary- national pour la défense de la démocratie
General, Optional Protocol to the Convention on
– Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie,
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children
CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza)). In November a new,
in armed conflict, Declarations and Reservations,
www2.ohchr.org. inclusive government was established after a
second Pretoria agreement granted the forces
of both sides immunity from prosecution.1 In
2005 the CNDD-FDD won parliamentary and
local administrative elections. Pierre Nkurunziza,
head of the CNDD-FDD, was elected president
in August 2005.2 Fighting between government
forces and the one remaining armed group, the
National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales
de Libération, FNL), continued sporadically. In
June 2006 the government and the FNL signed
an agreement on the restoration of peace
and security. In September the same year a
Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between
the two parties set a date for the cessation of
hostilities and established army integration
and demobilization procedures. The agreement
created a joint verification and monitoring
mechanism (JVMM) and an African Union special
task force to protect FNL leaders and move
combatants to assembly areas.
The process stalled repeatedly, however. In
March 2007 the FNL suspended participation
in the JVMM until various demands were met,

including the release of political prisoners and the death penalty for those found guilty of the
FNL incorporation into political institutions. offence.9
In July, following further negotiations, the FNL In October 2005 the Senate and National
delegation left the capital, saying that it would Assembly issued a statement calling on the
not return until army repression of its members armed forces to stop using children as porters.10
had ceased and agreement was reached on Government soldiers and police regularly used
its political status. The security situation former FNL fighters, including children, to identify
deteriorated after the ceasefire agreement, with suspected members of the FNL in 2006.11
a reported upsurge in torture, arbitrary arrest
and detention of children by government security Child recruitment and deployment
forces, and an increase in incidents of rape and
other sexual violence by FNL members.3 FNDD-CDD (Nkrunziza)
The United Nations peacekeeping operation The FNDD-CDD (Nkrunziza), which joined the
(Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi, ONUB) transitional government at the end of 2003,
was deployed in June 2004, replacing the African reportedly continued to recruit children for civil
Mission in Burundi (AMIB). It was mandated, defence militias in 2004.12 Recruitment by the
inter alia, to support the country’s national CNDD-FDD (Nkrunziza) was reported in refugee
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps in Tanzania as late as September 2004,
(DDR) process, initiated in 2003, and to ensure and at the end of that year they and other
human rights promotion and protection, armed political groups were reported still to
especially with regard to women, children and be demanding financial contributions from the
other vulnerable persons.4 On 1 January 2007 refugee population.13
ONUB was replaced by a UN Integrated Office
in Burundi (Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies
au Burundi, BINUB), mandated to support the Armed groups
government in its efforts towards long-term
peace and stability.5 FNL
From November 2003 the FNL was the only
Government remaining active armed group in Burundi. In
2004 it was reported to be forcibly recruiting and
National recruitment legislation and using children for frontline duties, to transport
ammunition, to carry wounded or dead and for
practice intelligence-gathering activities.14 Recruitment
The February 2005 constitution stated that no continued into 2006, and intensified in June
child could be used in direct combat and that the and July, although this appeared to be linked to
protection of children during an armed conflict peace negotiations and the prospect of rapid
should be assured (Article 45). The constitution demobilization packages for new recruits. The
did not define the age of majority, but the latter reportedly included street children from
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other Bujumbura Mairie province, and there were
international human rights treaties ratified by anecdotal reports of recruitment through raids
the government were incorporated into it (Article on schools by FNL members. Some captured
19). In its 1998 initial report to the UN Committee child soldiers said that they had been promised
on the Rights of the Child on implementing cars and other luxury goods if they enlisted.15
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the A further upsurge of recruitment was reported
government stated that recruitment into the immediately after the September 2006 ceasefire
armed forces “is set at between 16 and 25 years agreement, and some children reported being
and that in practice that limit is 18 years and asked to pay to enlist voluntarily in the FNL. More
the recruit must have a primary-school leaving than 48 schoolchildren were recruited in Bururi
certificate”.6 The 2004 armed forces law stated and Ngozi provinces in April and May 2007.16
that recruitment was voluntary (Article 37), but
no minimum recruitment age was specified.7
A revised criminal code was awaiting approval Disarmament, demobilization
by the National Assembly in October 2007. It
defined the military recruitment of children below
the age of 16 as a war crime and raised the age of A DDR program for children recruited and used
criminal responsibility from 13 to 15.8 during the armed conflict began in 2003 under
Legislation punishing and preventing the the auspices of a government national structure
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and for child soldiers, with implementation support
war crimes came into force in May 2003. The from UNICEF.17 A National Commission to manage
law defined the conscription of children under the country’s DDR program was subsequently
15 into national armed forces and their use in established but did not begin work until
active hostilities as a war crime. It provided for September 2005.18 By June 2006 some 3,000
children had been demobilized from the former

government’s armed forces, the government- The official version of events was that he had
backed Peace Guardian militias, and all armed been shot either as he attempted to flee or in
opposition groups except the FNL. The majority crossfire, although evidence at the scene strongly
of those who took part in the program returned suggested he had been extrajudicially executed.
to farm and fish in their local communities, but No investigation into his death was carried out.30
A—E
nearly 600 returned to school. Some 1,800 former
child soldiers received occupational training.
Health care was provided for those with special
Developments
needs and psychosocial support was provided The National Assembly on 28 January 2005
through individual and group meetings.19 approved ratification of the Optional Protocol
Concerns were expressed over the lack of to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
initiatives to prevent future recruitment and the involvement of children in armed conflict.
the fact that many returning child soldiers were However, the instruments of ratification had not
nearing the age of majority, with adult concerns been deposited with the UN at the end of October
and responsibilities. The lack of programs to 2007.
facilitate sustainable reintegration was also At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
noted as a flaw in the DDR process.20 Paris, Burundi and 58 other states endorsed
In April 2006 the government assembled the Paris Commitments to protect children
several hundred FNL fighters at a “welcome from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
centre” in Randa, Bubanza province, in forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
preparation for demobilization. By March and guidelines on children associated with
2007 preparations for the demobilization of an armed forces or armed groups. The documents
estimated 500 FNL child soldiers from Randa reaffirmed international standards and
were under way.21 The children in Randa were operational principles for protecting and assisting
transferred to a transit centre for demobilized FNL child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
fighters in Gitega in November 2006 and their consultation jointly sponsored by the French
parents were traced. By 10 March 2007 all the government and UNICEF.
children had been reunited with their families.22 The UN Secretary-General’s Special
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict
Other treatment of child soldiers visited Burundi in March 2007. She commended
After taking office in August 2005, government the government for its progress on the DDR of
forces targeted real or suspected FNL supporters, children, but said that more needed to be done
arresting, torturing and even summarily to protect children in detention and called for the
executing those suspected of belonging to release of FNL child soldiers.31 The FNL was listed
or supporting the FNL.23 Although the age as a party recruiting and using child soldiers in
of criminal responsibility was 13, children as the Secretary-General’s annual reports between
young as nine were detained on suspicion of 2002 and 2008.
collaborating with the FNL. Over 170 cases of
detention of alleged FNL child soldiers were 1 Amnesty International (AI), Burundi: Child
reported to ONUB between November 2005 and soldiers – the challenge of demobilization, March
July 2006.24 In early 2007, 51 FNL child soldiers, 2004.
including one aged 14, were in detention.25 2 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and
Captured child soldiers were reportedly severely Armed Conflict in Burundi, UN Doc. S/2006/851,
beaten in detention, some with metal bars and 27 October 2006.
hammers. Some were denied medical attention 3 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and
until human rights groups intervened on their Armed Conflict in Burundi, UN Doc. S/2007/686,
behalf.26 Captured child soldiers injured during 28 November 2007; International Crisis Group
combat were also denied medical treatment (ICG), Burundi: Finalising Peace with the FNL, 28
while in detention.27 In February 2007 the August 2007.
Minister of National Solidarity was reported to 4 UN Security Council Resolution 1545, The
have declared that all children accused of FNL Situation in Burundi, UN Doc. S/RES/1545
participation would be released.28 More than 67 (2004), 21 May 2004.
children detained at Mpimba prison for alleged 5 UN Security Council Resolution 1719, The
association with FNL were released in March.29 Situation in Burundi, UN Doc: S/RES/1719
Ramazani Nahimana, aged 16, was detained (2006), 25 October 2006.
in November 2005 by the state intelligence 6 Initial report of Burundi to the UN Committee on
agency after being identified by a former FNL the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.58,
combatant as a member of the FNL youth wing, 31 July 1998.
the Patriotic Hutu Youth (Jeunesse patriotique 7 Loi No.1/019 du 31 décembre 2004 portant
hutu, JPH). He was reportedly severely beaten Création, Organisation, Missions, Composition et
during his detention and was subsequently Fonctionnement de la force de Défense Nationale.
shot dead in the Kinama district of Bujumbura.

© Coalition 2006
Drawing by a former child soldier of the armed group National Liberation Forces, Burundi

8 “Burundi: Government committed to child
protection”, UN press release, 13 March 2007, C AM B O D I A
www.un.org/children/conflict; Human Rights
Watch (HRW), Paying the Price – Violations of the Kingdom of Cambodia
Rights of Children in Burundi, March 2007.
A—E
9 Loi No. 1/004 du 8 mai 2003, portant Répression Population: 14.1 million (6.2 million under 18)
du Crime de Génocide, des Crimes contre Government armed forces: 124,300
l’Humanité et des Crimes de Guerre. Compulsory recruitment age: 18
10 Child Soldiers Coalition meeting with the Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (see text)
President of the Senate, Bujumbura, October Voting age: 18
2005.
Optional Protocol: ratified 16 July 2004
11 HRW, A Long Way from Home: FNL Child Soldiers Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
in Burundi, June 2006.
12 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
armed conflict, UN Doc. A/59/695-S/2005/72, 9 Although there were no reports of
February 2005.
under-18s being recruited or used, the
13 AI, “Burundi: refugee rights at risk: human rights
abuses in returns to and from Burundi”, AI Index: recruitment and use of children as soldiers
AFR 16/006/2005, 27 June 2005. was not specifically criminalized in
14 Amnesty International (AI), “Burundi: child national legislation.
soldiers – the challenge of demobilisation”, AI
Index: AFR 16/011/2004, 24 March 2004.
15 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2. Context
16 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 3. Child labour was still widespread, with more
17 “Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, than half of Cambodian children aged under
why they left, how they fared”, Multi Country 14 being put to work, despite a national legal
Demobilization and Reintegration Program minimum working age of 15.1 The Extraordinary
(MDRP), Working Paper No. 3, October 2007, at Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
www.child-soldiers.org/document. was established in 2006 to bring to trial those
18 Action Aid, “BINUB: Good governance, security responsible for serious crimes committed during
sector reform and enhancing human rights the Khmer Rouge period.2
– establishing priorities”, October 2006, www.
actionaid.org.
Government
20 Confidential source, May 2006. National recruitment legislation and
21 World Bank, MDRP, www.mdrp.org/burundi.htm. practice
22 Information provided by MDRP World Bank
The constitution provided that “The State shall
country office, November 2007.
protect the rights of children as stipulated in the
23 Children and armed conflict, Report of the Convention on Children, in particular, the right to
Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/61/529- life, education, protection during wartime, and …
S/2006/826, 26 October 2006; HRW, “Warning
shall protect children from acts that are injurious
signs: continuing abuses in Burundi”, 27
February 2006.
to their educational opportunities, health and
welfare” (Article 48).
24 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2. According to the government’s initial report
25 Confidential source, April 2007. to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
26 HRW, above note 23. under-18s were not accepted for military service.3
27 HRW, above note 11. The Law on General Statutes for the Military
28 HRW, above note 8. Personnel of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
contained separate provisions for regular military
personnel and those serving fixed-term contracts.
30 HRW, above note 23. It stipulated that those on contracts should be
31 “UN Special Representative commends at least 18 (Article 42), but did not expressly
demobilization of child soldiers in Burundi”, stipulate a minimum age for other military
ReliefWeb, 27 March 2007, www.reliefweb.int.. personnel.4
In October 2006 the National Assembly
passed a new law on compulsory military service,
requiring all Cambodian men aged 18–30 to
register and, if required, to serve 18 months in
the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces.5 The law
also provided for prison sentences of up to five
years for men who refused to join up.6 A similar

law had been rejected in 1996.7 Critics of the new Forces during Cambodia’s civil war in the years
law accused the government of using military following the end of the Khmer Rouge period in
service to hide growing unemployment figures.8 1979.13
As of October 2007, regulations to establish The second phase of the government’s
registration and call-up procedures had yet to be US$42 million donor-assisted demobilization
finalized, and no conscription had taken place. program, which had commenced in 1999 and
was suspended indefinitely in 2003 after the
Military training and military schools World Bank identified irregularities in the use
Cambodia operated several military schools, of funds, was not resumed. In total, 16,500 of
although full details of their structure and a planned 31,500 soldiers, most of whom were
operation were not clear. Four levels of old, sick or disabled, had been demobilized
professional military education were set out in under the program before it was suspended.14
a Defence White Paper in 2000. Comprehensive The program did not include a component for
recruit training was to be provided by the demobilization or reintegration of those who
commanders in each military region, with were under 18 when recruited.
emphasis placed on physical training and sport. In October 2006 the government announced
The Junior Officer School would develop courses its intention to reduce the size of the army by
on discipline and humanitarian law for all a further 40,000, to a total of 70,000 troops.15
newly commissioned officers. A command and There was reported to have been an attempt to
staff course would provide training to middle- identify former child soldiers for demobilization,
ranking officers. Finally, a senior officer training but there was no follow-up action taken or
program would be provided at the Officers’ further available information.16 The government’s
Academy.9 However, an updated Defence White 2006 Defence White Paper stated that Category
Paper in 2006 acknowledged that the control of II soldiers (the disabled, the elderly and the
educational institutions for career soldiers was chronically ill) would again constitute the
“in disarray”, and announced a new series of principal group for discharge over the next five
reforms intended to reorganize and modernize years.17
military training. The 2006 White Paper also
noted the important and extensive role in Developments
training new recruits played by the Army Non-
commissioned Officers’ School, now planned to At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,
be brought under the Army Training Centre.10 Cambodia and 58 other states endorsed the Paris
It was not clear whether students at the Commitments to protect children from unlawful
various military schools were considered active recruitment or use by armed forces or armed
members of the military and what, if any, military groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on
training was given to students below the age children associated with armed forces or armed
of 18. The law did not set a lower age limit for groups. The documents reaffirmed international
regular military personnel, but the duration of standards and operational principles for
training courses at military schools would appear protecting and assisting child soldiers and
to preclude students from being selected to join followed a wide-ranging global consultation
military ranks before the age of 18.11 jointly sponsored by the French government and
UNICEF.
Child recruitment and deployment
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
The recruitment and use of children as soldiers
was not specifically criminalized in national of Cambodia (ECCC)
legislation. In October 2004 Cambodia ratified its May
Recruitment of children as soldiers and 2003 agreement with the UN to establish a
cadres had been very common in the Khmer criminal tribunal to bring to justice suspected
Rouge period (1975–9), with evidence of children perpetrators of serious human rights violations
as young as five being trained as cadres.12 It during the period of Khmer Rouge rule (1975–9).
was not known whether the prosecutors’ office The ECCC was established in 2006, its judicial
of the ECCC would seek to bring charges either work being formally launched in July with the
against former child soldiers or in relation to their swearing in of judicial officers.18 The tribunal was
recruitment. based on a mixed model with both Cambodian
and international judges, prosecutors and
defence lawyers, and a voting system designed
Disarmament, demobilization to ensure that every decision had the support of
and reintegration (DDR) both Cambodian and international judges.19
From its inception the ECCC was subject to
Both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) repeated delays and dogged by accusations of
and UN bodies reported many cases of under- politicization and corruption, but by June 2007
age recruitment by the Royal Cambodian Armed two obstacles to progress had been removed with

the unanimous adoption of ECCC internal rules20 19 Khmer Rouge Trial Task Force, “An Introduction
and measures to facilitate the participation to the Khmer Rouge Trials”, August 2004, www.
of foreign defence lawyers.21 The first suspect cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/introduction_eng/
was arrested and charged with crimes against index.htm.
humanity in July 2007.22 20 ECCC, above note 2, Internal Rules, 12 June 2007.
A—E
21 “Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge tribunal still at risk:
International standards UN judge”, ABC Radio Australia, 24 March 2007.
In July 2004 Cambodia ratified the Optional 22 ECCC, above note 2, Statement of the Co-
Protocol, referring in its declaration to Article 42 investigating Judges, 31 July 2007.
of the Law on General Statutes for the Military 23 Declaration on accession to the Optional
Personnel of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
which set 18 as the minimum age for contractual-
service military personnel.23
Cambodia ratified the ILO Worst Forms of
Child Labour Convention 182 in March 2006.
1 “Child labour still rampant in Cambodia: UNICEF”,

ABC News, 12 June 2006.
2 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC), www.eccc.gov.kh.
3 ��
Initial report��
��
of Cambodia to the UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/11/
Add.16, 24 June 1998.
4 Law on General Statutes for the Military
Personnel of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
(1997), www.moc.gov.kh.
5 “Lawmakers OK military conscription”, Cambodia
Daily, 26 October 2006.
6 “Cambodia defies int’l donors with military
conscription”, China Post, 26 October 2006.
7 “Cambodia introduces conscription”, CO Update,
November 2006, War Resisters International,
www.wri-irg.org.
8 “Cambodia votes for conscription”, BBC News,
25 October 2006.
9 Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia, Royal
Government of Cambodia Defence White
Paper, August 2000, http://merln.ndu.edu/
whitepapers/Cambodia-2000.pdf.
10 Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia, Royal
Government of Cambodia Defence White Paper,
August 2006.
11 Ibid.
12 Child Soldiers in Cambodia, LICADHO (Cambodian
League for the Promotion and Defence of Human
Rights) Briefing Paper, June 1998, www.licadho.
org.
13 A Survey of Programs on the Reintegration of
Former Child Soldiers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Japan, 30 March 2001, www.mofa.go.jp.
14 Ian C. Porter, World Bank Country Director, “World
Bank defends role in demob process”, letter,
Phnom Penh Post, 22 April–5 May 2005,
www.phnompenhpost.com.
15 “Cambodia to downsize troops by 40,000”,
Xinhua, 16 October 2006.
16 Confidential source, October 2007.
17 Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia, above
note 10.
18 Annual report on achievements of the ECCC for
2006, www.eccc.gov.kh.

C A MEROON C ANA DA
Republic of Cameroon Canada
Population: 16.3 million (7.9 million under 18) Population: 32.3 million (7.0 million under 18)
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
Voluntary recruitment age: 18; under 18 with Voluntary recruitment age: 16
parental consent Voting age: 18
Voting age: 20 Optional Protocol: ratified 7 July 2000
Optional Protocol: signed 5 October 2001 Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 182
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
Sixteen- and 17-year-olds continued to be
There were no reports of under-18s in the recruited into the armed forces.
armed forces.
Government
Context
There was an increased spill-over of insecurity
and refugees from the Central African Republic practice
in mid-2007, and Cameroon sent troops from Recruitment into the Canadian armed forces
its Rapid Intervention Battalion to its eastern was entirely voluntary under the terms of the
regions.1 National Defence Act. Most Canadian Forces
programs permitted enrolment at 17, although
16-year-olds could enrol in the Regular Officer
Government Training Plan (Junior Program) and the reserves.1
As of July 2007, 139 16- and 17-year-olds were
National recruitment legislation and serving in the regular Canadian armed forces,
practice and 2,194 16- and 17-year-olds were enrolled
Presidential Decree No. 94/185 (September in the reserves.2 Those serving in the Canadian
1994), concerning non-officer military personnel, Forces under the age of 18 were permitted to
set the minimum recruitment age at 18 (Article leave the forces at any time without penalty.
11); recruitment was on a voluntary basis.2 In April However, those who had entered the Regular
2001 Cameroon reported to the UN Committee Officer Training Program under the age of 18
on the Rights of the Child that there was no could be required to repay their educational costs
conscription in Cameroon. The government also should they choose to leave after a year’s service.
stated that no child under the age of 18 might Under the National Defence Act, “members of
be recruited into the armed forces, gendarmerie the Canadian Forces who have not yet reached
or police force, except with parental consent.3 the age of 18 may not be deployed to any theatre
No information was available on the number of of hostilities, or indeed, any area where armed
recruits under the age of 18 in the security forces. combat is a possibility. The Canadian Forces also
do not permit persons under the age of 18 to
1 International Crisis Group (ICG), CrisisWatch No. be deployed in any domestic emergency where
47, 1 July 2007, www.crisisgroup.org. weapon use cannot be ruled out.”3
2 Bart Horeman and Marc Stolwijk, Refusing to Military training and military schools
bear arms: A world survey of conscription and
conscientious objection to military service, War Canada’s Royal Military College is operated and
Resisters International, 1998, www.wri-irg.org. managed by the Canadian Forces. However, the
3 Initial report of Cameroon to the UN Committee government does not regard it as being bound
on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/28/ by the restrictions on the age of recruitment
Add.16, 26 March 2001. required by Article 3 of the Optional Protocol.4
In June 2006 the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child asked the government to “provide
further information on the status of children
attending the Royal Military College, particularly
as to whether they are considered as just civilian
students of a military college or already as
military recruits”.5

At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
Developments Paris, Canada and 58 other states endorsed
Omar Ahmed Khadr, a Canadian national, the Paris Commitments to protect children
was taken into US custody in Afghanistan in from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
late July 2002 when he was 15 years old, and forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
A—E
subsequently transferred to the US naval base and guidelines on children associated with
Guantánamo, Cuba. In November 2005 he was armed forces or armed groups. The documents
charged for trial by military commission under reaffirmed international standards and
a military order signed by President George W. operational principles for protecting and assisting
Bush in November 2001. The military commission child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
system was replaced by a revised system under consultation jointly sponsored by the French
the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA). In government and UNICEF.
April 2007 Omar Khadr was charged under the
MCA with murder and attempted murder in 1 Initial report of Canada to the UN Committee on
violation of the law of war, conspiracy, providing the Rights of the Child on implementation of the
material support for terrorism, and spying.6 In Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/CAN/1,
June 2007 a military judge dismissed the charges 29 July 2005.
against Khadr on a jurisdictional question.7 On 2 Government Response to the Standing Senate
24 September 2007 a newly established Court Committee on Human Rights Report, “Children:
of Military Commission Review overturned the the silenced citizens – effective implementation
ruling, allowing proceedings against Khadr to of Canada’s obligations with respect to the rights
continue. of children”, tabled in the Canadian Senate on 16
In connection with a concern about rules November 2007.
and procedures regarding the capture of 3 Initial report, above note 1.
persons under the age of 18 in the context of the 4 Ibid.
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 5 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
mission in Afghanistan, the UN Committee Consideration of report submitted by Canada
on the Rights of the Child expressed concern on implementation of the Optional Protocol,
in June 2006 about “the lack of information Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
about measures taken to ensure that captured CAN/CO/1, 9 June 2006.
persons below 18 are treated in accordance 6 Charge sheet available at www.defenselink.mil.
with international standards of human rights
7 At his arraignment proceedings in Guantánamo
and humanitarian law when transferred to
on 4 June 2007, the military judge dismissed the
other national authorities”. The Committee charges against him because, while Omar Khadr
recommended that the government ensure that had been designated as an “enemy combatant”
transfers of such detained persons to national in Guantánamo, nowhere was there a record
authorities only take place when “there is a of his designation as an “unlawful enemy
reason to believe that their human rights will combatant”, the label which (when attached to
be respected and as long as the State party is a non-US national) is a prerequisite for trial by
satisfied that the receiving State is willing and military commission under the MCA.
able to apply the Geneva Conventions”. Noting 8 Concluding observations, above note 5.
that Canada exported small arms and light 9 Ibid.
weapons, the Committee recommended that “the
State party ensure that its domestic legislation
and practice prohibit in any case the trade of
small arms and light weapons to countries where
persons who have not attained the age of 18
may take a direct part in hostilities as members
of their armed forces or armed groups that are
distinct from the armed forces of a State”.8
With regard to dissemination of the Optional
Protocol, the Committee urged the government
to “strengthen education and training in all
domestic languages on the provisions of the
Optional Protocol for all relevant professional
groups, in particular military personnel”. It was
likewise suggested that the Optional Protocol be
made “widely known to the public at large and in
particular to children and their parents, through,
inter alia, school curricula in a child-friendly
version”.9

C ape Verde C ARIB B E A N
Republic of Cape Verde Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines��
(see individual entries
for Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad
and Tobago)
Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: acceded 10 May 2002 Population: 505,000
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): Government armed forces: see text
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182, ACRWC Compulsory recruitment age: ��
not applicable
Voluntary recruitment age: 18–19��
17-year-olds could volunteer for military Voting age: 18
service with parental consent. No Optional Protocol: Dominica
��
acceded 20
information was available on the presence September 2002
of under-18s in the armed forces. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Dominica: CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO
182
Government Grenada: CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
National recruitment legislation and Saint Kitts and Nevis: CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO
practice 138, ILO 182
Saint Lucia: CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182
Under the 1992 constitution, all individuals “shall
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: CRC, GC AP I
have the duty to contribute to the defence of the
nation” (Article 83). The constitution also stated and II, ICC, ILO
��
138, ILO
��
182
that “Military service shall be compulsory” and
that “Conscientious objectors and those who Dominica, Grenada,
��
Saint Lucia and
are unfit for military service shall perform civic Saint Vincent and the Grenadines��
had
service, as provided by law” (Article 271). no military forces; security was the
Military service, reportedly for two years, was responsibility of their police forces. Saint
��
compulsory for all men aged between 18 and Kitts and Nevis had a small military force
35.1 Volunteers could enlist at the age of 17, with
parental consent.2 that patrolled jointly with the police. There
In its declaration on accession to the Optional were no reports of under-18s in these
Protocol in 2002, Cape Verde stated that “the security forces.
minimum age for special voluntary recruitment
into the Cape Verdean armed forces is 17 years in
accordance with article 31 of Legislative Decree Government
No. 6/93 of 24 May 1993”, and that “Special
recruitment shall apply to citizens, who of National recruitment legislation and
their own freely expressed will, decide to enter practice
military service subject to meeting the following The police force in Dominica,��
Grenada, Saint
requirements: (a) They must have attained the Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines�
minimum age of 17 years; (b) They must have was each country’s sole security force. None
the consent of their parents or legal guardians; maintained military armed forces, although
(c) They must be mentally and physically fit for the police forces carried out a range of security
military service.”3 duties and the police force in Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines included a coastguard and a
1 B. Horeman and M. Stolwijk, Refusing to Bear special unit with paramilitary training. The police
Arms: A World Survey of Conscription and force in Dominica had around 400 officers, in
Conscientious Objection to Military Service, War Grenada about 750, and in Saint Vincent and the
Resisters International, London, 1998, www.wri- Grenadines approximately 850.1
irg.org. Saint Kitts and Nevis had a defence force
2 Initial report by Cape Verde to UN Committee consisting of an infantry unit and a coastguard.2
on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/11/ Its police force could also be employed for
Add.23, 9 January 2001; summary record of the defence against external aggression.3
746th meeting: Cape Verde, UN Doc. CRC/C/ Recruitment to the security forces was
SR.746, 7 November 2000. voluntary. In Dominica and Saint Lucia, the
3 Declaration by Cape Verde on acceding to the minimum age for recruitment to the police force
Optional Protocol, 10 May 2002, www2.ohchr.org. was 18.4 In Grenada and in Saint Vincent and

the Grenadines the minimum age was 19.5 The 4 Initial report of Dominica to the Committee on
minimum age for recruitment to the defence or the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.48,
police forces in Saint Kitts and Nevis was 18.6 15 October 2003; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force,
Training information, www.rslpf.com.
Military training and military schools 5 Royal Grenada Police Force, Training School;
A—E
In Grenada police officers received 18 weeks’ Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
training at the Police Training School.7 In Saint Service Commissions, www.gov.vc.
Lucia the cadet corps, a paramilitary youth 6 CIA, above note 1; Saint Kitts and Nevis, 2003
organization, enrolled around 180 members in Police Act.
2005 and developed new units in all secondary 7 Royal Grenada Police Force, Training School.
schools and the community college in 2006.8 8 “St Lucia Cadet Corps on recruitment drive”,
A focus of its activities in 2006 was training in Caribbean Net News, 9 October 2006, www.
emergency and disaster relief.9 In Saint Vincent caribbeannetnews.com.
and the Grenadines a small cadet unit formed 9 Government of Saint Lucia, “Cadet Corps to
part of the police force.10 attend Disaster Management Training”, press
In Saint Kitts and Nevis secondary-school release, 15 March 2006, www.stlucia.gov.lc.
pupils of 13 years and above could join the cadet 10 US Department of State, Country Reports on
corps, which was organized by the defence forces Human Rights Practices 2003.
but could not be used in military operations. 11 Conway, above note 2.
The defence forces conducted basic training of
troops, and advanced training was provided by Consideration of initial report submitted by
regional, Canadian, UK and US armed forces.11 Dominica, Concluding observations, UN Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.238, 30 June 2004.
Developments 13 Initial report of Saint Lucia to the Committee
In June 2004 the UN Committee on the Rights Add.23, 13 October 2004.
of the Child recommended that Dominica
improve its birth registration system, develop its
Consideration of initial report submitted by Saint
national plan of action for youth and ensure that Lucia, Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/
children defined in Dominica as “young persons” C/15/Add.258, 21 September 2005.
between the ages of 14 and 18 received the same
protection as those under the age of 14 defined
as “children”.12
The government of Saint Lucia reported to the
Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2004 that
it worked with civil society groups to advance the
issue of child rights and had designated 2003–4
as the Year of the Child.13 In September 2005
the Committee recommended ratification of the
Optional Protocol.14
Saint Kitts and Nevis ratified the ILO Minimum
Age Convention 138 in June 2005 and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court in
August 2006. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
ratified the ILO Minimum Age Convention 138 in
July 2006.
1 Matthias Lestrade, “Crime Management and

Challenges in the 21st Century”, National
Symposium on Crime – Commonwealth of
Dominica, 2003, www.da-academy.org/; Royal
Grenada Police Force, www.spiceisle.com/rgpf;
CIA, World Factbook 2007 (Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines).
2 Stanford Conway, “SKNDF: Over a Century and
Counting”, St Kitts–Nevis Observer, 21 October
2005, www.thestkittsnevisobserver.com; CIA,
above note 1.
3 Saint Kitts and Nevis, 2003 Police Act, www.
police.gov.kn.

In the remote and marginalized north-
C E NTR AL AFRIC AN east, the Union of Democratic Forces (UFDR)
was mostly active in Vakaga province. It was
R E PUBLIC composed of General Bozizé’s own former
supporters and members of the Gula ethnic
Central African Republic group, who claimed long-standing ethnic
discrimination by the government.5 In September
Population: 4.0 million (2.0 million under 18) and October 2006 the UFDR seized control
Government armed forces: 3,200 of several towns, prompting French military
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 assistance to government forces in December
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 2006. The French military intervened once
again in an air strike, in which 15 children were
Voting age: 18
reportedly killed, following a UFDR attack on
Optional Protocol: not signed Birao in March 2007.6 Birao’s estimated 14,000
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): inhabitants fled and 70 per cent of houses were
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 thought to have been burned down following
the recapture of Birao.7 In April 2007 a peace
The opposition Popular Army for the agreement was signed between the government
Restoration of the Republic and Democracy and the UFDR chief of staff, Damané Zakaria, only
(APRD) and the Union of Democratic Forces to be rejected by the jailed UFDR leader, Abakar
(UFDR) used children in hostilities which Saboune.8
The majority of human rights abuses against
broke out in early 2005. Both expressed civilians in the north-west were attributed
willingness to demobilize their child to government forces, in particular the GP.
soldiers, but only the UFDR had officially Attacks on government forces by the APRD were
entered a disarmament, demobilization typically followed by reprisals against the civilian
population by the FACA and the GP. By September
and reintegration (DDR) process by 2007 hundreds of summary executions,
October 2007. Children were thought to be extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances
present in government armed forces, but and rapes of civilians had taken place. In addition
were not believed to be actively involved in the FACA and the GP burned tens of thousands of
hostilities. houses, leading to mass internal displacement.9
By August 2007, 180,000 people were internally
displaced in the north-west.10 Human rights
Context violations were also committed by the FACA and
the GP in the north-east against the Gula ethnic
General François Bozizé won the May 2005 group.11 As of August 2007, 30,000 people were
elections after seizing power in a coup against internally displaced in the region.12 By September
President Ange-Félix Patassé in March 2003. 2007 a total of approximately 212,000 people
From May 2005 hostilities were ongoing in the had fled their homes in the north-west and north-
north-western and north-eastern provinces east to take refuge in the bush. Another 80,000
between the government Central African Armed sought refuge in Chad, Cameroon and south
Forces (Forces armées Centrafricaines, FACA) and Darfur, Sudan.13
the Presidential Guard (Garde présidentielle, GP), The situation in the CAR was exacerbated
and various armed opposition groups.1 by regional conflict and instability. Chadian
In the north-west, ex-president Patassé’s government troops regularly conducted
traditional stronghold, the Popular Army for cross-border raids into the CAR, attacking
the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy CAR opposition groups, looting villages and
(Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la raping women and girls. Chadian bandits
République et la Démocratie, APRD) launched were implicated in criminal groups, including
attacks on the government almost immediately zaraguinas, attacking people in the north of the
following the May 2005 elections. The APRD country. The APRD and the UFDR recruited and
was composed of former members of Patassé’s used children in their forces, and engaged in
Presidential Guard and local armed self-defence widespread extortion, kidnappings and beatings
groups,2 established in response to the failure of the civilian population. UFDR members killed
of government forces to protect the local captured civilians.14
population from bandits (known as zaraguinas),
who commonly attacked civilians and kidnapped
children repeatedly for ransom.3 In January 2007
the APRD launched a failed attack on the town of
Paoua, resulting in further casualties and civilian
displacement. Conflict between the APRD and the
government continued in 2007.4

stated that many were armed and participated
Government in combat. They claimed that many children
National recruitment legislation and joined the APRD voluntarily, for protection from
government forces.20
practice
A—E
The 1994 constitution provided for (male-only) Union of Democratic Forces (UFDR)
conscription or voluntary recruitment into the The UFDR forcibly recruited children, and
government armed forces at 18. Conscription was witnesses reported seeing child soldiers with the
not enforced and there was no legislation relating UFDR in the October–November 2006 offensive.
to child soldiers.15 An inter-agency UN mission reported seeing
Neither the constitution nor the criminal code children in UFDR ranks in January 2007. The UFDR
criminalized child recruitment or use. The CAR reportedly used civilians, including young girls,
was, however, a party to the Rome Statute of to cook or to transport looted goods.21 During
the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the UFDR attacks on the FACA in March 2007, former
constitution stated that international law took students at the Birao government secondary-
precedence over national law and policy. There school were identified among its troops. Many
were moves to reform the criminal code to bring of the children, aged 12 to 17 and most of them
it in line with the Rome Statute and to introduce boys, who had participated in the attacks, were
a military justice code, which would hold military killed.22
personnel criminally liable for serious human
rights violations.16
Disarmament, demobilization
Child recruitment and use and reintegration (DDR)
Children were thought to be present in the
FACA and the GP but not actively engaged in An adult DDR program, administered by the UN
the current armed conflict, in contrast to the Development Programme (UNDP), was in place
2002–3 conflict when large numbers of children from February 2004 to end-February 2007,23
were reportedly actively involved.17 Documents with the aim, among others, of integrating ex-
providing proof of age of recruits enlisting in the combatants into the national armed forces. Of
armed forces were checked by recruiters when more than 7,500 combatants who went through
available. However, central government records the process, only 26 children, most of them boys,
had been destroyed or looted during the 2002–3 were included.24 UNICEF was not involved in the
armed conflict, and no one whose records had process.
been lost could obtain copies. The government In February 2007 the APRD told the non-
stated that recruiters should use common sense governmental organization (NGO) Human Rights
and ask children questions that would reveal Watch that they would demobilize child soldiers
whether they were really 18. If a child joined the immediately, as long as their security could be
armed forces, he was treated as an adult. There guaranteed.25 In March and June 2007 the APRD
were no reports available that any recruiters or requested assistance from the UN country team
others had been subject to disciplinary measures in a children’s DDR procedure. However, by late
or other sanctions for recruiting children.18 2007 it was not clear that progress had been
made, and formal negotiations were hampered
by insecurity in the north-western region.26
Armed groups
The number of children in the APRD and the UFDR UFDR
was unknown, but both groups recruited and In April and May 2007 more than 450 children
used child soldiers. Until May 2007 both groups associated with the UFDR were demobilized, all
refused to recognize 15–18-year-olds as children, of whom were subsequently reintegrated into
but they subsequently accepted that they had their communities and families. Some 75 per cent
children in their ranks and said that they were of this group were boys aged between 13 and
willing to discuss the demobilization of children 17, and 75 per cent had participated in military
below the age of 15. Reports indicated that both operations and combat for sustained periods
the UFDR and the APDR recruited Chadian and that averaged from nine months to a year. Some
Sudanese children. Children in the north-east of 10 per cent of the children were as young as
the CAR were also reportedly forcibly recruited by ten, and were used mainly for logistical support
Chadian armed groups.19 during 2006 and early 2007.27 On 16 June 2007
a tripartite action plan between the UFDR, the
Popular Army for the Restoration of government and UNICEF to allow children to be
the Republic and Democracy (APRD) reintegrated was signed and another group of
approximately 200 children was released.28 It
There were large numbers of child soldiers in the was claimed that by September 2007 the last
APRD ranks. APRD commanders confirmed the remaining 450–500 children were released into
use of children as young as 12 in their forces, and

their communities; however, this was not verified 2 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “State of anarchy:
by the joint UNICEF–UFDR monitoring structure rebellion and abuses against civilians”, Human
established by the tripartite action plan.29 Rights Watch, Vol. 19, No. 13(A) (September
The UN Secretary-General’s Representative 2007).
on human rights of internally displaced persons 3 “CAR: Villagers flee kidnappers demanding
visited the country during March 2007. He huge ransoms”, 5 March 2007, “Central African
recommended that armed groups immediately Republic – Cameroon: CAR refugees in Cameroon
cease the recruitment of children and enter fear returning home”, 29 November 2007, IRIN.
the DDR process. He also recommended that 4 “CAR: Civilians in northwest still afraid of going
the government and the armed groups comply home”, IRIN, 2 August 2007; Report of the
with their obligations under international Secretary-General on Chad and the Central
humanitarian law.30 African Republic, UN Doc. S/2007/97, 23
February 2007.
5 HRW, above note 2.
Developments 6 ICG, above note 1; “CAR: Rebel activity fuels
The government referred the situation of insecurity in the northeast”, IRIN, 8 February
2002 and 2003 to the International Criminal 2007.
Court in December 2004. In May 2007 the ICC 7 Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the
agreed to begin an investigation into the most Central African Republic, UN Doc. S/2007/488, 10
serious crimes committed after 1 July 2002. August 2007.
The Prosecutor stated that the investigation 8 HRW, above note 2.
would focus in particular on allegations of 9 Ibid.; “Central African Republic”, Amnesty
rape, which, he said, appeared to have been International Report 2007; US Department
“committed in numbers that cannot be ignored of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
under international law”. Reports received Practices 2006, Central African Republic, 6 March
by the ICC indicated that the victims included 2007, www.state.gov/; “Caught in CAR’s deadly
elderly women, young girls and men, often with crossfire”, BBC News, 30 July 2007.
aggravated aspects of cruelty, such as rape 10 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 7.
committed by multiple perpetrators, in front of 11 HRW, above note 2.
third persons, or where relatives were forced to
participate. Many victims were subsequently
shunned by their families and communities. The 13 UNHCR News Stories, “Central African Republic’s
ICC Office of the Prosecutor also continued to quiet conflict uproots more than 290,000”, 27
monitor closely allegations of crimes committed September 2007, www.unhcr.org/; “Thousands
flee from CAR violence”, BBC News, 25 March
since the end of 2005.31
2006.
On 25 September 2007 the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 1778 (2007) on the 14 HRW, above note 2.
Central African Republic and Chad. It established 15 Child Soldiers Coalition, discussion with minister
MINURCAT, a “multidimensional presence” for information, Bangui, March 2007.
of UN and EU personnel, comprising police, 16 “La Centrafrique va se doter d’un code de justice
military liaison officers and civilian personnel. It militaire”, APA Bangui, 11 July 2007, www.
mandated the protection of civilians in danger, apanews.net.
particularly refugees and internally displaced 17 Confidential coalition interviews, Bangui, March
persons, and the facilitation of humanitarian 2007.
aid and movement of humanitarian personnel 18 Confidential source, Bangui, March 2007.
in north-eastern CAR and eastern Chad.32 Up to 19 Confidential source, November 2007.
4,000 UN-mandated European Union troops were
20 “CAR: Conflict forces children into insurgency”,
expected to be deployed to Chad by early 2008.33 IRIN, 23 February 2007; HRW, above note 2.
In November 2006 the mandate of the UN Peace-
Building Support Office in the Central African
Republic (BONUCA), authorized in 2000 by the 22 Report of the Secretary-General on children in
Security Council, was renewed until 31 December armed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757,
2007.34 21 December 2007.
The UFDR and the APRD were among the 23 Funded by the World Bank Multi-country MDRP
parties listed as recruiting and using child and UNDP, www.mdrp.org. See also African
soldiers in the 21 December 2007 report of the Development Bank – World Bank strategy for the
Secretary-General to the UN Security Council on CAR 2007–2008, www.afdb.org.
children and armed conflict.35 24 Confidential source, Bangui, March 2007.
1 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Central African 26 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.
Republic: anatomy of a phantom state”, Africa 27 Ibid.
Report No. 136, 13 December 2007.

28 UNICEF, “Central African Republic signed child
soldiers reintegration agreement, 16 June 2007, CHA D
www.unicef.org.
29 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22. Republic of Chad
30 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-
A—E
General on human rights of internally displaced Population: 9.7 million: (5.3 million under 18)
persons, Addendum: Mission to the Central Government armed forces: 25,400
African Republic, preliminary note, UN Doc. Compulsory Recruitment Age: 20
A/HRC/4/38/Add.5, 16 March 2007. Voluntary Recruitment Age: 18 (lower with
31 International Criminal Court (ICC), “Prosecutor parental consent)
opens investigation into the Central African Voting Age: 18
Republic”, press release, 22 May 2007; Optional Protocol: ratified 28 August 2002
“Background: Situation in the Central African
Republic”, 22 May 2007; www.icc-cpi.int/ Treaties ratified (see glossary):
32 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1778
(2007) on the situation in Chad, the Central
African Republic and the subregion.
Increased recruitment of children by
33 Reuters Foundation, AlertNet, “Chad fighting Chadian armed forces and Chadian and
raises stakes of EU peace deployment”, 27 Sudanese armed groups was reported in
November 2007, www.alertnet.org. 2006 and 2007, in particular along Chad’s
34 UN Security Council, Statement by the President eastern border with Sudan and from its
of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2000/5,
10 February 2000; UN Security Council, Statement
refugee and displaced persons camps.
by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. Despite an agreement by the government
S/PRST/2006/47, 22 November 2006. to facilitate the demobilization of child
35 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22. soldiers, an estimated 7,000 to 10,000
children remained in armed forces and
groups in September 2007.
Context
Constitutional changes in June 2005 allowed
President Idriss Déby to run for a third term
in office. They exacerbated tensions over
governance and access to Chad’s oil wealth and
intensified political and armed resistance to
the president.1 Between 2005 and 2006 the two
principal Chadian armed opposition groups were
the United Front for Change (Front uni pour le
changement, FUC), and the Platform for Change,
Unity and Democracy (Socle pour le changement,
l’unité et la démocratie, SCUD).2 These groups
launched several attacks against the government
between 2005 and 2006.3 In April 2006 an FUC-
led offensive on the capital, N’Djaména, sought
to oust President Déby and resulted in hundreds
of civilian deaths.4 President Déby, of Zaghawa
ethnicity, was elected for a third term in office
in May 2006. The elections, in which under-age
voting was reported, were boycotted by major
opposition parties.5
In December 2006 FUC leader Mahamat Nour
signed a peace accord with the government that
extended a general amnesty to all FUC soldiers
and called for “the creation of the conditions” for
the integration of FUC soldiers into the Chadian
National Army (Armée Nationale Tchadienne,
ANT).6 Following the agreement Nour was
appointed minister of defence, and other FUC
officials took government posts in March 2007.
The government stated that it would not accept
child soldiers from the FUC in the ANT.7
From 2006, three, at times overlapping, villages and raping women and girls. Chadian
dimensions of conflict contributed to an emerging anti-Déby groups based themselves in the CAR,
humanitarian and human rights crisis in eastern and Chadian bandits were involved in criminal
Chad and along the border with Sudan. These groups attacking civilians in the northern CAR.15
were internal armed conflict between government Reports indicated that children in the CAR were
forces and opposition groups, inter communal forcibly recruited by Chadian armed groups and
and ethnically based violence in the east, and that the CAR armed groups recruited Chadian and
the Darfur conflict and tensions between Chad Sudanese children.16
and Sudan along their common border, which By late 2007 there were approximately
led to a proliferation of arms and cross-border 240,000 Sudanese refugees in Chad, almost
banditry. In addition, the Darfur conflict enabled all located in the east. Of these, 60 per cent
Chadian armed opposition groups to use Sudan were estimated to be under 18. There were
as a base for attacks against Chadian government approximately 45,000 refugees from the CAR
forces, and Sudanese armed opposition groups, in eastern Chad and approximately 180,000
including the Justice and Equality Movement and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Chad, the
the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), to seek vast majority of whom were also located in the
refuge in eastern Chad.8 Increasingly frequent east. It was estimated that school-age children
attacks by Sudanese government-backed constituted approximately 30 per cent of the IDP
Janjaweed militias on eastern Chadian villages population in eastern Chad.17
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians in
late 2006.9 In April 2007, after attacks, allegedly
by Janjaweed, on their villages, 9,000 Chadians
Government
moved to Habile camp, administered by the UN National recruitment legislation and
refugee agency UNHCR, for internally displaced
persons (IDPs).10 practice
Intercommunal violence between the On ratification of the Optional Protocol in
Zaghawa and Tama ethnic groups in north- 2002 Chad declared that the minimum age
eastern Chad escalated during the second half of for recruitment into the Chadian armed forces
2006. Fuelled by clan disputes and competition was 18. It stated that enlistment was voluntary,
for water and grazing lands, hostilities were and could take place only on a fully informed
additionally embedded in and informed by basis.18 The 1996 constitution stated that the
national political dynamics. Dozens of Tama defence of the country and of national territorial
civilians were killed and thousands were integrity was the duty of every citizen, and that
displaced in attacks on Tama villages between military service was compulsory (Article 51).
August and November 2006. The attacks were A national law adopted in January 1991 on the
reportedly carried out by Zaghawa militias reorganization of the armed forces stated that the
(loyal to the president) backed by the Chadian minimum age of recruitment into the ANT was 18,
government.11 By January 2007 up to 1,500 FUC and that the minimum age for conscription was
soldiers, mostly of Tama ethnicity, had taken 20.19 However, the 1992 General Statute of the
up positions in and around Guéréda in north- Army provided that a person under the age of 18
eastern Chad, prompting a renewed spate of could be enrolled with the consent of a parent or
ethnic violence between the Tama and Zaghawa guardian.20 The Labour Code prohibited children
groups.12 under the age of 18 from undertaking any work
In October 2007 a peace accord was signed which by its nature was likely to cause harm to
in Libya between the Chadian government and the health, safety or morals of children.21
four armed opposition groups, which included In November 2006 the minister of defence
two factions of the Union of Forces for Democracy ordered the military leadership not to recruit
and Development (Union des forces pour la children, and a memorandum was issued by the
démocratie et le développement, UFDD), the ministry stating that the recruitment of children
Chadian National Concord (Concorde nationale below the age of 18 was prohibited. In February
tchadienne, CNT), and the Rally of Forces for 2007 the government acknowledged that children
Change (Rassemblement des forces pour le had been associated with armed groups and
changement, RFC), a SCUD splinter group. The forces in Chad and that the ANT might have
agreement called for an immediate ceasefire, recruited and used children.22 Following the
the integration of opposition fighters into the peace agreement with the FUC, the ANT stated
national army and the start of a process to that it would not accept under-age FUC soldiers
integrate the parties into the government.13 into its ranks.
However, heavy fighting between the ANT and
these groups resumed in eastern Chad in late Child recruitment and deployment
2007.14 Children were known to have been recruited and
ANT forces regularly conducted cross-border used in the ANT as of mid-2007. One official told
raids into the Central African Republic (CAR), Human Rights Watch that boys between the ages
attacking CAR armed opposition groups, looting

of 12 and 15 were deployed to make tea, find ANT control abandoned their positions in eastern
water, collect firewood and mind goats. Another Chad and returned to Darfur.28
senior ANT official stated that “child soldiers are
ideal because they don’t complain, they don’t Chadian-backed Sudanese armed
expect to be paid, and if you tell them to kill, they opposition groups
A—E
kill”. Recruitment of children between January
Massive recruitment took place among the
2006 and July 2007 into the ANT took place in the
refugee and IDP communities in eastern Chad
Salamat and Ouddai regions in the east, and in
by Sudanese armed opposition groups in March
the Wadi Fira region in the north-east. Civilians
and April 2006. Recruitment was at times carried
were reportedly recruited en masse in late 2006
out forcibly, with reports of torture as a coercive
at a time of ANT losses, and included children
means. In July 2007 the UN reported that the
as young as 14, who were rapidly organized into
Chadian government alleged that more than
units to defend the capital, and issued uniforms
1,000 children had been recruited by the SLA in
and weapons. The ANT reportedly held captured
refugee camps in the east.29 In March 2006 the
armed opposition-group child soldiers as young
G-19 faction of the SLA, working in co-operation
as 13 in the same facilities as adult soldiers.23
with Chadian government officials, recruited,
Militias incorporated into the ANT some forcibly, 4,700 Sudanese refugees,
including hundreds of children, from the Breidjing
In late 2006 the government incorporated village- and Treguine UN-supervised refugee camps 50
level and ethnically based self-defence militias, km west of Adré, in eastern Chad.30 Most of these
composed mainly of the Dadjo clan group, into people subsequently returned to the camps.
the ANT in areas where it was militarily weak, In 2006, Sudanese children were recruited
such as the Dar Sila area in south-eastern Chad. from the Djabal and Goz Amir refugee camps in
This resulted in widespread child recruitment. eastern Chad, where teachers were among the
An agreement between the Dadjos and the recruiters.31 In January 2007, 39 children were
Zaghawas in November 2006 stipulated that the recruited from the Breidjing refugee camp by
Dadjos would provide young people in exchange Sudanese armed opposition groups.32
for arms and training. Soldiers who appeared to
be under 18 were reported in self-defence forces Other armed groups
in Goungour, Borot, Koloy, Modoyna, Tiero and
Unidentified armed groups increasingly recruited
Dogdore.24
children in the east during 2006 and 2007. They
were known to attract new members by offering
Armed groups financial compensation on joining as well as
monthly pay.33 In February 2007 the government
United Front for Change (FUC) alleged that there were hundreds of children
The FUC, concentrated in north-eastern Chad, in the UFDD and claimed that a significant
recruited children as young as 12 on a large scale proportion of UFDD prisoners captured during
before its integration into the ANT in late 2006. combat in Abeche in November 2006 were
More than 25 per cent of the FUC was estimated children.34
to be made up of children, including children
under 15. There were confirmed reports that
between January 2006 and May 2007 the FUC Disarmament, demobilization
abducted children in the Guéréda area on their and reintegration (DDR)
way to school or the market to strengthen their
forces.25 Children reportedly joined up to avenge In September 2007 an estimated 7,000 to 10,000
killings of family members by Zaghawa militias, children, used in combat and non-combat roles,
or to protect themselves in a context of armed were identified by the UN as needing DDR from
violence and insecurity. While girls were not armed forces and groups.35 The government and
recruited in large numbers, the 3rd Brigade was UNICEF signed an agreement on 9 May 2007 to
composed of 52 women and girls. Some female begin the demobilization of children from the
soldiers had reportedly taken part in operations ANT and integrated FUC forces. By July 2007, 425
against ANT forces in late 2006. Girl members boys – ex-FUC members – had been released from
of the brigade said they had enlisted after being government military installations.36 However,
raped or to seek protection from rape by Zaghawa despite promises from the government, UNICEF
militias. Children were also forcibly recruited by had by July been granted access to only one
the FUC from refugee camps in Darfur.26 government military installation, at Mongo in
Following the 2006 peace agreement, FUC south central Chad, where they identified 383
leader Mahamad Nour became minister of child soldiers, some as young as eight, in May
defence, and in March 2007 the first FUC officials 2007. Evidence suggested that ANT personnel
accepted positions in the Chadian government.27 were concealing children to prevent them from
By October 2007 FUC troops operating outside registering for demobilization.37 Children who
were demobilized could not be reunited with their 1 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “They Came Here to
families because of ongoing hostilities.38 Kill Us”: Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of
In May 2007 the UNHCR in Abeche organized Civilians in Eastern Chad, January 2007.
a series of three refugee-protection workshops 2 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
for local authorities, with specific reference to armed conflict in Chad, UN Doc. S/2007/400, 3
the need to prevent child recruitment in the east. July 2007.
As of July 2007 a strategy on prevention, release 3 “Chad: Déby dissolves presidential guard
and reintegration of children associated with following wave of desertions”, IRIN, 31 October
armed forces and groups was being developed 2005; “Chad fight-back kills ‘300 rebels’”, BBC
by a consortium of government ministries, UN News, 20 December 2005.
agencies and local NGOs.39 4 International Crisis Group (ICG), Chad: Back
towards War?, June 2006.
Developments 5 US Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices 2006, Chad, www.state.
In May 2006 the UN Emergency Relief Co- gov.
ordinator expressed serious concern over 6 HRW, Early to War: Child Soldiers in the Chad
recruitment in and around refugee camps and Conflict, July 2007.
IDP sites, and the increasing militarization of 7 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.
refugee camps.40 In September 2007 the UN
8 HRW, above note 1; Report of the Secretary-
Security Council Working Group on Children
General, above note 2.
and Armed Conflict expressed grave concern
over the recruitment and use of children by 9 “Chad”, Amnesty International Report 2007;
UNHCR, “Lives in limbo as terror resumes in
armed groups and local commanders of the
eastern Chad”, 1 November 2006, www.unhcr.org.
ANT; strongly condemned the continuous
recruitment and use of children by armed groups, 10 UNHCR, “Some 9,000 Chadians move to IDP
in particular the SLA, the Sudanese rebel Justice camp after brutal village attacks”, 10 April 2007,
www.unhcr.org.
and Equality Movement (JEM) and the UFDD;
and urged the government to criminalize the 11 HRW, above note 1.
unlawful recruitment and use of children in 12 HRW, above note 6.
armed conflict.41 Chad was listed as a situation 13 “Chad: peace deal signed to end rebellion”, IRIN,
of concern in the UN Secretary-General’s October 26 October 2007.
2006 and December 2007 Reports on Children 14 “Chad’s battle army in east”, BBC News, 19
and Armed Conflict.42 October 2007; “Hundreds dead in Chad fighting”,
On 25 September 2007 the UN Security BBC News, 27 November 2007.
Council adopted Resolution 1778 (2007) 15 HRW, “State and Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses
concerning the CAR and Chad. Its provisions against Civilians”, September 2007.
established the United Nations Mission in the 16 Confidential source, November 2007.
Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT),
17 OCHA, “Humanitarian Action in Chad: Facts and
a “multidimensional presence” of UN and EU
Figures Snapshot Report”, 15 November 2007,
personnel, comprising police, military liaison www.reliefweb.int.
officers and civilian personnel. Its mandate
authorized the protection of civilians in danger,
particularly refugees and internally displaced
persons, and the facilitation of humanitarian aid 19 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.
and movement of humanitarian personnel in the 20 Child Soldiers Coalition, Child Soldiers: Global
north-eastern CAR and eastern Chad.43 Up to Report 2004.
4,000 UN-mandated EU troops were expected to 21 US Department of State, Country Reports on
be deployed to Chad by early 2008.44 Human Rights Practices, March 2007, www.state.
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in gov.
Paris, Chad and 58 other states endorsed the 22 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.
Paris Commitments to protect children from 23 HRW, above note 6.
unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces 24 Ibid.; Report of the Secretary-General, above note
or armed groups and the Paris Principles and 2.
guidelines on children associated with armed
forces or armed groups. The document reaffirmed
international standards and operational 26 HRW, above note 6.
principles for protecting and assisting child 27 Ibid.
soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global 28 “Chad: Unravelling the meaning of latest ex-
consultation jointly sponsored by the French revolt”, IRIN, 19 October 2007.
government and UNICEF. 29 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.
30 HRW, Violence beyond Borders: The Human
Rights Crisis in Eastern Chad, June 2006.

31 Report of the Secretary-General on children in
armed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826, Chile
26 October 2006.
32 Report of the Secretary-General on children in Republic of Chile
armed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757,
A—E
21 December 2007. Population: 16.3 million (4.9 million under 18)
33 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2. Government armed forces: 75,700
34 HRW, above note 6. Compulsory recruitment age: 18
35 Security Council Working Group on children Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (see text)
and armed conflict, Conclusions on children Voting age: 18
and armed conflict in Chad, UN Docs. S/AC Optional Protocol: ratified 31 July 2003
51/2007/16, 3 July 2007, and S/AC 51/2007/16, Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
24 September 2007. CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
37 HRW, above note 6. There was no information about under-18s
38 Confidential sources, February 2008. in the armed forces.
40 Ibid. Government
41 Security Council Working Group, 24 September
2007, above note 35. National recruitment legislation and
42 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 31. practice
43 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1778 Military recruitment was transformed following
(2007) on the situation in Chad, the Central
the death in May 2005 of 44 conscripts during
African Republic and the subregion.
a compulsory training exercise in sub-zero
44 Reuters Foundation, AlertNet, “Chad fighting temperatures in the Andes mountains.1 The
raises stakes of EU peace deployment”, 27 victims, some of whom were from the indigenous
November 2007, www.alertnet.org.
Mapuche community, had received only a few
weeks’ military training.2 Demands for reform
focused on the recruitment system, which was
widely seen as targeted at the poorest sectors of
the population. In practice only 15–20 per cent of
those liable each year did active service.3
A new law came into effect in September
2005 to modernize recruitment and mobilization.
Under the new law all citizens were automatically
registered for compulsory military service at the
age of 18. Citizens aged 18–45 had to fulfil their
military obligations, either through two years’
compulsory military service (for men) or (for men
and women) through voluntary military service
or being available for mass mobilization. Quotas
were first filled by volunteers and the remainder
chosen by lottery. Those declared able to do
military service but who delayed their enlistment
could be called up for an additional year. The
law also established a channel for complaints of
ill-treatment or abuse.4
In 2007, for the first time since compulsory
military service was introduced in Chile over
a century earlier, all quotas were filled by the
selection of 15,000 candidates from among
40,000 volunteers.5
Students could delay military service until
they completed their studies, when they could
choose to serve in the regular forces for a year
or in an armed forces professional institution
for a total of 180 days, or to follow a Military
Instruction Special Course (Curso Especial de
Instrucción Militar) for 150 days.6
The 2005 law also increased the minimum
age for voluntary recruitment from 17 to 18.
Individuals who wanted to bring forward their 10 FLACSO, Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,
registration for military service could do so, Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latina
but could only undertake active service when y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Chile, August 2006,
they were at least 18. This effectively prevented www.flacso.cl.
under-18s from participating in hostilities. By law 11 Initial report, above note 7.
the minimum age of recruitment could not be 12 Ley moderniza el servicio militar obligatorio, ab.
lowered even in exceptional circumstances such
as a state of emergency.7
Women aged 18–24 could volunteer to do
military service.8 There were around 1,000 female
volunteers in the army, and they constituted
about 15 per cent of the air force.9

training schools. Officer schools offered four
years of military, legal, economic, scientific and
moral training, including human rights education.
Non-commissioned officers took a two-year
course to obtain a technical diploma.10
Candidates to military schools offering
basic training were required to have completed
secondary education. Some schools stipulated
also that candidates had to be 18. Courses were
for between two and five years.11 Students at
military schools were considered to be on active
service.12
1 “Tragedia militar podría cambiar conscripción

obligatoria en Chile”, Terra, 24 May 2005, www.
terra.com/noticias; “Families angry at deaths
in Andes”, Guardian (UK), 21 May 2005, www.
guardian.co.uk.
2 “El derecho a decir No”, Quechua Network, 25
May 2005, www.quechuanetwork.org.
3 David Álvarez Veloso, Servicio Militar en Chile:
un debate obligatorio, Facultad Latinoamericana
de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)-Chile, July 2006,
www.flacso.cl.
4 Ley moderniza el servicio militar obligatorio, No.
20.045 of 2005, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional
de Chile, www.bcn.cl.
5 “Por primera vez en 107 años habrá sólo
voluntarios realizando la milicia en las Fuerzas
Armadas chilenas”, Terra, 3 April 2007, http://
actualidad.terra.es/articulo/por_fuerzas_
armadas_1496070.htm.
6 Dirección General de Movilización Nacional,
Servicio militar, www.dgmn.cl, No voluntarios
sorteados.
7 Initial report of Chile to the UN Committee on
the Rights of the Child on implementation of the
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/CHL/1, 6
July 2007.
8 Dirección General de Movilización Nacional,
Servicio militar, above note 6, Servicio militar
femenino.
9 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Participación de
las mujeres en las fuerzas armadas, March 2005,
www.defensa.cl.

C HINA Government
People’s Republic of China
practice
A—E
Population: 1,315.8 million (352.7 million under The 1982 constitution provided for conscription
18) as the sacred obligation of every citizen of
Government armed forces: 2,255,000 the People’s Republic of China to defend the
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 motherland and resist aggression, and provided
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 (see text) for the power of the president to proclaim a state
Voting age: 18 of war and issue mobilization orders (Articles 55
Optional Protocol: ratified 20 February 2008 and 80).
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): The 1984 Military Service Law, revised
in 1998, provided the legal basis for military
service. The armed forces were recruited mainly
Because of the high number of volunteers, by conscription but included volunteers and a
militia with a reserve service (Article 2).7 Article
it had apparently not been necessary 12 stated that “Each year, male citizens who have
to enforce conscription. The minimum reached 18 years of age by 31 December shall
voluntary recruitment age was apparently be enlisted for active service. Those who are not
17. There were close links between the enlisted during the year shall remain eligible
for active service until they are 22. To meet
military and the education system, and the needs of the armed forces, female citizens
secondary-school and higher education may be enlisted for active service.” Conscripts
students were required by law to undergo had to be registered for military service by 30
some military training. September in the year in which they turned 18
(Article 13). However, it appeared that, because
of the number of volunteers from rural areas and
Context the downsizing of the standing army, the Peoples’
The predominantly Muslim population in the Liberation Army had not found it necessary to
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, particularly enforce conscription.
alleged Uighur nationalists characterized by the The minimum age for voluntary recruitment
government as “ethnic separatists, terrorists and was not specified in the Military Service Law,
religious extremists”,1 continued to face denial of which stated, “To meet the needs of the
their human rights, including freedom of religion armed forces and on the principle of voluntary
and access to education. The authorities used participation, male and female citizens who have
the “war on terror”, initiated by the United States not yet reached 18 years of age by 31 December
(USA) following the attacks of 11 September of a certain year may be enlisted for active
2001, as justification for the detention and service” (Article 22). However, in the “Decision
imprisonment of alleged Uighur separatists.2 An of the State Council and the Central Military
increased number of Uighurs were extradited to Commission on Amending the Regulations on
China from Central Asian countries, reflecting Conscription Work” of September 2001, Article
growing pressure by China on governments in the 3(3) of the Regulations on Conscription Work was
region. One individual, who was under 18 at the revised as follows: “To meet the needs of the
time of his arrest in Pakistan in 2001 and who was armed forces and on the principle of voluntary
subsequently detained in Guantánamo Bay, was participation, male and female citizens who
among a group of five Uighurs who were released have reached 17 years of age but have not yet
and transferred to Albania in May 2006.3 reached 18 years of age by 31 December of a
Restrictions on the rights to religious belief, certain year may be enlisted for active service.”8
expression and association, and discrimination This appeared to impose a minimum voluntary
in employment, continued to be reported from recruitment age of 17. China’s second periodic
the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan report to the UN Committee on the Rights of
areas.4 Many people were detained, including the Child quoted the Military Service Law as
children between the ages of approximately six stipulating that “no one in China under the age
and ten.5 of 15 may voluntarily enlist in any armed force”.9
China was a member of the Shanghai This might, however, be an error.
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), established In its declaration to the Optional Protocol,
in June 2001, comprising also Kazakhstan, China stated that the minimum age for voluntary
Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan recruitment was 17. However, there was an
and Uzbekistan, whose goals included mutual apparent contradiction later in the declaration,
co-operation in security matters.6 which stated that the Regulations on the
Recruitment of Soldiers “provides that in order
to meet the needs of the armed forces and on resided in the country.14 However, more than 50
the principle of voluntary participation, male schools for the children of migrant workers were
and female citizens who have not yet reached 17 reportedly closed down in Beijing in September
years of age by 31 December of a given year may 2006, the authorities claiming that the schools
be recruited for active service”.10 were unregistered and substandard.15 It was
Reservists in the militia or reserve service widely assumed the closures were linked to a
had to be between 18 and 35 (Article 23) but age crackdown on unregistered migrant workers
limits could be extended, including “in frontier in preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games in
areas on land or sea, areas inhabited by minority Beijing.16
nationalities as well as urban units in special China had submitted a second periodic report
circumstances” (Articles 37 and 38). The militia to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in
provided assistance and support to the People’s June 2003. In the concluding observations to its
Liberation Army, including in preparations against consideration of the report, the Committee called
war, defending China’s borders and maintaining for an independent expert to be allowed to visit
public order, as well as participating in combat and confirm the well-being of Gedhun Choekyi
operations (Article 36).11 Nyima, the disputed reincarnation of the Panchen
Lama – the second most important figure in Tibet
Military training and military schools after the Dalai Lama.17 Gedhun Choekyi Nyima
The Law on Military Service stated that “military had disappeared in 1995, aged six, and had since
institutes and academies may, according to the then been held by the Chinese authorities in
needs in building up the armed forces, enrol “protective custody”.18
cadets from among young students. The age limit At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
for the cadets to be enrolled must be the same Paris, China and 58 other states endorsed the
as that for the active servicemen” (Article 30). It Paris Commitments to protect children from
therefore appeared that under-18s could enrol for unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces
military training at specialist institutions. or armed groups and the Paris Principles and
There were close links between the military guidelines on children associated with armed
and the education system. The Military Service forces or armed groups. The documents
Law required secondary school and higher reaffirmed international standards and
education students to undergo one month’s operational principles for protecting and assisting
military training (Articles 43–46). child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
Developments
The Law on the Protection of Minors which came 1 On the labelling of Chinese Uighur separatists
into effect in 1992 defined “minors” as “citizens as “terrorists”, see Human Rights Watch (HRW),
under the age of eighteen”. A revised Law on Devastating blows, religious repression of
the Protection of Minors was adopted by the Uighurs in Xinjiang, April 2005.
Standing Committee of the National People’s 2 Amnesty International Report 2006.
Congress and came into force on 1 June 2007. 3 Confidential source, September 2007.
It required People’s Courts to set up special 4 Amnesty International Report 2007.
tribunals to try cases involving under-age
5 “Chinese troops detain Tibetan children”,
offenders and ensure that a guardian was present
Associated Press, 11 October 2006, at www.
when a child was questioned by the police or taipeitimes.com.
prosecutors.12
While millions of children accompanied 6 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www.
sectsco.org.
migrant worker parents, it was estimated that
as many as 20 million rural children, most of 7 Military Service Law of 31 May 1984.
them cared for by relatives, were left behind 8 GOV.cn (Chinese government official web
by parents migrating to cities to work. The portal), “Decision of the State Council and the
residency registration system, which restricted Central Military Commission on Amending the
access to education and healthcare, discouraged Regulations on Conscription Work”, September
migrant worker parents from taking their 2001, www.gov.cn.
children with them. Official reports claimed 9 Second periodic report of China to the UN
negative consequences in health, schooling Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
and psychological development in children left CRC/C/83/Add.9, 15 July 2005.
behind.13 10 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
A September 2006 amendment to the of the Child on the involvement of children in
Compulsory Education Law (which guaranteed armed conflict, China: Ratification,
nine years of free education to all children) 20 February 2008, http://untreaty.un.org/
provided for the right to education of children English/CNs/2008/101_200/164E.pdf.
of migrant workers regardless of where they 11 Military Service Law, above note 7.

12 “Revised Law on Protection of Minors Effective
next June”, Xinhua, 30 December 2006, at http:// COLOM B I A
en.chinagate.com.cn.
13 “Life bitter for migrant workers’ children left Republic of Colombia
home alone”, Xinhua, 15 December 2006, at
A—E
www.china.org.cn. Population: 45.6 million (16.8 million under 18)
14 Chinese Radio International report, 7 July 2006, Government armed forces: 208,600
http://english.cri.cn. Compulsory recruitment age: 18
15 Amnesty International Report 2007. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
16 HRW, “China: Beijing closes schools for migrant Voting age: 18
children in pre-Olympic clean-up”, 25 December Optional Protocol: ratified 25 May 2005
2006. See also Amnesty International (AI), Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
People’s Republic of China: Internal migrants: CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
discrimination and abuse: the human cost of an
economic “miracle” (ASA 17/008/2007), 1 March Children were both forcibly and voluntarily
2007.
recruited and used by the two armed
Consideration of second periodic report opposition groups, the FARC and the ELN.
submitted by China, Concluding observations, UN They were used as combatants, to lay
Doc. CRC/C/CHN/CO/2, 24 November 2005. mines and explosives and to carry out
18 “Tibet’s missing spiritual guide”, BBC News, 16 other military tasks. Girls were subjected
May 2005.
to sexual abuse, including rape and
forced abortion. Some children reportedly
remained with paramilitary groups which
had failed to demobilize fully. Government
forces used captured and surrendered
child soldiers to gather intelligence on
opposition forces.
Context
The armed conflict which had so far lasted 40
years continued between government forces
and the opposition Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia, FARC) and the National Liberation
Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional,
ELN), accompanied by widespread human
rights abuses and breaches of international
humanitarian law (IHL), including abuses
against children.1 The government, headed
by President Alvaro Uribe Vélez, continued to
pursue its democratic security policy, announced
in June 2003, which involved civilians in the
conflict, particularly in gathering information.2
The government reported a decline from 2002
to 2007 in murders and “massacres” (defined
as the killing of more than three people at the
same time and in the same place).3 However, the
number of enforced disappearances increased
from 2004 to 2005, and the level of IHL violations
was relatively constant in 2005 and 2006.
Reports of hostage-taking declined during the
same period.4
Government efforts to resume peace talks
and discuss the release of hostages with the
FARC were stalled after the president blamed
the group for a car bomb explosion at a Bogotá
military college in October 2006.5 Government
and FARC forces attacked each other throughout
© Jason P. Howe 2005
Female government soldier puts camouflage cream on a boy’s face during a “Soldiers for a
Day” session at school, Colombia

the remainder of 2006 and periodically in 2007.
Eleven FARC hostages were shot and killed in
Government
June 2007.6 Peace talks with the ELN, initiated National recruitment legislation and
in December 2005, had produced no tangible
results by October 2007.7 practice
A—E
More than 31,000 adult members of The minimum age for recruitment to the armed
Colombia’s largest paramilitary group, the United forces was 18, established by Law 418 of 1997 for
Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas conscription and Law 548 of 1999 for voluntary
Unidas de Colombia, AUC), were demobilized recruitment.17 However, the government’s 2005
between 2003 and 2006, although some units declaration on ratification of the Optional
had not fully disbanded.8 The army-backed AUC Protocol signalled an apparent exception to
was responsible for widespread human rights recruitment legislation. The declaration stated
abuses and child recruitment before 2003.9 that “minors in age” could be recruited with the
The 2005 Justice and Peace Law, providing the consent of their parents.18 The recruitment of
legal framework for demobilization, was widely children into illegal armed groups was an offence
criticized for failing to comply with international under the criminal code, with prison sentences
law, raising fears that AUC members would of between six and ten years, in addition to
not be held accountable for abuses and other the possibility of fines.19 Law 418 of 1997 also
criminal acts.10 The law allowed paramilitaries prohibited the recruitment of children by armed
not to provide information on offences they had forces or armed groups, with a penalty of up to
committed, not to turn over illegally obtained five years’ imprisonment (Article 14).
assets and not to disclose information about Laws on membership of armed groups and
their groups’ criminal activities.11 Article 64 stated the use of children for intelligence-gathering
that “the handing over of minors by members of appeared to be contradictory. The Childhood and
outlawed armed groups shall not be grounds for Adolescence Code expressly prohibited the use
losing the benefits referred to in this law and Law of demobilized children for intelligence-gathering
782 of 2002”.12 activities.20 However, Decree 128 of 2003 stated
From early 2006 the UN and civil society that children could be used for activities related
groups in Colombia increasingly warned of the to intelligence work (Article 22), and could be
rearming of demobilized paramilitary units, financially rewarded for supplying information
the continued existence of groups not involved (Article 9). Law 782 of 2002 stated that a child
in the AUC demobilization and the merging of could only be recognized as belonging to an
some former paramilitary units with criminal armed group by the spokesperson of the group
organizations, often involved in drug trafficking. in question or as a result of evidence provided by
Evidence was also emerging of new armed groups the child (Article 53), even though providing such
and criminal organizations establishing business evidence could involve children being used in
relations over drugs with elements of the FARC intelligence work.
and the ELN. Some of the groups reportedly Laws and implementing regulations on
operated along similar lines to the AUC, including demobilization treated children recruited by
involvement in counter-insurgency operations illegal armed groups primarily as victims of
and efforts to control territory.13 violence requiring special care and protection.
Internal armed conflict continued to have Law 782 of 2002 defined children involved in
a devastating impact on civilians. They were armed groups as victims of the armed conflict
victims of extrajudicial executions, enforced rather than as combatants (Article 15). In March
disappearance, death threats, anti-personnel 2005 the Constitutional Court handed down
mines, indiscriminate attacks and forcible Judgment 203 which revoked another provision
displacement in large numbers.14 Children of Law 782 which allowed the prosecution of
formed a high proportion of the victims, in minors involved in armed groups (Article 19).21
part because fighting forces at times operated However, under the Childhood and Adolescence
in and near schools and other places where Code, prosecution for membership of, or for acts
children were likely to gather. In one case, in committed during membership of, an armed
March 2006, army troops took up positions in group could be waived for all but the most
a village school near Puerto Asís, Putumayo, serious acts – those “which may constitute grave
causing 30 village families to leave their homes breaches of international humanitarian law,
after the FARC announced that it would attack crimes against humanity or genocide under the
the site.15 In June 2006 the Representative of the Rome Statute”.22
UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of
Internally Displaced Persons observed that “the Child recruitment and deployment
armed forces had installed their headquarters in Government security forces did not officially
the middle of the village [of Toribo, Cauca], next recruit under-18s, but continued to use captured
to a primary-school, and had erected posts in children for intelligence-gathering, despite
the central square of town immediately next to a the legal prohibition of the practice. The
playground and a church centre”.16

Ombudsman’s Office reported that in Cauca a accord in Germany.34 The UN High Commissioner
child demobilized from the FARC was used as an for Human Rights continued to receive some
informant during a military operation and was reports of recruitment of children by the ELN in
later killed at the age of 19 while in combat with Arauca and other parts of the country.35 More
the FARC.23 Captured children continued to be than 50 children demobilized in 2005 and 2006
held by security forces for longer than the 36- said that they had been in the ranks of the ELN.
hour period provided for by law, after which they Two girls aged 14 and 15 were reported to have
had to be placed in the care of the Colombian been forcibly recruited in Nariño in December
Institute of Family Welfare (Instituto Colombiano 2006.36
de Bienestar Familiar, ICBF).24 Children who had
left armed groups told the Ombudsman’s Office Paramilitary and other armed groups
that they were kept in police stations and army Children were believed to remain with the AUC
bases for longer periods and were pressured to and other partially demobilized paramilitary
give information about the groups they had left.25 groups, such as the Peasant Self-Defence Forces
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child of Casanare and the Cacique Pipinta Front.37
expressed concern about these practices, which The Ombudsman’s Office reported that more
placed children at serious risk of reprisals by than 200 children in the AUC ranks had not been
armed groups.26 demobilized in 2006.38
Sixteen-year-olds could enter air force train-
ing programs and 17-year-olds could train with
the national army as non-commissioned officers Disarmament, demobilization
in the infantry. Students could also enrol as
cadets in military secondary-schools, where they
carried out “special” military service from years The rules and practices governing demobilization
4 to 6, including 1,300 hours of military training were unclear. Law 782 of 2002 stated that
and participation in military exercises.27 children surrendering to the armed forces should
Government programs such as “soldiers be placed in the care of the ICBF within 36 hours.
for a day” (soldados por un día) and “peas- Decree 128 stated that only those who voluntarily
ant soldiers” (soldados campesinos) aimed to left an armed opposition or paramilitary group
familiarize children with the “war dynamic”.28 The were allowed to benefit from the government-
UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom run DDR program. However, since child soldiers
of opinion and expression was among those were required to identify themselves as members
who observed that the programs “militarize the of an armed group under Law 782, those who
countryside” and “ultimately endanger entire escaped or were discharged, and those afraid
villages, exposing them to the retaliation of the to reveal their identity, were unable to receive
guerrillas”.29 assistance. In practice the majority of FARC and
ELN child soldiers entering the DDR program
had surrendered to the security forces and been
Armed groups handed over to the ICBF.39 Some 3,300 former
Children were recruited and used by the child soldiers, mostly from the FARC, had taken
opposition FARC and ELN and various other part in the government’s DDR program since its
armed groups, mostly operating in urban areas, inception in November 1999.40
including some paramilitaries who had failed Some 300 children were formally released
to demobilize.30 Recruitment of children by the by the AUC and handed over to the authorities
FARC and ELN extended to areas of Ecuador and during the demobilization process which began in
Venezuela near the Colombian border.31 2003. However, the majority of AUC child soldiers
left the groups informally and made their way to
Revolutionary Armed Forces of the ICBF on their own, thus failing to meet the
Colombia (FARC) requirements of the collective demobilization
process. Concerns were expressed that many
Children were forcibly recruited by the FARC or former AUC child soldiers consequently received
joined up for lack of alternatives in a context of no demobilization or reintegration support.41
rural poverty. They acted as combatants, laid The DDR program was run by the ICBF,
explosives, ferried supplies, carried messages working in partnership with a number of
and served as guides. Girls were subjected international and national organizations that
to sexual abuse including rape and forced provided direct services, care and support.
abortions.32 Child recruitment by the FARC was Returning children initially received medical
recorded in at least eight departments, including attention and counselling at a “transition home”.
Arauca, Cauca and Putumayo.33 They were then transferred to specialized
institutional care centres for adolescents
National Liberation Army (ELN) up to the age of 18 for nine to 12 months in
The ELN pledged in 1998 to stop child preparation for “reintegration”.42 The program
recruitment, on signing the Puerta del Cielo initially envisaged that children would be

reunited with their families or placed in a foster forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
home. In practice security concerns and the and guidelines on children associated with
risk of re-recruitment made it impossible for armed forces or armed groups. The documents
many child soldiers to return to their families reaffirmed international standards and
in areas affected by the armed conflict. Foster operational principles for protecting and assisting
A—E
care presented a major challenge, with families child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
fearful of being targeted by the armed groups. consultation jointly sponsored by the French
The stigmatization of child soldiers, frequently government and UNICEF.
perceived as violent and threatening, meant The FARC and the ELN were listed as
that families were reluctant to receive former recruiting and using child soldiers in the UN
child soldiers. Those leaving the specialized Secretary-General’s annual reports on children
care centres moved either to youth homes or and armed conflict between 2002 and 2007.
youth protection facilities for those with special Paramilitary groups were listed for child
protection problems. While efforts continued recruitment and use between 2003 and 2005,
to strengthen fostering and family-based care, with the eception of two listed up to 2007.
approximately 60 per cent of those entering the
DDR program were in institutional care in 2007.43 1 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Child soldiers from the FARC and ELN, many Rights on the situation of human rights in
of whom came from rural areas and enlisted Colombia, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/9, 16 May 2006.
voluntarily for economic reasons, experienced 2 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Tougher
particular difficulties adapting to life in the challenges ahead for Colombia’s Uribe”, Latin
cities where the centres were located. They were America Briefing No. 11, 20 October 2006.
separated from family, friends and community 3 Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos
support systems, and faced the additional y Derecho Internacional Humanitaria,
challenge of stigmatization by the population. Vicepresidencia de la República, “Indicadores
Child soldiers demobilizing from the AUC de situación y resultados operacionales de la
presented greater psychological and behavioural Fuerza Pública (comparativo 2006–2007)” and
problems, including drug addiction.44 “Situación de derechos humanos y derecho
internacional humanitaria,” December 2004,
Developments 2005, 2006, www.derechoshumanos.gov.co.
4 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
The Committee on the Rights of the Child “Colombia: Humanitarian Situation Remains of
considered Colombia’s Third Periodic Report Concern”, 1 February 2006; ICRC, “Colombia”,
on the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Annual Report 2006, www.icrc.org.
June 2006. In its concluding observations the 5 “Colombia’s president vows to defeat rebels,”
Committee called on the government to take New York Times, 3 November 2006, www.nytimes.
effective measures to prevent the recruitment com.
and involvement of children in armed groups. It 6 Simon Romero, “Colombian rebels blamed for
urged the government to issue clear instructions hostage deaths,” New York Times, 28 June 2007,
and training to the armed forces to ensure www.nytimes.com.
that captured child soldiers were no longer 7 ICG, “Colombia: moving forward with the ELN?”,
interrogated or used for intelligence gathering Latin America Briefing No. 16, 11 October 2007.
and were handed over to civilian authorities 8 Alto Comisionado para la Paz, “Cuadros
within 36 hours. The Committee further urged Resumen: Areas Despejadas 2003–2006: 31.671
the government to increase substantially demovilizados”, www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.
resources for social reintegration, rehabilitation gov.co.
and reparations for returning child soldiers. It 9 Human Rights Watch (HRW), You’ll Learn not to
asked the government to consider withdrawing Cry: Child combatants in Colombia, September
its reservation under Article 124 of the Rome 2003.
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 10 Amnesty International (AI), Colombia: Justice and
The reservation allowed a country not to submit Peace Law Will Guarantee Impunity for Human
cases of those accused of war crimes to the Rights Abusers, 26 April 2005.
ICC for seven years. Once this period was over,
11 Sentencia C-370/2006, Corte Constitucional
only war crimes committed after the seven-year de Colombia, 18 May 2006; HRW, “Smoke
moratorium could be submitted to the ICC. The and mirrors: Colombia’s demobilization of
Committee expressed concern that the current paramilitary groups”, August 2005.
position blocked accountability for those
12 Article 64, Diario Oficial 45,980, Ley 975, 25 July
responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers 2005.
and the planting of landmines.45
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in 13 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights on the situation of human rights in
Paris, Colombia and 58 other states endorsed
Colombia, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/48, 5 March 2007;
the Paris Commitments to protect children ICG, “Colombia’s new armed groups”, 10 May
from unlawful recruitment or use by armed 2007, www.icg.org.

14 See, for example, Human Rights Council, 4th 31 Coalición contra la vinculación de niños, niñas
sess., provisional agenda item 2, Report of the y jóvenes al conflicto armado de Colombia and
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,
Rights, above note 13; HRW, “Maiming the Frontiers: Children at the Borderline, February
people: guerrilla use of antipersonnel landmines 2007.
and other indiscriminate weapons in Colombia”, 32 Report of the UN High Commissioner for
July 2007. Human Rights on the situation of human rights
15 Human Rights Council, above note 14. in Colombia, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/10, 28
16 Report of the Representative of the Secretary- February 2005; Special Rapporteur on the Rights
General on the human rights of internally of Women of the Inter-American Commission
displaced persons, Walter Kälin, Addendum: on Human Rights (IACHR), “Violence and
Mission to Colombia, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/38/ Discrimination against Women in the armed
Add.3, 24 January 2007. conflict in Colombia”, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 67, 18
October 2006; Defensoría del Pueblo and UNICEF,
17 Law No. 418 of 1997 and Law No. 548, http://
“La niñez y sus derechos, Caracterización de las
www.secratariasenado.gov.co/leyes.
niñas, niños, adolescentes desvinculados de los
18 Declaration on accession to the Optional grupos armados ilegales”, November 2006.
33 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human
19 Law No. 599 of 24 July 2000, ‘por la cual Rights, above note 1; Report of the UN High
se expide el Código Penal’, Art. 162 (illicit Commissioner for Human Rights, above note 13.
recruitment).
34 Acuerdo del Puerto del Cielo con el ELN, 15 July
20 Código de la Infancia y la Adolescencia, Article 1998, www.ciponline.org.
176.
35 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human
21 Sentencia C-203/05, Corte Constitucional de Rights, above note 1.
Colombia, 8 March 2005, www.secretariasenado.
gov.co.
22 Código de la Infancia y la Adolescencia, Article
armed conflict, UN Doc. A/62-S/2007/757, 21
175. This article largely took the approach of Law
December 2007; “Smoke and mirrors”, above
418 of 1997 and legislation extending it.
note 11.
38 Defensoría del Pueblo, Defensoría Delegada para
armed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/608/S/2007/757,
los Derechos de la Niñez, la Juventud y la Mujer,
21 December 2007.
Caracterización de las niñas, niños y adolescentes
24 Law 782 of 2002. desvinculados de los grupos armados ilegales:
25 Defensoría del Pueblo, Caracterización de los Inserción social y productiva desde un enfoque
niños, niñas y adolescentes desvinculados de derechos humanos, Bogotá, 2006, www.
de los grupos armados ilegales: Inserción saliendodelcallejon.pnud.org.co.
social y productiva desde un enfoque de 39 Y Care International, Overcoming Lost
derechos humanos, Bogotá, 2006, www. Childhoods, Lessons Learned from the
saliendodelcallejon.pnud.org.co. Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Former
26 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Child Soldiers in Colombia, 2007, www.
Consideration of report submitted by Colombia, ycareinternational.org.
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/COL/ 40 Informe alterno, above note 28; Procuraduría
CO/3, 8 June 2006. General de la Nación, Seguimiento a políticas
27 See, for example, Colegio Militar Simón públicas de desmovilización y reinserción,
Bolívar, “Reseña histórica”, www. Bogotá, June 2006, Vol. II.
colegiomilitarsimonbolivar.com/; Colegio Militar 41 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 37;
José María Córdoba, “Información general”, www. Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human
colmiljosemariacordoba.edu.co. Rights, above note 13.
28 Informe alterno a la Representante Especial del 42 Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar,
Secretario General para la cuestión de los niños “Programa de Atención a Jóvenes Desvinculados
y los conflictos armados, Situación de derechos y Amenazados poer el Conflicto Armado”, www.
humanos y derecho humanitario de la niñez bienestarfamiliar.gov.co.
2005–2006, Bogotá, 2007, www.coalico.org.
43 Y Care International, above note 39.
29 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission
44 Ibid.
on Human Rights, 61st sess., provisional agenda
item 11(c), Civil and Political Rights, Including the 45 Concluding observations, above note 26.
Question of Freedom of Expression: Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom
of opinion and expression, Ambeyi Ligabo,
Addendum: Mission to Colombia, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/64/Add.3, 26 November 2004.
armed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S2006/826,
26 October 2006.

© Christian Relief Network 2005
A—E
Former child soldier talks to a professional counsellor at a rehabilitation centre in Beni,

Democratic Republic of the Congo

C OMOROS CONG O , D e m o c ra t i c
Union of the Comoros Repu b l i c o f t h e
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government armed forces: unclear1
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription Population: 57.5 million (31.0 million under 18)
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 Government armed forces: 51,000
Voting age: 18 Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
Optional Protocol: not signed Voluntary recruitment age: 18
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): Voting age: 18
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC Optional Protocol: ratified 11 November 2001
There were no reports of under-18s in the CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
armed forces.
An estimated 7,000 child soldiers
Government remained in government forces and armed
groups, including foreign armed groups
National recruitment legislation and mostly to be found in the eastern provinces
practice of Equateur, Ituri, Katanga, North and
There was no conscription in Comoros. Military South Kivu, and Maniema. They were
recruitment was governed by law No. 97-06(AF), used as combatants, porters, guards and
which specified that the minimum age for sexual slaves. Children were recruited from
entrance into the armed forces was 18.2
The 2001 constitution enshrined in its refugee camps in Rwanda and used by
preamble respect for international human rights armed groups in North Kivu.
standards, in particular those relating to the
rights of children, and specifically includes the
right of children to be protected from violence. Context
Nearly 5.5 million people were estimated to have
Armed groups died in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) since the beginning of the armed conflict in
There were no new reports of the recruitment of 1998.1 Exploitation of mineral and other economic
children by armed political groups or militias. resources fuelled the conflict, which was
Children associated with armed groups on the characterized by systematic human rights abuses
island of Nzwani during the secession crisis in and population displacement, particularly in the
1997 were reintegrated into civilian life through east and north-east. Following an agreement in
two socio-economic programs with the support 2002 a government of national unity took office
of the World Bank and the UNDP. The programs in July 2003, composed of representatives of
ended in 2002.3 Nzwani still had an armed militia, the former government, major armed groups,
thought to be about 500 strong.4 opposition political parties and civil society.2
Priorities for the transition included restoring
Developments security and the extension of state authority
throughout the national territory, the creation of a
International standards unified national army and the demobilization and
reintegration of combatants, including children.3
In August 2006 Comoros ratified the Rome The UN mission in the DRC (MONUC) maintained
Statute of the International Criminal Court. a peacekeeping force of 16,000 troops across the
country.4
1 The military resources of the Comoros consist of Delayed presidential and legislative elections
a small standing army and a 500-member police were held in July and October 2006. In December
force, as well as a 500-member defence force. President Joseph Kabila was inaugurated and
A defence treaty with France provides naval became head of the DRC’s first democratically
resources for protection of territorial waters, elected government.5 However, parts of the
training of Comorian military personnel, and air
country remained under the control of different
surveillance. France maintains a small maritime
base and a Foreign Legion contingent on Mayotte.
armed forces and groups, with some military
commanders resisting army unification and
2 Confidential source, April 2007. operating parallel chains of command. Tensions
3 Ibid. were exacerbated by delayed and poorly
4 “Comoros: An expensive statement”, IRIN, 3 managed army unification, which left thousands
August 2007.

of former combatants without reintegration
support.6
Government
Armed activity by foreign armed groups National recruitment legislation and
continued, causing insecurity, violence and
displacement in the east. These groups included practice
A—E
the Rwandan Democratic Forces for the Liberation The February 2006 constitution defined a child
of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques pour la as any person below the age of 18. All forms of
libération du Rwanda (FDLR)), and the Ugandan exploitation of children were punishable by the
Allied Democratic Forces and National Army for law (Article 41), and public authorities were under
the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU). A small obligation to protect young people from threats
number of Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army to their health, education and development
troops were located in the remote Garamba Park (Article 42). The organization of military or
area.7 By late 2007 about 15,300 foreign fighters, paramilitary formations, private militias or youth
primarily from the FDLR, had been repatriated.8 armies was prohibited (Article 190).
However, regional relations continued to be The 2004 Defence and Armed Forces Law
characterized by tension and mistrust. In 2004 prohibited the individual requisition of one or
Rwanda threatened three times to renew military more children below the age of 18 in the event of
operations in the DRC, citing the need to protect a mobilization (Article 10) and the maintenance
Congolese Tutsi and to counter the threat posed of a youth army or youth subversive group
by the FDLR.9 (Article 41). Responsibility for child-soldier
Hostilities continued in several areas, demobilization was held by the Minister of
particularly Ituri, Katanga, and North and South National Defence, Demobilization and Former
Kivu provinces, where ethnic tensions were Combatants (Article 25).14 A previous decree-law,
manipulated for political ends or control of of 9 June 2000, ordered the demobilization of
economic resources in politically or militarily children below the age of 18 from armed forces
strategic areas.10 Human rights abuses against and groups. A May 2005 circular issued by the
civilians, including rape and murder, were widely military prosecutor instructed regional and local
committed by armed forces and groups involved military prosecutors to initiate proceedings
in hostilities. Those suspected of committing against all those accused of child recruitment
abuses continued to enjoy near-total impunity. A or use in military operations. The same circular
handful of military and armed-group leaders were instructed military prosecutors to refer illegally
arrested and prosecuted, but dozens of others recruited children accused of crimes to a
were promoted to senior military or government competent civilian court, or to the official DDR
positions.11 program for demobilization.15
Children were recruited and used by all A comprehensive Child Protection Code was
parties to the armed conflict for combat and awaiting approval by parliament in October 2007.
support roles, and thousands of girls were used The code prohibited the forced recruitment of
as sexual slaves. An estimated 30,000 children children or their use in armed conflict (Article
were awaiting demobilization from armed 50a), as well as the enlistment or use of
forces and other parties to the armed conflict children in the national armed forces, the police
at the end of 2003. Child recruitment by the and armed groups (Article 73). Prison terms
former Congolese army officially ended in 2003, of between ten and 20 years were specified
although some children remained in individual for these offences (Article 193). The code
units. National army unification and the national criminalized rape, (Article 175) and sexual slavery
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (Article 189), with prison terms of 7–25 and
(DDR) programs did not begin in earnest 10–25 years respectively. A wide range of other
until 2005; some 30,000 children had been acts of sexual violence and exploitation were
demobilized by mid-2007.12 Thousands of others, criminalized by the code.16
including many girls, escaped, were abandoned
or left the armed forces without being officially Child recruitment and deployment
demobilized. From 2005 the UN reported an Children remained in FARDC units which had
overall reduction in child-soldier recruitment and completed the army unification program (known
use by armed forces and groups – a consequence as integrated units) and in those awaiting
of a decrease in the number of active fighting unification (non-integrated units). In mid-2006
zones, the progressive incorporation of armed more than 26 cases of child recruitment and
groups into the national army and the associated other violations by FARDC were brought to the
demobilization process for adults and children.13 attention of FARDC chief of staff by MONUC.
However, some 7,000 child soldiers remained in Children were seen in FARDC brigades in
armed groups and the Armed Forces of the DRC Kasai Occidental, Katanga and South Kivu.17
(Forces armées de la République démocratique FARDC troops undergoing redeployment in
du Congo, FARDC). Active recruitment continued Ituri and the Kivus abducted children to carry
in some areas in 2007, particularly in North Kivu. equipment and belongings.18 In mid-2007

local sources reported seeing children used as camps and threatened child-protection workers
guards and “wives” in integrated and non- throughout 2007.
integrated units in the Fizi area, South Kivu. Some 300 to 500 children, some as young
Children interviewed complained of lack of food as 13, were reportedly serving in newly formed
and harsh conditions.19 Some child soldiers “mixed” brigades in North Kivu in April 2007,
were abandoned by commanders en route to and were deployed to fight against Mai-Mai and
unification centres in several locations, including the FDLR.26 Forcible recruitment was reported in
South Kivu and Katanga, possibly for fear of Ngungu and Rutshuru (North Kivu) in July, and
prosecution.20 Children captured from armed children were being hidden by troops loyal to
groups were detained by FARDC members in Nkunda in these and other zones in violation of
order to gather information on armed groups Military HQ Command’s orders. Children were
or to extort money from family members. Some told to lie about their age (to state that they
had been beaten while in detention. Former child were adults) and those who managed to escape
soldiers faced intimidation and harassment by returned to their villages, where they remained
FARDC members, including non-respect for their at risk of re-recruitment.27 MONUC reported in
official demobilization certificates.21 October that around 200 children remained in the
FARDC units loyal to Nkunda, particularly among
North Kivu brigades.28
Armed groups An upsurge in child recruitment from refugee
Child recruitment in armed units loyal camps and communities in Rwanda occurred from
January 2007.29 Children said they were offered
to Laurent Nkunda money and employment if they returned to North
Child soldiers were actively recruited and used Kivu, but on arrival were recruited into “mixed”
in hostilities by FARDC brigades and other armed brigades loyal to Nkunda.30 Rwandan authorities
units loyal to Laurent Nkunda, predominantly carried out a joint assessment with officials from
in North Kivu. Recruitment intensified in late the UN refugee agency UNHCR in May. They
2006 and continued throughout 2007. Nkunda, visited refugee camps to establish mechanisms
a former military officer of the armed wing of the for improved child protection, including improved
Rwanda-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy control over the exit of children from the
(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie- camps.31 The Rwanda government initiated an
Goma, RCD-Goma), remained hostile to the investigation into the alleged removal of eight
army unification process and exerted control children from Kiziba camp in July, for deployment
over troops and territory. Troops loyal to Nkunda in South Kivu.32 Some Rwandan child soldiers
clashed with the FARDC in Bukavu in 2004 and repatriated to Rwanda were reportedly arrested
in Sake in August and November 2006, after and beaten by the authorities.33
Nkunda mobilized his troops, ostensibly to
confront threats posed by the FDLR.22 An arrest Armed groups in Ituri
warrant for Nkunda, widely accused of human Numerous armed groups, often formed along
rights abuses, was issued by the government in ethnic lines, continued to operate in Ituri, an
September 2005, but he remained at large as of area of considerable natural wealth. Tensions
October 2007. between Hema and Lendu (pastoralist and
In January 2007 some armed units loyal to agriculturalist respectively) and associated
Nkunda agreed to enter the FARDC following communities, over land use, arms smuggling and
Rwanda-facilitated talks under an informally other resources, persisted throughout 2004. The
agreed process known as mixage, under groups carried out killings, rape and abductions
which Nkunda-affiliated troops combined with of the civilian population, as well as burning
government forces into five “mixed” brigades property and looting.34 All the groups recruited
which remained in North Kivu. In practice and used children. Some groups signed an “act
Nkunda retained command over the newly of engagement” with the government in May
formed FARDC units and his own troops, and 2004. They committed to joining the transitional
controlled parts of North Kivu. Troops loyal process and agreed to take part in a pilot DDR
to Nkunda were deployed to fight against the program initiated in September.35 However,
FDLR and Mai Mai militias,23 especially in Masisi disarmament was repeatedly delayed as
and Rutshuru, throughout 2007, contributing commanders attempted to negotiate amnesties
to rising insecurity, ethnic tension and human and to secure senior FARDC posts.
rights abuses in the province.24 In July 2006 Several leaders of armed groups were
Alphonse Batibwira, a non-governmental arrested in March 2005 after nine UN
organization (NGO) staff member, was killed peacekeepers from Bangladesh were killed in
while trying negotiate the release of child the Bunia area. They included Thomas Lubanga,
soldiers. A member of the non-integrated 81st head of the Union of Patriotic Congolese (Union
brigade, loyal to Nkunda, was accused of the des patriotes congolais, UPC/L), and Germain
killing. 25 Commanders of mixed brigades denied Katanga, head of the Ituri Patriotic Resistance
the presence of children, obstructed access to

Front (Front de résistance patriotique en Ituri, Other armed groups
FRPI).36 The two were subsequently indicted by
Mai-Mai militias – local defence groups – were
and handed over to the International Criminal
active in the eastern provinces of Katanga, the
Court (ICC). From 2005 the FARDC and MONUC
Kivus and Maniema during the armed conflict.
increased their efforts to compel the groups to
They received direct military support from the
A—E
disarm and to protect the civilian population. The
armed forces, as well as entering opportunistic
Congolese Popular Armed Forces (Forces armées
alliances with adversary groups. Some Mai-Mai
populaires congolaises, FAPC) was completely
groups entered the transitional process in 2003.
dismantled in 2006 and hundreds of children,
Others, particularly in Katanga and North and
including numerous girls, joined the DDR
South Kivu, were not eligible for, or remained
program. Some children could have remained
hostile to, army unification and the DDR
with remnants of the group, which crossed the
program.47 Seventy-six children were released
border into Uganda.37
from one group in Katanga in May 2006 when
While militarily weakened, the FRPI and the
Mai-Mai leader Kyungu Mutanga surrendered,
Nationalist and Integrationist Front (Front des
but children probably remained among the 2–
nationalistes et intégrationnistes, FNI) continued
4,000 remaining militia members.48 Children were
to operate, and in 2005 they attempted to
deployed by Mai-Mai to fight troops affiliated
consolidate their remaining forces under a new
with Laurent Nkunda in North Kivu from 2006,
alliance, the Congolese Revolutionary Movement
and recruitment was ongoing in 2007. Children
(Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais, MRC).38
were recruited and used by Banyamulenge
Children continued to be recruited and re-
(Congolese Tutsi) militias in South Kivu.49
recruited by the FNI, led by Peter Karim Udaga
throughout 2005. In July 2006 Karim agreed
to disarm and enter the DDR program, and 87 Disarmament, demobilization
children were demobilized from his forces. By late
August the UN reported that the FNI was again and reintegration (DDR)
recruiting children, including by force.39 Several Ongoing impunity for human rights violations,
dozen children were released from these groups including for sexual violence, hindered the
or escaped during the first months of 2007, but successful reintegration of former child soldiers.
some FNI commanders actively obstructed the Efforts by the government, the international
release of children.40 Local sources estimated community, donors and NGOs were hampered by
that as of April 2007 several hundred children a context of poverty, weak or non-existent state
remained in these groups.41 They included institutions and an infrastructure devastated by
children forced to remain unless amnesty war.
conditions for disarmament were met by the Funding for adults’ and children’s DDR was
authorities.42 established by the World Bank and the Multi-
country Demobilization and Reintegration
Forces démocratiques pour la Program in 2002. In the absence of a national
libération du Rwanda (FDLR) body, DDR was initially carried out by UNICEF
Rwandan armed groups opposed to the Rwandan and NGOs with assistance form MONUC child
government had been present in the eastern protection advisers.50 A national body, the
DRC since shortly after the 1994 genocide, and Commission Nationale de Désarmement,
the Rwandan FDLR had been active in North and Démobilisation et Réinsertion (CONADER), was
South Kivu from about 2004. While officially established in December 2003 to oversee a DDR
opposed to the Rwandan government, it primarily program for an estimated 150,000 adult fighters
engaged in criminal activities in the Kivus, and 30,000 children. An operational framework
including extortion and trading in minerals.43 for children’s DDR was adopted by CONADER
Reports persisted of Congolese government in March 2004.51 By December 2006 CONADER
assistance in the form of weapons and military stated that 30,000 children had been released
support to the FDLR, and in early 2007 some from armed forces and groups.52 Four thousand
FARDC brigades might have been assisted by the children were released between October 2006
FDLR in fighting troops loyal to Laurent Nkunda. and August 2007, mainly from “mixed” brigades
Killings, abductions and looting by the FDLR were and armed groups.53
reported throughout 2006 and 2007.44 Numerous Implementation of the children’s DDR program
cases of rape were reported, including the rape was delayed, owing to continued hostilities, lack
of a four-year-old girl in South Kivu in 2006. In at of political and military will, mismanagement of
least one case a group of abductees was released funds and poor co-ordination and timetabling.54
after a ransom was paid.45 The FDLR recruited Throughout 2005 CONADER, the UN and NGOs
and used a number of children, some of whom were forced to respond on an emergency basis to
were deployed to fight against Nkunda-affiliated urgent needs to identify, demobilize, transport,
troops in 2007, although numbers were difficult shelter and feed thousands of children. Most
to establish.46 reintegration programs did not start until 2006.55

Reintegration support was consistently Community-based initiatives were established
underfunded or entirely absent. In December from 2004 to respond to the needs of girls in
2006 CONADER said that of the 30,000 some regions, but thousands of girls received no
demobilized children some 14,000 had yet to reintegration support. Despite well-documented
receive reintegration assistance. By mid-2007 evidence of widespread sexual violence against
CONADER was winding down and international girls, their complex medical and psychosocial
funding had virtually ceased.56 CONADER needs remained largely unmet. Programs to
was slow to approve funding for NGO-based assist girl mothers and their children remained
reintegration projects. Most programs were virtually non-existent.65 Existing provision
established in urban centres and inaccessible to was largely provided by NGOs working at
the majority of child soldiers, who were based in the community level.66 Returning girls were
rural areas.57 rejected by their communities because of their
An estimated 11,000 children escaped involvement in sexual activity.67
or left the armed forces and groups without
being officially demobilized.58 Children, many Other treatment of child soldiers
of them used in frontline combat, saw adults Children were arrested, detained and tried in
receive demobilization packages and support military courts for military offences and other
for a one-year period, while they returned crimes allegedly committed while they were in
home without material support, training or armed forces or groups. The trials contravened
other assistance. Some reportedly resorted to Article 114 of the Military Justice Code, which
identifying themselves as adults to enter the stipulated that persons below the age of 18 did
adult program.59 Others were either forcibly re- not fall under military jurisdiction.68 A decree-
recruited or re-enlisted “voluntarily” in the face of law passed in 2000 ordered the demobilization
a dearth of alternatives. of children illegally recruited or used by armed
Thousands of girls were recruited and used forces and groups, and the provision was
by armed forces and groups during and after reinforced in May 2005 by a circular issued by the
the armed conflict, and girls continued to be military prosecutor (auditeur général) instructing
associated with armed forces and groups in the military prosecutors to refer illegally recruited
eastern DRC. They performed combat duties children accused of crimes to a competent civilian
and portering, provided medical assistance court or the national body responsible for DDR
and carried out domestic labour. Thousands for demobilization.69
were raped, resulting in serious and permanent At least 12 children were known to have
injuries; many had children as a result of rape.60 been sentenced to death since 2003.70 The Child
Girl soldiers were initially largely overlooked Soldiers Coalition was informed in mid-2007
by the government and the donor community. that executions were no longer carried out in the
Most girls did not enter the official DDR program, DRC,71 but at least five children were believed to
fearing stigmatization by their communities if remain in detention under sentence of death in
they were identified as child soldiers. Others July 2007 in prisons in the eastern DRC.72
remained with their military “husbands” for fear The arrest and detention of child soldiers on
of violence and recrimination if they left.61 Only charges of desertion and other military offences
12 per cent of formally demobilized children (such as abandonment of duty and disobeying
were girls, despite estimates that girls might orders) appeared to have decreased over
have comprised up to 40 per cent of the total the previous two years, but cases of children
number of child soldiers during the armed detained for desertion continued to be identified.
conflict. CONADER reported in May 2006 that Captured child soldiers were also held by the
of the 18,500 demobilized children at that date, FARDC so that information on the activities of
only 2,900 (15 per cent) were girls. A World Bank armed groups could be extracted from them.73
official told Amnesty International in March 2006
that very little was being done for girl soldiers,
adding that “we have no good profile of who Developments
these girls are”.62
In April 2007 DRC Child Soldiers Coalition Impunity
members identified 415 girls in the ranks of On 29 January 2007 the ICC confirmed three
armed forces and groups in South Kivu. All the charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, head
commanders denied the presence of girls in their of the UPC, for conscripting and enlisting
ranks, alleging that they were dependents or children under the age of 15 and for using them
“wives”. Local sources reported that many girls to participate actively in hostilities in Ituri from
remained with the 115th brigade of the FARDC, September 2002 to 13 August 2003.74 His trial,
Mai Mai groups and the FDLR in North Kivu.63 the first in the ICC’s history, was scheduled to
Military commanders and fighters frequently begin in early 2008. Germain Katanga, of the
assumed possession of the girls, claimed them Ituri-based FRPI, was indicted by the ICC in June
as “wives” and saw no obligation to identify or on three counts of crimes against humanity,
release them.64 including murder, inhumane acts and sexual

enslavement, and six counts of war crimes, protecting and assisting child soldiers and
including child-soldier recruitment and use. followed a wide-ranging global consultation
Katanga was transferred to The Hague in October jointly sponsored by the French government and
2007. UNICEF.
A Mai-Mai militia leader based in Katanga Mrs Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN Special
A—E
province, Kyungu Mutanga, also known as Representative of the Secretary-General for
“Gédéon”, surrendered to MONUC in 2006 children and armed conflict, visited the DRC in
and was subsequently held by the FARDC March 2007. She urged the authorities to take
along with his wife and four child soldiers timely and decisive action against the violators of
previously with his group.75 He was charged children’s rights, including the arrest of Laurent
with “insurrection, crimes against humanity, Nkunda, and called for measures to demobilize
war crimes and terrorism”, and his trial, which children still in the FARDC and armed groups.
began in August 2007, was ongoing in October.76 Mrs Coomaraswamy expressed concern at the
National authorities prosecuted Jean-Pierre extent of sexual violence in the eastern DRC
Biyoyo, a FARDC member and former leader and the prevailing climate of impunity for such
of the Mudundu 40 militia. He was tried by a crimes. She noted that long-term development
military court and sentenced in March 2006 to strategies were required along with adequate
life imprisonment for insurrection and to five donor support for the work of child-protection
years’ imprisonment for the arbitrary arrest agencies.81
and illegal detention of children (de facto child The FARDC and numerous armed groups
recruitment) carried out in South Kivu in April (including many of those named above) were
2004.77 Biyoyo escaped from prison in June 2006 repeatedly listed as parties responsible for
and the following February returned to Bukavu as recruiting and using children between 2002 and
part of a military delegation to address military 2007 in the annex to the Secretary-General’s
units resisting the army unification process in annual reports on children and armed conflict.
Minembwe (South Kivu).78 Most were additionally named as responsible for
Laurent Nkunda remained at large despite killings, abductions and rape.82
being widely accused of serious human abuses,
including responsibility for a massacre in 1 International Rescue Committee, Mortality in the
Kisangani in May 2002, summary executions, DRC, an Ongoing Crisis, January 2008, http://
torture, rape and looting following hostilities in theirc.org.
Bukavu in 2004, as well as forced recruitment 2 Amnesty International Report 2005.
and use of children in hostilities. In September
3 Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in
2005 the government issued an international the DRC, 16 December 2002, www.reliefweb.org.
arrest warrant for Nkunda on charges of
insurrection, war crimes and crimes against 4 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
humanity.79
UN Doc. S/2007/671, 14 November 2007.
Impunity for rape and other acts of sexual
violence contributed to the widespread 5 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN
and continued commission of these crimes, Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
UN Doc.S/2007/156, 20 March 2007.
with children (girls and boys) comprising a
high proportion of the victims. A handful of 6 Amnesty International (AI), DRC, Children at War:
prosecutions was successfully carried out. In Creating Hope for their Future, October 2006.
one important case, in April 2006, seven FARDC 7 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
members were convicted of crimes against armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
humanity for mass rapes carried out in Equateur Congo, UN Doc. S/2007/391, 28 June 2007.
province in 2003. The court applied the Rome 8 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4.
Statute of the ICC, which qualified rape as a crime 9 Amnesty International Report 2005.
against humanity. A further dozen or so FARDC 10 Ibid.
soldiers were convicted by military courts and 11 Human Rights Watch World Report 2008.
sentenced to prison terms of between eight and
12 DRC, Children at War, above note 6.
ten years in 2006 and 2007.80
Other developments armed conflict in the DRC, UN Doc. S/2006/389,
13 June 2006, and Report of the Secretary-
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, General, above note 7.
the DRC and 58 other states endorsed the Paris
14 Loi No. 04/023 du 12 novembre 2004 portant
Commitments to protect children from unlawful organisation générale de la défence et les
recruitment or use by armed forces or armed forces armées, Journal officiel de la République
groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on démocratique du Congo, 13 November 2004.

15 Circular No. AG/0631/D8a/2005, 19 May 2005, 37 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
cited in MONUC Child Protection Section, armed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826,
Arrestations et détentions dans les prisons et 26 October 2006.
cachots de la RDC et la détention des enfants 38 Eighteenth Report of the Secretary-General on
et la justice pour mineurs, March 2006, www. the UN Mission in Democratic Republic of the
monuc.org. Congo, UN Doc. S/2005/506, 2 August 2005;
16 RDC, Ministère de la Condition Féminine, Projet DRC, Children at War, above note 6.
de Code de Protection de l’Enfant, version 39 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 37;
definitive à traiter au Conseil des Ministres, MONUC Press release, 18 August 2006.
October 2007.
41 Interviews with child protection agencies, Bunia,
18 Ibid. March 2007; report on the national workshop on
19 Confidential sources, South Kivu, July 2007. DDR, Goma, 12–14 April 2007.
20 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 13. 42 “RDC, Peter Karim, dernier chef milicien d’Ituri a
21 DRC, Children at War, above note 6. rendu les armes”, Agence France-Presse, 7 April
2007; interviews with child protection agencies,
22 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “DRC: Arrest Laurent
Bunia, March 2007.
Nkunda for war crimes”, 1 February 2006; Report
of the Secretary-General on children and armed 43 ICG, The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once
conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529 S/2006/826, 26 and for All, May 2005; ICG, Congo: Bringing
October 2006. peace to North Kivu, October 2007.
23 Mai Mai groups were locally based armed 44 HRW, above note 24.
militias. Mainly active in the eastern provinces 45 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
of Maniema, Katanga and the Kivus, they were armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
backed by government forces during the armed Congo, UN Doc. S/2007/391, 28 June 2007.
conflict but entered opportunistic alliances with 46 UNICEF, Report of the National Workshop on
opposing forces. Some entered the unification Children’s DDR, Goma, 12–14 April 2007.
process but others remained outside and
47 DRC, Children at War, above note 6; Report of the
engaged in armed activity against FARDC units.
Secretary-General, above note 13.
24 HRW, Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, October
2007; International Crisis Group (ICG), Congo:
armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Bringing Peace to North Kivu, 31 October 2007.
Congo, UN Doc. S/2007/381, 28 June 2007.
49 Coalition information from local sources, eastern
26 HRW, “Army should stop use of child soldiers”, DRC, June 2007.
19 April 2007; RDC-Humanitaire, “Implications
50 A separate process was established for the
of the mixage for the demobilisation of children
demobilization and repatriation of all foreign
associated with armed groups”, February 2007,
groups, which was managed by MONUC.
www.rdc-humanitaire.net; Coalition sources,
eastern DRC, June 2007. 51 DRC, Children at War, above note 6.
27 Coalition sources, June 2007 52 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 13.
28 MONUC, “MONUC denounces the presence of 53 Report of the secretary-General, above note 32.
children in FARDC’s ranks”, press statement, 31 54 DRC, Children at War, above note 6.
October 2007. 55 Coalition sources, July 2007.
29 Coalition sources, eastern DRC, April 2007 56 Coalition sources, July 2007.
30 HRW, above note 26. 57 Coalition sources, eastern DRC, April 2007.
31 HRW, above note 24. 58 UNICEF, above note 46.
32 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and 59 Under the adult DDR program fighters received
armed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/609-S.2007/757, a monetary sum on demobilization followed by a
21 December 2007. monthly allowance for one year.
33 Coalition source, July 2007. 60 Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004; report of the
34 MONUC Human Rights Division, The Human Secretary-General, above note 13.
Rights Situation in the DRC, 10 May 2006; 61 Beth Verhey, Reaching the Girls: Study on Girls
Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on Associated with Armed Forces and Groups in the
the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the DRC, Save the Children and NGO Group: CARE,
Congo, UN Doc. S/2005/167, 15 March 2005. IFESH, IRC, April, 2005.
35 Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on 62 DRC, Children at War, above note 6.
the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 63 Coalition sources, DRC, April 2007.
Congo, UN Doc. S/2004/645, 12 August 2004.
64 DRC, Children at War, above note 6.
36 Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General,
above note 34. 65 Coalition interviews, March, April and July 2007.

66 Save the Children UK, The Forgotten Casualties
of War, April 2005, www.savethechildren.org.uk; CON G O , R e p u b l i c o f
Verhey, above note 61.
67 Verhey, above note 61. Republic of Congo
68 Military Justice Code, Law No. 023/2002 of 18
A—E
November 2002, Article 114. Population: 4.0 million (2.2 million under 18)
69 MONUC Child Protection Section, Circular No.
AG/0631/D8a/2005,19 May 2005, cited in Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
Arrestations et détentions, above note 15. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
70 MONUC Child Protection Section, Arrestations et Voting age: 18
détentions, above note 15. Optional Protocol: not signed
71 Coalition source, July 2007. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
72 Ibid. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
73 MONUC Human Rights Section, “Monthly report
on human rights, March 2007”, 16 April 2007. There were no reports of under-18s in the
74 International Criminal Court, “Pre-trial Chamber armed forces. An unknown number of child
I commits Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for trial”, press soldiers and former child soldiers were
release, 29 January 2007, http://www.icc-cpi.int. thought to remain with an armed group.
75 MONUC, “The human rights situation in the DRC,
July to December 2006”, 8 February 2007, www.
monuc.org. Context
76 MONUC, monthly human rights assessment, Implementation of the March 2003 peace
September 2007. agreement between the government and the
77 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 13; National Resistance Council (Conseil national
MONUC, “RD Congo: l’ONU est ‘consternée’ par de résistance, CNR) (known as the Ninjas) was
l’impunité à l’est du pays pour les coupables repeatedly delayed. The situation in the Pool
du recrutement des enfants”, MONUC News, 12 region in south-eastern Congo, the stronghold
March 2007. of the Ninjas, remained particularly difficult.
78 Le Potentiel, Kinshasa, 1 March 2007; “RDC: By March 2007 security appeared to have
un officier condamné au sein d’une mission improved, but the fragility of the improvement
officielle, l’ONU préoccupée”, Agence France- was underlined by the failure fully to implement
Presse, 1 March 2007. disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
79 HRW, above note 22; AI, DRC, Civilians Pay the (DDR) programs or to control the spread of
Price for Political and Military Rivalry, September small arms.1 In January 2007 CNR leader Frédéric
2005. Bitsangou, alias Pasteur Ntoumi, announced
80 Reports of the Secretary-General, above notes 7 that the CNR had applied to be registered
and 13. as a political party and committed itself to
81 UN, Report of the Special Representative of disarmament.2 In May Frédéric Bitsangou was
the Secretary-General for Children and Armed appointed by presidential decree as general
Conflict, UN Doc. A/62/228, 13 August 2007. delegate in charge of promotion of peace and
82 Reports of the Secretary-General, above notes 32 post-conflict reconstruction, but failed to take up
and 37. his post as expected in September after a dispute
with the government.3
Former CNR child soldiers, not always under
the control of their former leaders, were reported
to be a major factor in the insecurity in the
Pool region through their involvement in armed
robbery. UNICEF expressed concern that the pres-
ence of armed elements increased the threat of
sexual violence.4
Government
practice
There had been no conscription since 1969.
Enlistment in the armed forces was voluntary
with a minimum recruitment age of 18.5

couraging participation in the program, adapting
Armed groups psychosocial support to female trauma profiles
No recent information was available on the and conflict experiences, providing appropriate
recruitment of child soldiers by the CNR. The apprenticeships and training, and sensitizing
vast majority of former child soldiers who had spouses and families.15
fought with the CNR during the conflict were A project on Prevention and Reintegration of
by 2007 believed to be over 18. However, child Children involved in Armed Conflict was imple-
soldiers were reported as guarding the railway in mented between 2004 and 2007 by the Interna-
the Pool region, suggesting that recruitment in tional Program on the Elimination of Child Labour
some form may have been continuing.6 Estimates (IPEC) of the International Labour Organization
dating from 2003 were that some 1,500–1,800 (ILO). It focused on socio-economic reintegration
former child soldiers required demobilization, support and preventing recruitment of children
but the reliability of these figures had not been by armed groups. Approximately 200 former child
established.7 soldiers, more than 70 of them girls, received
professional training or work placements, while
over 650 vulnerable children, including more than
Disarmament, demobilization 200 girls, participated in the anti-recruitment
and reintegration (DDR) program.16
In 2006 an estimated 34,000 weapons were
The governmental commission for the illegally held in Congo by members of former
reintegration of former combatants, Haut armed groups as well as by the civilian popula-
Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex- tion. In September 2005, 507 firearms and over
combattants, estimated that over 4,600 child 3,600 pieces of ammunition were destroyed,
soldiers took part in Congo’s conflicts between and weapons collected between December 2005
1993 and 2002.8 and March 2006 from 800 civilians and former
Between February 2002 and December soldiers were destroyed in March 2006 through
2004, 965 former child soldiers, most of whom an internationally funded weapons collection
were by then over 18, were among 9,000 program.17
former combatants taking part in an Emergency The CNR received an unknown sum of money
Demobilization and Reintegration Program (Projet from the Congolese government to disarm its
d’Urgence de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion, combatants in the Pool region. Progress was not
PDR).9 clear, and in May 2007 a first symbolic burning of
After significant delays due in part to collected weapons was postponed.18
the difficulty in establishing the number of
beneficiaries and a financial management
system, a National Disarmament, Demobilization Developments
and Reinsertion Program (Programme national In 2006 the UN Committee on the Rights of
de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion, the Child expressed concern that despite
PNDDR), partially funded by the Multi-country international support for a DDR process, the
Demobilization and Reintegration Program physical and psychological recovery needs of
(MDRP),10 received its first disbursement in many former child soldiers had not been met. It
October 2006. It was expected that by July 2007 recommended that particular attention be paid to
reintegration support would have been delivered the specific needs of girls and to the reintegration
to some 1,000 former combatants who had self- of former child soldiers into the education
demobilized.11 Up to 30,000 former combatants, system.19
including 19,000 from the 1998–9 conflict, were At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
expected to benefit from the PNDDR.12 Paris, the Republic of Congo and 58 other states
Of former child soldiers to have been endorsed the Paris Commitments to protect chil-
provisionally identified, 517 were girls and 1,261 dren from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
boys.13 forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
Building on the lessons of other MDRP-sup- and guidelines on children associated with
ported DDR programs in the region, the PNDDR armed forces or armed groups. The documents
explicitly recognized the necessity of addressing reaffirmed international standards and opera-
the particular needs of former child soldiers, tional principles for protecting and assisting
recruited as children but demobilized as young child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
adults. It proposed that particular attention be consultation jointly sponsored by the French
paid to psychosocial counselling and support, government and UNICEF.
life skills, independent living skills, employment
orientation and guidance for former child soldiers International standards
up to the age of 21 in the case of males and 25 in The Republic of Congo ratified the Rome Statute
the case of females.14 The PNDDR also recognized of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in May
the special attention required to address the
needs of former girl child soldiers, including en-

2004 and the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child in September 2006. COSTA R I C A
1 UNICEF Humanitarian Action Report 2007: Republic of Costa Rica
Republic of Congo, www.unicef.org/har07.
A—E
2 “Congo: Govt, agencies welcome decision
Government armed forces: no armed forces
to make rebel group political party”, IRIN, 1
February 2007, www.irinnews.org. Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable
3 “Congo: Ntoumi ‘problem’ is solved, says Voluntary recruitment age: not applicable
president”, IRIN, 5 October 2007. Voting age: 18
��
4 UNICEF, above note 1. Optional Protocol: ratified
��
24 January 2003
5 Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin, Children: Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
The Invisible Soldiers, Rädda Barnen (Save the CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
Children–Sweden), Stockholm, 1998; Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill and Ilene Cohn, Child Soldiers, The minimum age for recruitment to the
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994. police, the country’s only security force,
6 Information from Haut Commissariat à la was 18.
Réinsertion des Ex-combattants, May 2007.
7 Information from Lead Specialist, World Bank,
April 2007. Government
8 Haut Commissariat, above note 6.
9 Ibid.
10 The Multi-country Demobilization and
practice
Reintegration Program (MDRP) supports Under the 1949 constitution, which abolished the
demobilization and reintegration of ex- armed forces, the police force was the country’s
combatants in the greater Great Lakes region of only security force, and military forces could be
central Africa (Angola, Burundi Central African organized only under a continental agreement
Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or for national defence and had always to be
Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda). subordinate to civilian control.1
It is financed by the World Bank, 12 donor Police recruits had to be 18 and to have
governments and the European Commission, completed their third year of general basic
and involves governments in the region, the UN education (secondary education).2 Police training
and its agencies, and regional organizations. See
was vocational, accredited by the Ministry of
www.mdrp.org.
Education and civilian in nature, and directed
11 World Bank, above note 7. towards upholding civil law, democracy and
12 MDRP, Republic of Congo Activities at a Glance, human rights.3
www.mdrp.org, updated March 2007. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
13 Haut commissariat, above note 6. recommended in May 2007 that the prohibition
14 World Bank Document, Technical Annex for a on recruiting children under 15 and their direct
Program of US$17 million from the MDRP multi- participation in hostilities be expressly set out
donor trust fund to the Republic of Congo for an in law.4
emergency reintegration program, Report No.
33787, 14 December 2005, www.mdrp.org.
15 World Bank, above note 7. Disarmament, demobilization
16 Le projet BIT/IPEC fait le bilan de ses activités, and reintegration (DDR)
www.congo-site.com).
There were about 13,000 refugees in Costa Rica,
17 “Congo: small arms continue to threaten political
10,000 of whom were Colombian.5 In May 2007
transition and stability”, IRIN, 9 May 2006.
the Committee on the Rights of the Child noted
18 Haut commissariat, above note 6. the lack of information in Costa Rica’s 2005
19 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, report to the Committee about child refugees
Consideration of report submitted by the and migrants from countries affected by armed
Republic of Congo, Concluding observations, UN conflict, and about “measures adopted with
Doc. CRC/C/COG/CO/1, 20 October 2006. regard to their identification, physical and
psychological recovery and social reintegration”.
The Committee recommended early identification
of those who might have been recruited or used
in hostilities, and assistance for their recovery
and reintegration.6
1 Constitución Política de la República de Costa

Rica, Article 12.

