EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8936

October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffsappellants,

vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining
lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone
wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the p
laintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot.
After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of
October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be
registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under
the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in
the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now
occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the
registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for
under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition
of the defendant also included said wall.

Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the
plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the
certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said
parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant,
denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the
petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make
any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the
name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of
each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by
it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action
for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding
and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did
not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the
plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on
which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been
theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct
one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact,
belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory
should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him,
he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the
plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years
before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by
simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having
secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged
to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land
court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the
same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative,

then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to
land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the
owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility
of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for
the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial
(Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all
the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the
world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey
Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep.,
31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219
U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences
than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the
government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists
no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest.
The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration.
The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties.
To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and
they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again
cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the
very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens
system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does
not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple
titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates
in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the
evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.
The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter
be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished,
except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all

security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be

altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in acollateral proceeding and
not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed
by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing
for the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no
remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under
conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates
who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name
of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the
registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over
the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world
are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever
barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This,
we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the
certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other
exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once
registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and
notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not
be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one
can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two
different persons, has been presented to the courts in other
jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been
adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision.
In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent
discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The
general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised
in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193;

Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48;
Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance
Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very
clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to
written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title
of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the
latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the
"Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the
excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page
99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two
certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date
prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate
is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest;
and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the
holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person
who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.
While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the
issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered
owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that
where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the
holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration)
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name
in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general
description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of
registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest.

It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall
not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not
even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of
registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a
direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set
aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a
subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the
law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title
in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs
the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the
ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil
Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property
had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person
acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course,
presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title
to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of
registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of
the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though
we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other
express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting
a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the
purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion
and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date
shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful
argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et
al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of
the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he,
Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the
parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to
appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a

default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the

decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and
can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity
of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To
decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are
above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens
system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in
this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those
dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then
nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred
thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered
land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all.
Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had
secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would
be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are
bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done
thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of
the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages,
taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the
respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was
the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was
not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration
in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for
the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in
1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration,
and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the
appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set
up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a
judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting
that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his
failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the
appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against
impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why

the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants

than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land
Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of
the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be
applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates?
Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is
discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser."
The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or
interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor
had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be
the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast
some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the
vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the
vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the
vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third
parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent
purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in
land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to
enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the
provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land,
including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the
same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that
phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of
their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of
Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him
to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the
wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in
the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections?
Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the
same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent
purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers,
should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These

questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving

meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.

absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless

litigation.

May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original
certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the
rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs,
assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public
registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the
world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains.
All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must
be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged
with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established
that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support
(Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on
Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).

While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original

deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule
requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil
Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .
1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to
be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the
statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser
of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its
existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from
such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be
relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona
fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona
fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the
mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what
the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the
rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of
the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do
not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory,
notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of
ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is

constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289;
Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill.,
500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509;
Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined
every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is
irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record
and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record
would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the
law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any
more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the
facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be

In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of

land from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent
purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been
registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion
that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such
purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser
should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the
first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser
of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original
certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent

purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original

certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the
idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an
innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a
name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to
minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We
believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should
be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully
included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once
brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate
and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being
the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part
of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not.
Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under
the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had
included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question.
Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip?
Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly
not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the
possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the
rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the
question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that
these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than
the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser
from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be
required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like
the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who
has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original
certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their
title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who
had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land
included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts
contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is
charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any,

resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first
certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the
difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system
and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to
decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon
the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view,
without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede
all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in
dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered
and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be
examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to
the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have
acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who
acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the
law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower
court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to
the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised
by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the
premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land
in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of
the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
G.R. No. 80687 April 10, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE MARIANO M. UMALI, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 23,
Trece Martires City, REMEDIOS MICLAT, JUAN C. PULIDO,

ROSALINA NAVAL, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF

CAVITE, respondents.

the joint affidavit dated August 9, 1971, on which Deed No. V-10910
(Sale Certificate No. 1280) was based. 8

The petitioner seeks reversion of a parcel of land on the ground that the
original sale thereof from the government was tainted with fraud
because based on a forgery and therefore void ab initio. The present
holders of the property claiming to be innocent purchasers for value and
not privy to the alleged forgery, contend that the action cannot lie
against them.

In their answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any participation in the
joint affidavit and said they had all acquired the property in good faith
and for value. By way of affirmative defenses, they invoked estoppel,
laches, prescription and res judicata. 9 For her part, Miclat moved to
dismiss the complaint, contending that the government had no cause of
action against her because there was no allegation that she had violated
the plaintiff's right, that the government was not the real party-ininterest because the subject land was already covered by the Torrens
system, and that in any event the action was barred by prescription or
laches. 10

The land in question is situated in Tanza, Cavite, and consists of 78,865

square meters. 1 It was originally purchased on installment from the
government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedly
transferred her rights thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and
Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in 1922. 2 Tomasa and Julio assigned their
shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio. 3 In 1971 these three assignees
purportedly signed a joint affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of
Lands to support their claim that they were entitled to the issuance of a
certificate of title over the said land on which they said they had already
made full payment. 4 On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources executed Deed No. V-10910 (Sale
Certificate No. 1280) on September 10, 1971, in favor of the said
affiants. 5 Subsequently, on October 13, 1971, TCT No. 55044 (replacing
Bobadilla's OCT No. 180) was issued by the register of deeds of Cavite in
favor of Maria Cenizal, Gregorio Cenizal, and (in lieu of Martina Cenizal)
Rosalina Naval, Luz Naval, and Enrique Naval. 6
When the complaint for reversion was filed on October 10, 1985, the
registered owners of the land, following several transfers, were
Remedios Miclat under TCT No. 80392, Juan C. Pulido under TCT No.
80393, and Rosalina, Luz and Enrique Naval under TCT No.
80394. 7 They were named as defendants and asked to return the
property to the State on the aforestated grounds of forgery and fraud.
The plaintiff claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having died on February 25,
1943, and Maria Cenizal on January 8, 1959, they could not have signed

The respondent court, in its order dated October 2, 1987, granted the
motion. 11 The petitioner, contesting this order, now insists that it has a
valid cause of action and that it is not barred by either prescription
or res judicata.
The Court will observe at the outset that the joint affidavit is indeed a
forgery. Apart from the fact that two of the supposed affiants were
already dead at the time they were supposed to have signed the sworn
statement, even the most cursory examination of the document will
show that the three signatures affixed thereto were written by one and
the same hand. 12 There is no doubt about it. It is indeed difficult to
understand how such an obvious forgery could have deceived the
people in the Bureau of Lands who processed the papers of this case
and made possible the fraudulent transfer of the land.
But given such deception, would the sale itself be considered null and
void from the start, as the petitioner insists, so as to make all titles
derived therefrom also ineffectual ab initio?
We agree with the contention that there is no allegation in the
complaint 13 filed by the petitioner that any one of the defendants was
privy to the forged joint affidavit or that they had acquired the subject

land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees for value was
never questioned in that pleading. Not having been disproved, that
status now accords to them the protection of the Torrens System and
renders the titles obtained by them thereunder indefeasible and
conclusive. The rule will not change despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044.
Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided:
Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered
land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the
same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate.
The rulings on this provision are indeed as numerous as they are
consistent:
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 (then Sec. 39 of the Land Reg. Act),
every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered
land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate
and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated
in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever character,
except those mentioned by law as existing against the land prior to the
issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted
thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including
the government. 14
xxx xxx xxx
A holder in bad faith is not entitled to the protection of Sec. 39 of the
Land Registration Act. 15
xxx xxx xxx

