Ludwig Fleck and The Sociology of Knowledge

Review: Ludwik Fleck and the Sociology of Knowledge
Author(s): Jonathan Harwood

Review by: Jonathan Harwood
Source: Social Studies of Science, Vol. 16, No. 1, Theme Section: 'Funding and Knowledge Growth'
(Feb., 1986), pp. 173-187
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
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REVIEW
LudwikFleckand the Sociology of

Knowledge
JonathanHarwood
Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Developmentof a ScientificFact, translatedby F.
Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn, edited by Thaddeus J. Trenn and R.K.
Merton, forewordby T.S. Kuhn (Chicago and London: The Universityof
Chicago Press, 1979), xxviii+ 203pp., ?14.00/$17.50,?7.25/$6.95pbk. ISBN
0-226-25324-4(-25325-2pbk).
Ludwik Fleck, Enstehungund Entwicklungeiner wissenschaftlichen
Tatsache,
introducedand edited by L. Schaferand Th. Schnelle (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,
1980), xlix+ 190pp.,DM 12. ISBN 3-518-07912-3.
LudwikFleck, Erfahrungund Tatsache,collectedessaysedited and introduced
by L. Schaferand Th. Schnelle (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1983), 195pp., DM 16.
ISBN 3-518-28004-X.
Thomas Schnelle, Ludwik Fleck: Leben und Denken (Freiburg: HochschulVerlag,1982), 376pp., DM 70. ISBN 3-8107-2165-4.
RobertS. Cohen and Thomas Schnelle(eds), Cognitionand Fact: Materialson
Ludwik Fleck, Boston Studies in the Philosophyof Science, Volume 87, series
editorsR.S. Cohen and M.W. Wartofsky(Dordrecht,Lancasterand Boston,
Mass.: D. Reidel, 1985), x + 468pp., Dfl. 180/f49.95/$59.50.
ISBN 90-2771902-0.
In 1935 a Polish physiciannamed Ludwik Fleck published a

monographin German entitled Genesis and Developmentof a
ScientificFact. Although it addressed central issues in the
philosophyof science,thebook made virtuallyno impact.Most of
the reviewsit received appeared in medical journals or popular
magazines. After the war it languished in obscurity,despite
Social Studies of Science (SAGE, London, Beverly Hills and New Delhi),
Vol. 16 (1986), 173-187.
174
Social Studiesof Science
Kuhn's passing reference to it in The Structureof Scientific

Revolutions,untila German scholar rediscoveredit in the early
1970s.1
Recently,however,Fleck's workhas been grantedmuchmore
attention. In 1979 an English translationof his book was
published,2quicklyfollowedbya reissueoftheGermanedition, a
dissertationon his life and work,4a collectionof his essays on
sociologyof knowledge,5and a conferencedevoted to him.6The
explanationforthissuddeninterestis clear: Fleck anticipatedfifty
years ago many of the currentargumentsfor a sociology of
scientificknowledge,argumentswhichin Anglo-Saxon(and quite
possibly German) scholarshiphave been derived largely from
Kuhn.
In an essay of thisscope it is impossibleto do expositoryjustice
to the works under review. I will, therefore,draw upon these
worksin orderto venturea judgementof Fleck's significance.My
questionis: how are we to welcomethisprescientlatecomer?Is he
largelyof historicalinterest?Or is hiswritingstillof heuristicvalue
forthesociologyofknowledge?
A SingularCareer
Fleck was born in 1896 in Lwow ('Lemberg' until 1918), a city
whoseclose culturaltiesto Vienna meantthathe grewup speaking
both Polish and German fluently.He trainedin medicine after
World War I and developed a particularinterestin medical
bacteriology,working during the 1920s and 1930s in various
hospitallaboratorieswhile conductingresearchin his free time.
Neverthenarrowscientist,he devotedhis eveningsto philosophy,
sociology and historyof science and medicine. Although his
accordreadingin these areas was evidentlyratherunsystematic,
ing to Schnelle,Fleck's interestwas sustainedby his membership
societieswhichfosteredscholarlybreadth
ofvariouslocal scientific
It was in the Lwow Societyforthe Friends
and inter-disciplinarity.
that he presented his firstsociological
of
Medicine
of History
1927).
paper (ET:
Attemptingto identifythe intellectualcontextin whichFleck's
sociological thoughtdeveloped between the mid-1920sand mid1930s,SchnelleconcludesthatFleck was almosttotallyunawareof
the contemporaryGerman literaturein sociologyof knowledge.
Review:Harwood: LudwikFleck
175
That he could fashiona conceptof 'thought-style'

