LOURDES DELA CRUZ,

- versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 139442

The Case
This petition for review seeks to nullify the April 30,
1999 Decision and the July 16, 1999 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097, which
reversed the Decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 98-89174, and
reinstated the Decision of the Manila Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Branch 20, which ordered petitioner Dela
Cruz to vacate the subject lot in favor of respondent Tan
Te.[1]
The Facts
The Reyes family, represented by Mr. Lino
Reyes, owned the lot located at No. 1332 Lacson Street
(formerly
Gov.
Forbes
Street),
Sampaloc,
Manila. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz was one of their
lessees, and she religiously paid rent over a portion of
the lot for well over 40 years. Sometime in 1989, a fire
struck the premises and destroyed, among others,
petitioners dwelling. After the fire, petitioner and some
tenants returned to the said lot and rebuilt their
respective houses; simultaneously, the Reyes family
made several verbal demands on the remaining lessees,
including petitioner, to vacate the lot but the latter did not
comply. On February 21, 1994, petitioner was served a
written demand to vacate said lot but refused to
leave. Despite the setback, the Reyes family did not
initiate court proceedings against any of the lessees.
On November 26, 1996, the disputed lot was sold
by the Reyeses to respondent Melba Tan Te by virtue of
the November
26,
1996 Deed
of
Absolute
Sale. Respondent bought the lot in question for
residential purposes. Despite the sale, petitioner Dela
Cruz did not give up the lot.
On January 14, 1997, petitioner was sent a written
demand to relinquish the premises which she ignored,
prompting respondent Tan Te to initiate conciliation
proceedings at the barangay level. While respondent
attempted to settle the dispute by offering financial
assistance, petitioner countered by asking PhP
500,000.00 for her house. Respondent rejected the
counter offer which she considered unconscionable. As
a result, a certificate to file action was issued to Tan Te.
On September 8, 1997, respondent Tan Te filed an
ejectment complaint with damages before the Manila
MeTC, entitled Melba Tan Te v. Lourdes Dela Cruz and
docketed as Civil Case No. 156730-CV. The complaint
averred that: (1) the previous owners, the Reyeses were
in possession and control of the contested lot; (2) on
November 26, 1996, the lot was sold to Tan Te; (3) prior
to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the property with
strategy and/or stealth; (4) the petitioner unlawfully
deprived the respondent of physical possession of the
property and continues to do so; and, (5) the respondent
sent several written demands to petitioner to vacate the
premises but refused to do so.
On October 24, 1997, petitioner filed her answer
and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over
the case because it falls within the jurisdiction of the
RTC as more than one year had elapsed from
petitioners forcible entry; (2) she was a rent-paying
tenant protected by PD 20; [2] (3) her lease constituted a
legal encumbrance upon the property; and (4) the lot
was subject of expropriation.
The Ruling of the Manila MeTC
On April 3, 1998, the MeTC decided as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant

and all persons claiming right
under her to vacate the premises
situated
at 1332
Lacson
Street (formerly Gov.
Forbes
Street),
Sampaloc, Manila and
peacefully return
possession
thereof to plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendant to
pay the plaintiff the amount of
P360.00 a month from December
1996 to November 1997; P432.00
a month from December 1997 to
November 1998, plus 20% for
each subsequent year until the
premises shall have been vacated
and turned over to the plaintiff;

3. Ordering the defendant to

pay the plaintiff the amount of
P10,000.00 as attorneys fees;
and, the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Unconvinced, petitioner Dela Cruz appealed the
Decision of the MeTC in the Manila RTC and the appeal
was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-89174. On
September 1, 1998, the RTC rendered its judgment
setting aside the April 3, 1998 Decision of the Manila
MeTC and dismissed respondent Tan Tes Complaint on
the ground that it was the RTC and not the MeTC which
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The
RTC believed that since Tan Tes predecessor-in-interest
learned of petitioners intrusion into the lot as early
as February 21, 1994, the ejectment suit should have
been filed within the one-year prescriptive period which
expired on February 21, 1995. Since the Reyes
did not file the ejectment suit and respondent Tan Te filed
the action only on September 8, 1997, then the suit had
become an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Disappointed at the turn of events, respondent
Tan Te appealed the adverse Decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA) which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
49097. This time, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of
respondent Tan Te reversing the Manila RTC September
1, 1998 Decision and reinstated the Manila MeTC April 3,
1998 Decision.
Petitioner tried to have the CA reconsider its
Decision
but
was
rebutted
in
its July
16,
1999 Resolution.
Unyielding to the CA Decision and the denial of
her request for reconsideration, petitioner Dela Cruz now
seeks legal remedy through the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari before the Court.
The Issues
Petitioner Dela Cruz claims two (2) reversible
errors on the part of the appellate court, to wit:
A

THE
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
WITH
DUE
RESPECT, WENT BEYOND THE
ISSUES OF THE CASE AND
CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE
TRIAL COURT.
B
THE
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
WITH
DUE
RESPECT,
ERRED
IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF
THE RTC AND IN EFFECT,
REINSTATING THE DECISION
OF THE [MeTC] WHICH IS
CONTRADICTED
BY
THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[4]
The Courts Ruling
Discussion on Rule 45
Before we dwell on the principal issues, a few
procedural matters must first be resolved.
Petitioner Dela Cruz asks the Court to review the
findings of facts of the CA, a course of action proscribed
by Section 1, Rule 45. Firm is the rule that findings of
fact of the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal to this Court provided they are
supported by evidence on record or substantial
evidence. Fortunately for petitioner, we will be liberal
with her petition considering that the CAs factual
findings contradict those of the RTC, and there was an
asseveration that the court a quo went beyond the
issues of the case. Indeed, these grounds were
considered exceptions to the factual issue bar rule.
Secondly, the petition unnecessarily impleaded
the CA in violation of Section 4, Rule 45. We will let this
breach pass only because there is a need to entertain
the petition due to the conflicting rulings between the
lower courts; however, a repetition may result to
sanctions.
The actual threshold issue is which court, the
Manila RTC or the Manila MeTC, has jurisdiction over
the Tan Te ejectment suit. Once the jurisdictional issue
is settled, the heart of the dispute is whether or not
respondent is entitled to the ejectment of petitioner Dela
Cruz from the premises.

xxxx
(2)
Exclusive
original
jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when, in such
cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to
determine
the
issue
of
possession.
Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over
ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged with
the first level courts. This is clarified in Section 1, Rule
70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that embraces
an action for forcible entry (detentacion), where one is
deprived of physical possession of any land or building
by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. In actions for forcible entry, three (3) requisites
have to be met for the municipal trial court to acquire
jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior
physical possession of the property. Second, they must
also assert that they were deprived of possession either
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third,
the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time
the owners or legal possessors learned of their
deprivation of physical possession of the land or
building.
The other kind of ejectment proceeding is
unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one unlawfully
withholds possession of the subject property after the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. Here,
the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive; for in
such action, the defendant is the party in actual
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the
termination of the defendants right to continue in
possession.[7] The essential requisites of unlawful
detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract
express or implied; (2) the expiration or termination of
the possessors right to hold possession; (3) withholding
by the lessee of the possession of the land or building
after expiration or termination of the right to possession;
(4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or
comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the
premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1)
year from date of last demand received by the
defendant.

