SECONDDIVISION

GOVERNMENT

SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and
WINSTONF.GARCIA,inhiscapacity
asGSISPresident&GeneralManager,
Present:
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 170132

PUNO,J.,Chairperson,

SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,
versus

*CORONA,

AZCUNA,and

GARCIA,JJ.

KAPISANAN

NG

MANGGAGAWASAGSIS,

MGA

Respondent.

Promulgated:

December6,2006

xx

*CORONA,* On Leave.

DECISION

GARCIA,J.:

InthispetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesof
Court,theGovernmentServiceInsuranceSystem(GSIS)anditsPresident
andGeneralManagerWinstonF.Garcia(Garcia,forshort)assailandseek
tonullifytheDecision1[1]datedJune16,2005oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)
inCAG.R.SPNo.87220,asreiteratedinitsResolution2[2]ofOctober18,
2005denyingGarciasmotionforreconsideration.

Therecourseiscastagainstthefollowingsetting:

A fourday October 2004 concerted demonstration, rallies and en

masse walkout waged/held in front of the GSIS main office in Roxas
Boulevard,PasayCity,starteditall.FormingahugepartoftheOctober4
toOctober7,2004massactionparticipantswereGSISpersonnel,among
themmembersofthehereinrespondentKapisananNgMgaManggagawasa
1[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca DeGuia-Salvador, concurred
in by Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Aurora SantiagoLagman, Rollo, pp. 78-98.
2[2]Id.at101105.

GSIS(KMGortheUnion),apublicsectorunionofGSISrankandfile
employees.Contingentsfromothergovernmentagenciesjoinedcauseswith
the GSIS group. The mass actions target appeared to have been herein
petitionerGarciaandhismanagementstyle.WhiletheMayorofPasayCity
allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS
employeeswasnotcoveredbyapriorapprovedleave.3[3]

OnoraboutOctober10,2004,themanageroftheGSISInvestigating
Unitissuedamemorandumdirecting131unionandnonunionmembersto
show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their
participation in said rally. In reaction, KMGs counsel, Atty. Manuel
Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among
others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in
obedience to the returntowork order thus issued. The plea for
reconsiderationwas,however,effectivelydeniedbythefiling,onOctober
25,2004,ofadministrativechargesagainstsome110KMGmembersfor
gravemisconductandconductprejudicialtothebestinterestoftheservice. 4
[4]

What happened next is summarized by the CA in its challenged

decisionofJune16,2005,albeitthehereinpetitionerswouldexceptfrom
someofthedetailsoftheappellatecourtsnarration:

3[3]
4[4]

CA Decision, p. 2; Id. at 79.

Id. at 80.

Ignoring said formal charges, KMG, thru its President, Albert Velasco,
commencedtheinstantsuitonNovember2,2004,withthefilingofthePetitionfor
Prohibitionatbench.Onthegroundthatitsmembersshouldnotbemadetoexplainwhy
theysupportedtheirunionscause,petitioner[KMG]faultedrespondent[Garcia]with
blatant disregard of Civil Service Resolution No. 021316, otherwise known as the
Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action, Section 10 of which exhorts government
agenciestoharnessallmeanswithintheircapacitytoaccorddueregardandattentionto
employeesgrievancesandfacilitatetheirspeedyandamicabledispositionthroughthe
useofgrievancemachineryoranyothermodesofsettlementsanctionedbylawand
existingcivilservicerules.Twosupplementstotheforegoingpetitionwereeventually
filedbyKMG.Thefirst,apprised[theCA]ofthesupposedfactthatitsSpeaker,
Atty.Molina,hadbeenplacedunderpreventivesuspensionfor90daysandthatthe
formalchargesthusfiledwillnotonlydepriveitsmembersoftheprivilegesandbenefits
duethembutwillalsodisqualifythemfrompromotion,stepincrementadjustmentsand
receiptofmonetarybenefits,includingtheir13thmonthpayandChristmasbonuses.The
second,xxxmanifestedthat,onDecember17,2004,respondent[Garcia]servedaspate
ofadditionalformalchargesagainst230ofKMGsmembersfortheirparticipationin
theaforesaidgrievancedemonstrations.

