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2. Azajar vs. CA Nov.

10, 1986

3.

Without the notice, the occasion would not arise to determine with
reasonable certitude whether and within what time the adverse party would
respond to the motion, and when the motion might already be resolved by
the Court.

4.

The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant and not on the court.

FACTS:
1.

2.

Azajar purchased thru the agent of Cham Samco 100 kegs of nails of
various sizes and paid P18,000 in full. However, Cham Samco only
delivered a part of the quantity ordered. Azajar filed a complaint before the
CFI of Cam Sur.
Instead of submitting an answer, Samco filed a motion to dismiss on two
grounds: failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and that venue
was improperly laid.

3.

The motion to dismiss contained a notice addressed to the Clerk of Court.

4.

Contending that such notice was fatally defective, Azajar filed a motion to
declare Samco in default, which the court granted. Azajar was allowed to
present evidence ex parte and the court rendered judgment against Samco.

5.

The TC justified its order of default in this wise: that instead of filling an
answer to the complaint, Samco filed a motion to dismiss which is not a
motion at all because the notice is directed to the Clerk of Court instead of
the party concerned (as required by Sec.5, Rule 15, RC) and is without the
requisite notice of hearing directed to the CC and not to the parties, and
merely stating that the same be submitted for resolution. It is without the
requisite notice of time and place of hearing.

6.

Aggrieved, Samco went to CA for recourse, but the CA affirmed the decision
of the TC. However, on motion for reconsideration, CA reversed itself and
declared that technicalities should be brushed aside so that Samco can be
given a day in court.

ISSUE: WON the failure of Cham Samco to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on a
specified date and time and for not addressing the same to the party interested is
fatal to his cause.

HELD: Yes. Although the Court sided with CA that technicalities should be set aside
to Samco to be afforded with his day in court.
1.

The law explicitly requires that notice of motion shall be served by the
appellant to all parties concerned at least 3 days before the hearing,
together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers
accompanying it; and that notices shall be directed to the parties concerned
stating the time and place for the hearing of the motion. Failure to comply
with the requirement is a fatal flaw.

2.

Such notice is required to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and give
the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion as well as to
determine or make determinable the time of submission of the motion for
resolution.

3. G.R. No. 163785

December 27, 2007

KKK FOUNDATIONVS. HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS


FACTS:On March 1, 2002, petitioner, filed a complaint for Annulment of Extra-judicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage and/or Nullification of Sheriffs Auction Sale and
Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.3
Petitioner alleged that: (1) the auction sale was made with fraud and/or bad faith
since there was no public bidding; (2) the sheriff did not post the requisite Notice of
Sheriffs Sale; (3) the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure was fatally defective since it
sought to foreclose properties of two different entities; (4) the foreclosed properties
were awarded and sold to Imelda A. Angeles for an inadequate bid of only
P4,181,450; and (5) the auction sale involved eight parcels of land covered by
individual titles but the same were sold en masse. On March 7, 2002, Judge
Calderon-Bargas issued TRO preventing Angeles from consolidating her ownership to
the foreclosed properties. On even date, petitioner and Angeles executed a
Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to pay Angeles the bid price of the
eight parcels of land within 20 days. The parties then filed a Motion to Approve
Compromise Agreement.On April 1, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Recall Compromise Agreement since the other property owner and other trustees
of petitioner were not consulted prior to the signing of the agreement. Angeles
opposed the motion.Judge Calderon-Bargas issued an Order stating that Record
shows that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise Agreement and Motion
to Approve Compromise Agreement both failed to comply with Sec[s]. 4 and 5, Rule
15 of the Civil Procedure. Both proceedings have no specific date of hearing. The
reason why the Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement up to now has not yet
been acted upon was that it has no date of hearing.Thus, these are considered mere
scrap[s] of paper. The TC approved the Compromise Agreement. Angeles then
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. The TC required petitioner to comment
on the motion within ten (10) days.TC directed the Clerk of Court to issue a writ of
execution. On the same date, the trial court received petitioners Motion for Extension
of Time to File Comment with Entry of Appearance which was denied on October 10,
2002. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration of the October 3, 2002
Order.Petitioner came to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. The CA
denied the petition and ruled that petitioner was not deprived of due process when the
trial court issued the October 3, 2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders since it was
given sufficient time to file its comment. The appellate court did not rule on the
second and third issues after noting that petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
October 3, 2002 Order had not yet been resolved by the trial court. It did not resolve
the issues even after the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on
December 12, 2003,11 ratiocinating that the trial courts denial of petitioners motion
for reconsideration did not operate to reinstate the petition because at the time it was
filed, petitioner had no cause of action.Hence , this petition.

ISSUES: WON the trial court seriously erred: (1) in issuing the October 3, 2002 and
the October 10, 2002 Orders without awaiting petitioners comment; (2) in granting
the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution although it lacked the requisite notice of
hearing; and (3) in issuing the writ of execution since it varied the tenor of the
decision dated June 28, 2002.
HELD:
On the first issue, we note that in its September 9, 2002 Order, the trial court gave
petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment to Angeless Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution. While petitioner claims that it received the Order only on September 21,
2002, Angeles counters that petitioner received it on September 12, 2002. We are
more inclined to believe Angeless allegation since the trial court itself declared in its
Order dated October 10, 2002 that the Order dated September 9, 2002 was
personally served upon petitioner on September 12, 2002.13 Thus, petitioner had
until September 22, 2002 within which to file its comment or to request for an
extension of time. Consequently, petitioners motion for extension and comment were
not seasonably filed and such procedural lapse binds petitioner.
Anent the second issue, a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 1514 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper,
which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to
act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place
of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to
comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However,
there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are: (1)
where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final
and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained
therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the
resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of
the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.A
notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process to afford the
adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court.
Through such notice, the adverse party is given time to study and answer the
arguments in the motion. Records show that while Angeless Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date
and time of the hearing. However, scstill find that petitioner was not denied
procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution, the trial court issued an Order dated September 9, 2002 giving petitioner
ten (10) days to file its comment. The trial court ruled on the motion only after the
reglementary period to file comment lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was given time to
study and comment on the motion for which reason, the very purpose of a notice of
hearing had been achieved.Procedural due process is not based solely on a
mechanical and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead,
procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist in
obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding.
On the last issue, SC note that the Compromise Agreement approved by the trial
court in its Decision dated June 28, 2002 merely provided that petitioner would pay
Angeles the bid price of P5,500,000, for the eight parcels of land subject of the

auction sale, within twenty (20) days. Upon payment, Angeles would execute a
Certificate of Deed of Redemption and a Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage, and
surrender to petitioner the titles to the eight parcels of land. Nevertheless, when the
trial court issued the writ of execution, the writ gave Sheriff Bisnar the option "to allow
the consolidation of the subject real properties in favor of the defendant Imelda
Angeles."
Undoubtedly, the writ of execution imposed upon petitioner an alternative obligation
which was not included or contemplated in the Compromise Agreement. While the
complaint originally sought to restrain Angeles from consolidating her ownership to
the foreclosed properties, that has been superseded by the Compromise Agreement.
Therefore, the writ of execution which directed Sheriff Bisnar to "cause the Register of
Deeds of Morong, Rizal, to allow the consolidation of the subject real properties in
favor of the defendant Imelda Angeles" is clearly erroneous because the judgment
under execution failed to provide for consolidation. Because the writ of execution
varied the terms of the judgment and exceeded them, it had no validity. The writ of
execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, as it may not vary
the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Neither may it go beyond the terms of
the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity.20

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated


November 28, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 73965 are MODIFIED such that the writ of execution issued on
October 11, 2002 by Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas is declared NULL and VOID.
SC ordered that the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Morong,
Rizal, Branch 78, which is hereby ORDERED to issue another writ of execution
against petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc., in conformity with the Decision dated June
28, 2002 of the trial court. This is without prejudice to filing a new motion for
consolidation by respondent Angeles.
Rule 12 Motions for Bill of Particulars
1. SANTOS V. LIWAG (G.R. No. L-24238 November 28, 1980)
DOCTRINE: The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of
particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in
matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that regard will not be
reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous
order. EMERGENCY RECIT (Very short case please refer to the facts below)
FACTS: June 8, 1964: Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo Liwag with the
CFI of Manila, which seeks to annul certain documents which were alleged to be
done with malice, threats, false pretenses, machination, misrepresentations, and
other fraudulent means, with damages and costs.
July 4, 1964: Santos filed a motion asking the court to order Liwag (petitioner) to
submit bill of particulars on certain allegations of the complaint believed to be vague

and conflicting, and that he be informed of the charges filed against him to prepare an
intelligent and proper pleading necessary and appropriate in the premises

Facts:
1.

On November 25, 1956 plaintiffs filed this action to recover portions of a


parcel of land in Isabela, and damages. Under date of December 4, 1956
defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars, with notice of hearing on
December 8, but since the motion was actually received in court only on
December 12 the court set it for hearing on December 22.

2.