However, the petition is bereft of merit.

On the Issue of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the
law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine
certain controversies.[5] Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law.
Section 33 of Chapter III -- on Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts of B. P. No. 129[6] provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan
Trial
Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
civil cases.Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:

A person who wants to recover physical

possession of his real property will prefer an ejectment
suit because it is governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure which allows immediate execution of the
judgment under Section 19, Rule 70 unless the
defendant perfects an appeal in the RTC and complies
with the requirements to stay execution; all of which are
nevertheless beneficial to the interests of the lot owner
or the holder of the right of possession.
On the other hand, Section 19, of Chapter II of
B.P. No. 129 on Regional Trial Courts provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in
civil
cases.Regional
Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxxx

(2)
In all civil actions
which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, except
actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over
which
is
conferred
upon
Metropolitan
Trial
Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of
real property which fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC
are: (1) the plenary action for the recovery of the real
right of possession (accion publiciana) when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year or
when the action was filed more than one (1) year from
date of the last demand received by the lessee or
defendant; and (2) an action for the recovery of
ownership (accion reivindicatoria) which includes the
recovery of possession.
These actions are governed by the regular rules
of procedure and adjudication takes a longer period than
the summary ejectment suit.
To determine whether a complaint for recovery
of possession falls under the jurisdiction of the MeTC
(first level court) or the RTC (second level court), we are
compelled to go over the allegations of the
complaint. The general rule is that what determines the
nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction
over the case are the allegations in the
complaint. These cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the
defendant.[8]
This
general
rule
however
admits
exceptions. In Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan, it was held
that while the allegations in the complaint make out a
case for forcible entry, where tenancy is averred by way
of defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the case
should properly be filed with the then Court of Agrarian
Relations.[9]
The cause of action in a complaint is not what
the designation of the complaint states, but what the
allegations in the body of the complaint define and
describe. The designation or caption is not controlling,
more than the allegations in the complaint themselves
are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the
complaint.[10]
Let us refer to the allegations of the complaint
filed in the Manila MeTC in Civil Case No. 98-89174,
which we quote verbatim:
3.
That plaintiff is the
absolute and registered owner of
a parcel of land located at No.
1332, Lacson Street, Sampaloc,
Manila now being occupied by
defendant;
4.
That
plaintiff
purchased the above-said parcel
of land together with its
improvements from the legal heirs
of
the
late
EMERLINDA
DIMAYUGA
REYES
on
November 26, 1996, under and

by virtue of a Deed of Absolute

Sale x x x;
5.
That pursuant to the
said deed of sale, the title to the
land and all its improvements was
transferred in plaintiffs name as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 233273 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Manila on
April 22, 1997 x x x;
6.
That prior to said
sale, the previous owners,
represented by Mr. Lino Reyes,
husband of the said deceased
Emerlinda D. Reyes and the
administrator of her estate, was in
possession and control of the
property subject of this complaint;
7.
That also prior to said
sale, defendant, without the
knowledge and consent of Mr.
Lino Reyes, surreptitiously and by
means of stealth and strategy
entered, used and occupied the
said premises thus depriving the
former of rightful possession
thereof;
8.
That on February 21,
1994, Mr. Lino Reyes, through
Atty. Alejo Sedico, his lawyer,
furnished the defendants a letter
formally
demanding
that
defendant vacate the premises x
x x;
9.
That,
however,
defendant failed and refused to
vacate despite just and legal
demand by Mr. Lino Reyes;
10.
That after the sale to
plaintiff of said premises, plaintiff
has several times demanded of
defendants
to
vacate
the
premises, the last demand having
been made on them personally
and in writing on January 14,
1997 x x x;
11.
That defendant failed
and refused and still fails and
refuses to vacate the premises
without legal cause or justifiable
reason whatsoever;[11]
The answer of petitioner averred:
4.
The Court has no
jurisdiction over the case, having
been filed by plaintiff more than
the reglementary one year period
to commence forcible entry case,
which is reckoned from the date
of the alleged unlawful entry of
defendant by the use of stealth
and strategy into the premises;
5.
For more than four
decades now, defendant has
been and still is a rent-paying

tenant of the subject land

occupied by their residential
house, dating back to the original
owner-lessor,
the
Dimayuga
family. Her lease with no definite
duration, commenced with a rent
at P60.00 per month until it was
gradually
increased
in
the
ensuing years. As of November
1996, it stood at P300.00 a
month;
6.
In this circumstances
[sic], defendant enjoys the
protective mantle of P.D. 20 and
the subsequent rental control
status
against
dispossession. She cannot be
ejected other than for causes
prescribed under B.P. Blg.
25. Further, in case of sale of the
land, she has the right of first
refusal
under
the
express
provision of P.D. 1571;
7.
Throughout the years
of her tenancy, defendant has
been updated in her rental
payment until the collector of the
original owner-lessor no longer
came around as she has done
theretofore;
7.1.
As
a
result,
she
was
compelled to file a
petition for consignation
of rent before the
Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila;
8.
A bona fide tenant
within the ambit if [sic] P.D. 20
and the subsequent rental control
status, including B.P. Blg. 25,
under its terms, cannot be ousted
on a plea of expiration of her
monthly lease;
9.
Her lease constitutes
a legal encumbrance upon the
property of the lessor/owner and
binds the latters successor-ininterest who is under obligation to
respect it;
10.
The land at bench is
the subject of a pending
expropriation proceedings;
11.
Plaintiff
being
a
married woman cannot sue or be
sued without being joined by her
husband;[12]
Undeniably, the aforequoted allegations of the
complaint are vague and iffy in revealing the nature of
the action for ejectment.
The allegations in the complaint show that prior
to the sale by Lino Reyes, representing the estate of his
wife Emerlinda Reyes, he was in possession and control
of the subject lot but were deprived of said possession
when petitioner, by means of stealth and strategy,

