INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & LIBERTIES

16. CITY OF MANILA V. LAGUIO JR., 455 SCRA 308

Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Ordinances|Local
Governments|Police Power|Due Process
Constitutional Law; Ordinances; For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
substantive require-ments.The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A
long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general
and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Same; Same; Local Governments; Police Power; Local government units exercise
police power through their respective legislative bodies, in this case, the
sangguniang panlungsod or the city coun-cil.Local government units exercise
police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the
sangguniang panlung-sod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative
bodies to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. The inquiry in this Petition is
concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The police power of the City Council, however broad and
far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject
to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.The
police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to
the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its
exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the
enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Procedural Due Process and Substantive
Due Process Distinguished.Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to
the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what
kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes
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a particular action. Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether
the government has an adequate reason for taking away a persons life, liberty, or
property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a
sufficient justification for the governments action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The police power granted to local government
units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people
to due process and equal protection of the law; Due process requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property. The police power granted to local government units must always be
exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and
equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental
law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty and property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment,
for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.To
successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment
of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not
only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means
adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative
for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites,
the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights
a violation of the due process clause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An ordinance which permanently restricts the use
of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation.The Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially
divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The Ordinance in Section
1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate
area and in Section 3 instructs its own-ers/operators to wind up business operations
or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses.
An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used
for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
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taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the
private property rights of individuals.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The directive to wind up business operations
amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property,
and is practically confiscatory. The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of
the prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to
wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the ErmitaMalate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within
the area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of
the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically
confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an
allowed business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left
empty and gathering dust.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Private property which is not noxious nor
intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without
compensation.Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a
zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power,
which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of
it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning,
be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the
principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units
which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to
cover this particular taking.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of
the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause.The
Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend
to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community. The cited case supports the nullification of
the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in
carrying out its provisions. Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the
enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of
imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference
into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard,
we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to
liberty and property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The equal protection clause extends to artificial
persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.Equal protection requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not
be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate
against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be
denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
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classes in like circumstances. The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws. It limits governmental discrimination. The equal
protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is
concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements in order that Classification of the
Subjects of Legislation may be Valid. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the
subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only
on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. The
classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it
must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial
distinctions; 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; 3) It must not be
limited to existing conditions only; 4) It must apply equally to all members of the
class.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as
are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to
the exercise thereof.The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the
exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers
are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the
terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council.
Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all
others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of
logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the
construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or
punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have
force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but
the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.Not only
does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions
of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the
residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the
establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except
warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule
is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be
within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with
or repugnant to the general law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the presumption is always in favor of the
validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be
set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the
ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence.Petitioners contend that the
Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it has
already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside
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when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself
or is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local
government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act
of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. [City of Manila vs. Laguio,
Jr., 455 SCRA 308(2005)]

17. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Comelec, April 8, 2010

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; The enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive.As we explicitly ruled
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698
(2001), the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated,
but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Same; Same; Same; Aside from Commission on Elections (COMELECs) moral
objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has
the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under any of the requisites under Republic Act No. 7941 or
the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.We find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed,
aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence,
nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not
qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA
7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies
in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
Same; Same; Same; It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad.Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that
it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Same; Same; Same; Through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval.We are not
blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censurereligious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust
of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall
that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,
therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.
Election Law; Party-List System; Civil Law; Nuisance, Defined.Article 694 of the
Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,
the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.

Same; Same; Evidence; A mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace
the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability
or culpability.A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be
emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
Same; Same; Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
system.We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection
clause.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; Recent
jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, the Supreme Court will uphold the classification as long as it
bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.Recent
jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a
rational relationship to some legitimate government end. In Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004), we
declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection
challenges xxx have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless
there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Law of general application should apply with equal force
to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs), and they deserve to participate
in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors.From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion
in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system
on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to
those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but
also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere
7

must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state
interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
one.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Association; Only if a political party incites violence
or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside
the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.A political group should
not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association
guarantee.
Same; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; The principle of nondiscrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.The principle of
non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual
orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in
Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the
reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual orientation.
Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
Same; Same; Same; Yogyakarta Principles; Using even the most liberal of lenses,
these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, areat bestde lege ferendaand do not constitute
binding obligations on the Philippines.Using even the most liberal of lenses, these
Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international
law professors, areat bestde lege ferendaand do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is
characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human
rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the
support of either State practice or opinio juris.
PUNO,C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the assailed
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the nonestablishment clause of the Constitution.The assailed Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment clause of
the Constitution. There was cypher effort on the part of the COMELEC to couch its
reasoning in legalmuch less constitutionalterms, as it denied Ang Ladlads
petition for registration as a sectoral party principally on the ground that it
tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e., Christian and Muslim) beliefs. To
be sure, the COMELECs ruling is completely antithetical to the fundamental rule
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that [t]he public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular[,] for in our
constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a
religion, including the morality it sanctions.
Same; Same; Same; View that the assailed resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) are violative of the constitutional directive that no religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.The assailed
resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the constitutional directive that no
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Ang
Ladlads right of political participation was unduly infringed when the COMELEC,
swayed by the private biases and personal prejudices of its constituent members,
arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or worse, a morality police.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) capitalized
on Ang Ladlads definition of the term sexual orientation, as well as its citation of
the number of Filipino men who have sex with men, as basis for the declaration that
the party espouses and advocates sexual immorality; This position would deny
homosexual and bixesual individuals a fundamental element of personal identity
and a legitimate exercise of personal liberty.The COMELEC capitalized on Ang
Ladlads definition of the term sexual orientation, as well as its citation of the
number of Filipino men who have sex with men, as basis for the declaration that the
party espouses and advocates sexual immorality. This position, however, would
deny homosexual and bisexual individuals a fundamental element of personal
identity and a legitimate exercise of personal liberty. For, the ability to
[independently] define ones identity that is central to any concept of liberty
cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the emotional enrichment
from close ties with others.
Same; Same; Same; View that at the heart of liberty is the right to define ones own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
It has been said that freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the due process clause. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define ones own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.
Same; Same; Same; View that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation
is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review.The
ponencia of Mr. Justice Del Castillo refused to characterize homosexuals and
bisexuals as a class in themselves for purposes of the equal protection clause.
Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most liberal basis of
judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to which government need only
show that the challenged classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate
state interest. I humbly submit, however, that a classification based on gender or
9

sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level

of review.
Same; Same; Same; View that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional
protection despite some recent political progress.It would not be difficult to
conclude that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection
despite some recent political progress. The discrimination that they have suffered
has been so pervasive and severeeven though their sexual orientation has no
bearing at all on their ability to contribute to or perform in societythat it is highly
unlikely that legislative enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that
discrimination.
Same; Same; Same; View that any state action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals
and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays,
bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and
stereotyping.
Same; Same; Same; View that the position that the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) community cannot participate in the party-list system because
it is not a marginalized and underrepresented sector is belied by the Supreme
Court ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, where the Court
held that the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive.It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in
the party-list system because it is not a marginalized and underrepresented
sector enumerated either in the Constitution or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941.
However, this position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), where we clearly held that the enumeration of
marginalized and underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.
CORONA,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the party-list system
is essentially a tool for the advancement of social justice with the fundamental
purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
participate in the shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws.The
party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a tool for
the advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording
opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the
shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the
proposition that the advancement of the interests of the marginalized sectors
contributes to the advancement of the common good and of our nations
democratic ideals.
Same; Same; Same; Congress; View that the Constitution left the matter of
determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as marginalized to the hands
of Congress.The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors
10

that may qualify as marginalized to the hands of Congress. Pursuant to this

constitutional mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court stressed that the party-list
system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the
past.In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), the Court
stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized
and underrepresented in the past (e.g., labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, professionals and even those in the underground movement who
wish to come out and participate). They are those sectors traditionally and
historically marginalized and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the
formulation of national policy although their sectoral interests are also traditionally
and historically regarded as vital to the national interest.
Same; Same; Same; View that the concept of marginalized and underrepresented
sectors under the party-list scheme has been carefully refined by concrete
examples involving sectors deemed to be significant in our legal tradition.The
concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list scheme
has been carefully refined by concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be
significant in our legal tradition. They are essentially sectors with a constitutional
bond, that is, specific sectors subject of specific provisions in the Constitution,
namely, labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, veterans, fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, overseas workers and
professionals.
Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors should be given a say in
governance through the party-list system, not simply because they desire to say
something constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their
traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine society.The long-muffled
voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their respective interests are
intimately and indispensably woven into the fabric of the national democratic
agenda. The social, economic and political aspects of discrimination and
marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a particular sector or group
in the advancement of the collective goals of Philippine society as a whole. In other
words, marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance through the partylist system, not simply because they desire to say something constructive but
because they deserve to be heard on account of their traditionally and historically
decisive role in Philippine society.
Same; Same; Same; View that the majoritys decision is cryptic and wanting when it
makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.The enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized
and underrepresented in the fundamental law and in the implementing law (RA
7941) cannot be without significance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts of the
Constitution and of RA 7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Partys eight guidelines for screening party-list participants is this: the parties,
sectors or organizations must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. For this reason, I submit the majoritys
11

decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the issue of whether
petitioner is a marginalized and underrepresented sector in the following manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the
party-list system but not mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are such other
sectors as may be provided by law duly enacted by Congress.Marginalized
sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not mentioned in Section
5(2), Article VI are such other sectors as may be provided by law duly enacted by
Congress. It is also consistent with the basic canon of statutory construction,
ejusdem generis, which requires that a general word or phrase that follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or
phrase should be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or
cases, akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.
Same; Same; Same; View that even assuming that petitioner was able to show that
the community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is
underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as marginalized under the
party-list system.Even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the
community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is
underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as marginalized under the
party-list system. First, petitioner is not included in the sectors mentioned in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an overly
strained interpretation is resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot establish a close
connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed, petitioner does not even try to show
its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an altogether distinct
sector with its own peculiar interests and agenda.
Same; Same; Same; View that only sectors expressly or closely related to those
sectors mentioned in Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 are qualified to
participate in the party-list system.In this instance, Congress, in the exercise of its
authority under Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, enacted RA 7941.
Sections 2, 3(d) and (5) of the said law instituted a policy when it enumerated
certain sectors as qualified marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the
party-list system. Respect for that policy and fidelity to the Courts duty in our
scheme of government require us to declare that only sectors expressly mentioned
or closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 are qualified
to participate in the party-list system.
Same; Same; Same; View that until and unless Congress amends the law to include
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs) and other sectors in the partylist system, deference to Congress determination on the matter is proper.The
Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by strictly adhering to,
rather than expanding, legislative policy on the matter of marginalized sectors as
expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no power to
amend and expand Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the guise of interpretation.
The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the authority to determine such
other [marginalized] sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system to
Congress. Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to include the LGBT and
12

other sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress determination on the

matter is proper.
Same; Same; Same; View that the party-list system was not designed as a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors.
While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be given
no place in a truly just, democratic and libertarian society, the party-list system has
a well-defined purpose. The party-list system was not designed as a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors.
Rather, it is a platform for the realization of the aspirations of marginalized sectors
whose interests are, by nature and history, also the nations but which interests
have not been sufficiently brought to public attention because of these sectors
underrepresentation.
Same; Same; Same; View that Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion
to determine what sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented, the
Courts task is to respect that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it.
Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors
may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented. The Courts task is to respect
that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly
expand such congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an
act of political will and not of judicial judgment.
ABAD,J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the underlying policy
of Republic Act No. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society an opportunity to take a direct part in
enacting the laws of the land.The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The Party-List
System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an
opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 359 SCRA 698
(2001), the Court laid down guidelines for accreditation, but these seem to leave
the COMELEC like everyone else even more perplexed and dumbfounded about
what organizations, clubs, or associations can pass for sectoral parties with a right
to claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court can, in adjudicating this
case, unravel some of the difficulties.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) erred when
it denied Ang Ladlads petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and
moral groundsthe COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular candidates
for Congress.Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang
Ladlads petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds.
The COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress.
There is no reason for it to apply them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already
amply and lucidly discussed this point.
Same; Same; Same; View that a reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that,
based on the Courts reading, neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 7941
intends the excessively limited coverage that the Commission on Elections
13

(COMELEC) now suggests.The COMELECs proposition imposes an unwarranted

restriction which is inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the Constitution and
the law. A reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Courts
reading, neither the Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited
coverage that the COMELEC now suggests. In fact, the Court said in that case that
the list in R.A. 7941 is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant
for all sectors of society, it was envisioned as a social justice tool for the
marginalized and underrepresented in general.
Same; Same; Same; View that Congress did not provide a definition of the term
marginalized and underrepresented.Congress did not provide a definition of the
term marginalized and underrepresented. Nor did the Court dare provide one in
its decision in Ang Bagong Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense of what
Congress intended in adopting such term. No doubt, Congress crafted that term
marginalized and underrepresentedfrom its reading of the concrete examples that
the Constitution itself gives of groupings that are entitled to accreditation. These
examples are the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural
minorities, the women, and the youth sectors. Fortunately, quite often ideas are
best described by examples of what they are, which was what those who drafted
the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an abstract description of them.
Same; Same; Same; View that an interpretation that will allow concretely or
specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself
will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the
House of Representatives.An interpretation that will allow concretely or
specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself
will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the
House of Representatives. It will defeat altogether the objectives of the party-list
system. If they can muster enough votes, the country may have a party-list of
pedicab drivers and another of tricycle drivers. There will be an irrational
apportionment of party-list seats in the legislature.
Same; Same; Same; View that applying the universally accepted estimate that one
out of every 10 persons is a Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs) of a
certain kind, the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million.In this case,
Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons (LGBTs). Applying the universally accepted
estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind, the Filipino
LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million. Despite this, however, they are by and
large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the mainstream, discriminated against,
and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads petition on religious and
moral grounds is proof of this discrimination.
Same; Same; Same; View that Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the
requirements for sectoral party accreditationtheir members are in the vulnerable
class like the women and the youth.Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets
the requirements for sectoral party accreditation. Their members are in the
vulnerable class like the women and the youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow
definition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a concrete and specific definition of a sub14

group within the class (group of gay beauticians, for example). The people that Ang
Ladlad seeks to represent have a national presence. [Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs.
Commission on Elections, 618 SCRA 32(2010)]

15

18. National Power Corporation v. Zabala, G.R. No.

173520 , January 30, 2013
Expropriation; Just Compensation; Words and Phrases; Just compensation has been
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss; Statutes and
executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just
compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines
in ascertaining the amount thereof.Just compensation has been defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to
[qualify] the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea
that the [amount] to be [t]endered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample. The payment of just compensation for private property
taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the
Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent
the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just
compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by
any other branch or official of the government. Thus, we have consistently ruled
that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of
computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as
mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof.
Same; Same; Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court may
accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the commissioners report which is
merely advisory and recommendatory in character. It may also recommit the report
or set aside the same and appoint new commissioners.Under Section 8, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, the trial court may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part,
the commissioners report which is merely advisory and recommendatory in
character. It may also recommit the report or set aside the same and appoint new
commissioners. In the case before us, however, in spite of the insufficient and
flawed reports of the Commissioners and Napocors objections thereto, the RTC
eventually adopted the same. It shrugged off Napocors protestations and limited
itself to the reports submitted by the Commissioners. It neither considered nor
required the submission of additional evidence to support the recommended
P150.00 per square meter just compensation. Ergo, insofar as just compensation is
concerned, we cannot sustain the RTCs Partial Decision for want of documentary
support.
Same; Same; Just compensation should be computed based on the fair value of the
subject property at the time of its taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever
came first.It should be borne in mind that just compensation should be computed
based on the fair value of the subject property at the time of its taking or the filing
of the complaint, whichever came first. Since in this case the filing of the eminent
domain case came ahead of the taking, just compensation should be based on the
fair market value of spouses Zabalas property at the time of the filing of Napocors
Complaint on October 27, 1994 or thereabouts. [National Power Corporation vs.
Zabala, 689 SCRA 554(2013)]
16

19.
Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12,
2013
Constitutional Law; Police Power; Police power is the plenary power vested in the
legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.Police power is
the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. The State, through the legislature, has delegated the
exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State. This
delegation of police power is embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the General Welfare Clause, which has two
branches. The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the
municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law,
as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second, known as the police power
proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and
proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of
their property.
Same; Same; Ordinances; For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the substantive
requirements.White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 576 SCRA 416 (2009),
discusses the test of a valid ordinance: The test of a valid ordinance is well
established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
Same; Same; Same; Rational Relationship Test; Strict Scrutiny Test; To successfully
invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an
ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests
have been used by the Courtthe rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny
test.To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional
infirmity, two tests have been used by the Courtthe rational relationship test and
the strict scrutiny test: We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test
mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis
examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
17

substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest.
Same; Same; Same; The State may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve
or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.Regarding the
beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the
State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable
and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of
their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No.
192 is invalid.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court will not be
ordinarily considered by a reviewing court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.The petitioners, however, argue that the invalidity of
Section 5 was properly cured by Zoning Ordinance No. 303, Series of 2000, which
classified the respondents property to be within an institutional zone, under which a
five-meter setback has been required. The petitioners are mistaken. Ordinance No.
303, Series of 2000, has no bearing to the case at hand. The Court notes with
displeasure that this argument was only raised for the first time on appeal in this
Court in the petitioners Reply. Considering that Ordinance No. 303 was enacted on
December 20, 2000, the petitioners could very well have raised it in their defense
before the RTC in 2002. The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot
change the legal theory of this case under which the controversy was heard and
decided in the trial court. It should be the same theory under which the review on
appeal is conducted. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a
reviewing court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This
will be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
Constitutional Law; Ordinances; Right to Property; Right to Privacy; Compelling the
respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is,
thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes
their right to decide how best to protect their property; It also appears that requiring
the exposure of their property via a see-thru fence is violative of their right to
privacy.Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with
the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property,
which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their property. It
also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see-thru fence is
violative of their right to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine
nuns is also located within the property. The right to privacy has long been
considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to
be let alone, as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of its citizens. It is inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the
18

Bill of Rights (Article III) in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue
interference with the respondents rights to property and privacy. Section 3.1 of
Ordinance No. 192 is, thus, also invalid and cannot be enforced against the
respondents.
Statutes; Retroactivity of Laws; Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a
prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of
conformity with certain legal requirements; Curative statutes, by their very essence,
are retroactive.Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to
validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity
with certain legal requirements. They are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry
into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected
legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own
action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid.
Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. Curative statutes,
therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.
Same; Where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if susceptible to being separated from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced.Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, as
amended, are, thus, invalid and cannot be enforced against the respondents.
Nonetheless, the general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to
the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if susceptible to being
separated from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. Thus, the other sections of
the assailed ordinance remain valid and enforceable. [Fernando vs. St. Scholastica's
College, 693 SCRA 141(2013)]

19

20. Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta.

Romana, G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Settled is the rule that when the agrarian
reform process is still incomplete, as in this case where the just compensation for
the subject land acquired under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 has yet to be paid,
just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under Republic
Act No. (RA) 6657, with PD 27 and Executive Order No. (EO) 228 having mere
suppletory effects.Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete, as in this case where the just compensation for the subject land
acquired under PD 27 has yet to be paid, just compensation should be determined
and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having mere
suppletory effects. This means that PD 27 and EO 228 only apply when there are
gaps in RA 6657; where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 and EO 228 are superseded.
Same; Same; For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value
of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time
of taking.For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of
an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of
taking. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17
* The instant petition was consolidated with G.R. Nos. 183298-99 which, however,
was subsequently withdrawn by the petitioner in the said cases. SeeResolutions
dated September 29, 2008 and January 18, 2010; Rollo (G.R. No. 183290), pp. 95
and 161. of RA 6657, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of
like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income
therefrom, (d) the owners sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the
assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the
property, and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.
Same; Same; Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time
when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as
when title is transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.Just
compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, the evidence to be presented
by the parties before the trial court for the valuation of the subject land must be
based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands.
Same; Same; Interest Rates; The Supreme Court (SC) has allowed the grant of legal
interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the just
compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on
the part of the State; Beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation
due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in
line with the amendment introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board
(BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.In previous cases, the Court has allowed
the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the
20

payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an
effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the
rate of 12% interest per annum (p.a.). from the time of taking until June 30, 2013
only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation
due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in
line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
Same; Same; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is reminded that while it should take
into account the different formula created by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) in arriving at its just compensation valuation, it is not strictly bound thereto if
the situations before it do not warrant their application.The Regional Trial Court is
reminded, however, that while it should take into account the different formula
created by the DAR in arriving at its just compensation valuation, it is not strictly
bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application.
[Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Sta. Romana, 729 SCRA 387(2014)]

21

21. Garcia v. Velasco, G.R. No. 157383, 10 August 2010

Civil Service Law; The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with
original charters, like the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), or those
created by special law.The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs)
with original charters, like the GSIS, or those created by special law. As such, the
employees are part of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the
circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC on discipline, attendance and
general terms and conditions of employment. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and
decide disciplinary cases against erring employees.
Same; The Civil Service Commission (CSC) Rules does not specifically provide that a
formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void; Upon
receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining
authority shall require the person complained of to submit a CounterAffidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt.The CSC Rules does
not specifically provide that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary
investigation is null and void. However, as clearly outlined above, upon receipt of a
complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall
require the person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath
within three days from receipt. The use of the word shall quite obviously indicates
that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or at least respondent should be given the opportunity to comment
and explain his side.
Administrative Law; Due Process; The cardinal precept is that where there is a
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction;
Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.The cardinal
precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a partys right to due process raises a
serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally
true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional
guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or
administrative) where he stands to lose the same.
Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; Administrative proceedings are not
exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due
process in investigations and hearings; What Includes Due Process in Administrative
Proceedings.Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often
applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations
and hearings. In particular, due process in administrative proceedings has been
22

recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice to
the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a
real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected.
Same; Same; It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void
ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a
separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is
invoked.It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void ab
initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate
action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked.
Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before the GSIS the lack of preliminary
investigation, records show that in their Urgent Motion to Resolve (their Motion to
Lift Preventive Suspension Order) filed with the CSC, respondents questioned the
validity of their preventive suspension and the formal charges against them for lack
of preliminary investigation. There is, thus, no waiver to speak of. [Garcia vs. Molina,
627 SCRA 540(2010)]

22. Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military

Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015

23

23. Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014

Constitutional Law; Due Process; Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due
process exists when a party is given a chance to be heard through his motion for
reconsideration.The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.
What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute
absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the
requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance to be heard
through his motion for reconsideration. In the present case, we do not find it
disputed that the respondents filed with the Secretary of Justice a motion for
reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any,
was cured by the remedy the respondents availed of. On the respondents allegation
that they were denied due process during the NBI investigation, we stress that the
functions of this agency are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has
no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any
party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency
whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes
upon its own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with its
mandate. It also renders assistance when requested in the investigation or
detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible. Since the NBIs
findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the respondents
due process right could have taken place; the NBIs findings were still subject to the
prosecutors and the Secretary of Justices actions for purposes of finding the
existence of probable cause. We find it significant that the specimen signatures in
the possession of Metrobank were submitted by the respondents for the
consideration of the city prosecutor and eventually of the Secretary of Justice during
the preliminary investigation proceedings. Thus, these officers had the opportunity
to examine these signatures.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; It is well-settled that in order to
arrive at a finding of probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be
present. In determining these elements for purposes of preliminary investigation,
only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are
required, not absolute certainty.Probable cause pertains to facts and
circumstances sufficient to support a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is well-settled that in order
to arrive at a finding of probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should
be present. In determining these elements for purposes of preliminary investigation,
only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are
required, not absolute certainty. Thus, probable cause implies mere probability of
guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that
would justify a conviction. [Shu vs. Dee, 723 SCRA 512(2014)]
Criminal Law; Falsification of Public Documents; Elements of.The elements of
falsification of public documents are as follows: (1) the offender is a private
individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position; (2) he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171

24

of the RPC; and (3) the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial
document.
Same; Same; The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the
judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order
to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.That the findings of the
city prosecutor should be ventilated in a full-blown trial is highlighted by the reality
that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its
general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine
signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge
who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Thus, Section 22 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison
of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; The determination of probable
cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first place on the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation.The determination of
probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first place on the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation. The prosecutors ruling is
reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter,
has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutors determination. It is wellsettled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to interference by
the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; when he grossly misapprehends facts; when he acts in a
manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the
contemplation of law. [Shu vs. Dee, 723 SCRA 512(2014)]

25

24. Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Family Courts; Family Courts Act of 1997
(R.A. No. 8369); It must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the
same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the
Family Courts Act of 1997, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children.At the
outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level
as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the Family Courts
Act of 1997, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of domestic violence against women and children. In accordance with said
law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial
Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified. To achieve
harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law.
Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; It is settled that Regional Trial Courts
have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law.Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all
kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have
jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA, 3 SCRA 696 (1961),
that, [p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue.
Same; Violence Against Women and Children; Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC,
the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of
procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an
answer.Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women
and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to
file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. Thus: SEC. 20. Opposition to
petition.(a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself
shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show
cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued; (b)
Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or

26

third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action.
Same; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; The unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a thirdparty complaint.We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that,
since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from
the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A
counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending
party may have against an opposing party. A crossclaim, on the other hand, is any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.
Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of
court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim. As pointed out by
Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a thirdparty complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in
view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Same; Evidence; Constitutional Law; The question relative to the constitutionality of
a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.That the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have
deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to
the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported
by evidence.
Same; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); If a temporary protection order issued is
due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of
thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered.To obviate potential
dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary,
Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order
issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a
period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise
modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary
to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without
necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on
summary procedure.
Same; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); It bears
stressing that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and
their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will
defeat the very purpose of the law against Violence Against Women and Children.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is
prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection
shall not stay its enforcement, with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for
thirty (30) days at a time, should not be enjoined. The mere fact that a statute is
alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have
27

the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme
Court of the United States declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state criminal
statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are
unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a
prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not
alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to
prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted) The
sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears
fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are
granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To
issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law
against VAWC.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; By the principle of separation of
powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and
expediency of any law.It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. Hence, we dare not venture into the real
motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection
against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper
challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has
made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice
may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its
amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it
is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency
of any law. We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However,
none was sufficiently shown in this case.
Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which
it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of
the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in
28

the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in

speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in
no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has
held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Same; Same; The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact
that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law.The unequal power relationship between women and
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and
the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality.
Same; Same; Gender-Based Violence; According to the Philippine Commission on
Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Womens Empowerment),
violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal
power relationship between women and men otherwise known as gender-based
violence.According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National
Machinery for Gender Equality and Womens Empowerment), violence against
women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as gender-based violence. Societal
norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers,
providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, mens
companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This
perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the
need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of mens expression of
controlling women to retain power.
Same; Same; The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination
brought about by biases and prejudices against women.The enactment of R.A.
9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices
against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through
specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men.
Petitioners contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an
anti-male, husband-bashing, and hate-men law deserves scant consideration.
As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate
measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of
29

the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. Justice Puno correctly
pointed out that (t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence
from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct
mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges.
Same; Same; The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose
of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children,
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy.The distinction between men and women is
germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows: SEC.
2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of
women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Towards
this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women
and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights
instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
Same; Same; The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions
when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety
and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security
of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262
applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
Statutes; An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.There is nothing in the
definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.
Yet, petitioner insists that phrases like depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her child of a legal right, solely controlling the conjugal or common
money or properties, marital infidelity, and causing mental or emotional
anguish are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse.
However, we have stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision
or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; Conspiracy; While the law
provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
30

marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of

the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).VAWC may
likewise be committed against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship. Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word person who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related
or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 567 SCRA
231 (2008), the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be
proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and
their son (Go-Tans husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting
her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically.
Remedial Law; Temporary Protection Order; Words and Phrases; A protection order is
an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs;
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified
by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein.A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of
violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and
to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties
from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The scope of reliefs in
protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim.
This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the
victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family
residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. The rules
require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence
is to be prevented, the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but
before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy
and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the
victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such
violence, which is about to recur.
Same; Same; Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without
notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough
to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the
victim of Violence Against Women and Children may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
31

notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.The grant
of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable
the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of
VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such
acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting
vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security. It should be pointed out
that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five
(5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the
petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs.
The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate
issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the
notice.
Same; Same; The respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of
the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side; To be
heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings.It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a
petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being
stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened is a
mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of ones defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process.
Same; Same; Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private
respondents residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no
property rights are violated.Petitioner next laments that the removal and
exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim,
regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a blank check issued to the
wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. The wording of the pertinent rule,
however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It
states: SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party.The protection order shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs: x x x x (c) Removing and excluding
the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of
32

the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party,
or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must
remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there
until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
x x x x Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private
respondents residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no
property rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any
property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
Same; Same; Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer
the Violence Against Women and Children case or any issue thereof to a mediator.
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or
any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained
by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family
Violence as follows: This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties
to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by
which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence
implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a
proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is
frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the
protection order has been sought.
Same; Same; Barangay Protection Order (BPO); The Barangay Protection Order
issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to
the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in
nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all
laws and ordinances, and to maintain public order in the barangay.Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. On the other hand, executive power is generally defined as the power
to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance. As clearly delimited by the
aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to
desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening
to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong
Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances, and to maintain
public order in the barangay. We have held that (t)he mere fact that an officer is
required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law
33

thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that
these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers.
Statutes; Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an
unequivocal breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in
the mind of the Court.Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are
voided, an unequivocal breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave
no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and
convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by
the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001), courts must assume that the legislature is
ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws
with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; View that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide
issues of constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9262 can be resolved in a summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule that the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it
may not be considered on appeal.I agree with Justice Bernabe that the RTC,
designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide issues of
constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can
be resolved in a summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule that the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not
be considered on appeal. Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Republic
Act No. 9262 provides: Sec. 20. Opposition to Petition.(a) The respondent may file
an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied
by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued. (b) Respondent shall not include in the
opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of
action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Temporary Protection Order; View that the alleged
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented
the trial court from granting the petition for protection order against the petitioner.
The alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would
have prevented the trial court from granting the petition for protection order against
the petitioner. Thus, petitioner should have raised it in his Opposition as a defense
against the issuance of a protection order against him.

34

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that an action questioning the
constitutionality of the law cannot be filed separately even with another branch of
the RTC. This is not technically feasible because there will be no justiciable
controversy or an independent cause of action that can be the subject of such
separate action if it were not for the issuance of the Temporary Protection Order
against the petitioner.For all intents and purposes, the Petition for Prohibition filed
before the Court of Appeals was precipitated by and was ultimately directed against
the issuance of the TPO, an interlocutory order, which under Section 22(j) of A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC is a prohibited pleading. An action questioning the constitutionality
of the law also cannot be filed separately even with another branch of the RTC. This
is not technically feasible because there will be no justiciable controversy or an
independent cause of action that can be the subject of such separate action if it
were not for the issuance of the TPO against the petitioner. Thus, the controversy,
subject of a separate action, whether before the Court of Appeals or the RTC, would
still have to be the issuance of the TPO, which is the subject of another case in the
RTC.
Statutes; View that the challenge to the constitutionality of the law must be raised
at the earliest opportunity.The challenge to the constitutionality of the law must
be raised at the earliest opportunity. In Dasmarias Water District v. Monterey Foods
Corporation, 565 SCRA 624 (2008), we said: A law is deemed valid unless declared
null and void by a competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly
pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity. x x x. The settled rule is that courts will not anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. (Citation
omitted.) This Court held that such opportunity is in the pleadings before a
competent court that can resolve it, such that if it is not raised in the pleadings, it
cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be
considered on appeal. The decision upon the constitutional question is necessary
to determine whether the TPO should be issued against petitioner. Such question
should have been raised at the earliest opportunity as an affirmative defense in the
Opposition filed with the RTC handling the protection order proceedings, which was
the competent court to pass upon the constitutional issue.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Multiplicity of Suits; View that the filing of a separate
action before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is
clear that the issues of constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection order
raised by petitioner are inextricably intertwined.The filing of a separate action
before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the issues
of constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection order raised by petitioner
are inextricably intertwined. Another court, whether it is an appellate court or a trial
court, cannot resolve the constitutionality question in the separate action without
affecting the petition for the issuance of a TPO. Bringing a separate action for the
resolution of the issue of constitutionality will result in an unresolved prejudicial
question to the validity of issuing a protection order. If the proceedings for the
protection order is not suspended, it does create the danger of having inconsistent
35

and conflicting judgments between the two separate courts, whether of the same or
different levels in the judicial hierarchy. These two judgments would eventually be
the subject of separate motions for reconsideration, separate appeals, and separate
petitions for review before this Court the exact scenario the policy against
multiplicity of suits is avoiding. As we previously held, the law and the courts frown
upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of actions.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; View that when public interest requires the
resolution of the constitutional issue raised, and in keeping with the Supreme
Courts duty of determining whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of
government have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not
abused the discretion given them, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure and resolve the constitutional issue.Notwithstanding my position that
the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the Petition for Prohibition because of
petitioners failure to raise the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 at
the earliest opportunity, I concur that the Court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, should still pass upon the said issue in the present Petition. Notable is
the fact that not only the petitioner, but the private respondent as well, pray that
the Court resolve the constitutional issue considering its novelty and paramount
importance. Indeed, when public interest requires the resolution of the
constitutional issue raised, and in keeping with this Courts duty of determining
whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of government have remained
within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them,
the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve the constitutional
issue.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that recent Philippine
jurisprudence has recognized the need to apply different standards of scrutiny in
testing the constitutionality of classifications.Recent Philippine jurisprudence has
recognized the need to apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the
constitutionality of classifications. In British American Tobacco v. Camacho, 585
SCRA 36 (2009), this Court held that since the case therein neither involved a
suspect classification nor impinged on a fundamental right, then the rational basis
test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed law in the
face of an equal protection challenge.
Same; Same; View that in the context of the constitutional policy to ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men the level of scrutiny
applicable, to test whether or not the classification in Republic Act No. 9262 violates
the equal protection clause, is the middle-tier scrutiny or the intermediate standard
of judicial review.Since statutory remedies accorded to women are not made
available to men, when the reality is that there are men, regardless of their number,
who are also suffering from domestic violence, the rational basis test may be too
wide and liberal to justify the statutory classification which in effect allows different
treatment of men who are similarly situated. In the context of the constitutional
policy to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men the
level of scrutiny applicable, to test whether or not the classification in Republic Act
No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause, is the middle-tier scrutiny or the
36

intermediate standard of judicial review. To survive intermediate review, the

classification in the challenged law must (1) serve important governmental
objectives, and (2) be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
Same; Same; View that by constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to
ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human
rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone. It was one of the
countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
which was a mere two years after it gained independence from the United States of
America. In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United Nations human
rights treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against
Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
Same; Same; View that the Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262
enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the governments
obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children by
providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical, psychological,
and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the
victim.The Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates the purpose
of the said law, which is to fulfill the governments obligation to safeguard the
dignity and human rights of women and children by providing effective remedies
against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse
perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim. The said law is also
viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure gender equality,
which is quoted as follows: Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nationbuilding, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW); Republic Act No. 9262; View that Republic Act No. 9262 can be viewed
therefore as the Philippines compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is committed to
condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake,
without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women in
all forms both in law and in practice.It has been acknowledged that gender-based
violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits womens ability to enjoy
rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men. Republic Act No. 9262 can be
viewed therefore as the Philippines compliance with the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is
committed to condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to
undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against
women in all forms both in law and in practice. Known as the International Bill of
Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most comprehensive document for
the advancement of the welfare of women. It brings the women into the focus of
human rights concerns, and its spirit is rooted in the goals of the UN: to reaffirm
37

faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in
the equal rights of men and women. The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly
acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination against women, and
emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect
for human dignity.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; Gender-Based Violence; As one of
the countrys pervasive social problems, violence against women is deemed to be
closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men and is
otherwise known as gender-based violence.As one of the countrys pervasive
social problems, violence against women is deemed to be closely linked with the
unequal power relationship between women and men and is otherwise known as
gender-based violence. Violent acts towards women has been the subject of an
examination on a historic world-wide perspective. The exhaustive study of a foreign
history professor noted that [f]rom the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of
women, in the form of violence, were facts of life, as three great bodies of thought,
namely: Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law
Legal Code, which have influenced western societys views and treatment of
women, all assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination stemming from
the view of male superiority. It cited 18th century legal expert William Blackstone,
who explained that the common law doctrine of coverture reflected the theological
assumption that husband and wife were one body before God; thus they were
one person under the law, and that one person was the husband, a concept that
evidently found its way in some of our Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment
of the Family Code.
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A. No. 9262); View that
although there exists other laws on violence against women in the Philippines,
Republic Act No. 9262 deals with the problem of violence within the family and
intimate relationships, which deserves special attention because it occurs in
situations or places where women and children should feel most safe and secure but
are actually not.Preventing violence against women and children through their
availment of special legal remedies, serves the governmental objectives of
protecting the dignity and human rights of every person, preserving the sanctity of
family life, and promoting gender equality and empowering women. Although there
exists other laws on violence against women in the Philippines, Republic Act No.
9262 deals with the problem of violence within the family and intimate
relationships, which deserves special attention because it occurs in situations or
places where women and children should feel most safe and secure but are actually
not. The law provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are
victims of violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by
strangers, but by a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or
had a sexual or dating relationship. Aside from filing a criminal case in court, the law
provides potent legal remedies to the victims that theretofore were not available.
The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women and
children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal
intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a
conclusion that men need legal protection from violence perpetuated by women.
38

Temporary Protection Order (TPO); View that the law permits the issuance of
protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims, even without
a hearing; Despite the ex parte issuance of these protection orders, the temporary
nature of these remedies allow them to be availed of by the victim without violating
the offenders right to due process as it is only when a full-blown hearing has been
done that a permanent protection order may be issued.The law takes into account
the pervasive vulnerability of women and children, and the seriousness and urgency
of the situation, which, in the language of the law result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty. Hence, the law permits the issuance of protection orders and the granting
of certain reliefs to women victims, even without a hearing. The law has granted
authority for barangay officials to issue a protection order against the offender,
based on the victims application. The RTC may likewise grant an application for a
temporary protection order (TPO) and provide other reliefs, also on the mere basis
of the application. Despite the ex parte issuance of these protection orders, the
temporary nature of these remedies allow them to be availed of by the victim
without violating the offenders right to due process as it is only when a full-blown
hearing has been done that a permanent protection order may be issued. Thus,
these remedies are suitable, reasonable, and justified. More importantly, they serve
the objectives of the law by providing the victims necessary immediate protection
from the violence they perceive as threats to their personal safety and security. This
translates to the fulfillment of other governmental objectives as well. By assuring
the victims instant relief from their situation, they are consequently empowered and
restored to a place of dignity and equality. Such is embodied in the purpose to be
served by a protection order.
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A. No. 9262); View that in
furtherance of the governmental objectives, especially that of protecting human
rights, violence against women and children under this Act has been classified as a
public offense, making its prosecution independent of the victims initial
participation.In furtherance of the governmental objectives, especially that of
protecting human rights, violence against women and children under this Act has
been classified as a public offense, making its prosecution independent of the
victims initial participation. Verily, the classification made in Republic Act No. 9262
is substantially related to the important governmental objectives of valuing every
persons dignity, respecting human rights, safeguarding family life, protecting
children, promoting gender equality, and empowering women.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that the equal protection
clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification.The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee
an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women
and men under Republic Act No. 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and
to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women
and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed
differences between men and women. Republic Act No. 9262, by affording special
and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
39

domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of

protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The
gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor
of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to
achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or
middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not
violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
Violence Against Women and Children; Temporary Protection Order; View that a
protection order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing
further acts of violence against a woman or her child.A protection order is issued
under Republic Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against a woman or her child. The circumstances surrounding the availment thereof
are often attended by urgency; thus, women and child victims must have immediate
and uncomplicated access to the same.
Same; Same; Police Power; View that Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power of the State to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
comfort of the public (in this case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the
protection of human life, commonly designated as the police power.The ex parte
issuance of the TPO does not make it unconstitutional. Procedural due process
refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced. It consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an
impartial and competent tribunal. However, it is a constitutional commonplace that
the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those involved herein. Republic Act No. 9262
and its implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of
that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect the safety, health, and
general welfare and comfort of the public (in this case, a particular sector thereof),
as well as the protection of human life, commonly designated as the police power.
Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Words and Phrases; View that a Barangay
Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by the Punong
Barangay, or in his absence the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to
desist from committing acts of violence against the family or household members
particularly women and their children.A Barangay Protection Order (BPO) refers to
the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in his absence the Barangay
Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts of violence
against the family or household members particularly women and their children.
The authority of barangay officials to issue a BPO is conferred under Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 9262: SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue
and How.Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued
by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date
of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be
40

acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay
Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay
Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of
the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect is personal service. The parties may be accompanied by a nonlawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Same; View that in the case of a Barangay Protection Order, it is a mere provisional
remedy under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need of the
victims for instant protection; Under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No.
9262, the issuance of a Barangay Protection Order or the pendency of an
application for a Barangay Protection Order shall not preclude the victim from
applying for, or the court from granting, a Temporary Protection Order or Permanent
Protection Order.While judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary, it may be
conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies, or
even particular government officials, quasi-judicial power involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions.
But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would
leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are
to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of
administrative duties, which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a
matter exclusively vested in the courts. In the case of a BPO, it is a mere provisional
remedy under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need of the
victims for instant protection. However, it does not take the place of appropriate
judicial proceedings and remedies that provide a more effective and comprehensive
protection to the victim. In fact, under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No.
9262, the issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for a BPO shall not
preclude the victim from applying for, or the court from granting, a TPO or PPO.
Where a TPO has already been granted by any court, the barangay official may no
longer issue a BPO. The same Implementing Rules also require that within twentyfour (24) hours after the issuance of a BPO, the barangay official shall assist the
victim in filing an application for a TPO or PPO with the nearest court in the victims
place of residence. If there is no Family Court or RTC, the application may be filed in
the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court or the Metropolitan Trial
Court.
BRION, J., Concurring Opinion:
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; View that Congress found that
domestic and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the
failure to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the States mandate to
actively promote the familys total development.From the terms of the law, I find
it plain that Congress enacted R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen
the family. Congress found that domestic and other forms of violence against
women and children contribute to the failure to unify and strengthen family ties,
thereby impeding the States mandate to actively promote the familys total
41

development. Congress also found, as a reality, that women and children are more
susceptible to domestic and other forms of violence due to, among others, the
pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles within the
family environment that traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis,
Congress found it necessary to recognize the substantial distinction within the
family between men, on the one hand, and women and children, on the other hand.
This recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be made in the laws as our law on
persons and family under the Civil Code also recognize, in various ways, the
distinctions between men and women in the context of the family.
Constitutional Law; Reasonableness Test; View that the reasonableness test has
been consistently applied to allow the courts to uphold State action as long as the
action is found to be germane to the purpose of the law, in this case to support the
unity and development of the family.My serious reservation on the use of an
expanded equal protection clause and in applying a strict scrutiny standard is,
among others, based on lack of necessity; we do not need these measures when we
can fully examine R.A. No. 9262s constitutionality using the reasonableness test.
The family is a unit, in fact a very basic one, and it cannot operate on an uneven
standard where measures beyond what is necessary are extended to women and
children as against the manthe head of the family and the family provider. The
use of an expanded equal protection clause only stresses the concept of an uneven
equality that cannot long stand in a unit living at close quarters in a situation of
mutual dependency on one another. The reasonableness test, on the other hand,
has been consistently applied to allow the courts to uphold State action as long as
the action is found to be germane to the purpose of the law, in this case to support
the unity and development of the family. If we are to deviate from or to modify this
established standard of scrutiny, we must do so carefully and for strong justifiable
reasons.
Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Suspect Classification; Words and Phrases; View
that a suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the most
invidious bases for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on
the basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation and, to a certain
extent, sex and sexual orientation.When the court uses a strict standard for
review to evaluate the constitutionality of a law, it proceeds from the premise that
the law established a suspect classification. A suspect classification is one where
distinctions are made based on the most invidious bases for classification that
violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of race, national origin, alien
status, religious affiliation and, to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation. With
a suspect classification, the most stringent scrutiny of the classification is applied:
the ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and the government
carries the burden of proving the statutes constitutionality. This approach is unlike
the lowest level of scrutiny (reasonableness test) that the Court has applied in the
past where the classification is scrutinized and constitutionally upheld if found to be
germane to the purpose of the law. Under a reasonableness test, there is a
presumption of constitutionality and that the laws enacted by Congress are
presumed to fall within its constitutional powers.

42

Same; Same; View that there is no indication that Congress actually intended to
classify women and children as a group against men, under the terms of R.A. No.
9262. Rather than a clear intent at classification, the overriding intent of the law is
indisputably to harmonize family relations and protect the family as a basic social
institution.I do not really see any indication that Congress actually intended to
classify women and children as a group against men, under the terms of R.A. No.
9262. Rather than a clear intent at classification, the overriding intent of the law is
indisputably to harmonize family relations and protect the family as a basic social
institution. After sifting through the comprehensive information gathered, Congress
found that domestic and other forms of violence against women and children
impedes the harmony of the family and the personal growth and development of
family members. In the process, Congress found that these types of violence must
pointedly be addressed as they are more commonly experienced by women and
children due to the unequal power relations of men and women in our society;
Congress had removed these types of violence as they are impediments that block
the harmonious development that it envisions for the family, of which men are
important component members.
Same; Same; Suspect Classification; View that a suspect classification and the
accompanying strict scrutiny should depend on the circumstances of the case, on
the impact of the illegal differential treatment on the group involved, on the needed
protection and the impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future
classification.In my view, a suspect classification and the accompanying strict
scrutiny should depend on the circumstances of the case, on the impact of the
illegal differential treatment on the group involved, on the needed protection and
the impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future classification. A suspect
classification label cannot solely and automatically be triggered by the circumstance
that women and children are accorded special protection by the Constitution. In
fact, there is no place for a strict level of scrutiny when the Constitution itself has
recognized the need for special protection; where such recognition has been made,
congressional action should carry the presumption of validity.
Same; Same; View that the classification in the law was not immediately brought on
by considerations of gender or sex; it was simply a reality as unavoidable as the
reality that in Philippine society, a marriage is composed of a man, a woman and
their children.A suspect classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny
standard cannot be solely based on the circumstance that the law has the effect of
being gender-specific. I believe that the classification in the law was not
immediately brought on by considerations of gender or sex; it was simply a reality
as unavoidable as the reality that in Philippine society, a marriage is composed of a
man, a woman and their children. An obvious reason, of course, why the
classification did not solely depend on gender is because the law also covers
children, without regard to their sex or their sexual orientation.
Same; Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 does not deny, restrict or curtail civil and
human rights of other persons falling outside the classification, particularly of the
men members of the family who can avail of remedies provided by other laws to
ensure the protection of their own rights and interests.With the objective of
43

promoting solidarity and the development of the family, R.A. No. 9262 provides the
legal redress for domestic violence that particularly affects women and their
children. Significantly, the law does not deny, restrict or curtail civil and human
rights of other persons falling outside the classification, particularly of the men
members of the family who can avail of remedies provided by other laws to ensure
the protection of their own rights and interests. Consequently, the resulting
classification under R.A. No. 9262 is not wholly intended and does not work an
injustice by removing remedies that are available to men in violence committed
against them. The law furthermore does not target men against women and
children and is there simply to achieve a legitimate constitutional objective, and it
does not achieve this by a particularly harmful classification that can be labeled
suspect in the sense already established by jurisprudence. Under the
circumstances, the use and application of strict scrutiny review, or even the use of
an expanded equal protection perspective, strike me as both unnecessary and
disproportionate.
ABAD, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that men and women are
supposed to be equal yet this particular law provides immediate relief to
complaining women and harsh consequences to their men even before the matter
reaches the courtroom, a relief not available to the latter.This separate concurring
opinion will address the issue of equal protection since it presents the more serious
challenge to the constitutionality of the law. Men and women are supposed to be
equal yet this particular law provides immediate relief to complaining women and
harsh consequences to their men even before the matter reaches the courtroom, a
relief not available to the latter. The law, Garcia says, violates his right to equal
protection because it is gender-specific, favoring only women when men could also
be victims of domestic violence.
Same; Same; View that the equal protection clause can no longer be interpreted as
only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality.Chief Justice Punos
thesis is that the right to equal protection casts another shadow when the issue
raised under it involves persons protected by the social justice provision of the
Constitution, specifically, Section 1, Article XIII. The equal protection clause can no
longer be interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive
equality. It ought to be construed, said the Chief Justice, in consonance with
social justice as the heart particularly of the 1987 Constitution a transformative
covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to enshrine asymmetrical equality to
uplift disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely egalitarian democracy. This
means that the weak, including women in relation to men, can be treated with a
measure of bias that they may cease to be weak.
Same; Same; Expanded Equal Protection Clause; View that the expanded equal
protection clause should be understood as meant to reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good.Chief Justice Puno goes on: The
Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored on the human rights rationale, is
designed as a weapon against the indignity of discrimination so that in the patently
44

unequal Philippine society, each person may be restored to his or her rightful
position as a person with equal moral status. Specifically, the expanded equal
protection clause should be understood as meant to reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good. Borrowing the language of Law v.
Canada, 1 S.C.R. 497 (1999), case and adding his own thoughts, the Chief Justice
said: The purpose of the Expanded Equal Protection Clause is to protect and
enhance the right to dignity by: 1) preventing the imposition, perpetuation and
aggravation of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political [,economic, cultural,] or
social prejudice; and 2) promo[ting a Philippine] society in which all persons enjoy
equal recognition at law as human beings.
Violence Against Women and Children; Equal Protection of the Law; View that
Republic Act No. 9262 is gender-specific as only they may file the prescribed actions
against offenders, whether men or women, with whom the victims are or were in
lesbian relationships.What remedies does R.A. 9262 especially provide women
and children? The law is gender-specific as only they may file the prescribed actions
against offenders, whether men or women, with whom the victims are or were in
lesbian relationships. The definition includes past or present marital, live-in, sexual
or dating relationships. This law also provides for the remedy of a protection order in
a civil action or in a criminal action, aside from the criminal action for its violation. It
makes the process of securing a restraining order against perpetrators easier and
more immediate by providing for the legal remedy of protection orders from both
the courts and barangay officials.
Same; Same; Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW); View that in the context of womens rights, substantive equality
has been defined by the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which requires that women be given an equal
start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality
of results.In the context of womens rights, substantive equality has been defined
by the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) as equality which requires that women be given an equal start and that
they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is
not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather,
biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between women
and men must be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical
treatment of women and men will be required in order to address such differences.
Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 is based on the experiences of women who have
been victims of domestic violence.Clearly, the substantive equality model inspired
R.A. 9262. For one thing, Congress enacted it because of compelling interest in
preventing and addressing the serious problem of violence against women in the
context of intimate relationships recognized all over the world as one of the most
insidious forms of gender discrimination. For another, R.A. 9262 is based on the
experiences of women who have been victims of domestic violence. The list of acts
regarded as forms of violence come from true-to-life stories of women who have
suffered abuses from their male partners. Finally, R.A. 9262 seeks womens full
45

participation in society. Hence, the law grants them needed relief to ensure equality,
protection, and personal safety, enabling them to enjoy their civil, political, social,
and economic rights. The provision on protection orders, for instance, precisely aims
to safeguard the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the
victims daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to
independently regain control over her life.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; View that Locus
standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.Legal standing in cases that raise constitutional issues is essential.
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. The fundamental question is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Violence Against Women and Children; View that it may be said that violence in the
context of intimate relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a gender
issue; rather, it is a power issue.In this light, it may be said that violence in the
context of intimate relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a gender
issue; rather, it is a power issue. Thus, when laws are not gender-neutral, male
victims of domestic violence may also suffer from double victimization first by their
abusers and second by the judicial system. Incidentally, focusing on women as the
victims entrenches some level of heteronormativity. It is blind to the possibility that,
whatever moral positions are taken by those who are dominant, in reality intimate
relationships can also happen between men.
Statutes; View that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x as
inoperative as though it had never been passed.We have declared that [a]n
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords
no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative as though it had never
been passed. However, the seemingly all-inclusive statement of absolute
retroactive invalidity may not always be justified. One established exception is the
doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the
general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of
an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid Law. [Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352(2013)]

46

25. Atienza v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

188920, February 16, 2010
Election Law; Political Parties; Intra-Party Disputes; Parties; Where no wrong had
been imputed to a political party nor had some affirmative relief been sought from
it, then such political party is not an indispensable party.But petitioners Atienza, et
al.s causes of action in this case consist in respondents Roxas, et al.s
disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al. from the election of party leaders and in
_______________

** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza per Raffle
dated January 11, 2010.
the illegal election of Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were supposedly
excluded from the elections by a series of despotic acts of Roxas, et al., who
controlled the proceedings. Among these acts are Atienza, et al.s expulsion from
the party, their exclusion from the NECO, and respondent Drilons railroading of
election proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal and prejudicial acts
to Roxas, et al. Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some
affirmative relief been sought from it, the LP is not an indispensable party.
Petitioners Atienza, et al.s prayer for the undoing of respondents Roxas, et al.s acts
and the reconvening of the NECO are directed against Roxas, et al.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where individual members of a political party who want
to take part in another election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the
Courts decision in the instant case, they have legal standing to pursue the present
petition.But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006)
legal standing in suits is governed by the real parties-in-interest rule under
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This states that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. And real partyin-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiffs standing
is based on his own right to the relief sought. In raising petitioners Atienza, et al.s
lack of standing as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al. would have the
Court hypothetically assume the truth of the allegations in the petition. Here, it is
precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.s allegations that respondents Roxas, et al.
deprived them of their rights as LP members by summarily excluding them from the
LP roster and not allowing them to take part in the election of its officers and that
not all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If Atienza, et
al.s allegations were correct, they would have been irregularly expelled from the
party and the election of officers, void. Further, they would be entitled to recognition
as members of good standing and to the holding of a new election of officers using
the correct list of NECO members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, et al. who want
to take part in another election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the
Courts decision in this case. Consequently, they have legal standing to pursue this
petition.
47

Same; Same; Same; The amended Liberal Party (LP) Constitution did not intend the
National Executive Council (NECO) membership to be permanent.Nothing in the
Courts resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO membership should be
pegged to the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There would have been
no basis for such a position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the NECO
membership to be permanent. Its Section 27 provides that the NECO shall include
all incumbent senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors, and
mayors who were LP members in good standing for at least six months. It follows
from this that with the national and local elections taking place in May 2007, the
number and composition of the NECO would have to yield to changes brought about
by the elections. Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them to
membership had to be dropped. Newly elected ones who gained the privilege
because of their offices had to come in. Furthermore, former NECO members who
passed away, resigned from the party, or went on leave could not be expected to
remain part of the NECO that convened and held elections on November 26, 2007.
In addition, Section 27 of the amended LP Constitution expressly authorized the
party president to nominate persons of national stature to the NECO. Thus,
petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot validly object to the admission of 12 NECO
members nominated by respondent Drilon when he was LP president. Even if this
move could be regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.s way of ensuring their
election as party officers, there was certainly nothing irregular about the act under
the amended LP Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; A political party could very well remove an officer for cause as
it sees fit.Petitioner Atienza claims that the Courts resolution in the earlier cases
recognized his right as party chairman with a term, like respondent Drilon, that
would last up to November 30, 2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from that
position violated the Courts resolution. But the Courts resolution in the earlier
cases did not preclude the party from disciplining Atienza under Sections 29 and 46
of the amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him or any officer
for cause as it saw fit.
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; Under the circumstances of the
present case, the validity or invalidity of the expulsion of a political partys officers
is purely a membership issue that has to be settled within the partyit is an
internal party matter over which the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has no
jurisdiction.While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members
belong to their faction, they did not specify who these members were and how their
numbers could possibly affect the composition of the NECO and the outcome of its
election of party leaders. Atienza, et al. has not bothered to assail the individual
qualifications of the NECO members who voted for Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al.
present proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then assembled. In other
words, the claims of Atienza, et al. were totally unsupported by evidence.
Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the
party impacts on the party leadership issue or on the election of respondent Roxas
as president so that it was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim.
Under the circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion was

48

purely a membership issue that had to be settled within the party. It is an internal
party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The Commission on Elections (COMELECs)
jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limitedthe Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the
discharge of its constitutional functions, such as in resolving an intra-party
leadership dispute as an incident of its power to register political parties.What is
more, some of petitioner Atienzas allies raised objections before the NECO
assembly regarding the status of members from their faction. Still, the NECO
proceeded with the election, implying that its membership, whose composition has
been upheld, voted out those objections. The COMELECs jurisdiction over intraparty disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all
controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to
conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may
intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions. The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership
disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections, that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section
2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the
political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also
declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register political parties
necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf.
Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case
brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The requirements of administrative due process
do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties.Petitioners Atienza, et al.
argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party membership
or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due
process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first
summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party.
According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of
administrative proceedings and are, therefore, covered by the due process
requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635
(1940). But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the
internal affairs of political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover
only administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain
governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or
instrumentality contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function. The constitutional
limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too,
to administrative bodies.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary
citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by
private individuals or entities.The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the
states powers are found in Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill
49

of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property, or liberty without
due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the states powers in
relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect
ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed
by private individuals or entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that provide
reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against
unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens
and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The discipline of members by a political party does not
involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process
clause; Even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not
interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party.Although
political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right
to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An
individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his
removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have,
in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely
agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among
the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been
violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not
as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies. But even
when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in
membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free
to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free
association. In Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266 (1999) the Court said that judicial
restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing the political
processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state
policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free
choice of the people.
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; While the question of party
leadership has implications on the Commission on Elections (COMELECs)
performance of its functions under the Constitution, the same cannot be said of an
expulsion which, for the moment, is an issue of party membership and discipline.
The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas election as
LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the
party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs
performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the
LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline,
in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its power over
political parties. [Atienza, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 612 SCRA 761(2010)]

