G.R. No. 128772.

February 3, 2000

not preclude the application of principle of

conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code.

Gomez vs Ventura
Facts:
Plaintiff had his license
unprofessional
conduct
administration of opium

revoked
due

on
to

Petitioner claims that his administration of

opium to patient was not a grounds for
unprofessional conduct because it has
been repealed by subsequent opium laws.
Issue
W/n the prescription by a physician of
opium for a patient whose condition did
not require the use of opium constitutes
unprofessional conduct as to justify
revocation of physicians license to
practice
Held
Yes. Court said I cannot be seriously
contented that aside from the five
examples specified, there can be no other
conduct
of
a
physician
deemd
unprofessional. Nor it can be argued that
the legislature intended to wipe out all the
other form of conduct therefore deemed
as ground for revocation of license.
Go-Tan vs Spouses Tan
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition of issuance
of TPO against Steven and her parents-inlaw in grounds of verbal, psychological
and
economic
abuse.
(RA
9262).
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that they are not covered by the
said law, applying the expression unius est
exclusion alterius
Issue:
W/N the parents-in-law are covered by the
provision of RA 9262.
Held:
Court ruled in favour of the petitioner.
Provision provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim, it does

RICARDO C. CADAYONA, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNOR OF LEYTE, respondents.
Facts
On January 13, 1997, petitioner Ricardo C.
Cadayona filed a Petition for Review with
the Court of Appeals to annul Resolution
Nos. 96-7418 and 96-2569 of the Civil
Service Commission, which affirmed his
preventive suspension. Upon filing the
appeal to the appellate court, the CA
dismissed the petition due to petitioners
failure to submit requirements required in
Section 6 of Administrative Circular 1-95
which the court construes as certified
true copies. While petitioner on the other
hand invokes the doctrine of last
antecedent that only copies of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution
appealed from and material points of
record referred in the petition shall be
certified; said circular does not require
that the annexes be certified true copies.
Under the so-called doctrine of last
antecedent, the phrase certified true
copies does not qualify the remote
phrase other supporting papers; the
qualifier phrase certified true copies
only refers to the immediately succeeding
phrase such material portions of the
record as referred to therein.
6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. The
petition for review shall (a) state the full
names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the courts or agencies either
as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain
a concise statement of the facts and
issues involved and the grounds relied
upon for the review; (c) be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original or
certified true copy of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution appealed from,
together with certified true copies of such
material portions of the record as are
referred to therein and other supporting
papers; and (d) state all the specific
material dates showing that it was filed

within the reglementary period provided

herein;
and
(e) contain
a
sworn
certification against forum shopping as
required in Revised Circular No. 28-91.

forms of development if offered and

indicated in the approved subdivision
plans.

ISSUE:
Issue:
Whether or not CAs dismissal of petition is
valid due to petitioners failure to submit
requirements pursuant to Administrative
Circular 1-95

W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts

include and incorporate P.D. 957 through
the doctrine of last antecedent, making
the cancellation of the contracts of sale
incorrect.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held in Section 6
of Rule 1 of the rules of court states that
the Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition
of
every
action
and
proceeding. In line with this guideline, the
court did not construe the above-quoted
section as imposing the requirement that
all supporting papers accompanying the
petition should be certified true copies.

Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and

Labrador Development Corporation
G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)

FACTS:
Mapa
bought
lots
from
Labrador
Development Corporation which are
payable in ten years. Mapa defaulted to
pay the installment dues and continued to
do so despite constant reminders by
Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that
the contracts to sell the lots were
cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of
the four contracts. Said clause obligates
Labrador to complete the development of
the lots, except those requiring the
services of a public utility company or the
government, within 3 years from the date
of the contract. Petitioner contends that
P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the
facilities,
improvements,
and
infrastructures for the lots, and other

HELD:
No. Labrador has every right to cancel the
contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of
the said contract for the reason of the
lapse of five years of default payment
from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply
because it was enacted long after the
execution of the contracts involved, and,
other than those provided in Clause 20, no
further written commitment was made by
the developer. The words which are
offered and indicated in the subdivision or
condominium plans refer not only to
other forms of development but also to
facilities, improvements, and
infrastructures. The word and is not
meant to separate words, but is a
conjunction used to denote a joinder or a
union.

