Secretary of Justice vs Judge Lantion GR 139465 Jan 18 2000

Facts
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez
for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal
law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 Prescribing the Procedure for
Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country and the
established Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America, the department proceeded with
proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical
evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty.
The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the
documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it
alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to
provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere
evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.

Issue
1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the
official extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on
or opposition thereto
2.Whether or not private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of
time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there
exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to
comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection
of its citizens of its right of due process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an
impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as the evaluation
stage. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the
other hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the
process.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in

good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state.
Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international
law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld
by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments.
In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The
United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States
accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither
the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a
prospective extradite.

Philip Morris vs. Court of Appeals

[GRN 91332 July 16, 1993.]MELO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques of
Tabac Reunies, S.A., are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon
magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent
Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, herein private respondent, from manufacturing and
selling "MARK" cigarettes in the local market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners'
respective symbols "MARK VII", 'MARK TEN", and "MARK", also for cigarettes, must
be protected against unauthorized appropriation, Philip Morris, Incorporated is a
corporation organized under the laws of the State of Virginia, United States of
America, and does business at 100 Park Avenue, New York, New York, United States
of America. The two other plaintiff foreign corporations, which are wholly-owned
subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., are similarly not doing business in the Philippines
but are suing on an isolated transaction. Plaintiffs-petitioners asserted that
defendant Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell
cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark 'Plaintiffs
admit in the complaint that "xxx they are not doing business in the Philippines and
are suing on an isolated transaction xxx'. This simply means that they are not
engaged in the sale, manufacture, importation, expor tation and advertisement of
their cigarette products in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been an invasion o plaintiffs' right of property to such
trademark or tradename. Whether of not there is a violation of the International
Agreement on protection of trademarks.
Held:

There is no proof whatsoever that any of plaintiffs products which they seek to
protect from any adverse effect of the trademark applied for by defendant, is in
actual use and available for commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines. To
sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement, petitioners, as foreign
corporations not engaged in local commerce, rely on Section 21-A of the Trademark
Law reading as follows: SECTION 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to
which a mark or trade-name has been registered or assigned under this act may
bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false
designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has been licensed to do
business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty nine, as
amended, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint:
Provided, That the country of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person is
a citizen or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar
privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines. (As inserted by Sec. 7 of
Republic Act No. 638.) to drive home the point that they are not precluded from
initiating a cause of action in the Philippines on account of the principal perception
that another entity is pirating their symbol without any lawful authority to do so.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT VS. CA
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act
No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish
corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the
Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law
gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters.
Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2
of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal
waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the

LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake
region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.
The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of
special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored
and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature.
A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law
by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On
the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and
other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating &
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and
management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive,
least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of
taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of
police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de
Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect
to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters
affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA
4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities
situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter
vested on it.
KURODA VS. JALANDONI
Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by Major
General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were done against non combatant civilians and
prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68 which established the
National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war
criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for
in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the
Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose
against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?

HELD:
EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the
President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an
instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of
international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international
jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian)
guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and
customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules
and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law.
They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)
As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its
country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.
Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and
representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.

AGUSTIN VS. EDU

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter
of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning
devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early
warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel
and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking
lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the
mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is
redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights
in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor
vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any
motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized
rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways,
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that

road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or

disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist
who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum
lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think
what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of
the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power.
That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the
submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has
offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad
and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief
Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more
or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed
in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified
police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a preCommonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v.
Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the
most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice
Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding
to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the
present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the
time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct

unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure

communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact
that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to
promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to
invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to
our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point,
Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived
with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of
fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted
by the imperative demands of public safety.

MEJOFF VS. DIR. OF PRISONS

Facts : This is a second petition for habeas corpus by herein petitioner.
Mejoff is an alien of Russian decent. He was brought to this country from Shanghai
as a secret operative by the Japanese forces. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a
Japanese spy. He was deported having been found out that he has no travel
documents and his entry here in the Philippines was illegal. The Deportation Board
ordered the immigration officials for his deportation on the first transportation to
Russia. He was moved in Cebu where two Russian ships were scheduled, but each
respective masters of the ship refused to take petitioner due to no authority to do
so. Thus, respondent was moved again to Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa. Since then
and until the time this case was initiated he was still detained in the said jail.
Issue : Whether or not an aliens prolonged detention is unlawful.
Held : Petitioners entry here in the Philippines was not illegal since he was brought
here by the armed force of the then de facto government.
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the Nation. Thus, in view of this principle the resolution entitled
Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved by the general assembly of the
United Nations , Philippines is a member. This provides the right to life and liberty
and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings proclaimed without
any distinction.
It has been said that the petitioner was engaged in subversive activities. If the only
purpose of the detention is to eliminate danger, government is not impotent to deal
or prevent any threat. The prolonged detention of herein petitioner is not the only
way of governments keeping our country safe and peaceful.

The writ will issue commanding the respondent to release the petitioner from
custody upon terms. The petitioner shall be placed under surveillance of the
immigration authorities and insure that he keep peace and be available when the
Government is ready to deport him.
No cost will be charged.

LAWYERS LEAGUE CASE

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate
Decision:
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for
the reasons to be stated below.
On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and
73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they would pursue the question
by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the
people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to
uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.