In his December 14, 2004 comment to the foregoing petition, respondent

[Garcia]averredthatthecaseatbenchwasfiledbyanunauthorizedrepresentativein
viewofthefactthatAlbertVelascohadalreadybeendroppedfromtheGSISrollsand,
bysaidtoken,hadceasedtobeamembermuchlessthePresidentofKMG.Invoking
theruleagainstforumshopping,respondent[Garcia]called[theCAs]attentiontothe
supposedfactthattheallegationsinthesubjectpetitionmerelyduplicatedthosealready
setforthintwopetitionsforcertiorariandprohibitionearlierfiledbyAlbertVelasco.
Becausesaidpetitionsare,inpointoffact,pendingbeforethiscourtasCAG.R.SP
Nos.86130and86365,respondent[Garcia]prayedforthedismissalofthepetitionat
bench.5[5](Wordsinbracketadded.)

ItappearsthatpendingresolutionbytheCAoftheKMGpetitionfor
prohibition in this case, the GSIS management proceeded with the
investigationoftheadministrativecasesfiled.Asrepresentedinapleading
beforetheCA,asofMay18,2005,twohundredseven(207)outofthetwo
hundredseventyeight(278)casesfiledhadbeenresolved,resultinginthe
exoneration of twenty (20) respondentemployees, the reprimand of one
hundredeightytwo(182)andthesuspensionforonemonthoffive(5).6[6]

5[5] Id. at 79-81.

6[6]
Garcias Motion for Reconsideration of the [CAs] Decision
dated June 22, 2005, pp. 8-9; Annex G, Petition, Id. at 44-45.


OnJune16,2005,theCArenderedthehereinassaileddecision7[7]
holding that Garcias filing of administrative charges against 361 of
[KMGs]membersistantamounttograveabuseofdiscretionwhichmaybe
thepropersubjectofthewritofprohibition.Dispositively,thedecision
reads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,the petition[of KMG] is GRANTED

and respondent [Winston F. Garcia] is hereby PERPETUALLY ENJOINED from
implementingtheissuedformalchargesandfromissuingotherformalchargesarising
fromthesamefactsandevents.

SOORDERED.(Emphasisintheoriginal)

Unable to accept the above ruling and the purported speculative

factualanderroneouslegalpremisesholdingittogether,petitionerGarcia
soughtreconsideration.InitsequallyassailedResolution 8[8]ofOctober18,
2005,however,theappellatecourtdeniedreconsiderationofitsdecision.

Hence,thisrecoursebythepetitionersascribingseriouserrorsonthe
appellatecourtingrantingthepetitionforprohibitionabsentaninstanceof
graveabuseofauthorityontheirpart.
7[7]Supranote1.

8[8]

Supra note 2.

WeresolvetoGRANTthepetition.

Itshouldbestressedrightoffthatthecivilserviceencompassesallbranchesandagenciesofthe
Government,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations(GOCCs)withoriginalcharters,like
theGSIS,9[9]orthosecreatedbyspeciallaw.10[10]Assuch,employeesofcoveredGOCCsarepartof
thecivilservicesystemandaresubjecttocirculars,rulesandregulationsissuedbytheCivilService
Commission(CSC)ondiscipline,attendanceandgeneralterms/conditionsofemployment,inclusiveof
mattersinvolvingselforganization,strikes,demonstrationsandlikeconcertedactions.Infact,policies
establishedonpublicsectorunionismandrulesissuedonmassactionhavebeennotedandcitedbythe
Courtinatleastacase.11[11]AmongtheseissuancesisExecutiveOrder(EO)No.180,seriesof1987,
providingguidelinesfortheexerciseoftherighttoorganizeofgovernmentemployees.Relevantalsois
CSCResolutionNo.021316whichprovidesrulesonprohibitedconcertedmassactionsinthepublic
sector.

