Attending the Copenhagen Climate
A brief background to Copenhagen:
the Rio earth summit in 1992 was
when the world started to get serious
on climate change. Its outcome was
the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change whose ultimate goal
is the stabilization of greenhouse gas
to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.”
Singed by 192 countries it was a start
but lacked teeth and operalisation
details. In answer to this, the Kyoto
Protocol was signed in 1997 and
came into force in 2005 (infamously
without the US) and the system of
national quotas (for the developed
world only) and carbon trading was
born. The fundamental problem with
the Protocol (and the reason the US
never ratified it) is that it divides the
world into two homogenous blocks:
the developed world (38 OECD
countries who would shoulder the
burden of dealing with climate
change on the basis that our caused it)
and the developing (i.e. the rest). It
only regulates the emissions of the
former who are required to cut their
emissions as well as assist the
developing world to reduce their
emissions (‘mitigation’) and to adapt
to the effects of climate change. I.e.
it requires a north- south transfer of
resources as reparations for the
climate damage caused by our
industrialisation and because climate
chaos will ensue if the developing
world doesn’t leapfrog our dirty
development paths. Eh voila –
impasse ensues over climate
responsibility.
Friction over this crude division of
perpetrators and victims has escalated
as the wealth and carbon emissions of
some advanced developing nations
(the BICs and Middle East states) has
grown at rapid pace and now eclipses
that of many developed nations. The
absurdity of Saudi Arabia
representing the developing world’s
negotiating block (the G77) is a case
in point.
Conference – a student’s
perspective
The stage was set for Copenhagen to be the pinnacle climate
conference – the culmination of a series of multi-national
meetings and conferences where the world’s leaders were
finally going to “seal the deal” on a new global regime for
tackling climate change. We know now that it was a failure:
an organisational disaster on an embarrassing scale but more
importantly, despite the sophisticated development of the
arguments across the plethora of climate issues, it did not
move significantly beyond the north/ south division of
responsibility impasse that has beset climate politics for the
last 18 years since Rio (see side bar). However, from a
personal perspective Copenhagen got me hooked as a climate
junkie. It was a thrilling insight to the multiple agendas and
actions operating in this realm and a fascinating exposé of
the mechanics of international diplomacy.
I came to Copenhagen as part of the university’s delegation,
having NGO observer status. Like many others I expected to
see the gamesmanship of international politics in full,
sophisticated flow. This was the ultimate tournament, the
one all others had been qualifying rounds building up to. In
fact it was rather tedious – slow and futile. We knew in
advance a final legal text would not be ready for inking yet at
least the fundamental outstanding points should be squared
off- right? In fact the pages would turn, a flag would raise
and a nation given its turn to express the strength of its
feelings on the sentence (or word) in question. Then another
country would interject and elaborate at length on why they
felt strongly in the alternative.
Before coming to Oxford I was a lawyer and so have some
experience in negotiating deals between parties at
loggerheads. Long, dull meetings turning the pages of
hideously large agreements are not new to me. But here! I
expected more pace, final point knock-ins only, surely? The
energy and desire to close the deal seemed absent. For
almost every issue there were 3 options: i) yes, lets do X, ii)
no, or iii) let’s hold on this and decide later! And there was a
farcical lack of co-operation to combine (or even co-ordinate
progress on) the two alternative proposals (work streams)
being negotiated.
The crux of the global impasse rests with
two countries: China and the US, the
biggest two emitting nations who together
account for 50% of the world’s emissions
yet neither are covered by Kyoto’s legal
regime. Both are seen globally as climate
pariahs. China recently overtook the US
in becoming the world’s largest emitter
and is the world’s 3rd largest economy
and a huge beneficiary of the climate
finance regime and the growing clean
market economy.
The US’s per capita emissions are 4 times
that of China’s. It is late to the climate
party and its emission reduction offerings
at the Copenhagen conference alter were
pitiful (3% reduction by 2020 compared
to 20% (or possibly 30%) committed to
by the EU). Its major culpability for the
climate crises and its refusal to engage to-
date promotes international inaction (why
should the rest act if the US refuses to
take its share of the clean-up burden?) It
is expected that if the US signs its tabled
clean energy bill and offers meaningful
emission cuts then like dominoes the rest
of the major emitters around the world
will fall in place. But the US and China
are in a Mexican stand-off. The US has
always asserted that it will not join a
regime which penalises its industries who
are forced to finance technological
investments in key competitors (read
China) in rapidly developing nations
unless they are subject to similar carbon
restraints.
Copenhagen effectively stalled in
anticipation of one of these proud titans to
stand down first – a tough diplomatic
challenge. The conference failed as it did
not facilitate the horse trading and game
playing that is needed to get a deal done.
There were some points of drama: some threatened walk outs
by delegates, protestor skirmishes and excessive clamp-
downs, chinese whispers of deals done in other rooms… But
as the days ticked by no real progress, actually often the
reverse.
But all was not lost, Obama was coming, he wouldn’t come
empty handed, he’d just picked up his peace prize saying now
was the time to earn it. The US and China had been in
months of private climate meetings – surely a deal was to be
announced. And so the two week conference felt like a
basketball game of inconsequential point scoring, or even
lack thereof, either way it didn’t matter as we all know the
exciting zenith of the game is in the last few minutes before
the whistle blows. So the frustrations of the increasingly
wasted days in the weeks before where somehow pacified
with the mindset that Obama and Hu Jin Tao would fly in for
the final slam dunk.
It didn’t happen. In the final few days we NGOs were booted
out and left to watch on internet relays as the world leaders
took the stage to orate their commitments and concerns. If
you played a drinking game on words and phrases like
‘historic’ and ‘the world’s eyes are on us’ or ‘future
generations will ask…’ you’d have had one hell of a
hangover. Like X factor – you either want to see a Susan
Boyle or a hilarious disaster. And there were few of either.
Though my top scores for the former goes to Sarkosy
(surprised me too) but without doubt the one to look for on
Utube is Chavez. So when Obama delivered his bland
address with pointed distrust directed at China it wasn’t just a
damp squid for a man known for his oratory it was a terrible
signal – he hadn’t come with a deal to save the conference
and the climate.
Yes, Obama secured the ‘Copenhagen Accord’ (and so could
announce the vital ‘success’ story to domestic audiences) but
it is debatable how valuable this loose, non-binding
agreement will be for the climate. It did break new ground in
securing mitigation commitments from all major emitters
(including, for the first time, those in the developing world).
It has now been signed by 110 countries. And it does include
significant climate funds for developing countries. However,
its 3 pages cover headline points without operational detail or
mechanisms and it makes no reference to many of the
panoply of complex issues that are entailed in the climate debate (from forests to nuclear,
carbon capture to carbon trading). It was heavily criticised by some for its cloak and
dagger manner of last minute negotiation. (Much has been made of China walking out
and being obstructive, of the EU being marginalised, of slammed tables and secret
meetings). In juxtaposition, the UN’s 192-party consensus based democratic regime has
inevitably mired its twin track negotiating process in deadlock and lowest common
denominator settlements. Thus, on one hand this club deal represents a pragmatic, real
politik step forward. On the other its marginalisation of the UN process opens the way
for undemocratic bilateralism and western conditionality terms to de facto rule climate
based international relations. Couched in diplomatic language it makes clear to
developing countries that to get a slice of the significant green funds they need to
conform to conditions set by the donor countries. Such a donor-led club regime latently
leaves open the possibility of carbon tariffs being imposed at borders to punish regimes
without (western) accepted carbon management policies. This may be good for the
environment after years of inaction but it does not bode well for international relations or
a true global, legally binding deal being agreed.