in ignoranceof
Mannheim or Lukacs is remarkabletestimonyto the fact that
sociologicalthinking
about knowledgewas verymuch'in theair' in
German culturalcircles afterthe firstworld war. Furthermore,
whatlittleFleck had read of the sociologyof knowledgefailedto
satisfyhim; Durkheim and Levy-Bruhlwere scolded for exemptingscience fromsociologicalanalysis.Even ifone compares
him with those of his contemporarieswho did venture a
sociologicalanalysisof science,Fleck was farmoreradical. While
Max Scheler,forexample, preferredto treatscience as a body of
thoughtobservedin abstractionfromafar,Fleck wentstraightto
the heart of the cognitive process, analysing perception and
classificationin empiricaldetail. Schaferand Schnelle (EEWT)
thusjustifiably
regardFleck as the firstwriterto make a sustained
case fora sociologyofscientific
knowledge.
Most of Schnelle'smonographis devotedto establishingthatthe
intellectualmilieu which shaped Fleck's epistemologicalwriting
was dominatedby threephilosophersat the Universityof Lwow:
K. Twardowski, K. Ajdukiewicz and L. Chwistek. Much of
Fleck's writingaddresses problems with which these three had
wrestled:is realitygiven or constructed?Is cognitionbuiltupon
formal deductive structures?Can a multiplicityof knowledge
systems(thus 'realities')be rationallygrounded?In attempting
to
solve theseproblems,Fleck sometimesadopted the philosophers'
assumptionson particularmatters.From Twardowskiand Chwistek,forexample,he appropriatedthe idea thatperceptionas well
as concept-formation
were activeprocessesin whichthe knowing
subject,in accord withhis/her
practicalneeds, abstractsparticular
featuresfromthe objects observed. From all three,he took over
the viewpointthat,whilethe assumptionof 'thingsin themselves'
was plausible, it was of little use to any theoryof knowledge
because humanshad onlymediatedaccess to suchthings.
Despite thiscommonground,however,Fleck's solutioiito the
problemsposed by the Lwow philosopherswas distinctive.While
Twardowski regarded the individual as perceiving cognitive
objects,Fleck wrote:'We look withour own eyes,we see withthe
eyes of the collective' (ET 154). Faced witha range of formally
equivalent knowledge-systems,
Chwistek attempted to defend
their rationalityby attributingtheir underlyingassumptionsto
'healthyhumanreason' but withoutelaboratingon the natureof
humanreason. Fleck objected that human reason was not static
176
Social StudiesofScience
buthistorically
and sociallyvariable.Havingconcededa multitude
of incommensurable
axiomaticstructures,
each consonantin some
waywithreality,Ajdukiewiczcould notexplainwhypeople in fact
chose one ratherthan another. Fleck argued that such choices
were dictated by the circumstancesin which collectivesfound
themselves.Thus Fleck certainlygained much-fromhis philosophical contemporaries,but his genius lay in the abilityto use
what littlesociologyhe knew in order to open up for empirical
analysisthoseepistemologicalissuesto whichthephilosophershad
no answer.
By the mid-1930s the most productive period for Fleck's
sociological work was over. With the German occupation of
Poland in 1941, he was confinedto Lwow's Jewishghetto,where
appalling sanitary conditions meant that 70 percent of the
inhabitantssufferedfrom typhus. In the ghetto hospital he
attempted to develop a vaccine against typhus until he was
deportedin 1943 to Auschwitzand subsequentlyto Buchenwald.
There, in the Waffen-SS'sInstitutefor Hygiene he directed a
laboratorywhose task was to develop a typhusvaccine which
would protectSS guardsfrominfection.Even duringthisperiod
Fleck remainedinterestedin the natureof scientific
inquiry.In an
essay published after the war he described the social process
wherebyone of the teamsin his laboratory(composed exclusively
of bacteriologicallyilliterate members) managed to convince
themselvesinitiallyof the validityof theirfindings,as well as the
subsequentprocess wherebythat certaintywas graduallyunderminedbyparticularevents.
From the end of the war untilthe late 1950s,withprofessional
recognition,a large researchschool and muchimprovedfacilities
in Lublin and Warsaw, Fleck's bacteriologicalwork flourished
while his sociological interestsreceded. In 1957 he emigratedto
Israel,wherehe died in 1961.
By any reckoning,Fleck was a remarkablescholar. That he
managed not only to stay abreast of historyand philosophyof
science while pursuing a medical career but also to publish
to thatliteratureis impressive.That thispublished
contributions
workshould have provedhighlyoriginal,even twentyyearslater,
is phenomenal.There can be littledoubt, therefore,thatLudwik
Fleck is a figureof considerablehistoricalinterest,even thoughhis
sociologicalwork made littleimpactin its own time. But are his
ideas stillnovel? What mightthe sociologyof knowledgebe able
to learnfromFleck today?
177
FleckversusKuhn
When readingFleck, the modernwriterwho mostoftencomes to
mind is T.S. Kuhn. Both of them developed generalizable
propositionsabout scientificchange in the course of detailed
historical analysis rather than in the more abstract manner
common among philosophers.Various writershave noted the
strikingsimilaritiesbetween Fleck's conception of science and
Kuhn's 'normalscience',themostimportant
ofwhichare these:
1. According to Fleck, scientists'work is characterizedby a
traditionof sharedassumptions('thought-style')
whichare largely
invisibleto membersand thusrarelyquestioned(ET: 1929).
2. These assumptions,he argues, definewhich questions are
significantand prefigurethe appropriate answers (GDSF 40,
83-84, 104).
3. Using severalvividexamples,Fleck showsthatperceptionis
an active and selective Gestalt process, conditionedby these
assumptions.When one initiallylooks at objects in a visual field,
the impressionsare unclear and chaotic. With experience they
acquire shape and identitythroughcategoriesprovided by the
prevailingthought-style
(ET: 1929, 1935, 1947; GDSF 28-30,
90-92).
4. Challenges to the thought-style
as commonlyrejected or
assimilated(GDSF sec. 2.3; ET: 1935).
5. Members of differentresearch communities ('thoughtcollectives') adhere to differentthought-styles
and tend to talk
pastone another(ET: 1936; GDSF 109).
6. Admission to the research communityproceeds via a
dogmatic form of education. The prevailing thought-styleis
transmittedto the pupil, not throughthe masteryof formal
principles,but througha process of 'experience' that cannot be
rationallyreconstructed
butwhichresultsin theacquisitionofcraft
knowledge(ET: 1927, 1935, 1946; GDSF 52-54, 87ff.,95-97).
7. As scientificknowledge develops, its scope widens, we
acquire more knowledgeoverall, and some older problemsare
solved, but the process is patchy. Science cannot be said to
approach the truthbecause successive thought-styles
raise new
problemswhile discardingolder areas of understanding(ET 55,
125, 132; GDSF 19, 51, 137-39).
Inevitably,thereare also differences
betweenFleck and Kuhn,
both rhetoricaland substantive.Among the former,as Baldamus
178
has emphasized,it is evidenthow unreservedlyFleck embraced

