Oxfam GB

Unsustainable Development: The Philippine Experience (Dveloppement non durable:

l'exprience des Philippines / Desenvolvimento no-sustentvel: a experincia filipina /
Desarrollo insostenido: la experiencia de las Filipinas)
Author(s): Karina Constantino-David
Source: Development in Practice, Vol. 11, No. 2/3 (May, 2001), pp. 232-241
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of Oxfam GB
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Development in Practice, Volume11, Numbers2 & 3, May 2001

Unsustainable development: the

experience
Philippine

Karina Constantino-David
High rates of urbanisationin the South have led to unsustainabledevelopmentin its cities and
towns. Theform of developmentthat is takingplace is 'parasitic', in that it excludes the poor
and follows the developmentparadigm of the North rather than one more appropriateto the
situationsfaced in the South. Sustainable developmentis seen as a measure to counterpoise
economic growth with environmentalconcerns, but it remains doubtfulwhether this can be
realised since the impactof participationof the countriesof the South in the global markethas
proved disastrous. This paper highlights the need to be aware of a country's 'carrying' and
'caring' capacity,and argues that work towardssustainabledevelopmentneeds to go from the
poor upwards.
The Philippines epitomises these concerns, especially regarding the high rate of
urbanisationin MetroManila, where environmentalproblemsand lack of services have led to
a deteriorationin the quality of life. This is seen by the author to be the responsibilityof five
overlappingpower groups-the state, business, the church, the media, and internationalaid
agencies. The latter tend to follow the Northern developmentparadigm, which places the
South in a vulnerableposition andforces Southerngovernmentsto act against their country's
best interests.A new developmentparadigm is desperatelyneeded that will avoid the mistakes
of the past and improvefuture prospectsfor the poor and the environment.

Introduction
In 1960, less than 50 per cent of the world's 19 megacities were in developing countries.
Today,more than80 per cent of its 60 megacites are in the South.In just four decades our cities
have grown to spectacularproportions.Every countryin the South can boast at least one major
city that serves as the centre of governanceand commerce as well as newer cities that are also
developing at an alarmingrate. While the presence of modern amenities marks our cities, a
large segment of the urbanpopulationhas barely the basic necessities for survival.The urban
poor, residing on the perimetersof the rich ghettos, eke out a living in the midst of affluence,
scavenge from the remainsof our cities' consumeristlifestyle, and are systematicallyexcluded
from urbandevelopment.
For decades we have known of the spreadof urbanisationand its concomitantills. But our
governments chose to prioritise 'development' even as countries of the North are already
exhibitingthe negative characteristicsof unplannedgrowth.We set our sights on emulatingthe
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ISSN 0961-4524 printlISSN1364-9213 onlinelOI1020232-10? 2001 Oxfam GB

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Unsustainabledevelopment:the Philippine experience

patternsof more developed countries, blindly importing and transplantingimages of cities

from the more affluent parts of the globe into what were essentially underdeveloped
nations.

