India's Cold Start Is Too Hot

usni.org /print/7538
Proceedings Magazine

March 2011 Vol 137/3/1297

By Cdr Muhammad Azam Khan (Pakistan Navy retired)

Based on punitive offensive operations short of nuclear attack, Indias new doctrine against Pakistan
flirts with Armageddon.
The provocative Cold Start Doctrine, which India developed specifically to deal with Pakistan, is the
hottest buzzword in military circles and institutions throughout the region. Both India and Pakistan are
self-declared nuclear powers that, ever since the two countries independence from Britain in 1947,
have claimed control of Kashmir. This has made the area a dangerous flashpoint several times during
the past six decades.
Central to Cold Start is a synergetic effort aimed at the destruction of Pakistans military potential
without much collateral damage. 1 Envisioning limited war, the doctrine seeks swift mobilization to
undertake punitive strikes in response to acts of terrorism by Pakistan-based militant Islamist groups
and incursions such as the 1999 infiltration of Kargil in India-controlled Kashmir, and/or to make
territorial gains of 30-50 miles to obtain post-conflict concessions, i.e., handing over terrorists or
shutting down training camps. 2 Announced in April 2004, Cold Start represents a marked departure
from the fundamentally defensive orientation of the Indian Army.

Tense Borderlines
The Indian military has an exasperating tendency to act quickly and decisively against Pakistan. After
five gunmen attacked the Indian Parliament on 18 December 2001, the Indian government ordered
Operation Parakaram, the largest mobilization since its 1971 war with Pakistan. The Indian Air Force
activated forward operating bases, while the navys western fleet, reinforced with strike elements from
the eastern fleet, deployed in a deterrent posture. 3
Nearly ten months later, Operation Parakram, a massive exercise in coercive diplomacy, had run out of
steam; both sides disengaged. India lost face because of its failure to elicit any strategic gains from
Pakistan. This was principally because it took more than three weeks for the three Indian strike corps
to reach their wartime locations from eastern and central India. 4 During this period, Pakistan was able
not only to internationalize the crisis, but also to send a clear message that any attack inside the portion
of Kashmir that it controlled would invite a retaliatory strike. 5
Thus for India, the drawn-out arrival time and attendant lack of strategic surprise, inhibiting a rapid
punitive strike, was compounded by Pakistans quick marshaling of world opinionall of which pointed
to a faulty military strategy. Moreover, the enormous size of the strike corps and concentration in the
forward area provided an indication of the general thrust. 6

The U.S. Navys Central Role in Stability

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the U.S. maritime strategy has played a major role in binding
together the international system that U.S. foreign policy has aimed to establish. Meanwhile, American
naval power has maintained its countrys status in the middle of a fluid and troubling strategic
environment. The size, shape and strategy of the U.S. Navy are a critical element of Americas position
as the worlds great power. 7 But this appears to be heading for a change.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have sucked the oxygen out of any serious effort to understand the
connection between the large changes that strategic planners see in the future, Americans
expectations that they will retain their ability to wield global influence, the Navys role in maintaining
such influence, and the U.S. fleets slow evanescence. 8 A clear illustration of this was the grounding
of the USS Port Royal (CG-73) in February 2009, half a mile south of the Honolulu airport.
Investigations revealed a sleep-deprived commanding officer and manning shortages, as well as fewer
real-life training opportunities. Reduced budgets, efforts to save money by cutting the size of crews,
schemes to take up the slack with shore services and all manner of labor saving devices parallel and
reflect the Navys increasingly distressed fortunes since the end of the cold war. 9
Historically, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command has been a dynamic component that ensured
stability and security in the Indian Ocean. It still does so. Under the Global Maritime Partnership, it
continues to enhance regional maritime security as well as build capacity of regional maritime forces.
As a consequence, key choke points critical to world trade and economy in an area with extensive
shipping lanes and a very high vessel throughput has remained secure from traditional and
nontraditional threats. 10
On the shores of the North Arabian Sea, nuclear neighbors Pakistan and India have kept the region on
high alert. The presence of the U.S. Navy has been the most compelling factor in restraining and
cooling frequently exploding tempers. This has ensured stability. The eventual impact of a weakening
U.S. Navy may include, but is not limited to, a major shift of power away from American influence in
Asia, a debilitating loss of U.S. ability to shape the future strategic environment, and a powerful
reinforcement of the perception that the United States is in decline. 11
A shrinking U.S. Navy leading to a reduced presence, along with a weakening ability to project power
and provide a steadying presence, will inevitably create a voidwhich will be filled by the new rising
naval power, Chinas Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. 12 The strategic environment in the Indian
Ocean region may then be altered as never before, to the detriment of U.S. interests.
Through its launch of the nuclear submarine S-2 (the INS Arihant ), India has already militarily
nuclearized the region. Because of budgetary constraints and diminishing platform strength, if the U.S.
Navy should outsource functions to the Indian Navy, this will have the effect of allowing India to confer
upon itself the role of regional policeman. The Pakistan and PLA navies may then forge a new strategic
partnership to reshape the areas maritime environment.
The PLA Navy may deploy more than one carrier by 2015. This will greatly expand Chinas ability to
project power into the Pacific and Indian oceans. In the latter, it will find no better partner than the
Pakistan Navy. What the Indian strategic community continues to call the encirclement of India will
then become a reality. At that point, not only the North Arabian Sea but the entire Indian Ocean will
scream for stability.