the sociologicalimplicationsof his work. Repeatedlyhe attacked
positivistphilosophersof science for idealizing the process of
An empiricallyadequate theoryofknowledge,
knowledge-growth.
he insisted,must necessarilyby sociological (ET: 1929, 1936).
Kuhn,on theotherhand,was slowerto encouragethesociological
reception
extensionof hiswork.Ambivalentabout his enthusiastic
by sociologistsduringthe 1970s, he confessesin his forewordto
GDSF to havingfound Fleck's sociology of the collectivemind
'vaguelyrepulsive'(ix).
Among substantivedifferences,the most significantconcerns
There is, to be sure,commongroundhere. Both
meaning-change.
authors agree that concepts change their meaning as they are
and thatknowledgegrows,
incorporatedintonewerthought-styles
not by accretionbut by qualitativeshiftsas findingsare reinterpreted.Moreover,both authorstreatmeaningin a 'Wittgensteinean' manner (that is, terms' meaning is context-dependent),
despite the fact that Fleck was writingtwo decades before
Philosophical Investigationswas published. Nevertheless,while
Kuhn and Fleck agree thatmeaning-changeis fundamental,they
differover the way in which it occurs. When Kuhn discusses
it is in connection with scientificrevolutions;
meaning-shift,
normalscience appears as a period of relativeconsensuson the
meaning of concepts central to a paradigm until the onset of
science. Whethersuch a view was plausible or not
extraordinary
became the subject of debate about ten years ago between
sociologistsfroman older 'normative'and a newer'interpretivist'
(that is, Wittgensteinean)tradition.8WhateverKuhn had originRevolutions,9it has since
of Scientific
allyintendedin The Structure
become widelyaccepted among sociologiststhat even in normal
subjectto negotiation.Accordingsciencemeaningsare constantly
and consensusin all phases of
ly, the extentof meaning-stability
sciencemustforthemomentbe regardedas an empiricalmatter.
Fleck's conception of meaning-changeis more consistently
Wittgensteinean.As Schafer and Schnelle have rightlynoted
xxxix),one of Fleck's mostimportantinsights
(EEWT xxviii-xxix,
is that meaning-changeis a continuousfeatureof inquirywithin
any given thought-style.Knowledge, he writes, consists of a
networkof conceptsand factsin dynamicequilibriumwitheach
other(GDSF 79). Each new factshiftsthe meaningof all terms
throughoutthe network(GDSF 102-03). Even the background
179
are constantlyin flux(GDSF 64). It

