Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 7



International Security

Jonathan Monten

Office Hours:

Friday, 11-12, 31 Tavistock G.02


10 hours of lectures, 10 hours of seminars


0.5 Course Units/ 4 US Credits/ 7.5 ECTS Credits


Two essays

Essay Deadlines:



Attendance is compulsory at all lectures and

seminars for which students are timetabled.
Attendance will be monitored and no student will
be entered for assessment unless they have
attended and pursued the module to the
satisfaction of the department.

Lecture and Seminar Times:
Online Timetable at www.ucl.ac.uk/timetable
Essay Submission Information
Extenuating Circumstances
Penalties for Late Submission and Overlength Essays
Essay Writing, Plagiarism and TurnItIn

International Security | 2016

POLS6005B: International Security

University College London, Term 2, 2015/2016
Instructors: Dr Jonathan Monten, Melanie Garson, and Filippo Costa Buranelli
Time and Location: Lecture: Monday 11 am 12 pm, Chadwick B05
Contact: j.monten@ucl.ac.uk, m.garson-sweidan@ucl.ac.uk,
Office Hours: Monten (Fri. 11-12, 31 Tavistock G.02); Garson (TBA); Buranelli (TBA)

This module examines major debates in the field of international security. Many important
issues in international politics relate to the use or threat of military force and political
violence, and the insecurity this threat poses to states, communities, and individuals. This
module is organized into two parts. The first part will introduce students to key questions in
the field of international security and the theoretical and empirical approaches scholars use to
answer them, such as the causes of war, whether democracies are more peaceful than
autocracies, and how international norms and institutions shape the behavior of states. The
second part will examine a number of contemporary international security issues, including
nuclear proliferation, civil conflict and terrorism, military intervention, and shifts in the global
balance of power. Particular focus will be given to the research methods and empirical
strategies commonly used by scholars in the field.
Module Objectives
By the end of the module, students will:

Understand the major theoretical debates and empirical approaches used in the study
of international security;
Learn to critically evaluate competing theoretical and empirical claims about
important international security problems;
Apply diverse theoretical and empirical tools to understand and evaluate debates over
international security policy;
Develop a more conceptually and empirically informed understanding of the current
international security environment;
Become better consumers and producers of scholarly research in international

Module Format and Assessment

The module consists of weekly lectures and seminars. The seminars will deepen the
discussion of the material introduced in the lecture and readings through discussion questions,
group exercises, and debates. Students are required to complete all assigned readings prior to
the seminar.
This module will be assessed via two essay assignments: an analytical essay due in Week 6,
and a policy brief due in Week 10.
Please direct any questions about the essay submission process to Kayt Newman in the
School of Public Policy at k.newman@ucl.ac.uk.
Classroom Policy

International Security | 2016

We aim to create an inclusive classroom environment that encourages participation, critical

thinking, and debate. Please observe the following classroom policies: (1) Complete all
assigned readings prior to the seminar; (2) Arrive on time; and (3) Use electronic devices
The best place to raise questions about readings, lectures, or assignments is in class, seminar,
or office hours. Please restrict emails to (1) notifying us about absences and (2) personal
Beyond Class Activities
UCL has many interesting talks and seminars relevant to class topics. We will update you on
interesting events as they come up over the course of the term.
Course Outline
Week 1: Introduction to International Security
Required Readings:

Snyder, Jack. 2004. One World, Rival Theories. Foreign Policy

(November/December): 53-62.
Van Evera, Stephen. 1991. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Chapter 1.

Week 2: Realism
Required Readings:

Morgenthau, Hans. 2013. Six Principles of Political Realism. In Robert Jervis and
Robert Art, eds., International Politics. New York: Pearson, pp. 14-22.
Mearsheimer, John. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W.
Norton. Chapters 1-2.
Jervis, Robert. 2013. Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma. In Robert Jervis
and Robert Art, eds., International Politics. New York: Pearson, pp. 90-110.

Supplementary Readings Realism:

Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill.
Nexon, Daniel H. 2009. Review: The Balance of Power in the Balance. World
Politics 61(2): 330-359.
Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization
49(3): 379-414.

Week 3: Power and Coercion in International Security

Required Readings:

International Security | 2016

Schelling, Thomas. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Chapter 2
Art, Robert. 2002. Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know? In Robert Art and
Patrick Cronin, eds., The United States and Coercive Diplomacy. Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace Press.
Nye, Joseph. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York:
Public Affairs. Chapter 1.

Supplementary Readings:

Schelling, Thomas. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University

Press, Daryl G. 2007. Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Frieden, Jeffrey A., David A. Lake, Kenneth A. Schultz. 2013. World Politics:
Interests, Interactions, Institutions. New York: W.W. Norton. Chapter 3.
Lake, David A., and Robert Powell. 1999. Strategic Choice and International
Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Walt, Stephen. 1999. Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies.
International Security 23(4): 548.

Week 4: International Law and International Norms

Required Readings:

Frieden, Jeffrey A., David A. Lake, Kenneth A. Schultz. 2013. World Politics:
Interests, Interactions, Institutions. New York: W.W. Norton.
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change. International Organization 52(4): 887-917.
Mearsheimer, John. 1994/95. The False Promise of International Institutions.
International Security 19(3): 5-49.

