Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament Election:

Does Campaign Personalization Increase the Propensity to Turn Out?

Hermann Schmitt
Politics, University of Manchester and MZES, University of Mannheim
Sara B. Hobolt
European Institute, London School of Economics
Sebastian Adrian Popa
MZES, University of Mannheim

Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR General Conference

to be convened at the University of Glasgow, Scotland, 3-6 September 2014

(draft September 1, 2014: 13245 words overall)

Abstract
The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections are considered a turning point in the history of the
European Union. For the first time is there a direct link between the vote in these elections and
the nomination of the President of the European Commission. Consequently, the major political
groups each nominated a lead candidate, or Spitzenkandidat, for the post. We postulate that
these developments towards personalization increased the visibility and the mobilization
potential of the EP election campaign, hence calling for a gradual revision of the classical second
order election model customarily used to analyse these elections. Based on 28 nationally
representative post-electoral survey data collected EU wide by the 2014 European Election Study
in co-operation with the European Parliament, we analyse whether and how the presence of the
lead candidates influenced the individual propensity to participate in these elections. We show
that recognition of the candidates leads to a higher propensity to turn out, even when controlling
for a host of other individual-level factors explaining turnout and the context factors known to
facilitate participation. Furthermore their campaign efforts (both online and offline) also had an
impact on the propensity to turn out both directly and by reinforcing the effect of recognition.

Introduction

It was the motto of the European Parliament ahead of the 2014 election of its members: This
time its different. And the 2014 election indeed was different on at least two accounts. The first
was that it was held in times of a lasting public debt crisis in parts of the Union. Austerity
measures were imposed on the debtor countries by the Eurozone government (European
Commission and the relevant part of the European Council of Ministers) together with the
International Monetary Fund (quotes). The economic consequences rocketing youth
unemployment for example of these measures were severe. Whether these economic
turbulences have set the scene for a critical election (Key 1955) by fostering a lasting
realignment between citizens and voters on the one hand and political parties on the other, is
under investigation.
The other important difference of the 2014 election was that the member parties of the
major political groups of the European Parliament rallied behind a common lead candidate (or
Spitzenkandidat as these people have commonly been called using the German term). For the
first time in 35 years of a directly elected European Parliament, the extra-parliamentary party
organisation of five major political groups of the European Parliament nominated a lead
candidate during their respective party conventions (or by way of primaries) in order to support
their local campaignsand offered EP voters a choice regarding the next President of the
European Commission. It was a common understanding during the campaign that the
predominant political camp would also win the presidency of the European Commission.
However, it must be noted that this link between the electoral result and the selection of the next
EC President while in accordance with Art 17 (7) of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union was
not commanded by it. It rather was as a gamble that the European Parliament played in order to

further democratize the EP elections and at the same time increase its power vis vis the
Council. As could have been expected, the Council did not immediately consent with this new
selection procedure. Even if it was finally accepted the decision was not unanimous as it used to
be in the past. A few pockets of resistance (viz. the governments of the United Kingdom and
Hungary) could not be persuaded to support the Councils nomination as Commission president
of Jean Clause Juncker, whose EPP had won the election by a comfortable margin.
Five of seven (or eight if we count the non-affiliated as a group) groups nominated a lead
candidate : EPP (Jean Claude Juncker), PES (Matin Schulz), ALDE (Guy Verhofstadt), the
Greens (Ska Keller and Jos Bov), and the Left (Alexis Tsipras). The two groups which did not
come along belong to the Euro-sceptical camp in the EP: the European Conservatives and
Reformists (ECR) in which the British Conservatives played a leading role, and Europe for
Freedom and Democracy (EFD) in which the British UKIP was the strongest force. In what
follows we will analyse whether and how these lead candidates affected the voting behaviour of
EU citizens in the 2014 European Parliament election. Based on survey data of the 2014
European Election Study we concentrate our attention on three most visible of the five lead
candidates (Juncker, Schulz and Verhofstadt), and restrict our curiosity to electoral participation
(and ignoring for now the question of party choice). Did the lead candidates increase the
propensity of citizens to turning out (as compared to a hypothetical situation in which they would
not have run)? This is the leading research question of this article.

2 The Emergence of a Parliamentary System in the EU

At the heart of the argument in favour of Spitzenkandidaten is the expectation that it will
strengthen executive accountability in the European Union. It is well known that thee EU is a

hybrid system with a mixture of parliamentary and presidential features. Its legislative power are
shared between the Council and the European Parliament, and it has a dual executive where
national governments in the Council and European Council possess long-term executive power
and set the overall political and legislative agenda, whereas the EU Commission has the sole
right of legislative initiative. Yet, the EU has until recently lacked mechanisms for citizens to
hold the EU executive to account, or to throw the rascals out of executive office, through the
process of competitive elections. Unlike a presidential system, there are no direct elections
where citizens can elect the president of the Commission (or the Council). Unlike a
parliamentary system there is not even a strong indirect link between the party choice in
parliamentary elections and the executive, at least not until recently. Prior to the Maastricht
Treaty, the Commission President was chosen unanimously by the national governments. The
public therefore had no real way of influencing the election of the EUs executive or hold it to
account for its actions.
During the early decades of European integration this was not regarded as a problem,
since democratic legitimacy rested solely, in an intergovernmental manner, on the national
governments in the Council. However, the pooling of sovereignty at the European level, the
move away from unanimity in the Council (meaning that individual governments could be
outvoted) and the end of the permissive consensus in the early 1990s put pressure on the EU to
establish a European electoral dimension, where voters could be directly represented at the
European level, rather than only indirectly through their national governments. Strengthening the
powers of the European Parliament was at the core of these reforms. First, the Amsterdam and
Maastricht Treaties strengthened the legislative powers of the EP, gradually making it a genuine
co-legislature with the Council. Second, the Maastricht Treaty (1993) introduced a new

investiture procedure where the Council must consult the European Parliament on their
nominee for the Commission president and Parliaments approval was required before the
Member States could appoint the President and Members of the Commission as a collegiate
body. The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) took matters further by requiring Parliaments specific
approval for the appointment of the Commission President, prior to that of the other
Commissioners. Parliament also introduced hearings of Commissioners-designate in 1994.
While these reforms clearly strengthened the powers of the European Parliament vis-vis the executive institutions in the European Union, they did little to strengthen the link between
voters and the EU executive, or mobilize citizen interest in EP elections. The European
Parliament had argued that in choosing the Commission President, European elections would
really start to matter to citizens and this would bolster interest and turnout (e.g. Lodge, 1995; Hix
1997). However, despite the new powers of the European Parliament, they did not bring about
the genuine electoral connection between voters and EU policy-making that was hoped for.
Turnout to European Parliament elections continued to decline in successive elections from 62
per cent in 1979 to only 43 per cent in 2009. Worryingly, there was also evidence that the
elections failed in providing a strong democratic mandate for policy-making at the European
elections, since parties and election campaigns focused largely on domestic matters. Due to their
perceived insignificance, the elections continued to be second-order national elections (Reif
and Schmitt 1980, Schmitt 2005), where a majority of voters stayed at home, and others cast a
vote in protest against national government or with their hearts without any regard to government
formation (e.g., Hix and Marsh 2007; Marsh 1998; van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). This
second-order nature of European elections have been attributed to the fact that citizens generally
have little knowledge of policies implemented or promised at the European level by parties, and

parties themselves often use these elections as opportunities to test their standing with the public
in terms of their domestic political agendas. The legislative process in the European Parliament
operates very much like in any national legislature with members belonging to EU-level political
groups such as the centre-right EuropeanPeoples Party (EPP) and the centre-left Progressive
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) that structure debate over and support for
legislation and they decide vital political issues (Hix et al. 2006, 2007). However, despite the
presence of traditional party politics at the European level, voters are generally unaware of this
and Euro-parties have traditionally played a limited role in EP election campaigns. This is not
least owing to the fact that, unlike national parliamentary systems, these elections have not been
genuine contests between competing government alternatives and over incumbent performance
records. While Euro-parties produce electoral manifestos, the extent to which the national parties
use these manifestos in their own campaigning has traditionally been minimal. Instead, European
election campaigns have tended to focus on domestic political matters and be dominated by
national political actors. In between European elections, the European Parliament is largely
ignored by national media (Norris 2000; Peter and de Vreese 2004). It is therefore unsurprising
that citizens have limited knowledge of and interest in the European Parliament.
These problems led scholars and politicians alike to suggest constitutional innovations
that could remedy the growing democratic deficit in the European Union. This idea of Europarties nominating competing candidates was discussed already in the 1990s, by scholars such as
Simon Hix (see Hix 1997, 1998). The core idea was to inject real political and personalized
choice into the EP election campaigns by having competing Commission President candidates
with alternative political agendas nominated by Euro-parties, and the candidate nominated by the
winning party group would in turn be nominated by the Council and elected by the European

Parliament to become the President of the Commission. As Hix noted optimistically in his 2008
book on Whats Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, such changes could lead to
public identification of the policy options on the EU table and the winners and losers in the EU.
In short, there would be democratic politics in the EU for the first time (Hix 2008: 164).
These discussions about how to strengthen electoral accountability, and enhance public
interest, in European Parliament elections also played a central role in the debates leading to the
(failed) Constitutional Treaty and, in turn, the Lisbon Treaty (2009). In the Lisbon Treaty the
investiture procedure was revised to emphasize that the European Council should take into
account the elections before nominating and that the European Parliament subsequently elects
the Council nominee:
Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held
the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority,
shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the
Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a
majority of its component members. If he does not obtain the required majority, the
European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall within one month propose a
new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament following the same
procedure. (Article 17(7) TEU; emphases added).