50

51

26. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Comelec, April 8,

2010
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; The enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive.As we explicitly ruled
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698
(2001), the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated,
but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Same; Same; Same; Aside from Commission on Elections (COMELECs) moral
objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has
the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under any of the requisites under Republic Act No. 7941 or
the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.We find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed,
aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence,
nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not
qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA
7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies
in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
Same; Same; Same; It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad.Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that
it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Same; Same; Same; Through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval.We are not
blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censurereligious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust
of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall
that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,
therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.
Election Law; Party-List System; Civil Law; Nuisance, Defined.Article 694 of the
Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,

52

the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.
Same; Same; Evidence; A mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace
the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability
or culpability.A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be
emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
Same; Same; Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
system.We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection
clause.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; Recent
jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, the Supreme Court will uphold the classification as long as it
bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.Recent
jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a
rational relationship to some legitimate government end. In Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004), we
declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection
challenges xxx have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless
there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Law of general application should apply with equal force
to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs), and they deserve to participate
in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors.From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion
in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system
on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to
those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.
53

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic

society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but
also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state
interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
one.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Association; Only if a political party incites violence
or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside
the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.A political group should
not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association
guarantee.
Same; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; The principle of nondiscrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.The principle of
non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual
orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in
Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the
reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual orientation.
Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
Same; Same; Same; Yogyakarta Principles; Using even the most liberal of lenses,
these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, areat bestde lege ferendaand do not constitute
binding obligations on the Philippines.Using even the most liberal of lenses, these
Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international
law professors, areat bestde lege ferendaand do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is
characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human
rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the
support of either State practice or opinio juris.
PUNO,C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the assailed
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the nonestablishment clause of the Constitution.The assailed Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment clause of
the Constitution. There was cypher effort on the part of the COMELEC to couch its
reasoning in legalmuch less constitutionalterms, as it denied Ang Ladlads
54

petition for registration as a sectoral party principally on the ground that it

tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e., Christian and Muslim) beliefs. To
be sure, the COMELECs ruling is completely antithetical to the fundamental rule
that [t]he public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular[,] for in our
constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a
religion, including the morality it sanctions.
Same; Same; Same; View that the assailed resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) are violative of the constitutional directive that no religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.The assailed
resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the constitutional directive that no
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Ang
Ladlads right of political participation was unduly infringed when the COMELEC,
swayed by the private biases and personal prejudices of its constituent members,
arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or worse, a morality police.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) capitalized
on Ang Ladlads definition of the term sexual orientation, as well as its citation of
the number of Filipino men who have sex with men, as basis for the declaration that
the party espouses and advocates sexual immorality; This position would deny
homosexual and bixesual individuals a fundamental element of personal identity
and a legitimate exercise of personal liberty.The COMELEC capitalized on Ang
Ladlads definition of the term sexual orientation, as well as its citation of the
number of Filipino men who have sex with men, as basis for the declaration that the
party espouses and advocates sexual immorality. This position, however, would
deny homosexual and bisexual individuals a fundamental element of personal
identity and a legitimate exercise of personal liberty. For, the ability to
[independently] define ones identity that is central to any concept of liberty
cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the emotional enrichment
from close ties with others.
Same; Same; Same; View that at the heart of liberty is the right to define ones own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
It has been said that freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the due process clause. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define ones own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.
Same; Same; Same; View that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation
is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review.The
ponencia of Mr. Justice Del Castillo refused to characterize homosexuals and
bisexuals as a class in themselves for purposes of the equal protection clause.
Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most liberal basis of
judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to which government need only
55

show that the challenged classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate

state interest. I humbly submit, however, that a classification based on gender or
sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level
of review.
Same; Same; Same; View that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional
protection despite some recent political progress.It would not be difficult to
conclude that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection
despite some recent political progress. The discrimination that they have suffered
has been so pervasive and severeeven though their sexual orientation has no
bearing at all on their ability to contribute to or perform in societythat it is highly
unlikely that legislative enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that
discrimination.
Same; Same; Same; View that any state action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals
and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays,
bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and
stereotyping.
Same; Same; Same; View that the position that the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) community cannot participate in the party-list system because
it is not a marginalized and underrepresented sector is belied by the Supreme
Court ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, where the Court
held that the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive.It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in
the party-list system because it is not a marginalized and underrepresented
sector enumerated either in the Constitution or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941.
However, this position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), where we clearly held that the enumeration of
marginalized and underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.
CORONA,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the party-list system
is essentially a tool for the advancement of social justice with the fundamental
purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
participate in the shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws.The
party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a tool for
the advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording
opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the
shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the
proposition that the advancement of the interests of the marginalized sectors
contributes to the advancement of the common good and of our nations
democratic ideals.
Same; Same; Same; Congress; View that the Constitution left the matter of
determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as marginalized to the hands
56

of Congress.The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors

that may qualify as marginalized to the hands of Congress. Pursuant to this
constitutional mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court stressed that the party-list
system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the
past.In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), the Court
stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized
and underrepresented in the past (e.g., labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, professionals and even those in the underground movement who
wish to come out and participate). They are those sectors traditionally and
historically marginalized and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the
formulation of national policy although their sectoral interests are also traditionally
and historically regarded as vital to the national interest.
Same; Same; Same; View that the concept of marginalized and underrepresented
sectors under the party-list scheme has been carefully refined by concrete
examples involving sectors deemed to be significant in our legal tradition.The
concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list scheme
has been carefully refined by concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be
significant in our legal tradition. They are essentially sectors with a constitutional
bond, that is, specific sectors subject of specific provisions in the Constitution,
namely, labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, veterans, fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, overseas workers and
professionals.
Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors should be given a say in
governance through the party-list system, not simply because they desire to say
something constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their
traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine society.The long-muffled
voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their respective interests are
intimately and indispensably woven into the fabric of the national democratic
agenda. The social, economic and political aspects of discrimination and
marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a particular sector or group
in the advancement of the collective goals of Philippine society as a whole. In other
words, marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance through the partylist system, not simply because they desire to say something constructive but
because they deserve to be heard on account of their traditionally and historically
decisive role in Philippine society.
Same; Same; Same; View that the majoritys decision is cryptic and wanting when it
makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.The enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized
and underrepresented in the fundamental law and in the implementing law (RA
7941) cannot be without significance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts of the
Constitution and of RA 7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Partys eight guidelines for screening party-list participants is this: the parties,
sectors or organizations must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
57

groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. For this reason, I submit the majoritys
decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the issue of whether
petitioner is a marginalized and underrepresented sector in the following manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the
party-list system but not mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are such other
sectors as may be provided by law duly enacted by Congress.Marginalized
sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not mentioned in Section
5(2), Article VI are such other sectors as may be provided by law duly enacted by
Congress. It is also consistent with the basic canon of statutory construction,
ejusdem generis, which requires that a general word or phrase that follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or
phrase should be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or
cases, akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.
Same; Same; Same; View that even assuming that petitioner was able to show that
the community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is
underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as marginalized under the
party-list system.Even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the
community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is
underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as marginalized under the
party-list system. First, petitioner is not included in the sectors mentioned in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an overly
strained interpretation is resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot establish a close
connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed, petitioner does not even try to show
its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an altogether distinct
sector with its own peculiar interests and agenda.
Same; Same; Same; View that only sectors expressly or closely related to those
sectors mentioned in Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 are qualified to
participate in the party-list system.In this instance, Congress, in the exercise of its
authority under Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, enacted RA 7941.
Sections 2, 3(d) and (5) of the said law instituted a policy when it enumerated
certain sectors as qualified marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the
party-list system. Respect for that policy and fidelity to the Courts duty in our
scheme of government require us to declare that only sectors expressly mentioned
or closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 are qualified
to participate in the party-list system.
Same; Same; Same; View that until and unless Congress amends the law to include
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs) and other sectors in the partylist system, deference to Congress determination on the matter is proper.The
Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by strictly adhering to,
rather than expanding, legislative policy on the matter of marginalized sectors as
expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no power to
amend and expand Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the guise of interpretation.
The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the authority to determine such
other [marginalized] sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system to
58

Congress. Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to include the LGBT and
other sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress determination on the
matter is proper.
Same; Same; Same; View that the party-list system was not designed as a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors.
While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be given
no place in a truly just, democratic and libertarian society, the party-list system has
a well-defined purpose. The party-list system was not designed as a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors.
Rather, it is a platform for the realization of the aspirations of marginalized sectors
whose interests are, by nature and history, also the nations but which interests
have not been sufficiently brought to public attention because of these sectors
underrepresentation.
Same; Same; Same; View that Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion
to determine what sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented, the
Courts task is to respect that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it.
Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors
may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented. The Courts task is to respect
that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly
expand such congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an
act of political will and not of judicial judgment.
ABAD,J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the underlying policy
of Republic Act No. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society an opportunity to take a direct part in
enacting the laws of the land.The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The Party-List
System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an
opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 359 SCRA 698
(2001), the Court laid down guidelines for accreditation, but these seem to leave
the COMELEC like everyone else even more perplexed and dumbfounded about
what organizations, clubs, or associations can pass for sectoral parties with a right
to claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court can, in adjudicating this
case, unravel some of the difficulties.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) erred when
it denied Ang Ladlads petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and
moral groundsthe COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular candidates
for Congress.Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang
Ladlads petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds.
The COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress.
There is no reason for it to apply them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already
amply and lucidly discussed this point.
Same; Same; Same; View that a reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that,
based on the Courts reading, neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 7941
59

intends the excessively limited coverage that the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) now suggests.The COMELECs proposition imposes an unwarranted
restriction which is inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the Constitution and
the law. A reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Courts
reading, neither the Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited
coverage that the COMELEC now suggests. In fact, the Court said in that case that
the list in R.A. 7941 is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant
for all sectors of society, it was envisioned as a social justice tool for the
marginalized and underrepresented in general.
Same; Same; Same; View that Congress did not provide a definition of the term
marginalized and underrepresented.Congress did not provide a definition of the
term marginalized and underrepresented. Nor did the Court dare provide one in
its decision in Ang Bagong Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense of what
Congress intended in adopting such term. No doubt, Congress crafted that term
marginalized and underrepresentedfrom its reading of the concrete examples that
the Constitution itself gives of groupings that are entitled to accreditation. These
examples are the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural
minorities, the women, and the youth sectors. Fortunately, quite often ideas are
best described by examples of what they are, which was what those who drafted
the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an abstract description of them.
Same; Same; Same; View that an interpretation that will allow concretely or
specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself
will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the
House of Representatives.An interpretation that will allow concretely or
specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself
will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the
House of Representatives. It will defeat altogether the objectives of the party-list
system. If they can muster enough votes, the country may have a party-list of
pedicab drivers and another of tricycle drivers. There will be an irrational
apportionment of party-list seats in the legislature.
Same; Same; Same; View that applying the universally accepted estimate that one
out of every 10 persons is a Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs) of a
certain kind, the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million.In this case,
Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons (LGBTs). Applying the universally accepted
estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind, the Filipino
LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million. Despite this, however, they are by and
large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the mainstream, discriminated against,
and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads petition on religious and
moral grounds is proof of this discrimination.
Same; Same; Same; View that Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the
requirements for sectoral party accreditationtheir members are in the vulnerable
class like the women and the youth.Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets
the requirements for sectoral party accreditation. Their members are in the
vulnerable class like the women and the youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow
60

definition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a concrete and specific definition of a subgroup within the class (group of gay beauticians, for example). The people that Ang
Ladlad seeks to represent have a national presence. [Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs.
Commission on Elections, 618 SCRA 32(2010)]

61

27. Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410. January 20,

1999
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Statutes|Equal
Protection Clause|Administrative Law|Statutory
Construction
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Executive Order 97-A is constitutional and valid.The
solicitor general defends, on behalf of respondents, the validity of EO 97-A, arguing
that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate
the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance fully complies with
the requirements of a valid classification. We rule in favor of the constitutionality
and validity of the assailed EO. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection
clause; neither is it discriminatory. Rather, we find real and substantive distinctions
between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval
Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; The fundamental right of equal protection of the
laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.The fundamental
right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and
must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Same; Same; Requisites for Valid Classification.Classification, to be valid, must (1)
rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same
class.
Same; Statutes; The real concern of Republic Act 7227 is to convert the lands
formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial areas.From
the above provisions of the law, it can easily be deduced that the real concern of RA
7227 is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into
economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it
necessary to extend economic incentives to attract and encourage investors, both
local and foreign. Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory
within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income tax
rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange control, (5)
liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident status
to certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Statutory Construction; It was reasonable for the
President to have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the
former Subic military base, the specific area which the government intends to
62

transform and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into
a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and
local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries; The
intent of a statute is the law.We believe it was reasonable for the President to
have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former
Subic military base. It is this specific area which the government intends to
transform and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into
a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and
local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries. Why
the seeming bias for big investors? Undeniably, they are the ones who can pour
huge investments to spur economic growth in the country and to generate
employment opportunities for the Filipinos, the ultimate goals of the government for
such conversion. The classification is, therefore, germane to the purposes of the
law. And as the legal maxim goes, The intent of a statute is the law.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; Certainly, there are substantial differences between
the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate their industries in the
so-called secured area and the present business operators outside the area.
Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being
lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called secured area and
the present business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of
billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other hand, definitely
none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the
second, only local. Even more important, at this time the business activities outside
the secured area are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the
law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the
Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them
the benefits and incentives accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, as the Court of
Appeals pointed out, it will be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the
secured area, which is already fenced off, to prevent fraudulent importation of
merchandise or smuggling.
Same; Same; It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require
territorial uniformity of laws.It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee
does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and
material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional
clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the requisite
investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her
resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone. [Tiu vs. Court of
Appeals, 301 SCRA 278(1999)]

63

28. Central Bank Employees Association v. BSP, G.R. No.

148208, 15 December 2004
Case Title : CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Doctrine of Relative
Constitutionality|Judicial Review|Equal Protection|Equal
Protection Clause|Equal Protection Clause|Enrolled Bill
Doctrine|Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality|
Government Financial Institutions (GFIs)|Salary
Standardization Law (R.A. No. 6758)|Standards of Review|
Strict Scrutiny|Two-Tier Analysis|Separation of Powers|
International Law|Legal Research|Foreign Jurisprudence|
Judicial Activism|Social Justice|Judicial Review|Canons of
Judicial Avoidance|Under the third tier or the intensified
means test|the Court should accept the legislative end|but
should closely scrutinize its relationship to the
classification made|Judicial Legislation|Salary
Standardization Law (SSL)|Words and Phrases|Salary
Standardization Law (R.A. 6758)
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; The equal protection clause does not
prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon
which different rules shall operateso long as the classification is not unreasonable.
It is settled in constitutional law that the equal protection clause does not
prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon
which different rules shall operateso long as the classification is not unreasonable.
As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, and reiterated in a long line of
cases: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
64

The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which
it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
Same; In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the
exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the
BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and
executivesit was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file, and the
resulting discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably,
purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all
those belonging to the same class. In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative
deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was
intended to address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the
rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between
the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the
discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and
entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.
Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases,
the Supreme Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse
invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated
contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference
committee of both Houses.That the provision was a product of amendments
introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its
validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases, this Court has
subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision
of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such
provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both
Houses.
Same; Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality; A statute valid at one time may
become void at another time because of altered circumstances.The
constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere
comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the
statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time
because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation
becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former
adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
Same; Same; Government Financial Institutions (GFIs); Salary Standardization Law
(R.A. No. 6758); It is noteworthy that the subsequent charters of the seven other
GFIs share the common proviso of a blanket exemption of all their employees from
65

the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly.We take judicial notice that after
the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment
of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to
2004, viz.: 1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); 2. R.A. No.
8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS); 3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small
Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC); 4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); 5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP); 6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home
Guaranty Corporation (HGC); and 7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC). It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the
subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket
exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or
impliedly.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Standards of Review; Strict Scrutiny; Two-Tier Analysis;
While the prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an
evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP,
which was found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made
real differences between the two classes, subsequent enactments involving the
exemption of all rank and file employees of other GFIs constitute significant changes
in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation
of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby
exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny.The prior view on the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because
there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two
classes. The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute
significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the
continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act
No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. The scrutiny
relates to the constitutionality of the classificationalbeit made indirectly as a
consequence of the passage of eight other lawsbetween the rank-and-file of the
BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but
must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its
operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are
without differences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The second level of inquiry deals
with the following questionsGiven that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs
(aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file
employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that
Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is
Congress power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory
treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a
single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of
Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space?
66

Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions:
Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage
of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rankand-file employees of the BSP stand
constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rankand-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress power to classify so unbridled as
to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity
manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and
progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal
protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be
invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a
discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and
(b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters
of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby
proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several
similar enactments made over a period of time?
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; In the second
level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere
assertion that each exemption rests on a policy consideration by the legislature
there is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination by Congress or by
the Executive as it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the
Constitution; The policy determination argument may support the inequality of
treatment between the rank-and-file and the offices of the BSP, but it cannot justify
the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs who are
similarly situated; In the field of equal protection, the guarantee includes the
prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination directly or
indirectly.In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be
justified on the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other
GFIs) rests on a policy determination by the legislature. All legislative enactments
necessarily rest on a policy determinationeven those that have been declared to
contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain
the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would
ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made
by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of
protection of the Constitution. In fine, the policy determination argument may
support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the
BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and
other GFIs who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in
the second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se, but the
oppressive results of Congress inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP
rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to
the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised
precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its
treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the
guarantee that no person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws
includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination,

67

directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the
law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As regards the exemption from the
coverage of the SSL, there exists no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate
the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIsour legal
history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class,
separate from other government entities.It is against this standard that the
disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand
judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there
exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the
other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that
GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from
other governmental entities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The argument that the rank-and-file
employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their
institutions mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.It has
been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of
exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived need to fulfill the mandate of the
institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is
essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with
their [sic] counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of
goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel;
and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla
positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for
the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each
institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the
employees is merely incidental. The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the
BSP is the central monetary authority, and the banker of the government and all its
political subdivisions. It has the sole power and authority to issue currency; provide
policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit; and supervise banks
and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing
quasi-banking functions, including the exempted GFIs. Hence, the argument that
the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the
importance of their institutions mandate cannot stand any more than an empty
sack can stand.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is patent that the classification made
between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent,
and not intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the
particular circumstances of each GFI.It is certainly misleading to say that the
need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular
circumstances of each institution. Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent
basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was
granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP
and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it necessary
for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the
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BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters of each GFI, enacted
separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI has
a mandate different and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that
the raison dtre of the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most
part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in
the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective
personnel to carry out the GFIs mandate; and (3) the recognition that the
compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially below
industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted
SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish
between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made
between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent,
and NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the
particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs
makes express reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended
to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other GFIs,
underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within the realm of government
entities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is precisely the unpremeditated
discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSPmade manifest and glaring
with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the
other GFIsthat cannot be rationalized or justified. If Congress had enacted a law
for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the
exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of any
substantial or material basis.It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in
treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSPmade manifest and glaring with each and
every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs
that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SECwhich is not a
GFIwas given leave to have a compensation plan that shall be comparable with
the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs], then granted a
blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred
treatment than the rank-and-file of the BSP. The violation to the equal protection
clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable
truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the
eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file
employees would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no
moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising
from one law. Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum.
No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As regards the exemption from the SSL,
there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so
as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were deniedthe
distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary.In the case at
bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify
the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the
69

anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only
superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make
real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; While the granting
of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain and
prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this prerogative is
subject to judicial review; The disparity in treatment between BSP rank-and-file and
the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bear the unmistakable badge of
invidious discrimination.It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a
privilege fully within the legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its
subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial
to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latters right to equal protection.
In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy
exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of
the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review. So when the distinction
made is superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to correct. As held in the
United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, once
the State has chosen to confer benefits, discrimination contrary to law may occur
where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another,
even though the State is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment.
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the
other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination
no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the
subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when
such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any
rational basis.
Same; Standards of Review; In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal
protection challenges in the main have followed the rational basis test, coupled
with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications.In our jurisdiction, the
standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the
rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications
and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
Same; Same; International Law; The equality provisions in the international
instruments do not merely function as traditional first generation rights,
commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State
actionthey imposed a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take
steps to eradicate discrimination.Most, if not all, international human rights
instruments include some prohibition on discrimination and/or provisions about
equality. The general international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or
equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
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(CERD); the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against

Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). In the
broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments
such as the American Convention on Human Rights; the African Charter on Human
and Peoples Rights; the European Convention on Human Rights; the European
Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union
Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the Council of
the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994,
although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League. The equality
provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional first
generation rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather
than requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires guarantee[s] of
equal and effective protection against discrimination while Articles 1 and 14 of the
American and European Conventions oblige States Parties to ensure . . . the full
and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] . . . without any discrimination and to
secure without discrimination the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed. These
provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to
eradicate discrimination.
Same; Same; Same; Two-Tier Analysis; The two-tier analysis made in the case at bar
of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent
operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other
jurisdictions and in international law.Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case
at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by
subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend
of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using
the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable
irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the
Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor,
compel this approach.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The deference to Congressional discretion stops
where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution, and when these violations arise, the
Supreme Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitationsrational basis should not suffice.Congress retains its wide discretion in
providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition
and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution.
The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or
prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these
violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Foreign Jurisprudence; Foreign decisions and
authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdictionat best, they are
persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisionsand we should
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not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable
mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the
employment of our own endowments.Admittedly, the view that prejudice to
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial
scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these
foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At
best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We
should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as
indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions
through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience
and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and
of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own
concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the
intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language
of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More
importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the
be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public
interest is distinct and different from others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Activism; The quest for a better and more
equal world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial
intervention.Further, the quest for a better and more equal world calls for the
use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention. Equality is one
ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble
proclaims equality as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in
Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in
all phases of national development, further explicated in Article XIII, are clear
commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality
. . . . [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a
more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
Same; Same; Social Justice; Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over
backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law.Our
present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic
rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social
justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working
class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have
more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on
the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this
pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Same; Same; Same; Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial
restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion
given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.Concerns have been raised as
to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered
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that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone
has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill
proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been
filed. Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the rational
basis test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment. But
if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or
the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with
special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered
down view would call for the abdication of this Courts solemn duty to strike down
any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true
whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the
government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
Same; Same; Same; Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file
employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited,
especially in terms of job marketability, it is theyand not the officerswho have
the real economic and financial need for the adjustment.In the case at bar, the
challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee
status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher
grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers
of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the
industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates
prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher
in rankpossessing higher and better education and opportunities for career
advancementare given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay.
Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people
whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is theyand not the officerswho have the real economic and
financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of the
Constitution to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services,
extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all.
Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves
strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.
PANGANIBAN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality; From the manner in which it has been utilized
in American and Philippine jurisprudence, the novel theory of relative
constitutionality finds relevance only when the factual situation covered by an
assailed law changes, not when another law is passed pertaining to subjects not
directly covered by the former.The ponencia advocates the application of the
theory of relative constitutionality to the present case. The theory says that a
statute valid at one time may become unconstitutional at another, because of
altered circumstances or changed conditions that make the practical operation of
73

such a statute arbitrary or confiscatory. Thus, the provisions of that statute, which
may be valid as applied to one set of facts but invalid as applied to another, cannot
be merely compared with those applicable under the Constitution. From the manner
in which it has been utilized in American and Philippine jurisprudence, however, this
novel theory finds relevance only when the factual situation covered by an assailed
law changes, not when another law is passed pertaining to subjects not directly
covered by the former. Thus, the theory applies only when circumstances that were
specifically addressed upon the passage of the law change. It does not apply to
changes or alterations extraneous to those specifically addressed.
Same; A statute that is declared invalid because of a change in circumstances
affecting its validity belongs only to a class of emergency laws; Unlike congested
traffic or motor-driven vehicles on public roads, the payment of salaries at differing
scales in various GFIs vis--vis in the BSP, is not such a change in conditions as
would cause deprivation of property without due process of law.With due respect,
the ponencias reference to changed conditions is totally misplaced. In the abovecited US cases, this phrase never referred to subsequent laws or executive
pronouncements, but rather to the facts and circumstances that the law or
ordinance specifically addressed upon its passage or adoption. A statute that is
declared invalid because of a change in circumstances affecting its validity belongs
only to a class of emergency laws. Being a manifestation of the States exercise of
its police power, it is valid at the time of its enactment. In contrast thereto, RA 7653
cannot be regarded as an emergency measure that is merely temporary in
operation. It is not even a statute limited to the exigency that brought it about. The
facts and circumstances it specifically addressed upon its passage have not been
shown to have changed at all. Hence, the assailed provision of such a declaratory
statute cannot be invalidated. Unlike congested traffic or motor-driven vehicles on
public roads, the payment of salaries at differing scales in various GFIs vis--vis in
the BSP, is not such a change in conditions as would cause deprivation of property
without due process of law. Petitioners members have not been deprived of their
right to income as mandated by law. They have not received less than what they
were entitled to ever since RA 7653 was passed eleven years ago.
Same; Separation of Powers; Applying the concept of relative constitutionality
strongly advocated in the ponencia not only goes beyond the parameters of
traditional constitutionalism, but also finds no express basis in positive law; In a
constitutional order that commands respect for coequal branches of government,
speculation by the judiciary becomes incendiary and deserves no respectable place
in our judicial chronicles.Applying the concept of relative constitutionality strongly
advocated in the ponencia, therefore, not only goes beyond the parameters of
traditional constitutionalism, but also finds no express basis in positive law. While it
has been asserted that a statute valid when enacted may become invalid by
change in conditions to which it is applied, the present case has shown no such
change in conditions that would warrant the invalidation of the assailed provision if
applied under such conditions. Hence, no semblance of constitutional impuissance,
other than its conjured possibility, can be seen. In a constitutional order that
commands respect for coequal branches of government, speculation by the

74

judiciary becomes incendiary and deserves no respectable place in our judicial

chronicles.
Same; International Law; Government employees at the BSP with salary grades 19
and below are not entities vested with international personalityany possible
discrimination as to them, in the light of the principles and application of
international law would be too far-fetched.The ponencia further contends that the
principles of international law can operate to render a valid law unconstitutional.
The generally accepted definition states that international law is a body of legal
rules that apply between sovereign states and such other entities as have been
granted international personality. Government employees at the BSP with salary
grades 19 and below are not such entities vested with international personality; any
possible discrimination as to them, in the light of the principles and application of
international law would be too far-fetched.
Same; The ponencia overlooks the fact that the Bangko Sentral is not a GFI but a
regulatory body of GFIs and other financial-banking institutionsit should not be
compared with them as there is no parity.The dangerous consequences of the
majoritys Decision in the present case cannot and should not be ignored. Will there
now be an automatic SSL exemption for employees of other GFIs and financial
regulatory agencies? Will such exemption not infringe on Congress prerogative?
The ponencia overlooks the fact that the Bangko Sentral is not a GFI, but a
regulatory body of GFIs and other financial/banking institutions. Therefore, it should
not be compared with them. There is no parity. The Bangko Sentral is more akin to
the Insurance Commission, the National Telecommunications Commission, and the
Energy Regulatory Commission. Should not more appropriate comparisons be made
with such regulatory bodies and their employees?
Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Activism; The trust reposed in this Court is not
to formulate policy but to determine its legality as tested by the Constitution;
Judicial activism should not be allowed to become judicial exuberance.The trust
reposed in this Court is not to formulate policy but to determine its legality as
tested by the Constitution. It does not extend to an unwarranted intrusion into
that broad and legitimate sphere of discretion enjoyed by the political branches to
determine the policies to be pursued. This Court should ever be on the alert lest,
without design or intent, it oversteps the boundary of judicial competence. Judicial
activism should not be allowed to become judicial exuberance. As was so well put
by Justice Malcolm: Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional
rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government,
so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or
by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.
Same; Same; Same; The remedy against any perceived legislative failure to enact
corrective legislation is a resort, not to the Supreme Court, but to the bar of public
opinion.Since Congress itself did not commit any constitutional violation or
gravely abusive conduct when it enacted RA 7653, it should not be summarily
blamed for what the ponencia calls altered circumstances. Congress should be
given the opportunity to correct the problem, if any. I repeat, I am not against
exemption from the SSL of Bangko Sentral employees with salary grades 19 and
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below. Neither am I against increases in their pay. However, it is Congress, not this
Court, that should provide a solution to their predicament, at least in the first
instance. The remedy against any perceived legislative failure to enact corrective
legislation is a resort, not to this Court, but to the bar of public opinion. The
electorate can refuse to return to Congress members who, in their view, have been
remiss in the discharge of their constitutional duties. Our Constitution presumes
that, absent any inference of antipathy, improvident legislative decisions will
eventually be rectified by the democratic processes; and that judicial intervention
is unwarranted, no matter how unwisely a political branch may have acted.
Same; Same; Same; To compel this Court to make a more decisive but unnecessary
action in advance of what Congress will do is a downright derogation of the
Constitution itself, for it converts the judiciary into a super-legislature and invests it
with a power that to it has never belonged.It is only the legislature, not the courts,
that must be appealed to for the change. If, however, Congress decides to act, the
choice of appropriate measure lies within its discretion. Once determined, the
measure chosen cannot be attacked on the ground that it is not the best solution, or
that it is unwise or inefficacious. A law that advances a legitimate governmental
interest will be sustained, even if it works to the disadvantage of a particular
group, or x x x the rationale for it seems tenuous. To compel this Court to make a
more decisive but unnecessary action in advance of what Congress will do is a
downright derogation of the Constitution itself, for it converts the judiciary into a
super-legislature and invests it with a power that to it has never belonged.
Same; It is equally true that the levels of difficulty and responsibility for BSP
employees with salary grades 19 and below are different from those of other BSP
employees with salary grades 20 and above; To assert, as petitioner does, that the
statutory classification is just an artifice based on arbitrariness, without more, is
nothing more than throwing a few jabs at an imaginary foe.While it is true that all
employees of the BSP are appointed under the authority of the Monetary Board,
observe the same set of office rules and regulations, and perform their work in
practically the same offices, it is equally true that the levels of difficulty and
responsibility for BSP employees with salary grades 19 and below are different from
those of other BSP employees with salary grades 20 and above. All those classes of
position belonging to the Professional Supervisory Category of the Position
Classification System under RA 6758, for instance, are obviously not subjected to
the same levels of difficulty, responsibility, and qualification requirements as those
belonging to the Professional Non-Supervisory Category, although to both
categories are assigned positions that include salary grades 19 and 20. To assert, as
petitioner does, that the statutory classification is just an artifice based on
arbitrariness, without more, is nothing more than throwing a few jabs at an
imaginary foe.
Same; The BSP and the GFIs cited in the ponencia do not belong to the same
category of government institutions, although it may be said that both are, broadly
speaking, involved in banking and financewhile the former performs primarily
governmental or regulatory functions, the latter execute purely proprietary ones.
In like manner, petitioners denunciation of the proviso for allegedly discriminating
76

against its members vis--vis the rank and filers of other GFIs ignores the fact that
the BSP and the GFIs cited in the ponencia do not belong to the same category of
government institutions, although it may be said that both are, broadly speaking,
involved in banking and finance. While the former performs primarily
governmental or regulatory functions, the latter execute purely proprietary ones.
Same; Judicial Review; Canons of Judicial Avoidance; One such canon of avoidance is
that the Court must not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it; Applying to this case the contours of constitutional
avoidance Brandeis brilliantly summarized, this Court may choose to ignore the
constitutional question presented by petitioner, since there is indeed some other
ground upon which this case can be disposed of.In the United States more than
sixty years ago, Justice Brandeis delineated the famous canons of avoidance under
which their Supreme Court had refrained from passing upon constitutional
questions. One such canon is that the Court must not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it x x x. It is not the habit
of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. In addition, the Court must
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record,
if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
of. Applying to this case the contours of constitutional avoidance Brandeis
brilliantly summarized, this Court may choose to ignore the constitutional question
presented by petitioner, since there is indeed some other ground upon which this
case can be disposed ofits clear lack of urgency, by reason of which Congress
should be allowed to do its primary task of reviewing and possibly amending the
law.
Same; Same; Same; Since the authority to declare a legal provision void is of a
delicate and awful nature, the Court should never resort to that authority, but in
a clear and urgent case.Taking cognizance of this case and disposing of, or
altogether ignoring, the constitutional question leads us to the same inevitable
conclusion: the assailed provision should not be declared unconstitutional, unless it
is clearly so. Whichever path is chosen by this Court, I am of the firm belief that
such provision cannot and should not be declared unconstitutional. Since the
authority to declare a legal provision void is of a delicate and awful nature, the
Court should never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case. If ever
there is doubtand clearly there is, as manifested herein by a sharply divided Court
the expressed will of the legislature should be sustained.
Same; Same; Same; Future changes in both legislation and its executive
implementation should certainly not be the benchmark for a preemptive declaration
of unconstitutionality, especially when the said provision is not even constitutionally
infirm to begin with.Indeed, this Court is of the unanimous opinion that the
assailed provision was at the outset constitutional; however, with recent
amendments to related laws, the majority now feels that said provision could no
longer pass constitutional muster. To nail my colors to the mast, such proclivity to
declare it immediately unconstitutional not only imprudently creeps into the
legislative sphere, but also sorely clings to the strands of obscurantism. Future
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changes in both legislation and its executive implementation should certainly not be
the benchmark for a preemptive declaration of unconstitutionality, especially when
the said provision is not even constitutionally infirm to begin with.
Same; Same; Same; This Court should bide its time, for it has neither the authority
nor the competence to contemplate laws, much less to create or amend them.The
congressional enactment into law of pending bills on the compensation of BSP
employeesor even those related theretowill certainly affect the assailed
provision. This Court should bide its time, for it has neither the authority nor the
competence to contemplate laws, much less to create or amend them. Given the
current status of these pending bills, the arguments raised by petitioner against the
assailed provision become all the more tenuous and amorphous. I feel we should
leave that provision untouched, and instead just accord proper courtesy to our
legislators to determine at the proper time and in the manner they deem best the
appropriate content of any modifications to it. Besides, there is an omnipresent
presumption of constitutionality in every legislative enactment. No confutation of
the proviso was ever shown before; none should be considered now.
Same; Same; Same; A judicial determination is fallow when inspired by purely
cerebral casuistry or emotional puffery, especially during rowelling times.It would
be wise not to anticipate the serious constitutional law problems that would arise
under situations where only a tentative judgment is dictated by prudence.
Attempts at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. A judicial determination is fallow
when inspired by purely cerebral casuistry or emotional puffery, especially during
rowelling times.
Same; Same; Standards of Review; Under the first tier or the rational relationship or
rational basis test, courts will uphold a classification if it bears a rational relationship
to an accepted governmental endit must be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.Under the first tier or the rational relationship or rational basis test,
courts will uphold a classification if it bears a rational relationship to an accepted
governmental end. In other words, it must be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. To be reasonable, such classification must be (1) based on
substantial distinction that makes for real differences; (2) germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to
all members of the same class.
Same; Same; Same; The retention of the best and the brightest officials in an
independent central monetary authority is a valid governmental objective that can
be reasonably met by a corresponding exemption from a salary standardization
scheme that is based on graduated salary levels.Murphy states that when a
governmental classification is attacked on equal protection grounds, such
classification is in most instances reviewed under the standard rational basis test.
Accordingly, courts will not overturn that classification, unless the varying
treatments of different groups are so unrelated to the achievement of any
legitimate purpose that the courts can only conclude that the governmental actions
are irrational. A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and x x x rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
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of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
All these conditions are met in the present case. The retention of the best and the
brightest officials in an independent central monetary authority is a valid
governmental objective that can be reasonably met by a corresponding exemption
from a salary standardization scheme that is based on graduated salary levels. The
legislature in fact enjoys a wide berth in continually classifying whenever it enacts a
law, provided that no persons similarly situated within a given class are treated
differently. To contend otherwise is to be presumptuous about the legislative intent
or lack of it.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Comity with and courtesy to a coequal
branch dictate that our lawmakers be given sufficient time and leeway to address
the alleged problem of differing pay scalesOnly by faithful adherence to this
guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the
legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.The
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) is also a government regulatory
agency almost on the same level of importance as the BSP. However, its charter was
only amended very recentlyto be more precise, on July 27, 2004. Consequently, it
would be most unfair to implicitly accuse Congress of inaction, discrimination and
unequal treatment. Comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that our
lawmakers be given sufficient time and leeway to address the alleged problem of
differing pay scales. Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial
review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful
independence and its ability to function. Besides, it is a cardinal rule that courts
first ascertain whether construction of a statute is fairly possible by which any
constitutional question therein may be avoided.
Same; Same; Same; The validity of a law is to be determined not by its effects on a
particular case or by an incidental result arising therefrom, but by the purpose and
efficacy of the law in accomplishing that effect or result.The validity of a law is to
be determined not by its effects on a particular case or by an incidental result
arising therefrom, but by the purpose and efficacy of the law in accomplishing that
effect or result. This point confirms my earlier position that the enactment of a law
is not the same as its operation. Unlike Vera in which the Court invalidated the law
on probation because of the unequal effect in the operation of such law, the
assailed provision in the present case suffers from no such invidious discrimination.
It very well achieves its purpose, and it applies equally to all government employees
within the BSP. Furthermore, the application of this provision is not made subject to
any discretion, uneven appropriation of funds, or time limitation. Consequently,
such a law neither denies equal protection nor permits of such denial.
Same; Same; Same; Under the second tier or the strict scrutiny test, the Court will
require the government to show a compelling or overriding end to justify (1) the
limitation on fundamental rights or (2) the implication of suspect classes.Under
the second tier or the strict scrutiny test, the Court will require the government to
show a compelling or overriding end to justify (1) the limitation on fundamental
rights or (2) the implication of suspect classes. Where a statutory classification
impinges upon a fundamental right or burdens a suspect class, such classification is
79

subjected to strict scrutiny. It will be upheld only if it is shown to be suitably

tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Therefore, all legal restrictions that
curtail the civil rights of a suspect class, like a single racial or ethnic group, are
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny. Pressing public necessity, for instance, may justify the existence of those
restrictions, but antagonism toward such suspect classes never can.
Same; Same; Same; Salary grade or class of position is not a fundamental right like
marriage, procreation, voting, speech and interstate travel.To date, no American
casefederal or statehas yet been decided involving equal pay schemes as
applied either to government employees vis--vis private ones, or within the
governmental ranks. Salary grade or class of position is not a fundamental right like
marriage, procreation, voting, speech and interstate travel. American courts have in
fact even refused to declare government employment a fundamental right.
Same; Same; Same; For purposes of equal protection analysis, financial need alone
does not identify a suspect class.In fact, for purposes of equal protection analysis,
financial need alone does not identify a suspect class. And even if it were to
consider government pay to be akin to wealth, it has already been held that where
wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages. After all, a law does not become invalid because of
simple inequality, financial or otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Since employment in the government is not a fundamental
right and government employees below salary grade 20 are not a suspect class, the
government is not required to present a compelling objective to justify a possible
infringement under the strict scrutiny test.Since employment in the government is
not a fundamental right and government employees below salary grade 20 are not
a suspect class, the government is not required to present a compelling objective to
justify a possible infringement under the strict scrutiny test. The assailed provision
thus cannot be invalidated via the strict scrutiny gauntlet. In areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines
nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.
Same; Same; Same; Under the third tier or the intensified means test, the Court
should accept the legislative end, but should closely scrutinize its relationship to the
classification made; There exist classifications, which have not been deemed to
involve suspect classes or fundamental rights thus not subjected to the strict
scrutiny test, are subjected to a higher or intermediate degree of scrutiny than the
deferential or traditional rational basis test.Under the third tier or the intensified
means test, the Court should accept the legislative end, but should closely
scrutinize its relationship to the classification made. There exist classifications that
are subjected to a higher or intermediate degree of scrutiny than the deferential or
traditional rational basis test. These classifications, however, have not been
deemed to involve suspect classes or fundamental rights; thus, they have not been
subjected to the strict scrutiny test. In other words, such classifications must be
80

substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest. Examples

of these so-called quasi-suspect classifications are those based on gender,
legitimacy under certain circumstances, legal residency with regard to availment of
free public education, civil service employment preference for armed forces
veterans who are state residents upon entry to military service, and the right to
practice for compensation the profession for which certain persons have been
qualified and licensed.
Same; Same; Same; Non-exempt government employees may be a sensitive but not
a suspect class, and their employment status may be important although not
fundamental; In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are
imperfect.Non-exempt government employees may be a sensitive but not a
suspect class, and their employment status may be important although not
fundamental. Yet, the enactment of the assailed provision is a reasonable means by
which the State seeks to advance its interest. Since such provision sufficiently
serves important governmental interests and is substantially related to the
achievement thereof, then, again it stands. In the area of economics and social
welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some
reasonable basis, it does not offend the Constitution simply because the
classification is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results
in some inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that x x
x the fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Since relative constitutionality was not
discussed by the parties in any of their pleadings, fundamental fairness and
evenhandedness still dictate that Congress be heard on this concept before the
Court imposes it in a definitive ruling.In our jurisdiction, relative constitutionality is
a rarely utilized theory having radical consequences; hence, I believe it should not
be imposed by the Court unilaterally. Even in the US, it applies only when there is a
change in factual circumstances covered by the law, not when there is an
enactment of another law pertaining to subjects not directly covered by the assailed
law. Whether factual conditions have so changed as to call for a partial or even a
total abrogation of the law is a matter that rests primarily within the constitutional
prerogative of Congress to determine. To justify a judicial nullification, the
constitutional breach of a legal provision must be very clear and unequivocal, not
doubtful or argumentative. In short, this Court can go no further than to inquire
whether Congress had the power to enact a law; it cannot delve into the wisdom of
policies it adopts or into the adequacy under existing conditions of measures it
enacts. The equal protection clause is not a license for the courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. Since relative constitutionality was
not discussed by the parties in any of their pleadings, fundamental fairness and
evenhandedness still dictate that Congress be heard on this concept before the
Court imposes it in a definitive ruling. [Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299(2004)]

81

82

29. Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012

Case Title : MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, petitioner, vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PNPPROVINCIAL DIRECTOR OF ILOCOS NORTE, and P/SUPT.
WILLIAM O. FANG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF,
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, PNP PROVINCIAL OFFICE, ILOCOS
NORTE, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Br. 13.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Private Armies
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean
more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as
well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the
beginning of all freedom.The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty,
has long been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22
SCRA 424 (1968), thus enunciated: The due process question touching on an
alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the
objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a
sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to
privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: Liberty in the
constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental
restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The
right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom. As a matter of fact, this
right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. The concept of liberty would
be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique
individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint.Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a
fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA 456 (2007), this
Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz.: With respect to the
right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state
that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative
investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to
thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the
right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally
prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we
declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid
83

down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy

as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to
ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions
adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that
this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed
legislative investigation.
Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones
right to the truth and to informational privacy.The writ of habeas data is an
independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of
private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted
authority.The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies
and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also
provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and
civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission. [Gamboa vs. Chan, 677 SCRA 385(2012)]

84

30. Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26,

2013
Case Title : SPOUSES BILL and VICTORIA HING, petitioners,
vs. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY,
respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Real Party-InInterest|Words and Phrases
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Words and Phrases; Right to privacy is defined
as the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from
intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
persons ordinary sensibilities.The right to privacy is enshrined in our
Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. It is the right of an
individual to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily
concerned. Simply put, the right to privacy is the right to be let alone. The Bill of
Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them against the
States abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people
to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except in case of
overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards,
can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.
Same; Same; Article 26(1) of the Civil Code protects an individuals right to privacy
and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by
other individuals; This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where
his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others.Article 26(1) of
the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy and
provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by
other individuals. It states: Art.26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1)Prying into
the privacy of anothers residence; x x x x This provision recognizes that a mans
house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by
others. It includes any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the
residence of another without the consent of the latter. The phrase prying into the
privacy of anothers residence, however, does not mean that only the residence is
entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino: Our Code
specifically mentions prying into the privacy of anothers residence. This does not
mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law
85

covers also similar acts. A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the
public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may
come in. x x x (Emphasis supplied) Thus, an individuals right to privacy under
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it
may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase prying into the privacy of anothers residence, therefore,
covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private.
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe
on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article
26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
Same; Same; Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test; In ascertaining whether there
is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the reasonable expectation of
privacy test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.In ascertaining whether
there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the reasonable expectation of
privacy test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, 504
SCRA 704 (2006), we enunciated that the reasonableness of a persons expectation
of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual
has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable. Customs, community norms, and practices may,
therefore, limit or extend an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy. Hence,
the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must be determined on a
case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the
case.
Same; Same; Same; Surveillance Cameras; In this day and age, video surveillance
cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of
everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places
where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the
individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained.In this day and
age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however,
should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained.
Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or
business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime
under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Real Party-in-Interest; Words and Phrases; A real
party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong
done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which had violated
the legal right of the former.Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC.
2. Parties-in-interest.A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. A real party
86

defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to
the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which had violated the
legal right of the former. In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the
CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not have installed
the video surveillance cameras. Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact
that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance
cameras. [Hing vs. Choachuy, Sr., 699 SCRA 667(2013)]

87

31. Vivares v. St. Theresas College, G.R. No. 202666,

September 29, 2014
Case Title : RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA
and DAVID SUZARA, petitioners, vs. ST. THERESAS
COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES,
respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Br. 14.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law ; Habeas Data Rule (A.M.
No. 08-1-16-SC) ; Writ of Habeas Data ; Online Social
Networks ; Facebook ; Informational Privacy ;
Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); Writ of Habeas Data;
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the
truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Same; Same; Same; The existence of a persons right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.In developing the writ of habeas data, the
Court aimed to protect an individuals right to informational privacy, among others.
A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as a procedure
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age. The
writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access
to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or
security on the other. Thus, the existence of a persons right to informational
privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.
88

Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; The writ of habeas data can be availed of
as an independent remedy to enforce ones right to privacy, more specifically the
right to informational privacy.Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the
operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances,
the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data
situations, would not have been made. Habeas data, to stress, was designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age. As such, it is
erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements
the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that: The writ of habeas data, however, can be
availed of as an independent remedy to enforce ones right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of
such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents.
(emphasis ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be
availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in
the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.Nothing in the Rule
would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against
abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and
collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule: Section 1. Habeas Data.
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Same; Same; Same; Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions
of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering,
collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family.The provision, when taken in its
proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a
protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private
individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data. To
engage in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To
engage means to do or take part in something. It does not necessarily mean
that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information
about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the
element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a
personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial
and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

89

Same; Same; Same; The Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial
remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or
information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.The Court
saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary
hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations
of the right to privacy. In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision
in the landmark case, H v. W, promulgated on January 30, 2013, recognized that
[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only technologically
but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is
imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting
cautiously and with wisdom. Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what
may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect,
recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy
is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including
those that occur in OSNs.
Same; Same; Same; Online Social Networks; The purpose of an Online Social
Networks (OSN) is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay
connected to other members of the same or different social media platform through
the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services
provided by the site.Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the
ability to interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or different
social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among
others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room
filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or walls, the contents of which are
under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner
can post anything from text, to pictures, to music and videos access to which
would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see
his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way
to the creation of various social networking sites, including the one involved in the
case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers,
people use to stay connected with friends and family, to discover whats going on
in the world, and to share and express what matters to them.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Facebook; Facebook connections are established
through the process of friending another user.Facebook connections are
established through the process of friending another user. By sending a friend
request, the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view
any and all Public and Friends Only posts of the other. Once the request is
accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other
users Public or Friends Only posts, among others. Friending, therefore, allows
the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the
user gives his or her Facebook friend access to his or her profile and shares
certain information to the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; Before one can have an
expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Networks (OSN) activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the
90

intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to

prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.Before one can have an expectation
of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case
the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of
the OSNs privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation, in cyber world, of the users invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the default setting for Facebook
posts is Public, it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable
to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph.Considering that the default setting for
Facebook posts is Public, it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children
positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they
cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The
ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d, is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such
as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that
would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Messages sent to the public at large in the chat
room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any
semblance of privacy.Also, United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, held that [t]he
more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably
expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is
forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Setting a posts or profile details privacy to
Friends is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content.That the photos are viewable by
friends only does not necessarily bolster the petitioners contention. In this
regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still
remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users
the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way; (2) A good number of
Facebook users befriend other users who are total strangers; (3) The sheer
number of Friends one user has, usually by the hundreds; and (4) A users
Facebook friend can share the formers post, or tag others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own
Facebook friends. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile
details privacy to Friends is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The users
own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
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not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged
can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at Friends.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There can be no quibbling that the images in
question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are
personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of
the minors enrolled in a conservative institution.In sum, there can be no quibbling
that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students
scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated,
the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the
records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized
Facebooks privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select
few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the
ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As a cyberspace community member, one has to
be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.It has been said that the best
filter is the one between your childrens ears. This means that self-regulation on
the part of OSN users and internet consumers in general is the best means of
avoiding privacy rights violations. As a cyberspace community member, one has to
be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy. It is in this regard that many OSN
users, especially minors, fail. Responsible social networking or observance of the
netiquettes on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the
widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally
lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public
forum.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering the complexity of the cyber world
and its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or
unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being
a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations.
Considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness, as well as the
dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their
unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining
and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by
these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that to limit such risks,
theres no substitute for parental involvement and supervision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to
exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be
negligent in protecting their rights.It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to
exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be
negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from
the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in
safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are
indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did
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nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users
must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire
to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available
privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is
notorious for changing these settings and the sites layout often. [Vivares vs. St.
Theresa's College, 737 SCRA 92(2014)]

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32. Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335,

February 11, 2014
Title : PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE,
composed of DAKILA-Philippine COLLECTIVE FOR MODERN
HEROISM, represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO LAKAS
NG MASA, represented by Cesar S. Melencio, FRANCIS
EUSTON R. ACERO, MARLON ANTHONY ROMASANTA
TONSON, TEODORO A. CASIO, NOEMI LARDIZABAL-DADO,
IMELDA MORALES, JAMES MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN
G.M. RAGRAGIO, MARIA FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M.
MANRIQUE, JR., LAUREN DADO, MARCO VITTORIA TOBIAS
SUMAYAO, IRENE CHIA, ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO,
CRISTINA SARAH E. OSORIO, ROMEO FACTOLERIN, NAOMI
L. TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA ALEXANDRA C. CASTRO,
petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR OF
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF THE DOJ
OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER,
respondents.
Case Nature : PETITIONS to declare the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175) Unconstitutional
and Void.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Cybercrime Prevention
Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175)|Unsolicited Commercial
Communications|Spams
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; Strict Scrutiny Standard; According
to the strict scrutiny standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.The Court has in a
way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, useful
in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or
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persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly

interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing
with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights,
as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.
Criminal Law; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); Ethical Hackers;
Ethical hackers evaluate the target systems security and report back to the owners
the vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how these can be
remedied.Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of
ethical hackers, professionals who employ tools and techniques used by criminal
hackers but would neither damage the target systems nor steal information. Ethical
hackers evaluate the target systems security and report back to the owners the
vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how these can be remedied.
Ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors who come into an
organization to verify its bookkeeping records.
Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; Section 4(a)(3) of R.A. No. 10175 punishes
what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right
the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message.Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper
governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be
achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of
willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no
connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples
computer systems and private documents.
Same; Same; All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent
chilling effect, an in terrorem effect or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on
the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is
proper.All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling
effect, an in terrorem effect or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the
heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper.
But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind
of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful
conduct. Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section
4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to
intimidate the free exercise of ones constitutional rights.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; The challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is
baseless.There is no real difference whether he uses Julio Gandolfo which
happens to be his real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for
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which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing
him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of
registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on
ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.
Same; Right to Privacy; The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was
institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.Petitioners claim that
Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press. The right to privacy, or
the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of
the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22
SCRA 424 (1968), it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its
identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the
Zones of Privacy. The Court explained in In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance
of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon, 504 SCRA 704 (2006), the
relevance of these zones to the right to privacy: Zones of privacy are recognized
and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The
meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that
the right to privacy is a constitutional right and the right most valued by civilized
men, but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which mandates that, no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy and everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.
Criminal Law; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); The theft of
identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose.Petitioners fear
that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be
hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to
secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of
identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of
identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover,
acquiring and disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be
regarded as a form of theft.
Same; Same; Theft; Intent to Gain; Words and Phrases; The Supreme Court has
defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt
acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different
intent on the part of the perpetrator.The Court has defined intent to gain as an
internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender, and it
may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another,
unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.
As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has
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nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain

which is required by this Section.
Same; Same; Cybersex; Words and Phrases; Cybersex is the willful engagement,
maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition
of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
consideration.Section 4(c)(1) provides: Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses.The
following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act: x x x x
(c) Content-related Offenses: (1) Cybersex.The willful engagement, maintenance,
control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
consideration. Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression
clause of the Constitution. They express fear that private communications of sexual
character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded
as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done for
favor in cyberspace. In common usage, the term favor includes gracious
kindness, a special privilege or right granted or conceded, or a token of love (as
a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously. This meaning given to the term favor
embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement
agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.
Same; Same; Prostitution; Words and Phrases; The law defines prostitution as any
act, transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of a person by another, for
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other
consideration.The subject of Section 4(c)(1)lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activityis not novel. Article 201 of the RPC punishes obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows. The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
of 2003 penalizes those who maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or
pornography. The law defines prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme, or
design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other consideration.
Same; Same; Cybersex; The Supreme Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) of R.A.
No. 10175 unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only
to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly
or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid
of a computer system as Congress has intended.In any event, consenting adults
are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the bounds of obscenity.
The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a
construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of
maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition
of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress
has intended.
Same; Same; Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009; In theory, nothing prevents the
government from invoking the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) when
prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system; Of
course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is
committed in cyberspace.In theory, nothing prevents the government from
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invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a
computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child pornography already embraces
the use of electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means.
Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision. Of course, the law makes the
penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no
one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative
prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty. The potential for
uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded
in the cyberspace is incalculable.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Spams; Transmitting spams
amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending out spams enters the
recipients domain without prior permission.The term spam surfaced in early
internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same
sentence or comment was said to be making a spam. The term referred to a
Monty Pythons Flying Circus scene in which actors would keep saying Spam,
Spam, Spam, and Spam when reading options from a menu. The Government,
represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network
capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and
technology, and interferes with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending
out spams enters the recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG
contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads
would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not
accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State
cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
Same; Same; Libel; Elements of.The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c)
identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. There is actual malice
or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the
knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he
published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual
malice.

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Same; Same; Same; Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly
target libel against private persons, the Supreme Court recognizes that these laws
imply a stricter standard of malice to convict the author of a defamatory
statement where the offended party is a public figure.The prosecution bears the
burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is
required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the
statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public
official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal
(the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the
penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private
persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of malice
to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a
public figure. Societys interest and the maintenance of good government demand a
full discussion of public affairs.
Same; Same; Same; Where the offended party is a private individual, the
prosecution need not prove the presence of malice.Where the offended party is a
private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law
explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of
the assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a
justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
Same; Same; Same; Cyberlibel; Cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article
353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect,
Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes similar
means for committing libel.The UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as
petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply suggested that defamation laws be
crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of expression. Indeed,
the ICCPR states that although everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its
exercise carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Free speech is not
absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be
provided by law. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to
protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new
crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes
it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes
similar means for committing libel.
Same; Same; Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime; The idea of
aiding or abetting wrongdoings online threatens the heretofore popular and
unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace use.The Solicitor General contends, however,
that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently
protects the freedom of expression of netizens, the multitude that avail
themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and
jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of aiding or abetting a crime as
to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and
common usage is at times sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing
the law. The legislature is not required to define every single word contained in the
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laws they craft. Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and
application in existing laws. When a person aids or abets another in destroying a
forest, smuggling merchandise into the country, or interfering in the peaceful
picketing of laborers, his action is essentially physical and so is susceptible to easy
assessment as criminal in character. These forms of aiding or abetting lend
themselves to the tests of common sense and human experience. But, when it
comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the line of sight is
somewhat blurred. The idea of aiding or abetting wrongdoings online threatens
the heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace use.
Same; Same; Facebook; As of late 2012, 1.2 billion people with shared interests use
Facebook to get in touch. Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an
open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages,
including automatic notifications when they update their profile.Two of the most
popular of these sites are Facebook and Twitter. As of late 2012, 1.2 billion people
with shared interests use Facebook to get in touch. Users register at this site, create
a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and
exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they update their
profile. A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be
made visible to anyone, depending on the users privacy settings. If the post is
made available to the public, meaning to everyone and not only to his friends,
anyone on Facebook can react to the posting, clicking any of several buttons of
preferences on the programs screen such as Like, Comment, or Share. Like
signifies that the reader likes the posting while Comment enables him to post
online his feelings or views about the same, such as This is great! When a
Facebook user Shares a posting, the original posting will appear on his own
Facebook profile, consequently making it visible to his down-line Facebook Friends.
Same; Same; Twitter; Microblogging; Words and Phrases; Twitter is an internet social
networking and microblogging service that enables its users to send and read short
text-based messages of up to 140 characters; Microblogging is the practice of
posting small pieces of digital content which could be in the form of text,
pictures, links, short videos, or other media on the internet.Twitter, on the other
hand, is an internet social networking and microblogging service that enables its
users to send and read short text-based messages of up to 140 characters. These
are known as Tweets. Microblogging is the practice of posting small pieces of
digital content which could be in the form of text, pictures, links, short videos, or
other media on the internet. Instead of friends, a Twitter user has Followers,
those who subscribe to this particular users posts, enabling them to read the same,
and Following, those whom this particular user is subscribed to, enabling him to
read their posts. Like Facebook, a Twitter user can make his tweets available only to
his Followers, or to the general public. If a post is available to the public, any Twitter
user can Retweet a given posting. Retweeting is just reposting or republishing
another persons tweet without the need of copying and pasting it.
Same; Same; Cyberlibel; Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons
image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and travel
fast across the globe like bad news.Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a
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persons image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread
and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand
in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends,
evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which
seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a
persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily
and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. If such means are
adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet
users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be
threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. The terms aiding or abetting constitute broad sweep
that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace
posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that
punishes aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech; When a penal statute
encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the voidfor-vagueness doctrine is acceptable.When a penal statute encroaches upon the
freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine
is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As
Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections, 553 SCRA 370 (2008), we must view these statements of the Court on
the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as
appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to mount facial challenges to
penal statutes not involving free speech.
Same; Same; Same; One can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he
asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the
constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court.In an as applied challenge, the petitioner who
claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground
absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards,
overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing
the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against thirdparty standing. But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance
mount a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no
violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech
on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The rationale for this
exception is to counter the chilling effect on protected speech that comes from
statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself
from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague
law thus chills him into silence.

