Sociology of Religion l 999, 60:3 303433

Religion in Modernity as a New Axial Age:

Secularization or New Fieligious Forms?

Yves Lambert*
Grmtpede$ociol-ogieiies Religions ettiela more

CNRS-EPHE_ Paris

This article proposes o general model of analysis of the relotiorts ltetween religion and modcniity,
it-liere modernity is conceived as o new axial age. Murlemiry appears to have four principal types of
religious effects: decline, odofrtotion and reintertnetotion, conser-vao've reaction, and innovation. It
fnocluces secularization as well as new rcligfotts fomzs, in particular: worlillistess, deltieftifchitotio of
the ltumon and the divine, selspirituolity, poroscientificitjr, plurolisrn, and rturlzilitj. Two thresltolds

of secularitotiort are distinguished: ll U autoaomization in relation to o religious authority and (Ii

obontlonmenr of any religious symbol. J conclude that the first rlireslioltl has largely been crossed, but
not the second one. except in some domains lscience, eooriomicsl or for onlgr o minority of the
population. This is because of the adaptation of the great religions to I'll-Ot.'ll'I"'l'llltj|', o_ffundarnemalist
reactions, and of the spread ofnew religious forms.

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Instead of approaching the question elf secularization directly, l will begin

with a general model of analysis of the relations between religion and modernity.

This model is based on a comparative analvsis of oral religions, religions of

antiquity, religions of salvation, and the transforrnations linlcecl to modernity. ln
itself, seculo rizarion is not the object of this work, but if we proceed correctlv, it

should allow us to evaluate the scope of secularization without entering into the
debates and emotions to which this thesis has given rise in the past thirty years.
A large portion of the article will thus he devoted to an analysis of the relation
between religion and tnodernitv. It characterizes modernity as a new axial
period, reviews the global analyses of the religious consequences of modernity,
presents a model of analvsis and several religious forms typical of mo-demitv, and

provides empirical illustrations. We shall then examine the conclusions which

can be drawn from this analysis as far as secularization is concerned and compare
them to the data obtained from the 1981 and 1990 World Value Surveys
I Direct correspontlence to res Lambert, Groups rle Sociologrle ties Religions er tie lo
CNRSJSPHE, ParisMany thanks to A- T. Larson and 5. Lo-ndquist, for the translation of the French orieiml; to A. Blast, J. Ruonz and
W- H. Simnosfor the
and, for their oomrnervs and rn'tio'.oru, to: F. Chrrrnpion, M. Cohen, K. Dobbdoere,
D. Heru'euLeger, F. l.ourrrion.J.-M. C)uee'roogo. G. l'vlichelor,J. Huone,_l'. Snorer. W. H- Santos, L. Tomasi. anal
thereferee.

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304 SOCIOLOGY or asuoton

(V/'VSs), and the 1991 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) survey
dedicated to religion.
Obviously, our conclusion depends, in part on the ways in which we define
modernity, religion, and secularization. Without wishing to enter into the
debate on these questions, I will explain my definitions with the aim of
clarifying my approach and indicating the limits of my analysis. For religion, l
understand it in the most common sense of a group, organization, or institution
considering itself as such. This excludes secular religions but does not prevent
us from finding a religious dimension present in such ideologies. More precisely,
I will consider "religious" any practice or belief which refers to a superernpirical
reality, i.e., a reality radically exceeding the objective limits of nature and man,

provided that there is a symbolic relationship between man and this reality;
objective is used in the sense of the scientific process which characterizes the
point of view of the social sciences. This definition allows us to deal with
parallel beliefs" which are currently increasing in importance (telepathy,
astrology, fortune telling, spiritism, cosmic consciousness, energies, near death
experiences, and so on). They refer to a superempirical reality, and they will be

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considered as religious if they include a symbolic relationship with man, which is

the case of spiritism but not of astrology, which will be considered as

parareligious. For secularization, Peter Bergers (196?) definition seems to be the
most relevant to our purpose, and I will operationalize it by distinguishing two
thresholds of secularization: (1) an autonomization in relation to religious
authority while religious symbols remain salient and (Z) an abandonment of
religious symbols.