Fortich vs. Corona (AJG)

G.R. No. 131457 | August 19, 1999 | YnaresSantiago, J.

Petitioners: Carlos Fortich (Governor of Bukidnon),

Rey Baula (Mayor of Sumilao, Bukidnon), NQSR
Management and Development Corporation

Respondents: Deputy Executive Secretary Renato

Corona, Agrarian Reform Secretary Ernesto Garilao

Summary: The subject of the controversy is an

agricultural land in Sumilao, Bukidnon, measuring
144 hectares. The municipality of Sumilao wanted to
convert this into an agro-industrial land. In its Order
dated March 29, 1996, Office of the President
acceded to this conversion, and converted the whole
144 hectares to agro-industrial land in order to attract
investors. This order became final and executory.
Feeling aggrieve, farmers commenced a hunger-strike
in protest of this ruling. The OP wanted to appease
the farmers, hence, they issued a new resolution.
They said that only 44 hectares will be converted into
agro-industrial land and that the remaining 100
hectares will be distributed to the farmers. The
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but
there was no result because the justices voted 2-2
in resolving such MR. Now, the respondents wanted
to refer the case to the Supreme Court en banc. The
Supreme Court said that the resolution of the MR
cannot be referred to the Court en banc. It based its
reasoning on Article 8, Sec. 4 (3) of the Constitution.
From that certain paragraph, the Court differentiated
CASES from MATTERS. CASES are to be
DECIDED, while MATTERS are to be RESOLVED.
An example of a MATTER is a motion for
reconsideration, such as the one in this case. Only
CASES which do not obtain the required number of
votes are required to be elevated en banc. On the
other hand, as regards MATTERS, the failure of the
division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the
voting does not leave the case undecided. If there is a
tie in resolving a matter, the earlier decision of the
Court is upheld.

RESOLUTION
(We will learn the difference between Decision and
Resolution in this case. This case is a
Resolution, just in case sir asks :D )

Facts:

Background facts: On October 1997, alleged

farmer-beneficiaries commenced a hunger
strike in front of the Department of Agrarian
Reform compound in Quezon City. They

protested the decision of the Office of the

President (OP) dated March 29, 1996 which
approved the conversion of a 144-hectare
land
from
agricultural
to
agroindustrial/institutional area. Note that this
decision already became final and executory.
o The land is located at San Vicente,
Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by
NQSRMDC (Norberto Quisumbing
Sr. Management and Development
Corp). It was leased as a pineapple
plantation to Del Monte.
o The Sangguniang Bayan of
Sumilao,
Bukidnon
became
interested in the property, and
enacted an ordinance converting
the
said
land
to
industrial/institutional with a view
to attract investors in order to
achieve economic vitality.
o Apparently, land conversion issues
need to go through the Department
of Agrarian Reform. The DAR
rejected the land conversion and
instead opted to put the same under
CARP and ordered the distribution
of the property to the farmers.
o The case reached the OP. The OP
rendered a decision reversing the
DAR and converting the land to
agro-indusrial area, which became
the subject of the strike of the
farmers.
o The hunger strike was dramatic and
well-publicized which commanded
nationwide attention that even
church
leaders
and
some
presidential candidates tried to
intervene for their cause.
These events led the OP, through then
Deputy Exec. Sec. Corona, to issue the socalled Win-Win Resolution, substantially
modifying its earlier Decision (see decision
dated March 29, 1996) after it had already
become final and executory.
o It modified the approval of the land
conversion to agro-industrial area
only to the extent of forty-four (44)
hectares, and ordered the remaining
one hundred (100) hectares to be
distributed to qualified farmerbeneficiaries.
The Supreme Court, in their decision dated
April 24, 1998, ruled for Fortich and
company and declared that the Win-Win