Parasitic development
The problemwith developmentis thatit implies movementtowardsa goal. Throughthe years,
this movementhas focused primarilyon economic growth.The hope and the promisewere that
growthwould 'trickledown' to the poor.Towardsthe second half of the 1980s, the concept of
sustainabledevelopment was introduced.Sustainabledevelopment was meant to correct the
flaws of developmentalthinkingby mitigatingthe effects of the gods of economic growthwith
the foresight of generationsto come. But this kept us essentially on the same development
path, except that the importanceof the environmentwe share has come to the forefront.
However, even with the grudging acceptance of the need for sustainabledevelopment by
governmentsand multilateralagencies, the realitieshave not changedfor the vast masses in the
South.We have a parasiticform of development.It is a developmentthatblindly assumes that
humanandnaturalresourcesare inexhaustible.It sacrificesthe poor and the environmentat the
altar of the marketand its promises of economic growth.
Economic growth and its consequent patternsof consumptioncannot be equated with an
improvementin the quality of life. In fact, while the pursuitof economic growth has indeed
producedincreasesin trade,investment,and outputin general,it has also resultedin widening
disparitiesand inequalitiesamong people and nations. The transactionaland utilitariannature
of the market has further disempowered large numbers of people and marginalised their
environments.
The unquestioneddevelopmentparadigmand the rush of our governmentsto compete in the
global market have had disastrous results. While our cities have grown to attract foreign
investments,our ruralareashave stagnated.Findingno way out of poverty,ruralfolk migrate
to the cities in search of wage work. But for an underdevelopedcountry to attractforeign
investment,one prerequisiteis low wages. These migrantsswell the ranks of the urbanpoor,
engaging in low-paid contractualjobs, surviving throughthe informaleconomy, and residing
in informalsettlements.The irony of our cities is thatthey develop quite literallyat the expense
of the poor and our environment.
The reasons for poverty are complex. The primary causes are of a political, economic,
structural,and social nature, abetted by a lack of political resolve and erroneous attitudes
regardingpublic policy and the deployment of resources:
At the individual level, people are handicappedby lack of access to resources, skills, or
opportunitiesto make a decent living.
* On the societal plane, the major causes are inequalities in the distributionof resources,
services, and power. These inequalities may be institutionalisedin terms of land, capital,
infrastructure,markets,credit, education, information,and advisory services. The same is
true for the provision of social services: education, health, clean water, and sanitation.
Inequalityof services leaves ruralareasthe worst off, so that it comes as no surprisethat an
estimated77 per cent of the developing world's poor live in ruralzones. Yet the urbanpoor
are mired in even worse conditions (ICPQL 1996:22).
a

A more appropriatedirectionwould be towardsa 'SustainableImprovementin the Quality of

Life'. This would allow us to focus on the needs of the poor and the environmentwithin the
realities of each countrywithout compromisingthe ability of futuregenerationsto meet their
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233

Karina Constantino-David

own needs. The needs of the presentmust be viewed from the needs of the poor; the needs of
those who have been abused most by the currentdevelopmenttrack.The goal of sustainable
improvementin the quality of life allows countries and sectors to define directions that can
accommodatesubjectivityand culturaldiversity in an ever-ascendingspiral.
The 'Sustainable Improvementin the Quality of Life', as proposed by the Independent
Commission on Population and the Quality of Life, requires us to respect the limits of the
globe's 'carryingcapacity' while at the same time takingresponsibilityfor the needs of people
and the environment,in otherwords our 'caringcapacity'. The antithesisof care is power and
control, abuse and aggression. But in orderto take this new path, we must recognise that the
continued parasitism of society on the misery of the poor and the degradation of the
environmentwill inevitably become the basis for the unsustainabilityand breakdownof our
cities.

Patterns of parasitism in Philippine cities

The Philippine population is 51 per cent urban, roughly 38 million people or 6.5 million
families. The countryhas one of the highest rates of urbangrowth in the developing world at
5.1 per cent over the past four decades.This has been due to a high birthrate of approximately
2.3 per cent per annum, rural-to-urbanmigration, and the reclassification of rural areas as
urbandue to their increasingpopulationdensities. It is significant to note that while rural-tourbanmigrationis still a majorsource of an increasingurbanpopulation,especially in newer
cities, second- and third-generationmigrants,in areas like Metro Manila, are now greaterin
number.Migrationis obviously testimony to the continuing poverty in the countrysidethat
forces the poor to seek their survival in the cities.
Of the urban population, approximatelyten million live in Metro Manila, which has an
annualgrowthrate of 3.3 per cent. This area accounts for more than 30 per cent of the gross
nationalproduct,but at least 3.5 million people can be categorisedas urbanpoor.Ten thousand
families live along the Pasig River alone, 32,000 families along the majortributaries,45,000
families beside the railway tracks, and the rest in pockets of urbandecay that range from a
handful of families to slums of tens of thousandsof people.
The 'brown'environmenthas long been abused-air, noise, and waterpollution,inadequate
waste disposal, and congestion.The 'carryingcapacity', or the maximumsustainableload that
humankindcan impose on the environmentbefore it loses its capacity to support human
activity,is in peril. Motorisedtransportaccountsfor 94 per cent of the total organicgas in the
air, 99 per cent of the carbon monoxide, and 83 per cent of the nitrogen oxide emissions.
Industriesrelease massive amountsof sulphurdioxide into the atmosphere,and domestic and
industrialwaste is indiscriminatelydumpedinto the city's waterways and streets.Apart from
this, environmentaldegradationcan be seen in various disasters that frequently occur: for
example, flooding, traffic pollution, homes destroyed by landslides and other earth
movements, and death of wildlife in the rivers and seas.
Even as we strainthe carryingcapacityof the metropolis,the inadequacyof our own caring
capacityis obvious. Metro Manila, where economic activities are centred,is home to the best
of urbanamenitiesin both the business districtsand in the rich areas.But security services are
booming, protecting these sectors from the assaults of those who have far less. Tertiary
healthcareand education are concentratedin the metropolis. But the primaryhealth services
accessible to the urbanpoor pale in comparisonwith those in ruralareas:there is one primary
health unit for every 10,000 people in the countrysideagainst one for every 50,000 people in
the urbancentres. Even though primaryand secondaryeducationmay be of a slightly higher
quality in cities, the 1:50 teacher-to-pupilratio makes basic education unsatisfactory.At the
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Unsustainabledevelopment:the Philippine experience