The wording of the treaty is ambiguous when it comes to the powers of the European
Parliament to impose its own candidate. But the European Parliament seized upon the treaty
change by deciding that the European political groups would nominate lead candidates, or

Spitzenkandidaten, for the post of European Commission president. In a resolution agreed on 22

November 2012, the European Parliament presented its main argument:
[The Parliament] urges the European political parties to nominate candidates for the
Presidency of the Commission and expects those candidates to play a leading role in the
parliamentary electoral campaign, in particular by personally presenting their programme
in all Member States of the Union; stresses the importance of reinforcing the political
legitimacy of both Parliament and the Commission by connecting their respective
elections more directly to the choice of the voters.1

This message was reinforced by the European Commission, which fully supported the
move towards Spitzenkandidaten, arguing that this would make concrete and visible the link
between the individual vote of a citizen of the Union for a political party in the European
elections and the candidate for President of the Commission supported by that party2and
thereby increase the legitimacy and accountability of the Commission, and more generally the
democratic legitimacy of EU policy-making.
These institutional resolutions thus echo the message found in the academic literature
concerning the key objectives of the reformed process of nominating and electing the
Commission president. The first aim is to transform the nature of elections to the European
Parliament by creating a genuine contest for the top executive job and a choice between
alternative political platforms. The hope is that this would mobilize citizens to take greater
interest in and participate in the elections in greater numbers. Secondly, the politicisation of
European issues should also allow voters to vote on the basis of issues that matter to EU policy1

European Parliament Resolution of 22 November 2012 on the elections to the European Parliament in 2014 (2012/2829(RSP)).
Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2013 on enhancing the democratic and efficient conduct of the elections to the
European Parliament (2013/142/EU)
2

making rather than treating the elections as a mid-term beauty contest for national
governments. This may, in time, strengthen electoral accountability in the EU: EP elections will
also voters to provide the executive with a genuine democratic mandate, and to subsequently
reward or punish them for the degree to the fulfilled this mandate. Finally, the objective is that
by increasing electoral accountability in EP elections, this will also contribute to the legitimacy
(so-called input legitimacy) of the European Union. In addition to these lofty democratic aims,
there may also be more prosaic inter-institutional reasons for introducing the Spitzenkandidaten.
By introducing its own candidate with the democratic legitimacy conveyed by the vote of
Europes citizens the European Parliament put significant pressure on national governments to
nominate the elected candidate to accept informally, if not formally, the Parliaments right to
appoint the EUs executive, as it eventually happened (Schimmelfennig 2014; Hobolt 2014).
However, this paper will focus on the extent to which there is any evidence that the
Spitzenkandidaten had the desired impact on the campaign and the vote, by raise the stakes of
the vote, personalize the electoral campaign, and thus to attract more voters to the polls and
create a clearer democratic mandate for the European Commission.
While the Parliaments slogan that this time is different held plenty of promise, there
were clearly significant challenges to overcome for the Spitzenkandidaten to have any real
impact on the campaign and the elections. Not least the fact that the European Union lacks a
common public sphere with a common media, or even a common language, to discuss alternative
political visions. While recent studies have shown an increasing parallelization of public
spheres across Europe, where similar issues are being debated at the same time (see Koopmans
and Statham 2010; Kriesi and Grande 2014; for an opposite view Fuchs 2000 and more often),
this does not amount to a Europe-wide public debate on the elections akin to what we know from

other federal systems. Moreover, while the candidates were officially nominated by Euro-parties,
it is still national parties that dominate the election campaigns. The lead candidates impact on
national campaigns was therefore largely determined by the extent to which national party
leaders and the national media involved the European candidates in their national campaign, and
they may have strong incentives to fight on domestic issues (e.g. opposition parties in opposition
to the national government) and even to deliberately disassociate themselves from the
Spitzenkandidaten (as happened in the UK, and to a lesser degree in Italy). Finally, the
procedures adopted by the two major groups to nominate their candidates resulted in the
nomination of two Brussels insiders, Juncker (former Luxembourgian Prime Minister and head
of the Euro Group) and Schulz (President of the European Parliament) rather than politicians
elected primarily for their broad electoral appeal. While the lead candidates had held important
posts inside the EU and in their own member states, they were largely unknown outside their
country of origin before the start of the campaign.
Hence, the effectiveness of the Spitzenkandidaten depended largely on the campaign
itself, however. For the European Parliaments argument to be convincing, European voters
would also need to take notice of the competing candidates. This is discussed in the next section.

Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 campaign

Despite the challenges outlined above, the Spitzenkandidaten did make efforts to run a
distinctly European campaign. According to the EU-Observer, which quotes party sources, the
five candidates had a total budget of 4.5 million Euro (see http://euobserver.com/euelections/124152). Although these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt, they can give us
some idea about the activities of the candidates, with both Schulz and Juncker disposing of a

10

budget of approximately 1.5 million Euro, Verhofstadt spending under 1 million, while the other
two candidates has substantially smaller amounts of money available3.
The most eye-catching initiatives were the nine televised debates between the
Presidential candidates that took place between 9 April and 20 May 2014. They were
conducted in French, English and German, and broadcast on the internet, on Euronews and on
selected national channels. A post-election survey of citizens in 15 EU countries reveals that 15
per cent of European citizens claim to have seen at least one of the TV debates (AECR 2014).4
Not surprisingly these debates generated the most interest in the home countries of the lead
candidates: in Luxembourg (Juncker) and in Greece (Tsipras) where 36 and 26 per cent of
respondents respectively reported to had watched one of the debates whereas only 6 per cent of
Dutch and British citizens had seen any of the debates. An important role was also played by the
language in which the debate was carried out. A further example of the debates is the of the 8th
of May. Schulz and Juncker opposed one another, the debate was carried out in German and
broadcasted in Austria and Germany. It gained quite significant traction being watch by 330000
viewers in Austria (i.e. 13% market share) and 1.8 million people in German (i.e. 6% of the
market share), much more than other political talk shows in the two countries (cite the news
article).
In addition to the debate the candidates also had a substantial presence on the ground.
This is probably best summarised by a quote of the campaign chief of the Juncker campaign,
Martin Selmayr: "Our wives don't know us anymore, we don't know where our bed is,". And
this seems to be true given the intensity of the campaign activity of the three most visible

This funding hierarchy also confirms that the three candidates we included in our surveys are the most visible and important
of the five.
4
The survey was conducted by AMR GmbH Dusseldorf on behalf of the AECR. The poll was in the field on 25 and 26 of May on a
sample base of 12,132 respondents across 15 EU countries (6,083 voters and 6,049 non-voters).

11

candidates. In the two months prior to Election Day Schulz had 38 visits in 20 countries,
Juncker covered 17 countries and participated in 34 campaign visits (i.e. days spent in the
country), while Verhofstadt had a more modest presence only had 29 visits in 12 countries.
Furthermore, these numbers do not take into account that in some cases they visited several cities
or attended several campaign events in the same day (see Appendix 2 for a complete description
of the campaign events). Most of these were classical campaigning events such as meeting party
activists and party supporters, participating at large campaign gatherings, or being present by the
launching of national candidates. Still the campaign of both Schulz and Juncker each had its
specificity. First, Schulz had several events in which he directly addressed trade union members
or factory workers, but this is not surprising considering that the before mentioned groups are the
traditional base of the European Socialists. Second, and probably more important, Juncker had
several meetings with the heads of national government and other important national and
European political figures. For example he had private meeting with the German, Polish, Greek,
Portuguese, Finish and Latvian, Prime ministers and the ex PMs of France, Germany and Malta.
When we take into account that he was the favourite to ensure the nomination as President of the
European Commission, these meeting were most likely an attempt to secure the nomination,
especially bearing in mind the somewhat ambiguous text of the Lisbon treaty.
Last but not least the on-line campaign of the Spitzenkandidaten was not negligible. It
gained special transaction during around the time of the TV debate. For example during the 15
May debate, #TellEUROPE was trending in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Netherlands and the UK and was mentioned in 110k tweets
(http://www3.ebu.ch/contents/news/2014/05/ebu-makes-history-with-the-eurov.html). All in all
Schulz was the most active in the online environment, having approximately 110k twitter

12

followers and almost 250k mentions during the two months before the elections. Verhofstadt also
had a remarkable presence with 26k followers and 105k mentions in the same period. Probably
the most surprising is the fact the favourite, i.e. Juncker, was the last active twitter user as he is
not even among the top ten most popular European leaders.5
Individual level studies of electoral participation in European Parliament elections
Individual level analyses of electoral participation as a dependent variable is a difficult task to
address. The problem is the notorious over-reporting of survey respondents who claim to have
participated while in fact they did not.6 Aggregate statistics speak a very clear language: the
proportion of respondent in representative surveys who claim to have participated in an election
while they did not is between 10 and 20 percent higher than the official participation rate as
reported by the national statistical offices (and further down the line by Eurostat).
If we want to understand the determinants of abstention and voting, this over-reporting is
only a problem if those who falsely claim to have voted are indeed different from the true voters.
We can differentiate between these two classes of voters, true and false, in countries where
electoral registers are held. Britain is a good example here, but also some of the Scandinavian
countries and the US. A number of studies has revealed that indeed the true and the false voters
are pretty much of the same kind so that at least for the study of the determinants of electoral
participation the phenomenon of over-reporting does not constitute a major problem (e.g.
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Cassel 2003; for a question mark Bernstein et al. 2001).
Participation levels in European Parliament elections started out at a low level in 1979,
and turned even lower over time. As a consequence, individual-level analyses of EP electoral

The source of these number is the TNS leader watch available at, http://www.tnsglobal.com/what-we-do/european-leaderwatch
6
The most frequently cited is social desirability.