Resolution is VOID and of no legal effect

considering that the March 29, 1996
resolution of the OP already became final
and executory.
ALERT This is where the issue relevant to
our topic arose: Aggrieved, respondents
Corona and Garilao filed [separate] motions
for reconsideration for the said ruling
(separate MRs pero rinesolve ng Court
through one resolution).
o The Court, in their Resolution
dated Nov. 17, 1998, voted TWOTWO on the separate MRs filed by
Corona and Garilao assailing the
April 24, 1998 Decision.
Hence, this motion. The respondents pray
that this case be referred to the Court en
banc. They contend that inasmuch as their
earlier motions for reconsideration (of the
Decision dated April 24, 1998) were
resolved by a vote of two-two, the required
number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was
not met. Consequently, the case should be
referred to and be decided by this Court en
banc, relying on the following constitutional
provision:
o Art. 8, Sec. 4 (3) - Cases or matters
heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon, and in
no case without the concurrence of
at least three of such Members.
When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided
en banc:
Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the Court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by
the Court sitting en banc.
Issue/Held: Whether or not the aforementioned
resolution of the Court (the resolution addressing the
MR, wherein the justices voted 2-2) should be
referred to the Court en banc NO.

Ratio:

A careful reading of the above

constitutional provision, however, reveals
the intention of the framers to draw a

distinction
between
CASES
and
MATTERS.
o CASES are decided.
o MATTERS,
which
include
motions, are resolved.
Otherwise put, the word decided must
refer to cases; while the word resolved
must refer to matters, applying the rule of
reddendo singula singulis.
o This is true not only in the
interpretation of the above-quoted
Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also
of the other provisions of the
Constitution where these words
appear.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in
mind, it is clear that only cases are referred
to the Court en banc for decision whenever
the required number of votes is not
obtained.
Conversely, the rule does not apply where,
as in this case, the required three votes is
not obtained in the resolution of a motion
for reconsideration. Hence, the second
sentence of the aforequoted provision
speaks only of case and not matter.
The reason is simple. The above-quoted
Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the
disposition of cases by a division. If there
is a tie in the voting, there is no decision.
The only way to dispose of the case then is
to refer it to the Court en banc.
o On the other hand, if a case has
already been decided by the
division and the losing party files a
motion for reconsideration, the
failure of the division to resolve
the motion because of a tie in the
voting does not leave the case
undecided.
There is still the
decision which must stand in view
of the failure of the members of the
division to muster the necessary
vote for its reconsideration.
Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie,
the motion for reconsideration is lost.
The assailed decision is not reconsidered
and must therefore be deemed affirmed.
Such was the ruling of this Court in the
Resolution of November 17, 1998.
Respondents further argue that the issues
submitted in their separate motions for
reconsideration are of first impression. They
are arguing that the local government unit
concerned still needs to obtain the approval

of DAR when converting land. However,

this was rebutted in the resolution dated
November 17, wherein it was expressed
that:
o Regrettably, the issues presented
before us by the movants are
matters of no extraordinary import
to merit the attention of the Court
en banc. In the case of Province of
Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals wherein we held that local
government units need not obtain
the approval of the DAR to convert
or
reclassify
lands
from
agricultural to non-agricultural
use.
o The Court voted uninamously in
that case, hence, the argument of
the petitioners that their MRs are
motions involving first impression
is flawed.
Moreover,
a
second
motion
for
reconsideration is generally prohibited,
unless there is a showing of extraordinary
persuasive reasons and a leave of court is
filed. In this case, there was none.
Remember that the Court, in its Decision,
upheld the March 29, 1996 ruling of the OP
because it was already final and executory
thus the Win-Win resolution cannot be
implemented anymore? Well, because of
this, there was a litany of protestations on
the part of respondents and intervenors
including entreaties
for
a
liberal
interpretation of the rules. The sentiment
was that notwithstanding its importance and
far-reaching effects, the case was disposed
of on a mere technicality.
o The Court however said that it was
not a mere technicality because
the finality of the March 29, 1996
OP Decision accordingly vested
appurtenant rights to the land in
dispute on petitioners as well as on
the people of Bukidnon and other
parts of the country who stand to
be benefited by the development of
the property.
Lastly, the Court determines whether or not
the farmer-intervenors have standing to
intervene in this case. The Court said there
was none, because the source of their
standing to file is the Win-Win
Resolution (note that in that resolution,
pinamigay nga yung lupa sa mga farmers,