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Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) of
R.A. No. 10175 is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of
internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression,
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the
cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is
unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users
because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since
the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a
fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are
not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the
interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries,
Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot
stand scrutiny.
Same; Same; Same; There should be no question that if the published material on
print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material
cannot be the subject of two separate libels.Online libel is different. There should
be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again
posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two
separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially
the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself
claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already
punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system
as another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a
blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy. The same is true with
child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPAs
scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed,
ACPAs definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means. Thus, charging the
offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Same; Same; Penalties; The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes
is as a rule a legislative prerogative.The matter of fixing penalties for the
commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature
prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious
cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The
power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded
simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of
another offense or might just have been connected with another crime. Judges and
magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or
revise their range as determined by the legislative department. The courts should
not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Same; Same; Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording
of traffic data is a part, aims to provide law enforcement authorities with the power
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they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in

cyberspace.Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording
of traffic data is a part, aims to provide law enforcement authorities with the power
they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in
cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business. Indeed, as Chief Justice Sereno
points out, the Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to
adopt legislative measures to empower state authorities to collect or record traffic
data, in real time, associated with specified communications. And this is precisely
what Section 12 does. It empowers law enforcement agencies in this country to
collect or record such data.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; The Supreme Court recognizes in
Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968) that certain constitutional guarantees work
together to create zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude,
and that there exists an independent constitutional right of privacy.Petitioners of
course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and do not provide
ample safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and invading the peoples right
to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed, the Court recognizes in Morfe v.
Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968), that certain constitutional guarantees work together to
create zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and that
there exists an independent constitutional right of privacy. Such right to be left
alone has been regarded as the beginning of all freedoms. But that right is not
unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589 (1977), the United States Supreme Court
classified privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy.
Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important
decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters. It is the latter right the right to informational privacy that
those who oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time
seek to protect. Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private
information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.
In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court
has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the
right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter.
The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court must ensure that laws seeking to take
advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to
ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.This Court is
mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions
to monitor individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that have
previously been impractical or even impossible. All the forces of a technological
age x x x operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In
modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society. The Court
must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written
with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the
Constitution guarantees.
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Same; Same; No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the
internet belong to their authors or recipients and are to be considered private
communications.No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the
internet belong to their authors or recipients and are to be considered private
communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to
indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of users.
By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service providers to keep
traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services for at
least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data
for at least six months from receipt of the order for their preservation.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Subpoena; It is well-settled that the power to
issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the
power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.The process
envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners
objection is that the issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is wellsettled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function.
Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their
investigatory powers. Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement
of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law
enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed
procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor
would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can
be made only after judicial intervention.
Constitutional Law; Illegal Searches and Seizures; Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that the right to be secure in ones papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable.Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines of code,
including malware, as well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video
recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the
digital space, it is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their
writers or authors may constitute personal property. Consequently, they are
protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their
personal computers or in the service providers systems. Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in ones papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in
effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without
a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search
warrant.
Same; Delegation of Powers; In order to determine whether there is undue
delegation of legislative power, the Supreme Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.In order to determine whether
there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law
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must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot.
Criminal Law; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); Cybersecurity;
Words and Phrases; Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk
management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and
technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and
users assets.Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk
management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and
technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and
users assets. This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should
work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.
SERENO, CJ., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; View that the power of judicial review especially
refers to both the authority and the duty of the Supreme Court to determine
whether a branch or an instrumentality of government has acted beyond the scope
of the latters constitutional powers.As distinguished from the general notion of
judicial power, the power of judicial review especially refers to both the authority
and the duty of this Court to determine whether a branch or an instrumentality of
government has acted beyond the scope of the latters constitutional powers. It
includes the power to resolve cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. This power, first verbalized
in the seminal case Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), has been exercised by
the Philippine Supreme Court since 1902.
Same; Same; View that the power of judicial review has since been strengthened in
the 1987 Constitution, extending its coverage to the determination of whether there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.The power of judicial
review has since been strengthened in the 1987 Constitution, extending its
coverage to the determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. The expansion made the political question
doctrine no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. Thus, aside from the test of constitutionality, this Court has been
expressly granted the power and the duty to examine whether the exercise of
discretion in those areas that are considered political questions was attended with
grave abuse.
Same; Same; View on the Seven Pillars of the Limitations of the Power of Judicial
Review.Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987), and Francisco v. House of
Representatives, 415 SCRA 44 (2003), cite the seven pillars of the limitations of
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the power of judicial review, enunciated in the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S.
288 (1936), as follows: 1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding, declining because to decide
such questions is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never
was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature
could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative
act. x x x. 2. The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it. x x x. It is not the habit of the Court to
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision
of the case. 3. The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. x x x. 4. The Court
will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other
a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the
latter. x x x. 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint
of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. x x x. Among the many
applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of
challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a
public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be
entertained. x x x. 6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute
at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. x x x. 7. When the
validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt
of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.
Same; Same; Facial Challenge; View that a facial challenge refers to the call for the
scrutiny of an entire law or provision by identifying its flaws or defects, not only on
the basis of its actual operation on the attendant facts raised by the parties, but
also on the assumption or prediction that the very existence of the law or provision
is repugnant to the Constitution.A facial challenge refers to the call for the
scrutiny of an entire law or provision by identifying its flaws or defects, not only on
the basis of its actual operation on the attendant facts raised by the parties, but
also on the assumption or prediction that the very existence of the law or provision
is repugnant to the Constitution. This kind of challenge has the effect of totally
annulling the assailed law or provision, which is deemed to be unconstitutional per
se. The challenge is resorted to by courts, especially when there is no instance to
which the law or provision can be validly applied.
Same; Same; View that when Congress enacts a penal law affecting free speech and
accordingly imposes a penalty that is so discouraging that it effectively creates an
invidious chilling effect, thus impeding the exercise of speech and expression
altogether, then there is a ground to invalidate the law.While the determination of
the severity of a penalty is a prerogative of the legislature, when laws and penalties
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affect free speech, it is beyond question that the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion in
imposing or increasing the penalty. The Constitutions command is clear: No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances. Thus, when Congress enacts a penal law affecting free
speech and accordingly imposes a penalty that is so discouraging that it effectively
creates an invidious chilling effect, thus impeding the exercise of speech and
expression altogether, then there is a ground to invalidate the law. In this instance,
it will be seen that the penalty provided has gone beyond the in terrorem effect
needed to deter crimes and has thus reached the point of encroachment upon a
preferred constitutional right. I thus vote to facially invalidate Section 6 insofar as it
applies to the crime of libel.
Criminal Law; Penalties; View that our Revised Penal Code increases the imposable
penalty when there are attending circumstances showing a greater perversity or an
unusual criminality in the commission of a felony.Our Revised Penal Code
increases the imposable penalty when there are attending circumstances showing a
greater perversity or an unusual criminality in the commission of a felony. The
intensified punishment for these so-called aggravating circumstances is grounded
on various reasons, which may be categorized into (1) the motivating power itself,
(2) the place of commission, (3) the means and ways employed, (4) the time, or (5)
the personal circumstances of the offender or of the offended party. Based on the
aforementioned basic postulate of the classical penal system, this is an additional in
terrorem effect created by the Revised Penal Code, which targets the deterrence of
a resort to greater perversity or to an unusual criminality in the commission of a
felony.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech; View that because of the inextricability of
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) from modern life and the
exercise of free speech and expression, I am of the opinion that the increase in
penalty per se effectively chills a significant amount of the exercise of this preferred
constitutional right.One begins to see at this point how the exercise of freedom of
speech is clearly burdened. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that ICTs
are fast becoming the most widely used and accessible means of communication
and of expression. Educational institutions encourage the study of ICT and the
acquisition of the corresponding skills. Businesses, government institutions and civil
society organizations rely so heavily on ICT that it is no exaggeration to say that,
without it, their operations may grind to a halt. News organizations are increasingly
shifting to online publications, too. The introduction of social networking sites has
increased public participation in socially and politically relevant issues. In a way, the
Internet has been transformed into freedom parks. Because of the inextricability
of ICT from modern life and the exercise of free speech and expression, I am of the
opinion that the increase in penalty per se effectively chills a significant amount of
the exercise of this preferred constitutional right.
Criminal Law; Penalties; Accessory Penalties; View that under the Revised Penal
Code, there are accessory penalties that are inherent in certain principal penalties.
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Under the Revised Penal Code, there are accessory penalties that are inherent in
certain principal penalties. Article 42 thereof provides that the principal (afflictive)
penalty of prisin mayor carries with it the accessory penalty of temporary absolute
disqualification. According to Article 30, this accessory penalty shall produce the
following effects: 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which
the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election. 2. The
deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to
be elected to such office. 3. The disqualification for the offices or public
employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned. In case of
temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2
and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence. 4. The loss of all right
to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
Same; Same; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); View that before
the Cybercrime Prevention Act, the imposable penalty for libel under Art. 355 of the
Revised Penal Code, even if committed by means of Information and
Communications Technologies (ICT), is prisin correccional in its minimum and
medium periods. Under Section 6 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act, the imposable
penalty for libel qualified by Information and Communications Technologies is now
increased to prisin correccional in its maximum period to prisin mayor in its
minimum period.Before the Cybercrime Prevention Act, the imposable penalty for
libel under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code, even if committed by means of ICT,
is prisin correccional in its minimum and medium periods. Under Section 6 of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act, the imposable penalty for libel qualified by ICT is now
increased to prisin correccional in its maximum period to prisin mayor in its
minimum period. Consequently, it is now possible for the above-enumerated
harsher accessory penalties for prisin mayor to attach depending on the presence
of mitigating circumstances.
Same; Probation; View that probation is a special privilege granted by the State to
penitent, qualified offenders who immediately admit to their liability and thus
renounce the right to appeal.Probation is a special privilege granted by the State
to penitent, qualified offenders who immediately admit to their liability and thus
renounce the right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and
willingness to be reformed, the State affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of
an incarceration record by making them undergo rehabilitation outside prison.
Same; Same; Penalties; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); Libel;
Cyberlibel; View that in the light of the increase in penalty by one degree under the
Cybercrime Prevention Act, libel qualified by the use of information and
communications technologies (ICT) is now punishable by prisin correccional in its
maximum period (from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years) to prisin mayor in
its minimum period (from 6 years and 1 day to 8 years). This increased penalty
means that if libel is committed through the now commonly and widely used means
of communication, ICT, libel becomes a non-probationable offense.Pursuant to
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, libel is punishable by prisin correccional in
its minimum (from 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months) and medium (from
2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months) periods. However, in the
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light of the increase in penalty by one degree under the Cybercrime Prevention Act,
libel qualified by the use of ICT is now punishable by prisin correccional in its
maximum period (from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years) to prisin mayor in
its minimum period (from 6 years and 1 day to 8 years). This increased penalty
means that if libel is committed through the now commonly and widely used means
of communication, ICT, libel becomes a non-probationable offense.
Same; Same; View that one of the features of the Probation Law is that it suspends
the execution of the sentence imposed on the offender.One of the features of the
Probation Law is that it suspends the execution of the sentence imposed on the
offender. In Moreno v. Commission on Elections, 498 SCRA 547 (2006), we reiterated
our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148 (1984), and explained the effect
of the suspension as follows: In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order
placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to
petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as
well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right
to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the
paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching
profession.
Same; Prescription of Offenses; View that by setting a prescription period for crimes,
the State by an act of grace surrenders its right to prosecute and declares the
offense as no longer subject to prosecution after a certain period.By setting a
prescription period for crimes, the State by an act of grace surrenders its right to
prosecute and declares the offense as no longer subject to prosecution after a
certain period. It is an amnesty that casts the offense into oblivion and declares that
the offenders are now at liberty to return home and freely resume their activities as
citizens. They may now rest from having to preserve the proofs of their innocence,
because the proofs of their guilt have been blotted out.
Same; Penalties; Qualifying Circumstances; View that a qualifying aggravating
circumstance has the effect not only of giving the crime its proper and exclusive
name, but also of placing the offender in such a situation as to deserve no other
penalty than that especially prescribed for the crime; A qualifying aggravating
circumstance increases the penalty by degrees.A qualifying aggravating
circumstance has the effect not only of giving the crime its proper and exclusive
name, but also of placing the offender in such a situation as to deserve no other
penalty than that especially prescribed for the crime. Hence, a qualifying
aggravating circumstance increases the penalty by degrees. For instance, homicide
would become murder if attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
thereby increasing the penalty from reclusin temporal to reclusin perpetua. It is
unlike a generic aggravating circumstance, which increases the penalty only to the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law, and not to an entirely higher
degree. For instance, if the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling or
nighttime attends the killing of a person, the penalty will remain the same as that
for homicide (reclusin temporal), but applied to its maximum period. Also, a
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generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a generic mitigating

circumstance, while a qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be.
Same; Same; Same; View that qualifying aggravating circumstances, by
themselves, produce an in terrorem effect.Before the Cybercrime Prevention Act,
libel even if committed through ICT was punishable only by prisin correccional
from its minimum (6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months) to its medium
period (2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Under Section 6
however, the offender is now punished with a new range of penalty prisin
correccional in its maximum period (from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years) to
prisin mayor in its minimum period (from 6 years and 1 day to 8 years). And since
the use of ICT as a qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be offset by any
mitigating circumstance, such as voluntary surrender, the penalty will remain within
the new range of penalties. As previously discussed, qualifying aggravating
circumstances, by themselves, produce an in terrorem effect. A twofold increase in
the maximum penalty from 4 years and 2 months to 8 years for the use of an
otherwise beneficial and commonly used means of communication undeniably
creates a heavier invidious chilling effect.
Constitutional Law; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); View that I
support the ponencia in finding the first paragraph of Section 12 of R.A. No. 10175
unconstitutional because of its failure to provide for strong safeguards against
intrusive real-time collection of traffic data. I clarify, however, that this declaration
should not be interpreted to mean that Congress is now prevented from going back
to the drawing board in order to fix the first paragraph of Section 12. Real-time
collection of traffic data is not invalid per se. There may be instances in which a
warrantless real-time collection of traffic data may be allowed when robust
safeguards against possible threats to privacy are provided.Real-time collection of
traffic data may be indispensable to law enforcement in certain instances. Also,
traffic data per se may be examined by law enforcers, since there is no privacy
expectation in them. However, the authority given to law enforcers must be
circumscribed carefully so as to safeguard the privacy of users of electronic
communications. Hence, I support the ponencia in finding the first paragraph of
Section 12 unconstitutional because of its failure to provide for strong safeguards
against intrusive real-time collection of traffic data. I clarify, however, that this
declaration should not be interpreted to mean that Congress is now prevented from
going back to the drawing board in order to fix the first paragraph of Section 12.
Real-time collection of traffic data is not invalid per se. There may be instances in
which a warrantless real-time collection of traffic data may be allowed when robust
safeguards against possible threats to privacy are provided. Nevertheless, I am of
the opinion that there is a need to explain why real-time collection of traffic data
may be vital at times, as well as to explain the nature of traffic data.
Same; Same; View that real-time collection of traffic data may be absolutely
necessary in criminal investigations such that, without it, authorities may not be
able to probe certain crimes at all.What is beyond debate, however, is that realtime collection of traffic data may be absolutely necessary in criminal investigations
such that, without it, authorities may not be able to probe certain crimes at all. In
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fact, it has been found that crucial electronic evidence may never be stored at all,
as it may exist only in transient communications. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime
requires real-time collection of data because of the urgency, sensitivity, or
complexity of a law enforcement investigation. Hence, it is imprudent to
precipitately make (1) an absolute declaration that all kinds of traffic data from all
types of sources are protected by the constitutional right to privacy; and (2) a
blanket pronouncement that the real-time collection thereof may only be conducted
upon a prior lawful order of the court to constitute a valid search and seizure.
Rather, the Court should impose a strict interpretation of Section 12 in the light of
existing constitutional, jurisprudential and statutory guarantees and safeguards.
Same; Searches and Seizures; View that as a general rule, a search and seizure is
reasonable when probable cause has been established.As a general rule, a search
and seizure is reasonable when probable cause has been established. Probable
cause is the most restrictive of all thresholds. It has been broadly defined as those
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. It has been
characterized as referring to factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Furthermore,
probable cause is to be determined by a judge prior to allowing a search and
seizure. The judges determination shall be contained in a warrant, which shall
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Thus,
when no warrant is issued, it is assumed that there is no probable cause to conduct
the search, making that act unreasonable.
Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court said that if neither the vehicle nor its
occupants are subjected to a search the inspection of the vehicle being limited to
a visual search there is no violation of an individuals right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.In Valmonte v. De Villa, 185 SCRA 665 (1990), the Court
said that the constitutional rule cannot be applied when mere routine checks
consisting of a brief question or two are involved. The Court said that if neither
the vehicle nor its occupants are subjected to a search the inspection of the
vehicle being limited to a visual search there is no violation of an individuals
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, for as long as there is no
physical intrusion upon a constitutionally protected area, there is no search.
Same; Right to Privacy; View that internet users have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in traffic data per se or in those pieces of information that users necessarily
provide to the ISP, a third party, in order for their communication to be transmitted.
I share the view that Internet users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
traffic data per se or in those pieces of information that users necessarily provide to
the ISP, a third party, in order for their communication to be transmitted. This
position is further bolstered by the fact that such communication passes through as
many ISPs as needed in order to reach its intended destination. Thus, the collection
and recording of these data do not constitute a search in the constitutional sense.
As such, the collection thereof may be done without the necessity of a warrant.

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Same; Same; View that there is clearly no legitimate expectation of privacy in traffic
data per se because of the nature of the Internet it requires disclosure of traffic
data which, unlike content data, will then travel exposed as it passes through a very
public communications highway.Thus far, it has been shown that real-time
collection of traffic data may be indispensable in providing a crucial first lead in the
investigation of criminality. Also, it has been explained that there is clearly no
legitimate expectation of privacy in traffic data per se because of the nature of the
Internet it requires disclosure of traffic data which, unlike content data, will then
travel exposed as it passes through a very public communications highway. It has
also been shown that the definition of traffic data under the law is sufficiently
circumscribed to cover only non-content and non-identifying data and to explicitly
exclude content data. This distinction is important in protecting privacy guarantees
while supporting law enforcement needs.
Statutes; View that laws and jurisprudence should be able to keep current with the
exponential growth in information technology.Laws and jurisprudence should be
able to keep current with the exponential growth in information technology. The
challenge is acute, because the rapid progress of technology has opened up new
avenues of criminality. Understandably, governments try to keep pace and pursue
criminal elements that use new technological avenues. It is precisely during these
times of zeal that the Court must be ever ready to perform its duty to uphold
fundamental rights when a proper case is brought before it.
CARPIO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech; View that just as the actual malice doctrine
is enshrined in the U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, it too has become
interwoven into our own understanding of the Free Speech Clause of the Philippine
Bill of Rights of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.Indeed, just as the actual malice
doctrine is enshrined in the U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, it too has become
interwoven into our own understanding of the Free Speech Clause of the Philippine
Bill of Rights of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Same; View that allowing a criminal statutory provision clearly repugnant to the
Constitution, and directly attacked for such repugnancy, to nevertheless remain in
the statute books is a gross constitutional anomaly which, if tolerated, weakens the
foundation of constitutionalism in this country.Allowing a criminal statutory
provision clearly repugnant to the Constitution, and directly attacked for such
repugnancy, to nevertheless remain in the statute books is a gross constitutional
anomaly which, if tolerated, weakens the foundation of constitutionalism in this
country. The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, x x x or it is on a
level with ordinary legislative acts, and if it is superior, as we have professed ever
since the Philippines operated under a Constitution, then a law repugnant to the
Constitution is void.
Criminal Law; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); View that as
worded, Section 4(c)(1) of R.A. No. 10175 penalizes the willful engagement,
maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition
of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
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consideration.As worded, Section 4(c)(1) penalizes the willful engagement,

maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition
of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
consideration. On the first interest identified by the government, the
overinclusivity of this provision rests on the lack of a narrowing clause limiting its
application to minors. As a result, Section 4(c)(1) penalizes the lascivious exhibition
of sexual organs of, or sexual activity involving minors and adults, betraying a
loose fit between the state interest and the means to achieve it.
Same; Same; Child Pornography; View that the proffered state interest of protecting
minors is narrowly advanced not by Section 4(c)(1) but by the provision
immediately following it, Section 4(c)(2), which penalizes online child pornography.
Indeed, the proffered state interest of protecting minors is narrowly advanced not
by Section 4(c)(1) but by the provision immediately following it, Section 4(c)(2),
which penalizes online child pornography. Section 4(c)(2) provides: (2) Child
Pornography.The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic
Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a
computer system x x x. Republic Act No. 9775 defines Child pornography as
referring to any representation, whether visual, audio, or written combination
thereof, by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means, of
child engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities.
Same; Same; View that Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175 is constitutional because it
narrowly prohibits cybersex acts involving minors only, while Section 4(c)(1) is
unconstitutional because it expands the prohibition to cybersex acts involving both
minors and adults when the justification for the prohibition is to protect minors only.
Clearly then, it is Section 4(c)(2), not Section 4(c)(1), that narrowly furthers the
state interest of protecting minors by punishing the representation x x x by
electronic means of sexually explicit conduct including the exhibition of sexual
organs of, or sexual acts, involving minors. Section 4(c)(1) does not advance such
state interest narrowly because it is broadly drawn to cover both minors and adults.
Section 4(c)(2) is constitutional because it narrowly prohibits cybersex acts
involving minors only, while Section 4(c)(1) is unconstitutional because it expands
the prohibition to cybersex acts involving both minors and adults when the
justification for the prohibition is to protect minors only.
Same; Same; View that the crime of lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration embraces
within its ambit works of art that depict sexual activities made accessible to the
public for a fee or commercially available cinematic films which feature adult
subject matter and artistic, literary or scientific material and instructional material
for married couples.The crime of lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration embraces
within its ambit works of art that depict sexual activities made accessible to the
public for a fee or commercially available cinematic films which feature adult
subject matter and artistic, literary or scientific material and instructional material
for married couples. Congress could have narrowly tailored Section 4(c)(1) to cover
only online pornography by hewing closely to the Miller test the prevailing
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standard for such category of unprotected speech, namely, an average person,

applying contemporary standards would find [that] the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest by depict[ing] or describ[ing] in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable x x x law and x x x, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Same; Same; View that what Section 4(c)(1) of R.A. No. 10175 should have
prohibited and penalized are free and open porn websites which are accessible by
minors, and not fee-based porn websites which are accessible only by credit cardowning adults, unless such fee-based websites cater to child pornography, in which
case they should also be prohibited and penalized.The absence of regulation
under Section 4(c)(1) of undeniably unprotected online speech in free and open
porn websites defeats the advancement of the state interests behind the enactment
of Section 4(c)(1) because unlike fee-based online porn websites where the pool of
viewers is narrowed down to credit card-owning subscribers who affirm they are
adults, free and open porn websites are accessible to all, minors and adults alike.
Instead of purging the Internet of pornographic content, Section 4(c)(1) will trigger
the proliferation of free and open porn websites which, unlike their fee-based
counterparts, are not subject to criminal regulation under Section 4(c)(1). What
Section 4(c)(1) should have prohibited and penalized are free and open porn
websites which are accessible by minors, and not fee-based porn websites which
are accessible only by credit card-owning adults, unless such fee-based websites
cater to child pornography, in which case they should also be prohibited and
penalized.
Same; Same; View that contrary to the ponencias conclusion, Section 4(c)(1) does
not cover the same subject as Article 201 of the Code and RA 9208.Contrary to
the ponencias conclusion, Section 4(c)(1) does not cover the same subject as
Article 201 of the Code and RA 9208. Article 201 penalizes Immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as understood under the
Miller test. On the other hand, RA 9208 penalizes trafficking in persons (or its
promotion) for illicit purposes (Section 4[a]). The fact that these statutory provisions
remain valid in the statute books has no bearing on the question whether a
statutory provision penalizing the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration offends the
Free Speech Clause.
Same; Same; View that Section 4(c)(3) of RA 10175 makes criminal the transmission
through a computer system of electronic communication which seek to advertise,
sell, or offer for sale products and services unless they fall under three categories
of exceptions.Section 4(c)(3) of RA 10175 makes criminal the transmission
through a computer system of electronic communication x x x which seek to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services unless they fall under three
categories of exceptions. These categories are: (1) the recipient of the commercial
message gave prior affirmative consent to do so; (2) the primary intent of the
commercial message is for service and/or administrative announcements from the
sender to its users, subscribers or customers; and (3) the commercial message
(a) has an opt-out feature; (b) has a source which is not purposely disguise[d];
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and (c) does not purposely include misleading information x x x to induce the
recipient to read the message. According to the OSG, Congress enacted Section
4(c)(3) to improve the efficiency of commerce and technology and prevent
interference with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property [computer
device].
Same; Same; View that under the exception clauses of Section 4(c)(3), commercial
speech may be transmitted online only when (1) the recipient has subscribed to
receive it (opted-in); or (2) the commercial speech, directed to its users,
subscribers or customers, contains announcements; or (3) the undisguised, nonmisleading commercial speech has an opt-out feature.Under the exception
clauses of Section 4(c)(3), commercial speech may be transmitted online only when
(1) the recipient has subscribed to receive it (opted-in); or (2) the commercial
speech, directed to its users, subscribers or customers, contains announcements;
or (3) the undisguised, non-misleading commercial speech has an opt-out feature.
The combination of these exceptions results in penalizing the transmission online
(1) of commercial speech with no opt-out feature to non-subscribers, even if
truthful and non-misleading; and (2) of commercial speech which does not relay
announcements to subscribers, even if truthful and non-misleading. Penalizing the
transmission of these protected categories of commercial speech is devoid of any
legitimate government interest and thus violates the Free Speech Clause.
Same; Same; View that in cyberspace, the free flow of truthful and non-misleading
commercial speech does not obstruct the public view or degrade the aesthetics of
public space in the way that billboards and poster advertisements mar the streets,
highways, parks and other public places.Indeed, the free flow of truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech online should remain unhampered to assure freedom
of expression of protected speech. In cyberspace, the free flow of truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech does not obstruct the public view or degrade the
aesthetics of public space in the way that billboards and poster advertisements mar
the streets, highways, parks and other public places. True, commercial speech does
not enjoy the same protection as political speech in the hierarchy of our
constitutional values. However, any regulation of truthful and non-misleading
commercial speech must still have a legitimate government purpose. Regulating
truthful and non-misleading commercial speech does not result in efficiency of
commerce and technology in cyberspace.
Same; Same; View that R.A. No. 10175 adopts the Revised Penal Codes definition of
libel by describing online libel under Section 4(c)(4) as [t]he unlawful or prohibited
acts as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed
through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the
future.RA 10175 adopts the Codes definition of libel by describing online libel
under Section 4(c)(4) as [t]he unlawful or prohibited acts as defined in Article 355
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or
any other similar means which may be devised in the future. By adopting the
Codes definition of libel, Section 4(c)(4) also adopts the elements of libel as defined
in Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the Code. Section 4(c)(4) merely adds the
media of computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the
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future to the list of media enumerated in Article 355. This is understandable

because at the time the Code was enacted in 1930, the Internet was nonexistent. In
the words of the OSG itself (in contradiction to its position on the constitutionality of
Section 7), Congress enacted Section 4(c)(4) not to create a new crime, but merely
to ma[ke] express an avenue already covered by the term similar means under
Article 355, to keep up with the times: Online libel is not a new crime. Online libel
is a crime punishable under x x x Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code. Section 4(c)(4) just made express an avenue already covered
by the term similar means under Article 355, to keep up with the times.
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; View that under the Double Jeopardy Clause,
conviction or acquittal under either Section 4(c)(4) or Article 353 in relation to
Article 355 constitutes a bar to another prosecution for the same offense of libel.
For purposes of double jeopardy analysis, therefore, Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 and
Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the Code define and penalize the same
offense of libel. Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, conviction or acquittal under
either Section 4(c)(4) or Article 353 in relation to Article 355 constitutes a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense of libel.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech; View that the specter of
multiple trials and sentencing, even after conviction under R.A. No. 10175, creates a
significant and not merely incidental chill on online speech.Section 7 of RA 10175
also offends the Free Speech Clause by assuring multiple prosecutions of those who
fall under the ambit of Section 4(c)(4). The specter of multiple trials and sentencing,
even after conviction under RA 10175, creates a significant and not merely
incidental chill on online speech. Section 7 stifles speech in much the same way
that excessive prison terms for libel, subpoenas to identify anonymous online users
or high costs of libel litigation do. It has the effect of making Internet users steer
far wide of the unlawful zone by practicing self-censorship, putting to naught the
democratic and inclusive culture of the Internet where anyone can be a publisher
and everyone can weigh policies and events from anywhere in the world in real
time. Although Section 7, as applied to Section 4(c)(4), purports to strengthen the
protection to private reputation that libel affords, its sweeping ambit deters not only
the online publication of defamatory speech against private individuals but also the
online dissemination of scathing, false, and defamatory statements against public
officials and public figures which, under the actual malice rule, are conditionally
protected. This chilling effect on online communication stifles robust and uninhibited
debate on public issues, the constitutional value lying at the core of the guarantees
of free speech, free expression and free press.
Same; Same; View that Section 12 of R.A. No. 10175 grants authority to the
government to record in bulk and in real time electronic data transmitted by means
of a computer system, such as through mobile phones and Internet-linked devices.
Section 12 of RA 10175 grants authority to the government to record in bulk and
in real time electronic data transmitted by means of a computer system, such as
through mobile phones and Internet-linked devices. The extent of the power granted
depends on the type of electronic data sought to be recorded, that is, whether
traffic data or non-traffic data (all other data). For traffic data, which RA 10175
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defines as the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size,

duration, or type of underlying service, the government, for due cause can
record them on its own or with the aid of service providers, without need of a court
order. For non-traffic data collection, a court warrant is required based on
reasonable grounds that the data to be collected is essential for the prosecution
or prevention of violation of any of the crimes defined under RA 10175.
Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; View that by vesting the government with
authority to undertake such highly intrusive search and collection in bulk of
personal digital data without benefit of a judicial warrant, Section 12 of R.A. No.
10175 is unquestionably repugnant to the guarantee under the Search and Seizure
Clause against warrantless searches and seizures.Section 12 of RA 10175 is the
statutory basis for intelligence agencies of the government to undertake
warrantless electronic data surveillance and collection in bulk to investigate and
prosecute violations of RA 10175. Section 12 fails constitutional scrutiny. Collection
in bulk of private and personal electronic data transmitted through telephone and
the Internet allows the government to create profiles of the surveilled individuals
close social associations, personal activities and habits, political and religious
interests, and lifestyle choices expressed through these media. The intrusion into
their private lives is as extensive and thorough as if their houses, papers and effects
are physically searched. As such, collection in bulk of such electronic data rises to
the level of a search and seizure within the meaning of the Search and Seizure
Clause, triggering the requirement for a judicial warrant grounded on probable
cause. By vesting the government with authority to undertake such highly intrusive
search and collection in bulk of personal digital data without benefit of a judicial
warrant, Section 12 is unquestionably repugnant to the guarantee under the Search
and Seizure Clause against warrantless searches and seizures.
Same; Same; Same; View that to determine whether the collection of bulk traffic
data of telephone and online communication amounts to a constitutional search, the
relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether individuals using such media hold legitimate
expectation that the traffic data they generate will remain private.There is no
quarrel that not all state access to personal information amount to a search within
the contemplation of the Search and Seizure Clause. Government collection of data
readily available (or exposed) to the public, even when obtained using devices
facilitating access to the information, does not implicate constitutional concerns of
privacy infringement. It is when government, to obtain private information, intrudes
into domains over which an individual holds legitimate privacy expectation that a
search takes place within the meaning of the Search and Seizure Clause. To
determine whether the collection of bulk traffic data of telephone and online
communication amounts to a constitutional search, the relevant inquiry, therefore,
is whether individuals using such media hold legitimate expectation that the traffic
data they generate will remain private.
Same; Same; Same; View that as searches and seizures within the contemplation
of Search and Seizure Clause, bulk data and content-based surveillance and
collection are uniformly subject to the constitutional requirement of a judicial
warrant grounded on probable cause.Bulk data surveillance and collection is a
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search and seizure within the meaning of the Search and Seizure Clause not only
because it enables maximum intrusion into the private lives of the surveilled
individuals but also because such individuals do not forfeit their privacy
expectations over the traffic data they generate by transacting with service
providers. Bulk data and content-based surveillance and collection are functionally
identical in their access to personal and private information. It follows that the
distinction Section 12 of RA 10175 draws between content-based and bulk traffic
data surveillance and collection, requiring judicial warrant for the former and a mere
administrative due cause for the latter, is unconstitutional. As searches and
seizures within the contemplation of Search and Seizure Clause, bulk data and
content-based surveillance and collection are uniformly subject to the constitutional
requirement of a judicial warrant grounded on probable cause.
Same; Same; Right to Privacy; View that the erosion of the right to privacy of
communication that Section 12 of R.A. No. 10175 sanctions is pernicious because
the telephone and Internet are indispensable tools for communication and research
in this millennium.The erosion of the right to privacy of communication that
Section 12 sanctions is pernicious because the telephone and Internet are
indispensable tools for communication and research in this millennium. People use
the telephone and go online to perform tasks, run businesses, close transactions,
read the news, search for information, communicate with friends, relatives and
business contacts, and in general go about their daily lives in the most efficient and
convenient manner. Section 12 forces individuals to make the difficult choice of
preserving their communicative privacy but reverting to non-electronic media, on
the one hand, or availing of electronic media while surrendering their privacy, on
the other hand. These choices are inconsistent with the Constitutions guarantee to
privacy of communication.
Same; Same; View that in specific and limited cases where wiretapping has been
allowed, a court warrant is required before the government can record the
conversations of individuals.When Congress passed the Anti-Wiretapping Act
(enacted in 1965), it exempted from the ban on wiretapping cases involving the
crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy,
mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition,
kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth
Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security
(Section 3). In these specific and limited cases where wiretapping has been allowed,
a court warrant is required before the government can record the conversations of
individuals.
Same; Same; View that as large parts of the world become increasingly connected,
with communications carried on wired or wirelessly and stored electronically, the
need to balance the states national security and public safety interest, on the one
hand, with the protection of the privacy of communication, on the other hand, has
never been more acute.As large parts of the world become increasingly
connected, with communications carried on wired or wirelessly and stored
electronically, the need to balance the states national security and public safety
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interest, on the one hand, with the protection of the privacy of communication, on
the other hand, has never been more acute. Allowing the state to undertake
extrajudicial, unilateral surveillance and collection of electronic data in bulk which,
in the aggregate, is just as revealing of a persons mind as the content of his
communication, impermissibly tilts the balance in favor of state surveillance at the
expense of communicative and expressive privacy. More than an imbalance in the
treatment of equally important societal values, however, such government policy
gives rise to fundamental questions on the place of human dignity in civilized
society.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; View that by allowing the
government to electronically search without warrant and administratively censor all
categories of speech, specifically speech which is non-pornographic, not
commercially misleading and not a danger to national security, which cannot be
subjected to censorship or prior restraint, Section 19 is unquestionably repugnant to
the guarantees of free speech, free expression and free press and the rights to
privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures.The
OSG concedes the unconstitutionality of Section 19 which authorizes the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to issue an order to restrict or block access to
computer data, that is, any representation of facts, information, or concepts in a
form suitable for processing in a computer system, whenever the DOJ finds such
data prima facie violative of RA 10175. The OSGs stance on this take down clause
is unavoidable. Section 19 allows the government to search without warrant the
content of private electronic data and administratively censor all categories of
speech. Although censorship or prior restraint is permitted on speech which is
pornographic, commercially misleading or dangerous to national security, only
pornographic speech is covered by RA 10175 (under Section 4(c)(2) on online child
pornography). Moreover, a court order is required to censor or effect prior restraint
on protected speech. By allowing the government to electronically search without
warrant and administratively censor all categories of speech, specifically speech
which is non-pornographic, not commercially misleading and not a danger to
national security, which cannot be subjected to censorship or prior restraint, Section
19 is unquestionably repugnant to the guarantees of free speech, free expression
and free press and the rights to privacy of communication and against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Indeed, as a system of prior restraint on all categories of
speech, Section 19 is glaringly unconstitutional.
BRION, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Criminal Law; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); Libel; Cyberlibel;
View that Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law merely extends the application of
Article 355 to communications committed through a computer system, or any
other similar means which may be devised in the future. It does not, by itself,
redefine libel or create a new crime it merely adds a medium through which libel
may be committed and penalized.Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes
libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any
similar means. Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law merely extends the
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application of Article 355 to communications committed through a computer

system, or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. It does
not, by itself, redefine libel or create a new crime it merely adds a medium
through which libel may be committed and penalized. Parenthetically, this medium
under the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis could already be
included under Article 355 through the phrase any similar means.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in the process of declaring internet
defamatory statements within the reach of our libel law, the Cybercrime Law also
makes the consequences of cyber-libel far graver than libelous speech in the real
world.In the process of declaring internet defamatory statements within the reach
of our libel law, the Cybercrime Law also makes the consequences of cyber-libel far
graver than libelous speech in the real world. These consequences result from the
application of other provisions in the Cybercrime Law that Congress, in the exercise
of its policy-making power, chose to impose upon cybercrimes. Thus, the law,
through Section 5, opts to penalize the acts of aiding, abetting, and attempting to
commit a cybercrime; increases the penalty for crimes committed by, through and
with the use of information and communications technologies in Section 6; and
clarifies that a prosecution under the Cybercrime Law does not ipso facto bar a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code and other special laws in Section 7. In my
view, the application of these provisions to cyber-libel unduly increases the
prohibitive effect of libel law on online speech, and can have the effect of imposing
self-censorship in the Internet and of curtailing an otherwise robust avenue for
debate and discussion on public issues. In other words, Sections 5, 6 and 7 should
not apply to cyber-libel, as they open the door to application and overreach into
matters other than libelous and can thus prevent protected speech from being
uttered.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the rationale for penalizing defamatory
statements is the same regardless of the medium used to communicate it. It springs
from the states interest and duty to protect a persons enjoyment of his private
reputation.Neither do I believe that there is sufficient distinction between libelous
speech committed online and speech uttered in the real, physical world to warrant
increasing the prohibitive impact of penal law in cyberspace communications. The
rationale for penalizing defamatory statements is the same regardless of the
medium used to communicate it. It springs from the states interest and duty to
protect a persons enjoyment of his private reputation. The law recognizes the value
of private reputation and imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous words
or libelous publications the liability to fully compensate for the damages suffered
by the wronged party. I submit that this rationale did not change when libel was
made to apply to Internet communications. Thus, cyber-libel should be considered
as the States attempt to broaden the protection for a persons private reputation,
and its recognition that a reputation can be slandered through the Internet in the
same way that it can be damaged in the real world.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that a key characteristic of online speech is its
potential to reach a wider number of people than speech uttered in the real world.
A key characteristic of online speech is its potential to reach a wider number of
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people than speech uttered in the real world. The Internet empowers persons, both
public and private, to reach a wider audience a phenomenon some legal scholars
pertain to as cyber-reach. Cyber-reach increases the number of people who would
have knowledge of a defamatory statement a post published by a person living in
the Philippines, for instance, can reach millions of people living in the United States,
and vice versa. It could thus be argued that an increase in the audience of a libelous
statement made online justifies the inhibitive effect of Section 5, 6, and 7 on online
speech.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that penalizing libelous speech committed through
the Internet with graver penalties and repercussions because it allegedly reaches a
wider audience creates an unreasonable classification between communications
made through the Internet and in the real, physical world, to the detriment of online
speech.Penalizing libelous speech committed through the Internet with graver
penalties and repercussions because it allegedly reaches a wider audience creates
an unreasonable classification between communications made through the Internet
and in the real, physical world, to the detriment of online speech. I find no basis to
treat online speech and speech in the real world differently on account of the
formers cyber-reach because Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code does not treat
libel committed through various forms of media differently on account of the
varying numbers of people they reach. In other words, since Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code does not distinguish among the means of communications by
which libel is published, the Cybercrime Law, which merely adds a medium of
communications by which libel may be committed, should also not distinguish and
command a different treatment than libel in the real world.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that I agree with the ponencia that Section 5 of the
Cybercrime Law, which penalizes aiding, abetting, or attempting to commit any of
the cybercrimes enumerated therein, is unconstitutional in so far as it applies to the
crime of cyber-libel.I agree with the ponencia that Section 5 of the Cybercrime
Law, which penalizes aiding, abetting, or attempting to commit any of the
cybercrimes enumerated therein, is unconstitutional in so far as it applies to the
crime of cyber-libel. As the ponente does, I believe that the provision, when applied
to cyber-libel, is vague and can have a chilling effect on otherwise legitimately free
speech in cyberspace.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law exposes a
person accused of uttering a defamatory statement to multiple prosecutions under
the Cybercrime Law and the Revised Penal Code for the same utterance.I also
agree with Justice Carpio that the application of Section 7 to cyber-libel should be
declared unconstitutional. By adopting the definition of libel in the Revised Penal
Code, Section 4(c)(4)s definition of cyber-libel penalizes the same crime, except
that it is committed through another medium enumerated in Article 355. Thus,
Section 7 exposes a person accused of uttering a defamatory statement to multiple
prosecutions under the Cybercrime Law and the Revised Penal Code for the same
utterance. This creates a significant chill on online speech, because the gravity of
the penalties involved could possibly compel Internet users towards self-censorship,
and deter otherwise lawful speech.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the presumed malice rule embodied in Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code provides a presumption of malice in every
defamatory imputation, except under certain instances.The petitions against the
Cybercrime Law provide us with the opportunity to clarify, once and for all, the
prevailing doctrine on libel committed against public officers and figures. The
possibility of applying the presumed malice rule against this kind of libel hangs like
a Damocles sword against the actual malice rule that jurisprudence established for
the prosecution of libel committed against public officers and figures. The presumed
malice rule embodied in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides a
presumption of malice in every defamatory imputation, except under certain
instances. Under this rule, the defamatory statement would still be considered as
malicious even if it were true, unless the accused proves that it was made with good
and justifiable intentions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court has applied the actual
malice rule in libel committed against public officers and figures. This means that
malice in fact is necessary for libel committed against public officers and figures to
prosper, i.e., it must be proven that the offender made the defamatory statement
with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or
not.Recognizing the importance of freedom of speech in a democratic republic,
our jurisprudence has carved out another exception to Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code. Through cases such as Guingguing v. Court of Appeals, 471 SCRA 196
(2005) and Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 1 (1999), the Court has applied the
actual malice rule in libel committed against public officers and figures. This means
that malice in fact is necessary for libel committed against public officers and
figures to prosper, i.e., it must be proven that the offender made the defamatory
statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it
is false or not. As the Court held in Guingguing, adopting the words in New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254: [w]e have adopted the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well
include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that with the four provisions i.e., Section 5,
Section 6 and Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law and Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code, removed from cyber-libel, Section 4(c)(4) would present a proper balance
between encouraging freedom of expression and preventing the damage to the
reputation of members of society.With the four provisions i.e., Section 5,
Section 6 and Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law and Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code, removed from cyber-libel, Section 4(c)(4) would present a proper balance
between encouraging freedom of expression and preventing the damage to the
reputation of members of society. Conversely, the presence of either one of these
three provisions could tilt this delicate balance against freedom of expression, and
unduly burden the exercise of our fundamental right. Thus, hand in hand with the
recognition of the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law under a

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facial challenge, the four mentioned provisions should likewise be struck down as
unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that I justify my position on the unconstitutionality
of Section 12 as it patently lacks proper standards guaranteeing the protection of
data that should be constitutionally-protected.I justify my position on the
unconstitutionality of Section 12 as it patently lacks proper standards guaranteeing
the protection of data that should be constitutionally-protected. In more concrete
terms, Section 12 should not be allowed based solely on law enforcement agents
finding of due cause to serve as authority for the warrantless real-time
collection and recording of traffic data.
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; View that the right to privacy essentially means
the right to be let alone and to be free from unwarranted government intrusion.
The right to privacy essentially means the right to be let alone and to be free from
unwarranted government intrusion. To determine whether a violation of this right
exists, a first requirement is to ascertain the existence of a reasonable expectation
of privacy that the government violates. The reasonable expectation of privacy can
be made through a two-pronged test that asks: (1) whether, by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation
is one that society recognizes as reasonable. Customs, community norms, and
practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals reasonable expectation of
privacy. The awareness of the need for privacy or confidentiality is the critical point
that should dictate whether privacy rights exist.
Criminal Law; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); Traffic Data;
Content Data; View that traffic data refer to the computer data generated by
computers in communicating to each other to indicate a communications origin,
destination, route, time, date, size, duration or type of underlying service. These
data should be distinguished from content data which contain the body or message
of the communications sent.Traffic data refer to the computer data generated by
computers in communicating to each other to indicate a communications origin,
destination, route, time, date, size, duration or type of underlying service. These
data should be distinguished from content data which contain the body or message
of the communications sent. Traffic data do not usually indicate on their face the
actual identity of
the sender of the communication; the content data, on the other hand, usually
contain the identity of sender and recipient and the actual communication between
them. It must also be appreciated that as the technology now exists, data (both
traffic and content) are usually sent through the Internet through a packet-switching
network. The system first breaks down the materials sent into tiny packets of data
which then pass through different networks until they reach their destination where
they are reassembled into the original data sent. These tiny packets of data
generally contain a header and a payload. The header contains the overhead
information about the packet, the service and other transmission-related
information. It includes the source and destination of the data, the sequence
number of the packets, and the type of service, among others. The payload, on the
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other hand, contains the actual data carried by the packet. Traffic data may be
monitored, recorded and collected from the headers of packets.
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; View that casting a net of protection wider than
what is necessary to protect the right to privacy in the Internet can unduly hinder
law enforcement efforts in combating cybercrime.In concrete terms, casting a net
of protection wider than what is necessary to protect the right to privacy in the
Internet can unduly hinder law enforcement efforts in combating cybercrime. Raw
traffic data raise no expectation of privacy and should not be beyond the reach of
law enforcers. At the opposite end, constitutionally allowing the unregulated
inspection of Section 12 may unwittingly allow government access or intrusion into
data greater than what the public recognizes or would allow, resulting in the
violation of privacy rights.
Same; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); View that the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law in the
manner framed by the Supreme Court, should not tie the hands of Congress in
enacting a replacement provision empowering the conduct of warrantless real-time
collection of traffic data by law enforcement agents.The declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Section 12 in the manner framed by the Court, should not tie
the hands of Congress in enacting a replacement provision empowering the conduct
of warrantless real-time collection of traffic data by law enforcement agents. This
grant of power should of course avoid the infirmities of the present unconstitutional
provision by providing for standards and safeguards to protect private data and
activities from unwarranted intrusion.

Same; Same; View that the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law
does not remove from the police the authority to undertake real-time collection and
recording of traffic data as an investigation tool that law enforcement agents may
avail of in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses, both for offenses
involving cybercrime and ordinary crimes.I clarify as well that the
unconstitutionality of Section 12 does not remove from the police the authority to
undertake real-time collection and recording of traffic data as an investigation tool
that law enforcement agents may avail of in the investigation and prosecution of
criminal offenses, both for offenses involving cybercrime and ordinary crimes. Law
enforcement agencies may still conduct these activities under their general powers,
but with a prior judicial authorization in light of the nature of the data to be
collected. To cite an example in todays current crime situation, this tool may
effectively be used against the drug menace whose leadership has so far evaded
arrest and whose operations continue despite police interdiction efforts.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; View that the judicial steps in cybercrime
prosecution start as early as the investigation of cybercrimes, through the issuance
of warrants necessary for real-time collection of traffic data, as well as the issuance
of the orders for the disclosure of data retained by internet service providers.The
judicial steps in cybercrime prosecution start as early as the investigation of
cybercrimes, through the issuance of warrants necessary for real-time collection of
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traffic data, as well as the issuance of the orders for the disclosure of data retained
by internet service providers. After these, courts also determine the probable cause
for the arrest of suspects accused of committing cybercrimes. The suspects arrest
would then lead to a trial that, depending on the suspects conviction or acquittal,
could then go through the judiciary appellate process. During trial, pieces of
evidence would be presented and testimonies heard, and trial courts would then
exercise their constitutional duty to adjudicate the cases brought before them.
Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; View that Section 21 of the
Cybercrime Law grants the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) jurisdiction over any violation
of the Cybercrime Law, and provides that special cybercrime courts manned by
specially trained judges should be designated.The designation of special
cybercrime courts of course is not outside our power to undertake:
Section 21 of the Cybercrime Law grants the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over
any violation of the Cybercrime Law, and provides that special cybercrime courts
manned by specially trained judges should be designated. Section 5, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, empowers this Court to promulgate rules
on the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.
LEONEN,J., Dissenting and Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No.
10175); Libel; Cyberlibel; Freedom of Expression; View that the constitution requires
that libel as presently contained in the Revised Penal Code and as reenacted in the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (Rep. Act No. 10175) be struck down as
infringing upon the guarantee of freedom of expression provided in Article III,
Section 4 of our Constitution.I am of the opinion that the constitution requires that
libel as presently contained in the Revised Penal Code and as reenacted in the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (Rep. Act No. 10175) be struck down as
infringing upon the guarantee of freedom of expression provided in Article III,
Section 4 of our Constitution. I am also of the firm view that the provisions on
cybersex as well as the provisions increasing the penalties of all crimes committed
with the use of computers are unconstitutional. The provision limiting unsolicited
commercial communications should survive facial review and should not be
declared as unconstitutional.
Same; Judicial Review; View that the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on
only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned.
The general rule is still that: the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on
only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned. Justiciability on the other hand requires that: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of judicial
determination; (b) the parties raising the issue must have standing or locus standi
to raise the constitutional issue; (c) the constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity, thus ripe for adjudication; and (d) the constitutionality

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must be the very lis mota of the case, or the constitutionality must be essential to
the disposition of the case.

Same; Same; Facial Challenge; View that there is a limited instance where facial
review of a statute is not only allowed but essential: when the provision in question
is so broad that there is a clear and imminent threat that actually operates or it can
be used as a prior restraint of speech.There is, however, a limited instance where
facial review of a statute is not only allowed but essential: when the provision in
question is so broad that there is a clear and imminent threat that actually operates
or it can be used as a prior restraint of speech. This is when there can be an
invalidation of the statute on its face rather than as applied. The use of the
doctrine gained attention in this jurisdiction within a separate opinion by Justice
Mendoza in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128
(2000), thus: The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is
when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the
overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even
though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional but it might be if applied to
others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.
Invalidation of the statute on its face rather than as applied is permitted in the
interest of preventing a chilling effect on freedom of expression. But in other
cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, courts will
decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far inseparable from the
rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not possible.
Same; Same; Same; View that the prevailing doctrine now is that a facial challenge
only applies to cases where the free speech and its cognates are asserted before
the court.In my view, the prevailing doctrine now is that a facial challenge only
applies to cases where the free speech and its cognates are asserted before the
court. While as a general rule penal statutes cannot be subjected to facial attacks, a
provision in a statute can be struck down as unconstitutional when there is a clear
showing that there is an imminent possibility that its broad language will allow
ordinary law enforcement to cause prior restraints of speech and the value of that
speech is such that its absence will be socially irreparable.
Same; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); Prior Restraint; View
that Section 19 of Republic Act No. 10175 is unconstitutional because it clearly
allows prior restraint.Section 19 of Republic Act No. 10175 is unconstitutional
because it clearly allows prior restraint. This section provides: SEC. 19. Restricting
or Blocking Access to Computer Data.When a computer data is prima facie found
to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict
or block access to such computer data. Among all the provisions, this is the sole
provision that the Office of the Solicitor General agrees to be declared as
unconstitutional.
Same; Criminal Law; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); Libel;
Cyberlibel; View that the crime of libel in its 1930 version in the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) was again reenacted through the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012; The law
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as crafted fails to distinguish the malice requirement for criticisms of public officers
(and public figures) on the one hand and that for ordinary defamation of private
citizens carefully crafted by jurisprudence.The crime of libel in its 1930 version in
the Revised Penal Code was again reenacted through the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012. It simply added the use of the internet as one of the means to commit the
criminal acts. The reenactment of these archaic provisions is unconstitutional for
many reasons. At minimum, it failed to take into consideration refinements in the
interpretation of the old law through decades of jurisprudence. It now stands starkly
in contrast with the required constitutional protection of freedom of expression. The
ponencia fails to account for the evolution of the requirement of malice in situations
involving public officers and public figures. At best, the majority will have us believe
that jurisprudence can be read into the current text of the libel law as referred to in
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. However, this does not appear to be the
intent of the legislature based on the text of the provision. Congress reenacted the
provisions defining and characterizing the crime of libel as it was worded in 1930. I
concur with Justice Carpios observations that the law as crafted fails to distinguish
the malice requirement for criticisms of public officers (and public figures) on the
one hand and that for ordinary defamation of private citizens carefully crafted by
jurisprudence. Understandably, it creates doubt on the part of those who may be
subject to its provisions. The vagueness of the current text, reenacted by reference
by Rep. Act No. 10175 is as plain as day.
Same; Freedom of Speech; Libel; View that the threat to freedom of speech and the
publics participation in matters of general public interest is greater than any
satisfaction from imprisonment of one who has allegedly maliciously imputed a
crime, or a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status,
or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or blackened the memory of the dead.The threat to freedom of
speech and the publics participation in matters of general public interest is greater
than any satisfaction from imprisonment of one who has allegedly malicious[ly]
imput[ed] x x x a crime, or x x x a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or x x x blacken[ed] the
memory of [the] dead. The law provides for other means of preventing abuse and
unwarranted attacks on the reputation or credibility of a private person. Among
others, this remedy is granted under the Chapter on Human Relations in the Civil
Code, particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, and even 26. There is, thus, no cogent reason
that a penal statute would overbroadly subsume the primordial right of freedom of
speech provided for in the Constitution.
Criminal Law; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); Libel; Cyberlibel;
View that there is the problem of extraterritoriality and the evils that it spawns on
speech. Enforcement of the crime of libel will be viable only if the speaker is within
our national territory.Then, there is the problem of extraterritoriality and the evils
that it spawns on speech. Enforcement of the crime of libel will be viable only if the
speaker is within our national territory. Those residing in other countries are beyond
our jurisdiction. To be extradited, they will have to have laws similar to ours. If they
reside in a state different from our 1930 version of libel, then we will have the
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phenomenon of foreigners or expatriates having more leeway to criticize and

contribute to democratic exchanges than those who have stayed within our borders.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the kinds of speech that are actually deterred
by libel law are more valuable than the state interest that is sought to be protected
by the crime.The kinds of speech that are actually deterred by libel law are more
valuable than the state interest that is sought to be protected by the crime.
Besides, there are less draconian alternatives which have very minimal impact on
the publics fundamental right of expression. Civil actions for defamation do not
threaten the publics fundamental right to free speech. They narrow its availability
such that there is no unnecessary chilling effect on criticisms of public officials or
policy. They also place the proper economic burden on the complainant and,
therefore, reduce the possibility that they be used as tools to harass or silence
dissenters.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that it is time that we now go further and declare
libel, as provided in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and in the Cybercrime Prevention
Act of 2012, as unconstitutional.It is time that we now go further and declare libel,
as provided in the Revised Penal Code and in the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012, as unconstitutional. This does not mean that abuse and unwarranted attacks
on the reputation or credibility of a private person will not be legally addressed. The
legal remedy is civil in nature and granted in provisions such as the Chapter on
Human Relations in the Civil Code, particularly Articles 19, 20, and 21. These
articles provide: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that declaring criminal libel as unconstitutional,
therefore, does not mean that the state countenances private defamation. It is just
consistent with our democratic values.The states interest to protect private
defamation is better served with laws providing for civil remedies for the affected
party. It is entirely within the control of the offended party. The facts that will
constitute the cause of action will be narrowly tailored to address the perceived
wrong. The relief, whether injunctive or in damages, will be appropriate to the
wrong. Declaring criminal libel as unconstitutional, therefore, does not mean that
the state countenances private defamation. It is just consistent with our democratic
values.
Same; Obscenity; View that at present, we follow Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), a United States case, as the latest authority on the guidelines in
characterizing obscenity.At present, we follow Miller v. California, 413 US 15
(1973), a United States case, as the latest authority on the guidelines in
characterizing obscenity. The guidelines, which already integrated the Roth
standard on prurient interest, are as follows: a. Whether the average person,
applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
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the prurient interest x x x; b. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently

offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
c. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.
Same; Same; View that the guidelines on determining what is obscene are premised
on the idea that men and women are equal and viewed equally which basically
pertains to the males point of view of equality that women are inferior.The issue
of inequality had, in the past, been rendered irrelevant when faced with the issue of
obscenity or pornography. This was not addressed by our jurisprudence on
obscenity. The guidelines on determining what is obscene are premised on the idea
that men and women are equal and viewed equally which basically pertains to
the males point of view of equality that women are inferior.
Same; Constitutional Law; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175);
Cybersex; Freedom of Expression; View that the current provision prohibiting
cybersex will reduce, through its chilling effect, the kind of expression that can be
the subject of mature discussion of our sexuality; If freedom of expression is a
means that allows the minority to be heard, then the current version of this law fails
miserably to protect it. It is overbroad and unconstitutional and should not be
allowed to exist within our constitutional order.Punishing or even threatening to
punish lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity through the aid of
a computer system for favor or consideration does nothing to alleviate the
subordination of women. Rather, it facilitates the patriarchy. It will allow control of
what a woman does with her body in a society that will be dominated by men or by
the ideas that facilitate mens hegemony. The current provision prohibiting cybersex
will reduce, through its chilling effect, the kind of expression that can be the subject
of mature discussion of our sexuality. The public will, therefore, lose out on the
exchanges relating to the various dimensions of our relationships with others. The
cybersex provisions stifles speech, aggravates inequalities between genders, and
will only succeed to encrust the views of the powerful. If freedom of expression is a
means that allows the minority to be heard, then the current version of this law fails
miserably to protect it. It is overbroad and unconstitutional and should not be
allowed to exist within our constitutional order.
Same; Same; Same; Child Pornography; Facial Challenge; View that Section 4(c)(2)
of R.A. No. 10175 should survive constitutional challenge; The explicit reference to
the Anti-Pornography Law or Republic Act No. 9775 constitutes sufficient standard
within which to base the application of the law and which will allow it to survive a
facial challenge for now.It is apt to express some caution about how the parties
confused child pornography done through the internet and cybersex. Section 4(c)
(2), which pertains to child pornography, is different from the cybersex provision.
The provision on child pornography provides: (2) Child Pornography.The unlawful
or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That
the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9775. In my view, this provision should survive constitutional
challenge. Furthermore, it is not raised in this case. The explicit reference to the
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Anti-Pornography Law or Republic Act No. 9775 constitutes sufficient standard

within which to base the application of the law and which will allow it to survive a
facial challenge for now.
Same; Same; Same; View that traffic data is related to and intimately bound to the
content of the packets of information sent from one user to the other or from one
user to another server.Traffic data is related to and intimately bound to the
content of the packets of information sent from one user to the other or from one
user to another server. The provision is silent on the limits of the technologies and
methods that will be used by the law enforcer in tracking traffic data. This causes an
understandable apprehension on the part of those who make use of the same
servers but who are not the subject of the surveillance. Even those under
surveillance even only with respect to the traffic data have no assurances that
the method of interception will truly exclude the content of the message.
Same; Same; Same; View that Section 12 of R.A. No. 10175 broadly authorizes law
enforcement authorities with due cause to intercept traffic data in real time.
Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 10175 broadly authorizes law enforcement authorities
with due cause to intercept traffic data in real time. Due cause is a uniquely
broad standard different from the probable cause requirement in the constitution
or the parameters of reasonable searches in our jurisprudence. The statute does
not care to make use of labels of standards replete in our jurisprudence. It foists
upon the public a standard that will only be defined by those who will execute the
law. It therefore amounts to a carte blanche and roving authority whose limits are
not statutorily limited. Affecting as it does our fundamental rights to expression, it
therefore is clearly unconstitutional.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; View that the general rule is that in
order for a search to be considered reasonable, a warrant must be obtained.I
concede that the general rule is that in order for a search to be considered
reasonable, a warrant must be obtained. In Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 scra 69 (1989):
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be
determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The probable cause
must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted. The probable cause for a valid search warrant, has
been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet arid prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge
of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay.
Same; Same; Warrantless Searches and Seizures; View that not all searches without
a warrant are per se invalid. Jurisprudence is replete with the exceptions to the
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general rule.Not all searches without a warrant are per se invalid. Jurisprudence is
replete with the exceptions to the general rule. In People v. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA
791 (1992), this court reiterated the enumeration of the instances when a search
and seizure may be conducted reasonably without the necessity of a search
warrant: As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must
generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government
authority. True, in some instances, this Court has allowed government authorities to
conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the
owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; when the search is
incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of
customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in
plain view; or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly made
even without a search warrant.
Same; Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175); Right to Privacy; View
that absent an actual case therefore, I am not prepared to declare Section 12 of
Rep. Act 10175 as unconstitutional on the basis of Section 2 or Section 3(a) of
Article III of the Constitution.Absent an actual case therefore, I am not prepared to
declare Section 12 of Rep. Act 10175 as unconstitutional on the basis of Section 2 or
Section 3(a) of Article III of the Constitution. My vote only extends to its declaration
of unconstitutionality because the unlimited breadth of discretion given to law
enforcers to acquire traffic data for due cause chills expression in the internet. For
now, it should be stricken down because it violates Article III, Section 4 of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Unsolicited Commercial Communications; Section 4(c)(3) of Republic
Act No. 10175 on unsolicited commercial communication has no chilling effect.
Section 4(c)(3) of Rep. Act No. 10175 on unsolicited commercial communication has
no chilling effect. It is narrowly drawn. Absent an actual case, it should not be
declared as unconstitutional simply on the basis of its provisions. I dissent,
therefore, in the majoritys holding that it is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; View that since it is valuable only to the
extent of its ability to inform, advertising is not at par with other forms of expression
such as political or religious speech; While business organizations, as juridical
persons, are granted by law a capacity for rights and obligations, they do not count
themselves as among those upon whom human rights are vested.Since it is
valuable only to the extent of its ability to inform, advertising is not at par with
other forms of expression such as political or religious speech. The other forms of
speech are indispensable to the democratic and republican mooring of the state
whereby the sovereignty residing in the people is best and most effectively
exercised through free expression. Business organizations are not among the
sovereign people. While business organizations, as juridical persons, are granted by
law a capacity for rights and obligations, they do not count themselves as among
those upon whom human rights are vested.