13

participation have concentrated on the meaning of non-voting, and more in particular whether
electoral abstention is indicative of critical or even hostile attitudes on the side of non-voters
about European integration in general, and/or the institutions and policies of the European
Union in particular. Indeed, the most popular view expressed in the media is that Euroskepticism is a major driving force behind Euro-election abstentions (a recent example is The
Guardian of 19 May 2014). But there are also a number of scholarly pieces of research pointing
in this direction (Blondel et al. 1998; Steinbrecher & Rattinger 2012; Evans & Ivaldi 2012).
However, the tenor of the analyses of individual level participation seems to point in a
different direction. In line with the second-order elections model, the authors here expect
deficient mobilization to be the main factor explaining non-voting, for at least two reasons: the
first one is that campaign efforts of the competing parties in the past notoriously turned out to be
shallow; and the second is that Euro-skepticism is not a convincing explanation since in membercountries where a significant Euro-skeptical voter segment existed in the electorate, political
entrepreneurs in general did not fail to compete for these votes and represent them in the
European Parliament (as members of one or the other Euro-skeptical group of the house).
Obvious examples here are the Danish Folkebevaegelsen, the Swedish June list, or the British
UKIP. The new East of the European Union (from 2004 on) has a number of additional
examples on offer.
Results of individual level participation analyses obviously depend essentially upon the
causal structure that the analyst imposes on the data he or she analyses. What is cause and what
is effect is the critical question here or in other words: which variable is causally prior to which
other variable in the model, and can additional (control) variables therefore be ignored?7
7

This will be an important issue in the next section when we discuss our extensive set of control variables that we employ in
order to strengthen the validity of our central regression results.

14

Considering those concerns, a number of European Election Study based analyses of the
determinants of individual electoral participation have been elaborated in the past which all tend
to support the mobilization hypothesis (Schmitt & Mannheimer 1991; Schmitt & van der Eijk
2003, 2007, 2008; van der Eijk & Schmitt 2009). This is not to say that Euro-skepticism nowhere
did play a role for shaping turnout in the past, or never will become an important co-determinant
of non-voting. But so far, the main story goes in the opposite direction: the main determinant of
electoral participation has been shown to be mobilization rather than citizens attitudes about the
EU. Upon that background, we expect that the Spitzenkandidaten contributed to electoral
mobilization and help to raise turnout (H1).
There are several mechanisms through which the Spitzenkandidaten can increase
mobilization. The first is personalization: the addition of European faces and voices to the
campaign is expected to increase mobilization and contribute to an increase in turnout (cites).
Therefore we expect that those who are able to recognize the Spitzenkandidaten benefited from
their mobilization potential and hence have a higher propensity to turnout (H1.1).
The second mechanism consists of the actual campaigning efforts of the lead candidates.
We expect that in countries where the campaign efforts of the Spitzenkandidaten are stronger
individuals are more like to report casting a vote (H1.2.). Furthermore, we anticipate that the
mechanism one and two have an additive interactive effect: personalization and campaigning
should reinforce one another. On the one hand, the campaign activities and the subsequent media
coverage they receive are likely to reaffirm the importance of the Spitzenkandidaten for the
individuals who are able to recognise them and thus reinforce the effect of personalization. On
the other hand, previous research has shown that candidates visits are more effective for
individuals that have at least some basic previous knowledge of them (Fowler et al. 2002; Joslyn

15

and Ceccoli 1996; King and Morehouse, 2005). All in all, we expect that the effect of candidate
recognition is stronger in countries where the candidates campaigned (H1.3).
Last but not least the mobilization potential of the lead candidates can be also dependent
on external factors. The most obvious one that comes to mind is the strength of the local
member party of his EP party group in a given country. Any campaign activity benefits from
public attention. The stronger the national party is that supports the lead candidate, the more
attention there is. We therefore expect that the effect of campaigning on turnout is stronger the
larger the local party of a candidate is (H2).

Data and methods

The present paper is the first that uses the European Election Study (EES) 2014 Voter Study.
This is a nationally representative post-election survey that was realised in each of the 28
member countries of the EU. This study continues the EES tradition of post European Parliament
election surveys which started in 1989 (and actually in 1979 with an addition to the
Eurobarometer at the time). It is worth mentioning that for the first time in the history of EES,
this study was commissioned in collaboration with the Public Opinion Monitoring Unit of the
European Parliament. The EES part of the study was funded by a consortium of private
foundations8 and benefited in addition from the generous support of TNS Opinion. The data
collection was carried out by TNS Opinion in collaboration with its local partners between 30
May and 27 June 2014 (it started five days after the European Parliament elections and lasted for
four weeks). The sample is representative at the country level and it consists of roughly 1,100

Lead by the Volkswagen Foundation and supported in addition by the Mercator Foundation, the Swedish Rijksbank
Foundation, and the Portuguese Gulbenkian Foundation.

16

respondents in each EU member country, the total sample size being 300649. All the interviews
were carried out face to face (by way of Computer Assisted Personal Interviews, or CAPI)10.
Excluding demographics, the survey consists of approximately 60 question units,
summing up to a total of 220 items. The core of the questionnaire is similar to the EES 2009
Voter Study, including traditional items such as left-right and pro-anti EU self- and partyplacements, a PTV battery, media use items, a most important issue battery, and so on. One of
the main innovations of the 2014 study consists in a battery inquiring about respondents
recognition of the Spitzenkandidaten. A second innovation is a focus on the effects of the
economic crisis. The third and not the last is that this study uses issue questions that will also be
used in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014, therefore allowing for a direct comparison between
expert placements of political parties and self-placements of voters11.
The dependent variable of this paper is measured by a standard self-reported turnout
variable that also includes a memory cue (the date of the elections) and a face saving statement
(For one reason or another, some people in [OUR COUNTRY] did not vote in these elections).
The main instrument which we use to measure the mobilizing potential of the
Spitzenkandidaten (i.e. the personalization of the campaign) is a name-party recognition
battery. This requires respondents to identify which EP party group or which national party
supports the nomination of the three most important candidates: Jean-Claude Juncker, Martin
Schulz and Guy Verhofstadt. Although the question is not in an ideal open-end format, the
respondents where offered four response options and thus not only the three that applied to one

The exceptions are: Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg where only approximately 550 respondents were interviewed.
Furthermore in Germany the sample was 1648 (consisting of two representative samples for West and East Germany) and the
United Kingdom where the sample was 1442, of which 338 interviews were conducted in Northern Ireland.
10
More details regarding the study can be found at http://eeshomepage.net/voter-study-2014/
11
The master questionnaire in both English and French is available at the following link: eeshomepage.net/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/Master-Questionnaire.pdf

17

of the candidates but also a fourth and false one: Socialists & Democrat (S&D) (identified e.g.
in Germany by mentioning the SPD), European People's Party (EPP) (identified in Germany
by the CDU/CSU), Liberals and Allies Group (ALDE) (identified in German by the FDP) and
finally The Greens (identified in Germany by Die Grnen)12. The correct answer was therefore
neither a trivial one nor easy to guess. Furthermore, in order to discourage guessing, the Dont
know option was also offered. All in all, the battery does not only measure the familiarity with
the Spitzenkandidaten but it also tests the ability of respondents to associate them with a specific
party, thus appropriately capturing the mobilisation potential of the three candidates.
In addition to measuring the mobilisation through personalization we also take into
account possible macro level effects. In operational terms we rely on the offline campaign
activity of the candidates indicated by the number of campaign visits of each candidate per
member country. Given the distribution of the variable (see Appendix 1) and the limited
campaign time, we chose to use a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the candidate visited
the country and 0 otherwise. We expect this effect to be moderated by the strength of the
candidates local party (i.e. the local member party in the EP group) in the respective country,
measured as the share of the votes which the respective party gained in the 2014 EP election.
In addition to candidate recognition we also employ a host of control variables as they are
customarily used to explain the propensity of turnout. The first group assembles variables
measuring campaign engagement (i.e. exposure to the campaign, campaign involvement and
contact by a party) and general political engagement (interest in politics, level of political
discussion, internal political efficacy, partisanship, and news consumption). These variables are
generally considered as proxies for political mobilisation (Gerber and Green 2000; Rosenstone
12

In countries where two or more parties were expected to join an EP group, the biggest party was mentioned. In countries
where there was no party supporting one of the four EP groups, only the name of the EP group was provided.