2 2001 Ley General de Policía.
3 Initial report of Costa Rica to the UN Committee Côte d’ I voire
on the Rights of the Child on implementation of
the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ Republic of Côte d’Ivoire
CRI/1, 22 December 2005.
4 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Population: 18.2 million (8.9 million under 18)
Consideration of initial report submitted by Costa Government armed forces: 17,050
Rica on implementation of the Optional Protocol, Compulsory recruitment age: 18
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ Voluntary recruitment age: 18
CRI/CO/1, 1 May 2007. Voting age: 21
5 “Costa Rica, el segundo país con más refugiados Optional Protocol: not signed
en Latinoamérica”, EFE, 15 June 2006, at www. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
acnur.org.
6 Concluding observations, above note 4.
Children, including former child soldiers
from the Liberian conflict, were recruited
for use in pro-government militias and the
armed opposition group Forces armées
des Forces nouvelles (FAFN) at least until
late 2005. Active recruitment of children
appeared to have stopped from October
2006, but by late 2007 children reportedly
continued to be associated with both
militias and the FAFN, despite concerted
efforts at demobilization.
Context
The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire began with an
attempted coup against President Laurent
Gbagbo in September 2002, and led to the
country being divided into two territories. The
south was controlled by the government and
the north by the opposition New Forces (Forces
nouvelles), which had been formed out of the
Côte d’Ivoire Patriotic Movement (Mouvement
patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire, MPCI), and two other
armed opposition groups, the Ivorian Popular
Movement of the Great West (Mouvement
populaire ivoirien du grand ouest, MPIGO), and
the Justice and Peace Movement (Mouvement
pour la justice et la paix, MJP). The January
2003 Linas-Marcoussis agreement, signed by all
parties to the conflict and aimed at bringing them
all within a transitional government of national
reconciliation, was only partially and reluctantly
implemented.1
Interests within neighbouring countries
fuelled the conflict. The Liberian government of
President Charles Taylor reportedly supported
armed opposition groups in western Côte
d’Ivoire, which included fighters from armed
groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and Liberian
fighters and Liberian nationals recruited from
refugee camps in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana fought
in both pro-government militias and armed
opposition groups.2
In April 2004 a UN peacekeeping force (United
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UNOCI) was
deployed. Also present in the country were

French troops, initially sent in September 2002 mainly as an economic opportunity. Many
to protect foreign nationals, whose presence had had first been forcibly recruited as children in
subsequently been endorsed and clarified by UN one conflict, and then had willingly crossed
Security Council resolutions.3 The international borders to take up arms in another conflict,
troops patrolled a buffer zone, known as the often with a different armed group. A 2005
A—E
“zone of confidence”, between the north and study by Human Rights Watch found that most
south of the country. had been motivated by promises of financial
A number of agreements, including the Accra gain, and many could not articulate the political
Agreement III of July 20044 and the Pretoria objective of the group they fought with. The
Agreement of April 2005,5 were reached with risk of re-recruitment was exacerbated by high
international mediation, but political stalemates, rates of youth unemployment and corruption
disagreements about implementation and and deficiencies in the implementation of
outbreaks of violence hindered the peace disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
process.6 Presidential elections originally (DDR) programs.13 An August 2006 report by the
scheduled for October 2005 were postponed UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) noted that
several times. In November 2006 UN Security high levels of unemployment, particularly youth
Council Resolution 1721 extended the transitional unemployment, across west Africa posed a risk
government’s mandate and tasked it with to stability in the region. This was reiterated in a
completing the peace process by October 2007. 2007 report by the UN Secretary-General which
In March 2007 President Gbagbo and the highlighted also the importance of reform of the
leader of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume security sector in countries in the region as a
Soro, signed the Ouagadougou peace accord, means of addressing it.14
under which Guillaume Soro was named prime
minister.7 The agreement included provisions
for creating a new transitional government,
Government
merging the Forces nouvelles and the national National recruitment legislation and
defence and security forces within an integrated
command centre, disarming combatants, practice
granting amnesty for all crimes relating to The Armed Forces Code of 7 September 1995
national security committed since September established a minimum age of 18 for compulsory
2000, and organizing a presidential election.8 and voluntary military service for men and
As a supplement to the agreement, in April the women.
president signed a decree, applicable to both In October 2006 the UN reported that there
sides, granting amnesty for crimes committed was at that time no tangible evidence of children
during the armed conflict. However, contrary participating in the regular armed forces (Forces
to the Ouagadougou agreement and the 2003 nationales de Côte d’Ivoire, FANCI), but that
amnesty law, which excluded from amnesty children were evidently associated with armed
“crimes constituting serious violations of human militia groups close to the ruling party, the
rights and international humanitarian law and Popular Ivorian Front (Front populaire ivoirien,
crimes listed in Articles 5–8 of the Treaty of Rome FPI). 15
on the International Criminal Court”, the amnesty
decree did not expressly exclude crimes under
international law, such as the recruitment and
Armed groups
use of children as soldiers.9 Children were associated with armed groups
In April 2007 there were reports that on both sides of the conflict, in pro-government
demilitarization in the zone of confidence had militias and the Forces armées des Forces
led to an increase in violence, including rape, nouvelles (FAFN).16 By August 2007 the UN
against people living in the region.10 The fragility reported that there had been no substantiated
of the peace process was highlighted in June by evidence of the active recruitment and use of
a rocket attack on Prime Minister Soro’s aircraft. children by armed groups since October 2006.17
He escaped uninjured but four of his companions Anecdotal reports from the west of the country
were killed.11 indicated that children continued to be used as
Many aspects of the conflicts in Liberia and servants and that girls were sexually abused
in Sierra Leone since the 1990s and in Côte by the FAFN. The environment continued to be
d’Ivoire since 2002 were intricately linked, with unstable, and delays in the disarmament of
operations across borders, including in Guinea, militias and the FAFN and in the establishment
which bordered all three countries, and a of a joint military structure made children
complex web of governments and armed groups vulnerable to re-recruitment and use by these
providing support to factions in neighbouring groups.
countries.12 A migrant population of thousands
of young fighters, including child soldiers,
crossing the borders between Liberia, Guinea,
Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, saw conflict

© Coalition 2006
Children in a local community group beside a military camp in Bouaké, northern Côte
d’Ivoire

Pro-government militias assets freeze on several individuals for serious
violations of human rights and international
According to reports, scores or even hundreds
humanitarian law in Côte d’Ivoire. Among them
of Liberian children who had been reunited with
was a FAFN commander, Martin Kouakou Fofié.
their families following their demobilization
According to the Security Council, forces under
in Liberia were re-recruited in Liberia between
A—E
his command had, among other abuses, engaged
late 2004 and early 2005 to fight alongside
in recruitment of child soldiers.26
pro-government militias in the west of Côte
The FAFN was one of the parties listed in
d’Ivoire. Most of these children had originally
reports of the Secretary-General in February
been forcibly recruited by various armed groups
2005 and October 2006 as recruiting or using
during the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.18
children in situations of armed conflict. The FAFN
In late 2004 around 20 child members of the Lima
was also named as being responsible for rape
force supplétive, a militia operating alongside the
and other grave sexual violence.27 The Secretary-
Ivorian armed forces, were reportedly recruited
General’s report of October 2006 indicated that
from a camp for Liberian refugees in western
while children continued to be associated with
Côte d’Ivoire.19 In September and October 2005,
the FAFN, they had committed to an action plan
in Liberian counties bordering government-
in November 2005 to demobilize children.28 The
controlled areas of Côte d’Ivoire, Liberian
FAFN leadership had objected to their continued
children, alongside hundreds of other former
inclusion on the list stating that it was not their
fighters in the Liberian conflict, were recruited
policy to recruit children, although children might
into pro-government militias in western Côte
be found around their camps in search of basic
d’Ivoire in anticipation of renewed fighting with
assistance such as food.29
opposition forces.20
At least four pro-government militias
operational in areas under the control of the Disarmament, demobilization
government in the west of the country – the
Liberation Front for the Great West (Front pour and reintegration (DDR)
la libération du grand ouest, FLGO), the Patriotic The disarmament, demobilization and
Alliance of the Wè People (Alliance patriotique reintegration (DDR) process, which under the
du peuple Wè, APWE), the Patriotic Resistance Accra III Agreement was due to start in October
Union of the Great West (Union patriotique de 2004, was delayed in its implementation, at
résistance du Grand Ouest, UPRGO) and the times because the FAFN were not willing to
Ivorian Liberation Movement for the West of Côte disarm in the absence of the implementation of
d’Ivoire (Mouvement ivoirien de libération de other agreed reforms,30 and later on because
l’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire, MILOCI) – reportedly pro-government militias were unwilling to hand in
continued to maintain child soldiers in their ranks their arms.31
in late 2006.21 These four groups were among In 2004 the National Commission for
the parties listed by the Secretary-General in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
February 2005 and October 2006 as recruiting or (Commission nationale de désarmement,
using children in situations of armed conflict.22 démobilisation et réintegration, PNDDR)
The Young Patriots (Jeunes Patriotes), a estimated that 30,000 ex-combatants would
pro-government party, used children in violent participate in the program, including 26,000 FAFN
demonstrations. In one such demonstration (of whom 3,000 were children), and 4,000 FANCI
in Guiglo in January 2006, during which UN personnel recruited since September 2002.32 A
peacekeepers were also attacked, five Ivorians, later estimate was that just over 48,000 would
including two children aged 14 and 16, were benefit from the DDR program, including 5,500
killed.23 FANCI and over 42,500 FAFN.33
By June 2007 UNICEF indicated that it had
Forces armées des Forces nouvelles helped 1,900 of an estimated 4,000 child soldiers
(FAFN) to be reinserted into their communities, but
In November 2004 demobilized Liberian children concerns remained that instability in the country
in Bong and Nimba counties in eastern Liberia could lead to the re-recruitment of these children.
were believed to have been recruited to fight
with the FAFN in Côte d’Ivoire. Former Liberian Pro-government militia groups
commanders were identified as being involved In 2005 the PNDDR estimated that there were
in the recruitment.24 Six hundred children in 10,000 militia members, considered by the
Danané, near to the Liberian border, who in 2006 UN to be an underestimate.34 By September
were reported as having self-demobilized, had 2005, 4,800 militia members had been
received military training from pro-FAFN Liberian formally registered but no weapons had been
fighters.25 collected.35 In early August 2006, when almost
In February 2006, pursuant to Security 1,000 had disarmed, the PNDDR suspended the
Council Resolution 1572 (2004), the UN disarmament of the militias because of the low
Security Council imposed a travel ban and an

ratio of weapons to combatants and the high security forces, as the Forces de défense et de
number of unserviceable weapons surrendered.36 sécurité–Forces nouvelles) submitted a report
In late 2005 four pro-government militia on the implementation of the action plan which
groups had submitted a list of 150 children for indicated that 85 children, including 27 girls, had
DDR, but the UN noted that an effective end to been identified for release to UNICEF.45
the use of child soldiers by such groups would
depend on being able to identify the groups,
which required the full involvement and support
Developments
of the government.37 In September 2006 the four Côte d’Ivoire was among the conflicts designated
main militia groups in the west, FLGO, MILOCI, by the UN Security Council for the setting up
APWE and UPRGO, submitted action plans to of a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
the UN to end the association of children with (MRM) on six grave violations of children’s rights
their forces.38 In April 2007, at militia-group focal (including child recruitment and use) established
points for child demobilization, the PNDDR and by its Resolution 1612 (2005) on children and
UNICEF began to identify children within these armed conflict. The action plans by FAFN and
groups in areas near to the border with Liberia. pro-government militias for ending the use of
A total of 204 children, including 84 girls, were child soldiers were the first such action plans to
registered for demobilization and were by August be negotiated by the UN under the framework
being assisted through UNICEF programs. The established by Resolution 1612 (2005).46
UN noted that there were particular challenges The UN Special Representative for Children
to identifying and reintegrating children in and Armed Conflict visited Côte d’Ivoire in
this process, arising from the fact that the September 2007. Although the Ouagadougou
combatants and associated children were not agreement made no explicit reference to
always based in camps but often dispersed children, the Special Representative obtained
within their communities.39 The UN estimated in firm commitments from the government and non-
May 2007 that 1,100 militia members remained to government actors with regard to the protection
be disarmed.40 of children associated with armed groups and
armed forces. In particular, the government
Forces armées des Forces nouvelles promised to create an inter-ministerial structure
(FAFN) to co-ordinate work on these issues. The Special
Representative also stressed the importance
The UN estimated a caseload of around 4,000 of ending the use and involvement of youths in
children for demobilization from the FAFN, political violence.47
although no exact figures were available.41 The There were allegations of other serious
first demobilizations of children by the FAFN violations of children’s rights, including the
took place in Bouaké between October 2003 and trafficking of children and the use of child labour
February 2004. Further demobilizations occurred particularly in cocoa plantations.48 In June 2007
in April and July–August 2004. In February 2005 UNICEF reported that it was working with the
demobilizations took place in Man, where by co-operation of the government and the Forces
late June 87 children had been identified, the nouvelles, particularly along the borders, to
youngest being nine years old. Nine girl soldiers curtail trafficking, and had intercepted 100
identified could not be demobilized at that time children.49 Sexual violence against women and
as there were no reception facilities for them.42 girls by members of, or persons affiliated to,
In November 2005 the FAFN submitted to government forces, armed groups and pro-
the Secretary-General’s Special Representative government militias took place in a climate
in Côte d’Ivoire an action plan for preventing of widespread impunity.50 There were also
recruitment and releasing children associated allegations of UN peacekeepers involved in
with their forces, and made serious efforts with sexual exploitation and abuse of women and
regard to implementation.43 In October 2006 girls.51
the Secretary-General stated that since July At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
2005, 327 children associated with fighting Paris, Côte d’Ivoire and 58 other states endorsed
forces in areas under the control of the Forces the Paris Commitments to protect children
nouvelles had been demobilized, in addition to from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
600 children trained by Liberian commanders forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
who had self-demobilized in Danané. By October and guidelines on children associated with
2006 the Forces nouvelles claimed that no more armed forces or armed groups. The documents
children were associated with their forces in reaffirmed international standards and
Bouaké and Katiola and sought assistance from operational principles for protecting and assisting
UNOCI in identifying and demobilizing children child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
in other areas under their control.44 In August consultation jointly sponsored by the French
2007 the FAFN (which under the terms of the government and UNICEF.
March 2007 Ouagadougou agreement was
to be merged with the national defence and

International standards 17 Report of the Secretary-General on children
and armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.
In June 2007 Côte d’Ivoire ratified the African S/2007/515, 30 August 2007. See also Special
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict, “Côte d’Ivoire:
A—E
1 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Côte d’Ivoire”, The Government is committed to give children
www.crisisgroup.org. an eminent place in the peace process”, press
2 For a more detailed account see Child Soldiers: release, 7 September 2007.
Global Report 2004. 18 HRW, above note 13.
3 Amnesty International (AI), “Côte d’Ivoire: clashes 19 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
between peacekeeping forces and civilians: armed conflict, UN Doc. A/59/695-S/2005/72,
lessons for the future” (AFR 31/005/2006), 19 9 February 2005; Coalition correspondence with
September 2006. Office of UN Special Representative on Children
4 Second Report of the UN Secretary-General and Armed Conflict, March 2005.
on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc. 20 HRW, “Côte d’Ivoire: Government Recruits Child
S/2004/697, 27 August 2004. Soldiers in Liberia”, 28 October 2005.
5 Fifth progress report of the Secretary-General 21 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 15.
on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc. 22 Reports of the Secretary-General, above notes 19
S/2005/398, 17 June 2005. and 16.
6 See, for example, Reports of the Secretary- 23 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 16.
General on the UN Operation in Cote D’Ivoire, 24 HRW, above note 13.
2004.
7 ICG, above note 1.
26 UN Security Council, “Security Council Committee
8 Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary- concerning Côte d’Ivoire issues list of individuals
General on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN subject to measures imposed by resolution 1572
Doc. S/2007/275, 14 May 2007. (2004)”, SC/8631, UN Department of Public
9 AI, “Côte d’Ivoire: Crimes under international law Information, 7 February 2006.
cannot be amnestied” (AFR 31/006/2007), 4 May 27 Reports of the Secretary-General, above notes 19
2007. and 16.
10 Médecins Sans Frontières, “Ivory Coast: 28 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 16.
Increasing violent attacks against civilians in the
former Zone of Confidence”, 25 April 2007. 29 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 17.
11 “Des roquettes contre la paix ivoirienne”, Le 30 See, for example, Third progress report of the
Figaro, 30 June 2007. Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Côte
d’Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2004/962, 9 December 2004,
12 See entries on Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in and Fifth progress report, above note 5.
this volume.
31 See, for example, Tenth progress report of the
13 See Human Rights Watch (HRW), Youth, Poverty Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Côte
and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa’s d’Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2006/821, 17 October 2006.
Regional Warriors, March 2005; Report of the
Secretary-General on ways to combat subregional 32 Third progress report of the Secretary-General,
and cross-border problems in West Africa, UN above note 30.
Doc. S/2004/200, 12 March 2004; Report of the 33 Fifth progress report of the Secretary-General,
Secretary-General on inter-mission co-operation above note 5.
and possible cross-border operations between 34 Fourth progress report of the Secretary-General
the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, the UN Mission in on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.
Liberia, and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN S/2005/186, 18 March 2005.
Doc. S/2005/135, 2 March 2005. 35 Sixth progress report of the Secretary-General
14 UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), Youth on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.
Unemployment and Regional Insecurity in S/2005/604, 26 September 2005.
West Africa, 2nd edn, August 2006, www. 36 Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General
un.org/unowa; Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.
on cross-border issues in West Africa, UN Doc. S/2006/939, 4 December 2006.
S/2007/143, 13 March 2007.
37 Seventh progress report of the Secretary-General
15 Report of the Secretary-General on children on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.
and armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2006/2, 3 January 2006.
S/2006/835, 25 October 2006.
39 Ibid.
armed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529–S/2006/826,
26 October 2006. 40 Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-
General, above note 8.

42 Child Soldiers Coalition, Child Soldiers and
Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and CROAT I A
Reintegration in West Africa, November 2006.
43 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 16. Republic of Croatia
44 Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General,
above note 31. Population: 4.6 million (873,000 under 18)
Voluntary recruitment age: none
47 Office of the UN Special Representative on
Children and Armed Conflict, above note 17. Voting age: 18
48 “Child cocoa workers still ‘exploited’”, BBC News,
Optional Protocol: ratified 1 November 2002
2 April 2007. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
49 UNICEF, “Child trafficking in Côte d’Ivoire: efforts CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
under way to reverse a tragic trend”, press
release, 14 June 2007. There were no reports of under-18s serving
50 AI, Côte d’Ivoire: Targeting women – the forgotten in the armed forces.
victims of the conflict (AFR 31/001/2007), 15
March 2007.
51 UN News Centre, “Côte d’Ivoire: UN, Moroccan
Context
officials meet to address allegations of sexual Impunity for war crimes committed during the
abuse”, 23 July 2007; “Des Casques bleus 1991–5 war remained widespread. The Croatian
suspectés d’abus sexuels en Côte d’Ivoire”, Le judicial system failed to address adequately
Figaro, 21 July 2007. wartime human rights violations, regardless of
the ethnicity of the victims or of the perpetrators.1
The government, supported by UNICEF,
the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) and
domestic institutions, provided a national
program for child victims of the war to combat
long-term consequences such as post-traumatic
stress disorder, and somatic and psychological
symptoms.2
Government
practice
Conscription was provided for in Article 47.1 of
the 1990 constitution, and was further regulated
by the 2002 Defence Law. The length of military
service was six months, and all men between the
ages of 18 and 27 were eligible for conscription.
Reservist obligations applied up to the age of 55
during wartime. 3
In its Initial Report to the UN Committee on
the Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol,
the government stated that “[a]lthough there is
no need to bring a treaty into the legal system
by enacting a specific law, the Defence Law
(Official Gazette Nos. 33/2002 and 58/2002)
has specific provisions related to compulsory
recruitment of male conscripts, but only those
who have reached the age of 18, as the Defence
Law has no provision for the compulsory
recruitment of children … Under the provisions
of articles 34, 42 and 43 [of the Defence Law],
the requirement to enlist takes effect at the
beginning of the year in which the person subject
to military service reaches the age of 19, and
under all circumstances, lapses at the end of the
year in which he turns 30 … Croatian legislation

does not recognize the institution of ‘voluntary 2 Initial report of Croatia to the UN
��
Committee on
recruitment’ (‘enlisting’).”4 the Rights of the Child on implementation of the
��
In February 2007 it was reported that Croatia Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/HRV/1,
was initiating a large-scale plan for all-volunteer 11 January 2007.
armed forces. One of the first steps toward this 3 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Right to
A—E
would be the suspension of compulsory military Conscientious Objection in Europe, 2005, www.
service, only voluntary recruits being enrolled in wri-irg.org.
the armed forces. However, obligatory military 4 Initial report, above note 2.
service could be periodically reactivated if there 5 Vjesnik On-line, in Croatian, www.vjesnik.hr.
were not enough recruits to meet defence needs. 6 Initial report, above note 2.
An all-volunteer Croatian army would most likely
7 Croatian Ministry of Defence, www.morh.hr.
not be achieved before 2010.5
Military training and military schools Consideration of report submitted by Croatia,
In its Initial Report on the Optional Protocol, HRV/CO/1, 5 October 2007.
Croatia stated that it had “no high schools
operated by or under the control of the armed
forces within the meaning of article 3, paragraph
5, of the Protocol. Nevertheless, pursuant to
article 4 of the Law on the Service in the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Croatia (Official
Gazette Nos. 33/2002, 58/2002 and 175/2003)
a conscript is also a cadet who is defined as
a ‘person educated at a military school under
a contract of education’, but the point here is
that a person of age is educated at university
(faculties) for the requirements of the Croatian
Armed Forces.”6 In January 2005 the Ministry
of Defence introduced student scholarships at
Zagreb University and Split University. Successful
candidates would have the status of “cadet”,
take part in army training and be obliged to stay
in the armed forces for at least ten years after
graduating.7
Developments
In its Concluding Observations on Croatia’s Initial
Report on the Optional Protocol, the Committee
on the Rights of the Child recommended that
violation of the provisions of the Optional
Protocol regarding the recruitment and
involvement of children in hostilities be explicitly
criminalized in legislation and that extraterritorial
jurisdiction be established for these crimes when
they are committed by or against a citizen of or
someone with links to Croatia.8
In October 2007 Croatia endorsed the Paris

The Youth Labour Army (Ejército Juvenil del
C U BA Trabajo, EJT) was part of the armed forces, and
its members were paid a salary. Their activities
Republic of Cuba focused on promotion of social and economic
development and the rational use of natural
Population: 11.3 million (2.7 million under 18) resources, as well as environmental protection.8
Government armed forces: 49,000 Territorial troop militias (milicias de tropas
Compulsory recruitment age: 16 �� territoriales) were considered part of the
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 �� armed forces when on active military service.9
Voting age: 16
�� One million men and women in militia units
Optional Protocol: ��
ratified 9 February 2007 throughout the country had rapid access to
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): infantry and artillery equipment.10
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138 Military training and military schools
Sixteen-year-olds were liable for Girls and boys who had completed nine years of
compulsory military service in the armed basic education and were aged 15 could enter
one of 14 Camilo Cienfuegos military schools,
forces or the police. which provided pre-university vocational
officer training and secondary-school diplomas
Government in sciences and humanities. Graduates were
expected to go on to one of the military
National recruitment legislation and academies.11
There were eight military academies training
practice members of the regular armed forces.12 The
Boys had to register for conscription with the College of National Defence was a postgraduate
military authorities in the year they turned 16.1 institution managed by the armed forces for
All male citizens were liable for two years of the training of military personnel and civilians
compulsory military service between 1 January responsible for national defence.13
of the year they turned 17 and the last day of Every province had a school for defence
the year they turned 28. Men up to the age of 45 preparedness that trained territorial troop militia
were liable for service in the reserve for up to one leaders and municipal, local and regional defence
year. A form of alternative service was available councils. Militias and other bodies regularly
as long as the armed forces were able to maintain participated in “defence days”, when they
military preparedness.2 The minimum age for received military training.14
voluntary recruitment for both boys and girls was Basic military instruction for defence
17.3 preparedness was compulsory for pre-university
Compulsory military service could be students from age 15.15
carried out in the armed forces or the police.
“Exemplary” conscripts could be granted early
release from service or assisted in obtaining Developments
a university education on discharge. The
government reported that thousands of female
volunteers had joined the armed forces.4 All Cuba ratified the Optional Protocol in February
members of the Communist Youth (Juventud 2007. It declared that the minimum age for
Comunista) organization, male and female, were voluntary recruitment into its armed forces was
required to do military service, except in cases 17, and that the guarantees and safeguards for
of physical impediment or need beyond their this provision were contained in Act No. 75 (the
control.5 National Defence Act) of 21 December 1994 and
A new recruitment drive in December 2004 Decree-Law No. 224 (the Active Military Service
was reported to have been necessary because Act) of 15 October 2001.16
of a reduction in the number of males available
due to a lower birth rate and the shorter period 1 Confidential source, March 2007.
served by university students.6 2 Ley de la Defensa Nacional, No. 75.
Military preparedness was based on a 3 Declaration by Cuba on ratification of the
defence system in place since the 1980s called Optional Protocol, 9 February 2007, www2.ohchr.
the “war of all the people” (guerra de todo el org.
pueblo). In the event of large-scale external
4 Servicio Militar Activo, www.cubagob.cu.
aggression, this would deploy every citizen
and all society’s moral and material resources 5 “La defensa de la Patria: primer programa de
la Revolución”, Juventud Rebelde, 4 December
organized into a territorial defensive system to
2004, www.juventudrebelde.cu.
confront the enemy in their own place and ways.7

6 Gerardo Arreola, “Pide Raúl Castro a rama juvenil
del Partido Comunista reforzar su apoyo al C YP R U S
reclutamiento militar”, Revista Opositor, 9–16
December 2004, www.elveraz.com. Republic of Cyprus
7 Guerra de todo el pueblo, Sistema Defensivo
A—E
Territorial, www.cubagob.cu. Population: 835,000 (205,000 under 18)
8 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Ejército Juvenil Government armed forces: 10,000
del Trabajo, www.cubagob.cu. Compulsory recruitment age: 18
9 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Milicias de Voluntary recruitment age: 17 (not confirmed)
tropas territoriales. Voting age: 18
10 Preparación para la defensa, Preparación de los Optional Protocol: not signed
Ciudadanos, www.cubagob.cu. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
11 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Escuelas CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
militares Camilo Cienfuegos.
12 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Academias The minimum voluntary recruitment age
militares. was believed to be 17, but it was not known
13 Preparación para la defensa, Colegio de Defensa whether under-18s were serving in the
Nacional.
armed forces.
14 Preparación para la defensa, Escuelas de
Preparación para la Defensa, and Preparación de
los Ciudadanos. Context
15 Ministerio de Educacion, Estructura de los planes
de estudio de la educacion pre-universitaria,
Cyprus had been divided since 1974. The
www.rimed.cu/preuniversitario/estructura.asp. northern part, named the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus, remained occupied by
16 Declaration, above note 3.
Turkish armed forces and was not recognized
internationally as a separate state from the
Republic of Cyprus, the southern part. A buffer
zone patrolled by the UN Peacekeeping Force
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) separated the two parts.
In April 2004 Greek and Turkish Cypriots took
part in separate simultaneous referendums
on whether Cyprus should be reunited when it
joined the European Union (EU) on the basis of a
power-sharing agreement brokered by the UN. A
majority of Turkish Cypriots (65 per cent) voted
yes, but Greek Cypriots rejected the settlement
by a three-to-one majority (76 per cent). As a
result, Cyprus remained divided when it joined
the EU on 1 May 2004. The whole island was
by law an EU member state, but the body of
laws that states had to adopt to join the EU was
suspended in the north.1
Government
practice
The constitution provided for conscription,
stating that “No person shall be required to
perform forced or compulsory labour”, but that
this should not include “any service of a military
character if imposed or, in case of conscientious
objectors, subject to their recognition by a law,
service exacted instead of compulsory military
service” (Article 10).
Conscription was regulated by the National
Guard Law, No. 20, of 1964. All male citizens
on completion of their eighteenth year and up
to the age of 50 were liable on 1 January each
year for national service of 25 months’ duration.

Among those exempted from conscription were Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
members of the clergy; the only or eldest son
of a family whose father or brother died or went Population: 201,0005
missing during national service or during or after Government armed forces: not known
the 1974 Turkish invasion; and members of the Compulsory recruitment age: 19
Maronite, Armenian and Latin (Roman Catholic) Voluntary recruitment age: 17
communities. Military service could be reduced Voting age: 18
in a number of cases, including to 13 months for Treaties ratified: not applicable
orphans and the eldest sons of large families
and to 21 months for conscripts with only one The minimum voluntary recruitment age
living parent. Women could enlist as volunteers was 17, but it was not known whether
on a contract for an initial duration of three years
that could be renewed for subsequent three-year
under-18s were serving in the armed
periods. 2 forces.
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
in 2003 noted that it was possible to volunteer Government
for military service from the age of 17 in 2003,
and expressed concern that under-18s could be National recruitment legislation and
deployed, since no distinction was made between
the ages for recruitment and for deployment. practice
The Committee encouraged Cyprus to clarify the Under the constitution, all citizens were liable for
minimum age for voluntary recruitment and to military service: “National service in the armed
ensure that no one under 18 was deployed as a forces shall be the right and sacred duty of every
combatant to armed conflicts. 3 citizen” (Article 74).6
The legal basis for conscription was the
Military training and military schools Military Service Law, No. 59, of 2000. All citizens
No information was available on military were liable for compulsory military service from
training and schools. However, male and female the age of 19. The length of service ranged from
graduates of military schools in Greece could 8 to 15 months. Those considered Turkish Cypriot
become officers of the National Guard.4 citizens because of their parents’ origin but who
resided abroad could qualify for shorter terms.
Recruits planning to go into university education
Developments could defer or bring forward their service.7 The
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, minimum age for voluntary recruitment was 17,
Cyprus and 58 other states endorsed the Paris provided that the recruit had parental consent
Commitments to protect children from unlawful (Article 18).
groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on Military training and military schools
children associated with armed forces or armed There were no military schools.8
standards and operational principles for 1 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country
protecting and assisting child soldiers and Profile, www.fco.gov.uk.
followed a wide-ranging global consultation 2 Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office,
jointly sponsored by the French government and “Cyprus National Guard”, 2005, at CyprusNet,
UNICEF. www.cyprusnet.com.
Consideration of report submitted by Cyprus,
Add.205, 2 July 2003.
4 Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office,
“Cyprus National Guard”, 2005.
5 North Cyprus Online, Demographic Information,
http://www.northcyprusonline.com.
6 The Constitution of the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus, www.cypnet.com.
7 Guvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanligi, “Obligation of
military service”, www.mucahit.net.
8 ��
Information from Office of the Representative of
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, London,
2004.

of the Child in 2005 that under-18s could enter
C ZECH REPUBLIC military secondary-schools, and that they
provided four years of general education and
Czech Republic “education and training for duties on the warrant
officer level, training for a chosen specialization,
A—E
Population: 10.2 million (1.9 million under 18) as well as full secondary vocational and technical
Government armed forces: 24,800 education”. The government also reported
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscription that “Students entering military schools are
phased out by 2005) not soldiers and do not become soldiers in
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 the course of study. This rule would continue
Voting age: 18 to apply in crisis situations: teachers-soldiers
Optional Protocol: ratified 30 November 2001 would be detailed to other duties and the
schools temporarily closed down. Military school
graduates do not incur any financial or other
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182 obligations towards the armed forces. There is
no pressure on the students to apply for regular
There were no reports of under-18s in the army jobs.”8
armed forces.
Developments
Government In its Concluding Observations on the
National recruitment legislation and government’s initial report on the Optional
Protocol, the Committee on the Rights of the
practice Child recommended that the provisions in the
Conscription ended in December 2004, with draft Criminal Code be strengthened so that the
the last conscripts due to leave the Czech army criminalization of the recruitment of children
that month.1 As of 1 January 2005, compulsory in armed forces is not limited to recruitment in
recruitment would only occur in a state of times of war or armed conflict. The Committee
“national danger” or war.2 All men between the further recommended that the involvement of
ages of 18 and 28 had previously been liable for children in hostilities be explicitly made a crime
compulsory military service. 3 Men and women subject to the principle of universality.9
who were at least 18 could volunteer for military At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
service under the terms of Act 221/1999 on Paris, the Czech Republic and 58 other states
Regular Soldiers. Act 585/2004 allowed those endorsed the Paris Commitments to protect
over 18 to volunteer for the Active Reserve.4 children from unlawful recruitment or use by
The government reported to the UN armed forces or armed groups and the Paris
Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2005 that Principles and guidelines on children associated
the state’s security was ensured by the armed with armed forces or armed groups. The
forces and security corps, that no member of documents reaffirmed international standards
these forces could be under 18 years old, and and operational principles for protecting and
that this age limit could not be lowered in any assisting child soldiers and followed a wide-
crisis situations.5 ranging global consultation jointly sponsored by
the French government and UNICEF.
Some military secondary schools were downsized International standards
and stopped admitting new pupils in the The Czech Republic ratified the ILO Minimum Age
academic year 2003–4; these were the school in Convention 138 in April 2007.
Vyskov which trained specialists for the artillery
and engineer corps, the school in Brno which 1 “Bill brings end to nearly 140 years of compulsory
provided warrant officer training and the Military military service”, Radio Prague, 24 September
Conservatory for military musicians. 6 The schools 2004, www.radio.cz.
in Vyskov and in Brno closed in 2006 and the 2 Initial report of the Czech Republic to the
Military Conservatory was due to close by the end UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on
of August 2008. The military education system implementation of the Optional Protocol, UN Doc.
currently comprised the Military High School and CRC/C/OPAC/CZE/1, 15 August 2005.
High Technical School of the Ministry of Defence 3 Bart Horeman and Marc Stolwijk, Refusing to
at Moravska Trebova, the University of Defence in Bear Arms: A world survey of conscription and
Brno, and the Educational and Training Centre of conscientious objection to military service, War
the Ministry of Defence at Komorni Hradek.7 Resisters International, 1998, www.wri-irg.org.
The minimum age for enrolment in a military 4 Information from the embassy of the Czech
secondary-school was 15. The government Republic in the UK, 28 June 2007.
reported to the UN Committee on the Rights

6 Ibid.
7 Ministry of Defence, Military Education, www. DENM A R K
army.cz.
8 Initial report, above note 2. Kingdom of Denmark
9 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Population: 5.4 million (1.2 million under 18)
Consideration of report submitted by the Czech
Republic, Concluding observations, UN Doc.
CRC/C/OPAC/CZE/CO/1, 21 June 2006. Compulsory recruitment age: 18
Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: ratified 27 August 2002

armed forces.
Government
practice
The obligation to perform military service was
set out in Article 81 of the 1953 constitution and
the 1980 National Service Act.1 According to the
Danish Defence Personnel Organization, men and
women between the ages of 18 and 30 were liable
for conscription.2 The 1998 Ministry of Defence
Order No. 1083 stipulated that no one under the
age of 18 could be conscripted or could volunteer
for service in the armed forces. This minimum age
of 18 also applied to joining the volunteer Home
Guard, in keeping with the provisions of the 2004
Home Guard Act.3 The 1987 Civilian Service Act
(amended in 1992 and 1998) provided for an
alternative service for conscientious objectors
– with the length of alternative service matching
that of military service.4
Developments
In its November 2005 Concluding Observations
on Denmark’s initial report to the UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child concerning
implementation of the Optional Protocol,
the Committee expressed concern that the
government had failed to follow reporting
guidelines and had not included relevant
legislation with its submission. The report also
failed to include information regarding assistance
for the physical and psychological recovery of
former child soldiers and dissemination of the
Optional Protocol and its incorporation into
training programs for relevant professionals.5
Paris, Denmark and 58 other states endorsed
the Paris Commitments to protect children
from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
and guidelines on children associated with
armed forces or armed groups. The documents
reaffirmed international standards and

operational principles for protecting and assisting
child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global DJIB O U T I
government and UNICEF. Republic of Djibouti
A—E
1 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Right
to Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Government armed forces: 11,000
Europe: A Review of the Current Situation, April Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
2005. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
2 Information from the Danish Defence Personnel Voting age: 18
Organization, October 2007. Optional Protocol: signed 14 June 2006
3 Initial report of Denmark to the UN Committee on Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
the Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol CRC, GC AP 1 and 2, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, UN There were no reports of under-18s in the
Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/DNK/1, 21 April 2005.
armed forces.
4 Right to Conscientious Objection, above note 1.
Consideration of initial report submitted by Context
Denmark on implementation of the Optional
Djibouti had experienced no armed conflict
Protocol, Concluding observations, UN Doc.
CRC/C/OPAC/DNK/Co/1, 24 November 2005. since the signature in May 2001 of a final peace
agreement between the government and the
armed faction of the Front for the Restoration of
Unity and Democracy (Front pour la restauration
de l’unité et de la démocratie, FRUD).1
France provided significant amounts of aid
and financial support. Some 2,700 French troops
remain stationed in Djibouti under agreements
signed at independence. Djibouti also hosted
1,800 US troops and was the headquarters of the
US-led Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
(CJTF–HOA) which supported counter-terrorism
activities in the region.2
Government
practice
The constitution stated that “the defence of the
Nation and the territorial integrity of the Republic
is the sacred duty for every Djiboutian citizen”.
There was no compulsory military service, and
the minimum age for voluntary recruitment was
18.3 A voluntary national service program, the
Service national adapté (SNA), which accepted
volunteers between the ages of 17 and 25,
continued to operate. One of the stated aims
of the SNA was to assist unqualified young
people by providing them with professional
training with the Djiboutian armed forces. During
the two-year training, recruits were subject to
military discipline and on its completion were
given priority for jobs. There was no obligation
or expectation that recruits would remain with
the armed forces,4 and military training could
form no more than 30 per cent of training
provided. Military activities covered by the SNA
included participation in operations to help the
public in cases of natural or industrial disasters
and activities relating to guarding military
installations.5

Developments DOMI N I C A N
During the 1991–4 conflict, both government
forces and the FRUD used landmines. The REPU B L I C
government declared the country to be “mine
safe” in January 2004 following a five-year Dominican Republic
de-mining program. However, in February
2004 the Minister of Foreign Affairs reportedly Population: 8.9 million (3.5 million under 18)
acknowledged that more work was needed if Government armed forces: 24,500
Djibouti were to be mine-free by March 2009. Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription in
Three girls were reportedly injured by a mine in peacetime
September 2004.6 Voluntary recruitment age: 16 ��
A UN Security Council committee repeatedly
Voting age: 18
��
reported that several countries, including
Djibouti, were violating an arms embargo on Optional Protocol: signed
��
9 May 2002
Somalia by providing military support to an Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
armed group, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
Djibouti was specifically accused of supplying
military uniforms and medicines, which it The minimum age for voluntary recruitment
denied.7 The UIC was responsible for significant was 16.
levels of new recruitment and training of children
in Somalia, some as young as ten, in late 2006.8
Djibouti signed the Optional Protocol in Government
June 20069 and ratified the International Labour
Organization’s Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention 182 in February 2005.10 practice
Under the Armed Forces Law, enlistment into
1 US Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, the armed forces was compulsory in times of
Background Note: Djibouti, January 2008, www. war or serious public disorder, and voluntary in
state.gov. peacetime. The minimum age to be a member
2 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country of the armed forces was 16.1 However, the
Profiles, Djibouti, 2007, www.fco.gov.uk. government reported to the UN Committee on the
3 Initial report of Djibouti to the UN Committee on Rights of the Child in 2007 that the minimum age
the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.39, for voluntary recruitment was 18.2
3 August 1998.
4 Journal official de la République de Djibouti, Military training and military schools
Décret N. 2003-0240/PRE portant création du The Armed Forces Superior Studies Specialized
Service national adapté, 17 December 2003, Institute (Instituto Especializado de Estudios
www.presidence.dj. Superiores de las Fuerzas Armadas, IEESFA)
5 Journal official de la République de Djibouti, was established in 2005 to centralize all military
Arrêté No. 2003-0914/PR/MDN portant training and instruction. It grouped eight
organisation et modalités de fonctionnement military academies and institutes, including
du Service national adapté, 21 December 2003, the Military Institute of Human Rights and
www.presidence.dj. International Humanitarian Law. Its courses
6 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, Djibouti, www. had to be approved by the Ministry of Higher
icbl.org. Education, and its procedures and methodology
7 UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring had to promote and defend democratic values,
Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council emphasizing respect and protection of human
resolution 1676 (2000), UN Doc. S/2006/913, 22 rights and a culture of peace.3
November 2006.
8 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-
General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc.
Developments
A/61/529-S/2006/826, 26 October 2006. In May 2005 thousands of Haitians and
9 Declaration on accession to the Optional Dominicans of Haitian origin were expelled
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. across the border to Haiti.4 In September 2005
10 International Labour Organisation, Worst Forms the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
of Child Labour Convention C 182, 1999, www.ilo. found the state’s application of nationality
org (ilolex database). laws and regulations to be discriminatory in
the case of two girls of Haitian descent, born in
the Dominican Republic, who had been denied
Dominican nationality.5

1 Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas.
2 Second periodic report of Dominican Republic to ECUA D O R
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN
Doc. CRC/C/DOM/2, 16 July 2007. Republic of Ecuador
3 Decreto No. 146-05, “Que crea el Instituto
A—E
Especializado de Estudios Superiores de las Population: 13.2 million (5.1 million under 18)
Fuerzas Armadas (IEESFA)”. Government armed forces: 56,500
4 Jesuit Refugee Service, “República Dominicana: Compulsory recruitment age: 18
Autoridades dominicanas expulsan en masa a Voluntary recruitment age: 17
miles de haitianos y dominicanos de ascendencia Voting age: 18
haitiana”, 16 May 2005, www.jrs.net. Optional Protocol: ratified 7 June 2004
5 Amnesty International Report 2006; Inter- Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Girls CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Judgment
of 8 September 2005, Series C No. 130, www. The minimum age for voluntary recruitment
corteidh.or.cr.
was 17. Very few Colombian former child
soldiers benefited from assistance in
Ecuador.
Context
The Colombian armed conflict continued to affect
Ecuador profoundly, with a marked increase
in incursions by Colombian armed groups,
thousands of asylum seekers, and smuggling
and violence in border areas, as well as health
concerns related to coca-eradication by means of
spraying with glyphosate.1 Ecuador maintained a
position of non-interference in the armed conflict
in Colombia.2
Between 2000 and 2006, 700 killings were
reported in Sucumbíos province, near the border
with Colombia, as a result of the increased milita-
rization of the area. None had been investigated
by the authorities.3 The victims included civilian
men, women and children.4
There were approximately 250,000 Colombian
asylum seekers in Ecuador. In 2006 between
600 and 700 Colombians requested asylum each
month.5�
Government
practice
According to the Law on Military Service, military
age started at 18, when males had to fulfil their
duties as determined by law, while women could
be called up if required by national defence
needs.6 Married men, household heads, members
of religious orders, the disabled, prisoners,
military and police cadets, students at military
schools and Ecuadoreans abroad were exempted
from military service.7
At the age of 17 all males were required to
register with the military authorities and then
selected to serve through a lottery system. On
turning 18 they were enlisted into active service
in three batches, in February, May and August.8
Military service lasted for nine months but could

also be performed for shorter and more intensive (usually age 16) were required to participate in
periods.9 In 2007 nearly 5,000 18-year-olds were community service programs organized by the
due to join active service.10 Recruits received Ministry of Education, such as teaching literacy
uniforms, meals and a monthly stipend, as well and undertaking cultural promotion and civil
as literacy, vocational and academic instruction. 11 defence activities.22 As part of this program,
Those who had not been selected to join ac- students could volunteer to attend military in-
tive service were at the age of 19 included in the struction every Saturday morning from November
Civil Defence Auxiliary Units (Unidades Auxiliares to June as members of the Voluntary Military
de la Defensa Civil) at their places of residence Student Instruction and Community Support Pro-
for a fixed time determined by law.12 gram (Instrucción Militar Estudiantil Voluntaria y
Every male aged 18–55 had to have his Apoyo a la Comunidad).23
military passbook (libreta militar) to work, study
or travel abroad or to obtain his university degree
or driver’s licence. Ecuadorean males wishing to
Armed groups
travel abroad paid a “military compensation”: During 2005 and 2006 Colombian military
those who did not do military service paid US$32, forces and armed groups reportedly entered
exempted men $20 and former conscripts $5.13 Ecuador’s border areas.24 In April 2007 eight
All male and female nationals and residents men and one woman, presumed members of
aged 18–60 and regardless of their family circum- the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
stances were required to participate in national (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,
mobilization in case of necessity. National mobi- FARC), were detained in Cuembí and Sansahuari,
lization included military, civilian and economic Sucumbíos province, Ecuador, by members of the
mobilization.14 Ecuadorean armed forces.25
In June 2007, following a prolonged campaign Although Ecuador had no official records of
by human rights non-governmental organizations Colombian children and young people formerly
(NGOs), the Constitutional Court declared Articles involved in the armed conflict in Colombia, most
88 and 108 of the Compulsory Military Service organizations working with children and ado-
Law to be unconstitutional. Article 88 established lescents believed that there could be dozens of
penalties for those not fulfilling military service Colombian former child combatants in Ecuador
obligations, including being unable to register for and hundreds more who had crossed the border
university, run for public office and travel abroad, when faced with the threat of recruitment.26
while Article 108 provided that objectors had to
do alternative service inside military units.15
Volunteers for the navy had to be at least 17 Disarmament, demobilization
and to have completed secondary education.16 and reintegration (DDR)
The Resistance Forces (Fuerzas de Resisten-
cia) were made up of civilians organized, trained Between 2004 and 2006 around 7,500 people
and equipped by the army as a reserve force, to requested asylum each year.27 It was estimated
support military activities in civil defence, first aid that 27 per cent of asylum seekers were under
and environmental protection. At the end of 2006 18.28 Although the 2002 Children’s and Youth
the Resistance Forces had 1,600 members.17 Code had a stated policy of protection of children
The National Police was an auxiliary force, in the event of disaster or armed conflict,29 there
assisting in the maintenance of internal security were no special protection policies for refugee
and defence.18 children.30 Data was scarce and incomplete and
the government did not keep its own statistics.31
Military training and military schools Only a very few demobilized Colombian
children were known to have benefited from
Individuals wishing to become professional
reception programs in Ecuador. Most young
soldiers underwent a practical and technical
Colombians did not admit to being combatants
course, including jungle training, and were then
because of the stigma attached to it, as well as
given a three-year contract.19
fear of being denied asylum.32
Students at the Army Polytechnic Superior
School and the Naval University obtained nation-
ally recognized tertiary-level degrees on graduat- Developments
ing. Human rights courses were incorporated
In September 2005, on considering Ecuador’s
throughout the military educational system.20
consolidated second and third report, the UN
The air force had five primary and second-
Committee on the Rights of the Child reiterated
ary-schools (Ecuadorian Air Force Experimental
its concern over the high number of victims
Educational Units, Unidades Educativas Experi-
of violence and displacement, and the health
mentales de la Fuerza Aérea Ecuatoriana, UEFAE)
and environmental effects of spraying of illegal
throughout Ecuador accepting children from
crops.33
grade 1 (typically age six).21
Secondary school students in the fifth year

International standards 21 Fuerza Aérea Ecuatoriana, Apoyo al Desarrollo,
Educación, www.fuerzaaereaecuatoriana.org.
Ecuador ratified the Optional Protocol on 7
22 Ministerio de Educación, “En vigencia reglamento
June 2004. Its declaration stated that under the
sustitutivo de participación estudiantil”, 21 July
constitution military service was compulsory,
2006, www.educacion.gov.ec.
commencing at 18 years of age, with provision for
A—E
alternative service for conscientious objectors.34 23 Colegio Mixto Isaac Newton, www.isaacnewton.
edu.ec.
24 Amnesty International Report 2006 and 2007.
1 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Directiva de
Defensa Nacional, 2 September 2005, http:// 25 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, “Militares
midena.gov.ec. ecuatorianos capturaron a ocho presuntos
miembros de las FARC en la frontera norte”,
2 “‘Ecuador no se entrometerá en conflicto armado Boletín No. 26, 25 April 2007.
de Colombia’, reitera su Ministra de Defensa”,
El Tiempo (Colombia), 14 March 2007, www. 26 Coalition interview with Simone Schwartz,
eltiempo.com. UNHCR Ecuador, 10 January 2006.
3 Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional 27 Ministerio de Defensa, Plan Ecuador.
(CEJIL), “CEJIL y organizaciones ecuatorianas 28 Cladem Ecuador, Alternative report to the
denuncian ante la CIDH la violencia e impunidad Convention on Children’s Rights, Period:
en la frontera de Ecuador y Colombia”, 25 1996–2002, November 2004, www.crin.org.
October 2006, www.cejil.org. 29 Consolidated second and third periodic reports of
4 Amnesty International Report 2007. Ecuador to the UN Committee on the Rights of the
5 Noticias ACNUR, “Misión del Alto Comisionado a Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.28, 15 July 2004.
Ecuador y Colombia”, 9 March 2007, www.acnur. 30 Foro Ecuatoriano permanente de organizaciones
org. por y con los Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes,
6 Communication to Child Soldiers Coalition from El Cumplimiento de la Convención sobre los
Ecuadorean embassy, London, 10 May 2007. derechos del niño en el Ecuador: 15 años
después, 16 May 2005, www.crin.org.
7 “Se acuartelarán la próxima semana”, La Hora, 12
February 2007, www.lahora.com.ec. 31 Respuestas escritas del Gobierno del Ecuador al
Comité de los Derechos del Niño, UN Doc. CRC/C/
8 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Resumen de RESP/86, 2 May 2005.
Noticias, 25 March 2007.
32 Coalition interview with social worker from Tulcán
9 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Ecuador), 25 February 2005.
Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latina 33 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Ecuador, August Consideration of combined second and third
2006, www.flacso.cl. reports submitted by Ecuador, Concluding
observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.262, 13
10 Resumen de Noticias, above note 8. September 2005.
11 “Se acuartelarán la próxima semana”, above note 34 Declaration on accession to the Optional
7. Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
12 Ley de Seguridad Nacional, at http://midena.
gov.ec (Información institucional, Seguridad
nacional).
13 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, “Obtener la
libreta militar”, 17 April 2007.
14 Ley de Seguridad Nacional.
15 Serpaj (Servicio Paz y Justicia) Ecuador, “Pasemos
la voz: ni un joven más al servicio militar”, 2 July
2007, www.serpaj.org.ec; Ley de Servicio Militar
Obligatorio en las Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales,
Articles 88 and 108.
16 Armada de la República del Ecuador, Ingreso a la
Armada, Tripulantes, www.armada.mil.ec.
17 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, “Fuerzas de
resistencia conmemoran aniversario”, 22 January
2007.
18 Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas, Ley No.
109. RA/1990, at http://midena.gov.ec.
19 FLACSO, Informe Nacional, above note 9.
20 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Libro Blanco de
la Defensa, Capitulo V, Sistema de la Defensa
Nacional, “Educación”.

is genuine and entirely willing, with the informed
EGYPT consent of the parents or legal guardians after
the volunteers have been fully informed of the
Arab Republic of Egypt duties included in such voluntary military service
and based on reliable evidence of the age of
Population: 74.0 million (29.7 million under 18) volunteers.”4
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 Military training and military schools
Voluntary recruitment age: 16 Military training for recent secondary school
Voting age: 18 graduates was provided in some military
Optional Protocol: acceded 6 February 2007 academies, such as the Air Defence Academy
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): and the Egyptian Naval College in Alexandria,
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC the Egyptian Air Academy in the Sharqiya
Governorate and the Armed Forces Technical
Military service remained compulsory Institute.5 Children aged between 11 and 15 could
for men aged between 18 and 30, and the be accepted in certain military schools provided
that they had completed their primary school
minimum age for voluntary recruitment education.6
remained 16.
Developments
Context In December 2005 police violently dispersed
In April 2006 the government renewed for an more than 2,500 Sudanese refugees and
additional two years the Emergency Law (Law migrants who had been staging a peaceful sit-in
No. 162 of 1958), which allowed for the trial near the office of the UN refugee agency UNHCR
of civilians before military and state security in Cairo since the previous September. As a
courts.1 New armed political groups emerged, result, at least 27 Sudanese nationals, including
such as the Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (Unity and Holy several children, were killed and others were
War), accused by the government of being injured.7
responsible for bombings in the Sinai Peninsula
which left hundreds of civilians killed and injured International standards
between 2004 and 2006.2 Members of al-Gama’a Egypt acceded to
��
the Optional Protocol on 6
al-Islamiya (Islamic Group), which renounced February 2007.8
violence in late 1997, were reported to have
forged links with al-Qaeda in 2006, although 1 “Egypt”, Human Rights Watch World Report 2008.
this was denied by its leadership.3 There were no
2 International Crisis Group, “Egypt’s Sinai
reports of under-18s in these groups.
Question”, 30 January 2007, www.crisisgroup.
org.
Government 3 “Egyptian group denies Al-Qaeda tie-up”, Al-
Jazeera, 11 August 2006, http://english.aljazeera.
National recruitment legislation and net.
practice 4 Declaration on accession to Optional Protocol,
Major constitutional amendments in March www2.ohchr.org.
2007 did not affect military service, which, in 5 Egyptian armed forces website, http://www.mmc.
accordance with Article 58 of the constitution and gov.eg.
Article 1 of the 1980 Military and National Service 6 Law 122 (1982) on Establishing Elementary
Act, remained compulsory for men aged between Technical Military Schools, Article 14.
18 and 30. Standard military service lasted three 7 “Egypt”, Amnesty International Report 2007;
years; lesser terms were stipulated for those “Egypt must probe Cairo violence”, BBC News, 31
with certain types of education, such as higher December 2005.
education graduates. 8 See www2.ohchr.org.
into the armed forces remained 16. In ��
its
declaration on accession��
to the Optional Protocol
in February 2007, the
��
government stated
that “in accordance with its current laws the
minimum age for conscription into the armed
forces of Egypt is 18 years and the minimum
age for voluntary recruitment into the armed
forces is 16 years. The Arab Republic of Egypt is
committed to ensuring that voluntary recruitment

prosecutors and judges in the region on drug-
E L S ALVADOR enforcement and counter-terrorism practices.9
Republic of El Salvador Government
A—E
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 practice
Voluntary recruitment age: 16 �� The constitution provided for compulsory military
Voting age: 18
�� service for all nationals aged 18–30 (Article 215).
ratified 18 April 2002 Individuals had to enrol on the military
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): register within one month of turning 17, but
only 18-year-olds could be called up. The Armed
Forces (Military and Reserves Service) Act
Military service was compulsory for 18- stated that “Salvadorans over 16 years of age
may voluntarily submit to the Recruitment and
year-olds. There were no under-18s in the Reserves Department or its subsidiary offices an
armed forces. application to perform military service, and the
Department shall accept them according to the
needs of the service”.10 El Salvador’s declaration
Context on ratification of the Optional Protocol stated
Harsh anti-gang laws and law enforcement that such applications required parental consent.
measures were used against gangs (maras). However, there was a permanent order from the
There were an estimated 10,500 gang members General Staff of the Armed Forces “to refrain
in El Salvador, with connections to other Central from accepting minors among newly recruited
American countries and the USA.1 In 2004 the personnel”.11
National Council for Public Security started The Committee on the Rights of the Child
implementing a Safe Country plan, the Super recommended that El Salvador explicitly prohibit by
Heavy Hand (Mano Súper Dura) policy.2 Members law the voluntary recruitment of 16- and 17-year-
of the armed forces patrolled with the civilian olds, to reflect current practice, and the recruitment
police��
. Children were blamed for increasing of children under the age of 15, into armed forces
criminal violence, although of the 300,000 or groups. It also recommended the prohibition of
suspects detained between 2000 and 2006, under-18s directly participating in hostilities. The
fewer than 6 per cent were under 18. Human
�� government told the Committee that legal reforms
rights organizations accused the government of were under way to raise the minimum age of
the arbitrary detention of hundreds of youths voluntary recruitment from 16 to 18.12
under the security policy.3 Some
��
43 per cent
of under-18s were held without proof of illegal Military training and military schools
association.4 Candidates for the Capitán General Gerardo
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child Barrios Military School had to be aged 17–22 and
called on El Salvador to abrogate its second Anti- to have completed their secondary education.13
gang Law of April 2004 and to apply the Juvenile In 2005 there were four 17-year-olds attending
Offenders Act as the only legal instrument in the school – three males and one female. The
the area of juvenile justice.5 ��
The authorities five-year curriculum of military and academic
considered lowering the age of criminal subjects, approved by the Ministry of Education,
responsibility to 12, with penalties ranging from included study of the international law of armed
therapy to custody in a juvenile detention centre.6 conflict and human rights. Most teachers were
In March 2005 the Inter-American Court military officers.14
of Human Rights requested El Salvador to
establish a national commission to determine the
whereabouts of children who had disappeared Disarmament, demobilization
during the 1980–91 armed conflict.7 Children had
been abducted and given to families in other
countries for illegal adoptions. In September In 2006 the government reported that former
2005 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred the members of the Farabundo Martí National
case of the Serrano Cruz sisters, on which the Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí
Court’s decision was based, for investigation.8 para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN), who were
In September 2005 the governments of El 15 and 16 in January 1992 and who had not
Salvador and the USA signed an agreement benefited from a land program agreed between
to establish an International Law Enforcement the government and the FMLN, had received
Academy (ILEA) to train police officers, educational and technical training.15 According
to official statistics, 152 children had opted to
return to school, while 97 had chosen technical

training. Only nine children had successfully been
incorporated into the educational system and just EQUATO R I A L
one had completed the course of studies. During
the armed conflict an estimated 2,000 children
served in the FMLN, and 80 per cent of recruits in
GUIN E A
the government armed forces were under 18.16 Republic of Equatorial Guinea
In 2006 the Committee on the Rights of
the Child criticized the lack of information on Population: 504,000 (257,000 under 18)
measures and the program adopted with regard Government armed forces: 1,300
to former child soldiers and children affected by Compulsory recruitment age: not established
the armed conflict.17 Voluntary recruitment age: 18
Voting age: 181
1 USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Optional Protocol: not signed
Assessment, April 2006, www.usaid.gov.
2 Pais Seguro: Plan de gobierno 2004–2009, www.
servicios.gob.sv.
3 Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional Although obligatory by law, in practice
(CEJIL), “Políticas de seguridad salvadoreñas
violan derechos humanos de la niñez y military service was voluntary. Only men
adolescencia”, 7 March 2007, www.cejil.org. over 18 years old could volunteer for
4 Comunidad Segura, “Toward a national youth military service.
policy in El Salvador”, 24 October 2006, www.
comunidadesegura.org.
Government
Consideration of second periodic report
submitted by El Salvador, Concluding
National recruitment and legislation
observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.232, 30 The constitution stated that military service is
June 2004. compulsory and “regulated by law”.2 However, no
6 Ministry of Interior, Proyecto de Reformas a la Ley law was enacted to regulate military service and
Penal Juvenil, www.gobernacion.gob.sv. recruitment and, in practice, military service was
7 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of voluntary. The government periodically called on
Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Judgment of men over 18 years of age to enlist voluntarily in
1 March 2005, Series C, No. 120, www.corteidh. the armed forces for a minimum two-year period.
or.cr. There were no reports of recruitment of under-
8 Written replies by the Government of El Salvador 18s.3
to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on The 1990 Labour Act regulated child labour
implementation of the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. and set the minimum legal age for employment at
CRC/C/OPAC/SLV/Q/1/Add.1, 12 May 2006. 14, although 12-year-olds were permitted to work
9 Gobierno de El Salvador, Noticias y Eventos, “El in certain jobs; it also stated that the minimum
Salvador quinto país del mundo en contar con age for admission to employment “which by its
ILEA”, 21 September 2005, www.gobernacion. nature or owing to the conditions under which
gob.sv. it is performed may place at risk the health,
10 Initial report of El Salvador to the Committee on safety or morals of children shall be 16 years”.4 In
the Rights of the Child on implementation of the practice, however, the law was seldom enforced.
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/SLV/1,
15 August 2005. Developments
11 Ibid.
In its concluding observations on Equatorial
Consideration of report submitted by El Salvador Guinea’s initial report to the UN Committee
on implementation of the Optional Protocol, on the Rights of the Child, the Committee
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ recommended that the government ratify the
SLV/CO/1, 2 June 2006. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
13 Escuela Militar, “Cap. Gral. Gerardo Barrios”, of the Child on the involvement of children in
www.escmilitar.edu.sv. armed conflict.5
15 Written replies, above note 8. 1 CIA, World Factbook.
16 Child Soldiers Coalition, “El Salvador: Children
in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
(FMLN) and the Armed Forces of El Salvador
(FAES)”, July 2006.
17 Concluding observations, above note 12.

2 B. Horeman and M. Stolwijk, Refusing to Bear
Arms: A World Survey of Conscription and ERIT R E A
Conscientious Objection to Military Service, War
Resisters International, London, 1998, www. State of Eritrea
wri-irg.org/; Report of the UN Secretary-General
A—E
to UN Commission on Human Rights on civil Population: 4.4 million (2.3 million under 18)
and political rights, including the question of Government armed forces: 201,800
conscientious objection to military service, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/2000/55, 17 December 1999.
3 Confidential source, July 2007.
Voting age: 181
4 Initial Report of Equatorial Guinea to the UN
Optional Protocol: acceded 16 February 2005
CRC/C/11/Add.26, 28 January 2004. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
5 Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC, ILO 138, ACRWC
Consideration of report submitted by Equatorial
Guinea, Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/ Forcible recruitment of under-18s had
C/15/Add.245, 3 November 2004. previously been reported. However there
was no recent information, due to severe
restrictions on access to independent
observers by the government.
Context
The 2000 Algiers Agreement,2 ending war
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, established a
25-km-wide demilitarized zone known as the
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and created the
Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission.3 Ethiopia
deployed an additional seven military divisions
to the border in December 20044 and tensions
between the two countries steadily escalated.5
The Boundary Commission suspended its
operations in March 2005, citing Ethiopian non-
co-operation over demarcation,6 and indicated
that it would close in November 2007 unless it
was allowed to proceed to demarcation.7 The
peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE),
mandated by UN Security Council Resolution
1320 (September 2000), was severely limited by
Eritrean restrictions on its movements, and its
force was reduced to 1,700 peacekeepers in April
2007.8
By October 2007 Eritrea maintained 4,000
troops in the TSZ, in violation of the Algiers
Agreement, and an estimated 120,000 troops
in the border area.9 Ethiopia maintained an
estimated 100,000 troops along the border.
An increase in the number of cross-border
abductions and missing persons, including
children, was reported. This was attributed in
part to the Eritrean government’s conscription
campaign.10
Eritrea provided military assistance to the
Somali armed group Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC), which seized control of Somalia’s capital,
Mogadishu, in June 2006. There were reports of
military assistance and links between Eritrea,
the UIC and two Ethiopian opposition groups
– the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Ethiopia
provided Eritrean opposition groups, including

the Eritrean Revolutionary Democratic Front, with of military conscripts accused of desertion were
training and arms, and the Shiraro and Shimbela arbitrarily detained without formal charge, held
refugee camps in Ethiopia were used as recruiting incommunicado and frequently tortured.22 A non-
grounds by Eritrean opposition groups.11 The governmental organization (NGO) reported that
Eritrean government faced the threat of armed 161 young Eritreans were shot and killed trying to
opposition from the Ethiopia-based Eritrean escape Wia Military Camp in June 2005.23
Democratic Alliance.12 Exit visas, which were required for leaving the
In 2006 the government decided to return country, were rarely granted to men of military
the large majority of internally displaced age.24 During 2006 the government began
persons (IDPs) to their villages of origin in the refusing to issue exit visas to some children who
TSZ. Despite the danger posed by the presence were 11 and older, on the grounds that they were
of landmines, and tensions relating to the approaching the age of eligibility for national
stalemate over demarcation,13 by May 2007 the service.25
number of IDPs was reduced to 12,000 due to the
government’s promotion of returnee programs.14
Government and reintegration (DDR)
A demobilization program which began in 2000
National recruitment legislation and was managed by the National Commission for
practice Demobilization and Reintegration Program
The forcible recruitment of under-18s had (NCDRP), established in 2001 by presidential
previously been reported, but there was no decree.26 As of December 2006, some 104,400
recent information due to severe restrictions soldiers had been demobilized,27 while the initial
imposed by the government on access to target was to reduce the 300,000–350,000
independent observers. military personnel by approximately 200,000.28
The constitution stated that all citizens had to It is not known whether there was any child DDR
‘be ready to defend the country’ and ‘complete … in this program. In June 2007 it was reported that
National Service’ (Article 25). Under the National demobilization was suspended due to tension in
Service Proclamation No. 82/95 of 23 October the region and Eritrea’s strained relations with
1995, national service of six months of military Ethiopia.29
training and twelve months of military service
was obligatory for men between the ages of 18 Developments
and 40.15 However, in practice national service
remained extended indefinitely. Conscript reserve Eritrea’s Second and Third Periodic Reports to
duties extended to the age of 50 and former the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front veterans were stated that the minimum recruitment age was
also subject to recall.16 Recruitment of under- 18, and that full-time students and those who
18s into the armed forces was prohibited under were temporarily medically unfit could have their
Proclamation 11/1991.17 The law prohibited service deferred.30
children under the age of 18 from performing UN Security Council Resolution 1767 (2007)
certain dangerous or unhealthy labour.18 provided for the extension of the peacekeeping
The government required that all students mandate of UNMEE until January 2008.31
attend their final year of secondary-school at a
location adjacent to the Sawa military training International standards
facility. Students who did not attend this year Eritrea acceded to the Optional Protocol on 16
could not graduate. Many students elected to February 2005. Its declaration stated that the
repeat grades to avoid being forced to go to minimum age for recruitment into the armed
Sawa.19 Other Eritreans at the age of conscription forces was 18.32
and final year secondary school students fled the
country in their thousands or went into hiding.20 1 CIA, “Eritrea”, World Factbook, www.cia.gov.
The authorities instituted harsh measures 2 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
to counter the widespread evasion of military (UNMEE), Algiers Peace Agreement 2000, www.
service and desertion by thousands of conscripts. unmeeonline.org.
Police searches and round-ups were carried out,
3 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Ethiopia and
and in mid-2005 the government made hundreds Eritrea: preventing war”, Africa Report No. 101, 22
of arrests of family members of children who December 2005.
had not reported to the military training camp
4 Ibid.
at Sawa for their final year of high school or
had not reported for national service.21 This
continued into 2007 and relatives were released
only on payment of a large financial bond and the
surrender of the missing conscript. Thousands

5 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary- 29 UN/Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc. (UN/OSAA), “Overview: DDR processes in Africa”,
S/2005/142, 7 March 2005; UN Security Council Report of the Second International Conference on
Resolution 1622, UN Doc. S/RES/1622 (2005), 13 DDR and Stability in Africa, Kinshasa, Democratic
September 2005. Republic of the Congo, 12–14 June 2007, www.
A—E
6 UN Security Council Report of the Secretary- un.org.
General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc. 30 Second and third periodic reports of Eritrea to the
S/2005/400, 20 June 2005. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
7 ICG, “Ethiopia and Eritrea: stopping the slide to CRC/C/ERI/3, 23 October 2007.
war”, Africa Briefing No. 48, 5 November 2007. 31 UN Security Council Resolution on the Situation
8 UN Security Council Report of the Secretary- between Eritrea and Ethiopia, UN Doc. S/
General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc. RES/1767 (2007), 30 July 2007.
S/2006/140/, 6 March 2006. 32 Declaration on accession to the Optional
9 “Stopping the slide to war”, above note 7. Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
10 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-
General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc.
S/2007/440, 18 July 2007; UN Security Council,
Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and
Eritrea, UN Doc. S/2006/749, 19 September
2006; Report of the Secretary-General, 7 March
2005, above note 5.
11 “Stopping the slide to war”, above note 7.
12 “Eritrea”, Amnesty International Report 2007.
13 “Horn of Africa: the way forward”, New Routes,
Vol. 12, No. 2 (2007), www.brookings.edu.
14 OCHA Regional Office for Central and East Africa,
Displaced Persons Report, Issue 1 (January–June
2007), www.nrc.ch.
15 UK Home Office Border and Immigration Agency,
Country of Origin Information Report, Eritrea, 22
October 2007, www.homeoffice.gov.uk.
16 “Eritrea”, above note 12.
17 UK Home Office, above note 15.
18 US Department of State, Country reports on
Human Rights Practices 2006, Eritrea, 6 March
2007, www.state.gov.
19 Ibid.
20 “Eritrea”, Human Rights Watch World Report
2007.
21 “Eritrea”, Human Rights Watch World Report
2006.
22 “Eritrea”, above note 12; confidential source,
February 2008.
23 Eritreans for Human and Democratic Rights,
“Brutality beyond imagination”, 29 July 2005,
http://ehdr.org.uk.
24 “Eritrea”, above note 12.
26 Eritrea – Demobilization and Reintegration
Program, World Bank report No. P1D10371, 2001,
www-wds.worldbank.org.
27 UNDP, “Technical assistance to demobilize
soldiers”, Eritrea project fact sheet, November
2006, www.er.undp.org.
28 Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham
House), “Eritrea’s economic survival”, summary
record of a conference held on 20 April 2007,
www.chathamhouse.org.uk.

medical commission. A new Defence Resources
E STONIA Agency registered boys eligible for the draft
(Article 46) and considered written applications
Republic of Estonia for alternative service. These could be made
on religious or moral grounds, and applicants
Population: 1.3 million (265,000 under 18) could appeal against the agency’s decisions to a
Government armed forces: 4,100 Defence Forces Service Commission (Article 47)
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (but see text) and then to an Administrative Court. The Defence
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (but see text) Forces Service Commission might “exceptionally”
Voting age: 18 grant appeals, but the circumstances were not
Optional Protocol: signed 24 September 2003 specified (Article 41). Alternative service was for
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): 12–18 months (Article 74), to be carried out in the
rescue, emergency or social care services of the
Interior Ministry or Ministry of Social Affairs.4
Seventeen-year-olds could be liable for Armed forces reserves included former
conscripts but were mostly made up of members
call-up but active combat duties were of the voluntary paramilitary National Defence
reserved for those aged 18 and over. League, open to boys and girls, administered by
Under-18s could volunteer for the National the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its 9,980 members
Defence League which provided weapons in 2005 included 3,788 girls in the Home
Daughters section, and 4,019 boys in the Young
training. Eagles section.5 League members were trained
in the use of weapons, and in giving assistance
Context to internal security, border control and rescue
services.
In May 2004 Estonia amended its Child Protection Under the Defence Force Services Act,
Act.1 As amended, the Act recognized as a child as amended, 18-year-old reservists could
anyone under 18 years of age, and required be mobilized in active conflict (Article 139).
the government to provide and protect the Previously, 16-year-old reservists had been
internationally recognized rights and freedoms eligible.
of the child (Article 1). The Act banned the Volunteers aged 18 and over could sign
manufacture or sale of toys that imitated objects contracts for military service (Article 79). The
used to destroy people, and prohibited the introduction of a non-conscript army was
making or broadcast of films, audio and video increasingly discussed after Estonia joined the
material for children that promoted cruelty and European Union in May 2004.
violence (Article 48). The Act recognized a child There was no specific legislation criminalizing
whose health or life was in danger as being in the recruitment or use of under-18s by armed
need of immediate assistance (Article 32). groups, but in March 2007 there were plans to
Estonia joined NATO in 2004. amend the law in this respect.6
Government Developments
National recruitment legislation and At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,
practice Estonia and 58 other states endorsed the Paris
Estonia amended its Defence Force Services recruitment or use by armed forces or armed
Act, most recently in 2007.2 The revised law groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on
required all male Estonian citizens to be “liable” children associated with armed forces or armed
for service in the Defence Forces from the age of groups. The documents reaffirmed international
16 to 60, during which time they were liable to standards and operational principles for
be registered and conscripted, or to serve in the protecting and assisting child soldiers and
reserve (Article 3). Boys eligible for the draft had followed a wide-ranging global consultation
to register at the age of 16, until call-up or release jointly sponsored by the French government and
from mandatory military service (Article 7). UNICEF.
Between the ages of 18 and 27 they were liable
to conscription (Article 46). In practice, any boy International standards
aged 17 on 15 September was liable to call-up
Estonia ratified
��
the ILO Minimum Age Convention
the following year, even if he had not reached the
138 in March 2007. It��
said it intended to take
age of 18. Periods of service were variable and
steps to ratify the Optional Protocol in 2007.7
depended on the date of call-up, ranging from
8–11 months.3
The Defence Force Service Act set up two 1 Child Protection Act, RT I 2004, 27, 180, May
agencies to administer recruitment, aided by a 2004.

2 Defence Force Services Act, 14 March 2000.
3 Estonian Institute for Human Rights, Overview of ETH I O P I A
the Human Rights Situation in Estonia in 2005,
www.eihr.ee. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
4 Communication to Child Soldiers Coalition from
A—E
Estonian embassy, London, March 2007. Population: 77.4 million (39.8 million under 18)
5 Estonian Institute for Human Rights, above note
3. Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (see text)
6 Communication from Estonian embassy, above Voluntary recruitment age: 18
note 4. Voting age: 18
7 Ibid. Optional Protocol: not signed
There were no reports of child recruitment

or use by government forces or armed
opposition groups, although independent
monitoring was severely limited.
Context
The 2000 Algiers Agreement,1 ending war
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, established a
25-km-wide demilitarized zone, known as the
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), and created the
Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission.2 Ethiopia
deployed an additional seven military divisions
to the border in December 2004 and tensions
between the two countries steadily escalated.3
UN Security Council Resolution 1640 (2005)
demanded that Ethiopia “accept fully and without
further delay the final and binding decision of the
Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission”.4
The Boundary Commission suspended its
operations in March 2005, citing Ethiopian non-
co-operation over demarcation,5 and indicated
that it would close in November 2007 unless
it was allowed to proceed to demarcation.6
The peacekeeping capacity of the UN Mission
in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was severely
limited by Eritrean restrictions on its movements
and its force was reduced to 1,700 peacekeepers
in April 2007. 7 By October 2007 Ethiopia
maintained an estimated 100,000 troops along
the border. Eritrea maintained 4,000 troops in
the TSZ and an estimated 120,000 troops in
the border area.8 An increase in the number of
cross-border abductions and missing persons,
including children, was reported. This was
attributed in part to the Eritrean government’s
conscription campaign.9
The government continued to face internal
opposition from armed groups, including the
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which
sought self-determination for ethnic Somalis in
the Ogaden region, and the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF).10 In April 2007 ONLF gunmen killed
74 people and kidnapped seven others at an
oilfield in Abole, a remote region of Ethiopia
populated by ethnic Somalis.11 In June 2007 the
government launched a major military campaign

in the Ogaden against the ONLF, committing used by Ethiopian forces in the conflict in
widespread human rights violations, blocking Somalia.24
food deliveries and forcibly relocating thousands The constitution stated that children would
of people.12 By October 2007 the government was “not be subject to exploitative practices, neither
reportedly forcing civilians in the region to form to be required nor permitted to perform work
militias to fight the ONLF, and those who refused which may be hazardous or harmful to [their]
faced possible detention and torture.13 During health or well-being” (Article 36).
2006 the authorities in Oromia state reportedly
imprisoned, tortured and harassed their critics,
including schoolchildren.14
Armed groups
The ONLF and the OLF reportedly received Ogaden National Liberation Front
military support from Eritrea and Somalia.
Ethiopia provided Eritrean armed groups with (ONLF)
training and arms and the Shiraro and Shimbela In September 2007 the ONLF told the Child
refugee camps in Ethiopia were used as recruiting Soldiers Coalition that “The minimum age for
grounds by these groups.15 recruitment into the ONLF military wing is 18
In October 2006 Prime Minister Zenawi years and there are no ONLF fighters under
declared Ethiopia officially at war with Somalia the age of 18.” The ONLF said that it “fully
after the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) declared recognizes and has adopted all articles enshrined
a jihad (holy war) against the Ethiopian in the Convention on The Rights of The Child
government over its military involvement and in particular the Optional Protocol to the
in Somali affairs.16 In late 2006, Ethiopian convention”.25 There was no available information
troops entered Somalia to support Somalia’s from independent sources about the use by the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against ONLF of child soldiers.
the UIC and forced the UIC from Mogadishu and
other areas, remaining in Somalia as of late
2007.17 Ethiopian forces fired into urban civilian Disarmament, demobilization
areas and summarily executed civilians, resulting and reintegration (DDR)
in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, including
children.18 The Ethiopia Emergency Demobilization and
Reintegration Project (EDRP), funded by a
World Bank loan, ended on 30 June 2007. None
Government of the soldiers supported under this program
were under the age of 18 at the time of their
National recruitment legislation and demobilization.26 There were reportedly no
practice programs in 2007 that specialized in supporting
Ethiopia set 18 as the minimum age for the demobilization of children.27
recruitment into the armed forces. However,
because of the lack of adequate birth registration Developments
in Ethiopia the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child expressed concern over possible In November 2006 the Committee on the
flaws in the recruitment process.19 According to Rights of the Child urged Ethiopia to take all
the government, recruits and conscripts were possible measures to prevent the recruitment
required to produce documents such as school of children and to ratify the Optional Protocol.
or medical records testifying to their age. Military The Committee also recommended that Ethiopia
authorities reportedly refused to permit children provide physical and psychological recovery
under 18 to enlist.20 measures for all children affected by armed
Military service was not compulsory. However, conflict.28
Defence Force Proclamation No. 27/1996 stated UN Security Council Resolution 1767 provided
that the Defence Ministry “may, in accordance for the extension of the peacekeeping mandate of
with criteria issued by it from time to time, recruit UNMEE until January 2008.29
persons fit and willing for military purposes” Ethiopia hosted around 100,000 refugees
(Article 4). In call-up notices, these criteria from Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of
defined a minimum recruitment age of 18.21 the Congo and Eritrea, with 300 people crossing
Failure to respond to call-up was punishable to Ethiopia each month to seek asylum, almost
by “simple” imprisonment and, in times of half of whom were children.30
emergency, general mobilization or war, by up to
10 years’ “rigorous” imprisonment.22 1 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
There was no available evidence regarding (UNMEE), Algiers Peace Agreement, 2000, www.
child soldiers in Ethiopia, and reports of children unmeeonline.org.
being unofficially involved in either government 2 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Ethiopia and
or armed group activity were difficult to verify. Eritrea: preventing war”, Africa Report No. 101, 22
23
There were no reports of child soldiers being December 2005.

3 Ibid.; UN Security Council, Report of the 24 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and
Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Armed Conflict in Somalia, UN Doc. S/2007/259,
Doc. S/2005/142, 7 March 2005; UN Security 7 May 2007.
Council Resolution 1622, UN Doc. S/RES/1622 25 E-mail from ONLF to Child Soldiers Coalition, 7
(2005), 13 September 2005. September 2007.
A—E
4 UN Security Council Resolution 1640 on the 26 Confidential source, Addis Ababa, September
Situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, UN Doc. 2007; World Bank, “Ethiopia – Demobilization
S/RES/1640 (2005), 23 November 2005. and Reintegration Project”, Environmental
5 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary- Assessment, 31 May 2004, www.web.worldbank.
General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc. org/, as cited in Coalition Global Report 2004.
S/2005/400, 20 June 2005. 27 Confidential source, Addis Ababa, September
6 ICG, “Ethiopia and Eritrea: stopping the slide to 2007.
war”, Africa Briefing No. 48, 5 November 2007. 28 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
7 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary- Consideration of report submitted by Ethiopia,
General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc. Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/ETH/
S/2007/440, 18 July 2007. CO/3, 1 November 2006.
8 “Stopping the slide to war”, above note 6. 29 UN Security Council Resolution on the Situation
9 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 7; between Eritrea and Ethiopia, UN Doc. S/
UN Security Council Report of the Secretary- RES/1767 (2007), 30 July 2007.
General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc. 30 UNHCR, Global Appeal 2007, Ethiopia, www.
S/2006/749, 19 September 2006; Report of the unhcr.org/; Concluding Observations of
Secretary-General, above note 3. the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
10 “Stopping the slide to war”, above note 6. Discrimination, Ethiopia, UN Doc. CERD/C/ETH/
CO/15, 20 June 2007.
11 “Scores die in Ethiopia oil attack”, BBC News, 24
April 2007.
12 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Ethiopia:
crackdown in the east punishes civilians”, press
release, 4 July 2007.
13 “Ethiopians said to push civilians into rebel war”,
New York Times, 15 December 2007.
14 “Ethiopia”, Human Rights Watch World Report
2007.
15 “Stopping the slide to war”, above note 6.
16 “Ethiopia says technically at war with Somali
Islamists”, Reuters Alertnet, 24 October 2006,
www.alertnet.org.
17 ICG, “Somalia: the tough part is ahead”, Africa
Briefing No. 45, 26 January 2007; “Ethiopia
bogged down in Somalia”, BBC News, 27
November 2007.
18 HRW, “Shell-shocked: civilians under siege in
Mogadishu”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 19, No.
12(A), August 2007.
Consideration of report submitted by Ethiopia,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/ETH/
CO/3, 1 November 2006.
Consideration of report submitted by Ethiopia,
Summary record, UN Doc. CRC/C/SR.1164, 22
September 2006.
21 Information from Rädda Barnen (Save the
Children – Sweden), March 2004. As cited in Child
Soldiers Coalition, Global Report 2004.
22 Amnesty International Netherlands Section 1998,
“Ethiopia: dienstwigering en desertie”, citing War
Resisters’ International, Ethiopia: CONCODOC
1998 report, 17 August 1998, http://wri-irg.org.
As cited in Coalition Global Report 2004.
23 Confidential source, Addis Ababa, September
2007.

FIJI Developments
Republic of the Fiji Islands
Fiji signed the Optional Protocol on 16 September
Population: 848,000 (317,000 under 18) 2005.
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription 1 “British Army plans to limit troop quota”, Fiji
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 Times Online, 3 April 2007, www.fijitimes.com.
Voting age: 21 2 Amnesty International (AI), “Fiji: Human rights
Optional Protocol: signed 16 September 2005 protections must be upheld”, AI Index: ASA
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): 18/001/2007, News Service No: 033, 16 February
2007; Human Rights Watch (HRW), Letter to
CRC, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 Interim Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama and
President Ratu Josefa Iloilo of Fiji, 5 February
There were no reports of under-18s in the 2007.
armed forces. Over 2,500 Fijian soldiers 3 Royal Fiji Military Forces Act, Chapter 81, Part
were serving in the United Kingdom (UK) II(5)(3).
army, where the minimum voluntary 4 “Induction Service for new recruits”, Mataivalu
recruitment age was 16. It was not known News, Issue No. 10, January–February 2006,
www.rfmf.mil.fj.
whether they included under-18s.1
Profiles, Fiji, www.fco.gov.uk.
Context 6 Royal Fiji Military Forces Act, Chapter 81, Part
III(18).
The head of the armed forces, Commodore
Voreqe Bainimarama, declared a state of 7 Australian Broadcast Corporation, Foreign
Correspondent, “Fiji – Green Tribe”, broadcast
emergency following a military coup on 5
11 January 2005, www.abc.net.au.
December 2006. Military forces could benefit
from an amnesty decree passed in January 2007
for human rights violations committed by their
members between 5 December 2006 and
5 January 2007.2
Government
practice
There was no conscription. An individual had
to be at least 18 to be recruited into the army.
However, “the Commander may permit the
enlistment of such number of persons of or
above the age of sixteen years and under the age
of eighteen years as he may from time to time
determine”.3 New recruits into the Fijian armed
forces underwent a 12-week training course.4
There were over 2,500 Fijian soldiers serving
in the UK armed forces.5

The Royal Fiji Military Forces Act stated that
the “Minister may establish Cadet Units, the
description of, numbers in, enrolment in, and
organization of which shall be such as the
Minister may from time to time prescribe”. Cadet
units, made up of boys between the ages of 12
and 18, did not form part of the armed forces
but were affiliated to them and regarded as a
“training unit for the Forces”.6 Cadet training
was in practice compulsory for all high school
students, and children took part in drills and
school parades.7

F INL AND Developments
In March 2004 the government’s human rights
Republic of Finland policy as expressed in its initial report to the
Committee on the Rights of the Child on the
Population: 5.3 million (1.1 million under 18) Optional Protocol specifically mentioned the
Government armed forces: 29,300 special protection needs of children in situations
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 of armed conflict.5
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 The Committee on the Rights of the Child
Voting age: 18 (CRC) noted in October 2005 that “the State party
Optional Protocol: ratified 10 April 2002 is a country of destination of asylum-seeking and
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): migrant children coming from war-torn countries
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 who may have been victims of traumatic
experiences”.6
There were no reports of under-18s in the At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
Paris, Finland and 58 other states endorsed
armed forces. the Paris Commitments to protect children
F—J
Government forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
National recruitment legislation and armed forces or armed groups. The documents
practice reaffirmed international standards and
Section 127 of the constitution (731/1999) child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
required all Finnish citizens to play a role in consultation jointly sponsored by the French
the country’s defence. Section 1 of the Military government and UNICEF.
Service Act of 1991 obliged all Finnish men to
perform military service. Women wishing to do
1 Initial report of Finland to the UN Committee on
voluntary military service of a complementary
nature were permitted to do so under the terms Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/FIN/1,
of the 1995 Act on Voluntary Women’s Service. 10 March 2005.
With regard to the overall structure of national
2 Finnish Defence Forces, Conscript 2005, www.mil.
defence, provisions for non-armed service were
fi.
also included in the 1991 Military Service Act,
while civilian service was organized in accordance 3 Amnesty International Report 2007.
with the 1991 Civilian Service Act. All men and 4 Initial report, above note 1.
women had to be at least 18 before they could be 5 Ibid.
conscripted or volunteer for service in the Finnish 6 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Defence Forces, even in a state of emergency. Consideration of report submitted by Finland
Recruitment of any person under the age of 18 in on implementation of the Optional Protocol,
a situation of armed conflict was classified as a Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
war crime in the Finnish Penal Code.1 Conscripts FIN/CO/1, 21 October 2005.
usually completed military service at the age of
19 or 20, although entry into the armed forces
was possible between the ages of 18 and 29.2
While a civilian alternative to compulsory military
service was offered to conscientious objectors,
the length of the service (395 days) was 215
days longer than military service and could
therefore be considered punitive. During 2006
Amnesty International reported on the cases of
11 imprisoned conscientious objectors whom
the organization considered to be prisoners of
conscience.3

In its June 2004 initial report to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child concerning
government stated that there were no schools
operated or controlled by the Finnish Defence
Forces.4

On consideration of France’s Initial Report
F R ANCE on the Optional Protocol, the UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child recommended that
French Republic the recruitment and involvement of children
in hostilities be explicitly criminalized in
Population: 60.5 million (13.3 million under 18) legislation and that extraterritorial jurisdiction
Government armed forces: 254,900 be established for these crimes when they
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscription are committed by or against a person who is
suspended since January 2003) a citizen of or has other links with France. The
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 Committee encouraged the government to raise
Voting age: 18 the minimum age of recruitment into the armed
Optional Protocol: ratified 5 February 2003 forces and Foreign Legion to 18. The Committee
further recommended that the government
“provide by law for a special status, different
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 from that of the military, for 16 to below 18 years
old children enrolled in military schools and for
While in its 2006 report to the UN those in the Foreign Legion”.7
Committee on the Rights of the Child
France stated there were no under-18s Military training and schools
in the Foreign Legion, revised 2005 Military schools in France included four for the
legislation still fixed the minimum age of army (Prytanée nationale militaire, Lycée Militaire
recruitment to it at 17, with consent from de Saint-Cyr, Lycée Militaire d’Aix-en-Provence
and Lycée Militaire d’Autun) and one for the navy
their “legal representative”. (Lycée Naval de Brest). Students were admitted
to the air force school, the Ecole d’Enseignement
Government Technique de l’Armée de l’Air de Saintes, from the
age of 16. There was also a Polytechnic School
National recruitment legislation and (Ecole Polytechnique). Under Law No. 70-631
of July 1970, as amended by Law 94-577 of July
practice 1994, candidates for the Polytechnic School had
Conscription was suspended from 1 January 2003 to be 17 to sit admission examinations and could
under the National Service Reform Act, Act No. enter the school during the year in which they
97-1019 of 28 October 1997, which amended the turned 18.8
1972 National Service Code. The law allowed the
government to reinstate conscription at any time
(Article L112-2)1 and the legislation providing for Developments
national service was not repealed.2 France dedicated part of its development aid to
Law No. 2205-207 of 24 March 2005 on the children in armed conflicts, financing directly
General Status of Servicemen, which revised or indirectly through multilateral funds child
the body of provisions contained in previous demobilization and reintegration programs,
laws, entered into force on 1 July 2005.3 Article particularly in Africa. From 2002 it increased its
20(4) of this new legislation stated that no one co-operation with UNICEF, the UN refugee agency
could become part of the armed forces if not “at (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations
least 17 years of age or 16 years of age in order working in this area. In 2006 France increased
to receive general or vocational training as a its contribution to UNICEF by 30 per cent. This
volunteer in the armed forces or as a pupil in a money supported UNICEF’s Innocenti Research
military school”.4 Centre, which studied, among other things,
Foreign Legion recruits had to be aged questions relating to the reintegration of children
between 17 and 40.5 Selected candidates signed who have been released from armed groups. The
a five-year unconditional contract to serve money also supported a long-term program for
anywhere in the world. They were trained for West Africa and the Great Lakes.9
four months at the Fourth Foreign Regiment in Following an extensive review of the Cape
Castelnaudary before being posted.6 Under- Town Principles and Best Practices, led by UNICEF
18s had to have the consent of their “legal in 2006, in February 2007 the French government
representatives” to enlist. However, Article and UNICEF jointly sponsored a ministerial-level
83 of the Law No. 2205-207 offered no legal meeting in Paris. At the meeting France and 58
guarantee regarding the verification of age: “the other states endorsed the Paris Commitments to
military authorities designated by the Ministry protect children from unlawful recruitment or use
of Defence can, in the absence of the necessary by armed forces or armed groups and the Paris
supporting documents, accept the enlistment [of Principles and guidelines on children associated
a candidate]”. with armed forces or armed groups. The
documents reaffirmed international standards

and operational principles for protecting and
assisting child soldiers. GAB O N
France had chaired the UN Security Council
working group on children and armed conflict, Gabonese Republic
established under the provisions of Security
Council Resolution 1612 (2005), since its creation Population: 1.4 million (651,000 under 18)
in July 2005. Government armed forces: 4,700
1 Initial report of France to the UN Committee on Voluntary recruitment age: 20
the Rights of the Child on implementation of the Voting age: 211
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/FRA/1, Optional Protocol: signed 8 September 2000
6 November 2006. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
2 ��
Loi no 97-1019 du 28 octobre 1997 portant CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 182, ACRWC
réforme du service national.
3 “National implementation of international There were no reports of under-18s in the
humanitarian law – biannual update on national government security forces.
legislation and case law – January–June 2005”,
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87
F—J
(859) (September 2005), www.icrc.org. Government
4 ��
Loi no. 2005-270 du 24 mars 2005 portant statut
général des militaires, NOR: DEFX0400144L. National recruitment legislation and
5 Act of 21 March 2005, Art. 83, Ch. II. practice
6 Portail Web Légion, www.legion-etrangere.com. The Gabonese constitution stated that it was the
7 Committee on the Rights of the Child, duty of every citizen to defend the country. The
Consideration of initial report submitted by state security forces defended the nation and
France on the Optional Protocol, Concluding safeguarded public order, and the creation of
observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/FRA/CO/1, private militias was forbidden.2
5 October 2007, unedited version. There was no conscription into the armed
8 ��
Ministère de la Défense, www.defense.gouv.fr. forces.3 Under Act No. 004/98 of February 1998
9 Information provided in meetings with the on the general organization of national defence
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. and public security, the minimum age for
voluntary recruitment was 20.
Developments
Gabon ratified the African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child in 2007.
1 Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). The

Gabonese constitution, however, gives the voting
age as 18 (Article 4).
2 Article 1(21) and (22).
3 Initial report of Gabon to the UN Committee
Add.10, 13 July 2001.

G ambia Developments
In August 2006 over 4,000 Senegalese
Republic of the Gambia refugees fled into Gambia from Senegal’s
southern Casamance region to escape fighting
Population: 1.5 million (704,000 under 18) between Senegalese troops and a splinter
Government armed forces: 800 group of the armed political group Democratic
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des forces
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC) led by
Voting age: 18 Salif Sadio.5 According to the UN refugee agency
Optional Protocol: signed 21 December 2000 (UNHCR) there were over 6,000 refugees by the
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): end of October 2006.6
1 “Gambia jail terms for coup plot”, BBC News, 20
There were no reports of under-18s being April 2007.
used in the armed forces. 2 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Consideration of report submitted by Gambia,
Context Add.165, 6 November 2001.
In April 2007, ten former army officers were 3 See NewGambia.com, www.newgambia.gm.
convicted of treason and sentenced to life 4 US Department of State, Country Report on
imprisonment by a military court for attempting Human Rights Practices 2006, the Gambia, March
to overthrow President Jammeh in March 2006. 2007, www.state.gov.
Five people who had been arrested as part of 5 “Thousands flee Senegal fighting”, BBC News, 24
the attempted coup in March 2006 were feared August 2006.
to have been executed in April 2006 after the 6 UNHCR, “Gambia: New arrivals from Senegal”,
government stated that they had escaped while press briefing note, 31 October 2006.
being transferred to a different prison.1
Government
practice
There was no conscription. Section 23 of the
Armed Forces Act stated, “Where a person
enlisting has not attained the age of eighteen
years, his period of enlistment shall commence
from the date he attains the age of eighteen
years.” Although in November 2001 the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child asked the
government to establish a clear legal minimum
age for enlistment into the armed forces,2 it
appeared that no action had been taken.
The government reported that it planned to
establish a military academy, an infantry centre
and school, and military primary and secondary-
schools. Currently a number of countries were
training the Gambian military.3
The Children’s Act, passed in June 2005, was
designed to protect and promote the welfare
of children and to curb abuses against them,
including trafficking. The definition of a child was
set as any person under the age of 18. As a result
of the Act one of five regional children’s courts
opened in February 2006. The Act also protected
children from exploitative labour or hazardous
employment.4

Georgia planned to switch to an entirely non-
G EORGIA conscript army by the end of 2009. The increased
costs were estimated at US$4,226 for the annual
Georgia cost of every non-conscript soldier compared
with US$1,001 for every conscript.10
Government armed forces: 11,320 Military training and military schools
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 The military schools which formerly existed in
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 Georgia were reportedly no longer in operation
Voting age: 18 and there was no military education in schools.11
Optional Protocol: not signed There were four tertiary-level military
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): academies.12 Of these, the NCO School admitted
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 applicants straight from school; the Defence
Academy had previously also taken school
There were no reports of under-18s in graduates, many from poor families and
the armed forces. Firearms training was orphanages, and including 17-year-olds, but now
restricted entry to graduates.13
available for boys and girls from the age of The government strongly supported and
F—J
15 in Patriot Camps. fully funded a number of Patriot Camps around
the country, which offered ten-day residential
programs in gun handling, sport and leadership
Context training for young people (male and female)
In May 2004 Georgia regained control over the aged 15–20. Handling guns, including automatic
autonomous region of Ajaria without resorting weapons, was taught by military trainers.14 In
to force. However, most of Abkhazia and South 2005, 15,000 young people attended Patriot
Ossetia remained unrecognized self-proclaimed Camps, and in 2006, 30,000.15 In 2006 the
republics.1 Georgia reiterated its aim to join NATO government announced plans to hold a camp in
and strengthen ties with the European Union the Kodori Gorge.16 Opposition politicians were
(EU).2 The USA continued to develop its training critical of the militaristic nature of the camps.17
program for Georgia’s army.3 The UN Observer
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) continued to carry
out peacekeeping activities, including monitoring
Abkhazia
the 1994 ceasefire between Georgian and Abkhaz Abkhazia’s 1995 Law on Universal Military Service
forces, in co-operation with a Commonwealth of set 18 as the minimum age for conscription. Boys
Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force.4 were registered with the authorities at the age
In August 2004 an attempt to retake South of 17.18
Ossetia militarily resulted in dozens of deaths.5 In There were some reports that boys under
July 2006 Georgia regained control of the Kodori the age of 18 had been conscripted illegally into
Gorge in Abkhazia from a former paramilitary the Abkhazia forces or released on payment
group which had continued to operate despite of bribes, including in the ethnic Georgian Gali
being disbanded. The authorities in Abkhazia region under the control of Abkhazia.19 The
regarded the action as a breach of agreements authorities in Abkhazia denied that an attempt
to demilitarize the gorge.6 Four Russian military had been made in November 2005 to conscript
officers were arrested in late September ethnic Georgians.20 In March 2007 UNOMIG
2006 and charged with spying, and Russia assigned a human rights officer to its office in
subsequently imposed a range of sanctions on Gali, to coordinate with the newly established
Georgia.7 The Russian government denied that a non-governmental Human Rights Centre in the
helicopter attack in the gorge in March 2007 was district.21
carried out by Russian forces.8 In the final two grades of school, between
the ages of 15 and 17, pupils received “pre-
conscription training for civil defence” for two
Government hours a week. However, in many schools the
National recruitment legislation and course did not take place because of its obsolete
nature and the lack of trained staff, and the
practice Ministry of Education planned to produce a new
All male citizens and residents aged 18–27 were course. Entrance to Abkhazia’s Military Academy
subject to conscription. Military service was for and entry to the reserve officer training corps in
18 months. Women, and men in the reserves higher education institutions was limited to those
after completing compulsory service, could join over 18.22
the army on a professional basis on a four-year In August 2007 it was reported that a military
contract.9 school in Abkhazia was to be reopened with

support from the Russian armed forces. No 14 Natalia Antelava, “Patriot games for young
details of enrolment policy were available.23 Georgians”, BBC News, 19 September 2005;
Lawrence Sheets, “‘Patriot camps’ cause concern
The Monadire paramilitary group in former Soviet republic”, Morning Edition,
National Public Radio (NPR), 12 October 2005,
The Monadire paramilitary group based in
www.npr.org.
Abkhazia’s Kodori Gorge was officially disbanded
in 2005 and disarmed by the Georgian 15 Government of the Autonomous Republic of
Adjara, “President accompanied by guests visited
government in mid-2006. It was reported to have
‘patriot’ camp”, 25 May 2006, www.adjara.gov.ge.
had up to 700 members at times.24 It was not
known if any of its members were under 18. 16 “Georgia revives despite blockade – Saakashvili
tells ‘patriots’”, Civil Georgia, 16 September
2006, www.civil.ge.
South Ossetia 17 Natalia Antelava, above note 14.
The South Ossetian army reportedly followed the 18 Confidential sources, Abkhazia.
military regulations of the Russian Federation, 19 US Department of State, Country Reports on
with a minimum age of 18 for conscription. The Human Rights Practices 2005 and 2006.
bulk of its security training took place in Russia. 20 “UN Expresses Concern at Situation in Abkhazia’s
Military service was for 18 months. A South Gali region”, RFE/RL,��
��
7 November 2005; “Some
Ossetian military official stated that there was of the conscripts detained in Gali region returned
no bullying in the army because soldiers served to their families”, Novosti-Gruziya, 14 December
mainly in their home areas.25 2005, www.newsgeorgia.ru.
21 Report of the UN Secretary-General on the
* Titles of non-English language sources have been Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, UN Doc.
translated by the Coalition. S/2007/182, 3 April 2007.
1 See, for example, Amnesty International Report 22 Confidential sources, Abkhazia, March 2007.
2005. 23 “Separatists Open Military School”, Georgian
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister’s Directives Times, 8 August 2007, www.geotimes.ge.
for 2007, undated, www.mfa.gov.ge. 24 Nino Khutsidze, “Military expert on Kodori
3 ��
“��
US Signs New Military Assistance Accord with operation”, Civil Georgia, 26 July 2006, www.civil.
Georgia”, ��
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/ ge.
RL), Newsline,
��
20 September 2006, reported in 25 “Tskhinvali army begins spring draft”, Regnum,
Georgia Daily Digest, www.eurasianet.org.
�� 5 April 2006, www.unomig.org.
4 UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), www.
un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig.
5 See International Crisis Group (ICG), Georgia:
Avoiding War in South Ossetia, Europe Report No.
159, 26 November 2004, www.crisisgroup.org.
6 Giorgi Kupatadze and Inal Khashig, “Georgian–
Abkhaz tensions rise over Kodori Gorge”, Institute
of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 25 August
2006, www.iwpr.net.
7 ��
Claire Bigg, Russia: 2006 – A Year of Muscle and
Missteps, RFE/RL, 28 December 2006, www.rferl.
org; “Georgia orders Russia ‘spies’ held”, CNN, 29
September 2006.
8 ��
“Georgian official says Kodori attack came from
Russia”, RFE/RL, 14 March 2007.
9 Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces of Georgia,
Military Service, www.mod.gov.ge.
10 J. Mazakhiroglu, “Military commissioners’ offices
will be abolished”, Armeyskoe Zerkalo, 30
December 2006, www.zerkalo.az.
11 Confidential source, November 2007.
12 Ministry of Defence, above note 9, Educational
institutions.
13 Human Rights Centre (HRIDC), “Students of
the Military Academy voice a protest in front
of parliament”, 22 September 2005, www.
humanrights.ge; Tamar Maisuradze, “��
The parade
in front of the state chancellery”, 24 hours press
agency, 10 June 2005, www.24hours.ge.

armies or armed groups was not recognized by the
G ERMANY authorities as a basis for granting refugee status;
the number of former child soldiers currently
Federal Republic of Germany living in Germany was estimated to be between
300 and 500. The German Code of Crimes against
Population: 82.7 million (14.7 million under 18) International Law criminalized the recruitment
Government armed forces: 245,700 or enlistment of children under the age of 15 into
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 armed forces or armed groups, as well as their
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 (training only) active participation in international or internal
Voting age: 18 armed conflicts, including such acts committed
ratified 13 December 2004 outside, or having no connection with, Germany.4
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): During the first quarter of 2006, Germany
contributed approximately �83 million towards
the cost of projects aiming at the reintegration
Under-18s continued to serve in the armed of ex-combatants, especially child soldiers, in
Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of
forces. the Congo, Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.
Approximately €1.4 million were directed towards
F—J
Government civil peace service programs in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Uganda.5
National recruitment legislation and At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
Paris, Germany and 58 other states endorsed
practice the Paris Commitments to protect children
Article 12 of the 1949 Basic Law (constitution) from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
provided the legal basis for conscription to forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
military service. In accordance with the 1956 and guidelines on children associated with
Military Service Act, all German males became armed forces or armed groups. The documents
liable for compulsory military service, lasting nine reaffirmed international standards and
months, at the age of 18. Article 4b of the 1949 operational principles for protecting and assisting
Basic Law established a right to conscientious child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
objection to military service, and current consultation jointly sponsored by the French
provisions for alternative service, also lasting government and UNICEF.
nine months, were set out in the 2003 Law on
Conscientious Objection.1 For those who became International standards
eligible for conscription at 18, a pre-induction Germany ratified the Optional Protocol on 13
medical examination took place no earlier than December 2004. In its declaration entered upon
six months before their 18th birthday. Voluntary ratification, Germany confirmed that 17 was the
enlistment in the German armed forces was minimum age for voluntary recruitment to the
permissible at 17, provided that the individual armed forces, and that “persons under the age of
volunteering had the consent of a parent or 18 years shall be recruited into the armed forces
guardian. In such cases, a pre-induction medical solely for the purpose of commencing military
examination took place six months before the training.”6
applicant’s 17th birthday. Volunteers under 18
were enrolled for military training only, and were
expressly prohibited from participating in any 1 Quaker Council for European Affairs, “The right
to conscientious objection to military service in
military operations and from performing any
Europe: A review of the current situation”, April
function requiring the use of firearms, including
2005.
deployment for armed guard duty. However,
17-year-old volunteers could receive firearms 2 Initial report of Germany to the UN Committee on
training; at the time of their enrolment they
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/DEU/1,
received written instructions stating that their use
17 April 2007.
of firearms would be strictly limited to training,
and that they would not be involved in any activity 3 Confidential source, August 2007.
that may lead to armed conflict.2 In 2005 there 4 Kindernothilfe, Terre des Hommes and the
were 1,229 males and females under the age of 18 German Coordination for Child Soldiers, Shadow
serving in the German armed forces. The number Report in the Context of the States Report
of under-18s serving in 2006 was 906.3 Procedure Pursuant to Article 8 of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Developments Conflicts, 2007.
A group of German non-governmental 5 Initial report, above note 2.
organizations (NGOs) working on children’s rights 6 Declaration of Germany on ratification of the
suggested that the recruitment of child soldiers by Optional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.

G hana armed forces or armed groups. The documents
Republic of Ghana operational principles for protecting and assisting
Population: 22.1 million (10.2 million under 18) consultation jointly sponsored by the French
Government armed forces: 13,500 government and UNICEF.
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 1 Second periodic report of Ghana to the UN
Voting age: 18 Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
Optional Protocol: signed 24 September 2003 CRC/C/GHA/CO/2, 14 July 2005.
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): 2 Ghana’s National Service, History and Profile
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 182, ACRWC Section.
3 UNHCR, Global Appeal 2008–2009.
There were no reports of under-18s in the 4 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
armed forces. Consideration of report submitted by Ghana,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/GHA/2,
17 March 2006.
Government
practice
In 2005 the government reported to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child that the
minimum age for voluntary enlistment into the
army was 18, that there was no conscription and
that by law under-18s were not allowed to join the
armed forces.1 There were no reports of under-18s
Ghana’s National Service Scheme (NSS),
which lasted for one to two years and was
compulsory for able-bodied persons between
the ages of 18 and 40, consisted mainly of public
service, but military training was an option for
some.2
Developments
In 2005 significant numbers of Togolese refugees
arrived in Ghana, fleeing political violence in
their home country, joining the large numbers
of Liberian refugees. In its planning for 2008
the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) estimated that
there were present in the country almost 10,000
Togolese refugees and asylum seekers and over
32,000 Liberians.3
An increase in sexual exploitation, in
particular for commercial purposes, was raised
by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
in its concluding observations on Ghana’s second
periodic report, in March 2006. The committee
also expressed concern about the existence of
discrimination against girls and street children
and other groups of vulnerable children. It
welcomed the National Plan for Action entitled
“Ghana Fit for Children” and the passing of the
Human Trafficking Act of 2005.4
Paris, Ghana and 58 other states endorsed

mobilization, for the purposes of exercises, or for
G REECE specific operational missions in border areas.4
Hellenic Republic Military training and military schools

Military educational institutions included the
Hellenic Military Academy, the Hellenic National
Government armed forces: 147,100 Defence College and the Non-commissioned
Compulsory recruitment age: 19 Officer Army School. Military academies enjoyed
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 the same status as universities, and entrance
Voting age: 18 was conditional on completion of high school
Optional Protocol: ratified 22 October 2003 education. Students also trained abroad at
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): institutions of other NATO member countries.5
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 Both male and female students at the Greek
military academies could not be married, have
The minimum legal age for voluntary children, be pregnant or become pregnant during
recruitment was 18. their studies. They had to be under 21 on entry,6
but there was no information available about the
minimum age of entry.
F—J
Context
The state of mobilization from 1976 because of Developments
the conflict in Cyprus ended on 18 December At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,
2002.1 Greece and 58 other states endorsed the Paris
Government recruitment or use by armed forces or armed
National recruitment legislation and children associated with armed forces or armed
practice groups. The documents reaffirmed international
A new conscription law in 2005 provided for protecting and assisting child soldiers and
mandatory military service of 12 months for followed a wide-ranging global consultation
men between the ages of 19 and 45. All healthy jointly sponsored by the French government and
male citizens had to register at the age of 18. UNICEF.
Deferments were available to students in higher
education, on health grounds or to those with
brothers serving in the armed forces. The length 1 ��
Presidential Decree 371 of 2002, Government
Gazette, FEK 320A, 18 December 2002, www.
of military service could be reduced for various
et.gr.
reasons, for example for the eldest sons of large
families in which the father had died, or for men 2 Conscription Law, No. 3421 of 2005, 13 December
who had dependent elderly parents. People 2005, www.stratologia.gr/; Ministry of Defence,
official conscription website, www.stratologia.
exempt from conscription included fathers of
gr; OMHROI.GR, “Conscription in Greece”, www.
more than three children or fathers whose wives
omhroi.gr.
had died or were incapable of work and whose
children could not support themselves. The 3 ��
Declarations and reservations to the Optional
2005 law allowed alternative civilian service
to be suspended in times of war, and for those 4 Universal Defence Law, No. ��
2641 of 1998;
performing such service to be integrated into i��
nformation from Amnesty International
“unarmed military service” (Article 65).2 Greece 2007; Amnesty International “Right to
conscientious objection should be introduced in
On ratifying the Optional Protocol in October
new Universal Defence Law”, 22 June 1998.
2003, Greece declared that the minimum age for
voluntary recruitment to the armed forces was 18 5 Hellenic Army General Staff website, “Cadres’
years.3 Training”, www.army.gr.
��
A law that had not been repealed but was 6 NATO, Committee on Women in the NATO forces,
reportedly not enforced required all men and “Frequently Asked Questions”, www.nato.int.
women aged between 18 and 60 who were not
serving in the armed forces to complete service
in universal defence units for up to four days a
year. Certain women were exempt, such as those
who were pregnant or had children under the
age of 12. The functions of such units included
responding to natural disasters, guarding vital
installations and providing first aid. They could
be provided with arms and ammunition during

G uatemala The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) assisted in training members of the
Republic of Guatemala army in international humanitarian law;7 the
Population: 12.6 million (6.3 million under 18) government reported that more than 14,000 men
Government armed forces: 15,500 and 970 women in the armed forces had received
human rights training.8
There were 11 educational establishments
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 administered by the armed forces.9 Under
Voting age: 18 national law, children attending military schools
Optional Protocol: ratified 9 May 2002 were not members of the armed or reserve forces,
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): and were not required to join the armed forces.10
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182 In the event of an emergency or armed conflict
they could not be designated active members of
Some 16-year-old boys in eastern parts the armed forces or be enlisted.11
of the country were recruited and used as Officer cadets followed a four-year course at
soldiers. the Polytechnic School (Escuela Politécnica).12
Candidates had to be at least 17 and have
completed secondary-school. Cadets at the
Government Polytechnic School could apply to become naval
officers at the Navy School after completing at
National recruitment legislation and least one year of studies.13 The minimum age
practice of entry to the Adolfo V. Hall schools, which
combined academic and military education
Guatemalans had to register with the military over five or six years, was 11; graduation after
authorities on becoming 18, regardless of their completing five years was as a sub-lieutenant
place of residence. Women were required to join in the army reserve. Candidates to the
active military service in times of war.1 Military Aviation Technical School had to have
The Law of Social and Civic Service successfully completed the third grade of basic
(Legislative Decree 20-2003) provided for education, but no minimum age was specified.
alternative service for conscientious objectors. Cadets at the Military Aviation School had to have
There were no specific policies on indigenous completed a minimum of two years’ study at the
populations, who formed a considerable Polytechnic School.14
proportion of recruits.2 There were reports of the use of corporal
Non-governmental organizations reported punishment in military schools and that no
that in some areas 16-year-olds were “delivered” adequate impartial complaints mechanisms were
to army officials by their families, in the belief available to students.15
that military service was an essential part
of their becoming men. Military authorities
reportedly permitted this type of recruitment in Disarmament, demobilization
eastern regions of the country, where the birth
registration process was weak.3 and reintegration (DDR)
The Law of Integral Protection of Children and According to the government the National
Adolescents (Legislative Decree 27-2003) stated Compensation Program provided psychosocial
that “in the event of armed conflict, children and rehabilitation and material compensation to
young persons have the right not to be recruited victims of serious human rights violations during
and the State shall abide by and enforce the the internal armed conflict which ended in 1996,
applicable norms of international humanitarian including the forced recruitment of children.16 It
law. The State shall take all possible measures to was estimated that of the 3,000 members of the
ensure that persons who have not yet attained armed opposition group Guatemalan National
the age of 18 years do not take a direct part Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria
in hostilities and are not recruited for military Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG) who participated
service at any time.”4 in reintegration programs, 214 were under 18
There was no legal provision criminalizing years of age.17
the recruitment of children, but several statutory Non-governmental organizations reported
offences described in the Criminal Code, such as that a lack of information on the number and
abduction of children and abuse of power, could age of those recruited during the conflict had
be applied against recruiters.5 There were no prevented former child soldiers from benefiting
plans to include a provision expressly prohibiting from any reparation or reintegration programs,
the recruitment of children under 18 in the most of which were aimed at widows and former
Criminal Code.6 members of armed opposition groups and self-
defence groups.18

10 NGO Group for the Convention on the Rights of
Developments the Child, State Party Examination of Guatemala’s
There were no reports of armed political Initial Report on the OPAC, Session report, 8 June
groups operating in the country, but gangs and 2007, www.crin.org.
criminal groups with links to private security 11 Written replies, above note 6.
companies and former and current members of 12 Escuela Politécnica, Admisión.
the police committed hundreds of killings and 13 Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional, Acuerdo
other crimes.19 It was estimated that there were Gubernativo No. 714-95, December 1995, www.
around 340 gangs in Guatemala, with as many as congreso.gob.gt.
165,000 members in all, mostly under 24 years 14 Initial report, above note 4.
of age.20 15 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Consideration of report submitted by Guatemala,
Child, on reviewing Guatemala’s initial Optional Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
Protocol report in June 2007, expressed concern GTM/CO/1 (unedited version), 8 June 2007.
about the lack of specific legal provisions 16 Committee against Torture, above note 8.
criminalizing child recruitment and of information
on safeguards adopted to ensure that children
were not recruited or involved in armed conflict.21 18 ��
Movimiento Social por los Derechos de la Niñez,
F—J
In October 2007 Guatemala endorsed the above note 3.
Paris Commitments to protect children from 19 US State Department, Country Reports on Human
unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces Rights Practices 2006: Guatemala, 6 March 2007,
or armed groups and the Paris Principles and www.state.gov.
guidelines on children associated with armed 20 USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang
forces or armed groups. The two documents, Assessment, Annex 2: Guatemala Profile, April
which were previously endorsed by 59 states 2006, www.usaid.gov.
at a February 2007 ministerial meeting in 21 Concluding observations, above note 15.
Paris, reaffirmed international standards and
operational principles for the protection of and
assistance to child soldiers, following a wide-
ranging global consultation jointly sponsored by
1 Decreto No 72-90, Ley Constitutiva del Ejército,

Leyes de Guatemala.
y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Guatemala, August
3 ��
Movimiento Social por los Derechos de la Niñez,
Adolescencia y Juventud en Guatemala, “Informe
Alternativo sobre el Cumplimiento del Protocolo
Facultativo de la CDN sobre la Participación de
los Niños en Conflictos Armados”, November
2006, www.crin.org.
4 Initial report of Guatemala to the UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
GTM/1, 17 July 2006.
5 Ibid.
6 Written replies by Guatemala to the Committee
on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
GTM/Q/1/Add.1, 23 April 2007.
7 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
“Guatemala: respetar el derecho humanitario
desde el entrenamiento”, 19 July 2006, www.icrc.
org.
8 UN Committee against Torture, Thirty-sixth
session, Summary record of the 701st meeting:
Guatemala, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.701, 12 May 2006.
CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008 1 55

of 1990–7 and 2000–3, and in Côte d’Ivoire
G U INEA since 2002.6 The Guinean security forces were
reportedly involved in providing or facilitating the
Republic of Guinea provision of arms flows to combatants in those
countries.7 At times attacks were mounted from
Population: 9.4 million (4.7 million under 18) those countries into Guinea.
Government armed forces: 12,300 In the 1990s Guinea was intimately involved
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 in the conflict in Sierra Leone, from where the
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched cross-
Voting age: 18 border attacks on Guinea in 2000–1. Guinea used
Optional Protocol: not signed recruits from Sierra Leonean refugee camps in
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): Guinea to fight off those attacks, and played an
active role in defeating the RUF in the final stages
of the Sierra Leone conflict.8
There were no reports of under-18s in Around the same time as the attacks by the
RUF, Guinea was attacked also from Liberia. The
government armed forces. Guinean armed group Liberians United for Reconciliation
nationals, including children, who and Democracy (LURD) was based in Guinea,
had taken part in the Liberian conflict and in contravention of the UN arms embargo
were demobilized from Liberian armed on Liberia the Guinean Ministry of Defence
reportedly provided arms to LURD around the
groups, but only very few took part in time of its attacks on Monrovia in July 2003 which
demobilization programs. There were ultimately overthrew President Charles Taylor.9
reports of re-recruitment of former Guinea was also involved in the conflict in
combatants. Côte d’Ivoire. The Guinean government reportedly
was transhipping arms for the government of
Côte d’Ivoire, at least until the imposition of a UN
Context arms embargo in November 2004.10 In June 2004
Drastically deteriorating living standards for the the Forces armées des Forces nouvelles (FAFN)
majority of the population after over 20 years in Côte d’Ivoire claimed that an attack on them
of authoritarian rule under President Lansana by unidentified armed elements which killed 11
Conté led to two general strikes in February civilians in Korhogo, in the north of the country,
and June 2006. A third general strike in January was supported by the Guinean government.11 In
2007 became an unprecedented popular revolt December 2006 a UN expert group reported that
calling for political change. Demonstrations in it had credible information that Guinea had been
the following weeks, in which school students used as a transit point for the training of fighters
and other young people played an active part, loyal to Côte d’Ivoire President Gbagbo.12
were violently suppressed by the security forces. The Forest Region of Guinea was the
Estimates of those killed ranged from 130 to over crossroads for arms trafficking and a migrant
180 with over 1,500 injured. Some of them were population of thousands of young fighters,
children.1 including child soldiers, crossing the borders
Guinea was an immediate neighbour of between Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte
Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia. When d’Ivoire who saw conflict mainly as an economic
conflicts broke out in those countries thousands opportunity. Many had first been forcibly
of refugees, as well as large numbers of returning recruited as children in one conflict, then willingly
Guinean nationals, crossed the border into crossed borders to take up arms in another,
Guinea. Most of them found refuge in the isolated often with a different armed group. A 2005
Forest Region of Guinea (Guinée forestière), study by Human Rights Watch found that most
where the borders of all four countries met.2 By had been motivated by promises of financial
1997–8 there were close to half a million refugees gain, and many could not articulate the political
and asylum-seekers in Guinea registered with the objective of the group they fought with. The
UN refugee agency (UNHCR), reducing to about risk of re-recruitment was exacerbated by high
100,000 in 2004–5 as neighbouring countries rates of youth unemployment and corruption
became more stable and refugees returned and deficiencies in the implementation of
home.3 By 2007 around 12,000 refugees – about disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
70 per cent from Liberia and about 30 per cent (DDR) programs.13 An August 2006 report by the
from Sierra Leone – remained in Guinea.4 They UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) noted that
included about 350 Sierra Leonean children high levels of unemployment, particularly youth
separated from their families.5 unemployment, across west Africa posed a risk
Guinea was involved in the complex web of to stability in the region. This was reiterated in a
conflicts in neighbouring countries – in Sierra 2007 report by the UN Secretary-General which
Leone from 1991–2002, in the Liberian conflicts highlighted also the importance of reform of the

security sector in countries in the region as a foreign national children formerly associated with
means of addressing it.14 the fighting forces who were repatriated from
Liberia by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC).27
Government In mid-2005 it was reported that many
National recruitment legislation and former LURD combatants, who had operated
from Guinea during the Liberian conflict, were
practice moving back from Liberia to the Forest Region of
Under Order No. 072/PRG/SGG/90 of 25 July Guinea.28
1990, all Guinean citizens aged 18–25 could be From mid-2004 there were reports of active
called for military service for 18 months (Article recruitment of former combatants in Liberia for
1).15 While conscription was provided for in law, both pro and anti-government groups in Guinea.
there was no military service in practice.16 Recruitment was reported to be taking place
Guinean law and army regulations prohibited in Monrovia and counties bordering Guinea,
the recruitment of under-18s into the armed among former combatants associated with
forces.17 However, there were insufficient former President Charles Taylor, as well as former
measures with regard to birth registration, LURD combatants.29 According to some reports,
especially in rural areas.18 This meant that it was Guinean military officials associated with the son
F—J
not always be possible to be sure whether a of a former president of Guinea, Sékou Touré,
young person was 18. offered money to former LURD combatants to join
an attack on Guinea. There were also allegations
Child recruitment and deployment that Liberians may have been involved in an
At the time of the cross-border attacks into assassination attempt against President Conté
Guinea from Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2000–1, in January 2005. Other former LURD combatants
more than 7,000 young men volunteered for the were recruiting on behalf of the Guinean
Young Volunteers (Jeunes volontaires), civilian government. Some of those being recruited were
militias supporting the Guinean army.19 The reported to be children.30 However, despite the
government had undertaken that they would be well-documented recruitment, and reports of
employed in the regular army afterwards but in infiltration into Guinea in late 2004, attacks by
fact very few of them were.20 the armed groups allegedly plotting to overthrow
The extent of child recruitment into the President Conté did not materialize.31 In October
Young Volunteers was not established and was 2006 the Secretary-General reported that the UN
consistently denied by government authorities. had obtained no confirmation of the allegations
There had been training for officers with regard of recruitment of child soldiers by Liberian
to children’s rights, including preventing the armed groups in connection with the situation in
recruitment and use of children.21 One former Guinea.32
Young Volunteer claimed to have been as young During the crisis in early 2007 there were
as 13 when he was recruited.22 some reports of fighters crossing into Guinea
Only a small minority of Young Volunteers from neighbouring countries in anticipation
had completed a demobilization process, and of recruitment into armed groups or militias.
the status of those who had not demobilized was However, there was no evidence of such groups
unclear. Some retained their arms and reportedly being formed, or of children being targeted for
continued to act as volunteer soldiers; others recruitment. Former armed group commanders
were reportedly employed providing security were reported to have said there was now no
services for non-governmental organizations need to recruit children given the numbers of
(NGOs) and UN agencies operating in the Forest experienced combatants – many of them former
Region.23 There were also reports that some of child soldiers – to recruit from.33
them set up roadblocks, looting vehicles and
robbing passengers.24 In March 2006 the UN
reportedly estimated that some 4,000 volunteer
soldiers, all or almost all by then over 18, and reintegration (DDR)
operated in the Forest Region, providing their
own uniforms and hoping to be formally recruited By 2004 about 350 Young Volunteers had
completed training as part of a demobilization
to the armed forces.25
program, but thousands of others, many
recruited as children, had not benefited from the
Armed groups program because of lack of funds.34 In 2007 it
was reported that some rehabilitation projects
Many of the combatants in the conflicts in
aimed at former Young Volunteers continued.35
neighbouring countries were from Guinea. More
In November 2003 UNICEF estimated that
than half of the over 600 disarmed combatants in
some 2,000 Guinean child soldiers, including
Liberia who were identified as foreign nationals
child soldiers returning from Liberia, required
were from Guinea.26 The same applied also to
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration.36

In the event, the number of Guinean child 13 See HRW, Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal
soldiers who took part in DDR programs was Legacy of West Africa’s Regional Warriors, March
substantially lower than this estimate. As of 2005; Report of the Secretary-General on ways to
June 2006, 29 Guinean child soldiers had been combat subregional and cross-border problems
demobilized in Liberia and returned to Guinea.37 in West Africa, UN Doc. S/2004/200, 12 March
Many children reportedly self-demobilized 2004; Report of the Secretary-General on inter-
through fear of being stigmatized. NGOs working mission co-operation and possible cross-border
operations between the UN Mission in Sierra
with children in Guinea reported that a barrier
Leone, the UN Mission in Liberia, and the UN
to both successful reintegration of former child
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2005/135,
soldiers and prevention of new recruitment 2 March 2005.
was the difficulty of discussing the issue
14 UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), Youth
openly because of the stigma attached to child
Unemployment and Regional Insecurity in West
soldiering. This meant that many former child
Africa, 2nd edn, August 2006, www.un.org/
soldiers were unwilling to reveal that they had unowa; Report of the Secretary-General, above
been combatants. 38 note 5.
Former child soldiers were also reported to
15 Initial report of Guinea to the UN Committee on
be having difficulty in adapting to civilian life,
the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.48,
in particular the loss of the power and relative 17 June 1997. (This corrects the error in Child
wealth gained through association with an armed Soldiers: Global Report 2001 and 2004.)
group.39 In 2007 large numbers of former child
16 Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004, citing
soldiers were believed to be present, without
confidential source, Guinea, May 2004.
support, in the Forest Region.40
17 Ibid., citing confidential source.
1 International Crisis Group (ICG), Guinea: Change
Consideration of initial report submitted by
or Chaos, Africa Report No. 121, 14 February
Guinea, Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/
2007, and Guinea: Change on Hold, Africa
C/15/Add.100, 10 May 1999.
Briefing No. 49, 8 November 2007; Human
Rights Watch (HRW), Dying for Change: Brutality 19 Stopping Guinea’s Slide, above note 7; Guinea:
and Repression by Guinean Security Forces in Change or Chaos, above note 1.
Response to a Nationwide Strike, April 2007; 20 Child Soldiers Coalition, Child Soldiers and
Amnesty International (AI), Guinea: “Soldiers Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and
were Shooting Everywhere” – The Security Forces’ Reintegration in West Africa, November 2006.
Response to Peaceful Demands for Change (AFR 21 Coalition interviews in Guinea, 2005; information
29/003/2007), 27 June 2007. from confidential source, 2007; see also Child
2 “Guinea’s Forest Region – living on the edge”, Soldiers: Global Report 2004.
IRIN, January 2005, www.irinnews.org. 22 “Guinea: in a desperate bid for jobs, youths sign
3 UNHCR, Country Data Sheet: Guinea, 2005 up as ‘volunteers’”, IRIN, 6 March 2006.
UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, 30 April 2007, 23 Ibid.; Coalition interviews in Guinea, 2005;
www.unhcr.org. Confidential sources, Guinea, August 2007.
4 UNHCR, Global Appeal 2008–2009. 24 Coalition interviews with army officers and NGOs
5 Report of the UN Secretary-General on in Guinea, June 2007.
cross-border issues in West Africa, UN Doc. 25 IRIN, above note 22.
S/2007/143, 13 March 2007. 26 Fifth progress report of the Secretary-General on
6 See entries on Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2004/972,
Leone in this volume. 17 December 2004.
7 ICG, Stopping Guinea’s Slide, Africa Report No. 27 Seventh progress report of the Secretary-
94, 14 June 2005. General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.
8 Ibid. S/2005/391, 16 June 2005.
9 Ibid. 28 Stopping Guinea’s Slide, above note 7.
10 Ibid. 29 Ibid.; Youth, Poverty and Blood, above note 13.
11 Second report of the Secretary-General on the UN 30 Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia, UN
operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2004/697, Doc. S/2005/30, 13 June 2005.
27 August 2004. 31 Guinea: Change or Chaos, above note 1.
12 Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, UN Doc. 32 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
S/2006/976, 15 December 2006. armed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006-826,
26 October 2006.
33 Confidential source, May 2007.
34 For a more detailed account see Child Soldiers:
Global Report 2004.
35 Coalition interviews in Guinea, June 2007.