entered
and
occupied
the
same
lot. These
circumstances imply that he had prior physical
possession of the subject lot and can make up a forcible
entry complaint.
On the other hand, the allegation that petitioner
Dela Cruz was served several demands to leave the
premises but refused to do so would seem to indicate an
action for unlawful detainer since a written demand is not
necessary in an action for forcible entry. It is a fact that
the MeTC complaint was filed on September 8,
1997 within one (1) year from the date of the last written
demand upon petitioner Dela Cruz on January 14, 1997.
As previously discussed, the settled rule is
jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the initiatory
pleading and the defenses in the answer are deemed
irrelevant and immaterial in its determination. However,
we relax the rule and consider the complaint at bar as an
exception in view of the special and unique
circumstances present. First, as inIgnacio v. CFI of
Bulacan,[13] the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised
in the answer wherein there was an admission that
petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the former owners
of the lot, the Reyeses, prior to the sale to respondent
Tan Te. The fact that petitioner was a tenant of the
predecessors-in-interest of respondent Tan Te is material
to the determination of jurisdiction. Since this is a
judicial admission against the interest of petitioner, such
admission can be considered in determining
jurisdiction. Second, the ejectment suit was filed with
the Manila MeTC on September 8, 1997 or more than
nine (9) years ago. To dismiss the complaint would be a
serious blow to the effective dispensation of justice as
the parties will start anew and incur additional legal
expenses after having litigated for a long time. Equitable
justice dictates that allegations in the answer should be
considered to aid in arriving at the real nature of the
action. Lastly, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
clearly empowers the Court to construe Rule 70 and
other pertinent procedural issuances in a liberal manner
to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.
Based on the complaint and the answer, it is
apparent that the Tan Te ejectment complaint is after all
a complaint for unlawful detainer. It was admitted that
petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the Reyeses for
around four (4) decades. Thus, initially petitioner as
lessee is the legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue
of a contract of lease. When fire destroyed her house,
the Reyeses considered the lease terminated; but
petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in returning to the lot and
occupied it by strategy and stealth without the consent of
the owners. The Reyeses however tolerated the
continued occupancy of the lot by petitioner. Thus, when
the lot was sold to respondent Tan Te, the rights of the
Reyeses, with respect to the lot, were transferred to their
subrogee, respondent Tan Te, who for a time
also tolerated the stay of petitioner until she decided to
eject the latter by sending several demands, the last
being the January 14, 1997 letter of demand. Since the
action was filed with the MeTC on September 8, 1997,
the action was instituted well within the one (1) year
period reckoned from January 14, 1997. Hence, the
nature of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer and
the Manila MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.
Thus,
an
ejectment
complaint
based
on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the Tan
Te complaint, is a specie of unlawful detainer cases.
As early as 1913, case law introduced the
concept of possession by tolerance in ejectment cases
as follows:

It is true that the landlord

might, upon the failure of the
tenant to pay the stipulated rents,
consider the contract broken and
demand immediate possession of
the
rented
property,
thus
converting a legal possession into
illegal possession. Upon the other
hand, however, the landlord might
conclude to give the tenant credit
for the payment of the rents and
allow him to continue indefinitely
in the possession of the property.
In other words, the landlord might
choose to give the tenant credit
from month to month or from year
to year for the payment of their
rent, relying upon his honesty of
his financial ability to pay the
same. During such period the
tenant would not be in illegal
possession of the property and
the landlord could not maintain an
action of desahucio until after he
had taken steps to convert the
legal possession into illegal
possession. A mere failure to pay
the rent in accordance with the
contract would justify the landlord,
after the legal notice, in bringing
an action of desahucio. The
landlord might, however, elect to
recognize the contract as still in
force and sue for the sums due
under it. It would seem to be clear
that the landlord might sue for the
rents due and [unpaid, without
electing to terminate the contract
of tenancy;] [w]hether he can
declare the contract of tenancy
broken and sue in an action
desahucio for the possession of
the property and in a separate
actions for the rents due and
damages, etc.[14]
The concept of possession by tolerance in
unlawful detainer cases was further refined and applied
in pertinent cases submitted for decision by 1966. The
rule was articulated as follows:
Where despite the lessees
failure to pay rent after the first
demand, the lessor did not
choose to bring an action in court
but suffered the lessee to
continue occupying the land for
nearly two years, after which the
lessor made a second demand,
the one-year period for bringing
the detainer case in the justice of
the peace court should be
counted not from the day the
lessee refused the first demand
for payment of rent but from the
time the second demand for rents
and surrender of possession was
not complied with.[15]
In Calubayan v. Pascual, a case usually cited in
subsequent decisions on ejectment, the concept of
possession by tolerance was further elucidated as
follows:

In allowing several years to

pass
without
requiring
the
occupant to vacate the premises
nor filing an action to eject
him, plaintiffs have acquiesced
to defendants possession and
use of the premises. It has
been held that a person who
occupies the land of another at
the
latters
tolerance
or
permission,
without
any
contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing
which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy
against them. The status of the
defendant is analogous to that of
a lessee or tenant whose term of
lease has expired but whose
occupancy continued by tolerance
of the owner. In such a case, the
unlawful
deprivation
or
withholding of possession is to be
counted from the date of the
demand to vacate.[16] (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing jurisprudence, it is
unequivocal that petitioners possession after she
intruded into the lot after the firewas by tolerance or
leniency of the Reyeses and hence, the action is
properly an unlawful detainer case falling under the
jurisdiction of the Manila MeTC.
Even if we concede that it is the RTC and not
the MeTC that has jurisdiction over the Tan Te complaint,
following the reasoning that neither respondent nor her
predecessor-in-interest filed an ejectment suit within one
(1) year from February 21, 1994 when the Reyeses
knew of the unlawful entry of petitioner, and hence, the
complaint is transformed into an accion publiciana, the
Court deems it fair and just to suspend its rules in order
to render efficient, effective, and expeditious justice
considering the nine (9) year pendency of the ejectment
suit. More importantly, if there was uncertainty on the
issue of jurisdiction that arose from the averments of the
complaint, the same cannot be attributed to respondent
Tan Te but to her
counsel who could
have been confused as to the actual nature of the
ejectment suit. The lawyers apparent imprecise
language used in the preparation of the complaint
without any participation on the part of Tan Te is
sufficient special or compelling reason for the grant of
relief.
The case of Barnes v. Padilla[17] elucidates the
rationale behind the exercise by this Court of the power
to relax, or even suspend, the application of the rules of
procedure:
Let it be emphasized that the
rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate
the
attainment
of
justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial
justice,
must
always
be
eschewed. Even the Rules of
Court reflect this principle. The
power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so

pervasive and compelling as to

alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be
final x x x.
The emerging trend in the
rulings of this Court is to afford
every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free
from
the
constraints
of
technicalities. Time and again,
this Court has consistently held
that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice.[18]
Moreover, Section 8, Rule 40 authorizes the
RTCin case of affirmance of an order of the municipal
trial court dismissing a case without trial on the merits
and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matterto try the case on the merits as if the
case was originally filed with it if the RTC has jurisdiction
over the case. In the same vein, this Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, can suspend its rules
with respect to this particular case (pro hac vice), even if
initially, the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over the
ejectment suit, and decide to assume jurisdiction over it
in order to promptly resolve the dispute.
The issue of jurisdiction settled, we now
scrutinize the main issue.
At the heart of every ejectment suit is the issue
of who is entitled to physical possession of the lot or
possession de facto.
We rule in favor of respondent Tan Te for the
following reasons:
1.
Petitioner admitted in her Answer that she
was a rent-paying tenant of the Reyeses, predecessorsin-interest of respondent Tan Te. As such, she
recognized the ownership of the lot by respondent,
which includes the right of possession.
2.
After the fire raged over the structures on
the subject lot in late 1989 the contracts of lease
expired, as a result of which Lino Reyes demanded that
all occupants, including petitioner, vacate the lot but the
latter refused to abandon the premises. During the
duration of the lease, petitioners possession was legal
but it became unlawful after the fire when the lease
contracts were deemed terminated and demands were
made for the tenants to return possession of the lot.
3.
Petitioners possession is one by the
Reyeses tolerance and generosity and later by
respondent Tan Tes.
Petitioner fully knows that her stay in the subject
lot is at the leniency and magnanimity of Mr. Lino Reyes
and later of respondent Tan Te; and her acquiescence to
such use of the lot carries with it an implicit and
assumed commitment that she would leave the premises
the moment it is needed by the owner. When
respondent Tan Te made a last, written demand
on January 14, 1997 and petitioner breached her
promise to leave upon demand, she lost her right to the
physical possession of the lot. Thus, respondent Tan Te
should now be allowed to occupy her lot for residential
purposes, a dream that will finally be realized after nine
(9) years of litigation.