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MODERNITY AS A NEW AXIAL PERIOD

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Several historians and philosophers have stressed the key role that certain

periods in history have played in developing techniques, political structures, or

worldviews which were to dominate the foreground of the next centuries or
millennia before being, in turn, questioned, then replaced, or altered and inserted into new systems.Man seems to have started again from scratch four times,"
Karl ]aspers wrote (1954: 3?-38): with the Neolithic age, with the earliest
civilizations, with the emergence of the great empires, and with modernity. Each

of these axial turns produced a general reshaping of the symbolic field," to use
Pierre Bourdieus tenn, and a great religious commotion which led to disappear-

ances, redefinitions, and emergences. Each period finally led to new religious
configurations, respectively: oral agrarian religions, religions of antiquity,
religions of salvation (tmiversalist religions), modern changes. Of the religions of
antiquity, only Judaism and Hinduism survived the preceding axial age, aheit
greatly changed and keeping typically pre-universalist traits (at least up to
modernity): a large number of prohibitions, important domestic rites, transmission by descent. We may assume that modernity also stands as a major

RELIGION IN MODERNITY as A NEW AXIAL not 305

challenge to established religions as well as a potential source of religious
innovation, especially if it is about to be radicalired and generalized, as Giddens
argues (1991). In addition, the hypothesis of modernity as a new axial turn leads
us to consider very long-term effects; this enables us to perform comparative
research, and proposes an interpretation accounting not only for religious
decline, but also for revivals, mutations, and inventions.
The concept of axial age" has been used to refer to one historical period:
the emergence of universalism, philosophy, great religions, early science (see,
e.g., ]aspers 1954; Bellah 1976:1050; Eisenstadt 1936; Hick 1939: Z1-35). This
is especially true of the sixth to fifth centuries BCE, which were a ltey stage in
this process (Deutero-Isaiah, the era of Pericles, Upanishads, ]ain, Buddha,

Confucius, Lao-Tre), of which Christianity and lslam are offsprings. This age is
considered as "axial" because we continue to be its heirs, particularly through
the great religions. However there is no reason that we cannot also consider the

Neolithic age, the earliest civilizations, the great empires, and modemity as such
axial ages, since they too marl: a general reshaping of collective thought.
Therefore, our definition of axial age" (or axial period) shall include these four
ages. At its beginning, an axial age is a kind of cinematic fade; it is marl-ted by
critical moments of crisis and shifts of thought which lead to a reshaping of the
symbolic field which creates a new period of stability. These critical phases vary

in duration from, for example, a thousand years for universalism (from the sixth
century BCE to the emergence of Islam) to several millennia for the Neolithic
age (from its first emergence to its eventual global expansion and triumph).
]aspers, while in fact considering modernity as being a new axial period,
regarded the turn taken by modernity in the nineteenth century as the harbinger
of a probable "second axial period (]aspers 1954: 38). He hesitated because
globalisation was not yet a widespread phenomenon when he first wrote this in
1949, although we can assume that this is the case today. ]aspers identified
modernity with four fundamental distinguishing features: modern science and
technology, a craving for freedom, the emergence of the masses on the historical

stage (nationalism, democracy, socialism, social movements), and globalisation.

We find it relevant to add to this list the primacy of reason (a point that ]aspers
implicitly includes in the four features), the development of capitalism, and
functional differentiation (the rise of the modern state, and Parsons's and

Luhmanns concept of differentiation of the spheres of activity in society).

This notion of axial age has not been utilized by sociologists to analyze

modernity. However Arpd Srakolczai and Laszlo Fiistos (1996) refer to the
axial age," and they use the concept of axial moment in ways that are
relevant to this analysis. They define this notion as follows: An axial moment
occurs whenever there is a global collapse of the established order of things,
including the political system, the social order of everyday life, and the system of

beliefs a very rare event and a major spiritual revival. . . . Such a period
happened in the first centuries (collapse of the Roman republic and rise of

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306 soctotosr or RELIGION

Christianity), in the fifth-seventh centuries (collapse of the Roman Empire and

rise of Islam), in the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries (the waning of the Middle

Ages, Renaissance, and Protestantism), and finally the two majors stages of the
dissolution of absolutist politics and the traditional European social order,
Enlightenment and socialism." Thus, that which they choose to define as an
axial moment corresponds to key phases that occur within an axial age. For
example, the rise of Christianity and of Islam are two key phases of the previous
axial age (universalism), and the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, the Enlightenment, and socialism (or more accurately the rise of industrial society) are the
three key phases of modernity. Nonetheless, l believe that it is useful to employ
the term axial moment to define such phases within an axial period.