36 UNICEF, “A window on West Africa’s war-weary
children”, 4 November 2003. GUI N E A - B I S S AU
38 Coalition interviews in Guinea, 2005. Republic of Guinea-Bissau
39 Ibid. Population: 1.6 million (856,000 under 18)
40 Confidential source, May 2007. Government armed forces: 9,300
Voluntary recruitment age: 16, younger with
parental consent
Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: signed 8 September 2000
CRC, GC AP I and II
There were no reports of child soldiers

serving in the armed forces, although by
F—J
law children aged under 16 years could be
enlisted with parental consent.
Context
Political tension and army unrest persisted. In
October 2004, a year after ousting President
Kumba Ialá, General Veríssimo Correia Seabra,
the chief of staff of the armed forces, and Colonel
Domingos de Barros were killed in a revolt
by soldiers who were demanding payment of
arrears owed to them for their service in the
UN peacekeeping force in Liberia.1 No one was
prosecuted for those deaths.2 The revolt was
ended by a deal with the military hierarchy which
included an offer of an amnesty for offences
committed by soldiers between 1980 and 6
October 2004.3 However, the amnesty law had
not yet been approved by parliament. There was
serious unrest in the run-up to the July 2005
presidential elections, which were won by a
former president, João Bernardo “Niño” Vieira.
Fighting erupted in March 2006 between
the armed forces and a dissident faction of the
Senegalese separatist armed group Democratic
forces of Casamance Movement (Mouvement des
forces democratiques du Casamance, MFDC), led
by Salif Sadio, which had entered Guinea-Bissau
territory. The ensuing conflict, which lasted for a
month, resulted in the isolation of over 20,000
people in rural communities in the north, and the
displacement of at least 10,000 people, mostly
women and children, some 2,000 of whom fled
to Senegal. The MFDC reportedly laid mines and
other explosive devices in the area.4 There were
no reports of children taking part in the fighting.
Government
practice
Decree 20/83 of 9 July 1983 provided for
compulsory military service for men aged

between 18 and 25. However, obligatory military 8 “Guinea-Bissau: International attention on drug
service ceased to be implemented from the trafficking could help demining efforts”, IRIN, 26
second half of the 1980s.5 The decree also July 2007.
provided for boys under 16 to perform military 9 Report of the UN Secretary-General, above note
service with parental or guardian consent. 7.
Currently, no under-18s appeared to be serving in 10 Report of the UN Secretary-General on
the armed forces. developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the
activities of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office
in that country, UN Doc. S/2007/715, 6 December
Disarmament, demobilization 2007.
and reintegration (DDR) 11 Confidential sources, May 2007.
In October 2005 the government announced

the destruction of its entire stockpile of
approximately 5,000 landmines.6 Emergency
de-mining in the north got under way following
the fighting in March–April 2006.7 Nevertheless,
Guinea-Bissau remained plagued by landmines
and other explosive devices, and according to a
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
report, 32 of 39 sectors remained contaminated
by mines and other munitions. This had a
particularly negative impact on the rural poor
and the national economy, since much of the land
could not be cultivated.8
According to the Ministry of Defence, a
security sector reform envisaged the reduction of
the armed forces from 9,650 to 3,440.9 In 2007
the UNDP agreed to finance an independent
census of the armed forces, in order to take into
account the needs and numbers of armed forces
to be targeted for demobilization.10
Developments
Senegalese children of MFDC fighters or who
were refugees from the conflict in Casamance
grew up in extreme poverty in Guinea-Bissau,
and were exposed both to conflict and to armed
criminal activity.11
1 “Soldiers Stage Revolt in Guinea-Bissau”, AP, 6

October 2004.
Rights Practices, 2006: Guinea-Bissau, Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 6 March
3 “Guinea-Bissau renegade troops reach deal with
military”, AFP, 10 October 2004.
4 Report of the UN Secretary-General on
developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the
(UNGBIS), UN Doc. S/2006/487, 6 July 2006.
5 Confidential sources, 31 July 2007.
6 “Guinea-Bissau: Stockpiles gone but landmines a
continued threat”, IRIN, 26 October 2005.
7 Report of the UN Secretary-General on
developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the
(UNGBIS), UN Doc. S/2006/946, 6 December
2006.

2 Initial report of Guyana to the UN Committee on
G uyana the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.47,
6 August 2003.
Republic of Guyana 3 Defence Act, Chapter 15.01.
4 Guyana Defence Force; see also Initial report,
Population: 751,000 (261,000 under 18) above note 2.
Government armed forces: 1,100 5 National Service Act, Chapter 15.02.
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (no conscription
in practice)
Voluntary recruitment age: 16; 14–16 with
parental consent
Voting age: 18
F—J
armed forces but legislation providing for
recruitment from the age of 14 was still in
force.
Government
practice
The Guyana Defence Force consisted of a
regular force and reserves and was charged with
the defence of, and maintenance of order in,
Guyana. According to the Guyana Defence Force,
individuals aged 18–25 with a “good primary
education” were eligible to apply.1
In August 2003 Guyana reported to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child that, under
the Defence Act, “A recruiting officer shall not
enlist a person under the age of eighteen years
in the regular Force.”2 However, provisions in the
Defence Act permitting recruitment from the age
of 14 had not been repealed or amended. Section
18.2 of the Defence Act stated that “A recruiting
officer shall not enlist a person under the age of
sixteen years in the regular Force, unless consent
to the enlistment has been given in writing.” This
consent could be given by either of his parents,
anyone with “parental rights and powers in
respect of him”, or “if there is no such person …
any person in whose care (whether in law or in
fact) the person offering to enlist may be”. The
same section stated that “no person under the
age of fourteen years shall be enlisted in the
regular Force”.3
armed forces.
There was no conscription in practice,4 but the
National Service Act was still in force, stating that
every male citizen ordinarily resident in Guyana
who had attained the age of 18 years was liable
for national service.5
1 Guyana Defence Force, “Become a Soldier,” www.

gdf-gy.org.

with gang leaders showed no real results. The
H A ITI situation came to a head in December 2006,
when a spate of kidnappings of children for
Republic of Haiti ransom caused the closure of schools and
widespread panic in Port-au-Prince, prompting
Population: 8.5 million (3.8 million under 18) tougher military operations against the gangs by
Government armed forces: no armed forces MINUSTAH in Cité Soleil. UN troops concentrated
Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable on the stabilization of Bel Air, given its proximity
Voluntary recruitment age: not applicable to the port and the presidential palace, and by
Voting age: 18 the end of 2006 a number of gang members had
Optional Protocol: signed 15 August 2002 either been arrested or had dispersed to other
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): areas. Following major MINUSTAH operations
in late 2006 and early 2007, security improved
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182
in Cité Soleil, but gang activity and kidnappings
Armed gangs, mostly in Port-au-Prince, persisted, albeit to a lesser extent. Street gangs
continued to operate in Port-au-Prince, in
continued to use children as spies and particular in the poor areas of Bel Air, Cité Soleil
guards, to transport weapons and to and Martissant.5 In Gonaïves, rival gangs from
participate in clashes with the police and the neighbouring areas of Jubilé and Raboteau
UN troops. Rape of women and girls by fought each other, each reportedly controlled by
different political groups.6
gang members was widespread and girls Former military officials were grouped in
associated with gangs were subject to bases in Port-au-Prince, the Central Plateau
sexual abuse and exploitation. and the towns of Cap-Haïtien, Les Cayes and
Ouanaminthe throughout 2004 and some of
2005, pressuring the government to compensate
Context them for wages not paid since the dissolution of
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide resigned and the armed forces in 1995. In 2005 the transitional
left the country in February 2004 after an armed government agreed to pay former military
group took control of much of the northern part officials a total of US$2.8 million, and they
of the country. A transitional government was abandoned their bases. Most were not disarmed,
established, but the government and a weakened however, and their weapons remained at large.7
police force were unable to respond to a dramatic The poorest country in the Americas, Haiti
upsurge in violent crime in the capital, Port- ranked 154th on the UN Human Development
au-Prince.1 The large quantity of small arms in Index and 78 per cent of Haitians lived below the
circulation fuelled criminal activities and human national poverty line. Child mortality was high,
rights abuses. In late 2004, despite the presence most children lacking access to safe drinking
of the UN Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti water and sanitation; illiteracy was widespread
(MINUSTAH), armed gangs loyal to Aristide as most children did not finish primary-school.8
launched ‘Operasyon Bagdad’, in which they The humanitarian situation was particularly acute
called for the return of the former president, in areas such as Cité Soleil, where siege-like
targeting and killing several Haitian National conditions persisted as MINUSTAH attempted
Police (HNP) officials. A spate of kidnappings to root out gangs, compounding the conditions
of wealthy Haitians further destabilized Port- of destitution that already existed. Access to
au-Prince, peaking in May and June 2005 and medical facilities for civilians caught in crossfire
eventually targeting any Haitian perceived to was limited to a hospital run by the humanitarian
be able to raise a ransom.2 The government and medical aid agency Médecins Sans Frontières.
MINUSTAH came under severe pressure from
Haitian civil society organizations to deal with Government
gang activity and crack down on kidnappers.3
Armed criminal gangs, including under-18s, National recruitment legislation and
established themselves in the impoverished
neighbourhoods of Bel Air and Cité Soleil. Human
practice
rights organizations affiliated to the pro-Aristide The 1987 constitution provided for compulsory
movement accused the transitional government military service by all Haitians who reached the
and MINUSTAH of human rights violations age of 18 (Article 268). However, there had been
against the civilian populations in these areas.4 no military service since January 1995, when the
Delayed presidential elections took place in armed forces were disbanded by presidential
February 2006, returning to power the former order, although no constitutional amendment
president René Garcia Préval. Throughout 2006 was passed to confirm their dissolution.9
Préval continued to be confronted with violent
crime, and a controversial policy of dialogue

and instructed to look out for the police or
Armed gangs MINUSTAH. 19
A variety of armed gangs continued to operate, Rape of women and girls was widespread
primarily in Port-au-Prince and Gonaïves. While and the UN estimated in 2006 that up to 50 per
primarily criminal in nature, the gangs varied in cent of girls living in violent neighbourhoods
organizational structure, activities, motivation such as Cité Soleil had been raped and that in the
and degree of political affiliation, and could be Carrefour and Martissant areas of Port-au-Prince
mobilized for political purposes during periods and the southern town of Les Cayes gang rapes
of heightened tension.10 Among them were gangs were common. Girls in the custody of the HNP
which evolved from “popular organizations” were also reportedly raped.20 From January to
established in impoverished communities during June 2007 the UN documented the cases of 54
Aristide’s term of office, when they were given children raped by armed gang members, among
jobs and in many cases supplied with weapons. them ten who were gang-rape victims.21 Rape
These groups actively demonstrated between was used by gangs to intimidate and control the
2004 and 2007 for the return of Aristide. Corrupt local population, to extort money or as revenge
HNP officers reportedly led some of the gangs, for acts by rival gangs. Girls associated with
and other gangs could have been co-opted gangs were subjected to rape and exploitation.22
and paid to mobilize on behalf of various non- Children associated with armed gangs were
F—J
traditional political actors during the same also reported to have committed rape. A
period.11 Many armed gangs were primarily judicial official reported a case in 2006 in which
organized to carry out criminal activities. The under-18s were found guilty of participation in
extreme poverty of families in destitute urban kidnapping and rape and were sentenced to
neighbourhoods and their inability to feed rehabilitation in a juvenile detention centre. The
children or send them to school rendered children children were released, however, since there
vulnerable to recruitment by the armed gangs. In was no centre to accommodate them.23 Few
a context of poverty and insecurity, gang leaders rapes were reported to the authorities and the
were at times perceived as community leaders government failed to take significant steps to
or even heroes. In Cité Soleil, gang leaders address the problem.24
cultivated an almost parental status with the
children – who lacked affection and authority
figures – and were often known as “uncle” or Disarmament, demobilization
“father”.12 and reintegration (DDR)
In early 2007 some seven or eight main armed
gangs reportedly operated across Cité Soleil’s 32 In February 2005 the transitional government
neighbourhoods, each with about 20 full-time announced the creation of a National
members and dozens of additional “helpers”, Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization
including children.13 Gangs were involved in and Reintegration (CNDDR) but a presidential
armed confrontations with MINUSTAH and the decree establishing the commission was not
HNP during 2006 and on occasion children issued until August 2006.25 DDR activities were
were said to have been involved.14 Children extremely slow to get off the ground, and human
were reported to have actively participated in rights organizations accused the transitional
Operasyon Bagdad in 2004.15 Children were government of lacking the political will to
used by these and other gangs as spies, guards, implement disarmament.26 The Commission’s
messengers or general helpers, or to transport work was not helped by the controversy
weapons. They were used as guards to watch out generated by the nomination of a Bel Air gang
for MINUSTAH troops or the HNP, to watch over leader, Samba Boukman, to the Commission, an
kidnap victims and to run errands. On occasion appointment contested by some human rights
they were ordered to throw stones at MINUSTAH organizations, who claimed that Boukman had
troops during armed confrontations, and been a leading participant in the 2004 Operasyon
MINUSTAH documented one case in which very Bagdad.27 Despite a slow start, however, the
young children cut brake cables in their tanks CNDDR appeared to have shown some progress
during an operation to arrest gang leaders.16 by the end of March 2007. On 19 March CNDDR
Along with women, children were used as shields president Alix Fils-Aimé announced that an
by gang members fleeing arrest.17 In Gonaïves, important arms consignment of automatic
children sent from rural areas to be “fostered” weapons and more than 40 boxes of cartridges
by relatives ended up on the streets or joining had been handed over to the Commission
gangs when the host family did not live up to its following pressure on gangs by MINUSTAH
promises of food and schooling, or was violent operations in Cité Soleil.28
or abusive to the children.18 Girls were said to The disparate and heterogeneous nature
have been used to transport illegal weapons of the gangs, the prevalence of small arms
from the village port of Anse Rouge to Gonaïves, held by private citizens and the fact that non-
and children were dressed in school uniforms traditional actors were involved in fomenting
instability presented particular challenges for

the implementation of a DDR program. In 2007 3 Organization of American States (OAS), First
the UN country team developed a community Quarterly Report of the Secretary-General on the
violence reduction program and focused on Situation in Haiti in Compliance with Resolution
institutional support to build the strength of the AG/RES 2147, 20 October 2005, page 7, www.
CNDDR. The program focused on labour-intensive oas.org.
projects to present an alternative to criminality 4 Haiti Information Project, “Evidence mounts of a
to those in violence-affected communities, UN massacre in Haiti”, 12 July 2005.
pending larger-scale economic recovery efforts. 5 Report of the Secretary-General on the
Reintegration projects facilitated the return of UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, UN Doc.
former gang members to their communities. S/2007/503, 22 August 2007; confidential
Several of the projects were aimed at women sources, Port-au-Prince, March 2007.
who had been victims and perpetrators of armed 6 Youri Latortue, a senator representing the party
violence.29 Latibonit an Aksyon (LAAA), was said to control
By early 2007 MINUSTAH had offered a the gangs in Raboteau, while those of Jubilé
DDR program to several hundred young people, were said to be controlled by Winter Etienne, an
including children in Cité Soleil and Martissant, associate of Guy Philippe, leader of the Front de
providing education, vocational training and a Resistans Nasyonal, the armed group that led
small allowance. Critics of the program stated the uprising that led to the departure of Aristide.
that the gangs had sent young people to take Interview with local NGO, Port-au-Prince, 14
March 2007.
part who had never been armed and that gang
members remained armed and on the streets.30 7 Amnesty International (AI), Haiti, Disarmament
Child protection agencies nevertheless expressed delayed, Justice Denied, 28 July 2005.
concern for the safety of under-18s who signed up 8 UN Millennium Development Goals data, 2004,
for disarmament – in particular their vulnerability http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals.
to HNP arrest and detention, or attack by their 9 OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti,
own or rival gangs.31 The Haitian National Police and Human Rights,
July 1996; Report of the UN Secretary-General on
Haiti, UN Doc. S/2004/300, 16 April 2004.
Developments 10 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, armed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757,
Haiti and 58 other states endorsed the Paris 21 December 2007.
Commitments to protect children from unlawful 11 Confidential sources, March 2007.
recruitment or use by armed forces or armed 12 Interviews with NGOs, Port-au-Prince, March,
groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on 2007.
children associated with armed forces or armed 13 Interviews with NGOs, Port-au-Prince, March
groups. The documents reaffirmed international 2007.
standards and operational principles for 14 Interviews with NGOs, Port-au-Prince, March
protecting and assisting child soldiers and 2007.
15 Interview with NGO, Port-au-Prince, March 2007.
UNICEF. 16 UN sources, Port-au-Prince, March 2007.
17 Interview with NGO, Port-au-Prince, March 2007.
International standards 18 Interview with local NGO, Port-au-Prince, March
Haiti ratified the Protocol Additional to the 2007. The restavek system is one of domestic
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, slavery, whereby the children of destitute families
and relating to the Protection of Victims of are sent to work as domestic helpers in families
of greater economic means.
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 19 Interview with local NGO, March 2007.
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 20 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts armed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826,
(Protocol II) on 20 December 2006. Haiti ratified 26 October 2006.
ILO Convention 182 on 19 July 2007. 21 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 10.
22 Alex Renton, “The rape epidemic”, Observer, 2
1 Réseau national de défense des droits humains December 2007; interviews with NGOs, Port-au-
(RNDDH), “Situation chaotique au sein de la Prince, March 2007.
PNH”, open letter to the director-general of the 23 Confidential sources, Port-au-Prince, March 2007.
PNH, 10 March 2004, www.rnddh.org. 24 Amnesty International Report 2006 and 2007.
2 Report of the Secretary-General on the 25 OAS, Secretary-General’s report to Permanent
UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, UN Doc. Council, 28 March 2005; Presidential Decree of
S/2005/631, 6 October 2005. August 29, 2006 (“Dilia Lemaire quitte le navire”,
Le Nouvelliste, 28 September 2006).
26 AI, above note 7.

27 RNDDH, “Le Terreur s’installe à Port-au-Prince”,
news release, 6 December 2006. Holy See
28 Confidential sources, Port-au-Prince, March
2007; “Bélony en cavale remet des armes”, Le Holy See
Nouvelliste, 22 March 2007.
29 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 5. Population: 1,000
30 NGO and UN sources, Port-au-Prince, March
Government armed forces: 1001
2007. Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
31 UN sources, March 2007. Voluntary recruitment age: 19
Voting age: not applicable
Optional Protocol: ratified 24 October 2001
CRC, GC AP I and II
There were no under-18s in the Swiss

Guard.
F—J
Government
practice
There was no conscription. Defence of the
Vatican and the protection of the Pope were
the responsibility of the Swiss Guard, founded
in 1506 and, with approximately 100 members,
the world’s smallest army.2 Service in the Swiss
Guard was entirely voluntary, and was open to
those between the ages of 19 and 30. Entry into
the Swiss Guard required that the volunteer be
a Swiss national and a member of the Roman
Catholic Church. Candidates had also to be
unmarried, to hold a professional or secondary
school diploma, and to have completed military
service in Switzerland. The minimum term of
service was two years.3 The voluntary nature of
service and the minimum age limit of 19 were
confirmed in the Holy See’s declaration made on
ratification of the Optional Protocol in October
2001.4
Developments
Expressions of the Holy See’s continuing concern
about the impact of armed conflict on children
included a statement in the 2006 Christmas Eve
Homily of Pope Benedict XVI. With reference to
the birth of Christ, the Pope stated that “The
child of Bethlehem directs our gaze towards all
children who suffer and are abused in the world.”
Among several examples of such especially
vulnerable children he mentioned “children
who are placed as soldiers in a violent world”.5
In August 2007, during a visit to northern
Uganda, Cardinal Renato Martino, president
of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace,
condemned the Lord’s Resistance Army for the
kidnap and forced recruitment of thousands of
children into their forces. He also called on the
international community to increase its funding
and support for the reintegration of former child
soldiers.6

1 “Pope’s guards celebrate 500 years”, BBC News,
22 January 2006. HOND U R A S
2 “First non-white joins Vatican guard”, BBC News,
4 July 2002; “Vatican’s honour to Swiss Guards”, Republic of Honduras
BBC News, 5 June 2006.
3 Holy See, Roman Curia, “The Swiss Guard: Population: 7.2 million (3.3 million under 18)
Admission Requirements”, www.vatican.va. Government armed forces: 12,000
4 Declaration of the Holy See on ratification of the Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription in
Optional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. peacetime (see text)
5 Holy See, Holy Father, “Homily of His Holiness Voluntary recruitment age: 18 ��
Benedict XVI, 24 December 2006”, www.vatican. Voting age: 18
��
va. Optional Protocol: acceded
��
14 August 2002
6 “Vatican official: Ugandan thugs must stop Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
forcing children to fight”, Catholic News Service CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
Briefs, 6 August 2007, www.catholicnews.com.
armed forces.
Context
An estimated 36,000 individuals were members
of gangs (maras).1 In 2004 and 2005 over 800
children and youths were killed, many of them
street children.2 The Special Attorney for Human
Rights stated in April 2007 that members of the
police and armed forces had reportedly been
involved in 360 such killings over nine years.3
Longer periods of detention without charge
and tougher penalties were introduced for
leaders of gangs.4 In December 2006 the UN
Human Rights Committee called on Honduras to
amend the definition of the offence of “unlawful
association” in the Criminal Code to be more
restrictive, as it was often used by the police to
arrest adolescents on suspicion, including in
mass round-ups based on appearance alone and
without judicial warrant.5
In September 2006 the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, in a case relating to the
extrajudicial execution of four youths in 1995,
ordered Honduras to establish a child rights
training program for police and other officials.6
Government
practice
Under Article 276 of the constitution military
service was compulsory in times of conflict for all
Hondurans “capable of serving”. The constitution
also provided for compulsory peacetime military
service for all Hondurans aged 18–30, but this
was modified by a 1994 decree making peacetime
military service voluntary.7

Several military schools and academies provided
training for cadets and officers.8 Graduates from
the Liceo Militar del Norte, a military secondary-
school in San Pedro Sula, were considered to be

officers and given priority to enter officer training
academies. The Liceo Militar del Norte also HUN G A RY
maintained a primary-school.9
The Centre for Naval Studies offered technical Republic of Hungary
and specialized courses for officers.10 Under-18s
wishing to enter the Military Aviation Academy Population: 10.1 million (2.0 million under 18)
as pilot cadets or technical students had to have Government armed forces: 32,300
parental authorization, signed by a lawyer.11 The Compulsory recruitment age: 18
Honduras Defence University and the National Voluntary recruitment age: 18; 17 with parental
Defence College offered degrees in military, air consent
and naval sciences, and defence and security.12 Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: signed 11 March 2002
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
recommended that Honduras pay more attention
to social factors and root causes of the gang
The minimum voluntary recruitment age
problem and focus on preventive measures, was 17 with parental consent. It was not
F—J
refraining from treating the issue exclusively in a known whether under-18s were serving in
punitive and repressive way.13 the armed forces.
1 “El Salvador, Honduras y Guatemala, los más

violentos del Istmo”, Prensa Libre (Guatemala), Government
27 April 2007, www.prensalibre.com.
2 Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos,
Informe al Congreso Nacional, Año 2004, practice
“Seguridad y Justicia”, 8 March 2005, www. All men between the ages of 18 and 50 living in
conadeh.hn; Amnesty International Report 2005 Hungary were liable for conscription.1 However,
and 2006. the government’s Second Periodic Report to the
3 “Fiscalía involucra a policía en asesinatos en UN Committee on the Rights of the Child stated
Honduras”, El Nuevo Herald (Miami), 25 April that “universal conscription” for men started at
2007, www.elnuevoherald.com. age 17.2 They had to register with the authorities
4 Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional by 1 January of the year they were 18. Regular
(CEJIL), “Honduras es denunciada por su política military service, armed or unarmed, was for six
anti pandillas”, 19 October 2005, www.cejil.org. months, with obligations for reserve service of
5 UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration of up to five months. Before enlistment, certain
initial report submitted by Honduras, Concluding conscripts declared fit for military service could
observations, UN Doc. CCPR/C/HND/CO/1, 13 volunteer to take part in preliminary home
December 2006. defence specialized training with the approval
6 CEJIL, “Nueva condena internacional contra of the Recruiting Command. Alternative civilian
Honduras”, 23 October 2006; Inter-American service was for 11 months, and could be carried
Court of Human Rights, Case of Servellón-García out in hospitals, schools or other public services.
et al. v. Honduras, Judgment of 21 September Conscripts could be enlisted between the ages of
2006, Series C, No. 152, www.corteidh.or.cr. 18 and 25, or could volunteer from the age of 17
7 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales with parental consent. Those over 18 could apply
(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía, for the voluntary military reserve. Professional
Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latina contracted military service was available for
y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Honduras, October Hungarian citizens aged from 18 to 47.3
2006, www.flacso.cl. Another source indicated that conscription
8 Ejército de Honduras, Centros de Estudio, at was suspended in November 2004 but could
Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras, www.ffaah.mil.hn. be reintroduced during war or emergency, and
9 Ejército de Honduras, Centros de Estudio, Liceo that by December 2004 the armed forces were
Militar del Norte, www.ffaah.mil.hn. comprised entirely of volunteers.4
10 Centro de Estudios Navales, www.ffaah.mil.hn.
11 Academia Militar de Aviación, Documentos, www. Military training and military schools
academiamilfah.com. Military educational institutions included the Beri
12 Universidad de Defensa and Colegio de Defensa Balogh Adam Secondary-school and Dormitory
Nacional, www.ffaah.mil.hn. for Home Defence for elementary school students
13 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, (boys and girls) below the age of 17. The intake
Consideration of third periodic report submitted was 60 pupils and the course was for four years.
by Honduras, Concluding observations, UN Doc. Students aged between 18 and 23 could attend
CRC/C/HND/CO/3, 2 February 2007. the Kinizsi Pal Professional Non-commissioned

Officers Training School or the Zrinyi Miklos
National Defence University for officers.5 ICEL A N D
Developments Republic of Iceland
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, Population: 295,000 (78,000 under 18)
Hungary and 58 other states endorsed the Paris Government armed forces: none
Commitments to protect children from unlawful Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable
recruitment or use by armed forces or armed Voluntary recruitment age: not applicable
groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on Voting age: 18
children associated with armed forces or armed Optional Protocol: ratified 1 October 2001
groups. The documents reaffirmed international Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
followed a wide-ranging global consultation There were no armed forces and no
UNICEF. evidence of child recruitment or use.
In 2002 Hungary had advised the UN General
Assembly Special Session on Children that the Government
constitutional process for ratifying the Optional
Protocols to the Rights of the Child was under National recruitment legislation and
way.6 In 2006 the Committee on the Rights of the
Child urged Hungary as a matter of urgency to
practice
ratify the Optional Protocols,7 but as of October Iceland had no armed forces, although it was a
2007 Hungary had not done so. founder member of NATO (1949), which remained
central to its security policy. A 1951 bilateral
1 The laws governing ��
conscription are��
the Statute
�� agreement with the United States provided for
on National Defence (CX/1993), as amended; Iceland’s territorial defence, and approximately
Government Decree on the execution of the 2,200 US armed forces personnel (the Iceland
Statute on National Defence (178/27 December Defence Force) were stationed at Keflavik
1993); Statute on Service Relations of Conscripts (chiefly for the purpose of North Atlantic air
(XLIV/1996); Decree on the Judgment of Fitness defence) until the station’s closure in 2006. The
for Military Service (7/1996); and Statute on Icelandic Crisis Response Unit (ICRU), a register
Civilian Service (XXI/1997). of approximately 200 volunteers from a range of
2 Second Periodic Report of Hungary to the UN professions, provided personnel for a variety of
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. international peacekeeping missions.1
CRC/C/70/Add.25, 24 May 2005. In its July 2005 Initial Report to the
3 ��
Ministry of Defence, www.honvedelem.hu
�� UN Committee on the Rights of Child on
(Recruitment, General conscription, Contracted implementation of the Optional Protocol, which
military service). had come into force in Iceland in February
4 Quaker Council for European Affairs, “Country 2002, the government stated that “the rule in
report: Hungary”, The Right to Conscientious Iceland is that international agreements do not
Objection in Europe: A Review of the Current automatically acquire the force of law in the
Situation, April 2005, http://www.quaker.org. country, even though Iceland is a party to them”.
5 Ministry of Defence, above note 3 (Recruitment, Nevertheless, it also emphasized that the current
Educational institutions). practice was to interpret current legislation in the
6 ��
Permanent Mission of Hungary to the UN, light of international obligations. Icelandic courts
Statement by State Secretary Imre Szakacs, 8 were also said to be increasingly linking their
May 2002, www.humisny.org. judgments to the country’s commitments under
international human rights law.2
Consideration of report submitted by Hungary,
Concluding observations: Hungary, UN Doc. Developments
CRC/C/HUN/CO/2, 17 March 2006.
The Icelandic Red Cross, which received
funds from the government, in October 2004
organized a national financial appeal for the
assistance of children involved in or otherwise
affected by armed conflict. The appeal included
the distribution of information materials and
television programs, and awareness events were
held in schools and offices.3
In June 2006 the Committee on the Rights of
the Child expressed its concern that the absence

of armed forces in the country itself did not
preclude “the possibility of individuals or groups IND I A
undertaking efforts to recruit children for foreign
armed forces or groups”, and recommended that Republic of India
Iceland explicitly criminalize the recruitment of
children under the age of 15 into armed forces Population: 1,103.4 million (420.7 million under
or armed groups and their direct participation 18)
in hostilities. The Committee also called on Government armed forces: 1,316,000
the government to establish extraterritorial Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
jurisdiction for these crimes when perpetrated Voluntary recruitment age: 17 years and 6
by or against an Icelandic citizen or an individual months
connected in some way with Iceland.4 Voting age: 18
1 Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
mfa.is/; Iceland’s Security Co-operation: Iceland
and NATO, www.iceland.org/; confidential CRC
information October 2007.
No information was available on how
2 Initial report of Iceland to the UN Committee on
F—J
the Rights of the Child on implementation of the many under-18s were serving in the
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ISL/1, 15 armed forces. There were allegations that
July 2005. children were recruited by government-
3 Ibid. supported anti-Maoist village defence
4 Committee on the Rights of the Child, forces. Armed groups, including Maoists
Consideration of report submitted by Iceland,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ and groups in Jammu and Kashmir and in
ISL/CO/1, 21 June 2006. the north-east, were reported to be using
children. Children accused of membership
of armed groups were detained in conflict
areas.
Context
Violence by Maoists (Naxalites)1 increased
dramatically in 2005 in a number of states, and
tribal people became the victims of human rights
abuses perpetrated by both Maoists and the
security forces. The violence affected at least
ten states, with the worst violence taking place
in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.
According to the Asian Centre for Human Rights
(ACHR), some 750 people – security personnel,
alleged Maoists and almost 300 civilians – were
killed in 2006.2 The Prevention of Terrorism Act
(POTA) 2002, which had led to widespread human
rights violations, was repealed in September
2004 by the government, but similar provisions
were included in December 2004 amendments
to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967.3
They were subsequently used to detain human
rights activists working with tribal communities in
areas of Maoist violence.4
Armed conflicts also continued in several
north-eastern states (Assam, Manipur, Nagaland
and Tripura) and in Jammu and Kashmir. A
decade-long ceasefire between the National
Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN (Isaac-
Muivah, I-M)) and the Indian government
continued, but sporadic clashes took place and
factional fighting between the NSCN(I-M) and the
NSCN (Khaplang) claimed many lives, including
those of children.5 A temporary ceasefire between

the central government of India and the United Detention of children
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in 2006 failed
There was evidence that in areas of armed
to reduce violence, in which civilians continued
conflict children accused of being members of
to be targeted by both security forces and armed
armed groups were detained, often in violation of
opposition groups. In Jammu and Kashmir the
national legislation designed to protect children
ceasefire announced in November 2003 between
in conflict with the law. In Manipur it was alleged
India and Pakistan continued, but little progress
that the system established under the Juvenile
was made towards a political solution to the
Justice Act 2000 was non-functioning due to
conflict.
inadequate resources; in particular no juvenile
home had been established. As a result, security
Government forces (including police) who detained children
in anti-insurgency operations were reportedly
National recruitment legislation and claiming that they were over 18 when registering
practice cases against them and sending them to adult
detention centres. Human rights organizations
The minimum age for recruitment into the
attempting to address individual cases of
armed forces was raised from 16 to 17 years
detained children on behalf of parents were
and 6 months in mid-2004, although legislation
hampered by the absence of birth certificates to
governing the armed forces did not stipulate
prove age.10
a minimum recruitment age.6 However, India’s
The Kashmir Bar Association, visiting the
November 2005 declaration on ratifying the
District Jail, Kathua, in November 2006, found
Optional Protocol did not reflect the rise in
four boys aged between 16 and 18 who had
minimum age, stating that the minimum age
been detained under the Jammu and Kashmir
of recruitment was 16. The declaration did,
Public Safety Act 1978 without their cases being
however, contain a clear statement reiterating
heard.11 There were also reports of children being
the government’s position that after enrolment
arrested and detained for long periods by police
and a requisite training period, personnel were
in Chhattisgarh. In one reported incident in
sent to operational areas only after reaching the
November 2005 police shot at a group of young
age of 18.
people who had been abducted by Maoists,
Recruitment for the Territorial Army (reserve)
injuring two young girls who were subsequently
was from 18, as was recruitment for various
detained in Jagdalpur hospital and then Jagdalpur
auxiliary forces including the Central Reserve
Central Jail, and killing three boys whose bodies
Police Force, the Border Security Forces and the
were later disposed of by the police (it was
Assam Rifles.7
not clear if the young people were under 18).12
Military training and military schools The National Commission for Women (NCW – a
statutory body mandated to protect and promote
A number of military schools and institutions, the rights of women), visiting Jagdalpur Central
including the Rashtriya Indian Military College Jail in December 2006, also reported seeing
(RIMC), provided preliminary training for students young girls (possibly between the ages of 17 and
wishing to go on to join the army. The RIMC 20) who had been in detention for over a year,
enrolled students between the ages of 11 years accused of being Maoist activists.13
and 6 months and 13, and encouraged only those
wishing to have a career in the defence forces
to apply. The National Cadet Corps recruited Armed groups
school and college students from the age of 13
to take part in military and other training on a State-backed village defence forces
voluntary basis. Although not obliged to sign There were widespread reports of under-18s
up for military service, cadets who succeeded being recruited to state-backed anti-insurgency
in passing exams were given concessions when groups in Chhattisgarh. In an attempt to address
applying to the army, navy or air force as well as Maoist violence in the state, the central and
auxiliary forces. Cadets were involved in relief state governments were reported to support
operations in southern India following the 2004 the establishment of village defence forces. The
Asian tsunami.8 Salwa Judum campaign emerged in Chhattisgarh
in 2005, its leaders claiming that it was a
Child recruitment and deployment spontaneous and voluntary movement against
The lack of systematic birth registration, violence perpetrated by Maoists. A number of
particularly in rural areas, made it difficult camps were established where around 50,000
to verify ages, making it impossible to rule mainly tribal people were living in temporary
out the possibility that under-18s might shelters. There were allegations that many of
participate actively in hostilities. There were these people had been forcibly displaced and
active recruitment drives targeting “youths”, recruited to the Salwa Judum campaign as a
particularly in the Kashmir valley.9 means of isolating the Maoists and clearing

land for development. Special police officers Pakistan-based armed groups including the Jaish-
(SPOs) were recruited from among Salwa Judum e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen as well
members to join village defence forces and as the Hizbul Mujahideen.24 Children in Jammu
provided with arms and training by state police and Kashmir were said to be being indoctrinated
and security forces, including the Naga Indian and recruited from schools and mosques. Lack
Reserve Battalion.14 There were allegations that of education and employment opportunities for
under-18s were being recruited as SPOs.15 young people were said to be major factors in the
In March 2006 a human rights organization recruitment of children by armed groups.25
visited Dantewada district, Chhattisgarh, and Children as young as ten were said to be used
found evidence of children, including nine girls by armed groups as messengers and couriers
aged between 14 and 16, being recruited as and provided with basic training in the use of
SPOs. The girls said that they were being given weapons. Some children were reported to have
training in fighting tactics, including how to use been used by armed groups to throw grenades
guns, as well as being used as informers.16 The and plant improvised explosive devices.26 The
central government Home Ministry reportedly use of children by armed groups put them at
subsequently issued directions that persons increased risk from the security forces. During
below 18 years old were not to be recruited.17 2005 and 2006 there were two major incidents
However, in December 2006 members of the in which security forces opened fire on children.
F—J
NCW visited Salwa Judum camps in Dantewada In Bangergund in Kupwara district soldiers of
district and reported that tribal girls and boys had the Rashtriya Rifles waiting to ambush militants
been recruited as SPOs and were being used as claimed to have mistakenly shot dead three boys
combatants in the Salwa Judum campaign against and critically injured a fourth on the night of 23
the Maoists.18 There was no official response to July 2005. The army said that the boys had acted
the NCW’s allegations and its recommendation suspiciously by failing to stop when challenged.
that such recruitment should stop.19 In Doodipora, Handwara, on 22 February 2006
soldiers shot at a group of children playing
Maoists cricket, claiming that militants were among them,
There was a reported increase in the recruitment killing four boys including an eight-year-old.27
of children by Maoists since 2005.
Sources in the Communist Party of India (CPI) North-east
(Maoist) and in the Andhra Pradesh police were Much of the evidence of the involvement of
reported to have stated that children as young children in the various conflicts in north-eastern
as 14 or 15 were being recruited into armed states was anecdotal and generalized, with a lack
squads in Andhra Pradesh. Maoists claimed that of primary field-based research on the issue.
its children’s division, the Bal Mandal, was not In May 2007, for example, it was reported
used in hostilities but that children were used that ULFA used teenagers to ferry explosives
only as messengers and informers. However, they and throw grenades, although they did not
admitted that they were provided with military openly recruit child soldiers.28 The report further
training to prepare them for any situation.20 claimed that other armed groups operating in
Recruitment of under-18s by Maoists was also the north-east, including the NSCN (it was not
reported to have increased in Chhattisgarh and reported which faction), the United Liberation
Jharkhand. Some children were reportedly taken Front (Manipur) and the People’s Liberation Army
from school without their parents’ consent.21 (Manipur) openly recruited children. The report
Almost all those under-18s recruited by Maoists claimed that the smallest boys, as “the most
were reported to be illiterate and from tribal fearless”, were placed closest to the enemy.29
communities. In Manipur, a culture of violence as a result
of decades of conflict was said to be fuelling the
Jammu and Kashmir desire of children to handle weapons and join
There was evidence that armed groups in Jammu armed groups, many of which were organized
and Kashmir, in Pakistan-administered Kashmir along ethnic lines. Some of the more recently
and in Pakistan were actively recruiting children.22 formed ethnically based groups were reported to
The Jammu and Kashmir police claimed that be commonly recruiting children.30
around 200 children had been reported missing
in the state since 2004, alleging that most of
these were children of poor and illiterate families
who had been recruited by militants, although and reintegration (DDR)
this could not be independently confirmed.23
There were no official government programs
Some were said to be as young as 13 or 14 and
specifically targeted at the rehabilitation of
using sophisticated weapons. In August 2004 the
former child soldiers. Human rights organizations
Indian Army claimed to have caught nine children
working in areas of armed conflict confirmed
who were armed. The army claimed that some of
that there were few effective policies or
them were from Pakistan and had been trained by
facilities in place to reintegrate former militants,

particularly children, into the mainstream. A 9 “Concession for Kashmiris in CRPF recruitment”,
draft Integrated Child Protection Scheme was United News of India (UNI), 30 April 2007, at
under consideration by the government. The http://news.oneindia.in.
draft document acknowledged the inadequate 10 Confidential source, June 2007.
resources allocated to child protection to date 11 Kashmir Bar Association, Jail Visit Report, www.
and consequent lack of structural mechanisms to kashmirbarassociation.org/jail_report_jmu_
deal with children in need, referring specifically kathua.html (accessed June 2007; link not
to the lack of intervention for children affected by functioning when finalizing this text).
militancy. However, the draft did not contain any 12 People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Where
specific proposals relating to children involved in the State Makes War on Its Own People: A Report
armed conflict.31 on Violation of Peoples’ Rights during the Salwa
Judum Campaign in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh,
April 2006, www.pucl.org.
Developments
13 Malini Bhattacharya and Manju Snehlata
A National Commission for the Protection of Child Hembrom, Report on Visit to Dantewara,
Rights was established at the end of 2006 and a Chhattisgarh, to Examine the Situation of Tribal
chairperson appointed in February 2007.32 The Women in ‘Salwa Judum’ Camps, National
Act under which it was established defined “child Commission for Women (NCW), December 2006.
rights” as including “the children’s rights adopted 14 PUCL, above note 12.
in the United Nations Convention on the Rights 15 “Inside India’s hidden war”, Guardian, 9 May
of the Child,” but did not refer explicitly to the 2006.
Optional Protocol.33 It was not known whether the 16 Asian Centre for Human Rights, The Adivasis of
Commission would take up matters relating to Chhattisgarh: Victims of the Naxalite Movement
the use of child soldiers. and Salwa Judum Campaign, March 2006.
17 Asian Centre for Human Rights, India Human
International standards Rights Report 2007.
India ratified the Optional Protocol in November 18 Bhattacharya and Hembrom, above note 13.
2005. Its declaration referred to the minimum age
19 Information from member of NCW investigation
for voluntary recruitment (see above) and stated team, June 2007.
that there was no conscription.34
20 “Maoist rebels spread across rural India”,
Christian Science Monitor, 22 August 2006.
1 The term “Maoist” is used throughout this entry. 21 “Children at war in insurgency zone”, Times of
However, Naxalism in India, which emerged in India, 29 May 2007.
the 1960s, encompasses a range of left-wing
revolutionary movements. The largest of these 22 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Everyone lives
is currently the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in fear”: Patterns of impunity in Jammu and
(CPI-Maoist), formed in 2004 from the Maoist Kashmir, September 2006.
Communist Centre of India and the CPI (Marxist- 23 Prakriti Gupta, “Child Warriors of Kashmir”, 20
Leninist) People’s War, which has ties with November 2005, at www.boloji.com.
Maoists in Nepal. 24 “Army grappling with ‘child warriors’ in J&K”,
2 Asian Centre for Human Rights, “749 killed in Hindustan Times, 1 August 2004.
2006 in the Maoists’ conflict in India”, press 25 HRW, above note 22.
release PR/IND/03/07, 10 January 2007, www. 26 Gupta, above note 23.
achrweb.org.
28 A confidential source in June 2007 also reported
4 Amnesty International (AI), “India: Chhattisgarh unsubstantiated claims that unemployed youth
government detains human rights defender, aged between 16 and 20 were being given cash
refuses to arrest police officials suspected of by ULFA cadres to plant roadside bombs.
involvement in unlawful killings of Adivasis” (ASA
20/013/2007), 24 May 2007. 29 “Child soldiers in northeast raise concerns”, New
Delhi TV, 5 May 2007, www.ndtv.com.
5 “Tangkhul youth shot dead at Kohima”, Sangai
Express, Imphal, 4 October 2006, at www. 30 Confidential source, June 2007.
nagalim.nl. 31 Department of Women and Child Development,
6 “Age for army recruitment raised”, Times of India, The Integrated Child Protection Scheme (ICPS)
15 July 2004. – A Centrally Sponsored Scheme of Government
– Civil Society Partnership, 27th Draft, 27
7 Territorial Army, http://indianarmy.nic.in/arta1. December 2006, http://wcd.nic.in/drafticps.pdf.
htm; Central Reserve Police Force, Recruitment
www.crpf.nic.in; Border Security Force, www. 32 “Shanta Sinha is chief of child rights
bsf.nic.in/recruitment/r150.pdf; Recruitment in commission”, The Hindu, 24 February 2007.
Assam Rifles, www.assamrifles.com/ar_rect_ 33 Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act
advt.htm. 2005.
8 See Rashtriya Military College, www.rimc.org; 34 Declaration on accession to the Optional
National Cadet Corps, http://nccindia.nic.in. Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.

I NDONE SIA Government
Republic of Indonesia
practice
Population: 222.8 million (75.6 million under 18) In July 2003 Indonesia reported to the UN
Government armed forces: 302,000 Committee on the Rights of the Child that
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 “Indonesia has set the minimum age for
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 recruitment or enlistment into the armed forces
Voting age: 17, or married at time of registration at 18 years, as set forth in Act No. 2/1988.”7
Optional Protocol: signed 24 September 2001 Article 15 of the Republic of Indonesia
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): Law Number 23 Year 2002 on Child Protection
CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182 provided for the protection of every child from
involvement in armed conflict, social unrest or
There were no reports of the use of under- an “event that involves violence” and “misuse
for political activities”. Article 63 stated that
18s by either government forces or armed “All persons shall be prohibited from recruiting
groups. or equipping children for military or similar
F—J
purposes, and from putting the lives of children in
Context danger.” Article 87 provided for imprisonment of
no more than five years and/or a maximum fine
With the signing of a peace agreement in August of 100 million rupiah (approximately US$11,000)
2005, armed conflict came to an end in Nangroe for recruiting and equipping children for military
Aceh Darussalam (Aceh). The province was purposes, or misusing children by “involving
devastated by the December 2004 tsunami, them in political activities, or in an armed conflict,
which killed almost 170,000 people in Aceh, social disturbance … or in a violent event”. It was
displaced 513,000 others and destroyed much not known whether anyone had been prosecuted
of the infrastructure in the west of the province. under this provision. Article 1(1) defined a child as
In mid-2007 some 70,000 people were still someone under 18 years of age.
internally displaced.1 Article 17(1) of the Child Protection Law
In December 2006 Irwandi Yusuf, a senior provided that “Every child whose liberty has
member of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan been taken away shall be entitled to: a. Receive
Aceh Merdeka, GAM), the Aceh armed separatist humane treatment and be housed separately
group, was elected as governor of Aceh. After from adults”, and also provided for entitlement
the signing of the 2005 agreement security had to legal assistance. During the conflict in Aceh,
improved considerably, although bomb and under-18s were among those the authorities
grenade attacks and other violent incidents, arrested and brought to trial. In many cases they
some allegedly due to conflicts over resources were tortured for their alleged involvement in or
and aid allocation, were reported during the first support for GAM. In 2003–4 under-18s allegedly
eight months of 2007.2 involved in GAM were arrested by TNI and were
In March 2007 the police arrested seven not granted legal representation.8 In August 2005
members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a radical a 16-year-old Muslim boy, arrested in Ambon
armed Islamist group, and seized a large for allegedly planting a bomb which injured a
stockpile of weapons and explosives.3 In June two pedicab driver, was sentenced to approximately
senior leaders were arrested. seven years’ imprisonment; he began serving his
Support for independence was reportedly sentence at Ambon prison, where he was held
widespread in the two provinces of Papua with adults.9
and West Papua, although the armed Papuan
separatist Free Papua Movement (Organisasi
Papua Merdeka, OPM) controlled no territory and
Armed groups
reportedly did not pose a large security threat to Jemaah Islamiyah
the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional
Indonesia, TNI). There were some 12,000 TNI JI, an Islamist armed group whose long-term
troops there,4 and TNI and police abuses were goal was the establishment of an Islamic state
reported, including the rape by TNI troops of a 16- in Indonesia, was thought to comprise over 900
year-old Papuan girl in May 2005.5 Competition members across Indonesia.10 According to the
over resources, inter-tribal tensions, and tensions International Crisis Group, JI had a “systematic
between Papuans and Indonesian settlers were indoctrination program”, starting with playgroups
also reported.6 for children under five and continuing on to
religious boarding schools across Java which
whole families attended; however, enrolment in
some JI schools seemed to be declining.11 Most JI
men arrested for violent crimes were reportedly

in their 20s and 30s. They would not normally In January 2007 police conducted two major
be accepted as members until after graduating raids in Poso, central Sulawesi, the scene of
from JI schools, usually at about the age of 18. previous widespread intercommunal violence
Members were also recruited who were outside and of subsequent attacks since 2004 by armed
the JI school network.12 Muslim groups. The stated purpose of the raids
was the arrest of a group of men, reportedly
Aceh mostly local JI members, who were suspected
After the tsunami armed conflict continued of responsibility for bombings, beheadings and
between GAM and TNI. Following talks facilitated drive-by shootings against local Christians and
by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI, an police.24 A police raid on 22 January 2007 faced
international mediation organization), the heavy armed resistance; 15 people, including
Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) one police officer, were killed. During the
between GAM and the government was signed operations a 16-year-old Muslim boy was killed;
on 15 August 2005,13 ending an almost 30-year police reportedly said they found a weapon in
conflict. Previously under-18s had been used by his possession.25 Since January 2007 no serious
both GAM and TNI, including as informants or violence had occurred in Poso.26
guards, for logistical support and, less frequently,
as combatants.14 The total number of children Maluku province
involved in the conflict was not known. Intercommunal violence declined in Maluku
Not all people associated with GAM’s armed after the signing of the Malino II agreement in
wing, Tenara Negara Aceh (TNA), including February 2002. Although a bomb exploded in
under-18s, were on active duty all of the time.15 Ambon in April 2007, injuring six people,27 and
In an interview with the Child Soldiers Coalition, an estimated 50,000 people remained displaced
former child soldiers stated that in 2003–4, when by the violence there,28 the security situation
they were aged about 14–17, they were pressured improved.29
by TNA to run errands, look out for police and
purchase supplies. They lived in a village in
a GAM stronghold where they were able to Disarmament, demobilization
continue their education, although they reported and reintegration (DDR)
frequent skirmishes and a general lack of security
during that time.16 The Aceh MOU provided for the demobilization
The MOU (Article 5) provided for the of 3,000 adult GAM combatants and the
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), comprising decommissioning of weapons, and the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) unconditional release of some 2,000 political
and European Union nationals, whose function prisoners (Articles 4.2, 4.3 and 3.1 respectively).
was to assist with monitoring the implementation In the MOU, GAM set the number of their
of the MOU, and whose mission ended in combatants at 3,000 (Article 4.2), although
December 2006.17 The MOU (Articles 2.2 and observers believed the true number to be higher,
2.3) also provided for a human rights court and and stated that many former GAM combatants
a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC).18 In were not receiving any assistance. There were
May 2007 community consultation on the TRC no provisions in the MOU for the DDR of children
began in Aceh.19 In June 2007 a written proposal who had been involved in the conflict. Among
for a TRC was issued by the Coalition for Truth the 2,000 political prisoners released were 19
Recovery (KPK), a coalition of non-governmental boys between 14 and 17 years of age who had
organizations (NGOs) from Aceh and Jakarta. been arrested for alleged association with GAM.
This document called for “protection and special There were reportedly several 17-year-old female
measures for … children”.20 However, the TRC’s prisoners who were treated as adults because
future was not clear, following a December 2006 they were married.30 UNICEF and the International
ruling by the Constitutional Court which declared Office for Migration (IOM) provided assistance
the national truth and reconciliation commission to 21 individuals who were under 18 at the time
unconstitutional; this could affect the legal status of their arrest. IOM also helped to provide adult
of the Aceh TRC.21 former political prisoners and former GAM
combatants with vocational training and business
Central Sulawesi advice.31
Former TNA soldiers were not formally
Intercommunal violence on the whole declined
discharged, officially counted or registered.
after the signing of the Malino I Agreement
At the end of 2005 GAM established the Aceh
in December 2001, but in October 2005 three
Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh,
Christian schoolgirls were beheaded near Poso,
KPA), comprising former GAM commanders.32
central Sulawesi.22 In May 2006, police arrested
Part of the role of the KPA leaders was to oversee
three men for the killings and in March 2007
the reintegration of GAM combatants through
the alleged leader was given a 20-year prison
aid projects. In February 2006 the government
sentence and the others 14-year sentences.23
established the National Reintegration Agency
1 74 CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008

(Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, BRA), to offer established by Article 74 of the 2002 Child
reintegration assistance to both combatants Protection Law), parliament and civil society
and civilians affected by the conflict.33 Many about ratification of the Optional Protocol
observers noted the lack of transparency and continued. At the same time proposals for
uneven levels of assistance in the reintegration parliament to enact a law which would upgrade
process.34 the status of the Convention on the Rights of the
Some observers expressed concern about Child from a presidential decree to parliamentary
the high level of unemployment of young men, legislation were also put forward.41
including former child soldiers.35 Although
children in former conflict areas received some 1 Oxfam, “Over 25,000 landless families in Aceh
assistance from UNICEF, some international still waiting for new land and homes”, press
aid agencies and local non-governmental release, 7 December 2006; UN Office for the
organizations (NGOs), most of the aid programs Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Indonesia,
focused on the tsunami victims. Local NGOs Sri Lanka, Maldives: Earthquake and Tsunami
highlighted the disruption of education during OCHA Situation Report No. 37, www.reliefweb.int.
the conflict and the continuing lack of education 2 Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update, 1–31 August
for children.36 Moreover, the deaths and the 2007, World Bank, Conflict and Development
destruction of an already crippled local economy Program, www-wds.worldbank.org.
F—J
caused by the tsunami compounded the effects 3 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Indonesia,
of the long-term armed conflict on children, Jemaah Islamiyah’s current status”, Asia Briefing
many of whom lost one or both parents in the No. 63, 3 May 2007.
tsunami.37 4 ICG, “Papua: answers to frequently asked
In Central Sulawesi and Maluku province, questions”, Asia Briefing No. 53, 5 September
which had been affected by previous widespread 2006.
intercommunal violence, UNICEF and local and 5 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Out of sight,
international NGOs conducted programs for endemic abuse and impunity in Papua’s Central
children on peace building, conflict resolution Highlands”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 19, No.
and cultural diversity.38 10(C), July 2007.
6 ICG, “Indonesian Papua: a local perspective on
Developments the conflict”, Asia Briefing No. 66, 19 July 2007.
7 Second periodic report of Indonesia to the UN
In its Concluding observations on the second Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
periodic report of Indonesia, the UN Committee CRC/C/65/Add.23, 7 July 2003.
on the Rights of the Child recommended that it
8 HRW, “Aceh at war: torture, ill-treatment and
ratify the Optional Protocol on the involvement of unfair trials”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 16, No.
children in armed conflict.39 11(C), September 2004; Amnesty International
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in (AI), “Indonesia: New military operations,
Paris, Indonesia and 58 other states endorsed old patterns of human rights abuses in Aceh
the Paris Commitments to protect children (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD)”, October
from unlawful recruitment or use by armed 2004, AI Index ASA 21/033/2004.
forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles 9 Confidential source, Jakarta, May 2007.
10 ICG, “Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s current
armed forces or armed groups. The documents status”, press release, 3 May 2007.
operational principles for protecting and assisting 11 Sidney Jones, “Inherited Jihadism: Like Father,
Like Son”, Australian Financial Review, 6 July
2004.
government and UNICEF. 12 Confidential source, Jakarta, May 2007.
At the February 2007 ministerial meeting, 13 Keynotes, DDR Programme in Aceh Indonesia
the government said in its public statement that 2005–2006, Cranfield Centre for Security Sector
“Indonesia believes that first and foremost, Management Case Study Series, http://cranfield.
[what] governments should do is to adopt and ac.uk.
ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention 14 Armed Conflict in Aceh: Involvement of Children
on the Rights of the Child … To prevent impunity, in Armed Forces, Kelompok Kerja Studi Perkotaan
governments should adopt and implement law (KKSP), Yayasan Anak Bangsa (YAB), People’s
to punish severely those involved in recruiting Crisis Centre (PCC), Jesuit Refugee Service
children in armed conflicts.”40 However, Indonesia (JRS), 2004, copy with Child Soldiers Coalition
(Coalition).
has not yet ratified the Optional Protocol.
Discussion by the National Human Rights 15 7 May 2007, Coalition meeting in Banda Aceh.
Commission of Indonesia (Komisi Nasional Hak 16 8 May 2007, Coalition interview of four young
Asasi Manusia, known as Komnas HAM), the men formerly associated with GAM, Banda Aceh.
Indonesian Commission for Child Protection
(Komisi Perlindungan Anak Indonesia,

17 Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC),
“Re-paving the road to peace, Analysis of the IR AN
implementation of DD & R, Brief 35”, 2007, www.
bicc.de. Islamic Republic of Iran
18 Memorandum of Understanding between the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Population: 69.5 million (25.2 million under 18)
Free Aceh Movement, www.aceh-mm.org. Government armed forces: 545,000
19 Confidential source, Banda Aceh, May 2007. Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (regular forces);
20 “A Proposal for Remedy for Victims of Gross unknown (paramilitary forces)
Human Rights Violations in Aceh”, Working Paper, Voluntary recruitment age: 16
14 June 2007, English translation, Coalition copy. Voting age: 18
21 Confidential source, October 2007. Optional Protocol: not signed
22 “Three Indonesian girls beheaded”, BBC News, Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
29 October 2005. CRC, ILO 182
23 Annual Report of the United States Commission
on International Religious Freedom, May 2007, The number of under-18s in government
www.uscirf.gov. armed forces was unknown, but the
24 ICG, “Jihadism in Indonesia, Poso on the Edge”, official paramilitary Basij recruited
Asia Report No. 127, 24 January 2007.
25 Confidential source, Jakarta, May 2007.
schoolchildren. It was not known whether
26 ICG, “Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso”,
armed opposition groups had children in
Asia Briefing No. 75, 22 January 2008. their ranks.
27 Jakarta Post, April 2007, in Indonesia News
Digest 16, www.asia-pacific-action.org. Context
28 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Tens
of thousands of IDPs still waiting for assistance”, Bomb explosions in October 2005 and January
June 2007, www.internal-displacement.org. 2006 in Khuzestan province reportedly killed at
29 Confidential source, Jakarta, May 2007. least 12 people and injured hundreds of others.
30 Coalition meetings in Banda Aceh, 7 May 2007;
There were also attacks against oil installations
BICC, above note 17. there in September and October 2005. The
province bordered Iraq, and was home to a large
31 7 May 2007, Coalition meetings in Banda Aceh.
part of Iran’s Arab minority. Much of Iran’s oil
32 ICG, “Aceh: Post-conflict Complications”, Asia resources were located in the province, and long-
Report No. 139, 4 October 2007. standing grievances about resource distribution
33 BICC, above note 17. continued to be reported. The response of the
34 Coalition meeting in Banda Aceh, 7 May 2007. security forces to unrest in Khuzestan resulted in
35 Coalition meetings in Banda Aceh, May 2007. human rights violations.1
36 Coalition meeting, above note 34. Iran allegedly supported Hizbollah, a
political party and armed group in Lebanon
37 Coalition discussions in Jakarta and Banda Aceh,
May 2007.
which reportedly trained children for military
purposes. Support included military equipment
38 Coalition discussions in Jakarta, May 2007. and training of Hizbollah fighters by members of
39 Concluding observations of the Committee on the the Iranian al-Quds Force (a branch of the Iranian
Rights of the Child: Indonesia, 30 January 2004, Revolutionary Guard Corps) in Lebanon.2 Iran
UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.223. also allegedly gave financial support to Hamas,
40 Remarks by the ambassador of the Republic a Palestinian political party with an armed wing
of Indonesia to the Republic of France and the which was currently in control of the Gaza Strip.3
Principality of Andorra, H.E. Arizal Effendi, Head Financial support was also given to Islamic Jihad,
of Delegation, Paris, 6 February 2007, Coalition another armed group in Palestine. Both groups
copy. used children in military attacks and training.4
41 Coalition discussions, above note 38.
Government
practice
Current information about recruitment was
difficult to obtain. The constitution stated
that “the government is obliged to provide a
programme of military training, with all requisite
facilities for all its citizens, in accordance with
the Islamic criteria, in such a way that all citizens

will be able to engage in the armed defence of It was not known whether armed opposition
the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Article 151). The groups recruited or used under-18s.
government stated in 1998 that “according to
article 2 of the Public Conscription Act, every
Iranian citizen is eligible for military service
Developments
as of 21 March of the year he reaches 19”, During 2006 at least four people were executed
and that “the minimum employment age for who were under 18 at the time of the alleged
the armed forces for the purpose of receiving offence, including one who was under 18 at the
military training is 16 and the minimum age time of the execution. A 14-year-old ethnic Azeri
for employment for the Police Forces is 17”.5 boy was arrested in April 2006 and reportedly
The voluntary recruitment age was 16.6 Military tortured before being released. In September
service was carried out in the Iranian Armed he was rearrested and beaten.15 As of January
Forces and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 2007 there were reportedly 23 under-18s
Corps, the latter established shortly after awaiting execution.16 In March 2007 the UN
the 1979 revolution and with its own air and Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary
naval services. Most of the armed forces were or Arbitrary Executions called the execution of
reportedly made up of conscripts who received juveniles in Iran “completely unacceptable”.
minimal training and served for 18 months. There Referring to Iran’s ratification of the Convention
F—J
was also a large army reserve, who received on the Rights of the Child in 1994, he reminded
“negligible” training.7 There was a military the government that this was “a clear and
academy in Teheran, and a signals training centre unambiguous legal commitment not to impose
and special forces and airborne training facility in the death penalty for offences committed by
Shiraz.8 The number of under-18s in government persons less than 18 years old”.17
armed forces was unknown. The government delivered its second periodic
report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child in July 2002. Among its recommendations
Armed groups the Committee urged the government to
Paramilitaries ensure that all children were registered at birth
and acquired irrevocable nationality without
The Basij, under the control of the Revolutionary discrimination. The Committee also expressed
Guards,9 was a paramilitary organization concern that Iran had not signed or acceded to
reportedly made up of volunteers, including either of the two Optional Protocols.18
schoolchildren.10 Basij members were reportedly
mostly boys, older men and recent veterans.
Middle-school members were known as Seekers 1 Amnesty International (AI), “Iran: New
government fails to address dire human rights
and high-school members as the Vanguard.
situation”, report, 16 February 2006, AI Index
Ansar-e Hizbollah was a semi-official paramilitary MDE 13/010/2006.
organization aiming to enforce Islamic standards
in Iranian society. Most of its members reportedly 2 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Support of the
Hezbollah in Lebanon, Institute of Strategic and
also belonged to the Basij or were veterans of the
International Studies, 15 July 2006.
Iran–Iraq War.11
3 ��
Patrick Saint-Paul, “L’Axe Iran-Hezbollah-
Armed opposition groups Hamas s’organise contre les forces modérées
en Palestine”, Le Figaro, 5 ��
January 2007, www.
In March 2006 Jondallah, a Baluchi armed group, lefigaro.fr.
killed 22 Iranian officials and took at least seven 4 “Iran’s Khamenei calls on Islamic govts to support
people hostage in Sistan-Baluchistan province.12 Hamas”, Reuters, 20 February 2006, http://asia.
Human rights abuses by both the Iranian security news.yahoo.com.
forces and Jondallah against children were
5 Initial report by Iran to the UN Committee on the
reported, including the killing of two boys by the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.5, 23
Iranian security forces in January 2006.13 July 1998.
Although some Iranian Kurdish armed groups,
6 UK Home Office, Border and Immigration Agency,
including Komala and the Kurdistan People’s
Country of Origin Report, Iran, 4 May 2007, www.
Democratic Party (KDPI) had carried out armed homeoffice.gov.uk.
resistance in the past, they had renounced
armed struggle and supported a federal solution. 7 Janes Information Group, “World Armies Profile:
Iran”, 29 August 2006, www.janes.co.uk.
However, the Kurdistan Independent Life Party
(PJAK, affiliated to the Turkish PKK, Kurdistan 8 Global Security, “Iran Army”, www.globalsecurity.
Workers’ Party) had reportedly begun armed org.
operations in 2004, which continued into 2007. 9 Global Security, “Intelligence, Niruyeh
Violent unrest broke out in July 2005 in Kurdish Moghavemat Basij, Mobilisation Resistance
areas, mainly in the north-eastern provinces, Force”, www.globalsecurity.org.
after the security forces shot dead a Kurdish
opposition activist.14

10 Wahied Wahdat-Hagh, “Basij – the Revolutionary
People’s Militia of Iran”, Middle East Media I raq
Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series
No. 262, 1 February 2006, www.memri.org. Republic of Iraq
11 Global Security, “Ansar-i Hizbullah, followers of
the party of God”, www.globalsecurity.org. Population: 28.8 million (13.8 million under 18)
12 Amnesty International Report 2007. Government armed forces: 227,000
13 AI, “Iran”, above note 1. Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
14 AI, “Iran: new government fails to address dire Voluntary recruitment age: 18
human rights situation”, 16 February 2006, AI Voting age: 18
Index MDE 13/010/2006. Optional Protocol: not signed
15 Amnesty International Report 2007. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
16 AI, “Iran: fear of imminent execution”, 26 January CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182
2007, Amnesty International Urgent Action, AI
Index number AI MDE 13/008/2007. There were no reports of under-18s serving
17 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on in the Iraqi armed forces formed in 2003
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, after the US-led occupation. Armed
UN Doc. A/HRC/4/20, 27 March 2007.
political groups reportedly used children
Consideration of second periodic report as combatants.
submitted by Iran, Concluding observations, UN
Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.254, 31 March 2005. Context
According to the UN Secretary-General, children
in Iraq continued to “suffer most in the ongoing
violence” in the country. The Secretary-General
also noted that “statistics from United Nations
partners and Iraqi authorities suggest that
approximately half of all Iraqi refugees are
children, as are as many as 38 to 40 per cent of
internally displaced persons.”1
The new Iraqi constitution was adopted in
October 2005 with the acceptance of all religious
groups. Elections were held in December 2005
for a new 275-seat National Assembly. In June
2006 Prime Minister Nouri Maliki announced a
24-point National Reconciliation Plan addressing
the political and security crises in the country.
The plan provided for mechanisms to facilitate
the political process, the disbanding of armed
militias and the establishment of security plans.
The Plan contained provisions for dealing with
internal displacement, for enacting legislative
and judicial reforms, for a partial amnesty for
non-terrorist offences and for accountability
mechanisms for human rights abuses.2 Political
uncertainty continued, however, as sectarian
violence persisted.3
The US-led Multi-National Force–Iraq
(MNF-I) and the Iraqi government faced
increasing attacks from supporters of the former
government and other armed groups. Attacks by
the various groups intensified after the February
2006 bombing of the Samara Mosque, a Shia
shrine, reportedly carried out by al-Qaeda in Iraq.
The incident sparked increased sectarian violence
and resulted in mass displacement. The bombing
was followed by retaliatory violence; over a
hundred people were killed in the immediate
aftermath and at least 165 in the following
days.4 Iraq’s civilian population was faced with
daily violence perpetrated by armed groups,

criminal gangs, religious radicals and militias. Military training and military schools
There were also injuries and deaths resulting
MNF-I implemented a structured training and
from operations by the security forces. Civilians
assessment process for the Iraqi military forces.
accounted for the majority of these casualties.
Training was divided into two areas: for new
Human rights abuses, ranging from killings
recruits and for former soldiers. Membership
to discrimination on the basis of political and
of the Iraqi Special Forces Brigade required
religious affiliation, gender, sexual orientation
additional training. All Iraqi Special Operations
and professional group, had an enormous impact
Forces (ISOF) soldiers underwent a three-
on the population.5
week assessment and selection course. They
Abductions of children by Iraqi armed groups
played crucial roles in major combat operations
related to the sectarian violence increased
alongside, and sometimes independently of,
significantly, in addition to the number of children
multinational forces. A small number of army
abducted for ransom. A survey conducted by
personnel attended advanced training with NATO
several local non-governmental organizations
and in US army schools.10
(NGOs) in Baghdad indicated that at least
20,000 people had been abducted throughout
the country in 2006, half of them women and Armed groups
children.6
F—J
A wide range of armed groups operated in Iraq,
The Secretary-General reported that there
most of them opposing the occupation of the
had been “frequent attacks on schools, children
multinational forces or engaging other sectarian
and teachers” in Iraq since 2006. In January 2007
militia groups. Iraqi armed groups opposing
members of an armed group were said to have
the occupation were mainly Sunni, although
deliberately targeted a girls’ school in western
Sunni armed groups also attacked Shia targets.
Baghdad, with five students killed and 21 others
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (al-Qaeda of Jihad Organization
injured in the incident. In June 2007 members of
in the Land of the Two Rivers) was the most
an armed group were said to have abducted 30
prominent insurgent group.11
students between the ages of 17 and 19 from a
Children were reportedly involved in attacks
secondary-school in Saydiyah.7
carried out by armed groups at least since
In mid-March 2006 five MNF-I soldiers were
November 2005, when a boy aged between ten
charged with the rape and murder of a 14-year-
and 13 carried out a suicide bombing targeting
old girl and the murder of her family, including
the police commander in the city of Kirkuk. No
her 5-year-old sister, in Mahmoudiyah, south of
group claimed responsibility for the attack.12
Baghdad.8
Later the same month two boys aged 12 and 13
reportedly carried out attacks against MNF-I
Government patrols in Fallujah and Hweejah.13
Various armed groups allegedly used child
National recruitment legislation and soldiers. The two main child recruiters were
practice al-Qaeda in Iraq and Jaysh al-Mahdi (Army of the
Mahdi), according to research conducted by an
Article 9 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution stated that
Iraqi NGO. These groups reportedly used money
“[t]he Iraqi Armed Forces and Security Services
to entice children into the group.14
will be composed of the components of the
The Sunni group al-Qaeda in Iraq was led by
Iraqi people with due consideration given to its
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death in 2006.
balance and its similarity without discrimination
The group was believed to be led subsequently
or exclusion and shall be subject to the control of
by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (also known as Abu
the civilian authority”, and that “[m]ilitary service
Ayyub al-Masri). Al-Qaeda in Iraq targeted mainly
shall be regulated by law”.
the MNF-I presence and individuals co-operating
In May 2003 the Coalition Provisional
with MNF-I. It also launched attacks against
Authority (CPA) had ordered the complete
civilians, often targeted at the Iraqi Shia majority,
dismantling of the Iraqi army, the demobilization
in an attempt to incite sectarian violence. Al-
of all enlisted soldiers and the indefinite
Qaeda was estimated to have more than 1,000
suspension of universal conscription. The August
active members. Reports indicated that the group
2003 CPA order creating the new armed forces
recruited children to carry out its attacks, but the
specified that the minimum age of recruitment
number involved was not known.15
was 18 and that recruitment was voluntary.
Mentally disabled children were allegedly
Former military officers of the rank of lieutenant-
sold to or abducted by al-Qaeda in Iraq and used
colonel and below were being accepted into the
by the group in night raids and as decoys to
new army; all other males between the ages of 18
divert the attention of US or Iraqi forces in the
and 40 who were not listed on excluded lists were
run-up to attacks in cities such as Diyala, Ramadi
allowed to sign up at recruiting centres.9
and Fallujah.16
On 21 March 2007 mentally disabled
children were allegedly used by al-Qaeda in

Iraq operatives in a suicide attack on a market According to a US Army spokesperson, the
in the Adhamiyah neighbourhood of Baghdad. number of child arrests was on the rise, from 25 a
According to a spokesperson for the Ministry of month in 2006 to 100 a month in 2007.24
Interior, “they were put in the back of a car with US soldiers within MNF-I described abuses
another two adults in the front. The military let against child detainees in detention centres run
their car pass through the check point since it by MNF-I, including the rape of a 15-year-old
had children as passengers. When they reached boy at Abu Ghraib prison, forced nudity, stress
the market, they [the adults] left the car with positions, beating and the use of dogs.25
the children inside and detonated a bomb in As of October 2007 it was not clear whether
the vehicle, killing the children and another five children in MNF-I custody in Iraq were subject
Iraqis.”17 to the same detention review process as adults,
Children orphaned since the US-led invasion who did not have access to lawyers and had to
in 2003 were allegedly used by the group as sign pledges of good behaviour and produce a
spies, or sent to gather information or distract guarantor to be released.26 According to Major-
troops while the group prepared to detonate General Douglas Stone, as of September 2007
bombs nearby. According to the Ministry of between 50 and 60 children aged 15 to 17 had
Interior, at least 12 children had died by April been turned over to Iraqi custody for trial.27
2007 as a result of such bomb explosions.18
Jaysh al-Mahdi, led by radical cleric Sheik
Muqtada Sadr, had a large presence in the cities
Developments
of Najaf and Karbala and the “Sadr City” suburb The government, through the Commission of
in Baghdad. It was created in 2003 following the Child Care, began to address the challenges
collapse of the Saddam Hussein government, and confronting children in Iraq. The Commission
sought to replace more traditional factions as the established a committee, which recommended
voice of Iraq’s Shiite majority. As of early 2004 that the government sign the Optional Protocol to
it was estimated to consist of about 500–1,000 the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on
trained combatants along with another 5,000– the involvement of children in armed conflict.28
6,000 active participants, including under-18s.19
In summer 2004 Muqtada al Sadr directed a 1 Report of the UN Secretary-General to the
revolt that affected the primarily Shia south of Security Council on Children and armed conflict,
Iraq, with the fighting against the MNF-I in the UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757, 21 December
holy city of Najaf being particularly fierce. Child 2007.
soldiers were allegedly used by the al-Mahdi 2 United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), www.
militias during the fighting, some as young as uniraq.org/; see also Human Rights Watch,
12.20 In September 2006 children were reportedly Country Summary, January 2007.
used to throw stones at US troops in “Sadr 3 UNAMI, 11th report on the situation of human
City”, although an Al-Sadr spokesman denied rights in Iraq, 1 April–30 June 2007, www.uniraq.
organizing children for this purpose, stating that org.
the rock-throwing was “spontaneous”.21 4 “Bombing shatters Mosque in Iraq”, Washington
Ansar al-Islam, one of two main ethnic Post, 23 February 2006, www.washingtonpost.
Kurdish Islamist groups in Iraqi Kurdistan, with com.
around 600 fighters, was accused of links with 5 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
al-Qaeda, and reportedly included non-Kurdish “Iraq: a desperate situation”, interview with
fighters.22 Since its establishment in 2001, the Béatrice Mégevand-Roggo, 22 September 2007,
group engaged in intermittent clashes with the www.icrc.org/; ICRC, “Iraq: civilians without
forces of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), protection”, report, 11 April 2007, www.icrc.org.
in whose stronghold Biyara and Tawela were 6 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and
located. There was no available information as to Armed Conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826,
whether this group recruited children. October 2006; see also Amnesty International
(AI), “Iraq: decades of suffering, now women
Detention of suspected child soldiers deserve better”, 22 February 2005.
Children were reportedly held in centres under 7 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 1.
the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. 8 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.
Some were suspected of having taken part in 9 Global Security, “New Iraqi Army”, www.
clashes against government forces, including globalsecurity.org.
those suspected of being linked to the Mahdi
10 Ibid.
Army.23
By mid-2007 around 800 children aged 11 “Guide: Armed groups in Iraq”, BBC News, 15
between ten and 17 were held in an MNF-I base August 2006.
in Baghdad, accused of making and planting 12 “World: Islamic clerics condemn use of children
roadside bombs for armed groups or caught in suicide bombings”, RadioFreeEurope/
when acting as lookouts or carrying guns. RadioLiberty, 3 November 2005, ww.rferl.org.

14 Confidential information, Iraq, May 2007. IREL A N D
15 Ibid.
16 “Iraq: mentally handicapped children are used in Ireland
attacks”, IRIN, 10 April 2007. Population: 4.1 million (1.0 million under 18)
17 Ibid. Government armed forces: 10,500
18 Ibid. Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
19 Global Security, “Al- Mahdi Army”, Voluntary recruitment age: 17; 16 as apprentices
www.globalsecurity. Voting age: 18
20 Peter W. Singer, “Young Soldiers Used in Conflicts Optional Protocol: ratified 18 November 2002
Around the World”, Washington Post, 12 June
2006.
21 “Young children fight US troops in Iraq”,
Associated Press, 9 September 2006, at www. The minimum voluntary recruitment
globalpolicy.org.
22 Global Security, “Ansar Al Islam”,
age was 17, but under-18s serving in
www.globalsecurity.org. the armed forces were unlikely to be
F—J
23 Human Rights Watch, “The New Iraq? Torture and deployed in hostilities because of training
Ill-treatment of detainees in Iraq and Custody”, requirements.
January 2005.
24 “US Detains nearly 800 juveniles in Iraq”, Agence
France-Presse (AFP), 19 August 2007, www. Government
timesofoman.com.
25 Amnesty International, “USA: human dignity
denied: torture and accountability in the ‘war on practice
terror’”, October 2004. The constitution and a series of Defence Acts
26 “US command in Baghdad launches bid to from 1954 to 1993 provided the basis for the
rehabilitate Iraqi detainees”, Inside the Air Irish Defence Forces. Compulsory military service
Force, Vol. 18, No. 29 (20 July 2007); Nancy and conscription had never existed in Ireland,
Montgomery, “Board decides fate of thousands and recruitment to the Irish Defence Forces
of Iraqi detainees: panel of Iraqis and American (made up of a Permanent Defence Force and a
military has released more than 14,000 in 18 Reserve Defence Force) was entirely voluntary.
months”, Stars and Stripes, 23 February 2006.
Defence Forces Regulations and Administrative
27 Walter Pincus, “US working to reshape Iraqi Instructions stated that enlistment in any branch
detainees: moderate Muslims enlisted to steer of the Irish Defence Force could take place at
adults and children away from insurgency”, the age of 17. Cadets entering the Permanent
Washington Post, 19 September 2007.
Defence Force for year-long intensive training
28 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6. leading to a commission as a junior officer also
had to be 17. The Defence Forces Administrative
Instructions explicitly barred the overseas service
of any member of the armed forces under the
age of 18. Following enlistment, most 17-year-
old recruits underwent a six-month period of
“essential core basic training” before actively
assuming military duties in the Permanent
Defence Force. Consequently, the government
emphasized that “the possibility of a person who
has not attained the age of 18 being exposed
to any ‘hostile’ incident is virtually negligible”.
According to the government, “the only
theoretical situation where a person who has
not attained the age of 18 could be exposed to
‘hostilities’ would be where hostilities had broken
out and were occurring within the State’s own
jurisdiction”. In February 2007 it was reported
that there were more than 300 17-year-olds in
the Reserve Defence Force, although mandatory
training requirements in the second year of their
service meant that they were not permitted to
take part in any actual operations until they
were at least 18 or 19. Members of the Reserve

Defence Force were expressly prohibited from in armed conflict and children are referred to
participation in civil power back-up operations these services where necessary”.5
and were also prohibited from taking part in any At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
international operations. All those seeking entry Paris, Ireland and 58 other states endorsed
to any branch of the Irish Defence Forces who the Paris Commitments to protect children
were under 18 were required to have the written from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
consent of their parent or guardian prior to forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
enlistment, and to have had a personal interview. and guidelines on children associated with
An estimated 22 per cent of personnel entering armed forces or armed groups. The documents
the Irish Defence Forces were younger than 18 reaffirmed international standards and
in recent years; of those, fewer than 45 per cent operational principles for protecting and assisting
were reportedly still under 18 at the conclusion of child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
their basic training.1 consultation jointly sponsored by the French
Irish military regulations allowed 16-year-olds 1 Initial report of Ireland to the UN Committee on
to be recruited as “apprentices”, receiving the Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol,
special training for three or four years at both UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/IRL/1, 5 February 2007.
military and civilian technological colleges. They 2 Ibid.
were completely prohibited from performing 3 Ibid.
any military duties, and would normally be 19 4 Ibid.
or 20 by the time they completed their studies
and gained their qualification. Only then would 5 Information from the Irish ambassador to the
United Kingdom, September 2007.
they assume active military duties including
possible deployment abroad. In current practice,
the minimum entry age for apprentices was
generally 17, comparable with the age of ordinary
enlistment in the Irish Defence Forces.2
Ireland contributed �500,000 in 2005 to the
UN Development Programme’s Disarmament,
Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation
Trust Fund for Liberia, supporting work with both
adult and child ex-combatants.3
Developments
In preparing its 2006 Initial Report to the
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on
government consulted with a wide range of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
statutory bodies and included some of the views
expressed in the consultation in its report to the
Committee. Among concerns identified in the
process was the exclusion of those members of
the Irish Defence Forces under the age of 18 from
the investigative mandate of the Ombudsman
for Children and the need for specific training
of refugee determination personnel on issues
relating to child ex-combatants.4
A community-based Child and Adolescent
Mental Heath Service, established by the
Irish Health Service Executive, organized
multidisciplinary teams of health professionals,
social workers and speech and language
therapists, prepared to “treat psychiatric and
psychological manifestations associated with
traumatic experiences such as those experienced

© Coalition 2005
F—J
School sign, East Jerusalem – children are vulnerable even at school

I S R AEL Government
State of Israel
practice
Population: 6.7 million (2.2 million under 18) All Israelis were required to perform military
Government armed forces: 168,000 service from the age of 18.6 Men were expected to
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 serve for 36 months and women for 24 months.
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 Children were assessed and interviewed for
Voting age: 18 service in the armed forces from the age of 16
Optional Protocol: ratified 18 July 2005 and a half, and at 17 were issued formal call-up
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): notices. Voluntary recruitment was allowed from
CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182 the age of 17, although the armed forces stated
that “frontline” duties were only possible from
The minimum age of conscription was 18 18.7 Exemption was possible on medical grounds
and by discretion of the Minister of Defence.8
and volunteers were accepted from age Only women could state religion or family status
17. Military training was widespread for as grounds for exemption.9
under-18s. Under-18s were recruited as
volunteers in the police-affiliated civil Military training and military schools
guard. Israeli children around Hebron Israeli children received familiarization
were used by extreme settler movements and military training well below the age of
recruitment. Most schools had uniformed
in violent activities. Israeli military forces teacher-soldiers and youth guides on their staff
continued to arrest large numbers of who provided a link between the education
Palestinian children, some of whom were system and the military establishment.10 Official
tortured during detention. Palestinian and pre-recruitment activities started at the age of
15–16 (tenth grade).11 By the 11th–12th grade
Lebanese armed groups launched attacks (age 16 up) students were reportedly “saturated
on Israeli civilian targets, killing and with the idea of enlistment” through a range of
injuring a number of Israeli children. promotional events and material.12 Gadna, or
youth battalions, ran a one-week military training
program on an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) base
Context as part of the curriculum for 16–17-year-olds at
The Palestinian intifada (uprising) against Israeli most Jewish state schools.13
occupation continued into 2007. Nearly 6,000 The armed forces also directly administered
people had been killed during the conflict, schools, including the Beit Biram Military
including 129 Israeli children killed by Palestinian Boarding School in Haifa, which accepted
forces1 and 889 Palestinian children killed by students from age 14.14 Pupils were called cadets
Israeli forces.2 Israel withdrew settlers and troops and wore military uniforms.15 The Israeli Air Force
from the Gaza Strip in August–September 2005, (IAF) ran four technical schools for children aged
although since then it had conducted frequent 13 and above. Amal High School in Ramat David
armed raids into the area.3 Israeli withdrawal was a joint military–civilian facility for children
from four West Bank settlements also took place, aged 13 and older based on an IAF base.16
but Israel confiscated Palestinian land through its A number of voluntary summer and extra-
construction of the “separation barrier” around curricular courses involving military training
the West Bank.4 The wall reduced the scope for were available for Israeli and foreign children
direct conflict, but there were frequent clashes from the age of 14–15. These included courses
between settler communities and Palestinians. run directly by the IDF and those run by other
Syria and Lebanon remained formally at war organizations, such as the scouts.17 Trials to serve
with Israel, which occupied disputed territory in elite units of the military began from the age of
of both countries. In July 2006 Israel launched 17. In 2006 there was controversy when 17-year-
an intensive month-long military campaign in old Itai Sharon died of heatstroke during Israeli
Lebanon after the abduction of two of its soldiers. Air Force (IAF) trials.18 The subsequent internal
The July 2006 conflict resulted in the deaths of inquiry identified a series of failures in the IAF’s
seven Israeli and nearly 400 Lebanese children.5 treatment of Sharon.19 Also in 2006, 17-year old
Aharon Tzarfati died accidentally during physical
evaluations for a naval commando program. He
was among two hundred 17–18-year-olds taking
part.20

Child recruitment and deployment part in a limited capacity from the tenth grade
and received weapons training and firearms from
There were no reported instances of under-18s
11th grade (16–17).35
serving in combat duty with the IDF. However, in
Hebron young Israeli children from settlements
often mingled with soldiers on duty and sat in Armed groups
military checkpoints, even when Palestinians
were present.21 On occasion IDF soldiers Palestinian groups
were reported to have stood by, or given tacit The military wings of Palestinian political groups
encouragement, as Israeli children engaged in – Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad and the Popular
hostile behaviour towards Palestinians.22 In one Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
case an Israeli soldier showed a Palestinian’s – continued attacks against Israelis in Palestinian
identity papers to two settler children, aged areas and in Israel.36 One hundred and twenty-
around 12. They and four other children then nine Israeli children were killed in attacks since
threw stones at the Palestinian under the gaze of 2000.37 They included two 16-year-olds who
the soldier.23 were killed in a suicide bombing at a Netanya
In 2007 three incidents were documented shopping centre in July 2005.38 The attack was
where Palestinian children were used as human carried out by 18-year-old Ahmed Abu Khalil and
F—J
shields by the IDF in and around Nablus, two claimed by Islamic Jihad.39 One older Palestinian
years after an Israeli Supreme Court ruling child was killed during attempts to cross the
banned this practice.24 In one case, an 11-year-old Israeli border on behalf of an armed group. No
girl was sent into a derelict building ahead of IDF under-18s were known to have been involved in
soldiers investigating the source of shooting.25 In suicide bombings since 2004.40 The shelling of
another case, a 15-year-old boy was told to walk Sderot, on the border with Gaza, by Palestinian
ahead of soldiers searching his family home, the armed groups constituted a threat to children on
soldiers firing five or six shots.26 both sides of the border.41 In September 2007
Israel’s internal security agency, known as Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a rocket
Shabak or Shin Bet, was also alleged to have attack that landed metres away from an Israeli
attempted to recruit Palestinian children as kindergarten.42
informants. An official from the Palestinian
Authority (PA) security forces told DCI-Palestine, Lebanese groups
a non-governmental organization (NGO), that 40 Hizbollah conducted a number of raids and
per cent of Palestinians accused of collaborating shelled Israeli positions prior to the July 2006
with the Israeli forces and arrested by the PA war. During the month-long battle, Hizbollah’s
were children. The youngest he had encountered shelling of northern Israel resulted in the deaths
was 12.27 A 16-year-old boy from Hebron was of seven children, as well as damage to 23
arrested by Israeli forces and held in solitary schools and 11 kindergartens. Six thousand
confinement at Ashkelon Prison in Israel for Israeli children required psychological treatment
35 days in 2007. He was mistreated during his as a result of the violence.43
detention and pressed to become an informant.28
Previous studies showed that such approaches Israeli settlers
were common during detention.29
In 2006 around 700 Palestinian under-18s Israeli children living in settlements were
were detained by Israeli forces, under military frequently involved in violent confrontations
provisions that contravened international with Palestinian neighbours and, on occasion,
humanitarian law and standards of juvenile international observers. In Hebron, observers
justice.30 Incidents of ill-treatment and torture reported the systematic use of youngsters under
remained common.31 In one case, a 17-year-old 12 to carry out acts of violence and vandalism
boy was arrested in July 2007 on charges of against Palestinians and their property.44 Israel’s
attempting to recruit a suicide bomber. During police commander in the Hebron region said, “We
the journey to the detention centre, he was have a major problem here. They [the settlers]
kicked and trampled on by Israeli soldiers. understand our weak point – and they use
Interrogators slapped him repeatedly and children under the age of criminal responsibility,
slammed his head against a desk. After initial under the age of twelve. They do this
interrogation he was held for five days in a cell intentionally. They [the children] are the tactical
with Palestinian informants and for 15 days in wing, even the strategic wing, of the adults.”45
solitary confinement.32 The Israeli NGO Yesh Din found that of 150
The Israeli police force encouraged older cases of complaints of settler violence opened
Israeli children to volunteer for its 70,000-strong in 2005 and closed by November that year,
civil guard.33 The guard undertook community 50 involved children under the age of criminal
policing alongside more security-focused roles responsibility, all from the Hebron area.46 One
such as foot patrols, checkpoint security and adult victim from the Tel Rumeida area of Hebron
security sweeps.34 Under-18s were noted taking reported that “settler children attack us, with

the parents encouraging them and standing next the “Living Under Fire” program for children in
to them”.47 A number of videos of child settler Sderot, Nahariya and Haifa after the 2006 conflict
violence were posted on the Internet in 2006–7.48 with Lebanon.61 NATAL – the Israel Center for
Attacks by groups of older Israeli children against Victims of Terror and War – was one of a number
Palestinians in the area were reported on a of groups running programs for residents of
relatively frequent basis.49 Sderot, including children.62
Throughout the West Bank, and formerly
in the Gaza Strip, older Israeli children were International standards
reportedly involved in the building and securing Israel ratified the Optional Protocol in July 2005.
of new outposts. This included four under-18s Its declaration confirmed that the minimum age
who were charged in 2007 for their role in for voluntary recruitment was 17 and that no
building the outpost of Shevut Ami on Palestinian one under 18 could be posted to combat duty.
land. 50 The precise affiliation of the child activists The declaration said that in order to ensure
was unclear, although observers said that they that recruitment of under-18s was not forced or
were well organized and briefed.51 They were coerced, written permission from the parents or
often referred to in the Israeli press as “Hilltop guardian, reliable proof of age and explanation of
Youth”, although this was an umbrella term for the duties were required.63 In March 2005 Israel
a number of diverse groups.52 During the first ratified ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of
seven months of 2005, 688 Israeli under-18s Child Labour.64
were detained for their role in protests against
the pull-out from Gaza and outpost settlements,
1 B’Tselem statistics to 31 October 2007 from 29
but in 2007 state prosecutors decided to drop September 2000, www.btselem.org.
charges against 60 minors indicted for assault
against the security forces in August 2005. 53 2 Information from DCI Palestine Section, to 5
November 2007.
During the IDF evacuation of Homesh in the
northern West Bank in March 2007, up to 2,500 3 See for example “One year after the
activists, most of them teenagers, attempted to ‘Disengagement’: Gaza still occupied and under
repopulate the area.54 In April 2006 a movement attack”, al Haq, September 2006, www.alhaq.org.
called “Youth for the Land of Israel” rallied 1,000 4 UN Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian
protestors for a demonstration at Bet El, when Affairs, “The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians
a 17-year-old participant was injured in clashes of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure in
with Palestinians.55 the West Bank”, July 2007, www.ochaopt.org.
“Youth for the Land of Israel” was also alleged 5 The UN estimated that a third of 1,191 deaths in
to have organized “hikes” in the West Bank by Lebanon were minors: “Major violations on both
means of leafleting campaigns in schools.56 This sides in Israel–Lebanon conflict, say UN Experts”,
activity often involved groups of Israeli settlers 4 October 2006, www.unhchr.ch.
trespassing on Palestinian land and sometimes 6 Defence Service Law, Consolidated Version 5746-
ended in clashes. Local settlement councils also 1986.
encouraged older children to participate in hikes 7 New Profile (Israeli non-governmental
as part of local youth activities.57 organization), “Child Recruitment in Israel”, 29
July 2004.
8 Defence Service Law, above note 6.
Developments 9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2005, www.mfa.
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory gov.il.
(OPT) were noted as situations of concern in the 10 Interview with New Profile, 11 September 2007.
UN Secretary-General’s reports to the Security 11 Hanan Greenberg, “IDF to look at teen’s
Council on Children and Armed Conflict in motivation”, Ynet News, 29 August 2006.
February 2005 and October 2006.58 The Special
12 Interview with New Profile, above note 10.
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict visited the area in 13 New Profile, above note 7.
April 2007. She recommended the establishment 14 Ibid.
of independent investigation mechanisms to 15 See www.panmaz.co.il.
follow up alleged violations of children’s rights. 16 New Profile, above note 7.
She suggested that Israel review its policies on 17 See Gadna programmes at http://dover.idf.il/;
detention for Palestinian children. The Special Tzofim brochure, www.chetz-vkeshet.org.il.
Representative also called on Palestinian armed 18 Information from DCI-Israel, 18 October 2007.
factions in Gaza to respect humanitarian law and
halt all indiscriminate rocket fire into Israel.59 19 Nir Hasson and Yoav Stern, “Report: IAF failures
to blame for teen’s death in pre-pilot course”,
A number of government and non-government
Ha’aretz, 17 December 2006.
programs supported Israeli children affected
by the conflict. This includes the Psychological 20 Amos Harel, “Naval Commando Candidate Dies
Counselling Service in state schools.60 The Israel During Pre-Conscription Trials”, Ha’aretz, 19
September 2006.
Center for the Treatment of Psychotrauma set up

21 Interview with international observers in Hebron, 46 Yesh Din, above note 22.
13 September 2007. 47 Testimony of Taysir Aby ’Ayeshe, “Ghost town”,
22 See numerous case studies in Yesh Din, “A above note 44.
Semblance of Law”, June 2006. 48 See Ali Waked, “Hebron settlers filmed throwing
23 Ibid. rocks at Palestinians”, Ynet News, 3 August 2007;
24 B’Tselem, “Human Shields”, background, Nir Hasson, “Hebron settler filmed attacking
www.btselem.org. Arabs”, Ha’aretz, 12 January 2007.
25 Incident in February 2007, information received 49 Testimony of Fawzi Abu Armila of stone-throwing
from DCI-Palestine Section, 10 September 2007. by 16–19-year-olds, given to B’Tselem, 14 January
2007, www.btselem.org.
26 B’Tselem, “Israeli soldiers use ’Amid ’Amirah,
15, as human shield, Nablus, February 2007”, 50 Email contact with Yesh Din, 29 October 2007.
www.btselem.org. 51 Telephone conversation with DCI-Israel, 18
27 DCI-Palestine, “Dealing with alleged child October 2007; interview with Amir Givol, New
collaborators in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Profile, 11 September 2007.
in the spirit of the Convention on the Rights of the 52 E-mail conversation with New Profile, 24 October
Child”, April 2005, www.dci-pal.org. 2007.
28 Documented by DCI-Palestine Section,19 July 53 Tal Rosner, “688 minors detained”, Ynet News,
F—J
2007, www.dci-pal.org. 9 August 2005, www.ynetnews.com/; www.
29 “Dealing with alleged child collaborators”, above israeljustice.com.
note 27. 54 Amos Harel and Nadav Shraqai, “Police planning
30 UN Report, Visit of the Special Representative to clear Homesh protesters by early Wednesday”,
of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Ha’aretz, 27 March 2007.
Conflict to the Middle East, 9–20 April 2007. 55 “Yaakov Katz Beit El marchers defy IDF closure”,
31 DCI-Palestine Section, “Palestinian Child Jerusalem Post, 16 April 2006.
Prisoners Report 2006”, March 2007, www.dci- 56 Ezra HaLevi, “Youth answer terrorism with
pal.org. trans-Samaria hike”, Arutz 7, 2 July 2006, www.
32 Information received from DCI-Palestine Section, shechem.org/; Ezra HaLevi, “Hikes, concerts
28 November 2007. and festivities planned for the Sukkot holiday”,
6 October 2006, IsraelNationalNews.com, www.
33 Israeli police website, www.police.gov.il.
israelnationalnews.com.
34 Israeli police civil guard information, www.police.
57 Telephone interview with Director of Research,
gov.il.
Yesh Din, 18 October 2007.
35 New Profile, above note 7.
58 UN Secretary-General’s reports to the Security
36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Suicide and Other Council on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc.
Bombing Attacks in Israel since the Declaration of A/59/695-S/2005/72, 9 February 2005; UN Doc.
Principles (Sept 1993)”, www.mfa.gov.il. A/61/529-S/2006/826, 26 October 2006.
37 B’Tselem, “Statistics to 29 September 2007 from 59 UN Report, above note 30.
start of Intifada, 29 September 2000”,
60 “Delays in school and trauma in northern Israel
www.btselem.org.
following Israel–Hezbollah conflict”, Ha’aretz,
38 B’Tselem, “Israeli minors killed by Palestinians in 22 August 2006.
Israel and Palestine to 31 October 2007”,
61 Israel Center for the Treatment of Psychotrauma,
www.btselem.org.
www.traumaweb.org.
39 “Israel reoccupies West Bank town”, BBC News,
62 NATAL, www.natal.org.il.
13 July 2005.
63 Declaration on accession to Optional Protocol:
40 Information from DCI-Palestine Section, 20
www2.ohchr.org.
October 2007.
64 International Labour Organization (ILO), Database
41 For instance Qassam rocket damage to a school
of International Labour Standards, www.ilo.org/
and shrapnel injuries to a child, reported by child
(ilolex database).
protection agencies working in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory (OPT), July–August 2007.
42 “Sderot schools launch strike because of
Palestinian resistance’s rockets”, Paltoday News
Network, 4 September 2007.
43 UN Report, above note 30.
44 Yesh Din, above note 22; B’Tselem and
Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “Ghost town:
Israel’s separation policy and forced eviction of
Palestinians from the center of Hebron”, May
2007.
45 Meron Rappoport, “Ghost Town”, Ha’aretz, 18
November, 2005.

I TA LY Italy had three military schools: the Teuliè
Military School in Milan, the Nunziatella Military
Italian Republic School in Naples and the Francesco Morosini
Population: 58.1 million (9.8 million under 18) Naval Military School in Venice. Applicants had to
Government armed forces: 191,200 be between 15 and 17 years of age and pass an
entrance examination.7 In addition to the normal
school curriculum, students received military
suspended from January 2005) training, including combat and weapons training.8
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 Italy’s Initial Report on the Optional Protocol
Voting age: 18 was ambiguous as to whether students enrolled
Optional Protocol: ratified 9 May 2002 in military schools were considered part of
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): the armed forces. It was particularly unclear
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 regarding the status of students aged 16 and
over, who had to sign a three-year contract of
According to 2004 legislation the minimum “special voluntary recruitment” into the armed
age for voluntary recruitment into the forces before they were allowed to continue
their studies.9 Failure to sign the contract
armed forces was 18, but the declaration
resulted in expulsion from the military school,10
made at the time of ratification of the raising questions as to whether the recruitment
Optional Protocol, indicating 17 as the was genuinely voluntary. Although parents or
voluntary recruitment age, had not yet guardians had to authorize a child’s age (as 15 or
been amended. above) before he could be admitted to a military
school, a parent or guardian’s informed consent
was not required for the contract of “special
Government voluntary recruitment” into the armed forces,
signed by military school students at the age
National recruitment legislation and of 16. There was no obvious requirement that
practice students had to be fully informed of the duties
involved in military service before signing the
Law No. 226/2004, enacted in August 2004, contract. The Initial Report also said nothing
suspended conscription with effect from 1 about 16-year-olds providing “reliable proof of
January 2005 (Article 1). Conscription could be age” at the point of signing the contract.
reintroduced if war was declared or if there was Despite this contract of “special voluntary
a serious international crisis and numbers in the recruitment” into the armed forces, Italy
services were insufficient.1 Law 226/2004 also maintained the position that such students
provided that the minimum age for voluntary were not part of the armed forces. The relevant
recruitment into the armed forces was 18, for a paragraphs in the Initial Report suggested some
fixed one-year or four-year contract.2 However, confusion between the concept of membership
the declaration made by the government at the of the armed forces and that of taking a direct
time of the ratification of the Optional Protocol, part in hostilities.11 The Initial Report did
which indicated 17 years as the voluntary not clarify when the three-year contract of
recruitment age, had neither been withdrawn nor voluntary recruitment would begin, and also
amended. failed to make it clear whether the students
Italy had not adopted legislation to prohibit would be considered military recruits during
and criminalize the recruitment or use in their education at the military school, or on
hostilities of children by armed groups distinct graduation.
from the state armed forces. The Military
Penal Code of War omitted the war crime of
conscripting or enlisting children under the Developments
age of 15 into armed forces or groups or using Children seeking asylum in Italy were routinely
them to participate actively in hostilities.3 In its detained, contrary to domestic law and
Concluding Observations on Italy’s Initial Report international human rights standards. Those
on the Optional Protocol, the UN Committee detained included former child soldiers.12 In its
on the Rights of the Child recommended Concluding Observations on Italy’s Initial Report,
that Italy introduce such legislation.4 The the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
Committee also expressed concern at the lack expressed regret about the lack of information
of definition of “take a direct part in hostilities” on specific reintegration programs or activities
in Italian legislation,5 and queried this issue for former child soldiers in Italy and the lack of
specifically during the dialogue with country systematic data collection on asylum seekers
representatives.6 under the age of 18 who were affected by armed
conflict. The Concluding Observations welcomed

the Italian government’s international and
bilateral technical co-operation activities and JAM A I C A
financial assistance aimed at preventing the
involvement of children in armed conflict and Jamaica
assisting the recovery of child victims of armed
conflict and of child combatants.13 Population: 2.7 million (992,000 under 18)
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Government armed forces: 2,830
Paris, Italy and 58 other states endorsed the Paris Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
Commitments to protect children from unlawful Voluntary recruitment age: 17 years and
recruitment or use by armed forces or armed 6 months (training only)
groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on Voting age: 18
��
children associated with armed forces or armed Optional Protocol: ratified 9 May 2002
protecting and assisting child soldiers and CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
UNICE. was 18 years. Younger recruits could enter
F—J
training at 17 years and 6 months with
1 Law 331/2000, Article 2.1(f ). parental consent.
2 Law 226/2004, Articles 4 and 11.
3 Amnesty International (AI), “Italy – Law reform Context
needed to implement the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court”, AI Index: EUR The police faced high levels of violence related to
30/009/2005, www.iccnow.org. drugs and arms trafficking and one of the highest
4 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, homicide rates in the world, while in turn being
Consideration of report submitted by Italy, responsible for hundreds of arbitrary killings,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ including extrajudicial executions.1
ITA/CO/1, 23 June 2006.
5 Ibid. Government
6 Committee on the Rights of the Child, 42nd
session, Summary Record – Italy, UN Doc. CRC/C/ National recruitment legislation and
SR.1125, 24 May 2006.
practice
7 Ministry of Defence and Military Schools, www.
esercito.difesa.it/ and www.difesa.it. According to Jamaica’s declaration on ratification
of the Optional Protocol, all service in the Jamaica
8 Initial report of Italy to the Committee on the
Defence Force (JDF) was voluntary. Recruits of 17
Rights of the Child on the implementation of the
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ITA/1,
�� years and 6 months could enlist in the JDF, but
14 July 2004. those under 18 required written parental consent,
and they could not graduate from training
9 Ibid.
institutions until the age of 18. Recruits over 18
10 Concluding observations, above note 4. served in the regular force or in the regular and
11 Initial report, above note 8. reserve forces under service contracts for periods
12 AI, “Italy: Invisible children – The human rights of up to 12 years. Under-18s could serve a longer
of migrant and asylum-seeking minors detained term, as their 12-year service began only when
upon arrival at the maritime border in Italy”, AI they reached the age of 18. Contracts could be
Index: EUR/30/001/2006, 23 February 2006. further renewed.2 Candidates for the reserve had
13 Concluding observations, above note 4. to be over 18.3
The 2004 Child Care and Protection Act
aimed to bring all child legislation in line with the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, but it did
not specifically prohibit the enlistment of under-
18s in the defence forces.4

A new Military Education Policy was being
developed to improve education and
performance standards in the armed forces.5
Around 560 boys and girls in secondary-
schools throughout Jamaica were members of
the Jamaica Combined Cadet Force, which was
affiliated to but not formally part of the armed

forces.6 Members received basic military training 9 UN Secretary-General, World Report on Violence
aimed at stimulating interest in a military career against Children, 20 November 2006, www.
and at showing how defence forces functioned. violencestudy.org.
The JDF took part in international training 10 Dowdney, above note 8.
exercises with the United Kingdom, Canada 11 UNICEF Jamaica, Violence, www.unicef.org.
and the USA and with countries in the Regional
Security System. It also provided training to the
forces of other Caribbean countries.7
Armed groups
Under-18s were reportedly among members of
armed gangs which developed in the context
of the political
��
patronage and political violence
that characterized electoral politics from the
1960s to the 1980s,��
and which were responsible
for gang and community violence.8 A quarter of
those arrested for violent crimes were school-age
children, mainly boys.9 The large number of guns
in inner-city areas appeared to be an important
factor in the recent upsurge of more informal
groups not connected to political patronage.
Boys of 16 or 17 were often considered “soldiers”
in gang warfare, and 14-year-olds acted as gun
carriers or lookouts.10
The government’s Violence Prevention
Alliance, launched in 2004, brought together
non-governmental, business, international
and intergovernmental agencies. The Xchange
movement, a regional initiative supported by
UNICEF to bring about positive change among
young people and adults, was launched in
Jamaica in May 2005. Other programs included
the training of community youth leaders and
outreach activities such as skills and mediation
training in communities severely affected by
violence.11
1 Latin American School of Social Sciences

(FLACSO), Security and Citizenship Program,
Latin American and the Caribbean Security Sector
Report, Country case study: Jamaica, October
2006, www.flacso.cl; Amnesty International
Report 2007.
2 1962 Defence Act, www.moj.gov.jm (laws of
Jamaica).
3 Jamaica Defence Force, Reserves, www.jdfmil.org.
4 UNICEF, Advancing Children’s Rights in Jamaica:
Report on Legislative Reform Initiative, November
2004, www.unicef.org.
5 Jamaica Defence Force, JDF members.
6 Jamaica Defence Force, JCCF, Cadet Force.
7 FLACSO, above note 1. (The Regional Security
System comprises Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines; see www.rss.org.bb.)
8 Luke Dowdney, Neither War nor Peace, Children
and Youth in Organized Armed Violence (COAV),
2005, www.coav.org.br.

Instructions for Assignment of Youth Cadets
J APAN stipulate that the Self-Defence Forces may
accept applications only from those who are
Japan 18 years old or over, except for attending its
educational institutions through the youth cadet
Population: 128.1 million (21.8 million under 18) programme”.5
Government armed forces: 240,400 There was no conscription.6 However,
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription emergency security legislation passed in 2002
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 calling for “people’s co-operation” in the event
Voting age: 20 of an emergency raised concerns that this could
Optional Protocol: ratified 2 August 2004 entail conscription.7
All three branches of the Self-Defence Forces
There were no reports of under-18s in the (ground, maritime and air) operated youth cadet
armed forces. Although 15-year-olds could programs for lower-secondary-school graduates.8
Cadets from the age of 15 received secondary-
become youth cadets, they were never school education, basic military training and
F—J
deployed. training to become technical specialists in the
armed forces. According to the government
they were not deployed on front lines and not
Context expected to engage in hostilities, even in the
Six hundred ground troops deployed by Japan event of an emergency.9 They were, however,
to Iraq in January 2004 were withdrawn in July considered to be adopted as members of the
2006. However, around 200 air force personnel Self-Defence Forces.10
continued to airlift personnel and cargo In addition, university-level military
between Iraq and Kuwait, with deployment to be academies existed, and about 1,700 cadets
reviewed in July 2008.1 This was the first foreign attended the National Defence Academy, where
deployment of Japanese troops since the end the emphasis was on academic education.
of the Second World War, apart from under the Cadets received further military training at officer
auspices of the UN, and it was criticized for being candidate schools after graduation.11
in potential breach of Article 9 of the constitution,
which defined Japan as pacifist.2
A nuclear test by North Korea in October 2006 Disarmament, demobilization
intensified public debate in Japan on whether and reintegration (DDR)
to revise the constitution towards taking a more
aggressive stance.3 In May 2007 the Japanese The Japanese government provided assistance
parliament passed legislation setting out the to demobilization and reintegration efforts in
procedures for a referendum on amending the a number of countries through the Japanese
constitution, while the government was working International Co-operation Agency (JICA).12
on draft amendments that were expected to move Projects included support to the demobilization
away from the pacifist approach.4 processes in Afghanistan and Cambodia, and
provision of skills training for demobilized
soldiers in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Eritrea,
Government Rwanda and Sudan. JICA’s programs were not
specifically directed at the DDR of under-18s, but
National recruitment legislation and in some situations children could be among those
practice to benefit.13
The 1947 constitution stated that the Japanese
people “forever renounce war as a sovereign Developments
right of the nation and the threat or use of force
as means of settling international disputes … At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,
land, sea and air forces, as well as other war Japan and 58 other states endorsed the Paris
potential, will never be maintained. The rights of Commitments to protect children from unlawful
belligerency of the state will not be recognized” recruitment or use by armed forces or armed
(Article 9). The Self-Defence Forces were groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on
established in 1954 to defend against invasion children associated with armed forces or armed
and to maintain the peace, independence and groups. The documents reaffirmed international
security of Japan. standards and operational principles for
In 2003 Japan reported to the UN Committee protecting and assisting child soldiers and
on the Rights of the Child that “Article 25 of followed a wide-ranging global consultation
the Enforcement Regulations of Law and the jointly sponsored by the French government and
UNICEF.

In August 2004 Japan ratified the Optional
Jordan
Protocol, stating in its declaration that “The
Government of Japan, by relevant laws and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
regulations, recruits only those who are at and Population: 5.7 million (2.5 million under 18)
above the minimum age of 18 as a member of the Government armed forces: 100,500
Japan Self-Defense Forces, with the exception
of the cases of the students solely receiving
educational training at the schools within the Voluntary recruitment age: 18
structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (… Voting age: 18
‘Youth Cadets’), which come under ‘schools’ Optional Protocol: ratified 23 May 2007
stipulated in Article 3, paragraph 5 of the Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Optional Protocol”. The declaration further stated CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
that the minimum age of recruitment of the
Youth Cadets was 15 years, and set out a number The presence of some under-18s continued
of safeguards designed to ensure that the to be noted in the armed forces, but they
recruitment of the Youth Cadets was not forced were reportedly not deployed. There
or coerced. These included the requirement of
consent from a parent or guardian, documentary were no reports of armed political groups
proof of age for being at or over 15 years, recruiting children.
and confirmation that a candidate was fully
informed in advance of the duties involved.14
Although more than two years had passed since
Government
ratification, Japan had yet to submit its initial National recruitment legislation and
report on the Optional Protocol.15
Japan acceded to Additional Protocols I and practice
II to the Geneva Conventions in August 2004 and The government decided in 2007 to reintroduce
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal conscription, which had been suspended in
Court in July 2007. 1999. Those first affected by the change were
males aged over 18 and born after 1989, who
1 “Japan will extend Iraq deployment till July 2008, would serve for a period of up to two years.1
Shiozaki says”, Bloomberg News, 10 July 2007, Conscription would be extended to females when
www.bloomberg.com. the necessary trainers were available; young
2 “Japan’s Iraq troops arrive home”, BBC News, 20 women would serve in universities and schools
July 2007. rather than in military facilities.2 The government
3 Amnesty International Report 2007. said that the aim of reintroducing universal
conscription was to instil a sense of national
4 “Japan approves constitution steps”, BBC News,
pride and discipline in the country’s youth and
14 May 2007.
provide training to help them find employment.3
5 Second periodic report of Japan to the UN The revised conscription law was to rule out
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. waivers for only sons or those who had brothers
CRC/C/104/Add.2, 24 July 2003.
killed in service,4 but they would be available
6 Ibid. for health reasons; deferrals were available
7 “Emergency legislation may allow for for students.5 In a separate move, the age for
conscription”, Japan Today, 3 May 2002, www. voluntary recruitment was raised to 18.6
japantoday.com.
8 Global Security, “Japan Ground Self Defence Military training and military schools
Force, Nihon Rikujyo Jieita”, 2000, www. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) ran 21
globalsecurity.org. institutions for military training, including the
9 Initial report of Japan to the Committee on the Royal Jordanian Military College in Amman.7
Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.1, 5 In 2007 the JAF set up a non-profit company
August 1996. in co-ordination with the Ministry of Labour to
10 Letter to Child Soldiers Coalition from Embassy of train unemployed youth to fill vacancies in the
Japan, London, 25 February 2004. construction sector and elsewhere. This followed
11 National Defence Academy, www.nda.ac.jp. previous involvement in vocational training for
12 Coalition correspondence with JICA, June 2007. over-16s.8 In its first phase, the Jordan Company
13 Ibid. for Training and Recruitment (JCTR) would run
a six-week military training program followed
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. by vocational and on-the-job-training for 4,000
Jordanians between the ages of 18 and 35.9
15 UN Treaty Bodies Database, http://tb.ohchr.org.
Trainees would receive a wage of 190–300 dinars

(approximately US$269–424), and social and administrative measures on such issues as
medical security benefits.10 recruitment age.22
Jordan’s National Plan of Action for Children,
Child recruitment and deployment to run from 2004 to 2013, also mentioned the
In its third periodic report to the UN Committee need for protection of children in armed conflict.
on the Rights of the Child, considered in March It aimed to provide training in this regard for
2006, Jordan stated that its armed forces those working in the field of child rights.23
employed 21 individuals under the age of 18, In July 2007 Jordan hosted the 27th
all of whom were 17; this number comprised 17 International Arab Children Congress (ACC) on
serving in the military sector and four in the civil the subject of security and development, which
service sector. No under-18s could take part in included workshops on the impact of war and
military operations.11 violence on children.24
In correspondence with the Child Soldiers
Coalition, the government stated on 19 October International standards
2007 that “Recruitment of persons under the The government ratified the Optional Protocol in
age of 18 is suspended concerning military May 2007, five years after signing it.25 Jordan’s
purposes and is only limited to vocational tasks declaration was not yet available.
… All members of the armed forces who are
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participating in peace operations are over 23 * Titles of non-English language sources have been
years old.”12 translated by the Coalition.
The Compulsory Military Service Act No. 23 of 1 “18-year-olds to do three months’ military
1986 put the minimum age limit at 18; this would service”, Jordan Times, 15 March 2007. The exact
be retained in the 2007 amendments.13 However, timeframe was to be set by the cabinet, on the
the issue of child recruitment was not mentioned basis of advice from the designated minister and
in Jordan’s draft Children’s Act of 2004, which the head of the joint forces. Nifin Abd al-Hadi,
in 2007 was still awaiting parliamentary “Service length fixed by cabinet”, Ad-Dustour,
approval.14 The Act was intended to implement June 2007.
the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of 2 Mu’adh Furaihat, “Deputies agree flag law”,
the Child.15 Ammannet, 10 June 2007.
3 Mohammad Ben Hussein, “Conscription law
Armed groups amendment approved”, Jordan Times, 19 April
2007.
A number of Palestinian political armed groups 4 Jihad al-Munsi, “Draft flat law cancels
were represented in Jordan, including the Fatah- exceptions”, al-Ghad, 18 March 2007.
affiliated Badr Brigade, which was under the
5 E-mail contact with the National Centre for
control of the JAF.16 There were no reports that Human Rights, 9 October 2007.
they recruited or trained under-18s.
6 Third periodic report of Jordan to the UN
Developments CRC/C/JOR/3, 2 March 2006.
There were 750,000 refugees from the Iraq 7 Jordanian Armed Forces website, www.jaf.mil.jo.
conflict in Jordan, of whom the UN estimated that 8 Third periodic report, above note 6.
some 250,000 were of school age.17 Of these, 9 Harun al-Khitab, “Civilian requests welcomed in
40,000 were expected to enter the Jordanian Maan for training in the armed forces”, al-Rai, 1
school system in 2007.18 There were no reports October 2007, www.alrai.com.
of the involvement of under-18s in cross-border 10 Khaled Neimat, “Army-run recruitment company
insurgency in Iraq. Care International was running launched”, Jordan Times, 6 September 2007.
counselling programs for Iraqi refugees affected 11 Third periodic report, above note 6.
by the conflict in Iraq, including children, with 12 Correspondence with Jordan mission to Geneva,
funding from the UN refugee agency UNHCR.19 19 October 2007.
Jordan made efforts to promote awareness 13 Mustafa al-Riyalat, “Representatives agree flag
of human rights and international humanitarian and reserve law”, ad-Dustour, April 2007.
law (IHL) in its security forces, including through
14 Contact with National Centre for Human Rights,
training programs run for the Police Academy
above note 5.
and members of the armed forces by the National
Centre for Human Rights and Mizan.20 IHL was 15 “Parliament Approves CRC”, ad-Dustour, 26
also integrated into military training in January August 2006.
2006.21 The Jordan Institute of Diplomacy’s 16 David Eshel, “The Jordanian Badr Brigade – can it
Regional Human Security Centre organized a save Abu Mazen’s West Bank?”, Defense Update,
number of meetings on child soldiers, which 2 October 2007, www.defense-update.com.
resulted in recommendations for legal and 17 Linda Hindi, “US pledges $30 million to support
Iraqis’ host countries”, Jordan Times, 29 August
2007.