On December 17, however, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the


complaint, with a prayer that consideration of their motion for a bill of
particulars be held in abeyance pending resolution of their motion to dismiss.
On December 22, 1956, the date set by the court for the hearing of the
motion for a bill of particulars and by defendants for the hearing of their
motion to dismiss, the court issued an order postponing "consideration" of
both motions to December 29.

HELD/RATIO: 1. NO. BILL OF PARTICULARS ARE DISCRETIONARY UPON THE


COURTS o The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of
particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in
matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that regard will not be
reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous
order. o Complaint was indeed drawn and suffers from vagueness and generalization
to enable the defendant properly to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify
issues and aid the court in an orderly and expeditious disposition in the case.

3.

On March 7, 1957 the court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered
defendants "to answer the complaint within the reglementary period provided
for by the Rules of Court." Hearing of the case on the merits was set for
October 29, 1957, notice of which was duly received by defendants.
Defendants not having filed their answer, plaintiffs, on October 17, 1957,
moved to have them declared in default. On the same day the court issued
the order of default together with another order commissioning the clerk of
court to receive plaintiff's evidence.

RULES ON BILL OF PARTICULARS ON THE GROUND OF VAGUE COMPLAINT


o If an action (like this case) is one for the annulment of documents that have been
allegedly executed by reason of deceit, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentation, threats, and other fraudulent means. o Deceit, machination, false
pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats, however, are largely conclusions of law
and mere allegations thereof without a statement of the facts to which such terms
have reference are not sufficient. The allegations must state the facts and
circumstances from which the fraud, deceit, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as conclusions. In his complaint, the
appellant merely averred that all the documents sought to be annulled were all
executed through the use of deceits, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentations, threats, and other fraudulent means without the particular-facts
on which alleged fraud, deceit, machination, or misrepresentations are predicated.

4.

On October 21, 1957 defendants moved to cancel the hearing scheduled for
October 29, on two grounds one of which was that their motion for a bill of
particulars had not yet been resolved. The motion to cancel was set for
hearing on October 26, 1957. When defendants arrived in court on that day
they learned that an order of default had been issued, so they immediately
filed a motion asking that the same be set aside that their pending motion for
a bill of particulars be resolved and that they be given a reasonable period
thereafter within which to file their answer to the complaint.

5.

On December 13, 1957 the court denied the motion and rendered its
decision in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants.

6.

On January 4, 1958 it denied defendants' motion for reconsideration of the


order of denial. On January 24, defendants filed their record on appeal (to
this Court from the order of December 13, 1957), but as they subsequently
filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default, they asked that
consideration and approval of their record on appeal be held in abeyance
until said petition had been resolved. The request was granted. Defendant's
petition for relief, which was filed on January 28, 1958, was denied on March
21, as was also, on September 20, 1958 their motion for reconsideration of
the order of denial.

7.

On October 4, 1958 the court denied likewise their motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain execution of the judgment by default.
Hence, this appeal.

Liwag opposed the said motion and said that the allegations in the complaint filed
are sufficient and contains the facts needed for a cause of action to exist and Santos
motion is indeed evidentiary in nature Trial Court
Granted the motion and directed the plaintiff to submit a bill of particulars with
respect to the paragraphs specified in defendants motion
When plaintiff failed to comply with the order of the court, the complaint was
dismissed with costs against the plaintiff
ISSUE: 1. WON the trial court erred in granting the motion for bill of particulars filed
by Liwag.

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER TO FILE OF A BILL OF


PARTICULARS RESULTS IN DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT o Hence, it was proper
for the trial court to grant the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, and when the
plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the trial court correctly dismissed the
complaint.

2. FAUSTA AGCANAS, JUAN MIGUEL, JUANITA MIGUEL, assisted by her


husband ULPIANO PASION,
assisted by her husband JUAN PASCUAL vs. BRUNO MERCADO and ANTONIO
DASALLA

Issue: Whether or not upon denial of a defendants' motion to dismiss the


reglementary period within which to file an answer resumes running even though the
motion for a bill of particulars of the same defendants is still pending and unresolved.
Held:
Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars interrupt the time to file
a responsive pleading. In the case of a motion to dismiss, the period starts running
against as soon as the movant receives a copy of the order of denial. In the case
of a motion for a bill of particulars, the suspended period shall continue to run upon
service on the movant of the bill of particulars, if the motion is granted, or of the notice
of its denial, but in any event he shall have not less than five days within which to file
his responsive pleading.
When appellants filed a motion to dismiss they requested that resolution of their
previous motion for a bill of particulars be held in abeyance. This was but practical
because if the court had granted the motion to dismiss, there would have been no
need for a bill of particulars. Resolution of the motion for the purpose was necessary
only in the event that court should deny, as it did, the motion to dismiss, in which case
the period to file an answer remained suspended until the motion for a bill of
particulars is denied or, if it is granted, until the bill is served on the moving party.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
No action having been taken thereon until the present, the period to answer has
not yet expired. The lower court, therefore, erred in declaring appellants in
defaults and in taking all the subsequent actions it did in the case.
The order of default issued and the decision rendered by the trial court are set aside
and the case is remanded for further proceedings, pursuant to the Rules.
3. Salita vs Magtolis

able to understand and accept the demands made by his profession that of a
newly qualified Doctor of Medicine upon petitioners time and efforts so that
she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, wh
ose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
4. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of part
iculars. She argued that the "assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement
of legal conclusion made by petitioners counsel and not an averment of ultima
te facts, as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may
properly be inferred . . . ." 4 But finding the questioned Bill of Particulars adequ
ate, the trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joseli
ta to file her responsive pleading.
5. She filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court but the SC referred it to
the CA. The CA denied her petition.
Issue: WON the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient defi
niteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her responsi
ve pleading or for trial.
Held: Yes. A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the pl
aintiffs cause or causes of action." 9 Ultimate facts has been defined as "those
facts which the expected evidence will support." 10 As stated by private responde
nt, "[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidenc
e by which these material elements are to be established." It refers to "the facts which
the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to pro
ve the existence of those facts." And a motion for bill of particulars will not be gra
nted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already states a suffic
ient cause of action. 11 A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters
which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such informatio
n may be obtained by other means. 12

Facts:
1. Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic C
hurch in Ermita, Manila.
2. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the gro
und of Joselitas psychological incapacity.
3. The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezo
n City. Therein it is alleged that petitioner came to realize that respondent was p
sychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although th
e same became manifest only thereafter."Edwin specified that at the time of the
ir marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to c
omply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was un

We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by
private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details f
rom private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indee
d, petitioner has already been adequately apprised of private respondents cause of a
ction against her thus
. . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital oblig
ations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demand
s made by his profession that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine upon petiti
oners time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her
even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can alre
ady prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already

alleged that "she (petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the demand
s made by his profession . . . upon his time and efforts . . . " Certainly, she can r
espond to this. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for informat
ion on evidentiary facts facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts.
13 For sure, the additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular
acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not
the function of a motion for bill of particulars. 14

RULE 16 Motion to Dismiss


1. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45107 November 11, 1991
BENEDICTO RAMOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ELVIRO L. PERALTA, Presiding Judge, Branch XVII, Court of First
Instance of Manila, SPOUSES JUVENCIO ORTANEZ and JULIANA S.
ORTANEZ, MINDANAO INSURANCE CO., INC. and P. R. ROMAN,
INC., respondents.
Angel Suntay, Jr. and Renato M. Coronado for petitioner.
Tolentino, Garcia, Cruz & Reyes for respondents Ortanez.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
Put in issue in this petition for review on certiorari is the propriety of the dismissal by
the then Court of First Instance of (CFI) of Manila, Branch XVII of petitioner's action
for consignation of the sum of P70,000.00 representing advance rentals for the 101hectare Salgado fishpond located in Bo. Balut, Pilar, Bataan.
Petitioner started occupying the Salgado fishpond in 1964 by virtue of a lease
contract executed in his favor by private respondents spouses Juvencio and Juliana
Ortanez. The original lease for a term of five (5) years from January 1, 1964 to
January 1, 1990, was renewed several times, the last renewal being on June 28,
1974 under a "Kasunduan sa Pag-upa" for a period of three (3) years starting January
1, 1975 to December 31, 1977.
Unknown to petitioner, title 1 to said property was in the name of Philippine
International Surety Co., Inc., a corporation founded, organized and 99.5%-owned by
the Salgado spouses. Later renamed Mindanao Insurance Co., Inc., 2 said
corporation was placed under receivership and liquidation on June 20, 1968 in Civil
Case No. Q-10664 of the then CFI of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City, upon application
of Insurance Commissioner Gregoria Cruz-Ansaldo who was appointed receiver.
Thereafter on February 23, 1976, respondent P. R. Roman, Inc. purchased from
Mindanao Insurance the Salgado fishpond for P950,000.00. The deed of sale was
signed by the receiver and duly approved by the liquidation court.
Apparently due to this development, the spouses Ortanez refused to accept from
petitioner the advance rentals on the fishpond due on March 15, 1976 in the amount
of P30,000.00.