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Same; Same; Same; Spams; View that spam is typified by its being unsolicited and
repetitive as well as by its tendency to drown out other communication. Compared
with other forms of advertising, spam has been distinguished as a negative
externality.Spam is typified by its being unsolicited and repetitive as well as by its
tendency to drown out other communication. Compared with other forms of
advertising, spam has been distinguished as a negative externality. This means that
it imposes upon a party a cost despite such partys not having chosen to engage in
any activity that engenders such cost. Thus: How does spam differ from legitimate
advertising? If you enjoy watching network television, using a social networking site,
or checking stock quotes online, you know that you will be subjected to
advertisements, many of which you may find relevant or even annoying. Google,
Yahoo!, Microsoft, Facebook, and others provide valuable consumer services, such
as search, news, and email, supported entirely by advertising revenue. While people
may resent advertising, most consumers accept that advertising is a price they pay
for access to content and services that they value. By contrast, unsolicited
commercial email imposes a negative externality on consumers without any marketmediated benefit, and without the opportunity to opt-out. [Disini, Jr. vs. Secretary of
Justice, 716 SCRA 237(2014)]

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33. GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

205357, September 2, 2014
Case Title : RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC., petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme
Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law ; Prior Restraint ;
Freedom of Speech and the Press ; Election Laws ;
Commission on Elections ;
Remedial Law; Improper Remedy; The Supreme Court (SC) has in the past seen fit to
step in and resolve petitions despite their being the subject of an improper remedy,
in view of the public importance of the issues raised therein.Respondent claims
that certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies that petitioners have
taken to question the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC. Technically, respondent
may have a point. However, considering the very important and pivotal issues
raised, and the limited time, such technicality should not deter the Court from
having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends
for enlightenment and guidance. [T]his Court has in the past seen fit to step in and
resolve petitions despite their being the subject of an improper remedy, in view of
the public importance of the issues raised therein.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech and the Press; Locus Standi; If in regard to
commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to assert a constitutional
right of their clients, with more reason should establishments which publish and
broadcast have the standing to assert the constitutional freedom of speech of
candidates and of the right to information of the public, not to speak of their own
freedom of the press. So, we uphold the standing of petitioners on that basis.If in
regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to assert a
constitutional right of their clients, with more reason should establishments which
publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the constitutional freedom of
speech of candidates and of the right to information of the public, not to speak of
their own freedom of the press. So, we uphold the standing of petitioners on that
basis.
Commission on Elections; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is not free to
simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision
in a particular manner in the past.There is no question that the COMELEC is the
office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it
cannot exercise its powers without limitations or reasonable basis. It could not
simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing
to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion
is something that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The
COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently
133

interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to

change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis.
Election Law; Political Ad Ban; The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that
the maximum allowable airtime should be based on the totality of possible
broadcast in all television or radio stations.The law, on its face, does not justify a
conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be based on the totality of
possible broadcast in all television or radio stations. Senator Cayetano has called
our attention to the legislative intent relative to the airtime allowed that it should
be on a per station basis. This is further buttressed by the fact that the Fair
Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) actually repealed the previous provision, Section 11(b)
of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited direct political advertisements the socalled political ad ban. If under the previous law, no candidate was allowed to
directly buy or procure on his own his broadcast or print campaign advertisements,
and that he must get it through the COMELEC Time or COMELEC Space, R.A. No.
9006 relieved him or her from that restriction and allowed him or her to broadcast
time or print space subject to the limitations set out in the law. Congress, in
enacting R.A. No. 9006, felt that the previous law was not an effective and efficient
way of giving voice to the people. Noting the debilitating effects of the previous law
on the right of suffrage and Philippine democracy, Congress decided to repeal such
rule by enacting the Fair Election Act.
Same; Same; Congress intended to provide a more expansive and liberal means by
which the candidates, political parties, citizens and other stakeholders in the
periodic electoral exercise may be given a chance to fully explain and expound on
their candidacies and platforms of governance, and for the electorate to be given a
chance to know better the personalities behind the candidates.It is therefore
ineluctable to conclude that Congress intended to provide a more expansive and
liberal means by which the candidates, political parties, citizens and other
stakeholders in the periodic electoral exercise may be given a chance to fully
explain and expound on their candidacies and platforms of governance, and for the
electorate to be given a chance to know better the personalities behind the
candidates. In this regard, the media is also given a very important part in that
undertaking of providing the means by which the political exercise becomes an
interactive process. All of these would be undermined and frustrated with the kind
of regulation that the respondent came up with.
Same; Same; Airtime Limits; Section 9(a) of Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the aggregate-based airtime limits
unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.The
guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and
disseminate what is said. And where there is a need to reach a large audience, the
need to access the means and media for such dissemination becomes critical. This
is where the press and broadcast media come along. At the same time, the right to
speak and to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability to be
heard by a few. It must be coupled with substantially reasonable means by which
the communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section 9(a) of

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COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the aggregate-based airtime
limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech and of the Press; Freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be
protected at all costs for the sake of democracy.Political speech is one of the most
important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. [F]reedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be
protected at all costs for the sake of democracy. Accordingly, the same must
remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state interest.
Election Law; Political Ad Ban; Airtime Limits; The assailed rule on aggregatebased airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people.The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime
limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability
of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
Here, the adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits
leveling the playing field does not constitute a compelling state interest which
would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs
of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the
COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its wings.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based
time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only
composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken
among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really
reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary
that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects
that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these
airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to
express himself a form of suppression of his political speech.
Same; Same; Same; Candidates and political parties need adequate breathing
space including the means to disseminate their ideas. This could not be
reasonably addressed by the very restrictive manner by which the respondent
implemented the time limits in regard to political advertisements in the broadcast
media.It has also been said that [c]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies
is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.
Candidates and political parties need adequate breathing space including the
means to disseminate their ideas. This could not be reasonably addressed by the
very restrictive manner by which the respondent implemented the time limits in
regard to political advertisements in the broadcast media.
Same; Same; Same; For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with
Resolution No. 9615, said Resolution, specifically in regard to the new rule on
aggregate airtime is declared defective and ineffectual.For failing to conduct prior
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hearing before coming up with Resolution No. 9615, said Resolution, specifically in
regard to the new rule on aggregate airtime is declared defective and ineffectual.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; It is a basic postulate of due process, specifically
in relation to its substantive component, that any governmental rule or regulation
must be reasonable in its operations and its impositions.It is a basic postulate of
due process, specifically in relation to its substantive component, that any
governmental rule or regulation must be reasonable in its operations and its
impositions. Any restrictions, as well as sanctions, must be reasonably related to the
purpose or objective of the government in a manner that would not work
unnecessary and unjustifiable burdens on the citizenry.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Right to Reply; The Constitution itself
provides as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest, fair and credible
elections, a task addressed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to provide
for a right to reply.The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure
free, orderly, honest, fair and credible elections, a task addressed to the COMELEC
to provide for a right to reply. Given that express constitutional mandate, it could be
seen that the Fundamental Law itself has weighed in on the balance to be struck
between the freedom of the press and the right to reply. Accordingly, one is not
merely to see the equation as purely between the press and the right to reply.
Instead, the constitutionally-mandated desiderata of free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections would necessarily have to be factored in trying to see where
the balance lies between press and the demands of a right-to-reply.
Carpio, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Political Ad Ban; Airtime Limits; Constitutional Law; View that in
capping the broadcast advertising time of candidates and political parties, neither
Congress nor the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) (under Section 6.2 of
Republic Act [RA] 9006 and Section 9(a) of the Resolution, respectively) supervised
or regulated the enjoyment and utilization of franchises of media outfits under
Section 4, Article IX-C.In capping the broadcast advertising time of candidates and
political parties, neither Congress nor the COMELEC (under Section 6.2 of RA 9006
and Section 9(a) of the Resolution, respectively) supervised or regulated the
enjoyment and utilization of franchises of media outfits under Section 4, Article IX-C.
Media firms continue to operate under their franchises free of restrictions
notwithstanding the imposition of these airtime caps. Section 6.2 of RA 9006 and
Section 9(a) of the Resolution do not approximate the rule barring media firms from
sell[ing] x x x print space or airtime for campaign or other political purposes except
to the Commission [on Elections], a clear statutory implementation of Section 4.
On the other hand, by regulating the length of broadcast advertising of candidates
and political parties, a propaganda activity with correlative financial effect, Section
6.2 of RA 9006 and Section 9(a) of the Resolution enforce Section 2(7), Article IX-C.
They are meant to advance the government interest of minimizing election
spending.
Same; Same; Same; View that the capping of campaign airtime by Section 6.2 of
Republic Act (RA) 9006 and Section 9(a) of the Resolution advances the state
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interest of minimizing election spending arbitrarily and the incidental restriction on

the freedoms of speech and expression these provisions impose is greater than is
essential to the furtherance of such state interest, thus failing the second and fourth
prongs of OBrien.Undoubtedly, it was within the power of Congress to enact
Section 6.2 of RA 9006 and of COMELEC to adopt Section 9(a) of the Resolution to
enforce Section 2(7), Article IX-C of the Constitution. Nor is there any question that
the government interest of minimizing election spending under Section 2(7) of
Article IX-C is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, concerned as it is in
the nonspeech government interest of maximizing competition in the political
arena. As explained below, however, the capping of campaign airtime by Section
6.2 of RA 9006 and Section 9(a) of the Resolution advances the state interest of
minimizing election spending arbitrarily and the incidental restriction on the
freedoms of speech and expression these provisions impose is greater than is
essential to the furtherance of such state interest, thus failing the second and fourth
prongs of OBrien.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; View that by ignoring the amount of
broadcasting expenses incurred by candidates and political parties, Section 6.2 of
Republic Act (RA) 9006 and Section 9(a) of the Resolution lack any rational relation
to the state policy of minimizing election spending under Section 2(7), Article IX-C of
the Constitution.Even if we subject Section 6.2 of RA 9006 and Section 9(a) of the
Resolution to the lowest level of scrutiny under the rational basis test, they still fail
to withstand analysis. Rules survive this minimal level of scrutiny if the means
drawn by Congress or administrative bodies are reasonably related to a legitimate
state interest. The government interest Section 6.2 of RA 9006 and Section 9(a) of
the Resolution are meant to advance is the minimization of campaign spending. The
means Congress and the COMELEC adopted to do so was to place uniform campaign
air caps for national and local candidates, without taking into account the amount of
money spent by candidates and political parties to air campaign ads. By ignoring
the amount of broadcasting expenses incurred by candidates and political parties,
Section 6.2 of RA 9006 and Section 9(a) of the Resolution lack any rational relation
to the state policy of minimizing election spending under Section 2(7), Article IX-C of
the Constitution. Their enforcement will only result in substantial variation in
election spending among national and local candidates for airing campaign ads.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that legislative measures aimed at limiting
campaign air time to advance the state policy of minimizing campaign spending
under Section 2(7), Article IX-C of the Constitution must necessarily be pegged to
spending caps for campaign broadcasting.Legislative measures aimed at limiting
campaign air time to advance the state policy of minimizing campaign spending
under Section 2(7), Article IX-C of the Constitution must necessarily be pegged to
spending caps for campaign broadcasting. Such caps, in turn, will depend on the
size of the voting population for each category of candidates (national or local),
consistent with the existing method for capping general campaign spending under
BP 881, as amended. The monetary limit must be set at say P2.00 per registered
voter for local candidates and P4.00 per registered voter for national candidates.
Once the total monetary limits are reached, the ban on broadcast advertising takes
effect, regardless of the amount of air time logged. This scheme grants to
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candidates and political parties greater space for the exercise of communicative
freedoms while, at the same time, allows the state to uniformly flag profligate
campaigns.
Brion,J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Political Ad Ban; Airtime Limits; View that while the Court has
acknowledged the Commission on Elections (COMELECs) wide discretion in
adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections, this discretion cannot be unlimited and must necessarily be within the
bounds of the law under the prevailing rule of law regime in our country.While the
Court has acknowledged the Comelecs wide discretion in adopting means to carry
out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections, this discretion
cannot be unlimited and must necessarily be within the bounds of the law under the
prevailing rule of law regime in our country. The legal limitations include those
imposed by the fundamental law, among them, the right to due process where
governmental action has been substantively unreasonable or its procedures and
processes are unduly harsh. The Comelecs failure to sufficiently explain the basis
for the change of interpretation it decreed under Resolution No. 9615, in my view,
falls within this limitation. Even without going into the niceties and intricacies of
legal reasoning, basic fairness demands that the Comelec provides a reasonable
justification, considering particularly the Comelecs own knowledge of the dynamics
of campaign strategy and the influence of the radio and television as medium of
communication.
Same; Same; Same; View that the validity or invalidity of the assailed Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution essentially rises or falls on the Comelecs
compliance with the legal concept of due process or, at the very least, the common
notion of fairness.Parenthetically, the need for prior notice and hearing actually
supports the conclusion that the Comelecs discretion is not unbridled. Giving the
petitioners prior opportunity to be heard before adopting a new interpretation would
have allowed the Comelec to make a reasonable evaluation of the merits and
demerits of the 2004-2010 interpretation of airtime limits and the needs to satisfy
the demands of the 2013 elections. In my discussions below, I shall supplement the
ponencias observations (which cited the case Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200 [1996]), that prior notice and hearing are required
if an administrative issuance substantially adds to or increases the burden of those
governed. I do so based on my own assessment that the validity or invalidity of the
assailed Comelec Resolution essentially rises or falls on the Comelecs compliance
with the legal concept of due process or, at the very least, the common notion of
fairness. In the latter case, the prevailing circumstances and the interests at stake
have collectively given rise to the need to observe basic fairness.
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; View that the remedy against an
improvident exercise of the Commission on Elections (COMELECs) quasi-judicial
power is provided under Article IX-A, Section 7, in relation with Article IX-C, Section 3
of the Constitution and with Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.The quasi-judicial power
of the Comelec embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
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controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and

qualifications. In the exercise of quasi-judicial power, the Comelec must necessarily
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings to secure or confirm these facts,
weigh the presented evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for its
action and exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character. When
exercising this power, due process requires that prior notice and hearing must be
observed. The remedy against an improvident exercise of the Comelecs quasijudicial power is provided under Article IX-A, Section 7, in relation with Article IX-C,
Section 3 of the Constitution and with Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in the exercise of quasi-legislative power,
administrative law distinguishes between an administrative rule or regulation
(legislative rule), on the one hand, and an administrative interpretation of a law
whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body (interpretative rule), on
the other.The Comelecs quasi-legislative power, which it may exercise hand in
hand with its power to administer and enforce election laws, refers to its power to
issue rules and regulations to implement these election laws. In the exercise of
quasi-legislative power, administrative law distinguishes between an administrative
rule or regulation (legislative rule), on the one hand, and an administrative
interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body
(interpretative rule), on the other.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; View that the Commission on Elections
(COMELECs) failure to notify and hear all the concerned parties amounted to a due
process violation amounting to grave abuse in the exercise of its discretion in
interpreting the laws and rules it implements.While the petitioners do not have
any absolutely demandable right to notice and hearing in the Comelecs
promulgation of a legislative rule, the weight and seriousness of the considerations
underlying the change in implementing the airtime limit rule, required a more
circumspect and sensitive exercise of discretion by the Comelec, in fact, the duty to
be fair that opens the door to due process considerations. The change touched on
very basic individual, societal and even constitutional values and considerations so
that the Comelecs failure to notify and hear all the concerned parties amounted to
a due process violation amounting to grave abuse in the exercise of its discretion in
interpreting the laws and rules it implements. While the Comelec admittedly
conducted a hearing after promulgating Comelec Resolution No. 9615, this belated
remedy does not at all cure the resolutions invalidity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
possesses wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of
ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections, but subject to the limitation that the
means so adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.By
holding that the Comelec must have reasonable basis for changing their
interpretation of the airtime limits under RA No. 9006 and that, impliedly its
absence in the present case constitutes a violation of the petitioners right to due
process, the ponencia in effect recognized the Comelecs duty under the
circumstances to provide for a reasonable basis for its action, as well as its
competence to adequately explain them as the constitutional body tasked to
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enforce and administer all elections laws and regulations. This recognition is
consistent with the Courts similar recognition that the Comelec possesses wide
latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free,
orderly, and honest elections, but subject to the limitation that the means so
adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Given this
recognition and in light of the nullity of Comelec Resolution No. 9615, the Court, for
its part, should also recognize that it should not preempt the Comelec from later on
establishing or attempting to establish the bases for a new interpretation that is not
precluded on other constitutional grounds. The Comelec possesses ample authority
to so act under the provision that airtime limits, among others, may be amplified
on by the Comelec.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) will not or should not pass
upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.I choose
to part with the ponencia at this point as I believe that with the due process and
fairness grounds firmly established, this Court should refrain from touching on other
constitutional grounds, particularly on a matter as weighty as the one before us,
unless we can adequately explain and support our dispositions. The oft-repeated
dictum in constitutional decision-making is the exercise of judicial restraint. The
Court will not or should not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the
case may be disposed of. This, to my mind, is the dictum most particularly fit for the
current legal situation before us, as I will explain below.
Same; Same; Same; View that after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9006,
which by its terms textually support Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution
No. 9615, it cannot be said that the resolution is not germane to the purpose of the
law or that it is inconsistent with the law itself.Pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 9006 and declared as a matter of
state principle that during the election period the State may supervise and regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media
of communication or information. The avowed purpose is to guarantee or ensure
equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time and space for
public information campaigns and fora among candidates. After Congress enacted
RA No. 9006, which by its terms textually support Comelec Resolution No. 9615, it
cannot be said that the resolution is not germane to the purpose of the law or that it
is inconsistent with the law itself.
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; View that since the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) is the body tasked by the Constitution with the enforcement
and supervision of all election related laws with the power to supervise or regulate
the enjoyment of franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication
or information, Congress found the Comelec to be the competent body to
determine, within the limits provided by Congress, the more appropriate regulation
in an ever changing political landscape.Since the Comelec is the body tasked by
the Constitution with the enforcement and supervision of all election related laws
with the power to supervise or regulate the enjoyment of franchises or permits for
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the operation of media of communication or information, Congress found the

Comelec to be the competent body to determine, within the limits provided by
Congress, the more appropriate regulation in an ever changing political landscape.
Reading RA No. 9006 and all the above considerations together, it is not difficult to
grasp that the 180 and 120 minute limitations for each candidate under the law
should be understood as the maximum statutory threshold for campaign
advertisement. This is by the express provision of RA No. 9006. The Comelecs on a
per station interpretation (effective from 2004 until 2010), on the other hand, may
be considered as another maximum limit for campaign advertisement, based on the
Comelecs authority to amplify. This Comelec ruling, standing as presented,
should be valid for as long as it does not exceed the statutory ceiling on a per
station basis.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Speech and of the Press; View that while freedom
of speech is indeed a constitutionally protected right, the ponencia failed to
consider that the Constitution itself expressly provides for a limitation to the
enjoyment of this right during the election period.The ponencia also claims that
Comelec Resolution No. 9615 violates the candidates freedom of speech because it
restricts their ability to reach out to a larger audience. While freedom of speech is
indeed a constitutionally protected right, the ponencia failed to consider that the
Constitution itself expressly provides for a limitation to the enjoyment of this right
during the election period. Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution reads: Section
4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
-controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that contrary to the ponencias very broad
statements, the press is not in any way silenced or muffled under Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9615; what the resolution affects is merely the
duration of allowable of radio and television advertisements by the candidates and
registered political parties.It may be argued that while the quantity of campaign
advertisements is reduced, this reduction inversely and proportionately increases
the radio and television stations own time the freedom of the press at its very
basic to actively perform their duty to assist in the functions of public information
and education. Thus, contrary to the ponencias very broad statements, the press is
not in any way silenced or muffled under Comelec Resolution No. 9615; what
the resolution affects is merely the duration of allowable of radio and television
advertisements by the candidates and registered political parties. In the same
manner, under Comelec Resolution No. 9615, the radio and television networks
themselves are not hindered in pursuing their respective public information
campaigns and other election-related public service activity. I incidentally find the
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Pentagon Papers case, which the ponencia found pertinent to quote, to be simply
inapplicable.
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; View that in enacting Republic Act
(RA) No. 9006, Congress has allowed the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
considerable latitude in determining, within statutory limits, whether a strict or
liberal application of the airtime limits in a particular election period is more
appropriate.In enacting RA No. 9006, Congress has allowed the Comelec
considerable latitude in determining, within statutory limits, whether a strict or
liberal application of the airtime limits in a particular election period is more
appropriate. Unless the Comelec has no reasonable basis and adequate explanation
for its action and unless the parties directly affected are not given opportunity to be
heard on this action as in the present case the Court should withhold the
exercise of its reviewing power.
Leonen,J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Prior Restraint; Freedom of Speech and of the Press; Words and
Phrases; View that prior restraint is defined as the official governmental restrictions
on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination.Prior restraint is defined as the official governmental restrictions
on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination. Prior restraints of speech are generally presumptively
unconstitutional. The only instances when this is not the case are in pornography,
false and misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security. Section 6 of the Fair Election Act is a form of prior
restraint. While it does not totally prohibit speech, it has the effect of limitations in
terms of the candidates and political parties desired time duration and frequency.
When an act of government is in prior restraint of speech, government carries a
heavy burden of unconstitutionality. In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 259
SCRA 529 (1996), this court said that any act that restrains speech is hobbled by
the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. This is
the only situation where we veer away from our presumption of constitutionality.
Same; Same; Same; Election Law; Fair Election Act (Republic Act [RA] No. 9006);
View that it is recognized that Section 6 of the Fair Election Act does not completely
prohibit speech. However, the provision effectively limits speech in terms of time
duration and frequency.It is recognized that Section 6 of the Fair Election Act does
not completely prohibit speech. However, the provision effectively limits speech in
terms of time duration and frequency. Admittedly, the present wording of Section 6
of the Fair Election Act does not clearly imply whether the one hundred twenty (120)
minutes of television advertisement and the one hundred eighty (180) minutes of
radio advertisement allotted to each candidate or registered political party is for
each network or is an aggregate time for all such advertisements, whether paid or
donated, during the entire election period. However, during the 2007 and the 2010
elections, the Commission on Elections allowed candidates and registered political
parties to advertise as much as 120 minutes of television advertisement and 180
minutes of radio advertisement per station.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Airtime Limits; View that it is within the legislatures
domain to determine the amount of advertising sufficient to balance the need to
provide information to voters and educate the public on the one hand, and to cause
the setting of an affordable price to most candidates that would reduce their
expenditures on the other.Whether the airtime in television and radio spots of
candidates and registered political parties may be regulated is not an issue in this
case. Indeed, the Constitution clearly allows this for purposes of providing equal
opportunity to all candidates. The issue is also not whether Congress, in
promulgating Section 6 of the Fair Election Act, committed grave abuse of discretion
in determining a cap of 120 minutes advertising for television and 180 minutes for
radio. It is within the legislatures domain to determine the amount of advertising
sufficient to balance the need to provide information to voters and educate the
public on the one hand, and to cause the setting of an affordable price to most
candidates that would reduce their expenditures on the other. We are not asked to
decide in these cases whether these actual time limitations hurdle the heavy
burden of unconstitutionality that attends to any prior limitations on speech.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; View that not only must the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) have the competence, it must also be
cognizant of our doctrines in relation to any kind of prior restraint.While the
Commission on Elections does have the competence to interpret Section 6, it must
do so without running afoul of the fundamental rights enshrined in our Constitution,
especially of the guarantee of freedom of expression and the right to suffrage. Not
only must the Commission on Elections have the competence, it must also be
cognizant of our doctrines in relation to any kind of prior restraint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that ideally, television and radio stations should
bid and compete for a candidates or a political partys airtime allocation, so that
instead of networks dictating artificially high prices for airtime (which price will be
high as television and radio stations are profit-driven), the market will determine for
itself the price.Ideally, television and radio stations should bid and compete for a
candidates or a political partys airtime allocation, so that instead of networks
dictating artificially high prices for airtime (which price will be high as television and
radio stations are profit-driven), the market will determine for itself the price. The
market for airtime allocation expands, and a buyers market emerges with low
prices for airtime allocation. This situation assumes that in the market for airtime
allocation, television and radio networks are the same in terms of audience
coverage and facilities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that limiting airtime to only a total of 120/180
minutes per candidate or political party will most likely only succeed in caricaturing
debate, enriching only the more powerful companies in the media sector and
making it more prohibitive for less powerful candidates to get their messages
across.Each candidate decides what media they will avail to allow for efficiency,
i.e., the most impact with the broadest audience and with the least cost. All
candidates limits will be the same. Limiting airtime to only a total of 120/180
minutes per candidate or political party will most likely only succeed in caricaturing
debate, enriching only the more powerful companies in the media sector and
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making it more prohibitive for less powerful candidates to get their messages
across.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that where a governmental act has the effect of
preventing speech before it is uttered, it is the burden of government and not of the
speaker to justify the restriction in terms which are clear to the Supreme Court (SC).
We emphasize that where a governmental act has the effect of preventing speech
before it is uttered, it is the burden of government and not of the speaker to justify
the restriction in terms which are clear to this court. Article III, Section 4 of the
Constitution which provides for freedom of expression occupies such high levels of
protection that its further restriction cannot be left to mere speculation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) will step in and review
the Commission on Elections right to amplify if it infringes on peoples fundamental
rights.Contrary to COMELEC Chairman Brillantes statement, this court will step in
and review the Commission on Elections right to amplify if it infringes on peoples
fundamental rights. What the Commission feels, even if it has the prerogative, will
never be enough to discharge its burden of proving the constitutionality of its
regulations limiting the freedom of speech.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; View that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) does not have a monopoly of the desire for genuine electoral
reform without compromising fundamental rights.The standard of analysis for
prior restraints on speech is well-known to all legal practitioners especially to those
that may have crafted the new regulations. Good intentions are welcome but may
not be enough if the effect would be to compromise our fundamental freedoms. It is
this courts duty to perform the roles delegated to it by the sovereign people. In a
proper case invoking this courts powers of judicial review, it should sometimes
result in more mature reflection by those who do not benefit from its decisions. The
Commission on Elections does not have a monopoly of the desire for genuine
electoral reform without compromising fundamental rights. Our people cannot be
cast as their epigones. [GMA Network, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 734 SCRA
88(2014)]

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34. The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,

G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
Case Title : THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, represented by the
MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP
HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the ELECTION OFFICER
OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON,
respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law ; Freedom of
Expression ;
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy
for all acts of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Rule 65 is applicable
especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the
ouster of jurisdiction.Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the
COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating to a grave
abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a special civil action,
there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of the law.
Election Contests; Appeals; Conditions in Order for the Supreme Court (SC) to
Review Orders and Decisions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Electoral
Contests Despite Not Being Reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc.Based on ABSCBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000), this court could
review orders and decisions of COMELEC in electoral contests despite not
being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if: 1) It will prevent the miscarriage of
justice; 2) The issue involves a principle of social justice; 3) The issue involves the
protection of labor; 4) The decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity;
or 5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and
speedy remedy available.
Supreme Court; Jurisdictions; Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC) over the subject matter is determined from
the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority
to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court and defines its powers.The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter
is determined from the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is
defined as the authority to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court and defines its powers. Definitely, the subject matter in
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this case is different from the cases cited by respondents. Nothing less than the
electorates political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by
COMELEC. Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood,
to move people to action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to change the
contours of power whether through the election of representatives in a republican
government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with which
we protect this kind of speech does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of
the message. Neither do we assess whether we should protect speech based on the
motives of COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions on freedom of expression from their
effects. We protect both speech and medium because the quality of this freedom in
practice will define the quality of deliberation in our democratic society.
Same; Same; During elections, the Supreme Court (SC) has the power and the duty
to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality
on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.During elections, we
have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act
tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this courts
constitutional mandate to protect the people against governments infringement of
their fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate outweighs the jurisdiction
vested with the COMELEC.
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of
courts was created by the Supreme Court (SC) to ensure that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.The
doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court
to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an
effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the
evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or
even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform
these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches.
Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they
mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as
these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur
within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the actual case that
makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some
cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of
Appeals.
Same; Court of Appeals; The Court of Appeals (CA) is primarily designed as an
appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial
courts. It is collegiate in nature.The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an
appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial
courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review
of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
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jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have
a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual
questions to determine.
Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad
rule.The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil
actions for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or
if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the
petition.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; In a democracy, the citizens right to
freely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decisionmaking is recognized.In a democracy, the citizens right to freely participate in the
exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-making is recognized. It
deserves the highest protection the courts may provide, as public participation in
nation-building is a fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to
engage in free expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by this
court.
Same; Same; The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for ones
chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general,
in the hope of influencing their votes.In the case before this court, there is a clear
threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression
which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this
decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future,
especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the
right to vote for ones chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to
the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an
election year, the right to vote necessarily includes the right to free speech and
expression. The protection of these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore,
allows for the immediate resort to this court.
Same; Same; This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are noncandidates, to
post the tarpaulin in their private property, as an exercise of their right of free
expression.The present petition does not involve a dispute between the rich and
poor, or the powerful and weak, on their equal opportunities for media coverage of
candidates and their right to freedom of expression. This case concerns the right of
petitioners, who are noncandidates, to post the tarpaulin in their private property,
as an exercise of their right of free expression. Despite the invocation of the political
question doctrine by respondents, this court is not proscribed from deciding on the
merits of this case.
Same; Political Questions; What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is
political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people
in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some
other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power
to act.In Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957), this court previously elaborated
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on the concept of what constitutes a political question: What is generally meant,

when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter
which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it
has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of
the government, with discretionary power to act. (Emphasis omitted) It is not for
this court to rehearse and reenact political debates on what the text of the law
should be. In political forums, particularly the legislature, the creation of the text of
the law is based on a general discussion of factual circumstances, broadly construed
in order to allow for general application by the executive branch. Thus, the creation
of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts that affect the rights of
certain individuals, per se.
Same; Same; A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the
powers or competence of different agencies and departments of the executive or
those of the legislature.A political question arises in constitutional issues relating
to the powers or competence of different agencies and departments of the
executive or those of the legislature. The political question doctrine is used as a
defense when the petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively
within the domain of their respective competencies, as provided by the Constitution
or the law. In such situation, presumptively, this court should act with deference. It
will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was so capricious and
arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Political Speeches; Sovereignty resides in
the people. Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty. The principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental
right.Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs
letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is
enough to curtail petitioners speech. In the context of this case, exhaustion of their
administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech. Political speech enjoys preferred protection
within our constitutional order. In Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008), Justice
Carpio in a separate opinion emphasized: [i]f ever there is a hierarchy of protected
expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank, and among
different kinds of political expression, the subject of fair and honest elections would
be at the top. Sovereignty resides in the people. Political speech is a direct exercise
of the sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in
order to protect this fundamental right.
Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Suspension of the Rules; Time and again, we have held
that the Supreme Court (SC) has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to
except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or when
the purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and
sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the
court.Time and again, we have held that this court has the power to relax or
suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons
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so warrant, or when the purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes
[as] good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary
upon the court. Certainly, this case of first impression where COMELEC has
threatened to prosecute private parties who seek to participate in the elections by
calling attention to issues they want debated by the public in the manner they feel
would be effective is one of those cases.
Election Law; Fair Elections Act (R.A. No. 9006); Section 17 of Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations implementing
the Fair Elections Act, regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to
candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances.
The above provisions regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to
candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9006 on Lawful Election Propaganda also states that these are
allowed for all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations participating under the party list elections and for all bona fide
candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to the limitation on
authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . . Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 provides for a similar wording. These provisions show that
election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination
with candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the candidates
and political parties for whom the election propaganda are released would ensure
that these candidates and political parties maintain within the authorized expenses
limitation.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; In this case, the tarpaulin contains
speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or
criticism on votes made in the passing of the Reproductive Health Law (RH Law).
Thus, petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.True, there is no
mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and political
parties themselves. The focus of the definition is that the act must be designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public
office. In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern,
that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing
of the RH Law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.
Same; Same; The right to freedom of expression applies to the entire continuum of
speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a
symbolic manner of communication.Communication exists when (1) a speaker,
seeking to signal others, uses conventional actions because he or she reasonably
believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended;
and (2) the audience so takes the actions. [I]n communicative action[,] the hearer
may respond to the claims by . . . either accepting the speech acts claims or
opposing them with criticism or requests for justification. Speech is not limited to
vocal communication. [C]onduct is treated as a form of speech sometimes referred
to as symbolic speech[,] such that when speech and nonspeech elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, the communicative element of the
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conduct may be sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of expression].
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech
from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic
manner of communication.
Same; Same; Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out
grievances and political discontent, should be protected and encouraged.
Proponents of the political theory on deliberative democracy submit that
substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue is a critical, and indeed defining, feature
of a good polity. This theory may be considered broad, but it definitely includes [a]
collective decision-making with the participation of all who will be affected by the
decision. It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every democracy is
that sovereignty resides in the people. To ensure order in running the states affairs,
sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or nominated in
key government positions to represent the people. On this note, the theory on
deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make government
accountable. Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to criticize acts made
pursuant to governmental functions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public
affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected and
encouraged.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has held free speech and other intellectual
freedoms as highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. These rights
enjoy precedence and primacy.Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to
communicate their opinions, views and beliefs about issues and candidates. They
argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of approval and appreciation of the
named public officials act of voting against the RH Law, and their criticism toward
those who voted in its favor. It was part of their advocacy campaign against the RH
Law, which was not paid for by any candidate or political party. Thus, the
questioned orders which . . . effectively restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom
of expression should be declared unconstitutional and void. This court has held free
speech and other intellectual freedoms as highly ranked in our scheme of
constitutional values. These rights enjoy precedence and primacy. In Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51
SCRA 189 (1973), this court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom of
expression: Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and
ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of
the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise. In
the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy
a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil
and political institutions; and such priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.
Same; Same; Political Speech and Commercial Speech, Distinguished.We
distinguish between political and commercial speech. Political speech refers to
speech both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about
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some issue, foster[ing] informed and civic-minded deliberation. On the other

hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction. The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
Same; Same; Election Propaganda; While the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean
it is election propaganda.While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure
of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for
consideration by any candidate, political party, or party list group.
Same; Same; Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of
expression and must be protected by the Supreme Court (SC).Speech with
political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and must be
protected by this court. Justice Brion pointed out that freedom of expression is not
the god of rights to which all other rights and even government protection of state
interest must bow. The right to freedom of expression is indeed not absolute. Even
some forms of protected speech are still subject to some restrictions. The degree of
restriction may depend on whether the regulation is content-based or contentneutral. Content-based regulations can either be based on the viewpoint of the
speaker or the subject of the expression.
Same; Same; Clear and Present Danger Rule; Content-based regulation bears a
heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present
danger rule as measure.Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of
expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this
court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure. Thus, in Chavez v.
Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008): A content-based regulation, however, bears a
heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present
danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a
compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.
(Citations omitted) Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger
rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Same; Same; Same; Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed
to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of
freedom of expression.Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents
failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of
freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of
noncandidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of
the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.
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Same; Same; Content-Based Restraint and Content-Neutral Regulation,

Distinguished.Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based
on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time,
place, or manner of the speech.
Same; Right of Peaceful Assembly; In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125
SCRA 553 (1983), this court summarized the steps that permit applicants must
follow which include informing the licensing authority ahead of time as regards the
date, public place, and time of the assembly.In the landmark case of Reyes v.
Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983), this court summarized the steps that permit
applicants must follow which include informing the licensing authority ahead of time
as regards the date, public place, and time of the assembly. This would afford the
public official time to inform applicants if there would be valid objections, provided
that the clear and present danger test is the standard used for his decision and the
applicants are given the opportunity to be heard. This ruling was practically codified
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, otherwise known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
Subsequent jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 as a valid contentneutral regulation. In the 2006 case of Bayan v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 226 (2006), this
court discussed how Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 does not prohibit assemblies but
simply regulates their time, place, and manner. In 2010, this court found in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, 613 SCRA 518 (2010), that respondent
Mayor Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when he modified the rally
permit by changing the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first
affording petitioners the opportunity to be heard.
Same; Freedom of Expression; Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would
render ineffective petitioners message and violate their right to exercise freedom of
expression.In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of
speech. Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective
petitioners message and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression. The
COMELECs act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading
expressions with political consequences. These should be encouraged, more so
when exercised to make more meaningful the equally important right to suffrage.
Same; Same; The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any
relationship to any political candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility
of abuse by those seeking to be elected.The guarantee of freedom of expression
to individuals without any relationship to any political candidate should not be held
hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is true that
there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidates
real levels of expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties that
tend to have an effect on the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia
would be too broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case.
Instead, to address this evil, better and more effective enforcement will be the least
restrictive means to the fundamental freedom.
Same; Same; Satire; Words and Phrases; Satire is a literary form that employs such
devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies, and this
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may target any individual or group in society, private and government alike.The
twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a literary form that
employs such devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or
follies, and this may target any individual or group in society, private and
government alike. It seeks to effectively communicate a greater purpose, often used
for political and social criticism because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed
shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to
have the high-and-mighty lampooned and spoofed. Northrop Frye, well-known in
this literary field, claimed that satire had two defining features: one is wit or humor
founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque and absurd, the other is an object of
attack. Thus, satire frequently uses exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical
devices.
Same; Same; In an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged speech
prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality prevails over
speech.In an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged speech prevails
over regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech.
This view allows the government leeway to redistribute or equalize speaking
power, such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting
voices often systematically subdued within societys ideological ladder. This view
acknowledges that there are dominant political actors who, through authority,
power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that may drown out the
messages of others. This is especially true in a developing or emerging economy
that is part of the majoritarian world like ours.
Same; Same; Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by
candidates or the members of their political parties or their political parties may be
regulated as to time, place, and manner.Clearly, regulation of speech in the
context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members of their political
parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place, and manner.
This is the effect of our rulings in Osmea v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447 (1998) and
National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992). Regulation of speech in the
context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do
not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally
advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the
fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that
can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of
a candidate.
Same; Same; Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if
it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as
members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is
declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the
endorsement of a candidate only; The regulation must only be with respect to the
time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message.Regulation of election
paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons
who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they
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are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a
whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The
regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to
meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and
considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably
the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with
respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no
situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For
this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private
property.
Same; Same; Right to Property; Other than the right to freedom of expression and
the meaningful exercise of the right to suffrage, the present case also involves ones
right to property.Other than the right to freedom of expression and the meaningful
exercise of the right to suffrage, the present case also involves ones right to
property.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right
to property.Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to
property. There may be no expression when there is no place where the expression
may be made. COMELECs infringement upon petitioners property rights as in the
present case also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.
Same; Same; This caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected
speech.The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of
those who are running for public office. Their message may be construed
generalizations of very complex individuals and party list organizations. They are
classified into black and white: as belonging to Team Patay or Team Buhay. But
this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
Carpio,J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Political Ads; View that Republic Act (RA) No. 9006 regulates a host of
other campaign related acts, such as the airing and printing of paid political ads
(Section 3.4 in relation to Section 4) and the conduct of election surveys (Section 5),
which involve not only political parties and candidates but also other individuals or
entities who fall within the ambit of these provisions.Section 3.3 of RA 9006 and
its implementing rule for the 2013 elections, Section 6(c) of Resolution 9615, are
regulations of general applicability, covering campaign speech of all candidates,
noncandidates, political parties and nonpolitical parties. This conclusion is
compelled by the absence of any provision in RA 9006, and indeed, in any related
statutes, limiting their application only to the campaign speech of candidates and
political parties. On the contrary, the penal clause of RA 9006 is couched in broad
language encompassing within its ambit anyone who breaches its provisions:
[v]iolation of th[e] Act and the rules and regulations of the COMELEC issued to
implement [it] shall be an election offense punishable under the first and second
paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. Indeed, RA 9006
regulates a host of other campaign related acts, such as the airing and printing of
paid political ads (Section 3.4 in relation to Section 4) and the conduct of election
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surveys (Section 5), which involve not only political parties and candidates but also
other individuals or entities who fall within the ambit of these provisions. RA 9006 is
a generally applicable law as much as the Omnibus Election Code is in the field of
election propaganda regulation.
Same; Election Spending; Words and Phrases; View that election spending refers
not only to expenses of political parties and candidates but also to expenses of their
supporters.Election spending refers not only to expenses of political parties and
candidates but also to expenses of their supporters. (Otherwise, all the limitations
on election spending and on what constitutes lawful election propaganda would be
meaningless). Freeing noncandidates and non-parties from the coverage of RA 9006
allows them to (1) print campaign ad banners and posters of any size and in any
quantity, (2) place TV and radio ads in national and local stations for any length of
time, and (3) place full-page print ads in broadsheets, tabloids and related media.
Obviously, printing posters of any size, placing full-page print ads, and running
extended broadcast ads all entail gargantuan costs. Yet, under the ponencias
holding, so long as these are done by noncandidates and nonpolitical parties, the
state is powerless to regulate them.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; Free Speech Clause; To satisfy the
strictures of the Free Speech Clause, Congress needs to craft legislation on the
sizing of campaign posters and other paraphernalia with sufficient flexibility to
address concerns inherent in the present fixed-dimension model.The practical
effect of the fixed-size rule under Section 3.3 of RA 9006 (and its implementing rule)
is to further narrow the choices of poster locations for anyone wishing to display
them in any of the venues allowed by law. Voters who wish to make known to the
public their choice of candidates (or for that matter, candidates who wish to
advertise their candidacies) through the display of posters are precluded from doing
so from certain areas not because these areas are off-limits but because, for
reasons of geography vis--vis the size of the poster, their contents simply become
illegible. Such restriction on campaign speech appears to me to be greater than is
essential to advance the important government interests of minimizing election
spending and ensuring orderly elections. To satisfy the strictures of the Free Speech
Clause, Congress needs to craft legislation on the sizing of campaign posters and
other paraphernalia with sufficient flexibility to address concerns inherent in the
present fixed-dimension model.
Brion,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Judicial Review; View that the petition prematurely availed of the Supreme Courts
(SCs) power of judicial review by openly disregarding established Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) processes by bypassing the comelec En Banc.In my view,
the petition prematurely availed of the Courts power of judicial review BY OPENLY
DISREGARDING ESTABLISHED COMELEC PROCESSES BY BYPASSING THE COMELEC
EN BANC. This is a legal mortal sin that will sow havoc in future cases before this
Court. The petition consequently failed to show any prima facie case of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Comelec, as it had not yet finally decided on its
course of action. Most importantly, the issues the petition presents have now been
MOOTED and do not now present any LIVE CONTROVERSY. The Court will recall that
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we immediately issued a temporary restraining order to halt further Comelec action,

so that the petitioner was effectively the prevailing party when the elections the
critical time involved in this case took place. Subsequently, the interest
advocated in the disputed tarpaulin was decided by this Court to the satisfaction of
the public at large, among them the Church whose right to life views prevailed.
THESE ARE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD DISSUADE THIS COURT FROM RULING
ON A CASE THAT WEIGHS THE RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRATIC
ELECTORAL VALUES.
Same; View on Requirements of Justiciability.Judicial review under the traditional
jurisdiction of the Court requires the following requirements of justiciability: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case. Failure to meet any of these requirements justifies the
Courts refusal to exercise its power of judicial review under the Courts traditional
power. The Court, however, has, in several instances, opted to relax one or more of
these requirements to give due course to a petition presenting issues of
transcendental importance to the nation.
Same; Locus Standi; Transcendental Importance Doctrine; View that when the
standing is relaxed because of the transcendental importance doctrine, the
character of the injury presented to fulfill the actual case or controversy
requirement is likewise tempered.In these cases, the doctrine of transcendental
importance relaxes the standing requirement, and thereby indirectly relaxes the
injury embodied in the actual case or controversy requirement. Note at this point
that an actual case or controversy is present when the issues it poses are ripe for
adjudication, that is, when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. Standing, on the other hand, requires a personal
and substantial interest manifested through a direct injury that the petitioner has or
will sustain as a result of the questioned act. Thus, when the standing is relaxed
because of the transcendental importance doctrine, the character of the injury
presented to fulfill the actual case or controversy requirement is likewise tempered.
When we, for instance, say that the petitioners have no standing as citizens or as
taxpayers but we nevertheless give the petition due course, we indirectly
acknowledge that the injury that they had or will sustain is not personally directed
towards them, but to the more general and abstract Filipino public.
Same; Political Questions; View that the political question doctrine prevents the
Supreme Court (SC) from deciding cases that are of a political nature, and leaves
the decision to the elected officials of government.The political question doctrine
prevents the Court from deciding cases that are of a political nature, and leaves the
decision to the elected-officials of government. In other words, the Court, through
the political question doctrine, defers to the judgment and discretion of the

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Executive and Legislature, matters that involve policy because they are the peoples
elected officials and hence are more directly accountable to them.
Same; Same; View that the 1987 Constitution, recognizing the importance of the
Supreme Courts (SCs) active role in checking abuses in government, relaxed the
political question doctrine and made it a duty upon the Court to determine whether
there had been abuses in the governments exercise of discretion and consequently
nullify such actions that violate the Constitution albeit in the narrow and limited
instances of grave abuse of discretion.The 1987 Constitution, recognizing the
importance of the Courts active role in checking abuses in government, relaxed the
political question doctrine and made it a duty upon the Court to determine whether
there had been abuses in the governments exercise of discretion and consequently
nullify such actions that violate the Constitution albeit in the narrow and limited
instances of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, when a government agencys exercise
of discretion is so grave as to amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction, it becomes
the duty to step in and check for violations of the Constitution. In these instances,
the political question doctrine cannot prevent the Court from determining whether
the government gravely abused its jurisdiction, against the back drop of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; View that translated in terms of the Supreme Courts (SCs) expanded
jurisdiction, the actual case or controversy requirement is fulfilled by a prima facie
showing of grave abuse of discretion.Translated in terms of the Courts expanded
jurisdiction, the actual case or controversy requirement is fulfilled by a prima facie
showing of grave abuse of discretion. This approach reflects the textual requirement
of grave abuse of discretion in the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution. As I have earlier pointed out in my separate opinion in Araullo v.
Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1 (2014), justiciability under the expanded judicial power
expressly and textually depends only on the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion, as distinguished from a situation where the issue of constitutional
validity is raised within a traditionally justiciable case which demands that the
requirement of actual controversy based on specific legal rights must exist.
Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; View that the constitutional grant to the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) of the power to investigate and to prosecute
election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election
laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively ensure to the people the free,
orderly, and honest conduct of elections.The petition characterizes the notices as
administrative acts of the Comelec that are outside the latters jurisdiction to
perform. The Comelecs administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. Under Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the Comelec is expressly given the power to prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices. The constitutional grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate
and to prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and
administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively
ensure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections.

157

Judicial Review; Jurisdiction; Expanded Jurisdiction; View that the Supreme Court
(SC) reviews Commission on Elections (Comelecs) administrative acts only by way
of exception, when it acts capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Necessarily, this invokes the Courts
expanded jurisdiction under the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1.The
Court reviews Comelecs administrative acts only by way of exception, when it acts
capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Necessarily, this invokes the Courts expanded jurisdiction
under the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1. That there is an alleged grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Comelec, however, does not automatically mean
that the petition should be given due course. It has to meet the requirements of
justiciability which, under the terms of the Courts expanded judicial power, has
been translated to mean a prima facie showing of a governmental entity, office or
official granted discretionary authority to act and that this authority has been
gravely abused. There can be no prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion
unless something has already been done or has taken place under the law and the
petitioner sufficiently alleges the existence of a threatened or immediate injury to
itself as a result of the gravely abusive exercise of discretion.
Election Law; Preliminary Investigation; View that Commission on Elections
(Comelec) Resolution No. 9386 (Rules of Procedure in the Investigation and
Prosecution of Election Offense Cases in the COMELEC), in particular, provides that
once a complaint is initiated, an investigating officer would have to conduct a
preliminary investigation to determine whether it warrants prosecution.Comelec
Resolution No. 9386 (Rules of Procedure in the Investigation and Prosecution of
Election Offense Cases in the Commission on Elections), in particular, provides that
once a complaint is initiated, an investigating officer would have to conduct a
preliminary investigation to determine whether it warrants prosecution. At this
stage, the respondent(s) to the complaint may submit his counter-affidavit and
other supporting documents for the complaints dismissal. The investigating officer
may also hold a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties and their
witnesses. The parties may even submit questions to the investigating officer, which
the latter may propound to the parties or parties or witnesses concerned.
Moot and Academic; View that a case becomes moot and academic when there is
no more actual controversy between the parties, or no useful purpose can be served
in passing upon the merits.A petition becomes moot and academic when it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. A case becomes moot
and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties, or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
Judicial Review; View that after the Commission on Elections (Comelec) had been
allowed to exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest, judicial review of its actions may be
availed of through a petition for certiorari under the Rules of Court.But while these
issues are capable of repetition, they most certainly cannot escape review. The
administrative process outlined in Comelec Resolution No. 9615 provides a process
through which the Comelec may decide these issues with finality. After the Comelec
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had been allowed to exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest, judicial review of its
actions may be availed of through a petition for certiorari under the Rules of Court.
At that point, the issues would certainly no longer be premature.
Election Law; View that the content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its
posting, makes it subject of the regulations in Republic Act (RA) No. 9006 and
Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 9615.The content of the
tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting, makes it subject of the regulations in
RA 9006 and Comelec Resolution No. 9615. Comelec Resolution No. 9615 contains
rules and regulations implementing RA 9006 during the 2013 national elections.
Section 3 of RA 9006 and Section 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 seek to regulate
election propaganda, defined in the latter as: The term political advertisement or
election propaganda refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed,
displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand,
insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is
capable of being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the
attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or
indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In
broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances
on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other
forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers.
Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal
opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not limited to, social
networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or
otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation.
Same; Election Propaganda; View that had Congress intended to limit its definition
of election propaganda to materials posted for or in behalf of candidates, it could
have so specified.Had Congress intended to limit its definition of election
propaganda to materials posted for or in behalf of candidates, it could have so
specified. Notably, Section 9 on the Posting of Campaign Materials indicates who the
Comelec may authorize to erect common poster areas for campaign materials in
public places. It does not, as the ponencia makes it appear, limit the definition of
election propaganda to those posted by candidates and parties. The title of Section
9 uses the word campaign materials and not election propaganda; thus, it refers
to a particular type of election propaganda. Election propaganda becomes a
campaign material once it is used by candidates and political parties. Nevertheless,
the latter is different from the more generic term election propaganda in the other
parts of RA 9006.
Same; Same; View that that the subject poster was posted on private property does
not divest the Commission on Elections (Comelec) of authority to regulate it.That
the subject poster was posted on private property does not divest the Comelec of
authority to regulate it. The law specifically recognizes the posting of election
propaganda on private property provided its owner consents to it. In the present
case, the property owner is the Diocese of Bacolod itself, and the posting of the
subject poster was made upon its own directive.