assumptionsof a thought-style
is precisely this flexibilityof the network which allows a
to resistmajorchallengewhileconveyingtheillusion
thought-style
of invariance.The social basis of thisperpetualmeaning-shift,
he
says, lies in the diversityof interpretations
withinthe thoughtcollectiveat anyone time:
One can assume that each observercarriesout observationsaccordingto his
thought-style.
These individual styles differto varyingdegrees; the more
distinctivethe stylesare, the more discrepantthe correspondingobservations
willbe ... If thesethought-styles
were everywhereidenticaland invariant,each
discovery(thatis, the perceptionof somethingnew) would be impossible.(ET
68, cf.Schnelle30-31)
Whence thisindividualdiversitywithina thought-collective?

It
derives,accordingto Fleck, fromthe factthateach memberof a
givenscientificthought-collective
is simultaneouslya memberof
manyothercollectivesboth in and outside science (GDSF 105).
Since no two individualsare identicalin theirmemberships,each
scientistsconductsa unique blend of meaningsfromthe outside
world and imparts,in consequence, a subtlydistinctivemeaning
to the concepts shared by membersof the researchcommunity
(GDSF 110). At the research front, therefore,diversityof
interpretation
even misunderstanding
(GDSF 119-20) - is
characteristic,as is evident fromthe tentativeand exploratory
tone of knowledge-claims
in specialistjournals. In the systematic
accountsof the fieldpublishedin handbooksand reviewpapers,
bycontrast,thetone is confidentand consensual.On thewayfrom
the journal to the handbook, knowledge-claimshave circulated
among specialists and been rejected or undergone shiftsof
meaning(sometimesso considerableas to be unrecognizableto
theiroriginators[GDSF 118-24,ET: 1935]) beforebecomingpart
of a new consensus.So This consensusis onlytemporary,
however;
although handbook science provides membersof the thoughtcollectivewitha heuristicmap, the precise meaningsof its terms
are soon subject to negotiationby workersat the researchfront,
struggling
to reconcilethe map withwhattheyobserve in nature.
Thus in Fleck's account,meaning-stability
is a briefand precarious
phase in thegenesisand developmentof a scientific
fact.
Kuhn's conceptof 'scientificrevolution'as a recurring
featureof
scientificchange has drawncriticismfromvarioushistorianswho
have complainedthatsuch discontinuities
have been non-existent
180
in some disciplinesand veryrare even in physicsand chemistry.