ngayon, meron silang Certificate of Land

Ownership Award (CLOA). Dahil dun, nag
intervene sila).
o Why was there no standing on the
part of the farmer-intervenors who
derived their rights from the WinWin resolution? The issuance of
the CLOA to them does not grant
them the requisite standing in view
of the nullity of the Win-Win
Resolution. No legal rights can
emanate from a resolution that is
null and void.
MIRASOL VS CA [351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448;
1 Feb 2001]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic
Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and
planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed
the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 19731975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The
Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel
Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage
empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's
sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of
their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974
authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX)
to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized
PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree
directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize
was to be remitted to the government. Believing that
the proceeds were more than enough to pay their
obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting
of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners
continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to
make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with
said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due
and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners,
conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en
pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded
to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties.
PNB still had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the

proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations.
PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D.
No. 579, there was nothing to account since under
said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar
pertained to the National Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for
accounting, specific performance, and damages
against PNB.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to
declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to
the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to
submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial
Court.
(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof
are unconstitutional.
(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial
review.
Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the
authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or
executive order. The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not
only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64,
Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide
whether or not his intervention in the action assailing
the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny
the Solicitor General such notice would be
tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We
must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the
mandatory notice requirement is not limited to
actions involving declaratory relief and similar
remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is
required in "any action" and not just actions
involving declaratory relief. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no
room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the
validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order,
or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is
mandatory.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its
implementing issuances are void for violating the due

process clause and the prohibition against the taking

of private property without just compensation.
Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power
of judicial review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites
for the exercise of this power: First, there must be
before the Court an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial review. Second, the question
before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third,
the person challenging the validity of the act must
have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL
LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and
MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY,
respondents
Ponente: QUIASON
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan two administrative cases
against respondent incumbent Mayor and
obtained favorable decision suspending
the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to
the Office of the President questioning the
decision and at the same time prayed for
the stay of execution in accordance with
Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code
(LGC). The Office of the President thru the
Executive Secretary directed stay of
execution. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
but
was
dismissed.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory
preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders
of the Office of the President as having
been issued with grave abuses of
discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68
of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed Section 6
of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160
repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18.
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed.
execution applied.

Stay

of

RATIO:
The first sentence of Section 68 merely
provides that an appeal shall not prevent
a decision from becoming final or
executory. As worded, there is room to
construe
said
provision
as
giving
discretion to the reviewing officials to stay
the execution of the appealed decision.
There is nothing to infer therefrom that
the reviewing officials are deprived of the
authority to order a stay of the appealed
order. If the intention of Congress was to
repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18, it could have used more direct
language expressive of such intention.
An implied repeal predicates the intended
repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict must be found
between the new and prior laws. In the
absence of an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in
the terms of the new and old laws.

Diokno
v.
Rehabilitation
Finance
Corporation Case No. 93G.R. No. L-4712
(July 11, 1952)Chapter VIII, Page 336,
Footnote No. 32
FACTS:
Petitioner, the holder of a back pay
certificate of indebtedness issued under
RA 304, sought to compel Respondent
Company to accept his back pay
certificate as payment of his loan from the
latter. His basis was Sec. 2 of RA 304,
which provides that investment funds or

banks or other financial institutions owned

or controlled by the government
Shall subject to availability of loanable
funds accept or discount at not more
than two per centum per annum for ten
years such certificate for certain specified
purposes.
Respondent
company
contended however that the word shall
used in this particular section of the law is
merely
directory.
The
lower
court
sustained Respondent company.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner can use his back pay
certificate to pay for his loan to
Respondent company.
HELD:
No. It is true that in its ordinary
signification,
the
word
shall
is
imperative. However, the rule is not
absolute; it may be construed as may
when required by the context or by the
intention of the statute. The modifier, at
not more than two per centum per annum
for ten years., the interest to be charged,
that the verb phrase is mandatory
because not only the law uses at not
more but the legislative purpose and
intent, to conserve the value of the back
pay certificate for the benefit of the
holders, for whose benefit the same have
been issued, can be carried out by fixing a
maximum limit for discounts. But as to
when the discounting or acceptance shall
be made, the context and the sense
demand a contrary interpretation. If the
acceptance or discount of the certificate is
to be subject to the condition of the
availability of loanable funds, it is evident
the
legislature
intended
that
the
acceptance shall be allowed on the
condition that there are available
loanable
funds.
In
other
words,
acceptance or discount is to be permitted
only if there are loanable funds.