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Same; Same; Content-Neutral Regulations; View that the assailed regulations in the
present case involve a content-neutral regulation that controls the incidents of
speech. Both the notice and letter sent by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
to the Diocese of Bacolod sought to enforce Section 3.3 of Republic Act (RA) No.
9006 and Section 6(c) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 which limits the size of
posters that contain election propaganda to not more than two (2) by three (3) feet.
It does not prohibit anyone from posting materials that contain election
propaganda, so long as it meets the size limitations.Content-based regulations are
viewed with a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality. Thus, the government has
the burden of showing that the regulation is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
state interest, otherwise, the Court will strike it down as unconstitutional. In
contrast, content-neutral regulations are not presumed unconstitutional. They pass
constitutional muster once they meet the following requirements: first, that the
regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government; second, that it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, that the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth,
that the incidental restriction on speech is no greater than is essential to further
that interest. The assailed regulations in the present case involve a content-neutral
regulation that controls the incidents of speech. Both the notice and letter sent by
the Comelec to the Diocese of Bacolod sought to enforce Section 3.3 of RA 9006
and Section 6(c) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 which limits the size of posters
that contain election propaganda to not more than two by three feet. It does not
prohibit anyone from posting materials that contain election propaganda, so long as
it meets the size limitations.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; View that Philippine jurisprudence has
long settled that the time, place, and manner of speech may be subject to
Government regulation. Since the size of a poster involves a time, place and
manner regulation, then it may be the proper subject of a government regulation.
Philippine jurisprudence has long settled that the time, place, and manner of speech
may be subject to Government regulation. Since the size of a poster involves a time,
place and manner regulation, then it may be the proper subject of a government
regulation. That Congress may impose regulations on the time place, and manner of
speech during the election period is even implicitly recognized in Section 2,
paragraph 7, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Under this provision, the Comelec
is empowered to recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted. That Congress can pass regulations regarding places where propaganda
materials may be posted necessarily indicates that it can also pass other contentneutral regulations, such as the time and manner of the speechs utterance.
Same; Same; View that freedom of expression, in the first place, is not the god of
rights to which all other rights and even government protection of state interest
must bow.Freedom of expression, in the first place, is not the god of rights to
which all other rights and even government protection of state interest must bow.
Speech rights are not the only important and relevant values even in the most
democratic societies. Our Constitution, for instance, values giving equal opportunity

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to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to a persons status, or the level of
financial resources that one may have at ones disposal.
Same; Same; View that size limits to posters are necessary to ensure equality of
public information campaigns among candidates, as allowing posters with different
sizes gives candidates and their supporters the incentive to post larger posters. This
places candidates with more money and/or with deep-pocket supporters at an
undue advantage against candidates with more humble financial capabilities.Size
limits to posters are necessary to ensure equality of public information campaigns
among candidates, as allowing posters with different sizes gives candidates and
their supporters the incentive to post larger posters. This places candidates with
more money and/or with deep-pocket supporters at an undue advantage against
candidates with more humble financial capabilities. Notably, the law does not limit
the number of posters that a candidate, his supporter, or a private individual may
post. If the size of posters becomes unlimited as well, then candidates and parties
with bigger campaign funds could effectively crowd out public information on
candidates with less money to spend to secure posters the formers bigger
posters and sheer number could effectively take the attention away from the
latters message. In the same manner, a lack of size limitations would also crowd
out private, unaffiliated individuals from participating in the discussion through
posters, or at the very least, compel them to erect bigger posters and thus spend
more.
Perlas-Bernabe,J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; Content-Neutral Regulation; View that a
governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government, if [(a)] it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; [(b)] the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [(c)] the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech and
expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.As
comprehensively explained in the seminal case of Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA
441 (2008), [w]hen the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral
regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity.
Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular
message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an
intermediate approach somewhere between the mere rationality that is required
of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-based
restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely
rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the restrictions be narrowlytailored to promote an important or significant governmental interest that is
unrelated to the suppression of expression. The intermediate approach has [thus]
been formulated in this manner: A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if
it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if [(a)] it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; [(b)] the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [(c)] the incident restriction on
alleged [freedom of speech and expression] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
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Same; Same; Same; View that a governmental action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its
inherent and invasive impact.A governmental action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its
inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear
and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Same; Same; View that while the Commission on Elections (COMELECs) regulatory
powers ought to be recognized, personal advocacies pertaining to relevant social
issues by a private entity within its own private property ought to fall beyond that
broad authority, lest we stifle the value of a core liberty.Considering the totality of
the factors herein detailed, and equally bearing in mind the discussions made in
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992), I submit that the COMELEC issuances
subject of this case do not satisfy the substantial governmental interest requisite
and, hence, fail the intermediate scrutiny test. Surely, while the COMELECs
regulatory powers ought to be recognized, personal advocacies pertaining to
relevant social issues by a private entity within its own private property ought to fall
beyond that broad authority, lest we stifle the value of a core liberty. [The Diocese
of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1(2015)]

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35. Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009

Case Title : ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. MA.
CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson
of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M.
DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ,
CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M.
SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme
Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Evidence|Constitutional Law|Religious
Freedom|Jurisdiction|Presidential Decree No. 1986 is
constitutional
Administrative Law; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB);
Powers of an administrative agency is ascertained from the law itself which is
liberally construed. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB)
has the power to issue a preventive suspension order.Administrative agencies
have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory,
quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the
Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are
granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an
agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once
ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed. A perusal
of the MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency
of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive
suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the
exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Administrative Agencies.But the mere absence of a
provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to
deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. Recall
that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise
television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others,
indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and,
corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioners
assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended
the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive
suspension, outrun its authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive
suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to
repeat, to the MTRCBs duty of regulating or supervising television programs,
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pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In

the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power
which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
Same; Same; Same; Movie and Television Review and Classification Boards
(MTRCBs) power to issue a preventive suspension order includes TV programs.We
cannot agree with petitioners assertion that the aforequoted IRR provision on
preventive suspension is applicable only to motion pictures and publicity materials.
The scope of the MTRCBs authority extends beyond motion pictures. What the
acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest as much. And while the law makes
specific reference to the closure of a television network, the suspension of a
television program is a far less punitive measure that can be undertaken, with the
purpose of stopping further violations of PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would
regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner
envisages.
Same; Same; Due Process; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB) issued the assailed order after a hearing.Just as untenable is petitioners
argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension order on the ground of lack of
hearing. As it were, the MTRCB handed out the assailed order after petitioner, in
response to a written notice, appeared before that Board for a hearing on private
respondents complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the order was issued
after the adjournment of the hearing, proving that he had already appeared before
the MTRCB. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension
shall issue [a]ny time during the pendency of the case. In this particular case, it
was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD
1986 and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such
violation.
Evidence; Constitutional Law; Petitioner has not been denied the equal protection of
the law as the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) ministers he criticized are not facing any
administrative charges.Petitioners position does not persuade. The equal
protection clause demands that all persons subject to legislation should be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and
liabilities imposed. It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well as
hostile discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself
in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative
complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said
ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to that which he used in his
own, necessitating the MTRCBs disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the
preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is
unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the equal
protection guarantee. The Court need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of
petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts
of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case, simply too
different to even consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of
oppressive inequality.

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Same; Same; Religious Freedom; Plain and simple insults to another person
cannot be elevated to the status of a religious speech.There is nothing in
petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious
belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out
with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically
accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed
at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even
petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by
anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim,
assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting
amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language
used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his
statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no
intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious
group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of namecalling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and
disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
Same; Same; Same; A TV program rated G or for general viewership reaches
adults and children alike. What may not be obscene speech to adults may be
considered obscene for children.A cursory examination of the utterances
complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an average adult,
the utterances Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang babae xxx. Yung
putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! may not constitute obscene but merely indecent
utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In
the context they were used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an
adult. The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV
program that is rated G or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would
likely reach even the eyes and ears of children.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases.While adults may have understood that
the terms thus used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be expected
to have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the unbridled use of
such language as that of petitioner in a television broadcast could corrupt
impressionable young minds. The term putang babae means a female
prostitute, a term wholly inappropriate for children, who could look it up in a
dictionary and just get the literal meaning, missing the context within which it was
used. Petitioner further used the terms, ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,
making reference to the female sexual organ and how a female prostitute uses it in
her trade, then stating that Sandoval was worse than that by using his mouth in a
similar manner. Children could be motivated by curiosity and ask the meaning of
what petitioner said, also without placing the phrase in context. They may be
inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the reasons
for the dissimilarity. And upon learning the meanings of the words used, young
minds, without the guidance of an adult, may, from their end, view this kind of
indecent speech as obscene, if they take these words literally and use them in their
own speech or form their own ideas on the matter. In this particular case, where
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children had the opportunity to hear petitioners words, when speaking of the
average person in the test for obscenity, we are speaking of the average child, not
the average adult. The average child may not have the adults grasp of figures of
speech, and may lack the understanding that language may be colorful, and words
may convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject speech is very
suggestive of a female sexual organ and its function as such. In this sense, we find
petitioners utterances obscene and not entitled to protection under the umbrella of
freedom of speech.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; As a standard of limitation on freedom of
speech and press, the clear and present danger test is not a magic incantation.It
was originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech
that espouses anti-government action, or to have serious and substantial
deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the community. The
clear and present danger rule has been applied to this jurisdiction. As a standard of
limitation on free speech and press, however, the clear and present danger test is
not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with analysis
and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which
compels a court to release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is
invoked, absent proof of imminent catastrophic disaster. As we observed in Eastern
Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA 628 (1985), the clear and present
danger test does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The State has a compelling interest to protect minors,
against offensive language in TV programs.The State has a compelling interest in
extending social protection to minors against all forms of neglect, exploitation, and
immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping
parents, through regulatory mechanisms, protect their childrens minds from
exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting experiences. The Constitution, no
less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote and protect the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better
prepare them fulfill their role in the field of nation-building. In the same way, the
State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character. Petitioners offensive and obscene
language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to
the children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is
unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the States
mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial
and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners utterances in TV
broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
Same; Same; Same; The assailed order penalized petitioner for past speech, not
future speeches in a TV program.Neither can petitioners virtual inability to speak
in his program during the period of suspension be plausibly treated as prior restraint
on future speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the suspension is in the
nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an unprotected form of speech. It is
definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible cancellation of exhibition or
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broadcast permit or license. In fine, the suspension meted was simply part of the
duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law which it is
tasked to implement. Viewed in its proper context, the suspension sought to
penalize past speech made on prime-time G rated TV program; it does not bar
future speech of petitioner in other television programs; it is a permissible
subsequent administrative sanction; it should not be confused with a prior restraint
on speech. While not on all fours, the Court, in MTRCB, sustained the power of the
MTRCB to penalize a broadcast company for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped TV
episode without Board authorization in violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Presidential Decree No. 1986 is constitutional; The
investiture of supervisory power would be meaningless if it did not carry with it the
power to penalize the supervised as may be proportionate to the offense proved.
Complementing this provision is Sec. 3(k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB to
exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the
attainment of the purpose and objectives of [the law]. As earlier explained, the
investiture of supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely be a
meaningless grant if it did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or
the regulated as may be proportionate to the offense committed, charged, and
proved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative regulation or subordinate legislation to
promote public interest is a necessity in modern life.The grant of the rule-making
power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of
powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers.
Administrative regulations or subordinate legislation calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary because of the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law. Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbowroom in its operations and, in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions,
according it ample latitude in fixing, by way of an appropriate issuance,
administrative penalties with due regard for the severity of the offense and
attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances, as the case may be, would be
consistent with its mandate to effectively and efficiently regulate the movie and
television industry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB) may suspend a TV program but not its host.But even as we uphold the
power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its
decision to suspend petitioner must be modified, for nowhere in that issuance,
particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative
Penalties effective January 1, 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the program
host or even to prevent certain people from appearing in television programs. The
MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel
permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend television personalities, for such
would be beyond its jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation
beyond what the law provides. Only persons, offenses, and penalties clearly falling
clearly within the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within the
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decrees penal or disciplinary operation. And when it exists, the reasonable doubt
must be resolved in favor of the person charged with violating the statute and for
whom the penalty is sought. Thus, the MTRCBs decision in Administrative Case No.
01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and the subsequent order issued pursuant to said
decision must be modified. The suspension should cover only the television program
on which petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language,
which sanction is what the law and the facts obtaining call for. [Soriano
vs.Laguardia, 587 SCRA 79(2009)]

168

36. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No.

175241, February 24, 2010
Case Title : INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by its National President, Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE LITO
ATIENZA, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Freedom of Expression|Right of Assembly|
Rally Permits|Clear and Present Danger Test
Judgments; Moot and Academic Questions; Even in cases where supervening events
had made the cases moot, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal
or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench,
bar and public.The petition filed with the appellate court on June 21, 2006 became
moot upon the passing of the date of the rally on June 22, 2006. A moot and
academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground
of mootness. However, even in cases where supervening events had made the
cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues
raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public.
Moreover, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In the present case,
the question of the legality of a modification of a permit to rally will arise each time
the terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it evades
review, owing to the limited time in processing the application where the shortest
allowable period is five days prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence
compels the Court to definitively resolve the issue at hand.
Actions; Prejudicial Questions; Since suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
action may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or the
investigating prosecutor, the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial
question without a petition to suspend being filed.Under the Rules, the existence
of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to suspend proceedings in a
criminal action. Since suspension of the proceedings in the criminal action may be
made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or the investigating
prosecutor, the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial question
without a petition to suspend being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed
only in the criminal action, the determination of the pendency of a prejudicial
question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before
this Court in an appeal from the civil action.
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Freedom of Expression; Right of Assembly; Rally Permits; Clear and Present Danger
Test; A mayor commits grave abuse of discretion when he modifies the permit
outright and does not immediately inform the applicant who should be heard first on
the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that
may warrant the changing of the venuethe standard of a clear and present danger
test is an indispensable condition to such modification.In modifying the permit
outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately
inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of
the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the
applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the
permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears
repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued
permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which
blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate
court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It smacks of whim and caprice for a mayor to just
impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific public
place.Respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for
his action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of
venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus
reversible error for the appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of
discretion and, under specific statutory provision, not to have modified the permit
in terms satisfactory to the applicant. [Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs.
Atienza, 613 SCRA 518(2010)]

170

37. Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012

Case Title : RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO,
petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Procedure|Constitutional Law|
Presumption of Innocence|Evidence|Proof Beyond
Reasonable Doubt
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants;
Requisites for the Issuance of a Search Warrant.The requisites for the issuance of
a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must
be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known
to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; Defined.Probable cause for a search
warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than
evidence which would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause,
is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a
fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances
standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of
the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to
disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search
warrant. A magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was
substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions
of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are
in the place sought to be searched. A review of the records shows that in the
present case, a substantial basis exists.
Same; Constitutional Law; Search Warrants; The warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it
to be valid.The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or
171

description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others,
and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness. In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24
specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to
be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut,
20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having
been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be
considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as
an evidence is a violation of petitioners constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the items
seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same
items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them
was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against
government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Agents of Persons in Authority; Barangay Tanods;
The Local Government Code contains a provision which describes the function of a
barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority.Having been established that
the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who
effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents
of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in
authority and agents of persons in authority as: x x x any person directly vested
with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a
person in authority. A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public
order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to
the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function
of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Shabu, Elements of.In
every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential
elements must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated
drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and
(c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; While it is not
necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing
that the property is under appellants control or possession.While it is not
necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing
that the property is under appellants control or possession. The CA, in its Decision,
referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive
172

one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control
over the place where it is found. The records are void of any evidence to show that
petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said
structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner
used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner
being an electrician by profession.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt;
The accused, in all criminal prosecutions, is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.In considering a criminal
case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting perspective on the status of
the accusedin all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge
laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty
that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. [Del
Castillo vs. People, 664 SCRA 430(2012)]

173

38. Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012

Case Title : RODEL LUZ y ONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Criminal Procedure|
Arrests|Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No.
4136)|Warrantless Searches
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Land Transportation and Traffic
Code (R.A. No. 4136); Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.Arrest is the
taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense.It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making
the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that
there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license
of the latter: SECTION 29. Confiscation of Drivers License.Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any
provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a
receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the
driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from
the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not
be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his
case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the
suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Procedure Being Observed in Flagging Down Vehicles
During the Conduct of Checkpoints.The Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations
Manualprovides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the
conduct of checkpoints: SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting
Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot
pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic
Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged,

174

unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles

occupants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Custodial Interrogation; The roadside questioning of a
motorist does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a
formal arrest.In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court
discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained
pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The
Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can
it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is
conducted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show
that person the warrant of arrest, if any.This Court has held that at the time a
person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of
the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.
Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It
may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Miranda Doctrine; In Berkemer vs. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420 (1984), the U.S. Court noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a
person apprehended due to a traffic violation.In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also
noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due
to a traffic violation: The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to
ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to
relieve the inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting
itself, which work to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as
possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to
determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those
purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies. If it
were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged
down for a traffic violation and while he was waiting for his ticket, then there would
have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police
officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; Instances When a Warrantless
Search is Allowed.The following are the instances when a warrantless search is
allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence
in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search;
(v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident
to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether consent to the search was in fact
voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether
the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants
belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that
has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that
was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the
morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Stop and Frisk; The stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons.Neither does the search qualify
under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer
observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a
criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; In Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1998), the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for
speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this
procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car.In
Knowles v. Iowa,the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a
person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the
latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the
car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search
when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only
conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or
doing a patdown.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures.Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at
times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government. [Luz vs. People, 667 SCRA 421(2012)]

176

177

39. Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, February 06, 2013

Case Title : DON DJOWEL SALES y ABALAHIN, petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law|Dangerous Drugs Act|Chain of
Custody Rule|Words and Phrases
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs;
Elements of.In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in
possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. In this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established
that airport security officers found in the person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting
tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the final security check at the airports
pre-departure area. Petitioner at first refused to show the contents of his short pants
pocket to Soriano who became suspicious when his hand felt the slightly bulging
item while frisking petitioner.
Constitutional Law; Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Routine Frisks; In People v.
Johnson, 401 Phil. 734 (2000), which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug from
a passenger during a routine frisk at the airport, the Supreme Court ruled that such
evidence obtained in a warrantless search was acquired legitimately pursuant to
airport security procedures.In People v. Johnson, 348 SCRA 526 (2000), which also
involved seizure of a dangerous drug from a passenger during a routine frisk at the
airport, this Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures, thus: Persons may
lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal
detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets
that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on
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notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and

seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 6235; The Supreme Court finds no irregularity
in the search conducted on petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his
pockets upon the friskers reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while
frisking petitioners short pants was a prohibited or illegal substance. Such search
was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under
Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235.We find no irregularity in the search conducted on
petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his pockets upon the friskers
reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while frisking petitioners short pants
was a prohibited or illegal substance. Such search was made pursuant to routine
airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235. Said
provision reads: SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air
carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed
thereon: Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for,
and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched
shall not be allowed to board the aircraft, which shall constitute a part of the
contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; The search of the contents of petitioners short pants
pockets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the
illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in
evidence.The search of the contents of petitioners short pants pockets being a
valid search pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the illegal substance
(marijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence. Petitioners
reluctance to show the contents of his short pants pocket after the friskers hand
felt the rolled papers containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the
suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material
subject to confiscation by the said authorities.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody Rule; As a mode of
authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the presentation
and admission of the seized prohibited drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to
be.As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that
the presentation and admission of the seized prohibited drug as an exhibit be
preceded by evidence to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. This requirement is essential to obviate the possibility of
substitution as well as to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence
are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements and custody of
the seized prohibited item, from the accused, to the police, to the forensic
laboratory for examination, and to its presentation in evidence in court. Ideally, the
custodial chain would include testimony about every link in the chain or movements
of the illegal drug, from the moment of seizure until it is finally adduced in evidence.
It cannot be overemphasized, however, that a testimony about a perfect chain is
almost always impossible to obtain.

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Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Chain of Custody means the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.The identity of the seized
substance in dangerous drug cases is thus established by showing its chain of
custody. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002
defined the concept of chain of custody as follows: b. Chain of Custody means
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and
custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and
the final disposition[.]
Same; Same; Same; The rule on chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) expressly demands the identification of
the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring
the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the
time they are seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court; As
long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, the guilt of the accused will not be
affected.The rule on chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) expressly demands the identification of the persons who
handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized
movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are
seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court. We have held,
however, that the failure of the prosecution to show compliance with the procedural
requirements provided in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR is not
fatal and does not automatically render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. As
long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, the guilt of the accused will not be
affected. [Sales vs. People, 690 SCRA 141(2013)]

180

40. Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19,

2014
Case Title : RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Chain
of Custody Rule ; Words and Phrases ;
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Under
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the Court of
Appeals (CA) judgment, final order or resolution is a petition for review on certiorari,
which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that this petition suffers from procedural infirmity.
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the
CA judgment, final order or resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for review
on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the
original case. By filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, Sanchez
therefore clearly availed himself of the wrong remedy.
Same; Same; Actions; Jurisdiction; It is axiomatic that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition and the character of the
relief sought.The Court, in several cases before, had treated a petition for
certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 45, in accordance with the liberal spirit
and in the interest of substantial justice, particularly (1) if the petition was filed
within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2) errors of judgment
are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
The case at bench satisfies all the above requisites and, hence, there is ample
justification to treat this petition for certiorari as a petition for review. Besides, it is
axiomatic that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition and the character of the relief sought. Here, stripped of
allegations of grave abuse of discretion, the petition actually avers errors of
judgment rather than of jurisdiction, which are the appropriate subjects of a petition
for review on certiorari.
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the
trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if
not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to
appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their
testimonies.Although it is true that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and not to be disturbed
on appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. It is a time-honored rule
that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses
deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has
181

the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the

declarants in the course of their testimonies. But an exception exists if there is a
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the case.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Searches
Incident to a Lawful Arrest; It bears emphasis that the law requires that the search
be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.
A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It
bears emphasis that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest.
Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person
and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed. Here, the search preceded the
arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the search. Arrest is
defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person
into custody that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
Under Section 2, of the same rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a)
of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest) to operate, two (2) elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.For
warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest) to
operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section
5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for its application that at the time of the
arrest, an offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be apprehended has
committed it.
Same; Same; Same; Stop-and-Frisk Searches; Words and Phrases; A stop and frisk
was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.Elucidating on what constitutes
stop-and-frisk operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v.
Chua, 396 SCRA 657 (2003), wrote: A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a
police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and
suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason,
in accordance with the police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband)

182

concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure
should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
Same; Same; Same; Plain View Doctrine; Under the plain view doctrine, objects
falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.Under the
plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody Rule; Words and Phrases;
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt
in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt
in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
The function of the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary
doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. Thus, the chain of custody
requirement has a two-fold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as
to the identity of the evidence. [Sanchez vs. People, 741 SCRA 294(2014)]

183

41. Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012

Case Title : RODEL LUZ y ONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Criminal Procedure|
Arrests|Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No.
4136)|Warrantless Searches
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Land Transportation and Traffic
Code (R.A. No. 4136); Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.Arrest is the
taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense.It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making
the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that
there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license
of the latter: SECTION 29. Confiscation of Drivers License.Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any
provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a
receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the
driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from
the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not
be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his
case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the
suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Procedure Being Observed in Flagging Down Vehicles
During the Conduct of Checkpoints.The Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations
Manualprovides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the
conduct of checkpoints: SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting
Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot
pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic
184

Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged,
unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles
occupants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Custodial Interrogation; The roadside questioning of a
motorist does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a
formal arrest.In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court
discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained
pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The
Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can
it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is
conducted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show
that person the warrant of arrest, if any.This Court has held that at the time a
person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of
the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.
Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It
may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Miranda Doctrine; In Berkemer vs. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420 (1984), the U.S. Court noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a
person apprehended due to a traffic violation.In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also
noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due
to a traffic violation: The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to
ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to
relieve the inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting
itself, which work to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as
possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to
determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those
purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies. If it
were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged
down for a traffic violation and while he was waiting for his ticket, then there would
have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police
officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; Instances When a Warrantless
Search is Allowed.The following are the instances when a warrantless search is
allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence
in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search;
(v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident
to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether consent to the search was in fact
voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether
the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants
belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that
has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that
was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the
morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Stop and Frisk; The stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons.Neither does the search qualify
under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer
observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a
criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; In Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1998), the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for
speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this
procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car.In
Knowles v. Iowa,the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a
person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the
latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the
car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search
when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only
conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or
doing a patdown.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures.Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at
times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government. [Luz vs. People, 667 SCRA 421(2012)]

186

187

42. Chavez v. Gonzales, 15 February 2008

Case Title : FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M.
GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Justice; and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Judicial Review|Freedom of Expression|
Locus Standi|Freedom of Expression|Hierarchy of Rights|
Freedom of the Press|Relativity of Liberties and Freedoms|
Prior Restraint|Words and Phrases|Content-Based and
Content-Neutral Regulations|Standards of Review|Press
and Broadcast Media Dichotomy; Reasons|Cable
Television|Digital Technology|Internet|Privacy of
Communications|Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200)|
Garci Tapes|Chilling Effect Principle|Judicial Review|
Content-Based Regulations|Right to Information|Suffrage|
Facial Challenges|Subsequent Punishment|Right to
Privacy|Administrative Law|National Telecommunications
Commission|Telecommunications Industry|Locus Standi|
Moot and Academic Issues|Capable of Repetition Yet
Evading Review Rule|Anti-Wiretapping Law (R.A. No. 4200)
Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Where serious constitutional questions are involved,
the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of
procedure.Petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having failed to
allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. But as
early as half a century ago, we have already held that where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must,
technicalities of procedure. Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and
consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing
and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in
keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or
not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them.
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Same; Freedom of Expression; In line with the liberal policy of the Supreme Court on
locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our
society, the Court brushes aside technicalities of procedure and takes cognizance of
the instant petition, seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the
civil rights, the freedom of expression.In line with the liberal policy of this Court on
locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our
society, we therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of
this petition, seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil
rights, the freedom of expression.The petition raises other issues like the extent of
the right to information of the public. It is fundamental, however, that we need not
address all issues but only the most decisive one which in the case at bar is whether
the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press.
Freedom of Expression; Hierarchy of Rights; Freedom of expression has gained
recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic government, and given
a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom
or other liberties.Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental
principle of every democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands
on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The cognate
rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, copied almost verbatim
from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights, were considered the necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the complement of free speech. This
preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its
recognition now enshrined in international law as a customary norm that binds all
nations.
Same; Same; In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of
expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system; It is only when
the people have unbridled access to information and the press that they will be
capable of rendering enlightened judgmentswe cannot both be free and ignorant.
In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is
a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. This right was elevated to
constitutional status in the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting
our own lesson of history, both political and legal, that freedom of speech is an
indispensable condition for nearly every other form of freedom. Moreover, our
history shows that the struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and
the press was, at bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the
exercise of other freedoms. For it is only when the people have unbridled access to
information and the press that they will be capable of rendering enlightened
judgments. In the oft-quoted words of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be free and
ignorant.
Same; Freedom of the Press; To be truly meaningful, freedom of speech and of the
press should allow and even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view,
though it be hostile to or derided by others, or though such view induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger.Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than
the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend
189

support to official measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on
any matter of public consequence. When atrophied, the right becomes meaningless.
The right belongs as wellif not moreto those who question, who do not conform,
who differ. The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not
only to those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly
meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow and even encourage
the articulation of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others;
or though such view induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. To paraphrase Justice Holmes,
it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees
with us.
Same; Same; Relativity of Liberties and Freedoms; The scope of freedom of
expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of
communicationit protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as
political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest; The
constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideasthe protection
afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well
as instructive or informative; While all forms of communication are entitled to the
broad protection of freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film, television
and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspapers and other print media, as will be subsequently discussed.The scope
of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of
communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as
political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The
protection covers myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all issues,
about which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional protection
assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious,
political, economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the
Constitutions basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the
expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. The constitutional
protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free
speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive
or informative. Specifically, in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans, 137
SCRA 628 (1985), this Court stated that all forms of media, whether print or
broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the clause on freedom of speech
and of expression. While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad
protection of freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers
and other print media, as will be subsequently discussed.
Same; Same; Tests for Restraints on Freedom of Speech and Expression.Generally,
restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a
combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits
limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the
speech restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests,
used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and
190

individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the

interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; and (c) the
clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be
restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an
evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil
consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high.As articulated in our jurisprudence, we
have applied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present danger
test to resolve free speech challenges. More recently, we have concluded that we
have generally adhered to the clear and present danger test.
Same; Same; The press is the chief source of information on current affairs, the
most pervasive and perhaps most powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions,
the instrument by which citizens keep their government informed of their needs,
their aspirations and their grievancesit is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep
government responsible and efficient.Much has been written on the philosophical
basis of press freedom as part of the larger right of free discussion and expression.
Its practical importance, though, is more easily grasped. It is the chief source of
information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps most powerful
vehicle of opinion on public questions. It is the instrument by which citizens keep
their government informed of their needs, their aspirations and their grievances. It
is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government responsible and efficient.
Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every administration would go uncorrected
and its abuses unexposed. As Justice Malcolm wrote in United States v. Bustos, 37
Phil. 731 (1918): The interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of
its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of clear
conscience.
Same; Same; Four Aspects of Freedom of the Press.Philippine jurisprudence, even
as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of
freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from
punishment subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to information;and (4)
freedom of circulation.
Same; Same; Prior Restraint; Words and Phrases; Prior restraint refers to official
governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or dissemination; Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom
from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and
regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of
the government.Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the
press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.
Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of
publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is
wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it
precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish;
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licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license

taxes for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against publication. Even the
closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the
discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as previous restraint or
censorship. Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had
before publication can be made, commits an infringement of the constitutional
right, and remedy can be had at the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the
Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as
against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.Given that
deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints
on speech, and any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid, and any act that
restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted
with furrowed brows, it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are
invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but
determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as against the
appropriate test by which it should be measured against.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Content-Neutral and Content-Based
Regulations, Distinguished.It is not enough to determine whether the challenged
act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be
made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time,
place or manner, and under well defined standards; or (2) a content-based restraint
or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act
is assayed with.
Same; Same; Same; Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulations; Standards of
Review; When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation,
only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity.When the
speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial
governmental interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of this type are
not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the
strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approachsomewhere
between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling
interest standard applied to content-based restrictions. The test is called
intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law
but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or
significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of expression.
The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner: A governmental
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A governmental action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its
inherent and invasive impact, and only when the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the
press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and
invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present
danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. Unless the government can
overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down.
Same; Same; Same; Press and Broadcast Media Dichotomy; Reasons; The
dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in the United States
there, broadcast radio and television have been held to have limited First
Amendment protection, and U.S. Courts have excluded broadcast media from the
application of the strict scrutiny standard that they would otherwise apply to
contentbased restrictions; The three major reasons why broadcast media stands
apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium
operates [i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print medium may be limitless];
(b) its pervasiveness as a medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to children.
The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from one other.
Contrasted with the regime in respect of books, newspapers, magazines and
traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film and video have been subjected to
regulatory schemes. The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its
origins in the United States. There, broadcast radio and television have been held to
have limited First Amendment protection, and U.S. Courts have excluded broadcast
media from the application of the strict scrutiny standard that they would
otherwise apply to content-based restrictions. According to U.S. Courts, the three
major reasons why broadcast media stands apart from print media are: (a) the
scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are
physically limited while print medium may be limitless]; (b) its pervasiveness as a
medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to children. Because cases involving
broadcast media need not follow precisely the same approach that [U.S. courts]
have applied to other media, nor go so far as to demand that such regulations
serve compelling government interests, they are decided on whether the
governmental restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental
interest, or the intermediate test.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed a
differentiation in treatment between broadcast and print media, a review of
Philippine case law on broadcast media will show thatas we have deviated with
the American conception of the Bill of Rightswe likewise did not adopt en masse
the U.S. conception of free speech as it relates to broadcast media, particularly as
to which test would govern content-based prior restraints.As pointed out by
respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed a differentiation in treatment
between broadcast and print media. Nevertheless, a review of Philippine case law
on broadcast media will show thatas we have deviated with the American
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conception of the Bill of Rightswe likewise did not adopt en masse the U.S.
conception of free speech as it relates to broadcast media, particularly as to which
test would govern content-based prior restraints. Our cases show two distinct
features of this dichotomy. First, the difference in treatment, in the main, is in the
regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that is not imposed on traditional
print media, and narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity,
pornography, seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a compelling
government interest that also has constitutional protection, such as national
security or the electoral process. Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that
broadcast media is subjected to, the Court has consistently held that the clear and
present danger test applies to content-based restrictions on media, without making
a distinction as to traditional print or broadcast media.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Cable Television; Digital Technology; While historically,
the scarcity of frequencies was thought to provide a rationale, cable and satellite
television have enormously increased the number of actual and potential channels
digital technology will further increase the number of channels available; Modern
developments show a need for a reexamination of the traditional notions of the
scope and extent of broadcast media regulation.Parenthetically, these
justifications are now the subject of debate. Historically, the scarcity of frequencies
was thought to provide a rationale. However, cable and satellite television have
enormously increased the number of actual and potential channels. Digital
technology will further increase the number of channels available. But still, the
argument persists that broadcasting is the most influential means of
communication, since it comes into the home, and so much time is spent watching
television. Since it has a unique impact on people and affects children in a way that
the print media normally does not, that regulation is said to be necessary in order to
preserve pluralism. It has been argued further that a significant main threat to free
expressionin terms of diversitycomes not from government, but from private
corporate bodies. These developments show a need for a reexamination of the
traditional notions of the scope and extent of broadcast media regulation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Internet; The emergence of digital technology
which has led to the convergence of broadcasting, telecommunications and the
computer industryhas likewise led to the question of whether the regulatory
model for broadcasting will continue to be appropriate in the converged
environment; Internet, for example, remains largely unregulated, yet the Internet
and the broadcast media share similarities, and the rationales used to support
broadcast regulation apply equally to the Internet.The emergence of digital
technologywhich has led to the convergence of broadcasting, telecommunications
and the computer industryhas likewise led to the question of whether the
regulatory model for broadcasting will continue to be appropriate in the converged
environment.Internet, for example, remains largely unregulated, yet the Internet
and the broadcast media share similarities, and the rationales used to support
broadcast regulation apply equally to the Internet. Thus, it has been argued that
courts, legislative bodies and the government agencies regulating media must
agree to regulate both, regulate neither or develop a new regulatory framework and
rationale to justify the differential treatment.
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Same; Same; Same; Privacy of Communications; Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No.

4200); Garci Tapes; Given all the unsettled facets of the Garci tape, it is even
arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.This outlines the
procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following:
(a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge
the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records
of the case at bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these acts do not
abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present
danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the
airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The
records of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents
evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the
various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the
tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect.
The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a
complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent,
especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wiretappers,
the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is
even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Not every violation of a law will justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the pressthe totality of
the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated
in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related
international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press; The need to
prevent the violation of laws cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and
free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils.We rule that
not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of
them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect
on a persons private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are
laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot
support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a
factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to
restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of
the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the
preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international
covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and
calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine
compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be
misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law should
be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence.
But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise
of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater
evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and
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present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free
speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the antiwiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not decisive that the press statements
made by Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission
were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circularsit is sufficient
that the press statements were made by them while in the exercise of their official
functions; Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraintthe
concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order
or official circular.This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We
slide to the issue of whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice
and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that
has transgressed the Constitution. In resolving this issue, we hold that it is not
decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or
followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements
were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions.
Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice,
while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done,
such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity
is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself
to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are
acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior
restraints on the right to free speech and press.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Chilling Effect Principle; There is enough
evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on recordthe warnings given to
media came from no less the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), a
regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and
broadcast media, and they also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of
the Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be
violating the laws of the land.There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the
complained acts on record. The warnings given to media came from no less the
NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio
and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of
the Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be
violating the laws of the land. After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the
NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner
Chavez was left alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech and of the press.
This silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too
deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation.
Same; Judicial Review; In cases where the challenged acts are patent invasions of a
constitutionally protected right, the Court should be swift in striking them down as
nullities per sea blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow too
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late.The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts

should always be exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of each case.
For there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery constitutional
questions, and the limits and construct of relative freedoms are never set in stone.
Issues revolving on their construct must be decided on a case to case basis, always
based on the peculiar shapes and shadows of each case. But in cases where the
challenged acts are patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should
be swift in striking them down as nullities per se. A blow too soon struck for freedom
is preferred than a blow too late.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Concurring Opinion:

Freedom of Expression; Freedom of the Press; Prior Restraint; Garci Tapes; The
threat of suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorization
hurled against radio and television stations should they air the Garci Tape is
definitely a form of prior restraint.The threat of suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorization hurled against radio and television
stations should they air the Garci Tape is definitely a form of prior restraint. The
license or authorization is the life of every media station. If withheld from them,
their very existence is lost. Surely, no threat could be more discouraging to them
than the suspension or revocation of their licenses. In Far Eastern Broadcasting v.
Dans, 137 SCRA 628 (1985), while the need for licensing was rightly defended, the
defense was for the purpose, not of regulation of broadcast content, but for the
proper allocation of airwaves. In the present case, what the NTC intends to regulate
are the contents of the Garci Tapesthe alleged taped conversation involving the
President of the Philippines and a Commissioner of the Commission on Election. The
reason given is that it is a false information or willful misrepresentation. As aptly
stated by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio that the NTC action in restraining the airing
of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the
message of the Garci Tapes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Content-Based Regulations; History teaches us that
licensing has been one of the most potent tools of censorship; Clearly, contentbased prior restraint is highly abhorred in every jurisdiction.History teaches us
that licensing has been one of the most potent tools of censorship. This powerful
bureaucratic system of censorship in Medieval Europe was the target of John
Miltons speech Areopagita to the Parliament of England in 1644. Under the
Licensing Act of 1643, all printing presses and printers were licensed and nothing
could be published without the prior approval of the State or the Church Authorities.
Milton vigorously opposed it on the ground of freedom of the press. His strong
advocacy led to its collapse in 1695. In the U.S., the first encounter with a law
imposing a prior restraint is in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Here, the
majority voided the law authorizing the permanent enjoining of future violations by
any newspaper or periodical if found to have published or circulated an obscene,
lewd and lascivious or malicious, scandalous and defamatory issue. While the
dissenters maintained that the injunction constituted no prior restraint, inasmuch as
that doctrine applied to prohibitions of publication without advance approval of an
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executive official, the majority deemed the difference of no consequence, since in

order to avoid a contempt citation, the newspaper would have to clear future
publications in advance with the judge. In other similar cases, the doctrine of prior
restraint was frowned upon by the U.S. Court as it struck down loosely drawn
statutes and ordinances requiring licenses to hold meetings and parades and to
distribute literature, with uncontrolled discretion in the licensor whether or not to
issue them, and as it voided other restrictions on First Amendment rights. Then
there came the doctrine that prior licensing or permit systems were held to be
constitutionally valid so long as the discretion of the issuing official is limited to
questions of times, places and manners. And in New York Times Company v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713. (1971), the same Court, applying the doctrine of prior restraint
from Near, considered the claims that the publication of the Pentagon Papers
concerning the Vietnam War would interfere with foreign policy and prolong the war
too speculative. It held that such claim could not overcome the strong presumption
against prior restraints. Clearly, content-based prior restraint is highly abhorred in
every jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Any action of the government by means of which
it might prevent free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely
essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.
Another objectionable portion of the NTCs Press Release is the warning that it will
not hesitate to apply with full force the provisions of the Circulars and their
accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television stations and their
owners/operators. This is a threat of a subsequent punishment, an equally abhorred
form of censorship. This should not also be countenanced. It must be stressed that
the evils to be prevented are not the censorship of the press merely, but any action
of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general
discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for
an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens. There is logic in the proposition that
the liberty of the press will be rendered a mockery and a delusion if, while every
man is at liberty to publish what he pleases, the public authorities might
nevertheless punish him for harmless publications. In this regard, the fear of
subsequent punishment has the same effect as that of prior restraint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To prevent the airing of the Garci Tapes on the
premise that their contents may or may not be true is not a valid reason for its
suppression.To prevent the airing of the Garci Tapes on the premise that their
contents may or may not be true is not a valid reason for its suppression. In New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Justice William Brennan, Jr. states that
the authoritative interpretation of the First Amendment guarantees have
consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truthwhether
administered by judges, jurists, or administrative officialsand especially not one
that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker. He stressed that the
constitutional protection does not turn upon the truth, popularity, or social utility of
the ideas and belief which are offered. Moreover, the fact that the tapes were
obtained through violation of the AntiWiretapping Law does not make the broadcast
media privy to the crime. It must be stressed that it was a government official who
initially released the Garci Tapes, not the media.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Information; Suffrage; The right of the
people to know matters pertaining to the integrity of the election process is of
paramount importanceelection is a sacred instrument of democracy.The right of
the people to know matters pertaining to the integrity of the election process is of
paramount importance. It cannot be sideswiped by the mere speculation that a
public disturbance will ensue. Election is a sacred instrument of democracy. Through
it, we choose the people who will govern us. We entrust to them our businesses, our
welfare, our children, our lives. Certainly, each one of us is entitled to know how it
was conducted. What could be more disheartening than to learn that there exists a
tape containing conversations that compromised the integrity of the election
process. The doubt will forever hang over our heads, doubting whether those who
sit in government are legitimate officials. In matters such as these, leaving the
people in darkness is not an alternative course. People ought to know the truth. Yes,
the airing of the Garci Tapes may have serious impact, but this is not a valid basis
for suppressing it. As Justice Douglas explained in his concurring opinion in the New
York Times, the dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the
widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information. A
debate of large proportions goes in the nation over our posture in Vietnam. Open
debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health.
Same; Same; Same; The struggle for freedom of expression is as ancient as the
history of censorshipfrom the ancient time when Socrates was poisoned for his
unorthodox views to the more recent Martial Law Regime in our country, the lesson
learned is that censorship is the biggest obstacle to human progress.Burke once
called the Press the Fourth Estate in the Parliament. This is because its ability to
influence public opinion made it an important source in the governance of a nation.
It is considered one of the foundations of a democratic society. One sign of its
importance is that when a tyrant takes over a country, his first act is to muzzle the
press. Courts should therefore be wary in resolving cases that has implication on the
freedom of the pressto the end that the freedom will never be curtailed absent a
recognized and valid justification. In fine let it be said that the struggle for freedom
of expression is as ancient as the history of censorship. From the ancient time when
Socrates was poisoned for his unorthodox views to the more recent Martial Law
Regime in our country, the lesson learned is that cen- sorship is the biggest obstacle
to human progress. Let us not repeat our sad history. Let us not be victims again
now and in the future.
CARPIO,J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Freedom of Expression; Chilling Effect Principle; Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Facial
Challenges; When the issue involves freedom of expression, any citizen has the
right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action in
violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action is directed
at such citizenthe government action may chill into silence those to whom the
action is directed.Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue
involves freedom of expression, as in the present case, any citizen has the right to
bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action in violation of
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freedom of expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such

citizen. The government action may chill into silence those to whom the action is
directed. Any citizen must be allowed to take up the cudgels for those who have
been cowed into inaction because freedom of expression is a vital public right that
must be defended by everyone and anyone. Freedom of expression, being
fundamental to the preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is of
transcendental importance that must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the
earliest opportunity. We have held that any concerned citizen has standing to raise
an issue of transcendental importance to the nation, and petitioner in this present
petition raises such issue.
Same; Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition to the exercise of almost
all other civil and political rights; Freedom of expression provides a civilized way of
engagement among political, ideological, religious or ethnic opponents for if one
cannot use his tongue to argue, he might use his fist instead.Freedom of
expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of
expression is an indispensable condition to the exercise of almost all other civil and
political rights. No society can remain free, open and democratic without freedom of
expression. Freedom of expression guarantees full, spirited, and even contentious
discussion of all social, economic and political issues. To survive, a free and
democratic society must zealously safeguard freedom of expression. Freedom of
expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of
expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office.
Freedom of expression crystallizes important public policy issues, and allows
citizens to participate in the discussion and resolution of such issues. Freedom of
expression allows the competition of ideas, the clash of claims and counterclaims,
from which the truth will likely emerge. Freedom of expression allows the airing of
social grievances, mitigating sudden eruptions of violence from marginalized groups
who otherwise would not be heard by government. Freedom of expression provides
a civilized way of engagement among political, ideological, religious or ethnic
opponents for if one cannot use his tongue to argue, he might use his fist instead.
Same; Prior Restraint; Content-Based Regulations; The exceptions, when expression
may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of
expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of
imminent lawless action, and danger to national securityall other expression is not
subject to prior restraint; Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected
expression or high-value expression, and any content-based prior restraint on
protected expression is unconstitutional without exception.The exceptions, when
expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four
categories of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security. All other
expression is not subject to prior restraint. As stated in Turner Broadcasting System
v. Federal Communication Commission, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), [T]he First
Amendment (Free Speech Clause), subject only to narrow and well understood
exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of
messages expressed by private individuals. Expression not subject to prior
restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior
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restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected

expression means what it saysit is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus,
there can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of
existing laws, on the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures,
or on proposed amendments to the Constitution.
Same; Same; While only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint,
any such prior restraint on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrierfirst,
such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional, and, second, the government
bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.
Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or lowvalue expression. By definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is contentbased since the restraint is imposed because of the content itself. In this
jurisdiction, there are currently only four categories of unprotected expression that
may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized false or misleading
advertisement as unprotected expression only in October 2007. Only unprotected
expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on
unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is
presumed unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of
proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint. Courts will subject to strict
scrutiny any government action imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression.
The government action will be sustained if there is a compelling State interest, and
prior restraint is necessary to protect such State interest. In such a case, the prior
restraint shall be narrowly drawnonly to the extent necessary to protect or attain
the compelling State interest.
Same; Same; Subsequent Punishment; While there can be no prior restraint on
protected expression, such expression may be subject to subsequent punishment,
either civilly or criminally; Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant
prior restraint, the same expression may still be subject to subsequent punishment.
While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression
may be subject to subsequent punishment, either civilly or criminally. Thus, the
publication of election surveys cannot be subject to prior restraint, but an aggrieved
person can sue for redress of injury if the survey turns out to be fabricated. Also,
while Article 201 (2)(b)(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing shows which offend
any race or religion cannot be used to justify prior restraint on religious expression,
this provision can be invoked to justify subsequent punishment of the perpetrator of
such offensive shows. Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant prior
restraint, the same expression may still be subject to subsequent punishment,
civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected expression. However, if
the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent
punishment, logically it cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior
restraint. Thus, since profane language or hate speech against a religious minority
is not subject to subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction, such expression cannot
be subject to prior restraint.
Same; Same; Prior Restraint; Garci Tapes; Suffrage; The public airing of the Garci
Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four
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existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdictionit is

essentially a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate
had allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the
close of voting in the last presidential elections; If ever there is a hierarchy of
protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank, and
among different kinds of political expression, the subject of fair and honest elections
would be at the top.The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression
because it does not fall under any of the four existing categories of unprotected
expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially
a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly
improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of
voting in the last presidential elections. Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes
affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the
ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior
restraint. Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the
highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost
protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression
would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds of political expression,
the subject of fair and honest elections would be at the top. In any event, public
discussion on all political issues should always remain uninhibited, robust and wide
open.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200); The alleged
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly
prohibits the enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws,
curtailing freedom of expression.The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that
there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On this
ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts
determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the
security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression
that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by
respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security
and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State. The alleged
violation of the AntiWiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly
prohibits the enactment of any law, and that includes antiwiretapping laws,
curtailing freedom of expression. The only exceptions to this rule are the four
recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the content of the Garci
Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of unprotected expression.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Privacy; Right to Information; The airing
of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the
Garci Tapes is a matter of important public concernthe Constitution guarantees
the peoples right to information on matters of public concern.The airing of the
Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the Garci
Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the
peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The remedy of any
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person aggrieved by the public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for
violation of the AntiWiretapping Law after the commission of the crime. Subsequent
punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; National Telecommunications
Commission; Unless ruled by the courts as a valid prior restraint, government
agencies cannot implement outright such prior restraint because such restraint is
presumed unconstitutional at inception; As an agency that allocates frequencies or
airwaves, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) may regulate the
bandwidth position, transmitter wattage, and location of radio and television
stations, but not the content of the broadcasts.The NTC has no power to impose
content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of the NTC does not vest
NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and television stations. In
the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can
never be subject to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression, only
the courts have the power to adjudicate on the factual and legal issue of whether
the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, so as to justify the
prior restraint. Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression
requires prior adjudication by the courts on whether the prior restraint is
constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the presumption of invalidity
of any prior restraint on unprotected expression. Unless ruled by the courts as a
valid prior restraint, government agencies cannot implement outright such prior
restraint because such restraint is presumed unconstitutional at inception. As an
agency that allocates frequencies or airwaves, the NTC may regulate the bandwidth
position, transmitter wattage, and location of radio and television stations, but not
the content of the broadcasts. Such content-neutral prior restraint may make
operating radio and television stations more costly. However, such content-neutral
restraint does not restrict the content of the broadcast.
AZCUNA,J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Freedom of Expression; Telecommunications Industry; Chilling Effect Principle; The

challenged National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) and Department of
Justice (DOJ) warnings violate Sec. 10, Art. XVI of the Constitutionthe regulatory
warnings involved in this case work against a balanced flow of information in our
communication structures and do so without respecting freedom of speech by
casting a chilling effect on the media.I vote to GRANT the petition on the ground
that the challenged NTC and DOJ warnings violate Sec. 10, Art. XVI of the
Constitution which states: Sec. 10. The State shall provide the policy environment
for the full development of Filipino capability and the emergency of communication
structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the nation and the balanced flow
of information into, out of, and across the country, in accordance with a policy that
respects the freedom of speech and of the press. x x x The regulatory warnings
involved in this case work against a balanced flow of information in our
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communication structures and do so without respecting freedom of speech by

casting a chilling effect on the media. This is definitely not the policy environment
contemplated by the Constitution.
TINGA,J., Separate Opinion (Dissenting and Concurring):
Freedom of Expression; Freedom of the Press; Prior Restraint; Garci Tapes; The
assailed act of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), contained in
what is after all an unenforceable Press Release, hardly constitutes an immediate
and irreversible sanctionthe issuance does not prohibit the airing of the Garci
tapes or require that the broadcast station obtain permission from the government
or the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to air such tapes.Yet prior
restraint by contrast and by definition, has an immediate and irreversible
sanction. The assailed act of the NTC, contained in what is after all an
unenforceable Press Release, hardly constitutes an immediate and irreversible
sanction. In fact, as earlier noted, the Press Release does not say that it would
immediately sanction a broadcast station which airs the Garci tapes. What it does
say is that only if it has been subsequently established that the said tapes are false
and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate investigation that the stations
could be subjected to possible suspension. It is evident that the issuance does not
prohibit the airing of the Garci tapes or require that the broadcast stations obtain
permission from the government or the NTC to air such tapes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Still, without undertaking a demonstration how the Press
Release actually restrained free expression, the majority surprisingly makes a leap
of logic, concluding as it does that such an informal act as a press statement is
covered by the prior restraint concept; Absent prior restraint, no presumption of
invalidity can arise.The Press Release does not fit into any of the acts described
above in the majority opinion. Neither can it be identified as an official government
restriction as it simply does not levy any actual restriction on the subjects of NTC
regulation. Still, without undertaking a demonstration how the Press Release
actually restrained free expression, the majority surprisingly makes a leap of logic,
concluding as it does that such an informal act as a press statement is covered by
the prior restraint concept. As with Justice Carpio, the majority does not precisely
explain how the Press Release could constitute an actual restraint, worded as it was
with nary a notion of restriction and given its lack of an immediate and irreversible
sanction. Absent prior restraint, no presumption of invalidity can arise.
Same; Same; Same; Chilling Effect Principle; A government act that has a chilling
effect on the exercise of free expression is an infringement within the constitutional
purview; If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication
chills speech, prior restraint freezes it at least for the time.A government act that
has a chilling effect on the exercise of free expression is an infringement within the
constitutional purview. As the liberal lion Justice William Brennan announced, in
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the threat of restraint, as opposed to actual
restraint itself, may deter the exercise of the right to free expression almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions. Such threat of restraint is perhaps a
more insidious, if not sophisticated, means for the State to trample on free speech.
Protected expression is chilled simply by speaking softly while carrying a big stick.
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In distinguishing chilling effect from prior restraint, Nebraska Press Association,

citing Bickel, observed, [i]f it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions
after publication chills speech, prior restraint freezes it at least for the time. An
act of government that chills expression is subject to nullification or injunction from
the courts, as it violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. Because
government retaliation tends to chill an individuals exercise of his right to free
expression, public officials may not, as a general rule, respond to an individuals
protected activity with conduct or speech even though that conduct or speech
would otherwise be a lawful exercise of public authority.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There appears to be no case in American jurisprudence
where a First Amendment claim went forward in the absence of evidence that
speech was actually chilled.On the one hand, Justice Carpio does not bother to
engage in any chilling effect analysis. On the other hand, the majority does
conclude that the acts of the NTC had a chilling effect. Was there truly a chilling
effect resulting from the Press Release of the NTC? While the act or issuance itself
may evince the impression of a chilling effect, there still must be factual evidence to
support the conclusion that a particular act of government actually engendered a
chilling effect. There appears to be no case in American jurisprudence where a First
Amendment claim went forward in the absence of evidence that speech was
actually chilled.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It makes utter sense to impose even a minimal
evidentiary requirement before the Court can conclude that a particular government
action has had a chilling effect on free speechwithout an evidentiary standard,
judges will be forced to rely on intuition and even personal or political sentiments as
the basis for determining whether or not a chilling effect is present.It makes utter
sense to impose even a minimal evidentiary requirement before the Court can
conclude that a particular government action has had a chilling effect on free
speech. Without an evidentiary standard, judges will be forced to rely on intuition
and even personal or political sentiments as the basis for determining whether or
not a chilling effect is present. That is a highly dangerous precedent, and one that
clearly has not been accepted in the United States. In fact, in Zieper v. Metzinger,
the U.S. District Court of New York found it relevant, in ruling against the petitioner,
that Zieper has stated affirmatively that his speech was not chilled in any way.
Where a party can show no change in his behavior, he has quite plainly shown no
chilling of his First Amendment right to free speech.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the employment of the chilling effect mode of
analysis, disregarding the actual effects would mean dispensing with any
evidentiary requirement for the constitutional claim, a doctrine which does not bode
well for the Courts future in constitutional adjudication, and one I expect that will
be significantly modified in due time.The majority states that [t]here is enough
evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts of record, alluding to the
warnings given to media [which] came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency
that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. With
due respect, I submit that what the record establishes is merely the presence of the
cause for chilling (the Press Release), but not the actual chilling effect itself on the
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broadcast media. In that respect, the Joint Statement of the NTC and the KBP
executed just three (3) days after the issuance of the Press Release, becomes
material. In the employment of the chilling effect mode of analysis, disregarding
the actual effects would mean dispensing with any evidentiary requirement for the
constitutional claim. That is a doctrine which does not bode well for the Courts
future in constitutional adjudication, and one I expect that will be significantly
modified in due time.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the unequivocal threats to prosecute would-beoffenders, made no less by the head of the principal law agency of the government
charged with the administration of the criminal justice system, that constitute the
violation of a fundamental freedom that in turn warrants this Courts intervention.
The majority and concurring opinions hardly offer any rebuke to the DOJ Secretary
even as they vote to grant affirmative relief against his actions. This ensued, I
suspect, due to the undue focus placed on the arguments concerning the NTC, even
though the petition itself was not so oriented. But for my part, it is the unequivocal
threats to prosecute would-be-offenders, made no less by the head of the principal
law agency of the government charged with the administration of the criminal
justice system, that constitute the violation of a fundamental freedom that in turn
warrants this Courts intervention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Quite clearly, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary
did infringe on the right to free expression by employing the threat of restraint,
thus embodying government retaliation [that] tends to chill an individuals exercise
of his right to free expression.Was there an actual infringement of the right to
free expression committed by the DOJ Secretary? If so, how was such
accomplished? Quite clearly, the DOJ Secretary did infringe on the right to free
expression by employing the threat of restraint, thus embodying government
retaliation [that] tends to chill an individuals exercise of his right to free
expression. The DOJ Secretary plainly and directly threatened anyone in possession
of the Garci tapes, or anyone who aired or disseminated the same, with the extreme
sanction of criminal prosecution and possible imprisonment. He reiterated the
threats as he directed the NBI to investigate the airing of the tapes. He even
extended the warning of sanction to the Executive Press Secretary. These threats
were evidently designed to stop the airing or dissemination of the Garci tapesa
protected expression which cannot be enjoined by executive fiat.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary
has yet to make operational his threats does not dissuade from the conclusion that
the threats alone already chilled the atmosphere of free speech or expression.
Tasked with undertaking the defense of the DOJ Secretary, the OSG offered not even
a ghost of a contest as soon as the bell for the first round rang. In abject surrender,
it squeezed in just one paragraph in its 27-page
Comment for that purpose. The arguments offered in that solitary paragraph are
meager. It avers that the media reports are without probative value or, at best,
inconclusive as the declarations therein may have been quoted inaccurately or out
of context. Yet the OSG does not deny that the statements were made, failing even
to offer what may have been the accurate context. The OSG also points out that
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the DOJ Secretary has not actually made any issuance, order or instruction to the
NBI to go after such media organizations. Yet the fact that the DOJ Secretary has
yet to make operational his threats does not dissuade from the conclusion that the
threats alone already chilled the atmosphere of free speech or expression.
VELASCO,JR.,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Freedom of Expression; Freedom of the Press; Prior Restraint; Chilling Effect
Principle; With the view I take of the situation, the very fact that the Kapisanan ng
mga Brodcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP) agreed to come up with the joint press
statement that NTC did not issue any [Memorandum Circular] or order constituting
a restraint of press freedom or censorship tends to prove, rather than disprove, the
threatening and chilling tone of its June 11, 2005 press release.The facts on record
are sufficient to support a conclusion that the press release issued by NTCwith all
the unmistakable threat embodied in it of a possible cancellation of licenses and/or
the filing of criminal cases against erring media owners and practitioners
constitutes a clear instance of prior restraint. Not lost on this writer is the fact that
five (5) days after it made the press release in question, NTC proceeded to issue
jointly with the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP) another press
release to clarify that the earlier one issued was not intended to limit or restrain
press freedom. With the view I take of the situation, the very fact that the KBP
agreed to come up with the joint press statement that NTC did not issue any
[Memorandum Circular] or order constituting a restraint of press freedom or
censorship tends to prove, rather than disprove, the threatening and chilling tone
of its June 11, 2005 press release. If there was no prior restraint from the point of
view of media, why was there a need to hold a dialogue with KBP and then issue a
clarifying joint statement? Moreover, the fact that media owners, operators, and
practitioners appeared to have been frozen into inaction, not making any visible
effort to challenge the validity of the NTC press statement, or at least join the
petitioner in his battle for press freedom, can only lead to the conclusion that the
chilling effect of the statement left them threatened.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There was no proof at all of the possible chilling effect
that the alleged statements of Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Gonzales had
on the reporters and media practitionersthe DOJ Secretary, as head of the
prosecution arm of the government and lead administrator of the criminal justice
system under the Administrative Code is, to be sure, impliedly empowered to issue
reminders and warnings against violations of penal statutes; For the reason that it is
unclear as to whether the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary exceeded his
mandate under the premises, the prior-restraint issue in the DOJ aspect of the case
is not yet ripe for adjudication.While the Court has several pieces of evidence to
fall back on and judiciously resolve the NTC press release issue, the situation is
different with respect to the Department of Justice (DOJ) warning issue. What is at
hand are mere allegations in the petition that, on June 8, 2005, respondent DOJ
Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters in possession of copies of the compact
disc containing the alleged Garci wiretapped conversation and those broadcasting
or publishing its contents that they could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping
Act, adding that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a
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continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge of the
crime committed or in whose presence the crime was being committed. There was
no proof at all of the possible chilling effect that the alleged statements of DOJ
Secretary Gonzales had on the reporters and media practitioners. The DOJ
Secretary, as head of the prosecution arm of the government and lead administrator
of the criminal justice system under the Administrative Code is, to be sure, impliedly
empowered to issue reminders and warnings against violations of penal statutes.
And it is a known fact that Secretary Gonzales had issued, and still issues, such kind
of warnings. Whether or not he exceeded his mandate under premises is unclear. It
is for this main reason that I found the prior-restraint issue in the DOJ aspect of the
case not yet ripe for adjudication.
CHICO-NAZARIO,J., Separate Opinion:
Freedom of Expression; Freedom of the Press; Prior Restraint; Chilling Effect
Principle; Administrative Law; The reason escapes me as to why a prohibition, when
it was stated in the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) Memorandum
Circulars and in the authorizations and permits, was valid and acceptable, but when
it was reiterated in a mere press statement released by the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC), had become a violation of the Constitution
as a prior restraint on free speech.A scrutiny of the fair warning issued by the
NTC on 11 June 2005 reveals that it is nothing more than that, a fair warning, calling
for sobriety, care, and circumspection in the news reporting and current affairs
coverage by radio and television stations. It reminded the owners and operators of
the radio stations and television networks of the provisions in NTC Memorandum
Circulars No. 11-12-85 and 22-89, which are also stated in the authorizations and
permits granted to them by the government, that they shall not use their stations
for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation.
It must be emphasized that the NTC is merely reiterating the very same prohibition
already contained in its previous circulars, and even in the authorizations and
permits of radio and television stations. The reason thus escapes me as to why said
prohibition, when it was stated in the NTC Memorandum Circulars and in the
authorizations and permits, was valid and acceptable, but when it was reiterated in
a mere press statement released by the NTC, had become a violation of the
Constitution as a prior restraint on free speech.
Same; Same; Same; Same; We should be judicious in giving too much weight and
credence to press statementsit would be a dangerous precedent to rule that press
statements should be deemed an official act of the administrative agency or public
official concerned.We should be judicious in giving too much weight and credence
to press statements. I believe that it would be a dangerous precedent to rule that
press statements should be deemed an official act of the administrative agency or
public official concerned. Press statements, in general, can be easily manufactured,
prone to alteration or misinterpretation as they are being reported by the media,
and may, during some instances, have to be made on the spot without giving the
source much time to discern the ramifications of his statements. Hence, they cannot
be given the same weight and binding effect of official acts in the form of, say,
memorandum orders or circulars.
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Judicial Review; Locus Standi; When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient
that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
Petitioner has standing to file the instant petition. The test is whether the party has
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. When
suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about
to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the
petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
Same; Moot and Academic Issues; It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have
any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.The
exercise by this Court of the power of judicial inquiry is limited to the determination
of actual cases and controversies. An actual case or controversy means an existing
conflict that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, one that is not
conjectural or anticipatory, otherwise the decision of the court will amount to an
advisory opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical questions since any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither will the Court determine a
moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. Indeed, it is
unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot
question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the
nature of things, cannot be enforced.
Same; Same; Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review Rule; Courts shall decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition yet evasive of
review.In the instant case, it is readily observable that the subsequent joint
statement of the respondent NTC and the Officers and Board of Directors of the KBP
after their June 14, 2005 dialogue not only substantially diminished but, in fact,
obliterated the effects of the earlier press warnings, thus rendering the case moot
and academic. Notably, the joint press statement acknowledged that NTC did not
issue any memorandum circular or order constituting a restraint of press freedom or
censorship. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. Be that as it
may, the Court should discuss and resolve the fundamental issues raised herein, in
observance of the rule that courts shall decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition yet evasive of review.
Freedom of Expression; Prior Restraint; As an aspect of freedom of expression, prior
restraint should not be confused with subsequent punishment; The doctrine of prior
restraint originated in the common law of England where prior restraints of the
press were not permitted, but punishment after publication was.As an aspect of
freedom of expression, prior restraint should not be confused with subsequent
punishment. In Alexander v. U.S., petitioners complaint was that the RICO forfeiture
provisions on businesses dealing in expressive materials constituted prior
restraint because they may have an improper chilling effect on free expression
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by deterring others from engaging in protected speech. In rejecting the petitioners

contention and ruling that the forfeiture is a permissible criminal punishment and
not a prior restraint on speech, the U.S. Supreme Court said: The term prior restraint
is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are
to occur. Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctionsi.e., court
orders that actually forbid speech activitiesare classic examples of prior restraints.
x x x x Finally, petitioners proposed definition of the term prior restraint would
undermine the time-honored distinction between barring speech in the future and
penalizing past speech. The doctrine of prior restraint originated in the common law
of England where prior restraints of the press were not permitted, but punishment
after publication was. This very limited application of the principle of freedom of
speech was held inconsistent with our First Amendment as long ago as Grosjean v.
American Press Co. While we may have given a broader definition to the term prior
restraint than was given to it in English common law, our decisions have
steadfastly preserved the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent
punishments. Though petitioner tries to dismiss this distinction as neither
meaningful nor useful, we think it is critical to our First Amendment jurisprudence.
Because we have interpreted the First Amendment as providing greater protection
from prior restraints than from subsequent punishments, it is important for us to
delineate with some precision the defining characteristics of a prior restraint. To
hold that the forfeiture order in this case constituted a prior restraint would have
the exact opposite effect. It would blur the line separating prior restraints from
subsequent punishments to such a degree that it would be impossible to determine
with any certainty whether a particular measure is a prior restraint or not.
Same; Same; Freedom of the Press; Chilling Effect; Warnings on possible license
revocation and criminal prosecution are simply what they are, mere warningsthey
have no compulsive effect, as they do not impose a limit on speech or other forms
of expression nor do they prevent the expression of a message.There is no parity
between these cases and the case at bench. Unlike the government acts in the
above-cited cases, what we have before us now is merely a press releasenot an
order or a circularwarning broadcast media on the airing of an alleged taped
conversation, with the caveat that should its falsity be subsequently established,
the act could lead to the revocation or cancellation of their licenses, after
appropriate investigation. The warnings on possible license revocation and criminal
prosecution are simply what they are, mere warnings. They have no compulsive
effect, as they do not impose a limit on speech or other forms of expression nor do
they prevent the expression of a message.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Anti-Wiretapping Law (R.A. No. 4200); Conviction under
the law should fittingly be a just cause for the revocation of the license of the erring
radio or television station.The Anti-Wiretapping Law (Republic Act 4200) is a penal
statute. Over the years, no successful challenge to its validity has been sustained.
Conviction under the law should fittingly be a just cause for the revocation of the
license of the erring radio or television station. [Chavez vs. Gonzales, 545 SCRA
441(2008)]