Thereishardlyanydisputeabouttheformalchargesagainstthe278
affectedGSISemployeesamixofKMGunionandnonunionmembers
having arose from their having gone on unauthorized leave of absence
(AWOL)foratleastadayortwointheOctober4to7,2004stretchtojoin
theranksofthedemonstrators/rallyistsatthattime.Asstatedineachofthe
formalcharges,theemployeesactofattending,joining,participatingand
takingpartinthestrike/rallyisatransgressionoftherulesonstrikeinthe
publicsector.Thequestionthatimmediatelycomestothefore,therefore,is
whetherornotthemassactionstagedbyorparticipatedinbysaidGSIS
9[9]
GSIS exists pursuant to PD 1146, as amended by RA No. 8291,
or the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997.
10[10]
Constitution, Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); SSS Employees
Association v. CA, G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989, 175 SCRA 686; Home
Development Mutual Fund v. COA, G.R. No. 142297, June 15, 2004, 432
SCRA 127.
11[11]
G.R. No. 124540, November 14, 1997, 281 SCRA 657.

employeespartookofastrikeorprohibitedconcertedmassaction.Ifinthe
affirmative,thenthedenouncedfilingoftheadministrativechargeswould
be primafacie tenable,inasmuchasengaginginmassactionsresultingin
work stoppage or service disruption constitutes, in the minimum, the
punishableoffenseofactingprejudicialtothebestinterestoftheservice. 12
[12]Ifinthenegative,thensuchfilingwouldindeedsmackofarbitrariness
andjustifytheissuanceofacorrectiveorpreventivewrit.

Petitionersassertthatthefilingoftheformalchargesarebutanatural
consequence of the servicedisrupting rallies and demonstrations staged
during office hours by the absenting GSIS employees, there being
appropriateissuancesoutlawingsuchkinds ofmassaction.Ontheother
hand,theCA,agreeingwiththerespondentsargument,assumedtheview
andheldthattheorganizeddemonstratingemployeesdidnothingmorethan
air their grievances in the exercise of their broader rights of free
expression13[13] and are, therefore, not amenable to administrative
sanctions.Forperspective,followingiswhattheCAsaid:

Although the filing of administrative charges against [respondent KMGs]

members is well within [petitioner Garcias] official [disciplinary] prerogatives, [his]
exerciseofthepowervestedunderSection45ofRepublicActNo.8291wastaintedwith
arbitrarinessandvindictivenessagainstwhichprohibitionwassoughtby[respondent].
xxx the fact that the subject mass demonstrations were directed against [Garcias]
supposedmismanagementofthefinancialresourcesoftheGSIS,byandofitself,renders
thefilingofadministrativechargesagainst[KMGs]membersuspect.Moresignificantly,

12[12]
Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124678, July 31,
1997, 276 SCRA 619.
13[13]
CA Resolution, p. 4; Rollo, p. 104.

we find the gravity of the offenses and the sheer number of persons charged
administrativelytobe,attheveryleast,antitheticaltothebestinterestoftheservice.

Itmatterslittlethat,insteadofthe361allegedbypetitioner,only278charges
wereactuallyfiled[and]inthemeantime,disposedofandofthesaidnumber,20resulted
toexoneration,182toreprimandand5totheimpositionofapenaltyofonemonth
suspension.Irrespectiveoftheiroutcome,theseverepenaltiesprescribedfortheoffense
withwhichpetitionersmemberswerecharged,toourmind,bespeakofbellicoseand
castigatoryreaction.Thefactthatmostoftheemployees[Garcia]administratively
chargedwereeventuallymetedwithwhatappearstobeavirtualslaponthewristeven
makesuswonderwhyrespondentevenbotheredtofilesaidchargesatall.xxx.