18 “Iraqi children join Jordanian peers at school”,
Jordan Times, 23 August 2007. K A Z A K H STA N
19 Linda Hindi, “Helping cure deep war wounds”,
Jordan Times, 29 August 2007. Republic of Kazakhstan
20 Third periodic report, above note 6.
21 International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual
Report, 2006, www.icrc.org.
22 Third periodic report, above note 6.
Voluntary recruitment age: 19 (16 as military
23 UNICEF, Jordanian National Plan of Action, www.
unicef.org. academy students)
24 Hani Hazaimeh, “Children’s congress to focus on
Voting age: 18
security, development”, Jordan Times, 26 June Optional Protocol: ratified 10 April 2003
2007. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
25 Ratifications, www2.ohchr.org. CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
There were no reports of under-18s in

the armed forces. Children could attend
military schools from the age of 11.
Secondary-school students received
weapons training at 16 or 17.
Context
In November 2004 security forces announced
the arrests of 17 people, including four from
Uzbekistan, in connection with explosions and
attacks in Uzbekistan earlier in the year. All were
described as members of a previously unknown
organization, the Mujahedin of Central Asia,1
which was alleged by the Kazakh authorities
to be linked to the armed opposition group the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (see
Uzbekistan entry) and al-Qaeda.2 The Uzbeks
among them were reportedly returned to
Uzbekistan.3 Others were reported to have been
sentenced in Kazakhstan in January 2006 to
prison terms of between eight and 25 years.4
Kazakhstan was a member of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), established in
June 2001, comprising also China, Kyrgyzstan, the
Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,
whose goals included mutual co-operation in
security matters.5
Government
practice
Following moves to convert the armed forces
to a non-conscript basis, by January 2007 only
15 to 20 per cent of the army was made up of
conscripts.6 The reduction in the length of military
service and transition towards a non-conscript
military was said to have reduced hazing – the
systematic abuse and humiliation of new recruits
by longer-serving or senior soldiers. However, a
significant number of hazing incidents continued
to be reported.7
A new Military Obligation and Military Service
Act of 8 July 2005 retained 18 as the minimum

age for compulsory military service (Article 23), Asia or the IMU. Pakistani military sources in
while reducing the length of standard military 2004 claimed that armed groups operating in
service from 24 to 12 months.8 The government Pakistan were increasingly recruiting teenagers
told the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child from Central Asia, but these claims were disputed
there was no provision for reducing the age of and could not be confirmed.19
conscription in a state of emergency or armed The recruitment, training, financing or other
conflict, and that there had been no cases of material support for mercenaries was prohibited
children being recruited into military service since under the criminal code (Article 162) and
the Optional Protocol came into force.9 punishable by 7–15 years’ imprisonment where
According to Kazakhstan’s declaration on minors were involved. The government told the
ratifying the Optional Protocol in 2003, the Committee on the Rights of the Child that there
minimum age for voluntary recruitment was 19.10 was no problem of minors in Kazakhstan being
The 2002 Children’s Rights Act prohibited recruited for involvement in armed activities.20
enlisting children “for participation in military
actions or armed conflicts, or to create children’s
military units”.11
Developments
In January 2006 the Ministry of Education and
Military training and military schools Science established a Committee on Protection of
Military preparation classes were available for Children’s Rights with responsibility for ensuring
senior school students, whose studies included compliance with the Convention on the Rights of
human rights and human rights law. From the the Child and the Optional Protocol.21
ages of 16 or 17 students received training in In September 2006 the Committee on the
the use of airguns, rifles and Kalashnikovs.12 If Rights of the Child noted with concern that there
martial law was declared, boys from the age of was no specific provision in law criminalizing the
16 and girls from 18 were required to undertake recruitment of children below the age of 18. The
military training, including in the use of firearms Committee called on the government to explicitly
and grenades.13 prohibit by law the recruitment of under-15s into
Boys from the age of 11 could enrol in the armed forces or armed groups and their direct
Zhas Ulan national military school, and from the participation in hostilities, and to establish
age of 15 or 16 in the national military boarding extraterritorial jurisdiction for these crimes when
K—O
schools. In 2005–6 about 4,000 children were committed by or against a person who was a
studying in military schools, from where about citizen of or had other links with Kazakhstan.22
65 per cent of students went on to become army
officers. Pupils entered voluntarily and with their 1 This group is known by a number of other
parents’ consent. By law the pupils could not names, including Islamic Jihad Group, the Islamic
participate in armed conflict or other military Jihad Union, and the Jamaat of Central Asia
activities.14 Mujahadins.
The Zhas Ulan military school offered the 2 Amnesty International Report 2005.
standard school curriculum as well as weapons 3 Information from Amnesty International (AI).
handling and physical training. Priority in 4 Marat Yermukanov, “Kazakhstan exacerbates
selection was given to orphans, children in care ‘religious threat’ by maneuvering between
and children from large and poor families and Beijing and Washington”, Jamestown Foundation
families of soldiers.15 The Cadet Corps took Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9 May 2006, www.
boarding students for three-year courses from jamestown.org.
the age of 15–16, after which they became low-
5 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www.
ranking officers. Cadet Corps students at the age sectsco.org.
of 18 committed themselves to five years’ military
service after graduation.16 Those who did not sign 6 Viktor Litovkin, “Kazakhstan wants to build
its army in accordance with the best foreign
up were liable for the cost of their education and
template”, Voenno-Promyshlenniy Curer, 17–23
to conscription.17 January 2007, www.vpk-news.ru.
Young people were eligible to enter military
academies from the year they turned 17. Students 7 For example, see US Department of State,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006.
were considered to be carrying out military duties
in accordance with the rules on carrying out 8 Military Obligation and Military Service Act, No.
military service. They could sign contracts for 74-III, 8 July 2005, at http://ru.government.kz.
military service on reaching the age of 18, but not 9 Written replies by the Government of Kazakhstan
before completing one year of studies.18 to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/KAZ/Q/1/Add.1, 21 August
2006.
Armed groups 10 Declaration on accession to the Optional
It was not known if under-18s from Kazakhstan Protocol, www2.ohchr.org/; Military Service on
were recruited to either the Mujahedin of Central Contract Basis Act, No. 167-II 3PK, 20 March 2001,
Article 17(1).

11 Initial report of Kazakhstan to the Committee on
the Rights of the Child on implementation of the KENYA
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/KAZ/1,
21 November 2005. Republic of Kenya
12 Written replies, above note 9.
13 Government Decree of 11 May 2006 in accordance Population: 34.4 million (17.2 million under 18)
with the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 8 Government armed forces: 24,120
July 2005 “On Military Obligation and Military Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
Service” (Article 41), at www.mod.kz. Voluntary recruitment age: 18, younger with
14 Written replies, above note 9; Statement of parental consent
Kazakhstan to the Committee on the Rights of Voting age: 18
the Child, 43rd session, 11 September 2006. Optional Protocol: ratified 28 January 2002
(Kazakhstan’s report to the Committee indicated
that children could enrol in the Zhas Ulan school Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
from the age of 11; the written replies, however, CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
gave the age of enrolment as 12–13.)
15 Government of Kazakhstan, Admission Rules for
No children were reported to be serving in
the Republican “Zhas Ulan” school, undated, at the armed forces. Children were members
http://ru.government.kz. of or implicated in the activities of gangs
16 Ministry of Defence, “Republican school ‘Zhas involved in criminal violence.
Ulan’ named”, and “The Cadet Corps of the
Ministry of Defense”, www.mod.kz .
17 Military Obligation and Military Service Act, Context
above note 8, Article 31. Hundreds of people died during periodic
18 Ibid. outbreaks of inter communal violence, often
19 See, for example, “Tale of a lost militant”, over livestock and grazing land. Long-standing
Reuters, 15 December 2004; “Qaeda using disputes over land in the Mount Elgon district of
children for terrorism”, Daily Times (Pakistan), 26 western Kenya led to violent clashes in December
November 2004, both at www.dailytimes.com.pk 2006 and continuing violence during 2007. In
(for more detail see Tajikistan entry). June 2007 it was reported that the violence had
20 Initial report, above note 11; Statement, above resulted in the displacement of an estimated
note 14. 60,000 people and the deaths of at least 200.
21 Kazakhstan NGOs’ Working Group on Protection This included some 36 people, mostly children,
of Children’s Rights, Explanatory Note to who died of malnutrition.1
the Report on Activities Undertaken by the
Republic of Kazakhstan in the Framework of
Implementation of the Provisions of the Optional Government
Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child Concerning the Children’s Participation National recruitment legislation and
in the Armed Conflicts, 2006, at www.crin.org. practice
22 Committee on the Rights of the Child, The Children’s Act stated that “No child shall
Consideration of report submitted by Kazakhstan take part in hostilities or be recruited in armed
on implementation of the Optional Protocol, conflict, and where armed conflict occurs, respect
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ for and protection and care of children shall be
KAZ/CO/1, 29 September 2006.
maintained in accordance with the law”, and that
it was the government’s responsibility “to provide
protection, rehabilitation care, recovery and
re-integration into normal social life of any child
who may become a victim of armed conflict”.2
In its declaration on the Optional Protocol, the
government stated that “the minimum age for
recruitment of persons into the armed forces
is by law set at eighteen years. Recruitment is
entirely and genuinely voluntary and is carried
out with the full informed consent of the persons
being recruited. There is no conscription in
Kenya.”3 However, the Armed Forces Act, Chapter
199, allowed for the enlistment of under-18s with
the consent of parents, guardians or the district
commissioner.4
Recruits had to be in possession of a national
identity card, issued only when a citizen was 18,

and able to produce a birth certificate.5 Recruits 3 Declarations and reservations to the Optional
also had to be able to show their school-leaving Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
certificates.6 Although there were no reports of 4 Second periodic report of Kenya, above note 2.
under-18s serving in the armed forces, the lack of 5 Information provided by Rädda Barnen (Save the
an effective system for registering births meant Children – Sweden), March 2004.
that there was a risk of under-age recruitment.7 6 Information provided by the High Commission of
the Republic of Kenya, July 2007.
Armed groups 7 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Consideration of report submitted by Kenya,
Children were known to be involved in the Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/KEN/
activities of armed criminal gangs, including CO/2, 2 February 2007.
transporting weapons.8 Members of the banned
8 Second periodic report of Kenya, above note 2.
Mungiki gang were reportedly responsible for a
range of criminal activities including extortion 9 Amnesty International, “Kenya: Police operations
against Mungiki must comply with Kenya’s
and killings. In June 2007 police killed more
obligations under international human rights
than 30 people in the settlement of Mathare
law”, AI Index AFR 32/008/2007, 11 June 2007.
during operations against gang members.
The operations followed a number of killings 10 “Banned Kenya gang leader caught”, BBC News,
23 August 2007.
attributed to Mungiki members. The gang had a
history of involvement in political violence and 11 Concluding Observations, above note 7.
in 2007 two former and two current members of 12 UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2006 (provisional),
parliament were arrested and questioned over http://www.unhcr.org.
their alleged links to the group.9 An alleged gang 13 UNHCR, “Kenya: Malnutrition levels in refugee
leader was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment camps cause alarm”, briefing note, 3 July 2007.
in June 2007, and another was arrested in August 14 ��
Refugee International, “Kenya denying asylum to
2007, reportedly as a move to limit the gang’s Somali refugees”, January 2007, www.refintl.org.
��
activities ahead of the elections to be held in 15 IRIN, “Kenya–Somalia: Which way out of the
December 2007.10 camps for Somalia’s young refugees?”, in Youth
in Crisis: Coming of Age in the 21st Century,
Developments February 2007, www.irinnews.org.
K—O
16 UNHCR Global Appeal 2008–2009, Kenya.
In 2007 the UN Committee on the Rights of the 17 International Criminal Court, states parties, www.
Child recommended that Kenya implement an icc-cpi.int.
efficient birth registration system, including by
providing free birth registration and registering
those individuals who had not been registered
at birth.11
As of the end of 2006, Kenya hosted a
refugee population of over 270,000, mainly from
Somalia.12 The Dadaab group of camps in eastern
Kenya held around 175,000 refugees, including
some 35,000 children under the age of five.13
In January 2007 Kenya forcibly returned about
400 Somali asylum seekers to Somalia.14 Given
the unstable situation in Somalia, humanitarian
workers were concerned that refugee children
could be at risk of being recruited by warring
parties there.15 The UN refugee agency (UNHCR),
in its planning figures for 2008–9 indicated
that there would be over 277,000 refugees and
asylum seekers in Kenya, most from Somalia.16
Kenya ratified the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court on 15 March 2005.17
1 Kenya Red Cross Society, “Kenya: Mount Elgon

Clashes”, 8 June 2007.
2 Second periodic report of Kenya to the UN
CRC/C/KEN/2, 4 July 2006.

armed forces was 16 – the age of graduating from
KOREA, Democratic senior middle school – but in practice volunteers
took an oath to respect the military code of
People’s Republic of conduct and began their regular military service
only at the age of 17 after pre-service military
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea education that lasted for six months or more, on
a selective basis. The report went on to state that
Population: 22.5 million (6.8 million under 18) those selected were educated in full-time military
Government armed forces: 1.1 million or technical educational institutes for one to two
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (unclear) years before being posted to units as servicemen
Voluntary recruitment age: 16 or 17 (unclear) on active duty. It emphasized that enlistment
was on a voluntary basis and that there was no
Voting age: 17
system of forced conscription.3
Optional Protocol: not signed Other reports claimed that there was
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): widespread conscription. According to one
CRC, GC AP I source all men between the ages of 18 and 24
were liable for military service. Women were
Both the conscription and voluntary not liable for regular military service, but had
recruitment ages were unclear, although to undergo annual and other military training
information indicated that the minimum until they were 40.4 Another source gave the
voluntary age for enlistment was 17. It conscription age as 20–25, followed by part-time
compulsory service in the Worker-Peasant Red
was not known whether under-18s were Guards until the age of 60.5
serving in the armed forces. Children were Elsewhere it was claimed that ten years’
reportedly subjected to military training service was mandatory for all conscripts and
and indoctrination in school from a young enlisted personnel, according to a directive
issued by head of state Kim Jong-Il in April 1993,
age. the system being revised in October 1996 to
require service until the age of 30 for men and
Context 26 for women. The source claimed that due
to a decrease in the number of volunteers for
Although there was currently no armed conflict work involving heavy labour, the government
in North Korea, no peace treaty had been signed had introduced “labour service”, whereby an
with South Korea and the two states technically individual could be exempted from military
remained at war. service in return for six to seven years’ labour.6
In October 2007 the leaders of North and Another source stated that all able-bodied men
South Korea agreed moves towards formally who did not go to college were conscripted into
declaring an end to the war, although a full peace the military and that some were conscripted
treaty is not expected for years.1 The government immediately after middle school, making them
pledged to disable all nuclear facilities by the end 17 or 18 years old. According to the same source,
of 2007 in return for multilateral economic aid.2 the duration of service depended on supply and
demand and if the authorities determined there
Government were insufficient new conscripts those who had
already completed their terms were required to
National recruitment legislation and stay on.7
practice A reserve military training unit, of men
aged 17–45 and unmarried women aged 17–30,
The 1972 constitution, amended in 1992 and consisted of approximately 1.7 million personnel.
1998, states that “the Democratic People’s Together with members of the Worker-Peasant
Republic of Korea rests on the people’s Red Guards and Young Red Guards, the total
nationwide defence system” (Article 58); that the number of available reserve personnel was
state would implement a system of “self-reliant estimated at 7 million.8
defence”, which would involve arming the “entire
people”, as well as training and modernizing the Military training and military schools
army “on the basis of equipping the army and the
According to North Korean media, Kim Jong-
people politically and ideologically” (Article 60);
Il frequently told officials that ideological
and that “National defence is the supreme duty
education, with its emphasis on a “military first”
and honour of citizens. Citizens shall defend the
policy, had to take precedence over academic
country and serve in the army as required by law”
education in the nation’s schools. Foreign visitors
(Article 86).
and academic sources reported that from an early
In 2003 the government reported to the UN
age children were subjected to several hours a
Committee on the Rights of the Child that the
legal minimum age for voluntary enlistment in the

week of mandatory military training and political 3 Second periodic report of the Democratic
indoctrination at their schools.9 People’s Republic of Korea to UN Committee
According to one source, 1.2 million male and on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/65/
female secondary-school students aged 14–16 Add.24, 5 November 2003.
received mandatory military training as members 4 B. Horeman and M. Stolwijk, Refusing to Bear
of the Young Red Guards, including a weekly Arms: A World Survey of Conscription and
four-hour drill session and an annual total of 160 Conscientious Objection to Military Service,
hours of on-campus drills and 450 hours of off- London, War Resisters International, 1998, www.
campus training.10 wri-irg.org.
In 2003, in response to a question on military 5 Library of Congress – Federal Research Division,
training of children by the UN Committee on Country Profile: North Korea, May 2005, http://
Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, the lcweb2.loc.gov/ .
government responded that students in their 6 Republic of Korea National Intelligence Service,
final year of secondary-school had one week’s North Korea Military Conscription, http://ftp.fas.
military camping in the summer, but emphasized org.
that “this is not a military training”, although the 7 Confidential sources, 2007.
students learned how to dismantle and assemble 8 Republic of Korea National Intelligence Service,
a weapon and to shoot. It was not known whether North Korea Military Reserves, http://ftp.fas.org.
such training continued.11 9 US Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices 2005, March 2006, www.
Child recruitment and deployment state.gov/ .
No information was available on how many 10 North Korea Military Reserves, above note 8.
children were recruited annually into the armed 11 Replies by the Government of the Democratic
forces, or how many were currently serving in the People’s Republic of Korea to the list of issues
ranks. (E/C.12/Q/Dprk/1) to be taken up in connection
with the consideration of the second periodic
Armed groups reports of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea concerning the rights referred to in Articles
The Worker-Peasant Red Guard reportedly 1–15 of the International Covenant on Economic,
consisted of a combination of older men aged Social and Cultural Rights (E/1990/6/Add .35),
K—O
45–60, along with those males aged 17–45 and HR/CESCR/NONE/2003/1, 10–28 November
unmarried females aged 17–30 who were not 2003.
included in the Reserve Military Training Unit. 12 North Korea Military Reserves, above note 8.
They trained for a total of 30 days a year, and 13 Library of Congress Country Profile, above note 5.
one source estimated their total numbers at 4.1 14 Concluding observations of the Committee on the
million.12 There were also around 189,000 other Rights of the Child, Democratic People’s Republic
paramilitary security troops, including border of Korea, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.239, 4 June
guards and public safety personnel.13 2004.
15 Human Rights Watch, 2005 World Report, North
Developments Korea.
Among the recommendations made by the UN

Committee on the Rights of the Child in its 2004
consideration of North Korea’s second periodic
report were that North Korea should ratify the
Optional Protocol, take all necessary measures
to avoid the early militarization of children and
increase the age of majority from 17 to 18, to
ensure the full protection of all persons under the
age of 18.14
A three-member delegation of the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child was allowed
unprecedented access to the country in April
2004, when they highlighted mistreatment
of children returned from China, economic
exploitation, trafficking and torture.15
1 “North, South Korea pledge peace, prosperity”,

Reuters, 4 October 2007; “Peace Treaty Feasible
in 5 Years”, Korea Times, 24 October 2007.
2 “North Koreans Agree to Disable Nuclear
Facilities”, New York Times, 3 October 2007.

The Military Service Act also stipulated that
KO REA, Republic of special measures could be taken in exceptional
cases, such as during wartime or emergencies, or
Republic of Korea in the event that an order of military mobilization
was issued (Article 83). However, there was no
Population: 47.8 million (10.8 million under 18) provision that allowed for an exception to adjust
Government armed forces: 687,000 the enlistment age to below 18.5
Compulsory recruitment age: 19 The military planned to reduce troop levels
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 from 680,000 to 500,000 by 2020, and to cut
Voting age: 191 the compulsory service period in stages by six
Optional Protocol: ratified 24 September 2004 months.6
There were several military schools, including
The minimum voluntary recruitment age the Military Academy, the Third Military Academy,
was raised from 17 to 18. the Naval Academy and the Air Force Academy.
In its initial report on the Optional Protocol,
the government noted that under the Act on
Context Establishment of Military Academies and the Act
on Establishment of Nursing Military Academies,
Although there was currently no armed conflict persons admitted into a military academy must
in South Korea, no peace treaty had been be older than 17 and younger than 21. To be
signed with North Korea and the two states admitted into the Korea Third Military Academy,
technically remained at war. In June 2007 South persons must be 19 or older.7
Korea announced that it would resume food In January 2005 an army captain was arrested
aid shipments to North Korea, which had been and an investigation launched into all 36 initial
suspended following a nuclear test conducted by training camps, following reports of brutality
North Korea in October 2006.2 In October 2007 against conscripts at a camp in Nonsan.8
the leaders of South and North Korea agreed
moves towards formally declaring an end to the
war, although a full peace treaty is not expected Disarmament, demobilization,
for years.3
Government In its initial report on the Optional Protocol, the
government noted that it had been “voluntarily
National recruitment legislation and contributing funds worth USD 2.1m annually
to a variety of projects aimed at preventing
practice the involvement of children in armed conflict,
The 1987 constitution states that “All citizens including a UNICEF project to protect children in
have the duty of national defence under the areas beset by armed hostilities such as those
conditions as prescribed by law. No citizen in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Democratic Republic
may be treated unfavourably on account of the of Congo”. The government reported that it
fulfilment of his obligation of military service” had also pursued bilateral-level action with the
(Article 39). intention of preventing children’s involvement
In its initial report in 2007 to the UN in armed conflict, including a US$2.3 million
Committee on the Rights of the Child on the project contribution towards building schools,
Optional Protocol, the government stated that purchasing computers for classes and providing
the Military Service Act, which provided the basis vitamins to students at elementary, middle
for both compulsory and voluntary recruitment, and high schools in the Occupied Palestinian
had been amended in December 2004 to adjust Territory.9
the minimum age for voluntary enlistment from
17 to 18. With regard to conscription, the Act International standards
stated that every male would be enlisted into the In September 2004 South Korea ratified the
first militia service when he attained 18 years of Optional Protocol, stating in its declaration that
age, would undergo the conscription examination “In accordance with paragraph 2, Article 3 of the
in the year that he attained 19, and would be aforementioned Protocol, the Government of the
enlisted into active service at the age of 19 or 20 Republic of Korea declares that the minimum age
(Articles 8, 9 and 16). Air Force Regulation 15-1 for voluntary recruitment into the Korean national
(provision on the operation of wartime education) armed forces is 18 years.”10 In April 2007 South
was amended in April 2005 to delete a provision Korea submitted its initial report on the Optional
requiring that trainees at the Air Force Aerial Protocol, which was scheduled for consideration
Science High School be made to perform wartime
duties, even if aged under 18.4

by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its
May–June 2008 session. KUW A I T
1 National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, State of Kuwait
“Parliamentary committee passes amendment
proposal to lower voting age”, 5 March 2007, Population: 2.7 million (764,000 under 18)
http://korea.assembly.go.kr. Government armed forces: 15,500
2 “Analysis: Seoul encouraged by N. Korea Compulsory recruitment age: 18
progress”, World Peace Herald, 14 June 2007. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
3 “North, South Korea pledge peace, prosperity”, Voting age: 21
Reuters, 4 October 2007; “Peace Treaty Feasible Optional Protocol: acceded 26 August 2004
in 5 Years”, Korea Times, 24 October 2007. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
4 Initial report of South Korea to the UN Committee CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
on the Rights of the Child on implementation of
the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ There were no reports of under-18s in the
KOR/1, April 2007. armed forces.
5 Ibid.
6 “Stricter rules on substitute service planned”,
Korea Times, 31 May 2007. Government
7 Initial Report of South Korea, above note 4.
8 “Army captain arrested after forcing trainees to
eat feces”, Korea Times, 21 January 2005. practice
9 Initial Report of South Korea, above note 4. According to the government’s initial report to the
10 Declaration of South Korea on ratification of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on the
Optional Protocol, 24 September 2004, www2. Optional Protocol, Article 3 of the Army Act No. 32
ohchr.org. of 1967 stipulated that, in order to be accepted as
an army officer, a candidate had to have reached
21 years of age. Under Article 40 of the same
Act, concerning non-commissioned officers and
K—O
regular soldiers, a volunteer for military service
had to be over 18 and under 26.1
Articles 37 and 40 of Act No. 32 of 1967
stipulated that anyone who wished to volunteer
for service had to be over 18. Article 37 provided
that anyone who volunteered for service as a
member of the police or as a non-commissioned
officer of the National Guard had to be over 20.2
Compulsory military service was regulated
by the Compulsory Reserve Military Service Act
No. 102 of 1980, which stated that “Compulsory
military service is a duty required of every
Kuwaiti of over 18 and under 30 years of age. It
is a national duty dictated by the requirements
of national unity and maintenance of national
sovereignty. Single women of over 18 and under
30 years of age may be called for compulsory
military service, pursuant to a decree, provided
that their duties are compatible with their natural
capacities.” However, Kuwait’s initial report on
the Optional Protocol stated that conscription
had been suspended in 2001 by the annulment
of the 1980 Act because of difficulties with its
implementation, temporarily exempting Kuwaitis
from military service for a non-specified period
of time.3
Developments
In its concluding observations, the UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child recommended
that Kuwait ensure that the recruitment and
involvement of children in hostilities was

explicitly criminalized in legislation and establish
extraterritorial jurisdiction for crimes regarding KYRGYZ STA N
the recruitment and involvement of children
in hostilities when committed by or against a Kyrgyz Republic
person who was a citizen or had other links to
Kuwait.4 Population: 5.3 million (2.0 million under 18)
International standards Compulsory recruitment age: 18
Kuwait acceded to the Optional Protocol in Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (men – but see
August 2004. Its declaration on acceding stated text); 19 (women); 16 (as cadets)
that “The Government of the State of Kuwait is Voting age: 18
committed to maintaining the minimum age for Optional Protocol: acceded 13 August 2003
voluntary service in the Kuwaiti armed forces Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
at 18 years of age, and to prohibiting the forced CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
conscription of any persons under 18.”5
1 Initial report of Kuwait to the UN Committee on armed forces but cadets as young as 16
the Rights of the Child on the implementation
of the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ were considered by law to be national
KWT/1, 24 April 2007. servicemen.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. Context
Consideration of report submitted by Kuwait on In May 2005 hundreds of refugees fled from
the implementation of the Optional Protocol, Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan after the killing of
Concluding observations, unedited version, UN hundreds of mainly peaceful demonstrators
Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/KWT/CO/1, 1 February 2008. in Andijon. Uzbekistan accused Kyrgyzstan of
5 Declaration on accession to the Optional hosting a training camp for an alleged armed
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. group named Akramia which it claimed was
involved in the Andijan events (see Uzbekistan
entry). 1 In May 2006 armed men, allegedly linked
to the armed opposition group Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU) (see Uzbekistan entry),
raided a Tajik-Kyrgyz frontier post; several of the
attackers and Tajik and Kyrgyz security forces
were killed in the ensuing fighting.2 In July five
alleged IMU members were killed in counter-
terrorism operations and in August the security
forces shot and killed two other IMU members
accused of involvement in the May attacks,
together with an imam initially accused of being
an IMU member but whom the authorities later
claimed was being used as a human shield.3
Kyrgyzstan was a member of the Shanghai
June 2001, comprising also China, Kazakhstan,
the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, whose goals included mutual co-
operation in security matters.4
Government
practice
The 1992 Compulsory Military Service Act, as
amended in July 2005, provided for universal
male conscription at 18. Military service was
for one year, and alternative service for two.5
The government stated that there were no
laws allowing any reduction in the age of
conscription.6

Men could enlist voluntarily after military or recruiting teenagers from Central Asia, but
alternative service, or after completing reserve these claims were disputed and could not be
officer training at a higher educational institution. confirmed.19
Women could join the army voluntarily from the The recruitment, training, financing or other
age of 19. 7 material assisting of child soldiers, or the use
Boys could enter the Higher Military Academy of child soldiers in armed conflicts or hostilities,
at the age of 16–17, and were by law national was a criminal offence.20 No prosecutions
servicemen (cadets).8 Kyrgyzstan’s declaration on were known to have been brought under this
accession to the Optional Protocol in 2003 stated provision. The Committee on the Rights of the
that the minimum age for recruitment of male Child expressed concern that there was no legal
citizens to active service was 18.9 Subsequently provision for extraterritorial jurisdiction in case
the government stated to the UN Committee on of recruitment abroad of Kyrgyz children or other
the Rights of the Child that first-year cadets were children by a Kyrgyz national or a person with
not allowed to take part in military operations, other links to Kyrgyzstan, and recommended that
and that in practice under-18s were thus excluded Kyrgyzstan establish extraterritorial jurisdiction in
from conflict, although it indicated that certain these matters.21
first-year cadets could be an exception to this
rule.10 Developments
Military training and military schools In June 2006 a new Children’s Code was adopted
All school pupils in grades ten and 11 (aged by parliament.22 Article 27(2) of the Code
15–16) took weekly classes in pre-conscription specified that extra state benefits would be
preparation. In grade 11, boys had three days’ available for children in zones of conflict or who
training in weapons handling and girls had first- had been forcibly displaced, but it did not contain
aid classes.11 any provision prohibiting the use of children as
Two military educational institutions accepted soldiers.
boys under 18 who had completed their ninth In May 2007 the Committee on the Rights
grade. In 2003–5 two 13-year-olds were enrolled of the Child examined the initial report of
at the Dair Asanov Kyrgyz State Military High Kyrgyzstan on implementation of the Optional
School. In 2005–6, 556 students were aged Protocol. In addition to its recommendations
K—O
14–17.12 The school was transferred from the for establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction
control of the Ministry of Education to the on child recruitment, the Committee raised
Ministry of Defence in January 2006 to “increase concerns about the export of small arms and light
the effectiveness of training”.13 In 2005–6 the weapons to countries where children took part
Kalyinur Usenbekov Higher Military College in in hostilities, and recommended that Kyrgyzstan
Bishkek took 26 students aged 17.14 review its domestic legislation with a view to
Applications to the two military schools were abolishing such exports.23
made through local conscription commissions,
and the consent of the student and parent International standards
was required. Most students went on to Kyrgystan ratified the ILO Worst Forms of Child
become military officers, but had the option of Labour Convention 182 in May 2004.
transferring out of the program after two years
and going on to higher education.15 In response 1 Bruce Pannier, “��
Uzbekistan: Tashkent points
to questions about reports of continued bullying finger at neighbor, foreign media over Andijon
and “initiation rites”, the government told violence”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/
the Committee on the Rights of the Child that RL), 16 September 2005, www.rferl.org.
measures had been taken, including separating 2 ��
Dadodjan Azimov, “��
Are Islamic militants
younger from older students, establishing a regrouping in the Fergana valley?”, Institute of
monitoring committee, and allowing students to War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 1 December
complain to the Ombudsman’s office and to non- 2006, www.iwpr.net; see also Amnesty
governmental organizations (NGOs).16 International Report 2007.
Mass fighting between second- and third-year 3 Amnesty International Report 2007.
students at the Dair Asanov school in April 2007 4 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www.
reportedly broke out after second-year students sectsco.org.
assaulted a younger student.17
5 Compulsory Military Service Act , Article 10, at
Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic, www.
Armed groups mil.kg; see also Initial report of Kyrgyzstan to
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on
The government stated that no non-governmental
�� implementation of the Optional Protocol, CRC/C/
armed groups��
operated in Kygyzstan.18 Pakistani OPAC/KGZ/1, 22 May 2006.
military sources in 2004 claimed that armed 6 Initial report, above note 5.
groups operating in Pakistan were increasingly
7 Ibid.

8 Compulsory Military Service Act, Article 11; Initial
report of Kyrgyzstan, above note 5. L aos
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. Lao People’s Democratic Republic
10 Initial report, above note 5; Statement by
Government of Kyrgyz Republic to the Committee, Population: 5.9 million (2.8 million under 18)
29 January 2007. Government armed forces: 29,100
11 ��
Written replies by the Government of the Kyrgyz Compulsory recruitment age: 18
Republic to the Committee on the Rights of the Voluntary recruitment age: 18
Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/KGZ/Q/1/Add.1,
�� 11 Voting age: 18
January 2007. Optional Protocol: acceded 20 September 2006
12 ��
Ibid; Ministry
��
of Defence website www.mil.kg/ru/ Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
education. CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
13 Z.��
��
Satabaldiev��
, “Military Academy is transferred
to the control of the Ministry of Defence of the The minimum age for conscription and
Kyrgyz Republic”, Voennyii, 19 January��
��
2006, voluntary enlistment was given by the
www��
.��
massmedia��
.��
kg��
/��
ru (no longer available);�
Press Service of President, “President Kurmanbek government as 18. There continued to be
Bakiev visited the National Military Lyceum reports of the use of children as soldiers
on the Day of Knowledge”, 1 September 2007, by armed Hmong groups.
www.president.kg; see also UN press release,
“Committee examines reports of Kyrgyzstan on
Optional Protocols to Convention on Rights of Context
Child”, 29 January 2007, www.ohchr.org (media
centre). The government continued attacks against
14 ��
Written replies, above note 11. thousands of ethnic minority women, men
and children living in scattered groups in the
15 Ibid.; Ministry of Defence website www.mil.kg/ru/
Lao jungles and hiding from the authorities,
education; UN��
press release, above note 13.
particularly from the military. These
16 ��
UN press release, above note 13. predominantly Hmong groups were a remnant
17 See, for example, Jyldyzbek Ibraliev, “The of an armed faction who fought alongside the
Administration of the Military Lyceum of USA in its war against the North Vietnamese,
Kyrgyzstan Doesn’t Deny that a Mass Fight which spilled over into Laos and Cambodia. The
between Pupils Occurred on 6 April 2007”, 24.kg, Lao People’s Army reportedly launched an attack
10 April 2007, www.24.kg. on 6 April 2006 in northern Vientiane province
18 Initial report, above note 6. which killed 26 Hmong belonging to a jungle
19 See, for example, “Tale of a lost militant”, group, of whom 17 were reportedly children and
Reuters, 15 December 2004; “Qaeda using several women. The Hmong groups denied being
children for terrorism”, Daily Times (Pakistan), 26 currently involved in attacks on the military, and
November 2004, both at www.dailytimes.com.pk after 2004 there were very few reports of such
(for more detail see Tajikistan entry). attacks by anti-government groups. While reliable
20 Criminal Code, Article 375, para. 3, cited in Initial information was very hard to obtain, it appeared
report, above note 5. that the groups no longer posed a serious
21 Committee on the Rights of the Child, military threat to the government.1 Hmong
Consideration of report submitted by Kyrgyzstan asylum-seekers in Thailand, mostly children, who
on implementation of the Optional Protocol, had been forcibly returned to Laos in December
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ 2005, were detained for over a year on their
KGZ/CO/1, 2 May 2007. return to Laos.2
22 ��
UNICEF, “��
Laying the foundation for the rights of
Kyrgyz children”, 9 June 2006, www.unicef.org.
Government
21. National recruitment legislation and
practice
The 1991 constitution states that “Lao citizens
have the obligation to defend the country, to
maintain the people’s security and to fulfil
military obligations as prescribed by law” (Article
36). The president may authorize general or
partial military conscription and declare a state of
emergency nationwide or in a particular locality
(Article 53).

According to the government declaration use of children as soldiers had been specifically
on ratification of the Optional Protocol, the Law criminalized in national legislation.
on Obligations of National Defence Service Laos ratified the ILO Minimum Age
stipulated that “all young men of Lao nationality Convention 138 and the ILO Worst Forms of
between 18 and 28 years of age, having good Child Labour Convention 182 in June 2005. The
health conditions, shall be obliged to serve for a government was preparing to ratify the Rome
short-term in national defence forces. In case of Statute of the International Criminal Court, and
necessity, young women between 18 and 23 years had reportedly drafted implementing legislation
of age may also be called upon to serve for a as a prerequisite for ratification under its own
short-term in national defence” (Article 13). These laws.7
provisions, however, were rarely enforced, and
there was little or no military service in practice.3 1 Amnesty International (AI), “Hiding in the jungle
The Law on Obligations of National Defence – Hmong under threat”, 23 March 2007.
Service also stated that, following medical 2 AI, “The Missing Children of Laos”, 22 March
checks, a selection process would take place at 2007.
district level to select voluntary recruits, with
3 Confidential source, March 2007.
good health, for short-term defence services,
according to the recruitment number officially 4 Declaration of Laos on acceding to the Optional
set forth on a yearly basis (Article 7). The Protocol, 20 September 2006, www2.ohchr.org.
government declaration on ratification of the 5 Roger Arnold, “Laos: Still a secret war”, Digital
Optional Protocol stated that the minimum age at Journalist, October 2006, http://digitaljournalist.
which it would permit voluntary recruitment into org.
its national armed forces was 18.4 6 Declaration, above note 4.
7 International Labour Organization (ILO),
International Labour Standards, www.ilo.
Armed groups org (ilolex database); “Rome Statute of the
Sporadic reports continued to be received of International Criminal Court Ratification and
the use of children as soldiers by armed Hmong Implementation in Asia: Some Prospects and
groups. One journalist who was able to visit the Concerns”, International Centre for Criminal Law
groups clandestinely in October 2006 described Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, February
K—O
and photographed boys apparently aged as 2007, www.icclr.law.ubc.ca.
young as 15 armed and acting as guards.5 It
remained unclear what other military duties
such children performed or what training they
had received, and whether they were involved
in any attacks on government forces or armed
resistance to government attacks.
Developments
In October 2007 Laos endorsed the Paris
Laos ratified the Optional Protocol in September
2006, stating in its declaration that the minimum
age for entry into the national armed forces,
both voluntary and obligatory, was 18.6 It was not
known what, if any, implementing legislation had
been drafted, or whether the recruitment and

training and about the history, structure and
L AT VIA functions of the armed forces. Their program
included militarized competitions and hiking.
Republic of Latvia A senior group, aged 16–18, underwent a basic
course in national defence, similar to the one
Population: 2.3 million (448,000 under 18) followed by privates in the army. This included
Government armed forces: 5,300 lessons in weaponry and shooting doctrine, drill,
Compulsory recruitment age: 19 (conscription tactics, first aid and topography, and training in
ceased by end 2006) national security policy and integration in NATO.
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 The course was designed to last three years and
Voting age: 18 awarded an academic diploma that would ensure
Optional Protocol: ratified 19 December 2005 fast-track entry into the military professions.
The Ministry of Defence also ran Youth Guard
courses as a voluntary option in the civilian
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 schools’ curriculum, for those eligible to take it
and with the agreement of specific institutions.
Conscription was ended during the Specially trained instructors were provided by the
reporting period. There were no reports of Ministry.
under-18s in the armed forces.
Developments
Context
Latvia joined NATO in 2004.
In December 2005 Latvia ratified the Optional
Protocol, its declaration stating that at that time
Government citizens aged 19 were liable to mandatory military
service and that young people could enlist
National recruitment legislation and voluntarily for military service from the age of 18.4
practice In June 2006 Latvia ratified the ILO Minimum
Age Convention 138 and the Worst Forms of Child
Measures were taken towards creating a non-
Labour Convention 182.
conscript army. The final compulsory call-up
took place on 24 November 2005 and the last
soldiers completed compulsory military service 1 Ministry of Defence, www.mod.gov.lv.
on 24 November 2006. As of December 2006, 2 Ministry of Defence Policy Paper, Priority No 9.
more than 5,000 soldiers were serving on 3 Ministry of Defence, Youth Guard (Jaunsardze).
contracts, 170 of them former conscripts who 4 Declaration on accession to the Optional
had transferred to service on a contractual basis Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.�
at the end of their conscription. Seventeen per
cent of those serving on a contractual basis were
women. On 1 January 2007 military conscription
ceased and the army became an entirely non-
conscript force.1 Defence service employment
contracts were open to 18-year-olds.

In 2007 the Ministry of Defence said that one of
its priorities was to maintain enrolment numbers
in the non-conscript armed forces, partly through
supporting the Youth Guard and by fostering “the
patriotic education of youth and the acquisition
of military skills.”2
The Youth Guard was a voluntary special-
interest organization set up and led by the
Ministry of Defence. Apart from instilling physical
fitness and patriotism, its purpose was to excite
young people’s interest in military service, and
to cultivate motivated personnel for the all-
volunteer military service. It had 6,500 members
in early 2004.3 Membership was open to citizens
with a good command of the Latvian language,
and training was arranged for two age groups.
Juniors, aged 12–15, learned the basics of military

total of 1,191 Lebanese, a third of whom were
L EBANON estimated to be children, were killed in the
33-day conflict.10 Around 1 million people were
Lebanese Republic displaced. In one incident, the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) bombed a residential building in
Population: 3.6 million (1.2 million under 18) Qana, killing 27 civilians, 16 of whom were
Government armed forces: 72,100 children. The IDF inquiry claimed that Hizbollah
Compulsory recruitment age: None (ended in was using the civilians as “human shields”.11
2007) However, a subsequent investigation by Human
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 or 18 Rights Watch found no evidence to support this
Voting age: 21 claim.12 Further attacks resulted in damage to
Optional Protocol: signed 11 February 2002 3,000 schools and the total destruction of 40
schools. The IDF use of cluster bombs, many
dropped in the last 72 hours of the war, posed
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182 a lasting threat to Lebanese civilians after the
withdrawal of Israeli troops. From 14 August to
Voluntary enlistment was possible for the end of September 2007, five children were
soldiers from the age of 17, and at 18 for killed and 66 were injured by munitions.13 This
non-commissioned personnel and officers. included 13-year-old Hadi Hattab, who was
Armed groups were involved in the training killed an hour after the ceasefire came into
and recruitment of children. effect after stepping on a cluster bomb outside
his home.14 The UN repeatedly asked the IDF to
give specific information on the location of the
Context remaining estimated 170,000 to 340,000 pieces
of unexploded ordnance.15 This had not been
From 2005 Lebanon’s stability was threatened by disclosed by late 2007.
a series of political assassinations, a 33-day war UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)
with Israel in 2006, and increased discord among paved the way for Israel’s withdrawal and a
the country’s mostly religious-based political strengthened UN Interim Force in Lebanon
groupings. In 2005 Syrian troops withdrew from (UNIFIL) of up to 15,000 troops in the south,
the country under international pressure after
K—O
alongside 15,000 LAF troops. Following the
the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime July–August 2006 crisis, UNIFIL’s remit was
Minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, responsibility for which extended to supporting the LAF as they deployed
was not claimed by any group.1 In July 2006 in southern Lebanon and helping to ensure
Israel launched an intensive military campaign in humanitarian access to civilian populations
Lebanon; seven Israeli children and nearly 400 and the safe return of displaced persons.
Lebanese children were killed in the conflict.2 The resolution recalled previous calls for the
Between May and September 2007 the disarmament of all armed groups.16 However,
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fought Fatah Hizbollah continued to retain its arms and the
al-Islam, an Islamist armed group based in a military wings of other political parties were
Palestinian refugee camp. The violence resulted reported to be recruiting new members and
in the deaths of at least 169 soldiers, 287 rearming.17
members of Fatah al-Islam and 47 civilians.3 At Lebanon remained formally at war with Israel,
least two children were killed, although exact which occupied Lebanese disputed territory.
figures were not released.4 They were among
127,000 Palestinian children living in Lebanon’s
12 official refugee camps and a number of Government
informal settlements. Of these children, the UN
agency mandated to respond to the needs of National recruitment legislation and
Palestinian refugees, the UN Relief Works Agency practice
(UNRWA)5, considered over 18,000 to be cases There were no reports of child recruitment or
of particular economic hardship.6 Up to 5,000 deployment by the Lebanese Armed Forces.
more Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were not Compulsory military service ended in
registered and had no documentation.7 This February 2007, following a government decree in
prevented their access to a number of services 2005 which was agreed by all political parties.18
and made it difficult to determine the age of Decree Number 665 of 2005 reduced the period
children, who had no birth certificates.8 of service in the two-year transition period to
six months.19 Deferrals and exemptions were
Israel–Hizbollah conflict available on a number of grounds. From February
Israel launched an intensive ground and aerial 2007 all recruitment was voluntary; officers and
assault on Lebanon in July 2006, after the non-commissioned personnel and specialists
abduction of two of its soldiers by Hizbollah in could join from the age of 18. However, soldiers
a cross-border attack the previous month.9 A were allowed to enlist from the age of 17.20 The

Lebanese Armed Forces had said in 2004 that for those who excelled.31 The group also ran a
under-18s were not allowed to take part in active number of activities for younger children through
service.21 its youth wing, the al-Mahdi scouts. Nearly
42,000 children from the age of six took part in
Military training and military schools activities organized by the group in 2005.32 These
Military training for recruits took place at the Flag reportedly included one-month summer camps
Service Camp, which ran induction courses for which featured religious education, arts, culture,
all soldiers. There was also a military school for physical training and games.33 These activities
officers, the Fu’ad Shihab Command and Staff and a number of services, including hospitals,
College, which offered further education, and nurseries, television and radio outlets and at
specialist schools running courses for trained least 12 schools, offered a means to extend
soldiers.22 Hizbollah’s influence and ideology.34
Palestinian groups
Armed groups A number of armed political groups operated in
Hizbollah was the principal Lebanese political the refugee camps, including Fatah, the Popular
party to retain an armed wing after the end of the Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
civil war in 1989. However, the unstable political and PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC), the
situation led to renewed militarization by most Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
groups. All armed wings of political parties Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Children reportedly
were reportedly rearming.23 Mainly Christian participated in internal Palestinian clashes,
parties, such as the Kataeb (Phalange) and the mainly to harass and intimidate members of
Lebanese Forces, were reported to have opened other groups. Children as young as ten were also
recruitment offices in the Beirut suburbs.24 reported to be taking part in military training. In
Military training was also stepped up by parties April 2007 militias linked to Fatah and the radical
associated with Lebanon’s Druze population Sunni group, Asbat al-Ansar, carried out military
and Sunni Muslim groups.25 Pro-Syrian Christian training for children in the Ain Helwah refugee
groups, including the Free Patriotic Movement camp.35
(FPM) led by General Aoun and Suleiman
Franjieh’s Marada movement were reported to Fatah al-Islam
have organized “youth summer camp” programs. This radical Sunni group was set up by a group
These combined physical activities with political who arrived at Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in
indoctrination.26 The armed wings of other pro- northern Lebanon at the end of 2006. The group
Syrian forces, the Syrian Nationalist Party and was reported to have enticed Palestinian children
mainly Shia groups, Amal and Hizbollah, were to attend Quranic schools with small amounts of
also reported to have provided military training money. According to one report, they were shown
to children.27 videos of events in Iraq and demonstrations
No children were reported to have of weapons training.36 There were reports that
participated in armed action on behalf of any children fought with the group in the three-month
Lebanese group since 2001, including during conflict with the Lebanese army.37 At least two
the conflict in 2006. Nevertheless, in 2007 the children were killed in the violence. Many more
Special Representative of the UN Secretary- were affected by the panic and mass evacuation
General for Children and Armed Conflict warned of 31,000 people from the camp.38 The group was
that “should sectarian violence flare in the defeated by the LAF in September 2007, although
current political climate … children and youth the return of residents was delayed by the need
may well become involved”. She added that the to rebuild the camp.39
insecurity and lack of social and economic outlets
for young people increased the attraction of the
“culture of martyrdom”.28 Disarmament, demobilization
Hizbollah and reintegration (DDR)
Hizbollah was the largest armed political Lebanese army and international experts
group in the country with a base mainly in Shia continued to remove the remaining 1.2 million
areas. It said that it supported the country’s unexploded ordnance left by Israeli forces.40
ratification of the Optional Protocol in meetings Mine-awareness training for children was
with government officials.29 The group denied undertaken by the Lebanese army, UNICEF,
any use of children in the ongoing conflict with Norwegian People’s Aid, Danchurch Aid and the
Israel, including the war of 2006.30 In 2007 there Red Cross.41 The government operated three
were reports that its military wing was recruiting medical and psychological centres to support
boys aged 16–19. Hizbollah reportedly offered child victims of armed conflict in Beirut, Nabatieh
one month’s basic military training and the and Sidon. These were overseen by a not-for-
prospect of further training and attractive salaries profit organization, the Association for the Care

of Children in War.42 Following the 2006 conflict 8 Third periodic report of Lebanon to the
with Israel, psychosocial support programs were Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
offered to children by organizations including CRC/C/129/Add.7, 25 October 2005.
UNICEF, Terre des hommes, Save the Children 9 “Hezbollah seizes Israel soldiers” BBC News, 12
Sweden and the local non-governmental July 2006.
organization Naba’a.43 10 “Major violations on both sides”, above note 2.
11 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Completion of
Developments inquiry into July 30th incident in Qana”, 2 August
2006, www.mfa.gov.il.
Lebanon had yet to ratify the Optional Protocol 12 Human Rights Watch, “Why they died: civilian
after signing it in 2001. In March 2007 the casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 war”,
Permanent Peace Movement launched a September 2007.
campaign to gather support for ratification. It 13 Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), South
established a network of organizations working Lebanon, “September 2007 report”, 5 October
on child rights to raise awareness and to put in 2007.
place measures to prevent child recruitment.44
14 Norwegian People’s Aid, “Survived the war, not
During the April 2007 visit of the Special the peace”, 3 October 2006, www.npaid.org.
Representative of the UN Secretary-General on
15 See, e.g., UN Report, Visit of the Special
Children in Armed Conflict, Prime Minister Fouad
Siniora and a parliamentary deputy, Mohamed
to the Middle East, UN OSRSG/CAAC, 9–20 April
Raad, representing Hizbollah, stated that 2007.
Lebanon would ratify the Optional Protocol and
16 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701
would prohibit the participation of children in
(2006), UN Doc. S/RES/1701, 11 August 2006.
armed violence.45
The International Committee for the Red 17 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Hizbullah and
Cross (ICRC) provided training on international the Lebanese crisis”, Middle East Report no 69,
October 2007.
humanitarian law (IHL) for the LAF and UNIFIL
forces.46 In 2006 it ran its first IHL training for a 18 Law 665 (4 February 2005), Lebanese Army site
group of field commanders from the military wing (Arabic), www.lebarmy.gov.lb.
of Hizbollah.47 19 Flag Service Law 665, Article 2 (Arabic), www.
K—O
Lebanon was listed as a situation of concern lebarmy.gov.lb.
in the Secretary-General’s sixth report to the 20 Lebanese Army site (Arabic), www.lebarmy.gov.lb.
Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict 21 Child Soldiers: Coalition Global Report 2004.
in October 2006.48 The UN Special Representative 22 Lebanese Army site, above note 20.
for Children and Armed Conflict visited the area
in April 2007. She pressed UNIFIL to appoint a
child protection officer to monitor events in the 24 Thanassis Cambanis, “Christian split in Lebanon
raises specter of civil war”, International Herald
area south of the Litani river. She also urged
Tribune, 6 October 2007.
increased funding for psychosocial programs for
Lebanese children who had been affected by the 25 “War of words and photos between police,
conflict with Israel, as well as for UNRWA’s work Aoun’s FPM”, Naharnet, 4 October 2007,
see ww.naharnet.com/; Nicholas Blanford,
in Palestinian camps.49
“Lebanon’s militias rearm before vote”, Christian
Science Monitor, 6 November 2007; Chancy
* Titles of non-English language sources have been Chassay, “Fears of new civil war increase as
translated by the Coalition. Lebanese political factions rearm”, Guardian, 6
1 UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) February 2007.
demanding Syrian withdrawal, UN Doc. S/ 26 Cambanis, above note 24.
RES/1559. 27 Child Soldiers Coalition (Coalition), “Lebanon:
2 The UN estimated that a third of 1,191 deaths in the vulnerability of children to armed conflict in
Lebanon were minors. “Major violations on both Lebanon”, briefing, September 2007.
sides in Israel–Lebanon conflict, say UN Experts”, 28 Visit of the Special Representative, above note
UN press release, 4 October 2006. 15.
3 “Rebuilding camp will be UNRWA’s largest 29 Information in response to e-mail questions
humanitarian project”, IRIN, 14 Nov 2007. by the Coalition from the Higher Council for
4 “48 killed as Lebanon army battles militants”, Ya Childhood Lebanon, Ministry of Social Affairs, 19
Libnan, 20 May, 2007, http://yalibnan.com. October 2007.
5 UNRWA mandate. 30 Visit of the Special Representative, above note
6 Written replies by Lebanon to the UN Committee 15.
on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/LBN/ 31 “Hizbullah getting stronger in Lebanon”,
Q/3/Add.1, 27 April 2006. Associated Press, 4 October 2007.
7 Amnesty International, “Limitations on rights of
Palestinian refugee children”, 2006.

32 See Mahdi scout website (Arabic), www.
almahdiscouts.net/; Scout summer camps LE SOT H O
information on Bint Jbeil website, www.bintjbeil.
org. Kingdom of Lesotho
33 See Mahdi scout website, above note 32.
34 Hazem Saghiya, “Chapters from the Story of Population: 1.8 million (840,000 under 18)
Lebanon’s Hizbollah (5)”, al-Hayat, 8 January Government armed forces: 2,000
2005. Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
35 Coalition briefing, above note 27. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
36 Andrew England, Roula Khalaf and Ferry Voting age: 18
Biedermann, “Into battle; a new threat emerges Optional Protocol: ratified 24 September 2003
in war-scarred Lebanon”, Financial Times, 3 June Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
2007. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
37 Coalition briefing, above note 27.
38 UNICEF, “UNICEF Lebanon joins UNRWA response There were no reports of under-18s in the
to urgent needs of children and women caught armed forces.
in El Bared camp crisis”, newsnote, 29 May
2007, www.unicef.org/; Inter-Agency Standing
Committee, “Lebanon Crisis: Health Cluster 28”, Government
4 August 2007, www.emro.who.int.
39 “Fatah Al-Islam commander captured”, Al Jazeera, National recruitment legislation and
1 October 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net. practice
40 International Crisis Group, “Avoiding renewed Under the Lesotho Defence Force Act of 1996,
conflict”, Middle East Report No. 59. there was no conscription. The minimum age
41 “National day against the use of landmines in for voluntary recruitment into the armed forces
Sur”, Army and National Defence Magazine, No. was 18, and recruits could enlist between the
261 (March 2007) (Arabic), www.lebarmy.gov.lb. ages of 18 and 24.1 In its declaration on ratifying
42 Third periodic report, above note 8. the Optional Protocol Lesotho supported the
43 Save the Children Sweden and UK, “Lebanon: “straight-18” position.2
war-affected children still at risk one year on”, 13 It was unclear how the age of volunteers was
July 2007, www.reliefweb.int. determined, since birth registration remained
44 Coalition briefing, above note 27. low, particularly in rural areas.3
45 Report of the UN Secretary-General to the
Security Council on Children and Armed
Conflict, 21 December 2007, UN Doc. A/62/609-
Developments
S/2007/757. With an HIV prevalence rate of 23.2 per cent
46 International Committee of the Red Cross among people aged 15–49, Lesotho was the
(ICRC), “Lebanon: ICRC activities October 2007”, third hardest-hit country in the world. In 2006
operation update, www.icrc.org. a national policy on orphans and other children
47 ICRC, Annual Report 2006, www.icrc.org. made vulnerable by HIV was approved.4 This
48 UN Doc. A/61/529–S/2006/826, 26 October
policy complemented the Children’s Protection
2006. and Welfare Bill, which consolidated and
reformed legislation related to the protection
49 Visit of the Special Representative, above note
and welfare of children.5 It was expected to be
15.
enacted in 2008.6
1 Initial report of Lesotho to the UN Committee

Add.20, 20 July 1998.
3 UNICEF, Information by Country, Lesotho.
4 UNAIDS, Lesotho Country Fact Sheet, 2006,
www.unaids.org.
5 “Lesotho: New policy to help orphans and
vulnerable children”, IRIN, 3 January 2007.
6 Confidential source, Lesotho, October 2007.

former combatants who had not benefited from
Liberia reintegration opportunities, and former members
of the armed forces who were not satisfied with
Republic of Liberia their demobilization and retirement benefits.
The Anti-terrorist Unit, an armed militia created
Population: 3.3 million (1.8 million under 18) by former president Charles Taylor, who claimed
Government armed forces: 2,400 to be entitled to benefits under security sector
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription reforms, threatened to cause problems in the
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (see text) peace process.3
Voting age: 18 Parliamentary elections and the first round of
Optional Protocol: signed 22 September 2004 presidential elections took place in October 2005.
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): There were allegations that former president
Charles Taylor, operating from abroad, tried to
influence the preliminary stages of the voting.4
There were no reports of under-18s in Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf won the second round of
the presidential elections in November and was
the armed forces. There were reports of inaugurated as president in January 2006.
under-18s and former child soldiers being There were sporadic episodes of violence. At
recruited for use in neighbouring Guinea the end of October 2004, 14 people were killed
and Côte d’Ivoire in 2004–5. Several and 200 injured during riots in Monrovia.5 In
April 2006 former combatants were involved in
thousand children underwent the official riots in Monrovia.6 In February 2007 there were
demobilization process, but UNICEF further riots there by about one thousand former
reported that the needs of girls were combatants demanding pay and demobilization
not being met adequately. By July 2006, packages.7 In July 2007 the regular police force
according to the UN, there was no known clashed with the seaport police force over
investigations into fuel theft.8
group in Liberia that used or recruited child The United States (USA) cancelled US$391
soldiers, but there was a continuing risk of million of debt in February 2007 but the
re-recruitment. Former president Charles humanitarian situation remained strained.9
K—O
Taylor went on trial in The Hague for By mid-2007 the humanitarian situation was
improved but the UN reported that there
crimes against humanity, war crimes and remained serious challenges in meeting basic
other serious violations of international needs such as health, education, food and water
law, including the recruitment of child and sanitation.10
soldiers, committed in Sierra Leone. Many aspects of the conflicts in Liberia and
in Sierra Leone since the 1990s and in Côte
d’Ivoire since 2002 were intricately linked, with
Context operations across borders, including in Guinea,
Following Liberia’s first civil war, Charles which bordered all three countries, and a
Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front complex web of governments and armed groups
of Liberia (NPFL), became president in 1997. providing support to factions in neighbouring
Conflict resumed in 2000 with two armed countries.11 A migrant population of thousands
groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation of young fighters, many of them from Liberia,
and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement including child soldiers, crossing the borders
for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), trying to between Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte
overthrow the government. Many members of d’Ivoire, saw conflict mainly as an economic
these armed groups were adherents of factions opportunity. Many had first been forcibly
that had participated in the first civil war. By May recruited as children in one conflict, and then
2003 the two armed groups had gained control had willingly crossed borders to take up arms
of much of the country and were threatening in another conflict, often with a different armed
to seize the capital, Monrovia. A ceasefire in group. A 2005 study by Human Rights Watch
June 2003 was followed by a Comprehensive found that most had been motivated by promises
Peace Agreement in August which provided for of financial gain, and many could not articulate
the establishment of a Transitional National the political objective of the group they fought
Government.1 Charles Taylor handed over power with. The risk of re-recruitment was exacerbated
and negotiated his departure to exile in Nigeria. by high rates of youth unemployment and
The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) established corruption and deficiencies in the implementation
by UN Security Council Resolution 1509 took up of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
peacekeeping duties on 1 October 2003.2 (DDR) programs.12 An August 2006 report by the
The security situation remained fragile. UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) noted that
There was frustration among unemployed high levels of unemployment, particularly youth
unemployment, across west Africa posed a risk

to stability in the region. This was reiterated in a children and former child soldiers by then over
2007 report by the UN Secretary-General which 18.
highlighted also the importance of reform of the
security sector in countries in the region as a Guinea
means of addressing it.13 In the period June 2004 to June 2005 there
was reportedly active recruitment of former
Government combatants in Monrovia and in Bong and Nimba
counties bordering Guinea for both pro- and anti-
National recruitment legislation and government groups in Guinea.26 In August 2004
Guinean embassy officials in Monrovia asked for
practice UNMIL to increase its border patrols following
There was no conscription in Liberia.14 reports of recruitment of Liberian former
The 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement combatants said to be intent on destabilizing
called for the restructuring of the armed forces Guinea. Those recruiting for anti-government
and for recruits to be screened with regard to, groups appeared to be supporters of former
among other things, educational qualifications Liberian president Charles Taylor. Around the
and prior history with regard to human rights same time, LURD commanders were also known
abuses.15 It did not explicitly state a minimum to be recruiting for a force to support President
age of recruitment, but according to reports the Conté. Many of the Liberian former combatants
minimum age of those applying to join the new approached by recruiters had previously been
Armed Forces of Liberia was 18.16 recruited as children during the conflicts in Sierra
As requested under the terms of the Leone and Liberia.27
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the USA took In May 2005 there were reports that Liberian
the lead in providing technical assistance for armed groups were operating military training
restructuring the armed forces. It contracted a camps in Guinea.28 In early 2007 the UN reported
US-based private company, DynCorp, for this that there were rumours of the involvement of
purpose.17 Initially the force was intended to Liberian former combatants in the disturbances
number 4,000, but lack of funding compelled in Guinea at that time but this could not be
the government to reduce it to 2,000.18 The confirmed.29
demobilization of the former armed forces, which Former armed group commanders were
had been plagued by shortfalls in funding, was reported to have said that child recruitment was
completed by December 2005 and recruitment to unnecessary, given the number of experienced
the new Armed Forces of Liberia commenced in combatants – many of them former child soldiers
January 2006.19 The first 106 recruits graduated in – available.30 However, at least 30 Liberian
November 2006.20 children who claimed to have been recruited
were identified and repatriated by a Guinean non-
Armed groups governmental organization (NGO) by July 2007.31
During 2004 and 2005 UNMIL and the Côte d’Ivoire

Transitional National Government reportedly Scores, if not hundreds, of Liberian children who
failed to fully control forest and border areas, had been reunited with their families following
which left opportunities for cross-border their demobilization during the disarmament
recruitment of combatants.21 process were reportedly re-recruited in Liberia
Large numbers of former combatants between late 2004 and late 2005 to fight in Côte
engaged in illegal gold and diamond mining.22 d’Ivoire, both for pro-government militias and
Former commanders of armed groups operated for the opposition Forces armées des Forces
criminal groups and organized illegal exploitation nouvelles (FAFN).32 Liberian former combatants
of plantations, sometimes using violence to recruited in late 2004 and early 2005 to fight in
retain control.23 In August 2006 the government Côte d’Ivoire said that one of the factors in their
and UNMIL forces repossessed the Guthrie decision to join the Ivorian militia was the failures
plantation in north-western Liberia, which was in implementation of the education and skills-
being controlled by former armed groups.24 training elements of the Liberian DDR program
in regions of Liberia close to the border.33 In late
Recruitment of ex-combatants 2004 around 20 children were recruited from the
Nicla camp for Liberian refugees in western Côte
and child soldiers for use in d’Ivoire by members of the Lima force supplétive,
neighbouring countries a militia operating alongside Côte d’Ivoire’s
regular armed forces (Forces armées nationales
In 2004 and 2005 there was continued de Côte d’Ivoire, FANCI).34 In early 2005 five
recruitment of ex-combatants from Liberia for demobilized children were among those included
use in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.25 These included in cross-border recruitment of Liberians. Their
demobilization cards issued in the DDR process

in Liberia were used to show recruiters that they the purpose of illegal diamond or gold mining, or
had experience as fighters.35 Recruitment into on rubber plantations.49
pro-government militias in Côte d’Ivoire was More than 10 per cent of those demobilized
reportedly intensified in March 2005, ahead were children.50 At the end of hostilities in
of peace talks in Pretoria.36 Liberian children August 2003, before the commencement of the
were again recruited in September and October official program, children came spontaneously
2005 into pro-government militias in western to child protection agencies to seek help to be
Côte d’Ivoire.37 In Côte d’Ivoire child soldiers demobilized.51 By October 2004 more than 10,000
demobilized from the FAFN in 2005 claimed that children, including over 2,300 girls, had been
they had been trained by Liberian fighters.38 disarmed and demobilized and more than 9,600
By July 2006, according to the UN, there was reunited with their families.52
no known group in Liberia that used or recruited Some of the children demobilized from
child soldiers or former child soldiers.39 However, Liberian former fighting forces were from
the UN also noted the potential threats to neighbouring countries – 120 from Sierra Leone,
stability in Liberia from the possible movement Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.53 By June 2006 a total
of armed groups from Côte d’Ivoire into Liberia of 55 children associated with the fighting forces
and recruitment of former Liberian combatants, (11 Ivorians, 29 Guineans and 15 Sierra Leoneans)
including children, by Ivorian militia groups and had returned to their countries of origin. The
Liberians to fight in Côte d’Ivoire.40 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
was also repatriating Liberian children associated
with the fighting forces from neighbouring
Disarmament, demobilization countries.54
and reintegration (DDR) Rape and other acts of grave sexual violence
were committed against girls who were recruited
The 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement or abducted by the former armed forces and
provided for a program of cantonment, other armed groups in Liberia. Approximately
disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation 75 per cent of demobilized girls reported
and reintegration (CDDRR).41 It was run by having suffered some form of sexual abuse or
the National Commission on Disarmament, exploitation.55 Many girls who were under 18
Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration when they were associated with the fighting
K—O
(NCDDRR) in coordination with UNMIL and forces had difficulties resuming their lives away
UNICEF, which co-ordinated the process for from their commanders and their so-called
under-18s, with input and assistance from other “bush husbands”, especially if they had had
UN agencies and international bodies.42 The children. Those over 18 at the time of the DDR
program was launched in December 2003.43 It program reportedly received no special protective
was formally closed in November 2004.44 assistance.56 In 2005 UNICEF reported that the
In May 2004 armed former combatants needs of girls were still not being met adequately,
rioted in Monrovia when told that they would not and that many had no access at all to the
receive immediate payment in return for their program.57
weapons.45 Weapons were reportedly passed A particular element of the program was the
from Guinea to Liberia to be “sold” as part of payment of a US$300 safety-net (demobilization)
the DDR process with Liberians making several allowance by UNMIL and the NCDDRR to all
round trips to fetch those weapons. Some former former combatants, including children. A UNICEF
members of armed groups complained that they evaluation of the program indicated that this
had not been able to benefit from the program had a significantly negative impact on children,
because their weapons had been confiscated by by exposing them to exploitation by their
their commanders, who had distributed them commanders and impairing their reintegration
to others in exchange for a percentage of the into their communities.58
disarmament bonus.46 According to local child protection agencies,
There were continued delays in providing the rapid demobilization failed to break the
former combatants with integration strong links between former child soldiers
opportunities. This meant they were subject to and their commanders. The disappointment
manipulation by elements seeking to disrupt the and frustration experienced by children and
2005 elections.47 communities during the reintegration period
By early 2006 over 100,000 combatants had led many to seek to re-establish links with their
been disarmed, with 37,000 still waiting to be former commanders – not necessarily in an
placed in reintegration programs.48 By August attempt to become soldiers again, but rather to
2007, 90,000 former combatants had benefited return to the last person who had provided them
from the reintegration and rehabilitation with food, shelter and protection.59
program, but many of them said that it had failed During 2005 it was reported that commanders
to provide them with sustainable livelihoods. expelled children under their “protection”
The majority of former combatants were still because they were no longer in a position to care
unemployed, and thousands had regrouped for for them. This led to an increase in the number of

street children and their migration to the cities.60 ban on diamond mining, paving the way for the
Child protection agencies highlighted the risks of official export of diamonds.74
re-recruitment of children in Monrovia, because At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
of the high concentration of military commanders Paris, Liberia and 58 other states endorsed
still active there and the lack of financial and the Paris Commitments to protect children
social alternatives for children.61 from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
By March 2007 reintegration opportunities forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
had been provided to over 9,700 of the 11,000 and guidelines on children associated with
child beneficiaries. About half of these had armed forces or armed groups. The documents
graduated from or were participating in the reaffirmed international standards and
education program and about half were operational principles for protecting and assisting
undergoing or had graduated from vocational child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
training.62 consultation jointly sponsored by the French
Developments Truth and Reconciliation Commission
In June 2006 the UN Security Council lifted the The 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
arms embargo to the extent of enabling the provided for the establishment of a Truth
procurement of arms for the Liberian police and and Reconciliation Commission, which was
security forces.63 established by an act of the Liberian parliament
Exploitation of children as labourers was in June 2005. The nine-member commission
reported, particularly in the north, which was began its work in June 2006, having been
hardest hit by the armed conflict.64 inaugurated the previous February. It was
Sexual and gender-based violence, mandated to investigate gross human rights
particularly rape of children, continued to be violations and violations of international
reported.65 In May 2006 it was reported that 12- humanitarian law as well as other grave abuses
year-old girls, and in some cases girls as young as that occurred from January 1979 to 14 October
eight, were involved in transactional sex in camps 2003. It was to pay “particular attention to
for internally displaced people and after being gender-based violations, as well as to the issue
resettled in their communities. Abusers allegedly of child soldiers, providing opportunities for them
included camp officials, humanitarian workers, to relate their experiences, addressing concerns
businessmen, peacekeepers, government and recommending measures to be taken for
employees and teachers.66 The UN noted the the rehabilitation of victims of human rights
allegations in the report and stated that 45 cases violations in the spirit of national reconciliation
of sexual exploitation involving UNMIL personnel and healing”. The Commission, which was due to
were investigated in 2005 and around 40 in complete its work in 2008, was mandated under
2006.67 In January 2007 UNMIL publicly called for certain conditions to recommend amnesties and
an internal UN investigation.68 to refer to the head of state individual cases for
In October 2004 the UN refugee agency prosecution.75
(UNHCR) began its repatriation of refugees from
Sierra Leone and Guinea. The return of internally Indictment of Charles Taylor
displaced persons began in November.69 The In March 2006, following a formal request
UNHCR repatriation program ended in June by President Johnson-Sirleaf, the Nigerian
2007 after some 105,000 refugees had been authorities apprehended Charles Taylor and he
repatriated. About 80,000 Liberian refugees was transferred to the authority of the Special
remained in neighbouring countries.70 Court for Sierra Leone where he was charged with
A key element in rebuilding the economy war crimes, crimes against humanity and other
was for the government to regain control of the serious violations of international humanitarian
country’s natural resources including rubber, law, including the use of child soldiers during
diamonds, gold and timber, illicit trade in which, his alleged involvement in Sierra Leone’s conflict
particularly in diamonds, had done much to supporting the Revolutionary United Front
fuel conflict.71 A joint government–UN task force (RUF).76 In June, in order to protect stability
established to assess the situation on rubber in Liberia and the sub-region, which might be
plantations reported to the president in May disrupted if he were to be put on trial in west
2006 making recommendations for measures Africa, he was transferred to The Hague to be
to stop the use of forced and child labour and tried by a trial chamber of the Special Court.77
illegal trafficking in raw rubber.72 The UN Security He first appeared before the Special Court in The
Council lifted its embargos on the export of Hague on 4 June 2007. His trial was adjourned
timber in June 2006 and of diamonds in April until January 2008 to allow time for his new
2007.73 In May 2007 Liberia was admitted to the defence team to prepare for trial.78
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and in
July the government removed the self-imposed

1 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the 16 “Liberia: Recruitment drive for new army
Government of Liberia and the Liberians United kicks off ”, IRIN, 18 January 2006. (One of the
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the recommendations in the HRW report, How to
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia,
Political Parties, Accra, 18 August 2003, at www. February 2004, was that the Liberian government
usip.org. should enact national legislation making 18 the
2 Report of the UN Secretary-General to the minimum age for recruitment to the newly formed
Security Council on Liberia, UN Doc. S/2003/875, national army.)
11 September 2003; UN Mission in Liberia, www. 17 Sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on
unmil.org. the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2005/177,
3 Ninth progress report of the Secretary-General on 17 March 2005.
the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2005/764, 7 18 Eighth progress report of the Secretary-
December 2005. General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.
4 Seventh progress report of the Secretary- S/2005/560, 1 September 2005; “Liberia: new
General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. national army to have 2,000 troops, half as many
S/2005/391, 16 June 2005. as expected”, IRIN, 29 June 2005.
5 “Mass arrests after Liberia riots”, BBC News, 1 19 Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General on
November 2004. the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2006/159,
14 March 2006.
6 “Liberia: Stone throwing ex-soldiers paralyse
capital”, IRIN, 25 April 2006. 20 “First unit of Liberia’s new post-war army
graduates”, Reuters AlertNet, 4 November 2006,
7 “Liberia: Ex-combatants riot”, IRIN, 9 February
www.alertnet.org.
2007.
21 Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia to
8 “Rival Liberia police forces clash”, BBC News, 9
the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2004/752, 24
July 2007.
September 2004; Global Witness, An architecture
9 “US cancels Liberia’s $391 million debt”, BBC of instability: How the critical link between
News, 13 February 2007; Kate Thomas, “After natural resources and conflict remains unbroken,
Liberia’s war: ‘Sometimes you wonder if peace is December 2005, www.globalwitness.org.
worthwhile’”, Independent, 24 May 2007, http://
22 Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General,
news.independent.co.uk.
above note 19.
10 Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-
K—O
23 Eighth progress report of the Secretary-General,
General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.
above note 18; Eleventh progress report of the
S/2007/479, 8 August 2007.
Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia,
11 See entries on Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra UN Doc. S/2006/376, 9 June 2006.
Leone in this volume.
24 “Liberia secures rubber plantation”, BBC News,
12 See Human Rights Watch (HRW), Youth, Poverty 15 August 2006.
and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa’s
25 See also entries on Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire in
Regional Warriors, March 2005; Report of the
this volume.
Secretary-General on ways to combat sub-
regional and cross-border problems in West 26 International Crisis Group (ICG), Stopping
Africa, UN Doc. S/2004/200, 12 March 2004; Guinea’s Slide, Africa Report No. 94, 14 June
Report of the Secretary-General on inter-mission 2005; Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia
cooperation and possible cross-border operations to the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2005/360, 13
between the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, the UN June 2005.
Mission in Liberia, and the UN Operation in Côte 27 HRW, Youth, Poverty and Blood, above note 12.
d’Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2005/135, 2 March 2005. 28 Coalition interview with humanitarian agencies in
13 UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), Youth eastern Guinea, July 2005.
Unemployment and Regional Insecurity in 29 Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-
West Africa, 2nd edn, August 2006, www. General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.
un.org/unowa; Report of the Secretary-General S/2007/151, 15 March 2007.
on cross-border issues in West Africa, UN Doc.
30 Information from HRW, May 2007.
S/2007/143, 13 March 2007.
31 Coalition interview with confidential source in
14 Report of the Secretary-General to the UN
Conakry, Guinea, September 2007.
Commission on Human Rights on conscientious
objection to military service, UN Doc. E/ 32 HRW, Youth, Poverty and Blood, above note 12.
CN.4/2000/55, 17 December 1999. 33 HRW, “Côte d’Ivoire: ex-child soldiers recruited
15 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, above note for war”, press release, 31 March 2005.
1, Article VII: Disbandment of irregular forces, 34 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
reforming and restructuring of the Liberian armed armed conflict, UN Doc. A/59/695-S/2005/72, 9
forces. February 2005.
35 Report of the Panel of Experts, June 2005, above
note 26.
36 HRW, “Cote d’Ivoire: ex-child soldiers recruited
for war”, above note 33.

37 HRW, “Côte d’Ivoire: Government recruits child 63 “Liberia: Security Council draws back on arms
soldiers in Liberia”, press release, 28 October embargo”, IRIN, 14 June 2006. See also UN
2005. Security Council Resolution 1683 (2006).
38 Report of the Secretary-General on children 64 “Liberia: 15,000 child labourers to be sent back to
and armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc. school”, IRIN, 1 August 2006.
S/2006/835, 25 October 2006. 65 UNMIL, Quarterly Report on the Human Rights
39 Report of the Secretary-General on children and Situation in Liberia, May 2007, http://unmil.org.
armed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826, 66 Save the Children UK, “From camp to community:
26 October 2006. Liberia study on exploitation of children”,
40 See, for example, Thirteenth progress report discussion paper, JENdA, Issue 8, May 2006,
of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in www.jendajournal.com.
Liberia, UN Doc. S/2006/958, 11 December 2006. 67 Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-
41 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, above General, above note 23; Thirteenth progress
note 1, Article VI: Cantonment, Disarmament, report of the Secretary-General, above note 40.
Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 68 “UN’s Liberia mission calls for immediate
(CDDRR). investigation into possible sexual abuse”, UN
42 Fifth progress report of the Secretary-General on News Centre, 19 January 2007.
the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2004/972, 69 “Liberia refugees return home”, BBC News, 1
17 December 2004. October 2004; “Liberians begin journey home”,
43 Report of the Secretary-General on children and BBC News, 9 November 2004.
armed conflict, February 2005, above note 34. 70 UNHCR, “UNHCR ends Liberian operation after
44 Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General, helping more than 100,000 go home”, press
above note 19. release, 2 July 2007, www.unhcr.org.
45 “Liberians riot over disarmament”, BBC News, 18 71 Following a report by the Sierra Leone Panel
May 2004. of Experts on the involvement of the Liberian
46 Report of the Panel of Experts, June 2005, above government in the illicit trade in diamonds from
note 26. Sierra Leone, UN Security Council Resolution
1343 (2001) mandated states to take measures
47 Eighth progress report of the Secretary-General,
to prevent the direct or indirect import of rough
above note 18.
diamonds from Liberia. See UN page on “Conflict
48 Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General, diamonds”, www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.
above note 19. html.
49 Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary- 72 Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-
General, above note 10. General, above note 23; “Liberia: Rubber
50 UNICEF, Evaluation of the Disarmament and Plantations ‘lawless’ says UN”, IRIN, 11 May
Demobilisation Programme for Children 2006.
Associated with the Fighting Forces in Liberia, 73 “Liberia: Lifting of UN timber ban gives hope for
2005 (electronic copy with the Coalition). economic revival”, IRIN, 21 June 2006; “Liberia
51 Child Soldiers Coalition, Child Soldiers and relaunches diamond trade after embargo ends”,
Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reuters AlertNet, 1 May 2007. See also UN
Reintegration in West Africa, November 2006. Security Council Resolutions 1689 (2006) and
52 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 34. 1753 (2007) respectively.
53 Ibid. 74 Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-
54 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 39. General, above note 10. The Kimberley Process
was a joint initiative of governments, industry and
55 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 34. civil society to stem the flow of conflict diamonds.
56 Irma Specht, Red Shoes, Experiences of girl- Its certification scheme imposed requirements on
combatants in Liberia, ILO, UNICEF and UNDP, its members to enable them to certify shipments
2006, at www.transitioninternational.com. of rough diamonds as “conflict-free”; www.
57 UNICEF, above note 50. kimberleyprocess.com.
58 Ibid. 75 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia,
59 Coalition meetings with child protection agencies, TRC Mandate, Article IV, Mandate, Section 4, and
Monrovia, July–August 2005, cited in Child Article VII, Functions and powers, Section 26,
Soldiers Coalition, above note 51. https://www.trcofliberia.org. For a comment on
the limitations to amnesties under international
60 Coalition meeting with UN agencies, Lofa county, law, see Amnesty International (AI), Liberia: Truth,
Liberia, August 2005, cited in Child Soldiers Justice and Reparation: Memorandum on the
Coalition, above note 51. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act (AFR
61 Child Soldiers Coalition, above note 51. 34/005/2006), 22 June 2006.
62 Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary- 76 Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-
General, above note 29. General, above note 23; Special Court for Sierra
Leone, Summary of charges against Charles
Taylor, www.sc-sl.org/Taylorcasesummary.html.

77 Twelfth progress report of the Secretary-
General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. LIBYA
S/2006/743, 12 September 2006.
78 “Taylor trial delayed until 2008”, BBC News, 20 Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
August 2007.
Voting age: 181
Although the government stated that the

minimum voluntary recruitment age was
18, no amendments to legislation had
been made to reflect this. Under-18s were
reportedly recruited into militias.
Government
practice
On accession to the Optional Protocol in October
2004, Libya declared that the required legal age
for volunteering to serve in the armed forces was
18.2 This followed concern expressed in 2003
K—O
by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
over the Mobilization Act No. 21 of 1991, which
“allows for persons of 17 years to, among other
things, engage in combat” and the Committee’s
call for the law to be amended so that under-
18s were not deployed as active combatants in
wartime.3 However, amendments to the 1991 Act
to raise the age of conscription from 17 to 18 were
not believed to have been made.4 According to
Libya’s Second Periodic Report to the Committee,
national service was compulsory for “medically
fit” men aged between 18 and 35.5
Little information was available about military
training and schools. There was a military
academy in Tripoli.6
Armed groups
Children as young as 14 were reportedly recruited
into government-sponsored militias including
the Revolutionary Guard and the revolutionary
committees. This took place mostly in rural
areas.7
Developments
Amnesty International on several occasions
expressed concern over the detention and
ill-treatment of hundreds of Eritrean nationals,
several of them children, by the authorities.8 In
February 2006 Human Rights Watch reported
that girls who had been detained for “social

rehabilitation” at the Benghazi Home for
Juvenile Girls were held indefinitely, provided LIECH T E N ST E I N
with no education and sometimes put in solitary
confinement. Many of them were reportedly Principality of Liechtenstein
victims rather than perpetrators of crimes.9
Libya brokered a peace agreement between Population: 35,000 (7,000 under 18)
four Chadian armed groups and the government Government armed forces: no armed forces
of Chad, signed in Sirte, Libya, on 25 October Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable
2007.10 The accord foresaw an immediate Voluntary recruitment age: not applicable
ceasefire and the setting up of a committee Voting age: 18
which would decide on the integration of Optional Protocol: ratified 4 February 2005
members of the armed groups into Chadian state Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
structures, although there was no mention of the
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC
demobilization and integration of child soldiers.11
The UN refugee agency UNHCR reported a There were no standing armed forces.
significant increase since 2004 in the numbers
of asylum-seekers, especially from Sudan and Conscription was provided for in times
Somalia, requesting refugee status in Libya. This of war or emergency, but there was no
was expected to continue through late 2007.12 information on the minimum age or
recruitment in such instances.
1 System of indirect voting for the 468 members
of the General People’s Congress. Inter-
Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org. Government
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. National recruitment legislation and
3 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, practice
Consideration of report submitted by the Libyan Liechtenstein had no armed forces, although the
Arab Jamahiriya, Concluding observations, UN 1921 Constitution (amended in 2003) provided
Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.209, 4 July 2003. the basis for conscription to be introduced in a
4 Confidential source, November 2007. time of war or other emergency.1 The defence
5 Second periodic report of Libya to the Committee of the principality was the responsibility of
on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/93/ neighbouring Switzerland.2 Liechtenstein ratified
Add.1, 19 September 2002. the Optional Protocol on 4 February 2005, and
6 Global Security, “Libyan Army”, included in its declaration the statement that
www.globalsecurity.org. “the Principality of Liechtenstein has no national
7 Confidential source, June 2007. armed forces and hence no legislation on a
8 Amnesty International, “Libya: Forcible return/ minimum age for the recruitment of persons into
torture and ill-treatment”, Urgent Action, 8 the armed forces and for taking part in hostilities
February 2007, AI Index MDE 19/004/2007. exists”.3
9 Human Rights Watch, “Libya: a threat to society?
Arbitrary detention of women and girls for ‘social Developments
rehabilitation’”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 18, No.
2 (E), February 2006. In November 2006 Liechtenstein welcomed the
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution
10 “Libya seals peace deal for Chad”, BBC News, 26
October 2007. 1612, which created the Monitoring and
Reporting Mechanism (MRM) as a basis for the
11 “Chad rebels sign peace accord”, Al-Jazeera, 25
activities of the Security Council Working Group
October 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net.
for Children and Armed Conflict. But it also
12 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNCHR underlined “a need for clarifying the intended
Country Operations Plan 2007, Libyan Arab use of information gathered through the MRM, in
Jamahiriya, 1 September 2006, www.unhcr.org. particular by identifying how the MRM can service
the information needs of different destinations
for action in an efficient and effective way. This
includes the gathering of information for key
destinations that advance the end of impunity
as well as in the area of child protection and
victim assistance.” In June 2007 Liechtenstein
welcomed the first convictions by the Special
Court for Sierra Leone for the recruitment and
use of child soldiers, calling this “one of the most
important developments in international relations
over the past two decades”.4 In its Initial Report

on the Optional Protocol to the UN Committee on
the Rights of the Child, the government stated LITH UA N I A
that it contributed inter alia to the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) disarmament, Republic of Lithuania
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program
in relation to children.5 Population: 3.4 million (745,000 under 18)
1 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Right Compulsory recruitment age: 19
to Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Voluntary recruitment age: 18
Europe: A Review of the Current Situation, April Voting age: 18
2005. Optional Protocol: ratified 20 February 2003
2 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Profiles: Liechtenstein, www.fco.gov.uk. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
3 Second periodic report of Liechtenstein to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. There were no reports of under-18s in the
CRC/C/136/Add.2, 14 July 2005. armed forces. Under-18s who joined a
4 Open Debate of the Security Council: Children
state-supported paramilitary organization
and Armed Conflict, Statement by Mr Patrick
Ritter, Deputy Permanent Representative of could be involved in training which
the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United included military activities.
Nations, 28 November 2006; Open Debate of the
Security Council: Children and Armed Conflict,
Statement by Mr Patrick Ritter, Deputy Permanent Context
Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein
Lithuania joined NATO in 2004.
to the United Nations, 22 June 2007, both at
www.iccnow.org.
5 Initial report of Liechtenstein to the Committee on Government
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/LIE/1, 11 National recruitment legislation and
December 2007. practice
K—O
Service in the armed forces, or in alternative
unarmed units, was the constitutional duty of all
male citizens aged 18 years and over.1 Lithuania’s
declaration on ratification of the Optional
Protocol in 2003 stated that the minimum ages
for voluntary and compulsory service in the
armed forces were 18 and 19 respectively.2
The Law on National Conscription regulated
military call-up. Military service had three stages:
registration, conscription and post-conscription
in the reserves. At 16, all male citizens had to
register for the draft at their nearest municipal
military office. They could be conscripted into
compulsory military service for a one-year period
between the ages of 19 and 26 (Article 17). At
19, they were obliged to appear in person at
the office within a 45-day period starting 30
days before their 19th birthday.3 Those selected
for conscription were put on the records of
the Conscription Administration Service of
the Ministry of National Defence. It was the
responsibility of the Ministry of Interior to
provide municipal military offices with updated
information on potential conscripts.
Volunteers could start their military service
earlier, at the age of 18, by written request to a
Selective Recruitment Commission or regional
military conscription centre.
A Commission for the Implementation of
International Humanitarian Law, established in
2001, had the task of supervising the Ministry

of National Defence in meeting its international 1 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, Article
humanitarian law obligations.4 139(2).
In May 2003 a new Article 105 was introduced 2 Declaration on accession to the Optional
into the Criminal Code giving effect to Lithuania’s Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
obligations under Article 4 of the Optional 3 Law on National Conscription, No. 106-2472 of
Protocol. The recruitment of under-18s into armed 1996.
groups and their use in hostilities was made 4 Initial report of Lithuania to the UN Committee on
punishable by up to 12 years’ imprisonment. the Rights of the Child on implementation of the
Also newly criminalized and made punishable by Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/LTU/1,
up to ten years’ imprisonment was “forced use 29 June 2006.
of civilians and prisoners of war in the armed 5 Ibid., referring in particular to revision of 1 May
forces of an enemy” in times of international 2003 to the Criminal Code, Article 105.
armed conflict, occupation or annexation. 6 Additional information from the Government
This prohibited the use of civilians as “human of Lithuania to the Committee on the Rights of
shields”, and the recruitment or use of children in the Child in connection with consideration of
armed groups or hostilities. This amendment to initial report on implementation of the Optional
the Criminal Code had retroactive effect and was Protocol, 22 August 2007.
not bound by the statute of limitations.5 Criminal 7 Initial report, above note 4.
liability for conscripting or enlisting children was
8 Riflemen’s Union, www.sauliusajunga.lt.
subject to universal jurisdiction.6
Military training and military schools Consideration of report submitted by Lithuania
on implementation of the Optional Protocol,
The General Jonas Zemaitis Military Academy in Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
Vilnius offered in-service officer training under LTU/CO/1, 5 October 2007 (unedited version).
the Ministry of National Defence, and five civilian 10 Additional information, above note 6.
degree courses, for students aged 18 years and
over. In 2006, 8.5 per cent of students were
9.
women.7 International humanitarian law was a
compulsory part of the officers’ course.
The Riflemen’s Union, a voluntary state-
supported paramilitary organization, provided
volunteers under 18 with training in shooting,
military history and fitness, for two hours weekly
and at summer camp.8 The UN Committee on
the Rights of the Child expressed concern that
this might involve the engagement of children as
young as 12 in military activities.9
Developments
The government reported that 80 per cent of
children in refugee reception centres came
from areas affected by armed conflict, and that
programs and services were provided for them.10
The Committee on the Rights of the Child urged
Lithuania to further strengthen its work on this
in particular with regard to early identification
of those who had been recruited or used in
hostilities and providing specialist psychological
and other assistance.11
Paris, Lithuania and 58 other states endorsed

support to a UNICEF project working with child
L UXEMB OURG soldiers in Burundi.2
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg Developments

Population: 465,000 (104,000 under 18) At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,
Government armed forces: 900 Luxembourg and 58 other states endorsed the
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription Paris Commitments to protect children from
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces
Voting age: 18 or armed groups and the Paris Principles and
Optional Protocol: ratified 4 August 2004 guidelines on children associated with armed
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): forces or armed groups. The documents
The minimum age for recruitment was 17, child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
and those under 18 were prohibited from government and UNICEF.
participating in any military operation.
1 Initial Report of Luxembourg to the UN Committee
Government on the Rights of the Child on implementation of
the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
National recruitment legislation and LUX/1, 6 November 2006.
2 Ibid.
practice
Compulsory military service was abolished in
1967. The amended Grand Ducal Regulation of
22 September 1967 established a minimum age
of 17 for voluntary military service, and 17-year-
olds entering the armed forces required the
written consent of parents or a legal guardian.
K—O
Approximately 20 per cent of those applying for
voluntary military service were 17. The amended
Military Act of 2 August 1997 stipulated that
recruitment for peacekeeping operations would
be on an exclusively voluntary basis, and limited
participation in peacekeeping missions strictly
to those who were 18 or older. Under the terms
of the Act of 20 December 2002 (which amended
the Military Organization Act), volunteer soldiers
under 18 were prohibited from participating in
any military operation. The prohibition applied
to national defence as well as to participation in
“operations of collective or common defence or
in peacekeeping operations”. All of the above
provisions were also included in the declaration
made by Luxembourg on ratifying the Optional
Protocol in August 2004. The declaration stated
that full information about military duties would
be given to recruits prior to their recruitment into
the armed forces, and that all voluntary recruits
were permitted to leave the armed forces at any
time.1
Luxembourg continued to make an annual
contribution of €25,000 to the funding of
the Office of the United Nations Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict. It had also given

task was to educate, train and provide further
M ACEDONIA development for officer personnel for the army,
and to engage them in research in the field of
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia defence. Entrants had to have completed at least
four years of secondary education and be at least
Population: 2.0 million (494,000 under 18) 18 years old, but not older than 21.4
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription 1 International Relations and Security Network,
(abolished 2006) “Macedonia announces end to conscription”, ISN
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 Security Watch, 11 April 2006, www.isn.ethz.ch.
Voting age: 18 2 Amnesty International, Europe and Central Asia:
Optional Protocol: ratified 12 January 2004 Summary of Amnesty International’s concerns in
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): the region, January–June 2006, 1 December 2006.
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 3 ��
There were no reports of under-18s in the 4 Republic of Macedonia Military Academy, http://
armed forces. va.morm.gov.mk.
Government
practice
In April 2006 the Ministry of Defence announced
that military conscription would end and the army
would comprise only volunteers by the beginning
of 2007. Officials said that the new army would
have around 7,000 regular soldiers and 2,500
reserve troops. New soldiers would be recruited
on a voluntary basis for an initial three-month
training period, after which they would join the
regular armed forces.1 In May 2006 parliament
voted to abolish compulsory military service.2
Conscription was previously provided for in
the constitution, which stated, “The defence of
the Republic of Macedonia is the right and duty
of every citizen” (Article 28). Under the Defence
Law, all male citizens aged 17 to 55 were required
to fulfil their military obligations (Article 3),
including registration for conscription before the
age of 18 (Article 51). Recruits had to be 18 years
of age before recruitment (Article 54). To ensure
that children did not join the armed forces,
call-up notices were not sent to individuals until
they were 19 years old. Those who volunteered
to begin service earlier were allowed to start
three months after their application, provided
they had reached the age of 18. In a state of war
or national emergency, the minimum age for
membership of the Civil Protection Forces was 18
for both men and women, with military service in
the armed forces subject to the same regulations
as in peacetime (Articles 11–13).
In its declaration on signing the Optional
Protocol in July 2001, Macedonia stated that the
Defence Law did not allow under-18s to serve in
the armed forces.3

The Military Academy was the only tertiary-
level military educational institution. Its main

3 See List of Countries Which Have Signed,
M ADAGA SC AR Ratified/Acceded to the African Union Convention
on African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
Republic of Madagascar the Child, www.africa-union.org.

Voting age: 18

armed forces.
Government
practice
There was no compulsory military recruitment.
Provision was made for military service under
the constitution, which stated that “National
service shall be an honourable duty”. Although
it was obligatory to present oneself for military
service at 18, the service itself was not. Recruits
presenting themselves to the police force had
K—O
to produce a copy of their birth certificate and
identity card as proof of age and identity. A
medical examination was carried out if there was
doubt over the age of the recruit.1
In its declaration on ratification of the
Optional Protocol, Madagascar stated that
“young men and women aged 18 years or more
may request to be recruited into the Armed
Forces or outside the Armed Forces before young
men and women of their age-group. In order to
preserve his or her contractual liberty, the person
requesting voluntary enlistment shall submit a
request approved by his or her parents or legal
guardian. Offences against the requirements
of these provisions shall be prosecuted and
penalized under the Code of Justice on National
Service or the Penal Code.”2
Developments
Madagascar ratified the Optional Protocol on
22 September 2004, and the African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child on 30 March
2005.3
1 Confidential sources, March 2007.

2 Madagascar, Declaration on Ratification of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, 22 September 2004, www2.ohchr.
org.

recruit women in the armed forces. By 2004, 130
M A L AWI women had been trained.8
Republic of Malawi 1 Confidential sources, Malawi, August 2007.

Population: 12.9 million (6.9 million under 18) 2 Information provided by the Malawi High
Commission, August 2007.
3 UNICEF, Draft Country Programme Document for
Malawi.
Voting age: 18
5 Malawi High Commission, above note 2.
Optional Protocol: signed 7 September 2000
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC 7 Malawi High Commission, above note 2;
confidential sources, above note 1.
There were no reports of under-18s in the 8 Combined second, third, fourth and fifth periodic
reports of Malawi to the Committee on the
armed forces.
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UN
Doc. CEDAW/C/MWI/2-5, 28 June 2004.
Government
practice
A new Defence Force Act came into force in
September 2004, replacing the earlier Army Act
and incorporating amendments proposed by
the Malawi Law Commission which removed any
possibility of under-18s serving in the Defence
Force (previously the Malawi Army). The Act
provided that the Defence Force had three
components: the regular Defence Force, the
Defence Force reserve and the militia. The militia
was defined as comprising persons other than
members of the regular force or reserve forces
trained for military purposes and called to serve
only in emergencies. No person under the age of
18 could be recruited to or be members of any of
these forces.1 While the academic qualifications
of recruits were checked with the aim of ensuring
that no under-18s were recruited,2 lack of a birth
registration system meant that the age of recruits
could not be definitively verified.3
Under-18s could previously apply to be
recruited with the consent of a parent or legal
guardian or, when the parents or guardian
were dead or unknown, with the consent of the
chairman of the local court of the area in which
they resided.4
There was no conscription,5 but the National
Service Act provided that in case of a public
emergency every citizen between the ages of 18
and 60 could be called for national service.6 In a
letter to the Child Soldiers Coalition, the Malawi
High Commission stated that the National Service
Act did not exist; other sources stated that the
Act remained in force as it had been neither
declared unconstitutional nor repealed by an act
of parliament.7
In June 2004 the government reported
to the UN Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women that since 1999
the policy of the Ministry of Defence had been to

components consisting of cultural and religious
M AL AYSIA activities, national integration and firearms
training.6
Malaysia The Child Act 2001 defined as children those
under 18, and aimed to provide children with
Population: 25.3 million (9.6 million under 18) protection and assistance, including those
Government armed forces: 109,000 who were at risk or were victims of physical
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription and sexual abuse, neglect and abandonment,
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 and a half; and those who had committed criminal
younger with parental consent offences. However, the law did not contain
Voting age: 21 specific provisions guaranteeing the protection
Optional Protocol: not signed of children affected by armed conflict or in
situations of armed violence.7
CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182 Military training and military schools
Although voluntary enlistment was The Malaysian Military Academy (Akademi
Tentara Malaysia, ATMA) was replaced by
permitted at 17 and a half , only those aged the National Defence University of Malaysia
18 and above were in practice recruited (University Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia,
into the armed forces. UPNM), which opened in mid-2007. The new
university operated under the Defence Ministry
and accepted both military cadets and officers
Government and civilians. Members of the military graduating
from ATMA were contracted to serve the armed
National recruitment legislation and forces for at least ten years after completing their
practice studies. Graduates from the UPNM were required
The Armed Forces Act of 1972 prohibited the to serve for “a period of time”, the exact length
voluntary enlistment of any person below the age of which was unclear. Civilian graduates were
of 17 and a half without the written consent of required to become members of the Reserve
parents and the production of a “��
certified copy of Officers Training Unit (ROTU).8
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an entry in the register of births or by any other The Royal Military College, a Ministry of
evidence appearing to him to be sufficient”.1 Defence-supported secondary school, accepted
According to the government, in practice only selected boys for entry into Form 4, or children
those aged 18 and above were recruited into the from the ages of 15 to 17. Students at the college
armed forces.2 received a secondary school education as well as
There were reports of bullying of recruits. In military training. Graduates were not required to
October 2007 two recruits complained of abuse pursue a military career on completion of their
by their seniors and officers. One alleged that he studies.9
had been forced to drink weapons-cleaning fluid
and another alleged that his arm had been cut Developments
with a knife.3 Malaysia’s initial report to the UN Committee
Under the National Service Training Act of on the Rights of the Child was considered in
2003, all citizens of Malaysia between the ages January 2007. The Committee recommended that
of 16 and 35 years of age were required to be Malaysia ratify the Optional Protocol and that
available to undergo national service training the birth registration system for non-Malaysian
of up to 90 days. Failure to attend, either as children born in Malaysia be improved.10
trainees or trainers, was an offence and liable to
both a fine and imprisonment. Participants were 1 Armed Forces Act (1972), Article 18(3) and (4).
selected randomly via a government computer
2 Initial report of Malaysia to the UN Committee on
database system. A total of 95,000 people were the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/MYS/1,
��
22
chosen to participate in 2006; the figure for 2007 December 2006.
was expected to be 100,000.4
3 “Malaysia’s army: Only tough guys need apply”,
The stated aim of national service training
Washington Post, 16 October 2007.
was to prepare “Malaysian youths for national
service under the National Service Act 1952” 4 Presentation of Lee Soon Hoe, Director of Unit
Planning and Customer Service, Ministry of
and to create “a nation which is patriotic
Defense, Malaysia, International Workshop on
and resilient and imbued with the spirit of
Youth Values Development, 18–25 March 2007.
volunteerism”.5 Training consisted of “character-
building”, “nation-building”, physical training 5 National Service Training Act, Article 2.
and “community services modules”. According 6 Presentation of Lee Soon Hoe, above note 4.
to a presentation given by a representative of 7 Child Act 2001 (Act 611).
the Ministry of Defence, there were additional

8 “UPNM begins operations in mid-year 2007”,
Malaysian National News Agency, 13 September MALD I V E S
2006, www.bernama.com.my/ .
9 Profile of the Royal Military College, www.rmc. Republic of Maldives
edu.my.
10 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Population: 329,000 (158,000 under 18)
Consideration of reports submitted by state Government armed forces: not known
parties under Article 44 of the Convention, Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
Concluding observations: Malaysia, UN Doc. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
CRC/C/MYS/CO/1, 2 February 2007. Voting age: 181
Optional Protocol: ratified 29 December 2004
CRC, GC AP I and II
The minimum age of recruitment to the

reorganized defence forces was 18.
Government
practice
In April 2006 the National Security Service (NSS)
was reorganized and renamed as the Maldivian
National Defence Force (MNDF). It was also
redefined as a self-defence force rather than a
paramilitary force as hitherto.2 A separate police
force had been formed under the Home Ministry
in 2004, to differentiate the military duties of
the NSS from what had been its domestic law
enforcement duties. According to the MNDF
website, the age range for recruitment to the
force was 18 to 28.3 There was no conscription.

The Defence Institute for Training and Education
was the officiating unit of the MNDF responsible
for training.4
Developments
The Optional Protocol was ratified in December
2004. In its declaration, the government
confirmed that the minimum age for recruitment
to the National Security Service and Police was 18
and that all applicants were required to present
proof of a birth date.5 In its Initial Report on the
Optional Protocol to the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child the government stated that
the ages of applicants to the armed forces were
verified through the national registration card
and birth registration. The report also stated that
Law No. 9/91, Law on the Protection of the Rights
of the Child, was amended in November 2002
to raise the age for recruitment into the armed
forces from 16 to 18 years.6
1 Maldives High Commission, “Modest presence

to monitor referendum”, News, 1 August 2007,
www.maldiveshighcommission.org.

2 Maldives National Defence Force, www.mndf.gov.
mv. MAL I
3 Maldives National Defence Force, above note 2,
Recruitment. Republic of Mali
4 Maldives National Defence Force, above note 2.
5 Maldives declaration on accession to the Optional
6 Initial reports of States parties due in 2007,
Maldives, UN Doc. CRC/OPAC/MDV/1, 23 October Voluntary recruitment age: 18
2007. Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: ratified 16 May 2002

armed forces.
Context
At least 11 people were reported to have been
killed, some by landmines, following attacks in
northern Mali in August 2007 attributed to armed
militias led by a leader of a former armed Touareg
group.1 A number of soldiers as well as a team
conducting a survey of the incidence of locusts in
the area were kidnapped.2
Government
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practice
The constitution stated that “Defence of the
country is a duty of every citizen” (Article 22).
There was no evidence of under-18s in the armed
forces. Mali’s declaration on ratification of the
Optional Protocol in June 2002 stated that no one
under 18 could be recruited, even voluntarily, or
enrolled as a member of the armed forces, that
the criminal law would be applied against anyone
breaching this provision, and that children
unlawfully recruited into the armed forces could,
depending on their individual circumstances,
receive support for their economic and social
rehabilitation and reintegration.3 In 2006 the
government stated to the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child that the minimum age for
voluntary enrolment in the armed forces and for
conscription was 18, and that under Article 17
of the Child Protection Code it was forbidden to
cause under-18s to participate in or to involve
them in armed conflicts or to enrol them in the
armed forces or groups.4
Developments
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
called for the necessary measures to be put in
place to implement fully ILO Conventions 138 and
182, and for the Child Protection Code to be fully
implemented.5

Paris, Mali and 58 other states endorsed the Paris MALTA
recruitment or use by armed forces or armed Republic of Malta
children associated with armed forces or armed Population: 402,000 (88,000 under 18)
groups. The documents reaffirmed international Government armed forces: 1,600
standards and operational principles for Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
protecting and assisting child soldiers and Voluntary recruitment age: 17 years and
followed a wide-ranging global consultation 6 months; under 17 years and 6 months with
jointly sponsored by the French government and parental consent
UNICEF. Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: ratified 9 May 2002
1 “Mali: Indignation dominates reaction as attacks Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
in north escalate”, IRIN, 31 August 2007, www.
irinnews.org. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
2 “Mali-Niger: insecurity halts locust monitoring There was no evidence of under-18s being
but threat deemed low – FAO”, IRIN, 17
September 2007. recruited into the armed forces.
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. Government
4 Second periodic report of Mali to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. National recruitment legislation and
CRC/C/MLI/2, 11 April 2006. practice
Consideration of report submitted by Mali, There was no compulsory military service in
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/MLI/ Malta, and the Malta Armed Forces Act set a
CO/2, 2 February 2007. minimum age of 17 years and 6 months for
voluntary recruitment.1 In its declaration on
ratification of the Optional Protocol in May 2002,
the government prohibited the enlistment of
anyone under the age of 17 years and 6 months,
and ruled out the participation in hostilities of
anyone under the age of 18. The Declaration also
included the provision that “a person under 18
years may not be enlisted unless consent to the
enlistment is given in writing by the father of
such person or, if such person is not subject to
paternal authority, by the mother or by another
person in whose care the person offering to enlist
may be”.2 In its November 2005 Initial Report to
implementation of the Optional Protocol, Malta
stated that this requirement also applied to
persons “under the appropriate minimum age”,
apparently contradicting the declaration’s ban on
recruitment of any individual under the age of 17
years and 6 months.3 In response, the Committee
expressed its regret that the government had
given “no indication of a minimum age under
which it would not be possible to recruit children
under any circumstance, i.e. even with parental or
other legal guardians’ consent”. The Committee
therefore recommended the enactment of a law
establishing an absolute minimum age without
exception for voluntary recruitment.4
All individuals of any age seeking to enlist
were required by law to be fully informed of the
general conditions of engagement in the forces,
and “the recruiting officer shall not enlist any
person in the regular force unless satisfied by
that person that he has been given such a notice,

understands it and wishes to be enlisted”. Those
enlisting under the age of 18 had to renew their MAU R I TA N I A
enlistment on reaching their 18th birthday. In
practice, the Maltese armed forces had not Islamic Republic of Mauritania
recruited anyone under 18 since 1970, which
was confirmed in a letter from the government Population: 3.1 million (1.5 million under 18)
to the Child Soldiers Coalition in January 2008. Government armed forces: 15,900
Although the Armed Forces Act established a Compulsory recruitment age: 18
Junior Leaders Scheme allowing for recruitment Voluntary recruitment age: 18
for training of individuals under the age of 17 Voting age: 18
years and 6 months, no recruitment of this kind Optional Protocol: not signed
had taken place since 1970.5 Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Developments
Although the government stated that all
In September 2006 the Committee on the Rights
of the Child expressed concern at the absence of texts governing recruitment to the armed
legislation explicitly criminalizing the recruitment forces and police prohibited recruitment of
of children under the age of 15 into armed forces under-18s, it was unclear whether the 1962
or armed groups and their direct participation law providing for voluntary enlistment
in hostilities. The Committee also called on
the government to establish extraterritorial
at 16 with parental consent had been
jurisdiction for such crimes.6 abrogated.
Paris, Malta and 58 other states endorsed the Government
Paris Commitments to protect children from
unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces National recruitment legislation and
or armed groups and the Paris Principles and
guidelines on children associated with armed practice
forces or armed groups. The documents The 1991 constitution stated that “Every citizen
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reaffirmed international standards and has the duty of protecting and safeguarding the
operational principles for protecting and assisting independence of the country, its sovereignty
child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global and integrity of its territory” (Article 18). In its
consultation jointly sponsored by the French initial report to the UN Committee on the Rights
government and UNICEF. of the Child, the government had stated that all
texts governing recruitment to the armed forces
1 Initial Report of Malta to the UN Committee on and police prohibited recruitment of under-18s.1
the Rights of the Child on implementation of the However, the government did not identify the
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/MLT/1, laws and regulations that prohibited recruitment
10 November 2005. under the age of 18, and it remained unclear
2 Declaration of Malta on ratification of the whether the 1962 Law on the Recruitment
Optional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. for the Army, which provided for two years’
3 Initial Report, above note 1. compulsory service, was still in force or had ever
been applied. It required every citizen aged 17
to register for military service and be medically
Consideration of report submitted by Malta,
examined and to have their cases considered by
MLT/CO/1, 17 October 2006. a review body, and provided that those aged 16
could enlist voluntarily with parental consent.2
5 Initial Report, above note 1; letter to the Child
Soldiers Coalition from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 28 January 2008. Developments
6 Concluding observations, above note 4. In its concluding observations the Committee
on the Rights of the Child urged Mauritania to
ratify the Optional Protocol on the involvement of
children in armed conflict.3
In October 2007 Mauritania endorsed the
Paris Commitments to protect children from
unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces
or armed groups and the Paris Principles and
guidelines on children associated with armed
forces or armed groups. The two documents,
which were previously endorsed by 59 states
at a February 2007 ministerial meeting in

Paris, reaffirmed international standards and
operational principles for the protection of and MAUR I T I U S
assistance to child soldiers, following a wide-
ranging global consultation jointly sponsored by Republic of Mauritius
International standards Government armed forces: none
Mauritania ratified the African Charter on the Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable
Rights and Welfare of the Child on 21 September Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (for security
2005.4 forces)
Voting age: 18
1 Initial report of Mauritania to the UN Committee Optional Protocol: signed 11 November 2001
on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/ Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Add.42, 18 January 2000. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, IL0 182, ACRWC
2 Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin, Children:
The Invisible Soldiers, Rädda Barnen (Save the There were no reports of under-18s in the
Children – Sweden), Stockholm, 1998. security forces.
Consideration of report submitted by Mauritania,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/ Government
4 African Union, List of Countries Which Have National recruitment legislation and
Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Union practice
Convention on African Charter on the Rights and
Mauritius did not have a standing army; all
Welfare of the Child, www.africa-union.org.
military, police and security functions were
carried out by the Mauritius Police Force, which
incorporated an air wing, a paramilitary Special
Mobile Force and the National Coast Guard.1 The
minimum age of recruitment was 18 for all these
forces.
Mauritius developed a National Children’s
Policy (2003) and a National Plan of Action
(2004), and adopted the Child Protection
Amendment Act (2005) which criminalized child
abuse and exploitation, abduction and child
trafficking.2 The maximum penalty for child
trafficking was 15 years’ imprisonment.3 The
Office of the Ombudsperson for Children was
established in 2003 to promote and safeguard
children’s rights. A Children’s Act to implement
the provisions of the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child was in draft form.4
1 ��
Mauritius Police Force, http://police.gov.mu.
Consideration of report submitted by Mauritius,
Summary record, UN��
Doc. CRC/C/SR.1105,
��
27 January 2006.
Human Rights Practices: Mauritius, www.state.
gov.
4 African Commission on Human and People’s
Rights, Report of the Promotional Mission to
Mauritius, August 2006, www.achpr.org.

activities related to the promotion of health and
M E XICO education.4
There were over 1,660 federal, state and
United Mexican States municipal police forces.5 Candidates for the
Federal Preventive Police had to be 18 years
Population: 107.0 million (39.7 million under 18) of age and to have completed their secondary
Government armed forces: 237,800 education.6 Many military officials in recent years
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 �� were transferred as active members of the armed
Voluntary recruitment age: 16 (training or early forces to this police force, raising concerns that
enlistment – see text) their policing functions were not clearly subject
Voting age: 18
�� to civilian oversight.7
ratified 15 March 2002
CRC, GC AP I, ICC, ILO 182 Armed forces schools were divided into
superior, technical superior, secondary high
With parental consent, 16-year-olds could and technical schools. Diplomas and degrees
obtained in military schools were equivalent
volunteer for early military service. No to those obtained in civilian colleges.8 In times
information was available on the use of of armed conflict, students at military schools
under-18s in armed groups. were subject to military jurisdiction (fuero de
guerra). Foreign or national scholars studying at
military institutions were not subject to military
Government jurisdiction, but had to follow the appropriate
regulations.9
National recruitment legislation and Superior schools included the Military Health
practice Graduates School, Naval Medical School, Military
All Mexican men had to do military service in the Dentistry School and Military Engineers School.
army or the navy. In case of international armed Civilian defence personnel were trained at the
conflict, service was compulsory for nationals of Naval Studies Superior Centre and the National
allied countries in the armed conflict who were Defence College. Naval recruits and officers could
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resident in Mexico. Young men had to register obtain degrees in naval sciences, engineering,
with the military authorities between July and medicine and communications at naval superior
December of the year they turned 18. The Ministry schools.10 These admitted young men and women
of National Defence determined the number aged 17–21, with parental consent.11
of conscripts needed each year, and the navy Generally, technical superior schools, which
selected the conscripts it required from those included the Heroico Colegio Militar (army) and
chosen by lottery to undertake active service. the Heroica Escuela Naval Militar (navy), admitted
Recruits chosen by lottery started active service candidates between 15 and 18 years of age, with
in January or July of the following year. One year parental consent certified by a lawyer. Graduates
of active service was followed by membership of from the Heroico Colegio Militar were given the
the reserve until the age of 40 and of the National rank of second lieutenant on completing three
Guard until the age of 45. All men of military age years of studies. 12 After 18 months’ training at the
received an identification card indicating whether Air Force Specialist Troop Military School, cadets
they had fulfilled their military obligations.1 became second sergeants. Training at other
Volunteers for military service had to be technical superior schools was for only one year,
aged 18–30, but under-18s could volunteer with in theory allowing a 16-year-old to become a non-
parental consent in signal units for training as commissioned officer just 12 months after being
technicians under contracts for no more than admitted to the school.13
five years.2 Sixteen-year-olds who would be
abroad or studying when they would normally do Armed groups
their military service could enlist with parental
consent.3 Paramilitaries
Military service could be carried out either
Paramilitary groups, with strong links to
when required by the Ministry of Defence or at
politicians, the military and powerful economic
a training centre every Saturday from February
sectors operated in Chiapas and other southern
to December. F��
rom 2006 conscripts undertook
states, taking advantage of local conflicts based
military instruction only; previously they had
on ethnic, religious and political differences
also worked with disadvantaged people in
and disputes over the use of natural resources
educational, sporting, cultural and social
and access to land.14 Many of these groups
activities��
. Women could volunteer to join the
were registered officially, such as Peace and
armed forces from the age of 18. They undertook
Justice (Paz y Justicia), which according to non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) had issued

threats against political opponents and carried There was no information on the presence of
out enforced disappearances. Armed forces under-18s in any of these groups.
commanders reportedly trained members of
these forces.15 In June 2005 several families were
forced to flee their homes in Sabanilla, Chiapas,
Developments
after reported threats from members of Peace In March 2006 a constitutional amendment
and Justice.16 created a separate juvenile justice system for
The Rural Defence Corps consisted of armed children aged 12–18, where judges had to apply
units made up of volunteers who supported the the principles of the best interests of the child.25
armed forces when required, including in case The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
of armed conflict. They were reported to have a noted that the implementation of the system
strength of around 14,000.17 would require laws in each state to be drafted
In October 2006 unidentified armed groups, and implemented, as well as additional financial
believed to include officers of state and municipal and human resources, and urged Mexico to
police in plain clothes, made scores of arrests take steps to ensure that states implement the
without identifying themselves. The arrests revision as a matter of priority.26
took place in the city of Oaxaca during violence
��
that followed a demonstration by supporters of 1 1942 Ley del Servicio Militar Nacional, amended
the Popular Assembly of the People of Oaxaca 1998.
against the presence of the Federal Preventive 2 1942 Ley del Servicio Militar Nacional.
Police in the city��
. The officers reportedly
3 1942 Reglamento de la Ley del Servicio Militar.
tortured and ill-treated detainees, who were
held incommunicado over several days.18 In 4 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
November 2006 an indigenous community (FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,
in Chiapas was attacked by over 200 armed Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latina
y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Mexico, November
individuals, reportedly wearing clothes used by
state police and armed with machetes and high-
calibre firearms. Four people died and four were 5 Ibid.
subjected to enforced disappearance.19 6 Secretaría de Seguridad Pública del Distrito
Little was known about the structure Federal, Instituto Técnico de Formación Policial,
of paramilitary groups, and there was no http://portal.ssp.df.gob.mx.
information on whether their members included 7 Amnesty International (AI), Mexico: Laws without
under-18s. justice – Human rights violations and impunity
in the public security and criminal justice system
Armed opposition groups (AMR 41/002/2007), 7 February 2007.
In November 2006 there were estimated to 8 2005 Ley de Educación Militar del Ejército y
be more than 30 armed opposition groups Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos.
in Mexico.20 One of the largest, the Popular 9 1986 Ley Orgánica del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea
Revolutionary Army (Ejército Popular Mexicanos, amended 1998.
Revolucionario, EPR), which emerged in the 10 FLACSO, above note 4.
state of Guerrero in 1996, had a presence in 11 See, for example, Escuela Médico Naval,
nearly 20 states including Chiapas. The Zapatista Requisitos de Ingreso, at http://ec.digaden.edu.
National Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de mx.
Liberación Nacional, EZLN), present in Chiapas 12 Heroico Colegio Militar, www.sedena.gob.
since 1994, had spread to several other Mexican mx; Heroica Escuela Naval de México, http://
states, although not Guerrero.21 No information ec.digaden.edu.mx.
was available on the number of members of each 13 Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA),
organization. Admisión 2007, Personal Civil y Militar
In July 2005 the EZLN announced plans to con secundaria.
initiate alternative political activism in Chiapas.22 14 Observatorio Ciudadano de Políticas de Niñez,
The leader of the EZLN, Subcomandante Marcos, Adolescencia y Familia, Unfulfilled Rights, Limited
denied links between the EZLN and other Futures: Public Policies and the Rights of Children
armed opposition groups, saying that the group and Adolescents in Mexico, 1 January 2006, www.
was seeking a peaceful solution and peace crin.org.
negotiations.23 15 “La PGR debe investigar a los grupos armados y
Smaller groups such as the Democratic sus nexos con militares”, La Jornada, 10 February
Revolutionary Trend–People’s Army (Tendencia 2005, www.jornada.unam.mx.
Democrática Revolucionaria–Ejército del Pueblo, 16 Amnesty International Report 2006.
TDR–EP) continued to be active and claimed 17 Marcos Pablo Moloeznik, “La naturaleza de un
responsibility for attacks with explosives in instrumento militar atípico: las fuerzas armadas
Morelos and Mexico state in 2004 and 2005 and mexicanas”, Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad,
in Mexico City in November 2006.24 Year 19, No. 1, 2005, www.fasoc.cl.

18 AI, “Mexico: Fear of torture or ill-treatment/
incommunicado detention” (AMR 41/055/2006), MO LD O VA
28 November 2006.
19 AI, “Mexico: Further information on fear for Republic of Moldova
safety/fear of ill-treatment/arbitrary detention”
(AMR 41/008/2007), 20 February 2007. Population: 4.2 million (1.0 million under 18)
20 “Estiman que hay más de 30 grupos armadas”, El Government armed forces: 6,800
Universal, 10 November 2006, www.eluniversal. Compulsory recruitment age: 18
com.mx. Voluntary recruitment age: 17, training only
21 Patricia de los Santos, “Grupos Armados en Voting age: 18
Mexico”, Rebelión, 3 April 2005, www.rebelion. Optional Protocol: ratified 7 April 2004
org. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
22 Amnesty International Report 2006. CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
23 “El EZLN no tiene nexos con grupos armados:
‘Marcos’ ”, El Sol de Cuautla, 13 December 2006, Officer trainees entering military training
www.oem.com.mx. at 17 were required to sign a military
24 “Estiman que hay más de 30 grupos armadas”, El
Universal, 10 November 2006.
service contract at 18 to be fulfilled on
25 Intervención del Secretario Técnico del
completing their education at 23.
Consejo de Menores, Lic. José Antonio Aguilar,
Consideration of third periodic report of Mexico
to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Context
23 May 2006. Security was a major concern. The status of the
26 Committee on the Rights of the Child, territory of Transdniestr remained unresolved. It
Consideration of third periodic report submitted controlled Moldova’s main energy sources and
by Mexico, Concluding observations, UN Doc. hosted Russian Federation troops that had defied
CRC/C/MEX/CO/3, 2 June 2006. international commitments to withdraw by 1999.
People and trade passed unregulated through
its long border with Ukraine, although security
improved after Ukraine introduced a customs
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mechanism in 2006. Isolated armed skirmishes
between Moldova and Transdniestr were reported
at ports and installations in 2007.
Government
practice
All male citizens, including men with dual
citizenship, had to register for conscription
with their local military authority at the age of
16, at which time they acquired the status of
recruits. Between 18 and 27 they were liable for
conscription.1 The term of service was 12 months,
three for conscripts with higher education.2
Alternative civilian service of 24 months was
available for conscientious objectors.3 In the
event of war, all young people could be mobilized
as soon as they were 18.
The Law on the Status of People doing
Military Service regulated the situation of non-
conscript soldiers. Contracts of up to five years’
service were open to all 18-year-old citizens
(people with dual citizenship were ineligible).
Troops were forbidden to obey unlawful
orders that contravened international
humanitarian law or Moldova’s international
treaty obligations.4 Such contraventions could
incur imprisonment of between 16 and 25 years
under an amendment to the 2002 Criminal Code
(Article 391).

Other amendments to the Criminal Code 4 Law on the Status of People doing Military
brought Moldova more closely into line with the Service, above note 1, Article 37.
Optional Protocol. The use of trafficked children 5 Declaration on accession to the Optional
in armed conflict was made punishable by Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
between ten and 25 years’ imprisonment (Article 6 Lenta.ru website, 23 March 2007, www.lenta.ru.
206), and knowingly taking a child hostage
was punishable by between 12 and 20 years’
imprisonment (Article 280).

Military education was available to young people
who were citizens of Moldova and not doing
military service. Under the Law on the Status
of People doing Military Service, those who
entered a Military Education Institute at 17 were
required to sign a military service contract at
18, which they carried out on completing their
course of education at 23. Students who were
expelled from a military institute for academic or
disciplinary shortcomings were to be immediately
conscripted, whatever their age (Article 29).
Developments
Moldova ratified the Optional Protocol in April
2004. Its declaration stated that the minimum
age for conscription was 18 but made no explicit
statement with regard to voluntary enlistment.5
Transdniestr
The self-proclaimed state had its own laws
and structures, but was not internationally
recognized. In 2007 Transdniestr had 7,500 men
doing military service in its border guards or
internal forces controlled by its Interior Ministry
and State Security Committee. It also had an
armed People’s Guard which foreign volunteers
could join.
According to Transdniestr’s 2005 conscription
law, male residents were liable to call-up
between 18 and 27 years, and those with a higher
education up to the age of 30. Conscription was
for 18 months, 12 for men with higher education.
Professional contracts were also open to
volunteers aged 18 and over, including foreigners.
In time of war, soldiers were to be mobilized from
the reserve.
In the second half of 2006 only 22 per cent
of the conscription quota was met, according
to local reports.6 Many recruits failed medical
requirements, and others reportedly migrated
to Ukraine or elsewhere in Moldova where
conscription terms were shorter.
1 Law on the Status of People doing Military

Service, No. 162-XVI, 22 July 2005, Article 38(1).
2 Law on the Training of Citizens for the Defence of
the Motherland, No. 1245-XV of 2002.
3 Law on Alternative Service, No. 534-XIV of 1999.

1 Initial report of Monaco to the UN Committee on
MONACO the Rights of the Child on implementation of the
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/MCO/1,
Principality of Monaco 1 March 2006.
Population: 35,000 (7,000 under 18) Consideration of report submitted by Monaco
Government armed forces: none on implementation of the Optional Protocol,
Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
Voluntary recruitment age: 21 (to security forces) MCO/CO/1, 8 June 2007.
Voting age: 18
CRC, GC AP I and II
Monaco had no armed forces.
Government
practice
The Franco-Monegasque Treaty of 17 July 1918
established the responsibility of France for the
defence of the territorial integrity of Monaco.
There were no armed forces; the only security
forces within Monaco were the Prince’s Guard and
the fire brigade. Volunteers for these forces had
to be at least 21 years of age, in keeping with the
provisions of Sovereign Ordinance Number 8017
of 1 June 1984, and with Monaco’s declaration on
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ratification of the Optional Protocol in November
2001.1
Developments
In June 2007 the UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child recommended that Monaco “consider
establishing extra-territorial jurisdiction over war
crimes which involve conscripting or enlisting
children under the age of fifteen into the armed
forces, or using them to participate actively in
hostilities, if such crimes are committed by or
against a Monegasque national or a person who
otherwise has a close link with the State Party”.
The Committee urged that “given the potential
connection between the sale of children and
their recruitment into armed groups … the State
Party proceed to ratify the Optional Protocol on
the Sale of Children, which it signed on 26 June
2000”.2
Paris, Monaco and 58 other states endorsed

MO NGOLIA Government
Mongolia
practice
Population: 2.6 million (998,000 under 18) Less than three per cent of the armed forces
Government armed forces: 8,600 were estimated to be volunteers.3 According to
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 Mongolia’s 2004 report to the Committee on the
Voluntary recruitment age: unclear Rights of the Child, men aged 18–25 years were
Voting age: 18 liable to compulsory military service of one year,
Optional Protocol: ratified 6 October 2004 under the Law on Citizens’ Military Obligations
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): and the Legal Status of the Military (Article 9),
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 which set no minimum age for mobilization in
time of conflict. There was no minimum legal
There were no records or monitoring of age for joining the armed forces as a volunteer.4
However, Mongolia’s declaration on ratification
the age of recruits in the armed forces, of the Optional Protocol stated that the minimum
which were largely conscripted. National age for recruitment into military service was
legislation did not explicitly specify 18.5 It was not clear if that was a statement of
minimum ages for recruitment on a accepted practice or if new legislation had been
voluntary basis or in armed conflict. introduced to set a minimum age in law.
The use of minors as foreign mercenaries in
armed conflicts was punishable by 10–15 years’
Context imprisonment, as was training, financing or
otherwise supporting them.6
In its report to the UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child in 2004 the government said it attached Military training and military schools
“special importance” to prompt assistance to
children in difficult circumstances, which, under There were reportedly no military schools for
the Law on Protection of Child Rights, included under-18s or any explicitly military patriotic
those affected by armed conflict.1 training in the main education system. However,
The parliamentary National Human Rights under-18s were permitted, at their own request
Commission of Mongolia had a special brief to and with parental permission, to study in the
monitor children’s rights, but the international music school of the Military Academy, where
human rights standards on its website did not in 2007 there were 18 children aged 15–17
include the Convention on the Rights of the reportedly enrolled.7
Child or its Optional Protocol. Its annual reports
monitored numerous Mongolian institutions but Developments
not the armed forces. No reason for this was
given. As the procedure for raising an individual International standards
case with the Commission did not guarantee Mongolia ratified the Optional Protocol in
automatic and confidential transmission of October 2004, stating in its declaration that the
complaints, complainants in closed institutions minimum age for recruitment into military service
such as the military could have been deterred was 18, that male citizens were obliged to do
from registering complaints. military service, but those with religious or moral
In its annual report for 2003 the National objections could do alternative service.
Human Rights Commission noted that in five
out of six cases, Mongolia’s reports to UN treaty
1 Second periodic report of Mongolia to the UN
bodies were overdue, and urged that drafting
responsibilities be added to job descriptions in CRC/C/65/Add.32, 15 November 2004.
ministries. It found that national legislation was
2 Ibid.
inconsistent with Mongolia’s obligations under
international treaties and that those obligations 3 CIA, World Factbook 2007.
were only partially fulfilled. It singled out the 4 Second periodic report, above note 1.
Criminal Code, which still provided for use of 5 Declaration on accession to the Optional
the death penalty, which was outlawed by the Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 6 Criminal Code, Article 303(2).
ratified by Mongolia in 2002. The Commission 7 Confidential source.
found that an “enormous volume” of executive
orders and decrees were not centrally registered,
let alone compiled and published. Many were
inconsistent with national laws and international
human rights principles. 2

MONTENEGRO Profile: Montenegro, www.fco.gov.uk.
3 CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov.
Republic of Montenegro 4 Optional Protocol, reservations and declarations,
www2.ohchr.org.
(abolished 2006)
Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: ratified 2 May 2007 by
succession

Context
A referendum in Montenegro on 21 May 2006,
observed by the European Union and the Council
of Europe, narrowly favoured Montenegro’s
independence from Serbia by a vote of over 55
per cent. The state of Serbia and Montenegro
had been a loose union of two semi-independent
republics created in 2003 following the break-up
of the former Yugoslavia. Montenegro formally
K—O
declared independence on 3 June 2006, and was
recognized as a member state of the UN on 28
June. Serbia and Montenegro both subsequently
appointed ministers to carry out previously state-
level functions, including for defence and foreign
relations.1
Government
practice
In 2007 a draft Defence Law provided a legal
basis for the creation and authority of a ministry
of defence. Following the split with Serbia, some
armed forces personnel in Montenegro chose
to serve in the Serbian armed forces and some
in Serbia chose to serve in Montenegro. Initial
reforms of the armed forces in Montenegro
included ending conscription and compulsory
armed service.2 Conscription was abolished in
August 2006.3
In its declaration on succession to the
Optional Protocol, the government stated that
there was no mandatory military service and that
the minimum age for voluntary recruitment was
18.4
1 Amnesty International, Europe and Central Asia:

Summary of Amnesty International’s concerns in
the region, January–June 2006, 1 December 2006.