210

211

43. Pollo v. David, GR No. 181881, 18 October 2011

Case Title : BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO, petitioner, vs.
CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV
RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A.
CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE
AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Right to Privacy
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Privacy; The right to privacy has been
accorded recognition as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction
as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Right to Privacy; The Civil Service Commission (CSC) had implemented a policy that
put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything
they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may
monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means.
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice
that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or
receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that onthe-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used
only for such legitimate business purposes.
Same; A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.A search by a
government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. Thus, in the 2004 case decided by
the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where a government
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agencys computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic

content and in addition expressly provided that employees do not have any
personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems and
technology, the government employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as
to the use and contents of his office computer, and therefore evidence found during
warrantless search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for child
pornography. In that case, the defendant employees computer hard drive was first
remotely examined by a computer information technician after his supervisor
received complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed nonwork-related e-mail messages throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed
that defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited websites, in
contravention of the express policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy
disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and
later search warrants were secured by the police department. The initial remote
search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as well as the subsequent
warrantless searches was held as valid under the OConnor ruling that a public
employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified
at inception and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it
in the first place.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Substantial Evidence; Well-settled is the rule that the
findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
are accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasijudicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only respect but even finality if
such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably
opine otherwise.
CARPIO,J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Right to Privacy; View that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) regulation declaring a
no-privacy expectation on the use of government-owned computers logically follows
from the statutory rule that government-owned property shall be used solely for a
public purpose.Any private use of a government property, like a governmentowned computer, is prohibited by law. Consequently, a government employee
cannot expect any privacy when he uses a government-owned computer because
he knows he cannot use the computer for any private purpose. The CSC regulation
declaring a no-privacy expectation on the use of government-owned computers
logically follows from the statutory rule that government-owned property shall be
used solely for a public purpose.
Same; View that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) office regulation denying CSC
employees privacy expectation in anything they create, store, send, or receive in
the computer system is constitutionally infirm insofar as the regulation excludes
from its ambit the three CSC commissioners solely by reason of their rank, and not
by reason of the confidential nature of the electronic data they generate.The CSC
office regulation denying CSC employees privacy expectation in anything they
213

create, store, send, or receive in the computer system, although valid as to

petitioner Briccio Pollo, is constitutionally infirm insofar as the regulation excludes
from its ambit the three CSC commissioners solely by reason of their rank, and not
by reason of the confidential nature of the electronic data they generate.
Bersamin,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Right to Privacy; View that the right to privacy involved herein is the petitioners
right to informational privacy in his workplace, specifically his right to work freely
without surveillance or intrusion.At the outset, I state that the right to privacy
involved herein is the petitioners right to informational privacy in his workplace,
specifically his right to work freely without surveillance or intrusion.
Same; View that even without Office Memorandum (OM) No. 10, Series of 2002
being issued by respondent Karina Constantino-David as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, the employees of the Commission have a reduced expectation
of privacy in the workplace.Even without Office Memorandum (OM) No. 10, Series
of 2002 being issued by respondent Karina Constantino-David as Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission, the employees of the Commission, including the
petitioner, have a reduced expectation of privacy in the workplace. The objective of
the issuance of OM No. 10 has been only to formally inform and make aware the
employees of the Commission about the limitations on their privacy while they are
in the workplace and to advise them that the Commission has legitimate reasons to
monitor communications made by them, electronically or not.
Same; View that the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in
respect of the communications created, stored, sent, or received after office hours
through the office computer, as to which he must be protected.I hold, instead,
that the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of
the communications created, stored, sent, or received after office hours through the
office computer, as to which he must be protected.
Same; View that the validity of the seizure of the files should be limited to the need
for determining whether or not the petitioner unjustly utilized official resources of
the Commission for personal purposes, and should not extend to the reading of the
files contents, which would be violative of his right to privacy.Thus, I vote to
uphold the legality of OM No. 10. I hasten to add, to be very clear, that the validity
of the seizure of the files should be limited to the need for determining whether or
not the petitioner unjustly utilized official resources of the Commission for personal
purposes, and should not extend to the reading of the files contents, which would
be violative of his right to privacy.
Same; View that although the right to privacy is referred to as a right to be enjoyed
by the people, the State cannot just sit back and stand aside when, in the exercise
of his right to privacy, the individual perilously tilts the scales to the detriment of
the national interest.I adhere to the principle that every man is believed to be
free. Freedom gears a man to move about unhampered and to speak out from
conviction. That is why the right to privacy has earned its worthy place in the Bill of
Rights. However, although the right to privacy is referred to as a right to be enjoyed
by the people, the State cannot just sit back and stand aside when, in the exercise
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of his right to privacy, the individual perilously tilts the scales to the detriment of
the national interest.
Same; View that the ruling about the decreased expectation of privacy in the
workplace may generate an unwanted implication for employers in general to
henceforth consider themselves authorized, without risking a collision with the
Constitutionally-protected right to privacy, to probe and pry into communications
made during work hours by their employees through the use of their computers and
other digital instruments of communication.I apprehend that the ruling about the
decreased expectation of privacy in the workplace may generate an unwanted
implication for employers in general to henceforth consider themselves authorized,
without risking a collision with the Constitutionally-protected right to privacy, to
probe and pry into communications made during work hours by their employees
through the use of their computers and other digital instruments of communication.
Thus, the employers may possibly begin to monitor their employees phone calls, to
screen incoming and out-going e-mails, to capture queries made through any of the
Internets efficient search engines (like Google), or to censor visited websites (like
Yahoo!, Facebook or Twitter) in the avowed interest of ensuring productivity and
supervising use of business resources. That will be unfortunate.
Same; View that a recognition of the limitations of man as a being needful of some
extent of rest, and of some degree of personal space even during work hours, is
most essential in order to fully maximize the potential by which his services was
obtained in the first place.Although the interests of capital or public service do
merit protection, a recognition of the limitations of man as a being needful of some
extent of rest, and of some degree of personal space even during work hours, is
most essential in order to fully maximize the potential by which his services was
obtained in the first place. The job should not own him the whole time he is in the
workplace. Even while he remains in the workplace, he must be allowed to preserve
his own identity, to maintain an inner self, to safeguard his beliefs, and to keep
certain thoughts, judgments and desires hidden. [Pollo vs. Constantino-David, 659
SCRA 189(2011)]

215

44. People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014

Case Title : THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondentappellee, vs. VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, accusedappellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Criminal Procedure|
Searches and Seizures|Exclusionary Rule|Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; The right to privacy is a fundamental right
enshrined by implication in our Constitution.The right to privacy is a fundamental
right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of
its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution: The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; There must be a particular
description of the place and the things to be searched.As a general rule, searches
conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are
reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge. The existence of probable cause must be established by the
judge after asking searching questions and answers. Probable cause at this stage
can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant
frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular
description of the place and the things to be searched.
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; There are instances when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless.There are instances when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to
lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. This court has taken
into account the uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of
the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured. The known jurisprudential instances of
reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are: 1. Warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest. . . ; 2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, . . . ; 3. Search of a
moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
216

furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the

occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5.
Customs search; 6. Stop and frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Searches Incidental to a Lawful Arrest; Searches
incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto,
and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person
arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the
evidence.One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is stop and
frisk. Stop and frisk searches are often confused with searches incidental to
lawful arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require
that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the
vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no
weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Stop and Frisk Searches; The stop and frisk search should
be used when dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in
the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure a search
warrant.Stop and frisk searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a
crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288
(1990), was similar to a stop and frisk situation whose object is either to
determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. This court
stated that the stop and frisk search should be used [w]hen dealing with a
rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the police officer who should observe facts that
would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should
not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person.It is the police officer who
should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a
person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon ones
basic right to security of ones person and effects.
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; For warrantless searches, probable
cause was defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged.
Same; Same; Same; Stop and Frisk Searches; The stop and frisk search was
originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous
weapons.Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this
exception, unless there is compliance with the genuine reason requirement and
217

that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat v.
Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997): [A] stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps
to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
(Emphasis supplied) The stop and frisk search was originally limited to outer
clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. As in Manalili v. Court
of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400 (1997), jurisprudence also allows stop and frisk for
cases involving dangerous drugs.
Same; Same; Same; Searches Incidental to a Lawful Arrest; Rule 126, Section 13 of
the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest.Rule 126,
Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For
there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful
warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Same; Same; Same; The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee.There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds
constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the police asked
him to open his bags. As this court previously stated: Appellants silence should not
be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search,
if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at
all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. (Citations omitted) Cogaeds
silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive
environment brought about by the police officers excessive intrusion into his
private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the
waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from
any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
Same; Same; Same; For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional
right, it is not sufficient that the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be
known as a police officer. The police officer must also inform the person to be
218

searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or
her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search.For a
valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that
the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer. The
police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or
her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must
communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to
waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the
police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental
nature of a persons constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
Same; Same; Same; Exclusionary Rule; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; Evidence
obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is
the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.The Constitution provides: Any evidence
obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the
exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional
provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967). This rule
prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on
fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be
excluded as evidence because it is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. It ensures
that the fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not
lightly infringed upon and are upheld. [People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427(2014)]

45. People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014

Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
OLIVER RENATO EDAO y EBDANE, appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law|Dangerous Drugs Act|Chain of
Custody Rule|Exclusionary Rule|Evidence|Fruit of the
Poisnous Tree
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; For a warrantless arrest
of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
219

commit an offense. This is known an arrest in flagrante delicto. For a warrantless

arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Trying to run away when no crime has been overtly
committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.That the appellant
attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by
itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge
that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting
to engage in criminal activity. As the Court explained in People v. Villareal, 693 SCRA
549 (2013): Furthermore, appellants act of darting away when PO3 de Leon
approached him should not be construed against him. Flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of
guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even in
high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of
retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of
being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, appellants attempt to run
away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have
meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence. In other words, trying to run
away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be
evidence of guilt.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; Illegal Searches and
Seizures; Considering that the appellants warrantless arrest was unlawful, the
search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.Considering that the
appellants warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted
from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline
substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an
invalid search and seizure.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs; The existence of dangerous drugs is a condition
sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it
being the very corpus delicti of the crimes.Even granting, for the sake of
argument, that the appellants warrantless arrest was valid, the latters acquittal is
still in order due to the prosecutions failure to establish the evidence of the corpus
delicti with moral certainty. We stress that [t]he existence of dangerous drugs is a
condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crimes. Thus, the evidence
of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In the present
case, the various lapses enumerated and discussed below committed by the
police in the handling, safekeeping and custody over the seized drug tainted the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu.
Same; Same; Marking; Words and Phrases; Marking, as used in drug cases, means
the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the item/s seized.Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing
220

by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on

the item/s seized. Consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that the
marking of the seized items to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done
(1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
The Court clarified in People v. Resurreccion, 603 SCRA 510 (2009), that marking
upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. Thus, while marking of the seized drugs
at the police station is permitted, the marking should be done by the police, and not
by the accused. The appellants participation in the marking procedure should only
be as a witness. Why the police failed to do a basic police procedure truly baffles us.
Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) offers some flexibility in complying with the express
requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165, i.e., noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the
IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements under
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e., noncompliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
This saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the
procedural lapses and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when
the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
seized had been preserved.
Same; Same; Same; Exclusionary Rule; Although the Supreme Court (SC) has
recognized that minor deviations from the procedures under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused, it has also declared that when
there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive
law (R.A. No. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the
seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence.Although the Court has
recognized that minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. No. 9165 would
not automatically exonerate an accused, we have also declared that when there is
gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A.
No. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items
that the prosecution presented in evidence. This doubt cannot be remedied by
simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties,
for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards
effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; The Supreme
Court (SC) holds that the appellants acquittal is in order since the shabu
purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit
of the poisonous tree.In sum, we hold that the appellants acquittal is in order
221

since the shabu purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence for being
the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Corollarily, the prosecutions failure to
comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody
requirement of this Act, compromised the identity of the item seized, leading to the
failure to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged. [People vs.
Edao, 729 SCRA 255(2014)]

222

46. People v. Ng, G.R. No. 180452, January 10, 2011

Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. NG YIK BUN, KWOK WAI CHENG, CHANG
CHAUN SHI, CHUA SHILOU HWAN, KAN SHUN MIN, and
RAYMOND S. TAN, accused-appellants
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of
Appeals
Syllabi Class : Evidence|Witnesses
Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; Warrantless arrests is considered
reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant
case, contrary to accused-appellants contention, there was indeed a valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances immediately
prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers
received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband;
(2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in
Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort
from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accusedappellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300
van.
Same; Same; In People v. Alunday, 564 SCRA 135 (2008), the Court held that when
a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect and arrest
without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the
offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view.In People v.
Alunday, 564 SCRA 135 (2008), we held that when a police officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at
once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec.
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his
presence or within his view. In the instant case, it can plausibly be argued that
accused-appellants were committing the offense of possessing shabu and were in
the act of loading them in a white van when the police officers arrested them. As
aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of the
police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain
view and duly observed by the arresting officers. And to write finis to the issue of
any irregularity in their warrantless arrest, the Court notes, as it has consistently
held, that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to their
arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea.
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs; Accused-appellants were found to be in possession of prohibited drugs
223

without proof that they were duly authorized by law to possess them. Having been
caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus
possidendi on the part of accused-appellants.Present in the instant case are all
the elements of illegal possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said
drug. Accused-appellants were positively identified in court as the individuals
caught loading and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to be in possession of
prohibited drugs without proof that they were duly authorized by law to possess
them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie
evidence of animus possidendi on the part of accused-appellants. There is, thus, no
merit to the argument of the defense that a warrant was needed to arrest accusedappellants.
Evidence; Witnesses; Appellate courts generally will not disturb the trial courts
assessment of a witness credibility unless certain material facts and circumstances
have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.As no ill motive can be imputed to
the prosecutions witnesses, we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and affirm the trial courts finding that the police officers
testimonies are deserving of full faith and credit. Appellate courts generally will not
disturb the trial courts assessment of a witness credibility unless certain material
facts and circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded. We find no
reason to deviate from this rule in the instant case. [People vs. Ng Yik Bun, 639
SCRA 88(2011)]

224

47. People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012

Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, accused-appellant.
Case Nature : AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law|Alibi
Criminal Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over the person of the accused
may be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through
his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court.
Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived.Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through
compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. Any objection
to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An
accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and
participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any irregularities
that may have attended his arrest. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is
not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived upon a
complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error.
Same; Constitutional Law; Right to Counsel; The right to counsel is deemed to have
arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to
stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
Contrary to Laras claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was
placed in a police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his
conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did
not render Sumulongs identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is
deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial
investigation.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Even in the absence of direct
evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.Well-settled is the
rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the
absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not. Under
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial
evidence sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a)
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there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide; In cases of robbery with homicide, the taking
of personal property with intent to gain must itself be established beyond
reasonable doubt; It must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit
was robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation of
the robbery by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.Indeed, in cases of
robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must
itself be established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the
physical act of asportation by the accused must be presented by the prosecution. It
must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit was robbery and the
homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The mere presence of the accused at the
crime scene is not enough to implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob
and the use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.
Same; Alibi; It is well-settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is
inherently a weak defense.In view of Sumulongs positive identification of Lara,
the CA was correct in denying Laras alibi outright. It is well-settled that positive
identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such is the
rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove. Moreover,
in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise
be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear
and convincing proof. [People vs. Lara, 678 SCRA 332(2012)]

226

48. Crescencio v People, G.R. No. 205015, November 19,

2014
Case Title : MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law ; Forestry Code ; Penalties ;
Attorneys; Attorney-Client Relationship; As a general rule, the inadvertence of
counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the appellate
courts indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law; (b) when application of the rule will result
in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (c) where the interests of
justice so require.As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be
considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the appellate courts indulgence
except: (a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process of law; (b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation
of the clients liberty or property; or (c) where the interests of justice so require.
Here, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel to serve a copy of
the Appellants Brief to the OSG is a persuasive reason or a compelling justification
to forego the Rules of Procedure as the wanton recklessness or gross negligence of
her counsel has deprived her of due process of law which will result in the outright
deprivation of her liberty. In this regard, the Court agrees that the CA should have
taken a liberal view of the rules and ruled on the merits of the appeal, especially
when what is involved is no less than the petitioners liberty.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Plainview Doctrine; Searches and Seizures;
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who
has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be
secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions, one of which is seizure of
evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain
view of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. There is no question that the
DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant when they went to the
house of the petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the petitioners house,
the lumbers were lying under the latters house and at the shoreline about two
meters away from the house of the petitioner. It is clear, therefore, that the said
lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the
petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
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Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; Forestry Code; Section 80 of the Forestry
Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) or any personnel of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to
seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense or the
forest products gathered or taken by the offender.The DENR personnel had the
authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant. Section 80 of the Forestry
Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of
the Philippine National Police to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the
Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense or the forest products gathered or taken by the offender.
Clearly, in the course of such lawful intrusion, the DENR personnel had inadvertently
come across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner. The fact of
possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of magsihagon lumber, as well as her
subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of the Forestry Code.
Under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, there are two distinct and separate offenses
punished, namely: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without any authority; and (2) possession of timber or
other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest
laws and regulations.
Criminal Law; Forestry Code; Penalties; Violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code
is punished as Qualified Theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).Accordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the
minimum penalty under Article 309(6) of the RPC, which is arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. However, considering that violation of Section 68 of
the Forestry Code is punished as Qualified Theft under Article 310 in relation to
Article 309 of the RPC, the statutory penalty shall be increased by two degrees, that
is, to prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods or within the range of
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and ten (10) days, considering that there are no attending mitigating or
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense. [Crescencio vs. People,
741 SCRA 319(2014)]

228

49. People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014

Case Title : THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondentappellee, vs. VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, accusedappellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Criminal Procedure|
Searches and Seizures|Exclusionary Rule|Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; The right to privacy is a fundamental right
enshrined by implication in our Constitution.The right to privacy is a fundamental
right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of
its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution: The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; There must be a particular
description of the place and the things to be searched.As a general rule, searches
conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are
reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge. The existence of probable cause must be established by the
judge after asking searching questions and answers. Probable cause at this stage
can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant
frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular
description of the place and the things to be searched.
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; There are instances when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless.There are instances when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to
lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. This court has taken
into account the uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of
the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured. The known jurisprudential instances of
reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are: 1. Warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest. . . ; 2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, . . . ; 3. Search of a
moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
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furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the

occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5.
Customs search; 6. Stop and frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Searches Incidental to a Lawful Arrest; Searches
incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto,
and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person
arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the
evidence.One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is stop and
frisk. Stop and frisk searches are often confused with searches incidental to
lawful arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require
that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the
vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no
weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Stop and Frisk Searches; The stop and frisk search should
be used when dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in
the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure a search
warrant.Stop and frisk searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a
crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288
(1990), was similar to a stop and frisk situation whose object is either to
determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. This court
stated that the stop and frisk search should be used [w]hen dealing with a
rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the police officer who should observe facts that
would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should
not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person.It is the police officer who
should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a
person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon ones
basic right to security of ones person and effects.
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; For warrantless searches, probable
cause was defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged.
Same; Same; Same; Stop and Frisk Searches; The stop and frisk search was
originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous
weapons.Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this
exception, unless there is compliance with the genuine reason requirement and
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that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat v.
Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997): [A] stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps
to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
(Emphasis supplied) The stop and frisk search was originally limited to outer
clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. As in Manalili v. Court
of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400 (1997), jurisprudence also allows stop and frisk for
cases involving dangerous drugs.
Same; Same; Same; Searches Incidental to a Lawful Arrest; Rule 126, Section 13 of
the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest.Rule 126,
Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For
there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful
warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Same; Same; Same; The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee.There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds
constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the police asked
him to open his bags. As this court previously stated: Appellants silence should not
be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search,
if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at
all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. (Citations omitted) Cogaeds
silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive
environment brought about by the police officers excessive intrusion into his
private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the
waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from
any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
Same; Same; Same; For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional
right, it is not sufficient that the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be
known as a police officer. The police officer must also inform the person to be
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searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or
her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search.For a
valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that
the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer. The
police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or
her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must
communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to
waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the
police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental
nature of a persons constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
Same; Same; Same; Exclusionary Rule; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; Evidence
obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is
the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.The Constitution provides: Any evidence
obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the
exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional
provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967). This rule
prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on
fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be
excluded as evidence because it is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. It ensures
that the fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not
lightly infringed upon and are upheld. [People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427(2014)]

50. Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October

18, 2011
Case Title : BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO, petitioner, vs.
CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV
RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A.
CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE
AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Right to Privacy
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Privacy; The right to privacy has been
accorded recognition as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction
as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 2.
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Right to Privacy; The Civil Service Commission (CSC) had implemented a policy that
put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything
they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may
monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means.
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice
that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or
receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that onthe-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used
only for such legitimate business purposes.
Same; A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.A search by a
government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. Thus, in the 2004 case decided by
the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where a government
agencys computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic
content and in addition expressly provided that employees do not have any
personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems and
technology, the government employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as
to the use and contents of his office computer, and therefore evidence found during
warrantless search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for child
pornography. In that case, the defendant employees computer hard drive was first
remotely examined by a computer information technician after his supervisor
received complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed nonwork-related e-mail messages throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed
that defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited websites, in
contravention of the express policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy
disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and
later search warrants were secured by the police department. The initial remote
search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as well as the subsequent
warrantless searches was held as valid under the OConnor ruling that a public
employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified
at inception and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it
in the first place.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Substantial Evidence; Well-settled is the rule that the
findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
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are accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasijudicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only respect but even finality if
such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably
opine otherwise.
CARPIO,J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Right to Privacy; View that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) regulation declaring a
no-privacy expectation on the use of government-owned computers logically follows
from the statutory rule that government-owned property shall be used solely for a
public purpose.Any private use of a government property, like a governmentowned computer, is prohibited by law. Consequently, a government employee
cannot expect any privacy when he uses a government-owned computer because
he knows he cannot use the computer for any private purpose. The CSC regulation
declaring a no-privacy expectation on the use of government-owned computers
logically follows from the statutory rule that government-owned property shall be
used solely for a public purpose.
Same; View that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) office regulation denying CSC
employees privacy expectation in anything they create, store, send, or receive in
the computer system is constitutionally infirm insofar as the regulation excludes
from its ambit the three CSC commissioners solely by reason of their rank, and not
by reason of the confidential nature of the electronic data they generate.The CSC
office regulation denying CSC employees privacy expectation in anything they
create, store, send, or receive in the computer system, although valid as to
petitioner Briccio Pollo, is constitutionally infirm insofar as the regulation excludes
from its ambit the three CSC commissioners solely by reason of their rank, and not
by reason of the confidential nature of the electronic data they generate.
Bersamin,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Right to Privacy; View that the right to privacy involved herein is the petitioners
right to informational privacy in his workplace, specifically his right to work freely
without surveillance or intrusion.At the outset, I state that the right to privacy
involved herein is the petitioners right to informational privacy in his workplace,
specifically his right to work freely without surveillance or intrusion.
Same; View that even without Office Memorandum (OM) No. 10, Series of 2002
being issued by respondent Karina Constantino-David as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, the employees of the Commission have a reduced expectation
of privacy in the workplace.Even without Office Memorandum (OM) No. 10, Series
of 2002 being issued by respondent Karina Constantino-David as Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission, the employees of the Commission, including the
petitioner, have a reduced expectation of privacy in the workplace. The objective of
the issuance of OM No. 10 has been only to formally inform and make aware the
employees of the Commission about the limitations on their privacy while they are
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in the workplace and to advise them that the Commission has legitimate reasons to
monitor communications made by them, electronically or not.
Same; View that the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in
respect of the communications created, stored, sent, or received after office hours
through the office computer, as to which he must be protected.I hold, instead,
that the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of
the communications created, stored, sent, or received after office hours through the
office computer, as to which he must be protected.
Same; View that the validity of the seizure of the files should be limited to the need
for determining whether or not the petitioner unjustly utilized official resources of
the Commission for personal purposes, and should not extend to the reading of the
files contents, which would be violative of his right to privacy.Thus, I vote to
uphold the legality of OM No. 10. I hasten to add, to be very clear, that the validity
of the seizure of the files should be limited to the need for determining whether or
not the petitioner unjustly utilized official resources of the Commission for personal
purposes, and should not extend to the reading of the files contents, which would
be violative of his right to privacy.
Same; View that although the right to privacy is referred to as a right to be enjoyed
by the people, the State cannot just sit back and stand aside when, in the exercise
of his right to privacy, the individual perilously tilts the scales to the detriment of
the national interest.I adhere to the principle that every man is believed to be
free. Freedom gears a man to move about unhampered and to speak out from
conviction. That is why the right to privacy has earned its worthy place in the Bill of
Rights. However, although the right to privacy is referred to as a right to be enjoyed
by the people, the State cannot just sit back and stand aside when, in the exercise
of his right to privacy, the individual perilously tilts the scales to the detriment of
the national interest.
Same; View that the ruling about the decreased expectation of privacy in the
workplace may generate an unwanted implication for employers in general to
henceforth consider themselves authorized, without risking a collision with the
Constitutionally-protected right to privacy, to probe and pry into communications
made during work hours by their employees through the use of their computers and
other digital instruments of communication.I apprehend that the ruling about the
decreased expectation of privacy in the workplace may generate an unwanted
implication for employers in general to henceforth consider themselves authorized,
without risking a collision with the Constitutionally-protected right to privacy, to
probe and pry into communications made during work hours by their employees
through the use of their computers and other digital instruments of communication.
Thus, the employers may possibly begin to monitor their employees phone calls, to
screen incoming and out-going e-mails, to capture queries made through any of the
Internets efficient search engines (like Google), or to censor visited websites (like
Yahoo!, Facebook or Twitter) in the avowed interest of ensuring productivity and
supervising use of business resources. That will be unfortunate.

235

Same; View that a recognition of the limitations of man as a being needful of some
extent of rest, and of some degree of personal space even during work hours, is
most essential in order to fully maximize the potential by which his services was
obtained in the first place.Although the interests of capital or public service do
merit protection, a recognition of the limitations of man as a being needful of some
extent of rest, and of some degree of personal space even during work hours, is
most essential in order to fully maximize the potential by which his services was
obtained in the first place. The job should not own him the whole time he is in the
workplace. Even while he remains in the workplace, he must be allowed to preserve
his own identity, to maintain an inner self, to safeguard his beliefs, and to keep
certain thoughts, judgments and desires hidden. [Pollo vs. Constantino-David, 659
SCRA 189(2011)]

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51. Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10,

2014
Case Title : JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS,
MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUOZ,
petitioners, vs. MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Remedial Law ; Criminal Law ;
Constitutional Law ; Preliminary Investigation ;
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; Probable Cause;
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended
with the incorporation of the word probable cause as the basis of the arresting
officers determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the
crime.Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further
amended with the incorporation of the word probable cause as the basis of the
arresting officers determination on whether the person to be arrested has
committed the crime. Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: When an offense has just been
committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just
been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.From the current phraseology of the rules on
warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section 5(b), the following are the
notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word just,
connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be
arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting
officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it. It is clear that the present rules have objectified
the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the (1)
commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize
arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay. As presently worded, the elements
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an
offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.

237

Same; Same; Same; Same; In determining the existence of probable cause, the
arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable
judgment.In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer
should make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The
standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment
are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant
is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless
arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the
arrest and not on the information acquired later. In evaluating probable cause,
probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and
practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act.
It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particular
circumstances and the particular offense involved.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigations; The purpose of a preliminary investigation
is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for trial.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty of the crime and should be held for trial. In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 32
Phil. 363 (1915), we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Warrant of Arrest; Before issuing a warrant of arrest,
the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient
proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof.Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must
be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to
review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is
sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause
to issue a warrant of arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; The arresting officers
determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.In contrast, the
arresting officers determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded

238

on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making
the arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the present rules and jurisprudence, the
arresting officer should base his determination of probable cause on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their
determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.It is clear therefore that
the standard for determining probable cause is invariable for the officer arresting
without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest.
It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be. However, while
the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine probable
cause, within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced
heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short,
although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess
dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they
must determine probable cause. Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence,
the arresting officer should base his determination of probable cause on his
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base
their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties. In other words, the
arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available
information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) holds that the following
must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just
committed; and 2) the arresting officers exercise of discretion is limited by the
standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances
within his personal knowledge.The clincher in the element of personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances is the required element of immediacy within which these
facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a
safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police
officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or
circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation. The reason for the
element of the immediacy is this as the time gap from the commission of the
crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become
contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the
other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officers determination of
probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The
same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as
the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer
could effect a valid warrantless arrest. In light of the discussion above on the
developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
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and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for
a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the
arresting officers exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause
to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge.
The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness
of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional
mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; With these facts and circumstances that the
police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one
hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of
the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners
warrantless arrests.To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the
crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police
officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those
responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived
almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were
confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired. With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and
which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they
have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners,
we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within then police officers observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances,
that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.To reiterate,
personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above cited
provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being
committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is
patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
recently committed the crime. Considering the circumstances of the stabbing,
particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances
of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the
immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently,
the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under
the circumstances.

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Same; Same; Judgments; No less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the
decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly
the reasons therefor.We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of
discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all
the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC
decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary
incidents leading up to the trial. Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself
provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state
clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the
proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the
validity of the RTCs order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the
petitioners Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
Leonen,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Illegal Searches and Seizures; View that the
right of a person to his or her liberties in the form of protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures enjoys a high degree of protection.I vote that
the petition be granted. Petitioners are entitled to a preliminary investigation
because the warrantless arrest was not valid. The right of a person to his or her
liberties in the form of protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
enjoys a high degree of protection. The Constitution only allows for reasonable
searches and seizures. As a general rule, courts decide whether there is probable
cause to issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest.
Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; View that the elements of a valid warrantless
arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) are the following: (1) the offense has just been
committed; (2) the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and (3) these facts and circumstances give rise to probable cause
that the person to be arrested has committed the offense.The elements of a valid
warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) are the following: (1) the offense
has just been committed; (2) the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances; and (3) these facts and circumstances give rise to probable cause
that the person to be arrested has committed the offense.
Same; Same; Same; View that to ensure that the right person can be put within the
jurisdiction of a court, the rules allow a valid warrantless arrest.The element that
the offense had just been committed was introduced in the 1985 revision of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. This element must be read in relation to the general
requirement that a warrant of arrest must be procured to ensure a more impartial
determination of the existence of facts and circumstances. This element, however,
acknowledges the necessities of law enforcement. At times, the police officer arrives
at the scene of the crime after the crime just happened and there are facts and
circumstances such as the sudden flight of a person or the wielding of a weapon
by a person near the incident that reasonably lead the police officer to believe
that the person is the perpetrator. In such cases, to ensure that the right person can
be put within the jurisdiction of a court, the rules allow a valid warrantless arrest.
241

This necessity is wanting in this case. Petitioners themselves, together with a

barangay tanod, voluntarily went to the police station. They did so after they had
gone to the barangay hall to report the incident and had their own complaints
entered into the barangay blotter. There was no urgency to arrest petitioners. They
were not planning to flee. They voluntarily presented themselves as complainants
against private respondent. For reasons not clear in the record, they were subjected
to a warrantless arrest and then to inquest. Private respondent, on the other hand,
was allowed to be a respondent in a preliminary investigation. He was not arrested.
Same; Same; Same; View that the arresting officers must obtain personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances that lead to the conclusion that an
offense has just been committed.The arresting officers must obtain personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances that lead to the conclusion that an
offense has just been committed. They must also perceive facts and circumstances
that would substantiate the probable liability of the person. The accused is usually
identified when he or she is seen fleeing the scene because the act of fleeing
suggests the attempt to evade authority. A person in possession of a weapon could
also be perceived as the one liable for an offense.
Same; Same; Same; View that in People v. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427 (2014), the
Supreme Court (SC) ruled that for there to be a genuine reason to execute a
warrantless arrest or search, there should be more than one suspicious
circumstance to infer that there was criminal activity.The plurality in the phrasing
suggests that there should be more than one fact or circumstance. In People v.
Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427 (2014), we ruled that for there to be a genuine reason to
execute a warrantless arrest or search, there should be more than one suspicious
circumstance to infer that there was criminal activity. In most cases that found the
validity of the warrantless arrest, there was the presence of more than one
circumstance that formed part of the personal knowledge of the police officers.
Same; Same; Same; View that if there is no personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances on the part of the police officers, a warrantless arrest under Rule
113, Section 5(b) will be unreasonable because there is nothing to base probable
cause on that the accused committed the offense.Flight of the accused is often a
sign that there is probable cause that he or she committed the offense. When he or
she attempts to escape from authorities, the authorities must act immediately
because not doing so might compromise the investigation. If there is no personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances on the part of the police officers, a
warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) will be unreasonable because there
is nothing to base probable cause on that the accused committed the offense.
Remedial Law; Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Preliminary Investigation; View that
with the absence of a valid warrantless arrest, petitioners are entitled to preliminary
investigation.With the absence of a valid warrantless arrest, petitioners are
entitled to preliminary investigation. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a
proceeding the purpose of which is to determine whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The right to
preliminary investigation is statutory in character. Being mandated by statute, a
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preliminary investigation becomes part of the constitutional due process rights

accorded to the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, a
preliminary investigation is required if an offense has a penalty of at least four (4)
years, two (2) months, and one (1) day. However, under Section 6 of the same rules,
a preliminary investigation is no longer necessary if the person accused was
arrested lawfully without a warrant.Under Rule 112, a preliminary investigation is
required if an offense has a penalty of at least four (4) years, two (2) months, and
one (1) day. However, under Section 6 of the same rules, a preliminary investigation
is no longer necessary if the person accused was arrested lawfully without a
warrant. If there was a valid warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section 5, inquest
proceedings are required.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that based on the Manual for Prosecutors, inquests
are conducted by a public prosecutor assigned as an Inquest Officer.Based on the
Manual for Prosecutors, inquests are conducted by a public prosecutor assigned as
an Inquest Officer. An inquest is conducted only at the police stations or
headquarters of the Philippine National Police, unless otherwise directed. Here,
petitioners alleged that they were brought from Batasan Hills Police Station to the
Office of the Prosecutor. At the Office of the Prosecutor, it was decided that
petitioners would be subjected to inquest, while respondent would undergo
preliminary investigation. This irregularly conducted inquest aggravates the fact
that petitioners were subjected to an inquest despite lack of a valid warrantless
arrest. [Pestilos vs. Generoso, 739 SCRA 337(2014)]

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52. Lumanog v. People, G.R. No. 182555 : September 7,

2010
Case Title : LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS,
petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Remedial Law|Hot
Pursuit|Warrantless Arrest
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Judgments; Judges are expected to make
complete findings of fact in their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects
of the case in the light of the evidence presented.The Constitution commands that
[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Judges are expected to make
complete findings of fact in their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects
of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency
to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such
conclusions are deduced.
Same; Same; Same; Memorandum Decisions; Though it is not a good practice, Court
sees nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completely copying the
memorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision clearly and distinctly
states sufficient findings of fact and the law on which they are based.In Bank of
the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, 375 SCRA 81 (2002), we held that though it is not
a good practice, we see nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completely
copying the memorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision clearly
and distinctly states sufficient findings of fact and the law on which they are based.
In another case where we upheld the validity of memorandum decisions, we
nevertheless took occasion to remind judges that it is still desirable for an appellate
judge to endeavor to make the issues clearer and use his own perceptiveness in
unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the law. No less
importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his judgment.
Same; Right to Counsel; Custodial Investigations; Custodial investigation refers to
the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a
particular person as a suspect. Police officers claimed that appellants were
apprehended as a result of hot pursuit activities on the days following the
ambush-slay of Abadilla. There is no question, however, that when appellants were
arrested they were already considered suspects: Joel was pinpointed by security
guard Alejo who went along with the PARAC squad to Fairview on June 19, 1996,
while the rest of appellants were taken by the same operatives in follow-up
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operations after Joel provided them with the identities of his conspirators and where
they could be found.
Same; Same; Same; Extrajudicial Confession; Settled is the rule that the moment a
police officer tries to elicit admissions, or confessions or even plain information from
a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel.P/Insp. Castillo admitted
that the initial questioning of Joel began in the morning of June 20, 1996, the first
time said suspect was presented to him at the CPDC station, even before he was
brought to the IBP Office for the taking of his formal statement. Thus, the possibility
of appellant Joel having been subjected to intimidation or violence in the hands of
police investigators as he claims, cannot be discounted. The constitutional
requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a
police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from
a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. The purpose of providing
counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice
of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating
statements.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence
when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial
investigation.Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels
execution of his statement before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said
confession must be invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must
conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible
in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under
custodial investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The phrase preferably of his own choice does not
convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is
exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling the defense; A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by
the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsels
appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.The phrase
preferably of his own choice does not convey the message that the choice of a
lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the
tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who
can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. Thus,
while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation
cannot afford the services of counselor where the preferred lawyer is not available
is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as
he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not
raise any objection against the counsels appointment during the course of the
245

investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the

statement before the swearing officer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and
logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.We held that the modifier
competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It
stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of
a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by
a diligent and capable lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and
logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should
ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under
investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly
be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be
presumed innocent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Credibility of Witnesses; When it comes to
credibility of witnesses, the court accords the highest respect, even finality, to the
evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented
before it; The fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one
who rendered the judgment, but merely relied on the record of the case, does not
render his judgment erroneous or irregular.Time and again, we have held that the
testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is
clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court. Indeed, when it
comes to credibility of witnesses, this Court accords the highest respect, even
finality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the
witnesses presented before it. This holds true notwithstanding that it was another
judge who presided at the trial and Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. who penned the
decision in this case heard only some witnesses for the defense. It is axiomatic that
the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered
the judgment, but merely relied on the record of the case, does not render his
judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest
opportunity to weigh the testimonies, not having heard all the witnesses speak or
observed their deportment and manner of testifying.
Same; Same; Affidavits; The discrepancies between a sworn statement and
testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as
testimonial evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.Appellants make much
of a few inconsistencies in his statement and testimony, with respect to the number
of assailants and his reaction when he was ordered to get down in his guard post.
But such inconsistencies have already been explained by Alejo during crossexamination by correcting his earlier statement in using number four (4) to refer to
those persons actually standing around the car and two (2) more persons as
lookouts, and that he got nervous only when the second lookout shouted at him to
246

get down, because the latter actually poked a gun at him. It is settled that
affidavits, being ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, but
do not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. The discrepancies between a
sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an
accused, as testimonial evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.
Same; Same; Out-of-court Identification; Procedure for out-of-court identification
and the test to determine the admissibility of such identification explained in People
v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995).In People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54
(1995), we explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to
determine the admissibility of such identification, thus: Out-of-court identification is
conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also
done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons
lined up for the purpose. . . In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-ofcourt identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness opportunity to
view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Out-of-Court Identification; The inadmissibility of a police
line-up identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification.In any case, the trial court did not rely solely
on said out-of-court identification considering that Alejo also positively identified
appellants during the trial. Thus, even assuming arguendo that Alejos out-of-court
identification was tainted with irregularity, his subsequent identification in court
cured any flaw that may have attended it. We have held that the inadmissibility of a
police line-up identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification.
Same; Same; Same; The presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used and
ballistic examination are not prerequisites for conviction.As this Court held in
Velasco v. People, 483 SCRA 649 (2006)As regards the failure of the police to
present a ballistic report on the seven spent shells recovered from the crime scene,
the same does not constitute suppression of evidence. A ballistic report serves only
as a guide for the courts in considering the ultimate facts of the case. It would be
indispensable if there are no credible eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it is
corroborative in nature. The presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used
and ballistic examination are not prerequisites for conviction. The corpus delicti and
the positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime are
more than enough to sustain his conviction. Even without a ballistic report, the
positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more than sufficient to prove
accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, since the identity of

247

the assailant has been sufficiently established, a ballistic report on the slugs can be
dispensed with in proving petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Alibi; To be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of
alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the person
charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the
reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time.Alibi is the
weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is
for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused
by the witnesses. To be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the
defense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the
person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its
commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time.
The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is
the least possibility of accuseds presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold
water.
Criminal Law; Murder; Treachery; The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime,
depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or to repel the aggression,
thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without any
provocation on the part of the victim.As regards the presence of treachery as a
qualifying circumstance, the evidence clearly showed that the attack on the
unsuspecting victimwho was inside his car on a stop position in the middle of
early morning traffic when he was suddenly fired upon by the appellantswas
deliberate, sudden and unexpected. There was simply no chance for Abadilla to
survive the ambush-slay, with successive shots quickly fired at close range by two
(2) armed men on both sides of his car; and much less to retaliate by using his own
gun, as no less than 23 gunshot wounds on his head and chest caused his
instantaneous death. As we have consistently ruled, the essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the
crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or to repel the
aggression, thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without
any provocation on the part of the victim.
Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; The essence of evident premeditation is that
the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive at
a calm judgment.Evident premeditation was likewise properly appreciated by the
trial court, notwithstanding the inadmissibility of Joel de Jesuss extrajudicial
confession disclosing in detail the pre-planned ambush of Abadilla, apparently a
contract killing in which the perpetrators were paid or expected to receive payment
for the job. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Alejo had stressed that as early as
7:30 in the morning of June 13, 1996, he already noticed something unusual going
on upon seeing the two (2) lookouts (appellants Joel de Jesus and Lorenzo delos
Santos) walking to and fro along Katipunan Avenue infront of the building he was
guarding. True enough, they were expecting somebody to pass that way, who was
no other than Abadilla driving his Honda Accord. After the lapse of more or less one
248

(1) hour, he already heard successive gunshots, while in his guard post, from the
direction of the middle lane where Abadillas car was surrounded by four (4) men
carrying short firearms. All the foregoing disclosed the execution of a pre-conceived
plan to kill Abadilla. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of
the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to
carry out criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.
Same; Same; Death of a Party; Damages; Damages that may be awarded when
death occurs due to a crime.When death occurs due to a crime, the following
damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim;
(2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
and (5) temperate damages.
BERSAMIN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; The records of the present case show that
impermissible suggestion did not precede Alegos out-of-court identification of De
Jesus as one of the perpetrators of the crime; The procedure outlined in People v.
Pineda, 429 SCRA 478 (2004) and People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995), for a
proper out-of-court identification was neither disregarded nor violated.In contrast,
the records of the present case show that impermissible suggestion did not precede
Alejos out-of-court positive identification of De Jesus as one of the perpetrators of
the crime. Alejos testimony on September 3, 1996 reveals, on the contrary, that
Alejo even categorically declined to identify any suspect by mere looking at a
photograph. Verily, the procedure outlined in People v. Pineda, 429 SCRA 478 (2004)
and People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995), for a proper out-of-court
identification was neither disregarded nor violated.
Same; Same; In any criminal prosecution there are more and better circumstances
to consider other than the initial sketch of a police artist for determining the
reliability of an identification.At any rate, a discrepancy between a police artists
sketch of a perpetrator of a crime based on descriptions of witnesses at the scene of
the crime, on one hand, and an actual identification of the perpetrator by an
eyewitness given in court, on the other hand, is a very minimal factor of doubt on
the reliability of the identification. In any criminal prosecution there are more and
better circumstances to consider other than the initial sketch of a police artist for
determining the reliability of an identification. We have to remember that a police
artists sketch of a perpetrator of a crime is initially for purposes of pursuing an
investigation, and has seldom any impact on the case after that.
Same; Same; The validity of a decision is not impaired when its writer only took
over from another judge who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts.The validity
of a decision is not impaired when its writer only took over from another judge who
had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of the facts. No such grave abuse of discretion was
shown herein. The trial records demonstrate, on the contrary, that the factual
findings of the trial court and the assessment of the credibility of Alejo as an
249

eyewitness rested on a most careful and thorough study of the evidence adduced
by both parties. Indeed, although he did not observe the demeanor of Alejo as a
witness, the writing judge (Judge Jaime N. Salazar) was not entirely deprived of a
proper sense of Alejos demeanor considering that the TSNs were replete with the
detailed manifestations on Alejos appearance, behavior, deportment, disposition,
and mien during the many days of his testimony that the various counsel of both
parties zealously put on record for memorialization.
Same; Same; The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof was speculative at
best.The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof was speculative at best. To
start with, that the family of the victim might have extended economic or financial
support to Alejo did not necessarily warrant the presumption of bias on the part of
Alejo as a witness. There was no evidence showing that any such support was for
the purpose of unduly influencing his testimony. Likelier than not, the support was
only an expression of the familys appreciation for his cooperation in the public
prosecution of the culprits, or for his resolve to ensure the successful prosecution of
the perpetrators.
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Presumption of Innocence; The presumption of
innocence serves to emphasize that the prosecution has the obligation to prove
not only each element of the offense beyond reasonable doubt but also the identity
of the accused as the perpetrator.The presumption of innocence serves to
emphasize that the prosecution has the obligation to prove not only each element
of the offense beyond reasonable doubt but also the identity of the accused as the
perpetrator. The accused, on the other hand, bears no burden of proof. The
prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the defense.
Same; Same; Out-of-Court Identification; Guidelines to determine the admissibility
and reliability of an out-of-court identification laid down in People v. Teehankee, 249
SCRA 54 (1995).In People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995), the Court laid down
the guidelines to determine the admissibility and reliability of an out-of-court
identification, thus: In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test
where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness opportunity to view
the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at the
time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Rules in proper photographic identification procedure explained
in People v. Pineda, 429 SCRA 478 (2004).In People v. Pineda, 429 SCRA 478
(2004), the Court explained the rules in proper photographic identification
procedure, to wit: Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the established
methods of identifying criminals, the procedure used in this case is unacceptable.
The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of
photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The second rule
250

directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and
display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect.
Same; Same; Same; The clear import of Rodrigo is that an out-of-court
identification, made by lone witness, who was subjected to impermissible
photographic suggestion, fatally tainted the subsequent in-court identification made
by the same witness.The clear import of Rodrigo is that an out-of-court
identification, made by the lone witness, who was subjected to impermissible
photographic suggestion, fatally tainted the subsequent in-court identification made
by the same witness. Accordingly, the testimony of such witness on the
identification of the accused, by itself, cannot be considered as proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Without proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the perpetrator, the accused deserves
an acquittal.
Same; Same; Same; Due process dictates that the photographic identification must
be devoid of any impermissible suggestions in order to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.Due process dictates that the photographic identification must be devoid
of any impermissible suggestions in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In
People v. Alcantara, 240 SCRA 122 (1995), the Court declared: Due process
demands that identification procedure of criminal suspects must be free from
impermissible suggestions. As appropriately held in US vs. Wade, the influence of
improper suggestion upon identifying witness probably accounts for more
miscarriages of justice than any other single factor.
Same; Same; Right to Counsel; Generally, an accused is not entitled to the
assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part
of custodial investigation; An exception to this rule is when the accused had been
the focus of police attention at the start of the investigation.As stated in Escordial,
generally, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of custodial investigation. An exception to
this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of
the investigation. The line-up in this case squarely falls under this exception. It was
established that Joel was already a suspect prior to the police line-up. In fact, even
before Joels apprehension, the police had already zeroed in on Joel as one of
Abadillas killers. As such, Joel was entitled to counsel during the police line-up.
Same; Same; Hot Pursuit; Warrantless Arrest; The warrantless arrest of Joel, made
six days after the murder, does not fall within the ambit of hot pursuit; In law
enforcement, hot pursuit can refer to an immediate pursuit by the police.The
police arrested Joel, without any warrant, on 19 June 1996 or six days after the
killing. Six days is definitely more than enough to secure an arrest warrant, and yet
the police opted to arrest Joel and the other accused, without any warrant, claiming
that it was conducted in hot pursuit. In law enforcement, hot pursuit can refer to
an immediate pursuit by the police such as a car chase. Certainly, the warrantless
arrest of Joel, made six days after the murder, does not fall within the ambit of hot
pursuit.

251

Same; Same; Same; Same; Torturing the accused to extract incriminating

confessions is repugnant to the Constitution.Torturing the accused to extract
incriminating confessions is repugnant to the Constitution. Section 12(2), Article III
of the Constitution expressly provides [n]o torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against [an
accused]. The blatant and unacceptable transgression of the accuseds
constitutional rights, for the sake of delivering speedy, but false, justice to the
aggrieved, can never be countenanced. This Court can never tolerate official abuses
and perpetuate the gross violation of these rights. The presumption that a public
officer had regularly performed his official duty can at no instance prevail over the
presumption of innocence. [Lumanog vs. People, 630 SCRA 42 (2010)]

53. Carbonnel v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.

187689, 07 September 2010
Case Title : CLARITA J. CARBONEL, petitioner, vs. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Right to Counsel|
Custodial Investigations
Remedial Law; Appeals; The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is mandatory.It is undisputed that petitioner appealed
the CSCRO IVs decision almost three years from receipt thereof. Undoubtedly, the
appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period when the decision had long
become final and executory. As held in Bacsasar v. Civil Service Commission (576
SCRA 787 [2009]), citing Talento v. Escalada, Jr. (556 SCRA 491 [2008])The
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is
mandatory. Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the
judgment final and executory and beyond the power of the Courts review.
Jurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes final and executory, it
becomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest. Such
decision or order can no loner be disturbed or re-opened no matter how erroneous it
may have been.
Constitutional Law; Right to Counsel; Custodial Investigations; The exclusionary rule
under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.It must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of
the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus,
the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies
only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.