Interestingly,
Fleck's model of science lacks any concept analogous to 'revolution'. The fact that there had been no such
conceptualupheavalsin bacteriologycannotsufficeto explainthis;
he was clearlyaware of recentupheavalsin thephysicsof his day.
Is it that by buildingcontinuousmeaning-changeinto science,
Fleck was able to dispense with the need for radical shiftsin
conceptual development?Perhaps Kuhn found the Einsteinean
revolutionin physicsso strikingthathe concentratedon meaningvariancebetweenparadigmsto the exclusionof thatwithinthem.
In any event, if Fleck has more adequately captured the latter
phenomenon,the fact of rare revolutionsremains. Indeed, the
theoretical task of explaining them becomes more difficult.
WhereasKuhnianparadigmsare unable to accommodateanomaly
indefinitely,conceptual networks in Fleck's scheme possess
infiniteresilience,bouncingback vigorously,thoughaltered,after
each challenge. Were Fleck to have developed a model of
revolution,it would have to have been a radicallyrelativistone:
revolutionaryresearch programmeswould supersede even the
healthiestofancienregimes.
Thought-Style
and Thought-Collective
In keepingwithhis explicitlysociologicalanalysisof science,Fleck
has rather more to say about the structureof the scientific
is borne by a
communitythan does Kuhn. Each thought-style
Withina giventhought-style
thereexistmany
thought-collective.
which are developed by
particular concepts/theories/methods
each sectorconsisting
particularsectorsof the thought-collective,
of a small'esotericcircle'of specialistsand a larger'exotericcircle'
thusconsistsof manyesoof non-experts.The thought-collective
and exo-tericcircleswhichoverlapsincean individualscientistwill
belong simultaneouslyto one esotericbut manyexotericcircles.
Withinscience,these circlesare mutuallydependent:membersof
the exoteric circle must accept on trustthe knowledge-claims
generatedby the esotericcircle,whiletheultimatevalidityof such
claims (hence the possibilityof progress) rests on the exoteric
circle's assent. In this way, Fleck emphasizes, the scientific
communityis fundamentally'democratic': the esoteric elite
proposes, and the exoteric mass disposes. The structureof a
181
religiousor metaphysicalthought-collective,
in contrast,is undemocraticbecause itsexotericcircleslack thepowerto challenge
itsesotericcircle'sclaims(ET: 1929).
Unfortunately,Fleck's discussion of social structureis very
abstract.He makes littleattempt,forexample,to relatehis richly
detailed accountof observation,classificationand the emergence
of a fact in bacteriologyto an equally detailed analysis of the
organization of the respective scientificcommunities.Furthermore, when he applies the terms 'thought-collective'and
'thought-style'
to concrete science, his analysis is inconsistent.
'Modern science' is said to constitutea single thought-collective
(GDSF 103, 105), Similarly,he refersfrequentlyto thethoughtstyle of modern science, as opposed to those of religion,art,
fashion,sport,or politics. On the other hand, he also refersin
passing to the distinctivethought-styles
of differentscientific
disciplines(GDSF 108) and even, as in the quotation above, of
differentscientists,withoutreconcilingthese divergentusages.
Towards the end of his monograph(section 4.5), he begins to
applythe termthought-style
in a more promisingway, discussing
differentstyles within a given discipline but only in widely
separated historical periods. Without conceptual elaboration,
therefore,his analysis is not as useful as it might be to
contemporary
sociologistsand historiansinterestedin contrasting
styleswithina givendisciplinein a particularperiod.
Quite apartfromthese ambiguitiesconcerningthe scope of the
term 'thought-collective',
the meaning of 'thought-style'
is also
disturbingly
broad. It is said to:
directperception(ET: 1935)
specifyquestionsto ask and solutionsto be sought(ET 48), as
well as methodsto use (GDSF 99)
conferintellectualpredispositions
and habits(ET 68)
establish'a certainmood' (GDSF 99).
Whentheconceptis stretchedto coverso muchground,itends up
meaninglittlemore than 'presupposition'.This minimalmeaning
may, of course, have been very usefulfor Fleck's attacksupon
logical positivismduringthe 1930s, but it is hardlynovel today
when the presuppositionalnatureof science has been argued so
often.
182
is Fleck's suggestionthatpresuppositions
Much moreinteresting
may arise fromnon-rationalcommitmentto
of a thought-style
primitiveimagesor metaphors(Urideen)- forexample,the idea
of fouledblood in syphilisresearch(GDSF), the analogybetween
fireand lifein medicineand physiology(ET: 1936), or the model
of 'attack and defence' in the conceptualizationof infectious
disease (GDSF 59ff).Necessarilyderivedfrominheritedpopular
notions,such images are reshapedby the scientificcommunityin
orderto yieldconceptswhose morespecificmeaningbetterserves
the collective'sparticularpurposes.Like a letter,therefore,every
scientificconceptbears signsof both its originand its destination
(ET 92), itspast as well as itsfuture.
To conceptualizethe structureand emergenceof thought-styles
in thisway- thatis, to propose thattheyare based upon a small
numberof ontologicaland epistemologicalassumptionsendorsed
- is certainly
useful.But
by the membersof a thought-collective
since Fleck failed to develop these insights,he has littleto offer
those already familiarwith more recent concepts such as root
metaphor,themata (G. Holton), the hard-core of a research
embodiedin themodels
programme(Lakatos), or themetaphysics
matrix(Kuhn).
and values of a disciplinary
Finally,thereis the question of the relationbetween thoughtstyle and the process of thinking. Unfortunately, Fleck
ways which were
approached this relation in two contradictory
never reconciled. In a materialistvein he argued that human
beings control their ideas ratherthan vice versa, and that our
imposedby the
knowledgeis shaped, at least partly,byconstraints
real world(ET 70, 75, 126, 168; GDSF 38, 46, 51). On the other
hand,however,as StephenToulminand David Bloor noted at the
Hamburg symposium,he repeatedlyinsistedthat thought-style
'dictates'and 'coerces' how and whatthe scientistsees and thinks
(ET 75; GDSF 41, 122). Clearly,thislatteridealistinterpretation
of style fitsvery poorly with Fleck's Wittgensteineanemphasis
upon the continualrenegotiationof meaningswithina collective,
includingchangesin meaningof the styleitself.For exampleFleck
wrote:
... while it lasted, only one solutionto any given problemconformedto that
style... Such a stylizedsolution,and thereis alwaysonlyone, ... is always,or
almostalways,completelydeterminedwithina thoughtstyle.(GDSF 100)
183
But how can a style 'coerce' if its meaningis not intrinsicbut