Alongsidetheconsequencesoftherightofgovernmentemployeestoform,join
orassistemployeesorganization,wehavealreadymentionedhowthebroaderrightsof
freeexpression castitslongshadowoverthecase.xxxwefind [petitionerGarcias]
assailedacts,onthewhole,anathematosaidrightwhichhasbeenaptlycharacterizedas
preferred, one which stands on a higher level than substantive economic and other
liberties,thematrixofotherimportantrightsofourpeople.xxx. 14[14] (Underscoring
andwordsinbracketadded;citationsomitted.)

Whileits decisionand resolution donotexplicitlysayso, theCA

equatedtherighttoformassociationswiththerighttoengageinstrikeand
similaractivitiesavailabletoworkersintheprivatesector.Intheconcrete,
the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not
barredfromforming,joiningorassistingemployeesorganization,petitioner
GarciacouldnotvalidlyinitiatechargesagainstGSISemployeeswagingor
joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the servicedisruptive
effectofsuchmassaction.CitingwhatJusticeIsaganiCruzsaidinManila
Public School Teachers Association [MPSTA] v. Laguio, Jr., 15[15] the
appellatecourtdeclared:

14[14]
CA Resolutions pp. 3-4; Rollo, 103-104.
15[15] G.R. Nos. 95445 & 95590, August 6, 1991, 200 SCRA 323.


ItisalreadyevidentfromtheaforesaidprovisionsofResolutionNo.021316that
employeesoftheGSISarenotamongthosespecificallybarredfromforming,joiningor
assistingemployeesorganizationsuchas[KMG].Ifonlyforthisineluctablefact,the
meritofthepetitionatbenchisreadilydiscernible. 16[16]

WeareunabletolendconcurrencetotheaboveCAposture.For,let
alonethefactthatitignoreswhattheCourthasuniformlyheldallalong,the
appellatecourtspositioniscontrarytowhatSection4inrelationtoSection
5 of CSC Resolution No. 02131617[17] provides. Besides, the appellate
courtsinvocationofJusticeCruzsopinioninMPSTAisclearlyofftangent,
thegoodJusticesopinionthereatbeingadissent.Itmaybe,astheappellate
courturgedthatthefreedomofexpressionandassemblyandtherightto
petitionthegovernmentforaredressofgrievancesstandonalevelhigher
thaneconomic andother liberties. Anysuggestion, however,aboutthese
rightsasincludingtherightonthepartofgovernmentpersonneltostrike
oughttobe,asithasbeen,trashed.Wehavemadethisabundantlyclearin
ourpastdeterminations.Forinstance,inAllianceofGovernmentWorkersv.

16[16] CA Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 87.

17

[17] Sec. 4. Limitation on the Right to SelfOrganization. The right toselforganization

accordedtogovernmentemployeesasdescribedintheforegoingsectionshallnotcarrywithitthe
righttoengageinanyformofprohibitedconcertedactivityormassactioncausingorintendingto
causeworkstoppageorservicedisruption,albeitoftemporarynature.

Sec.5.DefinitionofProhibitedConcertedMassAction.AsusedinthisOmnibus
rules,thephraseprohibitedconcertedactivityshallbeunderstoodtorefertoanycollective
activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees
organizations,withtheintentofeffectingworkstoppageorservicedisruptioninordertorealize
theirdemandsorforceconcessions,economicorotherwise,fromtheirrespectiveagenciesorthe
government.Itshallincludemassleaves,walkouts,picketsandactsofsimilarnature.

MinisterofLaborandEmployment,18[18]acasedecidedundertheaegisof
the1973Constitution,anenbancCourtdeclaredthatitwouldbeunfairto
allowemployeesofgovernmentcorporationstoresorttoconcertedactivity
withtheeverpresentthreatofastriketowringbenefitsfromGovernment.
Thencamethe1987Constitutionexpresslyguaranteeing,forthefirsttime,
therightofgovernmentpersonneltoselforganization19[19]tocomplement
theprovisionaccordingworkerstherighttoengageinpeacefulconcerted
activities,includingtherighttostrikeinaccordancewithlaw.20[20]

Itwasagainstthebackdropoftheaforesaidprovisionsofthe1987
ConstitutionthattheCourtresolved Bangalisanv.CourtofAppeals.21[21]
In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr.,22[22] that employees in the
publicservicemaynotengageinstrikesorinconcertedandunauthorized
stoppageofwork;thattherightofgovernmentemployeestoorganizeis
limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the
righttostrike.