Morocco and Government
W estern S ahara practice
Kingdom of Morocco The 1996 constitution stated that “All citizens
shall contribute to the defence of the country”
Population: 31.5 million (11.7 million under 18) (Article 16). The minimum age for voluntary
Government armed forces: 200,800 recruitment in the armed forces had been set at
Compulsory recruitment age: conscription 18 by the Royal Decree of 9 June 1996.9
abolished Morocco reportedly moved to abolish
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 compulsory military service in 2006 as a result
of fears that the army was being infiltrated by
Voting age: 18
members of armed Islamist opposition groups.
Optional Protocol: ratified 22 May 2002 Morocco’s junior defence minister was quoted
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): by news agencies as saying that “This text of
CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182 law came to abolish the obligatory military
service with immediate effect, according to the
There were no reports of under-18s serving instructions of his Majesty King Mohammed, the
in the armed forces. commander-in-chief and the chief of staff of the
royal armed forces.”10
There was no evidence of under-age
Context recruitment in the Moroccan armed forces.
The ongoing dispute between Morocco and the
Polisario Front (the pro-independence Sahrawi Military training and military schools
movement) over control of Western Sahara There were two military schools, in Kenitra and
remained deadlocked more than 30 years after Meknes. According to the government, students
the conflict had begun. The Polisario Front called who attended military schools did so voluntarily,
for an independent state of Western Sahara and those under 18 followed the same national
and ran a self-proclaimed government-in-exile curriculum as those in ordinary state schools.11
in refugee camps in south-western Algeria.
Demonstrations by Sahrawis against Moroccan
rule continued into 2006 and hundreds of people
Armed groups
were reportedly arrested. 1 In April 2007 the Polisario maintained that recruitment to the
Polisario Front rejected a Moroccan proposal for People’s Liberation Army (PLA, their armed
enhanced autonomy for the region, since it failed wing) was voluntary and that the minimum
to include a referendum on independence.2 In age, including for military training, was 18. The
April 2007 the UN Security Council renewed the Polisario’s UK representative stated that “No
mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum Sahrawi in the Sahrawi refugee camps in south-
in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 October west Algeria who is under the age of 18 years,
2007.3 The same month a leaked UN mission receives any military training, or participates
report voiced serious concerns over the human actively in situations of armed conflict.”12 It
rights situation in Western Sahara.4 was not possible to verify independently the
Between 2006 and the end of 2007 some 700 recruitment and use of under-18s in the PLA.
suspected members of armed Islamist groups
were arrested by Moroccan security forces.5
Over 500 members of the unauthorized Islamist
Developments
group Al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) were In October 2007 Morocco endorsed the Paris
charged with offences such as belonging to an Commitments to protect children from unlawful
unauthorized association after the group had recruitment or use by armed forces or armed
launched a recruitment campaign. 6 In March groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines
2007, 18 people were arrested in connection on children associated with armed forces or
with a suicide bomb attack in the Sidi Moumen armed groups. The two documents, which were
district.7 In April 2007 suicide bomb attacks were previously endorsed by 59 states at a February
made close to the US consulate in Casablanca. 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, reaffirmed
The renewed attacks in Morocco coincided with international standards and operational
bomb attacks in Algeria.8 principles for the protection of and assistance to

1 “Morocco/Western Sahara”, Amnesty
International Report 2007. MOZ A M B I Q U E
2 “Morocco/Western Sahara”, Human Rights Watch
World Report 2008. Republic of Mozambique
3 UN Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007), UN
Doc. S/RES/1754 (2007), 30 April 2007. Population: 19.8 million (10.0 million under 18)
4 “Leak Shows UN Concern for Western Sahara”,
Financial Times, 17 April 2007, www.ft.com. Compulsory recruitment age: 19
5 “Morocco/Western Sahara”, above notes 1, 2. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
6 “Morocco/Western Sahara”, above note 1. Voting age: 18
7 “Morocco arrests 18 people after explosion:
minister”, Reuters, 15 March 2007. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
8 “New suicide attacks hit Morocco”, BBC News, CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
14 April 2007.
9 Report of Morocco to the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.1, 19 in the armed forces. The minimum age for
August 1995. voluntary and compulsory recruitment was
10 “Morocco to do away with compulsory army 18, but it could be lowered in times of war.
service”, Reuters, 2 December 2006; Olivier
Guitta, “The Islamisation of Morocco”,
Weekly Standard, 2 December 2006, www. Government
weeklystandard.com.
11 Report, above note 9. National recruitment and legislation
12 Communication from Acting Representative of the According to the constitution, “participating
Polisario Front to the United Kingdom (UK) and in the defence of national independence and
Ireland, 17 April 2007. sovereignty and territorial integrity are an
honour and the sacred duty of all Mozambicans”.
The constitution also allows civilian service to
substitute for or complement military service for
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those not subject to military duties, including
conscientious objectors.1
Under the Law on Military Service all
Mozambican citizens were obliged to register
for two years’ military service at 18, and were
liable for service until the age of 35. However,
age limits could be altered in time of war. Actual
incorporation into the armed forces took place
in the year the recruit reached 20 years of age.
Eighteen was also the minimum age for special
recruitment, a category that included voluntary
military service.2
There was no evidence of under-age
recruitment, and the law provided for exemptions
from military service for the sons or brothers of
soldiers who died in service and young people
who were head of the household or the family
breadwinner. Although those who failed to
register for the call-up were supposedly subject
to sanctions, these were not specified and there
were no legal mechanisms to make young people
register for military service.3 As a result, few
people had registered for military service and
every year over 90 per cent of 18-year-olds had
refused to do so. However, in 2006 penalties were
introduced for failing to register, and registration
became a precondition for obtaining or renewing
passports and for accessing employment in the
civil service. As a result, the number registering
for military service soared to 167,000, well
beyond the government’s target of 59,000. Most
of those who registered were over 18 and the

majority of 18-year-olds still did not do so, as
happened in the registration exercise of 2007.4 MYAN M A R
Union of Myanmar
Population: 50.5 million (18 million under 18)
and reintegration (DDR) Government armed forces: 375,000
The proliferation of small arms, a continuing Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription in
legacy of 16 years of civil war, remained a law
problem. In August 2005 the UN Development Voluntary recruitment age: 18
Program (UNDP) provided US$550,000 to assist
Voting age: 181
the government in the implementation of a two-
year project to collect and destroy illegal arms.5 Optional Protocol: not signed
Thousands of illegal arms and weapons of war, Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
including rockets and landmines, were destroyed CRC
in October 2006, when it was estimated that
some 42,000 firearms and over 260 million Thousands of children continued to be
rounds of ammunition had been recovered since recruited and used in the Tatmadaw Kyi
1994.6 Despite these efforts tons of obsolete (army) and in armed political groups, as
weaponry and munitions continued to be kept the army continued its expansion drive
in poorly maintained arsenals, and in 2007 one
such dump on the outskirts of Maputo exploded, and internal armed conflict persisted
killing more than 100 people and injuring in some areas of the country. Although
hundreds more civilians and soldiers.7 the government took some steps to
address the issue, a formal disarmament,
Developments demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
program was not in place.
Mozambique acceded to the Optional Protocol
on the involvement of children in armed conflict Context
on 19 October 2004. In its declaration the The State Peace and Development Council
government stated that the minimum age of (SPDC, the military government, headed by
enlistment was 18, that “incorporation” started at Senior General Than Shwe) continued to rule
age 20, and that in case of war the age of military by decree in the absence of a constitution. The
service could be modified.8 SPDC-controlled National Convention ended in
September 2007, after drawing up principles for
1 Constitution, Article 267. a new constitution2 which were to be put to a
2 Law on Military Service, 24/97 of 23 December referendum at an unspecified date.
1997. In August 2007 prominent activists were
3 Ibid. arrested during demonstrations that broke out
4 “Registration for military service soars”, in Yangon and other towns in protest at the
Mozambique News Agency, 31 May 2006; large increase in the price of fuel imposed by
“Regularização do SMO como condicionalismo the SPDC. In September Buddhist monks led
para benefícios”, Vertical, 12 January 2007. mass protests in Yangon, Mandalay and other
5 “PNUD reforca controlo das armas ilegais no towns, during which tens of thousands of people
pais”, Notícias, 26 August 2005. peacefully demonstrated in the streets and
temples. The demonstrations were violently
6 “Illegal arms, mines to be destroyed in
suppressed by the security forces, who beat and
Mozambique”, Agence France-Presse, 16 October
2006. shot at demonstrators. An unknown number of
people, including monks and children, were killed
7 Mozambique News Agency, “Over a hundred
or injured. Almost 3,000 people were arrested;
dead as military arsenal explodes”, AIM Report
although many were released, hundreds of others
No. 338, www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news.
remained in detention.3
8 Declaration of Mozambique on accession to the In response to the crisis, the UN Secretary-
General dispatched his Special Advisor, Ibrahim
Gambari, to Myanmar for talks with the SPDC
and opposition leaders. On 11 October the UN
Security Council issued a presidential statement
calling for the release of all political prisoners and
for SPDC dialogue with “all concerned parties”,
and deploring the SPDC’s use of violence.4 On
2 October a similar resolution adopted by the

UN Human Rights Council had urged the SPDC to Defence Services Act and the War Office Council
co-operate fully with humanitarian organizations, Directive did not allow a person under 18 to be
and requested Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the Special enlisted. The letter further stated that forced
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in conscription or compulsory recruitment was
Myanmar, to seek a visit to the country.5 The visit prohibited, and that determining the minimum
was scheduled for November 2007. age requirement for compulsory recruitment was
Ceasefire agreements between the SPDC therefore unnecessary.12 However, in practice
and a number of ethnic-minority-based armed the Tatmadaw forcibly recruited both adults
groups remained in force. The ceasefire groups and children through intimidation, coercion and
were not formally demobilized and continued violence.13
to exert partial control over limited territory and
to engage in business activities. However, the Military training and military schools
Tatmadaw Kyi and several ethnic-minority armed Information about military training and military
groups, notably the Shan State Army-South schools was limited. The Defence Services
(SSA-South), the Karen National Union (KNU) and (Army) Officers’ Training School in Bahtoo and
the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) the tri-services Defence Services Academy (DSA)
continued to fight sporadically in the eastern in Maymyo were the two main officer training
part of the country. Fighting between the Karen schools, the latter accepting high-school leavers
National Liberation Army (KNLA, the KNU’s armed between 16 and 19 years of age for a four-year
wing) and the military escalated during 2006 in course.14
northern Kayin state and Bago division, amid Basic training for recruits, including
widespread Tatmadaw abuses against civilians, under-18s, reportedly lasted for 18 weeks and
including extrajudicial executions, forced labour, took place at over 20 training camps. Recruits
torture, destruction of crops and houses, internal underwent physical and combat training, which
displacement and collective punishments during reportedly proved particularly difficult for the
counter-insurgency operations.6 The Tatmadaw younger children. They also had to work on farms
continued to attack villages in northern Kayin or at other business ventures of officers.15 A
state and in eastern Shan state in mid-2007.7 September 2006 report found that conditions in
Four parties in Myanmar were identified military training centres were harsh for under-18s,
as using child soldiers in the 26 October 2006 characterized by overcrowding and poor nutrition
K—O
UN Secretary-General’s Report to the Security and medical care.16
Council on children and armed conflict: the
Tatmadaw, the KNLA, the Karenni Army (KA, the Child recruitment and deployment
KNPP’s armed wing) and the United Wa State Although the SPDC stated repeatedly that it
Army (UWSA, a ceasefire group).8 Ten parties was against their policy to recruit under-18s,17
were identified as recruiting or using child boys continued to be forcibly recruited in large
soldiers in the Secretary-General’s December numbers into the army in order to increase troop
2007 Report to the Security Council on children levels. From 1988 the army expanded rapidly; at
and armed conflict.9 the same time desertions reportedly increased
and volunteers decreased.18 Both military and
Government civilian recruiters seized or coerced street
children and children at bus and train stations
National recruitment legislation and and other public places. A system of incentives
practice and punishments was in place to encourage
recruiters to fill their quotas.19 Some local
Under the provisions of Directive No 13/73 (1974) authorities were reportedly pressured by the
of the Myanmar Defence Services and War Office military to produce a certain number of recruits
Council, under-18s were not permitted to be per village, some of them children. Some children
recruited into the armed forces.10 were threatened with jail if they did not agree
Under the 1993 Child Law, a child was to join the army.20 Once in the army, their ages
anyone under the age of 16 and a youth was were recorded as at least 18.21 Anecdotal reports
anyone over 16 and below 18. The law defined indicate that some children from vulnerable
penalties for offences including the abuse and families were taken to army bases, but not
torture of children, and stated that “employing officially recruited. They were reportedly used in
or permitting a child to perform work which is non-combat activities and were enlisted when
hazardous to the life of the child or which may they reached 18 years of age.22
cause disease to the child or which is harmful to After training, children were used as guards
the child’s moral character” was punishable by at checkpoints, porters, cleaners and spies,
imprisonment of up to six months or a fine, or and in active combat. Once deployed, they were
both (Section 65).11 at risk of attack, malnutrition and disease.23
A 21 September 2007 letter to the Child The younger boys were sometimes kept at the
Soldiers Coalition from the Permanent Mission base and acted as officers’ servants, sentries or
of Myanmar in Geneva stated that the Myanmar

clerks. Child soldiers witnessed or participated operated a quota system for recruitment in
in counter-insurgency activities such as the village tracts under its control and also relied on
destruction of villages and crops.24 voluntary recruitment. Under-18s were accepted,
An unknown number of children who and reportedly received the same treatment as
attempted to escape from the Tatmadaw were adult soldiers.31
sentenced to one to two years’ imprisonment,
possibly longer, for “desertion”.25 They were Armed opposition groups
reportedly held in Insein, Mawlamyine and The SSA-South stated that it was against their
Bassein prisons.26 Other under-18s who were policy to use child soldiers, and that they
recaptured after attempting to escape were provided care at their bases for hundreds of
detained at their battalion camp and then under-18s who had been internally displaced
forced to resume their duties as soldiers. Some or orphaned.32 However, restrictions on access
child soldiers who escaped in conflict areas made it very difficult to obtain independent
surrendered to armed groups.27 information.
The KA and KNLA engaged in initial
Armed groups discussions with UN agencies on action plans
to stop the recruitment and use of children. In
Several armed groups, some still fighting March and April 2007 respectively the KNLA and
against the Tatmadaw, and some in alliance with KA signed Deeds of Commitment, committing
them, recruited and used child soldiers, but themselves not to recruit or use child soldiers
the numbers were much lower than those child and to facilitate the disarmament, demobilization
soldiers recruited and used by the Tatmadaw. and reintegration (DDR) of children released
from their ranks.33 During the June 2007 visit
Ceasefire groups and armed groups to Myanmar by the Special Representative for
allied to the SPDC the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Several ceasefire groups and armed groups conflict (SRSG), the government agreed to further
allied to the SPDC were reported to recruit discussions to finalize arrangements for the UN
and use child soldiers, including the Karen country team to engage the KNU and KNPP on
National Union-Karen National Liberation Army action plans.34
– Peace Council (KNU-KNLA PC), the UWSA, the The KA stated that it had demobilized under-
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the 18s in its ranks. The KNLA continued to use
Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and the Karenni child soldiers, but their numbers had reportedly
Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF). declined since 2002. Its official policy was not
The former KNU 7th Brigade commander, who to recruit or use anyone under 18; however,
had been dismissed from the KNU, formed the witnesses reported the presence of child
KNU-KNLA PC in January 2007 and signed a soldiers in KNLA camps, at checkpoints and in
peace agreement with the SPDC in February operations.35
2007. Subsequently several boys from the Mae
La refugee camp in Thailand and other areas in Disarmament, demobilization
Thailand and Myanmar were reportedly forcibly
recruited by the KNU-KNLA PC.28 Previously, and reintegration (DDR)
under the same commander, the KNU 7th Brigade At a UN Security Council meeting on 24 July
had recruited and used child soldiers on a regular 2006 the Myanmar government delegation
basis.29 stated that the government had drawn up “an
The recruitment and use of boys as young action plan that included protection of children’s
as 12 by the UWSA had been reported in 2002, rights, prevention measures, promoting public
and some witness accounts suggested that awareness and coordinating with UNICEF”.36
these practices continued, although no further The plan reportedly outlined procedures for
information was available. The KIA, another discharging soldiers found to be under 18;
ceasefire group, stated that they did not recruit vocational training, other educational options
under-18s, but if under-18s asked to join they and income support for them; public-awareness
were housed in the army compound, attended raising; punishment of recruiters; and co-
school or worked around the camp. One KIA operation with international agencies.37
soldier estimated that there were approximately In September 2007 the SPDC stated that
300 under-18-year-olds in the KIA. The KPNLF, the Committee for the Prevention of Military
a ceasefire group in northern Kayah state, also Recruitment of Under-age Children, established
recruited and used child soldiers, some as young in 2004 to prevent the forced recruitment of
as 12, although they denied this to Human Rights children, undertook extensive field trips and
Watch.30 “launched a campaign to promote awareness and
The DKBA, a KNLA breakaway group which stricter enforcement of laws and regulations on
became allied to the SPDC in late 1994, recruited recruitments among the military establishments
and used child soldiers. The DKBA reportedly and training institutions”.38 The number of

children who were released from the armed operational. He noted that the number did not
forces was not known and was not possible to reflect the scale of the problem.47
verify. The SPDC provided very few details about In April 2007 the Security Council working
punishments for recruiters.39 There was no formal group on children and armed conflict placed the
DDR program.40 situation of children affected by armed conflict
in Myanmar on its agenda. The SRSG visited
Myanmar in June 2007 and met high-ranking
Developments government officials, the Government Committee
In June 2004 the UN Committee on the Rights for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of
of the Child expressed deep concern about the Under-age Children and the UWSA. The purpose
direct and indirect impact of armed conflicts of the visit was to establish a UN task force
and forced labour on children in Myanmar. The on children and armed conflict and to discuss
Committee recommended that all combatants modalities of the monitoring and reporting
under 18 be demobilized and reintegrated, that mechanism, established under UN Security
the army ensure that recruits were 18, and that Council Resolution 1612, undertaken by the UN
the SPDC ratify the Optional Protocol and ILO country team in co-operation with the SPDC.
Conventions 138 and 182.41 The SRSG recommended inter alia that the SPDC
In October 2006 the SPDC gave the establish a transparent complaints procedure
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for under-age recruitment, disciplinary action
a list of 17 complaints of child recruitment that it for those responsible and full co-operation with
said had been resolved.42 In June 2007 the ICRC the UN country team. The Committee for the
“strongly denounced violations of international Prevention of Military Recruitment of Under-
humanitarian law committed against civilians age Children agreed in principle to establish
and detainees” and expressed grave concern a subcommittee to deal with reintegration of
at “the persistent use of detainees as porters” former child soldiers. 48 The UN Security Council
by the SPDC. The ICRC’s operations to deliver working group on children and armed conflict
aid to conflict-affected areas were hampered was expected to examine the Secretary-General’s
by severely increased restrictions imposed report on children and armed conflict in Myanmar
by the SPDC. From late 2005 onwards, the in late 2007.
SPDC prevented the ICRC from conducting In September 2007 the SPDC established
K—O
private interviews with detainees, leading to a Working Group for the Prevention of Military
the ICRC’s withdrawal from prison visits.43 The Recruitment of Underage Children, which
SPDC denied access to conflict areas to UN engaged at a working level with the Country Task
agencies and international non-governmental aid Force on Monitoring and Reporting (established
organizations. by the UN country team). In addition, two
In March 2007 the UN General Assembly government task forces were set up to address
adopted a resolution on Myanmar, expressing monitoring and reporting and the rehabilitation
grave concern at “the continuing recruitment and and reintegration of children released from the
use of child soldiers” and strongly urging the armed forces.49
SPDC to put an immediate end to the practice, in An unknown number of former child soldiers
co-operation with the UN, particularly UNICEF.44 continued to flee to Thailand after escaping from
In February 2007 a Supplementary the Tatmadaw. Some were in refugee camps
Understanding was signed by the SPDC and and some joined the Burmese migrant worker
the International Labour Organization (ILO). It community (see Thailand entry).50
provided for a complaints mechanism under
which individuals could bring cases of forced 1 CIA World Factbook 2007, at https://www.cia.
labour under ILO Convention 29 Concerning gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
Forced Labour, which included forced and under- geos/bm.html.
age recruitment, to the ILO liaison officer in 2 “Lt-Gen Thein Sein delivers concluding speech
Yangon. The Supplementary Understanding was at plenary session of National Convention”, New
effective immediately and was to be implemented Light of Myanmar, 3 September 2007.
on a trial basis for 12 months.45 The ILO reported 3 “2,459 released on pledge up to date”, New Light
in March 2007 that one complaint concerned of Myanmar, 16 October 2007.
the recruitment of a child into the Tatmadaw.
4 UN Security Council, “Security Council calls
The case was forwarded to the SPDC Working for ‘genuine’ dialogue in Myanmar to achieve
Group, and the child was subsequently released reconciliation”, press document, 11 October 2007,
and returned safely to his family, and action UN Doc. SC/9139.
was taken against those responsible.46 The UN
5 UN Human Rights Council, “Situation of Human
Secretary-General reported in late 2007 that Rights in Myanmar”, 2 October 2007, UN Doc.
seven cases of the recruitment of boys between A/HRC/S-5/L.1/Rev.1.
the ages of 12 and 16 were brought to the ILO
6 Amnesty International Report 2007, Myanmar
after the Supplementary Understanding became
entry.

7 Human Rights Watch, “Burma: army attacks 33 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.
displace hundreds of thousands, grave abuses in 34 Office of the Special Representative for the
ethnic minority areas fuel growing humanitarian Secretary-General for Children and Armed
crisis”, 25 October 2007. conflict (SRSG), Report: Visit of the Special
8 Children and Armed Conflict, Report of Representative for the Secretary-General for
the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/61/529 Children and Armed conflict to Myanmar, 25–29
S2006/826. June 2007, UN Doc. OSRSG/CAAC, July 2007.
9 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and 35 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.
armed conflict to the UN Security Council, 21 36 UN Security Council, “Security Council reiterates
December 2007, UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757. commitment to address impact of armed
10 Myanmar Digest, “Secretary-1 briefs foreign conflict on children, determination to implement
diplomats on activities of Committee for Landmark 2005 Resolution 1612”, 24 July 2006,
Prevention of Recruiting Child Soldiers, All UN Doc. SC/8784.
Myanmar armed forces including army are formed 37 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.
with those who join them of their own volition”, 7
38 Letter to the Coalition from the Myanmar
February 2007, www.myanmardigest.com/eng_
Permanent Mission in Geneva, 21 September
md/Feb08.html.
2007.
39 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.
Consideration of reports submitted by states
parties under Article 44 of the Convention, 40 Confidential source, November 2007.
Second periodic reports of states parties due in 41 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,
1998, Myanmar, 11 June 2002, UN Doc. CRC/C/70/ Committee on the Rights of the Child, Thirty-sixth
Add.21, 5 November 2003. session, Consideration of reports submitted by
12 Letter to the Child Soldiers Coalition from the states parties under Article 44 of the Convention,
Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar to Concluding observations, Myanmar, UN Doc.
the United Nations Office and Other International CRC/C/15/Add.237, 30 June 2004.
Organizations, Geneva, 21 September 2007. 42 US Department of State, Burma: Country Reports
13 “Sold to be soldiers: the recruitment and use of on Human Rights Practices – 2006, March 6,
child soldiers in Burma”, Human Rights Watch, 2007, www.state.gov.
Vol. 19, No. 15(C), October 2007. 43 ICRC, “Myanmar: ICRC denounces major and
14 Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power repeated violations of international humanitarian
without Glory, Eastbridge Signature Books, law”, press release, 29 June 2007.
Norwalk, CT, 2002. 44 UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the
15 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13. General Assembly, Situation of human rights in
Myanmar, Sixty-first session, Agenda item 67(c),
16 Despite Promises: Child Soldiers in Burma’s SPDC
13 March 2007, UN Doc. A/RES/61/232.
Armed Forces, Human Rights Education Institute
of Burma (HREIB), September 2006, www.child- 45 International Labour Office (ILO), Governing
soldiers.org. Body, GB.298/5/1, 298th Session, Geneva, March
2007, Fifth Item on the Agenda, Developments
17 Associated Press, “Myanmar junta says Western
concerning the question of the observance
allegations of child soldiers are untrue”,
by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced
2 February 2007.
Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29, Appendix,
18 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13. Supplementary Understanding, III) Time frame
19 Confidential source, Bangkok, February 2007. and trial period, 10.
20 Despite Promises, above note 16. 46 Ibid.
21 Confidential source, July 2007. 47 Report of the Secretary-General on children
22 Confidential source, November 2007. and armed conflict in Myanmar to the
Security Council, 16 November 2007, UN Doc.
23 Despite Promises, above note 16.
S/2007/666.
48 SRSG Report, above note 34.
49 Confidential source, November 2007.
28 Karen Human Rights Group, “Child soldiers
recruited to support expansion of the KNU-KNLA
Peace Council”, May 2007, www.khrg.org; “Sold
to be soldiers”, above note 13.
31 Ibid.
32 SSA-South correspondence with the Coalition,
1 September 2007, by email.

N AMIBIA Developments
Republic of Namibia
Namibia ratified the African Charter on the Rights
Population: 2.0 million (993,000 under 18) and Welfare of the Child in July 2004.7
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription 1 Declarations and reservations to the Optional
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
Voting age: 18 2 Confidential information, Namibia, August 2007.
Optional Protocol: ratified 16 April 2002 3 Confidential information, Windhoek, August
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): 2007.
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC 4 Amnesty International Report 2007.
5 Confidential information, September 2007.
There were no reports of under-18s serving 6 “Botswana–Namibia: Caprivians reluctant to
in the armed forces. return home”, IRIN, 29 November 2006.
7 African Union, List of countries which have
signed, ratified/acceded to the African Union
Government Convention on African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child, www.africa-union.org.
practice
According to the declaration made by Namibia
when it ratified the Optional Protocol in April
2002, Namibia did not carry out conscription or
impose any form of forced obligatory service. The
declaration also confirmed Namibia’s adherence
to the “straight-18” position. Applicants to the
armed forces were required to show certified
K—O
copies of identity documents and birth
certificates.1
Armed groups
The Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) did not appear
to be active, and no information was available on
its recruitment of under-18s.2
The trial which had begun in 2004, of 119
people charged with involvement in the 1999
separatist attacks launched by the CLA in the
Caprivi region, was ongoing in August 2007. The
trial on treason charges of 12 other men, arrested
in November 2004 following further clashes,
ended in mid-2007. Ten defendants received
long prison sentences, while the other two were
acquitted.3
In September 2006 the government outlawed
the CLA’s political wing, the United Democratic
Party.4
As of November 2006, 1,100 Namibians who
had fled to Botswana following the 1999 CLA
attacks remained there. One Namibian, who had
been in detention for five years in Botswana on
charges relating to his alleged participation in the
CLA, returned to Namibia in November 2006, after
being told by the Namibian authorities that he
would not face charges on his return.5 Over 700
refugees had been repatriated to Namibia since
2003, 50 of whom were reportedly subsequently
charged with treason and involvement in the CLA
attacks.6

to manipulation, indoctrination, injury and
N E PAL death. During the protests in April 2006, 18
demonstrators were killed and more than 4,000
Nepal were reportedly injured by the security forces,
many of them children.5
Population: 27.1 million (12.4 million under 18) Incidents of excessive use of force continued
Government armed forces: 69,000 to be reported, especially in the context of
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription protests by members of the Madhesi community
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 of southern Nepal, who were demanding
Voting age: 181 autonomy and an end to discrimination. Five
Optional Protocol: ratified 3 January 2007 children were killed between December 2006 and
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): early February 2007, four of them by police. In
December 2006 a 17-year-old boy was killed by
CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182
a police officer in Nepalgunj when police opened
Under the 2006 Comprehensive Peace fire at a crowd of demonstrators during curfew
time. On 22 January 2007 the police and the
Agreement (CPA) parties were committed Armed Police Force (APF) fired live ammunition
not to use or enlist children in any directly at demonstrators, resulting in a total
military force and to release under-18s of four deaths, including that of a 15-year-old
immediately. There were no further reports boy, and several injuries caused by gunshots,
including to two boys aged 13 and 14. On 1
of government forces using children, but February, two 15-year-old boys died of gunshot
Maoist recruitment of children continued injuries when the police and the APF fired live
after the April 2006 ceasefire and there ammunition during a demonstration in Inaruwa,
were delays in the registration and release Sunsari district.6
of under-18 Maoist personnel cantoned In March 2007 UNICEF and the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
under the CPA. called on all political parties to develop codes of
conduct to prevent the misuse and manipulation
Context of children during political activity.7 As of October
2007, no political party was known to have
A ceasefire in April 2006 brought to an end the developed one.
10-year armed conflict between the security During the period between August 2005 and
forces and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) September 2006 there were 63 documented
(Maoist). King Gyanendra had been forced to incidents related to explosive devices which
relinquish power following mass demonstrations killed 29 children and injured 70 others.
organized by an alliance of the seven mainstream According to a survey carried out during the
political parties (the Seven-Party Alliance, first six months of 2006 by the UNICEF Mine
SPA) and supported by the Maoists.2 A Code of Action Unit, the number of such incidents was
Conduct agreed between the SPA and the CPN much larger, with children far more affected than
(Maoist) on 25 May 2006 provided for a freeze on adults and representing 78 per cent of reported
new recruitment by either side, but there were casualties. Most of the incidents involved
no provisions relating to children already in the improvised explosive devices left by the People’s
CPN (Maoist). A Comprehensive Peace Agreement Liberation Army (PLA, the armed wing of the CPN
(CPA), finalized in November 2006, included (Maoist)). Casualties from incidents involving
provisions committing the parties not to use or improvised explosive devices were reduced
enlist children in any military force and to rescue during the post-ceasefire period.8
and rehabilitate such children immediately.3 This The British army took Nepalese recruits in its
was the first time the issue was considered in the Brigade of Gurkhas. Applicants had to be at least
peace process. 17 years and 6 months at the beginning of the
In January 2007 a newly set up United Nations year they began their training.9 As of April 2007
Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), with the assistance there were around 3,500 members of the Brigade
of other UN agencies, embarked on a program of Gurkhas in the UK army.10
of registration and verification of Maoist army
combatants, the first phase of which ended
in mid-February 2007. The start of the second Government
phase, which among other things specifically
aimed at the identification of minors, began in
June 2007 but was subject to delays and not practice
completed until December (see below).4 As part of a wider program of political and
There were concerns about the involvement legal reform, a new Army Act came into force in
of children in political activities, including 2006. The army was made accountable to the
demonstrations, and their ensuing vulnerability government rather than to the crown, and was

renamed the Nepalese Army. The new Act did mass abductions and forced participation in mass
not include provisions for the minimum age of meetings and cultural events in rural areas.17
recruitment which continued to be governed by Children from all the Maoist organizations
the 1962 Royal Army New Recruitment Rules; performed a range of support tasks, including
these required recruits to be at least 18 years old. fund-raising, “mobilizing” communities and
The 1971 Young Boy’s Recruitment and Conditions acting as messengers, spies or providers of food
of Service Rules, which stated that recruits had or shelter. Children were also used as sentries,
to be between 15 and 18, was declared null and bodyguards, logistics assistants and combatants
void by a Supreme Court ruling in 2005, on the by the PLA. According to OHCHR children were
grounds that recruiting under-18s contravened used by PLA as combatants during clashes in
the constitution.11 In its declaration on ratifying Palpa district in January 2006, and a significant
the Optional Protocol, the government stated that number of children were used as porters during a
18 was the minimum age of recruitment, and that PLA attack in Panauti, Kavre district, in February
recruitment into the army was voluntary.12 2006 and during a clash in Khidim, Arghakanchi
district, in the same month.18
Child recruitment and deployment Children between the ages of ten and 16
Recruitment of children into the security forces were generally first recruited into the militia on
was rare, although there were reports of the use a part-time basis. They carried out propaganda
of children by the security forces as messengers, activities, distributed Maoist newspapers or
spies or informants.13 Such practices stopped served as spies and messengers. Anecdotal
after May 2007, when the army was confined to evidence suggests that some were unarmed,
barracks. while others had crude weapons.19 Only children
Many children who surrendered to the over 16 were officially able to join the “whole-
security forces or who were captured were timers”, although many were in fact much
subjected to threats, ill-treatment or torture younger. “Whole-timers” were given one month’s
by army personnel in order to force them to training on personal security, military tactics and
disclose information about their activities with political ideology and were equipped with crude
the Maoists, or to provide sensitive information weapons such as home-made guns and pressure-
about and sometimes guide the security forces cooker bombs. They were usually deployed in
to the locations of Maoist camps. It was common areas away from their homes and family and no
K—O
for children who were arrested, sometimes after longer attended school.20
having escaped from the Maoists, to be detained Being a “whole-timer” typically led to joining
unlawfully in locations such as army barracks. the PLA. The general practice of the PLA was
They were denied access to lawyers and to their to enrol children above the age of 16 after an
families. Some were detained under anti-terrorist initial period as members of the Maoist militia.
legislation.14 At least four people who were However, children who were allegedly particularly
children at the time of their arrest reportedly keen to join were integrated directly into the PLA.
remained imprisoned in mid-2007, some Children continued to be actively recruited
reportedly charged with murder.15 by the Maoists after the April 2006 ceasefire.
From May to September 2006 a total of 154 new
incidents of recruitment of children in all five
Armed groups regions were documented by local organizations
Despite widespread evidence to the contrary, and OHCHR, of which 72 involved recruitments
the CPN (Maoist) consistently denied that it into the PLA (the youngest being 12 years old)
recruited or used children for military activity. and 82 into other Maoist-affiliated organizations,
The party’s publicly stated policy was that it did including militias.21 In the Eastern Region, the
not allow anyone younger than 18 to join either Office of OHCHR confirmed the abduction by
the People’s Liberation Army or the “people’s the PLA after April 2006 of five boys between
militias”.16 the ages of 13 and 17 from the Bhanubhakta
During the conflict, the recruitment by the Secondary-school, Mangalbare, Ilam district. The
Maoists of children, both boys and girls, mostly children’s parents maintained that the children
between ten and 16 (although the youngest were forcibly taken.22
known was eight), took three main forms: At the end of February 2007, members of the
through special recruitment campaigns such as Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism Task Force,
“one family, one member for the Party”, where set up in 2005 to monitor and report to the UN
children were recruited forcibly or voluntarily; Security Council on children in armed conflict,
through the community activities of Maoist had documented some 1,995 children associated
cultural groups, full or part-time militias and with the parties to the conflict. The vast majority
associated organizations, such as the students’ were with the CPN (Maoist) and its affiliated
and women’s organizations, or directly by the organizations. Among the 1,995 documented
PLA; and through the widespread practice of cases, 475 children were below the age of 15 at
the time of recruitment. A total of 1,576 were
recruited after the April 2006 ceasefire, 896

of them in November 2006 alone – while 527 2006 Agreement on the Monitoring of the
children escaped or were released, the latter Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA).29
mostly due to family efforts or child protection Both registration and discharge of under-18s were
agencies’ interventions. Of the children recruited delayed because of the failure by the government
between October and December 2006, some 30 and CPN (Maoist) to reach agreement on various
per cent were released after a few days spent in issues, in particular the payment of allowances
the Maoist cantonments. Some were released to cantoned Maoist cadres. By October 2007
by their commanders as being “too young”, UNMIN, together with UNICEF, were preparing
while others were instructed to take part in other to monitor the release of “substantial numbers”
Maoist-affiliated organizations, but not the PLA.23 of under-18s who had been identified during
Most of these children were enrolled in verification in the first three cantonment sites.
schools at the time of their recruitment. Many It was noted, however, that girls could face
of those recruited into the PLA were promised particular challenges in returning home and
money by the Maoist recruiters and/or that generally there was a lack of economic
employment in the new national army to be opportunities in rural Nepal for returning young
formed under the CPA. people.30
After December 2006 there were increased
concerns about the enrolment of children into
the Young Communist League (YCL) – the youth
Developments
wing of the CPN (Maoist) – which attracted The situation in Nepal was the first to be
criticism for its use of violence and intimidation considered by the UN Security Council Working
that overshadowed its legitimate activities.24 Group on Children and Armed Conflict. Nepal
Nine cases of children active in the YCL were featured in four consecutive reports by the UN
documented in the first two months of 2007. Secretary-General to the Security Council as
The documentation collected on these few cases violating international standards prohibiting the
offered evidence that children, as part of larger recruitment and use of children.
groups, were given physical training and drilling The National Human Rights Commission
in military fashion (lining up and marching) such (NHRC), mandated to promote and protect
as in Palpa and Morang districts. Most were part human rights, including children’s rights, came
of regular Maoist indoctrination sessions. Four of under heavy criticism after new commissioners
the nine children were previously associated with were appointed by the king in May 2005. The
the Maoist army; one of them testified that he chairman and the new commissioners eventually
was simply redeployed with the YCL.25 resigned in July 2006; new members were
appointed in September 2007.31
In a December 2006 report to the Security
Disarmament, demobilization Council, the UN Secretary-General recommended
and reintegration (DDR) that the government invite the Special
Under the CPA both parties agreed to “protect to undertake a mission to Nepal in the near
the rights of women and children in a special future to help to draw attention to and highlight
way, to immediately put a halt on all types of the need to mainstream child protection issues
violent activities including any kind of sexual into the transition and post-transition priorities
exploitation and abuse against women and on of the government and its UN and civil society
child labour and to not use or enlist children of partners.32 The visit was scheduled to take place
18 years or below in any military force”. The CPA in August 2007 but was postponed; it had not
further provided that children recruited and used taken place by the end of October.
in armed groups should be “immediately rescued In June 2005 the UN Committee on the Rights
and necessary and proper cooperation should be of the Child, after consideration of Nepal’s
provided for their rehabilitation”.26 Of the more Second Periodic Report, recommended that the
than 30,000 Maoist cadres originally registered government “criminalize abduction, recruitment
in cantonment sites created under the CPA, and use of children for military purposes by any
2,973 were assessed to be under-age, although armed forces or armed group”.33 As of October
other children were believed to have left the 2007 this recommendation was not believed to
cantonments before the verification process was have been implemented.
completed.27 At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
In October 2007 UNMIN expressed concern Paris, Nepal and 58 other states endorsed the
about delays in the discharge of Maoist Paris Commitments to protect children from
personnel, specifically minors, from the unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces
cantonments and insisted that the discharge or armed groups and the Paris Principles and
of the latter should be treated as an urgent guidelines on children associated with armed
priority.28 The lack of progress related to broader forces or armed groups. The documents
difficulties with UNMIN’s monitoring of the reaffirmed international standards and
Maoist army in accordance with the 8 December operational principles for protecting and assisting

child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global 24 Report of the Secretary-General to UN Security
consultation jointly sponsored by the French Council on the request of Nepal for United
government and UNICEF. Nations assistance in support of its peace
process, UN Doc. S/2007/442, 18 July 2007.
25 Internal Task Force report, above note 23.
26 See Comprehensive Peace Agreement, www.
Nepal ratified the Optional Protocol in January peace.gov.np.
2007.34 27 UNMIN press statement, 27 December 2007,
www.unmin.org.np.
1 1990 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, Part 28 Report of the Secretary-General on the request
8, Article 45(6). of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support
2 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human of its peace process, UN Doc. S/2007/612, 18
Rights on the human rights situation and the October 2007.
activities of her office, including technical 29 AMMAA, www.peace.gov.np.
co-operation, in Nepal, UN Doc. A/61/374, 22 30 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 28.
September 2006.
31 OHCHR, “NHRC appointments an important
3 Comprehensive Peace Accord Concluded between development”, 18 September 2007.
the Government of Nepal and the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist), under 7.6, www.peace.
gov.np. 33 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Consideration of report submitted by Nepal,
4 “Registration of arms complete in Shaktikhor”,
Nepalnews.com, 29 January 2007; “Registration
Add.261, 21 September 2005.
of arms over; UN team submits report”,
Nepalnews.com, 19 February 2007; “Second 34 See www2.ohchr.org.
phase PLA verification resumes”, Nepalnews.
com, 14 August 2007; all at www.nepalnews.com.
5 Report of the High Commissioner, above note 2;
Child Workers in Nepal Concerned Centre (CWIN),
Children Affected in the Course of Suppressing
the Janaandolan, Nepal, June 2006.
K—O
6 Confidential report on file at the Coalition.
7 UNICEF/OHCHR, “Protection of children with
regards to political activities”, position paper,
Kathmandu, March 2007, http://nepal.ohchr.org.
armed conflict in Nepal, UN Doc. S/2006/1007,
20 December 2006.
9 See British Gurkhas Nepal, www.army.mod.uk.
10 UK Armed Forces Trained Strengths &
Requirements, 1 April 2007, www.dasa.mod.uk.
11 Legal News from Nepal, “SC rules against
recruiting minors in police and army,” 16
December 2005, http://nepallaw.blogspot.com.
14 Ibid.
15 Coalition communication with confidential
source, 29 August 2007.
16 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Children in the
ranks: the Maoists’ use of child soldiers in
Nepal”, February 2007.
18 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Internal Task Force report, on file at the Coalition.

N E THERL ANDS Disarmament, demobilization
Kingdom of the Netherlands
In its 2007 report to the UN Committee on the
Population: 16.3 million (3.6 million under 18) Rights of the Child, the government recorded its
Government armed forces: 53,100 financial contributions to several international
Compulsory recruitment age: conscription projects working with war-affected children,
suspended including a UNICEF vocational training project in
displaced persons camps in Uganda, a project
dealing with children who had disappeared in El
Voting age: 18 Salvador and a demobilization and reintegration
Optional Protocol: signed 7 September 2000 project in Colombia. The Netherlands also
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): contributed specifically to the UN Special
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 Representative for Children and Armed Conflict.4

was 17 and, although conscription was
Developments
suspended, all males continued to be The Netherlands signed the Optional Protocol in
September 2000, but had not yet ratified it. In its
required to register for military service at 2007 report to the Committee on the Rights of
17. the Child, the Dutch government stated that “the
process of ratifying the Optional Protocol (OP)
Government on the involvement of children in armed conflict
is almost complete. The OP is currently before
National recruitment legislation and the Senate, and the ratification process will be
rounded off in the near future. The OP raises the
practice minimum age for forced recruitment [sic] from
Although conscription was suspended in 1997 15 to 18. The Dutch government will thereby be
with the introduction of fully volunteer armed obliged to take all possible measures to prevent
forces, the Dutch constitution of 1989 stated that the involvement of minors in armed conflicts as
“All Dutch nationals who are capable of doing so part of the armed forces.”5
shall have a duty to co-operate in maintaining At a February 2007 ministerial meeting
the independence of the state and defending in Paris, the Netherlands and 58 other states
its territory … This duty may also be imposed endorsed the Paris Commitments to protect
on residents of the Netherlands who are not children from unlawful recruitment or use by
Dutch nationals” (Article 97). The constitution armed forces or armed groups and the Paris
emphasized that “To protect its interests, the Principles and guidelines on children associated
State shall maintain Armed Forces consisting of with armed forces or armed groups. The
volunteers and conscripts … Compulsory service documents reaffirmed international standards
in the armed forces shall be regulated by Act of and operational principles for protecting and
Parliament” (Article 98). Under the terms of the assisting child soldiers and followed a wide-
1997 Law on Conscription, all men continued ranging global consultation jointly sponsored by
to register for military service at the age of the French government and UNICEF.
17, although this did not involve any medical
examination or actual military service. The 1 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Right
registration procedure did not allow an individual to Conscientious Objection to Military Service in
to indicate a conscientious objection to military Europe: A Review of the Current Situation, April
service. In a time of war or other emergency, the 2005, www.quaker.org.
law allowed for the reintroduction of conscription 2 Confidential sources, September 2007.
and the possible compulsory recruitment of all
3 Information from the defence and naval attaché,
those registered up to the age of 45.1 Under the embassy of the Netherlands, London, October
Military Personnel Law the current minimum age 2007.
for voluntary recruitment to the armed forces was
4 Third periodic report of the Netherlands on
17. Seventeen-year-old recruits were required to
implementation of the United Nations Convention
have the consent of a parent or guardian before on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. AVT07/
enlistment, and were excluded from all active BZ85984 A, 2007.
combat operations or direct involvement in
5 Ibid.
hostilities. There were also restrictions on the use
of weapons by 17-year-old volunteers.2 In 2005
there were 4,038 applicants for enrolment in the
armed forces by 17-year-olds, and 997 men and
women aged 17 actually enlisted.3

In its initial report on the Optional Protocol,
N EW ZEAL AND New Zealand stated that reasons for retaining 17
as the minimum age for voluntary recruitment
New Zealand included the “inverse relationship between the
age of enlistment and retention after five years
Population: 4.0 million (1.0 million under 18) of service”. The government said that raising
Government armed forces: 9,000 the minimum recruitment age might increase
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription the difficulty in attracting recruits to technical
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 positions, and that an environment in which
Voting age: 18 all recruits started on an equal footing had
Optional Protocol: ratified 12 November 2001 traditionally offered opportunities of success
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): to recruits from lower socio-economic groups,
particularly those who left school at 17.7 The
government planned to review its position on the
The minimum voluntary recruitment age voluntary age of recruitment in 2007 as part of
its preparation of the 2008 periodic report.8 In
was 17. As of August 2007 some 120 under- September 2007, however, it informed the Child
18s were members of the regular forces. Soldiers Coalition that raising the recruitment age
was still not considered to be a “viable option”,
since, given the number of 17-year-olds currently
Government enlisting, this would prevent an annual average
National recruitment legislation and of 24 per cent of potential enlistees from joining
the armed forces.9
practice There was no legislation in New Zealand
New Zealand’s declaration on ratifying the providing for compulsory recruitment or
Optional Protocol stated that the minimum age conscription. In its initial report under the
for voluntary recruitment into its national forces Optional Protocol, the government noted that
was 17.1 The 1990 Defence Act set out the basis were conscription to be introduced in any form,
for voluntary recruitment, and was amended specific legislation would be required. The
in 2001 to implement the Optional Protocol, minimum age of 17 for voluntary recruitment into
K—O
stating that “No person who is under 17 years the Defence Force would not be affected, and any
may be appointed to, or enlisted or engaged in, future legislation establishing conscription would
the Navy, the Army, or the Air Force” (Article 33). need to comply with New Zealand’s international
The amended Defence Act further stated that legal commitments, including Article 1 of the
“no person serving in the Armed Forces who is Optional Protocol relating to direct participation
under 18 years shall be liable for active service” in hostilities.10
(Article 37). Defence Force Orders for Personnel
Administration were also amended, to make it Military training and military schools
clear that deploying personnel under 18 years There were no military schools run by the armed
of age on “active service”, whether overseas forces.11 The New Zealand Cadet Force was
or in New Zealand, was prohibited.2 Human “a voluntary, disciplined, uniformed training
rights organizations expressed concern that the organization” for young people aged between
Defence Act did not define “active service” and 13 and 18, according to the 1990 Defence Act. It
hence was unclear whether this would include aimed to promote training programs or courses
peacekeeping or rebuilding missions.3 similar to those undertaken by the armed forces,
In its initial report on the Optional Protocol, appreciation among cadets of the function
the government stated that “The Defence Act and operations of the armed forces, and the
1990 does not currently set a minimum age development of good citizenship (Section 77).
for voluntary recruitment”, indicating lack of Although the Cadet Force was administered
awareness of the 2001 amendment.4 Human by the New Zealand military, cadets were not
rights organizations were concerned that, since members of the armed forces (Section 2).12 As of
the minimum recruitment age was set by Defence June 2007 there were approximately 3,800 cadets
Orders and not by the Defence Act, there was enrolled.13
no legislative barrier to the age of recruitment
being lowered.5 However, the New Zealand Child recruitment and deployment
Defence Force subsequently agreed that the As of 1 August 2007 the total number of regular
term “enlistment” in section 33 of the amended forces members under 18 was 120, or 1.3 per cent
Defence Act covered voluntary recruitment, of the total number of service members.14
as contemplated by Article 3 of the Optional
Protocol, thereby confirming 17 as the minimum
age of recruitment.6

Disarmament, demobilization Nicaragua
Republic of Nicaragua
Since 2004, 13 former child soldiers from
Myanmar had been granted refugee status in Population: 5.5 million (2.5 million under 18)
New Zealand as unaccompanied minors.15 Government armed forces: 14,000
1 Optional Protocol, signatures, ratifications and Voluntary recruitment age: 18
declarations, www2.ohchr.org. Voting age: 16
2 Office of the Minister of Youth Affairs, Annual Optional Protocol: acceded 17 March 2005
Progress Report on the Uncroc Five-Year Work
Programme for 2004/2005, www.myd.govt.nz.
3 Robert Ludbrook, “Children’s Law since 2004”,
Working Paper No. 2, Action for Children and There were no reports of under-18s in the
Youth Aotearoa, August 2007, www.acya.org.nz.
armed forces.
4 Initial report of New Zealand to the UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child on the Optional
Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/NZL/1, July 2003. Context
5 Action for Children and Youth Aotearoa, Response
to the New Zealand government’s report on Public perceptions about increased insecurity
compliance with the Optional Protocol on children and the resulting stigmatization of children
involved in armed conflict, September 2003, and young people seemed unrelated to actual
www.acya.org.nz. crime statistics. It was estimated that only eight
6 Ministry of Youth Development, United Nations per cent of criminal suspects were under 18.1 In
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Five-Year September 2005 the UN Committee on the Rights
Work Programme 2004 to 2008, September 2004, of the Child recommended that the government
www.myd.govt.nz. carry out a full study on the scope, nature and
7 Initial report of New Zealand, above note 4. causes of youth gangs in order to develop a
comprehensive policy for their prevention and
8 Five-Year Work Programme, above note 6.
reduction.2
9 Child Soldiers Coalition correspondence with
Ministry of Defence, September 2007.
10 Initial Report of New Zealand, above note 4. Government
11 Ibid.
12 Defence Act (1990).
practice
13 Coalition correspondence with New Zealand
Cadet Force, June 2007. Under the constitution military service was not
14 Coalition correspondence, above note 9. compulsory and all forced recruitment to the
armed forces or police was prohibited.3 The
15 Ibid.
minimum age for participation in hostilities was
18.4 Those volunteering for military service had
to be over 18 and have parental authorization
certified by a lawyer.5 They signed up to an
annual, renewable contract.6
Under the 1998 Code on Children and Young
Persons (Chapter II) it was illegal to incite
children or young people to participate in armed
conflicts or armed activities of any kind. The Code
also provided special protection for children and
young people who had taken refuge in Nicaragua
or were victims of armed conflicts.7

Military schools formed part of the national
education system and qualifications obtained
were equivalent to civilian educational
qualifications.8
Soldiers received training at the Basic
Instruction National School, and non-
commissioned officers at the Sergeants’ National
School. Master’s degree courses were offered at

the General Benjamín Zeledón Rodriguez Staff
Superior School. Students from the General José NIG E R
Dolores Estrada Vado Superior Centre of Military
Studies were considered to be still in training on Republic of the Niger
joining the armed forces.9 Graduates obtained a
degree in tactical command, engineering, artillery Population: 14.0 million (7.8 million under 18)
or medicine, and a guaranteed post in the armed Government armed forces: 5,300
forces for 30 years.10 Compulsory recruitment: age not specified in law
Voluntary recruitment: age not specified in law
Developments Voting age: 18
International standards Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Nicaragua acceded to the Optional Protocol CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
in March 2005. Its declaration stated that the
minimum age for entry to the armed forces was There were no reports of under-18s in the
18, and that the requirement for applicants armed forces. Some pupils at the military
for military service to submit legally certified school received firearms training from as
parental authorization was in order to prevent young as 13. No information was available
recruitment by force or coercion.11
on the use of under-18s by armed groups.
1 Federación Coordinadora Nicaragüense de ONGs
que trabajan con la Niñez y la Adolescencia Context
(CODENI), III Complementary Report on
Compliance with the Convention on the Rights of The Movement of Nigeriens for Justice
the Child, 16 May 2005, www.crin.org. (Mouvement des nigériens pour la Justice, MNJ),
2 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, a new Tuareg armed group, claimed responsibility
Consideration of third periodic report submitted for an attack on an army base in northern Niger
by Nicaragua, Concluding observations, UN Doc. in February 2007.1 As of October 2007, reports
CRC/C/15/Add.265, 21 September 2005. indicated that attacks led by ethnic Touareg
had killed at least 45 government soldiers since
K—O
3 Constitución Política de la República de
Nicaragua, Artículo 96, www.asamblea.gob.ni. February.2 The MNJ’s stated objectives included
full implementation of past peace agreements,
4 Third periodic report of Nicaragua to the
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. measures to address development and political
CRC/C/125/Add.3, 15 October 2004. representation issues in northern regions, and
the holding of a national forum to debate political
5 “Tatuados no pueden ser oficiales del Ejército”,
reform.3
El Nuevo Diario, 13 October 2006, www.
elnuevodiario.com.ni; Declaration of Nicaragua The final stage of implementation of a socio-
on acceding to the Optional Protocol, 17 March economic reintegration program for some 4,000
2005, www2.ohchr.org. former combatants from armed groups, provided
for by three peace agreements signed between
(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía, April 1995 and August 1998, was ongoing in
Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latina 2007 following the late release of funds for the
y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Nicaragua, August implementation of the program targeting over
2006, www.flacso.cl. 3,000 former combatants in the Aïr-Azawak
7 Third periodic report, above note 4. region.4
9 Ministerio de Defensa, Libro de la Defensa Government
Nacional de Nicaragua, www.midef.gob.ni.
10 “Hacer carrera militar no es para cualquiera”, La
Prensa, 18 July 2005. practice
11 Declaration, above note 5. The constitution stated that it was the duty
of every citizen to defend the nation and
territorial integrity, and that military service
was compulsory under the conditions set
down by law. In 2001 Niger had reported to the
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child that
military service was governed by Ordinance
No. 96-033 (1996), obligatory except for those
who were unfit or exempt, and could “take the
form of military service, national civil service
or national participatory service”.5 In practice,

military service was currently not enforced due to 5 Initial report of Niger to the UN Committee on the
financial and material constraints.6 Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.29/
There was no minimum age for voluntary Rev.1, 17 October 2001.
or compulsory recruitment. Recruits had to be 6 ��
ANDDH, above note 4.
of Nigerien nationality and be unmarried and 7 ��
Ibid.
physically able. There was no evidence, however, 8 ��
Ibid.
of under-18s in the armed forces.7
9 ��
Ibid.
There was one military school, the Prytanée
militaire de Niamey, governed by Decree No. 97-
459/PRN/MDN. Sixty pupils, including ten pupils
from neighbouring countries, enrolled in the
school each year. No minimum age was specified
for entry, but admission was open to boys at the
age at which they would enter secondary-school
(approximately 10–12 years old). Admission was
through examination (concours) and applicants
had to be no more than 13 years old at the time of
the examination. 8
Pupils were given both academic and military
instruction. In the third year of study at the
school, at the age of approximately 13–15, pupils
were taught basic handling of firearms, and in
the sixth year, at the age of 16–18, further military
weapons training was provided, as was physical
training during a month in military camps. After
completing the school, pupils could enter a
military training school for officers (école des
officiers). Around 70 per cent of pupils were
reported to enter the armed forces.9
Armed groups
No information was available on the use of child
soldiers by armed groups.
Developments
Niger and 58 other states endorsed the Paris
UNICEF.
1 “Niger: Touareg attack army in the north”, IRIN,

9 February 2007, www.irinnews.org.
2 “Niger: Humanitarian crisis feared in the North”,
IRIN, 22 October 2007.
3 Programme des revendications du Mouvement
des nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ), 9 April 2007,
www.temoust.org/spip.php?article1958.
4 Information from Association nigérien pour la
défense des droits de l’homme (ANDDH), April
2007.

publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet
Nigeria Mohammed.5 In September 2006 further violence
was reported between Christian and Muslim
Federal Republic of Nigeria youths in Dutse, the state capital of Jigawa.6
There were continued concerns about the
Population: 131.5 million (67.4 million under 18) proliferation of small arms, a major destabilizing
Government armed forces: 85,000 factor in the country.7
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 Government
Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: signed 8 September 2000 National recruitment legislation and
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): practice
Although the 1999 constitution allowed for the
There was no evidence of under-18s being possibility of conscription, stating that it was
the duty of every citizen to “defend Nigeria and
used in the armed forces. There were render such national service as may be required”
reports of children being recruited and (Article 24(b)), no legislation provided for it.
used by armed groups and armed vigilante There was no conscription.8 The 2003 Child
groups and involved in intercommunal Rights Act (Section 34) stated that the minimum
age for voluntary recruitment or conscription into
violence and criminal gangs. the armed forces was 18.9
Context Military training and military schools

There were several military high schools,
Throughout��
2006
��
and up to the elections in April
including the Nigerian Military School, Zaria; the
2007 politically motivated violence by gangs
Air Force Military School, Jos; and the Nigerian
and militia groups allied to politicians and youth
Navy Secondary-schools in Ojo and Abeokuta.10
wings of political parties had taken place, and�
According to the government, the various branches
some 300 people were killed.1 The EU Election
of the military have schools where under-18s are
K—O
Observer Mission found that the elections fell
admitted; however, there is no “military activity”
far short of basic international standards,2 but
beyond parade and disciplinary training.11
in spite of the demand by the opposition for
the rejection of the results, the ruling party’s
candidate, Umaru Yar’Adua, was sworn in as Armed groups
president on 29 May 2007.
The Nigerian government agreed to the Armed groups in the Delta region
extradition of Charles Taylor following intense Violence in the Niger Delta region between armed
international pressure. He was wanted by the groups and the security forces continued, with
Special Court for Sierra Leone for trial on charges armed groups’ demands ranging from resource-
of crimes against humanity, war crimes and other control concessions and amenities and jobs for
serious violations of international humanitarian rural communities, and several oil concessions
law, including the recruitment and use of child for faction leaders, to independence.12 ��
In
soldiers. He was arrested on the border with September 2004 the leader of the armed group
Cameroon on 29 March 2006 and transferred to Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force threatened
the Special Court of Sierra Leone on request by to launch an “all-out war” in the region. In
Liberian president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. His trial September 2005 he was arrested on charges of
in The Hague was adjourned until January 2008.3 treason following a failed amnesty deal and was
Violence was reported between Christian released in June 2007 on health grounds.13 New
and Muslim youths, some under 18. In May armed groups came to the fore following this
2005 Human Rights Watch estimated that declaration, the most prominent of which was
approximately 700 Muslims were killed in the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger
attacks by Christians on Yelwa, a market town Delta (MEND). MEND claimed responsibility for
located in the southern part of Plateau state. a number of hostage-takings and violent clashes
The number of Christians killed was unknown, with security forces from December 2005.14
one estimate being 70. There were also reports Armed groups in the Niger Delta were thought
of the abduction of hundreds of women and to comprise mainly youths, some of whom were
children during the attacks, most, but not all, of suspected to be under 18. MEND in particular was
whom were able to return to their families in the regarded as a group with a predominantly young
following weeks.4 membership.15 In a presentation on children in
In February 2006, 150 people were killed armed conflict to the UN Security Council in July
and thousands were displaced due to sectarian 2006, a spokesperson for the UN Development
violence following protests over the international Program (UNDP) stressed that UNDP’s main

programs in the Niger Delta region aimed at giving 3 Special Court for Sierra Leone, www.sc-sl.org.
youths an alternative to armed violence.16 4 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Revenge in the
name of religion: The cycle of violence in Plateau
Vigilante groups and Kano States”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 17,
Illegal armed vigilante groups, in operation No. 8 (A) (May 2005).
in several states, sometimes with the tacit 5 Christian Allen Purefoy, “Five days of violence
endorsement of state governors, continued to by Nigerian Christians and Muslims kill 150”,
be responsible for unlawful killings. There were Independent, 24 February 2006.
reports of under-18s being members of the 6 “Arrests after Nigerian Violence”, BBC News, 22
Bakassi Boys in the east.17 September 2006.
The Egbesu Boys, in the Niger Delta, allegedly 7 Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman (eds.),
recruited children under 16. The O’odua People’s “Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and
Congress (OPC), of the Yoruba ethnic group, Human Security in the ECOWAS Region”, Small
continued to recruit under-18s through its Gani Arms Survey, April 2005, www.smallarmssurvey.
Adams’ faction, the Eso group, where the majority org.
of its members were reportedly under 18.18 8 B. Horeman and M. Stolwijk, Refusing to Bear
Arms: A World Survey of Conscription and
Criminal gangs Conscientious Objection to Military Services, War
There was a proliferation in the number of Resisters International, 1998, www.wri-irg.org.
youths (some reportedly under 18) in armed 9 Second periodic report of Nigeria to the UN
gangs who lived mainly through extortion and Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
robbery, frequently using violence or the threat CRC/C/70.Add.24, 17 September 2004.
of violence.19 The most well-known group was the 10 Nigerian Military Secondary-schools, http://
so-called Area Boys, operating in Lagos. There members.tripod.com/cdssikeja/links.html.
were clashes between the armed forces and this 11 Second periodic report, above note 9.
group in May 2005, and some attempts were 12 ICG, above note 1.
being made to rehabilitate the members of these 13 “Army recaptures Nigerian oil base”, BBC News,
gangs, apparently with little effect.20 Attacks by 21 June 2007.
armed gangs that were part of university student 14 Chris McGreal, “Delta Force”, Guardian, 10 May
cults also contributed to increased violence.21 2007, www.guardian.co.uk.
15 ICG, Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty, Africa
Developments Report No. 113, 19 July 2006.
In April 2005 the UN Committee on the 16 UNDP, Speech by Ad Melkert, UNDP Associate
Administrator, on children and armed conflict, to
Rights of the Child expressed concern about
UN Security Council, 24 July 2006.
intercommunal violence and, in particular, the
killing of children arising from such conflicts, as 17 Vincent Ujumadu, “21 die in Bakassi Boys’ cell”,
well as the “severe physical and psychological Vanguard, 6 August 2005, www.vanguardngr.
com.
trauma” inflicted on children, including child
combatants. The Committee was concerned 18 Mohamed Ibrahim, Empirical Survey of Children
about the vulnerability of refugee children from and Youth in Organised Armed Violence in
Chad, Sierra Leone and Liberia, especially girls, Nigeria: Egbesu Boys, OPC and Bakassi Boys as
a Case Study, Children in Organised and Armed
to sexual exploitation and forced prostitution,
Violence, 7 May 2005, www.coav.org.br.
and the problems of drug abuse and economic
exploitation were also raised.22 In November 19 HRW, Rivers and Blood: Guns, Power and Oil in
2005 the National Agency for Prohibition and Nigeria’s Rivers States, briefing paper, February
2005.
Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters
indicated that 15 million Nigerian children were 20 “Nigeria: Area Boys – a growing menace on the
being taken from rural to urban situations for streets of Lagos”, IRIN, 15 July 2005.
child labour or slavery purposes.23 21 “Nigeria: Gangs sowing terror on campus”, IRIN,
22 February 2007.
1 International Crisis Group (ICG), Fuelling the 22 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Niger Delta Crisis, Africa Report No. 118, 28 Consideration of report submitted by Nigeria,
September 2006; Christopher Albin-Lackey and Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/
��
Ben Rawlence, “Nigerian Nightmare”, Prospect, Add.257, 13 April 2005.
May 2007, www.prospect-magazine.co.uk. 23 CRIN, “Nigeria: 15 Million Children Toil in
2 European Union Election Observation Mission, Slavery”, 22 November 2005, www.crin.org.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, “Elections fail to
meet hopes and expectations of the Nigerian
people and fall far short of basic international
standards”, press release, 23 April 2007, http://
eueom-ng.org.

de facto become a member of the armed forces
Norway with the rights and obligations that this entails.
Members of the Home Guard are not to receive
Kingdom of Norway any practical training in or take part in any other
way in war-related activities and they are to be
Population: 4.6 million (1.1 million under 18) exempt from service in situations in which the
Government armed forces: 23,400 armed forces could be involved in hostilities
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 … Furthermore the Home Guard Youth are not
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 subject to military disciplinary authority or to
Voting age: 18 the military penal code.” Nevertheless, in July
Optional Protocol: ratified 23 September 2003 2007 the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): Child stated that “despite the aforementioned
safeguards of the Home Guard Act, the
Committee is of the view that these kinds of
There were no under-18s serving in the activities with a ‘military element’ for children
are not in full conformity with the spirit of the
armed forces, but the Home Guard Youth Optional Protocol”. The Committee urged Norway
was open to volunteers from the age of 16. “to raise the minimum age of volunteers joining
the Home Guard from 16 years to 18 years in
order to fully respect the spirit of the Optional
Government Protocol and to provide full protection for
National recruitment legislation and children in all circumstances”.4
practice
Article 109 of the Norwegian constitution stated
Developments
that “as a general rule every citizen of the State In a November 2006 statement to the UN
is equally bound to serve in the defence of the Security Council, the Norwegian ambassador
Country for a specific period, irrespective of birth welcomed the commitment of the Working
or fortune”. Compulsory military service of 12 Group on Children and Armed Conflict to a work
months (eight or nine months in practice) was plan “that includes consideration of specific
K—O
regulated by the General Compulsory Service Act situations and regular review of all situations
of 1953. The minimum age for voluntary military of concern”. Emphasizing the need for “regular
service in the Norwegian military was 18.1 While and substantive reports by the country level task
all men aged 18 to 44 were eligible for call-up, forces … followed up by adequate responses and
they were rarely conscripted after the age of 30. resources”, the ambassador noted that “Norway
Conscripts to the National Guard served for six has already provided support to the reporting
months, and were obliged to perform two weeks and monitoring system through UNICEF”.5
of reservist training each year until the age of 44.2 In July 2007 the Committee on the Rights of
According to the Ministry of Defence, the Child welcomed the proposed reform of the
“conscription will be oriented towards the best Penal Code which would “introduce as separate
qualified and motivated young people. To make criminal offences those crimes which are listed
sure the same information about military service in articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Rome Statute of
is given to all regardless of gender, young women the International Criminal Court, in particular
are being invited to attend a voluntary initial article 8 … which criminalizes conscripting
interview as from 2006.”3 or enlisting children under the age of fifteen
years into the national armed forces or using
Military training and military schools them to participate actively in hostilities as a
The Home Guard Youth was an entirely voluntary war crime”. The Committee noted particularly
organization for young persons, providing that in criminalizing conscripting or enlisting
“outdoor recreation and other physical and children under the age of 18 for such purposes,
sporting activities with a military element”, to the proposed new Penal Code would actually
be pursued in the young person’s free time and “introduce a higher standard than in the Rome
without any liability for enrolment in the armed Statute of the International Criminal Court”.6
forces. The Home Guard Youth was open to At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
volunteers from the age of 16. While formally Paris, Norway and 58 other states endorsed
a component of the Norwegian armed forces, the Paris Commitments to protect children
according to the government “the Home Guard from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
Youth cannot be considered to be recruited forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
to the Norwegian Armed Forces within the and guidelines on children associated with
meaning of the [Optional] Protocol because it armed forces or armed groups. The documents
is presumed that a person is not considered to reaffirmed international standards and
have been recruited before she has formally or operational principles for protecting and assisting

government and UNICEF. Occupied
1 Initial report of Norway to the UN Committee on Palestinian
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/NOR/1,
January 2006.
Territory
Occupied Palestinian Territory
to Conscientious Objection to Military Service in
Europe: A Review of the Current Situation, April Population: 3.7 million (1.9 million under 18)
2005.
Government armed forces: not applicable
3 Ministry of Defence, “Norwegian Defence 2006”, Compulsory recruitment age: none
www.mod.no.
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (security forces)
4 Initial report, above note 1; UN Committee on
Voting age: 18
the Rights of the Child, Consideration of report
submitted Norway, Concluding observations, UN Treaties ratified: not applicable
Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/NOR/CO/1, 6 July 2007.
The Palestinian Authority did not have
5 “Children Deserve Protection”, Norwegian
Statements at the United Nations, 30 November a system of conscription for the security
2006, www.norway-un.org. forces under its control. It officially
6 Concluding observations, above note 4. supported a “straight-18” position for
recruitment. Children were reported to
have been offered military training by
armed Palestinian groups. Older children
participated in operations for Islamic
Jihad, Fatah and Hamas. No under-18s
were known to have participated in suicide
bombings from late 2004 to November
2007.
Context
Israeli forces and settlers officially withdrew
from the Gaza Strip in August–September 2005,
although effective control remained in Israeli
hands. Israel’s occupation and confiscation of
Palestinian land in the West Bank continued,
with 38 per cent of the area out of bounds for
the Palestinian population.1 Hamas won the
January 2006 parliamentary elections, but the
new government was boycotted by much of the
international community, increasing economic
and political pressures. Hamas’s victory stoked
fighting between the military wings of Fatah
and Hamas. On 15 June 2007 Hamas effectively
took control of Gaza. Palestinian president and
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman
Mahmoud Abbas then moved to dissolve the
Hamas-led government and established an
“emergency” government in the West Bank.
This effectively created two Palestinian political
entities, one in Gaza led by Hamas and one in the
West Bank led by Fatah and the PLO.2 Efforts were
under way to reunite the entities in late 2007.
Sanctions against the Hamas-led government in
Gaza by Israel, the European Union (EU) and the
United States (USA) further reduced an already
low standard of living.3

Israeli Security Forces Military training and military schools
Training for new recruits to PA forces remained
From the start of the intifada (uprising) to early ad hoc. Funding for a new officer training facility
November 2007, Israeli forces were documented and three other training camps in Jericho was
as having killed 889 Palestinian children.4 One received from international donors in 2007.19
hundred and twenty-four children were killed There were no reports of military training in the
in 2006, mainly during Israel Defense Forces school system.
(IDF) operations “Summer Rains” and “Autumn
Clouds” in Gaza.5 This followed an IDF decision Child recruitment and deployment
to reduce the “safety zone” for artillery batteries
to 100 metres away from civilian areas. The The PA condemned the use of under-18s in
decision left no room for error, based on a shell armed conflict on a number of occasions.20 Some
fragmentation range of the same distance.6 In PA forces were previously understood to have
two incidents in August 2007 the IDF shot and recruited children as young as 16, but no new
killed five children under 12 in Gaza.7 It initially reports were available.21 In 2007 the Palestinian
claimed that the children were collecting rocket Child Planning Unit at the Ministry of Planning
launchers for a militant group.8 A subsequent IDF told the Child Soldiers Coalition that “there is
inquiry revealed that two of the children were a strong legal framework prohibiting the use of
collecting carob fruit and the second group were child soldiers. However, there is no monitoring
playing tag.9 of these laws nor ability to enforce them.”22 The
Curfews and checkpoint closures disrupted effective establishment of two rival government
children’s access to education. Poor school institutions with two separate security services in
performance was a key factor in encouraging Gaza and the West Bank in 2007 led to a lack of
young people to join militant factions, according clarity as to which legal system applied in Gaza.
to UNICEF.10 Children were also frequently
detained; in early November 2007 an estimated Armed groups
317 children were held in Israeli prisons. Figures
for 2006 showed that 64 per cent of sentences Political groups provided parallel services for
handed down to under-18s were on charges of the Palestinian civilian population. Hamas ran
stone-throwing.11 The Special Representative a number of schools, nurseries and clinics for
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of the UN Secretary-General for Children and children. These activities were understood to
Armed Conflict stated that stone-throwing and include a component of propaganda.23 Hamas
membership of a banned organization (19 per and Fatah controlled television stations featuring
cent of cases) should not lead to incarceration.12 children’s programs. These included political
On occasion, IDF soldiers were reported content and some glorification of “martyrdom”.24
to have stood by, or tacitly encouraged Israeli Fatah and Hamas ran voluntary summer
children to engage in hostile behaviour towards camps for children in Gaza involving ideological
Palestinians.13 As well as recruiting Israeli training. The convenor of one of the Hamas
children (see Israel entry), settlers frequently camps in Maghazi refugee camp denied that
attacked Palestinian children. Ten children had military training was included.25 However,
been killed by settlers since 2000, but no deaths anecdotal reports indicated that military
had been reported since 2004.14 Abductions and training took place during some summer
non-fatal attacks continued. In 2007 a 13-year- programs in 2007.26 There was a report that an
old boy was abducted, beaten and stripped by unnamed group had attempted to enlist older
settlers around Nablus before being dumped.15 children outside schools in Gaza to take part in
paramilitary training.27
All the Palestinian armed groups condemned
Palestinian Authority child recruitment in military conflict, most
notably in the verbal “code of conduct” of 2002.28
National recruitment legislation and However, some recruitment had been noted
practice since then, which the groups said was due to
The Palestinian Authority (PA) did not have a mistakes by individuals.29 Documentation on
system of universal conscription for its security child recruitment remained limited. The best
services, which included the Presidential available indicator was the record of child deaths
Guard (Force 17), the Preventive Security Force as a result of direct involvement in the conflict.
associated with Fatah and the Executive Security This figure fell from a high of 22 incidents
Force associated with Hamas.16 Recruitment for recorded in 2004 by Defence for Children
all government service was on a voluntary basis International-Palestine Section (DCI-Palestine),
from the age of 18.17 Article 46 of the Palestinian a non-governmental organization (NGO), to
Child Law of 2004 prohibited the use of children three incidents in 2005. In 2006 there were two
in armed conflicts. The amended Basic Law of incidents, both involving children killed while
2005 also prohibited the abuse of children.18 participating in armed clashes. From January to
October 2007 there were no deaths of under-

18s during clashes, although there were three Popular Front for the Liberation of
cases where children without any armed group
affiliation were killed trying to get across the
Palestine (PFLP) – Abu Ali Mustafa
Israeli border. From 2005 children who were Brigades
involved in violence on behalf of armed groups The PFLP claimed one suicide bombing
were between the ages of 16 and 18. There was perpetrated by 16-year-old Umar Abdullah al-Fa’r,
no documented evidence of child involvement in in late 2004.42 Another 16-year-old, Sa’id al-
suicide bombings after 2004.30 Majdlawi, joined the armed wing and was killed
From January to July 2007, 28 Palestinian the same year, according to the PFLP’s website.43
children were killed by Palestinian forces, No other cases of child involvement had been
including in interfactional clashes and misuse of recorded since then.
weapons. A further 217 were injured during the
same period, compared with 27 deaths and 260 Islamic Jihad – Al-Quds Brigades
injuries in 2006.31 After a misfired rocket killed Islamic Jihad also criticized the participation
two siblings aged nine and six in August 2007, a of children in armed conflict.44 However, in
Hamas spokesman urged “resistance factions to contacts with a Coalition member, Islamic Jihad
take all the necessary measures to avoid causing members suggested that children over the
any harm to civilians”.32 age of 15 and a half were adults.45 In 2005 the
group claimed responsibility for an attack on an
Hamas – Izz al-Din al-Qassam Israeli settlement during which an older child
Brigades was killed.46 Group websites indicated that two
Following strong public declarations in 2002, adult members of the group killed from January
Hamas leaders reiterated their opposition to 2006 to mid-November 2007 had been able to
the recruitment of children during contacts with join at the age of 15 in 2001. Both were initially
the Coalition in 2005 and 2006.33 A Hebron MP, involved in lookout and surveillance work.47 The
Dr Samir al-Qadi, said, “We need to respect al-Quds Brigades took part in most of the suicide
children’s rights and the right to childhood. bombings and rocket attacks on Israel after 2005,
Children are sacred to us – bodily, mentally, during which Israeli and Palestinian children were
spiritually”.34 However, this message was not killed (see also Israel entry).48
consistently applied by its military wing, the Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Popular Resistance Committees (PRC)
In 2005 one older child was reported to have – Al-Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades
been killed participating in armed action claimed The PRC was primarily made up of former
by Hamas, but there had been no documented members of other groups.49 It launched rocket
incidents since that time.35 However, limited and other attacks on Israeli military targets
involvement by older children was recorded on in recent years. No children were reported to
the group’s website. It listed six members killed have participated in its operations. However,
from January 2006 to mid-November 2007 who obituaries on its official website suggest that four
were aged 15–17 when they joined the armed adult members who were killed in action from
wing from 2000 to 2004. All were over 18 when January 2006 to mid-November 2007 had joined
they died.36 In 2007 a local NGO reported that a the group when they were 17,50 and another
13-year-old in Gaza had been assigned to monitor member joined at 15 in 2000.51
the streets for the group. He said that he was
supposed to gather information on drug dealers
and collaborators from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m.37 Disarmament, demobilization
Fatah – Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and and reintegration (DDR)
affiliates There were a number of psychological support
Fatah condemned the use of children by armed programs for Palestinian children affected by
groups.38 Nevertheless, in 2005 there was the conflict. UNICEF had 14 active teams in
documented evidence that one older child 2007 carrying out home visits and training,
affiliated with the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades counselling and playground activities.52 DCI-
was killed in clashes with the Israeli army.39 No Palestine, the Gaza Community Mental Health
incidents had been recorded on group websites Program and Save the Children-US also ran
since then, although the fragmentation of psychosocial programs. The government did
Fatah made monitoring difficult.40 There were not have rehabilitative services for children
unconfirmed media reports that the Fatah- who had participated in the conflict.53 The
affiliated Tanzim had attempted to recruit International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
children, including an alleged attempt to coerce ran international humanitarian law training
a 14-year-old in Nablus into a suicide bombing, courses for members of militant groups in Gaza in
when he was forced to write his own will.41 October–November 2007.54

15 Yesh Din, “The fifth attack on a Palestinian
Developments passerby in the last two months”, 26 July 2007,
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory www.yesh-din.org.
were noted as situations of concern in the UN 16 “After Gaza”, above note 2.
Secretary-General’s reports to the Security 17 Article 24, chapter 2 of the Civil Service Law;
Council on Children and Armed Conflict in letter from Dr Ahmed al-Yaziji, General Secretary
February 2005 and October 2006. In 2006 he of the Palestinian High Council for Childhood and
remarked that the “plight of Palestinian children Motherhood, in response to Coalition questions,
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including 21 March 2004.
East Jerusalem, has become more precarious 18 Information from Child Planning Unit, Palestinian
since the previous reporting period, as the Israeli- Ministry of Planning, 8 November 2007, in
Palestinian conflict intensified”.55 response to Coalition questions.
The Special Representative of the Secretary- 19 “Palestinian officers’ school opened”, Associated
General for Children and Armed Conflict visited Press, 31 October 2007.
Israel and the Palestinian Territory in April 2007. 20 See for instance Saeb Erakat’s comments after an
She urged the need for proper respect of the incident in 2004: Ali Daraghmeh, “Palestinians
civilian/combatant distinction in Israeli military outraged by recruiting of children for attacks on
actions in the territory. She highlighted settler Israelis”, Associated Press, 29 February 2004.
attacks on Palestinian children in Hebron and al- 21 DCI-Palestine, report, March 2004.
Tuwami. She also suggested the establishment of 22 Information from Child Planning Unit, above note
independent investigation mechanisms to follow 18.
up alleged violations of children’s rights.56
23 Forum on Armed Groups, background paper on
During the visit President Abbas and the then Hamas, 4–7 July 2006, at www.child-soldiers.org.
foreign minister, Abu Amr, agreed “to revive the
24 See, e.g., “Farfour mouse dies in last episode”,
code of conduct among Palestinian groups not
Associated Press, 29 June 2007.
to involve children in political violence, and to
engage with UNICEF to devise a plan of action to 25 “Rival Gaza children’s camps mix fun with
prevent the use of children in such violence”.57 politics”, Reuters, 22 August 2007.
26 Interview with confidential source, 9 September
2007.
* Titles of non-English language sources have been
K—O
translated by the Coalition. 27 UN Report, above note 5.
1 UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian 28 Workshop funded by the Quakers; see
Affairs, “The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians background paper on Hamas, above note 23.
of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure in 29 Information from Child Planning Unit, above note
the West Bank”, July 2007, www.ochaopt.org. 18.
2 International Crisis Group (ICG), “After Gaza”, 30 Information from DCI-Palestine, 20 October 2007.
Middle East Report No. 68, 2 August 2007. 31 Documentation from Mezan Centre for Human
3 Colin Urquhart, “Gaza goes hungry as Israeli Rights, www.mezan.org.
sanctions bite”, Guardian, 12 October 2007. 32 “Palestinian rocket kills 2 Gaza children: medics”,
4 Documentation from DCI-Palestine, 28 September Reuters, 7 August 2007.
2000 to 5 November 2007. 33 Background paper on Hamas, above note 23.
5 UN Report, Visit of the Special Representative for 34 Interview with Dr Samir al-Qadi, Hamas MP,
Children and Armed Conflict to the Middle East, Hebron, February 2006.
UN Doc. OSRSG/CAAC, 9–20 April 2007. 35 Documentation from DCI-Palestine, 20 October
6 Amos Harel, “Lull in Gaza but IDF says Qassam 2007.
fight to go on”, Ha’aretz, 11 April 2006. 36 Hamas official website, www.palestine-info.info/
7 OCHA/DCI information, July–August 2007. (Arabic).
8 “IDF: Palestinians use kids to collect Qassam 37 Information from Child Protection Agencies
launchers”, Ha’aretz, 22 August 2007. working in the OPT, July–August 2007.
9 Gideon Levy, “Children of war”, Ha’aretz, 2 38 Arnon Regular, “Palestinian groups condemn use
September 2007. of children in terror attacks”, Ha’aretz, 26 March
10 UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update, 21 2004.
September 2007, www.unicef.org. 39 Documentation from DCI-Palestine, above note
11 DCI-Palestine, 5 November 2007, www.dci-pal. 35.
org. 40 Interview with DCI-Palestine, 6 January 2006. See
12 UN Report, above note 5. also incomplete Fatah official website “martyrs”
13 See numerous case studies in Yesh Din, “A list, http://kataebaqsa.org.
semblance of law”, June 2006. 41 Efrat Weiss, “Boy pressed to carry out attack”,
14 Documentation from DCI-Palestine, 20 October Ynet News, 12 October 2005, www.ynetnews.
2007. com.

42 See PFLP website, www.pflp.ps/; Israeli Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.il. OMAN
43 See PFLP website, above note 42.
44 Cited in Human Rights Watch, “Erased in a Sultanate of Oman
moment: suicide bombing attacks against Israeli
civilians”, October 2002. Population: 2.6 million (1.1 million under 18)
45 Interview with DCI-Palestine, above note 40.
46 Documentation from DCI-Palestine, above note
35. Voluntary recruitment age: 15 or 18 (see text)
47 Obituaries of Muhammad al-Saksak and Ahmed Voting age: 21
al-Bal’awi, www.qudsway.com and www. Optional Protocol: acceded 17 September 2004
qudsnews.net (Arabic). Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
48 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Palestinian CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
Islamic Jihad terror organization in 2006”, 15
March 2007, www.mfa.gov.il. There were no reports of under-18s in the
49 Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi, “The Popular armed services.
Resistance Committees: Hamas’ new partners?”,
Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 17 May 2006 .
50 www.moqawmh.com/ (Arabic).
Government
51 “Yasser Abu Libda, born 1985”, www.moqawmh. National recruitment legislation and
com.
52 UNICEF, Humanitarian Action Update, 21
practice
September 2007. The Basic Law (constitution) of Oman stated that
53 Information from Child Planning Unit, above note “No institution or group may set up military or
18. paramilitary organizations. The Law regulates
54 “ICRC activities in Israel and the occupied and military services, general or partial mobilization
autonomous territories: operational update, and the rights, duties and disciplinary rules
October 2007”, www.icrc.org. of the Armed Forces, the public security
55 UN Doc. A/59/695-S/2005/72, 9 February 2005;
organizations and any other forces the State
UN Doc. A/61/529–S/2006/826, 26 October decides to establish” (Article 14). Oman stated
2006. in its declaration to the Optional Protocol that
“the minimum legal age for enlistment in the
56 UN Report, above note 5.
Ministry of Defence and the Sultan’s armed
57 Report of the UN Secretary-General to the forces is eighteen years; that a birth certificate
Security Council on Children and Armed or a certificate of ascertainment of age from
Conflict, 21 December 2007, UN Doc. A/62/609-
the competent governmental authorities
S/2007/757.
constitutes the precautionary measure for
ensuring compliance with that requirement; and
that enlistment is optional, not compulsory”.1
However, this appeared to be at variance with
Oman’s May 2006 Second Periodic Report on the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, in which
the government stated that children between
the ages of 15 and 18 could volunteer for the
armed forces. The report said that preference was
usually given to those who were oldest, who were
considered for “an extremely limited number of
branches of the armed forces”. The report further
stated that “the current law does not permit the
direct involvement of children under 15 years of
age in any war”.2

2 Second periodic report of Oman to the UN
CRC/C/OMN/2, 8 May 2006.

Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 2006, but
PACIFIC I SL ANDS had not moved on the ratification of the Optional
Protocol.
Republics of Kiribati and Nauru; Cook Islands,
Niue, Independent State of Samoa; Republic
of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of
COOK ISLANDS, NIUE, SAMOA
Micronesia, Republic of Palau; Tuvalu and Population: Cook Islands and Samoa 203,000
Republic of Vanuatu (see individual entries for (aggregate); Niue 1,000
Solomon Islands, Fiji and Tonga) Government armed forces: no armed forces
Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable
Many of the Pacific Islands had no armed Voluntary recruitment age: not applicable
forces. Australia, New Zealand or the USA Voting age: Cook Islands and Niue: 18; Samoa: 21
were responsible for defence assistance
for eight of them, while Tuvalu and Vanuatu Cook Islands: CRC, GC AP I and II
had no such defence arrangements with Niue: CRC
any state. Samoa: CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC
No armed forces were maintained by the

REPUBLICS OF governments of Cook Islands, Niue and
KIRIBATI AND NAURU Samoa. Defence was provided by New
Population: 113,000 (aggregate) Zealand.
Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable Government
Voluntary recruitment age: not applicable
Voting age: Kiribati: 18; Nauru: 20 National recruitment legislation and
Optional Protocol: practice
Kiribati: not signed New Zealand defined the relationship with the
Nauru: signed 8 September 2000 Cook Islands in August 1965 as “a form of full
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): self-government in free association with New
Kiribati: CRC Zealand”, New Zealand having responsibilities
Nauru: CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC for external affairs and defence in consultation
with them.3 The Niue Constitution Act 1974 stated
No armed forces were maintained by the that New Zealand was responsible for external
governments of Kiribati or Nauru. affairs and defence.4 New Zealand’s 1962 Treaty
of Friendship with Samoa brought with it an
obligation to consider sympathetically requests
Government for defence assistance.5
The New Zealand armed forces administered
National recruitment legislation and a Mutual Assistance Programme, which aimed to
P—R
practice support the Pacific Patrol Boat operations and
the police of several island states in the Pacific,
Australia and New Zealand provided defence
including training in using and securing small
assistance to Kiribati. Kiribati nationals
arms.6 Training support was provided to the Cook
volunteered in the past to join the UK armed
Islands and Samoan police forces.7
forces, where the minimum age for voluntary
recruitment is 16 (see UK entry). Australia was
responsible, under an informal agreement, for the Developments
defence of Nauru.1 There was no specific national
Samoa presented its Initial report to the
legislation on children and armed conflict.
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in
November 2005, stating that the government
Developments had continuously supported UN resolutions
on children in armed conflict.8 The Committee
International standards recommended that Samoa ratify the Optional
Kiribati presented its Initial report to the Protocol.9
Committee on the Rights of the Child in August
2005, and the Committee recommended in
September 2006 that the government ratify the
Optional Protocol.2 Nauru ratified the Additional

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL Developments
ISLANDS, FEDERATED STATES The Marshall Islands presented its Second
periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of
OF MICRONESIA, REPUBLIC the Child in December 2004, but failed to appear
OF PALAU twice at Committee sessions where the report
was to be reviewed.15
Population: 192,000 (aggregate)
Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable; no TUVALU AND VANUATU
conscription in Marshall Islands during peacetime Population: 221,000 (aggregate)
Voluntary recruitment age: not applicable Government armed forces: no armed forces
Voting age: 18 Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable
Optional Protocol: Voluntary recruitment age: not applicable
Marshall Islands, Palau: not signed Voting age: 18
Micronesia: signed 8 May 2002 Optional Protocol:
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): Tuvalu: not signed
Marshall Islands: CRC, ICC Vanuatu: ratified 27 September 2007
Micronesia, Palau: CRC, GC AP I and II Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Tuvalu: CRC
No armed forces were maintained by the
Vanuatu: CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182
governments of the Marshall Islands,
Micronesia and Palau. Defence was No armed forces were maintained by
provided by the USA. the governments of Tuvalu or Vanuatu.
Government security or paramilitary forces in Vanuatu.
National recruitment legislation and Context

practice
On 3 March 2007 serious violence erupted in
The USA maintained a separate Compact of the outskirts of Port Vila, Vanuatu, involving
Free Association (COFA) with each state, under members of the communities of Tanna and
which the US government had full authority and Ambrym Islands living in the capital. According
responsibility for security and defence in relation to reports, the violence broke out after residents
to the islands.10 of Tanna Island claimed that a sorcerer from
The constitution of the Marshall Islands Ambrym Island had cast a spell that killed a
states, “No person shall be conscripted to serve Tanna woman.16 The government declared a state
in the armed forces of the Marshall Islands except of emergency on 5 March and scores of Ambrym
in time of war or imminent danger of war as community members took refuge at the Vanuatu
certified by the Cabinet, and no person shall be Mobile Force (VMF) camp in Port Vila.17
conscripted if … he has established that he is a In November 2006, members of the Papuan
conscientious objector to participation in war” armed opposition group, the West Papuan
(Section 11). National Liberation Army (TPN-PB), appeared to
According to the COFA between the USA and be operating from Port Vila, the Vanuatu capital,
the Marshall Islands, no Marshallese citizen was where the group’s first national congress was
subject to “involuntary induction into military held.18
service of the United States as long as such
person has resided in the United States for a
period of less than one year” (Section 341).11 Government
A similar provision was made in the USA’s
agreement with Micronesia.12 National recruitment legislation and
It was estimated that hundreds of citizens practice
from the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau There were no regular military forces in Vanuatu,
continued to serve in all five branches of the US and members of the other security forces had
armed forces.13 At least five soldiers from the to be at least 18 years old. The police force had
Marshall Islands and Palau were killed in combat approximately 500 officers, including a police
in Iraq.14 maritime wing and the paramilitary Vanuatu
No specific legislation on children in armed Mobile Force (VMF).19
conflict had been enacted. The police were the only security force in
Tuvalu.

There were no specific laws on children in 17 “Displaced Ni-Vanuatu get help from France”,
armed conflict. Pacific Islands Report, 20 March 2007, http://
pidp.eastwestcenter.org.
Developments 18 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Protest and
Punishment: Political Prisoners in Papua”, Human
Rights Watch, Vol. 19, No. 4(C), February 2007.
Vanuatu ratified the Optional Protocol in Human Rights Practices 2006, Vanuatu, 6 March
September 2007 and in 2006 ratified ILO 2007, www.state.gov.
Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child
Labour. Its Declaration to the Optional Protocol
stated that the minimum age for voluntary
recruitment is 18.
1 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

Trade, Nauru-Country Information Paper, www.
mfat.govt.nz.
Consideration of report submitted by Kiribati,
Concluding observation, UN Doc. CRC/C/KIR/
CO/1, 29 September 2006.
3 Government of the Cook Islands, Definitions of
the Constitution, Special Relationship with New
Zealand, www.ck/govt.htm.
4 Niue Constitution Act 1974, Analysis, Article 6:
External Affairs and Defence, www.paclii.org.
5 New Zealand Ministry of Defence, Defence
Portfolio: Briefing to the Incoming Government
2005, www.defence.govt.nz.
6 New Zealand Ministry of Defence, Annual Report
2006, Part 1 – Overview, www.defence.govt.nz.
7 Ibid.
8 Initial report of Samoa to the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/WSM/1, 16
February 2006.
Consideration of report submitted by Samoa,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/WSM/
CO/1, 16 October 2006.
10 See www.fm/jcn/ (Marshall Islands); US
Department of State, Background note:
Micronesia, www.state.gov/; and US Department
P—R
of State, Background note: Palau, www.state.gov.
11 Republic of the Marshall Islands, Public Law 108-
188, 17 December 2003, www.rmiembassyus.org.
12 Joint Committee on Compact Economic
Negotiations (ICN), Compilation of Agreements
between the Government of the Federated States
of Micronesia and the Government of the United
States related to the Compact of Free Association,
Washington, DC, 2002, www.fm.
13 US Department of the Interior, Office of Insular
Affairs, www.doi.gov/ “Islanders in the Military”
(Military Highlights).
14 Ibid., “Islanders in the Military” (Insular Heroes).
15 “Marshall Islands a No-Show at Committee on the
Rights of Child Review”, Yokwe Online, 24 January
2007, www.yokwe.net.
16 “Vanuatu chiefs to meet over riots”, National Nine
News (Australia), 6 March 2007, http://news.
ninemsn.com.au.

protests by religious groups these directions
Pakistan were not fully implemented.6 In July 2007
government forces stormed the Lal Masjid (Red
Islamic Republic of Pakistan Mosque) madrasa complex in Islamabad which
had been taken over by militants seeking to
Population: 157.9 million (71.8 million under 18) impose sharia law in the city.7
Government
Voting age: 181 National recruitment legislation and
Optional Protocol: signed 26 September 2001 practice
The 1952 Pakistan Army Act allowed compulsory
military service to be introduced in times of
The minimum voluntary recruitment age emergency, but this provision had not been
used. Under Article 39 of the 1973 constitution,
was 17, but training requirements meant “The State shall enable people from all parts
that under-18s did not take part in active of Pakistan to participate in the Armed Forces
service. In a situation of continuing of Pakistan.” The Pakistan National Service
violence and unrest, armed groups, Ordinance of 1970 stated that officers and jawans
(soldiers) could be recruited between the ages
including those carrying out suicide of 17 and 23, and had to have at least a year’s
attacks in Afghanistan, continued to recruit training before taking part in active service.8
and use children. Candidates for a regular commission in the
Pakistan Army could apply from the age of 17.
Officer recruits received two years’ training at the
Context Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) in Abbotabad,
There were increasing calls for the restoration while ordinary soldiers received around one
of democracy and the rule of law and for year’s training. Recruitment information
the withdrawal of the military from politics, indicated that the authorities would lower the
particularly following President Musharraf’s minimum age requirement by between three
failed attempt to remove the chief justice of the and six months in “special deserving cases”.9
Supreme Court in March 2007. The government Statistics on the number of under-18s serving in
remained reliant on political support from the government armed forces were not available.
Islamist political parties.2
There was an escalation in violence and Military training and military schools
unrest in the Federally Administered Tribal A number of cadet colleges admitted children
Areas (FATA), in the province of Balochistan and from the age of ten, but pupils could choose
in Gilgit-Baltistan, while violence continued whether or not to join the armed forces after
in parts of Sindh, Punjab and North West completing their schooling. The majority of
Frontier province (NWFP).3 In some tribal areas graduates from the Military College, Jhelum, a
– South and North Waziristan in particular – the residential school and college educating around
government reached “peace” agreements with 500 cadets and run by the Pakistan Army, entered
pro-Taleban insurgents which effectively allowed the PMA.10 The Military College and cadet schools
them sanctuary and to set up quasi-governmental were reported to attract students because of the
structures, collect taxes, impose their “penal high quality of education that they offered.11
code” and exercise quasi-judicial functions.4
Armed groups seeking secession of parts Children in the justice system
of Jammu and Kashmir from India to Pakistan In December 2004 the Lahore High Court revoked
continued to be active in Pakistan-administered the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance (JJSO)
Kashmir (known as Azad Kashmir), although less 2000 which established certain protections for
overtly and in fewer numbers.5 children within the criminal justice process,
The government took some steps to address including defining a child as a person below
religious radicalism, particularly after bomb 18 years of age; providing for special juvenile
attacks in the United Kingdom in July 2005 by courts; regulating arrest, bail and probation;
bombers, some of whom had spent time in and prohibiting the death penalty and the use
Pakistani madrasas (Islamic religious schools). of fetters and handcuffs. The Lahore High Court
Hundreds of members of religious groups and held that the JJSO unduly privileged juveniles and
religious school students were arrested, and the argued that it was necessary to retain the death
government announced that all foreign students penalty for juveniles in order to deter crime.
at religious schools would be expelled and that Although the JJSO was temporarily reinstated
such schools needed to register. However, after while an appeal remained pending as of mid-

2007, the JJSO remained largely unimplemented. of adventure and sacrifice, but reports also
As a result children continued to be treated indicated that there was a degree of coercion and
on a par with adults within the criminal justice that parents and teachers feared retaliation if
system12 and subjected to widespread abuses in they prevented children from going.21
detention,13 and continued to be sentenced to One suicide attack by a child took place in
death and executed.14 Pakistan. In September 2007 it was reported that
a suicide bomber aged about 15 or 16 had blown
himself up in the town of Dera Ismail Khan in
Armed groups NWFP, killing himself and 17 others, in the context
The Taleban and other armed groups such of a wave of attacks by pro-Taleban militants in
as Hizb-e Islami and al-Qaeda were widely the area following the July 2007 siege of the Lal
believed to be active in the tribal areas of Masjid.22
Pakistan, regrouping and rearming, and a A number of children were caught up in the
few thousand non-Pakistani insurgents were siege of the Lal Masjid. Many were young girls
believed to be operating in these areas.15 The and boys who were students at the two madrasas
government continued to deny allegations that associated with the Lal Masjid. Those carrying
it or its intelligence services (the Inter-Services and using weapons were reported to be students
Intelligence, ISI) were providing direct support over the age of 18.23
to the Taleban. There were, however, credible In July 2007 a national child rights
allegations that in Waziristan and other border organization expressed concern about the
areas Pakistani and Afghan Taleban leaders recruitment and training of children and their
were training suicide bombers for operations in training and preparation for military action
Afghanistan.16 A UN report in September 2007 and conflict. In urging the government to
found that Pakistan remained an important ratify the Optional Protocol and take action to
source of human and material assistance for the protect children from recruitment it referred
insurgency in Afghanistan generally and suicide to unconfirmed reports of the involvement of
attacks in particular.17 Those trained for suicide children as young as 15 in political violence in
attacks included children (see below). Karachi in May 2007, as well as at the Lal Masjid
Madrasas served as an alternative to the in Islamabad in July 2007.24
failing public school system in many areas for There were unconfirmed reports that armed
those unable to afford private education, and Baloch nationalist groups and tribal leaders were
also attracted those seeking religious instruction using children as young as 14 in the ongoing low-
for their children. Many madrasas failed to level insurgency in Balochistan.25
provide an adequate education, focusing solely
on Islamic studies, and there was no regulation
or oversight of the education given in numerous Disarmament, demobilization
unregistered madrasas. Some madrasas and reintegration (DDR)
reportedly continued to promote religious
radicalism and violence, and were used for There were no government programs for the
military training, although madrasas were not the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
sole recruiting grounds for insurgents and the of children involved in armed conflict, despite
majority were not involved in militancy.18 the recommendation which the UN Committee
There were reports that in Pakistan- on the Rights of the Child made to the Pakistan
P—R
administered Kashmir, following the October government in October 2003, that it develop
2005 earthquake, some armed groups were in collaboration with non-governmental
involved in establishing schools, and anecdotal organizations and international organizations
evidence that they were recruiting children.19 a comprehensive system for the reintegration
In July 2007 it was reported that a 14-year- and recovery of children who had participated in
old boy was returned to his family in Pakistan hostilities.26
after being recruited from a madrasa in South
Waziristan, trained and sent over the border International standards
to carry out a suicide attack on a provincial
governor in Afghanistan, where he was detained Pakistan ratified the ILO Minimum Age
by security forces before he could carry out the Convention 138 in July 2006.
attack. The boy reportedly alleged that at least
two other boys from his madrasa had been 1 Constitution, Article 106, as amended in 2002.
indoctrinated to carry out suicide attacks.20 2 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Elections,
Another report indicated that in towns on the democracy and stability in Pakistan”, Asia Report
edge of Pakistan’s tribal belt children aged No. 137, July 2007.
between 11 and 15 were being recruited from 3 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Pakistan Assessment
schools by pro-Taleban insurgents and trained 2006, www.satp.org.
in Afghanistan as suicide bombers. Young boys 4 Amnesty International Report 2007.
were reported to have been lured by the promise

5 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “‘With friends
like these …’ human rights violations in Azad PANA M A
Kashmir”, September 2006.
6 Amnesty International Report 2006. Republic of Panama
7 See, for example, “Police probe attack at Red
Mosque”, BBC News, 28 July 2007, “Court Population: 3.2 million (1.2 million under 18)
demands Red Mosque answers”, 28 August 2007. Government armed forces: no armed forces
8 Second periodic report of Pakistan to the UN Compulsory recruitment age: ��
not applicable
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. Voluntary recruitment age: not��
applicable
CRC/C/65/Add.21, 11 April 2003. Voting age: 18
��
9 Pakistan Army, www.joinpakarmy.gov.pk/index. Optional Protocol: ratified
��
8 August 2001
php. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
10 Military College Jhelum, www.militarycollege.edu. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
pk.
11 Confidential source. There were no armed forces. The minimum
12 Amnesty International (AI), “Pakistan: Protection age for recruitment to the police was 18,
of juveniles in the criminal justice system remains but cadets could enter police training at 17.
inadequate” (ASA 33/021/2005), October 2005.
13 “Tragedy of Pakistan’s prison children”, BBC
News, 6 November 2006. Government
15 ICG, Pakistan’s tribal areas: Appeasing the
militants, Asia Report No. 125, 11 December 2006. practice
16 HRW, The Human Cost: The Consequences of Since the abolition of the armed forces in 1990,
Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan, April 2007. security and law enforcement had been the
17 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), responsibility of the police and the National
Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001–2007), Air and Maritime Services under the control
September 2007. of the Ministry of Government and Justice.1
18 US Department of State, Country Reports on Police cadets received instruction at the Police
Human Rights Practices 2006. See also C. Academy, the Police Training and Specialization
Christine Fair, “Militant recruitment in Pakistan: a Centre, and the Superior Studies Centre.
new look at the militancy–madrasah connection”, Candidates for the Police Academy had to be
Asia Policy, No. 4, July 2007, http://asiapolicy. aged 18–25 and have three years’ secondary
nbr.org. education. Candidates for the Superior Studies
19 “Education vacuum poses long-term threat to Centre had to be aged 17–22 and single, and to
children”, IRIN, 5 June 2006; ICG, Pakistan: have completed secondary-school. 2
Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Policy
Briefing No. 46, 15 March 2006.
20 “Boy forced by Taliban to become would-be
Developments
bomber is pardoned”, Guardian, 16 July 2007. Every month hundreds of Colombians, including
21 “Recruiting Taleban ‘child soldiers’”, BBC News, children, sought asylum in Panama from violence
12 June 2007. and recruitment by armed opposition groups
22 “17 killed in latest Pakistan suicide attack”, in Colombia; large numbers were turned away.3
Agence France-Presse, 10 September 2007. An estimated 200 were given refugee status.4
A further 900 were given temporary protection
on humanitarian grounds, but humanitarian
24 Society for the Protection of the Rights of the organizations criticized their lack both of
Child, “Ratification of Convention on Child Rights
freedom to work and of freedom of movement.5
Sought”, news release, 24 July 2007, www.
sparcpk.org.
In September 2007 the National Refugee
Office (Oficina Nacional para la Atención de los
25 Confidential source, above note 23. Refugiados, ONPAR) announced that over 400
26 Committee on the Rights of the Child, refugees living in the country for more than 15
Consideration of second periodic report years would be granted permanent residency
submitted by Pakistan, Concluding observations, permits, and that ONPAR was establishing a
UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.217, 27 October 2003. commission to look at the situation of more than
800 displaced Colombians, including those who
might wish to opt for voluntary repatriation, in
the border province of Darién.6
In June 2004 the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child recommended that, with regard to
Colombians under temporary protection, Panama

facilitate the naturalization of their children born
in Panama, and revise its practice of restricting PAP UA N E W
their freedom of movement, especially in the case
of young people. The Committee also called on
Panama, in those cases where families could be
GUI N E A
deported without breaching international human Papua New Guinea
rights or refugee law, to avoid separating children
from their parents.7 Population: 5.9 million (2.8 million under 18)
1 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía, Voluntary recruitment age: 16
Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latina Voting age: 18
y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Panama, August
2006, www.flacso.cl. Optional Protocol: not signed
2 Inscripción a la Academia de Policía Presidente
Belisario Porras, Inscripción al Centro de CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182
Enseñanza Superior Doctor Justo Arosemena,
www.panamatramita.gob.pa. The minimum age for voluntary recruitment
3 Jesuit Refugee Service, “Panama: immigration into the armed forces was 16. In practice,
policy tightened”, 31 July 2006, and “Panamá: there were no reports of under-18s being
aumenta la xenofobia contra inmigrantes y recruited.
refugiados”, 7 May 2007, www.jrs.net.
4 “Jesuitas censarán a refugiados de Curundú”, La
Prensa, 3 January 2006, http://mensual.prensa. Context
com.
Following the end of a nine-year secessionist
5 UN news service, “Panamá otorga estatus de conflict in 1997, and the withdrawal of Papua
refugiados a 42 indígenas colombianos, reporta
New Guinea troops from the island province of
ACNUR”, 15 December 2006, www.un.org/
North Solomons (known as Bougainville) in 2003,
spanish/News; Jesuit Refugee Service, “Panamá:
la legislación para los refugiados no se adapta a the Papua New Guinea government approved
la ley internacional”, 5 February 2007. a constitution for the Autonomous Region of
Bougainville in December 2004.
6 Jesuit Refugee Service, “Panama: some refugees
In May 2005 the UN Observer Mission on
get rights, others must wait”, 14 September 2007.
Bougainville (UNOMB) declared the weapons
7 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, disposal program provided for in the 2001
Bougainville Peace Agreement to be complete
submitted by Panama, Concluding observations,
and verified the situation as conducive to holding
UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.233, 30 June 2004�.
elections, which took place in May–June 2005.
The first Bougainville president and Autonomous
Bougainville government were sworn into office
in June 2005. The peace agreement also provided
for a referendum on the province’s independence
to be held after 10–15 years.1
P—R
There were high levels of violent crime
across the country, and a state of emergency
was declared in August 2006 in the Southern
Highlands. In Bougainville there were reports that
former combatants who had remained outside
the peace process had rearmed, contributing to
the high level of gun crime on the island.2
Government
practice
The 1974 Defence Act, which provided the legal
basis for voluntary recruitment, stated that a
person aged 16 or 17 could be enlisted, but not
without “the written consent of his parents or
guardians or, where the parents or guardians are
dead or unknown, or where it is unreasonable
in all the circumstances that their consent be

obtained, of a Provincial Administrator”. A person positions by the “resistance force” established by
under 16 years of age could not be enlisted the Papua New Guinea military.7
(Article 30). Members of the armed forces under
18 could be exempted from military discipline if
this was provided for by regulations or defence
Developments
council orders (Schedule 1.C3). There were no Human rights organizations continued to
provisions to protect under-18s from involvement criticize severely the treatment of under-18s by
in hostilities. The Defence Act also established a law enforcement officials, in particular ongoing
reserve force, consisting of volunteers discharged patterns of beatings, rape and torture in police
or transferred from the regular force, or persons custody. Although some progress was made
enlisted directly into the reserves (Article 14). in establishing a juvenile justice system, there
In times of war or “defence stand by” the head was yet to be a demonstrable change in police
of state could order the whole or any part of treatment of children.8
the reserve force to be on continuous full-time New child protection legislation was drafted.
military service (Article 41).3 In 2007 a submission was being drafted by
Although there was no conscription, in the the Minister for Community Development to
1975 constitution’s prohibition of forced labour recommend ratification of the Optional Protocol.9
there was a specific exclusion from this of “labour
of a reasonable amount and kind (including in 1 Australian Government Department of Foreign
the case of compulsory military service, labour Affairs and Trade, Bougainville Peace Process,
required as an alternative to such service in www.dfat.gov.au/ .
the case of a person who has conscientious 2 Amnesty International Report 2007.
objections to military service) that is required in
3 Defence Act, 1974.
the national interest” (Article 43).
4 Confidential Child Soldiers Coalition
Child recruitment and deployment correspondence, June 2007.
There were no reports of under-18s being
recruited in practice into the military. Current 6 UNDP, Bougainville Rehabilitation and
military policy was to recruit only those with a Reconstruction and Development, www.undp.org.
certificate of completion of school grade 12, and pg/ .
hence over 18.4 It was not known whether this 7 Initial report of Papua New Guinea to UN
practice was reflected in any updated legislation, Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
defence council orders or other military CRC/C/28/Add.20, 21 July 2003.
regulations. 8 Human Rights Watch, “Still making their own
rules: Ongoing impunity for police beatings, rape,
and torture in Papua New Guinea”, 30 October
Disarmament, demobilization 2006.
and reintegration (DDR) 9 Confidential source, above note 5.
Efforts for the rehabilitation of former

combatants, including child soldiers, continued
in Bougainville province. After UNOMB withdrew,
UNICEF increased its presence in Bougainville in
order to help improve the situation of women and
children. Many UNICEF-supported programs were
designed to contribute to the reintegration of ex-
combatants and reduce the likelihood of further
armed conflict.5 The UN Development Programme
(UNDP) was implementing the Bougainville
Planning and Community Support Project in
co-operation with the Autonomous Bougainville
government, the Papua New Guinea government
and other agencies and non-governmental
organizations. The project included support for
establishment of a youth network, and promotion
of human rights awareness and enhancement
of conflict resolution skills through training in
civic education, human rights, conflict resolution
and trauma healing.6 During the Bougainville
conflict, thousands of young men and children
as young as 14 had been deployed to fight by the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army or in front line

were under investigation before the national
PAR AGUAY courts, but no progress had been made in the
investigations. By October 2007 the government,
Republic of Paraguay working with the armed forces, the police and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), had
Population: 6.2 million (2.7 million under 18) reportedly identified over 250 such cases.9
Compulsory recruitment age: 17 Military training and military schools
Voluntary recruitment age: no legal minimum Each branch of the armed forces had its own
age (see text) training and specialist schools.10 Military
Voting age: 18 schools, which were entirely under military
Optional Protocol: ratified 27 September 2002 control, accepted children as young as 12. Little
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): information was available as to the education
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 provided, the disciplinary regime or the
punishments that students might be subjected
Following continued public and to.11
There were several such schools, including
international pressure about recruitment the Mariscal Solano López Military Academy
of children, by 2007 under-18s were no for officer training and the Mariscal Estigarribia
longer allowed to volunteer for military or military school for the instruction of non-
pre-military service. commissioned officers (NCOs).12 Six new NCO
schools had been opened throughout the country
by 2005.13
Government Until 2006 secondary-school students wishing
to bring forward their military service could
National recruitment legislation and attend four-week courses once a year for three
practice years at the Students’ Military Instruction Centre
The armed forces were mainly conscripted.1 for Reserve Officers (Centro de Instrucción Militar
Military law required the recruitment of all para Estudiantes de Formación de Oficiales de
males the year they turned 18, thus allowing Reserva, CIMEFOR). The first two periods were
the conscription of 17-year-olds.2 Conscientious compulsory and the third year was optional.
objectors, disabled people, people belonging Cimeforistas, as cadets were known, received
to indigenous communities and Catholic priests instruction in the use of firearms and physical
were not required to do military service.3 In and academic instruction.14
times of armed conflict all citizens could be On 24 June 2005, 18-year-old Darío González,
conscripted; special forces could also be a third-year student at the NCO Military College
mobilized for specific missions.4 Women could be in Encarnación, died of a gunshot wound to the
conscripted, but only in support functions.5 head, the third such case at the institution. In
Conditions of service for conscripts were July René González, also aged 18, a student at
extremely poor, with very strict disciplinary the NCO Military School in Dimabel, attempted
regimes. Between 1989 and 2005 more than suicide. No investigation had been carried out in
110 conscripts aged between 12 and 20 had either case.15 P—R
died during compulsory military service,
mostly as a result of ill-treatment or firearms
Child recruitment and deployment
accidents.6 A former conscript who had spent The law allowed under-18s to bring forward their
his military service at the Mariscal Estigarribia enlistment, but no minimum conditions were set.
military base in Chaco was found in the jungle Only a children’s court could grant an under-18
in 2006, suffering from severe malnutrition and permission to bring forward his military service.
psychological problems because of the service Administrative sanctions were provided for those
conditions.7 recruiting under-18s without this authorization,
In November 2006 the UN Special Rapporteur but were not enforced. Recruits under 18 were
on torture expressed concern about the automatically deemed to have reached the age of
beating and descuereo of conscripts, a form majority once they joined the armed forces, and
of systematic bullying which involved forcing were then bound by military law and discipline.16
individuals to carry out extreme forms of exercise Forced recruitment of children between
as punishment. He also expressed concern that 12 and 17 was very common. Military trucks
there had been no convictions for torture after travelled to communities and children were taken
the new penal code entered into force in 1999, away following false promises of education, food
and that torture was not criminalized in the and health care.17 Parents were often pressurized
military criminal code.8 or coerced into signing authorizations allowing
Numerous cases of soldiers, including their children to be conscripted, although these
under-18s, who had died in service over the years authorizations had no legal standing.18 The lack

of registration at birth facilitated this practice:
around 22 per cent of all under-18s in Paraguay
Developments
were not registered at birth and so had no legal Neighbourhood security commissions
papers.19
In all, around 60 per cent of recruits in Neighbourhood security commissions
military units were reportedly under 18. In 2005 (comisiones vecinales de seguridad ciudadana)
three young indigenous recruits were found were set up in some of the poorest parts of the
at the Engineering Command in Asunción, and country, with the support of the Ministry of the
four others at Cavalry Regiment No. 4, in Salto Interior and in direct communication with the
del Guiará, even though by law members of police, as part of the 2005 government-initiated
indigenous communities were exempt from Safe Paraguay Plan. The commissions had over
conscription.20 The Inter-institutional Commission 13,000 members, equipped with mobile phones
for Visiting Military Quarters (Comisión and weapons, in three departments – Caaguazú,
Interinstitucional de Visita a Cuarteles), Canindeyú and San Pedro.32 According to reports,
established in 2001,21 visited 40 military units in these commissions were increasingly involved
March 2005 and found 168 under-18 conscripts, in illegal detentions, death threats, house raids,
most of whom had been forcibly recruited. Some killings and attempted killings, and torture and
conscripts were used as forced labour in unpaid ill-treatment.33 They also offered protection
jobs for the benefit of their superior officers.22 to drugs traffickers and cigarette smugglers.
Regulations were modified in 2005 to allow In July 2006 peasant leader Luis Martínez,
only those who were 18 or older to join active from the Kamba community in Rembé, San
service, but for a year or more military authorities Pedro Department, and a member of a peasant
continued to recruit children as Cimeforistas, association critical of the commissions, died after
using a Supreme Court decree that allowed such being shot over 40 times, reportedly by members
recruitment with parental consent.23 of a neighbourhood security commission.34
In April 2006 the UN Human Rights Several families from Rembé left their homes
Committee expressed concern about the after receiving death threats. Investigations into
persistence of recruitment of children, especially the killing were stalled and by December 2006 an
in rural areas, and called for it to be abolished alleged perpetrator had not been arrested.35
and for all complaints of ill-treatment and
deaths of conscripts to be investigated and 1 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
compensation awarded to the victims.24 (FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,
In March 2006 Paraguay replaced its original Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latina
declaration on ratifying the Optional Protocol, y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Paraguay, August
which had stated that 16 was the minimum age 2006, www.flacso.cl.
for voluntary recruitment,25 with a declaration 2 Orlando Castillo, “Las Fuerzas Armadas”,
stating that the minimum age for recruitment Derechos Humanos en Paraguay 2005, Codehupy,
into the armed forces was 18.26 Legislation to December 2005, http://www.codehupy.org.
give effect to this change was pending before 3 CODEHUPY, Informe alternativo de CODEHUPY
Congress in mid-2007.27 al Segundo Informe Periódico del Estado de
In June 2006 government authorities publicly Paraguay (ICCPR), 2005, at www.omct.org.
recognized their responsibility in, and apologized 4 Ley Nº 216, de Organización General de la Fuerzas
for, the deaths of Gerardo Vargas Areco and Víctor Armadas de la Nación, 9 July 1993, www.senado.
Hugo Maciel Alcaráz, two recruits under 18, who gov.py.
died during military service in 1989 and 1995 5 CODEHUPY, above note 3.
respectively. The apology followed complaints 6 Ibid.
presented by NGOs before the Inter-American
7 Vidal Acevedo, Orlando Castillo and Ricardo
Commission on Human Rights.28 Yamil Derene, “Una de cal y otra de arena: un
In January 2007 the commander of the armed reconocimiento importante a los derechos
forces dismissed from the armed forces all cadets humanos, pero también significativo aumento
under 18 following an outcry by NGOs when presupuestario a militares”, Derechos Humanos
16-year-old Víctor José Coronel, a Cimeforista en Paraguay 2006, CODEHUPY, December 2006.
at the Luque Air Force unit, was hospitalized 8 UN Press Release, “Special Rapporteur on Torture
following severe physical and psychological ends mission to Paraguay”, 29 November 2006,
abuse, reportedly at the hands of his superiors.29 www.ohchr.org.
Also in January 2007 the appeals court issued a 9 Information from confidential source, November
ruling that under-18s could not be recruited to 2007.
CIMEFOR.30
In October 2007 a case of human rights
violations against two conscripts who were 14 11 Castillo, above note 2.
at the time of their recruitment in 1997 was still 12 Ejército Paraguayo, ORBAT, www.saorbats.com.
pending before the Inter-American Commission ar.
on Human Rights.31

13 Plan Nacional de Seguridad Pública “Paraguay 33 Juan Martens and Roque Orrego, “De la
Seguro”, www.stp.gov.py. constancia de las violaciones a la legalidad
14 Cimefor Ejército, www.defensanacional.cc/ penal, a la ilegalidad paraestatal de la mano de
images/Cimefor01.doc. comisiones vecinales de ‘seguridad ciudadana’”,
Derechos Humanos en Paraguay 2006,
15 Maria Noguera and Andrés Vázquez, “Continúan
CODEHUPY, December 2006.
prácticas de malos tratos, tortura y reclutamiento
forzado”, Derechos Humanos en Paraguay 2005, 34 Acevedo, Castillo and Yamil Derene, above note 7.
CODEHUPY, December 2005. 35 Martens and Orrego, above note 33.
16 CODEHUPY, above note 3.
17 Asociación de Familiares de Víctimas del
Servicio Militar Obligatorio (AFAVISEM), “Niños
y Adolescentes en Cuarteles: Una realidad en
Paraguay”, 10 January 2006, www.vivaparaguay.
com.
19 UNICEF Paraguay, Situación de la infancia en
Paraguay, undated, www.unicef.org/paraguay/
spanish/children_2699.htm.
20 Noguera and Vázquez, above note 15.
21 See Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004.
23 Information from Amnesty International (AI)
Paraguay, June 2007.
24 UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration of
second periodic report submitted by Paraguay,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CCPR/C/PRY/
CO/2, 24 April 2006.
25 See Child Soldiers, above note 21.
26 Amended declaration, www2.ohchr.org.
See also Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho
Internacional (CEJIL), “Paraguay pide perdón
público por el reclutamiento ilegal y muerte de
dos niños mientras realizaban el servicio militar
obligatorio”, 20 June 2006, www.cejil.org.
27 Government communication to Coalition, July
2007.
28 Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,
Acuerdo de Solucion Amistosa, Caso Nº 11607,
Victor Hugo Maciel v. Paraguay, in Gaceta Oficial
de la Republica del Paraguay, 19 May 2006, www.
corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/vargas/Escrito2.pdf;
Caso Vargas Areco v. Paraguay, Sentencia, 26
P—R
September 2006, www.corteidh.or.cr. See also
Acevedo, Castillo and Yamil Derene, above note 7.
29 “Juez rechazó reincorporación de los menores
al Cimefor”, La Nación, 19 January 2007, www.
lanacion.com.py; “Otra víctima más del servicio
militar”, Movimiento de Objeción de Conciencia,
Paraguay, 9 January 2007, http://moc-
py.cabichui.org.
30 Corte Suprema de Justicia, “Cámara rechazó
apelación promovida por padres de menores”, 30
January 2007, www.pj.gov.py.
31 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,
Informe Nº 82/03, Petición 12.330, Admisibilidad
– Marcelino Gómes Paredes y Cristián Ariel
Núñez, 22 October 2003, www.cidh.oas.org.
32 Acevedo, Castillo and Yamil Derene, above note 7.

forces was responsible for its own schools and
P E RU entry was by selection. Officer and NCO cadets
were on average between 16 and 21.7
Republic of Peru The selection procedure for entry into the
army’s Military School at Chorrillos included
Population: 28.0 million (10.7 million under 18) extensive tests as well as a home visit and an
Government armed forces: 80,000 interview. Candidates had to pay around US$130
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription to register.8 On graduating, officers received
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (16 as cadets) the rank of second lieutenant.9 Candidates for
Voting age: 18 the Army Technical School (Escuela Técnica del
Optional Protocol: ratified 8 May 2002 Ejército) had to have completed the fifth year
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): of secondary education and be at least 16 years
old.10
Navy School graduates were given the rank
Although there was no evidence of children of naval second lieutenant (alférez de fragata
de comando) and a degree in naval-maritime
serving in the armed forces, in some sciences. The Navy Recruits School (Escuela de
indigenous areas children from the age of Reclutas) trained recruits in military, technical
12 served in self-defence committees. and general subjects and offered them a
vocational diploma.11
The air force had five training centres and
Government schools, including the Officers’ School (Escuela
de Oficiales de la Fuerza Aerea del Perú), where
National recruitment legislation and cadets could choose to specialize in one of 11
practice areas, such as flying, special operations and
The Congressional National Defence Commission aerial defence.12
was considering a new military service law in late Military secondary-schools accepted children
2006.1 In September 2006 it was proposed in the from the age of 13. Candidates and parents had
Congress that compulsory military service, which to sign an honour pledge (compromiso de honor)
had been dropped in 1999,2 be reinstated, since on application.13 The Army Intelligence School
the number of voluntary recruits was falling.3 (Escuela de Inteligencia del Ejercito) offered short
It was also proposed to reinstate compulsory courses on self-defence to children between
pre-military education in all secondary-schools seven and 15 and prepared candidates for entry
to “promote in students their love and respect into military schools.14
for national values [and] the protection of [Peru’s]
interests in order to raise better citizens”.4 The Armed groups
proposals were still before the Congress in
October 2007. Comités de autodefensa
According to the Law on Voluntary Military Self-defence committees, which had emerged
Service, men and women aged 17–45 had a during the 1980s as a response by small
duty to do military service and had to register communities to the internal armed conflict,
with military authorities the year they turned 17. continued to operate. In 1991 Legislative Decree
Forcible recruitment was prohibited. 740 allowed peasant rondas (self-defence
After registering, those volunteering to do groups) to carry weapons, while Legislative
military service joined active service units at Decree 741 standardized their name as comités
18, while all the others went into the reserves, de autodefensa (CADs).15
although certain groups were exempted. If Article 88 of the decree regulating the Law
quotas were not filled with volunteers, the on Military Service (Supreme Decree 004-DE-SG)
executive could order the conscription of other established that CADs were recognized rural or
individuals from the military register. Service was urban organizations freely and spontaneously
for a maximum of 24 months. Those choosing constituted, authorized to carry out self-defence
to stay on longer signed a renewable two-year activities to counter crime, to stop terrorist
contract and could join the non-commissioned and drug trafficking activities and to defend
officer hierarchy after four years. Students in themselves against irregular groups. They also
military and police schools who had spent at supported the armed forces and the police in the
least one year at school were considered to have development and “pacification” of their regions.
fulfilled their military duty.5 Those wishing to do active military service in a
self-defence committee had to be aged 18–30
Military training and military schools and serve in their own community for a period of
In April 2004 the Ministry of Defence introduced two years. Volunteers received a stipend, land,
education in international humanitarian law for priority to receive agricultural or other credits and
all military personnel.6 Each branch of the armed

preferential conditions for entry into military or 7 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
police schools.16 (FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,
In November 2005 members of an Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latina
international non-governmental organization y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Perú, August 2006,
visited several indigenous communities near the www.flacso.cl.
Ene River in Ayacucho, where they found children 8 Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, Admisión, www.
as young as 15 taking part in CADs. Community ejercito.mil.pe.
leaders interviewed stated that everyone 9 FLACSO, above note 7.
aged 12–60 was expected to defend their 10 Escuela Técnica del Ejército, Requisitos, www.
village in case of attack by armed groups, drug ejercito.mil.pe.
traffickers or illegal woodcutters.17 The Truth and 11 FLACSO, above note 7.
Reconciliation Commission reported that these
12 Ibid.
groups remained in existence for fear of a return
of armed opposition groups such as Sendero 13 Colegio Militar Francisco Bolognesi (Arequipa),
Condiciones de admisión, www.cmfb.edu.pe.
Luminoso, but that such fears were in most cases
unjustifiable.18 14 Escuela de Inteligencia, www.ejercito.mil.pe.
15 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, “Los
comités de autodefensa”, Informe Final, Tomo II,
Developments Capítulo 1.5, www.cverdad.org.pe.
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, 16 Reglamento de la Ley No. 27178, “Ley del Servicio
Peru and 58 other states endorsed the Paris Militar”, Decreto Supremo Nº 004-DE-SG, 17
Commitments to protect children from unlawful March 2000, at www.defensaidl.org.pe.
recruitment or use by armed forces or armed 17 Save the Children, “Child Soldiers in Local Self-
groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on Defence Patrols in Peru”, 6 November 2005,
children associated with armed forces or armed http://video.google.es/videoplay?docid=117423
groups. The documents reaffirmed international 0518302730264&q=ni%C3%B1os+soldado.
standards and operational principles for 18 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, above
protecting and assisting child soldiers and note 15.
UNICEF.
1 Instituto de Defensa Legal, “Editorial”, En la

Mira: Boletín de Seguridad y Defensa, No. 37,
Jan–March 2007, www.defensaidl.org.pe.
2 See Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004.
3 Congreso de la República, Proyecto de Ley
275/2006-CR, Que modifica los artículos 31,34,
45 y 49 e incorpora el artículo 49a de la Ley No
27178, Ley del Servicio Militar, 18 September
2006.
4 Congreso de la República, Proyecto de Ley
P—R
223/2006-CR, Que propone restituir en la
curricula educativa la instrucción premilitar en
los centros de educación de nivel primaria y
secundaria de todo el país, 15 September 2006,
www.defensaidl.org.pe.
5 Dirección de Movilización, Ley del Servicio Militar
Voluntario del Perú, 29 February 2000, www.
serviciomilitar.mil.pe.
6 Resolución Ministerial Nº 536-2004-DE-SG,
Aprueban la Directiva Nº 001 MINDEF/CEA-
DIH, con la finalidad de integrar el Derecho
Internacional Humanitario en la doctrina e
instrucción de los institutos armados, 4 May
2004, www.mindef.gob.pe. See also International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Regional
delegation in Lima, Annual Report 2006, 24 May
2007, www.icrc.org.