18

and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995; Zuckerman et al. 2007) and individual resources (Burns et
al. 2001; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995), both of which are known to be strong predictors of turnout. However these indicators also allow to control for the possible endogeneity
between candidate recognition and propensity to vote. To be more specific one might claim that
once the decision to vote is taken, individuals start looking for all the relevant information that
would help them in making the best choice (Downs 1957) and this could, in turn, lead to a higher
propensity to recognise the Spitzenkandidaten (i.e. reverse causality). However, as soon as we
control for the level of political engagement of respondents we reduce the possibility that the
relation between recognition and propensity to vote is a result of previous knowledge or of
information acquired during the electoral campaign. Thus we can safely assume that any effect
that candidate recognition might have on the propensity to vote is a result of the mobilizing
effect of the Spitzenkandidaten.
A second group of factor is represented by social background variables that are indicative
for social integration and individual resources. Historically these were among the first factors
used to explain individual turnout (Tingsten 1937; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al.
1995). They include union membership, church attendance, rural vs. urban residence, but also
age, education, gender, marital status, employment status, immigrant status, and internet use.
The final group of individual level factors for which we control are three attitudinal
constructs. The first is the legitimacy of the electoral process, operationalised by trust in the
national parliament. The second is the legitimacy of European integration measured by trust in
EU institutions and evaluation of EU membership. The third and last factor here is the perceived
performance of the economy both at the socio-tropic and pocket-book level.

19

At the macro level we control for compulsory voting, whether other elections took place
at the same time as the EP elections, and post-communist past of the country13, all being factors
that were shown in previous studies to have a strong influence on turnout in EP elections (e.g.
Schmitt 2005; Franklin and Hobolt 2011; Wessels and Franklin 2009). We would like to point
out that all independent variables where rescaled to have values between a theoretical minimum
of 0 and a theoretical maximum of 1, thus allowing for a straightforward comparison of their
effects (see Appendix 1 for a complete description of all variables).
In order to test our hypothesis we proceed in two steps. First we present country level
descriptives and illustrate the aggregate relation between turnout and the mobilisation efforts of
the candidates. Second we make use of a series of multilevel logistic regression models to
present the mobilisation effects of the Spitzenkandidaten on the propensity to vote in the 2014
EP elections. It is important to mention that our unit of analysis at the second level is party
systems rather than countries. In Belgium and the UK, there are effectively two party systems in
operation: the Wallon and the Flemish in the Belgian case, and the British and Northern Irish one
in the UK case. Therefore our N at the second lever is 30 and not 28. We use random intercepts
and random slops for the variables measuring candidate recognition and grand mean centering
for aggregate level variables (Enders & Tofighi 2007). The analysis is conducted in R, using the
lme4 package version 1.1-7.

Empirical Analysis

13

It is worth mentioning that post-communism, the level of GDP per capita, and turnout in the previous national elections are
highly correlated. Controlling for any of the three yielded a very similar pattern of results (i.e. the significance levels for the
effects of interest were the same).

20

We start by presenting some descriptive statistics showing turnout levels in the 2014 EP
elections and the country-specific campaign of the Spitzenkandidaten (recognition and campaign
activity).

[Table 1 around here]

Although the motto for the current European elections was This time its different, at a
first glance this was not reflected by the 42.5% overall turnout level, which is still extremely low
when compared to the turnout registered in first order national elections. However, if we
compare this number elections with the turnout at previous the EP election, we notice something
like a stand-still in 2014. The notorious turnout decline from 1979 seems to have come to an end.
Between 2009 and 2014, the overall EU turnout only dropped by only 0.4% compared to 2.6%
from 2004 to 2009 and 4% from 1999 to 2004. Furthermore, in ten of the 28 countries we even
notice an increase in turnout.
Turning to the campaign effects of the candidates, we realise that the proportion of
citizens who recognised the candidates is not too impressive. 19 % of our respondents recognised
Juncker and 17% of them recognised Schulz. These numbers are even lower for the candidate of
the weakest of the three political groups that we consider, the Liberal Guy Verhofstadt who was
only recognised by 9 % of all respondents. Of course there are significant country differences as
the candidates are better known in their countries of origin and the neighbouring ones. In far
away countries such as the Czech Republic or the UK, only around 5% of respondents were able
to correctly identify them. More remarkable though are their campaigning efforts as between the

21

three of them they managed to cover 24 of the 28 EU countries14 in a period of just two months
before Election Day.

[Table 2 around here]

A first glimpse into how campaign mobilisation (measured as recognition and campaign
activities) links to turnout is presented in Table 2. We are interested in whether the lead
candidates made a difference this time, and therefore in the turnout difference between 2009
and 2014. At the aggregate level, there is not a single statistically significant relation between
turnout change and the above mentioned variables. However, we notice that the campaign
characteristics of the three lead candidates all point in the same direction. We find that the
turnout difference goes in a positive direction in member countries where the candidates have
visited and where the proportion of respondents recognizing them was higher. Needless to say,
these aggregate level associations are only suggestive of possible campaign effects on the
individual-level propensity to vote. Given the general direction of these associations, however,
we are looking forward to the findings of the individual level analysis.

[Table 3 around here]

In Table 3 we present a series of multilevel models that test the potential mobilizing
effects of the Spitzenkandidaten. Model 1 serves mostly as a reference model because it includes
all the relevant variables except for the recognition and the number of visits. A quick inspection

14

The only countries not visited by either of the candidates were: Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Great Britain.

22

of this model shows that there are no effects that go against previous findings. What needs to be
noted is that all subsequent models have a better fit than Model 1.
Model 2 examines the mobilizing effect of all candidates, but given the multicoliniarity
between candidate recognition (the correlation between the recognition of Schulz and Juncker is
0.61) and campaign visits, we chose to investigate these effects separately for each candidate.
First we looked into the effect of recognition and noted that these effects only reach statistical
significance in the case of Schulz and Juncker. Not only do they go in the expected directions,
these effects are also quite substantive (and comparable to the effects of most sociodemographics variables as well as the effects of some of the variables measuring political
engagement such as political knowledge and contact by party during the campaign). In the case
of Schulz we note that recognizing him increases the likelihood of casting a vote by 35%.
Everything else being equal15 this corresponds to an increase of 7% (from 32% to 39%) in the
predicted probability that respondents who recognized him went on and cast a vote. Although
slightly smaller, the effects are similar for those who recognised Juncker. The predicted
probability that they cast a vote is 0.5% compared to 0.4% for those who did not recognise him.
In the case of Verhofstadt the size of the effect is much smaller and did not reach the
conventional levels of statistical significance. A possible explanation is that he is the least
relevant of the three candidates (regarding the race for EC presidency) and had practically no
chance to be nominated. Recognizing him therefore did very little to boost the interest in the EP
elections and thus to mobilise individuals to vote.
All in all, the mobilizing effect of the Spitzenkandidaten, measured as recognition, had a
substantial effect on the individuals propensity to vote. And we are confident that this is not an
15

All predicted probabilities were computed using simulations based on the normal distribution of coefficients, while keeping
all continuous variables at their mean and all categorical variables at zero.

23

endogenous effect. As we control for political engagement (both general and campaign specific)
it is much more likely that recognition actually measures mobilisation and not a facet of political
engagement that was not covered by one of the several indicators we use to measure this
concept16. Finally, given the rather small proportion of respondents who actually recognised
Schulz and Juncker, we need to acknowledge that the impact of their visits on the overall turnout
is bound to be rather small.
If in the previous section we focused on a rather indirect measure of campaign
mobilisation, i.e. name recognition. In what follows we look at how the offline campaign efforts
of the candidates (i.e. whether they campaigned or not in a country) had an impact on turnout.
Our basic expectation is that through their campaign visits (an event we can safely assume was
covered by national media) candidates managed to raise interest in and awareness of the
forthcoming European Parliament election, and to mobilize turnout. Again, we only record a
statistically significant effect in the case of two of our three candidates, Schulz (Model 4) and
Verhofstadt (Model 5). In both cases the effects are substantial ones. Everything else being
equal, the predicted probability to vote for respondents who live in a country in which Schulz
campaigned is 45% compared to a baseline predicted probability of 32% for those who live in
another country. In the case of Verhofstadt (Model 5), the effect is slightly smaller, the predicted
probability of a respondent living in a country that he campaigned is 47% compared to 39% for
those living in other countries. These results reflect to a certain degree the campaign intensity of
the candidates. The strongest effect can be noticed in the case of Martin Schulz who had the
highest number of campaign events (see Table 1) and covered by far the largest number of

16

Among other indicators our models take into account political knowledge and political interest that are the most likely
suspects.

24

countries/political regions (21 in comparison Juncker who covered 18 and Verhofstadt who
covered only 14).
In addition to their main effects we expected these two facets of mobilisation to have a
cumulative effect. More specifically, we expected that they would reinforce one another (H1.3).
A test of this hypothesis is presented in Table 3, Models 6 to 8. We note that the interaction
reaches statistical significance only in the case of Schulz (Model 7) and Verhofstadt (Model 8).
The lack of an interactive effect in the case of Juncker is not surprising given that we did not find
any effect of his campaign visits on turnout17. Figures 1 and 2 support our understanding of these
interaction effects.