negotiable?It is surelythecollectivewhichcoerces; styleis merely
the medium throughwhich coercion is exerted. If Fleck were
simplyusingthe phrase 'stylecoerces' as shorthandforthe latter
moresociologicallyconsistentbut unwieldyclaim,he would surely
have pointed this out at least once somewhere in his work. I
suspect that, like some others, he simply did not notice this
explanatorytensionin hiswork.Despite thebestofintentions,
itis
quite easy to slipintothehabitof regardingthought-style
as a kind
of interveningvariable, emergingthroughthe actions of the
researchcommunityand, in turn,feedingback upon its inventors
to channeltheirperception.But to portraycognitionin thiswayis
inconsistent:the formerprocess is sociological but the latter
remainsintellectualist.
Herewitha reminderof the dangersof reifying
or
thought-style
paradigm, of imputingto cognitive structuresthe power to
constrainthought and action. Unlike, for example, theories,
concepts or techniqueswhichscientistsconsciouslyrecognizeas
theobjects upon whichtheywork,styleis an analyst'sconstructof
whichscientistsare quite unaware. As historiansand sociologists
we inferstylisticdifferencesfromthe factthat different
cultural
productsfromthe same community(for example, its art and its
science) are similar while comparable products (for example,
theoriesof light)developed by different
communitiesare distinctive.Alertedby the existenceof such patterns,we tryto tease out
theontologicalor epistemologicalassumptionswhichare common
to several sectorsof a community'sculture.The conceptof style
thusenables us to reduce the complexityof the bodies of thought
which we analyse, arrivingat a handful of lowest-commondenominators.Once these have been inferred,sociological explanation of scientists'commitmentis greatlysimplified:it can
concentrateupon these deeply embedded assumptions.At no
pointin the analysisneed styleacquire an independentstatusas a
cognitiveconstraint.It is thusthegenesisofsuchcognitivepattern,
notitsfunction,whichrequiresexplanation.
Fleck's TheoreticalSignificance
It is hardlysurprisingthatthe editorsof the German and English
184
editionsof Fleck's work are inclinedto assign more than simply