Petitioner raises the ancillary issue that on

March 15, 1998, the Manila City Council passed and
approved Ordinance No. 7951:
[a]uthorizing the Manila City
Mayor to acquire either by
negotiation
or
expropriation
certain parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
233273, 175106 and 140471,
containing an area of One
Thousand Four Hundred Twenty
Five (1,425) square meters,
located at Maria Clara and
Governor Forbes Streets, Sta.
Cruz, Manila, for low cost housing
and award to actual bonafide
residents thereat and further
authorizing the City Mayor to avail
for that purpose any available
funds of the city and other
existing funding facilities from
other government agencies x x x.
[19]

It readily appears that this issue was not

presented before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 49097 despite the fact that the respondents petition
was filed on September 25, 1998, six months after the
ordinance was passed. Thus, this issue is proscribed as
are all issues raised for the first time before the Court
are proscribed.
Even granting for the sake of argument that we
entertain the issue, we rule that the intended
expropriation of respondents lot (TCT No. 233273) by
the city government ofManila will not affect the resolution
of this petition. For one thing, the issue can be raised by
petitioner in the appropriate legal proceeding. Secondly,
the intended expropriation might not even be
implemented since it is clear from the ordinance that the
City Mayor will still locate available funds for project,
meaning the said expense is not a regular item in the
budget.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The April 30, 1999 Decision of the Court of
Appeals reinstating the April 3, 1998 MeTC Decision in
Civil Case No. 156730-CV and the July 16, 1999
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097 are
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182716

June 20, 2012

HEIRS OF JOSE MALIGASO, SR., namely, ANTONIO

MALIGASO, CARMELO MALIGASO and JOSE
MALIGASO,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES SIMON D. ENCINAS and ESPERANZA E.
ENCINAS, Respondents.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court of the Decision1 dated November 26, 2007 and
Resolution2dated April 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64775. The CA reversed and
set aside the Decision3dated April 2, 2001 of Branch 51
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon,

Sorsogon, which affirmed the Decision4dated August 22,

2000 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon dismissing the Spouses Simon D. Encinas
and Esperanza E. Encinas (respondents) complaint for
unlawful detainer.
Respondents are the registered owners of Lot No. 3517
of the Cadastral Survey of Sorsogon, which has an area
of 2,867 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4773. 5 The subject matter
of this controversy is a portion of Lot No. 3517 with an
area of 980 square meters, which the Heirs of Jose
Maligaso, Sr. (petitioners) continue to occupy despite
having received two (2) notices to vacate from the
respondents.

1. Dismissing the instant case;

2. Adjudicating the possessory rights over the
litigated portion to the defendants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds to cause the
annotation of the equitable title of defendants,
who are entitled to their fathers rightful
inheritance which is part of the property in
plaintiffs TCT No. T-4773 as a lien or
encumbrance;
4. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay defendants the
amount of [P]10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. The cost of suit.

Lot No. 3517 was previously covered by Original

Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 543, which was issued in
the name of Maria Maligaso Ramos (Maria), the
petitioners aunt, on February 7, 1929. Sometime in May
1965, Maria sold Lot No. 3517 to Virginia Escurel
(Virginia). Three (3) years later, on April 5, 1968, Virginia
sold Lot No. 3517 to the respondents, resulting to the
cancellation of OCT No. 543 and issuance of TCT No. T4773.6
On March 16, 1998 and June 19, 1998 or approximately
thirty (30) years from the time they purchased Lot No.
3517, the respondents issued two (2) demand letters to
the petitioners, asking them to vacate the contested area
within thirty (30) days from notice. 7 The petitioners
refused to leave, claiming that the subject area was the
share of their father, Jose Maligaso, Sr. (Jose, Sr.), in
their grandparents estate. Thus, the respondents filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against them with the
MTC, alleging that the petitioners occupation is by mere
tolerance and had become illegal following their refusal
to vacate the property despite being demanded to do so
twice.
The petitioners, in their defense, denied that their
possession of the disputed area was by mere tolerance
and claimed title thereto on the basis of their fathers
successional rights. That the petitioners occupation
remained undisturbed for more than thirty (30) years and
the respondents failure to detail and specify the
petitioners supposedly tolerated possession suggest
that they and their predecessors-in-interest are aware of
their claim over the subject area. The petitioners also
attacked the validity of OCT No. 543 and TCT No. T4773, alleging that it was thru fraud that Maria was able
to register Lot No. 3517, including the disputed area,
under her name. The petitioners likewise moved for the
dismissal of the complaint, claiming that the allegations
therein indicate that it was actually an action for
reconveyance. Further, laches had already set in view of
the respondents failure to assail their possession for
more than thirty (30) years.8
In an August 22, 2000 Decision, 9 the dispositive portion
of which is quoted below, the MTC dismissed the
respondents complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises
hereby rendered

considered,

judgment

is

SO ORDERED.10
The MTC gave more weight to the petitioners
possession of the contested area than the respondents
title as the former is founded on Jose Sr.s successional
rights and even held that the registration of Lot No. 3517
in Marias name created a trust in Jose Sr.s favor insofar
as the disputed portion is concerned. The MTC also held
that the respondents are barred by laches from pursuing
their cause of action against the petitioners given their
inaction for more than thirty (30) years despite being fully
aware of the petitioners adverse possession and claim
over the subject property.
The RTC dismissed the respondents appeal and
affirmed the MTCs Decision dated August 22, 2000. In a
Decision11dated April 2, 2001, the RTC found the
respondents allegations relative to the petitioners
merely tolerated possession of the subject area to be
wanting. The RTC also concluded, albeit implicitly, that
the petitioners possession is a necessary consequence
of their title as evidenced by their occupation in the
concept of an owner for a significant period of time. The
dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
annotations and the payment of attorney[]s fees as
ordered by the Court a quo be deleted. The instant
appeal is DISMISSED, for lack of merit.12
Consequently, the respondents filed with the CA a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
This was given due course and the RTCs Decision
dated April 2, 2001 was reversed and set aside. In its
Decision13 dated November 26, 2007, the CA had a
different view and rationalized the grant of possession to
the respondents as follows:
The rule is well-entrenched that a person who has a
Torrens title over the property is entitled to the
possession thereof. In like manner, prior physical
possession by the plaintiff is not necessary in unlawful
detainer cases as the same is only required in forcible
entry cases. Moreover, the allegations in the answer of
[the] defendant as to the nullity of plaintiffs title is
unavailing and has no place in an unlawful detainer suit