college level, the scene is dominatedby privateuniversities,which overchargefor substandard

education.The seats of government,media, and the churchare also situatedin Metro Manila,
but basic minimum needs remain unmet.
Despite respectableeconomic growthandthe proliferationof urbanamenities,the qualityof
life in Metro Manila has deteriorated.Economic growth that hinges on belief in the messiah
of globalisation has been achieved on the backs of the poor and at the expense of the
environment.Unless drasticsteps are taken, this very model is likely to discouragethe much
sought-afterforeign investments.Inevitably,the qualityof life will furtherdeteriorateand even
the few who benefit from this kind of parasiticdevelopment will end up with less than they
have today.

Which actors and what factors make or break cities?

No amount of dreamingcan result in an alternativefuture as long as the major actors and
factorsthat can make or breaka city remainunchanged.In the case of Metro Manila and other
urbanareas in the Philippines,these can be categorisedinto two distinct groups-those who
wield power and those who are powerless.
There are five distinct but overlappingpower groups-the state, business, the dominant
church,the media, and internationalaid agencies-which, althoughthey are not monolithic,
share responsibilityfor the deterioratingquality of life in cities. The model of development
that underpinstheir actions is economic development through global competitiveness, with
foreign investment as the engine of growth. But while sustainabledevelopment, equity, and
pro-poorrhetoric are standardfare, there have been but minimal improvementsin the lives
of the urban poor-secure shelter, sanitation, potable water, and pollution-remain grave
problems.
In the Philippines, the present administration,hounded by inefficiency and corruption,
doggedly pursues the same economic thrust as previous governments, despite a pro-poor
campaign line that ushered it into power.' The poor, who put their faith overwhelmingly in
PresidentEstrada,were buoyed by initial promises.The business communityand the dominant
church nervously awaited clear directions on economic policy, fearful of growing cronyism
and flip-flopping decisions. The news media exposes of the inadequaciesof the government
range from the banal to the sublime. Foreign agencies like the IMF baulked at what seemed
to be a partial declaration of autonomy by some government economic managers in, for
example, the insistence that interestrates be lowered.
But while charges of graft and mismanagementhave remained, the economic directions
seem to have settled back to the same development paradigm. In the Housing and Urban
Development Department,which we headed for 15 months, the following radical changes in
policy were undertaken:
a

.
*
*
a

.
*
*

situatingshelter within a broadernational urbanpolicy framework;

allocating 80 per cent of governmentbudgetaryallocations for housing to the poor;
expanding options for the lowest-income households throughefficient rental markets;
strengtheningcooperativehousing and the CommunityMortgageProgramme;2
housing finance reforms;
localising and decentralising urban and shelter policy, with an emphasis on ecological
balance;
ensuringeffective participationof the poor;
redefiningpublic and private sector roles to ensure a better distributionof responsibilities
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235