Jacintov.CourtofAppeals23[23]camenextandthereweexplained:
Specifically,therightofcivilservantstoorganizethemselveswaspositively

18[18]
19[19]
20[20]
21[21]
22[22] Supra

No. L-60403, August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1.

Art. IX(B), Sec. 2 (5).
Art. XIII, Sec. 2.
G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 619.
note 15.

23[23]Supranote11.

recognizedinAssociationofCourtofAppealsEmployeesvs.FerrerCaleja.But,asin
theexerciseoftherightsoffreeexpressionandofassembly, therearestandardsfor
allowablelimitationssuchasthelegitimacyofthepurposeoftheassociation,[and]the
overridingconsiderationsofnationalsecurity....

Asregardstherighttostrike,theConstitutionitselfqualifiesitsexercisewith
theprovisioninaccordancewithlaw.Thisisaclearmanifestationthatthestatemay,
bylaw,regulatetheuseofthisright,orevendenycertainsectorssuchright.Executive
Order180whichprovidesguidelinesfortheexerciseoftherightofgovernmentworkers
to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which enjoins
under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
stagingstrikes,demonstrations,massleaves,walkoutsandotherformsofmassaction
whichwillresultintemporarystoppageordisruptionofpublicservicebystatingthat
theCivilServicelawandrulesgoverningconcertedactivitiesandstrikesingovernment
serviceshallbeobserved.(Emphasisandwordsinbracketadded;citationsomitted)

AndinthefairlyrecentcaseofGesitev.CourtofAppeals,24[24]theCourtdefinedthelimitsoftherightof
governmentemployeestoorganizeinthefollowingwise:

Itisrelevanttostateatthispointthatthesettledruleinthisjurisdictionis
thatemployeesinthepublicservicemaynotengageinstrikes,mass
leaves,walkouts,andotherformsofmassactionthatwillleadinthe
temporarystoppageordisruptionofpublicservice.Therightof
governmentemployeestoorganizeislimitedtotheformationofunionsor
associationsonly,withoutincludingtherighttostrike,

addingthatpublicemployeesgoingondisruptiveunauthorizedabsencesto
joinconcertedmassactionsmaybeheldliableforconductprejudicialtothe
bestinterestoftheservice.

Significantly, 1986 Constitutional Commission member Eulogio

24[24] G.R. Nos. 123562-65, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 51.

Lerum,answeringinthenegativetheposerofwhetherornottherightof
governmentemployeestoselforganizationalsoincludestherighttostrike,
stated:

When we proposed this amendment providing for self organization of

governmentemployees,itdoesnotmeanthatbecausetheyhavetherighttoorganize,
theyhavealsotherighttostrike.Thatisadifferentmatter.xxx25[25]

WiththeviewwetakeoftheeventsthattranspiredonOctober47,
2004,whatrespondentsmemberslaunchedorparticipatedinduringthat
timepartookofastrikeor,whatcontextuallyamountstothesamething,a
prohibitedconcertedactivity. Thephraseprohibitedconcertedactivity
referstoanycollectiveactivityundertakenbygovernmentemployees,by
themselves or through their employees organization, with the intent of
effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass
leaves,walkouts,picketsandactsofsimilarnature.26[26] Indeed,forfour
straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees
staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or
demonstrationrightattheverydoorstepoftheGSISmainofficebuilding.
Therecordofattendance27[27]fortheperiodmaterialshowsthat,onthefirst
dayoftheprotest,851employees,orfortyeightpercent(48%)ofthetotal
numberofemployees inthemainoffice(1,756)tooktothestreetsduring
25[25]
Bernas, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES A COMMENTARY, 337 (1st ed, 1988).
26[26]
CSC Res. No. 021316, Sec. 5; Supra note 17.
.
27[27]
Annex C and Annex I, Petition, Rollo, p. 107 and 173,
respectively.

officehours,from6a.m.to2p.m.,28[28]leavingtheotheremployeestofend
forthemselvesinanofficewhereahostoftransactionstakeplaceevery
businessday.Onthesecondday,707employeeslefttheirrespectivework
stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third day. A
smallernumber,i.e.,306employees,butbynomeansaninsignificantfew,
joinedthefourthdayactivity.