Basilan in July 2007 by the radical armed Islamist
P H ILIPPINE S Abu Sayyaf group.6 There were indications in
September 2007 that the peace talks would be
Republic of the Philippines resumed.7
The 1996 peace agreement with the Moro
Population: 83.1 million (34.6 under 18) National Liberation Front (MNLF) continued
Government armed forces: 106,000 to hold, although clashes between MNLF and
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription the armed forces were reported in April 2007.8
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 (training only) US Special Forces were based in Jolo island to
Voting age: 18 provide non-combat support to the Philippines
Optional Protocol: ratified 26 August 2003 armed forces in their operations against Abu
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): Sayyaf. These operations were renewed in July
and August 2006 following reports that senior
CRC, GC AP II, ILO 138, ILO 182
operatives from the Indonesian radical Islamist
There were no reports of under-18s in armed group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) had taken
refuge with Abu Sayyaf.9
government armed forces; legislation was The UN Secretary-General’s 2003, 2005 and
in force to protect children from military 2006 reports on children and armed conflict
recruitment. There continued to be reports referred to the situation in the Philippines.
of children being used by government- The Abu Sayyaf Group, the MILF and the NPA
were included in the Annex II list of parties that
linked paramilitaries and armed opposition recruited and used children in situations of
groups. armed conflict.10
Context Government
A one-week state of emergency was declared in National recruitment legislation and
February 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo after claims that members of the military, practice
leftist politicians and communist armed groups The 1987 constitution stated that “the prime
were plotting a coup. In June the same year the duty of the Government is to serve and protect
president declared an “all-out war” to eliminate the people. The Government may call upon the
the New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of people to defend the State and, in the fulfilment
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).1 thereof, all citizens may be required, under
Thousands more troops were committed to conditions provided by law, to render personal
the anti-insurgency campaigns in central and military or civil service” (Article 2(4)).
southern Luzon and the Bicol regions.2 In its 2003 declaration on ratifying the
Formal peace talks between the government Optional Protocol, the government stated that
and the National Democratic Front, representing the minimum age for voluntary recruitment to the
the CPP and the NPA, collapsed in 2004. Informal Armed Forces of the Philippines was 18, “except
talks continued for another year, following the for training purposes whose duration shall have
government’s refusal to seek the removal of the the students/cadets/trainees attain the majority
CCP/NPA from the terrorist watch-lists of the age at the completion date”.11 The prohibition
European Union and the USA.3 on recruitment of under-18s was provided for
Armed clashes between the Revolutionary in various acts and regulations. Under the
Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA- 1991 Memorandum Circular No. 13 on Selective
ABB) and the NPA were reported in 2005 and Enlistment/Reenlistment of the Department of
2006.4 The RPA-ABB had concluded a peace National Defense and the Armed Forces of the
agreement with the government in December Philippines, only those aged 18 and above could
2000. enlist with the armed forces. The 1991 Republic
Following the signing of a ceasefire Act 7077, also known as the “Citizen Armed
agreement in 2003, peace negotiations between Forces of the Philippines Reservist Act”, provided
the government and the armed separatist Moro for the expansion of the armed forces “by the
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continued to well-disciplined Citizen Armed Force in the event
make slow progress. Negotiations reached an of war, invasion of rebellion”.12 The minimum age
impasse in May 2006 because of disagreements for reservists in the Citizen Armed Force was 18.
over ancestral-domain land claims and the The recruitment and use of under-18s was
amount of territory to be included in an expanded also prohibited under the Special Protection
Muslim autonomous region as part of the peace of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and
settlement.5 Tensions were increased by the Discrimination Act (Republic Act 7610), which
abduction of an Italian priest in June 2007 and declared children to be “Zones of Peace”. It
the MILF’s admission of involvement in the required that “Children shall not be recruited
killing and beheading of government troops in to become members of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines or its civilian units or other armed There were also reports that children who
groups, nor be allowed to take part in the were captured or rescued from armed groups
fighting, or used as guides, couriers, or spies”.13 were subsequently used in CAFGU operations.
Specific legislation also existed to prohibit the Vigilante groups in Mindanao, set up by the
recruitment of “children of indigenous cultural military as village defence groups, recruited
communities or indigenous peoples into the children from indigenous communities.19
armed forces under any circumstances”.14 In 2004 children were also reported to have
Penalties of 20 years’ imprisonment and been recruited from ethno-linguistic sub-groups
a fine of up to 2 million pesos (approximately in Davao City, Mindanao, by vigilante groups
US$49,000) were provided for under the Act set up by the military as part of its counter-
to Institute Policies to Eliminate Trafficking in insurgency efforts against the CPP-NPA in
Children (Republic Act 9208, 2003) for anyone southern Mindanao.20
found guilty of recruiting, transporting or
adopting a child “to engage in armed activities Armed political groups
in the Philippines or abroad”.15 The Act Providing There were continued reports of the involvement
for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child of children in armed groups including the CPP-
Labour and Affording Stronger Protection for the NPA, the MILF, Abu Sayyaf Group, the MNLF
Working Child (Republic Act 9231, 2003) also and the RPA-ABB. Research carried out by a
prohibited the recruitment of children under the national human rights organization found that
age of 18 for use in armed conflict, and provided the children who joined were predominantly
for perpetrators to be punished by up to 20 years’ from large, impoverished, rural families in areas
imprisonment or a fine.16 where economic opportunities were limited
and government delivery of social services was
Military training and military schools weak.21
The minimum age for entry into the Philippine
Military Academy was 17 and for the Philippines New People’s Army
Air Force Flying School 18. Once enrolled, a cadet Estimates of the numbers of children, both
became a member of the armed forces, although boys and girls, in the NPA varied significantly.
“in practice does not participate in armed According to one estimate, around one-fifth of
conflict”.17 the NPA’s 7,500-strong force were under 18.22
Another estimate put the figure at 3 per cent of
Armed groups the NPA’s 9,500-strong force.23
The CPP publicly declared that it prohibited
Paramilitaries the recruitment of under-18s into the NPA. In
April 2006 the executive committee of the CPP
The government paramilitary Citizen’s Armed
central committee reiterated that “the minimum
Force Geographical Units (CAFGU) and the
age requirement initially spelled out in 1999
Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVOs)
has since become a basic policy of the NPA and
assisted the military and police officials in
covers the entire organization”.24 However, the
the government’s anti-insurgency campaigns,
CPP had also noted in a public statement in
operating under guidelines issued in 1987 by
November 2005 that “units are confronted on
the Department of National Defence, which
a daily basis by youthful volunteers who wish
required that their membership was voluntary.
P—R
to join the people’s army but fail to meet the
Both the CAFGU and CVOs were reported to
minimum age requirements”. The statement
have recruited under-18s. The government’s
spoke of sanctions imposed on “Red fighters
initial report to the UN Committee on the Rights
discovered to have failed to meet the new age
of the Child on the Optional Protocol stated
requirement … [who] are discharged from the
that, especially in remote areas, “children are
NPA and reassigned to various other non-combat
reportedly being recruited into paramilitary
and non-hazardous tasks as civilian activists or
structures to provide security and protection
else sent home to support family production or
against ordinary criminal elements such as cattle
continue their schooling”.25 It also said that while
rustlers, thieves and other armed bandits”, and
children over the age of 15 had been accepted,
that these organizations, notable among which
they did not participate in direct hostilities but
were the CVOs and CAFGU, “are also fielded to
in activities “that prepare them for self-defence,
fight guerrilla insurgents”.18
for defending their communities and contributing
In 2005 recruitment of two children by the
to the over-all revolutionary effort”, which, it
CAFGU was reported in Negros Occidental by
argued, “are often maliciously misinterpreted
the Region VI (Western Visayas) Office of the
by the armed forces as actual participation in
Commission on Human Rights (CHR). The CHR
combat.”26
informed the local military commander, who
Government forces and the media continued
then sent the recruits home. However, no action
to report NPA recruitment and use of children in
appeared to have been taken against the military
hostilities. The 33 cases of rescued, captured or
commander for having recruited the children.

surrendered children involved in armed conflict Abu Sayyaf “was fully armed with heavy type[s]
that were handled by the Department of Social of weapons and they were all young, as young as
Welfare and Development from January 2005 to 15 years old”.35 The Abu Sayyaf group made no
March 2007 were all reported to be members of public statements on the age of recruitment.
the NPA. In 2004 and 2005, in the context of an
intensification of counter-insurgency operations
by government forces on the islands of Leyte Demobilization, rehabilitation
and Samar, Eastern Visayas region, recruitment and reintegration (DRR)
of under-18s was reported to have continued.
During the period 2005 to 2007, the Department The Republic Act 7610 outlined standard
of Social Welfare and Development handled 12 operating procedures for the treatment by
cases from the islands of Samar and Leyte; four government forces of under-age members
of these were girls and the youngest was 11.27 of armed groups. It required that individuals
In Negros Occidental the NPA was reported to under 18 “arrested for reasons related to
have increased recruitment in the last quarter of armed conflict” by the military or the police
2005 in the northern area of the province. A raid be separated from adults in detention, be
in November 2005 conducted by the CPP-NPA provided with immediate free legal assistance,
against one of its splinter groups reportedly have their parents or guardians immediately
involved children who acted as lookouts.28 From informed of their arrest, and be transferred to
July to October 2006 ten children were captured the custody of the Department of Social Welfare
by government forces in Negros Occidental.29 and Development within 24 hours from the
In April 2007 the media reported that a young time of rescue.36 The March 2000 Inter-agency
girl had been killed in an encounter between Memorandum of Agreement, on the handling and
the armed forces and NPA units in a village treatment of children involved in armed conflict,
in southern Mindanao. The military initially revised in June 2006, set out the responsibilities
claimed that the girl was a “child warrior”. An of various government agencies and standard
investigation by the Commission on Human procedures to be observed in handling child
Rights (CHR) revealed that the 11-year-old had soldiers. The memorandum required police and
been killed in crossfire.30 military authorities “to protect the child from
further exploitation or trauma”. It also required
Moro Islamic Liberation Front that under-18s be transferred to the Department
of Social Welfare or local authority within 24
There were continuing reports that children
hours “under normal conditions” and within
had joined the MILF in Maguindanao, Shariff
72 hours “when the situation does not warrant
Kabunsuwan and Lanao del Sur.31 According to
the turnover of the child within the prescribed
one estimate, in 2005 up to 13 per cent of MILF’s
period”. Parties to the memorandum include
10,000 members were children.32
the departments of Defence, Interior, Local
In May 2006 the MILF stated that “The
Government and Health, as well as the military
general policy of the MILF is not to recruit
and the police.37
children for combat; if they are with the MILF,
In some cases the guidelines relating to
their roles are purely auxiliary in character.”
rescued, captured or surrendered child soldiers
It was noted that the MILF is “fully cognizant
were not implemented. In one reported case,
that the rightful place of children is in schools”,
a 13- or 15-year-old boy, suspected of being a
although it “is preferable that children, who are
member of the NPA, was forced to lie on the road
forsaken or have no reliable guardians, are taken
for several hours in the heat of the day.38
cared of by the MILF rather than allow them to
Other children who surrendered or
become misfits in society”, and that it was “the
were captured were charged with rebellion,
right of everybody including children to self-
possession of firearms and other similar security-
defence especially when communities or villages
related charges. In March 2007 the Program
are under indiscriminate military actions by the
Management Bureau of the Department of
enemy”.33
Social Welfare and Development reported that
Abu Sayyaf Group three children from a province in the southern
Luzon region were in military custody and that
The Abu Sayyaf Group, together with the Rajah charges had been filed against them. Another two
Solaiman Movement, whose membership children from southern Luzon were also reported
consisted primarily of militant converts to Islam, to have been charged and were awaiting trial.
was reported to have been responsible for bomb Provisions in the Memorandum of Agreement
attacks which from January 2000 had caused which required that former child soldiers be
over 1,700 casualties, including the deaths of protected from exposure to the media, except
young children and teenagers. Both groups were where justified “by compelling national security
reported to be linked to the JI.34 US Marines interest” and in consultation with the Department
involved in clashes with Abu Sayyaf in August of Social Welfare and Development, were also
2007 were quoted by the media as saying that ignored in some cases. In March 2007 the

armed forces issued a media release displaying 19 Philippine Coalition to Protect Children Involved
pictures of children and young people captured in in Armed Conflict (Protect CIAC) & Southeast
Mindanao.39 Asia Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
In cases where guidelines were adhered to (SEASUCS), Preventing Children’s Involvement
and children were returned to their families, a in Armed Conflicts in the Philippines: A Mapping
wide range of services was provided by the social of Programs and Organizations, November 2007,
welfare and development offices, including legal draft version.
assistance. Counselling and protective custody 20 Protect CIAC & SEASUCS, Alternative report on
were provided to children who were unable the implementation of the Optional Protocol
to return to their families. Other cases were to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
documented of children associated with armed the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,
November 2007, draft version.
groups being returned directly to their families by
the military or the police without the support of 21 Philippine Human Rights Information Center
local social services.40 (PhilRights), Deadly Play Grounds: The
Phenomena of Child Soldiers in the Philippines,
2005.
1 “Crush-NPA war has 3 deadlines”, Manila Times,
22 Andrew Marshall, “The Philippines unending
20 June 2006, www.manilatimes.net.
guerrilla war”, Time Magazine, 25 January 2007,
2 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Scared silent: www.time.com/time/magazine.
impunity for extrajudicial killings in the
23 PhilRights, above note 21.
Philippines”, June 2007.
24 Researcher’s translation of “Panayam ng Unicef
3 Ibid.
Research Team hinggil sa usapin ng mga batang
4 “NPA, RPA fight anew in Victorias City”, SunStar, sundalo Abril 2006” (Interview by the Unicef
29 November 2005, www.sunstar.com.ph/; Research team with the CPP EC-CC on the
“Scores killed as rival rebel groups clash”, Manila question of child soldiers), Ang Bayan, special
Times, above note 1, 9 August 2006. issue, 25 August 2006, www.philippinerevolution.
5 Amnesty International Report 2007. net. See also Protect CIAC & SEASUCS, above
6 “MILF admits attack against marines, says note 19.
23 troops dead”, GMA.TV, 11 July 2007, www. 25 Information Bureau, Communist Party of the
gmanews.tv. Philippines, “The NPA does not allow below-18
7 “Government–MILF peace talks to continue”, recruits”, press release, 19 November 2005, www.
SunStar, above note 4, 10 September 2007. philippinerevolution.net.
8 “AFP overruns 2 MNLF Sulu camps”, GMA.TV, 26 Researcher’s translation, above note 24.
above note 6, 15 April 2007. 27 Summary of children involved in armed conflict
9 Human Rights Watch World Report 2007; January 2005–March 2007 by the Progam
International Crisis Group (ICG), “Indonesia: Management Bureau of the Department of
Jemaah Islamiyah’s current status”, Crisis Group Social Welfare and Development, provided to the
Asia Briefing No. 63, 3 May 2007. researcher.
10 Reports of the Secretary-General on Children 28 Confidential sources, September 2007.
and Armed Conflict, 26 October 2006, UN Doc. 29 From the draft report “The situation of children
A/61/529-S/2006/826, and 9 February 2005, UN involved in armed conflict in Negros Occidental”,
Doc. A/59/695-S/2005/72. a draft submitted on 22 January 2007 by the
11 Declarations and Reservations to the Optional Negros Alliance of Human Rights Advocates
P—R
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. (NAHRA) to the Philippine Coalition to Stop
the Use of Children as Soldiers (PCSUCS) as
12 Republic Act No. 7077, 27 June 1991.
part of the research component of the project
13 Republic Act No. 7610, 17 June 1992. “Strengthening protection of children involved
14 Republic Act No. 8371, Indigenous People’s Rights in armed conflict: implementation of the 11-point
Act, 29 October 1997. Program of the Philippine Coalition to Stop the
15 Republic Act 9208, 26 May 2003. Use of Children as Soldiers”.
16 Republic Act 9231, 19 December 2003. 30 Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Case of
17 Second periodic report of the Philippines on the Galacio, Grecil Buya versus Elements of the 67th
Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. IB, PA, Case No. XI-07-2984 CV RE, copy of the
CRC/C/65. Add.31, 5 November 2004, para. 248. documents provided to the researcher by the
Child Rights Center of the CHR – National Office
18 First periodic report of the Philippines on the on 22 June 2007.
Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children
in Armed Conflict, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/PHL/1, 7 31 SEASUCS, above note 19.
November 2007, para. 9.2.6. 32 PhilRights, above note 21.
33 Moroland, “MILF reiterates policy on ‘child
soldiers’”, 2 May 2006, http://moroland.net.
34 HRW, Lives Destroyed: Attacks against civilians in
the Philippines, July 2007.

35 “Military: No letup in war vs terror”, Inquirer,
Mindanao Bureau, 21 August 2007, http:// POL A N D
archive.inquirer.net.
36 Republic Act No. 7610, 17 June 1992. Republic of Poland
37 Copy provided to the Philippine Coalition to
Protect Children Involved in Armed Conflict. Population: 38.5 million (8.0 million under 18)
38 Confidential sources, June 2006.
39 (Diamond) Division, Philippine Army, “Army
in Agusan Del Sur Captured Minor NPA Voluntary recruitment age: 17
Combatants”, 26 March 2007. Copy of Voting age: 18
photograph held by the Philippine Coalition to Optional Protocol: ratified 7 April 2005
Protect Children Involved in Armed Conflict. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
40 Confidential sources. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182

appeared to be 17.
Government
practice
The constitution stated that “It shall be the duty
of every Polish citizen to defend the Homeland”
and that “Any citizen whose religious convictions
or moral principles do not allow him to perform
military service may be obliged to perform
substitute service” (Article 85). Under the Law on
the Universal Obligation to Defend the Republic
of Poland of 21 November 1967, “A person who
has attained 18 years of age may be called up for
military service.”1
All men between the ages of 18 and 28 were
liable for military service. Students were allowed
to replace military service with participation in
military training during their studies. Reservists
could be required to do service up to the age
of 50, but in practice most conscripts were not
called up for reservist training in peacetime.
To comply with NATO standards, over the last
decade the government had reduced the size of
the armed forces and increased the number of
non-conscript soldiers.2 The length of regular
military service was reduced from 18 months to
12 months on 1 January 2004 and again, to ten
months, on 1 January 2005. From 1 July 2005
regular military service was nine months, three
months for university graduates.3 In January
2006 the Defence Minister said that compulsory
conscription would end in six years, and that
since 1990 the number of troops had been
reduced from 450,000 to 150,000.4
Voluntary recruitment could begin from the
age of 17 under the 1970 Law on Regular Military
Service.5 Poland’s declaration to the Optional
Protocol stated that the minimum age for
conscription was 18, and 17 for voluntary service
in the armed forces, with applicants obliged to
provide a birth certificate and obtain parental
consent. However, Poland’s Initial Report to
the Optional Protocol stated that the voluntary

recruitment age was 18, even in the case of
“mobilization and war”.6 POR T U G A L
Military training and military schools Portuguese Republic
The military education system comprised one
military academy, two civil–military academies,
two officer high schools and eight schools for Government armed forces: 44,000
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) following Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscription
reorganization in 2001 and 2002. There were also suspended)
six technical training centres for NCOs and junior Voluntary recruitment age: 18
military specialists.7 Voting age: 18
Optional Protocol: ratified 19 August 2003
Poland and 58 other states endorsed the Paris There were no reports of under-18s in the
armed forces.
children associated with armed forces or armed Government
standards and operational principles for National recruitment legislation and
protecting and assisting child soldiers and practice
jointly sponsored by the French government and The 1976 constitution (2005 revision) stated
UNICEF. that “every Portuguese person shall possess
the fundamental right and duty to defend the
International standards nation”, and that “the law shall regulate military
service and shall lay down the forms, voluntary or
Poland ratified the Optional Protocol in April
compulsory nature, duration and content of the
2005. In its Initial Report to the Committee
performance thereof ”.
on the Rights of the Child on the Optional
With the suspension of conscription in
Protocol, the government stated that although
2004, service in the Portuguese armed forces
the current Penal Code did not explicitly punish
became entirely voluntary, in keeping with the
the recruitment of children, the Ministry of
provisions of the 1999 Military Service Law.1 The
Justice was drafting an amendment to ban the
commitment to voluntary recruitment, with a
conscription or recruitment of under-18s into
minimum age of 18, was included in Portugal’s
military service.8
declaration on ratification of the Optional
Protocol in August 2003.2 However, all 18-year-
1 ��
Second periodic report of Poland to the UN olds were still obliged formally to register their
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. names with their local authority. On an annual
CRC/C/70/Add.12, 6 February 2002. National Defence Day, a randomly selected group
2 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Right of approximately one hundred 18-year-olds were
P—R
to Conscientious Objection in Europe: A Review invited to attend a promotional event outlining
of the Current Situation, April 2005, www.quaker. the various options available to those who chose
org. to perform voluntary military service or embark
3 Communication from Polish embassy, 19 April on a military career. Voluntary military service
2007. was open to all those between the ages of 18
4 Judy Dempsey, “Poland will set own course, and 24, extending to the age of 27 for university
defense chief vows”, International Herald graduates and 30 for those with a medical
Tribune, 24 January 2006, www.iht.com. degree. The length of voluntary military service
5 Initial report of Poland to the Committee on the varied from an initial period of 12 months (after
Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.11,
��
31 which a volunteer could leave the armed forces,
January 1994. or return for a second year of service) to an
6 Report by Poland on the realization of the annually renewable contract for a maximum of
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/POL/1, eight years.3
2007.
7 Polish Army, Military Education, http://wojsko- Military training and military schools
polskie.pl. Individuals seeking to become career officers
8 Report on the realization of the Optional Protocol, in the Portuguese armed forces could attend
above note 6. one of three military academies (for the army,
navy and air force) that granted university

degrees. Applicants had to have completed
their secondary education, and those under Qatar
18 required parental consent. Postgraduate
education was offered by the Instituto de Estudos State of Qatar
Superiores Militares, which took students from
all three armed forces.4 Population: 813,000 (204,000 under 18)
Developments Voluntary recruitment age: 18
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, Voting age: 181
Portugal and 58 other states endorsed the Paris Optional Protocol: acceded 25 July 2002
Commitments to protect children from unlawful Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
children associated with armed forces or armed There were no reports of under-18s serving
standards and operational principles for in the armed forces.
followed a wide-ranging global consultation Government
UNICEF. National recruitment legislation and
practice
1 Information from defence attaché, Embassy of
Portugal, London, October 2007. The constitution, approved in a public
referendum in April 2003, stated that “Defending
2 Declaration of Portugal on ratification of the
the country is the duty of all citizens” (Article
53); however, military service is not compulsory.
3 Information from Defence attaché, above note 1. The minimum age for voluntary recruitment was
4 Ibid. 18, and there were no indications that under-18s
served in the armed forces. Qatar’s declaration
on acceding to the Optional Protocol stated that
“The State of Qatar declares that recruitment
to its armed forces and other regular forces is
voluntary and is for those who have attained
the age of 18 years and that it takes account of
the safeguards set forth in paragraph 3 of the
same article [Article 3, Optional Protocol] … the
State of Qatar affirms that its national legislation
makes no provision for any form of compulsory or
coercive recruitment.”2
Developments
Qatar and 58 other states endorsed the Paris
UNICEF.
1 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Qatar, 22

January 2008, www.fco.gov.uk.
2 Declaration on accession to Optional Protocol:
www2.ohchr.org.

the military and technical field” and to cultivate
R OMANIA “ethical and civic values”.7
Military high schools were open to both male
Romania and female students. Postgraduate education for
all military personnel, male or female, could be
Population: 21.7 million (4.4 million under 18) undertaken at the National Defence University as
Government armed forces: 69,600 well as at various civilian universities. 8
suspended) Developments
Voting age: 18 At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,
Optional Protocol: ratified 10 November 2001 Romania and 58 other states endorsed the Paris
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on
There were no reports of under-18s in the groups. The documents reaffirmed international
armed forces. standards and operational principles for
Government followed a wide-ranging global consultation
National recruitment legislation and UNICEF.
practice
1 Parliament of Romania, Law on Delay of
The 1991 constitution, as amended, stated that Compulsory Military Service and Passing to
“Citizens may be conscripted from the age of 20 Voluntary Based Military Service, N��
o. 395 of 16
and up to the age of 35, except for volunteers” December 2005.
(Article 55). 2 Information from the Romanian embassy, London,
Under a new law of December 2005, the last 12 June 2007.
conscription was to take place in October 2006 3 ��
Law on the Preparation of the Population for
and compulsory military service was suspended Defence, No. 46 of 1996, Article 11; Bart
��
Horeman
from 1 January 2007 (Article 2). Military and Marc Stolwijk, Refusing to Bear Arms: A
service remained compulsory in times of war, world survey of conscription and conscientious
mobilization or siege (Article 3).1 Law 446/2006 objection to military service, War Resisters
stated that in the case of war, mobilization or International, 1998, www.wri-irg.org.
siege, military service became mandatory for 4 Law on Delay of Compulsory Military Service��,
men aged 20 to 25.2 Men aged between 20 and above note 1, Article
��
1.
35 had previously been liable for military service 5 CIA, The World Factbook 2007.
of 12 months and higher education graduates for
6 ��
Law No. 272 of 2004, Article 78(1); Information
��
six months, and during times of war the minimum
from the Romanian embassy, above note 2.
age of conscription was 18.3
Male and female citizens could perform 7 ��
Law on the Preparation of the Population for
military service on a voluntary basis.4 The Defence, above note 3, Article 45.
P—R
minimum age for voluntary military service 8 NATO, Romania – National Report, www.nato.int.
remained 18. From October 2006 all volunteers
were contracted for an initial five-year term of
service. Subsequent voluntary service contracts
were for successive three-year terms up to the
age of 36.5
The 2004 Law on the Protection and
Promotion of the Rights of the Child stated that
in armed conflicts the authorities were required
to ensure the demobilization of child soldiers, to
remedy the physical and psychological effects of
conflict on children and to promote their social
reintegration.6

Young people between the ages of 15 and 20
could volunteer for pre-military training, which
aimed to provide “knowledge and orientation in

number of federal troops deployed in Chechnya
R U SSIAN was said to have risen again.7
The Russian Federation was a member of
F E DER ATION the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
established in June 2001, comprising also
Russian Federation China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Population: 143.2 million (28.8 million under 18) operation in security matters.8
Government armed forces: 1,027,000
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 Government
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (16 at military
education institutes) National recruitment legislation and
Voting age: 18 practice
Optional Protocol: signed 15 February 2001 Conscription remained a universal obligation for
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): men aged 18–27, and for women with a military
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182 proficiency qualification.9
In 2006 the government introduced an
Boys aged 15 or 16 had to undergo basic amendment to the Law on Military Obligations
military training in their final year at and Military Service to shorten the duration of
school. Some o��
rphans and other children military service. In 2007 the length of service
was cut from 24 months to 18, and to one
deprived of parental care were “adopted” year for conscripts with a higher education. In
by military units, lived in military barracks 2008 all conscripts, regardless of educational
and received military training in school. background, would do one year’s service. The law
Boys and girls studying at Military
�� cancelled occupational deferrals and repealed
Educational Institutes from the age of 16 provisions for the drafting of reservists. 10
Alternative service for conscientious objectors
were regarded as being on military service. remained at 1.75 times the length of conscription,
Under-18s were reportedly recruited into 1.5 times for those willing to do civilian jobs in
opposition separatist forces in the Chechen the military.
Republic and other parts of the north The logistics of conscription were basically
unchanged. Military registers throughout the
Caucasus�. country enrolled all 17-year-olds. Under the Law
on Military Obligations and Military Service,
Context active duty for conscripts began when they were
18 (Articles 8 and 22). Conscientious objectors
The Russian Federation remained committed had to apply for alternative service at the
to the introduction of a non-conscript army earliest stage of the conscription process, when
in a revised Military Doctrine published by they were only 16 or 17.11 Later requests were
the Ministry of Defence in March 2007.1 inadmissible.
However, only a fraction of recruits met medical A new requirement was that prior to
requirements in 2006, and increasing instability enrolment boys had to undergo training in the
in the north Caucasus led many non-conscript basics of military service in their final year at
soldiers to cancel their contracts.2 One of the school, when they were 15 or 16 (Article 13).
aims of a five-year Military–Patriotic Education Sixteen-year-olds who had already left school
Program announced in 2005 was to increase were supposed to attend training sessions at
“patriotic awareness” and improve defence centres in their neighbourhood.
capability.3 Under the Law on Contractual Military
Armed men thought to be Chechen Service, military service contracts were open to
separatists seized a school in Beslan, north volunteers from the age of 18, including non-
Ossetia, in 2004 and scores of children died in citizens (Article 34). Candidates had to have
the ensuing violence. By the end of 2006 the completed at least one year’s study at a Military
number of federal troops in Chechnya was cut Educational Institute that offered professional
from 80,000 to around 35,000.4 Some repairs training in military subjects to boys and girls from
to social infrastructure took place, but violence the age of 16. Students at these institutes were
remained an everyday occurrence in Chechnya regarded as being on military service (Article
and elsewhere in the north Caucasus. Hostage- 35). Each day of training counted as two days of
taking, enforced disappearances and torture conscription.
continued – sometimes involving children.5 Some It was not known if conscripts or contract
journalists and activists monitoring the situation soldiers received training in the Russian
were killed or suffered reprisals.6 In 2007 the Federation’s international human rights
obligations.

A large shortfall in conscription numbers establishments for boys (Article 19). Suvorov
was reported each year. In July 2006 the Deputy military colleges, Nakhimov naval-military
Defence Minister said in relation to the last call- colleges and musical military colleges for
up: “Instead of the traditional celebration of the orchestra players provided a general education
military draft as an honourable constitutional with extra military options for boys aged
duty, Russian men had to be forcibly escorted to 7–16. They prepared pupils for entry to Military
the barracks by police”.12 Several reasons were Education Institutes and a life in the military.
suggested for the shortfall. In the first quarter of Cadet Schools provided boys of 12–15 with
2006 only five per cent of recruits in Moscow met vocational training for jobs in specific branches of
the medical requirements for call-up, according the armed forces.22
to the official newspaper of parliament (Duma). Entry to these institutions was competitive,
Others were reported to be barely literate.13 Yet but automatic for applicants who were orphans
more evaded call-up because they feared bullying or children otherwise deprived of parental care.
from older soldiers.14 Cadet School was regarded as beneficial for
In November 2006 the UN Committee these children because it guaranteed them a
against Torture said that the Russian Federation social context and later a job. There appeared
should adopt a policy of zero tolerance to be no procedure for finding out if a child
towards dedovshchina (also known as hazing) genuinely wanted to attend Cadet School or for
in the military – the systematic physical and an informed adult to represent his best interests.
psychological abuse and humiliation of new There was also no legal means for reversing
recruits by longer-serving or senior soldiers the decision to attend Cadet School or the
which sometimes involved acts of considerable undertaking to do vocational military work on
violence.15 Some Russian human rights graduation. Cadet Schools offered a very limited
organizations saw the new measures to improve curriculum, hard physical drill, little relaxation
officers’ professionalism (see below) as a step and military discipline from an early age.
towards this goal. Monitoring of pupils’ welfare was entrusted
Reports of hazing in the armed forces were to unspecified local authorities.23 However, such
commonplace from almost every military district. authorities had an interest in cutting costs and
The case of 19-year-old Andrey Sychev attracted concealing problems. The governor of Irkutsk,
bitter controversy in 2006. One of eight new for example, set up a Cadet School for 12-year-
recruits in Chelyabinsk who were severely beaten old boys who wanted to become officers, on
by senior officers, he was gang-raped for several condition they were from local children’s homes.
hours and then forced to hold a crouching A local strategic rocket base agreed to guarantee
position for several more hours, resulting in jobs for the graduates. The first year, 23 boys
injuries that required amputation of his genitals aged 13–15 from orphanages or shelters for the
and legs.16 The alleged culprits were, unusually, homeless joined. The local authority paid 12 per
brought to trial, and in September 2006 were cent of Cadet Corps costs and the Ministry of
sentenced to prison terms.17 Defence the rest, rejecting on financial grounds
the original plan to house the children in civilian
Military training and military schools premises. The boys lived in barracks, studied
Legal amendments in July 2006 were aimed Russian and mathematics six days a week, and
at improving the professionalism of officers. did two hours’ parade drill daily. By 2007 nearly
They provided for the introduction of military half the military districts had Cadet Corps and
P—R
training centres in civilian higher-education publicized them on a website.24
establishments and of new rules for existing Leningrad Military District had revived a
military departments in such institutions. Tsarist tradition of “adopting” as “sons of the
Full-time students could enlist free of charge regiment” 12 boys deprived of parental care.
in a military training centre but had to give a The boys were subject to military discipline.
commitment to undertake a three-year military Punishments included working in the kitchen,
service contract on graduation. If they failed to do sweeping the grounds and extra guard duty.
the service, they had to refund their tuition costs For more serious infractions days off could be
and be conscripted.18 By 2003 nearly half the cancelled, and boys who failed an end-of-year
1,304 higher-education institutions were private, exam had leave withdrawn. The boys’ day began
following the ending of the state monopoly of at 6.30 a.m. and ended with marching and
education.19 The government was the only body singing. In between, according to one woman
entitled to establish institutions for professional officer, they were shooting, riding, learning
military education,20 but it could teach in civilian English and “constantly digging holes”. Every
educational institutions if it had the consent of child had an automatic weapon which they had
students and parents, and at Ministry of Defence to learn to clean. All day they were accompanied
cost.21 by an officer who at night time slept in their
The Law on Military Obligations and Military quarters in a separate building. One 12-year-old
Service provided for state-run military education orphan was separated from his only living relative
– his brother – and was too far away to see him

at weekends after he was taken to live with the presidential elections. Many people feared
regiment of the Leningrad Military District. His reprisals if they spoke about such abuses. 31
brother was brought to the regiment when space
became available a year later. It was not known if Non-governmental armed groups
this was voluntary.25 Non-governmental armed groups were active in
many parts of the north Caucasus, and attacked
Armed groups federal and local government structures. Some
were associated with Chechen separatists.
The Law on Defence states: “The creation and Others were influenced by radical Islamist ideas.
existence of other military formations or arms Sometimes the groupings overlapped. Elsewhere,
and military technology, in which military service small militia groups with extreme Russian
is foreseen, is not envisaged by Federal laws and nationalist views were sporadically reported to
is forbidden and punishable by law.”26 In practice have attacked and killed foreigners, or Russians
numerous armed groups continued to operate in they suspected of sympathizing with Chechen
Chechnya and the north Caucasus. They included nationalism.
groups closely linked to the security forces and a In September 2004 armed men thought to be
range of non-state groups. Chechen separatists seized a secondary-school
in the north Ossetian town of Beslan, taking a
Government-linked armed groups in thousand pupils and their teachers hostage.
Chechnya Of at least 331 people killed in an explosion
By 2006 power structures in Chechnya were and crossfire during the rescue attempt, more
said to have been significantly “Chechenized”, than half were children. Hundreds more were
following elections in the republic and the wounded.32
withdrawal of many federal troops. Such In October 2005 several scores of young
structures included the republic’s Ministry of men identifying themselves as members of
Internal Affairs, which had responsibility for the Kabardino-Balkar Section of the Caucasian
policing and security. In practice this meant that Front set fire to nine buildings associated with
some armed groups controlled by separatist federal security forces in the republic’s capital,
fighters were absorbed wholesale into the official Nalchik. The Chechen separatist commander
security forces without preliminary screening or Shamil Basayev later claimed responsibility for
retraining. Human rights monitors said that “anti- organizing them. The attackers were reported to
terror operations” now resembled a vendetta be Islamists aged between 17 and 30 who were
between clans.27 angry about the treatment of Muslims in the
There were credible reports that a parallel republic. At least 35 people were killed and over
system of secret detention centres operated 100 – some of them student bystanders – said to
in the republic.28 Four of them were linked to have been injured in crossfire with the security
Ramzan Kadyrov, appointed Chechen president forces.33 Some of the young attackers were later
by President Vladimir Putin in 2007. They tortured in police detention.34
included centres run by a regiment that guarded The editor of the Russian–Chechen Friendship
oil and other economic installations, “anti- Society bulletin in Nizhny-Novgorod was forced
terrorist centres”, and two prisons in private into hiding in 2005. A group calling itself the
houses. Other detention centres were run by two Patriotic Youth Front had distributed leaflets in
federal armed battalions and by special units of her neighbourhood and apartment block, giving
the Federal Security Service.29 Reports of torture her full name and address and inciting readers
at these detention centres, and the enforced to kill her as a “traitor who deserves shame and
disappearance of civilians arrested by armed contempt”.35
unidentified masked men, were rife. In some In September 2006 the governor of Karelia
cases civilians were taken hostage and executed claimed that an unknown organization was
by unidentified forces. Increasingly, these inciting young people through the internet and
episodes spilled over into other republics of the mobile phones to attack members of the minority
north Caucasus, most recently Kabardino-Balkar ethnic Chechen population or other people from
in 2005 and Karachaevo-Cherkessk in 2006.30 the Caucasus region in the south who were living
Children were among the victims. In the run- in Petrozavodsk. This followed organized violence
up to parliamentary elections in November 2005, against Chechens and Azeris by the inhabitants
villagers from Noviye-Atagi told local human of neighbouring Kondopoga, orchestrated by a
rights monitors that in September children aged group calling itself the Movement against Illegal
12, 13 and 14 had been among people detained Migration.36
and subjected
��
to enforced disappearance,
severe beatings and sometimes torture. The Developments
villagers believed they were being punished
for not showing sufficient support for Akhmed At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,
Kadyrov, Ramzan Kadyrov’s father, in the earlier Russia and 58 other states endorsed the Paris

Commitments to protect children from unlawful 15 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration
recruitment or use by armed forces or armed of fourth periodic report submitted by Russian
groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on Federation, Conclusions and Recommendations,
children associated with armed forces or armed UN Doc. CAT/C/RUS/CO/4, 6 February 2007.
groups. The documents reaffirmed international 16 Human Rights House Network, www.
standards and operational principles for humanrightshouse.org.
protecting and assisting child soldiers and 17 HRW, Impact, October 2006.
followed a wide-ranging global consultation 18 Federal Law Amending Certain Legal Acts of the
jointly sponsored by the French government and Russian Federation Concerning Defence and
UNICEF. Military Service, No. 96-FZ, 3 July 2006.
19 Russian Federation Law on Education, 1992.
* Titles of non-English-language sources have been 20 Ibid., Article 11(2).
translated by the Coalition. 21 Ibid., Article 14.
1 “Russia revises military doctrine to reflect global 22 Statute on the Suvorov Military Colleges, the
changes”, RIA Novosti, 5 March 2007. Nakhimov Naval–Military Colleges, and the Cadet
2 US Library of Congress, Country Profile: Russia, (Sea Cadet) Corps, No. 696, 11 June 1996.
October 2006, http://lcweb2.loc.gov. 23 Ibid, Item 10.
3 Statute of the Russian Federation Government, 24 Russian Cadet Corps library, www.ruscadet.ru.
No. 422, 11 July 2005.
25 Ibid.
4 President of Chechnya Alu Alkhanov, press
conference, 28 February 2006. 26 Law on Defence, No. 96-FZ, Article 1(9).
5 See Ombudsman of the Chechen Republic, 27 In a Climate of Fear, above note 6.
Special Report on Disappearances, April 2006, 28 Council of Europe – Committee for the Prevention
www.ombu.ru. of Torture (CPT), News Flash, May 2006, www.cpt.
6 International Helsinki Federation for Human coe.int.
Rights, International Federation for Human 29 International Helsinki Federation, Unofficial
Rights, Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Center Places of Detention in the Chechen Republic, 12
“Demos”, Human Rights Center “Memorial”, In May 2006, Appendix 2.
a Climate of Fear, 24 November 2005, www.fidh. 30 Kabardino-Balkar: Gazeta, No. 230, 5 December
org/IMG/pdf/chechnya112005a.pdf; International 2005, www.lenta.ru/news/2005; HRW, “Lawyers
Helsinki Federation, “A Fair Trial for Stas Illegally Removed From Cases of Abused Suspects
Dmitrievsky”, 2 February 2006, www.ihf-hr.org; in Nalchik”, 18 November 2005; Karachaevo-
Amnesty International (AI), “Disappearance of Cherkessk: “Security forces and rebels shoot
journalist Elina Ersenoeva”, 29 August 2006 (EUR it out in Cherkessk”, Eurasia Daily Monitor,
46/040/2006); “Murder of Anna Politkovskaya”, Jamestown Foundation, 4 January 2007, www.
AFP, 8 October 2006. jamestown.org.
7 Tony Wood, “Diary” (account of visit to 31 In a Climate of Fear, above note 6.
Chechnya), London Review of Books, 22 March 32 “Russia marks Beslan siege deaths”, BBC News, 1
2007. September 2007.
8 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www. 33 “Russia: Kondopoga Violence Continues
sectsco.org. Unabated”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
9 Law on Military Obligations and Military Service, (RFE/RL), 6 September 2006.
P—R
No. 53-FZ, Article 13(2). 34 “Former Nalchik detainee charges torture”,
10 Federal Law Amending Certain Legal Acts of the Chechnya Weekly, 3 November 2005, Jamestown
Russian Federation Pursuant to Shorten Duration Foundation.
of Military Service by Conscription, No. 104-FZ, 6 35 AI, “The Russian–Chechen Friendship Society
July 2006. under threat” (EUR 46/017/2005), 3 May 2005.
11 Federal Law on Alternative Civilian Service, No. 36 “Russia: Kondopoga violence continues
113-FZ, Article 11. unabated”, above note 33; “Kadyrov contradicts
12 Quoted in Moscow Human Rights Institute, Alkhanov in his response to the violence in
Survey No. 99, Analysis of Spring Parliamentary Karelia”, Chechnya Weekly, 8 September 2006,
Legislation in the Russian State Duma, Special Jamestown Foundation; “The provocative and
Issue on the Army and Citizens’ Rights, 18 July aggressive behavior”, Kommersant, 5 September
2006 www.hrights.ru/laws/law99.htm . 2006, www.kommersant.com.
13 “Countdown to call up”, Rossiiskaya Gazeta,
October 2006.
14 See, for example, Pravda, 23 February 2006;
Human Rights Watch (HRW), The Wrongs of
Passage, October 2004.

2003 report to the UN Committee on the Rights of
R W ANDA the Child, the government stated that “although
voluntary enlistment in the armed forces is
Republic of Rwanda subject by law to a minimum age of 16, the law
that was recently passed on the rights of the child
Population: 9.0 million (4.7 million under 18) and protection of children against violence states
Government armed forces: 33,000 in article 19 that military service is prohibited for
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription children under 18”. The report further stated that
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 since enlistment in the armed forces has always
Voting age: 18 been voluntary, no minimum conscription age
Optional Protocol: acceded 23 April 2002 was specified in Rwandan legislation.6 There were
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): no reports of child-soldier recruitment or use by
the Rwandan armed forces.
Children were recruited from Congolese Armed groups

refugee camps in Rwanda by armed units
under the command of Laurent Nkunda,
Recruitment in refugee camps by
and deployed in the eastern Democratic armed units under the command of
Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2007. Laurent Nkunda7
There was no evidence of under-18s in the An upsurge in child recruitment from refugee
Rwandan armed forces. camps and communities in Rwanda occurred
from January 2007.8 Children said that they had
been offered money and employment if they
Context returned to North Kivu, DRC, but on arrival were
recruited into armed units loyal to armed group
Rwandan government forces fighting in the leader Laurent Nkunda.9 Rwandan authorities
armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the carried out a joint assessment with officials from
Congo (DRC) conflict officially withdrew from the UN refugee agency UNHCR in May. They
the DRC in October 2002. Regional relations visited refugee camps to establish mechanisms
continued to be characterized by tension, for improved child protection, including
however, and in 2004 Rwanda threatened on improved control of the exit of children from the
three occasions to renew military operations in camps.10 The Rwandan government initiated an
the DRC, citing in June 2004 the need to protect investigation into the alleged removal in July of
Congolese Tutsi from ethnic violence and in April eight children from Kiziba camp, for deployment
and November the need to counter the threat in South Kivu.11 Some Rwandan child soldiers
posed by dissident Rwandan forces based in the repatriated to Rwanda were reportedly arrested
eastern DRC. There were credible reports that and beaten by the authorities.12 Twenty-seven
Rwandan army units entered the DRC in each children had been released from armed group
of these months, but this was denied by the units loyal to Nkunda by mid-2007; they included
government.1 In September 2004 Rwanda and 16 Rwandan children (of whom 13 were recruited
the DRC signed the terms of reference for a Joint in Rwanda).13 In July the UN Secretary-General
Verification Mechanism, providing a framework called on the Rwandan government to “act
for jointly addressing cross-border issues, immediately” to stop all recruitment of child
including the presence in the DRC of Rwandan soldiers in the refugee camps and elsewhere in
armed groups.2 The two governments committed Rwanda.14
to ensuring the disarmament, demobilization
and repatriation of foreign armed groups within Government militias
12 months of the date of signature.3 By the end
of 2007 about 15,300 of an estimated 18,500 Local Defence Forces (LDFs) were created by
fighters, primarily the Democratic Forces for the the government in the late 1990s and charged
Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques with ensuring local security. LDF members
pour la liberation du Rwanda, FDLR), had been were appointed by local officials and served
repatriated to Rwanda.4 as volunteers; they received limited training
and some were authorized to carry weapons.
LDF members were implicated in human rights
Government abuses, including the illegal detention of street
children, during the first months of 2006.15
National recruitment legislation and Children (some as young as 14) were reported to
practice have been recruited into LDFs before 2004.16 A
The June 2003 constitution reaffirmed Rwanda’s 2005 law formalized the legal status, structure
adherence to international treaties, including the and organization of the LDFs and established
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.5 In its 18 as the minimum recruitment age.17 No LDF

recruitment of children was reported after the law actions or detained, and that children over 14
came into effect.18 but under 18 should receive reduced penalties.26
A system of community-based gacaca tribunals
(based on traditional courts), established by the
Disarmament, demobilization government in 2001, continued to try persons
and reintegration (DDR) accused of involvement in the genocide. A
2007 amendment to the gacaca law reduced
Provision for ex-combatants repatriated the maximum penalty for minors convicted of
from the DRC was managed by the Rwanda offences under categories 2, 3 and 4 of the
Demobilization and Reintegration Commission law from 12 years and 6 months to 5 years and
(RDRC), a government agency operating within 6 months.27 Accused persons had no right to
the framework of the World Bank’s Multi-country counsel in gacaca jurisdictions, and the courts
Demobilization and Reintegration Program were widely accused of faulty procedure, judicial
(MDRP). By 2007 some 650 Rwandan former corruption and false accusations.28
child soldiers who had taken part in the DRC
armed conflict had been repatriated to Rwanda
1 “Democratic Republic of the Congo”, Amnesty
under the program. Of these, 85 had taken International Report 2005.
part in an education program, 147 had received
vocational training and 192 had been assisted 2 Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on
the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of
with income-generating activities.19 According
the Congo, UN Doc. S/2004/1034, 31 December
to one non-governmental organization (NGO) 2004.
survey, only two of the returnees were girls,
although this was attributed to the small 3 Ibid.
numbers of girls recruited in Rwanda and the fact 4 Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on
that girls preferred to return as civilians through the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
the UNHCR-run program.20 Congo, S/2007/671, 14 November 2007.
In late 2005 the RDRC opened a 5 The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda,
demobilization centre for child soldiers next to 2003, Articles 28 and 47.
Lake Muhazi, and in March 2007 the Muhazi 6 Second periodic report of Rwanda to the UN
centre housed 38 former child soldiers, most Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
of whom had fought with the FDLR. Former CRC/C/70/Add.22, 8 October 2003.
child soldiers were reported to spend three to 7 See the entry on the DRC in this volume for a
six months at the centre, where they received detailed explanation.
civic education, psychosocial assistance and 8 Child Soldiers Coalition sources, eastern DRC,
education or vocational training, while their April 2007.
families were traced. When leaving the centre 9 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Army should stop
former child soldiers received a basic kit but no use of child soldiers”, 19 April 2007.
cash payments.21 10 HRW, Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, October
2007.
Developments 11 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
armed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/609-S.2007/757,
Detention of children accused of 21 December 2007.
involvement in the genocide 12 Coalition sources, July 2007.
P—R
Of the 120,000 people detained for involvement 13 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
in the 1994 genocide, some 4,500 were armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, S/2007/391, 28 June 2007.
reportedly below the age of 18 at the time of the
genocide.22 Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, 14 Ibid.
ordered the release of all “genocide minors” 15 Human Rights Watch World Report 2003 and
in January 2003, but under implementing 2007.
regulations only those who had spent the 16 Information from Amnesty International, March
maximum possible sentence in pre-trial detention 2004.
were eligible to be freed.23 During the same 17 Law No. 25/2004 of 19 November 2004
month the government released some 1,100 Establishing and Determining the Organisation
detainees who had been children in 1994.24 A and Functioning of the Local Service in Charge of
further 1,900 were released in July 2005 and 78 Assisting in Maintenance of Security Referred to
more in March 2007. It was unclear whether any as “Local Defence,” Article 9(3), Official Gazette
individuals below the age of 18 in 1994 remained No. 1, 1 January 2005.
in detention as of October 2007.25 18 Confidential sources, Rwanda, March–April 2007.
Article 74 of the law on crimes against
humanity and genocide stated that children
under the age of 14 at the time of the crime
could not be held legally responsible for their

19 Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration
Program (MDRP), “Rwanda, Demobilization and S AN M A R I N O
Reintegration Commission”, 1 November 2006;
MDRP, Monthly Statistical Progress Report, Republic of San Marino
September 2007; both at http://www.mdrp.org.
20 Save the Children-UK, Crossing the Border: The Population: 28,000 (5,000 under 18)
Demobilisation and Reintegration of Rwandan Government armed forces: not known
Boys and Girls Associated with Armed Groups Compulsory recruitment age: 16 in time of war or
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, July 2004, emergency
www.savethechildren.org.uk.
21 Confidential sources, Rwanda, March–April 2007.
Voting age: 18
22 Report of the Special Representative of the Optional Protocol: signed 5 June 2000
Commission on Human Rights on the situation of
human rights in Rwanda, UN Doc. A/55/269, 4 Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
August 2000. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
23 Parquet Général, “Instruction concernant
l’exécution du communiqué présidential du
01 janvier 2003 venant de la présidence de la in the armed forces, but 16-year-olds could
république qui concerne la libération provisoire be recruited in time of war or emergency.
des détenus des différentes catégories,” 9
January 2003.
24 Ministry of Justice, Imbonerahamwe igaragaza Government
ibisabwa n’intangazo ryaturutse muri Perezidansi
ya Repubulika/Chart showing what was required National recruitment legislation and
by the Communiqué of the President of the practice
Republic, March 2003.
There was no compulsory military service in
25 Confidential sources, April and September 2007. San Marino, and the minimum age for voluntary
26 Second periodic report, above note 6. military service in the republic’s armed forces
27 Category 1 offences included crimes related was 18. The Voluntary Military Force (Corpi
to the organization or incitement of genocide. Militari Voluntar) carried out various ceremonial
Categories 2 and 3 defined “less serious” functions and could provide assistance in the
crimes including co-authorship of, or being an preservation of order. The Guard of the Great and
accomplice to, deliberate killing or the infliction General Council (Guardia del Consiglio Grande
of serious injuries with or without the intention e Generale) was charged with its protection
to cause death. Category 4 refers to those who and the protection of the Captains Regent (joint
have committed such acts but have reached an
heads of state). The Fortress Guard included an
amicable settlement with the victim or before
artillery unit, and had responsibility for border
the public authority. Article 51, Organic Law No.
10/2007 modifying and complementing Organic control and customs operations and maintained
Law No. 16/2004 of 19 June 2004, establishing security at important government buildings.
the organization, competence and functioning The Gendarmerie was responsible for law
of gacaca courts charged with prosecuting and enforcement and public security, including rescue
trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide operations in the wake of disaster.1
or crimes against humanity committed between Although service in these forces was not
1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994; Organic obligatory, Law Number 15 of 26 January 1990 on
Law No. 40/2000 of 26 January 2000 setting the Regulation and Discipline of Military Corps
up “gacaca jurisdictions” and organizing and their Officers stipulated that all citizens
prosecutions for offences constituting the between the ages of 16 and 60 could be recruited
crime of genocide or crimes against humanity, in a time of war or other national emergency.2
committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 Article 1 of the 1974 constitution, however, stated
December 1994, www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw. that San Marino “rejects war as a means to settle
28 Human Rights Watch World Report 2008. disputes between States, and in its international
policy, adheres to principles enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations”. Article 288 of
the Criminal Code prohibited any unauthorized
formation of armed groups, while Article 284
criminalized any action aiming at the provocation
of armed conflict within San Marino territory.3
1 Information from the San Marino Department

of Foreign Affairs, October 2007; Guardia del
Consiglio Grande e Generale, Functions, 2004,
www.guardiadelconsiglio.sm.

2 Information from the Department of Foreign
Affairs, October 2007. S aO TOM E A N D
3 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Second
periodic report of San Marino, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
SMR/2, 10 January 2007.
PRI N C I P E
Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe
Government armed forces: unknown
Voluntary recruitment age: 17, with parental
consent
Voting age: 18
National law provided for 17-year-olds to

enlist voluntarily in the armed forces, but it
was not known how many were serving.
Government
practice
The 1990 constitution stated that it is the
“honour and supreme duty of citizens to
participate in the defence of the sovereignty,
independence and integrity of the state” (Article
63); it defined the age of majority as 18. The law
on compulsory military service stated that the
minimum age for recruitment was 18; 17-year-
olds could volunteer with the consent of a parent
or legal representative; military service was for
two years.1 It was not known whether the age
limit was strictly enforced, or how many under-
18s were serving in the armed forces.
Developments
In considering Sao Tome and Principe’s initial
report in 2004, the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child welcomed measures taken to protect
and promote children’s rights, but
��
expressed
concern about the lack of compatibility between
some domestic laws and the provisions and
principles of the convention, and the lack of
implementation of relevant domestic laws. It��
urged the government to accede to the Optional
Child on the involvement of children in armed
conflict.2
S—Z
1 Initial report of Sao Tome and Principe to the UN

CRC/C/8/Add.49, 1 December 2003.
Consideration of report submitted by Sao Tome
and Principe, Concluding observations, UN Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.235, 1 July 2004.

Saudi Arabia National Guard received training at
saudi arabia the King Khaled Military Academy and from the
US-based Vinnell Corporation.9
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Population: 24.6 million (10.7 million under 18) Armed groups
Government armed forces: 224,500 An al-Qaeda offshoot, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription peninsula, stormed the US consulate in
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 December 2004, killing nine people and injuring
Voting age: not applicable1 others.10 On 24 February 2006 a Saudi-based
Optional Protocol: not signed al-Qaeda cell conducted a suicide attack on Saudi
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): Aramco’s Abqaiq oil facility near Dammam, which
resulted in the death of two security guards and
CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182
several of the bombers.11 There were no reports of
There was no evidence of under-18s in the the involvement of under-18s in these groups.
armed forces.
Developments
Context In March 2006 the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child recommended that the government
Since 2003 there had been several attacks expedite the process of ratification of the
on Saudi and Western targets, in which some Optional Protocol on the involvement of children
300 people were killed.2 Thousands of Saudi in armed conflict.12
young men held in jails were enrolled in “de-
radicalization programs”, which aimed to “reform 1 No national elections. Nationwide municipal
and re-educate” potential al-Qaeda members. elections were held for the first time in 2005,
The government offered financial incentives on in which male Saudis aged 21 and above
completion of the program in an effort to prevent were eligible to vote, “Q&A: Saudi municipal
recruitment to armed groups.3 elections”, BBC News, 9 February 2005.
2 “Saudi Arabia”, Amnesty International Report
Government 2007; “Saudi police round up militants”, BBC
News, 7 June 2007.
National recruitment legislation and 3 “Saudi jails aim to tackle terror”, BBC News, 31
practice January 2008.
4 CIA, “Saudi Arabia”, World Factbook, https://
According to the constitution, “[t]he defence of
www.cia.gov.
the Islamic religion, society, and country is a duty
for each citizen.” There was no conscription.4 5 Second periodic report of Saudi Arabia to the UN
In April 2005 Saudi Arabia reported to the UN
CRC/C/136/Add.1, 21 April 2005.
Committee on the Rights of the Child that “the
State prohibits the enlistment of any young 6 Global Security, “Saudi Arabia National Guard”,
person under the age of 18 in the armed forces”.5 27 April 2005, www.globalsecurity.org.
The Saudi Arabia National Guard, additional 7 Letter from the Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to
to the regular armed forces, was under the the Coalition, 22 April 2004.
control of the head of state, rather than the 8 Ibid.
Ministry of Defence. It reportedly recruited 9 Global Security, above note 6.
primarily from tribes loyal to the ruling family, 10 “Saudis renew vow to fight terror”, BBC News, 7
although the sources for potential recruits were December 2004.
widened to meet the demands for a larger force.6 11 “Al-Qaeda behind ‘Saudi oil plot’”, BBC News, 25
According to the government there were no February 2006.
militias, and safeguards existed, including in
military codes and articles, to ensure that under- Consideration of report submitted by Saudi
18s were not recruited into the armed forces.7 Arabia, Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/
SAU/CO/2, 17 March 2006.
Military training began at the age of 18, and
recruits were regarded “as students and not
military subjects in the armed forces”.8 Training
took place at four military schools: the King
Abdul Aziz Military Academy, the King Fahd Air
Force Academy, the Chief of Staff’s Academy and
the King Fahd Security Academy. Members of the

S ENEGAL Government
Republic of Senegal
practice
Population: 11.7 million (5.8 million under 18) The 2001 constitution stated that the rights and
Government armed forces: 13,600 duties of citizens during war would be the subject
Compulsory recruitment age: 20 of an implementing law (Article 70). Recruits to
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 the armed forces had to be between 18 and 21
Voting age: 18 years of age; the period of military service was
Optional Protocol: ratified 3 March 2004 24 months, after which the recruit could choose
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): to remain in the armed forces or to be placed on
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC the reserve list.10 In its declaration on ratifying
the Optional Protocol, the government stated
There were no reports of under-18s in the that it had raised the minimum age for regular
conscription to 20.11
armed forces. No recent information on the There were no reports of under-18s in the
use of child soldiers by an armed group armed forces.
was available.
Armed groups
Context The number of active MFDC combatants was
In June 2004 the Senegalese government not known; no factions were known actively to
announced a general amnesty for members have recruited new members in recent years. The
of the armed group Democratic Forces of extent to which children were associated with the
Casamance Movement (Mouvement des forces MFDC was not documented, although it appeared
démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC), despite that there was no widespread recruitment of
the human rights abuses and other crimes it had children.
committed during the conflict. Members of the
Senegalese armed forces also benefited from
impunity for human rights violations carried
out in Casamance.1 Following a new peace and reintegration (DDR)
agreement signed in December 2004 between
the government and the main wing of the MFDC, The December 2004 peace agreement called for
reconstruction work and de-mining began in the the demobilization and disarmament of MFDC
Casamance region. However, implementation of fighters, and the government committed itself
the agreement was hampered by disagreement to their integration on a voluntary basis within
between rival MFDC factions. The extent of government paramilitary forces. No attempt to
government support for implementation of the implement the agreement appeared to have been
agreement was also unclear.2 made by March 2007.
Sporadic fighting in Casamance resumed None of the peace agreements signed
in 2006.3 Clashes between the dissident MFDC between the government and the MFDC made any
Sadio, which had crossed the border into reference to the demobilization of child soldiers.12
Guinea-Bissau, and members of the Guinea-
Bissau army led to the displacement of more Developments
than 8,000 people in the border regions during
March 2006.4 Fighting between MFDC Sadio and The UN Committee on the Rights of the
the Senegalese armed forces in August 2006 led Child expressed concern that the physical,
nearly 4,000 people to flee to Gambia.5 In May psychological and social needs of children
2006 it was reported that MFDC Sadio was laying affected by the conflict in Casamance had not
mines in the areas it occupied.6 Several attacks been sufficiently addressed, and that landmines
attributed to the group took place in northern continued to pose a risk to children. It urged the
Casamance in February 2007,7 coinciding with government to take all appropriate measures to
presidential elections, when the incumbent, address these issues.13
Abdoulaye Wade, was re-elected.
S—Z
An estimated 3,000–5,000 people died during 1 Amnesty International Report 2005.

the 22-year conflict.8 In January 2005 it was 2 Confidential sources, Senegal, May 2007.
reported that 659 people, mostly women and 3 Amnesty International Report 2007.
children, had been the victims of mine-related
incidents.9

4 European Community Humanitarian Aid Office
(ECHO), Aide humanitaire d’urgence en faveur des SERB I A
populations Bissau guinéennes et sénégalaises
affectées par le conflit de Casamance, 19 May Republic of Serbia
2006, ECHO/-WF/BUD/2006/03000.
5 Diadie Ba, “Thousands flee south Senegal Population: 9.9 million (2.2 million under 18)
fighting”, Reuters Foundation, 25 August 2006. Government armed forces: 39,700
6 “Senegal”, World Food Programme Emergency Compulsory recruitment age: 17
Report, 19 May 2006, www.reliefweb.int. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
7 “Senegal: Casamance fighting allegedly linked to Voting age: 18
elections”, IRIN, 21 February 2007. Optional Protocol: ratified 31 January 2003
8 Martin Evans, “Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)”, CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
briefing paper, Armed Non-state Actors Project,
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Compulsory recruitment took place in
December 2004.
the year an individual turned 18 and the
9 Reliefweb, “West Africa: Report on the
Humanitarian Situation No. 12: January 2005”, minimum age for voluntary recruitment
http://reliefweb.int. was 18.
10 Initial report of Senegal to the UN Committee on
17 October 1994. Context
11 Senegal’s declaration on the Optional Protocol, Montenegro declared its independence in June
www2.ohchr.org. 2006 following a referendum, and seceded
12 Confidential source, Senegal, July 2007. from the state of Serbia and Montenegro, the
13 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, loose union of two semi-independent republics
consideration of Second periodic report of created in 2003 following the break-up of
Senegal, UN Doc. CRC/C/SEN.2, Concluding former Yugoslavia. Kosovo remained under the
observations, UN Doc CRC/C/SEN/CO/2, 20 administration of the UN Interim Administration
October 2006. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).1 Its military security
was maintained by the Kosovo Force (KFOR), a
NATO-led mission under a UN mandate.2
Serbia remained party to all international
agreements, treaties and conventions to which
Serbia and Montenegro had been a party. A new
constitution was approved by over 53 per cent
of voters in a referendum in October 2006, and
endorsed by parliament in November. A Strategic
Defence Review in 2006 committed Serbia to
considerable restructuring which would prepare
the armed forces for involvement in multilateral
defence activity. In November 2006 Serbia was
invited to join the NATO Partnership for Peace
program. 3
Serbia’s lack of co-operation in arresting and
transferring indicted suspects to the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(Tribunal) resulted in the suspension of talks on
a Stabilization and Association Agreement with
the European Union (EU). The former Serbian
president, Slobodan Milosevic, on trial before
the Tribunal for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, died in March 2006 following a heart
attack.4
Government
practice
In its initial report to the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child the government stated that

the conscription process began with registration
at the start of the calendar year in which a citizen SEYC H E L L E S
turned 17. Actual recruitment to the armed forces
took place in the year an individual turned 18, Republic of Seychelles
although recruitment could take place at age 17
if specifically requested. Military service could Population: 81,000 (41,000 under 18)
be deferred until the age of 21, should conscripts Government armed forces: 200
wish to complete their education first. However, Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
military service could commence at any time after Voluntary recruitment age: 18; younger with
the conscript became 18 years old. In a time of parental consent
war, 17-year-olds could be required to perform Voting age: 18
military service on order of the president.5 Optional Protocol: signed 23 January 2001
In its declaration on ratification of the
Optional Protocol, the government stated that the
minimum age for voluntary recruitment was 18.6 CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
In June 2006 the defence minister announced
army reforms which included the creation of a
No information was available on the
volunteer army by 2015.7 presence of under-18s in the armed forces.
Volunteers could be recruited under the
Military training and military schools age of 18 with parental consent.
The Ministry of Defence provided military
education at a military gymnasium and a military
academy.8 Government
National legislation and recruitment
practices
2 NATO, Kosovo Force,��
www.nato.int.
3 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country There were no reports of under-18s in the security
Profile, www.fco.gov.uk. forces. In its initial report to the UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child, the government stated
4 Amnesty International, above note 1.
that there was no conscription. It reported that
5 Initial report of Serbia to the UN Committee on the minimum age for voluntary military service in
the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/SRB/1, 31 the Defence Forces was 18 and that exceptions
August 2007.
required the written consent of a parent or
6 Declaration on ratification of the Optional guardian.1 In its consideration of the report, the
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. Committee recommended the government ratify
7 Centre for Civil–Military Relations, “Army reforms the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
continue”, 15 June 2006, www.ccmr-bg.org. Rights of the Child on the involvement of children
8 Ministry of Defence, www.mod.gov.yu. in armed conflict.2
1 Initial report of Seychelles to UN Committee on

3 May 2002.
Consideration of initial report of Seychelles, UN
Doc. CRC/C/SR.816, September 2002, Concluding
observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.189, 9
October 2002.
S—Z

Peace monument in Kono, former stronghold of the armed group the Revolutionary United © Coalition 2005
Front, Sierra Leone

of armed groups.1 The Liberian conflicts of
S ierra L eone 1990–7 and 2000–3, and the conflict in Côte
d’Ivoire since 2002, were intricately linked,
Republic of Sierra Leone with operations across borders, including in
Guinea, which bordered all three countries, and a
Population: 5.5 million (2.7 million under 18) complex web of governments and armed groups
Government armed forces: 10,500 providing support to factions in neighbouring
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription countries.2 A migrant population of thousands of
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 young fighters, including child soldiers, crossing
Voting age: 18 the borders between Liberia, Guinea, Sierra
Optional Protocol: ratified 15 May 2002 Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, saw conflict mainly as
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): an economic opportunity. Many had first been
forcibly recruited as children in one conflict,
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ACRWC
then willingly crossed borders to take up arms
There were no reports of under-18s in another, often with a different armed group. A
2005 study by Human Rights Watch found that
in the armed forces. Children were most had been motivated by the promises of
allegedly recruited in Sierra Leone by financial gain, and many could not articulate the
Liberians United for Reconciliation and political objective of the group they fought with.
Democracy (LURD) to fight in Liberia in The risk of re-recruitment was exacerbated by
high rates of youth unemployment and corruption
July 2005. The trial of the former Liberian and deficiencies in the implementation of
president, Charles Taylor, for crimes disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
against humanity, war crimes and other (DDR) programs.3 An August 2006 report by the
serious violations of international law UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) noted that
committed in Sierra Leone, including the high levels of unemployment, particularly youth
unemployment, across west Africa posed a risk
recruitment and use in hostilities of child to stability in the region. This was reiterated in a
soldiers under the age of 15, began in June 2007 report by the UN Secretary-General which
2007 before the Special Court for Sierra highlighted also the importance of reform of the
Leone. The same month the Special Court security sector in countries in the region as a
means of addressing it.4
convicted three former commanders of the In May 2007 the Secretary-General assessed
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) the security situation in Sierra Leone as stable
of recruitment and use in hostilities of but fragile, with risks to stability from the high
children under 15; in August it convicted a rate of youth unemployment, concerns over the
leader of the pro-government Civil Defence accountability of the authorities, the weakness of
the justice system and the lack of improvement in
Forces (CDF) of the same charge. general living standards.5 A June 2007 UN report
on conditions in prisons indicated that failure to
Context protect prisoners’ rights could also threaten the
country’s stability.6
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone was ranked the least-developed
which had been established under the 1999 country in the world by the UN Development
Lomé Peace Agreement, published its report in Programme (UNDP) 2007–8 Human Development
October 2004. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone Index, based on 2005 data.7
(UNAMSIL) completed its peacekeeping mandate The Child Rights Act, passed in June 2007,
in December 2005. It was succeeded by the introduced into domestic law the international
United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone definition of a child as any person under the age
(UNIOSIL), established by UN Security Council of 18 and other provisions of the Convention
Resolution 1620, which was mandated to assist on the Rights of the Child and the African
Sierra Leone in consolidating peace and human Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.8
rights, building capacity of state institutions, and It included (Section 28) a prohibition on the
strengthening the rule of law and the security use of land mines and other weapons declared
sector. by international instruments to be adverse to
In August 2007 the All People’s Congress
S—Z
children.
(APC) won parliamentary elections. In September
Ernest Bai Korom, representing the APC, was
elected president, replacing Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah.
The conflict in Sierra Leone, which began in
1991, was officially declared over in January 2002
with completed disarmament and demobilization

these, 3,710 had been with the Revolutionary
Government United Front (RUF), 2,026 with the pro-
National recruitment legislation and government Civil Defence Forces (CDF), 471 with
the Sierra Leone Army and 427 with the Armed
practice Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); 144 were
The Sierra Leone government affirmed in 2006 with other factions or non-affiliated.14
in its second report to the UN Committee on It was estimated that about 30 per cent of
the Rights of the Child that, as stated in its child soldiers in the conflict were girls, but only
declaration on ratifying the Optional Protocol, 8 per cent (513) of the former child soldiers
the age of recruitment into the armed forces had in the DDR program were female. The Truth
been raised from 17.5 to 18 years. The 2007 Child and Reconciliation Commission identified this
Rights Act enacted this into law, stipulating that failure to address the needs of girl soldiers as
the minimum age of recruitment into the armed the most glaring problem in the DDR program,
forces was 18 (Section 28), and amending the and in contravention of UN Security Council
Sierra Leone Armed Forces Act of 1961 to this Resolution 1314 of August 2000 on children and
effect. armed conflict, which called for special attention
In its declaration on ratifying the Optional to be given to the needs of girls in the wake of
Protocol, Sierra Leone had stated that there conflict, including in DDR programs. Gender had
was no compulsory recruitment into the armed been given scant regard in the planning of the
forces and that recruitment was exclusively on a DDR program, which did not take into account
voluntary basis.9 the gender-specific roles played by girls and the
complexity of their situations. One reason for the
lack of participation of girls in the DDR program
Armed groups was that most of them had been considered as
Reports of recruitment of children for camp followers and not as combatants in their
own right. In fact, they had played many roles
use in neighbouring countries in the conflict, as porters, fighters and “bush
There were reports that, in 2005, children in wives” held in sexual slavery by their captors.
Sierra Leone were being recruited with a view Some commanders to whom the girls had been
to fighting in Liberia. In July near Kaliahun in attached as “bush wives” refused to allow them
eastern Sierra Leone men from Liberia were to participate in the DDR program. Other girls
aiming to recruit children for the Liberians United refused to participate for fear of stigmatization.15
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and in UNICEF set up the “Girls Left Behind Project”
August Liberian LURD sympathizers were seeking to provide assistance to such girls. In the Kono,
to recruit children allegedly to work in diamond Bombali and Port Loko districts where the project
mines in Liberia as a cover for a recruitment was operated by UNICEF’s non-governmental
strategy.10 In August 2005 two boys claimed that organization (NGO) partners, by the time it
they had escaped from a recruitment camp in closed in February 2005 over 1,000 girls had been
Liberia.11 In September 2005, cases of children identified who had not gone through the DDR
who went to Liberia to sell goods but never came process, and 714 girls had been provided with
back were also documented in the Kaliahun services. Some similar projects were set up by
district.12 NGOs.16 One local NGO continued to work with
girls without focusing exclusively on girls formerly
associated with the fighting forces, but involving
Disarmament, demobilization other girls affected by the conflict, including
and reintegration (DDR) commercial sex workers.17
Demobilized children under 15 were sent to
The Lomé Peace Agreement had explicitly Interim Care Centres (ICCs) under the care of
provided that the special needs of children should UNICEF and child protection agencies, after which
be addressed in the disarmament, demobilization they were reunited with their families or went to
and reintegration (DDR) process. According to foster families, and entered education projects.
the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Those aged 15–17 could go into NCDRR training
Commission, there were no accurate statistics and employment programs for up to nine months,
for the number of children associated with the at the end of which they received a start-up kit.
fighting forces during the conflict. Estimates However, in many cases they were unable to
by different organizations including UNICEF, make effective use of their training because of the
UNAMSIL, and local agencies ranged from 5,000 weakness of the economy, and start-up kits on
to 10,000 depending on the criteria used.13 The their own were not enough to start a sustainable
national body responsible for the DDR program, business. To that extent the DDR program had not
the National Committee for Demobilisation, taken economic realities into account and had
Disarmament and Reintegration (NCDRR) given insufficient consideration to sustainability.18
confirmed to the Commission that more than The levels of economic deprivation reportedly
6,774 children entered the DDR program. Of were a factor in some Sierra Leone former

combatants, including former child soldiers, augment the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). The main
returning to fighting in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.19 recruitment of children into the army took place
during the National Provisional Ruling Council
(NPRC) government when proper recruitment
Developments procedures were not followed in view of the
The economic exploitation of children, including emergency situation and the need to increase the
in diamond mining, had been especially high number of soldiers. Some children were recruited
during the conflict. Levels of child labour recorded illegally and given the roll number of soldiers who
by UNICEF increased between 2003 and 2005.20 had been killed, while the salaries and benefits
In its second periodic report to the Committee on due to the dead soldiers were embezzled by
the Rights of the Child the government indicated senior officers and administrators for whom the
that the lack of proper and effective monitoring conflict had become profitable business.
and capacity in the relevant ministry might have The Commission noted the dual identities
led indirectly to the increase in child labour. The of children as victims and perpetrators. The
2007 Child Rights Act criminalized the use of violence of conflict had deadened their senses,
children, especially young children, in hazardous already impaired by drug abuse. Peer pressure
labour and other forms of economic and sexual and the need for a sense of belonging led them to
exploitation of children, and the 2005 Anti-human conform, and they often had to become ruthless
Trafficking Act (2005) contained provisions for the in order to survive.
prevention of child labour and trafficking.21 Sexual violence was systematic, but the
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Commission could not establish conclusive
Paris, Sierra Leone and 58 other states endorsed figures. Most girls abducted by the RUF and AFRC
the Paris Commitments to protect children were compelled to be available to their captors
from unlawful recruitment or use by armed for sex, resulting in the “bush wife” phenomenon
forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles of sexual slavery. The group targeted for sexual
and guidelines on children associated with slavery was girls and women aged 10–25; 50 per
armed forces or armed groups. The documents cent of them were 15 or under, and 25 per cent
reaffirmed international standards and were 12 or under. Of the rape victims 25 per cent
operational principles for protecting and assisting were 13 or younger.
child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global Many children had been mutilated with the
consultation jointly sponsored by the French name of the armed group who had captured them
government and UNICEF. branded or carved on their bodies to prevent
them escaping. These scars added to the fear
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of stigmatization after the conflict. UNICEF
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission established a project to provide plastic surgery to
published its final report in October 2004. It a number of children to remove or disguise their
was mandated to give special attention to the scars.
experiences of children who, at the onset of Many children were not reunited with their
the conflict in 1991, had comprised half the families after the conflict. Some had been so
population. It took steps to reach out to children young when abducted that they did not remember
to ensure that their voices would be heard and who their families were. Others had been rejected
published a child-friendly version of its report. A by their families, or the fear of stigma and
chapter of its final report focused on children and rejection led them to refuse to go back to their
examined the continuing impact of the conflict on communities. Girls in particular faced stigma
children. and rejection for having become “bush wives” or
All sides had recruited children, who were the sexual slaves. In cases where they had babies the
main victims of forced recruitment. By 1998 about babies had often been rejected too.
25 per cent of the fighting forces were under 18. All the armed factions pursued a policy of
The disproportionate targeting for recruitment of forcibly administering drugs to children to loosen
boys aged 10–14 led the Commission to conclude their inhibitions and to spur them to violence.
that the armed groups deliberately sought to In the years after the conflict there was a high
enlist them. Over 50 percent of people who number of young people addicted to drugs, with
suffered forced recruitment were abducted at the attendant psychiatric and other health problems.
age of 15 or younger, and over 28 per cent at the These factors, together with the deficiencies
age of 12 or younger. in the DDR program, including the failure to
S—Z
The RUF had been the first to enlist children include girls and young women, had led to a
and were responsible for the highest number dramatic rise in the number of street children
of child recruitments recorded. The government after the conflict, as well as a growth in the
side had started recruiting children in 1991–2 number of young girls engaged in prostitution as
under President Momoh, who encouraged a means of survival.22
chiefs and community leaders to organize the
civilian population into local vigilante groups to

Special Court for Sierra Leone guilty of the charge of conscripting or enlisting
children under the age of 15 into armed forces
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, created by
or groups or using them to participate actively
the government and the UN in January 2002,
in hostilities. Allieu Kondewa was found guilty
was mandated to try those “bearing the greatest
on this charge, along with four other charges.
responsibility” for crimes against humanity,
He was sentenced on 9 October 2007 to seven
war crimes and other serious violations of
years’ imprisonment for this specific charge. The
international law during the conflict in Sierra
Court concluded that he had initiated children as
Leone. In 2002 it was confirmed that children
young as 11 into the “Avondo Society”, a group
would not be indicted by the Court.23 The Court’s
of Kamajors (“hunters”, members of the CDF).
prosecutors viewed all children as victims as well
Both individuals were to serve their sentences
as perpetrators, and thus felt individual children
concurrently, which meant that Moinina Fofana
could not be been seen as bearing greatest
would serve a total of six years and Allieu
responsibility.24
Kondewa would serve eight years.32
By June 2007, eight people were on trial in
the Special Court in Freetown, for crimes which
included the recruitment and use of children 1 Amnesty International Report 2003.
under 15. They were three former AFRC leaders, 2 See entries on Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Liberia in
two former CDF leaders, and three former RUF this volume.
leaders. Two others had been indicted by the 3 See Human Rights Watch (HRW), Youth, Poverty
Court: the leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, who and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa’s
had died in custody in 2003, and the leader of Regional Warriors, March 2005; Report of the UN
the CDF, Hinga Norman, who died in February Secretary-General on ways to combat subregional
2007.25 In March 2006 the Nigerian authorities and cross-border problems in West Africa, UN
apprehended Charles Taylor, former president Doc. S/2004/200, 12 March 2004; Report of the
of Liberia, who was transferred to the authority Secretary-General on inter-mission cooperation
of the Court where he was charged with war and possible cross-border operations between
crimes, crimes against humanity and other the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, the UN Mission in
Liberia, and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN
serious violations of international humanitarian
Doc. S/2005/135, 2 March 2005.
law, including the use of child soldiers during his
alleged involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict 4 Youth Unemployment and Regional Insecurity in
supporting the RUF.26 In June, in order to protect West Africa, 2nd edn, UN Office for West Africa
(UNOWA), August 2006, www.un.org/unowa;
stability in Liberia and the sub-region, which
Report of the Secretary-General on cross-border
might be disrupted if he were to be put on trial in
issues in West Africa, UN Doc. S/2007/143, 13
west Africa, he was transferred to The Hague to March 2007.
be tried by a trial chamber of the Special Court.27
5 Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the
He first appeared before the Special Court in The
United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone,
Hague on 4 June 2007. His trial was adjourned
UN Doc. S/2007/257, 7 May 2007.
until January 2008 to allow time for his lawyers to
prepare for trial.28 6 “Sierra Leone prisons threaten peace”, BBC News,
22 June 2007. See also UN Integrated Office in
The first verdict by the Special Court was
Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), “Presentation of a report
announced on 20 June 2007 in the case of Alex
‘Behind the walls – an inventory and assessment
Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie of prisons in Sierra Leone’ – statement by the
Borbor Kanu. These three former commanders ERSG Victor Angelo on 21 June 2007”, press
of the AFRC were found guilty on 11 out of 14 release, UNIOSIL/PIO PR 50, www.uniosil.org.
charges, including the recruitment of children
7 UN Development Programme (UNDP), 2007/2008
under the age of 15 and their active use in Human Development Index rankings, http://hdr.
hostilities.29 The judgment marked the first time undp.org.
that an international criminal tribunal found
8 UNICEF, “Sierra Leone approves the National Child
individuals guilty of recruitment and use of
Rights Bill”, press release, 7 June 2007.
children as soldiers. These convictions were
welcomed by human rights NGOs as a historic 9 Declaration on accession to the Optional Protocol,
www2.ohchr.org.
precedent, showing that the recruitment of child
soldiers was considered to be among the most 10 Coalition interview with confidential sources,
serious of crimes and that those involved could Freetown, November 2005, cited in Child Soldiers
and would be brought to justice.30 The three Coalition, Child Soldiers and Disarmament,
Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
were sentenced to between 45 and 50 years’
in West Africa, November 2006.
imprisonment, covering all counts on which they
were found guilty.31 11 Report submitted to UNICEF by a child protection
On 2 August 2007 the Court announced agency in Sierra Leone, 18 August 2005, cited in
Child Soldiers Coalition, above note 10.
its verdicts in the cases of two CDF leaders.
Moinina Fofana was convicted on four counts
of the eight-count indictment, but found not

12 Coalition meeting with a child protection agency, 31 Special Court for Sierra Leone, sentencing
Freetown, October 2005, cited in Child Soldiers judgment, SCSL-04-16-T, 19 July 2007.
Coalition, above note 10. 32 Special Court for Sierra Leone, sentencing
13 Amnesty International (AI) estimated in 2000 judgment, SCSL-04-14-T, 9 October 2007.
that by then more than 10,000 children had been
associated with the fighting forces – see Sierra
Leone: childhood – a casualty of conflict (AI Index
AFR 51/69/00), 31 August 2000.
14 “Children and the armed conflict in Sierra Leone”,
Chapter 4 of the Final Report of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Vol.
3b, October 2004.
15 Ibid. See also Susan McKay and Dyan Mazurana,
Where Are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in
Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique:
Their Lives during and after War, International
Center for Human Rights and Democratic
Development, 2004, www.ichrdd.ca.
16 John Williamson, Reintegration of Child Soldiers
in Sierra Leone, USAID report, 2005, http://pdf.
usaid.gov.
17 Coalition interview with Caritas Makeni official,
Makeni, December 2005.
18 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra
Leone, above note 14.
20 UNICEF, State of the World’s Children 2005 and
2007. The 2005 report, based on figures up to
2003, indicated that the child labour rate for
those aged 5–14 was 57 per cent; the 2007 report,
based on figures up to 2005, indicated that the
child labour rate was 59 per cent.
21 Second periodic report of Sierra Leone to the UN
CRC/C/SLE/2, 8 September 2006.
22 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra
Leone, above note 14.
23 Special Court for Sierra Leone, “Special Court
prosecutor says he will not prosecute children”,
press release, 2 November 2002, www.sc-sl.org.
24 Coalition interview with chief of prosecutions
of Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown,
December 2006.
25 Special Court for Sierra Leone, www.sc-sl.org.
26 Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-
S/2006/376, 9 June 2006; Special Court for Sierra
Leone, Summary of charges against Charles
Taylor, www.sc-sl.org.
27 Twelfth progress report of the Secretary-
S/2006/743, 12 September 2006; Report of the
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict,
UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826, 26 October 2006.
28 “Taylor trial delayed until 2008”, BBC News, 20
S—Z
August 2007.
29 Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Special Court for Sierra
Leone, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 20 June 2007.
30 Coalition, “Child Soldiers Coalition welcomes
verdicts against child recruiters in Sierra Leone”,
press release, 20 June 2007.

The Children and Young Persons Act (1993,
S I NGAPORE amended 2001) provided for the general
protection of the rights and welfare of children –
Republic of Singapore defined as under 14 – and young people – defined
as over 14 and under 16. The Act contained no
Population: 4.3 million (1 million under 18) specific provisions prohibiting the recruitment
Government armed forces: 72,500 or use of children in conflict situations, nor did
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 it refer explicitly to children involved in conflict
Voluntary recruitment age: 16 situations as being among those in need of
Voting age: 21 protection. However, the Act provided that “any
Optional Protocol: signed 7 September 2000 act which endangers or is likely to endanger
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): the safety of the child or young person” was a
criminal offence.
Recruits could volunteer for military 1 Enlistment Act, Chapter 93.

service in the armed forces from the age of 2 Central Manpower Base, Ministry of Defence, “My
Son, the NS Man: What Parents Should Know
16 and a half. About the NS”, 2007, www.ns.sg.
3 “Register for NS-FAQ-Enlistment”, www.ns.sg.
Government 4 Enlistment Act, above note 1, Article 19.
5 “About BMT”, 2006, www.mindef.gov.sg/; “My
National recruitment legislation and Son, The NS Man”, above note 2.
practice 6 “My Son, the NS Man”, above note 2.
Under the 1970 Enlistment Act, male citizens and 7 Enlistment Act, above note 1, Article 33.
permanent residents aged 16 and a half were 8 Amnesty International, Annual Reports 2005,
required to register and to undergo a physical 2006 and 2007.
examination,1 but only those aged 18 and over
were liable to perform military service. Full-
time service was for two to two and a half years
according to rank attained during service.2
Males over the age of 16 and a half could
enlist earlier under the Voluntary Early Enlistment
Scheme (VEES) with parental consent. They were
required to undergo medical and psychological
screening to determine their capacity to cope
with the national service training, and to serve
for the same period as those conscripted under
the national service program.3 The Enlistment Act
also permitted “any person” to apply for regular
(volunteer) service in the armed forces.4
All those who enlisted were required to
undergo basic military training for between seven
and 26 weeks, depending on physical capacity.5
Information concerning training programs
specifically for recruits under 18 was unavailable,
as were statistics on the number of under-18s
who had voluntarily enlisted.
Persons undergoing national service were
provided with medical and psychological
counselling services. They were provided with
a monthly allowance and permitted to have
contacts with their family on a regulated basis.6
Refusal to enlist and to perform national
service was an offence under the Enlistment
Act, punishable by a fine, imprisonment of
not more than three years, or both.7 At least
14 conscientious objectors were imprisoned
between 2004 and 2006, and others continued
to serve prison sentences; all were members of
the banned Jehovah’s Witness religious group. No
alternatives to military service were offered.8

S LOVAKIA SLO V E N I A
Slovak Republic Republic of Slovenia
Population: 5.4 million (1.1 million under 18) Population: 2.0 million (345,000 under 18)
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscription Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
abolished in 2006) Voluntary recruitment age: 18
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 Voting age: 18
Voting age: 18 Optional Protocol: ratified 23 September 2004
Optional Protocol: ratified 7 July 2006 Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
Conscription was abolished in 2006. There in the armed forces.
were no reports of under-18s serving in the
armed forces. Government
Government National recruitment legislation and
practice
National recruitment legislation and A major reorganization of the armed forces
practice was under way, aimed at changing from a
The transition to a non-conscript armed force was conscription-based territorial defence force
completed and conscription was abolished in 2006. to a volunteer army deployable within NATO.
However, in cases of military emergency or state of Conscription ended in October 2003 and
war, the armed forces could recruit men above the compulsory reserve service was to end by 2010.1
age of 18. National legislation did not permit any In March 2007 the volunteer force consisted of
authority to recruit under-18s for any armed forces.1 6,500 soldiers, with a further 2,000 expected to
be recruited by 2010. Recruits were required to
Military training and military schools have been in education between the ages of 15
and 18, and to be under 25.2 In its declaration
There were three military colleges and a police on ratifying the Optional Protocol in September
academy.2 2004, the government stated that the minimum
age for voluntary recruitment was 18.3
Developments Previously, under the Military Service Act, all
men aged between 19 and 27 had been liable
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, for conscription, although 18 year olds could
Slovakia and 58 other states endorsed the Paris volunteer for military service. In time of war or
Commitments to protect children from unlawful emergency, 18 year olds could also have been
recruitment or use by armed forces or armed called up.4
children associated with armed forces or armed Military training and military schools
standards and operational principles for protecting The military education system was overhauled,
and assisting child soldiers and followed a wide- and in 2005 the process of merging all military
ranging global consultation jointly sponsored by schools under one command began. The Flight
the French government and UNICEF. School was subordinated to the Doctrine,
Development, Education and Training Command.
International standards The military schools provided education and
training programs for soldiers, non-commissioned
Slovakia ratified the Optional Protocol in July officers, officers and specialized military
2006. Its declaration stated that anyone serving personnel. Also in 2005 an e-learning centre and a
professionally in the armed forces was required Command and Unit Combat Training Centre were
to be 18.3
S—Z
established, and 67 army personnel successfully

completed basic military professional training at
1 Communication from the embassy of Slovakia, the Non-commissioned Officer School and the
London, March 2007. Officer Candidate School.5
2 Embassy of Slovakia, London, United Kingdom,
http://dev.dracon.biz/embassy.
3 Optional Protocol, Declarations and reservations,
www2.ohchr.org.

Developments SOLOMO N I S L A N D S
Slovenia and 58 other states endorsed the Paris Solomon Islands
recruitment or use by armed forces or armed Population: 478,000 (227,000 under 18)
groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on Government armed forces: no armed forces
children associated with armed forces or armed Compulsory recruitment age: not applicable
groups. The documents reaffirmed international Voluntary recruitment age: not applicable
standards and operational principles for Voting age: 18
protecting and assisting child soldiers and Optional Protocol: not signed
followed a wide-ranging global consultation Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
jointly sponsored by the French government and CRC, GC AP I and II
UNICEF.
There were no armed forces. The minimum
1 ��
US Department of State, Background Note, March recruitment age to the police force was
��
18. Former child soldiers were left out of
2 Slovenian Army, www.slovenskavojska.si.
reintegration programmes aimed at ex-
3 Declarations and reservations to the Optional
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org. combatants.
4 ��
Second periodic report of Slovenia to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. Context
CRC/C/70/Add.19��
, 18 June 2003.
5 Ministry of Defence, Annual Reports, www.mors. Following five years of internal armed conflict
si. and the intervention in 2003 of the Australian-led
Regional Assistance Mission for the Solomon
Islands (RAMSI), also known as Operation
“Helpem Fren” (Helping a Friend), progress
continued on the reconstruction of infrastructure
and key institutions affected by the armed
conflict. There were concerns, however, that the
root causes of the conflict remained, as more than
80 per cent of the population were still dependent
on subsistence agriculture and fishing and had
limited access to health and education services.
The marked disparity in development between
the capital, Honiara, and the provinces, and the
reported corruption among political leaders
continued to present significant challenges to
development.1
In 2005 the High Court convicted at least
ten people for their role in the conflict, including
Harold Keke, former leader of the Guadalcanal
Liberation Front, sentenced to life imprisonment
for the 2002 murder of Augustine Geve, a former
priest and government minister.2 It appeared
that no investigations had taken place into
recruitment of children by militias and other cases
of alleged war crimes affecting children during the
conflict, as recommended by the UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child in 2003.3
Government
practice
There were no armed forces. According to the
Police Act, “no person shall be enlisted in the
Force unless … he is of or above the age of
eighteen years and under the age of twenty-eight

years”.4 No law had been enacted to protect
children from their involvement in armed conflict. SOM A L I A
As part of proposed reforms, all students
would be required after Form 5 (age 17) “to Somalia
undertake National Service through government-
driven programs”. 5 It was not clear what Population: 8.2 million (4.2 million under 18)
activities this service would entail and no further Government armed forces: not known
information was available. Compulsory recruitment age: information not
available
Voluntary recruitment age: information not
Disarmament, demobilization available
and reintegration (DDR) Voting age: 181
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) helped Optional Protocol: not applicable
to demobilize over 1,000 police special constables Other treaties ratified: none applicable
between July 2002 and July 2004, most of
them recruited from former armed groups.6 The recruitment and use of child soldiers
The reintegration packages offered technical significantly increased, with thousands
assistance, monitoring and guidance for projects of child soldiers involved in all parties
with a maximum duration of six months.7 to hostilities which escalated in 2006.
While it was recognized that different
measures were needed for women and children Intense fighting resulted in large numbers
involved in the armed conflict,8 in reality children of civilian deaths and injuries, among them
did not benefit from the UNDP program, and many children, and massive displacement.
concerns remained for hundreds of former child
soldiers, for whom few provisions had been
made.9 Context
Somalia remained without a central government.
1 Amnesty International (AI), Amnesty International The Transitional Federal Government (TFG),
Report 2005 and 2006. created from 2002–4 peace talks in Kenya, was
2 AI, Amnesty International Report 2006. based in Baidoa town in the west of the country.
3 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Although recognized by the UN it was unable to
Consideration of report submitted by Solomon extend control beyond Baidoa or to establish
Islands, Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/ itself in the capital, Mogadishu, until early 2007,
C/15/Add.208, 2 July 2003. following attacks by Ethiopian forces backing
4 Solomon Islands, Police Act, Police Regulations, the TFG. The self-proclaimed Regional State of
section 72(2). Puntland controlled the north-east and remained
5 Solomon Islands, Department of Prime Minister nominally part of Somalia. The TFG opposed the
and Cabinet, “Government Policy Framework”, de facto independence of Somaliland in the north-
May 2006, www.pmc.gov.sb/; UNESCO, Institute west.2 In September 2007 fighting broke out
for Statistics, Global Education Digest 2006: between Somaliland’s armed force and Puntland’s
Comparing Education Statistics across the World, militia over an unresolved dispute relating to
Montreal 2006, unesdoc.unesco.org. territory in Sool and Sanaag.3
6 UN DDR Resource Centre, Country Programme: The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a complex
Solomon Islands, www.unddr.org. union of clan-based sharia courts, dominated by
7 UNDP, “Support to the Reintegration of Special the Hawiye clan based in Mogadishu, emerged
Constable in Solomon Islands”, project brief, as the major force opposed to the TFG in 2006.4
2006, www.unddr.org. The UIC seized control of Mogadishu in June
8 Country Programme: Solomon Islands, above note 2006 after four months of fighting against the
6. reportedly US-backed coalition of Mogadishu-
based armed factions known as the Alliance for
9 UNICEF EAPRO, Emergencies: Refugees, IDPs and
the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
Child Soldiers, Natural Disasters, 2005.
(ARPCT). The fighting disproportionately affected
children, as much of it took place in residential
areas of Mogadishu, although UIC control
S—Z
subsequently improved security in Mogadishu for

a short period.5 The UIC subsequently extended
its control over much of southern and central
Somalia with the exception of Baidoa.6
In December 2006, Ethiopian government forces
intervened in Somalia in support of the TFG and,
with the backing of the US government, ousted

the UIC within a few days.7 In early January 2007 decided to extend the AMISOM mission for a
the United States announced that it had carried further six months.19
out an air strike against suspected terrorists with
al-Qaeda links fighting alongside the UIC near
Afmadow. The attacks reportedly resulted in
Government
civilian casualties, including children.8 Following National recruitment legislation and
the establishment of Ethiopian and TFG troops in
Mogadishu in January 2007, attacks on Ethiopian practice
and TFG forces by insurgent groups increased. Lack of clarity over legal provisions and
In late March, Ethiopian forces launched a major inadequate systems of birth registration made
offensive, using rocket bombardments and shelling it difficult to establish the exact ages of those
of entire neighbourhoods to dislodge insurgent who were recruited into each territory’s forces.20
forces and occupy strategic locations. Hundreds of According to one media report, TFG officials
civilians died trying to flee or while trapped in their said that recruitment for a new national army
homes, and tens of thousands fled the city. Four had started in many regions of the country in
days of heavy fighting ended with a brief ceasefire mid-2005. The deputy Defence Minister stated
which broke down in late April, when Ethiopian that recruits, to be drawn from all the country’s
forces launched a second major offensive to regions, would be located at the military bases
capture additional areas of north Mogadishu, again of Mahadaay, Abqaale, Buq-Goosaar, Ceel-Gaal,
shelling and bombarding civilian neighbourhoods. Luuq-Jeelow, Waajid and other camps in the Lower
The TFG declared victory on 26 April, but attacks by Juba region. Reports indicated that recruitment
insurgent forces resumed within days.9 and encampment of recruits had started in
After the fall of the UIC, high levels of Puntland, with recruits reporting to Abqaale
insecurity and criminal activity returned to military camp near Gaalkacyo. A recruitment
southern and central Somalia. Hostilities exercise also reportedly began in Kismaayo.21 The
continued, with Ethiopian forces and the TNG Somaliland constitution contained no minimum
fighting insurgent groups, including remnants age for recruitment into the armed forces, but
of the UIC. Some 1,200 civilians were killed and there were no reports of recruitment of children.22
several thousand were injured between October It was not known whether Puntland forces
2006 and late 2007. An estimated 35 per cent recruited or used children.
of the victims were children.10 The TFG began to
disarm UIC remnants and militias in Mogadishu Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
in March 2007.11 However, the security situation The TFG acknowledged that it had children
in Mogadishu deteriorated in April as anti- in its ranks. Credible photographic evidence
government groups began staging hit-and-run and eyewitness reports of TFG child soldiers
attacks, using improvised explosive devices and revealed children as young as 11 years of age at
suicide bombings against the TFG and Ethiopian checkpoints and under-18s in military uniform
forces. The latter retaliated with indiscriminate patrolling Mogadishu airport in January 2007.23
shelling and rocket fire, much of which fell on Following fighting between the TFG and the UIC
residential areas of the city.12 in December 2006, reports were received of UIC
The recruitment and use of children by all child soldiers injured, killed or detained by the
parties to the hostilities, including the TFG, the TFG.24
UIC, their allied militias, the ARPCT and various
other clan militias, increased in 2006 and 2007.13
The rape of women and girls, including gang rape Armed groups
by soldiers and other militias in Mogadishu, was
reportedly common.14 Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)
Between February and May 2007, 400,000 The UIC comprised mainly members of the al-
civilians fled the conflict in Mogadishu.15 As of Shabaab (youth militants), a militia of 500–700
October 2007 there were approximately 850,000 fighters, largely drawn from the Hawiye and
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Somalia Ogaden clans.25 The UIC was responsible for
as a result of the conflict and of severe drought significant levels of forcible recruitment of
and flooding in 2006.16 There were hundreds of children in the latter part of 2006, declaring
thousands of Somali refugees in neighbouring publicly their intention to recruit from schools.
countries, in particular in Ethiopia and Kenya.17 Children were recruited from schools in
UN Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007) Mogadishu and the Hiran region. Headmasters
authorized an African Union peacekeeping from a variety of Mogadishu schools were
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and a first reportedly called to meetings in September 2006
contingent of 1,100 Ugandan troops arrived in in which they were each required to commit a
Mogadishu in March 2007. They came under quota of 300–600 adolescent children to military
repeated attack by anti-TFG militias.18 In July 2007 training programs of up to six months.26 After the
the African Union Peace and Security Council UIC seized control of Mogadishu in June 2006,
some children between the ages of 10 and 16
were forcibly recruited for military training by

the UIC in Dabble, near Kismayo, in Mogadishu and use of child soldiers, and to take necessary
and Hiran regions.27 There were reports that actions for the unconditional demobilization of
the UIC used child soldiers in recruiting efforts all children. The report urged the TFG to take
and rallies.28 A large number of child soldiers concrete steps to ratify the Convention on the
were reportedly abandoned when the UIC fled Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol on
Mogadishu in December 2006.29 involvement of children in armed conflict, and to
halt the proliferation of small arms.39
Alliance for the Restoration of Peace At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) Paris, representatives from Somalia and 58
other states endorsed the Paris Commitments to
During heavy fighting with the UIC in March protect children from unlawful recruitment or use
to June 2006, the ARPCT recruited numerous by armed forces or armed groups and the Paris
children, some forcibly, into its ranks, both in Principles and guidelines on children associated
Mogadishu and the Hiran region. The ARPCT with armed forces or armed groups. The
recruited street children and children from documents reaffirmed international standards
schools for its militia.30 and operational principles for protecting and
assisting child soldiers and followed a wide-
Armed militias ranging global consultation jointly sponsored
By June 2007 it was estimated that there were by the French government and UNICEF. At the
50,000–70,000 members of clan militia and other meeting Somali government ministers requested
armed groups operating in Somalia.31 In mid-2006 assistance from the international community to
the armed group led by Abdi Qeybdid and Musa address the problem of children in the TFG armed
Sudi Yalalow recruited children as young as 13 in forces.40
Mogadishu. There were also reports of several The UIC and the TFG were listed as parties
children as young as seven in armed groups in recruiting or using children in situations of armed
Galgadud, Dusamareb.32 Boys as young as 14 conflict in the December 2007 Secretary-General’s
or 15 participated in militia attacks, and many report on children and armed conflict.41
youths were members of criminal gangs known as
moryaan (parasites).33
1 The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali
Republic, February 2004, www.mpil.de.
Disarmament, demobilization 2 Amnesty International Report 2007; Human
Rights Watch (HRW), Shell-shocked: civilians
and reintegration (DDR) under siege in Mogadishu, August 2007.
In November 2005, Puntland authorities 3 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation
embarked on the first ever DDR program with in Somalia, UN Doc. S/2007/658, 7 November
the UN Development Programme (UNDP), 2007; confidential source, 2008.
but it was not known whether children were 4 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Can the Somali
included.34 In September 2006 the UN country Crisis be Contained?”, Africa Report No. 116, 10
team visited Mogadishu and raised the issue of August 2006.
child recruitment. The UIC responded positively, 5 HRW, above note 2.
acknowledging that child recruitment should be 6 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
halted, but there was no evidence of any action armed conflict in Somalia, UN Doc. S/2007/259, 7
taken to that effect.35 May 2007.
In February 2007 UNICEF offered to 7 HRW, above note 2.
support the TFG in developing a plan for the 8 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.
demobilization of children from its forces. A
response and follow up to this offer was pending
by October 2007.36 The issue of child soldiers was 10 Report of the Secretary-General on children
to be addressed as part of the UN task force on and armed conflict, A/62/609-S/2007/757, 21
DDR in Somalia.37 December 2007.
11 HRW, above note 2; “Somalia: children, women
most affected by fighting”, IRIN, 12 January 2007.
Developments 12 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.
In December 2006 the UN Resident and 13 Ibid.
Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Somalia formally 14 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation
S—Z
reminded both the TFG and the UIC of their in Somalia, UN Doc. S/2007/658, 7 November
obligations to uphold international standards 2007.
and laws concerning the recruitment of children 15 UNHCR News, “Renewed violence in Mogadishu
into armed forces and groups, and to ensure the sets thousands on the road once more”, 20 July
immediate release of any children.38 2007, and “Thousands flee Mogadishu as fresh
In May 2007 the UN Secretary-General’s fighting erupts”, 30 October 2007, www.unhcr.
report on children and armed conflict in Somalia org.
urged the TFG and UIC to end the recruitment

16 United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Monthly Somalia SOUT H A F R I C A
Humanitarian Analysis Report for October 2007,
13 November 2007; UNCHR News, “Latest figures Republic of South Africa
show 90,000 flee fighting in Mogadishu”, 31
October 2007, www.unhcr.org. Population: 47.4 million (18.4 million under 18)
17 UNHCR News, above note 16. Government armed forces: 62,400
18 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
in Somalia, UN Doc. S/2007/381, 25 June 2007. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
19 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 14. Voting age: 18
20 US Department of State, Country Reports on Optional Protocol: signed 8 February 2002
Human Rights Practices 2006, Somalia, 6 March Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
2007, www.state.gov. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
21 “Somalia: Start of new army recruitment”, Kenya
Broadcasting Corporation, 10 July 2005, www.kbc. There were no reports of under-18s in the
co.ke. armed forces. Large numbers of under-18s
were members of criminal gangs.
25 HRW, above note 2. Context
26 US Department of State, above note 20; Political violence in the run-up to the March
confidential source, 2008. 2006 municipal elections in KwaZulu-Natal led
27 Office of the Special Representative of the to the deaths of a number of African National
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Congress (ANC) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
Conflict, Developments in Somalia, www.un.org/ candidates.1 Criminal gangs linked to political
children/conflict/english/somalia.html. parties or their members were reportedly
28 US Department of State, above note 20. associated with the violence.2 It was not known
29 OCHA Somalia, IASC, Donors Summary of Meeting whether under-18s were involved.
Held on 4 January 2007, http://ochaonline. In 2005 South Africa National Defence Force
un.org. (SANDF) troops operating in the Democratic
30 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation Republic of the Congo (DRC) as part of the UN
in Somalia, UN Doc. S/2006/418, 20 June 2006; peacekeeping mission were accused of sexual
Office of the Special Representative, above note misconduct towards women and girls. Eight of the
27. allegations were substantiated, and the soldiers
31 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 18. responsible were returned to their country.3 There
were two cases of South African soldiers under
trial for sexual misconduct in peacekeeping
33 US Department of State, above note 20. missions in the DRC and in Burundi.4
34 UN OCHA, “Somalia: Puntland factsheet August
2006”, 28 August 2006, www.reliefweb.int.
Government
36 Ibid. National recruitment legislation and
37 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 18. practice
38 Monthly report of the Secretary-General on
Somalia, UN Doc. S/2007/115, 28 February 2007. There was no general conscription, although
the Defence Act No. 42 of 2002 provided for
the possibility of mobilization during a state of
40 “Government calls for assistance to rehabilitate national defence. Article 90 stated that “after
child soldiers”, IRIN, 2 February 2007. declaration of a state of national defence, the
41 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 10. President may, by proclamation in the Gazette,
authorise the mobilisation of persons for services
in the Defence Forces if it is necessary.”5
The 2002 Defence Act established 18 as
the minimum age for voluntary recruitment to
the SANDF, military training and mobilization,
including in times of emergency (Articles 52, 82
and 91).6

8 Andre Standing, “The threat of gangs and anti-
Developments gangs policy”, Occasional Paper 116, Institute of
Criminal violence remained high and tens of Security Studies, August 2006, www.iss.co.za.
thousands of under-18s belonged to armed 9 UNICEF, “At South Africa’s third national AIDS
gangs.7 The number of people involved in gangs conference, all eyes on rising child mortality”,
was not known, but current membership was www.unicef.org.
believed to be high, not least because these 10 UNICEF, Saving Children, Enhancing Lives,
gangs had expanded their operations into rural Combating HIV and AIDS in South Africa: Second
areas. Activities included involvement in the Edition 2006, www.unicef.org.
drugs trade, prostitution and control over local 11 Human Rights Watch World Report 2007.
economic activities. Gang members deliberately 12 “Zimbabwe: Child migrants seek a better life in
targeted vulnerable young people for recruitment. South Africa”, IRIN, 3 September 2007.
Young gang members were reportedly used
to carry out attacks because, if arrested and
tried, they were less likely to face a long prison
sentence. Initiation rituals included rape or killing
rival gang members, and gang members adopted
particular styles of clothing and were encouraged
to have gang tattoos and learn the gang’s history.
Attempts to leave a gang could be punished by
death.8
South Africa had the second-highest HIV
prevalence in the world9 and AIDS was the main
cause of death among children under five (40 per
cent of deaths). More than 1 million children had
lost one or both parents to AIDS.10
During 2006 the number of people applying
for asylum in South Africa noticeably increased,
the majority seeking refuge from armed conflict
in the DRC, although the number of Zimbabwean
asylum seekers rose significantly.11 Hundreds of
child migrants, some as young as ten, arrived
in South Africa from Zimbabwe, risking being
robbed or raped by trafficking gangs if they were
unable to pay them.12
Paris, South Africa and 58 other states endorsed

2 “South Africa: Province hit by spate of political
killings”, IRIN, 4 April 2006.
Rights Practices, 2005, www.state.gov.
4 Treaty body Monitor, UN Committee against
Torture, 37th session, 6–24 November 2006,
S—Z
www.ishr.ch.
5 Defence Act 42 of 2002, Article 90.
6 Government Gazette, Vol. 452, No. 24576, 20
February 2003, www.gov.za/gazette.
7 “South Africa: Gang culture in Cape Town”, IRIN,
27 February 2007.

recruited or used in hostilities prior to arrival in
S PAIN Spain is inadequate and … data on these children
are not systematically collected”. The Committee
Kingdom of Spain concluded that this “failure to identify such
children could result in a breach of the principle of
Population: 43.1 million (7.5 million under 18) non-refoulement”. A lack of available information
Government armed forces: 147,300 about the asylum process for conflict-affected
Compulsory recruitment age: Conscription children and the inadequate provision of medical,
suspended psychological and social services for those
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 seeking asylum in Spain was also emphasized
Voting age: 18 by the Committee. The Committee called on
Optional Protocol: ratified 8 March 2002 the government to enact legislation explicitly
criminalizing the recruitment and involvement
of children in armed conflict, and to “strengthen
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 extraterritorial jurisdiction for these crimes when
they are committed by or against a person who
There were no reports of under-18s in is a citizen of or has other links with the State
government forces. party”. Although welcoming Spain’s support for
the European Union 1998 Code of Conduct on
Government Arms Exports and the government’s subsequent
criminalization of the illegal arms trade, the
National recruitment legislation and Committee recommended that the government
now “consider introducing a specific prohibition
practice with respect to the sale of arms when the final
Article 30 of the 1978 constitution stated that destination is a country where children are known
“Citizens have the right and the duty to defend to be – or may potentially be – recruited or used
Spain. The law shall determine the military in hostilities”.4
obligations of Spaniards and shall regulate, with The Government’s Master Plan for Spanish
all due guarantees, conscientious objection Co-operation for 2005–8 named the situation of
as well as other grounds for exemption from children in armed conflict as a priority with regard
compulsory military service; it may also, when to the agenda for human rights protection during
appropriate, impose a community service in place this period. The Spanish Agency for International
of military service.” Article 30 also included the Co-operation actively supported a UNICEF project
provision that “The duties of citizens in the event for the reintegration of former child soldiers in
of serious risk, catastrophe or public calamity the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other
may be regulated by law.” projects assisting conflict-affected children in
Spain has maintained professional armed Timor-Leste and Colombia.5
forces after compulsory military service was At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
suspended with the adoption of the Armed Forces Paris, Spain and 58 other states endorsed the
Personnel (Regulations) Act, Act 17/1999. The Act Paris Commitments to protect children from
set the minimum age for voluntary military service unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces
in the Spanish Armed Forces at 18. Reservists in or armed groups and the Paris Principles and
the armed forces, to be mobilized “to meet the guidelines on children associated with armed
needs of national defence when these cannot be forces or armed groups. The documents
met by professional military staff,” likewise had reaffirmed international standards and
to be 18 years of age to be eligible for service. operational principles for protecting and assisting
Admission to military training institutions was child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
similarly limited to those who had reached the consultation jointly sponsored by the French
age of 18.2 Recruits had to be at least 18 to join government and UNICEF.
the Civil Guard (Guardias Civiles), who had both
policing and military functions under Organic Law 1 “ETA call off Spanish ceasefire”, Reuters, 5 June
2/1986 (amended). The Civil Guard came under 2007.
the authority of both the Interior and Defence 2 Initial report of Spain to the UN Committee on
Ministries, except in wartime, when the Defence the Rights of the Child on implementation of the
Ministry would hold exclusive authority.3 Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ESP/1,
16 October 2006.
Developments 3 LO 2/86 fe Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad
Reguladora del Estado, de las Policias de las
While noting that the government had made Comunidades Autonomas y de las Policias
efforts to process the applications of child asylum Locales, Organic Law 2/1986, 14 March 1986,
seekers, the UN Committee on the Rights of the www.igsap.map.es.
Child expressed concern in October 2007 that
“identification of children who may have been

Consideration of report submitted by Spain SRI L A N K A
on implementation of the Optional Protocol,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
ESP/CO/1, 17 October 2007.
5 Initial report, above note 2. Population: 20.7 million (6.1 million under 18)
Voting age: 18
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

continued to recruit and use children,
despite repeated commitments not to do
so. Children in the east of the country were
forcibly recruited and used by the Karuna
group, a breakaway group of the LTTE, with
the complicity of, and in some instances
actively working with, the security forces.
Context
In November 2005 Mahinda Rajapakse won
presidential elections which had been marked
by the LTTE’s obstruction of voting, especially
in the north. In the following months there were
almost daily attacks on security forces by the
LTTE, killings of high-profile public and military
persons and increased death and injury to
civilians (including children) in bomb attacks.
Civilians, including children, were also killed and
injured as a result of indiscriminate attacks by
the Sri Lankan armed forces. Fighting escalated
dramatically from May 2006, after a suicide bomb
attack on the army commander in Colombo.
There was heavy fighting between government
forces and the LTTE, in particular in the east of the
island. In mid-July 2007 the government declared
that it had won a victory in the east and that the
area had been cleared of LTTE presence.
Widespread extrajudicial executions, enforced
disappearances and violations of international
humanitarian law were committed against
civilians and people not taking part in the
fighting.1 Between April 2006 and March 2007
more than 230,000 people were newly displaced,
according to the UN refugee agency (UNHCR).2
Around half of them were from Batticaloa district
in the east. They reportedly faced pressure
to return to their homes, including threats by
S—Z
local authorities that the assistance they were

receiving would cease if they did not return.3
The delivery of humanitarian and development
assistance was subject to multiple challenges and
constraints, which resulted in the scaling down
of humanitarian and development support to
the affected population, including to vulnerable

children, and also in hampering access of According to the 1985 Mobilization and
independent observers and monitors to those Supplementary Forces Act, the National Cadet
affected areas.4 Corps was open to those over 16. It provided pre-
The Ceasefire Agreement of February 2002 military and civil training to students, but cadets
collapsed in practice, although neither party could not be called to active service and were not
formally renounced it. The leader of the LTTE members of the armed forces.
in late November 2006 stated that the LTTE no In February 2006 the Penal Code was
longer felt bound by it.5 In mid-April 2007, the amended to make “engaging/recruiting children
minister of defence was quoted as having said for use in armed conflict” a crime punishable by
that the ceasefire no longer had meaning.6 20 years’ imprisonment. Despite these provisions,
The indiscriminate use of claymore and there had so far been no arrests of cadres of the
pressure mines and other methods of killing LTTE or Karuna group (see below) in relation to
allegedly employed by the LTTE resulted in child recruitment.12 This was partly because the
child casualties. On 15 June 2006, 65 civilians, police often refused to accept complaints from
including 14 children, were killed and 70 other parents of abducted children, despite parents
civilians were injured by a claymore mine attack having information about the identity of the
on a civilian bus in Anuradhapura district.7 A abductors.13
Sri Lankan Air Force aerial bombardment on 2 The government was repeatedly condemned
January 2007 killed seven displaced children and for tolerating the aiding and abetting by the
injured several others in Padahuthurai, Mannar security forces of child recruitment by the Karuna
district.8 Bombing and shelling by the security group. In November 2006 a UN special advisor
forces in other parts of the country, including on children and armed conflict “found strong
Jaffna, Batticaloa, Mullaitivu and Killinochchi and credible evidence that certain elements of
districts, resulted in destruction of schools and the government security forces are supporting
the death of and injury to teachers and students. and sometimes participating in the abductions
The European Union (EU) listed the LTTE and forced recruitment of children by the Karuna
as a “terrorist organization” in May 2006. faction”.14 President Rajapakse and other Sri
Subsequently, the LTTE said that they were Lankan officials repeatedly promised that the
not going to guarantee full security for EU government would investigate the allegations
citizens, thus pressuring EU states to withdraw of state complicity and hold accountable any
their nationals from the country. This included members of the security forces found to have
those participating in the Sri Lanka Monitoring violated the law. Human Rights Watch repeatedly
Mission (SLMM), set up in 2002 to monitor the asked the government for the results of the
Ceasefire Agreement.9 Consequently, from around investigations and, in August 2007, questioned
September 2006, the SLMM was functioning with the sincerity of the government’s commitment to
only 30 monitors, half the original number, from an investigation.15 A government committee was
Iceland and Norway. established in 2007 to investigate the allegations.
The independence of the Human Rights There were longstanding concerns about
Commission (HRC) and other constitutional the treatment of children who “surrendered”
bodies (including the Police Commission) was to the security forces; in December 2006 the
undermined in 2006 when – in the absence of a government was criticized for not making a
functioning Constitutional Council – the president distinction between children and adults.16
of Sri Lanka directly appointed their members, The government subsequently appointed a
contrary to the constitution.10 commissioner general for rehabilitation, and
The HRC and SLMM, together with UNICEF as of mid-2007 was developing a rehabilitation
and the International Committee of the Red Cross program in cooperation with UNICEF. This
(ICRC), were among the organizations monitoring included setting up a rehabilitation centre for
the recruitment and use of child soldiers. With “child surrendees”, of whom there had been
the escalation of violence, all faced increasing more than 60, all of whom had been recruited
obstacles to their work. by the LTTE. As of that time, however, no specific
program had been established for girls.17
A particular concern relating to formerly
Government recruited children in the custody of the Sri Lankan
National recruitment legislation and security forces was their exposure to the media.
Concerns were raised that this public exposure
practice resulted in stigmatization and increased the
Enlistment of soldiers to the armed forces vulnerability of the child and their family.18 In July
was voluntary, and governed by the Soldiers 2007 the Anglican bishop in Colombo expressed
Enlistment Regulations of 1955. Enlistments concern at the wider exposure of children to
were conducted as either “recruits” or “directly programs highlighting images of war after all
enlisted soldiers”, at a minimum age of 18. All schools in the country were called upon to hold
those who qualified for enlistment had to produce ceremonies to celebrate the security forces’
an authentic birth certificate.11 military victory in the east.19

The LTTE consistently denied that it knowingly
Armed groups recruited children and it claimed that children
Karuna group sought to join by disguising their age.28 However,
there is overwhelming evidence of recruitment,
The Karuna group broke away from the LTTE in often forced, throughout areas under LTTE
March 2004, with an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 control as well as from government-controlled
fighters, many of them under-18s. It was led by areas in the north and east. The recruitment of
Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, known as Colonel children typically followed a pattern of increased
Karuna; its political wing was the Tamil Makkal recruitment during the season of temple festivals
Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP). It consisted mainly of and a fall during periods of international
former LTTE cadres from the east of the country. condemnation.
On the verge of defeat at the hands of the LTTE in As of September 2007 the total number
April 2004, Karuna disbanded his troops and sent of children known to have been recruited by
thousands of under-age fighters home. Over the the LTTE since January 2002 was well over six
next two years, as he slowly regrouped and began thousand, although the real number was thought
to wage more effective attacks on LTTE forces to be much higher. Over the years the recruitment
in the east, the Karuna group resumed forcibly rate had fallen steadily, from almost 1,500 in
recruiting children. By the middle of 2006, this 2002 to around 125 in the first nine months of
was occurring on a large scale.20 2007. Re-recruitment trends over this period
By September 2007 there were reports of fluctuated, with 30 children in 2002, about 70 in
about 400 children recruited by the Karuna group. 2003, almost 300 in 2004, about a hundred each
Their average age at the time of recruitment year in 2005 and 2006, and about 25 in the first
was about 16. Over 200 of those recruited as nine months of 2007. With one exception (April)
children were believed to remain with the group the number of children recruited each month
and over 150 of them were still below 18. All during 2007 was always lower than the number
except one of the children were boys. In the released. By mid-2007 about 1,500 people
period since November 2006 over 20 children had recruited as children remained in LTTE ranks, of
been released and ten re-recruited. The Karuna whom over 300 were still below 18. The average
faction was also reported to have targeted for age of recruitment increased from 14 to 16 during
recruitment children who had returned home the period 2002–7. Approximately one third of the
after previously being associated with the LTTE. children recruited by the LTTE were girls.29
It was likely that there was under-reporting of The LTTE’s “Child Protection Authority”
recruitment, as some children received a monthly reportedly put notices in the media to alert the
allowance on completion of military training public to its efforts to release under-age recruits.
and impoverished families were therefore less The LTTE said in July that because of the difficult
inclined to report their recruitment.21 situation it was not possible to assure safe
International criticism of the Karuna group release procedures for under-18s, thus delaying
grew. In April 2007 UNICEF publicly criticized the the process.30 It later claimed that all but 63
group for stalling on its promises to end child children in the north had been released by early
recruitment after being deliberately misled when October 2007 and that any names remaining on
trying to visit the group’s camps to verify reports the UNICEF database were due to problems of
of child recruitment.22 The chairman of the UN verification as a result of the conflict.31 However,
Security Council Working Group on Children according to other sources, well over 200 children
and Armed Conflict issued a statement strongly from the north remained unaccounted for.
condemning and calling for an end to the recent There were further concerns that new village-
recruitment and use of child soldiers.23 However, based military training, in which all civilians aged
Karuna continued to deny that children were between 15 and 50 were compelled to participate,
being recruited into his group.24 was being conducted in LTTE-controlled areas.
In addition, there were reports of a new type of
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) six-month residential military training being run
According to some sources, the LTTE, which had by the LTTE, after which people were allowed to
recruited under-age fighters for many years, continue their civilian lives, but had to remain
pledged on 18 June 2007 to rid its ranks of all available for military duties.32
under-18s by the end of 2007.25 The LTTE had The LTTE’s efforts on releasing under-18s
previously made similar promises, but this was were likely to be linked to increased international
S—Z
the first time that it had set a clear deadline.26 condemnation, in particular the call for targeted
However, the Special Representative of the UN sanctions by the UN Secretary-General.33 The UN
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Security Council’s Working Group on children
reported that that the LTTE had assured her and armed conflict on 10 May 2007 issued a
special advisor that they would accelerate the strong condemnation of the LTTE but stopped
release of all children under the age of 17, but short of recommending sanctions. In a direct
had not committed to the full release of children communication to the LTTE, the chairman of the
under 18.27 Working Group urged it to proceed immediately,

in a transparent manner, to return the children to 1 See, for example, International Crisis Group (ICG),
their families, to respect the neutrality of schools Sri Lanka’s human rights crisis, Asia Report No.
and to permit access to humanitarian actors in 135, June 2007; documents issued by Human
the zones under its control. The LTTE was also Rights Watch (HRW), including “Letter to the
warned of possible further measures, should it Human Rights Council”, March 2007, “Sri Lanka:
not act in response to this message.34 Karuna Group and LTTE continue abducting and
recruiting children”, March 2007; International
Commission of Jurists, “Sri Lanka – ICJ inquest
Disarmament, demobilization observer finds flaws in investigation into killing
of ACF aid workers”, April 2007; Amnesty
and reintegration (DDR) International (AI), Sri Lanka: A Climate of Fear in
the East, February 2006.
The Action Plan for Children Affected by War
signed in 2003 by the government and the LTTE 2 UNHCR News, “More than 40,000 civilians flee
was intended to provide comprehensive support latest fighting in eastern Sri Lanka”, 13 March
for conflict-affected children and included a 2007, www.unhcr.org.
framework for the release and reintegration of 3 See Interagency Standing Committee report, Sri
child soldiers. It provided, among other things, Lanka fact sheet: Batticaloa district, 29 March
for three transit camps to be set up. However, the 2007, at www.reliefweb.int.
centre in Kilinochchi functioned for only a short 4 Report of the UN Secretary-General on children
time and the other two never opened.35 and armed conflict in Sri Lanka, UN Doc.
In 2004 the transit centre in Kilinochchi was S/2006/1006, 20 December 2006.
closed due to a lack of commitment on the part of 5 “‘Heroes’ Day’ speech by LTTE chief Velupillai
the LTTE to release children as had been agreed Prabhakaran”, South Asia Intelligence Review,
in the Action Plan. By the end of 2004 the Tamil 27 November 2006, www.satp.org.
Rehabilitation Organization, an organization 6 TamilNet, “There is no ceasefire agreement with
closely linked to the LTTE, completed construction LTTE-Gothabaya”, 12 April 2007, www.tamilnet.
of an educational skills development training com.
centre in Kilinochchi, and while the LTTE made 7 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4.
commitments that they would not release 8 “16 Tamil civilian Christians killed by bombing in
children to the centre, it was found that they were Sri Lanka”, Journal Chrétien, 6 January 2007, at
doing so.36 In December 2006 the UN Secretary- www.spcm.org/Journal.
General called on the LTTE to release children 9 “Interview with then head of SLMM”, The Nation,
directly to their families as stipulated in the 20 August 2006.
Action Plan, with adequate information sharing 10 Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena, “Contempt of the
with UNICEF to ensure timely verification.37 constitution: reaching the zenith of disregard for
the rule of law in Sri Lanka”, Asian Legal Resource
Developments Centre (ALRC), Article 2, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 2006),
www.article2.org.
At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, 11 Communication to Child Soldiers Coalition from
Sri Lanka and 58 other states endorsed the Paris Sri Lanka High Commission, London, 31 July 2007.
Commitments to protect children from unlawful 12 Ibid.
13 HRW, Sri Lanka – Complicit in Crime: State
Collusion in Abductions and Forced Recruitment
by the Karuna Group, January 2007.
standards and operational principles for 14 Statement by Allan Rock, UN Special Advisor
on Children and Armed Conflict, Colombo, 13
November 2006, as quoted in ICG, above note 1.
jointly sponsored by the French government and 15 HRW, Sri Lanka: Return to War: Human Rights
UNICEF. under Siege, August 2007.
The LTTE were listed as a party recruiting and 16 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4.
using children in hostilities in the Annex to the 17 Communication from Sri Lanka High Commission,
Secretary-General’s annual report on children above note 11.
and armed conflict between 2003 and 2007. The 18 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4.
Karuna group was listed for child recruitment and 19 “Save the children from war agenda: bishop”,
use in 2006 and 2007. Daily Mirror, 21 July 2007, www.dailymirror.lk.
armed conflict in Sri Lanka, UN Doc. S/2007/758,
21 December 2007.