252

Same; Same; Same; A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted
by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioners capacity to
represent herself and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel.While investigations conducted by an administrative
body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under
existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioners capacity to
represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in
administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary
measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service. [Carbonel vs. Civil Service
Commission, 630 SCRA 202(2010)]

253

54. Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013

Case Title : CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law|Estafa Through Falsification of
Commercial Documents|Penalties
Constitutional Law; Custodial Interrogation; Words and Phrases; Custodial
interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner.The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of
admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in
custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by
law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under
custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the
commencement thereof, viz.: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two
other rights above. In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave
an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch
he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law
enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and,
(2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant
manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under
custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative
during the taking of his written statement.
Same; Right to Counsel; In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590
(2001), the Supreme Court declared that the right to counsel applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 362 SCRA
304 (2001), we declared that the right to counsel applies only to admissions made
in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case of
Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission, 630 SCRA 202 (2010): However, it must be
remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant
to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule
under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation. Here, petitioners written statement was given during an
administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an
254

anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. No

error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in
giving due consideration to petitioners written statement as there is no
constitutional impediment to its admissibility.
Same; Evidence; Confessions; A confession [or admission] is presumed voluntary
until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the
contrary.[I]t is settled that a confession [or admission] is presumed voluntary
until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the
contrary. Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his
written statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously. The
pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that
only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish.
Same; Same; Extrajudicial Confessions; It is a settled rule that where the defendant
did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence
of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having
been voluntarily executed.The fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of
protest and file any charges, criminal or administrative, against the investigator and
the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to sign
negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that
where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators,
where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement
shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed. Neither will petitioners
assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before affixing his
signature thereon just to get it over with prop up the instant Petition. To recall,
petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and had
been a bank manager for quite a number of years. He is thus expected to fully
understand and comprehend the significance of signing an instrument. It is just
unfortunate that he did not exercise due diligence in the conduct of his own affairs.
He can therefore expect no consideration for it.
Criminal Law; Forgery; Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the
signing of anothers name with intent to defraud.Forgery is present when any
writing is counterfeited by the signing of anothers name with intent to defraud. It
can be established by comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic or
genuine one. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of
government handwriting experts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the
courts. A trial judge is not precluded but is even authorized by law to conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; A rule of long standing in this
jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are accorded great weight and respect.In this case, the finding of forgery on the
signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the promissory notes and cashiers
checks was not anchored solely on the result of the examination conducted by the
255

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner. The trial court also
made an independent examination of the questioned signatures and after analyzing
the same, reached the conclusion that the signatures of Tan appearing in the
promissory notes are different from his genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit
Account Information and Specimen Signature Cards on file with the bank. Thus, we
find no reason to disturb the above findings of the RTC which was affirmed by the
CA. A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight and respect. Absent any reason to
deviate from the said findings, as in this case, the same should be deemed
conclusive and binding to this Court.
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the
evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present.The prosecution has the
prerogative to choose the evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the
discretion as to how it should present its case. Moreover, the presumption that
suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the
disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. In the present case, if petitioner
believes that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability by
establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the
most prudent thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the
right to have compulsory process to secure Tans attendance during the trial
pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2) of the Constitution. The records show, however,
that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of these, no suppression of
evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.
Criminal Law; Denials; Denials which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
who testified on affirmative matters.The Court is also not persuaded by the bare
and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the loans covered by the
promissory notes and the cashiers checks were personally transacted by Tan
against his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his
signature thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported
by established evidence. It is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. [They merit]
no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony
of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. The chain of events in
this case, from the preparation of the promissory notes to the encashment of the
cashiers checks, as narrated by the prosecution witnesses and based on
petitioners own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that he
committed the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.
Same; Falsification of Commercial Documents; Falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code refers
to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee, who did not
take advantage of is official position, of public, private or commercial document.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a private individual or a
256

public officer or employee, who did not take advantage of his official position, of
public, private or commercial document. The elements of falsification of documents
under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private
individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the RPC; and, (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document. All the above-mentioned elements were established in this
case. First, petitioner is a private individual. Second, the acts of falsification
consisted in petitioners (1) counterfeiting or imitating the handwriting or signature
of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects;
and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when
he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed in promissory
notes and checks which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in
general, documents or instruments which are used by merchants or businessmen
to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Promissory notes facilitate
credit transactions while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of
money for convenience in business transactions. A cashiers check necessarily
facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature
appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein.
Same; Complex Crimes; Words and Phrases; A complex crime may refer to a single
act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a
necessary means for committing another.When the offender commits on a public,
official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, theft or
malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC,
there are two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act
which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a
necessary means for committing another. In Domingo v. People, 603 SCRA 488
(2009), we held: The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may
be a means of committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually
utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the
crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the
crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public,
official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is
caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a
necessary means to commit estafa.
Same; Estafa; Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party
or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation.Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party
or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
[D]eceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should
257

have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he

shall act upon it to his legal injury. The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By
falsely representing that Tan requested him to process purported loans on the
latters behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan in the
cashiers checks. Through these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from
the bank. Once in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same
in Eurocan Future Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take
hold of the money, misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use and
benefit, and these resulted to the damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount
of about P43 million.
Same; Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents; Penalties; The crime
of falsification was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa. Pursuant
to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case
should be that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in
its maximum period.Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial document. The
crime of falsification was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa.
Pursuant to Article 48 of the Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case should be
that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. The applicable penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, being
the more serious offense than falsification. [Tanenggee vs. People, 699 SCRA
639(2013)]

258

55. Manila Water Company v. Rosario, G.R. No. 188747,

January 29, 2014
Case Title : MANILA WATER COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
CARLITO DEL ROSARIO, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Termination of Employment|
Separation Pay|Social Justice
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Separation Pay; As a general rule, an
employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under
Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay.As a general rule,
an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under
Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. Section 7, Rule I,
Book VI of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides: Sec. 7.
Termination of employment by employer.The just causes for terminating the
services of an employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The
separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the
termination pay provided in the Code, without prejudice, however, to whatever
rights, benefits and privileges he may have under the applicable individual or
collective agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice.
Same; Same; Same; Social Justice; In exceptional cases, the Supreme Court has
granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of social justice
or on equitable grounds. In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was
not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the
employee.In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay to
a legally dismissed employee as an act of social justice or on equitable grounds.
In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious
misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee. In the
leading case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC, 164 SCRA
671 (1988), we laid down the rule that separation pay shall be allowed as a
measure of social justice only in the instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct reflecting his moral character.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the subsequent case of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp.
Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission, 537 SCRA
171 (2007), the Supreme Court expanded the exclusions and elucidated that
separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in instances
where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct,
willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of
trust, commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or those reflecting
on his moral character.In the subsequent case of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp.
Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission, 537 SCRA
259

171 (2007), we expanded the exclusions and elucidated that separation pay shall be
allowed as a measure of social justice only in instances where the employee is
validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct, willful disobedience,
gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, commission of a
crime against the employer or his family, or those reflecting on his moral character.
In the same case, we instructed the labor officials that they must be most judicious
and circumspect in awarding separation pay or financial assistance as the
constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be an
instrument to oppress the employers. The commitment of the court to the cause of
the labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they are
right, as here. In fine, we should be more cautious in awarding financial assistance
to the undeserving and those who are unworthy of liberality of the law. [Manila
Water Company vs. Del Rosario, 715 SCRA 67(2014)]

260

56. People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22,

2014
Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR alias
NOY, accused-appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law ; Miranda Rights ;
Custodial Investigations ;
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; The Rules of Court expressly
provides that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused.Chavez invokes his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the prosecutions
evidence is purely circumstantial and a conviction must stand on a moral certainty
of guilt. The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of an
accused: SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Factual findings by the trial court on its
appreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and even its conclusions derived
from the findings, are generally given great respect and conclusive effect by this
court, more so when these factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(CA).Factual findings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presented
by the parties, and even its conclusions derived from the findings, are generally
given great respect and conclusive effect by this court, more so when these factual
findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, this court has held that
[w]hat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offenders intent to take personal
property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually
carried out. In cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that
homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be
convicted of robbery with homicide.
Criminal Law; Theft; When a person has possession of a stolen property, he can be
disputably presumed as the author of the theft.There is a disputable presumption
that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful
act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him. Thus, when a
person has possession of a stolen property, he can be disputably presumed as the
author of the theft.
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Same; Same; Penalties; The penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of
the stolen items.In any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on the
value of the stolen items. The lower court made no factual findings on the value of
the missing items enumerated in the information one Nokia cell phone unit, one
Motorola cell phone unit, six pieces ladies ring, two pieces necklace, and one
bracelet.
Constitutional Law; Miranda Rights; The Miranda rights were incorporated in our
Constitution but were modified to include the statement that any waiver of the right
to counsel must be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.The right to
counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda
rights, which require that: . . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the
right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a
court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and
to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires. The Miranda
rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the
statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made in writing and in
the presence of counsel. The invocation of these rights applies during custodial
investigation, which begins when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken
into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to
the person to elicit incriminating statements.
Same; Same; Custodial Investigation; Republic Act (RA) No. 7438 expanded the
definition of custodial investigation to include the practice of issuing an invitation
to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any
violation of law.Republic Act No. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial
investigation to include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law. This
means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be
apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting
exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in
a police station. As an additional pressure, he may have been compelled to
surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station. [People vs.
Chavez, 735 SCRA 728(2014)]

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57. Philcomsat Holdings v. Senate, G.R. No. 180308 , June

19, 2012
Case Title : PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION,
ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN and MANUEL D. ANDAL, petitioners,
vs. SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC
ENTERPRISES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES,
HON. SEN. RICHARD GORDON and HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Right to Counsel
Constitutional Law; Congress; Power of Inquiry; Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution, provides as follows: The Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.The respondents
Senate Committees power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon
and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio, which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as
follows: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. The Court explained that such conferral of the
legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the
respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper
for its effective discharge.
Same; Right to Counsel; The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by
a person under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and
therefore attaches only during such custodial investigation.Corollarily, petitioners
Locsin and Andals allegation that their constitutionally-guaranteed right to counsel
was violated during the hearings held in furtherance of PSR No. 455 is specious. The
right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial
investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only
during such custodial investigation. Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited
to the public hearings as resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke
their right to counsel. [Philcomsat Holdings Corporation vs. Senate of the Republic
of the Philippines, 673 SCRA 611(2012)]

263

264

58. People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012

Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, accused-appellant.
Case Nature : AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law|Alibi
Criminal Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over the person of the accused
may be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through
his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court.
Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived.Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through
compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. Any objection
to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An
accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and
participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any irregularities
that may have attended his arrest. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is
not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived upon a
complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error.
Same; Constitutional Law; Right to Counsel; The right to counsel is deemed to have
arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to
stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
Contrary to Laras claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was
placed in a police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his
conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did
not render Sumulongs identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is
deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial
investigation.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Even in the absence of direct
evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.Well-settled is the
rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the
absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not. Under
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Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial

evidence sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide; In cases of robbery with homicide, the taking
of personal property with intent to gain must itself be established beyond
reasonable doubt; It must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit
was robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation of
the robbery by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.Indeed, in cases of
robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must
itself be established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the
physical act of asportation by the accused must be presented by the prosecution. It
must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit was robbery and the
homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The mere presence of the accused at the
crime scene is not enough to implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob
and the use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.
Same; Alibi; It is well-settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is
inherently a weak defense.In view of Sumulongs positive identification of Lara,
the CA was correct in denying Laras alibi outright. It is well-settled that positive
identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such is the
rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove. Moreover,
in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise
be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear
and convincing proof. [People vs. Lara, 678 SCRA 332(2012)]

266

59. Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014

Case Title : ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M.
KASHIM, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of
the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary of the Department of Education, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme
Court. Certiorari and Prohibition; and PETITIONS-ININTERVENTION.
Syllabi Class : Reproductive Health Law|Parental Consent
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.In many cases
involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive
and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial
power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of
the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere. Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; (b) the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; and (c) the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; The Constitution impresses upon the Supreme Court
to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of
competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of
separation but only at a very limited and specific point to determine whether
the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were
undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.In times of social disquietude or
political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done
within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to
cross the line of separation but only at a very limited and specific point to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, while the Court
may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it
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may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion

results. The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those
cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial
review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutional- ity must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.In the scholarly estimation of
former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, judicial review is essential for
the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of
powers among the three great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him,
judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or
instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation. Lest it be
misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled
authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Actual Case or Controversy; Words and Phrases; An actual case
or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.An actual case or controversy means an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The
rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be
justiciable definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the
other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question
or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action.Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
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into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Facial Challenges; While the Supreme Court has
withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.In this jurisdiction, the
application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple.
For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily,
the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with
its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi or legal
standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act; The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of
the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the
court.Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions. In relation to locus standi, the as applied
challenge embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights
of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reproductive Health Law; The Reproductive Health (RH)
Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health,
the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all
these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have
already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Supreme
Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication.In view of the seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and
bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
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drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the
freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all
these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have
already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is
the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court
need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action. The Court cannot, and
should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the
mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Same; Statutes; One-Subject-One-Title Rule; The one subject/one title rule expresses
the principle that the title of a law must not be so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on
inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.The
one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be
so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act. Considering the close intimacy between
reproductive health and responsible parenthood which bears to the attainment
of the goal of achieving sustainable human development as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Reproductive Health Law; The use of contraceptives and family planning methods in
the Philippines is not of recent vintage.As expounded earlier, the use of
contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent
vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled An Act To Regulate The Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices on June 18,
1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the
ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized
the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order
to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use
of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health.
Same; Life begins at fertilization.The ponente, is of the strong view that life begins
at fertilization. In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made
on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads: Section 12. The State recognizes
the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
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life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. Textually, the Constitution
affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because
before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise
that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life
begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have
conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from
fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the
issue of when life begins. In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that
conception is synonymous with fertilization of the female ovum by the male
sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception
refers to the implantation of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; It is apparent that the
Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal
protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of
life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum.It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the
State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from
the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would
allow it determine when life begins.
Same; Same; Contraceptives; The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban
all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; Contraceptives that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.The Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In
fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of
whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should
be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. From the
discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be
deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly
take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.
Same; Conception; Words and Phrases; Mosbys Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionary defines conception as the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be
the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote; The
Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), used by medical
schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at
the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the
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formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all
developmental stages that ensue.That conception begins at fertilization is not
bereft of medical foundation. Mosbys Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a
spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote. It describes fertilization
as the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
develops. The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), used
by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human
person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the
sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic
composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue. Similarly, recent
medical research on the matter also reveals that: Human development begins after
the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as
fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the
contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with
the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the
mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a
zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human
being.
Same; Same; In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under
medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of
the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism
and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined
moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.In all, whether it be taken from a
plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly,
following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion
is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon
fertilization.
Same; Same While the Supreme Court has opted not to make any determination
when life begins, it finds that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law itself clearly
mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization.The clear
and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life
of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a
measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it
otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. x x x A reading of the RH Law would show
that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has
opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that
the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions
that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should
be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. Moreover, the RH Law
recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code,
which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum.

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Same; Abortifacients; In carrying out its declared policy, the Reproductive Health
(RH) Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients.In carrying out its declared
policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section
4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as: Section 4. Definition of Terms
x x x x (a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb upon determination of the
FDA. As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from
the moment of fertilization. By using the word or, the RH Law prohibits not only
drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and
those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. Thus, an
abortifacient is any drug or device that either: (a) Induces abortion; or (b) Induces
the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb; or (c) Prevents the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb, upon determination of the
FDA.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; As defined by the Reproductive Health (RH) Law,
any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the
fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mothers womb, is an abortifacient.Contrary to the assertions made by the
petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first,
prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed
exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the
fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (third kind). By expressly declaring
that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mothers womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to
mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It
also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as
the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to
protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must
be protected the moment it becomes existent all the way until it reaches and
implants in the mothers womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded
protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants there is nothing to
prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation. From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords
protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat,
it is the Courts position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as
defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills
or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mothers womb, is an abortifacient.
Same; Contraceptives; Evidently, with the addition of the word primarily, in
Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law
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(RH-IRR) is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the Reproductive Health
(RH) Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the
insertion of the qualifier primarily will pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.
Evidently, with the addition of the word primarily, in Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the
RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should,
therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier
primarily will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to
insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an abortifacient if its sole
known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of
the fertilized ovum. For the same reason, this definition of contraceptive would
permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of
their fair-sale mechanism.
Same; Same; Consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in
line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the Reproductive Health (RH) Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line
with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word primarily in
Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity
of Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that
have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively open the floodgates
to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.
Same; Same; With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to
ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the
public.The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to
leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away
with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the
effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs
and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No.
4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.
Same; Same; In the distribution by the Department of Health of contraceptive drugs
and devices, it must consider the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4729, which is
still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
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prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.In the distribution by the DOH of

contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729,
which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive
drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be
protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury,
illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot
legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and nonabortifacient.At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot
legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intrauterine devices are safe and nonabortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory shall is to be
construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved
by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and nonabortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for
the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL
supports this construction.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Church and State; Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas
or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another.
The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.: Section 6. The separation of Church and
State shall be inviolable. Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is
based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs
of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot
favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church
cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry.
It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that
they are good for the country. Consistent with the principle that not any one religion
should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision
utilizes the term church in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque,
an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the Church means the religious congregations collectively.
Same; Religious Freedom; Free Exercise Clause; Establishment Clause; The
constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.In short, the constitutional
assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause. The establishment clause principally prohibits the
State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other
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religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups.

Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. On the other hand, the basis of
the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of ones belief and faith.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality; In case of conflict between
the free exercise clause and the State, the Supreme Court adheres to the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality.In case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the
State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been
clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (2006), (Escritor)
where it was stated that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the
Philippine Constitution. In the same case, it was further explained that: The
benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the
governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of accommodation is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.
What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or
its burdensome effect, whether by the legislature or the courts. In ascertaining
the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper. Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise
is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.
Same; Reproductive Health Law; Religious Freedom; While the Supreme Court
stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the Reproductive Health
(RH) Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.In the case at bench, it
is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or ones participation in the support of modern reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to ones dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing
with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of
a church...are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province
of the civil courts. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be
understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the
Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes
the guarantee of religious freedom.
Same; Same; Same; The State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion.In the
same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do
with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the
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government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict
other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion. Consequently, the
petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its
population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because
it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesars and unto God the
things that are Gods.
Same; Same; Same; Compelling Interest Test; The conscientious objectors claim to
religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the
Reproductive Health Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by
government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the
Courts espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objectors claim to religious freedom
would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict
scrutiny.
Same; Same; Same; The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by
the Reproductive Health Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector.The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a
patient seeking information on modern reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, at the basis of the free exercise clause is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Though it has been said that
the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it
makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find
morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they
cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets
the offensive act by indirect participation.
Same; Same; Same; In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral
convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other,
to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children, the Supreme Court is of the strong view that
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the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be

accorded primacy.In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral
convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other,
to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the
religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance
with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of the principle of noncoercion enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Same; Same; Same; The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive
health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Supreme Court cannot allow.The
Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to
ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere
inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is
bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected
right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or
who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because
incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee
which the Court cannot allow.
Same; Same; Same; The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors
should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they
belong to the public or private sector.The conscientious objection clause should be
equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no
perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the
mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors
should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they
belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in
every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not
taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court finds no compelling state interest which
would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in
number.The Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails
to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. Freedom of religion means more than just the
freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what
one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against
ones belief or is prevented from acting according to ones belief.
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Same; Same; In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a
child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is
impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate.In a conflict
situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally
obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting
death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained: Principle of DoubleEffect.May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life
of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a good effect. In
a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in
favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save
both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles
are observed, the loss of the childs life or the mothers life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder.
The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable. Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures
endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious
sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed
upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified
considering the life he would be able to save.
Same; Same; Police Power; Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Supreme Court finds the same
to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government; All the law requires
is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition.Anent the requirement imposed under Section
15 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to
be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of
the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all
violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even
mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar,
whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who
receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the
information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of
family life without the intervention of the State.
Reproductive Health Law; Decision-making involving a reproductive health
procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them.
Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the right
of the spouses to found a family. One person cannot found a family. The right,
therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them is equally recognized. The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this
mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would
undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the
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decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in
bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of
reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the
State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution. Decision-making
involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their
future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children
significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs
exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their
own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the
State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that
they chart their destiny together as one family.
Same; Parental Consent; Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in
cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage.Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in
cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides: SEC. 7. Access to Family
Planning.x x x. No person shall be denied information and access to family
planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be
allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when
a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from
the decision-making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she
is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there
is a need to tame population growth. It is precisely in such situations when a minor
parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State
cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs
and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It
does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
Same; Same; Compelling State Interest; The State cannot, without a compelling
state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child,
whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a
compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on
matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of ones
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and stronglyheld Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition
that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as
one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society. The State cannot,
without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and
custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a

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miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.
Same; Access to Information; Principle of Double Effect; Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Supreme Court finds no constitutional objection to the
acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the
second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own
body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn
child.There must be a differentiation between access to information about family
planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures
and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the
acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the
second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own
body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn
child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is
essential in the protection and maintenance of ones health, access to such
information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation,
the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded
because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their
minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received.
Same; Same; Right to Life; No person should be denied the appropriate medical
care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.As in
the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in lifethreatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such
cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the
spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be
emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently
needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life. In this connection,
the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) should be struck down. By effectively
limiting the requirement of parental consent to only in elective surgical
procedures, it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where
what is involved are non-surgical procedures. Save for the two exceptions
discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first
sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their
constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
Same; Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law
is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) has
yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to
formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can
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only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used
to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of
the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature
nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or
validity.
Statutes; Principle of Void for Vagueness; A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application.A
statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute
are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning
alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of
it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment.
Constitutional Law; Reproductive Health Law; Equal Protection of the Law; To
provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments reproductive
health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause; It should be
noted that Section 7 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks
to target the poor to reduce their number.To provide that the poor are to be given
priority in the governments reproductive health care program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health
development of the people. Thus: Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated
and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free
medical care to paupers. It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes
poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to
have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(l)
explains, the promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive health.
Same; Same; Involuntary Servitude; Clearly, no compulsion, force or threat is made
upon reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service against
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their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Supreme Court does not consider the same to be
an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in
the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.The OSG counters that the
rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as
forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers
have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the
government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a
privilege and not a right. The point of the OSG is well-taken. It should first be
mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of
medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly
involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of
Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades
which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public
safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right
altogether. Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude
connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of
coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that
it only encourages private and nongovernment reproductive healthcare service
providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth,
no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and nongovernment reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to
choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to
provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the
rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth,
the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a
necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived
legitimate state interest.
Same; Same; From the declared policy of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, it is
clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.The functions, powers
and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of
the law. Being the countrys premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of
food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the
necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of
necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health
and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes service
and methods. From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically

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safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and

evidence-based medical research standards.
Same; Same; The fact that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law does not intrude in the
autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.The
fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can
be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.
Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the
ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the
RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of
the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply
delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can,
in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable
autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as
they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between
the national and the regional governments. Except for the express and implied
limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to
exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to
all matters of general concern or common interest.
Same; Same; Abortion; The Reproductive Health (RH) Law does not sanction the
taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to
enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to
the public, especially to the poor.Unless, a natural right has been transformed into
a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 (2003), the very case cited by the petitioners, it was
explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law
is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights
inherent to man where no law is applicable. At any rate, as earlier expounded, the
RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any
shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives
more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Same; Same; In general, the Supreme Court does not find the Reproductive Health
(RH) Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare
services, methods, devices, and supplies.In general, the Court does not find the
RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare
services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the
religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of
what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious
freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than
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the State. In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one
religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society.
Philippine modern society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may
continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is not the province of the judiciary to look into
the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch.
Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial
legislation if that would be necessary in the premises.Indeed, at the present, the
country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures
(like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it.
Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is
to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as
saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the
law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the
application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if
that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution
and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting
the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled
jurisprudence. The Courts function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must
confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the
lawmaking body.

Sereno,CJ., Opinyong Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat:

Constitutional Law; Reproductive Health Law; Hierarchy of Rights; Sa aking pananaw
sa herarkiya ng mga karapatang pantao, walang hihigit pa sa karapatang mabuhay,
at nasasalamin ng ating Saligang Batas ang ganitong paniniwala; Wala sa takda ng
Saligang Batas at Republic Act No. 10354 (The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012), o RH Law, ang pagkitil ng buhay.Sa herarkiya
ng mga karapatang pantao, walang hihigit pa sa karapatang mabuhay, at
nasasalamin ng ating Saligang Batas ang ganitong paniniwala. Ayon dito, pantay na
pangangalagaan ng pamahalaan ang buhay ng ina at ang buhay na kanyang
dinadala. Bakas sa adhikaing ito ang pagkilala sa malaking bahaging ginagampanan
ng ina sa pagbibigay ng buhay. Kayat sasalungatin ko ang bigkasin ng aking mga
kapatid na Mahistrado, na ang pagpapalaya sa pasiya ng may-katawan ay kumikitil
ng buhay ng kapwa-taong isisilang pa lamang. Wala sa takda ng Saligang Batas at
Republic Act No. 10354 (The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012), o RH Law, ang pagkitil ng buhay. Ngunit inuunawa rin nito ang karapatan ng
mag-asawa na magpalaki ng kanilang pamilya ng may dangal sa buhay.
Napakahalaga din sa pananaw ng Saligang Batas at ng RH Law ang kalusugan ng
pamayanan, lalung-lalo na ang kalusugan ng mga ina o magiging ina ng
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pamayanang ito. Kayat mahalaga na ang bawat interpretasyon ng RH Law ay ayon

sa ikabubuti ng pamilyang Pilipino at kalusugan ng ina.
Same; Same; Compelling Interest Test; Religious Freedom; Sa aking pananaw hindi
ako sumasang-ayon na nararapat gamitin ang compelling state interest test upang
tiyakin ang legalidad ng Reproductive Health (RH) Law partikular na ang
paggarantiya ng pamahalaan sa ligtas, mabisa, abot-kaya, de-kalidad, naaayon sa
batas at hindi abortifacient na reproductive health care services, methods, devices
at supplies para sa lahat, pati na ang mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito sa
kadahilanang buo ang pagkilala ng RH Law sa religious freedom, kayat hindi na
kailangan ang test na ito.Hindi ako sumasang-ayon na nararapat gamitin ang
compelling state interest test upang tiyakin ang legalidad ng RH Law partikular
na ang paggarantiya ng pamahalaan sa ligtas, mabisa, abot-kaya, de-kalidad,
naaayon sa batas at hindi abortifacient na reproductive health care services,
methods, devices at supplies para sa lahat, pati na ang mahalagang kaalaman ukol
dito sa kadahilanang buo ang pagkilala ng RH Law sa religious freedom, kayat
hindi na kailangan ang test na ito.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw ginamit ang compelling state interest test sa
Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003), upang malaman kung ang respondent doon
ay nararapat na bigyan ng exemption laban sa kasong administratibo bunga ng
pakikisama niya sa lalaking hindi niya asawa ayon sa Civil Code.Ginamit ang
compelling state interest test sa Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003), upang
malaman kung ang respondent doon ay nararapat na bigyan ng exemption laban sa
kasong administratibo bunga ng pakikisama niya sa lalaking hindi niya asawa ayon
sa Civil Code. Karaniwan, bilang kawani ng pamahalaan, mahaharap ang
respondent sa kasong disgraceful and immoral conduct. Bagkus, inilahad ng
respondent na bagamat walang basbas ng pamahalaang sibil ang kanilang
pagsasama, may basbas naman ito ng kanilang relihiyon na Jehovahs Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society. Kayat hindi siya nararapat na
sampahan ng kasong administratibo bunga nito.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw kapag hindi nanaig ang interes ng
pamahalaan, magbibigay ng exemption sa patakaran ang Korte Suprema para sa
mga mamamayang naninindigan para sa kanilang religious freedom.Malinaw sa
Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003), na sa ilalim ng compelling state interest test,
ipinagtutunggali ang religious freedom ng mga mamamayan at ang interes ng
pamahalaan sa pagpapatupad ng patakarang sinasabing nagpapahirap sa religious
convictions ng ilan. Kapag hindi nanaig ang interes ng pamahalaan, magbibigay ng
exemption sa patakaran ang Korte Suprema para sa mga mamamayang
naninindigan para sa kanilang religious freedom. Isinaad din sa Estrada v. Escritor
na nakagawian na ng Korte Suprema na magbigay ng exemption sa halip na
magpawalang-bisa ng mga patakaran ng pamahalaan pagdating sa usapin ng
religious freedom. Hindi ito ang sitwasyon sa ilalim ng RH Law. Ayon sa petitioners,
katumbas ng isang pagkakasala sa ilalim ng kanilang relihiyon ang pagsasagawa ng
serbisyo ukol sa modern family planning methods at pagbibigay ng payo ukol dito.
Labag ito sa religious freedom ng mga conscientious health professionals na
naniniwalang likas na masama ang contraception. Dahil dito, nararapat na
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ipawalang-bisa ang RH Law. At, ayon sa mga kapatid kong Mahistrado, walang
compelling state interest para payagan ang pamahalaang pilitin ang health
professionals na lumabag sa kanilang paniniwala. Ang totoo, walang paglabag sa
paniniwala na pinapataw ang RH Law.
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; Opt-Out Clause; Sa aking pananaw sa ilalim ng
opt-out clause na nakapaloob sa Section 7 ng Reproductive Health (RH) Law, hindi
obligadong magdulot ng serbisyo kaugnay sa modern family planning methods ang
mga non-maternity specialty hospitals at mga ospital na pagmamay-ari at
pinatatakbo ng mga religious groups.Nakalimutan ng petitioners ang kabuuan ng
RH Law. Batid ng Kongreso na maaaring makasagasa sa paniniwala at ikaligalig ng
ilang medical professionals ang kautusang ito sa RH Law. Dahil mismo dito kaya
nag-ukit ang Kongreso ng exemption sa RH Law para sa mga conscientious
objectors sa pamamagitan ng opt-out clause. Sa ilalim ng opt-out clause na
nakapaloob sa Section 7 ng RH Law, hindi obligadong magdulot ng serbisyo
kaugnay sa modern family planning methods ang mga non-maternity specialty
hospitals at mga ospital na pagmamay-ari at pinatatakbo ng mga religious groups.
Sa kabilang banda, pinahahalagahan sa ilalim ng Section 23(a)(3) ng RH Law ang
conscientious objection ng health care service providers batay sa kanilang ethical o
religious beliefs. Ayon dito, exempted sila sa kaparusahan na ipapataw sa mga
tatangging magdulot ng reproductive health care services at magbigay ng
mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw wala dapat pagtutol sa atas ng Reproductive
Health (RH) Law na ituro ng mga conscientious objector ang mga pasyente sa
pinakamalapit na health facility o health care service provider na makatutulong sa
kanila.Ayon sa Decision, walang idinudulot na paglabag sa religious freedom ang
pag-uutos sa mga ikakasal na dumalo sa mga seminar ukol sa responsible
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding at infant nutrition dahil hindi naman sila
obligadong sumunod sa mga ituturo dito. Hindi rin masama ang pagbibigay-daan na
mabigyan ng mahalagang kaalaman tungkol sa family planning services ang mga
menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage para matutunan nila ang
mga bagay na makatutulong sa kanila upang pangalagaan ang kanilang katawan at
anak o dinadala. Kung gayon, at kahalintulad ng nasabing sitwasyon, wala rin dapat
pagtutol sa atas ng RH Law na ituro ng mga conscientious objector ang mga
pasyente sa pinakamalapit na health facility o health care service provider na
makatutulong sa kanila.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw hindi maituturing na dagdag pasanin ng
medical professionals ang duty to refer sa ilalim ng Reproductive Health (RH) Law.
Sa kanilang pagpasok sa propesyon, tinanggap ng mga medical professionals ang
mga moral values at kaakibat na katungkulan sa mga pasyente. Isa dito ang
napapanahong duty to refer sa ibang health facility o health care service provider
kung batid nila na dahil sa kanilang religious beliefs, hindi nila maaaring ihatid ang
serbisyong hinihingi o kinakailangan ng pasyente. Upang mapanatili ang ethical
practice, hinihikayat ng mga pantas ang mga conscientious objectors na
maglingkod kalapit ang ibang medical professionals na hindi conscientious objectors
upang maayos na mapanatili ang isang referral system para masigurado na
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maibibigay sa pasyente ang mga pangangailangan nitong hindi kayang tugunan ng

conscientious objector. Mahalaga ito upang masiguro na tuloy-tuloy ang serbisyong
pangkalusugan para sa mga taong nangangailangan nito. Dahil dito, hindi
maituturing na dagdag pasanin ng medical professionals ang duty to refer sa ilalim
ng RH Law. Likas na ito sa kanilang propesyon. Sa katunayan, nasa kapangyarihan
ng Kongreso ang maglatag ng mga alituntunin at dagdag na pasanin sa propesyon
ng medisina ayon sa police power nito upang isulong ang public health. At,
inuunawa ng RH Law na dahil sa religious convictions, hindi maaaring isagawa ng
isang medical professional ang serbisyo ukol sa modern family planning methods
kahit hinihingi pa ng pasyente. Dahil dito, pinapayagan sila na tumanggi ng
pasyente at papuntahin ito sa ibang medical professional na makatutulong dito.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw kung tutuusin, maituturing na paglabag sa
sinumpaang tungkulin ng mga medical professionals ang pagtangging magturo ng
pasyente sa ibang medical professional.Kung tutuusin, maituturing na paglabag
sa sinumpaang tungkulin ng medical professionals ang pagtangging magturo ng
pasyente sa ibang mga medical professional. Maaari itong maging basehan ng
disciplinary action laban sa kanila. Ayon sa isang lathalain, dahil ang mga medical
professionals ay napapaloob sa isang monopoly sa paghahatid ng serbisyong
pangkalusugan, ang ilan sa kanila na mas pinahahalagahan ang kanilang religious
interests nang walang pakundangan sa kapakanan ng kanilang pasyente ay
nababalot sa isang matinding conflict of interest. Kilala ang dakilang propesyong ito
sa pagpapakasakit para sa ikabubuti ng ibang tao, kaya naman ang pagtanggi kahit
sa pagtuturo na lamang sa ibang health facility o health care service provider ay
maituturing na pagkait ng serbisyong pangkalusugan sa mga pasyente.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw ipinagbabawal ng Section 23(a)(1) ang pagkakait
ng mahalagang kaalaman, pagbabawal sa pagpapalaganap nito o sadyaang
pagbibigay ng maling impormasyon kaugnay ng mga programa at serbisyo ukol sa
reproductive health, karapatan ng lahat sa informed choice at ang paggarantiya ng
pamahalaan sa ligtas, mabisa, abot-kaya, de-kalidad, naaayon sa batas at hindi
abortifacient na family planning methods.Sa puntong ito, nais kong linawin na
ipinagbabawal ng Section 23(a)(1) ang pagkakait ng mahalagang kaalaman,
pagbabawal sa pagpapalaganap nito o sadyaang pagbibigay ng maling
impormasyon kaugnay ng mga programa at serbisyo ukol sa reproductive health,
karapatan ng lahat sa informed choice at ang paggarantiya ng pamahalaan sa
ligtas, mabisa, abot-kaya, de-kalidad, naaayon sa batas at hindi abortifacient na
family planning methods. Sa kabilang banda, ipinagbabawal naman ng Section
23(a)(2) ang pagtangging magsagawa ng ligtas at naaayon sa batas na
reproductive health procedures dahil lamang sa ang taong naghahangad nito,
bagamat nasa hustong edad, ay hindi makapagpakita ng pahintulot ng kanyang
asawa o magulang. Hindi nito ipinagbabawal ang pagtangging magsagawa ng
reproductive health procedures dahil sa kanilang religious beliefs.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw bagamat maaaring parusahan ang iba kung sila ay
tatangging magsagawa ng de-kalidad na health care services o tatangging
magbigay ng mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito, pinapayagan ang mga conscientious
objector na tumanggi kung wala sa emergency condition o hindi serious case ang
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pasyente.Kung conscientious objector ang health care service provider,

mapapasailalim siya sa Section 23(a)(3) na nagsasabing isasaalang-alang at
irerespeto ang kanilang ethical o religious beliefs. Ayon dito, bagamat maaaring
parusahan ang iba kung sila ay tatangging magsagawa ng de-kalidad na health care
services o tatangging magbigay ng mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito, pinapayagan
ang mga conscientious objector na tumanggi kung wala sa emergency condition o
hindi serious case ang pasyente. Hindi parurusahan ng batas ang mga
conscientious objector na tumanggi, at kabilang ito sa exemption na inilatag ng RH
Law para sa kanila.
Same; Same; Due Process; Sa aking pananaw bukod sa mga karapatang
ginagarantiya ng Bill of Rights, saklaw ng due process clause ang lahat ng bahagi
ng buhay ng tao. Kabilang na rito ang karapatan ng sariling pagpapasiya.
Mayroong pangunahing karapatan, at pangangailangan, ang lahat ng tao sa sariling
pagpapasiya. Biniyayaan ng kaisipan ang lahat ng tao upang malayang maipahayag
ang kanyang saloobin, makabuo ng sariling pananaw at makapagpasiya para sa
kanyang kinabukasan. Sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas, pinangangalagaan ng due
process clause ang garantiya ng kalayaan sa bawat Pilipino. Nagsasabi ito na
walang sinuman ang maaaring bawian ng buhay, kalayaan at ari-arian nang hindi
ayon sa paraang inilatag sa batas. Panangga ng mga mamamayan ang due process
clause sa hindi makatuwirang pamamalakad at pagsamsam ng pamahalaan.
Gayunpaman, [t]he Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the
liberty it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.
Nagtatakda ang due process clause ng limitasyon sa kapangyarihan ng pamahalaan
pagdating sa mga karapatan ng mamamayan. Bukod sa mga karapatang
ginagarantiya ng Bill of Rights, saklaw ng due process clause ang lahat ng bahagi
ng buhay ng tao. Kabilang na rito ang karapatan ng sariling pagpapasiya.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw sa ilalim ng Reproductive Health (RH) Law,
ihahandog sa lahat ang mahalagang impormasyon ukol sa modern family planning
methods. Ipinapalagay na paglilimian ng asawang sasailalim sa procedure ang mga
magiging epekto nito sa kanya at sa kanyang mahal sa buhay.Sa ilalim ng RH
Law, ihahandog sa lahat ang mahalagang impormasyon ukol sa modern family
planning methods. Ipinapalagay din na paglilimian ng asawang sasailalim sa
procedure ang mga magiging epekto nito sa kanya at sa kanyang mahal sa buhay.
Kung magdesisyon siya na sumailalim sa napiling reproductive health procedure,
hindi ito dapat hadlangan ng sinuman. Bahagi pa rin ito ng informed consent na
pundasyon ng RH Law.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw walang anumang nakasulat sa Reproductive Health
(RH) Law na humahadlang sa pagsali ng asawa sa pagtimbang ng mga pagpipiliang
modern family planning methods, at pagpapasiya kung ano ang pinakamabuti para
sa kanyang asawa.Walang anumang nakasulat sa RH Law na nag-aalis sa magasawa ng kanilang karapatang bumuo ng pamilya. Sa katunayan, tinitiyak nito na
ang mga maralita na nagnanais magkaroon ng anak ay makikinabang sa mga payo,
kagamitan at nararapat na procedures para matulungan silang maglihi at maparami
ang mga anak. Walang anumang nakasulat sa batas na nagpapahintulot sa
pamahalaan na manghimasok sa pagpapasiya [that] belongs exclusively to, and
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[is] shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny.
Walang anumang nakasulat sa RH Law na humahadlang sa pagsali ng asawa sa
pagtimbang ng mga pagpipiliang modern family planning methods, at pagpapasiya
kung ano ang pinakamabuti para sa kanyang asawa. Kung may epekto man ang RH
Law, ito ay ang pagpapatibay ng makatotohanang sanggunian sa pagitan ng mag-asawang pantay na magpapasiya ukol sa isang bagay na magtatakda ng kanilang
kinabukasan.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw hindi angkop na manghimasok ang Korte Suprema
sa katanungan kung ang Reproductive Health (RH) Law ay isang population control
measure sapagkat ang Kongreso lamang ang makasasagot sa tanong kung ano ang
nag-udyok dito sa pagbuo ng nasabing batas.Hindi angkop na manghimasok ang
Korte Suprema sa katanungan kung ang RH Law ay isang population control
measure sapagkat ang Kongreso lamang ang makasasagot sa tanong kung ano ang
nag-udyok dito sa pagbuo ng nasabing batas. Ang tanging dapat pagtuunan ng
pansin ng Korte Suprema ay kung ang batas at ang mga nilalaman nito ay alinsunod
sa itinatakda ng Saligang Batas. Masasabi nating ispekulasyon lamang ang
paghusga sa hangarin ng Kongreso na handa itong sirain ang parental authority
upang isulong lamang ang population control. Pasintabi po, hindi maaaring ganito
ang tono ng Korte Suprema patungo sa Kongreso.
Same; Same; Parental Authority; Sa aking pananaw pinag-uukulan ng ilang
karapatan at tungkulin ang mga magulang kaugnay sa kanilang mga anak na wala
pa sa tamang gulang. Maaaring talikuran o ilipat ang parental authority at
responsibility ayon lamang sa mga halimbawang nakasaad sa batas.[P]arental
authority and responsibility include the caring for and rearing of unemancipated
children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral,
mental and physical character and well-being. Pinag-uukulan ng ilang karapatan at
tungkulin ang mga magulang kaugnay sa kanilang mga anak na wala pa sa tamang
gulang. Maaaring talikuran o ilipat ang parental authority at responsibility ayon
lamang sa mga halimbawang nakasaad sa batas. Mabibinbin o mapuputol ito ayon
lamang sa mga sitwasyong nakasaad sa Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw sa ilalim ng Reproductive Health (RH) Law,
hindi pinagbabawalan ang mga menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng
miscarriage na humingi ng payo sa kanilang magulang, at hindi pinagbabawalan
ang mga magulang na magbigay nito.Walang anumang nakasulat sa RH Law na
nagsasabing napuputol ang parental authority kapag ang menor de edad ay may
anak na o nagkaroon ng miscarriage. Hindi nito dinadagdagan ang mga
halimbawang nakasaad sa Family Code ukol sa pagkawala ng parental authority.
Walang anumang nakasulat sa batas na nagbibigay kapangyarihan sa pamahalaan
upang humalili sa ina at ama sa pagdamay at pagtugon sa mga pangangailangan
ng kanilang mga menor de edad. Kailanmay hindi kaya at hindi maaaring gawin ito
ng pamahalaan, hindi lamang dahil hindi ito praktikal ngunit dahil walang
makatutumbas sa inaasahang pagmamahal ng magulang. Sa ganitong pagsubok sa
buhay ng isang menor de edad, higit lalo niyang kailangan ang comfort, care,
advice and guidance from her own parents. Sa ilalim ng RH Law, hindi
pinagbabawalan ang mga menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage
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na humingi ng payo sa kanilang magulang, at hindi pinagbabawalan ang mga

magulang na magbigay nito. Ipinapalagay na hangad lamang ng mga magulang ang
makabubuti para sa kanilang anak.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw sa pagsasabi na hindi kailangan ang
parental consent ng mga menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage
bago mabigyan ang mga ito ng modern family planning services,
pinanghihimasukan ng pamahalaan ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng menor de edad at
ang nilapitan nitong medical health professional.Sa pagsasabi na hindi kailangan
ang parental consent ng mga menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng
miscarriage bago mabigyan ang mga ito ng modern family planning services,
pinanghihimasukan ng pamahalaan ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng menor de edad at
ang nilapitan nitong medical health professional. Kadalasan, pinagkakaitan ng
reproductive health services ng mga pribado at pampublikong health professionals
ang mga menor de edad dahil sa kaisipang masyado pa silang mga bata para
magkaroon ng kaalaman sa mga bagay ukol sa kanilang sekswalidad. Ang paghingi
ng parental consent ang madalas na dahilan upang tanggihan ang ganitong
pagsangguni ng mga kabataan. Minsan nga, hinihiya pa ang mga ito. Ngunit
kailangang tandaan na nagdalang-tao na ang mga menor de edad na ito, at hindi na
masasabing wala silang muwang pagdating sa mga bagay na sekswal.
Same; Same; Age and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education; Sa
aking pananaw upang mapangalagaan ang karapatan ng mga kabataan na
magkaroon ng mahalagang kaalaman ukol sa kanilang kalusugan, ipinag-uutos ng
RH Law ang pagtuturo ng age- and development-appropriate reproductive health
education sa lahat ng pribado at pampublikong paaralan.Bahagi ng RH Law ang
paninindigan ng pamahalaan na ang mga kabataan ay active rights holders, at
katungkulan ng pamahalaan na siguraduhin na matatamasa nila ang kanilang mga
karapatan nang walang diskriminasyon. Upang mapangalagaan ang karapatan ng
mga kabataan na magkaroon ng mahalagang kaalaman ukol sa kanilang kalusugan,
ipinag-uutos ng RH Law ang pagtuturo ng age-and development-appropriate
reproductive health education sa lahat ng pribado at pampublikong paaralan.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw hindi ako sang-ayon sa Decision na walang totoong
pagkakaiba sa pagitan ng pribado at pampublikong health officers. Naniniwala ako
na napakalaki ng pagkakaiba sa pagitan nila at nagmumula ito sa kadahilanang
inaasahan ang mga pampublikong health officers bilang frontline sa paghahatid ng
serbisyong pangkalusugan.Hindi ako sang-ayon sa Decision na walang totoong
pagkakaiba sa pagitan ng pribado at pampublikong health officers. Naniniwala ako
na napakalaki ng pagkakaiba sa pagitan nila at nagmumula ito sa kadahilanang
inaasahan ang mga pampublikong health officers bilang frontline sa paghahatid ng
serbisyong pangkalusugan. Bilang public officers, may pananagutan sila sa taongbayan sa lahat ng oras, at nararapat na maglingkod sila nang may dangal,
katapatan, kahusayan, ganap-taglay ang pagiging makabayan at makatarungan, at
payak ang pamumuhay. Maaari din nating banggitin na ang sambayanan ang
nagpapasahod sa kanila. Sa pamamagitan ng paglilingkod ng mga pampublikong
health officers naisasakatuparan ng pamahalaan ang tungkulin nito na pangalagaan

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ang kalusugan ng mga mamamayan, lalo na ang mga maralitang bahagya na ngang
makabili ng sapat na pagkain sa araw-araw.
Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Sa aking pananaw hindi karapat-dapat na
sabihing lumalabag sa equal protection clause ng ating Saligang Batas ang
Reproductive Health (RH) Law at Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) nito.
Sa gayon, hindi karapat-dapat na sabihing lumalabag sa equal protection clause ng
ating Saligang Batas ang RH Law at IRR nito. Kaugnay nito, tinutuligsa ang
sumusunod na bahagi ng Section 5.24 ng IRR ng RH Law: Provided, That skilled
health professionals such as provincial, city, or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their
office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the
RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
(Emphasis supplied) Itinatadhana nito na hindi maaaring maging conscientious
objectors ang mga pampublikong skilled health professionals na mismong inatasang
magsagawa ng mga kautusan at programa sa ilalim ng RH Law at IRR nito. Malinaw
ang dahilan nito. Walang makabuluhang pagsasakatuparan ng RH Law, at
pangangalaga sa reproductive health ng sambayanan, kung hahayaan ang mga
provincial, city, o municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses at
supervising midwives iyong mga itinuturing na nasa frontline ng paghahatid ng
serbisyong pangkalusugan na tumangging magbigay ng reproductive health care
services at mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito. Makikitang hindi discriminatory ang
nasabing probisyon kapag inilapat ang test of reasonableness. Sakop lamang nito
ang mga public skilled health professionals na inatasang isagawa ang mga kautusan
at programa sa ilalim ng RH Law at IRR nito. Makikita na iyon lamang mga may
management prerogative at kapangyarihang mag-impluwensiya ng pamamalakad
ng kanilang institusyon ang hindi maaaring tumangging maghatid ng reproductive
health care services at mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito. Malinaw ang pagkakaiba
nila sa ibang pampublikong health professionals na maaaring maging conscientious
objectors.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw pagdating sa reproductive health programs,
magiging kahangalan para sa pamahalaan kung hahayaan nito na sariling mga
kawani ang humadlang sa pamamagitan ng paglalatag ng mga salungat na
patakaran gamit ang makinarya ng pamahalaan.Bilang mga kawani ng
pamahalaan, nalalagay sa isang pambihirang katayuan ang mga public officers para
isakatuparan ang mga nilalayon ng pamahalaan. Dahil dito, malaki ang nakaatang
na responsibilidad sa kanila upang ilunsad ang mga balakin ng pamahalaan.
Pagdating sa reproductive health programs, magiging kahangalan para sa
pamahalaan kung hahayaan nito na sariling mga kawani ang humadlang sa
pamamagitan ng paglalatag ng mga salungat na patakaran gamit ang makinarya ng
pamahalaan. Samakatuwid, hindi dapat payagang tumalikod sa tungkulin ang isang
public officer na mismong inatasang isagawa ang mga kautusan at programa sa
ilalim ng RH Law at IRR nito, o biguin nito ang paglulunsad ng isang reproductive
health program.
Same; Same; PhilHealth Accreditation; Sa aking pananaw alalahanin ng lahat na
pribilehiyo at hindi karapatan ang magkaroon ng PhilHealth accreditation kayat
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tama lang na isukli ng gynecologists at obstetricians ang 48 oras na pro bono

service sa maralita upang mapangalagaan ang kanilang reproductive health.
Masasabing isa lamang sa family planning information and services ang
contraceptives at contraception na tinututulan ng mga conscientious objectors.
Mayroon pang labing-isang bahagi ng reproductive health care na kasunod nito.
Maaaring gamitin ng mga reproductive health care service providers ang mga
libreng serbisyo na mapapaloob sa anumang bahagi ng reproductive health care
upang mabuo ang 48 oras na kakailanganin nila para sa kanilang PhilHealth
accreditation. Maaari ngang ibuhos ng conscientious objector ang lahat ng 48 oras
sa pagpapalaganap ng natural family planning method. Alalahanin ng lahat na
pribilehiyo at hindi karapatan ang magkaroon ng PhilHealth accreditation kayat
tama lang na isukli ng gynecologists at obstetricians ang 48 oras na pro bono
service sa maralita upang mapangalagaan ang kanilang reproductive health. Kung
tutuusin, reproductive health care ng mga pasyente ang pangunahing
pinagtutuunan ng pansin ng mga gynecologists at obstetricians. Kung bibigyan sila
ng exemption sa Section 17 dahil conscientious objector sila, ang tanging magiging
epekto nito ay hindi nila kakailanganing magbigay ng anumang libreng serbisyo.
Kung gayon, mawawalan ng saysay ang layunin ng pamahalaan sa ilalim ng RH Law
na ihatid sa mga maralitang mamamayan ang kadalubhasaan ng mga pribadong
reproductive health care service providers.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw pinapayagan ang lahat ng methods of
contraception hanggat ang mga ito ay ligtas, naaayon sa batas, aprobado ng
medical professionals at alinsunod sa Islamic Shariah.Pinapayagan ang lahat ng
methods of contraception hanggat ang mga ito ay ligtas, naaayon sa batas,
aprobado ng medical professionals at alinsunod sa Islamic Shariah. Wala ring
nakikitang pagtutol ang Shariah sa pakahulugan ng International Conference on
Population and Development sa reproductive health, pati na ang mga prinsipyo nito
ukol sa pagpapasiya sa dami at pag-aagwat ng mga anak, pagkakaroon ng
kaalaman ukol sa sariling sekswalidad, pagiging ligtas sa mga sakit kaugnay sa
reproduction, at pagkakaroon ng safe at satisfying sex life sa pagitan ng magasawa. Kung susukatin ang mga adhikain ng RH Law batay sa religious freedom ng
mga Muslim, na bumubuo sa limang porsiyento ng mga Pilipino, wala itong hatid na
ligalig o pasanin.
Carpio,J., Concurring Opinion:
Reproductive Health Law; View that the Supreme Court is simply not competent to
declare when human life begins, whether upon fertilization of the ovum or upon
attachment of the fertilized ovum to the uterus wall.I concur in the ponencia of
Justice Jose Catral Mendoza. However, my opinion is that at this stage, the Court is
simply not competent to declare when human life begins, whether upon fertilization
of the ovum or upon attachment of the fertilized ovum to the uterus wall. The issue
of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that cannot be decided by this
Court without the proper hearing and evidence. This issue has not even been
settled within the scientific and medical community.
Same; View that whether life begins upon fertilization or upon implantation of the
fertilized ovum on the uterus wall, R.A. No. 10354 protects both asserted starting
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points of human life. Absent a definitive consensus from the scientific and medical
community, the Supreme Court cannot venture to pronounce which starting point of
human life is correct.R.A. No. 10354, however, protects the ovum upon its
fertilization without saying that life begins upon fertilization. This should be
sufficient for purposes of resolving this case for whether life begins upon
fertilization or upon implantation of the fertilized ovum on the uterus wall, R.A. No.
10354 protects both asserted starting points of human life. Absent a definitive
consensus from the scientific and medical community, this Court cannot venture to
pronounce which starting point of human life is correct. We can only reiterate what
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution provides, that the State shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
Same; Constitutional Law; View that Section 12, Article II of the Constitution is
repeated in Section 2 of R.A. No. 10354; R.A. No. 10354 protects the fertilized ovum
by prohibiting services, methods, devices or supplies that prevent its implantation
on the uterus wall.Section 12, Article II of the Constitution is repeated in Section 2
of R.A. No. 10354. The law does not provide a definition of conception. However, the
law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the State to protect the
travel of the fertilized ovum to the uterus wall. In fact, the law guarantees that the
State will provide access only to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices,
supplies which do not prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined
by the Food and Drug Administration. R.A. No. 10354 protects the fertilized ovum
by prohibiting services, methods, devices or supplies that prevent its implantation
on the uterus wall.
Leonardo-De Castro,J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Facial Challenges; Words and Phrases; View that a
facial challenge is a constitutional challenge asserting that a statute is invalid on its
face as written and authoritatively construed, when measured against the
applicable constitutional doctrine, rather than against the facts and circumstances
or a particular case.In general, a facial challenge is a constitutional challenge
asserting that a statute is invalid on its face as written and authoritatively
construed, when measured against the applicable constitutional doctrine, rather
than against the facts and circumstances or a particular case. The inquiry uses the
lens of relevant constitutional text and principle and focuses on what is within the
four corners of the statute, that is, on how its provisions are worded. The
constitutional violation is visible on the face of the statute. Thus, a facial challenge
is to constitutional law what res ipsa loquitur is to facts in a facial challenge, lex
ipsa loquitur: the law speaks for itself. The Government, invoking Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001), argues that legitimate facial attacks upon
legislation constitute a rare exception to the exercise of this Courts jurisdiction. This
is the conventional wisdom and it is principally based on the American Salerno rule
that a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the law would be valid. It has been previously pointed out, however,
that the American Salerno rule has not been met with unanimity in the American
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legal community. It has also been pointed out that Philippine jurisprudence has
traditionally deigned to nullify or facially invalidate statutes or provisions thereof
without need of considering whether no set of circumstances exists under which
the [law or provision] would be valid.
Reproductive Health Law; View that the moment of conception is reckoned from
fertilization; that the fertilized ovum, known as zygote, is the beginning of a human
being; and that the theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any
legal or scientific mooring or basis as it pertains not to the beginning of life but to
the viability of the fetus.I fully concur with the comprehensive and exhaustive
discussion in the majority opinion penned by the Honorable Justice Jose Catral
Mendoza, as to the plain meaning and jurisprudential and medical foundation of the
Courts conclusion that the moment of conception is reckoned from fertilization; that
the fertilized ovum, known as zygote, is the beginning of a human being; and that
the theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring or basis as it pertains not to the beginning of life but to the viability of the
fetus. The fertilized ovum is able to attach or implant itself to the uterine wall
because it is a living human being. The majority opinion aptly quoted with favor the
following statement of the Philippine Medical Association: The scientific evidence
supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a
new human being commences at a scientifically well defined moment of
conception. This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and
independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life
or of human embryos.
Same; View that Section 9 should be read to mean that there is no legal compulsion
to include hormonal contraceptives, injectables and devices in the National Drug
Formulary unless they are safe, legal and non-abortifacient, which obligatory
preconditions must be determined by the appropriate government agency, in this
case the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); The government should be
accountable or held liable whenever deleterious consequences to the health or life
of the unborn or the mother result from the latters availment of government
supplied contraceptive drugs or devices and the governments inability to provide
adequate medical attention or supervision dictated by the individual health
condition or a woman beneficiary.Since Section 9 admits that only safe, legal and
non-abortifacient contraceptives, injectables and devices can be lawfully included in
the National Drug Formulary, I join the majority opinion in holding that Section 9
should be read to mean that there is no legal compulsion to include hormonal
contraceptives, injectables and devices in the National Drug Fomulary unless they
are safe, legal and non-abortifacient, which obligatory preconditions must be
determined by the appropriate government agency, in this case the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). I concur in principle with Justice Mariano C. del Castillos
opinion that the FDA must formulate stringent and transparent rules of procedure in
the screening, evaluation and approval of all contraceptive drugs and devices to
ensure that they are safe, non-abortifacient and legal or compliant with the
mandate of the Constitution and the law. The government should be accountable or
held liable whenever deleterious consequences to the health or life of the unborn or
the mother result from the latters availment of government supplied contraceptive
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drugs or devices and the governments inability to provide adequate medical

attention or supervision dictated by the individual health condition of a woman
beneficiary.
Same; View that I agree with Justice Mendozas ponencia and Justice del Castillos
objection to Section 3.01 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Laws Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) that the latter cannot redefine the term abortifacient by the
addition of the word primarily.I also agree with Justice Mendozas ponencia and
Justice del Castillos objection to Section 3.01 of the RH Laws Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) that the latter cannot redefine the term abortifacient by the
addition of the word primarily as follows: Section 3.01. For purposes of these
Rules the terms shall be defined as follows: a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or
device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mothers womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). (Emphasis supplied) As reworded, it will allow the approval of contraceptives
which has a secondary effect of inducing abortion or the destruction of the fetus or
the prevention of implantation of the fertilized ovum in the mothers womb. This
secondary effect is the fail-safe mechanism, which is contrary to Section 12, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4(a) of the RH Law.
Same; Precautionary Principle; View that the precautionary principle seeks to
protect the rights of the present generation as well as to enforce intergenerational
responsibility, that is, the present generation should promote sustainable
development and act as stewards or caretakers of the environment for the benefit
of generations yet unborn.The precautionary principle seeks to protect the rights
of the present generation as well as to enforce intergenerational responsibility, that
is, the present generation should promote sustainable development and act as
stewards or caretakers of the environment for the benefit of generations yet unborn.
In its essence, the precautionary principle calls for the exercise of caution in the
face of risk and uncertainty. It acknowledges the pcculiar circumstances surrounding
environmental cases in that scientific evidence is usually insufficient, inconclusive
or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates that there are
reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially dangerous effects on the
environment, human, animal, or planet health. For this reason, the precautionary
principle requires those who have the means, knowledge, power, and resources to
take action to prevent or mitigate the harm to the environment or to act when
conclusively ascertained understanding by science is not yet available.
Same; Same; Principle of Prudence; Constitutional Law; Right to Life; Right to
Health; View that in the face of the conflicting claims and findings presented by the
parties, and considering that the right to health is inextricably intertwined with the
right to life, it is proper to refer to the principle of prudence, which is the principle
relied on by the framers of the 1987 Constitution on matters affecting the right to
life.The right to health, which is an indispensable element of the right to life,
deserves the same or even higher degree of protection. Thus, if it is scientifically
plausible but uncertain that any foreign substance or material ingested or implanted
in the womans body may lead to threats or serious and irreversible damage to her
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or her unborn childs right life or health, care should be taken to avoid or diminish
that threat. The principle of prudence requires that such a rule be adopted in
matters concerning the right to life and health. In the face of the conflicting claims
and findings presented by the parties, and considering that the right to health is
inextricably intertwined with the right to life, it is proper to refer to the principle of
prudence, which is the principle relied on by the framers of the 1987 Constitution on
matters affecting the right to life. Thus, any uncertainty on the adverse effects of
making contraceptives universally accessible on the life and health of the people,
especially of women, should be resolved in a way that will promote life and health.
Same; Same; Same; View that considering the relevant medical issues and health
concerns in connection with contraceptives and devices, the regulated framework
under Republic Act No. 4729 where contraceptive drugs and devices are sold,
dispensed or distributed only by duly licensed drug stores or pharmaceutical
companies pursuant to a doctors prescription is no doubt more in harmony with the
principle of prudence and the precautionary principle than the apparently
unrestricted or universal access approach under the RH Law.Republic Act No. 4729
provides for a controlled access policy and requires that the sale, dispensation or
distribution of any contraceptive drug or device should be made only by a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company pursuant to a doctors prescription.
On the other hand, with its thrust of providing universal access to contraceptives,
the RH Law gives the impression that it requires, under pain of criminal prosecution,
even persons other than doctors of medicine (such as nurses, midwives, public
health workers, and barangay health workers) to distribute contraceptives.
Considering the relevant medical issues and health concerns in connection with
contraceptives and devices, the regulated framework under Republic Act No. 4729
where contraceptive drugs and devices are sold, dispensed or distributed only by
duly licensed drug stores or pharmaceutical companies pursuant to a doctors
prescription is no doubt more in harmony with the principle of prudence and the
precautionary principle than the apparently unrestricted or universal access
approach under the RH Law. This is so as the bodies of women may react differently
to said drugs or devices depending on many factors that only a licensed doctor is
capable of determining. Thus, the universal access policy should be read as
qualified by the regulated framework under Republic Act No. 4729 rather than as
impliedly repealing the said law.
Same; Constitutional Law; Religious Freedom; View that the guarantee of free
exercise of religion proscribes the imposition of substantial burden upon the said
right absent any compelling state interest to justify the same.The guarantee of
free exercise of religion proscribes the imposition of substantial burden upon the
said right absent any compelling state interest to justify the same. A governmental
restriction substantially burdens religious freedom when it bans behavior that the
objectors see as religiously compelled, or mandates behavior that the objectors see
as religiously prohibited. Requiring people to do something that is forbidden by
[their] faith qualifies as a substantial burden on religious practice. While the
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial and that is so even where the relevant conduct proscribed by a
religious faith is indirect complicity in other conduct, and the complicity line that
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the religious claimant draws appears inconsistent or unsound to the reviewing court
because [i]t is not for [secular courts] to say that the line [the claimant] drew was
an unreasonable one. Thus, the law recognizes that requiring a person to do
something that he or she sincerely sees as sinful is a substantial burden on his/her
religion, and peoples definition of sinful often includes sins of complicity and not
just sins of direct action.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; View that Section 23(a)(1) requires the
doctor or health care service provider to make a compelled speech, a speech that
may be against the doctors spiritual belief or professional opinion. Moreover, the
threat of criminal sanction enhances the chilling effect of the law and serves to
deter a health care service provider from expressing his professional views or
exercising his religious reservations.Section 23(a)(1) effectively compels the
doctor or health care provider to make a speech that promotes the Governments
RH Law program, particularly the use of contraceptive drugs and devices, regardless
of the doctors religious conviction or well-considered professional opinion. lt
dictates upon the doctor what should. be said and what should not be said in
matters of reproductive health. In other words, Section 23(a)(1) requires the doctor
or health care service provider to make a compelled speech, a speech that may be
against the doctors spiritual belief or professional opinion. Moreover, the threat of
criminal sanction enhances the chilling effect of the law and serves to deter a health
care service provider from expressing his professional views or exercising his
religious reservations.
Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law
dictates upon the doctor what to tell his/her patients in matters of family planning,
and threatens the doctor with criminal prosecution in case of noncompliance.
Indeed, a society that tells its doctors under pain of criminal penalty what they
may not tell their patients is not a free society. The RH Law, however, precisely
does that to our society. It dictates upon the doctor what to tell his/her patients in
matters of family planning, and threatens the doctor with criminal prosecution in
case of non-compliance. Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the
Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress
unpopular ideas or information or to manipulate the public debate through coercion
rather than persuasion.
Same; Same; Same; View that Section 23(a)(1) of the Reproductive Health (RH)
Law, a tool to promote the universal access policy established in Section 7 of that
law, constitutes an undue and unconstitutional restriction of the freedom of speech.
The Government also failed to show that speech may be compelled or restrained
because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the
government has a right to prevent. There is no demonstration of evil consequences
sought to be prevented which are substantive, extremely serious and highly
imminent. In other words, no clear and present danger to be prevented has been
established. All told, Section 23(a)(1) of the RH Law, a tool to promote the universal
access policy established in Section 7 of that law, constitutes an undue and
unconstitutional restriction of the freedom of speech.