Cold Start Fires Up

Since 2004, the Indian military has tirelessly firmed up Cold Start through a series of exercises,
including Divya Astra (Divine Weapon) 2004, Vijra Shakti (Thunder Power) 2005, Sang-i-Shakti (Joint
Power) 2006, and Ashwamedh (Valor and Intellectual Illumination) 2007. They made extensive use of
command, control, communications, and intelligence networks and systems; and of force-multiplying
command posts for the integration and flow of real-time information collected through satellites,
unmanned aerial vehicles, aerial reconnaissance radar networks, communication intercepts, and digital
photographs of enemy areas. All this was transmitted to forward combat units, facilitating speedy
decision-making. During the maneuvers, information dominance of the battlefield was practiced using
electronic-warfare systems. 13
In stark contrast to the previous Indian strategy, that of Cold Start essentially is to attack first and

mobilize later. 14 The idea is to achieve political and military gains in the shortest possible time, thus
circumventing Pakistans effort to bring into play international diplomatic efforts. Through joint
operations of Indias three services, Cold Start uses army strike corps to provide offensive elements for
eight or so integrated battle groups (IBGs). These are fully backed by naval-aviation assets assisting
IBGs in the south.
Positioned close to Pakistans borders, quite a few IBGs can be launched along multiple axes within 72
to 96 hours from the time an attack is ordered. These battle groups provide rapid thrusts at the same
time as Indias defenses are still being organized. The IBGs can continue conducting high-speed
day/night operations until the intended objectives have been attained. 15 In short, Cold Start envisages
quickly moving forces into unpredictable locations and making decisions faster than opponents can
plan. 16

Pakistan Prepares to Be Attacked

Among Pakistani military insiders, Cold Start has been under discussion since 2005. But our
neighbors aggressive strategy surfaced as a major challenge after Indian Army chief General Deepak
Kapoor sounded a warning in January 2010 that a limited war under the nuclear hangover is still very
much a reality. 17 Pakistan Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani responded: Cold Start would
permit the Indian Army to attack before mobilizing, increasing the possibility of a sudden spiral
escalation. 18
Be that as it may, Pakistans riposte to the Indian Army chiefs incendiary pronouncement came in April
2010 in the form one of the largest field maneuvers the country has ever mustered. Jointly conducted
by Pakistans army and air force and called Azm-e-Nau 3 (New Resolve), the exercise aimed at
developing response options to Cold Start. Between 10 April and 13 May, 20,000-50,000 troops
participated. 19 The area involved Pakistans eastern border in Sialkot, Cholistan, and the province of
Sindh in the south.
The scenario played out as follows: The Foxland army (representing India) suddenly invaded and
occupied part of Blueland territory (Pakistan). A Blueland antitank battalion used dispersal tactics
based on Pakistans real military doctrine to regain territory in an equally swift manner. 20 In the closing
stages, live weapon demonstrations and the shoot-down of a drone were also carried out. Still, the
reality of Cold Start places a dilemma before Pakistans military planners, as far as guessing which of
Indias IBGs would be launched.

Kargil Hangover
The Indian Navys stated role in Cold Start seemingly remains limited; ostensibly, the navy will provide
aviation assets to IBGs in the southern sector only. But to complement the effort on land, and posing a
multidimensional problem for Pakistani military planners, the Indian Navy will inevitably take a forward
posture, possibly impose a distant blockade of Pakistani ports, and/or move into sea lines emanating
from the Red Sea or Far East. The Indian Navy could deploy submarineswhich soon will be armed
with land-attack supersonic BrahMos cruise missilesclose to the Makran coast to clog Pakistans sea
traffic.
The western fleet of the Indian Navy routinely conducts annual exercises in February-March in the
Arabian Sea, while its eastern fleet carries out yearly maneuvers in July-August in the Bay of Bengal.
When the Kargil crisis erupted in 1999, the Indian militarys tri-services exercise (conducted every
three years) was due. In the interest of deterrence, its navy decided to shift the venue of the eastern
fleets maneuvers to the western seaboard. The two fleets later conducted large-scale joint exercises in
the North Arabian Sea. The sole Indian carrier was then under refit, so the navy carried out trials using
a containerships deck as a platform for Sea Harrier aircraft.