22 UNICEF, “UNICEF says Karuna faction not serious
about child releases: child recruitment continues SUDA N
as hostilities escalate in troubled island nation”,
27 April 2007, www.unicef.org/srilanka. Republic of Sudan
23 Permanent Mission of France to the UN in New
York, “Children and Armed Conflict / Meeting Population: 36.2 million (16.5 million under 18)
of the Working Group”, 10 May 2007, www. Government armed forces: 104,800
franceonu.org. Compulsory recruitment age: 18
24 HRW, above note 13. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
25 “UNICEF cautiously welcomes Tigers’ release of Voting age: 18
child soldiers”, IRIN, 29 June 2007; also stated Optional Protocol: ratified 26 July 2005
in communication to the Coalition from the LTTE, Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
23 July 2007. See also Report of the Secretary-
General, above note 21. CRC, GC API and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
26 The LTTE made promises in 1998 when the then Thousands of child soldiers were recruited
Special Representative for children affected by
armed conflict visited Sri Lanka, to UNICEF in and used by armed forces, government-
October 2002 and again in January 2003, and backed militias and armed opposition
under the Action Plan for children affected by war groups in Sudan. Recruitment of children
in March 2003.
from refugee camps in Chad occurred
27 Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for Children and Armed Conflict, Oral statement to in 2006. DDR efforts were hampered by
Human Rights Council, 20 September 2007, www. ongoing conflict in Darfur and the lack
un.org/children/conflict. of basic infrastructure for successful
28 AI, above note 1. reintegration in the south.
29 For more detailed figures on 2006–7, see Report
of the Secretary-General, above note 21.
30 Communication from the LTTE, 23 July 2007. Context
31 Communication to the Coalition from the LTTE, 11 Armed conflict continued in Darfur and delays to
October 2007. the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive
32 AI, above note 1. Peace Agreement (CPA) threatened to derail the
33 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4. consolidation of peace in southern Sudan.1 The
34 Permanent Mission of France, above note 23.
CPA officially ended more than two decades of
north–south conflict between the ruling National
35 For more details on the Action Plan and its Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s
operation in 2003–4 see Child Soldiers: Global
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). It provided
Report 2004. See also Child Soldiers Coalition,
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and
for a six-year interim power-sharing agreement
Child Recruitment, July 2006. to be followed by a referendum in 2011, in which
the people of southern Sudan would vote on self-
36 Information from local sources who wish to
determination. In the interim, the CPA established
remain anonymous.
the transitional Khartoum-based government of
37 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4. national unity (GoNU) and a semi-autonomous
Government of southern Sudan, based in Juba,
southern Sudan. Under the CPA the national
and southern governments shared power,
resources and wealth but maintained separate
constitutions, armies, budgets and laws.2 The
president of the former government of Sudan,
General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, became
president of the national unity government,
while the first vice-presidency was assumed by
the southern Sudan president and leader of the
SPLM, Dr John Garang de Mabior, who was killed
in a helicopter crash in July 2005 and replaced
by Salva Kiir Mayardit.3 UN Security Council
S—Z
Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005 mandated a

UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to
support and monitor implementation of the CPA.4
The CPA required all other armed groups to
join either the former Sudanese government’s
armed forces – the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)
– or the SPLA by 9 January 2006.5 The January

expected to become operational by the end of were reports of children associated with both the
2007. SAF and allied militias in Darfur.41
Relations between Chad and Sudan
deteriorated substantially in 2006 and 2007, each Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
government accusing the other of supporting its The SPLA acknowledged that it had child soldiers
armed opposition groups.31 Increasingly frequent in its ranks and made high-level commitments
Janjaweed cross-border attacks into eastern to end their recruitment and use. However, 47
Chad were reported, resulting in the deaths of children were reported in the Kilo 7 barracks in
hundreds of civilians.32 As of late 2007 there Bentiu (Unity state) in July 2006, and they were
were approximately 240,000 Sudanese refugees not released until July 2007. These children
in eastern Chad, 60 per cent of whom were had been enticed by SPLA junior officers who
estimated to be children.33 promised education in Southern Sudan. SPLA
forces raided a school in Nasir, Upper Nile,
Government in October 2006 and abducted 32 boys for
the purpose of recruitment. All but two were
National recruitment legislation subsequently released. In September 2007
The 2005 interim constitution stated that the UN confirmed the presence of children
“Defence of the Country is an honour and duty associated with SPLA forces in Southern Sudan.
of every citizen” and “Every citizen shall defend The youngest of the children was nine and the
the country and respond to the call for national average age 16.42
defence and national service”.34 Under the
National Service Law of 1992 (under review in late Armed groups
2007), all men between 18 and 33 were liable for
military service, which applied to all branches of Militias and armed groups associated
the armed forces.35 The length of military service with the SPLA
was 18 months for high-school graduates, 12
Militias increased recruitment, including child
months for university and college graduates and
recruitment, before incorporation into either the
24 months in all other cases. According to the
SAF or SPLA in order to bolster their numbers and
law, women were also liable for military service
strengthen their negotiating power. Commanders
but in practice were not called up.36 The draft
from Southern Sudan were confirmed to be
Sudan Armed Forces Act, which set 18 as the
actively recruiting children in Khartoum. Some
minimum age for recruitment and criminalized
armed groups in the SSDF continued to recruit
the recruitment of children, had not reached the
children after their incorporation into the SPLA in
National Assembly as of June 2007.
January 2006.43 The Pibor Defence Forces, a group
Southern Sudan’s interim constitution,
allied to the SPLA in April 2007, was responsible
adopted in December 2005, defined a child
for the recruitment and use of at least 78 children,
as anyone under the age of 18. It stated that
the youngest of whom was a boy aged six. The
“Defence of the Sudan in general and Southern
Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization
Sudan in particular, is an honour and a duty of
and Reintegration (DDR) Commission was notified
every citizen” and that “Every citizen shall ...
of their presence. Following the formal change of
defend the country and respond to the call for
alliance from the SAF to the SPLA in April 2007,
national service”.37 In Southern Sudan, the Child
the whereabouts of the children were unknown.44
Bill 2006, which prohibited the recruitment of
children, passed its first reading in the Southern Armed groups in Darfur
Sudan Assembly in June 2007.38 Recruitment and
use of children was a breach of both the CPA and Thousands of children were recruited and used
the DPA.39 by numerous armed groups in Darfur and actively
involved in the armed conflict between May and
Child recruitment and deployment July 2006. IDPs interviewed in May 2006 following
Sudan government-backed Janjaweed militia
Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) attacks on villages near Kutum, northern Darfur,
said that many armed child soldiers were among
The SAF denied recruitment or use of children in those who attacked them and Janjaweed were
their forces, but military officials acknowledged known to have recruited children from Sudanese
that children from armed groups were transferred refugee camps in Chad in 2006.45 In May 2006
into their forces during the unification process. SLA-Minawi was observed forcibly recruiting
In May 2006, child soldiers were seen in a newly boys in Gereida, and in April 2007 armed children
integrated SAF unit. In August 2006 the SAF believed to be as young as 12 were identified
estimated that there were approximately 19,000 with SLA-Minawi in northern Darfur. Recruitment
soldiers in these units and it was thought that a continued in 2007 by SLA-Minawi, factions of
significant number of them were under 18.40 There the SLA which had not signed the DPA and the
opposition JEM (Peace Wing).46

2006 Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration In August 2006 the NCP launched a new
was signed by the SPLA and the former South offensive; its forces bombed villages, killing
Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), which comprised and displacing hundreds of civilians, including
most of the militias in southern Sudan previously children.18 The NCP continued to support and arm
backed by Khartoum.6 However, the incomplete some tribal and militia groups through selective
integration of other armed groups into the SAF arms dealings and unilateral negotiations.19
and SPLA led to continued tensions in the south. Despite repeated disarmament promises it
The CPA’s Abyei Protocol provided for shared continued to incorporate the Janjaweed into
government in the oil-rich Abyei transitional official security structures and paramilitary
region. The Protocol granted Abyei special groups such as the Border Intelligence Brigade
administrative status, an interim oil-revenue and the Popular Defence Forces. The Janjaweed
sharing plan, and a 2011 referendum to decide continued to receive training and financial
whether to join what might be an independent and material assistance from the government,
southern Sudan. However, in violation of the CPA, including vehicle-mounted heavy machine guns
the NCP rejected the July 2005 Abyei Boundaries and mortars. The NCP ordered the reopening
Commission (ABC) report on demarcation of the of the Popular Military Defence (PMD) military
region. Both the SPLA and the SAF increased training camps around the country.20 In April
their forces in and around the Abyei region and 2007 the government formally launched the
along the border between north and south. Under Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), the
the CPA, SAF troops were required to hand over highest governing body for the region.21
control of the southern oilfields to joint patrols Throughout 2007 the SAF, the Janjaweed and
by 9 July 2007, but the deadline was missed.7 In Darfur armed groups continued to commit serious
2006 and 2007 both the SAF and SPLA severely human rights abuses.22 Continuing violence and
restricted UN military observers’ movements NCP intransigence severely limited access for
in the Abyei region.8 In violation of the CPA the humanitarian agencies in Darfur.23 As of July 2007,
NCP continued to sponsor proxy militias, and 2.2 million displaced people lived in camps in
hostilities continued in oil-producing areas.9 In Darfur, and an estimated 80 per cent of the camp
October 2007 the SPLM temporarily suspended population were women and children.24 A UN
participation in the national unity government, arms embargo was imposed on Darfur under UN
citing among other concerns lack of progress over Security Council Resolution 1591 of March 2005.25
demarcation of the Abyei region, transparency of However, the IDP camps were increasingly violent
oil revenues and preparations for the census and and militarized.26 Rape and other sexual violence
2009 national elections.10 against women and girls were widespread.
Conflict continued in Darfur with the Younger girls were specifically targeted for rape,
opposition Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army and many victims identified the perpetrators as
(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement members of the SAF, the central reserve police
(JEM) (both non-Arab ethnically based groups) and the Janjaweed.27 In August 2006 over 200
fighting the SAF and their proxy Janjaweed militias women and girls were sexually assaulted over a
over perceived exclusion from state structures of five-week period in Kalma camp in south Darfur.28
power and wealth.11 Hundreds of thousands of Twelve years of conflict in eastern Sudan over
people were killed and over 2.4 million displaced perceived political and economic marginalization
during the conflict, which had begun in 2003.12 under the Khartoum government was brought
The mandate of the African Union Mission in to an official end by the Eastern Sudan Peace
Sudan (AMIS), set up to monitor a failed April Agreement (ESPA) in October 2006. The ESPA
2004 ceasefire, was expanded in October 2004 to was signed by the GoNU and the Eastern Sudan
protect civilians.13 However, it had limited success Front, a coalition of armed groups including the
in stabilizing the region and itself came under Beja Congress and the Free Lions Movement
attack.14 representing the Rashaida ethnic group. In
The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),15 signed in October 2006 eight Eastern Front members took
May 2006 between the national unity government office in the National Assembly in accordance
and a faction of the SLA headed by Minni Minawi with the ESPA.29 However, implementation of the
(SLA Minawi), was rejected by the JEM and other ESPA was limited.
SLA factions. These groups criticized the DPA In July 2007 UN Security Council Resolution
for failing to address sufficiently power-sharing, 1769 established a hybrid UN–African Union
representation in government, disarmament Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), with the aim of
S—Z
of the Janjaweed militia, and a victim’s improving protection for civilians in Darfur, and
compensation fund.16 The DPA was followed by specifically requesting that the protection of
fragmentation and proliferation of armed groups children be addressed in the implementation
and an intensification of violence. Elements of the of the DPA. In addition it called for “continued
armed opposition groups that did not sign the dialogue with the parties towards the
DPA regrouped as the National Redemption Front preparations of time-bound action plans to end
(NRF), and from late June 2006 launched a series recruitment and use of child soldiers and other
of attacks against the government.17 violations against children”.30 UNAMID was

© Ron Haviv 2005
Young Sudanese soldiers in the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) armed group in SLA
territory, northern Darfur, Sudan

Chadian-backed Sudanese armed mainly in non-combat roles and in remote areas.55
As of August 2007, the Southern Sudan DDR
opposition groups Commission planned for the further release and
Massive recruitment by Sudanese armed reintegration of almost 600 children from SPLA
opposition groups took place in March and April ranks in Southern Sudan. Following training
2006 among the refugee and IDP communities in on child protection for 64 SPLA and SAF field
eastern Chad. Recruitment was at times carried commanders, in June 2007 commanders from
out forcibly, with reports of torture as a coercive both forces made a commitment to end child
means. In July 2007 the UN reported that the recruitment, and an Area Joint Military Committee
Chadian government had alleged that more than action plan to address abductions, rape and
1,000 children had been recruited by the SLA in sexual violence was developed in Upper Nile,
refugee camps in the east.47 In March 2006 the Jonglei and Unity states.56
G-19 faction of the SLA, working in co-operation An action plan for the identification and
with Chadian government officials, recruited, release of children was signed between SLA-
some forcibly, 4,700 Sudanese refugees, Minawi and UNICEF on 11 June 2007. The action
including hundreds of children, from the Breidjing plan was anticipated to benefit approximately
and Treguine UN-supervised refugee camps 1,800 children. Talks by UNMIS and UNICEF with
50 km west of Adré in eastern Chad.48 Most representatives of SLA (Wahid), SLA (Shafi), and
of these people subsequently returned to the SLA (Free Will) indicated that the groups were
camps. In 2006 Sudanese children were recruited willing to collaborate with the international
from the Djabal and Goz Amir refugee camps in community towards the release of children in
eastern Chad, where teachers were among the their ranks. However, by the end of June 2007 no
recruiters.49 In January 2007, 39 children were concrete commitments to release children had
recruited from the Breidjing refugee camp by been made by those armed groups.57
Sudanese armed opposition groups.50 Preparations for a children’s DDR program
by UNICEF in collaboration with the Northern
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Sudan DDR Commission and the Eastern Front
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan were being developed in mid-2007. As of August
armed opposition group, was present in 2007, preparations were under way between the
southern Sudan and attacked and killed civilians. UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the
Peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan Northern Sudan DDR Commission for the return
government began in July 2006 in Juba and a and assembly of former fighters of the Eastern
cessation-of-hostilities agreement was signed in Front.58 In late 2007 the UN Secretary-General
August 2006.51 The LRA forcibly recruited children reported that as part of the 2006 Eastern Sudan
from southern Sudan in the first half of 2007.52 Peace Agreement 3,700 ex-combatants were
While the total number of remaining LRA fighters being demobilized, 250 of whom were children.59
remained unknown, up to 2,000 women and
children were believed to remain in LRA camps.53 Developments
Mrs Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN Special
Disarmament, Demobilization Representative for children and armed conflict,
and Reintegration (DDR) visited Sudan in January 2007, following which
the government of Southern Sudan committed
The CPA obliged its signatories to demobilize all to increasing the budget for children’s DDR
children in their ranks by July 2005. The National programs. The national unity government agreed
Council for DDR Co-ordination and the Northern to allow UNICEF and UNMIS to visit and monitor
Sudan DDR Commission were established by the SAF camps as well as the military barracks
CPA in February 2006 and a DDR Commission of armed forces and groups allied with it. It
for Southern Sudan was created in May 2006. also agreed to adopt and implement national
Despite the establishment of dedicated children’s legislation to criminalize recruitment of child
desks within these commissions, DDR was soldiers. DPA signatories and non-signatories
hampered by continued conflict in Darfur and by committed to co-operating with preparation
the lack of basic infrastructure in communities. of action plans to identify and release children
Large numbers of children were still held in associated with their forces.60
military barracks beyond the CPA deadline and At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
some children returned to the armed forces
S—Z
Paris, Sudan and 58 other states endorsed

because of the lack of an effective reintegration the Paris Commitments to protect children
program.54 from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
From 2001 to April 2006 an estimated 20,000 forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
children from the SPLA were demobilized and and guidelines on children associated with
returned to their families and communities armed forces or armed groups. The documents
with UNICEF support, but an estimated 2,000 reaffirmed international standards and
children were still associated with the SPLA, operational principles for protecting and assisting

child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global 13 HRW, Darfur: Whose Responsibility to Protect?
consultation jointly sponsored by the French January 2005.
government and UNICEF. 14 HRW, Sudan: Peacekeeper Killings Are War
In May 2007 the International Criminal Court Crimes, 1 October 2007.
(ICC) issued arrest warrants for the Minister for 15 UNMIS, Darfur Peace Agreement, 5 May 2006,
Humanitarian Affairs in the Sudan government www.unmis.org.
and a Janjaweed leader on charges of war crimes 16 ICG, “Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement”, Africa
and crimes against humanity committed in 2003 Briefing No. 39, 20 June 2006.
and 2004 in Darfur.61 The Sudanese government 17 ICG, “Getting the UN into Darfur”, policy briefing,
refused to co-operate with the ICC.62 Africa Briefing No. 43, 12 October 2006.
Several parties in Sudan were listed as
18 “Sudan”, Human Rights Watch World Report
recruiting or using children in situations of armed
2007.
conflict in the December 2007 Secretary-General’s
report on children and armed conflict.63 19 ICG, above note 11.
20 ICG, “Darfur’s New Security Reality”, Africa Report
International standards No. 134, 26 November 2007.
Sudan ratified the Optional Protocol in July 2005. 21 ICG, above note 11.
In its declaration it stated that it was committed 22 Report of the Secretary-General on children
to maintaining a minimum age of 18 for voluntary and armed conflict in the Sudan, UN Doc.
service and “a prohibition of forced or voluntary S/2007/520, 29 August 2007.
conscription” of under-18s.64 23 ICG, above note 20.
24 United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of
1 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Sudan country Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Darfur, Humanitarian
summary, Human Rights Watch World Report Needs, 4 September 2007, http://ochaonline2.
2008. un.org.
2 United Nations Mission in Sudan, Comprehensive 25 UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005), UN
Peace Agreement between the Government of the Doc. S/RES/1591 (2005), 29 March 2005.
Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s 26 ICG, above note 20.
Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation 27 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.
Army, www.unmis.org. 28 “Sudan”, above note 18.
3 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Garang’s death: 29 ICG, “Sudan: Saving Peace in the East”, Africa
implications for peace in Sudan”, Africa Briefing Report No. 102, 5 January 2006; Amnesty
No. 30, 9 August 2005, www.crisisgroup.org. International (AI), “Sudan”, Amnesty International
4 UN Security Council Resolution 1590(2005), UN Report 2007; UNMIS, The CPA Monitor, October
Doc. S/RES/1590 (2005), 24 March 2005. 2006, www.unmis.org.
5 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, above note 2. 30 African Union and United Nations Hybrid
6 John Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forces Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
in the wake of the Juba Declaration”, Small Arms 31 Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the
Survey, November 2006, www.smallarmssurvey. Central African Republic, 22 December 2006, UN
org/; Report of the Secretary-General on children Doc. S/2006/1019.
and armed conflict in the Sudan, UN Doc. 32 AI, “Chad”, Amnesty International Report 2007.
S/2006/662, 17 August 2006.
33 UN OCHA, “Humanitarian Action in Chad: Facts
7 ICG, “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock”, Africa and Figures Snapshot Report”, 15 November
Briefing No. 47, 12 October 2007. 2007, www.reliefweb.int.
8 UNMIS, CPA Monitor, October 2007, www. 34 Interim National Constitution of the Republic of
unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-monitor/ the Sudan 2005, www.unmis.org.
cpaMonitor_oct07.pdf
35 Child Soldiers Coalition, correspondence with
9 UN Office of the Special Representative Sudanese NGO, September 2007.
of the Secretary-General for Children and
Armed Conflict, “Visit to Sudan of the Special 36 War Resisters’ International, Sudan, 15 July 1998,
Representative of the Secretary-General for www.wri-irg.org.
Children and Armed Conflict Mission Report”, 37 Government of Southern Sudan Interim
24 January–2 February 2007, www.un.org/ Constitution, United Nations Mission in Sudan
children/conflict/_documents/countryvisits/ (UNMIS), The CPA Monitor, October 2007, www.
SudanVisitReport.pdf. unmis.org.
10 UNMIS, The CPA Monitor, October 2007, www. 38 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.
unmis.org. 39 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, above note 2;
11 ICG, “Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process”, Darfur Peace Agreement, 5 May 2006, UNMIS,
Africa Report No. 125, 30 April 2007. www.unmis.org.
12 HRW, Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design, September 40 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.
2007. 41 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.

42 Ibid.
43 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6. Suriname
45 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6. Republic of Suriname
46 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22. Population: 449,000 (161,000 under 18)
47 Report of the Secretary-General on children and Government armed forces: 1,800
armed conflict in Chad, 3 July 2007, UN Doc. Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
S/2007/400. Voluntary recruitment age: not known
48 HRW, Violence beyond Borders: The Human Voting age: 18
Rights Crisis in Eastern Chad, June 2006.
Optional Protocol: signed 10 May 2002
49 Report of the Secretary-General on children in
26 October 2006. CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182
50 Report of the Secretary-General on children in No information was available on the
21 December 2007. presence of under-18s in the armed forces
51 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22. or the minimum age of recruitment.
52 “Edward Lomude: ‘LRA soldiers beat me and left
me for dead’”, IRIN, July 2007. Government
armed conflict in Uganda, UN Doc. S/2007/260, 7 National recruitment legislation and
May 2007.
practice
According to the constitution, military service,
55 UNICEF, “UNICEF welcomes child demobilisation
in Southern Sudan”, 24 April 2006, www.unicef.
or alternatively unarmed military service or
org. civilian service, was compulsory.1 However, the
law providing for compulsory military service had
been repealed, so that military service was no
57 Ibid. longer compulsory.2 No information was available
58 Ibid. on the minimum age of voluntary recruitment.
59 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 50. The armed forces, under the control of the
60 UN Office of the Special Representative of Ministry of Defence, were supplemented by a
the Secretary-General for Children and Armed civil police force controlled by the Ministry of
Conflict, above note 9. Justice and Police.3 Joint police and military
61 International Criminal Court, “Warrants for Arrest operations were formalized in October 2005.
for the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs The Netherlands, the USA and China provided
of Sudan, and a leader of the Militia/Janjaweed”, training, military equipment and logistics.4
press release, 2 May 2007, www.icc-cpi.int.
62 HRW, above note 1. Armed groups
In October 2006 former members of the Jungle
64 Declaration on accession to the Optional Protocol, Commando, an armed opposition group
www2.ohchr.org.
disbanded after a peace agreement was signed
in 1992, reportedly threatened to blow up a
hydroelectric dam if the government failed to
implement the peace agreement fully. Former
insurgents had been promised jobs, retraining
and land to start their own businesses after
demobilization.5
Developments
Suriname ratified the ILO Worst Forms of Child
S—Z
Labour Convention 182 in April 2006.
1 Constitution of Suriname, Article 180.

2 Initial report of Suriname to the UN Committee on
23 September 1998.

Human Rights Practices 2006. SWA Z I L A N D
4 Suriname.net, National Security, www.surinam.
net. Kingdom of Swaziland
5 “Former Suriname rebels threaten to blow up
hydro-power dam”, Caribbean Net News, 14 Population: 1.0 million (514,000 under 18)
October 2006, www.caribbeannetnews.com. Government armed forces: not known
Compulsory recruitment age: conscription not
enforced
Voting age: 18

armed forces.
Government
practice
Recruitment was regulated by the 1977 Umbutfo
Swaziland Defence Force Act, which set the
minimum age for conscription and voluntary
recruitment into the armed forces at 18 years.
Conscription was not, however, currently in force.1
Developments
In October 2006 the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child expressed a number of concerns
relating to the protection of child rights, including
Swaziland’s lack of a systematic review to bring
domestic legislation into line with the provisions
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the lack of clarity in minimum ages for
criminal responsibility and marriage, low birth
registration and the devastating impact of HIV/
AIDS on children in Swaziland. The Committee
recommended that Swaziland ratify the Optional
Child on the involvement of children in armed
conflict.2
The Committee welcomed the fact that the
constitution enacted in 2005 included provisions
affording special protection to children.3
1 Initial report of Swaziland to the UN Committee

on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRFC/C/
SWZ/1, 16 February 2006.
Consideration of report submitted by Swaziland,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/SWZ/
CO/1, 16 October 2006.
3 Ibid.

training with automatic weapons was restricted
S WEDEN to those aged 17 or above. The government
emphasized that “these activities do not involve
Kingdom of Sweden voluntary recruitment to the armed forces”, and
are “only aimed at providing information about,
Population: 9.0 million (1.9 million under 18) and promoting interest in, the Total Defence”.4
Government armed forces: 27,600 However, in 2007 the UN Committee on the Rights
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 of the Child encouraged the government to raise
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 the minimum age for firearms training in these
Voting age: 18 voluntary activities to 18, in keeping with the
Optional Protocol: ratified 20 February 2003 spirit of the Optional Protocol.5
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 Developments
There were no reports of under-18s in the In July 2004, Chapter 4, Section 1(a) of the Penal
Code, regarding the cross-border trafficking
armed services, although children could of human beings for sexual purposes, was
participate in military training programs extended to include “non-cross-border human
from the age of 15. trafficking and the trafficking in human beings
for the purpose of forms of exploitation other
than for sexual purposes, for example, for war
Government service and forced labour”.6 In December 2005
the government mandated the Swedish Migration
National recruitment legislation and Board to include the compulsory recruitment
practice of child soldiers in its consideration of forms of
All residents of Sweden between the ages of 16 persecution concerning children in the asylum
and 70 were liable for compulsory military, civilian process. As part of a reform of its Penal Code
or national service under the terms of the 1994 to allow for the greater integration of the Rome
National Total Defence Service Act. Compulsory Statute of the International Criminal Court into
military service was performed in the armed domestic law and practice, Sweden undertook
forces and compulsory civilian service in support to “criminalize, as a war crime, the recruitment
of the civilian dimension of the Total Defence, of children under the age of 15 years into the
defined as “the protection of Swedish society national armed forces or the use of such children
in times of crisis or war”.1 The obligation to for the active participation in hostilities”. As a
compulsory national service applied only in a time result, “the recruitment and use of child soldiers
of officially declared emergency preparedness. in hostilities, both within and outside Sweden, is
Compulsory military and civilian service was deemed to be an offence according to Swedish
limited to those who were 18 years old or older, law”.7 In 2007 the UN Committee on the Rights
and compulsory national service was restricted of the Child recommended that these proposed
to those who had reached the age of 16. As part reforms be completed as swiftly as possible.8
of the Total Defence, 16-year-olds were prohibited At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
from performing any tasks that could constitute Paris, Sweden and 58 other states endorsed
an aspect of military defence.2 All Swedish the Paris Commitments to protect children
men of 18 to 47 were liable for military service, from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
which lasted for seven and a half months. Of the forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
approximately 50,000 young men of conscription and guidelines on children associated with
age 40 per cent were recruited each year. The armed forces or armed groups. The documents
right to conscientious objection to military service reaffirmed international standards and
was guaranteed on the basis of the 1994 Total operational principles for protecting and assisting
Defence Service Act. Objectors were required to child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
perform a substitute service, also of seven and a consultation jointly sponsored by the French
half months’ duration.3 government and UNICEF.
Military training and military schools 1 Initial report of Sweden to the UN Committee on
Sweden’s Armed Forces held voluntary youth the Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol,
S—Z
courses aimed at informing young people UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/SWE/1, 10 July 2006;

Swedish Armed Forces, “The Facts 2006–2007”,
between the ages of 15 and 20 about the Total
www.mil.se.
Defence and career opportunities. Young people
under the age of 18 at the time of application had 2 Initial report, above note 1.
to have the permission of a parent or guardian to
participate in these activities. While 15-year-olds
were permitted to participate in firearms training,

to Conscientious Objection to Military Service in SWITZ E R L A N D
Europe: A Review of the Current Situation, April
2005. Swiss Confederation
5 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Population: 7.3 million (1.5 million under 18)
Consideration of report submitted by Sweden Government armed forces: 4,200
on implementation of the Optional Protocol, Compulsory recruitment age: 19
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ Voluntary recruitment age: 18
SWE/CO/1, 8 June 2007. Voting age: 18
6 Initial report, above note 1. Optional Protocol: ratified 26 June 2002
7 Ibid. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
8 Concluding observations, above note 5. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
Both compulsory and voluntary enlistment

in the Swiss armed forces before the age of
18 was explicitly prohibited.
Government
practice
Article 59 of the 1999 constitution provides the
basis for conscription; basic military training was
compulsory for all men aged 19 to 26. As the army
was a predominantly militia-style force, standing
forces were considerably smaller than the reserve
forces. While basic military training normally
lasted 21 weeks, the requirements of reserve
duty included participation in six or seven 17-day
training periods up to the age of 34 for all men
(continuing up to the age of 50 for officers).1 Both
compulsory and voluntary enlistment in the Swiss
armed forces before the age of 18 was explicitly
prohibited. The 1995 Federal Act concerning
the Army and Military Administration (LAAM)
stipulated that enlistment (including registration
and attendance of recruitment sessions) should
take place at the beginning of the year during
which those eligible for compulsory service
turned 19, extending to the end of the year that
those eligible for compulsory service turned 25. It
stipulated that the actual performance of military
service should begin at the start of the year
when the conscript became 20, with recruitment
training normally beginning at this time. The
LAAM also provided for voluntary military service
for all Swiss women. A range of provisions in the
Swiss Criminal Code prohibited and criminalized
the recruitment and use in hostilities of children
under the age of 18 by armed groups.2
According to the government, all armed forces
personnel received instruction in international
humanitarian law and children’s rights during
their training periods. Swiss civilian personnel
participating in international peace-building
missions were given training in the particular
needs of children in armed conflicts as a core part
of their preparation by the Department of Foreign
Affairs.3

Military training and military schools 5 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Consideration of report submitted by Switzerland
According to the 2002 Ordinance on the on implementation of the Optional Protocol,
Recruitment of Conscripts (OREC), all Swiss Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
citizens received information at the age of 16 CHE/CO/1, 17 March 2006.
from their cantonal authority regarding the
possibilities for military or civilian service, for
service in civil protection or in the Red Cross.
The OREC also required all those eligible for
conscription in the year they turned 19 to attend
recruitment sessions. Eighteen-year-olds wishing
to do their recruitment training early could also
attend.4 There were no schools operated or
controlled by the armed forces.
Developments
In examining Switzerland’s Initial Report on
implementation of the Optional Protocol in
January 2006, the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child took particular note that Switzerland
was “a country of destination of asylum-seeking
and migrant children coming from war-torn
countries”. The Committee expressed concern
over the apparent lack of relevant training
regarding the needs of war-affected children for
those interviewing asylum seekers, and regretted
the absence of any data on child asylum seekers
who had been involved in armed conflict in their
countries of origin. The Committee called on the
Swiss authorities to provide asylum-seeking,
refugee and migrant children who might have
been involved in armed conflict with “immediate,
culturally sensitive multidisciplinary assistance
for their physical and psychological recovery and
for their social reintegration”.5
Paris, Switzerland and 58 other states endorsed

to Conscientious Objection to Military Service in
Europe: A Review of the Current Situation, April
2005.
2 Initial report of Switzerland to the UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child on the implementation
of the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
S—Z
CHE/1, 14 July 2005.

3 Ibid.
4 2002 Ordinance on the Recruitment of Conscripts,
www.admin.ch.

for the families of those who had died in the
SYRIA course of military service, but these followed the
same curriculum as those run by the Ministry of
Syrian Arab Republic Education.8 Conscripted officers were trained at
the three main armed forces academies at Homs,
Population: 19.0 million (8.4 million under 18) Latakia and Aleppo.9
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (see text) Child recruitment and deployment
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 There were no reports that children were being
Voting age: 18 recruited into government forces.10 However,
Optional Protocol: acceded 17 October 2003 there was potential for confusion on verifying
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): this, given problems in registering births in some
CRC, GC AP I, ILO 138, ILO 182 areas, particularly Kurdish regions. The need
for improved documentation, irrespective of the
There were no reports that under-18s were legal status of parents, was highlighted by the UN
used by government armed forces. Committee on the Rights of the Child.
Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights made
it difficult to verify implementation in that area.11
Government
National recruitment legislation and Armed groups
practice Syria continued to support a number of non-state
armed groups in the region, including those
Under the terms of the constitution conscription reported to have recruited under-18s, notably
was compulsory for all Syrians (Article 40). Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Palestinian
In practice, it only applied to Syrian (and Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the Occupied Palestinian
Palestinian) males over the age of 19 living in Territory.12 Leaders of both Hamas and PIJ were
Syria. Under the Service of the Flag Law, Decree based in Damascus.13 Palestinian groups,
No. 115 of 5 October 1953, the minimum age for including Islamic Jihad, Fatah and the Popular
conscription was the “first day of January in the Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
year in which a Syrian citizen reaches 19”. The law Command (PFLP-GC), were also alleged to have
reserved the right to lower the recruitment age to carried out military training inside Syria.14 No
18 in times of “war or emergency” from the “first information came to light on the involvement of
day of January following the date on which the under-18s. There were a number of Iraqi armed
recruit reaches 18 years of age”.1 In 2005 military groups, both Shia and Sunni, with members in
service was reduced from 30 to 24 months.2 In Syria, notably former Ba’athists.15 Observers had
2007 Decree No. 30 further amended the Flag Law not noted any efforts to recruit under-18s from
and updated conditions for the deferral of service the growing refugee population. However, low
and exemptions, including study and residency school registration and limited humanitarian
abroad.3 Those from families with only one son assistance meant that there was a strong risk of
were also exempted.4 From the ages of 17 to 42, this happening.16
all Syrian males required advance permission
from the Armed Forces recruitment department to
leave the country. Voluntary recruitment was open Developments
to men and women over 18.5 On acceding to the Optional Protocol in 2003,
Article 6 of the Service of the Flag Law Syria supported the “straight-18” position,
stipulated the procedures to be followed to and stated that “the statutes in force and the
prevent the direct participation in hostilities of legislation applicable to the Ministry of Defence
members of the armed forces below 18 years of of the Syrian Arab Republic do not permit any
age. There was no known domestic legislation to person under 18 … to join the active armed forces
criminalize the recruitment of under-18s, but Syria or the reserve bodies or formations”.17 Its initial
said that it closely monitored the ages of recruits. report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child
Syria held that all international instruments relating to the Optional Protocol was considered
signed by the government, including the Optional in October 2007. The Committee appreciated a
Protocol, were treated as domestic law, so that number of Syria’s legal commitments on child
there was “no need to enact a special law to recruitment to date, but it urged Syria to enact
incorporate such an instrument into domestic legislation explicitly prohibiting the recruitment of
law”.6 children, whether by or against Syrian nationals.18
Syria worked with the International Committee
Military training and military schools of the Red Cross to train a number of military
Syria had phased out military education in officials in international humanitarian law (IHL) as
schools.7 The Ministry of Defence ran schools part of efforts to integrate IHL
��
into theoretical and

practical military training and civil society.19 The 16 Confidential sources, August 2007.
Committee on the Rights of the Child praised its 17 Declaration on accession to the Optional Protocol,
progress in raising awareness of the Convention www2.ohchr.org.
on the Rights of the Child. However, it urged Syria 18 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
to develop a systematic program to improve Consideration of report submitted by Syria,
awareness and training on the Optional Protocols Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
for all relevant professional groups.20 SYR/CO/1, 5 October 2007.
Having ratified the ILO Convention No. 182 19 International Committee for the Red Cross, Annual
on child labour in 2003, Syria amended some Reports 2004–6, www.icrc.org.
legislation accordingly, but loopholes remained 20 Concluding observations, above note 18.
and penalties were minimal.21
21 IRIN News, “Syria: Child labourers operate in
Syria remained formally at war with Israel,
legal loophole, say rights workers”, 13 July 2006.
which maintained its occupation of the Golan
Heights.
* Titles of non-English language sources have been

1 Initial Report by Syria to the UN Committee on
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/SYR/1,
��
18 April 2007.
2 “Military services in Syria reduced to two years”,
Arabic News, 7 January 2005, www.arabicnews.
com.
3 “President Assad Publishes Decree Number 30”,
al-Baath, no.13136, 6 May 2007 (Arabic). This
included payment of an exemption fee of between
US$500 and US$8,000 for Syrians living abroad;
www.syria-news.com.
4 Confidential sources, August 2007.
5 Ismail al-Jarradat, “Interview with Syrian Head of
Recruitment, General Muhammad Ali Qamtad”,
al-Thawra, 9 May 2007 (Arabic).
6 Initial Report, above note 1�.
7 Confidential sources, 15 July 2007.
8 Initial Report, above note 1�.
9 exploitz.com!, “Syria – Military Training”, www.
exploitz.com.
Consideration of report submitted by Syria,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPSC/
SYR/CO/1, 31 October 2006.
12 “Syria threatened to fight in Lebanon war
– Hezbollah”, Reuters, 23 July 2007; Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Iranian and Syrian
support for Hizbullah and the Palestinian terrorist
organizations”, 18 March 2007, www.mfa.gov.il.
13 Hamas’s political leader, Khaled Mashal, and PIJ’s
secretary-general, Dr Ramadan al-Shallah. See
Amira Howaidy, “Constants reiterated,” Al-Ahram
Weekly, 31 January 2008, http://weekly.ahram.
org.eg.
14 Matthew Levitt, “Terror from Damascus (Part
S—Z
I): The Palestinian terrorist presence in Syria”,

PeaceWatch #420, Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 7 May 2003. www.
washingtoninstitute.org.
15 Brookings Institute–University of Bern, “Iraqi
refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic: a field-
based snapshot”, occasional paper, June 2007,
www3.brookings.edu.

years for males of military service age who tried
TA I WAN to avoid recruitment (Article 3).9
The 1959 Act of Military Service for Volunteer
Taiwan Enlisted Men, as amended in 2003, stated that
males who had reached military service age could
Population: 22 million (5.2 million under 18)1 volunteer to enlist for between three and five
Government armed forces: 290,000 years, and could apply to extend their term for
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 between one and three years (Article 3). Further
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 extension could be ordered by the Ministry of
Voting age: 202 Defence in the event of war or disorder, or if the
Treaties ratified: not applicable number of retirees would affect national defence
(Article 5). According to the government about
The minimum age for recruitment to the 6,500 enlistees signed up in 2005.10
armed forces was 18, and there were no Military service requirements were currently
undergoing substantial revisions as part of an
reports of under-18s serving in the forces. overall streamlining of the armed forces, which
aimed to see troop numbers reduced to around
Context 275,000 by the end of 2008.11 While the military
had hitherto consisted primarily of conscripts,
Tensions remained high between Taiwan and efforts were now in place to reduce the numbers
China. Taiwan continued to build its defence of conscripted troops while encouraging
policies around a potential attack by China, volunteers. The government aimed for a ratio of
which it claimed was involved in an ongoing 60 per cent volunteers to 40 per cent conscripts
military build-up.3 In June 2007 proposals by the by 2008.12
Taiwanese president to hold a referendum on From January 2006 the compulsory service
whether the island should seek membership of period for conscripts was reduced from 22 to 16
the UN were met with severe criticism from China, months, to be reviewed annually.13 The Defence
which said that such moves would endanger Ministry announced that, subject to sufficient
peace and stability in the region.4 numbers of volunteers enlisting, the period would
be further reduced to 14 months in 2007, and 12
Government months in 2008.14 The 2005 amendments to the
Military Service Act also allowed women to serve
National recruitment legislation and as enlisted personnel.15
After discharge from active duty, all reservists
practice had to report to their local military reserve
The 1947 constitution states that “The people units, which were sub-units of the Armed Forces
shall have the duty of performing military service Reserve Command. Reservists were organized
in accordance with law” (Article 20). into various units according to their military
The 1933 Military Service Law, as amended occupational specialty. Registered reservists
in 2000 and 2005, provided the legal basis for totalled 3.4 million in 2005.16
conscription, stating that all males were liable for
military service from 1 January of the year after Military training and military schools
they turned 18 until 31 December of the year they Taiwan operated a range of military education
turned 40, this range being defined as the military establishments, including the Republic of
service age (Article 3). Exemption on health China Military Academy, Naval Academy and Air
grounds and deferment for school and college Force Academy, as well as various specialized
students were allowed. Citizens sentenced to military schools, such as Fu Hsing Kang College,
imprisonment for at least five years or who established to train in “political warfare”, the
had served a total of three years in prison were National Defence Medical Centre, the National
ineligible for service (Article 5).5 Defence Management College and the Chung
Under the Implementation Act for Substitute Cheng Institute of Technology. The armed forces
Service of 2000, those conscripts considered also operated a number of branch schools, such
unsuitable for regular military service were as the infantry, armour, and artillery and missile
allowed to perform substitute service, including branch schools of the army. The Chung Cheng
in the police, fire, social, environmental, medical Armed Forces Preparatory School provided senior
and educational services.6 Enlisted men could high school education to students who wished to
also apply for substitute service.7 According continue in one of the three service academies
to the government, about 14,000 conscripts or attend the Fu Hsing Kang College following
performed substitute service in 2005.8 graduation. It combined a regular senior high
The 1954 Punishment Act for Violation to school education with basic military training.17
Military Service System, as amended in 1967 and
1972, provided for prison sentences of up to five

1 Government Information Office, Taiwan Yearbook
2006 (figures from 2006), www.gio.gov.tw. TAJI K I STA N
2 CIA, The World Factbook, 2008.
3 “National Defence”, Taiwan Yearbook 2006, Republic of Tajikistan
above note 1.
4 VOA News, “China blasts Taiwan president’s
support for UN referendum”, 13 June 2007, www.
voanews.com. Compulsory recruitment age: 18
5 Military Service Act, 2 February 2000. Voluntary recruitment age: 18
6 “National Defence”, above note 3. Voting age: 18
7 Conscription Agency of the Ministry of Interior,
Optional Protocol: acceded 5 August 2002
www.nca.gov.tw. Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
8 “National Defence”, above note 3. CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
9 Punishment Act for Violation to Military Service Weapons training could begin in school
System, 24 February 1972.
10 “National Defence”, above note 3.
for senior students. There were some
11 Ibid.
allegations of illegal conscription of under-
12 Ministry of National Defence, 2006 National 18s into the armed forces.
Defence Report, R.O.C., Ch. 7.
13 Ibid. Context
14 “Compulsory service to be reduced to 1 year by
2008 if recruiting is successful”, Central News In May 2006 armed men, allegedly linked to the
Agency, 27 September 2005. armed opposition group Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) (see Uzbekistan entry), raided a
15 “National Defence”, above note 3.
Tajik-Kyrgyz frontier post; several of the attackers
16 Ibid. and Tajik and Kyrgyz security forces were killed
17 Ibid. in the ensuing fighting.1 During 2006 at least 30
alleged IMU members and 50 alleged members
of the banned Islamic opposition party Hizb-ut-
Tahrir were detained and many were sentenced to
long prison terms after unfair trials.2
Tajikistan was a member of the Shanghai
June 2001, comprising also China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and
operation in security matters.3
Until 2005 about half of Tajikistan’s conscripts
served with the Russian army, which protected
Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan.4 In mid-2005
Russian forces withdrew from the border, handing
over control to Tajik border guards, but retained
several thousand troops at a military base in the
capital, Dushanbe.5 There were also French and
Indian air force bases in Tajikistan.6
Government
practice
The armed forces were largely conscripted.
Conscription was provided for in the constitution.
The Law on Universal Military Responsibility and
S—Z
Military Service required men aged 18–27 to do

military service for 24 months, or 18 months for
those with higher education.
In February 2006 the president noted
that over 40 laws and decrees had come into
force in the previous five years in the field of
defence, including those to protect the rights

and social interests of conscripts.7 Details of the he been abducted with four younger boys from a
amendments were not readily available. village in Tajikistan and trafficked to Pakistan by
The Law on Universal Military Responsibility masked Tajik men in 2002. The Pakistani military
and Military Service stated that alternative said he had been trained to plant mines and
service could be carried out in accordance with that armed groups were increasingly recruiting
legislation, but no legislation had been passed teenagers from Central Asia to carry out attacks.20
to provide for it. A group of non-governmental In Tajikistan there was scepticism that children
organizations (NGOs) were still campaigning in had been abducted and trafficked from the
2007 for an alternative service law, but there country.21 In June 2006 the boy was released into
were fears that the government might delete the custody of a relief organization in Pakistan,
the provision from the Law on Universal Military which said he had been arrested by the Pakistani
Responsibility and Military Service.8 In October military in a madrasa (Islamic religious school) in
2007 the activities of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Pakistan and unlawfully detained, and was being
two evangelical Christian groups were suspended returned to his family.22
for three months because of members’ refusal to In May 2007 the State Committee on National
serve in the military.9 Security stated that an Iranian citizen detained
About 12,000 conscripts were called up every by the Tajik authorities had taken Tajikistani boys
year.10 Dozens of cases were reported annually aged 10–15 to a neighbouring country purportedly
in which officers or officials took bribes to let for religious education, but in fact for training by
conscripts avoid military service. The government armed groups. The State Committee on National
repeatedly acknowledged the problem of Security did not specify which armed groups were
corruption in the armed forces.11 One government implicated, how many boys were involved, or
official said parents did not want to send their which country they were sent to.23
children into the army because of poor food
and living conditions.12 Enlistment targets were
not met because young men left to find work in
Developments
Russia or avoided conscription. In some cases International standards
under-age boys were reportedly rounded up by
conscription officers who had failed to reach Tajikistan ratified the ILO Worst Forms of Child
their targets.��
In 2004��
nine senior military officials Labour Convention 182 in June 2005.
were sacked for enlistment offences and one
senior officer was convicted of abuse of power 1 ��
Dadodjan Azimov, “��
Are Islamic militants
by an army court. At least some of these cases regrouping in the Fergana Valley?”, Institute of
reportedly involved under-age boys.13 Cases of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 1 December
under-age recruitment to fulfil quotas continued 2006, www.iwpr.net; see also Amnesty
to be reported in 2006.14 International Report 2007, entry on Kyrgyzstan.
Tajikistan prohibited the voluntary recruitment 2 Amnesty International Report 2007.
of under-18s to the armed forces, according to its 3 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www.
declaration made on accession to the Optional sectsco.org.
Protocol in 2002.15 4 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 2004/2005, quoted in Derek
Military training and military schools Brett, Military Recruitment and Conscientious
The Ministry of Defence participated in the Objection: A Thematic Global Survey, Conscience
development of educational standards, programs and Peace Tax International, May 2006, p.11,
and methods for the preparation of civilians http://cpti.ws.
for military service.16 Students in senior school 5 Tajikistan Country Profile, BBC News, 23 March
classes studied principles of military science to 2007; Vladimir Socor, “Russia’s military presence
prepare them for military service.17 In 2006 one in Tajikistan to be legalized and diluted”,
school sent 30 students to the Russian military Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor,
base for five days where they were taught how to 6 October 2004 , www.jamestown.org; Zoya
Pylenko, “Badakhshan: more poverty after
fire weapons.18
Russian withdrawal”, Central Asia–Caucasus
Students could take two-year courses at a Analyst, 16 November 2005, www.cacianalyst.org.
military school in Dushanbe based on the Soviet-
model Suvorov schools. On average about 100 6 Shishir Gupta, “Tajik air base is ready, gives India
its first footprint in strategic Central Asia”, Indian
students graduated every year and went on to
Express, 25 February 2007, www.indianexpress.
study in the Military Institute of Tajikistan and com; “France to boost air group in Tajikistan
abroad in Russia and other countries.19 – embassy”, RIA Novosti, 11 May 2006, http://
en.rian.ru.
Armed groups
In October 2004 a boy captured by security forces
in the Pakistani border region of Waziristan said

7 “Address of President Emomali Rakhmonov of the
Republic of Tajikistan on the Occasion of Armed tanzania
Forces Day of the Republic of Tajikistan and
Defence of the Fatherland”, presidential website, United Republic of Tanzania
23 February 2006, www.president.tj; N. ��
Dodov,
“The Seventh Session of the Third Majlisi Mili Population: 38.3 million (19.1 million under 18)
Majlisi of the Republic of Tajikistan”, Khovar News Government armed forces: 27,000
Agency, 16 November 2006, www.khovar.tj. Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
8 ��
“Alternative Military Service Under Review”, IWPR Voluntary recruitment age: 18; younger with
News Briefing Central Asia, 12��
July 2007.
parental consent
9 “��
Tajik officials ban Jehovah’s Witnesses,
Voting age: 18
Baptists”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/
RL), 23 October 2007, www.rferl.org. Optional Protocol: acceded 11 November 2004
10 ��
O. Sidirov, “The armed forces of Tajikistan Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
– yesterday and today”, Gazeta.kz, 13 March CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWC
2007, www.gazeta.kz.
��
11 See, for example, “Address of President
E. Rakhmonov on the Occasion of the 14th armed forces although their presence
Anniversary of the Creation of the Armed Forces of could not be ruled out as defence force
the Republic of Tajikistan”, presidential website, regulations permitted recruitment under
23 February 2007.
12 ��
“Why doesn’t your son serve in the army?”,
some circumstances. No recruitment of
Avesta, 22 February 2007, www.avesta.tj. child soldiers from Burundian refugee
13 ��
Gulnora Amirshoeva, “Tajik army abuses tackled”, camps was reported after September 2004.
IWPR, 5 November 2004.
14 Correspondence with confidential source,�
Dushanbe.
Context
15 Declaration on accession to the Optional Protocol, Tanzania continued to host large numbers of
www2.ohchr.org. refugees who had fled conflict in their countries
16 Law on Universal Military Responsibility and of origin. The UN Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR)
Military Service, Article 18. planning figures for 2008–9 indicated over
17 ��
“Cultural events have taken place at the Ministry 381,000 refugees and asylum-seekers in Tanzania,
of Defence to celebrate the forthcoming 23 mostly from Burundi and the Democratic Republic
February Armed Forces Day of the Republic of of the Congo (DRC).1 In January 2007 there were
Tajikistan”, Safina Television, undated, www.
�� some 600,000 refugees, over 350,000 from
safina.tj. Burundi and over 120,000 from the DRC.2 In early
18 ��
Valentina Kondrashova, “Russian military 2007 the Tanzanian authorities were accused of
personnel gave schoolboys lessons in initial ill-treating Burundian and Rwandan refugees and
military preparation”, Asia Plus News Agency, of forcibly expelling them during 2006.3
1 June 2006, www2.asiaplus.tj. The entry of Burundi’s main armed opposition
19 ��
O. Sidirov, above note 10. group, the Conseil National pour la Défense
de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense
20 See, for example, ��
“Qaeda using children for
terrorism”, Daily Times (Pakistan), 26 November
de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD, led by Pierre
2004; “Tale of a lost militant”, Reuters, 15 Nkurunziza), into the Burundian government in
December 2004, both at www.dailytimes.com.pk. 2003 and the subsequent reform of the armed
forces there appeared to have triggered the
21 ��
“Why doesn’t the ‘Tajik boy’ come home?”,
Khovar, 12 November 2004, at www.tajik-gateway.
��
return to Burundi of some 90,000 refugees
org. in 2004. Thousands more returned ahead of
Burundian local and legislative elections in 2005.4
22 “Innocent foreigners detained”, Dawn, 31 May
Repatriation of both Burundian and DRC refugees
2006, www.dawn.com; “Pakistani court orders
release of two Tajik Al-Qaeda militants”, KUNA
continued in 2007.5
(Kuwait News Agency), 5 June 2006.
23 “Terrorist accomplice detained in Tajikistan Government
for recruiting teenagers to madrasah studies”,
Interfax, 23 May 2007, www.interfax-religion.com; National recruitment legislation and
S—Z
“Tajik youths were trained as future mohajedins practice

and suicide bombers”, Regnum, 21 ��
May��
��
2007,
www.regnum.ru. When acceding to the Optional Protocol in
November 2004, Tanzania stated in its declaration
that “the minimum age for the voluntary
recruitment into armed conflict is eighteen
years.” 6

However, Section 67 of the Defence Forces As of October 2007 the government reported
Regulations prohibited the recruitment of persons that it had yet to incorporate international
apparently under 18 into the armed forces, humanitarian laws (such as the Convention on the
“except that where a person is not of the apparent Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols) into
age of eighteen years he may be enrolled in the its domestic legislation.17
Defence Forces with the consent in writing of one
of his parents or guardian, or, when the parents or 1 UNHCR Global Appeal 2008–2009, Tanzania,
guardian are dead or unknown, with the consent http://www.unhcr.org.
of the Area Commission of the district in which 2 UNHCR Global Appeal 2007, Tanzania, www.unhcr.
that person resides”.7 The regulations provided org.
that no child under the age of 18 could be used
3 Human Rights Watch (HRW), letter to President
directly in armed conflict.8
Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete of Tanzania, 8 May 2007.
In July 2007 the government stated that the
age of voluntary recruitment to all defence forces 4 Amnesty International (AI), “Burundi: refugee
rights at risk: human rights abuses in returns to
was set at 18 and that birth and other certificates
and from Burundi”, AI Index: AFR 16/006/2005,
were scrutinized to prevent the recruitment
27 June 2005.
of under-18s. It also stated that only over-18s
could enlist, and that some military training was 5 UNHCR, “Uncertain future for return operation
provided. There was no compulsory recruitment.9 from Tanzania to Congo”, News Stories, 24
The government reported that although the September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/; UNHCR
News, ‘UNHCR and partners in new initiatives to
recruitment of under-18s appeared to be a
boost repatriation to Burundi”, 12 July 2007, www.
possibility in exceptional circumstances, in
unhcr.org.
practice there was no such recruitment of under-
18s in the Tanzania People Defence Forces (TPDF). 6 Declaration on accession to the Optional Protocol,
No schools were under the control of the TPDF.10 http://www2.ohchr.org.
7 Confidential sources, Tanzania, July 2007.
8 Second periodic report of Tanzania to the UN
Armed groups Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
Prior to 2004 Burundi’s armed political groups CRC/C/70/Add.26, 24 August 2005.
reportedly recruited children as young as eight 9 Letter to the Child Soldiers Coalition from the
from refugee camps in Tanzania and carried out Tanzania High Commission, London, July 2007;
training in or near camps.11 Second periodic report, above note 8.
The entry of the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) 10 Initial report of Tanzania to the Committee on the
into the Burundian government in 2003 and Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/TZA/1,
the subsequent return to Burundi of large 19 October 2007.
numbers of CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) fighters led 11 HRW, “Child Soldier Use 2003, a Briefing for
to improvements in camp security. Recruitment the 4th UN Security Council”, Open Debate on
by the CNDD-FDD (Nkrunziza) was reported Children and Armed Conflict, January 2003.
in refugee camps as late as September 2004, 12 Burundi: refugee rights at risk, above note 4.
and at the end of that year they and other 13 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-
armed political groups were reported still to General on Children and Armed Conflict in
be demanding financial contributions from the Burundi, UN Doc. S/2006/851, 27 October 2006;
refugee population.12 ITEKA, (Burundian Human Rights League), http://
Although recruitment, including of children, www.ligue-iteka.africa-web.org.
by the one remaining active Burundian armed 14 Confidential sources, Dar es Salaam, June 2007.
political group, the National Liberation Forces 15 Second periodic report of Tanzania to the
(Forces nationales de libération, FNL), was Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
reported in Burundian territory bordering CRC/C/70/Add.26, 24 August 2005.
Tanzania in 2006,13 no recruitment from
Burundian refugee camps had been reported Consideration of report submitted by Tanzania,
since 2004.14 Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/TZA/
CO/2, 21 June 2006.
Developments 17 Initial report, above note 10.
In 2005, in its second periodic report to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Tanzania
acknowledged that child trafficking existed within
Tanzania, and proposed introducing a “Children’s
Law” to address this and other child protection
issues, including a consistent legislative
definition of a child.15 In 2006 the Committee
expressed concern at the lack of a clear time
frame for finalizing and enacting this legislation.16

at variance with the 1954 law cited above. The
T HAIL AND declaration states, “At the age of 21, selected
inactive military personnel will become active
Kingdom of Thailand military personnel. Inactive military personnel
may also voluntarily apply to become active
Population: 64.2 million (18.5 million under 18) military personnel to serve in the national armed
Government armed forces: 306,600 forces. Women are exempt from compulsory
Compulsory recruitment age: 20 military service both in times of peace and in
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 times of war, but are subjected to other duties
Voting age: 18 assigned by law. In times of war or national crisis,
Optional Protocol: acceded 27 February 2006 inactive military personnel (men aged over 18)
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): may be recruited to participate in the armed
forces.”7

armed forces. Children were reported to The Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School
offered secondary education to students before
be involved with armed separatist groups they joined a military or police academy. The
in the south. Refugees from Myanmar school aimed to enhance the knowledge and
included former child soldiers recruited efficiency of pre-cadets, who were divided into
by the Myanmar armed forces and armed four battalions directly controlled by platoon
commanders, their military education and training
political groups. being provided by the Regiment of Cadets.
Applicants to the school had to be unmarried and
Context between 14 and 17 years of age, with educational
qualifications to the level of Grade 10, and they
Violence in the four mainly Muslim southern had to meet the health and height qualifications
provinces escalated steadily; over 2,000 people required by the armed forces or police.8
had been killed there since 2004. Armed groups In its accession declaration to the Optional
bombed, beheaded or shot Muslim and Buddhist Protocol, Thailand stated that admission to
civilians, including monks and teachers. Human military schools was on a voluntary basis,
rights violations committed by the authorities depending on success in the entrance
included the deaths of scores of people, enforced examinations and subject to the consent of
disappearances and arbitrary detention.1 parents or legal guardians. High school and
In September 2006 Prime Minister Thaksin university students regardless of gender could
Shinawatra was deposed in a bloodless apply voluntarily to receive military training from
military coup. Coup leaders abrogated the 1997 the Army Reserve Command, with the consent
constitution and issued decrees instituting of parents or legal guardians. Students who
martial law.2 A new constitution was endorsed in completed three years’ training were exempt from
a referendum in August 2007. military service as active military personnel when
they reached the age of 21.9 The minimum age for
Government enrolment in the Reserve Officer Training Corps
was 16.10
practice Armed groups
Article 71 of the 2007 constitution states that Although reliable information was scarce, there
“Every person has a duty to defend the country.” were credible reports of the use of children
The 1954 Military Service Act provided in operations by separatist armed groups in
the legal basis for conscription, requiring that southern Thailand.11 The most active of the
every Thai man who had attained the age of 20 separatist groups, the National Revolution
would be recruited into the armed forces;3 an Front-Coordinate (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-
estimated 80,000 troops in the Thai military were Koordinasi, BRN-C), had a youth wing with
conscripts.4 The age of voluntary recruitment was over 7,000 members, which, together with
18.5 The age for participation in hostilities was not units organized into cells, was reported to be
S—Z
stipulated in law.6 responsible for much of the violence.12 Between

In February 2006 Thailand acceded to the January 2004 and June 2007 separatist groups
Optional Protocol, stating in its declaration that were responsible for the deaths of at least 70
military service was compulsory by law and teachers, and burned down 170 government
that Thai men reaching the age of 18 had a duty schools.13 Children were among those who were
to register on the inactive military personnel killed.14
list. However, the age given for compulsory
recruitment in the declaration appeared to be

BRN-C was reported to have penetrated some KNLA (an ethnic Karen armed group fighting the
Islamic elementary schools and private boarding Tatmadaw) and made peace with the Myanmar
schools (ponohs) in the southern provinces.15 government in 2007.24 There were reported to
There was no information to indicate that military be plans by the UN Working Group on children
training took place in the schools, but according affected by armed conflict to develop a formal
to some sources “suitable” children or young system for monitoring and reporting on the
people were selected to join after-school study recruitment of child soldiers from the camps.25
groups, where initiation into the BRN-C began.
The number of children in the BRN-C or other 1 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “‘It was like
armed groups was not clear, nor was the extent suddenly my son no longer existed’: enforced
to which under-18s took part in their operations. disappearances in Thailand’s southern border
However, there were indications that boys below provinces”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 19, No.
the age of 18, some in their early teens, were 5(C), March 2007.
used to distribute leaflets and write graffiti, and 2 Amnesty International Report 2007.
for sabotage and arson.16 Occasionally, under- 3 Second periodic report of Thailand to the UN
18s were reported to have been used to plant Committee on the Rights of the Child, 31 May
bombs.17 2005, UN Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.15.
Some reports indicated that government 4 Global Security, “Royal Thai Military”, www.
forces had killed children suspected of globalsecurity.org.
involvement in the southern insurgency.18 There
5 CIA, The World Factbook, Thailand.
were also reports of the arbitrary detention of
under-18s suspected of belonging or having 6 Second periodic report of Thailand, above note 3.
links to armed groups. More than 600 people, of 7 Declaration of Thailand on acceding to the
whom at least six were under 18, were reportedly Optional Protocol, 27 February 2006, www2.
detained in operations from June to August 2007 ohchr.org.
and had “volunteered” to undergo a program of 8 Thailand Armed Forces Academies, www.
four months’ occupational training in an army geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/5522/T_T_
camp as an alternative to being charged with HE.HTM.
offences relating to national security.19 The six 9 Declaration of Thailand, above note 7.
were reported to have been released in August. 10 “Training for war so that we may live in peace”,
In its declaration on accession to the Optional Bangkok Post, 10 October 2006,
Protocol, Thailand stated that “Non-governmental www.bangkokpost.net.
militias are prohibited by law, regardless of the 11 Confidential correspondence, June 2007.
age of persons concerned.”20 12 HRW, “‘Suddenly my son no longer existed’”,
above note 1.
Developments 13 HRW, “Thailand: education in the south engulfed
in fear”, 14 June 2007.
Several thousand Lao Hmong asylum seekers
remained in a camp in Phetchabun province in 14 HRW, “No One is Safe: Insurgent Violence
Against Civilians in Thailand’s Southern Border
poor conditions. According to some sources, a
Provinces”, August 2007.
large percentage of the camp population were
children.21 15 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Southern
Over 140,000 refugees, largely from the Karen Thailand: insurgency, not jihad”, May 2005.
ethnic group, were living in refugee camps on the 16 Confidential interviews, Bangkok, February 2007.
Thailand–Myanmar border.22 Tens of thousands 17 Coalition confidential source.
of others were living outside the camps; these 18 “Army vows to probe killing of teenagers by unit,
reportedly included former child soldiers, who and take action if soldiers guilty”, Nation, 15 April
had escaped from the Myanmar armed forces 2007, www.nationmultimedia.com.
(Tatmadaw) and were reported to encounter 19 Working Group on Peace and Justice, “The human
discrimination, ostracism and other difficulties in rights situation in south Thailand”, briefing note,
the refugee camps. Many former Tatmadaw child 20 August 2007. Copy on file at Coalition.
soldiers who fled to Thailand remained outside 20 Declaration of Thailand, above note 7.
the camps, where they had no access to support 21 HRW, “Thailand: Protect Hmong refugees:
or services. Increasing restrictions imposed by the more than 8,000 Lao Hmong at risk of forced
Thai authorities on international organizations repatriation”, 30 August 2007.
made it extremely difficult for these organizations 22 UNHCR, “Borders with Myanmar remain calm;
to provide protection for former child soldiers no influx of refugees”, UNHCR News Stories, 1
crossing the border.23 October 2007.
There were reports of the recruitment of
23 “Sold to be soldiers: the recruitment and use of
several children who lived in Mae La refugee child soldiers in Burma”, Human Rights Watch,
camp in Thailand by the Karen National Union- Vol. 19, No. 15(C), October 2007.
Karen National Liberation Army – Peace Council
(KNU-KNLA PC), which had broken away from the

24 Karen Human Rights Group, “Child soldiers
recruited to support the expansion of the KNU- TIMO R - L E ST E
KNLA Peace Council”, news bulletin, 28 May
2007, www.khrg.org. Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
25 Thai Burma Border Consortium, TBBC Programme
Report: January to June 2007, 30 Aug 2007. Population: 947,000 (463,000 under 18)
Voting age: 17
Optional Protocol: acceded 2 August 2004
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC

armed forces. The demobilization process
did not include specific programs aimed at
assisting demobilized child soldiers.
Context
Violence erupted in April 2006 after almost
600 soldiers – more than a third of the armed
forces – were dismissed after protesting over
discrimination and poor conditions of work. Up
to 38 people died and some 150,000 people
were displaced in subsequent fighting. In May
2006 an international peacekeeping force was
deployed. The UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL)
had its mandate extended as a result of the
violence, and was replaced in August 2006 by the
UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT),
mandated to foster stability and support national
elections in 2007; it included up to 1,608
police personnel within a civilian peacekeeping
component.
Government
practice
The 2004 Organic Law of the Falintil–ETDF
(East Timor Defence Forces) provided the basis
for voluntary recruitment, and stated that the
defence force was to be “exclusively made up of
citizen volunteers” and that “No person under
18 years of age may be recruited for military
service in the Falintil–ETDF” (Article 14.2). UN
identity cards issued in early 2001 for the national
Constituent Assembly elections were used as the
proof of age for enlistment purposes. As of 2006
there were 1,435 persons in the force, comprising
two infantry battalions and one naval component.
S—Z
A 2006 review by the secretary of state for

defence examined a range of potential policy
aspects, including the introduction of compulsory
military service. Timor-Leste’s initial report on the
Optional Protocol stated that this was viewed as
highly unlikely to be supported, and that there
was believed to be no prospect of amending

current provisions concerning recruitment under ended its operations in May 2005. The Special
the age of 18. Panels established within the national court
In February 2007, however, a Law on system had exclusive jurisdiction in relation to
Military Service was passed, which provided grave crimes – war crimes, genocide and crimes
for conscription for those aged between 18 and against humanity – as well as for murder, sexual
30. Under the law the duration of service for offences and torture committed from 1 January
those selected for active service was 18 months, to 25 October 1999. Recruitment and use of
extendable by a maximum of 12 months “in children were not among the crimes with which
the event of national service requirements”. any of the 97 suspects tried by the court were
Although the law provided for exemption from charged. Indonesia refused to co-operate with the
military service for various categories, including serious crimes process and took no further action
individuals with care responsibilities, there subsequent to the widely discredited ad hoc
was no provision for conscientious objection or human rights court in Jakarta to bring to justice
alternatives to military service. Some 40,000 members of the Indonesian armed forces and
East Timorese were estimated to be eligible for other Indonesian citizens or individuals resident
conscription. in Indonesia for crimes committed in Timor-Leste.
Paris, Timor Leste and 58 other states endorsed
Disarmament, demobilization the Paris Commitments to protect children
and reintegration (DDR) from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
The pro-independence armed group, Armed and guidelines on children associated with
Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor armed forces or armed groups. The documents
(Falintil) had been demobilized in 2000 and reaffirmed international standards and
officially dissolved in 2001. All under-18 members operational principles for protecting and assisting
of Falintil were reported to have been sent back child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global
to their homes and schools. The demobilization consultation jointly sponsored by the French
process, implemented by the International government and UNICEF.
Organization for Migration (IOM), did not include
specific programs aimed at assisting demobilized International standards
child soldiers. Timor-Leste submitted its initial report on the
Optional Protocol in 2006, together with its initial
Developments report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child (CRC).
In October 2005 the Commission for Reception, The report stated that “Promotion and
Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste submitted advocacy of the principles and priorities of the
its final report to the Timor-Leste president. It Protocol have occurred as part of broader efforts
contained a detailed account of human rights by Government – especially in cooperation with
violations in Timor-Leste between 1974 and 1999, UNICEF – to promote and advocate the principles
including abuses against children. It found that and provisions of the CRC. The Government’s early
during Indonesia’s occupation of Timor-Leste accession to both the Convention and its optional
(1975–99) children, some as young as six years protocols has enabled a unified approach to
old, were used by the Indonesian armed forces, community awareness raising.”
Indonesian-backed militia and, to a lesser extent,
by the pro-independence armed group, Falintil,
and its clandestine front. According to the report, 1 Report of the UN Independent Special
children associated with Falintil were the victims Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Geneva, 2
of extrajudicial execution, arbitrary detention, October 2006, www2.ohchr.org.
torture and other human rights violations by the 2 United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste.
Indonesian occupying forces. Child members of 3 Initial report of Timor-Leste to the UN Committee
the pro-Indonesian militias responsible for much on the Rights of the Child on implementation of
of the violence that took place both before and the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
after the August 1999 Popular Consultation on TLS/1, 28 June 2007.
independence were reported to be among those 4 Secretary of State for Defence, Force 20-20, 2006,
who had suffered the greatest impact since www.etan.org.
Indonesia’s withdrawal from the territory and its 5 Initial report of Timor-Leste, above note 3.
subsequent independence. As those seen to have 6 Unofficial translation of Law of Military Service by
been on “the wrong side”, they suffered stigma Coalition.
and many had not returned from West Timor, 7 “Concern at Timor army conscription”, The
Indonesia, where they had fled in 1999, for fear of Australian, 31 January 2007, www.etan.org.
retribution or ostracism. 8 Initial report of Timor-Leste, above note 3.
The serious crimes process established by
the UN to try serious violations of human rights

9 Chega! Final Report of the Commission for
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor TOG O
(CAVR), 2005, www.etan.org.
10 Regulation on the Establishment of the United Togolese Republic
Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor, 27 November 1999, UN Doc. UNTAET/ Population: 6.1 million (3.1 million under 18)
REG/1999/1, Section 3. Government armed forces: 8,600
11 Initial report of Timor-Leste, above note 3. Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (see text)
Voting age: 18

regular armed forces. The extent to which
any under-18s may have participated in
the violence around the 2005 presidential
elections was not documented.
Context
Immediately after the death in February 2005 of
President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who had ruled
Togo since 1967, the Togolese Armed Forces
(Forces armées togolaises, FAT) proclaimed Faure
Gnassingbé, his son, as president, precipitating
a constitutional and political crisis. In the face of
international pressure, Faure Gnassingbé stepped
down and called presidential elections for April
2005, which he won amid widespread violence
and allegations by opposition parties of vote-
rigging.1
According to a fact-finding mission sent to
Togo by the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, at least 400 people were killed and
thousands wounded during the crisis. Estimates
by government sources were considerably
lower, of 60 to 70 killed.2 The non-governmental
Togolese Human Rights League (Ligue togolaise
des droits de l’homme, LTDH) reported 811
killed.3 Most of the victims were believed to be
adults, although some children were also killed.
The security forces were also alleged to have
abducted students from schools.4
More than 40,000 people sought refuge in
neighbouring Benin and Ghana and thousands of
others were internally displaced. As of September
2007 the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) estimated
that 13,300 Togolese refugees remained in Benin
and Ghana.5 Although opposition supporters were
responsible for some violence, including killings,
most of the violence and killings were attributed
to government security forces and militias, who
S—Z
were accused of using disproportionate force in

response to opposition violence, of the deliberate
killing of people in their homes and of attempting
to hide evidence of the scale of the killings.
Violence against women, including rape, by all
parties was reportedly widespread.6

In August 2006 the government and The report by the UN fact-finding mission
opposition parties signed an agreement calling described how opposition supporters at times
for a government of national unity, making a formed “disorganized political militias” during
number of electoral reforms and establishing the 2005 violence, and it severely criticized
an ad hoc committee to support UNHCR in opposition leaders for not providing the
assisting refugees to return. The government leadership which should have prevented violence
also agreed to reform the armed forces, which by their supporters. Opposition supporters,
were traditionally dominated by northerners and primarily armed with weapons such as machetes
members of the president’s ethnic group, and or cudgels, attacked government officials and
which had a record of committing human rights supporters. Foreign nationals were also the
abuses. However, no progress was reported targets of xenophobic attacks.13 It was not clear
regarding an end to impunity for the armed to what extent under-18s had been active in
forces, in particular with regard to violence during violence by opposition supporters.
the 2005 elections.7 Parliamentary elections
were scheduled for 2007.8 The elections, which
took place in mid-October 2007, were won by
Developments
the ruling party, the Rally of the Togolese People International standards
(Rassemblement du peuple togolais, RPT).9
Togo ratified the Optional Protocol in November
2005.14
Government
National recruitment legislation and 1 Amnesty International Report 2006.
2 Office of the UN High Commissioner for
practice Human Rights (OHCHR), Rapport de la mission
The 2002 constitution stated that the defence d’établissement des faits chargée de faire la
of the nation and its territorial integrity was lumière sur les violences et les allégations de
the duty of every Togolese citizen, that every violations des droits de l’homme survenues
citizen had the duty to undertake national au Togo avant, pendant et après l’élection
service under the conditions provided for in law, présidentielle du 24 avril 2005, 29 August 2005,
and that every citizen had the duty to fight any www.reliefweb.int.
person or group of people who attempted to 3 Amnesty International (AI), Togo: Will history
change the democratic order established by the repeat itself? (AFR 57/012/2005), 20 July 2005.
constitution. Togo’s declaration on ratifying the 4 AI, Togo: A high-risk transition (AFR
Optional Protocol in November 2005 stated that 57/008/2005), 18 March 2005; AI, above note 3.
all recruitment was voluntary, but some sources 5 “Togolese refugees start going home from Ghana
reported that conscription was in force on a with UNHCR help”, UNHCR news, 27 September
selective basis for a two-year term.10 2007, www.unhcr.org.
Togo’s declaration on ratification of the 6 OHCHR, above note 2.
Optional Protocol stated also that the minimum 7 Amnesty International Report 2007; “Special
age for voluntary recruitment into the national Rapporteur on torture concludes visit to Togo”,
armed forces was 18. UN press release HR/07/63, 18 April 2007, www.
ohchr.org (HRC media).
Armed groups 8 “Togo: political agreement aims to end 12-year
feud”, IRIN, 21 August 2006.
Under the presidency of Gnassingbé Eyadéma 9 “Togo ruling party wins election”, BBC News, 18
government security forces were supported October 2007.
by militias created by and linked to the ruling
10 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),
party. Militias repeatedly participated in violence
The Military Balance 2007.
against the population and political opponents
and were active in the violence which followed 11 AI, above note 3.
the April 2005 presidential elections, particularly 12 OHCHR, above note 2.
in Lomé and Atakpamé. Members of the security 13 Ibid.
forces and militias reportedly opened fire on 14 Declaration on accession to the Optional
unarmed demonstrators and attacked people Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
in their homes or at polling stations.11 Militia
members acting alongside members of the
security forces were reportedly armed with
machetes and other knives (armes blanches).
The majority of militia members were young men.
However, the extent to which any under-18s may
have been active in or alongside the militias was
not clear.12

1 “Six found dead after Tonga riots”, BBC News, 17
TONGA November 2006.
2 “Tonga extends state of emergency”, 16 April
Kingdom of Tonga 2007, www. news.com.au/; “Tonga MP warns
continuing state of emergency could lead to more
Population: 102,000 (43,000 under 18) violence”, Radio New Zealand International, 16
Government armed forces: not known April 2007, www. rnzi.com.
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription 3 “Tongan authorities accused of human rights
Voluntary recruitment age: 16 violations,” ABC news online,13 December 2006,
Voting age: 21 www. abc.net.au.
Optional Protocol: not signed 4 “People’s reps say govt. has agreed to 2008
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): elections”, Tonga-Now, 16 November 2006, www.
tonga-now.to/ .
CRC, GC AP I and II
5 Kingdom of Tonga, Tonga Defence Services Act
The minimum age of voluntary recruitment 1992, Part V – Enlistment and Terms of service in
the Regular Force, Enlistment, Section 25(2) and
to the Tonga Defence Services was 16. 25(3).
6 Kingdom of Tonga, Act of Constitution of Tonga,
Context 1988 Revised Edition, Articles 22 and 64.
Following the death of King Taufa’ahau Tupou

IV in September 2006, a government committee
recommended that all lawmakers be elected
by the public. Government delays in enacting
democratic reforms sparked rioting in Nuku’alofa
in November 2006 which left six people dead.1 A
state of emergency, banning gatherings of more
than four people, was subsequently declared and
was extended until May 2007.2 Reports indicated
that around 600 people, including children, had
been detained and subjected to torture and
other abuse.3 Following the riots, the government
agreed to hold parliamentary elections in 2008.4
Government
practice
Under-18s could enlist in the defence services
with the consent in writing of the person’s
parents or guardian. If the required consent
could not “reasonably be obtained”, the consent
of a magistrate could be obtained instead. The
minimum age of recruitment was 16.5 There was
no conscription.
Article 22 of the 1988 constitution states
that “It shall be lawful for the King to command
any taxpayer to join the militia for the purpose
of instruction or for parade on public occasions
should he think fit and also in time of war to call
out all those capable of bearing arms and to
make orders and regulations for their control and
provisioning.” No minimum age of recruitment is
specified, although Article 64 of the constitution
states that “Every Tongan subject of twenty-
S—Z
one years of age or more who being a male and

not a noble pays taxes”, making them liable to
be conscripted into a militia.6 It was not clear,
however, whether under-21s were protected from
conscription in the militia.

T rinidad and Trinidad and Tobago ratified the ILO Minimum
Tobago Age Convention 138 in September 2004.
1 Second periodic report of Trinidad and Tobago to

Republic of Trinidad and Tobago the Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.�
CRC/C/83/Add.12, 15 November 2004, para. 246.
Population: 1.3 million (355,000 under 18)
Government armed forces: 2,700 2 Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, www.ttdf.mil.
tt.
3 Defence Act, No. 7 of 1962, Chapter 14:01, http://
rgd.legalaffairs.gov.tt.
Voting age: 18
4 International Labour Organization (ILO)
Optional Protocol: not signed Committee of Experts on the Application of
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR),
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 Individual Direct Request concerning Forced
Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) Trinidad and
No information was available on whether Tobago (ratification: 1963) Submitted: 2006
any under-18s were serving in the armed – Trinidad and Tobago, ILO, www.ilo.org/ (ilolex
database). See also Regulation 27 of the Cadet
forces. Force Regulations, subsidiary legislation under
the Cadet Force Act, Chapter 14:02, http://rgd.
Government legalaffairs.gov.tt.
5 Tranquillity Government Secondary-school, Extra-
National recruitment legislation and curricular Activities, www.tranquillity.edu.tt.
practice 6 Cadet Force Act, No. 28 of 1963.
7 “Developing nation’s youth”, Trinidad Guardian, 7
There was no conscription.1 The minimum age
June 2005, www.guardian.co.tt.
of recruitment to the regular armed forces was
18, and to the reserve 25.2 Candidates for the 8 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
regular forces between the ages of 16 and 18 had
submitted by Trinidad and Tobago, Concluding
to have written parental or guardian consent.3
observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/TTO/CO/2, 17
From 1985 the government had reported to the March 2006.
International Labour Organization (ILO) that in
practice there had been no recruitment of under-
18s. However, it repeatedly failed to follow the
ILO recommendation to amend the Defence Act
so as either to fix the legal minimum age at 18
or to allow a child under the age of 18 who had
been recruited to choose to leave the service
on reaching 18, in line with similar regulations
applicable to recruits to the cadet force.4

Boys and girls of secondary-school age could
join the cadet force, open to children and young
people aged 12–19, which aimed to give “mental,
moral and physical training”.5 Those wishing to
enrol had to have parental consent.6 There were
approximately 40 secondary-schools in the cadet
force system and school students made up nearly
90 per cent of the membership. Courses included
first aid, rifle target-shooting and navigation.
The cadet force provided assistance in times of
national disaster, such as hurricanes.7
Developments
In March 2006 the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child recommended that the government
ratify the Optional Protocol.8

2 Initial report of Tunisia to the UN Committee on
T unisia the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/
TUN/1, 30 August 2007.
Republic of Tunisia 3 Declaration on accession to the Optional
Population: 10.1 million (3.3 million under 18) 4 Ibid.
Voting age: 20
Optional Protocol: ratified 2 January 2003

Context
In December 2006, fighting between the police
and alleged members of the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la
Prédication et le Combat-GSPC), an armed group
reportedly linked to al-Qaeda, left dozens of
people dead and many others injured, including
police officers.1
Government
practice
Under Articles 2 and 29 of Act No. 2004-1 of 14
January 2004 concerning national service and
Article 18 of Act No. 95-92 of 2 November 1995
promulgating the Child Protection Code, Tunisia
strictly prohibited service in the armed forces by
persons under the age of 18, and the involvement
of children in armed conflict. The Code forbade
the use of children to commit crimes, including
acts of violence and terror (Article 19). Tunisian
legislation did not contain special provisions
for lowering the age of conscription, even in
exceptional circumstances.2
The constitution stated that “defence of
the country and the integrity of the territory
is a sacred duty of every citizen” (Article 15).
In accordance with Article 1 of Act No. 51-1989
of 14 March 1989, recruitment into the armed
forces was compulsory for all citizens once
they reached the age of 20, unless they were
medically exempt. The minimum age for voluntary
recruitment of Tunisian citizens into the armed
forces was 18 years. 3
S—Z

Recruits between the ages of 18 and 23 could be
admitted into military schools.4
1 “Tunisia”, Amnesty International Report 2007.

after attending military school. 9 Length of service
T U RKEY was 15 months for private solders and non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) and 12 months
Republic of Turkey for reserve officers.10 Students could defer
conscription until they had completed higher or
Population: 73.2 million (25.3 million under 18) vocational education. There was no provision for
Government armed forces: 514,900 conscientious objectors.11 In times of mobilization
Compulsory recruitment age: 19 or a state of emergency, individuals liable for
Voluntary recruitment age: : 18 military service could be recruited from the age
Voting age: 18 of 19. The Military Code provided for voluntary
Optional Protocol: ratified 4 May 2004 recruitment to some parts of the armed forces at
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): a minimum age of 18, but the government stated
on ratifying the Optional Protocol in 2004 that
this was not applied in practice.12
In a state of emergency or partial Other legislation apparently permitted the
deployment of 15- to 18-year-olds in civil defence
mobilization, individuals aged 15 and over forces during national emergencies. During a
were apparently liable for service in civil national crisis, the constitution allowed the
defence forces. suspension of rights and freedoms and other
extraordinary measures. The National Defence
Service Law 3634 stated that “in cases of general
Context or partial mobilization and in preparation of
The human rights situation deteriorated in mobilization under a state of emergency, children
eastern and south-eastern provinces as fighting under the age of 15 … shall not be held liable”.13
increased between the security forces and the
armed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). There Military training and military schools
were attacks on civilians in other areas by armed Students at military schools and the NCO
groups.1 preparatory school were not liable for compulsory
PKK attacks increased, and claimed as many military service or considered members of the
as 600 lives in 2006.2 A unilateral PKK ceasefire in armed forces. Admission to military high schools
October 2006 did not halt its attacks in response and preparatory schools for NCOs was voluntary
to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism and required parental consent. The minimum
operations, especially in the south-east. Kurdish entrance age was 13 years, and students could
separatists were blamed by the security forces leave at any time. Basic military training and
for a May 2007 bomb blast that killed six people skills were not provided in these schools unless
in the capital, Ankara.3 In April 2007 the chief of students wanted to become “professional
general staff called for a military assault on PKK soldiers”, in which case they received education
bases in northern Iraq.4 In June 2007 the largest on “military courtesy rules, elementary military
operation against PKK fighters in recent years general culture etc”.14
was launched in the south-east amid continuing It was not apparent from the Law on Military
concerns about a Turkish cross-border attack Academies whether under-18s were legally
into Iraq.5 Clashes between the PKK and the prohibited from admission. The Naval Academy
army increased noticeably in October 2007, had no stated minimum entrance age but
heightening fears of a cross-border incursion.6 candidates could not be over 19 or admitted more
After the security forces killed four PKK than 12 months after leaving secondary-school.15
members in March 2006, violent protests broke Although school leavers could potentially be
out and four children were among 13 killed during aged only 17, the Turkish Military Academy’s
clashes between demonstrators and the security stated objectives implied that candidates had to
forces in the south-east.7 be over 18. The Academy said that its objectives
were to educate and train commissioned
officers who had “necessary military qualities
Government with developed leadership qualities” or “a BS
National recruitment legislation and degree on the scientific branches determined in
accordance with the needs of related Service”,
practice and to provide postgraduate education related
According to the constitution, “National service to service needs.16 Information from the Air
is the right and duty of every Turk” (Article 72). Force Academy referred to undergraduate and
Under Military Law No. 1111, men’s liability for postgraduate education but made no reference
military service started in the year they turned to age.17
20.8 Liability continued to the age of 41, except on War colleges for all branches of the armed
grounds of health or disability. Women were not forces were open to graduates who had
conscripted and could join the armed forces only completed their minimum two-year tactical-

level command and staff duties, and a National 17 Turkish Air Force Academy, www.hho.edu.tr.
Security College provided senior officer training.18 18 Turkish War Colleges, www.harpak.tsk.mil.tr.
19 “Local guards divide Turkish Kurds”, BBC News, 4
Armed groups August 2006.
20 “Daughters of the revolution”, Observer, 1 May
The government continued to organize, arm 2003, http://observer.guardian.co.uk.
and pay the Village Guards, a civil defence force
21 Center for Defense Information, Terrorism project,
numbering 60,000 and mainly concentrated in
“Children used as soldiers in Iraq”, 18 November
the south-east as part of its security operations 2002, www.cdi.org.
there.19 It was not known whether there were
22 Katie Scott, “Awaiting the invasion”, Guardian
under-18s in these paramilitary forces.
Unlimited, undated, accessed on 18 July 2007,
It was not known how many PKK fighters
www.guardian.co.uk/weekendphotoprize/
were under 18. Recruitment of under-18s of both story/0,,1776811,00.html.
sexes had been reported in 2003.20 The PKK was
23 AP, “Turkey troops head to Iraq border”, CNN,
believed to have used children in its forces since
30 May 2007, http://edition.cnn.com.
1994, and was believed in 1998 to have had 3,000
child soldiers, more than 10 per cent of them
girls, in its forces based in Iraq and operating
in south-east Turkey.21 Some estimates put the
number of PKK fighters in northern Iraq as high
as 10,000, a third of them women.22 However, the
Turkish military estimated that 3,800 were based
in Iraq and that up to 2,300 were operating inside
Turkey.23

Terrorism 2006, www.state.gov.
3 “Kurds implicated in Ankara bomb attack”,
Independent, 23 May 2007, http://news.
independent.co.uk.
4 “Turkish general calls for military assault in Iraq”,
Financial Times, 13 April 2007, www.ft.com/cms.
5 einnews.com, Kurdistan Workers Party News,
www.einnews.com.
6 “Dozens die in Turkey border clash”, BBC News,
21 October 2007.
7 Amnesty International, “Turkey: Recent violations
must be investigated”, 13 April 2006, Public
Statement, AI Index Number EUR 44/005/2006.
8 ��
Initial report of Turkey to the UN Committee on
8 August 2000.
9 All About Turkey, “Turkish Army”, www.
allaboutturkey.com.
10 Initial report of Turkey on implementation of the
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/TUR/1,
undated.
11 Quaker Council for European Affairs, “Turkey”,
The Right to Conscientious Objection in Europe,
2005, www.wri-irg.org.
12 ��
13 ��
Initial report to the UN Committee on the Rights
S—Z
of the Child, above note 8.

14 Initial report on the Optional Protocol, above note
10.
15 Turkish Naval Academy, Admission, www.dho.
edu.tr.
16 The general objective of the Turkish Military
Academy, www.kho.edu.tr.

Longstanding problems within the military
T U RKMENI STAN included widespread corruption in the Defence
Ministry and the general staff, bribe taking by
Turkmenistan draft commissions, and incompetence. Clan
rivalries sometimes led to violence against
Population: 4.8 million (1.9 million under 18) new recruits, sometimes with fatal outcomes.9
Government armed forces: 26,000 President Berdymuhammedov said publicly that
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 more attention should be paid to the health of
Voluntary recruitment age: 17 conscripts.10
Voting age: 18 Thousands of public sector workers were
Optional Protocol: acceded 29 April 2005 dismissed to reduce government expenditure in
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): the last years of President Niyazov’s rule. From
2002 onwards conscripts in the armed forces
CRC, GC AP I and II
reportedly served as hospital orderlies, guards at
The minimum age for voluntary recruitment industrial plants, firemen and traffic police. The
military had to conscript almost everyone eligible
was 17. Conscripts were employed in in order to fill these posts. An estimated 75 per
non-military roles to save government cent of men of conscription age were called up.11
expenditure but were often unpaid. Non-government sources reported that the cost
of paying conscripts was passed to the bodies
employing them. However, as these organizations
Context could not pay even their own staff, conscripts
President Saparmurat Niyazov, Turkmen were often forced to beg on the streets.12
Communist Party Chief from 1985 and head of
state since October 1990, died in December 2006. Military training and military schools
Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov was elected Two military schools, in the cities of Mary and
president in February 2007 with the support of Dashoguz, enrolled boys who had graduated
key members of the security establishment. The from the seventh grade of secondary-school,
new government made legislative and policy aged about 13. Students wore military uniforms
changes to improve the socio-economic situation and lived in military-style barracks. Only ethnic
and educational base, while also reportedly Turkmen were admitted. In 2004 the Dashoguz
ensuring that any changes in the political and school had about 660 students. There was
security fields did not weaken presidential strong competition for entry to these schools,
powers.1 with substantial bribes reportedly being paid
for admission. Graduates of military schools
could enter the Military Institute without work
Government experience.13
National recruitment legislation and There was a��
Military Institute to train officers
and specialists in Ashgabat.14 A new Military
practice Academy also opened in 2007 to train young
Young men could be called up for compulsory officers for border services.15
military service at 18. Under the 2002
Conscription and Military Service Act (Article 15)
the minimum age for voluntary military service
Developments
was 17.2 It was reportedly common for families to International standards
make boys volunteer at the age of 17 as a way to
save money or to guard against their becoming Turkmenistan acceded to the Optional Protocol
involved with drugs or criminals.3 Army service in April 2005. Its declaration on accession stated
was also seen as a way out of unemployment.4 that male citizens aged 18–30 were liable to
Boys often saw no other options on ��
leaving conscription, and that they could volunteer at the
school.5 age of 17.16 In May 2006 the UN Committee on
Education reforms in 2007 could potentially the Rights of the Child considered Turkmenistan’s
reduce the number of 17-year-olds joining the initial report on its implementation of the
army. A presidential decree in March 2007 Convention on the Rights of the Child.17
increased the number of years of compulsory
education to ten. The requirement that students 1 ��
“Security reform just for show”, News Briefing
must have work experience before entering Central Asia, IWPR, 13 March 2007.
university was also abolished.6 The government 2 See Initial report of Turkmenistan to the UN
said it wanted to facilitate students studying Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.
abroad.7 However, in September 2007 it was CRC/C/TKM/1, 5 December 2005.
reported that 17-year-olds could still carry out
their military service early.8

3 ��
International League for Human Rights and
Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, Alternative UGA N DA
Report on Compliance by the Republic of
Turkmenistan with the UN Convention on Republic of Uganda
the Rights of the Child, 24 May 2006, www.
��
eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project. Population: 28.8 million (16.5 million under 18)
4 “Dumbing down Turkmenistan”, Reporting Government armed forces: 45,000
Central Asia No. 294, IWPR,
��
18
��
June 2004. Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
5 ��
Correspondence from confidential source, 6 Voluntary recruitment age: 18
March 2007. Voting age: 18
6 ��
“��
Turkmenistan: President pushes ahead with Optional Protocol: acceded 6 May 2002
education and agricultural reform”, IRIN, 4 April Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
2007, www.irinnews.org.
CRG, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO138, ILO 182, ACRWC
7 ��
“Education set for overhaul”, IWPR, 6 February
2007. Up to 2,000 women and children remained
8 “��
Turkmenistan announces regular military call- with the opposition Lord’s Resistance Army
up”, Turkmenistan.ru,
��
17
��
September 2007, www.
turkmenistan.ru. (LRA) in October 2007. They included girl
9 “Abuse rife in the military”, IWPR/Turkmen Radio, soldiers who had been raped and borne
1 June 2006, www.iwpr.net. children while in the ranks. Children
10 “There has been a meeting of the cabinet of were abducted and used by the LRA in
ministers of Turkmenistan”, Gündogar, 20 March combat and other roles and forced to
2007, www.gundogar.org.
11 “Turkmen army unfit for service”, IWPR/Turkmen
commit and witness human rights abuses.
Radio, 13 October 2006. Fighting and LRA abuses had significantly
12 ��
Turkmen initiative for human rights, “The decreased by early 2006. Children were
Turkmen Army”, 25 April 2006, w��
ww.eurasianet. recruited and used by the national army,
org/turkmenistan.project. the United People’s Defence Force (UPDF),
13 ��
Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, “Military
schools”, 6 December 2004.�
and auxiliary Local Defence Units (LDU).
14 Oleg Sidorov, “The armed forces of Turkmenistan
Children captured by the UPDF were used
– a decisive force?”, Gazeta.kz, 27 December for gathering intelligence on the LRA and
2006, www.gazeta.kz. to identify LRA positions and weapons
15 “Sitting of the cabinet of ministers of caches.
Turkmenistan”, State News Agency of
Turkmenistan (TDH), 12 August 2007,
www.turkmenistan.gov.tm. Context
16 Declaration on accession to the Optional Armed conflict between government forces and
the opposition Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
17 Committee on the Rights of the Child, in northern Uganda continued between 2004
Consideration of report submitted by and early 2006. The government’s strategy
Turkmenistan, Summary record, UN Doc. CRC/C/ of pursuing a military solution to the conflict
SR.1143, 7 June 2006.
contributed to humanitarian suffering and abuses
against the civilian population. In March 2004
a major military operation (Iron Fist II) resulted
in an escalation of the conflict, with the LRA
intensifying its attacks and expanding into the
south and east, to areas previously less affected
by the conflict, such as Lango and Teso.1 The
national army – the United People’s Defence
Force (UPDF) – and auxiliary local defence units
(LDUs) committed human rights violations,
including killings, beatings and rape and other
crimes of sexual violence.2 UPDF soldiers were
S—Z
also responsible for killings and torture during

law enforcement operations to combat insecurity
and weapons proliferation in the Karamoja region
of north-eastern Uganda from mid-2006.3 In one
incident 66 children were reportedly crushed
by armoured vehicles or trampled to death by

stampeding animals following shooting during a “to undergo military training for the defence
February 2007 raid by UPDF troops.4 of this Constitution and the protection of the
The LRA was responsible for the killing, territorial integrity of Uganda whenever called
torture, rape, mutilation and abduction of thou- upon to do so” (Article 17(1)(e)). It stated that the
sands of adults and children, which continued to duty of every Ugandan citizen was “to protect
be carried out until late 2005.5 In January 2004 children and vulnerable persons against any form
President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni announced of abuse, harassment or ill-treatment” (Article
that he had referred the case of the LRA to the 17(1)(c)). The constitution stated that children
International Criminal Court (ICC), and arrest under the age of 16 “are entitled to be protected
warrants were issued in October 2005 for LRA from social and economic exploitation and shall
leader Joseph Kony and four senior commanders. not be employed in or required to perform work
The ICC stated that the LRA had “established a that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with
pattern of brutalization of civilians by acts includ- their education or to be harmful to their health
ing murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social
mutilation, as well as mass burnings of houses development” (Article 34(4)). It also specified
and looting of camp settlements”. The war crime that “children may not be separated from their
of forced enlistment of children below the age families or the persons entitled to bring them
of 15 was included among the charges against up against the will of their families or of those
Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti and Okot Odhiambo.6 persons, except in accordance with the law”
Two of those charged were subsequently killed; (Article 31(5)).
Raska Lukwiya was killed by government troops Uganda’s 2002 declaration on ratification of
in August 2006 and Vincent Otti died in October the Optional Protocol stated that there was no
or November 2007. According to some reports conscription and that the minimum voluntary
Otti was executed after being accused by Kony of recruitment age for the armed forces was legally
spying for the government.7 set at 18.12 The UPDF Act (2005) set the minimum
The LRA was sustained by support from the age at 18 for recruitment into the armed forces.13
Sudanese government which reportedly began Section 52(2)(c) stated that “no person shall be
in 1994; this waned in early 2005 following the enrolled into the Defence Forces unless he or
peace agreement which officially ended the civil she is at least 18 years of age and has attained
war in southern Sudan.8 Military pressure from such level of education as may be prescribed”.
the Ugandan armed forces caused the LRA partly In compliance with the Convention on the Rights
to retreat to Garamba National Park in the Demo- of the Child, the Children’s Act 2000 provided for
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in September the care, protection and maintenance of children.
the same year. The age of criminal responsibility was set at 12
Peace talks between the Ugandan govern- years of age. The act stated that “where a child is
ment and the LRA officially opened in July 2006 arrested, the police shall under justifiable circum-
in Juba, southern Sudan, and a cessation-of-hos- stances caution and release the child” (Section
tilities agreement was signed in August by both 89 (1)), that “No child shall be detained with an
parties. The talks stalled after three months of adult person” (Section 91 (8)) and that a child
negotiations, but resumed in April 2007, and the should be put in safe custody (Section 91(3)).
agreement was extended until 30 June, follow-
ing which remaining LRA combatants in Sudan Child recruitment and deployment
crossed into the DRC and assembled in Garamba The UPDF continued to hold children captured
Park.9 The Juba peace process and the LRA’s with- from the LRA for longer than the 48-hour limit
drawal from Uganda brought welcome security specified by UPDF regulations, and to use
improvements to the civilian population. No vio- children for intelligence-gathering or to identify
lent incidents attributed to the LRA were reported weapons caches. In 2005, children who escaped
from mid-2006 in Uganda, and some 300,000 or were captured or released from the LRA
displaced persons began to leave camps for were reportedly pressured by the UPDF to join
areas closer to their original homes.10 However, their forces and fight the LRA. The Ugandan
as of October 2007, 1.4 million people remained government said in March 2005 that the UPDF
in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) had never knowingly recruited a child, but
which were characterized by acute overcrowding admitted that age verification could be difficult
and lack of accommodation, medical care and and that sometimes under-18s were recruited.14
nutrition.11
Local Defence Units
Government The LDUs were established in the late 1990s to
provide protection for IDP camps and the roads
National recruitment legislation in northern Uganda. While administered and paid
The 1995 constitution required every citizen “to for by the Interior Ministry, they operated under
defend Uganda and to render national service UPDF command.15 Children below the age of 15
when necessary”, and every able-bodied citizen continued to serve in LDUs throughout 2007.

Local government officials said that under-18s bore children as a result of rape. On average
were often drawn to enlist by the promise of pay girls spent longer with the LRA than boys, since
and because of a lack of alternative educational they were defined as “wives” of commanders
or employment opportunities.16 Some 1,000 and left in rear camps with their babies. 26 The
children who were reported to have been enrolled girls, especially those with babies, found it more
into LDUs in late 2004 in Kitgum, Pader and parts difficult to return to their communities, where
of Teso had apparently not been demobilized by they were stigmatized and rejected.27
October 2007.17 Abductions decreased from 2005, with just
over 200 reported for the first six months of
Government-backed militias 2006.28 Some Sudanese and Ugandan children
Militia groups armed by government forces were were forcibly recruited by LRA fighters based in
established in several areas from 2003. They camps in southern Sudan during 2006 and early
included the Amuka militia, formed in Lango in 2007.29 About 70 children, including about ten
2003, and the Frontier Guards in Kitgum and girls, were returned from the LRA after escape
Pader and the Elephant Brigade in Gulu, all or capture in Sudan in 2007. The LRA had yet to
formed in early 2004.18 The Arrow Boys, formed release any women or children from its ranks,
in Teso in mid-2003, were used to protect IDP claiming that those remaining were their wives
camps, took part in military operations and and children. They maintained this stance despite
received some pay and training from the armed repeated pleas, including a request by the UN
forces.19 Some of the groups, including the Secretary-General. While the total number of
Frontier Guards in Kitgum, reportedly included remaining LRA fighters in the bush remained
children.20 The Amuka militia, the Arrow Boys and unknown, up to 2,000 women and children were
the Frontier Guards were reportedly demobilized believed to remain in LRA camps in the eastern
in early 2006; some of their members were DRC and southern Sudan.30
apparently absorbed into the UPDF and LDUs.
Child protection agencies were not involved in
the demobilization process, and it was not known
whether those released included children or and reintegration (DDR)
adults who had been recruited as children.21
There was no official DDR program in northern
Uganda. The majority of children leaving the LRA
Armed groups were captured by or surrendered to government
forces, or escaped. Under military procedures,
Lord’s Resistance Army LRA children were to be referred to the UPDF’s
About 25,000 children were abducted by the child protection unit and released within 48
LRA from the beginning of the conflict in the late hours. However, children were frequently held
1980s. Abductions peaked after 2002, with an for longer periods and some were used for
estimated 10,000 children abducted between intelligence purposes or as guides to identify
May 2002 and May 2003 alone.22 Throughout LRA positions and weapons caches. Fewer than
2003 and 2004 more than 20,000 child “night half the returning child soldiers registered for
commuters” sought safety each night in Gulu, demobilization with the UPDF, fearing the army
Kitgum and Pader towns, to reduce the risk itself, or rejection by their communities if they
of their abduction.23 During active hostilities were identified as LRA members.31 Those who
children in the LRA were forced to participate did not register at reception centres and who
in combat and to carry out raids, kill and returned straight home could not obtain an
mutilate other child soldiers and civilians and amnesty certificate or a resettlement package.32
loot and burn houses. Children were forced to During the 1990s non-governmental organiza-
kill relatives, including their younger siblings, tions (NGOs) and other agencies established a
often to “initiate” them into the LRA. They were number of reception centres to respond to the
trampled to death, beaten or mutilated either as needs of returning children, in Gulu, Lira and other
punishment or if physically unable to keep up locations. Such centres had assisted some 20,000
with their unit. Girls were routinely raped and returning children and youth.33 Children stayed
many bore children while in the ranks. While from three to four months in the centres, which
thousands of children managed to escape or offered a variety of services, including medical
were captured by government troops, large assistance, family tracing, recreational activities,
counselling and psychosocial support. Some
S—Z
numbers of those abducted, and their children,

remained unaccounted for. Many were believed offered training programs, mainly focused on life
to have died in battle, to have been killed by their skills, and basic skills training. While the children
abductors or to have died from injury or illness.24 were at the centres, efforts were made to prepare
In some regions an estimated 24 per cent of families and communities for the children’s return.
LRA child soldiers were girls.25 Girls as young as In practice, support for children at reception cen-
12 were used in combat and for other military tres varied widely and was often inadequate, par-
purposes, as well as for sexual slavery. Many ticularly in relation to health and trauma issues.34

© Jake Price 2005
Former child soldier, handicapped after stepping on a land mine, World Vision
rehabilitation centre, Gulu, northern Uganda

The number of former child soldiers entering Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation
the reception centres decreased substantially on 29 June 2007. It set out a national framework
after 2004. In one survey only about 600 children to address “serious crimes, human rights viola-
were found to have arrived at centres in 2005.35 tions and adverse socioeconomic and political
By June 2007, following the LRA’s retreat to the impacts” of the conflict and to promote peace
DRC and Sudan, many reception centres were and reconciliation. The agreement provided
almost empty.36 Difficulties faced by children for the prosecution in Ugandan courts of those
returning to their communities were widely who “bear particular responsibility for the most
reported. Girls in particular faced rejection, serious crimes”, to be complemented by tradi-
especially those who returned with babies. In one tional justice and other informal processes and
study, returning child soldiers in the Teso region reparations to be established in law. The parties
reported extensive and persistent stigmatization agreed to negotiate subsequently an annex to the
and rejection by their communities and constant agreement “to set out elaborated principles and
bullying by their peers at school. They also noted mechanisms for implementation”.43 Human rights
that assistance which set them apart from other organizations emphasized that national trials in
war-affected children provoked jealousy in the Uganda would not represent an alternative to
community.37 the ICC unless certain benchmarks were reached,
including fulfilment of the conditions that the tri-
als were credible, impartial and independent, ap-
Developments plied appropriate penalties and were consistent
Justice and accountability with international fair trial standards.44
In January 2004 President Museveni publicly Other developments
announced that he had referred the case of the
In June 2006 the Special Representative of
LRA to the International Criminal Court (ICC). In
the Secretary-General for children and armed
October 2005 the ICC unsealed arrest warrants
conflict visited Uganda. During the visit the
against LRA leader Joseph Kony and four senior
government acknowledged the presence of
commanders. They were accused of crimes
children in the UPDF and in LDUs. It agreed to
against humanity and war crimes, including
strengthen the implementation of existing legal
murder, abduction, rape, mutilation and sexual
and policy frameworks on the recruitment and
enslavement. Three of the five were charged with
use of children in armed conflict, to monitor the
the forced enlistment of children below the age
implementation of various laws and to remove
of 15.38 Human rights organizations and others
children found in the armed forces.45
emphasized the need for the ICC prosecutor
Representatives of the Security Council Work-
to act independently and to investigate crimes
ing Group on children in armed conflict visited
committed by all parties to the conflict, including
northern Uganda in February 2006. In July 2007
government forces.39
the chair of the Working Group issued a public
The involvement of the ICC was widely
statement condemning the recruitment and use
believed to have added impetus to the peace
of children, and other abuses by the LRA, and
process, but potential tensions emerged over the
urging it to take immediate steps to release un-
objectives of peace and justice. The security of
conditionally children associated with its forces.46
children still with the LRA was a major concern,
and there were fears that their safety would be The LRA, the UPDF and LDUs were listed as par-
further endangered if hostilities resumed. ties recruiting and using children in the Annex to
Civil society organizations raised concerns the Secretary-General’s annual report on children
that the threat of prosecution would cause the and armed conflict between 2002 and 2007.
LRA to withdraw from peace negotiations: the At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
LRA repeatedly cited the ICC indictments as Paris, Uganda and 58 other states endorsed
an obstacle to finalizing a peace agreement.40 the Paris Commitments to protect children from
unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces or
Concern was also expressed that the ICC’s
armed groups and the Paris Principles and guide-
involvement would undermine progress achieved
lines on children associated with armed forces or
through the 2000 Amnesty Act which provided
armed groups. The documents reaffirmed inter-
a framework for the surrender and reintegration
national standards and operational principles for
of LRA and other insurgents.41 Several surveys
protecting and assisting child soldiers and fol-
revealed complex views among the population,
lowed a wide-ranging global consultation jointly
with variations across different regions and
S—Z
sponsored by the French government and UNICEF.

levels of exposure to LRA and UPDF abuses.
Some emphasized traditional justice processes
and reconciliation, but a significant proportion 1 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Stolen Children:
expressed the view that LRA members, UPDF Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda,
troops and political leaders should be punished March 2003; HRW, Uprooted and Forgotten:
for conflict-related crimes.42 Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern
The government and the LRA signed the Uganda, September 2005.

2 HRW, above note 1; Amnesty International (AI), 23 Report of the Secretary-General on children and
Uganda: Doubly Traumatised: Lack of Access armed conflict in Uganda, UN Doc. S/2007/260,
to Justice for Female Victims of Sexual and 7 May 2007; Report of the Secretary-General
Gender-Based Violence in Northern Uganda, 30 on children and armed conflict, UN Doc.
November 2007, AI Index: AFR 59/005/2007. S/2003/1053, 10 November 2003.
3 HRW, Get the Gun! Human Rights Violations by 24 HRW, above note 1; Child Soldiers Coalition, Child
Uganda’s National Army in Law Enforcement Soldiers Global Report 2004.
Operations in Karamoja Region, September 2007. 25 Berkeley-Tulane Initiative on Vulnerable
4 IRIN, “Uganda: Children killed in Military Populations, Abducted: The Lord’s Resistance
operation – charity”, 30 March 2007. Army and Forced Conscription in Northern
5 HRW, Uprooted and Forgotten, above note 1. Uganda, Human Rights Center, University of
California, Berkeley and Payson Center for
6 International Criminal Court (ICC), “Warrant of
International Development, June 2007.
arrest unsealed against five LRA commanders”,
press release, 14 October 2005, www.icc-cpi.int. 26 UNICEF, A Hard Homecoming: Lessons Learned
from the Reception Center Process on Effective
7 “Uganda peace talks to restart despite death of
Interventions for Former “Abductees” in Northern
senior rebel leader”, Independent, 16 August
Uganda, June 2006, www.unicef.org.
2006; “Vincent Otti is confirmed dead”, New
Vision, 21 November 2007; “Uganda’s LRA 27 Rights & Democracy, Where Are the Girls? Girls in
confirm Otti death”, BBC News, 23 January 2008. Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone
and Mozambique: Their Lives during and after the
8 HRW, Uprooted and Forgotten, above note 1.
War, 2004, www.ichrdd.ca.
9 International Crisis Group (ICG), Northern Uganda
28 Report of the Secretary-General, 7 May 2007,
Peace Process: The Need to Maintain Momentum,
above note 23.
14 September 2007.
29 “LRA soldiers beat me and left me for dead”, IRIN
News, 16 July 2007.
armed conflict in Uganda, UN Doc. S/2007/260, 7
May 2007. 30 Report of the Secretary-General, 7 May 2007,
above note 23.
11 “Uganda, Humanitarian Country Profile”, IRIN,
December 2007. 31 UNICEF, The State of Youth and Youth
Participation in Northern Uganda: Findings from
the Survey for War-Affected Youth, June 2006,
www.unicef.org.
32 UNICEF, above note 26.
Consideration of report submitted by Uganda,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/UGA/ 33 Abducted, above note 25.
CO/2, 23 November 2005. 34 Child Soldiers Coalition, Returning Home:
14 HRW, “Submission to the Committee on the Children’s Perspectives on Reintegration, a Case
Rights of the Child (CRC)”, May 2005; Reports Study of Children Abducted by the LRA in Teso,
of the Secretary-General on children and armed Eastern Uganda, February 2008.
conflict, UN Docs. A/61/529-S/2006/826, 26 35 UNICEF, above note 26.
October 2006, and A/62/609-S/2007/757, 21 36 Abducted, above note 25.
December 2007.
37 Redress, Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes? Child
15 HRW, above note 14. Soldiers before the International Criminal Court,
16 Ibid. September 2006, www.redress.org; Coalition,
17 Report of the Secretary-General, 26 October above note 34.
2006, above note 14; Human Rights Watch, above 38 ICC, above note 6.
note 14. 39 HRW, “ICC to investigate all sides in Uganda”, 4
18 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian February 2005.
Affairs (OCHA), “Humanitarian Update Uganda 40 For example, “Ugandan rebels demand ICC drop
February 2004”, Vol. VI, Iss. II”, 29 February 2004, indictments”, Deutsche Presse Agentur, 9 July
www.reliefweb.int. 2007, www.reliefweb.int.
19 Information from AI, March 2004. 41 Refugees International, “Uganda: challenges
20 M. Wessells, Child Soldiers: From Violence to of peace and justice”, 19 February 2008, www.
Protection, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, refugeesinternational.org; Redress, above note
MA, 2006. 37; Coalition, above note 34.
21 Child Soldiers Coalition sources, September
2007.
22 Report of the UN Secretary-General, 26 October
2006, above note 14.