Karina Constantino-David

These changes were met with angry protests from a portion of the real estate business sector
whose short-terminterestswere threatened.While most of the top-level governmentdecision
makers, as well as foreign aid agencies, welcomed these policy shifts, they were diffident
about confronting the self-interest groups. It was more comfortable for government
functionariesto keep away from the fray while foreign aid agencies refusedto take a proactive
stance by hiding behindthe convenientexcuse of 'non-interference',thoughthey were willing
to voice their frustrationsin private. Only a section of the WorldBank took the bold step of
immediately suspendingnegotiations for a majorhousing programme.Since the early 1990s
the WorldBank had taken a critical stance regardingpast governmenthousing policies. Our
radical revisions in policies, especially in the field of housing finance, were basically
consistent with the Bank's perspectives.As such, a grant-loanpackage was in the final stages
of approvalat the time. In the final analysis, however, the political will for change gave way
to the temptationsof corruptionand image building.
Civil society-NGOs, people's organisations,academia,ideologically left-wing blocs, and
other voluntary organisations-were powerless in the face of these attemptsto protect the
statusquo andresist the reforms.First,the micro-perspectiveof the poor allowed them to view
the changes only within the limitedperspectiveof theirimmediateneeds. Second, NGOs could
not keep up with the policy debates, especially those that were systemic ratherthan concrete
in nature.Third,some ideological blocs could not wean themselves away from a consistently
oppositioniststance to anythingemanatingfrom government.Fourth,academicsdid not seem
to take much interest in either policy or research.Finally, there was a yawning gap between
civil society demands(which were eithervery concrete or supremelyconceptual)and the dayto-day requisites of change.

Pasig River rehabilitation

The case of the Pasig River RehabilitationCommission provides a concrete illustration.The
Pasig River is the major waterway of Metro Manila. It is a 27km stretch with dozens of
tributariesthat used to be the centre of economic, transportation,and culturalactivity.Today
the river is dead. It is the dumping ground for domestic and industrialwaste, the largest
septic tank in the country.On its banks, on stilts in the river and underneaththe bridges that
traverse it, are 10,000 informal settler families. Every previous administrationfor the past
40 years has tried to revive the river, and each has failed. The Estradagovernmentdecided
to embark on an ambitious but attainable programme to resurrect the river (dredging,
revetmentwalls, minimising water pollution, etc.), relocate the settlers within the ten-metre
easement, restore it as a viable means of alternativetransportation,and create open spaces
along the banks.
The determinationto achieve what others had miserably failed to do meant creating a
Commission composed of cabinet members who would orchestratethe entire programme.
Apart from governmentresources, DANIDA (the Danish government agency) and the Asia
Development Bank (ADB) provided support.A crucial element was dealing with the settlers.
Past attemptshad resulted in protests, forcible and inhumanerelocation to distant sites, and
ultimatelythe returnof about 50 per cent of the settlers.
Work on the Commission started in January 1999. A Housing and Resettlement Group
(HRG) (which I chaired)was immediatelyestablished.It included representativesfrom each
settlers and their
of the affected local governmentunits and representativesfrom the informnal
a
to
a
on
framework
at
consensus
arrived
The
HRG
govern resettlement,
NGO counterparts.
on
and
agreed uniformparameterson the process of
jointly revalidateda 1977 family census,
relocation, identified appropriatesites, scheduled each area for resettlementover a two-year
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Unsustainabledevelopment:the Philippine experience

period, and set up a monthly bulletin to provide accurate information to each of the
communities.Among the innovationsintroducedwere:
.
.
*
*
*
*

*
*

voluntaryrelocation;
priorityto in-city, then near-city,relocation;
providing communitieswith various options ratherthanjust one site;
the bringing of whole communitiesto the sites before they made their decisions;
the setting up of a graduated lease-purchase scheme, starting at less than US$10 a
month;
the encouragementof Local GovernmentUnits (LGUs) to keep the settlers within their
boundariesor to contributea set amountto the receiving LGUs if the settlers could not be
accommodatedin the city;
every effortbeing madeto ensurethatbasic amenitiesandfacilities-utilities, transportation,
schools, healthclinics, employment-were presentin each of the resettlementareas;
to ensure transparency,the private sector was asked to submit alreadydeveloped potential
resettlementsites and, apartfrom the technical evaluations,the prospectiveresidenthad the
final decision;
providing settlers with the option to submit their own resettlementplans.