Supplementary Readings International Law and Cooperation

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. Cambridge, MA.: Basic

Books. Chapter 1.
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa Martin. 1995. The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.
International Security 20(1): 39-51.
Ikenberry, G. John. 2000. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the
Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? International Organization
50(3): 379-406.
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design
of International Institutions. International Organization 55(4): 761-799.

Supplementary Readings International Norms

Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. 1996. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity
in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

International Security | 2016

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy
Networks in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Desch, Michael C. 1998. Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in
Security Studies. International Security 23(1): 141-170.
Carpenter, R. Charlie. 2011. Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and
the Paradox of Weapons Norms. International Organization 65(1): 69102.
Tannenwald, Nina. 1999. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative
Basis for Nuclear Non-Use. International Organization 53(3): 433-468.

Week 5: The Democratic Peace

Required Readings:

Russett, Bruce. 1999. Why Democratic Peace? In Michael E. Brown, Sean M. LynnJones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge, MA.:
MIT Press, pp. 82-115.
Sebastian Rosato. 2003. The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory. American
Political Science Review 97(4): 585-602.
Snyder, Jack, and Erica D. Borghard. 2011. The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny Not
a Pound. American Political Science Review 105(3): 437-456.

Supplementary Readings:

Lipson, Charles. 2005. Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate
Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Russett, Bruce, and John Oneal. 2000. Triangulating Peace: Democracy,
Interdependence and International Organizations. New York: W. W. Norton.
Reiter, Dan, and Alan C. Stam. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Doyle, Michael W. 1983. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. Philosophy &
Public Affairs 12(3): 205-235.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 1995. Democratization and the Danger of
War. International Security 20(1): 5-38.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Morrow, James D., Siverson, Randolph M. Siverson, and
Alastair Smith. 1999. An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace.
American Political Science Review 93(4): 791807.
Fearon, James D. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of
International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88(3): 577592.
Weeks, Jessica L. 2012. Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the
Initiation of International Conflict. American Political Science Review 106(2): 326

Week 6: International Terrorism

Required Readings:

Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. The Strategies of Terrorism.

International Security 31(1): 49-80.
Abrahms, Max. 2006. Why Terrorism Does Not Work. International Security 31(2):
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2013. Ending Terrorism. In Robert Jervis and Robert Art, eds.,
International Politics. New York: Pearson, pp. 402-415.

International Security | 2016

Supplementary Readings:

Pape, Robert. 2003. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political
Science Review 97(3): 343-361.
Kalyvas, Stathis. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Stedman, Stephen John. 1997. Spoiler Problems in the Peace Process. International
Security 22(2): 5-53.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford
Economic Papers 56(4): 563-595.
Walter, Barbara F. 1997. The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. International
Organization 51(3): 335-64.

Week 7: Nuclear Proliferation

Required Readings:

Sagan, Scott D. 1996/1997. Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in
Search of a Bomb. International Security 21(3): 54-86.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 2003. More May Be Better. In Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N.
Waltz, eds., The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. New York: W.W. Norton. Chapter 1.
Sagan, Scott D. 2003. More Will be Worse. In Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz,
eds., The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. New York: W.W. Norton. Chapter 2.

Supplementary Readings:

Waltz, Kenneth N. 2012. Why Iran Should Get the Bomb. Foreign Affairs
Gavin, Francis J. 2009/10. Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation,
and the Cold War. International Security 34(3): 737.

Week 8: Military Intervention

Required Readings:

Downes, Alexander B. 2011. Regime Change Doesnt Work. Boston Review

Power, Samantha. 2001. Bystanders to Genocide. The Atlantic (September): 84-108.
Western, Jon, and Joshua Goldstein. 2011. Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age.
Foreign Affairs (November/December).

Supplementary Readings:

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and George W. Downs. 2006. Intervention and

Democracy. International Organization 60(3): 627649.
Downes, Alexander B., and Jonathan Monten. 2013. Forced to be Free? Why
Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization. International
Security 37(4): 90131.
Edelstein, David M. 2004. Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed
or Fail. International Security 29(1): 4991.

International Security | 2016

Valentino, Benjamin. 2011. The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention. Foreign

Affairs (November/December.
Salehyan, Idean. 2010. The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations. Journal of
Conflict Resolution 54(3): 493515.
Peic, Goran, and Dan Reiter. 2011. Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, State Power
and Civil War Onset, 19202004. British Journal of Political Science 41(3): 453475.

Week 9: Power Transitions and the Rise of China

Required Readings:

Mearsheimer, John. 2006. Chinas Unpeaceful Rise. Current History (April): 160162.
Ikenberry, John. 2008. The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Foreign Affairs
Friedberg, Aaron. 2005. The Future of U.S. China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?
International Security 30(2): 7-45.

Supplementary Readings:

Gilpin, Robert. 1983. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kennedy, Paul. 1989. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Vintage.
Wohlforth, William. 1999. The Stability of a Unipolar World. International Security
24(1): 541.
Beckley, Michael. 2011/12. Chinas Century: Why Americas Edge Will Endure.
International Security 36(3): 41-78.
Monteiro, Nuno P., and Debs, Alexandre. 2014. Known Unknowns: Power Shifts,
Uncertainty, and War. International Organization 68(1): 1-31.
Christensen, Thomas J. 2001.Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and
Challenges for U.S. Security Policy. International Security 25(4): 5-40.

Week 10: Security Challenges: 2030

Required Readings:

U.S. National Intelligence Council. 2012. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds
(Executive Summary).