On or about May 1, 1976, petitioner received a letter from Don Pablo R. Roman
informing him of the latter's acquisition of the fishpond and intention to take
possession thereof on May 16, 1976. In his letter-reply, petitioner reminded Mr.
Roman of his lease contract over the fishpond and refused to consent to the intended
take over. Notwithstanding petitioner's objection, P. R. Roman, Inc. took over
possession of the fishpond.
On August 2, 1976, petitioner filed before the CFI of Manila the aforesaid complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 103647, 3 against private respondents Juvencio and
Juliana Ortanez, Mindanao Insurance and P. R. Roman, Inc. for consignation of the
sum of P70,000.00 representing advance rentals on the fishpond in the amounts of
P30,000.00 and P40,000.00 respectively due on March 15, 1976 and June 15, 1976,
which he had previously tendered to, but refused by the spouses Ortanez and Pablo
Roman.
P. R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that venue was improperly
laid, the complaint states no cause of action and the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject of the action or suit. In its motion to dismiss, P. R. Roman, Inc. cited the
pendency before the then CFI of Bataan of Civil Case No 4102 instituted by P.R.
Roman, Inc. against petitioner Benedicto Ramos on August 13, 1976 to quiet its title
over the Salgado fishpond.
On August 27, 1976, respondent CFI of Manila issued an order 4 dismissing Civil
Case No. 103647, stating in part:
Without discussing in detail the grounds mentioned above, the Court really sees that
this case should be dismissed not only insofar as against P. R. Roman, Inc. but also
as against the other defendants mentioned above for the reason, principally, that
there is already a case pending between the same parties and for the same cause in
Civil Case No. 4102 of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, entitled P. R.
Roman, Inc. vs. Benedicto Roman, which is precisely for the ownership of the subject
matter of the property allegedly leased to the plaintiff herein (Exhibit "A"-Motion). In
the said case, the defendant therein, Benedicto Ramos, who is the plaintiff in the case
at bar, filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the spouses
surnamed Ortanez and the Mindanao Insurance Company Inc. All the issues
respecting the fishpond, including the lease contract, are necessarily involved in the
case pending now in Bataan. Aside from the above, the Court cannot decide this case
because it cannot pre-empt the Court of Bataan on whether or nor the P. R. Roman,
Inc. is already the owner because if it finds that the said defendant P. R. Roman, Inc.
is really the owner of the fishpond, there is no more lease for which rentals are to be
paid.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was unsuccessful, the court a quo, standing
"pat on its previous order and reiterat(ing) its dismissal of the case, without costs." 5
Hence this petition anchored on the following ascribed errors of law: 6

1. The respondent court erred in not holding that the only issue in consignation of
funds is whether the defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment or not.
2. The respondent court erred in not holding that the prerogative of choosing the
proper venue belongs to the plaintiff.
3. The respondent court erred in holding that the subsequent filing of Civil Case No.
4102 before the Court of First Instance of Bataan is a bar to the prosecution of Civil
Case No. 103647 before it.
Petitioner contends that the Bataan quieting-of-title Civil Case No. 4102 cannot serve
as a bar to his Manila consignation Civil Case No. 103647 because they involve
different issues. Civil Case No. 4102 deals with the question of ownership while the
only issue involved in his consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing
to accept the proffered payment. In fact, petitioner posits, the action to quiet title is a
useless futile exercise as he does not question P. R. Roman Inc.'s ownership of the
fishpond under consideration, but merely wishes to assert his leasehold and
possessory rights over said property under the "Kasunduan sa Pag-upa." He further
contends that compelling him to litigate before the Bataan court would render
nugatory his right as a plaintiff to choose the venue of his action. Besides, Civil Case
No. 103647 was filed on August 2, 1976, ahead of Civil Case No. 4102 which was
filed on a much later date, August 13, 1976, after the Manila CFI had already acquired
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 103647.
Private respondents counter that the view taken by petitioner of the Manila
consignation case is quite limited and bookish, because while it may be true that
theoretically, the main issue involved in a consignation case is whether or not the
defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment, in the consignation case brought
by petitioner, other issues were pleaded by petitioner himself, such as the validity and
binding effect of the lease contract and the existence of the supposed obligor-obligee
relationship. They further contend that a plaintiffs right of choice of venue is not
absolute, but must invariably how to the dismissal of the case because of litis
pendentia which, in refutation of petitioner's argument, does not require that there is
a prior pending action, merely that there is a pending action.
We find for respondents.
Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be invoked as a ground for
the dismissal of an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary:
(a) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;
(b) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other. 7

These requisites are present in the case at bar. It is worthwhile mentioning that in his
basic petition for review, one of the assigned errors of petitioner is that the respondent
court erred in not holding that the parties in Civil Case No. 4102 are not the same as
the parties in Civil Case No. 103647. 8 However, in his brief, no further mention of this
assigned error was made; a clear indication of petitioner's admission of the identity of
parties in Civil Case No. 4102 and Civil Case No. 103647, particularly as he filed a
third party complaint in Civil Case No. 4102 against the spouses Ortanez and
Mindanao Insurance.
Anent the second element, we agree with private respondents' observation that
petitioner's approach to his consignation case is quite constricted. His contention that
the only issue in a consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing to
accept the proffered payment is true only where there is no controversy with respect
to the obligation sought to be discharged by such payment. His consignation case,
however, is not as simple. While ostensibly, the immediate relief sought for in his
consignation case is to compel therein defendants to accept his advance rentals, the
ultimate purpose of such action is to compel the new owner of the fishpond to
recognize his leasehold rights and right of occupation. In the last analysis, therefore,
the issue involved in Civil Case No. 103647 is the right of possession over the
fishpond intertwined with the validity and effectivity of the lease contract.
This is the same issue involved in Civil Case No. 4102. Although an action for
quieting of title refers to ownership, P. R. Roman, Inc. in its
complaint 9 in Civil Case No. 4102 alleged:
5. There is a cloud on the aforesaid titles of plaintiff on the said agricultural land,
marked Annexes "A", "B" and "C" hereof, as well as on its right of possession over
that real property by reason of a certain "Kasunduan sa Pagupa" (Contract of Lease)
dated June 28, 1974 executed by and between the spouses Jovencio Ortanez and
Juliana S. Ortanez purportedly as "may-ari/Nagpapaupa" (owner/lessor) and the
defendant as lessee, which instrument is apparently valid or effective but in truth and
in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and is prejudicial to the said
titles of plaintiff as well as to its right of possession over the same
fishpond/agricultural land in Barrio Balut, Pilar, Bataan.
Thus, while the respondent court in the assailed order of dismissal dated August 27,
1976 described Civil Case No. 4102 as "precisely for the ownership of the subject
matter of the property allegedly leased to the plaintiff herein," 10 its order dated
October 22, 1976 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, more perceptively
stated: 11
In Civil Case No. 4102 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, entitled P. R. Roman,
Inc. vs. Benedicto Ramos one of the principal issues is the possession of the
fishpond subject matter of the lease supposed rents of which are supposed to be
consignated in the instant case, plaintiff P. R. Roman, Inc. there, claiming to be
entitled to the possession of said property as owner under a certificate of title and

defendant Benedicto Ramos, plaintiff here, anchoring his claim of possession upon
his lease with the Ortanez spouses against whom, on his motion, he filed a third party
complaint in which he prayed in the alternative, that should he lose possession of the
fishpond in favor of P. R. Roman, Inc., the Ortanezes should be condemned to
reimburse him the rentals he has already paid for the unexpired portion of the lease.
The issue of whether or not the lease subsists even as regards P. R. Roman, Inc., for
it is the view of Ramos that it bought the property with knowledge of the lease, is
squarely planted in the case before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, and,
consequently, the more appropriate court with which rents are to be consignated. . . .
That whatever decision may be handed down in Civil Case No. 4102 would
constitute res judicata in Civil Case No. 103647 is beyond cavil. Should the Bataan
court rule that the lease contract is valid and effective against P. R. Roman, Inc., the
petitioner can compel it to accept his proffered payment of rentals; otherwise, he may
not do so.
Petitioner next contends that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 103647 deprived him of
his right to choose the venue of his action. Verily, the rules on the venue of personal
actions are laid down generally for the convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses.
But, as observed by private respondents, this right given to the plaintiff is not
immutable. It must yield to the greater interest of the orderly administration of justice,
which as in this case, may call for the dismissal of an action on the basis of litis
pendentia to obviate the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by two
different courts. 12
As private respondents would put it, "(T)he Rules of Court are not perfect. It does not
pretend to be able to make everyone happy simultaneously or consecutively or all the
time. Even the Rules of Court has hierarchy of values; thus, the choice of venue may
bow to dismissal of the case because of litis pendentia. 13 At any rate, petitioner
cannot complain of any inconvenience arising from the dismissal of Civil Case No.
103647. Being the defendant in Civil Case No. 4102, he cannot but litigate before the
Bataan court, and bringing his consignation case before the same court would
actually save him time, effort and litigation expenses.
Finally, the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to
the earlier case. What is required merely is that there be another pending action, not
a prior pending action. Considering the broader scope of inquiry involved in Civil Case
No. 4102 and the location of the property involved, no error was committed by the
lower court in deferring to the Bataan court's jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated August 27, 1976 of the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, is AFFIRMED in toto. This decision is immediately
executory, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