In a very schematic fashion we can therefore period ire modernity. It begins

with this axial moment of the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, which is not only
the beginning of what historians call the modern age, but also that of modem
science, and of the birth of capitalism and the bourgeoisie. But modernity only
becomes a major phenomenon at the end of this period with the Enlightenment,
the English and, especially, the American and French Revolutions, the birth of
scientific method and thought, and the birth of industry (second axial moment).
The third axial moment should include the development and triumph of indus-

trial society and of capitalism (nineteenth-mid-twentieth centuries), first in

England, and then throughout Europe and North America, the development of
socialism, the building of the natiotnstate, the spread of nationalism and
colonialism to its breaking point with the two world wars, and finally,
decolonisation, globalisation and, in the West, the triumph of democracy, of the
affluent society, and of the welfare state. Modernity also resulted in the Cold
War and the threat of nuclear destruction. The 19695 are often considered as a
turning point: the beginning of the so-called post-industrial, post-fordian

society, the information or knowledge society, and the beginning of the moral

revolution. Ever since, the tertiary sector has become increasingly dominant,

intangible factors of production (information, communication, and knowledge)

and new technologies (computers and electronics) have become more important; and the family is becoming less and less traditional. ln addition, globalisation is complete, the middle class is getting more and more powerful, new
problems (unemployment and pollution) and new social movements (feminism,

regionalism, ecology, etc.) are emerging, and finally, Communism has collapsed.
Are we still in the era of modernity or in postmodernityl I share the opinion
of Anthony Giddens (1991;3) who writes that rather than entering a period of
post-modern ism, we are moving into one in which the consequences of
modernity are becoming more radicalired and universalired than before." In fact,
that which is supposed to define postmodemity is far from featuring these
fundamentally new traits that characterise an axial turn, but could constitute a

new axial moment" (as Sralcolczai thinks) that could be explained in terms of
generalised, radicalized, and reflexive modernity. The hallmark of postmodemity

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RELIGION [N MODERNITY as A New AXLAL soc 30?

is the disqualification of great narratives: great religions, great ideologies

(nationalism, Communism, fascism), and the ideology of endless progress. But

this only allows us to differentiate ourselves from the prior phase (axial moment)
of modernity, and it is partly refuted by new forms of nationalism and by
religious fundamentalism. The relativization of science and technology is not

new, but is increasing precisely because the excesses and dangers of the former
are becoming dramatically threatening (nuclear threat, pollution). One could
continue and show that the other features attributed to postmodernity are the
logical extension of trends within modernity, as are the nuclear threat and
pollution: the detraditionalization of the life-world, the anthauthoritarian

revolt, hedonism, new social movements, and above all, individualization. The
same even holds true for the selective return to certain traditions, once

modernity has prevailed over tradition, or for the repeated claim to local
identities, which is a reaction against globalization. So I agree with Becltfords

criticism (1996: 304?) of the concept of postmudernity.

ln spite of all of this, l remain open to the hypothesis that we should be on
the edge of some form of postmodernity. at least in a deeply new moment in
modernity, because the risk of irreparable pollution and, above all, of nuclear

destruction is the most dramatic and the most radical fate we can imagine
insofar as the very survival of the human species is at stake; this actually is a

fundamentally new trait. Besides, if we consider modernity as a new axial period,

we cannot know where we are in this process, so much the more as modernity
involves permanent change, even change at an accelerated pace, so that it might
not be followed by a phase of stabilization, as was formerly the case. Thus, it
could create some kind of permanent turn. Anyway, since an axial turn is a
cinematic fade in which older forms can coexist for centuries with new forms or

survive by adopting new forms, it would be very difficult, while we are on the
inside of this fade, to distinguish the decline of modernity from the birth of

postmodernity. At present, we do not have the necessary distance to resolve the

matter, but in any case, whether we are in postmo-dernity, late modernity,
hypermodernity, or whatever other term one might choose, it does not change
anything concerning our method of analysis.