A flurry of naval activity and the Indian Navys threatening posture prompted the Pakistan Navy to go on
full alert. Naval assets were deployed to safeguard national maritime interests. Pakistan also began
escorting convoys along traditional sea lines, especially on the Persian Gulf route that transports the
countrys strategic commodityoilindispensable for both the economy and the war effort. The navy
also made plans for conducting P3-C strikes on strategic points along Indias eastern seaboard.
Visibly, the contribution of both navies during the Kargil crisis was enormous. On the Indian side, triservice cooperation set the standard for future operations, with complete harmony and synergy
between its army, navy, and air force. 21 In Cold Start, therefore, the Indian Navy cannot be expected
to remain dormant or play a trivial role.

Pakistan Navy at the Ready

In Azm-e-Nau 3, the Pakistan Navy was assigned the inconsequential role of observer. If continued,
such a course could be a fatal mistake. Pakistan cannot afford to overlook the lessons of the past. This
nations air force and navy learned of the Kargil conflict only after the Indian military reaction had
started to unfold. By then it had become indispensable for Pakistans army to seek the sudden support
of the nations two other armed forces.
Even though features inherent to naval platforms, such as rapid mobility, stealth, and speed of
deployment, may discount the need for a joint response (at least for the exercises), fixations on modus
operandi and clinging to dogmas have destroyed many militaries before.
Because Pakistan inherited a British colonial legacy, the army has dominated the country during much
of its history. Past wars with India have been mostly land affairs, with Pakistan suffering severe
setbacks because of a weak navy. Yet the armys mindset remains unchanged. In this climate, the
Pakistan Navy strives to demonstrate the significance of maritime issues in the overall national-security
calculus.
Aside from its deficiently assigned role in Azm-e-Nau 3, the Pakistan Navy remains fully cognizant of
the threat that the Indian Navy could pose in the maritime domain during Cold Start. Accordingly, a
major conceptual exercise designed to assess this, evaluate possible scenarios of conflict at sea, and
analyze response options was concluded in late 2010. 22 Named Shamsheer-e-Bahr IV (Sea Sword),
the exercise addressed the new Indian warfighting concept and aimed to prepare a comprehensive
counter-strategy.
Spread over two and a half months, the war game was planned sequentially, from peace to full-war
scenarioparticularly in the southern sector of the country bordering India. Lessons emerging from
this effort will be applied in the subsequent Navy-wide exercise Sea Spark to develop Pakistans future
naval strategy. To inject realism and draw useful information, from the outset the 5th Corps of the
Pakistan Army (with its area of operation in the south) and the Pakistan Air Force (Southern Air
Command) have been actively involved in the planning effort. Also included are several other
representatives of relevant government departments.
No future war can be fought without operational synergy, and a military strategy that does not
assimilate this reality will always fail. In Cold Start, a north-south split of Pakistan could occur in the
event of a penetration by an IBG positioned in the south. The countrys military planners must think
beyond using tactical nuclear weapons. This is imperative: Indian nuclear doctrine is unambiguous in
declaring that even a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon will invite a massive retaliatory strike. 23 But
Pakistan certainly has some other and better response options to consider.
The Pakistan Navy can play a vital role in the south. It can create diversions and fire effects using
submarines and air-launched missiles, while protecting sea lines, in particular the Gulf artery that feeds
national energy needs. Besides contesting a blockade, the navy could force a counter-blockade of vital

Indian shipping by jutting out from the Strait of Hormuz and hugging Pakistans western periphery on
the Makran coast. Submarines could be deployed at or close to Indias strategic energy and
commercial nodes along the Gujarat-Maharashtra coast, causing economic problems. 24 All this would
greatly ease Pakistans army and air force concerns on land and improve flexibility and liberty of action.