2. Lee Bun Ting and Ang Chia vs. Hon. Jose Aliagen, Rafael Dinglasan
et. al.
Facts: In a previous cases [G. R. No. L-5996, "Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun
Ting, et al.] decided by the SC with the same set of private parties, it was found that
private respondents sold to herein petitioner a parcel of land located in Roxas City,
Capiz through a conditional sale. Lee, the buyer, on the other hand avers that it was
an absolute sale. Both trial court and CA ruled in favor of buyer Lee. The SC found
that Lee is normally not allowed to purchase the property on the count of the
constitutional prohibition (Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines.- Article 13, 1935 Consitution) But since it was also found out that the
buyers (private respondents) are in pari delicto for selling the property in spite of the
constitutional prohibition they are proscribed from assailing the sale made between
them and herein private respondents.
12 years after the above mentioned case was promulgated, the present case for the
recovery of the lot was instituted with the same contention of the respondents
Dinglasan that the sale should be null and void on account of the constitutional
prohibition.
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioners in this case on the ground of res judicata.
An opposition thereto was filed by plaintiffs, with the averment that the decision in the
prior case "cannot be pleaded in bar of the instant action because of new or
additional facts or grounds of recovery and because of change of law or
jurisprudence.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not the motion to dismiss should be granted
Held: Affirmative. The decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-5996, "Rafael Dinglasan,
et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al." constitutes a bar to Civil Case No. V-3064 before the
respondent court. Said Civil case, therefore, should have been dismissed because it
is a mere relitigation of the same issues previously adjudged with finality, way back in
1956, between the same parties or their privies and concerning the same subject
matter. We have consistently held that the doctrine of res judicata applies where,
between a pending action and one which has been finally and definitely settled, there
is Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
We find that in the ultimate analysis, Civil Case No. V-3064 is but an attempt to
reopen the issues which were resolved in the previous case. Contrary to the
contentions of private respondents, there has been no change in the facts or in the
conditions of the parties. Posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court cannot

retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the
prior adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or criminal in nature. The
determination of the questions of fact and of law by this Court on June 27, 1956 in
case No. L-5996 has become the law of the case, and may not now be disputed or
relitigated by a reopening of the same questions in a subsequent litigation between
the same parties and their privies the same subject matter.

vs.

3. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant,


HERMOGENES HIPOLITO and LEONOR JUNSAY, defendantsappellees.
G.R. No. L-16463

FACTS: June 18, 1959 a complaint was filed alleging that defendant Hermogenes
Hipolito and Leonor Junsay obtained various sugar crop loans from plaintiff PNB
through its Victorias Branch, evidenced by promissory notes.
The amount of the notes was a total of P9,692.00. Defendants only paid P3,905.61,
leaving a balance of P6,786.39, which, added to accrued interest of P5,213.34,
summed up to P11,999.73 as of January 17, 1957.
Despite repeated demands, defendants failed and refused to pay said amount. May
7, 1957 - defendants went to Atty. Francis I. Medel of the legal department of plaintiff's
Victorias branch and offered a plan of payment of the account
For reasons unknown to plaintiff and probably due to the transfer of defendant
Hipolito as supervising teacher to some other province, his proposed plan of payment
did not materialize. Said offer of plan of payment was an acknowledgment of
defendants' just and valid obligation. The prayer is for the court to order defendants to
pay to plaintiff the said amount of P11,999.73, with accrued annual interest thereon
( rate of 5% from January 17, 1957 up to the date of payment, plus attorney's fees
equivalent to 10%.)
Defendants moved for a bill of particulars denied. Defendants moved to dismiss on
the ground that plaintiff's cause of action already prescribed. attached to the motion: a
joint affidavit and defendants averred that they never made any acknowledgment of
indebtedness nor offered a plan of payment, but on the contrary had always
maintained that plaintiff's action had prescribed.
Plaintiffs opposition - contending that the prescriptive period had been suspended
by "EO No. 32, known as the Moratorium Law," and interrupted, pursuant to Article
1973 of the old Civil Code, by plaintiffs written extra-judicial demands as well as by
defendants acknowledgment of the indebtedness.
Defendants reply to plaintiff's opposition - citing Bachrach Motors Co., Inc. v.
Chua Tia Hian, stated that EO. No. 32, if at all, suspended the prescriptive period

"only for 2yrs, 4 months and 16 days, from March 10, 1945, or only up to July 26,
1948," - that the alleged written extrajudicial demands constitute self-serving
evidence; and that defendant Hipolitos letter of February 16, 1959 cannot be
considered as an acknowledgment of indebtedness.
Lower court dismissed the complaint: ruled that the 7 promissory notes constituted
1 single obligation, that the last promissory note dated June 23, 1941, should be
considered as the true date of the written contract, from which the 10-year
prescriptive period and such period has been suspended for 2 years, 4 months and
sixteen 16 days (by reason of EO No. 32) until said Order was declared
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants denial of the allegations constitute as
grounds for the dismissal of the complaint
RULING: NO. The dismissal is erroneous. In a motion to dismiss defendant
hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations of fact contained in the complaint.
An examination of the complaint herein does not indicate clearly that prescription has
set in. On the contrary, it is belied by the allegation concerning defendants offer of
payment made on May 7, 1957. Such offer hypothetically admitted in the motion,
worked as a renewal of the obligation. An offer of payment works as a renewal of the
obligation and prevents prescription from setting in.
It is true that defendants attached to the motion a joint affidavit of merit wherein they
deny having made an offer of a plan of payment. The denial, being a contrary
averment of fact, would be proper in the answer to the complaint but not in a motion
for dismissal, for the contradictory allegations would require presentation of evidence.
Denial of allegations in a complaint is not proper in a motion to dismiss.
** A denial of an allegation of a complaint, as for example the denial of an offer of
payment which would prevent prescription from setting in, would be proper in the
answer to the complaint but not in a motion for dismissal, for the contradictory
allegations would require presentation of evidence
The same is true of the other allegations in the complaint concerning, the demands
for payment sent by plaintiff upon defendants and the partial payments made by
them, all or some of which may have a material bearing on the question of
prescription. In other words, the ground for dismissal not being indubitable, the lower
court should have deferred determination of the issue until after trial of the
case on the merits.
The order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings.
4. #11.G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994

GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner,


vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B.
BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO, respondents.
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

1.

2.

3.

FACTS:
Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did
not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his
answer.
@ PRE-TRIAL: Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr.: NOTED THAT: GUERRERO and
HERNANDO were related as brothers-in-law then JUDGE gave petitioner
five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the
parties were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and
that the complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts
towards a compromise were exerted but failed and considered this
deficiency a JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT.
MR was filed by GUERRERO: brothers by affinity are not members of the
same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise
DENIED: "[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is
jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the court would be deprived
of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case."
Case was dismissed without prejudice: No amended complaint filed
ISSUE: ON APPEAL: GUERRERO:
a. whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same
family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New
Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of
Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit
between them may be instituted and maintained;
b. whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest
efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is
a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to
strengthen it as a basic autonomous social institution. This is also embodied
in Art. 149, and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides:
Considering that Art. 151 starts with the negative word "No", the requirement
is mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should
allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that
the same failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact
made, the case must be dismissed."
BUT the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the abovequoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon
v. Gayon 6 that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the
same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law".

4.

5.

6.

The requirement that the complaint or petition should allege that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made but that the same failed is
mandatory
The enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family
does not comprehend sister-in-law/ brothers-in-law are not listed in Art
217 of the NCC as members of the same family and since Art 150 repeats
the same members of the family court finds no reason to alter the existing
jurisprudence
2nd ISSUE: The attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is
a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same
family, absent such allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage
of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.
5. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MUNICIPALITY OF
NORZAGARAY, respondents.

1.

2.

3.

4.