Ten months after,despite what seemed like a slow startbecause of the participatorynatureof
the process, almost 2000 families had moved into new homes of their choice. These were
medium-risebuildings along a majorhighway and terracedhouses in the peripheryof Metro
Manila.Relocationwas voluntary,therewere no acrimoniousprotests,and the cost of the sites
was 15-35 per cent lower than the market value. In one site where the schools were not
completelyin place, relocationwas limited only to those families thatcould be accommodated,
even though 2000 more houses were ready for occupancy.
In hindsight,we could have done better.One majorproblemwas the funds. The processing
time for the ADB meantthatfunds would only be availableby the year 2000. And yet President
Estrada demanded action based on an extremely tight schedule. At the same time, some
communitiesthat wanted to ensure getting the site of their choice also wanted to move even
while the schools were still being built.Withinsix monthsof my resignation,therewas already
restiveness in both the relocated communities and the communities still to be resettled. The
HRG has been effectively disbanded.The poor no longer have access to decision makers.The
identified sites for the Pasig River resettlers have become areas for other communities that
have been forcibly relocated,the promisedfacilities have not been completed, and the people
no longer have a say about the sites to which they would be transferred.
Not all the problemsthroughoutthis process came from governmentand foreign agencies.
Academia was completely absent, when it could have provided much-needed assistance
throughresearchand fresh insights. Some ideological blocs attemptedto derail the process by
rakingup all sorts of fears. But the participatorynatureof the HRG ensuredthat leaders of the
urbanpoor and NGOs could sufficiently contain any disinformationbecause they themselves
were partof the decision-makingbody.Althoughit was well worthit, the process was at times
tedious and repetitive due to initially unreasonabledemands, for example on-site relocation
with free land, or a lack of understandingof the complexities of resettlement.

The role of foreign aid agencies-the

seven deadly sins

The noble rationalefor foreign aid is altruism,the responsibilityof more developed countries
to assist those with less, as an expression of concern as well as recognitionthat we share the
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237

KarinaConstantino-David
same earth.But, in reality,much foreign assistancehas degeneratedinto expressions of power
and control.The dividing line between aid and business has been blurred.It is the reproduction
of old colonial relations framed within the hypocritical rhetoric of democracy and
philanthropy.
Undeniably,foreign aid agencies promote economic developmentas their highest priority.
Some espouse it openly while others hide behind the platitudesof sustainabledevelopment.
Countriesof the Souththatare in desperateneed of funds are thus placed in the ironic situation
of having to thank lenders and donors for funds that ensure the South develops accordingto
the paradigmsof the North. This integratesthem into a global orderin which poor countries,
like the poor of their own nations, are powerless.
With rare exceptions, foreign aid is premised on one view of the world. The identification
of projectsand programmesis largely left in the hands of the 'giver' with the recipienthaving
the illusory option to accept or reject.Countriesof the South are in a double bind-short-term
gains for long-termpains or short-termpains for long-termgains. Withina democraticpolitical
system each administrationinvariablychooses the former,if only for political survival.In the
final analysis, it is the poor and the environmentthat are made to suffer.
But, when viewed within the context of a governmentthat has almost lost the capacity to
care for the poor and the environment,beyond the basic issues of the developmentmodel that
underpinsforeign aid are practicalrealitiesthatmake the relationbetween 'givers' and 'takers'
more onerous. The seven deadly sins are as follows:
* Project pushers-the cycle begins with a mission, then moves to technical assistance,
usually by means of grantsappearingto be altruisticattemptsat assistance.But the agenda
is largely set by the aid agency and the countryis hooked to the loans that follow. And yet
aid-givers have no accountabilityfor the failures and the misery that may result from such
projects.
m Bureaucraticstraitjackets-the bureaucracythathas developed aroundaid is inflexible and
expensive. No matterhow much work has been put into consultationsand projectplanning,
foreign aid agencies requirerecipientsto run the gauntletof evaluationsand projectforms.
At every step, the premise seems to be an underlying suspicion that the officials in the
Southerncountryare either incompetentor cheats.
* Parasitic expertise-a lot of money is spent in hiring foreign consultants who tap local
expertiseas theirworkhorsesinsteadof establishinga collaborationon an equal footing. And
yet much of the paperworkis simply a rehash of previous studies and plans. In many
instances, governmentofficials need to spend hours in briefing sessions in orderto produce
instantforeign experts on the Philippines,who are paid by the day more than we earn in a
month.
* Cultural blinders-many foreign aid personnel and consultants regard the South as a
homogeneousentity,perhapsbelieving in the omnipotenceof theirparadigm,the infallibility
of their expertise, and the uniformnatureof their subjects.As such, countriesof the South
are forced to face an aid bureaucracythatis bereftof insight into our own uniqueness,which
is groundedin centuries of history.
a Insensitive conditionalities-because projects must run according to predetermined
schedules and patterns, it is the poor and/or the environment that must ultimately be
sacrificed. Like the structuraladjustmentprogrammesthat insist on bitterpills that further
compromisethe qualityof life of the poor, some urbanprojectsdismiss the needs of the poor
in orderto meet demands of foreign funders.
* Negative acculturation-because most foreign aid agencies work through and with
government, these agencies have learned to work the system. Instead of insisting on
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Unsustainabledevelopment:the Philippine experience