The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet

title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the
title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the
owner might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. 16
The decision in Piero v. Director of Lands 17 is not applicable to the
present proceeding because the lands involved in that case had not yet
passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. They were still
held by the Pineros. The action for reversion was filed by the
government against them as the original transferees of the properties in
question. They were the direct grantees of the free patents issued by
the government pursuant to which the corresponding certificates of title
were issued under the Torrens system. The fraud alleged by the
government as a ground for the reversion sought was imputable directly
to the Pineros, who could not plead the status of innocent purchasers for
value.
The difference between them and the private respondents is that the
latter acquired the land in question not by direct grant but in fact after
several transfers following the original sale thereof to Bobadilla in 1910.
The presumption is that they are innocent transferees for value in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. The petitioner contends that it was
Pedro Miclat who caused the falsification of the joint affidavit, but that is
a bare and hardly persuasive allegation, and indeed, even if true, would
still not prove any collusion between him and the private respondents.
The mere fact that Remedios Miclat was the daughter and heiress of
Miclat, without more, would not necessarily visit upon her the alleged
sins of her father.
The Solicitor General also argues that Remedios is an extension of the
juridical personality of her father and so cannot claim to be an innocent
purchaser for value because she is charged with knowledge of her

father's deceit. Such conclusion has no basis in fact or law. Moreover,

there is evidence that Remedios did not merely inherit the land but
actually purchased it for valuable consideration and without knowledge
of its original defect. The agreement to subdivide, 18 which she
presented to show that she had acquired the land for valuable
confederation, is more acceptable than the conjectures of the petitioner.
It is also consonant with the presumption of good faith.
The land being now registered under the Torrens system in the names of
the private respondents, the government has no more control or
jurisdiction over it. It is no longer part of the public domain or, as the
Solicitor General contends as if it made any difference of the Friar
Lands. The subject property ceased to be public land when OCT No. 180
was issued to Florentina Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest from the date
it was sold to the Cenizals in 1971 upon full payment of the purchase
price. As private registered land, it is governed by the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, now denominated the Property Registration
Decree, which applies even to the government.
The pertinent provision of the Land Registration Act was Section 122,
which read as follows:
Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the Government of the United States or to
the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated,
granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Act and shall become registered
lands. 19
This should be related to Section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, providing
thus:
Sec. 12. . . . upon the payment of the final installment
together with all accrued interest, the Government will
convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held

by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall

be issued and become effective in the manner provided in
section one hundred and twenty-two (Sec. 122) of the
Land Registration Act.
The petitioner claims that it is not barred by the statute of limitations
because the original transfer of the land was null and void ab initio and
did not give rise to any legal right. The land therefore continued to be
part of the public domain and the action for this reversion could be filed
at any time. The answer to that is the statement made by the Court in
Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan v. Martinez 20 that "even if
respondent Tagwalan eventually is proven to have procured the patent
and the original certificate of title by means of fraud, the land would not
revert back to the State," precisely because it has become private land.
Moreover, the petitioner errs in arguing that the original transfer was
null and void ab initio, for the fact is that it is not so. It was only
voidable. The land remained private as long as the title thereto had not
been voided, but it is too late to do that now. As the Court has held
in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals. 21
A certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and
void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in
misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain,
although it is not. In such case the nullity arises, not from
the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Inasmuch as
the land involved in the present case does not belong to
such category, OCT No. 282-A would be merely voidable
or reviewable (Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbengco,
110 Phil. 113): (1) upon proof of actual fraud; (2) although
valid and effective, until annulled or reviewed in a direct
proceeding therefor (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590),
not collaterally (Sorongon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil. 259,
262; Director of Lands vs. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184;
Henderson vs. Garrido, 90 Phil. 624,630; Samonte vs.
Sambilon, 107 Phil. 198,200); (3) within the statutory

period therefor (Sec. 38, Act 496; Velasco vs. Gochuico 33

Phil. 363; Delos Reyes vs. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420; Snyder vs.
Provincial Fiscal, 42 Phil. 761, 764; Reyes vs. Borbon, 50
Phil. 791; Clemente vs. Lukban, 53 Phil. 931; Sugayan vs.
Solis, 56 Phil. 276, 279; Heirs of Lichauco vs. Director of
Lands, 70 Phil. 69); (4) after which, the title would be
conclusive against the whole world, including the
Government (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 596;
Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883; J. M. Tuason vs.
Santiago, 99 Phil. 615).
And as we declared in Municipality of Hagonoy vs. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources: 22
. . . Once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of
public domain and becomes private property over which
the director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A
public land patent, when registered in the corresponding
Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens Title, and
becomes as indefeasible as Torrens Title upon the
expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance
thereof. Said title is, like one issued pursuant to a judicial
decree, subject to review within one (1) year from the
date of the issuance of the patent. Beyond said period,
the action for the annulment of the certificate of title
issued upon the land grant can no longer be entertained.
(Emphasis supplied).
It is worth observing here that in two earlier cases, the private
respondents were challenged by the heirs of Matilde Cenizal Arguson
but both were dismissed and the titles of the registered owners were
confirmed by the trial court. 23 This decision was later sustained by this
Court. 24 While this is not to say that the present petition is barred
by res judicata, as the government was not a party in these cases, it
does suggest that the issue it wants to rake up now has long been

settled. It should not be the subject of further judicial inquiry, especially

at this late hour. Litigation must stop at some point instead of dragging
on interminably.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed
to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles
and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the
assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the
risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This
would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were
permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous
and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive if not
even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the
Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued
thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. As in
this case.
We find that the private respondents are transferees in good faith and
for value of the subject property and that the original acquisition
thereof, although fraudulent, did not affect their own titles. These are
valid against the whole world, including the government.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 94114

June 19, 1991

FELICISIMA PINO, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, DEMETRIA GAFFUD, ROMUALDO GAFFUD,

ADOLFO GAFFUD & RAYMUNDO GAFFUD, respondents.

THAT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION PETITION

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21457

which affirmed in toto, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Echague, Isabela, Branch 24 in Civil Case No. 24-0190, the dispositive
portion of which latter decision reads:

I
WHEN IT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER IS NOT
AN INNOCENT PURCHASER OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY;
II
WHEN IT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PRESCRIPTION WOULD
NOT LIE TO BAR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' ACTION; and
III
WHEN IT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS VALID THE TRANSFER OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FROM THE ORIGINAL REGISTERED
OWNERS TO RAFAELA DONATO;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale made by Rafaela Donato
Vda. de Gaffud in favor of the defendant on June 10, 1970 over
Lot 6-B of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-68395 being a portion of
Lot 6 of the Echague Cadastre LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1063,
containing an area of 11,095 square meters, more or less, null
and void insofar as the shares of Cicero Gaffud and Raymundo
Gaffud are concerned, which is one-half-thereof, or approximately
5,547.5 square meters, more or less;
2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 49380 in the name of the
defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to reconvey one-half of the property
subject of this proceeding to the plaintiffs within ten (10) days
from finality of this Decision, failing which the same shall be done
at the cost of the defendant by the Clerk of Court and such act,
when so done, shall have like effect as if done by her;
4. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P5,000.00 by way
of attorney's fees.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
is now being assailed in the instant petition for certiorari upon the
ground