FACTS:
On February 1, 1985, the Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for
recovery of taxes against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan.
Before the expiration of the 15-day reglementary period to answer, the
petitioner filed two successive motions for extension of time to file
responsive pleadings, which were both granted. The last day of the second
extension was May 28, 1985.
On May 25, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of the plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue and lack of a cause of
action. The motion was denied "both for lack of merit and for having been
improperly filed."
On July 25, 1985, the plaintiff moved to declare the petitioner in default for
having filed only the motion to dismiss and not a responsive pleading during
the extension granted. This declaration was made on August 2, 1985, and
evidence for the plaintiff was thereafter received ex parte resulting in a
judgment in its favor on February 4, 1986. The judgment was affirmed by the
respondent court in its decision dated April 7, 1989, which is the subject of
the present petition.
ISSUE: WON the Motion to Dismiss was seasonably filed.
Ruling:
There is no question that the motion to dismiss was filed seasonably, within
the period of the second extension granted by the trial court. It is true that
such a motion could not be considered a responsive pleading as SC have

held in many cases. Nevertheless, it is also true that in Section 1 of Rule 16


of the Rules of Court, it is provided that "within the time for pleading,a motion
to dismiss the action may be made" on the grounds therein enumerated,
including the grounds invoked by the petitioner.
Moreover, it is clearly provided in Section 4 of the same Rule that:
Sec. 4. Time to plead. If the motion to dismiss is denied or if
determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the
period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of
denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period.
The motion to dismiss was filed on May 25, 1985, three days before the
expiration of the second extension. Notice of its denial was served on the
petitioner on July 29, 1985. From that date, the petitioner had 15 days within
which to file its answer, or until August 13, 1985. It was unable to do so,
however, because of the default order issued by the trial court on August 2,
1985. On that date, the petitioner still had eleven days before the expiration
of the 15-day reglementary period during which the petitioner was supposed
to file his answer.
The Court recapitulates the rules as to the filing of a Motion to dismiss by the
defendant as follows:
1. The trial court may in its discretion and on proper motion extend the 15day reglementary period for the filing of responsive pleadings.
2. During the original reglementary 15-day period, or any extension of such
period, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss the complaint.
3. If the motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant is allowed another fifteen
days from notice of the denial to file the responsive pleading. The full 15-day
reglementary period starts all over again.

Issue: WON, respondent court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing


the case based on the ground which is not alleged in the motion to dismiss
of MOWD
1.

2.

3.

xxx Summary or outright dismissals of actions are not proper where there
are factual matters in dispute which need presentation and appreciation of
evidence. Short cuts in judicial processes are to be avoided when they
impede rather than promote a judicious dispensation of justice xxx
7. DANFOSS, INC., Petitioners, vs. CONTINENTAL CEMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 143788 September 9, 2005

6. Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental Br. II


1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

Facts:
Borje is the counsel of the water consuming public of Ozamis City, he
allegedly received a blank water bill, with no indication of the meter readings,
no. of cubic meters consumed and the amount to be paid, hence he refused
to pay said bill which lead to the disconnection of his services;
He brought an action for damages w/ preliminary injunction against MOWD
in the respondent Court;
The Court then issued an order enjoining MOWD to disconnect the water
service and subsequently to reconnect the service;
MOWD then filed a motion to dismiss based on 2 grounds: 1) lack of
jurisdiction of respondent Court and 2) another action pending between the
same parties for the same causes;
Respond Court dismissed the case but not based on the grounds above
mentioned but because there was no malice or bad faith in the severance of
the water connection of petitioner and that MOWD had already reconnected
the same.

Held: YES.
The dismissal of an actions on grounds not alleged in the motion to dismiss
is improper for in so doing, a court in effect dismiss an action motu propio
w/out giving Borje a chance to argue ithe point w/out receiving any
arguments or evidence in question.
Under Sec. 1 of Rule 8, it enumerates the grounds upon which an action
may be dismissed and it specifically ordains that a motion to this end be
filed. The only instance in which the court may dismiss upon a courts own
motion on action is, when the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial
or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or to comply w/
the Rules or any order of the Court.
The dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of
due process, if from a consideration of the pleading it appears that there are
issues of fact which cannot be decided w/out the trial of the case on the
merits.

1.

2.

3.

FACTS:
Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) is an agent of Danfoss,
Inc.s products here in the Philippines. On September 1997, CCC ordered
two unit 132 KW Danfoss Brand Frequency Converter/Inverter from MINCI
to be used in the Finish Mill of its Cement Plant in Bulacan. In the terms of
conditions of the original purchase order, the two unit Frequency Converter
shall be delivered by Danfoss within 8 to 10 weeks from the opening of the
letter of credit. The letter of credit opened by CCC in favour of Danfoss on
September 9, 1997.
On September 17, 1997, MINCI informed CCC that its order are already
ready for shipment and MINCI requested to amend the letter of credit
changing the port of origin/loading from Singapore to Denmark (Singapore is
the Asian Regional Office of Danfoss, the Head Office of the company is
Denmark). CCC complied and the port of origin in the letter of credit was
changed.
On November 6, 1997, MINCI relayed to CCC that Danfoss Inc. was still
checking the status of their order. CCC replied that every delay in the

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

delivery of the order will cause loss to their company, so CCC requested for
early work out and immediate shipment to avoid further loss.
But, on November 9, 1997, Danfoss Inc. informed MINCI through fax, that
the reason for the delivery problems was that some of the supplied
components for the new VLT 5000 series (this may be a part of the converter
which is the subject thing in this case or a machine to create the converter)
did not meet the agreed quality standard. So, Danfoss was canvassing for
another supplier for the said VLT 5000 series. In the fax, there was no clear
message as to when normal production will resume.
Upon receiving the relayed information, CCC surmised that Danfoss would
not be able to deliver their order. There was also no definite commitment of
the delivery from Danfoss and MINCI, so CCC informed MINCI that they
intend to cancel its order. The order was cancelled on November 13, 1997.
Hence the complaint for damages filed by CCC with the RTC of Quezon City
against Danfoss and MINCI on November 5, 1998. In reply, Danfoss filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint.
CCCs contention : Due to the impending delay in the delivery of its order, it
suffered more than P8 million and was compelled to look for another
supplier.
Danfosss contention: The case should be dismissed on the ground that it
did not state a cause of action.
1)
The letter of credit was opened on September 9, 1997, so, since the
agreed delivery period is 8 to 10 weeks from the opening of the letter of
credit, the due date is until November 19, 1997.
2)
Although Danfoss was having a problem with its supplier prior to
CCCs cancellation of its order, CCC only surmised that Danfoss could not
deliver within the due date agreed upon.
3)
Neither Danfoss nor CCC agreed to change the date of delivery. Only
the port of origin was changed in the letter of credit. Danfoss has until
November 19, 1997 to deliver the order, CCC cancelled the order on
November 13, 1997.
4)
CCC never made an extrajudicial demand for the delivery of its order
on its due date as it cancelled the order before the due date.
5)
Damages sought for by CCC could not have accrued yet since the
order was cancelled before the delivery was actually delayed.
RTC ruled in favor of CCC. According to the RTC: ...the issue of whether or
not the defendants incur delay in the delivery of the equipment in question
within the period stipulated is a debatable question which necessitates
actual trial on the merits where the parties have to adduce evidence in
support of their respective stance.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of Danfoss.
ISSUE: WON there was a cause of action in the complaint filed by CCC
against Danfoss

HELD: No, there was no cause of action in the complaint for damages filed
by CCC.
SC ruled that In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause
of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint. And
the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit
the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
After a careful perusal of the allegations in respondents complaint for
damages against petitioner, we rule that the same failed to state a cause of
action. When respondent sued petitioner for damages, petitioner had not
violated any right of respondent from which a cause of action had arisen.
Respondent only surmised that petitioner would not be able to deliver the
two units frequency converter/inverter on the date agreed upon by them.
Based on this apprehension, it cancelled its order six days prior to the
agreed date of delivery. How could respondent hold petitioner liable for
damages (1) when petitioner had not yet breached its obligation to deliver
the goods and (2) after respondent made it impossible for petitioner to
deliver them by cancelling its order even before the agreed delivery date?
The trial court erred in ruling that the issue of whether or not the defendants
incurred delay in the delivery of the equipment within the period stipulated
was a debatable question. It said that trial on the merits was necessary and
the parties had to adduce evidence in support of their respective positions.8
But what was there to argue about when, based on the allegations of the
complaint, petitioner was not yet due to deliver the two units frequency
converter/inverter when respondent cancelled its order? It still had six days
within which to comply with its obligation. The court a quo should not have
denied petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint (for its failure to state a
cause of action) when, on its face, it was clear that petitioner had not yet
reneged on its obligation to deliver the frequency converter/inverter on the
date mutually agreed upon by the parties. Moreover, the obligation itself was
negated by no less than respondents own act of cancelling its order even
before the prestation became due and demandable. Where therefore was
the breach? Where was the damage caused by petitioner? There was none.
Consequently, it was wrong for the CA to affirm the order of the trial court
denying petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint for its failure to state a
cause of action.
8. Lu vs. Nabua (eto lang talaga facts ng case, please read rule 16 sec
2 and 3)
Facts:

The petition stemmed from an amended complaint filed by the "PR" against
"P", for accounting w/ TRO and Injunction;
"P" filed an Omnibus MD the Amended Complaint based on the ff. grounds:
o Plaintiff's claims are barred by a prior judgement or by statute of
limitations (R16 S1f)
o Plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and/or do not have a cause
of action(R16 S1g)
o Fraud and Equity
o Docket Fees are not paid
"PR" filed their opposition of the Omnibus MD Amended Complaint alleging
the ff.:
o Plaintiffs not barred by prior judgment nor by statute of limitations
o Plaintiffs have the legal capacity to sue and have a valid cause of
action
o DF have been paid
After the filing of "P" reply to the Opposition to MD Amended Complaint, the
same was submitted for resolution;
In resolving the OMD, lower court denied the OMD thenafter "P" filed an MR
regarding the dismissal of the OMD however it was also denied. Hence
appeal.
Issues:
1. WoN the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari in holding that
the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying "P" MD
2. WoN the trial courts denial of petitioners motion to dismiss on the ground
that [T]here are justiciable questions raised in the pleadings of the herein
parties which are proper subject of a full blown trial contravenes Sec. 3,
Rule 16 of the Rules and constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court.
Held:
1. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which
neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case,as it leaves something to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such,
the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed
to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a
denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a
final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must
have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
2. Under R16 S3, provides that Under this provision, there are three (3)
courses of action which the trial court may take in resolving a motion to
dismiss, i.e., to grant, to deny, or to allow amendment of the pleading.
Deferment of the resolution of a motion to dismiss if the ground relied upon
is not indubitable is now disallowed in view of the provision requiring
presentation of all available arguments and evidence. Thus, there is no

longer any need to defer action until the trial as the evidence presented, and
such additional evidence as the trial court may require, would already enable
the trial court to rule upon the dubitability of the ground alleged.
Further, it is now specifically required that the resolution on the motion shall
clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. This proscribes the common
practice of perfunctorily dismissing the motion for lack of merit. Such
cavalier dispositions can often pose difficulty and misunderstanding on the
part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the
higher court called upon to resolve the same, usually on certiorari.
The questioned order of the trial court denying the motion to dismiss with a
mere statement that there are justiciable questions which require a full blown
trial falls short of the requirement of Rule 16 set forth above. Owing to the
terseness of its expressed justification, the challenged order ironically suffers
from undefined breadth which is a hallmark of imprecision. With its
unspecific and amorphous thrust, the issuance is inappropriate to the
grounds detailed in the motion to dismiss.
While the requirement to state clearly and distinctly the reasons for the trial
courts resolutory order under Sec. 3,Rule 16 of the Rules does call for a
liberal interpretation, especially since jurisprudence dictates that it is
decisions on cases submitted for decision that are subject to the stringent
requirement of specificity of rulings under Sec. 1, Rule 3624 of the Rules,
the trial courts order in this case leaves too much to the imagination.

Rule 17 Dismissal of Actions


1. GO v CRUZ
FACTS:
On October 26, 1981, California Manufacturing Co., Inc. brought an action in the CFI
of Manila against Dante Go, accusing him of unfair competition. California alleged
that Dante Go is doing business under the name and style of "Sugarland International
Products," and engaged like California in the manufacture of spaghetti, macaroni, and
other pasta was selling his products in the open market under the brand name, "Great
Italian," in packages which were in colorable and deceitful limitation of California's
containers bearing its own brand, "Royal." Its complaint contained an application for
preliminary injunction commanding Dante Go to immediately cease and desist from
the further manufacture, sale and distribution of said products, and to retrieve those
already being offered for sale.
About two weeks later, however, or on November 12, 1981, California filed a notice of
dismissal.
Four days afterwards, or on November 16, 1981, California received by registered
mail a copy of Dante Go's answer with counterclaim dated November 6, 1981, which
had been filed with the Court on November 9, 1981.
On November 19, 1981 a fire broke out at the Manila City Hall destroying among
others the sala of Judge Tengco and the records of cases therein kept, including that
filed by California against Dante Go.
On December 1, 1981, California filed another complaint asserting the same cause of
action against Dante Go, this time with the CFI at Caloocan City. This second suit
was docketed as Civil Case No. C-9702 and was assigned to the branch presided
over by Judge Fernando A. Cruz.
On December 3, 1981, Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order against Go.
On the day following the rendition of the restraining order, Dante Go filed the present
petition for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for its nullification and perpetual
inhibition. On December 11, 1981, this Court, in turn issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining California, Judge Cruz and the City Sheriff from enforcing or
implementing the restraining order of December 3, 1981, and from continuing with the
hearing on the application for preliminary injunction in said Civil Case No. C-9702.
The scope of the injunction was subsequently enlarged by this Court's Resolution of
April 14,1982 to include the City Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby restrained from
proceeding with the case of unfair competition filed in his office by California against
Dante Go.
ISSUE: WON Sec. 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court applies in the present case.

HELD: No.What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the
action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant's answer with the Court (either
personally or by mail) but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for
summary judgment. This is the plain and explicit message of the Rules. "The filing of
pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers with the court,
"according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, means the delivery thereof to
the clerk of the court either personally or by registered mail. Service, on the other
hand, signifies delivery of the pleading or other paper to the parties affected thereby
through their counsel of record, unless delivery to the party himself is ordered by the
court, by any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e., by personal service, service by
mail, or substituted service.
Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila Court after the
filing of Dante Go's answer butbefore service thereof. Thus having acted well within
the letter and contemplation of the afore-quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court, its notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the action then pending in
the Manila Court, without need of any order or other action by the Presiding Judge.
The dismissal was effected without regard to whatever reasons or motives California
might have had for bringing it about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points
out, "without prejudice," the contrary not being otherwise "stated in the notice" and it
being the first time the action was being so dismissed.
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in the
Caloocan Court of First Instance based on the same claim. The filing of the complaint
invested it with jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of the action. In truth, and
contrary to what petitioner Dante Go obviously believes, even if the first action were
still pending in the Manila Court, this circumstance would not affect the jurisdiction of
the Caloocan Court over the second suit. The pendency of the first action would
merely give the defendant the right to move to dismiss the second action on the
ground of auter action pendant or litis pendentia.
Dante Go vs. Hon. Cruz, City Sheriff and California Manufacturing (1989)
[Facts]
-

California Manufacturing filed a case against Dante Go for unfair competition


alleging that the latters pasta products (Great Italian) such as spaghetti and
macaroni are packed with confusing similarity and colourable imitation with
the formers Royal Pasta products.

2 weeks later, California filed a Notice of Dismissal without prejudice

4 days after it received Gos answer with counterclaim

Fire broke out at the Manila City Hall and burned the records therein
including the case filed by California

California filed another complaint based on the same cause of action against
Go in the CFI Caloocan.

Caloocan judge issued a restraining order directing Go to cease and desist


from manufacturing and selling his products.

Go claims that the case in Manila is still pending and that the dismissal
sought by California is no longer a matter of right. He further accused
California of forum shopping at Caloocan judges sala.

[issue] Whether or not the dismissal of California is in accordance with the Rules of
Court thus allowing it to file a subsequent case
[ruling] Yes, it is in accord with RC. Section 1 Rule 17 mandates that notice of
dismissal must be filed any time before service of answer.
-California filed its notice of dismissal in CFI manila after Gos filing of answer but
before service thereof. Thus, its notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the
action pending in Manila court, without need of any order or action by the presiding
judge therein.
-No legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in the Caloocan CFI based
on the same claim.
2. G.R. No. L-35989

October 28, 1977

JALOVER vs. YTORIAGA


FACTS: This involves a land dispute filed by Ytoriaga and Lopez against Hedriana
and Jalover in the CFI of Iloilo. They claim that they the owners of the lot, covered by
TCT by virtue of the effects of the current of the river based on the principle of
continuous possession and alluvion. They alleged that Jalover , without their consent
had the portion of the land surveyed and even placed concrete monuments thereof
and even took possession of the land. Jalover , alleged, inter alia, that he is the
owner of the land as sole heir of his mother, who owned the land pursuant to Article
461 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Ytoriaga and Lopez offered documentary
evidence and upon admission thereof, rested their case. Jalover prayed the court to
dismiss the complaint with costs against Ytoriaga and Lopez Issues having been
joined, the case was set for trial. Trial was postponed many times stretching to a
period of more than 6 years, until January 26, 1970, when the case was called for
trial, and then Presiding Judge Ramon Blanco dismissed the case, for failure of
private respondents to appear in court, since the Plaintiff did not take the necessary
steps to engage the service of another lawyer in lieu of Atty. Atol, who since several
years ago has been appointed Chief of the Secret Service of the Iloilo City Police
Department. Two years later, private respondents' lawyer, Atty. Amado B. Atol, filed a
motion for reconsideration alleging that the said respondents did not fail to prosecute