[Figure 1 and 2 around here]18

As expected the highest propensity to vote is recorded in the case of those citizens who
recognised the candidates and resided in a country in which they campaigned. In the case of
Schulz (Figure 1) such a person on average is 10% more likely to vote compared to people who
reside in a country that Schulz visited but who were unable to recognise him as the S&D
nominee, and 20% more likely to vote when compared to people residing in countries where
Schulz did not campaign. The magnitude of the effects is lower for Verhofstadt (Figure 2) as
individuals residing in countries that he visited and were able to recognise him as the ALDE
nominee, were only about 10% more likely to vote than all other groups.

17

Models excluding the support of the EP party group and its interaction with campaign visits yielded almost identical results.
For the sake of simplicity we chose to only show the combined models; the separate models are documented in Appendix 3.
18
One should note that overlapping confidence intervals when plotting interaction effects are not necessarily suggesting a lack
of statistical significance. Confidence intervals that do not overlap are only a sufficient but not necessary condition for statistical
significance.

25

[Figure 3 around here]

Last but not least we expected the effect of campaign visits of our Spitzenkandidaten to
be stronger in countries where the local member party of the EP group that supported their
nomination is itself stronger. We only found such an effect in the case of Schulz (Model 7).
Figure 3 confirms that the Schulz campaign practically did not have any effect in countries with
low S&D support. The picture is totally different in countries where the local S&D member party
is strong. In such countries campaigning increased turnout as it had a chance to activate the large
number of S&D supporters.

Discussion (to be added)

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31

Table 1: Election turnout and candidate recognition, country level descriptives.

Turnout
in the
2014 EP
elections

Turnout
in the
2009 EP
elections

Difference
in turnout
(EP2014EP2009)

Turnout in
the
previous
legislative
elections

Austria

45.39%

45.97

-0.58%

74.91%

43.90%

39.77%

15.80%

Belgium

89.64%

90.39

-0.75%

89.45%

31.09

25.55

69.46

Bulgaria

35.84%

38.99

-3.15%

52.49%

13.45%

17.63%

4.63%

Croatia

25.24%

20.84*

4.40%

54.17%

11.97%

10.58%

4.08%

Cyprus
Czech
Republic

43.97%

59.4

-15.43%

78.7%

17.17%

12.08%

5.66%

18.2%

28.22

-10.02%

59.48%

4.5%

5.69%

3.40%

Denmark

56.3%

59.54

-3.24%

87.74%

17.42%

11.34%

3.23%

Estonia

36.52%

43.9

-7.38%

63.53%

4.32%

5.24%

2.12%

Finland

41%

38.6

2.4%

67.37%

25.18%

17.24%

11.50%

34.40%

26.72%

77.28%

Country

Flanders

Candidate recognition **
Verhofsta
Juncker
Schulz
dt

Number of campaign visits

Verho
Juncker
Schulz
fstadt

France

42.43%

40.63

1.8%

57.23%

12.48%

16.67%

2.42%

Germany

48.1%

43.27

4.83%

71.55%

63.65%

66.93%

8.01%

11

8.4%

2.03%

1.2%

Great Britain
Greece

59.97%

52.61

7.36%

62.47%

21.84%

18.25%

1.76%

Hungary

28.97%

36.31

-7.34%

61.73%

9.15%

9.69%

6.16%

Ireland

52.44%

58.64

-6.2%

70.05%

13.41%

5.00 %

13.15%

Italy

57.22%

65.05

-7.83%

75.19%

13.20%

20.26%

8.71%

Latvia

30.24%

53.7

-23.46%

59.49%

14.69%

4.17%

2.75%

Lithuania

47.53%

20.98

26.55%

52.93%

5.47%

7.48%

4.11%

Luxembourg

85.55%

90.76

-5.21%

91.15%

80.48%

45.91%

23.05%

Malta

74.8%

78.79

-3.99%

92.95%

34.37%

49.82%

4.23%

Netherlands
Northern
Ireland

37.32%

36.75

0.57%

74.56%

23.44%

16.00 %

24.16%

10.36%

9.17%

4.73%

Poland

23.83%

24.53

6.79%

5.15%

Portugal

33.67%

Romania

32.44%

Slovakia

-0.7%

48.92%

5.56%

36.77

-3.1%

58.03%

12.58%

9.20%

4.94%

27.67

4.77%

41.76%

5.42%

11.64%

3.34%

13.05%

19.64

-6.59%

59.11%

6.58%

6.48%

5.11%

Slovenia

24.55%

28.37

-3.82%

65.6%

17.67%

15.84%

8.92%

Spain

43.81%

44.87

-1.06%

68.94%

10.94%

10.32%

3.35%

Sweden
UK
Wallonia
EU mean

51.07%
35.4%

45.53
34.7

5.54%
0.7%

84.63%
65.1%

21.15%

11.54%

5.16%

67.47%

67.47%

2.04%
58.82%
8.78%

0
0
5

43.00%

3.73%
23.97%
16.87%

1
0
3

42.54%

8.87%
25.58%
18.91%

0
0
5

* turnout level in the 2013 EP elections, ** unweighted figures

32

Table 2: Country level correlations.

TD
Turnout difference
2009-2014 (TD)
recognition
Juncker (RJ)
recognition
Schulz (RS)
recognition
Verhofstadt (RV)
recognition
all (RA)
# visits
Juncker (VJ)
# visits Schulz
(VS)
# visits Verhofstadt (VV)
# visits all
(VA)

RJ

RS

RV

RA

VJ

VS

VV

VA

-.10
.32
-.17
.19
-.03
.43
-.13
.26
-.05
.40
-.20
.16
-.05
.40
-.11
.29

.87
.00
.38
.02
.94
.00
.48
.01
.44
.01
.47
.01
.47
.01

.27
.08
.89
.00
.56
.00
.58
.00
.55
.00
.58
.00

.62
.00
.57
.00
.44
.01
.50
.00
.55
.00

.64
.00
.59
.01
.64
.00
.64
.00

.89
.00
.99
.00
.99
.00

.87
.00
.95
.00

.98
.00

Note: first line in each cell is the Pearson correlation coefficient; second line is the significance (one tailed); n=28 in
all analyses.

33

Table 3: Effect of candidate recognition and campaigning on turnout, main effects

Model 1: Without
the candidates

Model 2: All
candidates

Model 3: Juncker

Model 4: Schulz

4.242*** (0.215)

- (0.339)
4.634***
0.137** (0.068)

- (0.272)
4.179***
0.243*** (0.061)

-4.651*** (0.290)

Model 5:
Verhofstadt

Fixed effects
Intercept
recognition Juncker

0.234*** (0.071)

recognition Schulz
recognition
Verhofstadt
married

0.303*** (0.068)

0.015 (0.090)
0.144 (0.090)
0.082** (0.036)

secondary education
tertiary education
age
female
unemployed
rural
religious

-0.020
-0.008
1.647***
0.131***
-0.044
0.049
0.315***

(0.046)
(0.052)
(0.109)
(0.034)
(0.060)
(0.036)
(0.061)

union member

0.140***
1.738***
0.129**
0.517***
0.442***

(0.048)

immigrant
internet use
Political knowledge
interest in politics
exposure to
campaign

4.483*** (0.220)

(0.116)
(0.060)
(0.068)
(0.066)

0.084** (0.036)

0.082** (0.036)

-0.026 (0.046)

-0.021 (0.046)

-0.021
1.587***
0.150***
-0.043
0.055
0.323***
0.145***

(0.052)
(0.110)
(0.035)
(0.060)
(0.036)
(0.061)
(0.048)

-0.018
1.600***
0.145***
-0.047
0.050
0.316***
0.140***

(0.052)
(0.110)
(0.035)
(0.060)
(0.036)
(0.061)
(0.048)

1.747***
0.448***
0.412***
0.037
0.122*

(0.117)

1.731***
0.468***
0.416***
0.038
0.130*

(0.117)

(0.069)
(0.066)
(0.039)
(0.073)

(0.069)
(0.066)
(0.039)
(0.072)

0.040 (0.039)
3.870*** (0.129)

3.872*** (0.128)

0.565*** (0.035)

0.572*** (0.035)
0.119 (0.091)
0.116* (0.060)

0.085** (0.036)
-0.025
-0.018
1.596***
0.148***
-0.043
0.054
0.320***

0.083** (0.036)

(0.046)
(0.052)
(0.110)
(0.035)
(0.060)
(0.036)
(0.061)

-0.020
-0.008
1.640***
0.135***
-0.043
0.051
0.318***

(0.046)
(0.052)
(0.109)
(0.034)
(0.060)
(0.036)
(0.061)

0.143*** (0.048)

0.143***
1.755***
0.503***
0.441***
0.041

(0.048)

-1.745***
0.460***
0.417***
0.036

(0.117)
(0.069)
(0.066)
(0.039)

(0.116)
(0.068)
(0.066)
(0.039)

0.126* (0.072)

0.132* (0.072)

3.873*** (0.128)

3.858*** (0.128)

0.568*** (0.035)
0.121 (0.091)

0.574*** (0.035)
0.123 (0.091)

0.113* (0.060)

0.126** (0.060)

political discussion

0.137* (0.072)

political efficacy
partisanship

3.868*** (0.128)
0.580*** (0.035)

news consumption
campaign
involvement
contact by party

0.119 (0.091)