historicalimportanceto his writing.In my view, however,such
claims have not been adequately justified.In a briefconference
paper, forexample, Trenn has suggestedthatFleck's writinghas
of both
an importantcontributionto make to our understanding
did
Fleck
Since
and science policy issues.1"
discipline-formation
the
all
writing
in
almost
since
and
problem,
not addresstheformer
aspect
or
one
other
to
is
relevant
knowledge
sociologyof scientific
ofsciencepolicy,thegroundsforthisoptimismare unclear.
Similarly,SchnellearguesthatFleck's mostimportantand novel
contributionis to conceptualize the genesis of fact in termsof
'active' and 'passive' connections(33-34). Active connectionsare
propertiesof the systemunderstudywhichare assumed withina
On the basis of these assumptions,otherproperties
thought-style.
of the systemappear obvious or inescapable, 'imposing' themselves upon the observer; these are what Fleck terms passive
connections. Active connections have an arbitrarycharacter;
passive ones seem necessary. Accordingly,the goal of each
researchcommunityis to maximizethe passive connectionsin its
while minimizingthe active ones. This distincknowledge-claims
tioncertainlyimpingesupon an importantproblem- namely,the
rhetorical tactics which are most effective in establishing
with
But can theseconceptstake us anyfurther
knowledge-claims.
the problem?Possiblynovel in theirday, active and passive are
little more than a sociological reformulationof the concepts
'subjective' and 'objective'. That is, active or subjectiveconnec(thus contenof narrowlyinstitutionalized
tionsare characteristic
(thusunexcepBroadly institutionalized
tious) knowledge-claims.
tionable) knowledge-claimsembodypassive or objective connections.
The most recent contributionto Fleck scholarship,Cognition
and Fact, is usefulin several respects. It makes available to an
audience a summaryof Schnelle'swork,Fleck's
English-speaking
essays on epistemologyand diverse commentarieson Fleck by
historians, philosophers and sociologists. Although none of
Fleck's essaysrepresentsa substantialtheoreticaladvance overhis
monograph,one or twoof them(especially'ScientificObservation
of the
and Perceptionin General', 1935) containvividillustrations
constructedand context-dependentnature of perception and
should prove usefulforteaching.The commentariesin Cognition
and Fact fall into two categories. The firstcategoryis, broadly
185
speaking,biographicalin approach. These essays (by N. Rotenstreich, Jerzy Giedymin, B. Wolniewicz, W. Markiewicz, T.
Schnelle, B. Zalc, A. Moulin and I. Lowy) relate Fleck's
epistemologicaland scientificviewsto a varietyof intellectualand
social contexts: developmentsin twentieth-century
philosophy,
interwarPolish philosophicaltraditions,the cultureof Lwow, and
schools of thoughtwithininterwarbacteriologyand immunology.
The second categoryaddressesgeneralproblemsof epistemology.
These authors(S. Toulmin,P.A. Heelan, Y. Elkana, D. Wittich,
S. Shapin and D. Bloor) use Fleck's workin variousways. Some
are criticalwhileothersappropriateFleck as an allyin advancinga
favouredepistemologicalposition.Significantly,
however,none of
these commentators(with the possible exception of Dieter
Wittich)makes a serious claim for the heuristicvalue of Fleck's
conceptsin contemporary
sociologyof knowledge.Wittichargues
that Fleck's work offersfar more theoreticalpossibilitiesthan
Kuhn's,but hisargument(confinedto 318-19) is too condensedto
be convincing.
It is thusdifficult
not to agree withBaldamus' judgement(see
note 7) that,while enormouslyinsightful
and pioneering,Fleck's
workis not systematicenoughto have had the impact,even in the
favourable climate of the 1960s and 1970s, enjoyed by The
Structureof ScientificRevolutions.Various observershave noted
conceptual inconsistencieswithin Fleck's monograph, and in
several places towards the end of the book (section 4.3) he
apologized fortruncateddiscussionof variouspoints,all of which
suggeststhathe wrotein haste.
The comparisonwithKuhn is again instructive.Like 'thoughtstyle',the conceptof 'paradigm'was originallyused by Kuhn, to
its detriment,in a greatvarietyof ways. But unlikeFleck, Kuhn
was a member of a professionalcommunityof historiansand
philosophersof science whose criticalresponsesled himto refine
theconceptsuccessfully.Paradigmas 'exemplar'characterizesthe
process of scientificdiscoverymuch more specificallythan does
'thought-style',
and even paradigmas 'disciplinarymatrix'- very
- is moreprecisein that
close in meaningto thatof thought-style
it identifiesparticular kinds of cognitive elements: symbolic
generalizations,exemplaryproblem-solutions,
models and values.
It is hardlysurprising,of course, that Fleck's insightsso often
remain underdeveloped.Not only was he of necessitya 'sparetime philosopher', but the only academic communitywhose
186
response mighthave carried his work furtherwas disintegrating