This haphazard collection of responses in the absence of a UN lead treaty has been called
‘anarchic but creative adhocary’. Perhaps this new wave of international climate politics
is not disastrous. Some argue that the ethic of UN consensus building is a myth anyway.
Roughly 8 countries account for 80% of the world’s emissions and that for some of the
vast majority that are not a part of the climate problem or solution their natural overriding
objective is to extract rent (public funds) from the system rather than make sacrifices for
the collective interest – their climate votes are for sale. Of course this is inherent to a
collective action problem such as climate change but also suggests that a future of adhoc
regimes that effectively focus on the key protagonists may still represent progress. One
can question how effective international law is anyway especially where enforcement
regimes are loosely defined, jurisdiction can be opted out of and ultimately few have the
will to enforce.

This shift away from the UN regime is significant in another area too. The Copenhagen
Accord regime is based on a bottom-up ‘pledge and review’ system of emission reduction
targets – i.e. countries pledge their commitments and then report back on progress.
Hence transparency (often referred to as ‘MRV’ (for monitoring, reporting and
verification)) becomes a critical component to ensure the system is working yet this
clashes with the golden principle of sovereignty. In contrast, the existing Kyoto Protocol
regime is based on a top-down allocation of targets and punishment (at least notionally)
for breach.

Thus the biggest failure of Copenhagen was not that there was not a binding legal
agreement but that the summit was not managed to extricate a bidding upwards of
ambitious pledges from the key emitters.