The Big Picture

More than 70 percent of Indian oil imports come into ports on the Gujarat and Maharashtra coasts. In
2006-07, 117 million tons of petroleum products passed through the Gulf of Kutch; 95 through Mumbai.
Indias major oil refineries are also located in the region. Kandla Port, close to Karachi, handles the
imports and exports of highly productive granaries and the industrial belt stretching across Jammu and
Kashmir, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Gujarat.
At the inaugural session of exercise Shamsheer-e-Bahr-IV early in July 2010, Prime Minister Yousaf
Raza Gilani of Pakistan stated: Prosperity of our people hinges upon the freedom of the sea and
security of our sea lines of communication. Notwithstanding its small size, the Pakistan Navy has
maintained a close vigilance of the seas and is fully capable of protecting our maritime interests. 25
Cold Start is based on undertaking offensive operations short of the nuclear threshold. India thereby
implies that should Pakistan opt for crossing that threshold, the onus would lie squarely on the latter.
On the other hand, Pakistans assumptions about Cold Start are that Indian offensive operations would
not give Pakistan time to bring diplomacy into play, and that such offensive operations would not cross
the nuclear threshold nor prompt Pakistan into crossing it. But with Pakistans core areas (particularly
those in the plains of Punjab) located close to borders and conventional asymmetry favoring India, Cold
Start is an exceedingly ambitious and dangerous concept. The fact that the Pakistan Army can occupy
contested locations faster than India grants it the capability of preempting Cold Start.
Since time and space would be of greatest importance to Pakistan, if this nation does not preempt
Indias Cold Start, the result could be a decision to use low-yield tactical nuclear weapons to dislodge
the IBG. And this would be the beginning of Armageddon. The fact that Indias new doctrine was not put
into effect following 26/11 (the Mumbai attacks) points to dithering politico-military minds as much as it
does to the danger of actually executing a not-so-cold plan.

1. Indias Cold Start Strategy: Limited Strikes against Targets vs. Hot War Leading to Nuclear
Armageddon, 6 January 2010, http://pakalert.wordpress.com/2010/01/06/india .
2. Pakistans Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises Define Strategic Priorities, Intelligence
Quarterly , 6 July 2010, www.intelligencequarterly.com/2010/05 .
3. Lt. Gen. Y. M. Bammi, Kargil 1999: The Impregnable Conquered (Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers), p.
436, 439.
4. A Challenging Doctrine, Daily Dawn , 8 February 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspa... .
5. Pakistan Forces Put on High Alert: Storming of Parliament, Daily Dawn , 15 December 2001,
http://www.dawn.com/2001/12/15/top1.htm .
6. A Challenging Doctrine.
7. Seth Cropsey, The U.S. Navy in Distress, Strategic Analysis 34, no. 1 (January 2010), p. 36.
8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 35.
10. COMUSNAVCENT, VADM William E. Gortney, Global Maritime Partnership, talk delivered at
Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore, 7 April 2010.
11. Cropsey, The U.S. Navy in Distress, p. 37.
12. Ibid., p. 43.
13. Cold-Starting Pakistan, Daily News , 22 January 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?
id=158401 .
14. Cold Start and Azm-e-Nau, Daily Dawn , 26 April 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspa... .
15. A Challenging Doctrine.
16. Ikram Sehgal, War-Gaming Nuclear Armageddon, http://www.opfblog.com/6591/war-gamingnuclear-armageddon-ikram-sehgal/ .
17. Maleeha Lodhi, Indias Provocative Military Doctrine, Daily News , 5 January 2010,
http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=216861 .
18. Kayani Spells Out Threat Posed by Indian Doctrine, Daily Dawn , 4 February 2010,
http://pakistankakhudahafiz.wordpress.com/2010/02/04/kayani-spells-out-t... .
19. Daily Dawn , 11 April 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/thenewspa... and Pakistans Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises Define Strategic Priorities,
Intelligence Quarterly , 6 July 2010, www.intelligencequarterly.com/2010/05
20. Ibid.
21. Bammi, Kargil 1999 , p. 440.
22. Pakistan Navy, Directorate of Public Relations, press release, 29 June 2010.
23. Cold Start Doctrine, Daily Dawn , 18 May 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawncontent-library/dawn/the-newspa...
24. VADM P. S. Das, Coastal and Maritime Security, Indian Defense Review 24, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar.
2009), p. 125. VADM Arun Kumar Singh, Peep at the Nautical Crystal Ball, Indian Defense Review 23,
no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 2008), http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2010/07/peep-at-the-nautical-crystal-... .
Asia TradeHub.com KANDLA PORT http://www.asiatradehub.com/india/portkandla.asp .
25. Credible Deterrence Important, Says PM, Daily Dawn , 13 July 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspa... .

Commander Khan is a research fellow at the Pakistan Navy War College in Lahore. He held several
command and staff appointments in the Pakistan Navy, participating in previous Sea Spark and
Shamsheer-e-Bahr exercises. He frequently writes about maritime and military issues in local and
international publications.
Commander Muhammad Azam Khan