The pertinent background facts as found by the trial court and adopted
by the respondent Court of Appeals in its now assailed decision are the
following:
The property subject of the controversy is a parcel of land situated in
Echague, Isabela, identified as Lot 6-B of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd68395, being a portion of Lot 6 containing an area of 11,095 square
meters, more or less.
Lot 6 has an area of 12,799 square meters, more or less. It was acquired
in 1924 by the spouses Juan Gaffud and Rafaela Donato. Juan Gaffud
died in 1936. On January 11, 1938, Lot 6 was originally registered in the
Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Isabela, under
Original Certificate of Title No. 4340 pursuant to Decree No. 650247
issued under L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 1063 in the names of Rafaela
Donato, Raymundo Gaffud and Cicero Gaffud (Raymundo and Cicero are
the sons of the spouses) as co-owners thereof in fee simple subject to
such of the incumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said act and to
Section 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court. The said lot was sold to Rafaela
Donato through a Deed of Transfer which cancelled O.C.T. No. 4340 and
in lieu thereof T.C.T. No. T-30407 was issued in the name of Rafaela
Donato.
On February 25, 1967, Rafaela Donato sold a portion of said Lot 6,
consisting of 1,704 sq. m., more or less in favor of Fortunato Pascua. The
aforesaid sale caused the subdivision of the said Lot 6 into Lot 6-A

containing an area of 1,704 sq. m., more or less, and Lot 6-B containing
an area of 11,095 sq. m., more or less, under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd68395.
Upon registration of said sale in favor of Fortunato Pascua, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-30407 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32683 was issued in the name of
Rafaela Donato on March 2, 1967 covering the land designated as Lot 6B of the subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-68395, being a portion of Lot 6 of the
Echague Cadastre, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1063, containing an area of 11,095
sq.m., more or less, which is the subject land. (RTC Decision dated
November 15, 1988, p. 310 Record).
On June 10, 1970 Rafaela Donato sold to petitioner Felicisima Pino said
Lot 6-B in consideration of P10,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale she executed in favor of petitioner Felicisima Pino which
was notarized by her lawyer, Atty. Concepcion Tagudin (Exh. 1).
Rafaela Donato undertook to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the
Register of Deeds of Isabela and on July 13, 1970 the sale was inscribed
therein under Entry No. 9286 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T49380 was issued in the name of Felicisima Pino.
On September 30, 1980, Cicero Gaffud died survived by his wife
Demetria Gaffud and sons Romualdo Gaffud and Adolfo Gaffud who are
the private respondents herein.
On March 9, 1982, private respondents filed a complaint for nullity of
sale and reconveyance against petitioner Felicisima Pino. Incidentally,
the sale of the other portion (Lot A) of the same lot to Fortunato Pascua
is not assailed by private respondents.
During the pendency of the case before the trial court, Rafaela Donato
(who was not a party to the case) died on November her 26, 1982.
On November 5, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision (the
dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted in this decision) which
was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appellant in its now assailed
decision, the pertinent portion of which reads:

The defense of an innocent purchaser for value would be of no

help to appellant in the absence of the document on extrajudicial
partition indicating that the conjugal property has been
adjudicated to Rafaela Donato Vda. de Gaffud and which would
be the source of her authority in transferring the subject property
to defendant. The sensible thing to do by any prudent person is
to examine not only the certificate of title of said property but
also all the factual circumstances necessary for him to determine
if there are any flaw in vendor's capacity to transfer the land.
Nor would prescription of action lie. An ordinary action for
reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in four (4) years (Lanera
v. Lopos, 106 Phil. 70). Appellant was a party to the alleged
fraudulent transfer of the subject property, consequently,
appellees have four (4) years to file an action to annul the deed
of sale from the discovery of the fraudulent act. In the case at
bar, appellees learned about the fraud on July 6, 1981 when they
received a letter from the appellant (Exhibit D). The filing,
therefore, of the complaint on March 9, 1982 (p. 1. Rec.) was
within the prescriptive period. (pp. 62-63, Rollo)
In elevating the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals to Us for
review petitioner prays that the appealed decision be reversed and
another one entered declaring as valid (1) the sale of the subject
property executed on June 10, 1970 in favor of petitioner Felicisima Pino
by Rafaela Donato Vda. de Gaffud and (2) the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-49380 issued in the name of petitioner by the Register of Deeds of
Isabela on July 13, 1970 upon the grounds
(a) that private respondents has (sic) no cause of action against
petitioner because she is an innocent purchaser for value of the
subject property;
(b) that the action of private respondents was already barred by
prescription when it was filed; and
(c) that the transfer of the subject property from the original
registered owners to Rafaela Donato was valid. (pp. 61-62, Rollo)

The rule applicable to this controversy is well-settled. Where the

certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the
vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate
of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, said
vendee is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate. The rationale for the rule is stated thus:
The main purpose of the Torrens' System is to avoid possible
conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the
face of a Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need
of inquiring further, except when the party concerned had actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. (Pascua v.
Capuyoc, 77 SCRA 78) Thus, where innocent third persons relying
on the correctness of the certificate thus issued, acquire tights
over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights.
(Director of Land v. Abache, et al., 73 Phil. 606)
In the case at bar, the evidence on record discloses that when petitioner
purchased the subject property on June 10, 1970, the title thereto (TCT
No. T-32683) was in the name of her vendor Rafaela Donato alone. The
said TCT No. T-32683 was shown to petitioner which shows on its face
the following:
is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act in the name of
RAFAELA DONATO, Filipino, of legal age, widow and with
residence and postal address at Centro, Echague, Isabela,
Philippines as owner thereof in fee simple, subject to such of the
encumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said Act as may be
subsisting, and to Section 4, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court. (Ex.
A, p. 169, Record)
Petitioner was advised by her lawyers that she could proceed to buy the
property because the same was registered in the name of the vendor.
Thus, on pp. 13 & 14 of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the
hearing of December 12, 1986, petitioner testified as follows:

Atty. Mallabo:
Q Before you brought this property madam witness, were you
shown a copy of the title of Rafaela Donato vda. de Gaffud on the
property?
A Yes, sir, she showed me the title. And I saw that the title was in
her name.
Q When the offer was made to you and the title was shown to
you, do you remember if you have done anything?
A Yes, sir, before I bought the property, I showed the documents
she bought to me to our lawyer, Custodia Villalva and Concepcion
Tagudin.
Q Why did you show them the title Madam witness?
A To be sure that the title does not have any encumbrance and
because I do not know anything about legal matters.
Q What did they advise you?
A Yes, Okey, I can proceed in buying the property, the title was
registered in her name, it was her personal property. (pp. 1516, Rollo)
In the case of Maguiling v. Umadhay, (33 SCRA 99, 103) this Court held:
However, while the Umadhay spouses cannot rely on the title,
the same not being in the name of their grantor, respondent
Crisanta S. Gumban stands on a different footing altogether. At
the time she purchased the land the title thereto was already in
the name of her vendors (T.C.T, 15522). She had the right to rely
on what appeared on the face of said title. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that she knew of any unregistered claims to or
equities in the land pertaining to other persons, such as that of
herein petitioner, or of any other circumstances which should put
her on guard and cause her to inquire behind the certificate.