since the issue of the validity of a Torrens title can only

be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. This may be gleaned from Spouses Apostol vs.
Court of Appeals and Spouses Emmanuel, where the
Supreme Court held that:
xxx
In the case at bench, petitioners are the registered
owners of Lot No. 3517 and, as a consequence of such,
are entitled to the material and physical possession
thereof. Thus, both the MTC and RTC erred in ruling that
respondents prior physical possession and actual
possession of the 980-square meter disputed portion of
Lot No. 3517 should prevail over petitioners Torrens title
over the said property. Such pronouncement
contravenes the law and settled jurisprudence on the
matter.14 (Citation omitted)
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
in its Resolution dated April 28, 2008.15
As earlier intimated, the petitioners anchor their
possession of the subject property on their fathers right
thereto as one of his parents heirs. The petitioners insist
on the nullity of the respondents title, TCT No. T-4773,
as the inclusion of the contested area in its coverage
was never intended. The petitioners accuse Maria of
fraud for having registered Lot No. 3517 in her name,
including the portion that their father allegedly inherited
from his parents, thus, reneging on her promise to cause
the registration of such portion in his name. It was their
father who had a legitimate claim over the subject area
and Maria never acquired any right thereto. Therefore,
respondents purchase of Lot No. 3517 did not include
the portion occupied by the petitioners, who succeeded
to Jose Sr.s rights thereto.
On the other hand, the respondents cause of action is
based on their ownership of Lot No. 3517, which is
evidenced by TCT No. T-4773, and on their claim that
they merely tolerated the petitioners occupation thereof.
According to the respondents, their being registered
owners of Lot No. 3517, including the portion possessed
by the petitioners, entitles them to the possession
thereof and their right to recovery can never be barred
by laches. They also maintain that the petitioners cannot
collaterally attack their title to the subject property.
The point of inquiry is whether the respondents have the
right to evict the petitioners from the subject property
and this should be resolved in the respondents favor.
Between the petitioners unsubstantiated self-serving
claim that their father inherited the contested portion of
Lot No. 3517 and the respondents Torrens title, the latter
must prevail. The respondents title over such area is
evidence of their ownership thereof. That a certificate of
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein and that a person who has
a Torrens title over a land is entitled to the possession
thereof16 are fundamental principles observed in this
jurisdiction. Alternatively put, the respondents title and
that of their predecessors-in-interest give rise to the
reasonable presumption that the petitioners have no

right over the subject area and that their stay therein was
merely tolerated. The petitioners failed to overcome this
presumption, being inadequately armed by a narration
that yearns for proof and corroboration. The petitioners
harped that the subject area was their fathers share in
his parents estate but the absence of any evidence that
such property was indeed adjudicated to their father
impresses that their claim of ownership is nothing but a
mere afterthought. In fact, Lot No. 3517 was already
registered in Marias name when Jose Sr. built the house
where the petitioners are now presently residing. It is
rather specious that Jose Sr. chose inaction despite
Marias failure to cause the registration of the subject
area in his name and would be contented with a
bungalow that is erected on a property that is
supposedly his but registered in anothers name. That
there is allegedly an unwritten agreement between Maria
and Virginia that Jose Sr.s and the petitioners
possession of the subject area would remain
undisturbed was never proven, hence, cannot be the
basis for their claim of ownership. Rather than proving
that Jose Sr. and the petitioners have a right over the
disputed portion of Lot No. 3517, their possession
uncoupled with affirmative action to question the titles of
Maria and the respondents show that the latter merely
tolerated their stay.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary
proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or the right to the
possession of the property involved. The avowed
objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which have purposely been made summary in
nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious
means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of
property from unjustly continuing his possession for a
long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace
and order in the community.17 The said objectives can
only be achieved by according the proceedings a
summary nature. However, its being summary poses a
limitation on the nature of issues that can be determined
and fully ventilated. It is for this reason that the
proceedings are concentrated on the issue on
possession. Thus, whether the petitioners have a better
right to the contested area and whether fraud attended
the issuance of Marias title over Lot No. 3517 are issues
that are outside the jurisdiction and competence of a trial
court in actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry.
This is in addition to the long-standing rule that a Torrens
title cannot be collaterally attacked, to which an
ejectment proceeding, is not an exception.
In Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E.
Concepcion,18 a similar allegation possession of the
property in dispute since time immemorial was met
with rebuke as such possession, for whatever length of
time, cannot prevail over a Torrens title, the validity of
which is presumed and immune to any collateral attack.
In this case, the trial court found that respondent owns
the property on the basis of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 12892, which was "issued in the name of Arsenio E.
Concepcion, x x x married to Nenita L. Songco." It is a
settled rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a
land is entitled to possession thereof. Hence, as the

registered owner of the subject property, respondent is

preferred to possess it.
The validity of respondents certificate of title cannot be
attacked by petitioner in this case for ejectment. Under
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot
be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct
proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The
issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can
only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. Whether or not petitioner has the right to claim
ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
trial court to determine in an action for unlawful
detainer.19(Citations omitted)
In Salandanan,20 the prohibition against the collateral
attack of a Torrens title was reiterated:
In Malison, the Court emphasized that when [a] property
is registered under the Torrens system, the registered
owners title to the property is presumed and cannot be
collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for
unlawful detainer. In this particular action where
petitioners alleged ownership cannot be established,
coupled with the presumption that respondents title to
the property is legal, then the lower courts are correct in
ruling that respondents are the ones entitled to
possession of the subject premises.21 (Citation omitted)
Given the foregoing, the petitioners attempt to remain in
possession by casting a cloud on the respondents title
cannot prosper.
Neither will the sheer lapse of time legitimize the
petitioners refusal to vacate the subject area or bar the
respondents from gaining possession thereof. As ruled in
Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association,
Inc.,22 laches does not operate to deprive the registered
owner of a parcel of land of his right to recover
possession thereof:
It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a
parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. In a
long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands
covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty
Corporation vs. Vallez, et al., we held that a claim of
acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land
involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of
the Civil Code, in relation to Act 496 (now, Section 47 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529).
xxxx
Petitioners would take exception from the above settled
rule by arguing that FETA as well as its
predecessor[-]in[-]interest, Don Dionisio M. Fabella, are
guilty of laches and should, therefore, be already
precluded from asserting their right as against them,
invoking, in this regard, the rulings of this Court to the
effect that while a registered land may not be acquired
by prescription, yet, by virtue of the registered owners
inaction and neglect, his right to recover the possession
thereof may have been converted into a stale demand.