0.122 (0.091)
0.108* (0.060)

1.915*** (0.108)
0.299*** (0.054)

1.885*** (0.108)
0.298*** (0.055)

1.896*** (0.108)
0.295*** (0.055)

1.888*** (0.108)
0.301*** (0.054)

1.911*** (0.108)
0.296*** (0.054)

trust national
parliament

0.211*** (0.041)

0.210*** (0.041)

0.088** (0.040)

- (0.041)
0.214***
0.090** (0.040)

-0.209*** (0.041)

trust EU institutions

- (0.041)
0.210***
0.085** (0.040)

0.083** (0.040)

0.087** (0.040)

0.109*** (0.039)

0.113*** (0.039)

0.111*** (0.039)

0.121*** (0.039)

EU membership

0.124*** (0.039)

retrospective
economic evaluation
economic situation
(personal)
Compulsory voting
concurrent ntl
election
Post-communism
candidate nationality
Verhofstadt
campaign visits
Schulz campaign
visits

0.294*** (0.078)

- (0.078)
0.289***

- (0.078)
0.298***

-0.296*** (0.078)

0.288*** (0.078)

0.129** (0.055)
1.055*** (0.338)

0.136** (0.055)
1.064*** (0.337)

0.131** (0.055)
1.088*** (0.322)

0.133** (0.055)
1.234*** (0.299)

0.136** (0.055)
0.955*** (0.290)

0.797*** (0.264)
-0.334 (0.232)
-0.010 (0.380)

0.885*** (0.268)
-0.065 (0.232)
-0.279 (0.435)

0.650** (0.283)
-0.235 (0.242)
-0.115 (0.363)

0.911*** (0.238)
-0.090 (0.210)
-0.567 (0.349)

0.807*** (0.234)
-0.156 (0.197)
0.141 (0.318)

0.209 (0.234)
0.309 (0.281)

34

0.366** (0.181)
0.548** (0.244)

Juncker campaign
visits
Random effects
(variance)
Intercept

0.270

recognition Juncker
recognition Schulz
recognition
Verhofstadt

0.076 (0.211)

-0.013 (0.223)

0.336
0.025

0.302

0.325

0.028

0.046

0.048

0.086

Residual
N (individual)
N (region)

0.250
23,586
30

0.248
23,586
30

0.249
23,586
30

0.248
23,586
30

Log Likelihood
AIC

-11,382.83
22,827.66

-11,346.97
22,785.94

-11,365.21
22,800.43

-11,352.87
22,775.74

**

denotes p<0.1 ; denotes p<0.05;

0.324

0.268

***

denotes p<0.01

35

0.250
23,586
30
-11,371.86
22,813.73

Table 4: Effect of candidate recognition and campaigning on turnout, interactions effects

Mode 6: Juncker

Model 7: Schulz

Intercept

-4.299*** (0.303)

-4.784*** (0.274)

candidate recognition
married

0.265** (0.101)
0.081** (0.036)

0.049 (0.125)
0.084** (0.036)

Model 8: Verhofstadt

Fixed effects

secondary education
tertiary education
age
female
unemployed
rural
religious
union member
immigrant
internet use
Political knowledge
interest in politics
exposure to campaign

(0.047)
(0.053)
(0.112)
(0.035)
(0.060)
(0.037)
(0.062)
(0.050)
(0.120)
(0.070)
(0.068)
(0.040)
(0.074)

-0.025
-0.019
1.603***
0.147***
-0.042
0.053
0.313***
0.149***
-1.730***
0.459***
0.415***
0.035
0.122*

(0.215)

-0.081 (0.122)
0.082** (0.036)

(0.046)
(0.052)
(0.110)
(0.035)
(0.060)
(0.036)
(0.061)
(0.048)
(0.116)
(0.069)
(0.066)
(0.039)
(0.072)

-0.021
-0.010
1.635***
0.135***
-0.042
0.054
0.320***
0.142***
-1.753***
0.502***
0.437***
0.041
0.132*

(0.046)
(0.052)
(0.110)
(0.034)
(0.060)
(0.036)
(0.061)
(0.048)
(0.116)
(0.068)
(0.066)
(0.039)
(0.072)

3.861***
0.574***
0.119

(0.128)
(0.035)
(0.091)

political discussion
political efficacy
partisanship

3.869*** (0.130)
0.574*** (0.036)
0.134 (0.092)

3.881*** (0.128)
0.568*** (0.035)
0.123 (0.091)

news consumption

0.099 (0.061)

0.117* (0.060)

campaign involvement
contact by politician

1.852*** (0.110)
0.304*** (0.056)

1.886*** (0.108)
0.301*** (0.055)

1.908***
0.297***

(0.108)
(0.054)

trust national parliament

-0.218*** (0.041)

-0.209*** (0.041)

-0.212***

(0.041)

trust EU institutions

0.076* (0.041)

0.083** (0.040)

EU membership
retrospective economic
evaluation
economic situation
(personal)
Compulsory voting

0.108*** (0.039)

0.111*** (0.039)

0.121***

(0.039)

-0.322*** (0.079)

-0.294*** (0.078)

-0.291***

(0.078)

0.135** (0.056)
1.108*** (0.299)

0.136** (0.055)
1.486*** (0.265)

0.137** (0.055)
0.928*** (0.281)

concurrent ntl election

Post-communism
candidate nationality

0.479* (0.266)
0.030 (0.281)
-0.090 (0.347)

0.986*** (0.207)
0.100 (0.188)
-0.694** (0.283)

0.855***
-0.179
0.126

(0.236)
(0.196)
(0.337)

candidate campaign visits

EPP support
PES support
ALDE support
rec candidate X visits
visits X EP group support
Random effects
(variance)
Intercept

0.161 (0.274)
-0.924 (1.181)

0.486** (0.223)

-0.012

(0.201)

1.118
0.447***
-1.000

(0.943)
(0.168)
(1.635)

candidate recognition
Residual (median)
Observations
Log Likelihood
AIC
*

-0.023
-0.007
1.624***
0.136***
-0.040
0.047
0.327***
0.139***
-1.698***
0.495***
0.414***
0.035
0.132*

-4.298***

0.124** (0.060)

0.087** (0.040)

-6.704*** (2.514)
-0.006 (0.123)
-1.248 (1.679)

0.321** (0.144)
8.785*** (2.604)

0.325

0.230

0.273

0.029

0.035

0.064

0.249
23,586

0.247

-11,364.14
22,804.28

denotes p<0.1 ; **denotes p<0.05; ***denotes p<0.01

36

0.249

23,586

23,586

-11,344.59
22,765.19

-11,367.64
22,811.27

Figure 1: Conditional effect of recognizing Schulz depending on countries where he

campaigned

Figure 2: Conditional effect of recognizing Verhofstadt depending on countries where he

campaigned

37

Figure 3: Conditional effect of Schulz campaigning depending on strength of PES

38

APPENDIX 1: Variable description

Dependent variable:
Turnout: question wording European Parliament elections were held on the (INSERT CORRECT DATE ACCORDING
TO COUNTRY). For one reason or another, some people in (OUR COUNTRY) did not vote in these elections.
Did you yourself vote in the recent European Parliament elections? recoded to 1 voted 0 did not vote.
Explanatory variables, individual component (level 1), original question available at the following link:
eshomepage.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Master-Questionnaire.pdf
Junker recognition: original question QPP24, recoded 1 for those who correctly identify the European People's
Party /(NATIONAL PARTY) as supporting Junkers nomination and 0 otherwise. Dont Know answers
were coded as incorrect answers as we consider that they reflect a degree of ignorance similar to the one
reflected by incorrect answers (see Luskin and Bullock 2006; Sturgis et al. 2008; Hansen 2009a.
Schulz recognition: original question QPP24, recoded 1 for those who correctly identify the Socialist & Democrats
/(NATIONAL PARTY) as supporting Junkers nomination and 0 otherwise. Dont Know answers were
coded as incorrect answers as we consider that they reflect a degree of ignorance similar to the one
reflected by incorrect answers (see Luskin and Bullock 2006; Sturgis et al. 2008; Hansen 2009a.
Verhofstad recognition: original question QPP24, recoded 1 for those who correctly identify the Liberals and Allies
Group/(NATIONAL PARTY) as supporting Junkers nomination and 0 otherwise. Dont Know answers
were coded as incorrect answers as we consider that they reflect a degree of ignorance similar to the one
reflected by incorrect answers (see Luskin and Bullock 2006; Sturgis et al. 2008; Hansen 2009a.
Political Knowlege: measure of political knowledge that ranges from 0 to 5, reflecting the correct True/False
answers given by each respondent to. Dont Know answers were coded as incorrect answers as we
consider that they reflect a degree of ignorance similar to the one reflected by incorrect answers (see
Luskin and Bullock 2006; Sturgis et al. 2008; Hansen 2009a. Original statements:
QPP23.1. Switzerland is a member of the EU. True/False
QPP23.2 Each Member State elects the same number of representatives to the European Parliament. True/False
QPP23.3. There are [150% of real number] members of the [COUNTRY Parliament]. True/False
QPP23.4 NAME OF THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT) belongs to (NAME OF CORRECT PARTY). True/False
Interest in politics: original wording QP6.9 Answers order was reversed and rescaled in the analysis, the final
variables takes values for 0 reflecting No, not at all to 1 reflecting yes totally.
Exposure to campaign: original wording QP8, responses was recoded to 0 reflecting No, not dont remember
and 1 reflecting yes, remember.
Political discussion: a mean of three items (Cronbach alpha= 0.87): d71_1 (discussion about national politics
matters) d71_2 (discussion about European politics matters) d71_3 (discussion about local politics
matters), final variables recoded to take values between 0 reflecting a low frequencies and 1 high
frequency of discussion.