According to the Court of Appeals she took all the necessary

precautions to ascertain the true ownership of the property,
having engaged the services of a lawyer for the specific purpose
and, it was only after said counsel had assured her that
everything was in order did she make the final arrangements to
purchase the property. The appellate court's conclusion that
respondent Crisanta S. Gumban was a purchaser in good faith
and for value is correct, and the title she has thereof acquired is
good and indefeasible.
Petitioner paid the sum of P10,000,00 in consideration of the sale which
is fair and reasonable considering that in 1967 Fortunato Pascua paid
the sum of P390.00 for the portion of the land consisting of 1,704 square
meters. (Exhs. 1 and 5)
The court a quo, however, ruled and this was sustained by respondent
Court of Appeals that petitioner was not an innocent purchaser.
The defense of an innocent purchaser for value could be of no
help to appellant in the absence of the document on extrajudicial partition indicating that the conjugal property has been
adjudicated to Rafaela Donato Vda. de Gaffud and which would
be the source of her authority in transferring the subject property
to defendant. The sensible thing to do by any prudent person is
to examine not only the certificate of title of said property but
also all the factual circumstances necessary for him to determine
if there are any flaws in vendor's capacity to transfer the land. (p.
10, Rollo)
We do not find any evidence in the record that would sustain such a
finding. The extra-judicial partition adverted to in said ruling was
executed by the heirs of Juan Gaffud prior to, and as the basis for, the
issuance of the Original Certificate of Title No. 4340 in the names of the
heirs of Juan Gaffud, as testified to by witness Demetria Gaffud in this
wise:
Q Were you able to read the title that was kept by your brother in
law?
A Yes, sir.

Q Who was the registered owner?

A Rafaela Donato, Raymundo Gaffud and Cicero Gaffud, coowner.
Q In other words, the title you read appears that the owners were
Raymundo, Cicero and Rafaela?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know what a title is ?
A Yes, it is thick.
Q You said that the property was bought by Juan Gaffud and
Rafaela Gaffud, how come that there is no name Juan Gaffud in
the title?
A Because he was already dead when I got married.
Q Do you have a knowledge how the title come to have the name
of Raymundo, Rafaela and Cicero?
A Yes, sir. (p. 66, Rollo)
The extra-judicial settlement, upon which was based the lien imposed by
Section 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court, was executed after the death of Juan
Gaffud in 1936 but before the issuance of the original title on January
11, 1938so that the title would be issued in the names of the heirs of
Juan Gaffud, namely: Rafaela Donato, Raymundo Gaffud and Cicero
Gaffud.
This conclusion is supported (a) by the fact that the subject property
was registered only on January 11, 1938, which is around two (2) years
after the death of Juan Gaffud in 1936, and therefore the title could not
have been issued in the name of Juan Gaffud; (b) by the fact that the
lien imposed by Section 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court was inscribed on the
face of the title itself and was not entered on the Memorandum of
Encumbrances as were done with the mortgages and their releases
which were inscribed under their Entry Numbers on the page for
Memorandum of Encumbrances and (c) by the fact that the Original
Certificate of Title was issued in the names of the heirs of Juan Gaffud.
The extra-judicial settlement, therefore, has no bearing on whether or
not there was fraud in the transfer of the subject property to Rafaela
Donato.
On the other hand, it was a Deed of Transfer which transferred the
subject property from the original owners to Rafaela Donato as stated in

Exhibit 3 which is the petition to cancel the conditions imposed by

Section 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court, to wit:
That since the time of the execution of the Deed of transfer from
the original owners to herein petitioner in 1967, and also since
the time of the registration of the said transfer at Register of
Deeds of Isabela last March 2, 1967, more than two (2)
years have already elapsed;
That from the time of the Deed of Transfer and within the period
of two years thereafter, NO CLAIM WHATSOEVER has been filed
against the herein petitioner with respect to the property thus
sold to her . (p. 67, Rollo)
Even granting that the extra-judicial settlement was the document
which transferred the subject property from the original owners to
Rafaela Donato the non-production thereof (private respondents should
have presented it, not petitioner) does not prove that there was fraud
committed in its execution and neither does it prove that petitioner was
a party thereto. There was no allegation, and much less any evidence,
that the transfer of the subject property from the original owners to
Rafaela Donato was fraudulent.
What private respondents allege as fraudulent was the extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of Juan Gaffud. But it has been shown that this
settlement was not the basis of the transfer of the subject property to
Rafaela Donato, petitioner's vendor.
That petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value is within the scope of
established jurisprudence.
The decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled
doctrine that the holder of a certificate of title who acquired the
property covered by the title in good faith and for value can rest
assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible. (Benin v.
Tuason, 57 SCRA 531, 581)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Guided by previous decisions of this Court, good faith consists in

the possessor's belief that the person from whom he received the
thing was the owner of the same and could convey his title
(Ariola v. Gomez dela Serna, 14 Phil. 627). Good faith, while it is
always presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary,
requires a well-founded belief that the person from whom title
was received by himself the owner of the land, with the right to
convey it (Santiago v. Cruz, 19 Phil. 148). There is good faith
where there is an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage from another (Fule v. Legare, 7 SCRA
351). Otherwise stated, good faith is the opposite of fraud and it
refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. In the case at bar, private respondents
(petitioner in this case), in good faith relied on the certificate of
title in the name of Fe S. Duran (Rafaela Donato in this case)
and . . . "even on the supposition that the sale was void, the
general rules that the direct result of a previous illegal contract
cannot be valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher
than its source) cannot apply here for We are confronted with the
functionings of the Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine
to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of
sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title
has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to
the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger.
(Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 489, 494).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of

the certificate of title issued, acquire rights over the property, the
court cannot disregard such rights and order the total
cancellation of the certificate for that would impair public
confidence in the certificate of title; otherwise everyone dealing
with property registered under the torrens system would have to
inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been
regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Indeed, this is
contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing
with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way
oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition
of the property. Stated differently, an innocent purchaser for

value relying on a torrens title issued is protected . . . (Duran v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 489, 494-495). (pp. 6870, Rollo)
In the case of Centeno v. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 545, 555) the
same rule was observed by this Court when it ruled
. . . Well settled is the rule that all persons dealing with property
covered by torrens certificate of title are not required to go
beyond what appears on the face of the title. When there is
nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in
the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the
purchaser is not required to explore further than what the torrens
title upon its face indicates in quest or any hidden defect or
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.
(William Anderson v. Garcia, 64 Phil. 506; Fule v. Legare, 7 SCRA
351). (p. 71, Rollo)
Petitioner being an innocent purchaser for value, private respondents
will have no cause of action against her. "The issue alone that petitioner
is a purchase in good faith and for value sufficiently constitutes a bar to
the complaint of private respondents . . ."(Medina v. Chanco, 117 SCRA
201, 205).
If an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot reach
an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded party is to
bring an action for damages against those who caused the fraud or were
instrumental in depriving him of the property. And it is now well-settled
that such action prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens
Title over the property. (Armerol v. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396, 407;
Caro v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 401, 407; Walstron v. Mapa, Jr., 181
SCRA 431, 442).
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32683 was issued in the name of
Rafaela Donato on March 2, 1967. The present action for reconveyance
was filed only on March 9, 1982. Clearly then, the action has already
prescribed because it was filed fifteen (15) years after the issuance of
TCT No. T-32683. Even if the period were to be reckoned from the
registration of the deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner on July 13,
1970, which is also the date of the issuance of Transfer Certificate of