While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners

posture, a closer look at our jurisprudence negates their
submission.
To start with, the lower court found that petitioners
possession of the subject lot was merely at the tolerance
of its former lawful owner. In this connection, Bishop vs.
Court of Appeals teaches that if the claimants
possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful
owner, the latters right to recover possession is never
barred by laches.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private
respondents have a right to eject any person illegally
occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible.
Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the
petitioners occupation of the property, and regardless of
the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time
as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by
laches.23 (Citations omitted)
It is, in fact, the petitioners who are guilty of laches.
Petitioners, who claimed that Maria fraudulently
registered the subject area inherited by their father, did
not lift a finger to question the validity of OCT No. 543,
which was issued in 1929. Petitioners waited for the
lapse of a substantial period of time and if not for the
respondents demands to vacate, they would not have
bothered to assert their fathers supposed successional
rights. The petitioners inaction is contrary to the posture
taken by a reasonably diligent person whose rights have
supposedly been trampled upon and the pretense of
ignorance does not provide justification or refuge. Maria
was able to register Lot No. 3517 in her name as early
as 1929 and respondents acquired title in April 5, 1968
and knowledge of these events is imputed to the
petitioners by the fact of registration.
In fine, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse and
set aside the findings and conclusions of the CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED and the Decision dated November 26, 2007
and Resolution dated April 28, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64775 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169380
FIORELLO
R.
vs.
ROBERTO ALFUERTO

November 26, 2012

JOSE, Petitioner,

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision 1 dated
March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 80166. The Court of Appeals decision reversed the
decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paraaque City, Branch 257, and of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 77, by
dismissing petitioner Fiorello R. Joses complaint for

ejectment against Roberto Alfuerto, Ernesto Bacay,

Iluminado Bacay, Manuel Bantaculo, Letty Barcelo, Jing
Bermejo, Milna Bermejo, Pablo Bermejo, Jhonny Borja,
Bernadette Buenafe, Alfredo Calagos, Rosauro Calagos,
Alex Chacon, Aida Consulta, Carmen Corpuz, Rodolfo
De Vera, Ana Dela Rosa, Rudy Ding, Jose Escasinas,
Gorgonio Espadero, Demetrio Estrera, Rogelio Estrera,
Eduardo Evardone, Antonio Gabaleo, Arsenia Garing,
Narcing Guarda, Nila Lebato, Andrade Ligaya, Helen
Lopez, Ramon Macairan, Domingo Nolasco, Jr., Florante
Nolasco, Regina Operario, Carding Orcullo, Felicisimo
Pacate, Conrado Pamindalan, Jun Paril, Rene Santos,
Dominador Selvelyejo, Rosario Ubaldo, Sergio Villar,
John Doe, Jane Doe and Unknown Occupants of
Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City (respondents), on the ground that the
petitioners cause of action was not for unlawful detainer
but for recovery of possession. The appellate court
affirmed this decision in its resolution of August 22,
2005.2
The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the
name of Rodolfo Chua Sing under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 52594,3 with an area of 1919 square meters,
located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Chua
Sing purchased the land in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua
Sing leased the property to the petitioner. Their contract
of lease was neither notarized nor registered with the
Paraaque City Registry of Deeds.4
The lease contract provided that:
That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and
renewable for the same period upon mutual agreement
of the parties to commence upon the total eviction of any
occupant or occupants. The LESSOR hereby transfers
all its rights and prerogative to evict said occupants in
favor of the LESSEE which shall be responsible for all
expenses that may be incurred without reimbursement
from the LESSOR. It is understood however that the
LESSOR is hereby waiving, in favor of the LESSEE any
and all damages that may be recovered from the
occupants.5 (Underscore ours)
Significantly, the respondents already occupied the
property even before the lease contract was executed.
On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the
petitioner signed the lease contract, the petitioner
demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the
property within 30 days and that they pay a monthly
rental of P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property.6
The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On
October 20, 1999, the petitioner filed an ejectment case
against the respondents before Branch 77 of the
Paraaque City MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
11344.7
In this complaint, no mention was made of any
proceedings before the barangay. Jose then brought the
dispute before the barangay for conciliation. 8 The
barangay issued a Certification to File Action on March
1, 2000.9 Jose was then able to file an amended
complaint, incorporating the proceedings before the

barangay before the summons and copies of the

complaint were served upon the named defendants.10
In the Amended Complaint11 dated March 17, 2000, the
petitioner claimed that as lessee of the subject property,
he had the right to eject the respondents who unlawfully
occupy the land. He alleged that:
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful
occupancy of the subject lot, have defiantly erected their
houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law
whatsoever, much less any building permit as
sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true,
lawful and registered owner, plaintiffs lessor.12
The petitioner also stated that despite his written
demand, the respondents failed to vacate the property
without legal justification. He prayed that the court order
the respondents; (1) to vacate the premises; (2) to pay
him not less than P41,000.00 a month from May 30,1999
until they vacate the premises; and (3) to pay him
attorneys fees of no less than P50,000.00, and the costs
of suit.13
In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out
that they have been in possession of the land long
before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991, and
that the lease contract between the petitioner and Chua
Sing does not affect their right to possess the land. The
respondents
also
presented
a
Deed
of
14
Assignment, dated February 13, 2000, issued by David
R. Dulfo in their favor. They argued that the MeTC had
no jurisdiction over the case as the issue deals with
ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of cause of action and for lack of
jurisdiction. They also filed a counterclaim for actual and
moral damages for the filing of a baseless and malicious
suit.
After the required position papers, affidavits and other
pieces of evidence were submitted, the MeTC resolved
the case in the petitioners favor. In its decision 15 of
January 27, 2003, the MeTC held that the respondents
had no right to possess the land and that their
occupation was merely by the owners tolerance. It
further noted that the respondents could no longer raise
the issue of ownership, as this issue had already been
settled: the respondents previously filed a case for the
annulment/cancellation of Chua Sings title before the
RTC, Branch 260, of Paraaque City, which ruled that
the registered owners title was genuine and valid.
Moreover, the MeTC held that it is not divested of
jurisdiction over the case because of the respondents
assertion of ownership of the property. On these
premises, the MeTC ordered the respondents to vacate
the premises and to remove all structures introduced on
the land; to each pay P500.00 per month from the date
of filing of this case until they vacate the premises; and
to pay Jose, jointly and severally, the costs of suit and
P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the
issue, among others, that no legal basis exists for the
petitioners claim that their occupation was by tolerance,
"where the possession of the defendants was illegal at

the inception as alleged in the complaint, there can be

no tolerance."16
The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision of January 27,
2003. It issued its decision17 on October 8, 2003,
reiterating the MeTCs ruling that a case for ejectment
was proper. The petitioner, as lessee, had the right to file
the ejectment complaint; the respondents occupied the
land by mere tolerance and their possession became
unlawful upon the petitioners demand to vacate on April
28, 1999. The RTC, moreover, noted that the complaint
for ejectment was filed on October 20, 1999, or within
one year after the unlawful deprivation took place. It
cited Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar, etc., et al. 18 and
Yu v. Lara, et al.19 to support its ruling that a case for
unlawful detainer was appropriate.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE BASED ON
RESPONDENTS MATERIAL CHANGE OF THEORY
WHICH IS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH
THEIR
DEFENSES
INVOKED
BEFORE
THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
III
WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY
DECIDE THIS CASE ON THE MERITS TO AVOID
CIRCUITOUS PROCEDURE IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE.24
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.