professional relations, they have learned the arts of patronage and pulling strings in the
background.
Direction without risk-foreign aid agencies have the luxury of imposing projects while
shielding themselves from any risks. On the financial side, loan repaymentsare, after all,
guaranteed.On the human side, it is not they who will suffer the consequences. On the
political side, foreign aid agencies hardlyearnthe wrathof those whose lives are negatively
affected since it is the in-countrygovernmentthat takes the flak.

Thereare certainlymany cases in aid programmeswhen these sins are avoided. I have had the
benefit of workingdirectlywith people from foreign aid agencies who have undeniablyhad the
best interestsof the Philippinesat heart.While thereis much thatcan be done to reformforeign
aid, it is still the countriesof the South that must bear the burdenof change.

The challenges ahead

A shift in our development paradigm is urgently needed. I do not refer to earth-shaking
upheavals,but to the simple resurrectionof the importanceof the rights of people and nature.
In our frenzy towardseconomic development,our macro-economicpolicies and the short-term
nature of political decision making have strained the carrying capacity of the earth and
forgottenour caring capacity for the rights and needs of the poor. But beyond the platitudes
thatregularlymarkour public statements,there are practicalinitiatives that can be introduced
or strengthened.
Most of our governmentshave highly centralisedsystems for deciding on nationalpolicies,
allocating resources, and implementingprogrammes.Although we can all hope for national
governancethatis moreresponsiveto the rightsof the poor and the environment,we also know
that the pressuresof the dominantdevelopmentparadigmare also strongerat this level. The
specific realities on the ground are also more distant from national agencies, despite the
presence of local structures.Consistent with a bottom-up approach, and because of the
growing complexity especially of urbanlife, decentralisationto the local governmentlevel has
the greatest potential to turn the situation around.This requiresthat central governmentlay
down the generaldirections,policies, and regulatoryframeworkwhile local governmentunits
play a more proactive role in planning and implementation.
Allow me to mention a few of the actions that local governments could undertake
immediately:
* Minimumquality-of-life indicators: social policies are the visible expressions of a caring
government. We can start by creating measurable and verifiable parameters for nonnegotiable minimum quality-of-life standardsfor each of our cities. Indicators must be
formulatedwith the active participationof civil society. Indicatorsthat are able to measure
outcomes can serve as a social contractbetween local authoritiesand their constituencies
because they relate to concrete action and defined accountabilities. For example, from
baseline data on existing realities, quantifiabletargets for the improvementof minimum
quality-of-life indicators on housing, potable water, sanitation systems, welfare, employment, education,and health can be regularlymonitored.Insteadof the rhetoricof promises,
it is a challenge to responsiblelocal officials to submitthemselves to a regularratingbased
upon clear indicators of perfornance. But, more than this, minimum quality-of-life
indicators with a defined timetable can lay the bases for ensuring that the poor and the
environmentare given the highest priorityin governance.
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239