CASE DIGEST: Adasa vs Abalos

Facts: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged
in the complaints and affidavits that
petitioner Bernadette Adasa was encashed
two checks issued in the name of the
respondent
through
deceit
without
knowledge of respondent Abalos. Adasa
failed to pay to the proceeds of the checks
despite demands of Abalos. Adasa filed a
counter-affidavit
admitting
that
she
received and encashed the checks and
alleged further in a supplemental affidavit
that Bebie Correa instead received the 2
checks and that she left the country. The
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Iligan
City issued a resolution finding probable
cause against Adasa and ordered for filing
of two separate informations for Estafa
through
falsification
of
commercial
document by a private individual. This
petition only concerns one of the two
(Criminal Case #8782) criminal cases
(8781 & 8782) that were docketed.
Petitioner Adasa filed a motion upon the
trial court in order for the OCP to conduct
a reinvestigation, in which the OCP has
reaffirmed its finding of probable cause.
Adasa has entered a not guilty plea during
her arrangement on October 1, 2001 and
later filed a petition for review before the
DOJ where it reversed and set aside the
resolution of the OCP and ordering it to
withdraw the information for estafa.
Respondent Abalos filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing that the DOJ
should have dismissed the petition for
review outright contending that Sec 7 of
DOJ Circular no 70 mandates that If an
information has been filed in court
pursuant to the appealed resolution the
petition shall not be given due course if
the accused had already been arraigned
the aggrieved party cannot file a petition
for review as the secretary of Justice shall
deny it outright.
The trial court has granted the petitioners
motion to withdraw information and
dismissed the criminal case, on February
2003. Respondent filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA on the DOJ

resolution and it reversed the sad

resolution.
The
appellate
court
emphasized that DOJ Circular 70 Sec 7
used the phrase shall not.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari
contending that section 12 of the same
DOJ Circular used the word may that
would give discretion to the Secretary of
Justice to entertain an appeal, thus this
petition.
Issue: WON the overall language and the
intent of DOJ Circular no 70 is directory
that it would give discretion to the
Secretary of Justice to entertain an appeal
even if the accused has been arraigned.
Held: No. the court held that CA is correct,
the DOJ cannot give an appeal/petition for
review due course and must dismiss such
actions if the accused has already been
arraigned. Therefore in Sec 12 if the
ground
for
the
dismissal
is
the
arraignment of the accused, it must go
back and act upon through Section 7. If
Sec 12 is given a directory application it
would render earlier mandatory provisions
invalid/negligible and would undermine
the main objectives of the said circular
which is for the expeditious and efficient
administration of justice.
PEOPLE vs. MARTIN
G.R. No. L-33487; May 31, 1971
Facts:
Respondents were charged with violating
Sec. 46 of C.A. No. 613 or the Philippine
Immigration Act by the Court of
First Instance of La Union, specifically in
the act of bringing in and landing. The
Court dismissed the charges on the
ground of it being a continuous offense
with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan
against other Respondents who were
concealing and harboring the same
Chinese Immigrants who were brought in
therefore they had no jurisdiction.
Issue:

Whether or not the the act of bringing in

and landing constitute a continuous
offense with concealing and harboring.
Ruling:
No. They are two separate offenses. C.A.
No. 613 clearly provides that the four acts
are in fact four separate acts. Each act
possesses its own distinctive, different,
and disparate meaning. The word OR in
C.A. No. 613 cannot be given a nondisjunctive
meaning
signifying
the
separation of one act from the other. The
words in the information suggesting

conspiracy are considered a mere

surplusage. A well-known Latin maxim is
statutory construction stated that The
useful is not vitiated by the non-useful.
Utile per inutile non vitiatur.