To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of

servicesremainedattheusuallevelofefficiencyattheGSISmainoffice
during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences
wouldbetounderstatethings.Andtoplacetheerringemployeesbeyondthe
reachofadministrativeaccountabilitywouldbetotrivializethecivilservice
rules,not tomentionthecompellingspiritof professionalismexacted of
civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
OfficialsandEmployees.29[29]

Theappellatecourtmadespecificreferencetotheparliamentofthe
streets,obviouslytolendconcurrencetorespondentspretensionthatthe
gatheringofGSISemployeesonOctober47,2004wasanassemblyof
citizensoutonlytoairgrievances,notastrikingcrowd.Accordingtothe
respondent,astrikepresupposesamassactionundertakentopressforsome
economicdemandsorsecureadditionalmaterialemploymentbenefits.
28[28] Id. at 267.
29[29]
Rep. Act No. 6713.

Wearenotconvinced.

Inwhatevernamerespondentdesirestocallthefourdaymassaction
inOctober2004,thestubbornfactremainsthattheerringemployees,instead
of exploring noncrippling activities during their free time, had taken a
disruptiveapproachtoattainwhateveritwastheywerespecifically after.
Aseventsevolved,theyassembledinfrontoftheGSISmainofficebuilding
during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to
convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and
servicedelivery disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the
prohibitionagainststrikesbygovernmentpersonnel.30[30]

The Court can concede hypothetically that the protest rally and
gatheringinquestiondidnotinvolvesomespecificmaterialdemand.But
thentheabsenceofsucheconomicrelateddemand,eveniftrue,didnot,
underthepremises,makesuchmassactionlessofaprohibitedconcerted
activity. For, as articulated earlier, any collective activity undertaken by
governmentemployeeswiththeintentofeffectingworkstoppageorservice
disruptioninordertorealizetheirdemandsorforceconcessions,economic
or otherwise, is a prohibited concerted mass action31[31] and doubtless
actionable administratively. Bangalisan even went further to say the
following:[i]ntheabsenceofstatute,publicemployeesdonothavethe
30[30] Jacinto v. CA, supra note 22..
31[31]
CSC Resolution No. 021316, Sec. 5.

righttoengageinconcertedworkstoppagesforanypurpose.

TopetitionerGarcia,asPresidentandGeneralManagerofGSIS,rests
theauthorityandresponsibility,underSection45ofRepublicActNo.8291,
the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS
personnelforcause.32[32] Atbottomthen,petitionerGarcia,byfilingor
causing the filing of administrative charges against the absenting
participantsoftheOctober47,2004massaction,merelyperformedaduty
expectedofhimandenjoinedbylaw.Regardlessofthemoodpetitioner
Garcia was in when he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be
sustainedaslegallycorrectanddoubtlesswithinhisjurisdiction.

ItbearstoreiterateatthispointthattheGSISemployeesconcerned
wereproceededagainstandeventuallyeitherexonerated,reprimandedor
metedaonemonthsuspension,asthecasemaybenotfortheexerciseof
theirrighttoassemblepeacefullyandtopetitionforredressofgrievance,but
for engaging in what appeared to be a prohibited concerted activity.
RespondentnolessadmittedthatitsmembersandotherGSISemployees
mighthavedisruptedpublicservice.33[33]
32[32]
SEC. 45. Powers and Duties of the President and General
Manager.- xxx The President and General Manager [of the GSIS],
subject to the approval of the Board, shall appoint the personnel of the
GSIS, remove, suspend or otherwise discipline them for cause, in
accordance with existing Civil Service rules and regulations .
33[33]
KMGs basic petition for prohibition, p. 13; Rollo, p. 121 et
seq.