39

Political efficacy: a mean of seven items (Cronbach alpha= 0.76): QP6.4, QP6.7, QP6.8, QPP9.2, QPP9.3, D72.1
D72.2, reflecting internal and external political efficacy at both national and EU level, ), final variables
recoded to take values between 0 reflecting a low sense of efficacy and 1 a high sense of efficacy.
Partisanship: wording of question QPP21 Recoded in 1 yes if R is feeling close to any party and 0 if the response is
no
News consumption: variable computed as the maximum of three items QP9.1 (TV news), QP9.2 (online news) and
QP9.3 (newspaper news): recoded to take values from 0 never following the news to 1 reflecting
following the news every day/almost everyday
Campaign involvement: mean of five items (Cronbach alpha= 0.7): QP11.1 (watched a programme about the
European election), QP11.2 (read in newspapers about the European election), QPP11.3 (talk to friends of
family about the European election), QPP11.4 (attended a meeting or a rally about the European election)
and QPP11.5 (read online about the European election), recoded to take values from 0 reflecting no
involvement to 1 reflecting strong involvement
Contact by party: original question wording QP12, recoded to 1 yes, contacted and 0 no, not contacted
Trust national parliament: original question wording QPP1.1, recoded to take values form 0 reflecting no trust in
the national parliament to 1 reflecting high trust in the national parliament.
Trust EU institutions: original question wording QP6.2, recoded to take values form 0 reflecting no trust in the EU
institutions to 1 reflecting high trust in the EU institutions.
EU membership: original question wording QP7, recoded to take 1EU membership is a good thing and 0
otherwise.
Retrospective economic evaluation: original question wording QPP15, recoded to take values from 0 is a lot
worse to 1 is a lot better.
Economic situation: original question wording D60, recoded to take values from 0 had difficulties to pay bills
most of the time to 1 Almost never/never had difficulties with paying the bills.
Married: original question D7c, recoded to 1 married and 0 otherwise.
Secondary edducatiom: original question VD11, recode 1 for those who ended their education between the age of
16 and 19 and 0 otherwise.
Tertiary education: original question VD8, recode 1 for those who ended their education after the age of 20 and 0
otherwise.
Age: : original question VD11.
Female: original question D10, recode to 1 female and 0 men.
Unemployed: original question C14, recode to 1 unemployed and 0 otherwise.
Rural: original question D25, recode to 1 rural residence and 0 otherwise.

40

Religious: original question D75, recode to take values between 0 never attends religious services to 1 attends
religious services more than once a week
Union member: original question D76, recoded 1 if respondent and/or somebody else in the household is union
member and 0 otherwise
Immigrant: original question D2, recode 1 if respondent of citizen of the country and 0 otherwise
Internet use: maximum of three items: D61.1 (home internet usage), D62.2 (work internet usage) and D63.3
(somewhere else internet usage), recode to take values from 0 never use internet to 1 use internet
every day.
Explanatory variables, maro component (level 2)
Compulsory voting: coded 1 for countries that have compulsory voting and 0 otherwise (source:
http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm).
Concurrent ntl. Election: coded 1 if any other national, regional or local elections took place in the same day as the
EP elections and 0 otherwise (source).
Post-communism: coded 1 for countries with a communist/socialist regime before 1989 and 0 otherwise.
Candidate nationality: code 1 if any of the candidates is a citizen of the given country and otherwise.
Juncker campaign visits: number of campaigning days Junker spent in a given country in the two month before the
EP elections, recode 1 if he campaigned in the country and 0 otherwise.
Schluz campaign visits: number of campaigning days Schluz spent in a given country in the two month before the
EP elections, recode 1 if he campaigned in the country and 0 otherwise.
Verhofstadt campaign visits: number of campaigning days Verhofstadt spent in a given country in the two month
before the EP elections, recode 1 if he campaigned in the country and 0 otherwise.

41

Table A1.1. Distribution macro variables

Country

Turnout in previous
national elections

EPP
strength

PES
strength

ALDE
strength

Candidate is
citizen

Postcommunism

Austria

74.91

26.98

24.09

8.14

Belgium

89.45

16.71

19.32

22.83

Bulgaria

52.49

36.85

18.93

17.27

1.00

Croatia

54.17

34.52

9.97

9.97

0.00

1.00

Cyprus

78.7

37.75

18.51

0.00

0.00

Czech Republic

59.48

25.90

14.17

16.13

Denmark

87.74

9.2

19.1

16.7

Estonia

63.53

13.9

13.6

46.7

1.00

Finland

67.37

22.6

12.3

19.7

Flanders

19.96

20.4

France

57.23

20.81

13.98

9.94

Germany

71.55

35.3

27.3

4.9

25.4

6.87

Great Britain

Concurrent
elections

Greece

62.47

22.71

14.63

0.00

0.00

Hungary

61.73

51.48

20.65

0.00

0.00

1.00

Ireland

70.05

22.3

12.85

12.85

Italy

75.19

20.66

40.81

0.00

0.00

Latvia

59.49

46.19

13.04

0.00

0.00

1.00

Lithuania

52.93

17.43

17.26

29.36

0.00

1.00

Luxembourg

91.15

37.65

11.75

14.77

1.00

Malta

92.95

40.02

53.39

0.00

0.00

0.00

Netherlands

74.56

15.18

9.4

27.5

0.00

0.00

13

0.00

0.00

0.00

Northern Ireland
Poland

48.92

38.93

9.44

0.00

0.00

1.00

Portugal

58.03

27.73

31.49

7.15

0.00

0.00

Romania

41.76

18.44

37.60

15.00

0.00

1.00

Slovakia

59.11

33.32

24.09

6.66

0.00

1.00

Slovenia

65.6

41.44

8.02

8.14

0.00

1.00

Spain

68.94

31.50

23

15.1

0.00

0.00

Sweden

84.63

19.60

24.4

16.5

0.00

0.00

UK

65.1

0.00

24.74

6.69

0.00

0.00

11.36

29.29

27.1

1.00

0.00

Wallonia

42

Appendix 2: Campaign Calendar

Table A2.1 :The Juncker campaign schedule
Date

Country

City

Type of Event

4/4/2014

Germany

Munich

Keynote speech at IHK Akademie

4/5/2014

Germany

Berlin

Press Conference + Keynote Speech at CDU Congress

Belgium

Nivelles/ Antwerp

Press Conference (Nivelles) + Meeting EPP politicans (Nivelles/Antwerp) + Speech for

the press (Antwerp)

Netherlands

Utrecht

Campaign Speech at the CDA party conference

4/15/2014

France

Pfettisheim/
Strasbourg

4/16/2014

Finland

Helsinki

4/17/2014

Latvia

Riga

Visiting the farm of EPP President Joseph Daul + Speech on his candidacy and the
importance of the Common Agriculture Policy + Press Point
Campaign Event with National Coalition Party (EPP) + meeting with prime-minister +
press conference
Meeting with former Prime Minister + Live TV Debate with former Prime Minister
and MEP Ivars Godanis

4/18/2014

Latvia

Riga

Meeting with Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma + press conference

Belgium

Brussels

Press Conference

4/25/2014

Poland

Poznan

Summit of EPP regional and local political leaders and Prime Minister Donald Tusk

4/26/2014

Germany

Braunschweig

4/27/2014

Bulgaria

Sofia

Campaign with CDU (EPP) and German lead candidate David Mc Allister
Event launching the European campaign of Citizens for the European Development of
Bulgaria (GERB)

3/25/2014
3/26/2014
3/27/2014
3/28/2014
3/29/2014
3/30/2014
3/31/2014
4/1/2014
4/2/2014
4/3/2014

4/6/2014
4/7/2014
4/8/2014
4/9/2014
4/10/2014
4/11/2014
4/12/2014
4/13/2014
4/14/2014

4/19/2014
4/20/2014
4/21/2014
4/22/2014
4/23/2014
4/24/2014

4/28/2014
4/29/2014

43

4/30/2014

Germany

Dsseldorf

Meeting with CDU-politicians and press conference

5/2/2014

Malta

Valetta

5/3/2014

Cyprus

Nicosia

Campaign of the Nationalist Party + Meeting with (former) Prime Minister + meeting
EPP-politicians
Meeting with President of the Republic, President of the Democratic Rally and
attendance of a ceremony celebrating the 10th anniversary of Cyprus's accession to
the EU