42 Redress, above note 37; Oxfam International, The
Building Blocks of Sustainable Peace, September UKR A I N E
2007; International Center for Transitional
Justice, Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Ukraine
Survey of Attitudes about Peace and Justice in
Northern Uganda, 2005, www.ictj.org; UN Office Population: 46.5 million (9.1 million under 18)
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Government armed forces: 187,600
Making Peace our Own: Victims’ Perceptions of
Accountability, Reconciliation and Transitional
Justice in Northern Uganda, 2007, www.ohchr. Voluntary recruitment age: 19
org. Voting age: 18
43 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Optional Protocol: ratified 11 July 2005
between the Government of the Republic Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/ CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182
Movement, Juba, Sudan, 29 June 2007.
44 HRW, Uganda: The June 29 Agreement on Orphans and the children of military
Accountability and Reconciliation and the Need personnel could be given intensive
for Adequate Penalties for the Most Serious preparation for military careers from the
Crimes, July 2007.
45 Report of the Secretary-General, 7 May 2007,
age of 15, and 17-year-olds could enrol in a
above note 23. higher military education institution.
46 Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict,
Message to the head of the Lord’s Resistance
Army delegation to the Juba peace talks through a
Context
public statement by the Chairman of the Working In April 2005 Ukraine launched an intensified
Group to be transmitted by the Special Envoy for dialogue with NATO but extensive military reform
the areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army, was necessary before it could enter into full
UN Doc. S/AC.51/2007/13, 20 July 2007. NATO membership. In a 2006 defence policy
paper, Ukraine outlined plans for transition to a
non-conscript army by 2010, as well as improving
social benefits for troops and modernizing
equipment.1
Amendments to the Criminal Code in January
2006 brought Ukraine closer in line with the
Optional Protocol. Imprisonment of up to 12 years
was introduced for the use of trafficked children
in an armed conflict, the same offence being
punishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment if
committed by an organized gang (Article 149).
Government
practice
An amendment to the 1999 Law on Military Duty
and Military Service, adopted in March 2005,
reduced the conscription pool. Previously, men
between the ages of 18 and 27 were liable for
conscription, but the new law set an upper age
limit of 25 years. It also reduced the length of
service for conscripts: from 24 months to 18 in
the navy, and from 18 months to 12 in the army
and air force, with university graduates serving
nine months and junior commanders three.
Voluntary contracts in the armed forces of up
S—Z
to three years were available to men and women

between the ages of 19 and 30.2
There was no reduction in the length of
alternative service for conscientious objectors,
which remained punitive at 27 months.3 A list of
ten minority religious groups whose members
were eligible to apply had been specified in a

1999 government decree.4 Objectors from Jewish International standards
or majority faiths, or who were not religious, had
In July 2005 Ukraine ratified the Optional
no alternative to compulsory military service.
Protocol, stating in its declaration that 19 was the
In November 2006 the UN Human Rights
minimum age for voluntary enlistment.10
Committee considered Ukraine’s sixth report
on its implementation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 1 Ministry of Defence, White Book 2006: Defence
noted that the right to conscientious objection Policy of Ukraine, www.mil.gov.ua.
against mandatory military service should be 2 Ministry of Defence, Professional Army,
fully respected, for those of all religions as Conditions of acceptance on service on contract
well as non-religious conscientious objectors. basis, www.mil.gov.ua.
The Committee also noted that new recruits in 3 1999 Law on Alternative Service, No. 3108
the armed forces were still subject to hazing 15, as amended on 17 November 2005, cited
– systematic abuse and humiliation by longer- in Conscience and Peace Tax International,
serving or senior soldiers which sometimes Submission to UN Human Rights Committee, 22
involved acts of considerable violence. One June 2006, www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/
recruit in Zhytomyr region had died as a result docs/ngos/CPTI.pdf; Marc Stolwijk, The Right
of hazing in January 2005. The Committee to Conscientious Objection in Europe: A Review
of the Current Situation, Quaker Council for
urged Ukraine to ensure that hazing stopped,
European Affairs, April 2005, http://www.quaker.
by adopting disciplinary measures against org/qcea/coreport.
the soldiers responsible and facilitating the
intervention of independent monitors such as the 4 Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 2066/199.
Ombudsman.5 5 UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration of
sixth report submitted by Ukraine, Concluding
Military training and military schools observations, UN Doc. CCPR/C/UKR/CO/6, 28
November 2006.
Young people could enrol for training in a
6 Ministry of Defence, above note 2, Military
higher military education institution between
Education.
the ages of 17 and 21.6 Potential officers could
enrol between the ages of 18 and 23. In 2005 7 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 381 of 26 May
the Ministry of Defence announced the closure 2005.
of 23 higher military schools by 2009, among 8 Kiev National University “Enlightment” website,
them the Mikolaiv Military Motor College and www.osvita.org.ua; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15
the Vasilkiv Air Force College.7 All higher military December 2006, www.nvo.ng.ru.
education for ground troops was in future to be 9 Crimean Ministry of Education and Science,
concentrated in one national university at Lviv. www.ccssu.crimea.ua/edu/school/military.html.
Among reasons given for the closures were falling 10 Declaration on accession to the Optional
enrolments and students’ need for vocational Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.
skills which they could transfer to civilian life.8
At least one secondary-school offered two
years’ intensive military preparation from the age
of 15, specifically for orphans and the children
of military personnel. The orphans’ secondary-
school in the Crimean town of Alushta reported
that in 2004, 90 per cent of its former students
had gone on to a career in the armed forces.9
Developments
In October 2007 Ukraine endorsed the Paris

1 Global Security, “Emirati Forces”,
United A rab www.globalsecurity.org/
2 “Military recruitment law approved”, Khaleej
E mirates Times online, 9 April 2003, www.khaleejtimes.
com.
United Arab Emirates 3 US State Department, Human Rights Report
Population: 4.5 million (1.2 million under 18) 4 UAE State report to the International Conference
Government armed forces: 50,500 on Education, September 2004, www.ibe.unesco.
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription org/ (Arabic).
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 for officers and 5 Ibid.
women; unknown for others
Voting age: not applicable

in the armed forces. There was limited
information available on the minimum
age for voluntary recruitment. Children
between 15 and 18 years old received
military training at school.
Government
practice
The constitution stated that “defence of the
union is a sacred duty for every citizen” (Article
43). There was no conscription, and migrants
comprised some 30 per cent of the armed forces.1
No information about voluntary recruitment was
provided in the UAE’s report to the UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child in October 2001.
The law on the recruitment of UAE nationals
as armed forces officers set the minimum age for
recruitment at 18, and required officer recruits
to be graduates of the UAE or other recognized
military educational institutions.2 The minimum
age for recruitment to other ranks remained
unclear.
The government encouraged women to
join the UAE military.3 Recruitment was open to
women between the ages of 18 and 28, provided
they had completed middle school.4

Military education was part of the secondary-
school curriculum for students aged 15 to 18.
It aimed at “inculcating values of patriotism,
self-denial and readiness to defend one’s country
S—Z
in students and thus motivate them to take up

military careers”. Voluntary professional military
training began at the completion of secondary
education. Training took place at nine military
schools (including two schools for female
recruits).5

into the Territorial Army, which operated on a
United K ingdom part-time basis, was from age 17 for both soldiers
and officers.4 All three services required parental
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern or guardian consent for those enlisting below the
Ireland age of 18.
As at 1 April 2007 there were 1,000 non-officer
Population: 59.7 million (13.1 million under 18) members of the regular forces aged 16, and 3,470
Government armed forces: 191,000 aged 17; 355 of these were female. The majority
Compulsory recruitment age: No conscription of under-18s were members of the army, with far
Voluntary recruitment age: 16 fewer in the navy and the air force.5
Voting age: 18 In its initial report to the UN Committee on
Optional Protocol: ratified 24 June 2003 the Rights of the Child on implementation of
the Optional Protocol, the government argued
that “To be unable to recruit from this age group
CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182 would mean that high quality school leavers
would settle into other careers and thus be
The UK appeared to intensify its efforts lost to the Services. This would create serious
to recruit under-18s with a range of manning problems for the Armed Forces since
recruitment methods during the reporting 30% of all recruits in 2006/07 were aged under
period, at the same time strengthening 18. The Services, in particular the Army, would be
safeguards for their protection. unable to man current structures and maintain
current capabilities.”6 Reflecting this position,
the government resisted calls made by the
Context House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC
– see below) to consider raising the minimum
In March 2007 the last remaining UK forces recruitment age to 18.7
were withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina, In ratifying the Optional Protocol, the
but sizeable contingents continued to serve in government stated that safeguards to protect
Afghanistan and Iraq. As of 5 September 2007, a under-18s were maintained by informing the
total of 76 British Forces personnel or Ministry of potential recruit about the nature of military
Defence (MoD) civilians had died while serving duties, ensuring that the decision to enlist was
in Afghanistan since the start of operations in voluntary, and obtaining free and informed
November 2001. As of 9 August 2007, a total parental consent. Doubts about the effectiveness
of 168 British Armed Forces personnel or MoD of some of these safeguards were expressed,
civilians had died in Iraq (during Operation TELIC) particularly in relation to the army. Reports
since the start of the campaign in March 2003.1 by the Adult Learning Inspectorate (ALI)8 on
armed services training published in 2005 and
Government 2007 spoke of recruitment practices being
“overzealous” and contributing to a “very high
National recruitment legislation and drop-out rate”9 and of recruitment procedures
practice and materials which “sometimes mislead”, with
some recruits reporting that they had been
There was no conscription into the UK armed steered into trades for which they were unsuited
forces and no statutory minimum age for or had little interest, but where shortages
recruitment. In November 2006 the government existed.10
replaced separate disciplinary legislation In the case of all three services, recruits,
covering the armed forces with a new Armed regardless of age, were not permitted to leave
Forces Act,2 which, while providing for the during the first 28 days of duty. They could then
drawing up of regulations regarding enlistment exercise “discharge as of right” and leave within
and terms and conditions of enlistment and the first six months.11 After the expiration of the
service by the Defence Council, failed to include a “discharge as of right” period, under-18 recruits
statutory minimum age for enlistment. to the army had no legal right to be transferred
In practice, enlistment for “non-officers” to the reserve until the age of 22, for which 12
was not permitted until the age of 16, although months’ notice had to be given.12 The normal
application could be made up to five months procedure was for all new recruits to enlist for
previously in the case of the army and up to a 22-year “open engagement”. Those ending
three months previously for the navy and the air their (regular) service before the completion of
force. Officers could be recruited into the navy this period were required to serve in the army
from the age of 17, into the air force from 17 reserve for the balance of the 22 years or for a
and a half, and into the army from 17 years and period of six years, whichever was less.13 Armed
9 months. The minimum enlistment age to the forces personnel under the age of 18 years and
army’s Brigade of Gurkhas was 17 and a half on 3 months could also apply for discretionary
31 January of the year following enlistment.3 Entry permission to leave before their eighteenth

birthday if they were “genuinely unhappy”. The most recent Army Continuous Attitude Survey
government itself acknowledged that this did not showed that 22 per cent of serving soldiers and
offer “discharge as of right”.14 Terms of service 50 per cent of serving officers had been part of a
for all three services were complicated and cadet organization.26
potentially confusing for new recruits, especially
those under 18 with low educational attainment.15 Military training and military schools
Those undertaking specialist employment In the case of the army, most 16-year-olds
training in all three services were required to were enlisted through “junior entry” and then
waive their right to give 12 months’ notice to underwent phase 1 training of between 14 weeks
terminate their contracts after the minimum and a year for a general introduction to military
required period of service, which could mean life, including drill. They were then sent to phase
the deferment of their ability to transfer to the 2 establishments, where they were trained and
reserve.16 Set against this, recruitment literature lived alongside older trainees for technical and
aimed at school leavers stressed opportunities professional training. Phase 2 training could last
for gaining educational and vocational between a few weeks and up to a year for more
qualifications without referring explicitly to the specialist training. Those recruited at 17, but
resulting obligation to remain in the services for also some aged 16 (all generally referred to as
longer periods. In concluding that recruitment to “single entry” recruits), were trained by the Army
the army should remain open to 16- and 17-year- Training Regiment alongside adult recruits at a
olds, the Deepcut Review (see below) highlighted number of other establishments.27 Recruits to the
the benefits to some young people of training army with specific qualifications could also enlist
opportunities offered by the armed forces, as apprentices in the Technical Corps between
commenting on the lack of opportunity for less the ages of 16 and 17, training in a range of trades
educationally inclined 16-year-olds in the UK.17 over a period of a year or more. Enlistment as an
In 2005 ALI commented that the “early drop- apprentice was on the same terms as for ordinary
out is very high, varying from about 15 per cent recruits, with a commitment to serve a minimum
for the Royal Air Force to 47 per cent in the Royal of four years from the age of 18. Students
Marines”, with more than a third of all entrants were paid during training.28 Periods of training
dropping out during the initial training period in for under-18s in the navy and air force varied
the army.18 according to chosen career paths.
The primary target group for the armed There were no schools operated by or under
forces’ promotional activity was children and the control of the armed forces, but the Defence
adolescents. A National Audit Office report Sixth Form College in Leicestershire, specifically
published in November 2006 noted that the aimed at recruiting and training engineers for the
services were “developing their youth strategies armed forces, was established by the MoD and
in order to raise awareness at an earlier age was overseen by the Defence Academy.29 While
to secure similar levels of recruitment from a there was no legal obligation to join the armed
smaller target population”. There were concerns forces on completing their studies, parents of
that those non-officer recruits who were of students who did not do so were required to
low educational attainment and from poor repay a contribution towards teaching costs.30
communities19 were joining as a last resort and
for other negative reasons, including the lack Child recruitment and deployment
of civilian career options in their particular The government stated that due to periods of
communities.20 recruit training, the number of under-18s joining
The Ministry of Defence Armed Forces Youth the “trained strength” of the armed forces and
Policy, aiming to promote the reputation of the liable for employment in military operations
armed forces and improve recruitment, had a was “small”. On 1 April 2007 the total “trained
particular focus on young people at risk of social strength” of under-18s was said to be 730
exclusion.21 The MoD and the Youth Justice Board individuals – 0.5% of the total trained strength
for England and Wales in late 2004 launched of the armed forces. Very few of these under-18s
a joint pilot program of courses which did not were said to be posted to higher-readiness (i.e.
involve military training, but offered challenging “frontline”) units, and the likelihood of under-18s
outdoor activities and development of teamwork, taking a direct part in hostilities was therefore
leadership and self-esteem. Those successfully said to be “very small”.31 In March 2006 the
completing the program were to be referred to Deepcut Review (see below), while stopping
S—Z
local cadet forces,22 which were not part of the short of recommending a ban on the recruitment
armed forces but were sponsored by the MoD of under-18s into the army, recommended that
and said to be at the core of the Youth Policy.23 phase 1 and 2 training should be such that no
Boys and girls aged between ten and 18 recruit joined their unit until they reached the age
could join either the combined cadet force (CCF) of 18.32 In its June 2006 response to the Review,
units based in schools24 or cadet forces for the the government indicated that the possibility
separate services linked to an establishment of of ensuring that trainees reached the age of 18
one of the regular or reserve armed forces.25 The

before being posted to their units was being The Deepcut Review, established in December
considered.33 2004 to review the circumstances surrounding
On signing the Optional Protocol in the deaths of the four soldiers, was published in
September 2000 the government had made March 2006.40 It concluded that, on the balance
a declaration reserving the right to deploy of probabilities, the deaths of three of the
members of its armed forces under the age of 18 soldiers41 were self-inflicted and that bullying,
to take a direct part in hostilities where “there ill-treatment or sexual harassment did not cause
is a genuine military need to deploy their unit their deaths (although the Review identified “low
or ship to an area in which hostilities are taking morale” among recruits as a problem), but that
place; and … by reason of the nature and urgency the opportunity for self-infliction was afforded
of the situation … it is not practicable to withdraw by a policy of frequently assigning unsupervised
such persons before deployment; or … to do so phase 2 trainees to armed guard duty at Deepcut.
would undermine the operational effectiveness The Review recommended that the appropriate
of their ship or unit, and thereby put at risk the minimum age for armed guard duty (outside the
successful completion of the military mission context of training that was directly supervised
and/or the safety of other personnel”. Personnel by an experienced adult soldier) should be 18
under 18 were not to be deployed on UN throughout the armed forces.42 The Review also
peacekeeping operations in line with UN policy.34 made a number of recommendations about the
The government reported in June 2007 that training of under-18s and the need for special
18 personnel aged under 18 had been deployed measures to be taken to protect their welfare.
into “areas where they may be exposed to In March 2007 ALI published its second report
hostilities” since the signing of the Optional following its inspections of training methods in
Protocol in 2003, but none since July 2005. The the armed services which had begun in 2004.
government further indicated that at least 15 of The report talked of “substantial improvements”
these were 17-year-olds who had been deployed since its previous inspections.43
to Iraq between 2003 and 2005, four of them
were female and the vast majority were deployed Detention of suspected child soldiers
within a week of their eighteenth birthdays or In 2006 the International Committee of the Red
were removed from theatre within a week of their Cross (ICRC) registered 59 children in detention
arrival. Only four under-18s were said to have during 16 visits to five places of detention
been deployed for a period of greater than two or or internment in Iraq controlled by the UK or
three weeks.35 the United States (USA).44 However, the UK
authorities claimed that as of October 2005
Treatment of child recruits they were not holding any women or children in
The fallout from the deaths of four soldiers at detention.45 The government issued directions
the Deepcut army barracks in Surrey between to its armed forces on the treatment of prisoners
1995 and 2002, two of whom were aged 17, of war, internees and detainees in May 2006,
continued. In March 2005 the House of Commons with a chapter on the treatment of juveniles
Defence Committee published its report into and children which clarified that the policy
the MoD’s “duty of care” in armed forces’ was to transfer prisoners who were or were
training establishments. The Committee found believed to be juveniles to the ICRC as quickly as
that the armed forces had failed to supervise practicable.46
adequately young recruits and noted the lack
of an independent complaints procedure for Developments
abuse victims. It recommended that the MoD
formulate a policy for the care of under-18s as if The UK government continued to incorporate
it acted in loco parentis.36 Policy guidelines were the issue of children in armed conflict in their
subsequently issued by the MoD in July 2005 and foreign policy commitments. The Department
revised and reissued in March 2007, but these for International Development (DfID) financed a
made it clear that “duty of care” responsibilities number of projects for children affected by armed
arose from the employment of under-18s and conflict, with a particular focus on programs
not from acting in loco parentis.37 The “duty concerned with demobilizing and reintegrating
of care” report also raised concerns about child soldiers into their communities.47
the lack of checks on the suitability of those At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in
supervising under-18s at training establishments, Paris, the UK and 58 other states endorsed
recommending that Criminal Records Bureau and the Paris Commitments to protect children
military service checks should be made before from unlawful recruitment or use by armed
appointing such supervisors.38 In October 2004 a forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles
former training instructor at Deepcut was jailed and guidelines on children associated with
for a number of indecent assaults on young armed forces or armed groups. The documents
soldiers between 1992 and 1997. His victims were reaffirmed international standards and
reported to have been aged between 17 and 21.39 operational principles for protecting and assisting

child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global 16 Army Terms of Service Regulations 1992 (SI
consultation jointly sponsored by the French No.1365), Regulation 11, restricted rights to
government and UNICEF. transfer to the reserve, as well as other perceived
“benefits”, to those undergoing training of
anything more than two weeks. A course lasting
1 Ministry of Defence, “Operations in Iraq: British more than three months could invite a restriction
fatalities”, defence fact sheet, www.mod.uk. of the right to be transferred to the reserve before
These figures include those killed in action and the expiry of up to six years. Similar restrictions
those who died as a result of illness, non-combat existed under Regulation 12 of the Royal Air
injuries or accident. Force Terms of Service Regulations 2007, and
2 Armed Forces Act 2006, c. 52. Regulation 5 of the Royal Navy Terms of Service
3 As set out in British Gurkhas Nepal Standing (Ratings) Regulations 2006.
Instruction No.5.01, para 12. Gurkha recruits 17 Nicholas Blake QC, The Deepcut Review: a review
undertook a 39-week basic training package. of the circumstances surrounding the deaths of
4 Army Jobs, “Entry requirements”, www.armyjobs. four soldiers at Princess Royal Barracks, Deepcut,
mod.uk. between 1995 and 2002, March 2006, www.
5 Defence Analytical Services Agency, TSP 08, “Age official-documents.gov.uk.
distribution: UK regular male/female other ranks 18 “Safer training”, above note 9.
by age and service”, www.dasa.mod.uk. Note that 19 Up to 50 per cent of recruits were reported to
the figures refer to UK regular forces and do not have literacy and numeracy skills at Entry Level
include Gurkhas or the Home Service battalions 3 (equivalent to those of an average 11-year-old)
of the Royal Irish Regiment. or Entry Level 2 (equivalent to an average 7-year-
6 Initial periodic report of the UK to the UN old). House of Commons Defence Committee,
Committee on the Rights of the Child on “Duty of care”, www.publications.parliament.uk.
implementation of the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. 20 David Gee, Informed choice? Armed forces
CRC/C/OPAC/GBR/1, 3 September 2007. recruitment practice in the United Kingdom,
7 House of Commons Defence Committee’s Third November 2007, www.informedchoice.co.uk.
Report of Session 2004–05, “Duty of Care”, www. 21 MoD, “Strategy for delivery of MOD youth
publications.parliament.uk. initiatives”, paper by Directorate of Reserve
8 ALI, a non-departmental public body, became Forces and Cadets, April 2005, www.mod.uk.
part of the new Office for Standards in Education, 22 Youth Justice Board News, No. 25 (November
Children’s Services and Skills (OFSTED) in April 2004), www.yjb.gov.uk.
2007. 23 MOD, www.mod.uk.
9 ALI, “Safer training”, March 2005, www.mod.uk. 24 Minimum ages were: Sea Cadet Corps – 12 years
10 ALI, “Better training”, March 2007, www.mod.uk. (with some units having junior sections for
11 Army Terms of Service (Amendment) Regulations 10–12-year-olds), Army Cadet Force – 13 years,
1999 (SI No.1610), Regulation 7A(2); Royal Navy Air Training Corps – 13 years. Of 253 CCF units
Terms of Service (Ratings) Regulations 2006, in operation in July 2006, only 52 were reported
Regulation 7 (SI No. 2918); Royal Air Force Terms to be in state schools, and most of these were
of Service Regulations 2007, Regulation 8; all at grammar schools. In June 2006 the government
www.opsi.gov.uk. announced a plan to set up six new CCF units
12 This “notice period” of four years, required in in state schools in “deprived areas”. “Gordon
order to transfer to the reserve while serving Brown wants more children to see the benefits of
a 22-year term, was available to all recruits being a cadet. But is he doing it the best way?”,
regardless of age (Regulation 5 of the Army Guardian, 25 July 2006.
Terms of Service Regulations 1992 (SI No.1365), 25 Defence Analytical Services Agency, UK Defence
as amended by the Army Terms of Service Statistics 2005, www.dasa.mod.uk.
(Amendment) (No.2) Regulations 1999 (SI 26 MOD, Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Surveys:
No.2764)), but the notice period could not begin Army: Mar–Jul 2006, www.mod.uk.
until a recruit had reached the age of 18, thereby 27 “Duty of care”, above note 19; MoD, Army Jobs,
making the minimum term of service for 16-year- “Soldier training”, www.armyjobs.mod.uk.
old recruits six years followed by a period of six
years’ service in the reserve. 28 Army, “Training establishments”, www.army.mod.
uk.
13 Regulation 12, Army Terms of Service Regulations
1992 (SI No.1365). 29 The Defence Academy was responsible for
postgraduate education and the majority
14 Initial periodic report, above note 6. of command, staff, leadership, defence
S—Z
15 For Terms of Service see above note 11. management, acquisition and technology training
for members of the UK armed forces and MoD
civil servants; www.defac.ac.uk. See also Ministry
of Defence, “Individual Training and Education
in the Armed Forces”, Policy Paper No.6, 2004,
www.mod.uk.

30 MoD, Army Jobs, “Welbeck – the defence sixth
form college”, www.armyjobs.mod.uk. United States
31 Initial periodic report, above note 6.
32 Deepcut Review, above note 17. of A merica
33 MoD, “The government’s response to the Deepcut
Review”, June 2006, www.mod.uk. United States of America
34 Report of the Secretary-General on the
implementation of the recommendations of the Population: 298.2 million (74.9 million under 18)
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Government armed forces: 1,506,800
23 February 1999, UN Doc A/AC/121/43; reflected Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscription
in Policy on the Care of Service Personnel under not currently in force)
the Age of 18, provided as Annexure B to the Voluntary recruitment age: 17
initial periodic report, above note 6. See also the
Voting age: 18
UK’s declaration on ratification of the Additional
Protocol, www2.ohchr.org/; Foreign and Optional Protocol: ratified 23 December 2002
Commonwealth Office, Explanatory Memorandum Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
on the Optional Protocol to the United Nations ILO 182
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1 February
2003, www.fco.gov.uk. The total number of 17-year-olds enlisting
35 Communication from the Ministry of Defence to in the armed services dropped by nearly
the Child Soldiers Coalition, 7 November 2007. 50 per cent between 2002 and 2005.
36 House of Commons Defence Committee’s Third The USA detained under-18s suspected
Report of Session 2004–05 on “Duty of Care”,
www.publications.parliament.uk. of participating in armed activities in
37 Policy on the Care of Service Personnel, above Afghanistan and Iraq. Under-18s were also
note 34. detained in Guantánamo Bay.
38 “Duty of care”, above note 19.
39 “Deepcut army sex attacker jailed”, BBC News,
22 October 2004.
Context
40 Deepcut Review, above note 17. In late 2006, US troops were stationed in
41 Sean Benton, Cheryl James and Geoff Gray. The 146 countries worldwide. The largest foreign
inquest into the death of James Collinson was deployment was to Iraq, where US armed forces
ongoing during the course of the review, and the were engaged in military operations following the
report therefore did not deal with the particular fall of the Iraqi government in April 2003. As of
facts of his death. October 2007, approximately 198,000 US troops
42 Deepcut Review, above note 17. were stationed in and around Iraq.1 According to
43 “Better training”, above note 10.
the US Department of Defense, between March
2003 and 24 October 2007, 3,833 US soldiers
44 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Iraq”, and Defense Department civilian workers died in
ICRC Annual Report 2006, May 2007, www.icrc.
the conflict, and over 28,000 were wounded.2
org.
US forces were also engaged in military
45 Amnesty International, “Beyond Abu Ghraib: operations in Afghanistan, with approximately
detention and torture in Iraq”, March 2006, AI 26,000 US troops stationed in the country in
Index MDE 14/001/2006.
2007.3 Between October 2001 and 24 October
46 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1-10: “Prisoners 2007, 383 US soldiers were killed and 1,707
of war, internees and detainees”, Chapter 2B on wounded in or around Afghanistan, as part of
the treatment of juveniles and children, provided “Operation Enduring Freedom”. An additional 62
as Annexure J to the initial periodic report, above
US soldiers were killed in other locations as part
note 6.
of the operation.4
47 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights
Report 2006, www.fco.gov.uk.
Government
practice
The USA currently maintained an all-volunteer
military force, and accepted both male and
female recruits from the age of 17 (US Code, Title
10 Section 505(a)). Parental consent was required
for under-18s. The present law regulating
conscription (50 USC App 454.455) allowed for
it at the age of 18, although conscription had

not been activated since 1973, at the end of the aptitude scores. In previous years the Army had
Vietnam war. allowed only 2 per cent of its recruits to have
In 2002 the US Congress enacted the No aptitude scores in the lowest 30 per cent, but
Child Left Behind Act of 2002, which required raised this limit to 4 per cent in 2005. In fiscal
secondary-schools to provide military recruiters year 2006, 2,600 enlistees (3.8 per cent) with
with the names, addresses and telephone low aptitude scores were accepted for service.11
numbers of all juniors and seniors (typically The proportion of recruits holding a high-school
ages 16–18), and to conduct recruiting activities diploma was 81.2 per cent as of August 2006,
on school premises. Following enactment of for the second year in a row falling below the
the law, the number of schools denying access Defense Department’s benchmark of 90 per
to the military dropped from 8–10 per cent in cent.12
2001 to less than 1 per cent in 2005.5 In March In 2006, 486,594 high-school students were
2007 proposed legislation entitled the Student enrolled in the Junior Reserve Officer Training
Privacy Protection Act of 2007 was introduced Corps (JROTC), an elective program for students
into Congress. Its provisions would amend the from the age of 14, with more than 3,300 units
No Child Left Behind Act to allow a student’s based in secondary-schools across the country.13
personal information to be provided to the The program’s stated goal was to “motivate
military only if his or her parent or guardian young people to be better citizens”. Courses were
provided explicit, written consent.6 taught by retired military personnel, and included
military drills with both real and dummy firearms.
Child recruitment Total enrolment in the program grew by 8 per cent
In the year ending 30 September 2005, 13,793 between 2001 and 2006, fuelled by a 57 per cent
recruits aged 17 joined the US armed forces increase in federal funding for the program. An
– 6,780 into the active armed forces (5,387 boys estimated 40 per cent of students who graduated
and 1,393 girls), representing 4.46 per cent of from high school with two or more years in the
all new active duty recruits, and 7,013 into the JROTC eventually enlisted in the military.14
reserve forces (5,013 boys and 2,000 girls),
representing 15.3 per cent of the total reserves. Child deployment
The total number of 17-year-olds enlisting in the Nearly all 17-year-olds who enlisted in the US
armed services dropped by nearly 50 per cent military were still attending school, and were
between 2002 and 2005. The steepest decrease placed in a delayed entry program (the Future
was in the number of 17-year-olds entering the Soldiers Training Program) until they had finished
reserves; in 2002, 16,885 boys and girls had their secondary education. Approximately 7,500
joined the reserve forces, more than double the were still 17 when they began their basic training
figure for 2005.7 program. On average, initial training lasted from
The US armed forces spent approximately four to six months, and the government reported
US$1.5 billion on recruiting each year, and that nearly 80 per cent of 17-year-olds turned 18
maintained approximately 14,000 “frontline” during this period; approximately 1,500 soldiers
recruiters, who were assigned monthly each year were still 17 when they completed their
recruitment goals.8 Approximately 55 per cent of basic training and were ready for operational
US youth aged 16–21 said that they had spoken assignment.15
to a US military recruiter.9 In 2003 each of the US armed services
A June 2006 Defense Department poll of adopted an implementation plan regarding the
US youth aged 16–21 found that declines in the deployment of 17-year-old soldiers, in order to
propensity of young people to join the military fulfil the USA’s obligations under Article 1 of the
“were unprecedented in magnitude”. The Optional Protocol. The US Army policy, issued
survey found that the proportion of youth that in January 2003, was not to “assign or deploy
“probably” or “definitely” planned to join the soldiers, less than 18 years of age, outside the
military dropped from 14.5 per cent in December continental US, Puerto Rico, or territories or
2005 to 10.1 per cent in June 2006. The steepest possessions of the United States”.16 The US
drops were among African-Americans and Navy assignment policy, issued on 28 February
Hispanics. 2003, stipulated that “At no time will an
To meet 2006 recruitment goals, the armed enlisted member under the age of 18 be issued
services added additional recruiters and orders that require reporting to an operational
increased enlistment bonuses. From March command,” including in a commissioned vessel
S—Z
2007 bonuses of up to US$14,000 – a US$2,000 or deployable squadron.17 In April 2007 the navy
increase – were offered to new infantry soldiers.10 added a further review on final orders for sailors
According to media reports, bonuses for highly under age 18 to ensure that they were not being
valued specialties, such as special operations ordered to an operational unit.18
forces, were as high as US$40,000. In 2005 the Initial guidance sent to Marine Corps
armed forces also lowered recruitment standards commanders in January 2003 did not preclude
to accept a higher number of recruits with low deployment of 17-year-olds; however, on 22

April 2007 the Marine Corps issued a new policy, On 3 October 2007 the Child Soldier
stating that with immediate effect Marines Accountability Act was introduced into Congress.
younger than 18 were prohibited from being It would amend the US criminal code to allow the
operationally deployed.19 prosecution of individuals who have recruited or
The Air Force policy was not to assign airmen used child soldiers, whether in the United States
who had not reached their 18th birthday to or elsewhere.28
hostile fire or imminent danger zones.20
In 2004 the Director of Military Personnel Detention of suspected child soldiers
Policy for the US Army acknowledged in a letter Children suspected of participating in armed
to Human Rights Watch that nearly 60 17-year- activities were detained in US-run detention
old US soldiers had been deployed to Iraq and facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq and in its
Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004.21 The Department naval base in Guantánamo, Cuba. In 2006 the
of Defense subsequently stated that “the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
situations were immediately rectified and action registered 59 children in detention during 16
taken to prevent recurrence”.22 Human Rights visits to five places of detention or internment
Watch sent written requests in April and August controlled by the USA or the UK in Iraq.29 US
2007 for updated information regarding possible soldiers stationed at the detention centres and
deployment of 17-year-old US troops to Iraq or former detainees described abuses against
Afghanistan, but as of October 2007 had not child detainees, including the rape of a 15-
received a response. year-old boy at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, forced nudity,
stress positions, beating and the use of dogs.30
Recruiter misconduct Following US troop increases in Iraq in early
In 2005 more than 80 military recruiters were 2007, US military arrests of children there rose
disciplined for sexual misconduct with potential from an average of 25 per month in 2006 to an
enlistees. An investigation conducted by the average of 100 per month.31 Military officials
Associated Press concluded that one out of every reported that 828 were children held at Camp
200 frontline recruiters was disciplined for sexual Cropper by mid-September, including children
misconduct in 2005, and that most victims were as young as 11. A 17-year-old was reportedly
girls between the ages of 16 and 18 who were strangled by a fellow detainee in early 2007.32
considering enlistment in the military.23 The In August 2007 the USA opened Dar al-
incidents of misconduct included groping, sexual Hikmah, a non-residential facility intended to
assault and rape. provide education services to 600 detainees aged
11–17 pending release or transfer to Iraqi custody.
US military officials excluded an estimated
Developments 100 children from participation in the program,
From 2001 the USA contributed US$34 million apparently on the grounds that they were
to support programs to prevent the recruitment “extremists” and “beyond redemption”.33
and use of child soldiers and to demobilize and As of October 2007 it was not clear whether
reintegrate child combatants, including US$10 children in US custody in Iraq were subject to the
million through the US Agency for International same detention review process as adults (who
Development (USAID) and US$24 million through had no access to lawyers when presenting their
the US Department of Labor. It supported case to a review board that routinely decided 20
programs in Angola, Afghanistan, Burundi, cases an hour, and who had to sign pledges of
Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, good behaviour and produce a guarantor in order
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan and to be released).34 In addition, as of September
Uganda.24 2007 between 50 and 60 children aged 15–17 had
In April 2007 the Child Soldier Prevention Act been turned over to Iraqi custody for trial.35
of 2007 was introduced into Congress.25 It would US forces in Afghanistan also detained
restrict US military assistance to governments children, a number of whom were transferred to
involved in the recruitment or use of child the military detention facility at Guantánamo.
soldiers. Research by the Center for Defense Omar Ahmed Khadr, a Canadian national,
Information found that of nine governments was taken into US custody in Afghanistan in
involved in child recruitment and use, eight late July 2002 when he was 15 years old, and
received some form of US military assistance in subsequently transferred to Guantánamo. In
2007.26 November 2005 he was charged for trial by
In April 2007 the Senate Judiciary military commission under a military order signed
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law by President George W. Bush in November 2001.
held a hearing to consider the Child Soldier The military commission system was replaced
Prevention Act, obstacles facing former child by a revised system under the 2006 Military
soldiers seeking asylum in the USA, and ways for Commissions Act (MCA). In April 2007 Omar
the USA to address child recruiters from other Khadr was charged for trial under the MCA with
countries who came to the USA.27 murder and attempted murder in violation of the

law of war, conspiracy, providing material support 15 US Department of State, Initial Report of the
for terrorism and spying.36 In June 2007 a military United States of America to the UN Committee on
judge dismissed the charges against Khadr on a the Rights of the Child concerning the Optional
jurisdictional question.37 On 24 September 2007 Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
a newly established Court of Military Commission Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Review overturned the ruling, allowing Conflict, 14 September 2002, www.state.gov.
proceedings against Khadr to continue. 16 Ibid.
On 11 October 2007 another Guantánamo 17 Navy Personnel Command, First-Term Personnel
detainee, Mohammad Jawad, was charged with Assignment Policy, 28 February 2003.
attempted murder for allegedly throwing a 18 “Marines under 18 no longer will deploy to
grenade at a US military vehicle. He was 17 at the combat zones”, Stars and Stripes, 26 April 2007.
time of the attack.38 19 US Marine Corps, Revised 17 Year Old Marine
in Combat Policy, 22 April 2007, MARADMIN
1 “US ground forces end strength,” Global Security, 272/07.
www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq. 20 US Department of State, above note 15.
2 US Department of Defense, www.defenselink.mil. 21 Brigadier General Sean J. Byrne, Director of
3 “US will keep troop levels steady in Afghanistan”, Military Personnel Policy, US Army, letter to
Associated Press, 9 February 2007. Human Rights Watch, 2 April 2004.
4 Department of Defense, above note 2. 22 Department of Defense, Information Paper
5 “Charges fuel debate over military recruiters’ regarding application of child soldiers protocols,
access to students”, Associated Press, 16 April provided to Senator Barbara Boxer, November
2006. 2004.
6 House Resolution 1346, Student Privacy 23 “Military recruiters cited for misconduct”,
Protection Act of 2007. Associated Press, 20 August 2006.
7 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 24 US Department of State, above note 15.
Personnel and Readiness, “Population 25 Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1175, HR
Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal 2620, HR 3028.
Year 2005”. 26 Center for Defense Information, “US military
8 US Government Accountability Office, “Military assistance to countries using child soldiers,
recruiting: DoD and services need better data to 1990–2007”, www.cdi.org.
enhance visibility over recruiter irregularities”, 27 US Senate, Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee
August 2006. on Human Rights and the Law, “Casualties of war:
9 Department of Defense, Defense Human child soldiers and the law”, hearing, Washington,
Resources Activity, Joint Advertising, Market DC, 24 April 2007, http://judiciary.senate.gov.
Research and Studies, “Department of Defense: 28 Child Soldier Accountability Act, S. 2135.
Youth Poll Wave 9 – June 2005: Overview Report”, 29 International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC
JAMRS Report No. 2006-001, January 2006, www. Annual Report 2006, “Iraq”, 24 May 2007, www.
jamrs.org. icrc.org.
10 “New army jobs qualifying for enlistment pay”, 30 Amnesty International, “USA: Human dignity
Stars and Stripes, 8 March 2007. denied: Torture and accountability in the ‘war on
11 “Lower standards help army recruit more”, terror’”, October 2004.
Associated Press, 10 October 2006. 31 “US detains nearly 800 juveniles in Iraq”, Agence
12 Department of Defense, Defense Human France-Presse (AFP), 19 August 2007.
Resources Activity, Joint Advertising, Market 32 Martin Fletcher , “They have planted bombs and
Research and Studies, “Department of Defense: shot soldiers – now it is time for school”, The
Youth Poll Wave 11 – June 2006: Overview Times, 15 September 2007, www.timesonline.
Report”, JAMRS Report No. 2006-008, November co.uk.
2006, www.jamrs.org.
33 “US detains juveniles”, above note 31; Fletcher,
13 US Army Junior ROTC website, www. above note 32.
usarmyjrotc.com/; Human Rights Watch e-mail
34 “US command in Baghdad launches bid to
communication from Marine Corps Junior ROTC
rehabilitate Iraqi detainees”, Inside the Air Force,
operations manager, 9 August 2007; US Air Force,
Vol. 18, No. 29, 20 July 2007; Nancy Montgomery,
“Fact Sheet: Air Force Junior Reserves Officer
“Board decides fate of thousands of Iraqi
Training Corps”, December 2006, www.afoats.
detainees: panel of Iraqis and American military
af.mil/; “JNROTC Basic Facts”, Navy Junior ROTC
S—Z
has released more than 14,000 in 18 months”,

website, www.njrotc.navy.mil.
Stars and Stripes, 23 February 2006.
14 “Junior ROTC takes a hit in LA”, Los Angeles
35 Walter Pincus, “US working to reshape Iraqi
Times, 19 February 2007.
detainees: moderate Muslims enlisted to steer
adults and children away from insurgency”,
Washington Post, 19 September 2007.
36 Charge sheet available at www.defenselink.mil.

37 At his arraignment proceedings in Guantánamo
on 4 June 2007, the military judge dismissed the URUG UAY
charges against him because, while Omar Khadr
had been designated as an “enemy combatant” Eastern Republic of Uruguay
in Guantánamo, nowhere was there a record
of his designation as an “unlawful enemy Population: 3.5 million (1.0 million under 18)
combatant”, the label which (when attached to Government armed forces: 25,100
a non-US national) is a prerequisite for trial by
military commission under the MCA.
38 “Guantánamo captive charged”, Miami Herald, 12
October 2007.
Voting age: 18
No under-18s were allowed to serve in the

armed forces, even in time of war.
Government
practice
All enlistment to the armed forces was voluntary,
and it was without exception illegal to enlist
anyone under the age of 18, even in time of war.
Men and women between the ages of 18 and 30
with basic (primary) education could volunteer,
regardless of their marital status; they had to
serve a minimum of two years.1 There had been
no conscription for over 50 years.2

Soldiers underwent a three-month training
course, and further training depended on their
unit and superior officer.3
The Liceo Militar (Military High School)
offered secondary education to children in the
fourth to sixth year of secondary education
(typically from age 15).4 The Navy School (Escuela
Naval) offered fifth- and sixth-year secondary
education in science, the humanities, engineering
or economics.5 Students from the Liceo Militar
became members of the armed forces reserves
on graduating.6
The Military School (Escuela Militar) was
a post-secondary-education centre for army
officer cadets. Candidates followed a four-year
program, specializing in infantry, cavalry, artillery,
engineering or communications.7

y el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Uruguay, August
2 Second periodic report of Uruguay to the UN
CRC/C/URY/2, 13 October 2006.
4 Escuela Militar, Formación Profesional, www.
escuelamilitar.edu.uy.

5 Escuela Naval, Plan de estudios, www.armada.
gub.uy. UZB E K I STA N
7 Escuela Militar, above note 4. Republic of Uzbekistan
Government armed forces: ±55,000
Voting age: 18
CRC, GC AP I and II

armed forces.
Context
On 13 May 2005 hundreds of people were
killed when security forces fired on mainly
peaceful demonstrators in Andijon. Early that
morning armed men had taken over the regional
government building and broken into the prison,
releasing hundreds of prisoners, who included
23 Islamic businessmen on trial for alleged
links with what the authorities claimed to be a
group called Akramia involved in terrorism. The
armed men were among thousands of people
who during the day gathered in the main square
to protest against poverty and government
repression, when the security forces sealed off
the square and fired indiscriminately on the
crowd.1 Eyewitness accounts indicated that
as many as 300 or more people were killed.2
According to the government, 187 people were
killed, most of them militants and security
officials.3 Following the killings, there was a
crackdown on the activities of independent
journalists and human rights activists, including
widespread torture of detainees.4
Remaining elements of the armed
opposition group, the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), had since 2002 been based
in the Pakistani region of Waziristan, bordering
Afghanistan. The IMU advocated the forceful
overthrow of President Karimov of Uzbekistan
and the establishment of an Islamic state,
and in 1999 and 2000 had carried out attacks
in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan from bases in
Afghanistan.5 An IMU breakaway group, the
Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) (alternatively known
by other names such as the Islamic Jihad Union,
and the Jamaat of Central Asia Mujahadins), was
believed to have been responsible for a series of
S—Z
bombings and shootings in Tashkent, the capital,

in March and April 2004.6 In May 2006 armed
men, claimed by officials to be linked to the IMU,
raided a Tajik-Kyrgyz frontier post; several of the
attackers and Tajik and Kyrgyz security forces
were killed in the ensuing fighting.7 In early 2007
there were reports of fighting among elements

of the IMU and troops and local tribespeople in or professional training college.18 Students aged
��
Waziristan, but the extent of the fighting and any about 17–18 took pre-conscription army training
IMU involvement was unclear.8 in grades 11 and 12 at the new professional
Uzbekistan was a member of the Shanghai colleges or lyceums, which included basic military
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), established in skills and one lesson in firing automatic weapons
June 2001, comprising also China, Kazakhstan, at a
��
firing range.19
Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, and There were also informal military-related
Tajikistan, whose goals included mutual co- activities in schools, including a national sport
operation in security matters.9 and military competition aimed at preparing boys
aged about 11–16 for military service, in which
teams fired airguns and threw grenades.20 In
Government 2005 more than 350,000 children participated.21
practice Armed groups
Military recruitment was regulated by the 2002 There were no reports of the recruitment or use
Law on Universal Military Service, which was of under-18s in armed groups within or outside
amended in 2006, transferring the management Uzbekistan. Pakistani military sources in 2004
of conscription from the government to the claimed that armed groups operating in Pakistan
Presidential Administration. The law governed were increasingly recruiting teenagers from
pre-conscription preparation, conscription, Central Asia, but these claims were disputed and
voluntary service, mobilization of reserves, could not be confirmed.22 Children and young
alternative service and military regulations. The people were among those killed in the violence
minimum age for conscription was 18. There in Tashkent in 2004, and five infants and children
were no reports of under-age recruitment. Moves were detained alongside family members
were made towards establishing a non-conscript arrested on suspicion of preparing explosives.23
military.10 Children were reported to have been among
Corruption in the conscription system was those killed in Andijon in May 2005, among those
common. Although in Tashkent young people subsequently detained by the authorities, and
paid bribes to be able to avoid military service, among the refugees who fled abroad.24
in rural areas where unemployment was rife
bribes were paid to be conscripted and have the
possibility of work in law enforcement, customs
Developments
or the military.11 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
The army was the largest in the region, urged Uzbekistan to ratify the Optional Protocol.25
was well financed, and provided soldiers with
subsidies for their families and future job * Titles of non-English-language sources have been
opportunities.12 Spending on soldiers’ pay translated by the Coalition.
increased sharply in the months following the 1 International Crisis Group (ICG), Uzbekistan:
Andijon events.13 The Andijon Uprising, Asia Briefing No. 38, 25
May 2005, www.crisisgroup.org; Organization
Military training and military schools for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
A new decree in April 2005 was aimed at Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan,
improving military education. A new faculty Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005, 20 June 2005, www.
was established at the Tashkent University of osce.org; Amnesty International Report 2006;
Information Technology on the use of radio air Human Rights Watch World Report 2006; C.J.
defences, accepting students under 25 after Chivers and Ethan Wilensky-Lanford, “Video of
military service, or military-school graduates from ill-fated Uzbek rising offers haunting, complex
17–21 years of age.14 view”, New York Times, 22 June 2006.
In 2006 there were overall more than six 2 Amnesty International Report 2006.
applicants for every place in the four military 3 “Uzbekistan rejects accusations over Andijon
colleges (general, air force, motor-artillery and trials”, AFP, 26 December 2005, at Radio Free
tank), and over eight for every place in the air Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), www.rferl.org.
force college specifically.15 The best college 4 See, for example, Human Rights Watch World
graduates were admitted to the Armed Forces Report 2007.
Academy.16 In January 2007 it was reported that a 5 ICG, Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty,
number of schools had been established to train Asia Briefing No. 67, August 2007.
non-commissioned officers.17 6 Jim Nichol, Central Asia: Regional Developments
An increase from 11 to 12 years in the duration and Implications for U.S. Interests, Congressional
of compulsory education in 2005 allowed Research Service, 5 June 2006, http://fpc.state.
students to spend nine years at a standard gov; see also ICG, Uzbekistan: Stagnation and
school, and a further three in an academic lyceum Uncertainty, above note 5.

7 Dadodjan Azimov, “Are Islamic militants 23 Doug Burton, “Religious fanaticism fuels Uzbek
regrouping in the Fergana Valley?”, Institute of blasts”, Washington Times, 31 July 2004, www.
War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 1 December washingtontimes.com; Asia Monitor Centre,
2006, www.iwpr.net; see also Amnesty “Uzbekistan: chronicle of terror”, 5 April 2004,
International Report 2007, entry on Kyrgyzstan. www.ames.kiev.ua.
8 Daniel Kimmage, “Central Asia: has IMU reached 24 Reza Hossaini, “An eyewitness account from
the end of the line?”, RFE/RL, 30 March 2007. Andijan”, UNICEF, 24 May 2005, www.unicef.org;
For alternative interpretations see Joshua Foust, “Uzbekistan: Andijon refugees in Romania await
“What’s the real story in Waziristan?”, Registan. third-country resettlement”, IRIN, 10 November
net, 7 April 2007, www.registan.net. See also ICG, 2005, www.irinnews.org.
Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty, above 25 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
note 5. Consideration of second periodic report
9 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www. submitted by Uzbekistan, Concluding
sectsco.org. observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/UZB/CO/2, 2 June
10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “To protect and 2006.
preserve independence is our holy duty”,
Narodnoe Slovo, 11 August 2006, www.mfa.uz;
“The results are deserved and the perspectives
are wide”, Uzbekistan Today, 12 January 2007,
www.ut.uz.
11 Correspondence from confidential source,
Uzbekistan, April 2007.
12 Oleg Sidirov, “The armed forces of the republic
of Uzbekistan yesterday and today”, Gazeta.kz, 8
February 2007, www.gazeta.kz.
13 “Uzbek military personnel set to receive big
pay raise”, Eurasianet, 30 August 2005, www.
eurasianet.org.
14 Uzbekistan National News Agency (UzA),
“Innovation in higher military education”,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2005, www.mfa.
uz.
15 Sidirov, above note 12; Press-uz.info, “The
Ministry of Defence reports strong competition
for place in military colleges”, Gazeta.uz, 11 July
2006, http://gzt.uz.
16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Towards Constitution
Day of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Defending
the Independence of the Homeland”, Narodnoe
Slovo, 25 November 2006, at http://jahon.mfa.
uz.
17 Anna Ivanova and Norali Ochilov, “Reliable
defenders of our independence”, Pravda Vostoka,
15 January 2007, www.pv.uz.
18 Second periodic report of Uzbekistan to the UN
CRC/C/104/Add.6, 30 August 2005.
19 Correspondence from confidential source,
Uzbekistan, April 2007.
20 “Regional military sports competition ‘shunkorlar’
has taken place”, UzA, 10 April 2007, www.uza.
uz; see also “Pupils are preparing to become
defenders of the homeland”, website of Nukus
School 11, 16 September 2005, http://nukus11.
connect.uz.
S—Z
21 “‘Kamolot’, youth and military patriotism”, UzA, 9

January 2006.
22 See, for example, “Tale of a lost militant”,
Reuters, 15 December 2004; “Qaeda using
children for terrorism”, Daily Times (Pakistan), 26
November 2004, both at www.dailytimes.com.pk
(for more detail see Tajikistan entry).

lasted for five months at military barracks or at
Venezuela schools, and those training for a further three
years were deemed to have fulfilled their military
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela obligations.5
A new conscription and military enlistment
Population: 26.7 million (10.0 million under 18) law was being developed. It proposed that active
Government armed forces: 82,300 military service would no longer be compulsory
Compulsory recruitment age: 18 for everyone, but all men and women of military
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 age would be required to register, with heavy
Voting age: 18 fines of up to US$350 for failing to register,
Optional Protocol: ratified 23 September 2003 not joining active service when called up or
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): not showing military papers when required.
Household heads, university students, parents
and married men and women could do military
There were reports of Colombian and service during weekends and holidays.6
Although the law had yet to be enacted, in
Venezuelan armed groups recruiting under- April 2007 military authorities were urging all
18s in border areas. adults to register, and it was reported that over
16,000 men and women had been incorporated
as reserves into the armed forces in January
Context 2007.7 It was expected that there would be up to
The increased militarization of the border 1.5 million reservists.8
between Venezuela and Colombia, combined with
rising insecurity, economic difficulties and armed Military training and military schools
confrontations among Colombian and Venezuelan Students at private or public military secondary-
armed groups, pushed a growing number of schools who received military training approved
Colombian refugees and asylum seekers to cities by the Ministry of Defence were deemed to have
such as Caracas and Maracaibo.1 fulfilled their military obligations.9
In September 2004 five Venezuelan soldiers Pre-military instruction was compulsory for
and an oil company engineer were killed in an all students in the last two years of secondary
ambush by members of a Colombian armed education (typically age 15–17) and additional to
opposition group in El Amparo, Apure state. Army compulsory military service.10
officers admitted difficulties in safeguarding the The officer training Military Academy
border against incursions by Colombian armed admitted students in the final year of secondary-
groups, which were also involved in kidnappings school (age 17).11
and smuggling.2 A new military education law was being
debated in 2007. It proposed the establishment
Government of joint civilian–military activities, including
the participation of the civilian population in
National recruitment legislation and territorial guard units. Secondary-education
students in all institutions would be required
practice to follow a “diversified secondary and military
The 1978 conscription law established that professional” educational program for 18
military service was compulsory for all men aged months, offering academic, scientific, technical
18–50 (military age). Young men had to register and military courses. Pre-military instruction in
with military authorities within 60 days of their secondary-schools would continue under the
18th birthday and serve for a maximum of 18 authority of the Ministry of Popular Power for
months. Military service was voluntary for women Defence.12
in times of peace and compulsory in times of
war. Men of military age must show proof of
having fulfilled their military obligations in order Armed groups
to be able to obtain a driver’s licence or to start According to reports there were at least ten
a business.3 The 1999 constitution expressly armed groups operating in Venezuela.13 The
prohibited forcible recruitment.4 Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas
Not all available men were called up for active Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC),
military service. In February 2005 President the National Liberation Army (Ejército de
Hugo Chávez issued a decree establishing a Liberación Nacional, ELN), Colombian army-
“military reserve” made up of men of military age backed paramilitaries, and the Venezuelan
not in active service. These new reserve units, Bolivarian Liberation Forces–Liberation Army
under the direct authority of the president, were (Fuerzas Bolivarianas de Liberación–Ejército
managed by the Strategic Operational Command, Libertador, FBL) controlled large areas along
independent of the Ministry of Defence. Training the border with Colombia, in effect carrying out

state functions with regard to political and social specific policies on refugees or reintegration of
control.14 child soldiers or refugees.25
The FBL had emerged in 1992 as a nationalist
political organization. It had military units
in border areas, purportedly to “stop the
Developments
advancement of paramilitaries from Colombia” The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, on
and any attempted “invasion by imperialist examining Venezuela’s second periodic report
forces”.15 Although it claimed to support the in October 2007, recommended improving the
government, President Hugo Chávez denied sharing of responsibilities between the National
any connections with the FBL.16 It proposed the Commission for Refugees and child-protection
creation of popular self-defence committees institutions, ensuring rapid access to refugee
in rural areas, the incorporation of the whole status determination procedures and subsequent
population in national defence and security assistance for unaccompanied and separated
policies and the extension of pre-military children, and other measures contained in the
education from the first year of secondary- Committee’s general comment No. 6 on the
school.17 In 2005 it was estimated that the FBL treatment of unaccompanied and separated
had around 4,000 members in Alto Apure, children outside their country of origin.26
near the Colombian border.18 The local priest at
Guasdualito, Apure state, reported that the FBL International standards
had recruited youngsters, but this was denied by Venezuela ratified the ILO Worst Forms of Child
FBL spokespersons.19 Labour Convention 182 in October 2005.
Armed groups in the border areas imposed
stringent controls on the movement of people
1 Child Soldiers Coalition, Armed Conflict
and were responsible for the forcible recruitment in Colombia – Frontiers: Childhood at the
of children, kidnappings and unlawful killings. Borderline, February 2007.
During 2006 at least 40 people, including some
2 Ibid.
under 18, died in El Nula and surrounding areas,
reportedly during combat or as a result of their 3 Ley de Conscripción y Alistamiento militar.
links with one of these armed groups. Many 4 Rocío San Miguel, “Baduel oculta la verdad”,
children stopped attending school for fear of Noticiero Digital, 3 May 2007, http://
being recruited.20 noticierodigital.com.
In October 2006 a member of the community 5 Vicente Ventura Barreiro, “Reserva militar de
of Santa Inés in El Nula, Apure state, was killed Venezuela o brazo armado de la Revolución
by unidentified men believed to be members Bolivariana”, Newpolitic.com, c.2006, at
of armed groups operating in the area. Thirty- www.ciee.org.ar.
two families left their homes seeking safety.21 6 “Consideran multar a quienes no exijan registro
In February 2007 a four-year-old girl was militar”, El Universal, 24 April 2007,
killed during an armed confrontation between www.eluniversal.com.
Colombian armed groups in El Amparo, Apure 7 José Luis Carrillo, “Jefe de la Circunscripción
state, allegedly over control of territory in Militar del Distrito Capital sostiene que todo
Venezuela.22 deber es una obligación”, Venezuela Real, 27
The office of the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, April 2007, http://venezuelareal.zoomblog.com.
in Táchira told the Child Soldiers Coalition about 8 Venezuela en Red, “Civiles coadyuvarán en la
cases where whole families had migrated to defensa en Venezuela”, 7 April 2005, http://
Venezuela from Colombia when their children venezuela-15a.blogspot.com.
reached the age of nine or ten, for fear that armed 9 Ley de Conscripción y Alistamiento militar.
groups would take them away. In one case, a 10 Ibid.
mother of five children had fled her farm after 11 Academia Militar de Venezuela, www.
two of them had been recruited. However, fear of academiamilitar.edu.ve.
recruitment of children was not often seen as the
12 Propuesta de Ley de Educación Militar (accessed
main reason for fleeing Colombia, even though 26 June 2007), www.ejercito.mil.ve.
the Coalition heard of cases where attempts had
been made to recruit several members of the 13 Centro de Documentación de los Movimientos
Armados (Cedema), www.cedema.org.
same family before leaving Colombia.23
14 Provea (Programa Venezolano de Educación-
Acción en Derechos Humanos), Derechos
S—Z
Disarmament, demobilization Humanos y Coyuntura, Boletín electrónico No.

177, 12–30 October 2006, www.derechos.org.ve.
and reintegration (DDR) 15 “Hablan las FBL: Estamos dispuestos a conversar
Although UNHCR estimated that around 200,000 con el señor Presidente”, Quinto Día Online,
Colombians had fled to Venezuela in recent edition 412, 8 October 2004, www.quintodia.com.
years,24 the Venezuelan government had no

16 Ministerio del Poder Popular para la
Comunicación y la Información, “Soberanía, Viet Nam
Chávez y sus posturas sobre las FARC”, 28
January 2005, www.minci.gob.ve. Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
17 Fuerzas Bolivarianas de Liberación – Ejército
Libertador (FBL-EL), “Visión”, www.fbl-el.org. Population: 84.2 million (30.5 million under 18)
18 “Aseguran que 4 mil hombres de la FBL operan en Government armed forces: 455,000
el Alto Apure”, El Universal, 19 July 2005. Compulsory recruitment age: 18
19 “Venezuela–Colombia: Violencia y silencio Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (17 for training)
fronterizos”, IPS, March 2007, www.ipsnoticias. Voting age: 18
net. Optional Protocol: ratified 20 December 2001
20 Equipo Pastoral de El Nula, “¿Quién tiene el Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
control de la zona?”, Provea, Derechos Humanos CRC, GC AP I, ILO 138, ILO 182
y Coyuntura, Boletín electrónico No. 177.
21 “Foro por la Vida rechaza la posibilidad de estado Only male citizens over the age of 18
de excepción en El Nula y solicita presencia could be recruited for military service and
de funcionarios públicos en la zona”, Provea,
Derechos Humanos y Coyuntura, Boletín under-18s could not be directly involved
electrónico Nº 177. in hostilities. Under-18s could participate
22 “Venezuela–Colombia”, above note 19. directly in military operations in an
23 Child Soldiers Coalition, above note 1. emergency situation. Male citizens turning
24 “Venezuela–Colombia”, above note 19. 17 could be accepted into military schools
25 Second periodic report of Venezuela to the UN and were recognized as servicemen on
CRC/C/VEN/2, 5 April 2007 (only in Spanish at
active service.
the time of writing).
26 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Government
submitted by Venezuela, Concluding National recruitment legislation and
observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/VEN/CO/2,
5 October 2007.
practice
The 1992 constitution states that “It is the
sacred duty and the noble right of the citizen to
defend his motherland. The citizen must fulfil
his military obligation and join in the all-people
national defence” (Article 77), and “The entire
people shall endeavour to defend the socialist
Vietnamese motherland and ensure national
security” (Article 44).
In its declaration on ratifying the Optional
Protocol in December 2001, and in subsequent
reporting and other responses to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the
government stated that by law only male citizens
over the age of 18 would be recruited for military
service and that under-18s would not be directly
involved in hostilities. Viet nam’s December
2005 initial report to the Committee on the
Optional Protocol stated that male citizens aged
18 could enlist in the armed forces. However, the
government maintained its position that under-
18s could directly participate in military battles
in the case of “an urgent need for safeguarding
national independence, sovereignty, unity and
territorial integrity”.1
The 1981 Military Service Law, as amended in
1994, provided the legal basis for conscription.
People’s Committees and other local officials
had to submit annually to the regional military
commander a list of boys who would turn 17 in
that year (Article 19), and the resulting call-up
took place “once or twice” a year (Article 19).2 In

June 2005 an amendment to the Law on Military UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in
Compulsory Service was adopted by the National September 2006. The Committee recommended
Assembly. Article 12 provided that the age for among other things an explicit prohibition by
military compulsory service for men was from law on recruitment to and use in armed forces or
18 to 25 years of age. A representative of the groups of under-15s and their direct participation
government reported that the number of qualified in hostilities. It also noted its concern that
citizens called up for military compulsory service uncertainty about the age of young recruits
was very small in comparison with the total could occur due to lack of birth registration in
population.3 the past. Where birth certificates were lacking,
The recruitment of child soldiers was the Committee recommended that the age of
not specifically criminalized under national the recruitment intake should be determined
legislation. However, there existed several by other reliable means, including medical
potential avenues for prosecution, in particular examinations. The government stated its
the 1999 Penal Code, which stipulated that those intention to amend the Law on Military Service,
who abused their position and power to act the Ordinance on Self-Defence Militia and other
against the regulations governing military service relevant legal documents to ensure compliance
registration, orders for military service or regular with the Optional Protocol.9
training would be punished by up to three years’
“non-custodial reform”, a form of community- 1 Declaration of Viet Nam on ratification of the
based service, or six months to three years’ Optional Protocol, 20 December 2001, www2.
imprisonment (Article 261).4 ohchr.org.
2 Law on Amendments and Supplements to a
Military training and military schools Number of Articles of the Law on Military Service
Article 13 of the 1981 Military Service Law Duty, 22 June 1994.
stipulated that male citizens turning 17 and 3 Viet Nam, Country presentation at the “Workshop
meeting necessary qualifications could be to Mainstream the OP-CRC-AC in the SEA Region”,
accepted into military schools and be recognized November 2007, Quezon City, Philippines,
as servicemen on active service; the government sponsored by the Southeast Asian Coalition
stated that application for such schools was to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (SEACUS),
voluntary.5 Coalition copy.
The government has stated that only students 4 Initial report of Viet Nam to the UN Committee on
aged over 18 could participate in direct military the Rights of the Child on implementation of the
training. For those aged under 18, military Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/VNM/1,
training was given to improve their knowledge 12 December 2005.
of national defence, and physical training 5 Ibid.
limited to learning how to march, stand in line 6 State party examination of Viet Nam’s initial
and salute. Following graduation from military report on the OPAC, 43rd Session of the CRC, 22
schools students were sent to serve in the army. September 2006, www.crin.org.
Permission to retire from military service was at 7 Ibid.
the discretion of military authorities.6
8 Initial report of Viet Nam, above note 4.
The government also stated that there existed
certain schools set up in remote areas under the 9 Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Consideration of report submitted by Viet Nam,
direction of the army, created for children who
Concluding observations, 17 October 2006, UN
would otherwise have no access to education.7 Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/VNM/CO/1; Initial report of
It is unclear whether attendance at such schools Viet Nam, above note 4.
was voluntary, what age limits were set for
students and whether military training was given.
Armed groups
Viet Nam maintained a paramilitary self-defence
militia force, whose operation was governed
by the 1996 Ordinance on Self-Defence Militia.
Article 2 of this Ordinance stipulated that persons
selected to join the self-defence militia force had
S—Z
to be 18.8
Developments
Viet Nam ratified the Optional Protocol in
December 2001 and in December 2005 submitted
its initial report, which was examined by the

regulate general mobilization which shall be
Yemen announced by the chairman of the Presidential
Council following the approval of the House of
Republic of Yemen Representatives” (Article 36). In 2001 Yemen’s
National Defence Council abolished compulsory
Population: 21.0 million (11.3 million under 18) military service, relying instead on volunteers
Government armed forces: 66,700 to fill posts in the military and security forces.6
Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription Article 149 of Law No. 45 (2002) on Child Rights
Voluntary recruitment age: 18 stated that “persons under the age of 18 cannot
Voting age: 18 participate in armed conflicts or be recruited”.
Optional Protocol: acceded 2 March 2007 The law forbade all exploitation of children as
Other treaties ratified (see glossary): child soldiers.
Although Yemen’s laws specified 18 as
the minimum recruitment age, under-age
Although Yemen’s laws specified 18 as recruitment to the armed forces reportedly
remained common. The recruitment system
the minimum recruitment age, under-age was disorganized and birth registration was
recruitment to the armed forces reportedly irregular. Joining the army was highly sought
remained common. after, since other employment opportunities were
extremely limited. Parents sometimes agreed to
the recruitment of their children into the armed
Context forces because of their poor economic situation.7
The government faced persistent opposition During fighting between the Yemeni armed
from followers of Sheik Hussein Badr Eddin forces and the Faithful Youth in January–March
al-Houti, who was killed in September 2004 2007, the Yemeni military reportedly used child
after months of battles with Yemeni security soldiers. Children as young as 15 were allegedly
forces. Sheik al-Houti, one of the clerics of the given weapons by the armed forces and sent to
Zaidi Shia community, headed an armed group, the front with no training.8
the Faithful Youth (Shabab al-Moumineen,
sometimes translated as the Believing Youth). Armed groups
This group, which was still active, led protests
at mosques against the United States (USA) and Paramilitaries
Israel, and launched attacks against government Yemen’s paramilitary force was about 70,000
and Western targets. Al-Houti’s followers claimed strong. Approximately 50,000 constituted
that the Yemeni government had become too the Ministry of Interior’s Central Security
closely allied with the USA.1 The Yemeni Ministry Organization; they were equipped with a range
of Defence published a fatwa (religious edict) in of infantry weapons and armoured personnel
March 2007, authorizing and obligating “the use carriers. An additional 20,000 were the forces
of deadly force against the Faithful Youth”.2 of armed tribal levies. There was no available
Al-Qaeda cells were reportedly present in information on whether children were part of
Yemen. In July 2007 the organization allegedly paramilitary groups.9
carried out a suicide bomb attack in the eastern
province of Marib, killing seven Spanish tourists Armed political and tribal groups
and two Yemenis. An al-Qaeda member who
had escaped from a Yemeni prison with 23 other The security forces faced threats posed by
militants in February 2006 was killed in a shoot- Islamist and tribal armed groups. Yemen’s
out with the armed forces in January 2007.3 mountainous topography contributed to a
Inter-tribal violence, fuelled by the availability lack of central government control in the more
of firearms in the hands of tribesmen, resulted remote governorates, which in turn enhanced
in a number of killings.4 The government’s ability the authority of the country’s well-armed
to control these clashes remained limited. autonomous tribes. In July 2005 armed tribal
Tensions which periodically escalated into militia blocked fuel deliveries in Sana’a to protest
violent confrontations continued between the against proposed reductions in fuel subsidies.
government and some tribes.5 Tribesmen, particularly in the north, sometimes
kidnapped foreign tourists and workers in order
to extract political and economic concessions
Government from the government.10
According to 2004 reports, children were
National recruitment legislation and widely involved, often forcibly, in tribal and family
practice conflicts, and were often at risk of being killed,11
The constitution made no direct reference to but no further information was obtained.
conscription, but stated that “[t]he law shall

Developments Z AM B I A
In consideration of Yemen’s third periodic
report on the Convention on the Rights of the Republic of Zambia
Child, the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child expressed concern about the lack of birth Population: 11.7 million (6.2 million under 18)
registration for a significant number of children, Government armed forces: 15,100
and recommended that Yemen take appropriate Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription
measures to ensure the registration of all births.12 Voluntary recruitment age: 18; 16 with parental
consent
International standards Voting age: 18
Yemen acceded to the Optional Protocol on 2 Optional Protocol: not signed
March 2007 and declared that it was committed Other treaties ratified (see glossary):
to retaining 18 years as the minimum age for CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182
voluntary recruitment into the Yemeni armed
forces, as well as to retaining the ban on the Under-18s could be serving in the
compulsory or voluntary recruitment of any armed forces, given the low rate of birth
person under 18 years of age.13
registration and the possibility for 16-year-
* Titles of non-English language sources have been olds to enlist with parental permission.
1 Global Security, “Al-Shabab al-Mum’en/Shabab Government
al-Moumineen (Believing Youth)”, www.
globalsecurity.org. National recruitment legislation and
2 Yemen Ministry of Defence, www.yemen.gov.ye. practice
3 “Al-Qaeda blamed for Yemen attack”, Al-Jazeera,
The Defence Act prohibited a child “under the
3 July 2007; “Yemen kills al-Qaeda fugitive”,
Al-Jazeera, 15 January 2007, http://english. apparent age of 18” from being recruited into the
aljazeera.net. armed forces without the consent of a parent,
guardian or local district secretary (Chapter
4 “Yemen: Despite ban on arms, activists warn of
106). The use of children in hostilities was also
increasing violence”, IRIN, 8 July 2007.
prohibited by law. There was no conscription.
5 “Al-Shabab al-Mum’en”, above note 1. Recruits had to be Zambian nationals and have
6 US Library of Congress, Country profile: Yemen, a national registration card, obtainable at the
http://lcweb2.loc.gov. age of 16.1 The Juvenile Act defined a “child”
7 Confidential source, Yemen, April 2007. as a person below 16 and a “young person” as
8 Jane Novak, “Yemen: from nepotism to internal between 16 and 19 years of age.2
jihad”, Worldpress.org, March 2007, www. There were no reports of under-age
worldpress.org. recruitment, but the situation was not known
9 Country profile, above note 6. to have changed significantly since 2003, when
10 Ibid. the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
expressed concern that the minimum age for
11 Yemen National NGOs Coalition, The Third NGOs’
Alternative Periodic Report on Rights of the Child, voluntary recruitment was an “apparent age” and
www.crin.org. noted that “less than 10 percent of children were
registered at birth in 1999, and even less in rural
areas”.3
Consideration of report submitted by Yemen,
Add.267, 21 September 2005. Developments
Zambia hosted an estimated 120,000 refugees
who had fled conflicts in Angola, Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda
and Somalia.4 Over 74,000 Angolan refugees
had been repatriated under a four-year voluntary
repatriation program (2003–6).5 Voluntary
S—Z
repatriation of DRC refugees began in May 2007;

some 60,000 reportedly remained in Zambia, of
whom 40,000 were living in camps.6
1 Initial report of Zambia to the UN Committee


2 UNHCR, “Zambia: analysis of the gap in
protection of refugees”, September 2007, http:// ZIMB A B W E
www.unhcr.org.
3 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Republic of Zimbabwe
Consideration of report submitted by Zambia,
Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/ Population: 13.0 million (6.3 million under 18)
Add.206, 2 July 2003. Government armed forces: 29,000
4 UNHCR, above note 2. Compulsory recruitment age: 18 or 16
5 Ibid. Voluntary recruitment age: unclear (see text)
6 “Kinshasa: DRC–Zambia: Congolese refugees Voting age: 18
return home”, IRIN, 8 May 2007. Optional Protocol: not signed
The national youth training program, which

included paramilitary training of children,
continued in 2007. Youth militias were
involved in human rights violations against
opposition supporters.
Context
Intensified political opposition to President
Robert Mugabe’s political party, the Zimbabwe
African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–
PF) was met with a violent crackdown in a climate
of economic crisis, hyper-inflation and systematic
human rights violations.1
Government
practice
The 1979 National Service Act regulated
recruitment for national service and the armed
forces. According to the government’s 1995 report
to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
“The direct recruitment of children under 18 years
of age into the army is prohibited by the National
Service Act of 1979. The Act provides for 18 years
as the lower age limit for recruitment into regular
national service and 18 years for emergency
national service.” However, the same report
stated elsewhere, “Direct recruitment of children
under 16 years of age into the army is prohibited
by the National Service Act of 1979. The Act
provides for 16 years as the lower age limit for
recruitment into regular national service and 18
years for emergency national service.”2
National youth service training

program
A compulsory national youth service training
program for all school-leavers (also known as
youth militia training) introduced in January
2003,3 continued in 2007.4 In 2003 the
government had stated that the training was
aimed at people aged 10–30.5 Training centres
provided militia training in a 120-day program for

1,000 young people at a time, although numbers were not only underpaid but were harassed and
declined as the economic and food crisis threatened by militias, including youth miltias.19
intensified in the country.6 Several thousand
children and young persons had received training 1 “Zimbabwe”, Human Rights Watch World Report
by March 2007. Training focused on paramilitary 2008.
skills and political education, and allegedly 2 Initial Report of Zimbabwe to UN Committee on
included torture and killing techniques. It was the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.35,
reported that girls were repeatedly raped by 12 October 1995.
other trainees and staff.7 3 “National service to be compulsory”, Herald
The government gave preference to national (Harare), 2 July 2002, www.herald.co.zw.
youth service graduates among those entering
4 “Zimbabwe: Youth militia camps may close”,
and seeking employment in the civil services,
IRIN, 6 September 2007.
especially in the security forces.8 A number of
government training programs, such as nurse 5 Solidarity Peace Trust, “National Youth
training and a program for media practitioners, Service Training – ‘shaping youths in a truly
Zimbabwean manner’”, 5 September 2003, www.
admitted only youth militia graduates. There were
solidaritypeacetrust.org.
plans to draft hundreds of youth militia graduates
into the civil service to be deployed as “youth 6 “Zimbabwe: Youth militia camps may close”,
development officers”.9 In September 2007 the IRIN, 6 September 2007.
Youth, Gender and Women’s Affairs parliamentary 7 See monthly reports from the Zimbabwe Human
portfolio committee recommended the closure of Rights NGO Forum, www.hrforumzim.com.
the youth militia training centres as there was no 8 US Department of State, “Zimbabwe”, Country
food to feed recruits.10 Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006, 6
March 2007, www.state.gov.
Youth militias 9 Zim Online, “Mugabe to draft youth militia into
Youth militia worked alongside the security civil service”, 17 November 2006, www.zimonline.
forces, whose ranks were increasingly weakened co.za.
by desertion. Members of youth militias earned 10 “Youth militia camps may close”, above note 6.
more than average civil servant pay, including 11 Martin Rupiya, “The military question”, Mail and
that of police officers.11 Information about the Guardian online, 25 April 2007, www.mg.co.za/;
precise age of youth militia members was not Zim Online, “Zimbabwe: Central Bank doubles
available. salaries for youth militia”, 13 February 2007,
Youth militia, as well as ruling-party www.zimonline.co.za/
supporters and the army, were used to intimidate 12 “Major Zimbabwe police crackdown”, BBC News,
the opposition in the 2005 elections.12 Youth 23 May 2005.
militia were also deployed in “Operation 13 “Zimbabwe seizes millions in cash”, BBC News, 9
Sunrise”, in which they harassed motorists August 2006.
and commuters when a new currency was 14 “Bashing dissent: escalating violence and state
introduced in 2006.13 Violence involving youth repression in Zimbabwe”, Human Rights Watch,
militia intensified from March 2007, with reports Vol. 19, No. 6(A) (May 2007), http://hrw.org.
of beatings, abductions and arbitrary detention 15 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Zimbabwe: a
targeting opposition figures.14 Militia were used regional solution?”, Africa Report No. 132, 18
to enforce price controls, especially from mid- September 2007.
2007 in “Operation Reduce Prices”, when youth 16 “Bashing dissent”, above note 14; US Department
militia were sent to enforce price reductions of of State, “Zimbabwe”, Country Reports on Human
50 per cent by supermarkets, shops and stalls.15 Rights Practices 2007, 11 March 2008, www.state.
Allegations of political intimidation and attacks gov.
on opposition supporters, forced displacement, 17 UNICEF UK, “Global support needed to protect
killings, torture, rape and the destruction of children in Zimbabwe”, 26 July 2005; “Children
property by members of ZANU–PF youth militias hit hardest by Zimbabwe’s economic problems”,
continued up to the end of 2007.16 29 June 2007, www.unicef.org.
18 Save the Children, Zimbabwe Country Brief 2006,
Developments www.savethechildren.org.uk/; “Zimbabwe:
diarrhoea outbreak claims 34”, IRIN, 9 July 2007.
Children were reported to be most affected 19 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
S—Z
by the economic crisis in Zimbabwe.17 Chronic Shadow Report to the Combined 7th, 8th and
malnutrition affected a third of all children.18 9th Report of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2007,
The education system had almost stopped www.amnesty.org/; “Zimbabwe: hunger bites
functioning, due to the general economic the health and education sectors”, IRIN, 26 July
collapse, prohibitive fees for both government 2007.
and private schools and lack of teachers, who

Uganda Coalition launch of a training event
on child protection for local authorities,
Pader district, Uganda
© Uganda Coalition 2007

Summary of selected
international treaties
The Coalition promotes the adoption and implementation of international legal standards
protecting children from recruitment or use as soldiers. The following is a summary of the
main regional and international legal standards relating to child soldiers:
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of
children in armed conflict: This was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 May 2000
and entered into force on 12 February 2002. The protocol sets 18 as the minimum age for
direct participation in hostilities, for recruitment into armed groups, and for compulsory
recruitment by governments. States may accept volunteers from the age of 16 but must
deposit a binding declaration at the time of ratification or accession, setting out their
minimum voluntary recruitment age and outlining certain safeguards for such recruitment.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998): This establishes a permanent court
to try persons charged with committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
In its definition of war crimes, the statute includes “conscripting or enlisting children under
the age of fifteen years into national armed forces or using them to participate actively in
hostilities” (Article 8.b.xxvi); and in the case of an internal armed conflict, “conscripting or
enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them
to participate actively in hostilities” (Article 8.e.vii). When drafting the treaty, delegates
agreed that the terms “using” and “participate” would prohibit not only children’s direct
participation in combat, but also their active participation in military activities linked to
combat such as scouting, spying, sabotage, and the use of children as decoys, couriers, or
at military checkpoints. Also prohibited is the use of children in “direct” support functions
such as carrying supplies to the front line. The statute also defines sexual slavery as a crime
against humanity (Article 7(1)(g)). The court came into being on 1 July 2002.
ILO Minimum Age Convention 138: This convention was adopted on 26 June 1973 and came
into force on 19 June 1976. States ratifying the convention are bound to:
pursue a national policy designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labour and
to raise progressively the minimum age for admission to employment or work to a level
consistent with the fullest physical and mental development of young persons (Article 1).
ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 182: The convention was adopted on 16 June
1999 and came into force on 19 November 2000. It commits each state which ratifies it to
“take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the
worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency.” The term “child” applies to all persons
under the age of 18 years and the worst forms of child labour include:
all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of
children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced
or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict (Article 3a).

Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1977): The protocols set
15 as the minimum age for recruitment or use in armed conflict. This minimum standard
applies to all parties, both governmental and non-governmental, in both international and
internal armed conflict.
Article 77 of Additional Protocol I, applicable to international armed conflicts, states:
The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who
have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in
particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting
among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not
attained the age of eighteen years the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give
priority to those who are oldest (Paragraph 2).
If, in exceptional cases, despite the provisions of paragraph 2, children who have not
attained the age of fifteen years take a direct part in hostilities and fall into the power
of an adverse Party, they shall continue to benefit from the special protection accorded
by this Article, whether or not they are prisoners of war (Paragraph 3).
Article 4(c) of the Additional Protocol II, applicable to non-international armed conflicts,
states:
Children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the
armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989): Although the Convention on the Rights of the
Child generally defines a child as any person under the age of 18, Article 38 uses the lower
age of 15 as the minimum for recruitment or participation in armed conflict. This language is
drawn from the two Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Article 38 states that:

States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not
attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities (Paragraph 2).
States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age
of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have
attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years,
States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest (Paragraph 3).
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: The charter is the only regional
treaty in the world which addresses the issue of child soldiers. It was adopted by the
Organization of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union) and came into force in November
1999. It defines a child as anyone below 18 years of age without exception. It also states
that: “States Parties to the present Charter shall take all necessary measures to ensure that
no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in particular, from recruiting any
child” (Article 22.2).

The UN Security Council has passed a series of resolutions condemning the recruitment and
use of children in hostilities. These are resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000) 1379 (2001),
1460 (2003), 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict. To download UN
resolutions visit http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.

Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the involvement of
children in armed conflict
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by
General Assembly resolution
A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000
entered into force on 12 February 2002
The States Parties to the present Protocol,

Encouraged by the overwhelming support for the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
demonstrating the widespread commitment that exists to strive for the promotion and
protection of the rights of the child,
Reaffirming that the rights of children require special protection, and calling for
continuous improvement of the situation of children without distinction, as well as for their
development and education in conditions of peace and security,
Disturbed by the harmful and widespread impact of armed conflict on children and the
long-term consequences it has for durable peace, security and development,
Condemning the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict and direct attacks
on objects protected under international law, including places that generally have a
significant presence of children, such as schools and hospitals,
Noting the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in
particular, the inclusion therein as a war crime, of conscripting or enlisting children under
the age of 15 years or using them to participate actively in hostilities in both international
and non-international armed conflicts,
Considering therefore that to strengthen further the implementation of rights
recognized in the Convention on the Rights of the Child there is a need to increase the
protection of children from involvement in armed conflict,
Noting that article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child specifies that, for the
purposes of that Convention, a child means every human being below the age of 18 years
unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier,
Convinced that an optional protocol to the Convention that raises the age of possible
recruitment of persons into armed forces and their participation in hostilities will contribute
effectively to the implementation of the principle that the best interests of the child are to
be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children,

Noting that the twenty-sixth International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent in December 1995 recommended, inter alia, that parties to conflict take every
feasible step to ensure that children below the age of 18 years do not take part in hostilities,
Welcoming the unanimous adoption, in June 1999, of International Labour Organization
Convention No. 182 on the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the
Worst Forms of Child Labour, which prohibits, inter alia, forced or compulsory recruitment of
children for use in armed conflict,
Condemning with the gravest concern the recruitment, training and use within and
across national borders of children in hostilities by armed groups distinct from the armed
forces of a State, and recognizing the responsibility of those who recruit, train and use
children in this regard,
Recalling the obligation of each party to an armed conflict to abide by the provisions of
international humanitarian law,
Stressing that the present Protocol is without prejudice to the purposes and principles
contained in the Charter of the United Nations, including Article 51, and relevant norms of
humanitarian law,
Bearing in mind that conditions of peace and security based on full respect of the
purposes and principles contained in the Charter and observance of applicable human
rights instruments are indispensable for the full protection of children, in particular during
armed conflicts and foreign occupation,
Recognizing the special needs of those children who are particularly vulnerable to
recruitment or use in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol owing to their economic or
social status or gender,
Mindful of the necessity of taking into consideration the economic, social and political
root causes of the involvement of children in armed conflicts,
Convinced of the need to strengthen international cooperation in the implementation
of the present Protocol, as well as the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation and social
reintegration of children who are victims of armed conflict,
Encouraging the participation of the community and, in particular, children and child
victims in the dissemination of informational and educational programmes concerning the
implementation of the Protocol,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces
who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.
Article 2
States Parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not
compulsorily recruited into their armed forces.
Article 3
1. States Parties shall raise in years the minimum age for the voluntary recruitment of
persons into their national armed forces from that set out in article 38, paragraph 3, of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, taking account of the principles contained

in that article and recognizing that under the Convention persons under the age of 18
years are entitled to special protection.
2. Each State Party shall deposit a binding declaration upon ratification of or accession to
the present Protocol that sets forth the minimum age at which it will permit voluntary
recruitment into its national armed forces and a description of the safeguards it has
adopted to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or coerced.
3. States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces under
the age of 18 years shall maintain safeguards to ensure, as a minimum, that:
(a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary;
(b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the person’s parents or
legal guardians;
(c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such military service;
(d) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national military
service.
4. Each State Party may strengthen its declaration at any time by notification to that effect
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall inform all States
Parties. Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received by the
Secretary-General.
5. The requirement to raise the age in paragraph 1 of the present article does not apply to
schools operated by or under the control of the armed forces of the States Parties, in
keeping with articles 28 and 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 4
1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any
circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use,
including the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such
practices.
3. The application of the present article shall not affect the legal status of any party to an
armed conflict.
Article 5
Nothing in the present Protocol shall be construed as precluding provisions in the law of a
State Party or in international instruments and international humanitarian law that are more
conducive to the realization of the rights of the child.
Article 6
1. Each State Party shall take all necessary legal, administrative and other measures to
ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of the provisions of the present
Protocol within its jurisdiction.
2. States Parties undertake to make the principles and provisions of the present Protocol
widely known and promoted by appropriate means, to adults and children alike.
3. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their
jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol are
demobilized or otherwise released from service. States Parties shall, when necessary,

accord to such persons all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological
recovery and their social reintegration.
Article 7
1. States Parties shall cooperate in the implementation of the present Protocol, including
in the prevention of any activity contrary thereto and in the rehabilitation and social
reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary thereto, including through
technical cooperation and financial assistance. Such assistance and cooperation will
be undertaken in consultation with the States Parties concerned and the relevant
international organizations.
2. States Parties in a position to do so shall provide such assistance through existing
multilateral, bilateral or other programmes or, inter alia, through a voluntary fund
established in accordance with the rules of the General Assembly.
Article 8
1. Each State Party shall, within two years following the entry into force of the present
Protocol for that State Party, submit a report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child
providing comprehensive information on the measures it has taken to implement the
provisions of the Protocol, including the measures taken to implement the provisions on
participation and recruitment.
2. Following the submission of the comprehensive report, each State Party shall include in
the reports it submits to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in accordance with
article 44 of the Convention, any further information with respect to the implementation
of the Protocol. Other States Parties to the Protocol shall submit a report every five
years.
3. The Committee on the Rights of the Child may request from States Parties further
information relevant to the implementation of the present Protocol.
Article 9
1. The present Protocol is open for signature by any State that is a party to the Convention
or has signed it.
2. The present Protocol is subject to ratification and is open to accession by any State.
Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
3. The Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and the Protocol,
shall inform all States Parties to the Convention and all States that have signed the
Convention of each instrument of declaration pursuant to article 3.
Article 10
1. The present Protocol shall enter into force three months after the deposit of the tenth
instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Protocol or acceding to it after its entry into force,
the Protocol shall enter into force one month after the date of the deposit of its own
instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 11
1. Any State Party may denounce the present Protocol at any time by written notification
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall thereafter inform the other
States Parties to the Convention and all States that have signed the Convention. The
denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the
Secretary-General. If, however, on the expiry of that year the denouncing State Party is
engaged in armed conflict, the denunciation shall not take effect before the end of the
armed conflict.
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party from its
obligations under the present Protocol in regard to any act that occurs prior to the date
on which the denunciation becomes effective. Nor shall such a denunciation prejudice in
any way the continued consideration of any matter that is already under consideration
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child prior to the date on which the denunciation
becomes effective.
Article 12
1. Any State Party may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon communicate the proposed
amendment to States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour
a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon the
proposals. In the event that, within four months from the date of such communication,
at least one third of the States Parties favour such a conference, the Secretary-General
shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment
adopted by a majority of States Parties present and voting at the conference shall be
submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations for approval.
2. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 of the present article shall enter
into force when it has been approved by the General Assembly and accepted by a two-
thirds majority of States Parties.
3. When an amendment enters into force, it shall be binding on those States Parties that
have accepted it, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of the present
Protocol and any earlier amendments they have accepted.
Article 13
1. The present Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United
Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of the
present Protocol to all States Parties to the Convention and all States that have signed
the Convention.

United Nations
S/RES/1612 (2005)
Resolution 1612 (2005)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5235th meeting, on 26 July

2005
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000,
1379 (2001) of 20 November 2001, 1460 (2003) of 30 January 2003, and 1539 (2004) of 22
April 2004, which contribute to a comprehensive framework for addressing the protection of
children affected by armed conflict,
While noting the advances made for the protection of children affected by armed conflict,
particularly in the areas of advocacy and the development of norms and standards,
remaining deeply concerned over the lack of overall progress on the ground, where
parties to conflict continue to violate with impunity the relevant provisions of applicable
international law relating to the rights and protection of children in armed conflict,
Stressing the primary role of national Governments in providing effective protection and
relief to all children affected by armed conflicts,
Recalling the responsibilities of States to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible
for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other egregious crimes perpetrated
against children,
Convinced that the protection of children in armed conflict should be regarded as an

important aspect of any comprehensive strategy to resolve conflict,
Reiterating its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security and, in this connection, its commitment to address the widespread impact of armed
conflict on children,
Stressing its determination to ensure respect for its resolutions and other international
norms and standards for the protection of children affected by armed conflict,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 9 February 2005 (S/2005/72) and
stressing that the present resolution does not seek to make any legal determination as to
whether situations which are referred to in the Secretary-General’s report are or are not
armed conflicts within the context of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols
thereto, nor does it prejudge the legal status of the non-State parties involved in these
situations,
Gravely concerned by the documented links between the use of child soldiers in violation
of applicable international law and the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons

and stressing the need for all States to take measures to prevent and to put an end to such
trafficking,
1. Strongly condemns the recruitment and use of child soldiers by parties to armed conflict
in violation of international obligations applicable to them and all other violations and
abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict;
2. Takes note of the action plan presented by the Secretary-General relating to the
establishment of a monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict
as called for in paragraph 2 of its resolution 1539 (2004) and, in this regard:
(a) Underlines that the mechanism is to collect and provide timely, objective, accurate
and reliable information on the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of
applicable international law and on other violations and abuses committed against
children affected by armed conflict, and the mechanism will report to the working
group to be created in accordance with paragraph 8 of this resolution;
(b) Underlines further that this mechanism must operate with the participation of and
in cooperation with national Governments and relevant United Nations and civil
society actors, including at the country level;
(c) Stresses that all actions undertaken by United Nations entities within the framework
of the monitoring and reporting mechanism must be designed to support and
supplement, as appropriate, the protection and rehabilitation roles of national
Governments;
(d) Also stresses that any dialogue established under the framework of the monitoring
and reporting mechanism by United Nations entities with non-State armed groups
in order to ensure protection for and access to children must be conducted in
the context of peace processes where they exist and the cooperation framework
between the United Nations and the concerned Government;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to implement without delay, the above-mentioned

monitoring and reporting mechanism, beginning with its application, within existing
resources, in close consultation with countries concerned, to parties in situations of
armed conflict listed in the annexes to the Secretary-General’s report (S/2005/72) that
are on the agenda of the Security Council, and then, in close consultation with countries
concerned, to apply it to parties in other situations of armed conflict listed in the
annexes to the Secretary-General’s report (S/2005/72), bearing in mind the discussion
of the Security Council and the views expressed by Member States, in particular during
the annual debate on Children and Armed Conflict, and also taking into account the
findings and recommendations of an independent review on the implementation of the
mechanism to be reported to the Security Council by 31 July 2006. The independent
review will include:
(a) An assessment of the overall effectiveness of the mechanism, as well as the
timeliness, accuracy, objectivity and reliability of the information compiled through
the mechanism;
(b) Information on how effectively the mechanism is linked to the work of the Security
Council and other organs of the United Nations;
(c) Information on the relevance and clarity of the division of responsibilities;
(d) Information on the budgetary and other resource implications for United Nations
actors and voluntary funded organizations contributing to the mechanism;
(e) Recommendations for the full implementation of the mechanism;

4. Stresses that the implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism by the
Secretary-General will be undertaken only in the context of and for the specific purpose
of ensuring the protection of children affected by armed conflict and shall not thereby
prejudge or imply a decision by the Security Council as to whether or not to include a
situation on its agenda;
5. Welcomes the initiatives taken by UNICEF and other United Nations entities to gather
information on the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of applicable
international law and on other violations and abuses committed against children in
situations of armed conflict and invites the Secretary- General to take due account of
these initiatives during the initial phase of implementation of the mechanism referred to
in paragraph 3;
6 Notes that information compiled by this mechanism, for reporting by the Secretary-
General to the General Assembly and the Security Council, may be considered by other
international, regional and national bodies, within their mandates and the scope of their
work, in order to ensure the protection, rights and well-being of children affected by
armed conflict;
7. Expresses serious concern regarding the lack of progress in development and

implementation of the action plans called for in paragraph 5 (a) of its resolution
1539 (2004) and, pursuant to this, calls on the parties concerned to develop and
implement action plans without further delay, in close collaboration with United Nations
peacekeeping missions and United Nations country teams, consistent with their
respective mandates and within their capabilities; and requests the Secretary- General
to provide criteria to assist in the development of such action plans;
8. Decides to establish a working group of the Security Council consisting of all members
of the Council to review the reports of the mechanism referred to in paragraph 3 of
this resolution, to review progress in the development and implementation of the
action plans mentioned in paragraph 7 of this resolution and to consider other relevant
information presented to it; decides further that the working group shall:
(a) Make recommendations to the Council on possible measures to promote
the protection of children affected by armed conflict, including through
recommendations on appropriate mandates for peacekeeping missions and
recommendations with respect to the parties to the conflict;
(b) Address requests, as appropriate, to other bodies within the United Nations system
for action to support implementation of this resolution in accordance with their
respective mandates;
9. Recalls paragraph 5 (c) of its resolution 1539 (2004), and reaffirms its intention to
consider imposing, through country-specific resolutions, targeted and graduated
measures, such as, inter alia, a ban on the export and supply of small arms and light
weapons and of other military equipment and on military assistance, against parties
to situations of armed conflict which are on the Security Council’s agenda and are in
violation of applicable international law relating to the rights and protection of children
in armed conflict;
10. Stresses the responsibility of United Nations peacekeeping missions and United Nations
country teams, consistent with their respective mandates, to ensure effective follow-up

to Security Council resolutions, ensure a coordinated response to CAAC concerns and to
monitor and report to the Secretary-General;
11. Welcomes the efforts undertaken by United Nations peacekeeping operations to

implement the Secretary-General’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and
abuse and to ensure full compliance of their personnel with the United Nations code
of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in
this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing
countries to take appropriate preventive action including predeployment awareness
training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in
cases of misconduct involving their personnel;
12. Decides to continue the inclusion of specific provisions for the protection of children in
the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations, including the deployment,
on a case-by-case basis, of child-protection advisers (CPAs), and requests the Secretary-
General to ensure that the need for and the number and roles of CPAs are systematically
assessed during the preparation of each United Nations peacekeeping operation;
welcomes the comprehensive assessment undertaken on the role and activities of CPAs
with a view to drawing lessons learned and best practices;
13. Welcomes recent initiatives by regional and subregional organizations and arrangements
for the protection of children affected by armed conflict, and encourages continued
mainstreaming of child protection into their advocacy, policies and programmes;
development of peer review and monitoring and reporting mechanisms; establishment,
within their secretariats, of child-protection mechanisms; inclusion of child-protection
staff and training in their peace and field operations; sub- and interregional initiatives
to end activities harmful to children in times of conflict, in particular cross-border
recruitment and abduction of children, illicit movement of small arms, and illicit trade
in natural resources through the development and implementation of guidelines on
children and armed conflict;
14. Calls upon all parties concerned to ensure that the protection, rights and well-being of
children affected by armed conflict are specifically integrated into all peace processes,
peace agreements and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction planning and
programmes;
15. Calls upon all parties concerned to abide by the international obligations applicable
to them relating to the protection of children affected by armed conflict as well as the
concrete commitments they have made to the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict, to UNICEF and other United Nations agencies
and to cooperate fully with the United Nations peacekeeping missions and United
Nations country teams, where appropriate, in the context of the cooperation framework
between the United Nations and the concerned Government, in the follow-up and
implementation of these commitments;
16. Urges Member States, United Nations entities, regional and subregional organizations
and other parties concerned, to take appropriate measures to control illicit subregional
and cross-border activities harmful to children, including illicit exploitation of natural
resources, illicit trade in small arms, abduction of children and their use and recruitment

as soldiers as well as other violations and abuses committed against children in
situations of armed conflict in violation of applicable international law;
17. Urges all parties concerned, including Member States, United Nations entities and
financial institutions, to support the development and strengthening of the capacities
of national institutions and local civil society networks for advocacy, protection and
rehabilitation of children affected by armed conflict to ensure the sustainability of local
child-protection initiatives;
18. Requests that the Secretary-General direct all relevant United Nations entities to take
specific measures, within existing resources, to ensure systematic mainstreaming of
CAAC issues within their respective institutions, including by ensuring allocation of
adequate financial and human resources towards protection of war-affected children
within all relevant offices and departments and on the ground as well as to strengthen,
within their respective mandates, their cooperation and coordination when addressing
the protection of children in armed conflict;
19. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that, in all his reports on
country-specific situations, the protection of children is included as a specific aspect
of the report, and expresses its intention to give its full attention to the information
provided therein when dealing with those situations on its agenda;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report by November 2006 on the

implementation of this resolution and resolutions 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), and 1539
(2004) which would include, inter alia:
(a) Information on compliance by parties in ending the recruitment or use of children in
armed conflict in violation of applicable international law and other violations being
committed against children affected by armed conflict;
(b) Information on progress made in the implementation of the monitoring and reporting
mechanism mentioned in paragraph 3;
(c) Information on progress made in the development and implementation of the action
plans referred to in paragraph 7 of the present resolution;
(d) Information on the assessment of the role and activities of CPAs;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of this matter.

© Jason P. Howe 2005
Children play near a checkpoint manned by government soldiers, Puerto Asis, Putumayo,
Colombia

Child Soldiers 2008:
Data Summary
Definitions
Government forces data adapted from The Military Balance, International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 2007, except where indicated.
Population data adapted from The State of the World’s Children, UNICEF, 2007.
± estimated figure
E Evidence of recruitment or use of child soldiers

P Possible recruitment or use of child soldiers
N No evidence of recruitment or use of child soldiers
B Insufficient birth registration made it possible that under-18s may have been recruited
and or used as child soldiers
G Children were involved in armed gangs associated with political violence
L Legal possibility of recruitment of under-18s but no reported practice.
S Children were used as spies, informants or messengers.
* Parental consent allowed recruitment at a lower age than established by law or
regulations.
1 State is party to the treaty, through ratification, accession or succession [= full black
circle]
r State has signed treaty [= half black circle]
! State has not signed treaty [= empty circle]
n/a not applicable
(Footnotes to the chart appear on page 406)

Under 18 population
government forces
government forces
Total population
Child soldiers in
Child soldiers in
armed political
Total active
groups
(2005)
(2005)
Countries and territories
Afghanistan 50,000 29,863,000 15,849,000 P E
Albania 11,020 3,130,000 1,034,000 N n/a
Algeria 137,500 32,854,000 11,983,000 N P
Andorra none 67,000 12,000 n/a n/a
Angola 107,000 15,941,000 8,502,000 N no data
Antigua and Barbuda 170 81,000 27,000 N n/a
Argentina 71,655 38,747,000 12,277,000 L n/a
Armenia 43,641 3,016,000 819,000 E n/a
Australia 51,610 20,155,000 4,797,000 E n/a
Austria 39,600 8,189,000 1,552,000 E n/a
Azerbaijan 66,740 8,411,000 2,736,000 P N
Bahamas 860 323,000 108,000 N n/a
Bahrain 11,200 727,000 232,000 P n/a
Bangladesh 126,500 141,822,000 59,402,000 E P
Barbados 610 270,000 63,000 E n/a
Belarus 72,940 9,755,000 1,967,000 L n/a
Belgium 39,690 10,419,000 2,120,000 L n/a
Belize ±1,050 270,000 117,000 N n/a
Benin 4,750 8,439,000 4,300,000 N n/a
Bhutan 9,0007 2,163,000 983,000 N E8
Bolivia 46,100 9,182,000 4,090,000 E n/a
Bosnia and Herzegovina 11,865 3,907,000 807,000 N n/a

Legal min. voluntary
Optional Protocol2
the Rome Statute3

Ratification of the
conscription age1
recruitment age1
Legal minimum
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Protocol II5
Additional
Additional
Protocol I5
ILO C1824
none 18 1 1 ! ! !
19 18 ! 1 1 1 1
19 unclear ! r 1 1 1
n/a n/a 1 1 ! ! !
18 (men)
20
20 (women) 1 r 1 1 !
none 18 ! 1 1 1 1
none6 18 1 1 1 1 1
18
18
(16 as cadet) 1 r 1 1 1
none 17 1 1 1 1 1
17 (training
18
only) 1 1 1 1 1
18 17 (as cadet) 1 ! 1 ! !
none 18 ! r 1 1 1
none Unclear 1 r 1 1 1
none 16 1 r 1 1 1
none 18 (under-18*) ! 1 1 1 1
18 (16 as
18
cadet*) 1 ! 1 1 1
17 (conscription
suspended)
18 1 1 1 1 1
not
specified
18 1 1 1 1 1
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 r ! ! ! !
15 (pre-military
19
service) 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 1 1 1 1 1

Under 18 population
government forces
government forces
Total population
Child soldiers in
Child soldiers in
armed political
Total active
groups
(2005)
(2005)
Botswana 9,000 1,765,000 800,000 B n/a
Brazil 287,870 186,405,000 62,229,000 L G
Brunei Darussalam 7,000 374,000 130,000 L n/a
Bulgaria 51,000 7,726,000 1,366,000 N n/a
Burkina Faso 10,800 13,228,000 7,176,000 N n/a
Burundi 35,000 7,548,000 3,969,000 S E
Cambodia 124,300 14,071,000 6,242,000 N n/a
Cameroon 14,100 16,322,000 7,881,000 L n/a
Canada 62,500 32,268,000 6,970,000 E n/a
Cape Verde 1,200 507,000 238,000 L n/a
Central African Republic 3,150 4,038,000 2,021,000 P/B E
Chad 25,350 9,749,000 5,257,000 E E
Chile 75,698 16,295,000 4,945,000 N n/a
China 2,255,000 1,315,844,000 352,718,000 L n/a
Colombia 208,600 45,600,000 16,755,000 S E9
Comoros unclear 798,000 387,000 N N
Congo, Democratic
51,000 57,549,000 31,071,000 E E10
Republic of the
Congo, Republic of 10,000 3,999,000 2,153,000 N P
Cook Islands none 18,000 7,000 n/a n/a
Costa Rica none 4,327,000 1,496,000 n/a n/a
Côte d’Ivoire 17,050 18,154,000 8,908,000 N E11
Croatia 20,800 4,551,000 873,000 N n/a
Cuba 49,000 11,269,000 2,666,000 E n/a

Optional Protocol2
the Rome Statute3

Ratification of the
conscription age1
recruitment age1
Legal minimum
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Protocol II5
Additional
Additional
Protocol I5
ILO C1824
none 18 1 1 1 1 1
18 17 (16*) 1 1 1 1 1
none 17.5 ! ! ! 1 1
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 1 1 1 1 1
none 16 r 1 1 1 1
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 (under-18*) r r 1 1 1
none 16 1 1 1 1 1
18 17 1 r 1 1 1
18 18 ! 1 1 1 1
20 18 (under-18*) 1 1 1 1 1
18 18 1 r 1 1 1
18 17 1 ! 1 1 1
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 ! 1 1 1 1
none 18 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 ! 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a ! ! ! 1 1
n/a n/a 1 1 1 1 1
18 18 ! r 1 1 1
18 none 1 1 1 1 1
16 17 1 ! ! 1 1

Under 18 population
government forces
government forces
Total population
Child soldiers in
Child soldiers in
armed political
Total active
groups
(2005)
(2005)
Cyprus12 10,000 835,000 205,000 L n/a
Czech Republic 24,752 10,220,000 1,882,000 N n/a
Denmark 21,620 5,431,000 1,211,000 N n/a
Djibouti 10,950 793,000 383,000 N n/a
Dominica none 79,000 27,000 n/a n/a
Dominican Republic 24,500 8,895,000 3,481,000 L n/a
Ecuador 56,500 13,228,000 5,100,000 L N69
Egypt 468,500 74,033,000 29,691,000 L N
El Salvador 15,500 6,881,000 2,750,000 L n/a
Equatorial Guinea 1,320 504,000 257,000 N n/a
Eritrea 201,750 4,401,000 2,266,000 P no data
Estonia 4,100 1,330,000 265,000 P n/a
Ethiopia 152,500 77,431,000 39,792,000 B N
Fiji 3,500 848,000 317,000 N n/a
Finland 29,300 5,249,000 1,100,000 N n/a
France 254,895 60,496,000 13,271,000 L n/a
Gabon 4,700 1,384,000 651,000 N n/a
Gambia 800 1,517,000 704,000 N n/a
Georgia 11,320 4,474,000 1,080,000 N n/a
Germany 245,702 82,689,000 14,707,000 E n/a
Ghana 13,500 22,113,000 10,159,000 N n/a
Greece 147,100 11,120,000 1,944,000 N n/a
Grenada none 103,000 35,000 n/a n/a
Guatemala 15,500 12,599,000 6,297,000 E n/a

Optional Protocol2
the Rome Statute3

Ratification of the
conscription age1
recruitment age1
Legal minimum
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Protocol II5
Additional
Additional
Protocol I5
ILO C1824
18 17 ! 1 1 1 1
18 (phased out
by 2005)
18 1 r 1 1 1
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 r 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a 1 1 1 1 1
none 16 r 1 1 1 1
18 17 1 1 1 1 1
18 16 1 r 1 1 1
18 16 1 ! 1 1 1
age not established 18 ! ! 1 1 1
18 18 1 r ! ! !
18 18 r 1 1 1 1
18 18 ! ! 1 1 1
none 18 r 1 1 ! !
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
18 (conscription
suspended)
17 1 1 1 1 1
none 20 r 1 1 1 1
none 18 r 1 1 1 1
18 18 ! 1 1 1 1
17 (training
18
only) 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 r 1 1 1 1
19 18 1 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a ! ! 1 1 1
18 18 1 ! 1 1 1

Under 18 population
government forces
government forces
Total population
Child soldiers in
Child soldiers in
armed political
Total active
groups
(2005)
(2005)
Guinea 12,300 9,402,000 4,723,000 B P11
Guinea-Bissau 9,250 1,586,000 856,000 L n/a
Guyana 1,100 751,000 261,000 L n/a
Haiti none 8,528,000 3,846,000 n/a G
Holy See 10013 1,000 no data N n/a
Honduras 12,000 7,205,000 3,317,000 N n/a
Hungary 32,300 10,098,000 1,965,000 L n/a
Iceland none 295,000 78,000 n/a n/a
India 1,316,000 1,103,371,000 420,678,000 L/S15 E
Indonesia 302,000 222,781,000 75,641,000 S E
Iran (Islamic
545,000 69,515,000 25,243,000 L15 P
Republic of )
Iraq 227,000 28,807,000 13,759,000 N E
Ireland 10,470 4,148,000 1,007,000 E n/a
Israel 168,000 6,725,000 2,200,000 L/S E
Italy 191,152 58,093,000 9,837,000 P n/a
Jamaica 2,830 2,651,000 992,000 P G
Japan 240,400 128,085,000 21,770,000 N n/a
Jordan 100,500 5,703,000 2,477,000 E N
Kazakhstan 65,800 14,825,000 4,394,000 P N
Kenya 24,120 34,256,000 17,214,000 L G
Kiribati none 99,000 39,000 n/a n/a
Korea, Democratic
1,106,000 22,488,000 6,756,000 L n/a
People’s Republic of

Optional Protocol2
the Rome Statute3

Ratification of the
conscription age1
recruitment age1
Legal minimum
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Protocol II5
Additional
Additional
Protocol I5
ILO C1824
18 18 ! 1 1 1 1
18 16 (under 16*) r r ! 1 1
18 16 (14–16*) ! 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a r r 1 1 1
none 19 1 ! ! 1 1
none 18 1 1 1 1 1
18 18 (17*) r 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a 1 1 1 1 1
none 17.5 1 ! ! ! !
18 18 r ! 1 ! !
18 16 ! r 1 ! !
none 18 ! ! 1 ! !
17 (16 for
none
apprentices) 1 1 1 1 1
18 17 1 r 1 ! !
conscription
suspended
18 1 1 1 1 1
18 (17.5 training
none
only) 1 r 1 1 1
none 18 1 1 1 1 1
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
19 (16 (military
18
academy) 1 ! 1 1 1
none 18 (under 18*) 1 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a ! ! ! ! !
16 or 17
18 unclear
unclear ! ! ! 1 !

Under 18 population
government forces
government forces
Total population
Child soldiers in
Child soldiers in
armed political
Total active
groups
(2005)
(2005)
Korea, Republic of 687,000 47,817,000 10,795,000 N n/a
Kuwait 15,500 2,687,000 764,000 N n/a
Kyrgyzstan 12,500 5,264,000 2,016,000 L n/a
Lao People’s Democratic

29,100 5,924,000 2,830,000 N P
Republic
Latvia 5,339 2,307,000 448,000 N n/a
Lebanon 72,100 3,577,000 1,225,000 L E
Lesotho 2,000 1,795,000 840,000 B n/a
Liberia 2,400 3,283,000 1,769,000 N E11
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 76,000 5,853,000 2,119,000 P15 n/a
Liechtenstein none 35,000 7,000 n/a n/a
Lithuania 12,010 3,431,000 745,000 N n/a
Luxembourg 900 465,000 104,000 E n/a
Macedonia (the former

10,890 2,000,000 494,000 N n/a
Yugoslav Republic of )
Madagascar 13,500 18,606,000 9,412,000 N n/a
Malawi 5,300 12,884,000 6,945,000 B n/a
Malaysia 109,000 25,347,000 9,603,000 L n/a
Maldives not known 329,000 158,000 N n/a
Mali 7,350 13,518,000 7,439,000 N n/a
Malta 1,609 402,000 88,000 L n/a
Marshall Islands none 62,000 24,000 n/a n/a
Mauritania 15,870 3,069,000 1,513,000 L n/a

Optional Protocol2
the Rome Statute3

Ratification of the
conscription age1
recruitment age1
Legal minimum
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Protocol II5
Additional
Additional
Protocol I5
ILO C1824
19 18 1 1 1 1 1
18 18 1 r 1 1 1
18 18 (16 as cadets) 1 r 1 1 1
18 18 1 ! 1 1 1
19 (ended in 2006) 18 1 1 1 1 1
18 (ended in 2007) 17 r ! 1 1 1
none 18 1 1 1 1 1
not established
none
in law r 1 1 1 1
17 17 1 ! 1 1 1
n/a n/a 1 1 ! 1 1
19 18 1 1 1 1 1
None 17 1 1 1 1 1
19 (conscription
abolished)
18 1 1 1 1 1
None 18 1 r 1 1 1
None 18 r 1 1 1 1
17.5 (under
None
17.5* ! ! 1 ! !
none 18 1 ! ! 1 1
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
17.5 (under
none
17.5*) 1 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a ! 1 ! ! !
18 or 16
18
(unclear) ! ! 1 1 1

Under 18 population
government forces
government forces
Total population
Child soldiers in
Child soldiers in
armed political
Total active
groups
(2005)
(2005)
Mauritius none 1,245,000 364,000 n/a n/a
Mexico 237,800 107,029,000 39,654,000 P N
Micronesia (Federated
none 110,000 51,000 n/a n/a
States of )
Moldova, Republic of 6,750 4,206,000 1,009,000 P no data
Monaco none 35,000 7,000 n/a n/a
Mongolia 8,600 2,646,000 998,000 P n/a
Montenegro 7,300 601,00014 145,00014 N n/a
Morocco 200,800 31,478,000 11,743,000 N N
Mozambique 11,200 19,792,000 10,049,000 N n/a
Myanmar 375,000 50,519,000 17,962,000 E E
Namibia 9,200 2,031,000 993,000 N N
Nauru none 14,000 5,000 n/a n/a
Nepal 69,000 27,133,000 12,395,000 S E8
Netherlands 53,130 16,299,000 3,559,000 E n/a
New Zealand 8,951 4,028,000 1,048,000 E n/a
Nicaragua 14,000 5,487,000 2,526,000 N n/a
Niger 5,300 13,957,000 7,765,000 L no data
Nigeria 85,000 131,530,000 67,371,000 N E/G
Niue none 1,000 no data n/a n/a
Norway 23,400 4,620,000 1,083,000 N n/a
Occupied Palestinian
none 3,702,000 1,938,000 N E
Territory
Oman 41,700 2,567,000 1,054,000 N n/a

Optional Protocol2
the Rome Statute3

Ratification of the
conscription age1
recruitment age1
Legal minimum
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Protocol II5
Additional
Additional
Protocol I5
ILO C1824
18 (for security
n/a
forces) r 1 1 1 1
16* (training
18
only) 1 1 1 1 !
n/a n/a r ! ! 1 1
17 (training
18
only) 1 r 1 1 1
21(security
n/a
forces) 1 r ! 1 1
18 18 (unclear) 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 1 r 1 ! !
19 18 1 r 1 1 1
none 18 ! ! ! ! !
none 18 1 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a r 1 ! 1 1
none 18 1 ! 1 ! !
conscription
suspended
17 r 1 1 1 1
none 17 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 1 ! 1 1 1
not specified not specified ! 1 1 1 1
none 18 r 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a ! ! ! ! !
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
18 (security
none n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
forces)
15 or 18
none
(unclear) 1 r 1 1 1

Under 18 population
government forces
government forces
Total population
Child soldiers in
Child soldiers in
armed political
Total active
groups
(2005)
(2005)
Pakistan 619,000 157,935,000 71,800,000 L E
Palau none 20,000 8,000 n/a n/a
Panama none 3,232,000 1,163,000 n/a n/a
Papua New Guinea 3,100 5,887,000 2,751,000 L n/a
Paraguay 10,100 6,158,000 2,722,000 E n/a
Peru 80,000 27,968,000 10,722,000 L15 N
Philippines 106,000 83,054,000 34,622,000 N15 E
Poland 141,500 38,530,000 7,984,000 L n/a
Portugal 43,960 10,495,000 2,007,000 N n/a
Qatar 12,400 813,000 204,000 N n/a
Romania 69,600 21,711,000 4,366,000 N n/a
Russian Federation 1,027,000 143,202,000 28,830,000 E P
Rwanda 33,000 9,038,000 4,658,000 N N10
Saint Kitts and Nevis no data 43,000 14,000 N n/a
Saint Lucia none 161,000 56,000 n/a n/a
Saint Vincent and the

none 119,000 43,000 n/a n/a
Grenadines
Samoa none 185,000 88,000 n/a n/a
San Marino no data 28,000 5,000 N n/a
Sao Tome and Principe unknown 157,000 73,000 L n/a
Saudi Arabia 224,500 24,573,000 10,690,000 N N
Senegal 13,620 11,658,000 5,804,000 N no data

Optional Protocol2
the Rome Statute3

Ratification of the
conscription age1
recruitment age1
Legal minimum
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Protocol II5
Additional
Additional
Protocol I5
ILO C1824
none 17 r ! 1 ! !
n/a n/a ! ! ! 1 1
n/a n/a 1 1 1 1 1
none 16 ! ! 1 ! !
no legal
17
minimum 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 (16 as cadets) 1 1 1 1 1
18 (17 for
none
training) 1 r 1 ! 1
18 17 1 1 1 1 1
18 (conscription
suspended)
18 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 1 ! 1 1 1
20 (conscription
suspended)
18 1 1 1 1 1
18 (16 at military
18 education r r 1 1 1
institutes)
none 18 1 ! 1 1 1
18 (security
none
forces) ! 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a ! r 1 1 1
19 (security
n/a
forces) ! 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a ! 1 ! 1 1
none 18 r 1 1 1 1
18 17 ! r 1 1 1
none 18 ! ! 1 1 1
20 18 1 1 1 1 1

Under 18 population
government forces
government forces
Total population
Child soldiers in
Child soldiers in
armed political
Total active
groups
(2005)
(2005)
Serbia 39,686 9,900,00014 2,200,00014 L n/a
Seychelles 200 81,000 41,000 L n/a
Sierra Leone 10,500 5,525,000 2,722,000 N N11
Singapore 72,500 4,326,000 1,023,000 L n/a
Slovakia 15,223 5,401,000 1,142,000 N n/a
Slovenia 6,550 1,967,000 345,000 N n/a
Solomon Islands none 478,000 227,000 n/a n/a
Somalia no data 8,228,000 4,152,000 E E
South Africa 62,334 47,432,000 18,417,000 N G
Spain 147,255 43,064,000 7,457,000 N N
Sri Lanka 150,900 20,743,000 6,054,000 N E
Sudan 104,800 36,233,000 16,547,000 E E
Suriname 1,840 449,000 161,000 no data N
Swaziland no data 1,032,000 514,000 B n/a
Sweden 27,600 9,041,000 1,943,000 N n/a
Switzerland 4,200 7,252,000 1,458,000 N n/a
Syrian Arab
307,600 19,043,000 8,375,000 B N
Republic
Taiwan 290,000 22,800,00016 5,250,00016 N n/a
Tajikistan 7,600 6,507,000 3,055,000 P P
Tanzania, United
27,000 38,329,000 19,070,000 L N
Republic of
Thailand 306,600 64,233,000 18,522,000 N E
Timor-Leste 1,250 947,000 463,000 N n/a

Optional Protocol2
the Rome Statute3

Ratification of the
conscription age1
recruitment age1
Legal minimum
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Protocol II5
Additional
Additional
Protocol I5
ILO C1824
17 18 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 (under-18*) r r 1 1 1
none 18 1 1 ! 1 1
18 16.5 r ! 1 ! !
18 (conscription
abolished in 2006)
18 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 1 1 1 1 1
n/a n/a ! r ! 1 1
no data
no data r ! ! ! !
none 18 r 1 1 1 1
conscription
suspended
18 1 1 1 1 1
none 18 1 ! 1 ! !
18 18 1 r 1 1 1
none no data r ! 1 1 1
18 18 ! ! 1 1 1
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
19 18 1 1 1 1 1
18 18 1 r 1 1 !
18 18 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
18
none
(under 18*) 1 1 1 1 1
20 18 1 r 1 ! !
18 18 1 1 ! 1 1

Under 18 population
government forces
government forces
Total population
Child soldiers in
Child soldiers in
armed political
Total active
groups
(2005)
(2005)
Togo 8,550 6,145,000 3,095,000 N n/a
Tonga not known 102,000 43,000 L n/a
Trinidad and Tobago 2,700 1,305,000 355,000 L n/a
Tunisia 35,300 10,102,000 3,259,000 N N
Turkey 514,850 73,193,000 25,348,000 N P
Turkmenistan 26,000 4,833,000 1,882,000 L n/a
Tuvalu none 10,000 4,000 n/a n/a
Uganda 45,000 28,816,000 16,539,000 E E
Ukraine 187,600 46,481,000 9,084,000 N n/a
United Arab Emirates 50,500 4,496,000 1,192,000 N n/a
United Kingdom 191,030 59,668,000 13,117,000 E n/a
United States of
1,506,757 298,213,000 74,926,000 E n/a
America
Uruguay 25,100 3,463,000 1,001,000 N n/a
Uzbekistan ± 55,000 26,593,000 10,742,000 P N
Vanuatu none 211,000 99,000 n/a n/a
Venezuela 82,300 26,749,000 9,988,000 N P9
Viet Nam 455,000 84,238,000 30,496,000 L n/a
Yemen 66,700 20,975,000 11,252,000 E P
Zambia 15,100 11,668,000 6,215,000 L/B N
Zimbabwe 29,000 13,010,000 6,256,000 P15 n/a
Footnotes to the Data Summary Chart appear on page 406.

Optional Protocol2
the Rome Statute3

Ratification of the
conscription age1
recruitment age1
Legal minimum
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Ratification of
Protocol II5
Additional
Additional
Protocol I5
ILO C1824
18 18 1 ! 1 1 1
none 16 ! ! ! 1 1
none 16* ! 1 1 1 1
20 18 1 ! 1 1 1
19 18 1 ! 1 ! !
18 17 1 ! ! 1 1
n/a n/a ! ! ! ! !
none 18 1 1 1 1 1
18 19 1 r 1 1 1
none 1817 ! r 1 1 1
none 16 1 1 1 1 1
18 (not in force) 17 1 r 1 ! !
none 18 1 1 1 1 1
18 18 ! r ! 1 1
n/a n/a 1 ! 1 1 1
18 18 1 1 1 1 1
18 (17 at
18 military service 1 ! 1 1 !
institute)
none 18 1 r 1 1 1
none 18 (16*) ! 1 1 1 1
18 or 16
18
(unclear) ! r 1 1 1

Footnotes
1 Refers to minimum conscription age and minimum voluntary recruitment age in
peacetime and recruitment ages may therefore be lower in cases of public emergency.
2 Adapted from Status of Ratifications of Principle International Human Rights Treaties,
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
www.unhchr.ch; Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, United
Nations Treaty Collection, http://untreaty.un.org (subscription required).
3 Adapted from States Parties to the International Criminal Court,
www.icc.cpi.int/statesparties.html.
4 Adapted from Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), International
Labour Organization, www.ilo.org.
5 Adapted from State Parties to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols,
International Committee of the Red Cross, www.icrc.org.
6 Authorities could authorize conscription if the number of volunteers failed to meet the
annual quota.
7 “Militia should start in 2008”, Kuensel Online, 16 June 2007, www.kuenselonline.com.
8 Bhutanese armed groups were reportedly recruiting children from refugee camps in
eastern Nepal.
9 Recruitment by Colombian armed groups reportedly extended across the borders into
Ecuador and Venezuela.
10 Armed group units loyal to Laurent Nkunda in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo recruited children from refugee camps in Rwanda.
11 In 2004 and 2005 former child soldiers from Liberia were recruited and used in
hostilities in Côte d’Ivoire. Liberian ex-combatants were reportedly recruiting for pro-
and anti-government groups in Guinea in 2004, although it was not possible to confirm
whether children were involved. Children were reportedly recruited in Sierra Leone by
Liberian armed groups in 2005.
12 Additional information: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus: Child soldiers in
armed forces: P (no data); child soldiers in armed political groups: not applicable;
legal minimum conscription age: 19; legal minimum voluntary recruitment age: 17.
Signatures and ratifications: not applicable.
13 “Pope’s guards celebrate 500 years”, BBC News, 22 January 2006.
14 UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children, 2008, www.unicef.org.
15 Children were reportedly recruited or used by paramilitary or civilian defence forces.
16 Government Information Office, Taiwan Yearbook 2006 (figures from 2006),
www.gio.gov.tw.
17 18 years for officers and women, unknown for others.

© Coalition 2007
Mural in a youth centre in Dheisheh refugee camp, Bethlehem, the West Bank

Methodology, terms and
definitions
Methodology
This report covers the period from April 2004 to October 2007 and the country entries
refer to events occurring within this period. Some important developments relating to the
recruitment and use of child soldiers between the end of October 2007 and the end of
March 2008 are referred to in the report’s introduction. Country ratifications of relevant
international treaties are up to date as of February 2008 and are included in the country
data at the top of each entry, and in the global data summary chart.
Information for this report was sought from a wide range of sources. These included
governments, UN agencies and peacekeeping missions, other intergovernmental
organizations, news media, academic sources, and human rights and humanitarian
organizations. Information was also provided by Coalition members and partners and by
local non-governmental organizations, journalists, lawyers, activists and others in many
countries. Sources for the information contained in the country entries and the data
summary chart are provided in endnotes. In some cases the identity of the source has been
withheld and this is indicated in the relevant endnote. The names of child soldiers have
been changed throughout this report.
Terms and definitions

Accession: Accession means formal consent by a state to be legally bound by a treaty
– essentially a one-step process combining signature and ratification (see below) of a
treaty. In most instances it requires action by the national parliament. States acceding
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child or its optional protocols must deposit their
instruments of accession with the UN Secretary-General.
Armed conflict: The term armed conflict is used to refer to both international and non-
international conflicts of high and low intensity.
Armed forces: These generally refer to official government armed forces, including the army,
navy and air force.
Armed groups and armed political groups: These terms are used to refer to non-state or
irregular armed groups which use arms for political reasons. They include opposition forces,
factional or tribal groups, armed groups belonging to ethnic or religious minorities and a
range of other militia groups. These terms are also sometimes used to refer to armed groups
(often paramilitaries or militias) which are backed by or allied to government forces but are
not officially part of them.

Child: A child is any person under 18 years of age. This is consistent with the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (Article 1), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
(Article 2), and International Labour Organization Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms
of Child Labour (Article 2). The Coalition also refers to “under-18s” in this report, generally
when referring to children between the ages of 15 and 18.
Child soldier: While there is no precise definition, the Coalition considers a child soldier any
person below the age of 18 who is a member of or attached to government armed forces
or any other regular or irregular armed force or armed political group, whether or not an
armed conflict exists. Child soldiers perform a range of tasks including: participation in
combat, laying mines and explosives; scouting, spying, acting as decoys, couriers or guards;
training, drill or other preparations; logistics and support functions, portering, cooking and
domestic labour. Child soldiers may also be subjected to sexual slavery or other forms of
sexual abuse.1
DDR: A commonly-used abbreviation for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

(see below).
Demobilization: The formal and controlled discharge of soldiers from the army or from
an armed group. In demobilizing children the objectives should be to verify the child’s
participation in armed conflict, to collect basic information to establish the child’s identity
for family tracing, to assess priority needs, and to provide the child with information about
what is likely to happen next.
Disarmament: The collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict
zone. It frequently entails weapons collection, assembly of combatants and development of
arms management programs, including their safe storage and sometimes their destruction.
Because many child soldiers do not carry their own weapons, disarmament should not be a
prerequisite for the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers.
Internally displaced persons: People who have been forced to flee their homes for reasons
such as armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights abuses or other disasters, and
who have sought safety elsewhere in the same country.
Ratification: Ratification is the means by which governments consent to be legally bound

by an international treaty. In most cases, ratification follows signature of the treaty and
requires action by the national parliament. States ratifying the Convention on the Rights of
the Child or its optional protocols must deposit their instruments of ratification with the UN
Secretary-General.
Recruitment: The term recruitment refers to three different means by which people
become members of armed forces or armed groups: compulsory, voluntary, and forcible (or
forced). Compulsory recruitment is defined in national legislation and typically applies to
conscripted members of official armed forces. Voluntary recruitment is usually regulated
by law or policy and occurs without conscription or force. Forcible (or forced) recruitment
entails the illegal use of force, for instance in the form of abduction or other duress. It is
important to note that the lines between compulsory, voluntary and forced recruitment
are often blurred. Children may be subjected to various political and economic pressures

which mean they have little alternative to enlisting in an armed force or group. The Coalition
opposes all forms of military recruitment or use of children under the age of eighteen.
Reintegration: A long-term process which aims to give children a viable alternative to

their involvement in armed conflict and help them resume life in the community. Elements
of reintegration include family reunification (or finding alternative care if reunification is
impossible), providing education and training, devising appropriate strategies for economic
and livelihood support and in some cases providing psycho-social support.
Signature: A state may sign an international treaty to indicate its preliminary and general
endorsement of its aims, but a signature is not a legally binding step or a firm commitment
to proceed to the next, and final, step of ratification. Nevertheless, signing a treaty creates
an obligation of good faith not to undermine the treaty’s objectives.
“Straight-18”: The Coalition campaigns for governments to adopt and implement the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed
conflict, in a manner which prohibits the military recruitment or use of all children below the
age of 18 years without exception or reservation. This is called the “straight-18” position.
1 A similar definition is provided in the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed
Forces or Armed Groups. It states “A child associated with an armed force or armed group” refers to any
person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group
in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters,
messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a
direct part in hostilities.

Glossary and explanatory notes
Frequently used abbreviations

ACRWC African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
AFP Agence France-Presse
AI Amnesty International
AP Associated Press
AU African Union (formerly Organization of African Unity)
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BONUCA UN Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic
CEDAW UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

Women (1979)
CEMAC Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (Economic

and Monetary Community of Central Africa)
CPT European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child. Also, UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child
DCI Defence for Children International
DDR disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (see Methodology, terms

and definitions)
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
EUFOR European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
FIDH Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme (International

Federation for Human Rights)
GC AP I Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and

relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), 8 June 1977

GC AP II Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), 8 June 1977
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICC International Criminal Court
ICG International Crisis Group
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP internally displaced persons (see Methodology, terms and definitions)
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
ILO International Labour Organization
ILO 138 C138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973
ILO 182 C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPS Inter Press Service
IRIN UN Integrated Regional Information Networks
KFOR Kosovo Force (NATO)
MINURCAT UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUC UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO non-governmental organization
OCHA UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Optional Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Protocol involvement of children in armed conflict
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PANA Panapress (Africa)
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN United Nations

UNAMID African Union/UN hybrid operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDOF UN Disengagement Observer Force (Golan Heights)
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF UN Children’s Fund
UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL UN Mission in Liberia
UNMIN UN Mission in Nepal
UNMIS UN Mission in the Sudan
UNMIT UN Integrated Mission in Timor Leste
UNOCI UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNOMB UN Observer Mission on Bougainville
UNOMIG UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNRWA UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization (Middle East)
US, USA United States of America
Internet sources
Websites for a particular document or source are given at first reference in the endnotes.
In most cases the link to the home page is provided (rather than a link to the specific
document), so the reader can locate the specific document using the site’s own search
engine or from its home page. Where additional guidance may be helpful for locating a
specific document or web page, it is given in brackets.
Frequently cited sources in this report include:
Amnesty International (AI): www.amnesty.org; documents under Library tab at http://web.

amnesty.org/library/engindex
BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk

Human Rights Watch (HRW): www.hrw.org
International Crisis Group (ICG): www.crisisweb.org
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): www.osce.org
UN Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN): www.irinnews.org
UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): http://ochaonline.un.org;

Reliefweb: www.reliefweb.int
US State Department: www.state.gov; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices since

1993: www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c1470.htm
Locating UN documents on the internet

UN human rights documents, such as those issued by the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (UN Doc. CRC/…) and other
Treaty Bodies, or the Commission on Human Rights and its mechanisms (UN Doc. E/
CN.4/…), can be found on the website of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, www.ohchr.org.
Reports of the UN Secretary-General to other UN bodies and other documents issued in

connection with the UN Security Council (UN Doc. S/…) and General Assembly (UN Doc.
A/…) can be found on the main UN website (www.un.org) under the Documents link or at
www.un.org/documents. The main UN website also provides links to other bodies in the UN
system, such as UNHCR (www.unhcr.ch) and UNICEF (www.unicef.org).
Material relating to UN peacekeeping missions can be found at the UN Department of

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO): www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp.
The UN Treaty Collection on-line service offers (subscription only) access to over 40,000
treaties and international agreements: http://untreaty.un.org.

Child Soldiers - 2008 Global Report

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Child Soldiers - 2008 Global Report

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Global Report 2008

COALIT ION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIER S

Cover photo © Marcus Bleasdale 2005

COALIT ION TO STO P T H E U S E O F C H I L D S O L D I E R S

This report covers the period from

© Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers

Text and cover design: www.intertype.com

Printed in the United Kingdom by Bell and Bain

World Map 2 the Grenadines, St Kitts Guinea 156

CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008 

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Child soldiers: progress,

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international units used to support counter-insurgency

law: a measure reports that untrained children as young

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Recruitment age Government armed forces which

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Demobilization during conflict

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Armenia France Netherlands

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recovery and their social reintegration.

1 Quotations from two boy (15 and 17 years old)

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Military training and military schools

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Context Armed groups

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1 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country

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There were no reports of under-18s in the

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CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008