Karina Constantino-David

. Learningfrom the poor: expertise very often takes on an unconscious arrogance.Most

public policy is formed without the participationof the poor. Many of our political leaders
and technocratsunfortunatelyperceive the engagement of the poor as messy. On the other
hand, civil society organisationstend to romanticise the poor as having all the answers.
Social policy can only be effective if decision makers draw from the wealth of knowledge
and skills of the technical experts and also the poor. In the final analysis, a participatory
process is the best guaranteefor success.
* Maximising innovative initiatives: we do not need to reinvent the wheel. There are many
innovative initiatives that can be mainstreamedand furtherstrengthened.The Sustainable
Cities Programmeof the UNCHS (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements) and
UNEP (United Nations EnvironmentProgramme)and the City Development Strategiesof
the WorldBank, althoughimplementedin only a few areas,have had some positive results,
especially in the areaof people's participation.In the Philippines,the CommunityMortgage
Programme,which allows informal settlementsto negotiate with landownersand purchase
the land on which they live, has accomplished significant results. More than 100,000
families have benefited, with repaymentrates significantly higher than the usual low-cost
housing packages. Variousmicro-enterpriseinitiatives and cooperativemovements in Asia
have also shown that, given the opportunity,the poor can manage their own economic
development. In the field of health and education, many NGO-initiatedprogrammesare
testimonies to successful alternativeinterventions.It is also worth emphasisingthat all the
successes can be tracedback to the level of organisationfound in urbanpoor communities.
Organisingand the accompanyingincrease in knowledge, attitudes,and skills of the urban
poor is the base upon which poverty can most effectively be overcome.
* Making the market work: in this era of globalisation, it is naive to dream of poverty
eradicationwithout addressingthe market.Business and finance have long been viewed as
the antithesisof poverty. But, in much the same way as we have learnedthat we all share
a finite earth,business has also come to accept the reality that massive poverty is not good
for business. The past few decades have seen a slowly emerging trend whereby more
business conglomerates have moved from an almost total lack of concern, to charitable
endeavours, to involvement in social issues, to self-imposed quality-of-life standards.
Governmentsmust speed up this development by providing the atmosphere that would
encourage access of the poor to the market.This can be done throughenhancementslike
guaranteesof and incentives for credit to the poor as well as throughtransparentsubsidies
so the poor can afford the market.
. Focusing on newly emerging cities: if our megacities developed into monstrositiesdue to
lack of planningand simple neglect, we have the opportunityto avoid the same mistakes in
the newer cities. At the same time, dramatictechnological advances, especially in mass
transit and electronic communication systems, make it possible to create centres of
governance, business, and culture that need not be congested within tightly confined
geographicareas. It is thereforeimperativethat local authoritiesin newly emerging cities
musterthe political will to anticipatethe future and plan their cities beyond their terms of
office.
We are fortunateto be leaders at the beginning of a new century.We can repeatthe mistakes
of the past or we can help to shape the future. I am confident that local authorities,with the
effective participationof business and civil society, can make a differencefor the poor and our
environment.With the assistance of multilateralinstitutionsalong with urbanresearchers,all
it takes is the political will to go against the grain of traditionand the daring to care for the
poor, the environment,and the future.
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Unsustainabledevelopment:the Philippine experience

Notes
1 This article was completed before the campaign to impeach President Estrada had
commenced.
2 The CommunityMortgage Programmeis an innovative system whereby informal settlers,
with the assistance of an intermediarycalled an originator,negotiate with the landowner
and, once an agreementhas been reachedbetween the parties,the land is mortgagedto the
government,the landowneris paid in full, and the people amortiseto the governmentover
a period of 25 years at 6 per cent interest. For a fuller descriptionand assessment of this
programme,see the article by Berner in this issue.

Reference
Independent Commission on Population and Quality of Life (ICPQL) (1996) Caringfor
the Future:Reportof the IndependentCommissionon Populationand Qualityof Life, Oxford:
OUP.

The author
KarinaConstantino-Davidis Professor of CommunityDevelopment at the University of the
Philippines,formerSecretaryof Housing and UrbanDevelopment, July 1998-October 1999,
and PhilippineNGO leader. Contact details: University of the Philippines,Diliman, Quezon
City, Philippines. <kcdavid@philonline.cpm> .

Development in Practice, Volume11, Numbers2 & 3, May 2001

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