Tobesure,arbitrarinessandwhimsicalexerciseofpoweror,infine,
grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioner Garcia cannot be
simplisticallyinferredfromthesheernumberofthosechargedaswellasthe
gravity or the dire consequences of the charge of grave misconduct and
conductprejudicialtothebestinterestoftheservice,astheappellatecourt
madeittoappear.Theprincipleofaccountabilitydemandsthateveryerring
government employee be made answerable for any malfeasance or
misfeasancecommitted.Andlestitbeoverlooked,themerefilingofformal
administrativecase,regardlessofthegravityoftheoffensecharged,does
notovercomethepresumptiveinnocenceofthepersonscomplainedofnor
does it shift the burden of evidence to prove guilt of an administrative
offensefromthecomplainant.

Moreover,theCourt invites attentiontoits holdingin MPSTA v.

Laguio,Jr.,acaseinvolvingover800publicschoolteacherswhotookpart
in mass actions for which the then Secretary of Education filed
administrativecomplaintsonassortedcharges,suchasgrossmisconduct.Of
thosecharged,650weredismissedand195suspendedforatleastsix(6)
monthsTheCourt,however,didnotconsidertheelementof numberof
respondentsthereatand/orthedireconsequencesofthecharge/sasfatally
vitiating or beclouding the bona fides of the Secretary of Educations
challengedaction.Thenasnow,theCourtfindsthefilingofchargesagainst
alargenumberofpersonsand/orthelikelihoodthattheywillbesuspended

or,worse,dismissedfromtheservicefortheoffenseasindicatingastrong
andclearcaseofgraveabuseofauthoritytojustifytheissuanceofawritof
prohibition.

The appellate court faulted petitioner Garcia for not first taping
existinggrievancemachineryandothermodesofsettlementagreeduponin
theGSISKMGCollectiveNegotiationsAgreement(CAN) beforegoing
fullsteamaheadwithhisformalcharges.34[34]

The Court can plausibly accord cogency to the CAs angle on

grievanceprocedurebutforthefactthatitconvenientlydisregardedwhat
appearstobethemorerelevantprovisionoftheCNA.WerefertoArticleVI
whichreads:

The GSIS Management and the KMG have mutuallyagreed to promote the
principleofsharedresponsibilityonallmattersanddecisionsaffectingtherights,
benefits and interests of all GSIS employees . Accordingly, the parties also
mutuallyagreethat theKMGshallnotdeclareastrikenorstageanyconcertedaction
whichwilldisruptpublicserviceandtheGSISmanagementshallnotlockoutemployees
whoaremembersoftheKMGduringthetermofthisagreement.GSISManagement
shallalsorespecttherightsoftheemployeestoairtheirsentimentsthroughpeaceful
concertedactivitiesduringallowablehours,subjecttoreasonableofficerules. 35[35]
(Underscoringadded)

34[34]
35[35]

CA Decision, pp. 17-18; Id. at 94-95.

Petition, p. 41; Id. at 43.

Ifthefingerofblame,therefore,istobepointedatsomeonefornon
exhaustionoflessconfrontationalremedies,itshouldbeattherespondent
union for spearheading a concerted mass action without resorting to
available settlement mechanism. As it were, it was KMG, under Atty.
AlbertoVelasco,whichopenedfirefirst.Thatnoneofthepartiesbothered
toavailofthegrievanceproceduresundertheGSISKMGCNAshouldnot
betakenagainsttheGSIS.Atbest,bothGSISmanagementandtheUnion
shouldbeconsideredasinparidelicto.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds it unnecessary to

discuss at length the legal standing of Alberto Velasco to represent the
herein respondent union and to initiate the underlying petition for
prohibition.SufficeittostatethatVelasco,perJointResolutionNo.0410
01approvedonOctober5,2004bytheKMGJointExecutiveLegislative
Assembly, had ceased to be member, let alone president, of the KMG,
havingpreviouslybeendroppedfromtherollsofGSISemployees. 36[36]
Whilethedroppingfromtherollsisallegedtohavebeenthesubjectofa
CAissued temporary restraining order (TRO), the injunction came after
Atty.Velascohadinfactbeenseparatedfromtheserviceanditappearsthat
theTROhadalreadyexpired.