GLOBAL ANALYSES OF THE DISTINGUISHING

RELIGIOUS FEATURES OF MODERNITY
The intent of this section is to review the various claims that have been
made concerning the effects of modernity on religion and the transformations
that are taking place in religion. l will not attempt to link these analyses in a
systematic way, as that is the task of the following section. I am reasonably
sure, said B-ellah (1976: 39), that even though we must speak from the midst of

it, the modern situation represents a stage of religious development in many

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RELIGION IN MODERNITY AS A NEW AXIAL AC-E

329

secular and that only one is predominantly religious. Unfortunately, they do not
give the religious characteristics of these different value types.
The factor analyses of correspondences between religious variables always
point to the existence of three different focal areas which we can call: (1)
confessing Christ ianiry according to Dietrich Bonhoeffefs definition (following
Keri-tofs 1988), which is to say the Christianity of faith in God; (2) cultural
Christianity (i.e., a question of identity), meaning little personal involvement,
rites of passage; and (3) secular humanism (Lambert 1996). lt is significant that
the notions of personal God," spirit, life force, and nonbelief in God are
respectively linked to the three focal areas (agnosticism comes somewhere
between the last two). lt is also worth noting that the less people believe in God
in a country, the less the God they believe in is a personal God, and the less God

is important in their lives. Confessing Christianity is predominant in the United

States, Ireland, Italy, and to a lesser extent in Portugal. Confessing Christianity
and culttual Christianity are on equal footing in Canada, Spain, Greece,
Luxembourg, and Ciennany. The majority of the French, Belgians, English, and
Dutch are divided between cultural Christianity and secular humanism. The
Scandinavian countries, where Christianity is more a civil religion, are largely
dominated by cultural Christianity.

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I121

A general evaluation of secularization

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It appears that the first rhreslwld of secularization was largely crossed in the
West with the coming of modernity, at three different levels.
(a) The macro level. States affirmed their autonomy in relation to religious

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institutions, even while they kept a civil religion (the United States) or a link

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with a particular denomination (Anglicanism in England, Lutheranism in

Sweden). Political parties did the same, even when they kept a religious label

(ChristianDemocrat). Opposite attempts have failed politically (the Moral

Majority). At the global level, the social bond rests first with democracy and
human rights, and not with religion. In Europe, the current tendency is one of a
weakening relationship between the state and the church in the countries that
were most linked to a denomination, and of a strengthening relationship in the
case of laicity and, above all, in the case of the former communist countries. For

instance, the Catholic church has been disestablished in Spain and Portugal;
Sweden is ending the automatic affiliation of newborns with Lutheranism (when

the parents did not express the desire for a different denomination). On the
contrary, in France, the legitimacy of Catholic schools is no longer questioned,
public schools are more open to religious culture, representatives from the main
religions and denominations are members of the National Consultative Ethics
Commitee (bioethics), not to mention Mitterrands state funeral in Paris's
Notre-Dame Cathedral; in the former communist countries, the churches cannot recover an authoritarian or monopolistic role, as Poland evidenced when the

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330 socrotoor or RELIGION

left won the elections. In any case, there is no clear relationship between the
denominational systems and the religious states, with the most interesting
example being that of the Scandinavian cotmtries, which have very low levels of
Christian religiosity (Lambert 1996).
lb) The meso level. With respect to schools and education, diverse situations
exist. Sometimes schools follow a religious authority while nonetheless aligning
their programs with national norms, sometimes they are autonomous. However,
most often they dispense a religious education (except in the cases of laicity or
laic pillars). As for culture, in the general sense of the arts, intellectual life, and
the media, we know that these sectors are for the most part autonomous with
relation to religious institutions.

(cl The individual level. If we were to judge by the degree of autonomy that
those who belong to a religion give themselves (according to the surveys], we
can see that institutional secularization is strong on an individual level as well.
This does not, however, prevent individuals from taking into account, in their
own way, the positions of their religious authorities. Furthermore, we note a

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strong desire to desecularize society (|"lervieu'l.eger 1993) within fundamem

talist, evangelical, Pentecostal, and charismatic groups, but as we have noted,
their reach is, with the exception of Poland, rather limited.