5/4/2014

Cyprus

Nicosia

Keynote speech at the electoral Congress of DISY

5/6/2014

Slovakia

Bratislava

Gala Dinner celebrating 10 years of Slovakia's EU Membership

5/7/2014

Austria

Vienna

Meeting with VP-politicians (EPP), Campaign Events of VP and press conferences

5/8/2014

Germany

Berlin

Event of Junge Union Berlin

5/9/2014

Italy

Meeting with young EPP party activists from Italy

Germany

Florence
Rotenburg an der
Fulda

5/12/2014

Spain

Madrid

Campaign Event with Partido Popular

5/13/2014

France

Bordeaux

Meeting with former Prime Minister Alain Jupp and participation in round table

5/14/2014

France

Paris

Press Breakfast

5/15/2014

Belgium

Brussels

Press Briefing

5/16/2014

Germany

Ludwigshafen

Talk with Bundeskanzler a.D. Helmut Kohl

5/17/2014

Porto

Meeting with Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister

5/18/2014

Portugal
Portugal/Greec
e

Lisbon/Athens

Campaign Event with Alliance for Portugal (Lisbon)/Press Briefing (Athens)

5/19/2014

Greece

Athens

Meeting with Prime Minister Antonis Samaras and other ministers

5/21/2014

Belgium

Brussels

Receiving of the Youth-EPP campaign Vans + Press Conference

5/22/2014

Luxembourg

Esch

Campaign Event of the CSV

5/23/2014

Germany

Saarlouis

Campaign Event of the CDU with prime minister Angela Merkel

5/1/2014

5/5/2014

5/10/2014

Campaign of the CDU in Hesse

5/11/2014

5/20/2014

5/24/2014

44

Table A2.2:The Schulz campaign schedule

Date
3/25/2014
3/26/2014

Country
Denmark

City
Copenhagen

Type
Meeting with Danish Social Democrats

3/28/2014

Finland

Helsinki

Meeting with Finish Social Democrats

3/29/2014

Germany

Hamburg

1. Campaign Event of the SPD with Martin Schulz

3/30/2014

Spain

Madrid

Campaign Event of the PSOE (PES)

3/27/2014

3/31/2014
4/1/2014
4/2/2014
4/3/2014
4/4/2014

Meeting with NGO's

Belgium

Brussels

Speech at a three-day conference of the PES in

Germany

Berlin

1. Conference of the SPD for the EP Elections 2014

Czech Republic

Prague

Round table discussion with European PES politicians

4/15/2014

Luxembourg

Luxembourg

Campaign Event of the Luxembourg Socialist Party (LSAP)

4/16/2014

Germany

Offenburg

4/17/2014

France

Paris

Campaign Event of the SPD

Speech at the launch of PS France's European Election Campaign + on
economic governance to an audience of trade unionists entrepreneurs and
academics (Porto)

4/22/2014

Germany

4/23/2014

Germany

Weimar/Erfurt
Cottbus/
Magdeburg

Round table discussion (Weimar)/ Campaign Event of the SPD (Erfurt)

Speech at a conference of work councils (Cottbus)/Campaign of the SPD with
local SPD candidates for the EP

4/25/2014

Bulgaria

Sofia

Speech at the launch of the BSP European Election Campaign

4/26/2014

Romania

Bucharest

Speech at the party Congress for the EP Elections of the PSD +

4/29/2014

Ireland

Dublin

Campaign Event of the Irish Labour Party

4/30/2014

Ireland

Belfast

Campaign Event of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)

5/1/2014

Poland

5/2/2014

Germany

Warsaw/Lodz
Essen/Dortmund
/Bremen

International Labour Day and Campaign with SLD

Visiting EU-financed project (Essen)/Campaign Event of the SPD + with Martin
Schulz (Dortmund) + SPD Campaign Event (Bremen)

5/3/2014

Germany

Kiel/Wismar

SPD Campagn Events with Martin Schulz

4/5/2014
4/6/2014
4/7/2014
4/8/2014
4/9/2014
4/10/2014
4/11/2014
4/12/2014
4/13/2014
4/14/2014

4/18/2014
4/19/2014
4/20/2014
4/21/2014

4/24/2014

4/27/2014
4/28/2014

45

5/4/2014

Portugal

Saarbrcken/
Mainz
Lisbon/Setubal/
Porto

Campaign Event of the SPD with Martin Schulz (Saarbrcken) + Meeting

working councils and trade union members
Visiting factories and two social projects (Lisbon) + press conference with
leader of Portuguese Socialist Party (Seguro) + Keynote Speech

Belgium

Brussels

Press Conference to present the policy programme

Italy

Florence

5/10/2014

Malta

Valetta/Paola

Speech in front of hundreds of trade union representatives in a steel fabric +

Meeting of Martin Schulz with Italian Prime-Minister and Party Leader of
Partito Democratico Matteo Renzi
Meeting with the Maltese Prime Minister Joseph Muscat + Campaign Event of
the Maltese Labour Party with Joseph Muscat

5/11/2014

Spain

Malaga

Campaign Event of the Spanish Socialists (PSOE)

5/12/2014

France

Rez

5/13/2014

France

5/14/2014

Italy/Slovenia

Brest
Verona/Trieste/
Ljubljana

Campaign Event of the PS France

Visiting agriculture and maritime industries + speech at the University of Brest
about youth unemployment
Round table discussion + Campaign Event Partito Democratico (PES) +
Campaign Event (Ljubljana)

5/16/2014

France

Forbach
(Loraine)

5/17/2014

Sweden

Umea

Meeting local entrepreneurs, trade unionists, and public sector workers +

round table discussion + meeting local PS France politicans
Martin Schulz joint Swedisch Social Democrats (SAP) for door to door
canvassing + meeting local SAP politicans

5/19/2014

Germany

Nrnberg/Berlin

Campaing Events SPD with Martin Schulz

5/20/2014

Germany

Hannover

Campaign Event SPD with Martin Schulz

5/21/2014

Spain

Barcelona

Campaign Event PSOE (PES) and Catalan Socialist Party (PSE)

5/22/2014

Austria

Vienna

5/23/2014

Croatia/France

5/24/2014

Germany

/Lyon
Frankfurt
a.M./Aachen

Campaign Event SP
Martin Schulz + Croation Social Democratic Party informing about the Balkan
Flood Situation/ Campaign Event of the PS France (Lyon)

5/5/2014

Germany

5/6/2014
5/7/2014
5/8/2014

5/9/2014

5/15/2014

5/18/2014

Campaign Event SPD with Martin Schulz

46

Table A2.3: The Verhofstadt campaign schedule

Date

Country

City

Type of Event

Belgium

Brussels

Campaign event of VLD

Slovenia

Ljubljana

Participation on a debate about the future of the EU

Netherlands

Den Haag

Campaign Event of D66

4/4/2014

Belgium/
Croatia

Brussels/

Meeting with Ban-Ki Moon (Brussels)/Campaign Event with Croatian Liberals

IDS-DDI and HNS

4/5/2014

Italy

Rome

Campaign Event with Italian liberals Scelta Europea

Romania

Bucharest

Campaign Event with Romanian liberals PNL

Belgium

Brussels

Participation in a book presentation about Arab spring

Italy

Milano

Congress of Italian liberals Scelta European

Belgium

Brussels

ALDE Press Conference

Germany

Karlsruhe

Campaign Event of German liberals FDP

4/24/2014

Poland

Katowice

Campaign Event with polish liberals Twoj Ruch

4/25/2014

Belgium

Brussels

Press Conference to launch election campaign

France

Lyon

Campaign Event with French Liberals Les Europeens

5/2/2014

Austria

Vienna

Campaign Event with Austrian liberals NEOS

5/3/2014

Italy

Napoli

Campaign Event with Italian liberals Scelta Europea

Sweden

Uppsala

Campaign Event

3/25/2014
3/26/2014
3/27/2014
3/28/2014
3/29/2014
3/30/2014
3/31/2014
4/1/2014
4/2/2014
4/3/2014

4/6/2014
4/7/2014
4/8/2014
4/9/2014
4/10/2014
4/11/2014
4/12/2014
4/13/2014
4/14/2014
4/15/2014
4/16/2014
4/17/2014
4/18/2014
4/19/2014
4/20/2014
4/21/2014
4/22/2014
4/23/2014

4/26/2014
4/27/2014
4/28/2014
4/29/2014
4/30/2014
5/1/2014

5/4/2014
5/5/2014

47

/Stockholm
5/6/2014

Ireland

Dublin

Discussion about digitalisation in Europe + Visiting google + campaigning

Italy

Florence

Campaign Event with Scelta Europea after TV-Discussion with other

Canididates

Belgium

Brussels

Campaign Event with Open VLD

5/13/2014

France

5/14/2014

Spain

Paris
Bilbao/
Barcelona

Campaign Event with French liberals

Meeting with liberal politicians + representatives from civil society and
entrepreneurs + campaign event in Barcelona

5/15/2014

Belgium

Brussels

Presenting plan for Europe at the European Business Summit

5/16/2014

Czech Republic

Prague

Campaigning with Czech liberals ANO2011

5/17/2014

Italy

Milano

Campaigning with Italian liberals Scelta Europea

5/18/2014

France

Paris

Campaign Event with French liberals

5/21/2014

Belgium

Hasselt

Final Open VLD Campaign Event

5/22/2014

France

Lille

Campaign Event with Drench liberals

5/23/2014

Greece

Athens

Campaign Event

5/24/2014

Greece

Athens

Campaign Event

5/7/2014
5/8/2014
5/9/2014
5/10/2014
5/11/2014
5/12/2014

5/19/2014
5/20/2014

48