because, during the times that the case was set for hearing, at least one of said
respondents was always present, and the record would show that the transfers of
hearing were all made at the instance of petitioner or his counsel; and, moreover,
private respondents had already finished presenting their evidence. respondent
Judge Venicio Escolin, who succeeded Judge Blanco in Branch V, issued an order
denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order of dismissal had
become final long ago and was beyond the court's power to amend or change.
Private respondents then filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment dated July 10,
1972, claiming that the order of dismissal dated January 26, 1970 was void because
of lack of due process and for having been obtained thru fraud, for the petitioner had
misrepresented to the court the status of the case by making Judge Blanco - who was
not the Presiding Judge when private respondents presented their evidence and
rested their case in 1963 - believe that trial had not even begun. Petitioner opposed
the petition for relief contending that private respondents were served a copy of the
order of dismissal on February 5, 1970, and, therefore, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 38
of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for relief should have been filed within 60
days from February 5, 1970, and within 6 months from January 26, 1970, when the
order was issued; hence, the filing of the petition was beyond the reglementary
period.The petition for relief was given due course,setting aside the orders dated
January 26, 1970 and June 23, 1972, and setting the continuation of the trial for
September 15, 1972. Hence, the present recourse by petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the prior case was validly dismissed for failure to prosecute
HELD: NO
It will be noted that, as found by respondent Judge, private respondents, as plaintiffs,
adduced their evidence and rested their case on September 4, 1963, or more than six
years before the dismissal of the case on January 26, 1970. It was, therefore, the turn
of petitioner, as defendant, to present his evidence. In the premises, private
respondents court not possibly have failed to prosecute they were already past the
stage where they could still be charged with such failure. As correctly held by
respondent Judge, private respondents' absence at the hearing scheduled on
January 6, 1970 "can only be construed as a waiver on their part to cross-examine
the witnesses that defendants might present at the continuation of trial and to object
to the admissibility of the latter's evidence." The right to cross-examine petitioner's
witnesses and/or object to his evidence is a right that belongs to private respondents
which they can certainly waive. Such waiver could be nothing more than the
"intentional relinquishment of a known right," and. as such, should not have been
taken against private respondents.
To dismiss the case after private respondents had submitted their evidence and
rested their case, would not only be to hold said respondents accountable for waiving
a right, but also to deny them one of the cardinal primary rights of a litigant, which is,
corollary to the right to adduce evidence, the right to have the said evidence
considered by the court. The dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute, when in

truth private respondents had already presented their evidence and rested their case,
and, therefore, had duly ,prosecuted their case, would in effect mean a total disregard
by the court of evidence presented by a party in the regular course of trial and now
forming part of the record. The ends of justice would be better served if, in its
deliberative function. the court would consider the said evidence together with the
evidence to be adduced by petitioner.However,relief from judgment under Rule 38 of
the Revised Rules of Court is not the appropriate remedy. A petition for relief is
available only if the judgment or order complained of has already become final and
executory; but here, as earlier noted, the order of January 26, 1970 never attained
finality for the reason that notice thereof was not served upon private respondents'
counsel of record. The petition for relief may nevertheless be considered as a second
motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial based on fraud and lack of
procedural due process.
Fermin Jalover vs Porferio Ytoriaga, Consolacion Lopez (1977)
[facts]

The dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute when in truth they have already
presented their evidence and rested their case would, in effect, mean a total
disregard of the court of the evidence presented by them in the regular course of trial.
Further, said dismissal never attained finality as the notice thereof was not served
upon their counsel of record.
3.
Ligaya, Jaime, Silvina, Fausta, Pablo all surnamed Mina vs. Antonia Pacson,
Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina (1963)
[facts]

This involves a land dispute filed by Ytoriaga and Lopez vs. Jalover in CFI
Iloilo.

Ytoriaga and Lopez claims that a land which was once under water
automatically belongs to them based on the principle of continuous
possession and alluvion. They alleged that Jalover, without their consent,
had that portion of land surveyed and even placed concrete monuments
thereon and took possession thereof.

Jalover, in his answer, alleged that his mother and Hedriana are co-owners
of said land; that he, as heir, is entitled to that portion.

Ytoriaga and Lopez offered documentary evidence and upon admission


thereof, rested their case.

Continuation of trial was ordered transferred until further assignment, thus,


causing the postponement of said case for a period of more than 6 years.

When the case was re-called for trial, Ytoriaga and Lopez failed to appear.
Judge Blanco dismissed the case for their failure to prosecute.

[ruling] No. Private respondents (Y and L) could not have possibly failed to prosecute
as they were already past the stage of presenting their evidence. Their absence
during the time the case was re-called for trial was a mere waiver of their right to
cross-examine the witnesses.

2 years after, Ytoriagas counsel filed an MR but denied. Counsel filed a


petition for relief of judgement. It was given due course.

[issue] Whether or not the prior case is validly dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Case 1: The Minas are claiming to be the illegitimate children of Joaquin


Mina while married to Pacson. They are claiming that the DOS allegedly
signed by Joaquin when he was ill was fraudulently obtained. They pray for
the annulment of the DOS and their recognition as illegitimate children.

Court in Case 1 ordered that Pacson be impleaded. The Minas failed to


comply with said order, thus, it was dismissed.

Case 2: The Minas filed another case, this time impleading Pacson but with
the same cause of action and including Medina and Cresencia.

Defendants filed a MTD on the ground of res judicata.

[issue] Whether or not CC 3015 (case 1) effectively bars the present case
[ruling] Partially. Failure to comply with a court order has the effect of adjudication
upon the merits (Sec 3 Rule 17). Thus, failure to comply with the court order in CC
3015 justifies the dismissal on the issue of annulment of DOS.
However, present case is not deemed dismissed as to the issue of filiation and
Pacson, as she is not impleaded in the prior case.
4. G.R. No. L-18707

February 28, 1967

CASEAS vs. ROSALES


FACTS: Araas and Caseas filed with the CFI of Agusan, a complaint for specific
performance and enforcement of their alleged right under a certain deed of sale, and

damages against the spousesRosales. They alleged that sometime in 1939, Agustin
O. Caseas acquired from Rodolfo Araas under a deed of assignment, the latter's
rights and interest over a parcel of land , that Rodolfo Araas in turn, acquired the
said property from the spouses Jose A. Rosales and Concepcion Sanchez under a
deed of sale ,under the terms of which, however, the actual transfer of the aforesaid
land unto the vendee would be made only on or before February 18, 1941; and that
despite the above documented transactions, and despite the arrival of the stipulated
period for the execution of the final deed of transfer, the vendors spouses refused to
fulfill their obligation to effect such transfer of the said lot to the vendee, Rodolfo
Araas or his assignee, the herein appellant, Agustin O. Caseas. After the
defendants-spouses had filed their answer to the above complaint, but before trial,
the counsel for the plaintiffs gave notice to the trial court that plaintiff Rodolfo Araas
and defendant Jose A. Rosales had both died. In view of the said manifestation, the
lower court,directed, the surviving plaintiff, Agustin O. Caseas, to amend the
complaint to effect the necessary substitution of parties thereon. The said surviving
plaintiff, however, failed altogether to comply with the aforementioned order. LC
dismissed the case for failure on the part of the counsel for the plaintiffs to comply
with the order of this Court which shows abandonment and lack of interest on the part
of the plaintiffs. Casenas, filed with the same CFI of Agusan, another complaint
against the widow and heirs of the late Jose A. Rosales "to quiet, and for
reconveyance of, title to real property, with damages. This suit referred itself to the
very same property litigated under Civil Case No. 261 and asserted exactly the
same .The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, namely: res
judicata, prescription, lack of cause of action, failure to include indispensable parties,
and that the contract subject of the complaint was void ab initio. After the plaintiff had
filed his opposition to the above motion, the lcissued the order under appeal
dismissing the complaint. Of the above grounds, though, the lower court relied alone
on the defendants' plea of res judicata, lack of cause of action and prescription.

pendency of which a party thereto dies, without such party having been validly
substituted in accordance with the rules, amounts to a "lack of jurisdiction."

ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the lower court was proper.

[facts]

HELD: No, the SC remanded the case to the court of origin.


When certain of the parties to Civil Case No. 261 died and due notice thereof was
given to the trial court, it devolved on the said court to order, not the amendment of
the complaint, but the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased in
accordance with the procedure and manner outlined in Rule 3, Section 17 of the
Rules of Court. In the case of Barrameda vs. Barbara, 90 Phil. 718, the SC held that
an order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as directed
by the aforequoted rule has been effected, is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no
duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said complaint, for
such non-compliance, would similarly be void. In a subsequent case, Ferriera et al.
vs. Gonzalez, et al., G.R. No. L-11567, July 17, 1958, this court affirmed a similar
conclusion on the determination that the continuance of a proceedings during the

The facts of this case fit four squares into the Barrameda case abovecited, save for
the minor variance that in the former two of the litigants died while only one
predeceased the case in Barrameda. Here, as in Barrameda, during the pendency of
civil case, notice was given to the trial court of the deaths of one of the plaintiffs and
one of the defendants in it. Instead of ordering the substitution of the deceased's legal
representatives in accordance with Rule 3, section 17 of the Rules of Court, the trial
court directed the surviving plaintiff to amend the complaint and when the latter failed
to comply therewith, the said court dismissed the complaint for such non-compliance.
We must hold, therefore, as We did in Barrameda that inasmuch as there was no
obligation on the part of the plaintiff-appellant herein to amend his complaint in Civil
Case No. 261, any such imposition being void, his failure to comply with such an
order did not justify the dismissal of his complaint. Grounded as it was upon a void
order, the dismissal was itself void.Consequently, as the dismissal of Civil Case No.
261 was void, it clearly may not be asserted to bar the subsequent prosecution of the
same or identical claim.
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of the other (Ma-ao Sugar Central vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666) and both these
elements were clearly alleged in the aforesaid complaint.
The resolution of the issue of prescription may be deferred until after the case is tried
on the merits where the defense pleaded against said issue is the existence of a trust
over the property in dispute.
Agustin Casenas vs. Concepcion Sanchez de Rosales, Romeo Rosales, et. Al.
(1967)

Case 1 prays for the execution of DOS in favour of Casenas: filed by


Rodolfo Aranas(assignor) and Casenas(assignee) vs. Jose Rosales and
Sanchez.