What about the secrmd tlrresholdi Contrary to the preceding one, this
threshold has been crossed only in a limited manner except, formerly, in the
communist countries and, today, in certain spheres and among the youth of
some countries, although it depends in part on the definition of the religious.
Besides, the idea that religion would tend to disappear with modernization has
declined, if not disappeared.
(al The macro level. Only several states have removed all religious references
from their constitutions (France, for example). On the contrary, Eastern
European countries and Russia, which had largely crossed the threshold on a

very hostile note, are returning either toward the rst one after the collapse of
Communism, or toward the more benevolent or neutral second one. We even
can observe that religion has played an important role in rebuilding the civil
society and the state in several countries, especially Poland (Casanova 1994-)(b) The meso level. Among the spheres of activity, only science and
economics have clearly passed this threshold, but this do-es not necessarily mean

that religion has been rejected in itself. Health and social services have more or
less crossed this threshold according to the country and, as we know, only in the
case of laicity or pillariration, as is the case with schools. Culture functions
largely autonomously in relation to religion, knowing that religious culture has
its proper place within the sphere of culture.
(c) The individual level. We have noted two opposite tendencies since the
1970s that differentiate the oldest from the youngest generations (Lambert 1993,
1996; Lambert and Voy 1997): on one hand, an increase in the percentage of
the nonreligious, and a decrease in the belief in God, less in the United States,

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RELIGION IN MOIJERNITY as A new AXIAL not 331

more so in Europe (with a majority of nonreligious young in France, Great
Britain, and Netherlands); on the other hand, a stability in belief in miracles
and in an afterlife, a spread of NR!/ls, and above all, a growth in parallel beliefs,
self-spirituality, loosely organised groups, "believing without belonging" (Davie
1995), such that approximately one-third of the nonreiigious have in fact
religious or parareligious beliefs. The balance depends upon the status we give to
these parallel beliefs and new religious forms. It is the same in the former

communist countries, where the return to religion is more limited than it first
seemed to be and where the nonreligious remain a majority in Russia, the former
East Germany, and Bulgaria, but where these parallel h-cliels and new religious
forms are spreading as well.
We can then conclude that, for the first threshold, there already exists a
widespread secularization and it is progressing. For the second threshold, secular-

ization is limited to some states, spheres, turd subpopulations, noting that, on an

individual level, it depends upon the status and importance of the parallel
beliefs, the self-spirituality, the seeker spirituality, the loose networks, knowing
that the spread of NRL/ls remains a very minor phenomenon, except if we
include the New Age-type nebula. The problem is best illustrated by the case of
Dutch youth (]anssen 1993), of whom, according to a 1991 national survey, only

39 percent belong to a religion, but 16 percent can be qualified as being

influenced by New Age or Eastern religions, l3 percent are doubters, 16 percent

are only praying, and a mere 8 percent are nonbelievers. Surprisingly, B2 percent

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pray at least sometimes and, among the nonchurchgoers, prayer is the most

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persistent religious element but only in a rather psychological and meditative

way: to give strength, to accept the inevitable such as the death of a relative, as a

release or as a time to ponder, in keeping with a primarily impersonal concept of

the divine. Do these findings point to a stage of religious decomposition, to a

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minor form of religiosity (a vague bacl-td top, comforting beliefs], or to the seeds

of possible reconfigurations? Are all of the parallel belief systems religious? If we

keep our two criteria to define the religious (a superempirical reality and a
symbolic relationship along with it}, we will then exclude astrology and
numerology for instance, but not the beliefs and practices of the Dutch youth,
except a few of them.
Whatever the case might be, we are left to wonder whether or not we might
be in the middle of an evolution toward a third threshold that we could define as
pluralistic secularization," in which religion has the same ascendancy upon
society and life as any other movement or ideology, but can also play a role

outside of its specic function and have an influence outside of the circle of
believers as an ethical and cultural resource, as lames Beclrfotd stressed (1989)
-- as it is illustrated here in the case of major causes." Once again, this seems
possible only if religion can respect individual autonomy and democratic
pluralism. We can also mention again Casanovas analysis, which illustrates this
new public role of religion, but we would balance his stress on deprivatiration

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332 socrot-my or RELIGION

with his own observations concerning the conditions for this role: the acceptance of pluralism and of functional differentiation. This new threshold would
correspond to a step beyond the conflicts that were linked to the long and

difficult redefinition of religion s place in modernity.

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