Title No. T-49380 in the name of petitioner, the action of private

respondents had already prescribed because a period of eleven (11)
years, seven (7) months and twenty-six (26) days has elapsed from July
13, 1910 to March 9, 1982.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered
dismissing Civil Case No. Br. V-756, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
24, Echague, Isabela.
[G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998]
SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by
their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioners,
vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J:
In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have
been adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence
that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens
certificate of title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled
by mandamus to issue such decree?
The Case
These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil
action for mandamus[1] under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022.[2]
The Facts

Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the
registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On
January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court,
rendered its decision disposing thus:[3]
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that
the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a
registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372,
the Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title
thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree
be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada,
both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880
Rizal Ave., Manila.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of
petitioners, issued an order[4] dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to
issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA
refused. Hence, petitioners filed this action for mandamus.[5]
Attached to the LRAs comment on the petition is a report dated April
29, 1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of
Registration, which explained public respondents refusal to issue the
said decree:[6]
In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through
counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted case/record,
the following comments are respectfully submitted:
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of
land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block
No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri,
Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and
Erlinda Laburada;

After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal

Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land
decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817,
as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said
subdivision plan is Annex A hereof;
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 &
917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904,
September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of
Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex B hereof, requesting for a
certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in
the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is Annex C hereof,
per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a
copy is Annex D hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the
technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not
readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April
15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is
Annex E hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No.
355, or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title
with complete technical description of the parcel of land involved
therein. To date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been received
by this Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of
Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex F hereof.
Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No.

6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several
sheets are [sic] incomplete.
For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration
sought by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8,
1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication
of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy
and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity
of the same (G.R. No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio,
et al.,); x x x.
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that
the petition be dismissed for being premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an
urgent motion, dated September 4, 1995,[7] for an early resolution of the
case. To this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution, dated
October 23, 1995, which ordered:[8]
x x x Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case dated
04 September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada herself, the
Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in
detail, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, what
concrete and specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since
19 May 1993 (the date of respondents Memorandum) to actually verify
whether the lot subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in
Mandaluyong City, might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in
Court of Land Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.

With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed

herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to Hon.
Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the
subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is
really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the
name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed]
from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per verification of the records
on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued for the
subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located
because TCT #6595 is incomplete.
It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant
to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991,
would result in the duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land,
and thus contravene the policy and purposes of the torrens registration
system, and destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K.
San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid
duplication of title over the same parcel of land.
Issue
Petitioners submit this lone issue:[10]
Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be
compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).
The Courts Ruling

On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his

compliance with the above resolution, to which was attached a letter
dated November 27, 1997 of Felino M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary
and Cadastral Decree Division, which states:[9]

The petition is not meritorious.

Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?

Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the

LRA unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office x x x. They cite four
reasons why the writ should be issued. First, petitioners claim that they
have a clear legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the
imperative duty to perform because, as land registration is an in
rem proceeding, the jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication
should be complied with.[11] Since there was no showing that the LRA
filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the
corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to take the
cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No.
29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595. Rather, it is the sole concern of said
private person-holders of said titles to institute in a separate but proper
action whatever claim they may have against the property subject of
petitioners application for registration. Third, petitioners contend that
they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of the
failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of
[sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595
notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said titles.
[12]
Fourth, the State consented to its being sued in this case[;] thus, the
legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this
case as final and make provision for its satisfaction.[13]
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general,
contends that the decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that
[the] Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case
and [so] a second decree for the same land is null and void. [14] On the
question of whether the LRA can be compelled to issue a decree of
registration, the solicitor general cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez[15] which
held:[16]
Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been
committed in the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the Court
in the interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in
this case, a strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation

where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over

land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of
another.
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only
alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering
any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having
been issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive
presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case, (t)he very
purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may
be subsequently brought under a second action for registration. The
application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under
the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816
which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Underscoring
supplied.)
We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not
the proper remedy for three reasons.
First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
Contrary to the petitioners allegations, the judgment they seek to
enforce in this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under
the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right
to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of
registration does not become executory until after the expiration of one
year after the entry of the final decree of registration. We explained this
in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals:[17]
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become
final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision
having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much
less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has
become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to
the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of

registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30

should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the
judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of
registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law,
petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision,
dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6
October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the
adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does
not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the
expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a
final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission
(now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date
of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the
performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same
parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the
purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of
registration.
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez,[18] this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated
to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the
preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect,
LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as officers of said
court, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called
upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings.

True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the

decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons
including the government and its branches, irrespective of whether they
were personally notified of the application for registration, and whether
they filed an answer to said application. This stance of petitioners finds
support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which provides:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and
proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be
entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name
in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general
description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be opened
by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First
Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree,
provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon
the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of
title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If
there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be
opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to
the right of appeal herein before provided: Provided, however, That no
decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal
shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree
in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the
applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the
decree. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As

amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD
1529, Sec. 39).
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and
Felino M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995,
respectively, clearly stated that, after verification from the records
submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property which
petitioners are seeking to register -- Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372
-- is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over which TCT
No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot
3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No.
6595. Thus, the LRAs refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on
documents which, if verified, may render the judgment of the trial court
void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order
the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an
earlier land registration case.A second decree for the same land would
be null and void,[19] since the principle behind original registration is to
register a parcel of land only once. [20] Thus, if it is proven that the land
which petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered in
1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners
will run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia:[21]
As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the
Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of
First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for
the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates
of title of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case
of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom.
November 24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera,
said:
As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the
lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding
possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps

valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here express no

opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land
registration court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in
decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in favor of respondent city,
of a lot already previously decreed and registered in favor of the
petitioners.
In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a
Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case
and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This is so,
because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the
title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the
whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no power in a
subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory
period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another
person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first
registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the
world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the
latter applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is
already covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply
for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the
Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its
indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in the efficacy of the registration law.
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial
function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and
Jacinto vs. Nable: [22]
Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral
court, there remain many things to be done before the final decree can
be issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended

descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot,

the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another
party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los
Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be
stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title
and must contain an accurate technical description of the land. This
requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only
portions of a parcel of land included in an application are ordered
registered and that the limits of such portions can only be
roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases
amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys become
necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be
done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor
of the General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative
Code, section 177).
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief
of the General Land Registration Office, the administrative officer, the
issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act
for the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office
acts not as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so
the issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an
administrative one (De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). x x x
(Underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not
compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the
exercise of discretion.[23] Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be
awarded only when the petitioners legal right to the performance of the
particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete.
[24]
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which
is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the
right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded. [25] But where the right sought to

be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case,

mandamus cannot issue.
A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a
question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide
for or against one of the parties.[26] As stated earlier, a judicial act is not
compellable by mandamus.[27] The court has to decide a question
according to its own judgment and understanding of the law.[28]
In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to
issue a decree of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits
and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the
LRA to expedite its study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is
included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a
report thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt
of this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate
speed according to the facts and the law, as herein discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is
REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land Registration
Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a
report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the
property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from
notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is
ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue
of whether the LRA may issue the decree of registration, according to
the facts and the law as herein discussed.
[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND
DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November

2002,[1] which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999, [2]granting the
application for land registration of the respondents.