Asafinalconsideration,theCourtnotesorreiteratesthefollowing
relevantincidentssurroundingthedispositionofthecasebelow:
36[36]

Annex D, Petition; Id. at 108.

1. The CA had invoked as part of its

ratio decidendi a dissenting

opinioninMPSTA,evengoingtotheextentofdescribingasinstructiveand
timelyaportion,whenthemajorityopinionthereat,whichtheappellate
courtignored,isthecontrollingjurisprudence.

2. The CA gave prominence to dispositions and rattled off

holdings37[37]oftheCourt,whichappropriatelyapplyonlytostrikesinthe
privateindustrylaborsector,andutilizedthesameasspringboardtojustify
aninferenceofgraveabuseofdiscretion.Ontheotherhand,itonlygave
perfunctorytreatmentifnottotallyignoredjurisprudencethatsquarelydealt
withstrikesinthepublicsector,asiftherighttostrikegiventounionsin
private corporations/entities is necessarily applicable to civil service
employees.

3.Ascouched,theassailedCAdecisionperpetuallybarsrespondent
GarciaandnecessarilywhoeversucceedshimasGSISPresidentnot
onlyfromimplementingtheformalcharges againstGSISemployeeswho
participatedintheOctober47,2004massactionbutalsofromissuing
other formal charges arising from the same events. The injunction was
predicatedonafindingthatgraveabuseofdiscretionattendedtheexercise
ofpetitionerGarciasdisciplinarypowervestedhimunderSection45ofRA
8291.38[38] Atbottomthen,theassaileddecisionstruckdownasanullity,
owingtotheallegedattendantarbitrariness,notonlyactsthathavealready
beendone,butthoseyettobedone.Inneteffect,anyformalchargearising
fromtheOctober47,2004incidentis,underanyandallcircumstances,
prejudgedasnecessarilytaintedwitharbitrarinesstobeslainatsight.

37[37]
Allied Banking Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116128, July 12,
1996, 258 SCRA 724; Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
95494-97, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 95; International Container
Terminal Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98295, April 10, 1996, 256
SCRA 134.
38[38]
Supra note 32.

The absurdities and ironies easily deducible from the foregoing

situationsarenotlostontheCourt.

We close with the observation that the assailed decision and

resolution,ifallowedtoremainundisturbed,wouldlikelypavethewayto
thelegitimizationofmassactionsundertakenbycivilservants,regardlessof
theirdeleteriouseffectsontheinterestofthepublictheyhavesworntoserve
withloyaltyandefficiency.Worsestill,itwouldpermittheemergenceofa
system where public sector workers are, as the petitioners aptly put it,
immune from the minimum reckoning for acts that [under settled
jurisprudence] are concededly unlawful. This aberration would be
intolerable.

WHEREFORE,theassailedDecisionandResolutionoftheCourtof
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the writ of prohibition
issuedbythatcourtisNULLIFIED.

NoCost.

SOORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WECONCUR:

REYNATOS.PUNO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

(ONLEAVE)
ANGELINASANDOVALGUTIERREZ

RENATOC.CORONA

AssociateJustice

AssociateJustice

ADOLFOS.AZCUNA

AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

Iattestthattheconclusionsintheabovedecisionwerereachedin
consultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionofthe
CourtsDivision.

REYNATOS.PUNO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,SecondDivision

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the

DivisionChairperson'sAttestation,itisherebycertifiedthattheconclusions
in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

ARTEMIOV.PANGANIBAN
ChiefJustice