under Nazi persecution after 1933. Fleck's work undoubtedly
sufferedthroughintellectualisolation,but thisveryfactexemplifies his central thesis: that discoveryis a collectiveprocess. If
Fleck's workis to make an impactupon sociologyof knowledgein
future,his admirerswill have to use theiringenuityto refashion
concepts in his work into full-blowntheory.If
the fragmentary
theyare successful,the outcome will be a collectiveachievement
whose features- as Fleck himselfrecognized- will bear onlya
tenuousconnectionto hisoriginalintentions.
* NOTES
For helpfulcommentson a previous draft,I am indebted to Peter Halfpenny,
Steven Shapin, Richard Whitleyand Edward Yoxen. Many thanks to Thomas
Schnelleforprovidingme withseveralworkspriorto publication.
1. W. Baldamus, 'The Role of Discoveries in Social Science', in T. Shanin
(ed.), The RulesoftheGame (London: Tavistock,1972), 276-302.
2. (Under review), henceforthGDSF. The editors of this edition are to be
variouspassages whichFleck
thankedforprovidingan indexas well as translating
had leftin Latin.
Tatsache (under
3. Entstehungund Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen
EEWT.
review),henceforth
4. Schnelle,LudwikFleck: Leben und Denken (underreview).
5. Erfahrungund Tatsache (under review). Referenceto specificpassages in
thisbook will be givenin the textas ET, followedby the relevantpage numbers.
General referencesto entireessayswillbe indicatedby 'ET:', followedbythe year
ofpublication.
6. 'Kolloquium Ludwik Fleck', Hamburg, 13-16 September 1981. The proceedings of thisconferencehave been recentlypublishedas Cohen and Schnelle
(eds), Cognitionand Fact (underreview).The volumeincludesEnglishtranslations
of Fleck's essayson sociologyof knowledge,originallypublishedas Erfahrungund
Tatsache:
'Some SpecificFeaturesoftheMedical Way ofThinking'(1927)
'On theCrisisof Reality'(1929)
'ScientificObservationand Perceptionin General' (1935)
'The Problemof Epistemology'(1936)
'Problemsof theScience ofScience' (1946)
'To Look, to See, to Know' (1947)
'Crisisin Science' (I 960)
Review:Harwood: Ludwik Fleck
187
7. Brief introductionsin English to Fleck's ideas may be found in GDSF

154-65,and in W. Baldamus, 'LudwikFleck and theDevelopmentof theSociology
of Science', in P.R. Gleichmann,J. Goudsblom and H. Korte (eds), Human
Figurations:Essays for Norbert Elias (Amsterdam: AmsterdamsSocialogisch
Tijdschrift,1977), 135-56. A bibliographyof the small secondaryliteratureon
Fleck up to 1982is to be foundin Schnelle,op. cit. note4, 70-71.
8. Cf. J. Law and D. French, 'Normative and InterpretiveSociologies of
Science', Sociological Review, Vol. 22 (1974), 581-95, as well as the exchange
betweenM. Mulkayand B. Barnes/J.Law in Sociological Review,Vol. 23 (1975),
509-26; Vol. 24 (1976), 115-33.
9. That Kuhn may not originallyhave been aware of meaning-changewithin
normalscience is perhaps reflectedin the facetsof Fleck's workwhichhe singles
out forpraise(GDSF ix): (a) thedistinction
betweenjournaland handbookscience
(discussedbelow) and (b) thetransfer
ofideas betweenthought-collectives.
Central
to bothis thephenomenonofmeaning-change.
10. Unlike those modern sociologistsof science influencedby ethnomethodology, Fleck seems to hav-eheld that the process wherebyconsensus emerges
cannotin principlebe explained(GDSF 72).
11. Thaddeus J. Trenn, 'Some Reflectionson the Chicago Edition of Fleck's
Monograph',mimeodistributed
at theFleck symposium(cf. note6).
Jonathan Harwood lectures in sociology of science

and historyof biology at the Universityof
Manchester and has published widely on the recent
controversyover race and intelligence.He is
currentlywritinga social historyof the
development of genetics in interwarGermany.
Author's address: Departmentof Science and
Technology Policy,The University,Manchester
M13 9PL, UK.

Ludwig Fleck and The Sociology of Knowledge

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Review: Ludwik Fleck and the Sociology of Knowledge

Author(s): Jonathan Harwood

LudwikFleckand the Sociology of

In 1935 a Polish physiciannamed Ludwik Fleck published a

Social Studiesof Science

Kuhn's passing reference to it in The Structureof Scientific

That he could fashiona conceptof 'thought-style'

has emphasized,it is evidenthow unreservedlyFleck embraced

are constantlyin flux(GDSF 64). It

Whence thisindividualdiversitywithina thought-collective?

in some disciplinesand veryrare even in physicsand chemistry.

But how can a style 'coerce' if its meaningis not intrinsicbut

editionsof Fleck's work are inclinedto assign more than simply

response mighthave carried his work furtherwas disintegrating

Review:Harwood: Ludwik Fleck

7. Brief introductionsin English to Fleck's ideas may be found in GDSF

Jonathan Harwood lectures in sociology of science

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