(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP)

No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot
No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in
the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in
1994;[9] and

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers,

Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a
single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422
and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots).
They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they
purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel
Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3] Together with their application for
registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of
respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No.
8423, in the name of respondent David; [4]
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5]
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyors
Certificates for the Subject Lots;[6]
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the
absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots; [7]
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that
the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963;[8]

(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses

Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject
Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and
respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot
No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was
sold to David.[10]
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents application for
registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to
comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots
required by law; (2) Respondents muniments of title were not genuine
and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of
the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to
private appropriation.[11]
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.
All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of
the Notice of Initial Hearing.[13] A copy of the Notice was also posted on
27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on
the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where
the Subject Lots were located. [14] Finally, the Notice was also published in
the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999 [15] and The Freeman Banat
News on 19 December 1999.[16]
[12]

During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an

Order of Special Default,[17] with only petitioner Republic opposing the
application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through
their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to

prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to

receive further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to
the MTC after 30 days.

can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject
lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still
the argument of the appellant does not hold water.

On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering

the registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over
Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently
issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for
the Subject Lots.[18]

As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as

shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of
prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision
of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply
for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which
allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again,
even considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned
from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable,
herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in
open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already
when they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land
in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the
court a quo.[20]

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December

1999, to the Court of Appeals.[19] The Court of Appeals, in its Decision,
dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment
reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be
registered has been classified as within the alienable and disposable
zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the
Civil Code, respectively provides that All things which are within the
commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial
character shall not be the object of prescription and that Ownership and
other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith.
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents
already acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this
application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it
with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated
December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees
or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the
subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since
1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees possession

The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the
basis of the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June
1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the
Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining
compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject
Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963,
per CENROs certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in
applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the
ruling in Republic v. Doldol,[21] where this Court declared that
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as
amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land
of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same
to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as

the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land
individually and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic
contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as
amended, that the application for registration of title to land shall be
filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single
application only in case they are co-owners. While an application may
cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of
land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject
parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same
province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a
statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it
must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void.
Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land
registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings
held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over
it.
I
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the
MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for
registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from those
presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents
application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject
Lots even though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and
David were actually seeking the individual and separate registration of
Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity

committed by the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC
of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for registration
of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts pronouncement in Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals,[22] to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance
with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have
not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with
the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as
prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly
followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this
regard. This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not
affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their
application for registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly allows
the following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several
applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought
to be registered;[24] and (2) the filing of a single application for
registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are
located within the same province.[25] The Property Registration Decree is
silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed
a single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate
and individual registration of the parcels of land in their respective
names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a
situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the
proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree
itself provides that, [t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and
cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.

Considering every application for land registration filed in strict

accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of
action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by
the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of
action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration,
respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed
separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question
of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case. [26] They are
not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. [27] Instead, under the
Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an
implied admission of the courts jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power
of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own
initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be
proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action);
and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against
said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of
misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present
Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion
of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed
to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still
pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did
not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for
severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of
misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication
requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus,
the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration
court.

Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the

present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land
registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect
in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC
from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents
application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and jurisdiction in
rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land
through publication and service of notice.[29]
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the
public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following
manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing,
the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial
hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the
adjoining owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. Said
notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a
certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application
shall not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of
the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in
the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands
v. Court of Appeals[30] that publication in a newspaper of general

circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm

and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of
the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the
requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial
Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of the Notice
in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative, and
must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded
on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation
should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all
of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The
reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as
widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its
circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be
owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other
real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land
registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against
the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide
a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication, mailing and posting.[31]
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and
was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice
thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August
1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The
Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and
circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas
and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months
after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the
initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever

read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had
a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was
already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the
initial hearing to oppose respondents application for registration, and to
present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the
Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before
the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would
forever be barred from contesting respondents application for
registration and even the registration decree that may be issued
pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default
on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper
of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the
same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the
Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to
acquire jurisdiction over respondents application for registration thereof.
Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and
David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC
Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December
1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a
decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for
having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of
the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect
or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application for
registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the

legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to

public land.

(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the
statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged
therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from
their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June
1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents
had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner
since 1950.[32]
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by
respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are within Alienable and
Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion,
Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated
June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed
Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29,
1992.[33] The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain,
classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
the government;[34] and it is indispensable that the person claiming title
to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or
any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. [35]
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public
domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privatelyowned lands which reverted to the State. [36] It explicitly enumerates the
means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37]
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters
of the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and
application procedure for every mode.[38] Since respondents herein filed
their application before the MTC,[39] then it can be reasonably inferred
that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their
imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title
to land, not exceeding 144 hectares,[40] may be availed of by persons
identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands
or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately

preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of

title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents
may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their
imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse
possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present
Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25
June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject
Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession;
such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had
been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title shall not apply thereto. [41] It is very apparent then that
respondents could not have complied with the period of possession
required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially
confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals was
based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title
to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree. According to
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section

14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land

in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents,
having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998,
when they filed their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots
by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article
1137, both of the Civil Code.[42]
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the
Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the
Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is
confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State,
and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the
same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious
possession.[43] As established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs,
the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have
acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents
may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the
Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization
thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for
Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or
successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the
provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to
the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged
title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to
them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.[44]
Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots
must have complied with the substantial requirements under Section

48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the
Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership
and other real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the
Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative
to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special
law[45] that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is
an established rule of statutory construction that between a general law
and a special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non
derogant.[46]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the
MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December
1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND
VOID. Respondents application for registration is DISMISSED.
G.R. Nos. L-21703-04

August 31, 1966

MATEO H. REYES and JUAN H. REYES, petitioners and appellants,

vs.
MATEO RAVAL REYES, respondent and appellee.
Harold M. Hernando for petitioners and appellants.
Rafael Ruiz for respondent and appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal on pure question of law from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, in its Cadastral Cases Nos. 31, L. R. C. Rec. No.
1188, and 42, L. R. C. Rec. No. 1994, denying petitioners' motion to
compel respondent to surrender their owners' duplicates of Original
Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066, as well as from a subsequent
order of the same court, refusing, upon petitioners' motion, to
reconsider the first order of denial.
The undisputed facts are: three brothers, Mateo H., Juan H., and
Francisco H., all surnamed Reyes, are the registered owners of several
parcels of land, to wit; Lots Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902 and 15912, of the
Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre, embraced in and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 22161, and also Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484, of
the same cadastral survey, embraced in and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 8066, both of the Registry of Deeds of Ilocos
Norte. These titles were issued pursuant to a decree of registration,
dated 31 May 1940.
On 17 July 1962, petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes filed, in
the above stated cadastral cases, a motion for issuance of writs of
possession over all the lots covered by both Certificates of Title above
referred to.
Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion, admitting that he is
only in possession of the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
22161, but denying that he possesses the lots covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 8066; however, he claimed that he has been in,
and is entitled to, the possession thereof (i.e., Lots Nos. 20481 and
20484), having acquired by way of absolute sale (not recorded) from
petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third
(1/3) share, interest and participation to these disputed lots.
After due hearing of this appellant, the court a quo issued, on 20
December 1962, the writ of possession with respect to Lot Nos. 15891
and 15896, which writ was, upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration,

amended, on 7 January 1963, to include all the other lots covered by

both titles.
Respondent did not appeal from this order amending the writ of
possession.
Subsequently, petitioners in the above cadastral cases, as plaintiffs,
commenced, on 15 January 1963, before the same court of first
instance, an ordinary civil action seeking to recover the products of the
disputed lots, or their value, and moral damages against respondent
Mateo Raval Reyes, as defendant. This case was docketed as its Civil
Case No. 3659.
Defendant therein (now respondent M. Raval Reyes) answered the
complaint and pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all the disputed
lots, alleging the same ground he had heretofore raised in his answer
and/or opposition to the motion for issuance of writ of possession, i.e.,
he is their (plaintiffs') co-owner, he having bought from plaintiffs'
brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third (1/3) share,
interest and participation to these disputed lots.
Pending trial on this ordinary civil case (No. 3659), petitioners
presented, on 25 February 1963, in the cadastral cases aforementioned,
a motion to compel respondent Mateo Raval Reyes to surrender and
deliver to them the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title
Nos. 22161 and 8066. Respondent opposed this motion.