Rosales and Sanchez filed an answer before trial. Counsel for Aranas and
Casenas manifested the death of Jose Rosales and Aranas. The court
ordered Casenas to amend the complaint. Casenas failed to comply, thus, it
was dismissed.

Case 2 (present case) prays for quieting and reconveyance of title in favour
of Casenas. Sanchez claims res judicata.

[issue] Whether or not dismissal in the prior case effectively bars the present case

[ruling] No. The order to amend the complaint is not in accordance with the procedure
of the RC. The court should have ordered the counsel to make a substitution of the
deceased by the legal representatives of the deceased. Casenas failure to comply
with the order of the court did not validly justify the dismissal of the said case.

RULE 18: PRE-TRIAL


Filoil Marketing Corporation vs Dy Pac & Co. (1988)
FACTS:
Filoil commenced an action for collection of sum of money with interest
against Dy Pac on the ground that the latter fails to pay, notwithstanding
repeated demands, the amount due to it for petroleum products bought on
credit.
At the hearing set, neither Dy Pac nor its counsel appeared. Filoil was
allowed by the City Court of Manila to proceed ex parte. The said court
rendered a decision on the same date ordering Dy Pac to pay Filoil.
Dy Pac appealed to CFI Manila which immediately set the case for pre-trial. It
ruled that:
[]plaintiff and defendant, who are hereby ordered to prepare a stipulation
of facts based on their exhibits already marked and submit the same to the
court the parties are warned that if they cannot submit the stipulation of
facts, the Court will dismiss the appeal.
CFI Manila dismissed the case for failure of the parties to submit the required
stipulation of facts and ordered the immediate return of the records to the
City Court for execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case can be dismissed on the ground that the
parties failed to submit a stipulation of facts.
RULE:
No. There is no law which compulsorily requires litigants to stipulate at pretrial on the facts and issues that may possibly crop up in a particular case,
upon pain dismissal of such case. The process of securing admissions
whether of facts or evidence is essentially voluntary, since stipulations of
facts, like contracts, bind the parties thereto who are not allowed to
controvert statements made therein. Courts cannot compel the parties to
enter into an agreement upon the facts.

Where the parties are unable to arrive at a stipulation of facts and do not
reach an amicable settlement of their controversy, the court must close the
proceedings and go forward the trial of the case. The CFI Manila committed
serious error in dismissing Dy Pacs appeal from the City Courts decision
solely on the ground that the parties failed to comply with the order.

Rodolfo Paredes, Tito Alago, Agripino Baybay vs. Ernesto Verano and
CosmeHinunangan (2006)
FACTS:
In Civil Case 2767, a compromise was entered into regarding the complaint
for the establishment of a right of way.Hinunangan granted a 2m-wide right of
way in favour of Paredes, Alago and Baybay in consideration of P6,000.00.
A complaint for specific performance with damages was filed by Hinunangan
on the ground that Petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of
the compromise agreement.
Petitioners denied the allegation contending that respondents were not actual
residents of the barangay and that the lot covering the passage of right of
way was sold by Hinunangan to Paredes. Petitioners filed a MTD on the
ground of lack of cause of action. The trial court denied the MTD.
Pre-trial was set on April but was reset on June. However, it did not push
through either because none of the parties appeared. On Nov, the RTC was
informed of a proposed settlement. The case was reset to January 2004. On
January, private respondents and their counsel were present. Petitioners
were also present but not their counsel.
RTC allowed respondents to present evidence ex parte for failure of the
defendants counsel to appear.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of counsel for petitioners at the pre-trial,
with all petitioners themselves present, is a ground to declare them in default
RULING: No. Absence of counsel at pre-trial does not ipso facto authorise
the judge to declare them in default. Sec. 4, Rule 18 imposes duty on
litigating parties and their respective counsel to appear at pre-trial. Sec. 5

penalizes the failure to appear of either plaintiff or defendant but not of their
counsel.
A judgment of default against one who failed to attend at pre-trial or even to
file an answer implies a waiver only of their right to be heard and to present
evidence to support their allegation but not all their other rights.
Paredes vs. Verano
Facts:
1. The legal battle between the parties began with a complaint for the
establishment of a right of way filed by the petitioners against
respondents. The complaint culminated in a judgment by
compromise.
2. In the Compromise Agreement, respondent Cosme Hinunangan
granted a 2 meter-wide right of way in favor of petitioners in
consideration of the amount of Php 6,000.00 which petitioners
agreed to pay.
3. Alleging that petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of
the Compromise Agreement, respondents filed a complaint for
specific performance with damages against petitioners.
4. In their answer, petitioners denied having violated the Compromise
Agreement, and alleged that like them, respondents were not actual
residents of Barangay Tagnipa where the road right of way was
established and that respondent Cosme had already sold his only
remaining lot in the vicinity to petitioner Paredes.
5. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of action.
TC-DENIED.
6. Pre-trial was initially set for 24 April 2003, but this was reset to 3
June 2003. But the pre-trial set on 3 June 2003 did not push through
either because none of the parties appeared. So, pre-trial was reset
to 11 November 2003. However, petitioner Baybay was present in
court along with other defendants was called. RTC was informed
then of a proposed settlement between the parties, although Baybay
qualified his reaction by telling the court that he would first have to
inform his lawyer of the said propodal.
7. RTC reset the pre-trial for 23 January 2004.
8. Before the new pre-trial date, counsel for petitioners filed a
Manifestation of Willingness to Settle With Request for Cancellation
dated 5 January 2004.

9. The hearing did push through on 23 January 2004. The private


respondents and their counsel were present. So were petitioners
Baybay and Paredes, and co-defendant Alago, but not their counsel.
10. RTC allowed respondents to present their evidence ex parte, for
failure of the defendants counsel to appear before the RTC.
11. Motion for recon DENIED.
12. Petition for certiorari CA dismissed for failure to attach duplicate
orig copies of annexes to petition as well as other pleadings relevant
and pertinent to the petition.
13. Motion for recon with motion to admit additional exhibits DENIED.
CA ruled that even with the submission by petitioners of the required
pleadings and documents, the instant petition must nevertheless
failed. It conceded that under Sec 5 Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, it is the failure of the defendant, and not defendants
counsel, to appear at the pre-trial that would serve cause to allow
plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
Issue: Whether the absence of the counsel for defendants at the pre-trial,
with all defendants themselves present, is a ground to declare defendants in
default and to authorize plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte.
Held: No.
Section 4. Appearance of parties. It shall be the duty of the parties and
their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may
be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall
appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter
into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to appear
when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for
dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall
be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court
to render judgment on the basis thereof.
Section 4 imposes the duty on litigating parties and their respective
counsel during pre-trial. The provision also provides for the instances where
the non-appearance of a party may be excused. Nothing, however, in Sec 4
provides for a sanction should the parties or their respective counsel be
absent during pre-trial. The penalty is provided for in Sec 5 which penalizes
the failure to appear of either the plaintiff or the defendant, and not their
respective counsel.
The absence of counsel for defendants at pretrial does not ipso facto
authorize the judge to declare the defendant as in default and order the

presentation of evidence ex parte. Nothing in the rules of court sanctions the


presentation of evidence ex parte upon instances when counsel for
defendant is absent during pre-trial. The Rules do not countenance stringent
construction at the expense of justice and equity.

Erlinda Guanzon vs Andrew Arradaza, Francisca Maidin, ErlindaLebita


(2006)
FACTS:
Arradaza boarded a jeepney owned and operated by Maidin and Lebita.
Following the jeepney was a dump truck registered in the name of Guanzon.
The two vehicles collided. Arradaza sustained injuries. Despite several
demands, Maidin and Lebita failed to reimburse Arradaza of the actual
damages he incurred. Arradaza filed a case against Maidin and Lebita. The
latter filed their answer arguing that it was the truck driver who was at fault.
Therefore, Guanzon, being the employer, failed to exercise the diligence of a
god father in selecting and hiring the driver.
Summons were served to Guanzon through substituted service via a certain
Susan Ador. Guanzon failed to file an answer and was declared in default.
2 years later, Guanzon filed a MTD on the ground that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over her because of the defective service of summons.
MeTCadjuged in favour of Arradaza.Guanzon appealed to the RTC Manila.
RTC affirmed the MeTC decision. Appeal to the CA was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper service of summons on Guanzon.

RULING: Yes. The motor vehicle registration of the truck is under the name
of Guanzon with address at Manresa, QC. The service of summons therein
failed because Guanzon was not known in the said address. Upon inquiry
with the SEC, it was found out that Guanzon was the director of Guanzon
Lime Devt Company with address at Caloocan. Service of summons was
effected there through Susan Ador, of suitable age and working in the
premises.
The service of summons upon petitioner first attempted by personal service,
and subsequently by substituted service more than meets the requirements
set by the Rules of Court.