On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the

RTC and MeTC decisions.20 It ruled that the
respondents possession of the land was not by the
petitioner or his lessors tolerance. It defined tolerance
not merely as the silence or inaction of a lawful
possessor when another occupies his land; tolerance
entailed permission from the owner by reason of
familiarity or neighborliness. The petitioner, however,
alleged that the respondents unlawfully entered the
property; thus, tolerance (or authorized entry into the
property) was not alleged and there could be no case for
unlawful detainer. The respondents allegation that they
had been in possession of the land before the
petitioners lessor had acquired it in 1991 supports this
finding. Having been in possession of the land for more
than a year, the respondents should not be evicted
through an ejectment case.
The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases
are summary proceedings where the only issue to be
resolved is who has a better right to the physical
possession of a property. The petitioners claim, on the
other hand, is based on an accion publiciana: he asserts
his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of lease
he contracted after the respondents had occupied the
land. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
decision dated October 8, 2003 of the RTC, Branch 257,
Paraaque City, in Civil Case No. 03-0127, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the amended
complaint for ejectment is DISMISSED.21
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 22 which
the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution 23 of August
22, 2005. In the present appeal, the petitioner raises
before us the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION
OF THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT IS NOT FOR
UNLAWFUL DETAINER BUT FOR RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION AND THEREFORE DISMISSIBLE
II

Unlawful detainer is not the proper

remedy for the present case.
The key issue in this case is whether an action for
unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery
of possession of real property. This action may be filed
by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the possession
of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession
was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express
or implied contract between them. However, the
defendants possession became illegal when the plaintiff
demanded that the defendant vacate the subject
property due to the expiration or termination of the right
to possess under the contract, and the defendant
refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful
detainer must be instituted one year from the unlawful
withholding of possession.25
The allegations in the complaint determine both the
nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court. The
complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting
unlawful detainer. In the absence of these allegations of
facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper
remedy and the municipal trial court or the MeTC does
not have jurisdiction over the case.26
In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the
following allegations in support of his unlawful detainer
complaint:
3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy
Chuasing, that parcel of lot owned and registered in the
lessors name, covering the area occupied by the
defendants.
xxxx
6. Plaintiffs lessor had acquired the subject property as
early as 1991 through sale, thereafter the aforesaid

Transfer Certificate of Title was subsequently registered

under his name.
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful
occupancy of the subject lot, have defiantly erected their
houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law
whatsoever, much less any building permit as
sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true,
lawful and registered owner, plaintiffs lessor.
8. By reason of defendants continued unlawful
occupancy of the subject premises, plaintiff referred the
matter to his lawyer who immediately sent a formal
demand upon each of the defendants to vacate the
premises. Copies of the demand letter dated 28 April
1999 are xxx hereto attached as annexes "C" to "QQ."
9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and
refused and continues to fail and refuse to vacate the
premises without valid or legal justification.27 (emphasis
ours)
The petitioners allegations in the amended complaint
run counter to the requirements for unlawful detainer. In
an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal and his possession was
permitted by the owner through an express or implied
contract.
In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the
respondents occupancy was unlawful from the start and
was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an unlawful
detainer case, the defendants possession becomes
illegal only upon the plaintiffs demand for the defendant
to vacate the property and the defendants subsequent
refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8 characterizes
the defendants occupancy as unlawful even before the
formal demand letters were written by the petitioners
counsel. Under these allegations, the unlawful
withholding of possession should not be based on the
date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged
unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified
date.
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly
alleged that the respondents occupied the premises by
mere tolerance of the owner. No allegation in the
complaint nor any supporting evidence on record,
however, shows when the respondents entered the
property or who had granted them permission to enter.
Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim
regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.
In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., 28 the Court cited Prof.
Arturo M. Tolentinos definition and characterizes
"tolerance" in the following manner:
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely
tolerated are "those which by reason of neighborliness or
familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or
another person to do on the property; they are generally
those particular services or benefits which ones property
can give to another without material injury or prejudice to
the owner, who permits them out of friendship or
courtesy." He adds that: "they are acts of little

disturbances which a person, in the interest of

neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do
on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a
horse therein, or getting some water from a well." And,
Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a
long time, no right will be acquired by prescription."
Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes:
"There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which
are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge
and silence on the part of the possessor can be
considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is
considered as an authorization, permission or license,
acts of possession are realized or performed. The
question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence
of the permission. [citations omitted; italics supplied]
The Court has consistently adopted this position:
tolerance or permission must have been present at the
beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not
be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.29
It is not the first time that this Court adjudged
contradictory statements in a complaint for unlawful
detainer as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of
Urban,30 the claim that the defendants possession was
merely tolerated was contradicted by the complainants
allegation that the entry to the subject property was
unlawful from the very beginning. The Court then ruled
that the unlawful detainer action should fail.
The contradictory statements in the complaint are further
deemed suspicious when a complaint is silent regarding
the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged
tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty Corporation v. Cruz, 31 the
complaint simply stated that: "(1) defendant immediately
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an
action merely tolerated by the plaintiff; and (2) the
respondents allegedly illegal occupation of the premises
was by mere tolerance." The Court expressed its qualms
over these averments of fact as they did not contain
anything substantiating the claim that the plaintiff
tolerated or permitted the occupation of the property by
the defendant:
These allegations contradict, rather than support,
plaintiffs theory that its cause of action is for unlawful
detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that
defendants occupation of the property was unlawful at
its inception. Second, they counter the essential
requirement in unlawful detainer cases that plaintiffs
supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present
right from the start of a possession that is later sought to
be recovered.
As the bare allegation of plaintiffs tolerance of
defendants occupation of the premises has not been
proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from
the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the
ejectment case should have been for forcible entry an
action that had already prescribed, however, when the
Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive
period of one year for forcible entry cases is reckoned
from the date of defendants actual entry into the land,
which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32

Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 33 the Court

considered the owners lack of knowledge of the
defendants entry of the land to be inconsistent with the
allegation that there had been tolerance.
In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required
allegations regarding the grant of permission, but proof
as well. It noted that the plaintiffs alleged the existence
of tolerance, but ordered the dismissal of the unlawful
detainer case because the evidence was "totally wanting
as to when and under what circumstances xxx the
alleged tolerance came about." It stated that:
Judging from the respondents Answer, the petitioners
were never at all in physical possession of the premises
from the time he started occupying it and continuously
up to the present. For sure, the petitioners merely
derived their alleged prior physical possession only on
the basis of their Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT),
arguing that the issuance of said title presupposes their
having been in possession of the property at one time or
another.35
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases
cannot simply anchor their claims on the validity of the
owners title. Possession de facto must also be proved.
As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et
al.,36 we already ruled that a complaint which fails to
positively aver any overt act on the plaintiffs part
indicative of permission to occupy the land, or any
showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for
unlawful detainer. As the Court then explained, a case
for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must definitely
establish its existence from the start of possession;
otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask itself as an
action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed
beyond the required one-year prescription period from
the time of forcible entry:
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the
word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed
that such tolerance must be present right from the start
of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a
cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a
dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible
entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy
redress in the inferior court provided for in the
rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to
lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be
speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived
his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a
forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after
the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well
be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe.
No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring
suit in the inferior court upon plea of tolerance to
prevent prescription to set in and summarily throw
him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable.
Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that
proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the

suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the

action.37 (italics supplied)
Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us
to deprive the respondents of possession over a
property that they have held for at least eight years
before the case was filed in 1999, by means of a
summary proceeding, simply because the petitioner
used the word "tolerance" without sufficient allegations
or evidence to support it.
There
was
no
change
respondents
theory
the
appeal
that
would
to
a
deprivation
of
the
right to due process.