moral damages, these lots are not in litigation in this ordinary civil case;
and that since respondent had already raised the issue of ownership and
possession of these lots in his opposition to the (petitioners') motion for
issuance of writ of possession and, despite this opposition, the court a
quo granted the writ, without any appeal being taken, respondent is
barred and estopped from raising the same issue in the ordinary civil
case, under the principle ofres judicata.1wph1.t
On the other hand, respondent-appellee maintains that, having pleaded
a counterclaim for partition of the lots in question in said Civil Case No.
3659, the trial court correctly held that these lots are subjects of
litigation in this ordinary civil case. He also maintains that petitioners
not having impleaded their brother, Francisco H. Reyes, or his heirs, as
parties in their motion for issuance of writ of execution, and because
these heirs have not intervened in this particular incident, the writ of
possession issued by the trial court is, at most, valid only with respect to
their (petitioners) undivided two-thirds (2/3) share and participation in
these disputed lots; hence, he concludes that he is not barred and
estopped from raising the issue of ownership and possession of the
undivided one-third (1/3) share and participation of petitioners' brother,
Francisco H. Reyes, which share respondent allegedly bought from the
latter.
In their reply brief, petitioners-appellants refute the latter argument of
respondent-appellee by showing that they had previously obtained
special authority from the heirs of their deceased brother to represent
them in the proceedings had in the court below.

The court a quo denied petitioners' motion, on the ground that the
parcels of land covered by both titles are subjects of litigation in Civil
Case No. 3659 and the same has not yet been decided on the merits by
it. Petitioners subjected the foregoing order to a motion for
reconsideration, but without success; hence, the present appeal.

The sole issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is: who between
petitioners-appellants or respondent-appellee has a better right to the
possession or custody of the disputed owners' duplicates of certificates
of title.

Petitioners-appellants dispute the above ruling of the trial court

contending that, since the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3659 are not
the lots covered by the titles in question but their products or value, and

While we agree with the court a quo that the disputed lots are subjects
of litigation in Civil Case No. 3659, it appearing that respondent, as
defendant therein, had presented a counterclaim for partition of the lots

covered by the titles, we see no valid and plausible reason to justify, on

this ground, the withholding from the registered owners, such as the
petitioners-appellants herein, the custody and possession of the owners'
duplicates of certificates of title. In a decided case, this Court has
already held that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose
name said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a
more preferential right to the possession of the owners' duplicate than
one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to
establish his right to the possession thereto. Thus, this Court said:
It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an
independent civil action to recover his alleged co-owner's share in the
disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for partition in said Civil Case No.
3659, his rights appear to be amply protected; and considering that he
may also avail of, to better protect his rights thereto, the provision on
notice of lis pendens under Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of
Court, for the purpose of recording the fact that the lots covered by the
titles in question are litigated in said Civil Case No. 3659, we again see
no justifiable reason for respondent to retain the custody of the owners'
duplicates of certificates of titles.
In view of the above considerations, we deem it unnecessary to pass on
the merits of the second contention of petitioners-appellants.
Wherefore, the orders appealed from should be, as they are hereby,
reversed; and, in accordance with this opinion, respondent Mateo Raval
Reyes is hereby ordered to deliver to petitioners the owners' duplicates
of Original Certificates of Title No. 22161 and 8066. With costs against
respondent-appellee, Mateo Raval Reyes.
G.R. No. L-68741 January 28, 1988
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MELECIO MAGCAMIT, NENA
COSICO and EMELITA MAGCAMIT,defendants-appellants.

This is a petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate

Appellate Court * (now Court of Appeals) dated January 31, 1984,
reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo City, 8th Judicial District, Branch III, and of the resolution dated
August 28, 1984 denying the motion for reconsideration filed thereof.
The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Trial Court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court are as follows:
On December 2,1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards,
as owners of a parcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria,
Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710 square meters, sold for
P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses Melencio Magcamit and
Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit (herein private respondents) as
evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This sale with right
to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna on December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972
the sale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of
the private respondents for the sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which
was paid upon the execution of the instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng
Bilihan Tuluyan," after being credited with the P30,000.00 consideration
of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the balance of P40,000.00
was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued. From
the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in
peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering
the property in question was issued to and in the name of the spouses
Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge of the private respondents and
on April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed a Special Power of Attorney in
favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property
with the petitioner, National Grains Authority.
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial
Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering,

among others, the property involved in this case covered by OCT No. T1728, for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of
the petitioner.
On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the
notice of sale of the property in question, scheduling the public auction
sale on June 28, 1974. The petitioner was the highest and successful
bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same
date by the Provincial Sheriff.
On July 10, 1974, the petitioner in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the
mortgagor sold the subject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of
the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Laguna was issued in the name of the petitioner on July
16, 1974. It was only in July 1974, that private respondents learned that
a title in the name of the Vivas spouses had been issued covering the
property in question and that the same property had been mortgaged in
favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay
the petitioner NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of the
amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of
sale but the petitioner refused to accept the payment. On July 31, 1974,
counsel for private respondents made a formal demand on the spouses
Vivas and Lizardo to comply with their obligation under the terms of the
absolute deed of sale; and soon after reiterated to the NGA, the offer to
pay the balance of P40,000.00 due under the absolute deed of sale. On
August 13, 1974 petitioner in its reply informed counsel of private
respondents that petitioner is now the owner of the property in question
and has no intention of disposing of the same.
The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of
subject property were asked by petitioner to vacate it but the former
refused. Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against private respondents
in the Municipal Court of Victoria, Laguna, but the case was dismissed.
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then
Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, San

Pablo City, against the petitioner and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo,
praying, among others, that they be declared the owners of the property
in question and entitled to continue in possession of the same, and if the
petitioner is declared the owner of the said property, then, to order it to
reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such terms and
conditions as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the
premises. (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner (defendant therein)
maintained that it was never a privy to any transaction between the
private respondents (plaintiffs therein) and the spouses Paulino Vivas
and Engracia Lizardo that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value of
the property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and that the title is now
indefeasible, hence, private respondents' cause of action has' already
prescribed. (Record on Appeal, pp. 16-22).
After due hearing, the trial court ** rendered its decision on March 17,
1981, in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of said judgment
reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) declaring defendant National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the
property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same;
(2) ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to defendant
National Grains Authority;
(3) ordering defendants-spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo to
pay plaintiffs the sum of P56,000.00 representing the amount paid
pursuant to the Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Tuluyan marked Exhibit "3", with
legal interest thereon from January 31, 1972 until the amount is paid, to
pay an additional amount of P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, an
additional amount of Pl0,000.00 as moral damages, another amount of
P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this
suit. (Rollo, P. 35).