in

the
during
amount
petitioners

The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never

questioned before the MeTC the fact that their
occupancy was by tolerance. The only issues the
respondents allegedly raised were: (1) the title to the
property is spurious; (2) the petitioners predecessor is
not the true owner of the property in question; (3) the
petitioners lease contract was not legally enforceable;
(4) the petitioner was not the real party-in-interest; (5)
the petitioners predecessor never had prior physical
possession of the property; and (6) the respondents
right of possession was based on the "Deed of
Assignment of Real Property" executed by Dulfo. The
respondents raised the issue of tolerance merely on
appeal before the RTC. They argue that this constitutes
a change of theory, which is disallowed on appeal.38
It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory
of the case or his cause of action on appeal. Points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court will not be considered by the
reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the answer
cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of
the issue in the case. To do so would be unfair to the
adverse party, who had no opportunity to present
evidence in connection with the new theory; this would
offend the basic rules of due process and fair play.39
While this Court has frowned upon changes of theory on
appeal, this rule is not applicable to the present case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the action due the
petitioners failure to allege and prove the essential
requirements of an unlawful detainer case. In Serdoncillo
v. Spouses Benolirao,40 we held that:
In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is
necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such
a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a
remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
(emphasis ours; italics supplied)

Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents,

the petitioner was required to properly allege and prove
when the respondents entered the property and that it
was the petitioner or his predecessors, not any other
persons, who granted the respondents permission to
enter and occupy the property. Furthermore, it was not
the respondents defense that proved fatal to the case
but the petitioners contradictory statements in his
amended complaint which he even reiterated in his other
pleadings.41
Although the respondents did not use the word
"tolerance" before the MeTC, they have always
questioned the existence of the petitioners tolerance. In
their Answer to Amended Complaint, the respondents
negated the possibility of their possession of the
property under the petitioner and his lessors tolerance
when the respondents alleged to have occupied the
premises even before the lessor acquired the property in
1991. They said as much in their Position Paper:
RODOLFO CHUA SING never had actual physical
possession of his supposed property, as when he
became an owner of the 1,919 square meters property
described in TCT No. 52594, the property had already
been occupied by herein DEFENDANTS since late
1970. Therefore, DEFENDANTS were already
occupants/possessors of the property from where they
are being ejected by FIORELLO JOSE, a supposed
LESSEE of a property with a dubious title. The main
thing to be proven in the case at bar is prior possession
and that the same was lost through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court
to restore possession regardless of title or even
ownership xxx. In the case at bar, neither RODOLFO
CHUA SING nor herein PLAINTIFF ever had any actual
physical
possession
of
the
property
where
DEFENDANTS have already possessed for more than
ten (10) years in 1991 when RODOLFO CHUA SING got
his fake title to the property.42 (citation omitted)
In addition, whether or not it was credible, the
respondents claim that their possession was based on
the Deed of Assignment executed by Dulfo, in behalf of
the estate of Domingo de Ocampo, shows that they
considered the petitioner and his lessor as strangers to
any of their transactions on the property, and could not
have stayed there upon the latters permission.
We note that even after the issue of tolerance had been
directly raised by the respondents before the RTC, the
petitioner still failed to address it before the RTC, the
Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court.43 At best, he
belatedly states for the first time in his
Memorandum44 before this Court that his lessor had
tolerated the respondents occupancy of the lot, without
addressing the respondents allegation that they had
occupied the lot in 1970, before the petitioners lessor
became the owner of the property in 1991, and without
providing any other details. His pleadings continued to
insist on the existence of tolerance without providing the
factual basis for this conclusion. Thus, we cannot
declare that the Court of Appeals had in anyway
deprived the petitioner of due process or had unfairly

treated him when it resolved the case based on the

issue of tolerance.
The
Court
cannot
treat
case
as
an
accion
accion reivindicatoria.

an
ejectment
publiciana
or

The petitioner argues that assuming this case should

have been filed as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria, this Court should still resolve the case, as
requiring him to properly refile the case serves no other
ends than to comply with technicalities.45
The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented
before the MeTC in an ejectment case and decide it as
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. These
cases are not interchangeable and their differences
constitute far more than mere technicalities.
In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action
for forcible entry cannot be treated as an accion
publiciana and summarized the reasons therefor. We
find these same reasons also applicable to an unlawful
detainer case which bears the same relevant
characteristics:
On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry
can be treated as accion publiciana, we rule in the
negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion
publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed within one
year from the unlawful dispossession of the real
property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after the
unlawful dispossession of the real property. Second,
forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to
the physical possession of the real property; in accion
publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better right
to possession over the real property. Third, an action for
forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court and is a
summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary
action in the RTC. [italics supplied]
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An
ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior court
to recover physical possession only or possession de
facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and
forcible entry cases are not processes to determine
actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the
issue of ownership is made only to resolve the issue of
possession, and is therefore inconclusive.47Because
they only resolve issues of possession de facto,
ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion
publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and accion
reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are
plenary actions.48The purpose of allowing actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in
summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful,
speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged
illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking and
continuing his possession during the long period it would
take to properly resolve the issue of possession de jure
or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of
peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party
illegally deprived of possession might take the law in his
hands and seize the property by force and violence. 49 An

ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown

trial for the purpose of determining rights of possession
or ownership. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva, 50 the Court in
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals 51 describes in detail how
these two remedies should be used:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and
detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person
who in fact has actual possession; and in case of
controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the
status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to
invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction
upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that
the person who has first acquired possession should
remain in possession pending the decision; and the
parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a
petty warfare over the possession of the property which
is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly
dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social
order.1wphi1Therefore, where a person supposes
himself to be the owner of a piece of property and
desires to vindicate his ownership against the party
actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to
institute an action to this end in a court of competent
jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by invading the
property and excluding the actual possessor, to place

upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try

the property right. [italics supplied]
Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later
consider them as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties to simply file
ejectment cases instead of plenary actions. Courts
would then decide in summary proceedings cases which
the rules intend to be resolved through full-blown trials.
Because these "summary" proceedings will have to
tackle complicated issues requiring extensive proof, they
would no longer be expeditious and would no longer
serve the purpose for which they were created. Indeed,
we cannot see how the resulting congestion of cases,
the hastily and incorrectly decided cases, and the utter
lack of system would assist the courts in protecting and
preserving property rights.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the
Court of Appeals' decision dated March 14, 2005 and
resolution dated August 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
80116.
SO ORDERED.