The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the

trial court to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
After proper proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on
January 31, 1984, reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial
court as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby reversed and set
aside and another one is rendered ordering the National Grains
Authority to execute a deed of reconveyance sufficient in law for
purposes of registration and cancellation of transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-75171 and the issuance of another title in the names of plaintiffappellants, and ordering defendants-appellees Paulino Vivas and
Engracia Lizardo to pay the National Grains Authority the sum of
P78,375.00 (Exh. 3) within thirty (30) days from the receipts of the writ
of execution. No damages and costs. (Rollo, p. 19).
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but
the same was denied. (Rollo, p. 26).

It is undisputed that: (1) there are two deeds of sale of the same land in
favor of private respondents, namely: (a) the conditional sale with right
to repurchase or the 'Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabibiling Muli" which was
registered under Act 3344 and (b) the deed of absolute sale or
"Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" which was not registered; (2) the
condition that the Certificate of Title will be delivered to the buyers upon
its issuance and upon payment of the balance of P40,000.00 is
contained in the deed of absolute sale; and (3) the land in question at
the time of the execution of both sales was not yet covered by the
Torrens System of registration.
It is axiomatic, that while the registration of the conditional sale with
right of repurchase may be binding on third persons, it is by provision of
law "understood to be without prejudice to third party who has better
right" (Section 194 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3344). In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a
registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a better
right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with
the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only
on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private respondents.

Hence, this petition.

In the resolution of May 20, 1985, the petition was given due course and
the parties were required to submit simultaneous memoranda (Rollo, p.
128). The memorandum for the petitioner was filed on July 3, 1985
(Rollo, p. 129) while the memorandum for the private respondents was
filed on August 26, 1985 1 Rollo p. 192).
The main issue in this case is whether or not violation of the terms of
the agreement between the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, the sellers, and
private respondents, the buyers, to deliver the certificate of title to the
latter, upon its issuance, constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat
the title and right acquired by petitioner NGA, an innocent purchaser for
value.

In their complaint at the Regional Trial Court, private respondents

prayed among others, for two alternative reliefs, such as: (a) to be
declared the owners of the property in question or (b) to order the
declared owner to reconvey or transfer the ownership of the property in
their favor.
Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by
virtue of the Conditional Sale, later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale
which although unregistered under the Torrens System allegedly
transferred to them the ownership and the possession of the property in
question. In fact, they argue that they have been and are still in
possession of the same openly, continuously, publicly under a claim of
ownership adverse to all other claims since the purchase on December
2, 1971 (Rollo, p. 165). It is stressed that not until the month of July,

1974 did the plaintiff learn that a title had been issued covering the
property in question (Rollo, p. 15).
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the
registration of title to land under the Torrens System is an action in
rem not in personam, hence, personal notice to all claimants of the res
is not necessary in order that the court may have jurisdiction to deal
with and dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such personal notice
vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a registration
proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it,
may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one in
the nature of or akin a to proceeding in rem which shall be binding upon
all persons, known or unknown (Moscoso vs. Court of appeals, 128 SCRA
719 [1984], citing: City of Manila vs. Lack, et al., 19 Phil. 324, 337;
Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120; Aguilar vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661). It
is thus evident that respondents' right over the property was barred
by res judicatawhen the decree of registration was issued to spouses
Vivas and Lizards. It does not matter that they may have had some right
even the right of ownership, BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for
value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances
except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances
which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said
provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those
mentioned by law as existing, against the land prior to the issuance of
certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon,
and the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the
government (Aldecoa and Co. vs. Warner Barns & Co., 30 Phil. 209
[1915]; Snyder vs. Fiscal of Cebu and Avila, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]). Under
said ruling, if the purchaser is the only party who appears in the deeds
and the registration of titles in the property registry, no one except such
purchaser may be deemed by law to be the owner of the properties in

question (Ibid). Moreover, no title to registered land in derogation to that

of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession (Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]).
It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the
exceptions provided for under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be
enforced against petitioner herein.
Thus, it has been invariably restated by this Court, that "The real
purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever
any question as to its legality. "Once a title is registered, the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court,
or sitting on the "mirador su casato," avoid the possibility of losing his
land." "An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not allowed
(Dominga vs. Santos, 55 Phil. 361; Singian vs. Manila Railroad, 62 Phil.
467)."
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of
title to a land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the
rights of the true owner. He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he
may be compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long
as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value (Angeles vs. Sania, 66 Phil. 444 [1938], emphasis supplied).
It will be noted that the spouses Vivas and Lizardo never committed any
fraud in procuring the registration of the property in question. On the
contrary, their application for registration which resulted in the issuance
of OCT No. 1728 was with complete knowledge and implied authority of
private respondents who retained a portion of the consideration until the
issuance to said spouses of a certificate of title applied for under the
Torrens Act and the corresponding delivery of said title to them. The
question therefore, is not about the validity of OCT No. 1728 but in the
breach of contract between private respondents and the Vivas spouses.
Petitioner NGA was never a privy to this transaction. Neither was it
shown that it had any knowledge at the time of the execution of the
mortgage, of the existence of the suspensive condition in the deed of

absolute sale much less of its violation. Nothing appeared to excite

suspicion. The Special Power of Attorney was regular on its face; the
OCT was in the name of the mortgagor and the NGA was the highest
bidder in the public auction. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an
innocent purchaser for value, first as an innocent mortgagee under
Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent purchaser for value in the
public auction sale.
Private respondents claim that NGA did not even field any
representative to the land which was not even in the possession of the
supposed mortgagors, nor present any witness to prove its allegations in
the ANSWER nor submit its DEED OF MORTGAGE to show its being a
mortgages in good faith and for value (Rollo, p. 110).
Such contention is, however, untenable. Well settled is the rule that all
persons dealing with property covered by a torrens certificate of title are
not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. When
there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in
the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the
purchaser is not required to explore further than what the torrens title
upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right
that may subsequently defeat his right thereto (Centeno vs. Court of
Appeals, 139 SCRA 545 [1985]).
More specifically, the Court has ruled that a bank is not required before
accepting a mortgage to make an investigation of the title of the
property being given as security (Phil. National Cooperative Bank vs.
Carandang Villalon, 139 SCRA 570 [1985]), and where innocent third
persons like mortgagee relying on the certificate of title acquire rights
over the property, their rights cannot be disregarded (Duran vs. IAC, 138
SCRA 489 [1985]).

Under the circumstances, the Regional Trial Court could not have erred
in ruling that plaintiffs (private respondents herein) complaint insofar as
it prays that they be declared owners of the land in question can not
prosper in view of the doctrine of indefeasibility of title under the Torrens
System, because it is an established principle that a petition for review
of the decree of registration will not prosper even if filed within one year
from the entry of the decree if the title has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value (Pres. Decree No. 1529, Sec. 32). The
setting aside of the decree of registration issued in land registration
proceedings is operative only between the parties to the fraud and the
parties defrauded and their privies, but not against acquirers in good
faith and for value and the successors in interest of the latter; as to
them the decree shall remain in full force and effect forever (Domingo
vs. The Mayon Realty Corp. et al., 102 Phil. 32 [19571). Assuming,
therefore, that there was fraud committed by the sellers against the
buyers in the instant case, petitioner NGA who was not privy therein
cannot be made to suffer the consequences thereof As correctly
declared by the trial court, the National Grains Authority is the lawful
owner of the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title.
As to private respondents' alternative prayer that the declared owner be
ordered to reconvey or transfer the ownership of the property in their
favor, it is clear that there is absolutely no reason why petitioner, an
innocent purchaser for value, should reconvey the land to the private
respondents.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna and San Pablo City, now Regional Trial Court, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.