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Same; Same; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law as worded contradicts the
constitutional text of the Family Provisions as well as the established constitutional
principles on the family.The RH Law as worded contradicts the constitutional text
of the Family Provisions as well as the established constitutional principles on the
family. The pertinent policy declarations are contained in Section 2 of the RH Law
quoted hereunder: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.x x x Moreover, the State
recognizes and guarantees the promotion of gender equality, gender equity, women
empowerment and dignity as a health and human rights concern and as a social
responsibility. The advancement and protection of womens human rights shall be
central to the efforts of the State to address reproductive health care. x x x
x x x x x x The State likewise guarantees universal access to medically-safe, nonabortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, supplies which do not prevent the implantation of a
fertilized ovum as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
relevant information and education thereon according to the priority needs of
women, children and other underprivileged sectors, giving preferential access to
those identified through the National Household Targeting System for Poverty
Reduction (NHTS-PR) and other government measures of identifying
marginalization, who shall be voluntary beneficiaries of reproductive health care,
services and supplies for free.
Same; Same; Parental Consent; View that the overly liberal stance or the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law as regards the access of minors, who are already
parents or have had a miscarriage, to modern family planning methods without
need of parental consent is contrary to the provision of Section 12, Article II of the
1987 Constitution.The overly liberal stance or the RH Law as regards the access of
minors, who are already parents or have had a miscarriage, to modern family
planning methods without need of parental consent is contrary to the provision of
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. It is also seriously doubtful if the
elimination of the requirement for parental consent with redound to the best
interest of the class of minors mentioned in the RH Law.
Same; Same; View that the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law
ought to be judged based on its implications on the relevant and treasured values of
the Filipino society as shown by the Filipino peoples history and tradition as
enshrined in the Constitution.The constitutionality of the RH Law ought to be
judged based on its implications on the relevant and treasured values of the Filipino
society as shown by the Filipino peoples history and tradition as enshrined in the
Constitution. These cherished values are as follows: the sanctity of the family; the
natural joint right of the spouses to found a family; the natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of their children; and the right to health or the
people, particularly of women; and the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men. These transcendental values include the protection of the freedom
of religion and freedom of speech.
Brion,J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Power; View that the 1987
Constitution, through the 2nd paragraph of its Section 1, confirms that judicial
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power is wider than the power of adjudication that it traditionally carried (by using
the word includes) and at the same time incorporated the basic requirements for
adjudication in the traditional concept, namely, the presence of actual
controversies, based on rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
In addition, the 1987 Constitution, through the
2nd paragraph of its Section 1, confirms that judicial power is wider than the power
of adjudication that it traditionally carried (by using the word includes) and at the
same time incorporated the basic requirements for adjudication in the traditional
concept, namely, the presence of actual controversies, based on rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable. The confirmation expressly mentions that the
power is granted to courts of justice and, aside from being a power, is imposed as
a duty of the courts. Thus, the Constitution now lays the courts open to the charge
of failure to do their constitutional duty when and if they violate the obligations
imposed in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 5, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution further fleshes out the irreducible powers of the Supreme
Court in terms of its original, appellate, and review adjudicative powers and its
other non-adjudicative powers. In so doing, Section 5 also confirmed the extent of
the constitutionally-granted adjudicative power of the lower courts that Congress
has the authority to create (by defining, prescribing and apportioning their
jurisdictions), as well as the grant of administrative, executive and quasi-legislative
powers to the Supreme Court, all within the sphere of its judicial operations.
Same; Same; Same; View that judicial power is extended over the very powers
exercised by other branches or instrumentalities of government when grave abuse
of discretion is present.A completely new one, to the concept of judicial power
under the 1987 Constitution is the power to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This new power is
innovative since its recognition is separate from the traditional adjudicative power
that Section 1 earlier confirms and which Section 5 in part fleshes out. It is likewise
a definitive expansion of judicial power as its exercise is not over the traditional
justiciable cases handled by judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. Notably, judicial
power is extended over the very powers exercised by other branches or
instrumentalities of government when grave abuse of discretion is present. In other
words, the expansion empowers the judiciary, as a matter of duty, to inquire into
acts of lawmaking by the legislature and into law implementation by the executive
when these other branches act with grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; View that under our constitutional regime, the judicial
department is the only organ of government tasked to guard and enforce the
boundaries and limitations that the people had put in place in governing
themselves.Under our constitutional regime, the judicial department is the only
organ of government tasked to guard and enforce the boundaries and limitations
that the people had put in place in governing themselves. This constitutional duty of
the Court has been expanded by the additional power of judicial review under the
1987 Constitution to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of

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discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government.
Same; Reproductive Health Law; Principle of Double Effect; View that while the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law generally protects and promotes the unborns right to
life, its Section 9 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) fail in their
fidelity to the Constitution and to the very terms of the RH Law itself. For one, it fails
to adopt the principle of double effect under Section 12, Article II of the 1987
Constitution.I agree with the ponencia that the RH law protects and promotes the
right to life of the unborn by its continued prohibition on abortion and distribution of
abortifacients. I do recognize, however, that while the RH law generally protects and
promotes the unborns right to life, its Section 9 and its IRR fail in their fidelity to the
Constitution and to the very terms of the RH Law itself. For one, it fails to adopt the
principle of double effect under Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, as
more fully discussed below. For these reasons, I cannot wholly concur that the RH
law and its IRR, as they came to this Court, were fully protective of the right to life
of the unborn. In fact, the Court should lay down guidelines, culled from a
constitutionally-valid RH Law, of what the government can actually procure and
distribute under the RH law, consistent with its authority under this law and Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.
Same; Same; View that although Section 12, Article II of the Constitution does not
consider the unborn a person, its terms reflect the framers clear intent to convey
an utmost respect for human life that is not merely co-extensive with civil
personality.Although Section 12, Article II of the Constitution does not consider the
unborn a person, its terms reflect the framers clear intent to convey an utmost
respect for human life that is not merely co-extensive with civil personality. This
intent requires the extension of State protection to the life of the unborn from
conception. To be precise, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Same; Same; View that unlike the ponencia, I take the view that the question of
when the life of the unborn begins cannot strictly be answered with reference to
time, i.e., the exact time the sperm cell fertilized the egg cell.Unlike the ponencia,
I take the view that the question of when the life of the unborn begins cannot
strictly be answered with reference to time, i.e., the exact time the sperm cell
fertilized the egg cell. But other than this uncertainty, the germinal stage of
prenatal development that transpires (after the union of the sperm cell and the egg
cell and the combination of their genetic material materialized to form the fertilized
egg or the zygote) is not debatable.
Same; Same; View that since the constitutional intent is to protect the life of the
unborn, and the fertilized egg (or the zygote) already exhibits signs and
characteristics of life, then this fertilized egg is already entitled to constitutional
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protection.Since the constitutional intent is to protect the life of the unborn, and
the fertilized egg (or the zygote) already exhibits signs and characteristics of life,
then this fertilized egg is already entitled to constitutional protection. I say this even
if this fertilized egg may not always naturally develop into a baby or a person. I
submit that for purposes of constitutional interpretation, every doubt should be
resolved in favor of life, as this is the rule of life, anywhere, everywhere; any doubt
should be resolved in favor of its protection following a deeper law that came before
all of us the law commanding the preservation of the human specie. This must
have been the subconscious reason why even those who voted against the inclusion
of the second sentence of Section 12 in Article II of the Constitution conceded that a
fertilized ovum the word originally used prior to its substitution by the word
unborn is possessed of human life although they disagreed that a right to life
itself should be extended to it in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Principle of Double Effect; View that the mandate to equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn child from conception under Section
12, Article II of the Constitution is self-executing to prevent and prohibit the state
from enacting legislation that threatens the right to life of the unborn child.I
submit that the mandate to equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn child from conception under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution is selfexecuting to prevent and prohibit the state from enacting legislation that threatens
the right to life of the unborn child. To my mind, Section 12, Article II should not be
read narrowly as a mere policy declaration lest the actual intent of the provision be
effectively negated. While it is indeed a directive to the State to equally protect the
life of the mother and the unborn child, this command cannot be accomplished
without the corollary and indirect mandate to the State to inhibit itself from
enacting programs that contradict protection for the life of the unborn.
Same; Same; Abortion; View that the clear intent of the Framers was to prevent
both Congress and the Supreme Court from making abortion possible.The framers
did not only intend to prevent the Supreme Court from having a Philippine
equivalent of a Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) decision, they also unequivocally
intended to deny Congress the power to determine that only at a certain stage of
prenatal development can the constitutional protection intended for the life unborn
be triggered. In short, the clear intent of the Framers was to prevent both Congress
and the Supreme Court from making abortion possible.
Same; Same; View that since conception was equated with fertilization, as borne out
by Records of the Constitutional Commission, a fertilized egg or zygote, even
without being implanted in the uterus, is therefore already entitled to constitutional
protection from the State.Based on paragraph number 6 of the Medical Experts
Declaration, abortion is the termination of established pregnancy and that
abortifacients, logically, terminate this pregnancy. Under paragraph number 5,
pregnancy is established only after the implantation of the blastocysts or the
fertilized egg. From this medical viewpoint, it is clear that prior to implantation, it is
premature to talk about abortion and abortifacient as there is nothing yet to abort. If
the constitutional framers simply intended to adopt this medical viewpoint in
crafting Section 12, Article II, there would have been no real need to insert the
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phrase from conception. This should be obvious to a discerning reader. Since

conception was equated with fertilization, as borne out by Records of the
Constitutional Commission, a fertilized egg or zygote, even without being implanted
in the uterus, is therefore already entitled to constitutional protection from the
State.
Same; Same; Principle of Double Effect; View that the general rule is that both the
life of the unborn and the life of the mother should be protected. However, in case
of exceptional conflict situations, the life of one may be preferred over the life of the
other where it becomes medically necessary to do so.To me, the general rule is
that both the life of the unborn and the life of the mother should be protected.
However, in case of exceptional conflict situations, the life of one may be preferred
over the life of the other where it becomes medically necessary to do so. The
principle of double effect recognizes that in some instances, the use or
administration of certain drugs that are abortifacient-capable are necessary in order
to save the life of the mother. The use in administration of these drugs in these
instances is and should be allowed by Section 12, Article II of the Constitution since
the policy is equal protection.
Reproductive Health Law; Department of Health; View that as the lead agency in the
implementation of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, the Department of Health
(DOH) is tasked to ensure peoples access to medically safe, non-abortifacient,
legal, quality and affordable reproductive health goods and services.As the lead
agency in the implementation of the RH law, the Department of Health (DOH) is
tasked to [e]nsure peoples access to medically safe, non-abortifacient, legal,
quality and affordable reproductive health goods and services[.] This is consistent
with the RH laws policy which guarantees universal access [only] to medically-safe
[and] non-abortifacient contraceptives. The law also provides that these
contraceptives do not prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined
by the FDA. Accordingly, DOH is tasked to procure and distribute to local
government units (LGUs) family planning supplies for the whole country and to
monitor their usage. Once delivered to the LGUs, the responsible health officials
shall assume responsibility for the supplies and ensure their distribution in
accordance with DOH guidelines. For this purpose, a regional officer appointed by
the DOH shall oversee the supply chain management of reproductive health
supplies and/or health products in his or her respective area. The RH law also
authorizes LGUs to implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring
program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the
DOH.
Same; Abortion; View that as a matter of exception, the government should be able
to procure and distribute abortifacients or drugs with abortifacient properties but
solely for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.As a matter of exception,
the government should be able to procure and distribute abortifacients or drugs
with abortifacient properties but solely for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother. Specifically, the procurement and distribution of these abortifacients may
be allowed only in emergency cases and should thus be made under medical
supervision. The IRR of the RH law defines an emergency as a condition or state
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of a patient wherein based on the objective findings of a prudent medical officer on

duty for the day there is immediate danger and where delay in initial support and
treatment may cause loss of life or cause permanent disability to the patient.
Same; Parental Rights; Mandatory Reproductive Health Education Program; View
that we cannot declare that the mandatory Reproductive Health (RH) education
program does not violate parental rights when the curriculum that could possibly
supplant it is not yet in existence.We cannot, without first examining the actual
contents of the curriculum and the religious beliefs and personal convictions of the
parents that it could affect, declare that the mandatory RH education is consistent
with the Constitution. In other words, we cannot declare that the mandatory RH
education program does not violate parental rights when the curriculum that could
possibly supplant it is not yet in existence. Given the primacy of the natural and
fundamental rights of parents to raise their children, we should not pre-empt a
constitutional challenge against its possible violation, especially since the scope and
coercive nature of the RH mandatory education program could prevent the exercise
of these rights.
Same; Same; View that pursuant to this natural right and duty of parents over the
person of their minor children, parental authority and responsibility include the
caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.The
relationship created by and resulting from a family naturally extends to and involves
other personal decisions that relate to child rearing and education. Parents have the
natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to
their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. These array of
personal decisions are protected by the constitutional right to privacy to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion. Pursuant to this natural right and duty of
parents over the person of their minor children, parental authority and responsibility
include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and
the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.
Same; Same; View that while parents are given a wide latitude of discretion and
support in rearing their children, their well-being is of course a subject within the
States constitutional power to regulate.While parents are given a wide latitude of
discretion and support in rearing their children, their well-being is of course a
subject within the States constitutional power to regulate. Specifically, the
Constitution tasked the State to promote and protect their moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social development, and to recognize and support their vital role in
nation-building. In this undertaking, the State acts in its capacity as parens patriae.
Concededly, the State as parens patriae has the right and duty to minimize the
risk of harm, arising from the acquisition of knowledge from polluted sources, to
those who are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. In other words, the
family itself and the rights of parenthood are not completely beyond regulation;
parental freedom and authority in things affecting the childs welfare, including, to
some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction are not totally beyond
State authority. It is in this area that the parents right to raise their children and the
States interest in rearing the youth clash
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Same; Same; Mandatory Reproductive Health Education Program; View that a

mandatory reproductive health education program in public schools does not violate
parental privacy if they allow parents to review and excuse their children from
attending the program, or if the State shows a compelling state interest to override
the parents choice and compel them to allow their children to attend the program.
A mandatory reproductive health education program in public schools does not
violate parental privacy if they allow parents to review and excuse their children
from attending the program, or if the State shows a compelling state interest to
override the parents choice and compel them to allow their children to attend the
program.
Same; View that one obvious discouraging effect of controlled population growth is
on the economy of some of these countries which now have to secure foreign labor
to balance their finances.The Philippines to be sure, is not the first country to use
contraceptives and the mixed results from countries that have long travelled this
road are, to my mind, not very encouraging. One obvious discouraging effect of
controlled population growth is on the economy of some of these countries which
now have to secure foreign labor to balance their finances. This development has
been a boon for a country like the Philippines with a fast-growing population; we are
enjoying now the benefits of our fast-growing population through the returns our
migrating Filipino workers bring back to the Philippines from their work in laborstarved countries. This has become possible because host countries like Japan and
the more economically advanced European countries need workers to man their
industries and supply their economies. Another economic effect is on retirement
systems that have been burdened by predominantly aging populations. For this
same reason, some countries even face impending economic slowdown in the
middle term unless they can effectively remedy their manpower shortage.
Same; Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech; View that broken down to its
elements, Section 23(a)(1) of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law penalizes health
care providers who (1) knowingly withhold information about programs and services
on reproductive health; (2) knowingly restrict the dissemination of these programs
and services; or (3) intentionally provide incorrect information regarding them; By
penalizing these expressive acts, Section 23 imposes a subsequent punishment on
speech, which as a counterpart to the prohibition against prior restraint, is also
generally prohibited under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.
Broken down to its elements, Section 23(a)(1) of the RH law penalizes health care
providers who (1) knowingly withhold information about programs and services on
reproductive health; (2) knowingly restrict the dissemination of these programs and
services; or (3) intentionally provide incorrect information regarding them. These
prohibited acts are, by themselves, communicative and expressive, and thus
constitute speech. Intentionally providing incorrect information cannot be performed
without uttering, verbally or otherwise, the information that the RH Law deems to
be incorrect. The information that is illegal to withhold or restrict under Section 23
also constitutes speech, as it is an expression of data and opinions regarding
reproductive health services and programs; thus, the prerogative to not utter these
pieces of information also constitutes speech. By penalizing these expressive acts,
Section 23 imposes a subsequent punishment on speech, which as a counterpart to
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the prohibition against prior restraint, is also generally prohibited under the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. Without an assurance that
speech would not be subsequently penalized, people would hesitate to speak for
fear of its consequences; there would be no need for prior restraints because the
punishment itself would effectively serve as a chilling effect on speech.
Same; Same; Same; View that Section 23(a)(1) of the Reproductive Health Law
violates the right of health practitioners to speak in public about reproductive health
and should simply be struck down.Jurisprudence in the United States regarding
the speech of medical practitioners has drawn a distinction between speech in the
course of their practice of medicine, and speech in public. When a doctor speaks to
his patient, his speech may be subjected to reasonable regulation by the state to
ensure the accuracy of the information he gives his patient and the quality of
healthcare he provides. But when the doctor speaks to the public, his speech
becomes protected speech, and the guarantees against prior restraint and
subsequent punishment applies to his expressions that involves medicine or any
other topic. This distinction is not provided in Section 23(a)(1) of the RH Law, and
we cannot create a distinction in the law when it provides none. Thus, I submit that
Section 23(a)(1) violates the right of health practitioners to speak in public about
reproductive health and should simply be struck down.
Del Castillo,J., Concurring and Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; View that the Supreme Court cannot remain an
idle spectator or a disinterested referee when constitutional rights are at stake.
The path that we, as a nation, will take has already been decided by Congress, as
representatives of the people, under our system of government. The task before the
Court, then, is not to say which path we ought to take but to determine if the
chosen path treads on unconstitutional grounds. But this is not all. For the Court,
which was once generally a passive organ in our constitutional order, has been
given expanded powers under the present Constitution. It is now not only its right
but its bounden duty to determine grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch, instrumentality or agency of government, and, equally important, it has
been given the power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court cannot, therefore, remain an idle spectator or a
disinterested referee when constitutional rights are at stake. It is its duty to protect
and defend constitutional rights for otherwise its raison detre will cease.
Same; Reproductive Health Law; Contraceptives; View that absent a clear and
unequivocal constitutional prohibition on the manufacture, distribution, and use of
contraceptives, there is nothing to prevent Congress from adopting a national family
planning policy provided that the contraceptives that will be used pursuant thereto
do not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception, which is synonymous
to fertilization, under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.I am fully in accord
with the result reached by the ponencia. Absent a clear and unequivocal
constitutional prohibition on the manufacture, distribution, and use of
contraceptives, there is nothing to prevent Congress from adopting a national family
planning policy provided that the contraceptives that will be used pursuant thereto
do not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception, which is synonymous
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to fertilization, under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. The plain meaning of
this constitutional provision and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
bare this out.
Same; Same; View that history will judge the Supreme Court on what it did or did
not do to protect the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization.The framers
of, and the people who ratified the Constitution set in bold and deft strokes the
protection of the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization because it is
precious, sacred and inviolable. For as long as this precept remains written in our
Constitution, our solemn duty is to stay the course in fidelity to the most cherished
values and wisdom of those who came before us and to whom we entrusted the
writing and ratification of our Constitution. History will judge this Court on what it
did or did not do to protect the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. There
is, therefore, no other recourse but for this Court to act in defense of the life of the
unborn.
Same; Same; View that the framers were unequivocal in their intent to define
conception as the fertilization of the egg by the sperm and to accord
constitutional protection to the life of the unborn from the moment of fertilization.
The framers were unequivocal in their intent to define conception as the
fertilization of the egg by the sperm and to accord constitutional protection to the
life of the unborn from the moment of fertilization. The plain meaning of the term
conception, as synonymous to fertilization, based on dictionaries and medical
textbooks, as aptly and extensively discussed by the ponencia, confirm this
construction. In addition, petitioners correctly argue that the definition of
conception, as equivalent to fertilization, was the same definition prevailing
during the 1980s or at around the time the 1987 Constitution was ratified. Hence,
under the rule of constitutional construction, which gives weight to how the term
was understood by the people who ratified the Constitution, conception should be
understood as fertilization.
Same; Same; View that the protection of the life of the unborn under Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution is a self-executing provision.The protection of the
life of the unborn under Article II, Section 12 is a self-executing provision because:
(1) It prevents Congress from legalizing abortion; from passing laws which authorize
the use of abortifacients; and from passing laws which will determine when life
begins other than from the moment of conception/fertilization; (2) It prevents the
Supreme Court from making a Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ruling in our
jurisdiction; and (3) It obligates the Executive to ban contraceptives which act as
abortifacients or those which harm or destroy the unborn from
conception/fertilization. Article II, Section 12 is, thus, a direct, immediate and
effective limitation on the three great branches of government and a positive
command on the State to protect the life of the unborn.
Same; Same; Right to Life; View that the framers repeatedly treated or referred to
the right to life of the unborn as a fundamental right and thereby acknowledged
that the unborn is a proper subject of a constitutional right.Article II, Section 12
recognized a sui generis constitutional right to life of the unborn. The framers
repeatedly treated or referred to the right to life of the unborn as a fundamental
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right and thereby acknowledged that the unborn is a proper subject of a

constitutional right. That this right is founded on natural law and is self-executing
further provides the unmistakable basis and intent to accord it the status of a
constitutional right. However, it is sui generis because, unlike a person who
possesses the right to life, liberty and property, the unborns fundamental right is
solely limited to the right to life as was the intention of the framers. Clearly, then,
Article II, Section 12 recognized a sui generis right to life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization and elevated it to the status of a constitutional right.
Same; Same; View that because the unborn has been accorded a constitutional
right to life from conception/fertilization under Article II, Section 12, this right falls
within the ambit of the Courts power to issue rules for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution.Because the unborn has been accorded a constitutional right to life
from conception/fertilization under Article II, Section 12, this right falls within the
ambit of the Courts power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution: Section5.
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: x x x x (5) Promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, x x x. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. This is significant because it imposes upon this
Court the duty to protect such right pursuant to its rule-making powers. In recent
times, the Court acknowledged that the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature under Article II,
Section 16 of the Constitution, though found in the Declaration of Principles and
Policies (like the subject right to life of the unborn) and not in the Bill of Rights, may
be given flesh pursuant to the power of the Court to issue rules for the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights. It, thus, proceeded to promulgate the rules
governing the Writ of Kalikasan.
Reproductive Health Law; Contraceptives; View that the Reproductive Health (RH)
Law repeatedly emphasizes that the contraceptives which will be made available
under the law should be non-abortifacient.The RH Law is to be commended for its
zealous protection of the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. It
repeatedly emphasizes that the contraceptives which will be made available under
the law should be non-abortifacient. It prohibits the use of abortifacients and
penalizes the use thereof. Thus, it cannot be said that the law violates Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Abortifacient; Words and Phrases; View that as defined in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), a drug or device is considered an
abortifacient if it primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mothers womb; where primarily means that the drug or device has no
other known effect aside from abortion.I agree that the insertion of the qualifier
primarily will open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. As defined in the IRR, a drug or device is
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considered an abortifacient if it primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a

fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mothers womb; where primarily means that the drug or
device has no other known effect aside from abortion. In other words, under the IRR,
a contraceptive will only be considered as an abortifacient if its sole known effect
is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized
ovum. Consequently, a drug or device which (a) prevents fertilization, (b) but does
not provide a 100% guarantee of such prevention, and (c) has a fail-safe
mechanism which will prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum in case
fertilization still occurs will not be considered an abortifacient because the known
effect thereof is not solely prevention of implantation since (1) it primarily prevents
fertilization and (2) only secondarily prevents the implantation of the fertilized ovum
in case fertilization still occurs.
Same; Same; View that although the Reproductive Health (RH) Law does not provide
a definition of contraceptive, a reasonable and logical deduction is that
contraceptive (or allowable contraceptive to be more precise) is the opposite of
abortifacient as defined under the RH Law.Although the RH Law does not
provide a definition of contraceptive, a reasonable and logical deduction is that
contraceptive (or allowable contraceptive to be more precise) is the opposite of
abortifacient as defined under the RH Law. This seems to be the tack adopted by
the IRR in defining contraceptive. However, the IRRs definition of contraceptive
again added the qualifier primarily. For similar reasons with the previous
discussion on the IRRs definition of abortifacient, this definition of
contraceptive opens the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which are
actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism. Hence, the qualifier
primarily in Section 3.01(j) is, likewise, void.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; View that the power to disapprove the rules of
procedure of quasi-judicial bodies is significant in that it implies the power of the
Supreme Court to look into the sufficiency of such rules of procedure insofar as they
adequately protect and enforce constitutional rights.Viewed in light of the broad
power of the Court to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, the power to disapprove the rules of procedure of quasi-judicial
bodies is significant in that it implies the power of the Court to look into the
sufficiency of such rules of procedure insofar as they adequately protect and
enforce constitutional rights. Moreover, the power to disapprove the aforesaid rules
of procedure necessarily includes or implies the power to approve or modify such
rules or, on the one extreme, require that such rules of procedure be issued when
necessary to protect and enforce constitutional rights. In other words, within and
between the broader power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights and the narrower power to disapprove the rules of procedure of
quasi-judicial bodies, there exist penumbras of this power that the Court may
exercise in order to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court must step in by directing the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to issue the proper rules of procedure in the
determination of whether a drug or device is an abortifacient under the
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Reproductive Health (RH) Law.Within this framework of implementation, and given

the unique status of the unborn and the exceptional need to protect its right to life,
the Court must step in by directing the FDA to issue the proper rules of procedure in
the determination of whether a drug or device is an abortifacient under the RH Law.
Such rules must sufficiently safeguard the right to life of the unborn. As a penumbra
of its power to issue rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights and its power
to disapprove rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies, the Court has the power
and competency to mandate the minimum requirements of due process in order to
sufficiently safeguard the right to life of the unborn in the proceedings that will be
conducted before the FDA. This is in line with the declared policy and numerous
provisions of the RH Law according utmost respect and protection for the right to
life of the unborn. In determining whether a drug or device is an abortifacient, the
FDA will necessarily engage in a quasi-judicial function. It will determine whether a
set of facts (active properties or mechanisms of a drug or device) comply with a
legal standard (definition of non-abortifacient) which will ultimately bear upon the
right to life of the unborn. Considering that quasi-judicial bodies involved in, say,
rate-fixing follow the due process requirements of publication, notice and hearing,
where the lesser right to property is involved, then with far greater reason should
the proceedings before the FDA require publication, notice and hearing.
Same; Same; View that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) should be ordered
to immediately inform this Court whether its previously approved and the currently
available contraceptive drugs and devices in our jurisdiction were screened,
evaluated and/or tested against the afore-discussed general and specific standards.
The FDA should be ordered to immediately inform this Court whether its
previously approved and the currently available contraceptive drugs and devices in
our jurisdiction were screened, evaluated and/or tested against the afore-discussed
general and specific standards. It should be emphasized that the FDA is not being
asked to re-screen, re-evaluate or re-test the aforesaid contraceptive drugs and
devices but only to inform this Court if they were screened, evaluated and/or tested
against the constitutional and statutory standards that the Court upholds in this
decision. Thus, this will not take an inordinate amount of time to do considering that
the files should be readily available with the FDA. This information will allow the
Court to take immediate remedial action in order to protect and defend the life of
the unborn from conception/fertilization, if the circumstances warrant. That is, if the
contraceptive drugs or devices were not screened, evaluated and/or tested against
the constitutional and statutory standards that the Court upholds in this decision,
then it would be necessary to suspend their availability in the market, as a
precautionary measure, in order to protect the right to life of the unborn pending
the proper screening, evaluation and/or testing through the afore-discussed rules of
procedure that the FDA is directed to issue.
Same; Same; View that pursuant to the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
and as a penumbra of its power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of
the right to life of the unborn as well as the exceptional need to protect such life,
the Court can require that, in the promulgation by the Department of Health (DOH)
of the subject rules and regulations or guidelines, certain minimum requirements of
due process shall be followed.Pursuant to the expanded jurisdiction of this Court
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and as a penumbra of its power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of
the right to life of the unborn as well as the exceptional need to protect such life,
the Court can require that, in the promulgation by the DOH of the subject rules and
regulations or guidelines, certain minimum requirements of due process shall be
followed. I find that, under these premises, publication, notice and hearing should
precede the issuance of the rules and regulations or guidelines which will govern
the purchase and distribution of the subject products and supplies. In other words,
there should be public hearings and/or consultations. The Solicitor General should
be mandated to represent the unborn and the States interest in the protection of
the life of the unborn in these proceedings before the DOH. And interested parties
should be allowed to intervene.
Same; Same; View that under the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, there is nothing to
suggest that the contraceptives will be made available without properly informing
the target users of their possible harmful side effects.While indeed the RH Law will
make available contraceptives that may have harmful side-effects, it is necessary to
remember that the law does not impose their use upon any person.
Understandably, from petitioners point of view, it would seem irrational for (1) a
person to take contraceptives, which have known harmful side effects and, in the
long term, even lead to premature death, and (2) the government to subsidize the
same in order to prevent pregnancy or to properly space childbearing given that
there are other safer means and methods of family planning. But the weighing of
which value is superior to the other is a matter left to the individuals sound
judgment and conscience. It is his or her choice; an axiom of liberty; an attribute of
free will. Men and women are free to make choices that harm themselves, like
cigarette-smoking or excessive intake of alcohol, in order to attain a value that they
perceive is more important than their own health and well-being. For as long as
these choices are made freely (and do not harm the unborn from
conception/fertilization insofar as this case is concerned), the State cannot
intervene beyond ensuring that the choices are well-informed absent a clear and
unequivocal constitutional or statutory command permitting it to do so. Under the
RH Law, there is nothing to suggest that the contraceptives will be made available
without properly informing the target users of their possible harmful side effects.
The law itself mandates complete information-dissemination and severely penalizes
deliberate misinformation.
Same; Same; View that all persons, who are qualified to avail of the benefits
provided by the law, shall be given complete and correct information on the
reproductive health programs and services of the government under the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law.The duty to inform is embodied in the above-quoted
Section 23(a)(1), which penalizes a public or private health care service provider for:
(1) knowingly withholding information or restricting the dissemination of
information, and/or (2) intentionally providing incorrect information; where
information pertains to the programs and services on reproductive health
including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medicallysafe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods. This provision, thus,
seeks to ensure that all persons, who are qualified to avail of the benefits provided
by the law, shall be given complete and correct information on the reproductive
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health programs and services of the government under the RH Law. It does not
provide any exception to the duty to inform. Thus, a conscientious objector is
mandated to provide complete and correct information even if this will include
information on artificial contraceptives to which he or she objects to on religious
grounds. Otherwise, he or she shall suffer the penal liability under the law.
Same; Constitutional Law; Religious Freedom; View that Section 23(a)(3) of the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law respects the right of the conscientious objector by
permitting him or her to refuse to perform or provide the health care services to
which he or she objects to on religious or ethical grounds provided that he or she
immediately refers the person seeking such care and services to another health
care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible.The duty to refer, on the other hand, is provided in the proviso of
Section 23(a)(3), which is likewise quoted above. This provision penalizes a public or
private health care service provider for refusing to extend quality health care
services and information on account of a persons marital status, gender, age,
religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature of work. However, it
respects the right of the conscientious objector by permitting him or her to refuse to
perform or provide the health care services to which he or she objects to on
religious or ethical grounds provided that he or she immediately refers the person
seeking such care and services to another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible. As an exception to the
exception, the conscientious objector cannot refuse to perform or provide such
health care services if it involves an emergency condition or serious case under
Republic Act No. 8344.
Same; Same; Same; View that the law does not command the health service
provider to endorse a particular family planning method but merely requires the
presentation of complete and correct information so that the person can make an
informed choice.The law does not command the health service provider to
endorse a particular family planning method but merely requires the presentation of
complete and correct information so that the person can make an informed choice.
A conscientious objector, like a Catholic doctor, is, thus, not compelled to endorse
artificial contraceptives as the preferred family planning method. On its face,
therefore, there appears to be no burden imposed on the conscientious objector
under the duty to inform.
Same; Same; Same; View that the duty to refer imposed on the conscientious
objector under Sections 7 and 23(a)(3) of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the Free Exercise of Religion Clause.I find that the
duty to refer imposed on the conscientious objector under Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)
of the RH Law is unconstitutional for violating the Free Exercise of Religion Clause.
Consequently, the phrase, Provided, further, That these hospitals shall immediately
refer the person seeking such care and services to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible, in Section 7 and the phrase, however, the conscientious
objector shall immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to
another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible, in Section 23(a)(3) of the RH Law should be declared void.
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Consequently, Sections 5.24(b) to (e) and 5.25 of the IRR, which implements the
aforesaid provisions of the RH Law, are void.
Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; View that under Section 23(a)(3) of the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law, both public and private health service providers may
invoke the right of a conscientious objector. The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) is, thus, void insofar as it deprives
the skilled health professionals enumerated therein from the right to conscientious
objection. I also agree with the ponencia that the last paragraph of Section 5.24 of
the IRR is unconstitutional for being violative of the Equal Protection Clause
although I find that the proper standard of review is the strict scrutiny test.The
above-enumerated skilled health professionals fall within the definition of a public
health care service provider under Section 4(n) of the RH Law. Under Section 23(a)
(3) of the RH Law, both public and private health service providers may invoke the
right of a conscientious objector. The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the IRR is,
thus, void insofar as it deprives the skilled health professionals enumerated therein
from the right to conscientious objection. I also agree with the ponencia that the last
paragraph of Section 5.24 of the IRR is unconstitutional for being violative of the
Equal Protection Clause although I find that the proper standard of review is the
strict scrutiny test. The IRR effectively creates two classes with differential
treatment with respect to the capacity to invoke the right of a conscientious
objector: (1) skilled health professionals such as provincial, city, or municipal health
officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who
by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RH Law and its IRR, and (2) skilled health professionals not
belonging to (1). Those belonging to the first class cannot invoke the right of a
conscientious objector while those in the second class are granted that right.
Same; Same; View that the decision-making process in this area is a delicate and
private matter intimately related to the founding of a family. The matter should,
thus, be decided by both spouses under the assumption that they will amicably
settle their differences and forthwith act in the best interest of the marriage and
family.Indeed, the decision-making process in this area is a delicate and private
matter intimately related to the founding of a family. The matter should, thus, be
decided by both spouses under the assumption that they will amicably settle their
differences and forthwith act in the best interest of the marriage and family. But, as
in all relations between and among individuals, irreconcilable disagreements may
arise. The law, therefore, steps in to break the impasse. The law, however, settles
the dispute by giving the spouse, who will undergo the procedure, the absolute and
final authority to decide the matter. The rationale seems to be that the spouse, who
will undergo the procedure, should ultimately make the decision since it involves his
or her body. Like the ponencia, I am of the view that this provision in the RH Law
clearly violates Article II, Section 12 in relation to Article XV, Sections 1 and 3(1) of
the Constitution.
Same; Same; View that the spouse, who will undergo the reproductive health
procedure, cannot be given the absolute and final authority to decide this matter
because it will destroy the solidarity of the family, in general, and do violence to the
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equal right of each spouse to found the family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood, in particular.The
provision speaks of this right as properly belonging to both spouses. The right is,
thus, conferred on both of them and they are to exercise this right jointly. Implicit in
this provision is that the spouses equally possess this right particularly when read in
light of Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution which enjoins the State to ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Thus, the spouse, who
will undergo the reproductive health procedure, cannot be given the absolute and
final authority to decide this matter because it will destroy the solidarity of the
family, in general, and do violence to the equal right of each spouse to found the
family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood, in particular.
Same; Same; View that while I agree that Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the Reproductive
Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional, the declaration of unconstitutionality should not
be construed as giving the non-consenting spouse the absolute and final authority
in the decision-making process relative to undergoing a reproductive health
procedure by one spouse.The key principle is that no spouse has the absolute and
final authority to decide this matter because it will run counter to the constitutional
edict protecting the solidarity of the family and equally conferring the right to found
the family on both spouses. Consequently, while I agree that Section 23(a)(2)(i) of
the RH Law is unconstitutional, the declaration of unconstitutionality should not be
construed as giving the non-consenting spouse the absolute and final authority in
the decision-making process relative to undergoing a reproductive health procedure
by one spouse. The proper state of the law and rules of procedure on the matter is
that the decision shall require the consent of both spouses, and, in case of
disagreement, the matter shall be brought before the courts for its just adjudication.
Same; Same; Parental Authority; View that as a natural right, parental authority is
recognized as an inherent right, not created by the State or decisions of the courts,
but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.The description of the
family as a basic social institution is an assertion that the family is anterior to the
state and is not a creature of the state while the reference to the family as
autonomous is meant to protect the family against the instrumentalization by
the state. This provision is, thus, a guarantee against unwarranted State intrusion
on matters dealing with family life. The subject of parental authority and
responsibility is specifically dealt with in the last sentence of the above
constitutional provision which reads: The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. As a natural right, parental
authority is recognized as an inherent right, not created by the State or decisions of
the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship. More important,
as pertinent in this controversy, the present Constitution refers to such right as
primary which imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that
of the state.
Same; Same; Same; View that because parental authority is a constitutionally
recognized natural and primary right of the parents, with emphasis on primary as
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giving parents a superior right over the State, the State cannot carve out an
exception to such authority without showing or providing a sufficiently compelling
State interest to do so.Because parental authority is a constitutionally recognized
natural and primary right of the parents, with emphasis on primary as giving
parents a superior right over the State, the State cannot carve out an exception to
such authority without showing or providing a sufficiently compelling State interest
to do so. A limited but blanket exception from parental authority, such as that found
in Section 7 of the RH Law, will undoubtedly destroy the solidarity of the family as
well as foster disrespect and disobedience on the part of the minor. It disrupts the
natural state of parent-child relationship and is wholly inconsistent with the purpose
and essence of parental authority granting the parents the natural and primary right
in all matters relating to the rearing and care of the minor in order to safeguard his
or her well-being.
Same; Same; Same; View that the fundamental right involving the parental
authority of parents over their minor children is unduly limited by the proviso in
Section 7 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, thus, calling for the application of
the strict scrutiny test.The fundamental right involving the parental authority of
parents over their minor children is unduly limited by the proviso in Section 7 of the
RH Law, thus, calling for the application of the strict scrutiny test. The government
must show that a compelling State interest justifies the curtailment of parental
authority of parents whose minor children belong to the first group (i.e., minors who
are already parents or have had a miscarriage) vis--vis parents whose minor
children belong to the second group (i.e., minors who are not parents or have not
had a miscarriage). However, for reasons already discussed as to the maturity level
of such group of minors and the apparent purpose of the subject legal provision, the
government has failed to show such compelling State interest. Hence, the phrase
except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage in Section 7
of the RH Law is, likewise, unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
Same; Same; Same; View that the State or parents of the minor cannot prevent or
restrict access to such information considering that they will be readily available on
various platforms of media, if they are not already available at present. It is only
when the minor decides to act on the information by seeking access to the family
planning services themselves that parental authority cannot be dispensed with.I
agree with the ponencia that there is nothing unconstitutional about the capacity of
a minor to access information on family planning services under Section 7 of the RH
Law for the reasons stated in the ponencia. In addition, for practical reasons, the
State or parents of the minor cannot prevent or restrict access to such information
considering that they will be readily available on various platforms of media, if they
are not already available at present. It is only when the minor decides to act on the
information by seeking access to the family planning services themselves that
parental authority cannot be dispensed with.
Same; Same; Age- and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education;
Police Power; View that pursuant to its police power, the State may regulate the
content of the matters taught to adolescents particularly with respect to
reproductive health education in order to, among others, propagate proper attitudes
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and behavior relative to human sexuality and sexual relations as well as properly
prepare the young for marriage and family life.I agree with the ponencia that the
constitutional challenge against Section 14 of the RH Law is unavailing insofar as it
is claimed to violate Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution on the natural and
primary right and duty of parents to rear their children. Indeed, the State has a
substantial interest in the education of the youth. Pursuant to its police power, the
State may regulate the content of the matters taught to adolescents particularly
with respect to reproductive health education in order to, among others, propagate
proper attitudes and behavior relative to human sexuality and sexual relations as
well as properly prepare the young for marriage and family life. The topics to be
covered by the curriculum include values formation; knowledge and skills in selfprotection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and
children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical,
social and emotional changes in adolescents; womens rights and childrens rights;
responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible
parenthood. The curriculum is, thus, intended to achieve valid secular objectives. As
the ponencia aptly noted, the RH Law seeks to supplement, not supplant, the
natural and primary right and duty of parents to rear their children.
Same; Same; Same; Religious Freedom; View that the constitutional challenge
against Section 14 relative to the Free Exercise of Religion Clause is premature
because, as noted by the ponencia, the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) has yet to formulate the curriculum on age- and developmentappropriate reproductive health education.The constitutional challenge against
Section 14 relative to the Free Exercise of Religion Clause is premature because, as
noted by the ponencia, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) has
yet to formulate the curriculum on age- and development-appropriate reproductive
health education. A Free Exercise of Religion Clause challenge would necessarily
require the challenger to state what specific religious belief of his or hers is
burdened by the subject curriculum as well as the specific content of the curriculum
he or she objects to on religious grounds. Moreover, the proper party to mount such
a challenge would be the student and/or his or her parents upon learning of the
specific content of the curriculum and upon deciding what aspects of their religious
beliefs are burdened. It would be inappropriate for the Court to speculate on these
aspects of a potential Free Exercise of Religion Clause litigation involving a
curriculum that has yet to be formulated by the DECS.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; View that as to the equal
protection challenge against Section 14 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, I
agree with the ponencia that there are substantial distinctions between public and
private educational institutions which justify the optional teaching of reproductive
health education in private educational institutions.As to the equal protection
challenge against Section 14, I agree with the ponencia that there are substantial
distinctions between public and private educational institutions which justify the
optional teaching of reproductive health education in private educational
institutions. (By giving private educational institutions the option to adopt the
curriculum to be formulated by the DECS, the RH Law effectively makes the
teaching of reproductive health education in private educational institutions
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optional because the aforesaid institutions may completely discard such

curriculum).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Academic Freedom; View that only institutions of higher
learning enjoy academic freedom. Considering that the students who will be
subjected to reproductive health education are adolescents or young people
between the ages of ten (10) to nineteen (19) years who are in transition from
childhood to adulthood, then this would presumably be taught in elementary and
high schools which are not covered by academic freedom.I disagree that the
academic freedom of private educational institutions should be a basis of such
justification. Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the Constitution provides that, [a]cademic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Thus, only
institutions of higher learning enjoy academic freedom. Considering that the
students who will be subjected to reproductive health education are adolescents or
young people between the ages often (10) to nineteen (19) years who are in
transition from childhood to adulthood, then this would presumably be taught in
elementary and high schools which are not covered by academic freedom.
Nonetheless, I agree with the ponencia that, by effectively decreeing optional
teaching of reproductive health education in private educational institutions, the RH
Law seeks to respect the religious belief system of the aforesaid institutions. I find
this to be a reasonable basis for the differential treatment between public and
private educational institutions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law is replete
with provisions respecting the religious freedoms of individuals.Noticeably, the RH
Law is replete with provisions respecting the religious freedoms of individuals. In
fact, one of its central and guiding principles is free and informed choice, thus,
negating the imposition of any family planning method on an individual who objects
on religious grounds. The same principle appears to have been carried over relative
to the teaching of reproductive health education in private educational institutions.
Congress may have legitimately concluded that the State interests in societal
peace, tolerance or benevolent-neutrality accommodation, as the case may be, vis-vis the various religious belief systems of private educational institutions in our
nation will be better served by making the teaching of reproductive health
education (which may touch on or impact delicate or sensitive religious beliefs) as
merely optional in such institutions. We can take judicial notice of the fact that
majority of the private educational institutions in our nation were established and
are run by religious groups or sects.
Same; Same; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality and should be given a construction which will avoid its nullity.The
RH Law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and should be given a
construction which will avoid its nullity. The phrase [k]nowingly withhold
information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and services under Section 23(a)(1) of
the RH Law should be reasonably and narrowly construed as merely requiring the
health care service provider to provide and explain to persons the list of the
governments reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law. To
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illustrate, if the governments reproductive health programs and services under the
RH Law consists of A, B, C and D, then a health care service provider is required to
transmit this information to a person qualified to avail of the benefits under the law.
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; View that Section 17 of the Reproductive Health
(RH) Law does not violate the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude and that it is unconstitutional insofar as it imposes a duty to conscientious
objectors to render pro bono reproductive health care services to which the
conscientious objector objects to on religious or ethical grounds for reasons stated
in the ponencia.I am fully in accord with the ruling of the ponencia that Section 17
of the RH Law does not violate the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude and that it is unconstitutional insofar as it imposes a duty to conscientious
objectors to render pro bono reproductive health care services to which the
conscientious objector objects to on religious or ethical grounds for reasons stated
in the ponencia. Corrorarily, the conscientious objector can be required to render
pro bono reproductive health care services for as long as it involves services that he
or she does not object to on religious or ethical grounds.
Same; Natural Law; View that I agree with the ponencia that natural law may not,
under the particular circumstances of this case, be used to invalidate the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law.I agree with the ponencia that natural law may not,
under the particular circumstances of this case, be used to invalidate the RH Law.
However, I disagree with the following statements: While every law enacted by man
emananted from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if
a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is
not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere
thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and
theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an
abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. These statements, I
submit, are not necessary in the disposition of this case and appear to be an
inaccurate description of natural law. The Court need not foreclose the usefulness of
natural law in resolving future cases. I submit that the statement that natural law is
not applicable in the resolution of this particular case suffices.
Abad,J., Concurring Opinion:
Reproductive Health Law; Constitutional Law; View that Republic Act 10354 or the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, the Reproductive
Health (RH) Law for short, repeatedly extols the principles of gender equality,
sustainable human development, health, education, information, the sanctity of
human life and the family, improved quality of life, freedom of religious convictions,
ethics, and cultural beliefs, freedom from poverty, and other ennobled principles.
Remarkably, Republic Act 10354 or the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012, the RH Law for short, repeatedly extols the principles of gender
equality, sustainable human development, health, education, information, the
sanctity of human life and the family, improved quality of life, freedom of religious
convictions, ethics, and cultural beliefs, freedom from poverty, and other ennobled
principles. But these are already part of existing laws and no one can object to
them. What they do is apparently embellish what the RH Law seeks to accomplish.
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Same; Same; Facial Challenges; View that a law claimed to threaten a childs right
to live sufficiently justifies a constitutional facial challenge.The ponencia is right
that the procedural challenges to the petitions are unmeritorious. In particular,
respondents claim that the Court should dismiss these actions since they are a mere
facial challenge on the constitutionality of the RH Law as opposed to an actual
breach of its provisions and the filing of a case in court on account of such breach.
The petitions should not be allowed, they add, since this challenge is not about the
exercise of the freedom of expression, an exception to such limitation. But the right
to life of the unborn child, which is at the center of these controversies, cannot be
compared with rights that are best examined in cases of actual violations.
Obviously, the Court cannot wait for the actual extermination of an unborn child
before assessing the constitutional validity of the law that petitioners claim to
permit such action. A law claimed to threaten a childs right to live sufficiently
justifies a constitutional facial challenge.
Same; Same; Same; View that there is no question of course that every couple
planning their family and every woman of ample, discernment has the right to use
natural or artificial methods to avoid pregnancy.There is no question of course
that every couple planning their family and every woman of ample discernment has
the right to use natural or artificial methods to avoid pregnancy. This much is clear.
But, in seeking to promote the exercise of this right, the RH Law must hurdle certain
constitutional barriers: 1) the right to life of the unborn child that outlaws abortion;
2) the right to health; 3) the free exercise of religion; 4) the right to due process of
law; and 4) the freedom of expression.
Same; Same; View that the 1987 Constitution is clear: the life of a child begins
from conception and the dictionary, which is the final arbiter of the common
meaning of words, states that conception is the act of being pregnant,
specifically, the formation of a viable zygote.Some people believe that the
conception of the child begins only from the moment the fleshed embryo implants
itself on the mothers uterine wall where it will draw the food and nutrition it needs
to survive and grow into a fetus. It is the termination of the embryo or the fetus at
this stage, painful, bloody, and depressing, that some are quick to condemn as
abortion. Preventing implantation by quietly slaying the zygote or the embryo with
little or no blood before it reaches the uterine wall is to them not abortion. But they
are wrong. The 1987 Constitution is clear: the life of a child begins from
conception and the dictionary, which is the final arbiter of the common meaning of
words, states that conception is the act of being pregnant, specifically, the
formation of a viable zygote. Science has proved that a new individual comes into
being from the moment the zygote is formed. Indeed, the zygote already has a
genome (DNA to others) that identifies it as a human being and determines its sex.
The union of man and woman in the fertilized ovum is the beginning of another
persons life.
Same; Same; Abortion; View that with the Constitution, the Filipino people have in
effect covenanted that the fertilized ovum or zygote is a person; Ambushing the
fertilized ovum as it travels down the fallopian tube to prevent its implantation on
the uterine wall is abortion.With the Constitution, the Filipino people have in effect
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covenanted that the fertilized ovum or zygote is a person. And it is a covenant that
binds. Indeed, the RH Law accepts this inviolable principle and precisely prohibits
the use of abortifacient that induces the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mothers womb. Ambushing the fertilized ovum as it
travels down the fallopian tube to prevent its implantation on the uterine wall is
abortion.
Same; Same; Same; View that since the conception of a child begins from the
fertilization of the ovum, it is evident that merely preventing the woman from
ovulating to produce ovum or preventing the sperm from fertilizing it does not
constitute abortion.Since the conception of a child begins from the fertilization of
the ovum, it is evident that merely preventing the woman from ovulating to produce
ovum or preventing the sperm from fertilizing it does not constitute abortion.
Contraception in this sense does not violate the Constitutional right to life since the
unborn has not as yet been conceived. The law may authorize or even encourage
this kind of contraception since it merely prevents conception. The life of an unborn
child is not at stake.
Same; Same; Contraceptives; Intrauterine Devices; View that the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has been routinely allowing public access to hormonal
contraceptives and Intrauterine Devices (IUDs) even before the passage of the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law.The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been
routinely allowing public access to hormonal contraceptives and IUDs even before
the passage of the RH Law. The outcry for the laws passage to make these things
available to whoever wants them is the lament of the unenlightened. In reality, the
government senses a strong resistance to their use, borne of beliefs that they are
unsafe and abortifacient. The RH Law precisely aims to put an end to this resistance
by imposing certain sanctions against hospitals, physicians, nurses, midwives, and
other health care providers who communicate to others the view that
contraceptives and IUDs are unsafe and abortifacient, refuse to prescribe them, or
decline to perform the required procedures for their use.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in any event, I agree with the Courts ruling
that the second sentence of Section 9 does not authorize the approval of family
planning products and supplies that act as abortifacient.Congress fears that
hormonal contraceptives and IUDs perform a third function disabling the
endometrium of uterine lining that enable them to serve as weapons of abortion,
proof of this is that the RH Law provides in the third sentence of Section 9 that
these contraceptives and devices may, assuming that they also function as
abortifacients, pass FDA approval provided the latter issues a certification that they
are not to be used as abortifacient.. Thus: Sec. 9. x x x Any product or supply
included or to be included in the EDL, must have a certification from the FDA that
said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used
as an abortifacient. The above of course makes no sense since the two functions go
together and the user has no way, after taking the contraceptive, of stopping the
second function from running its course. The bad simply comes with the good. The
certification requirement violates the RH Laws tenet that reproductive health
rights do not include...access to abortifacients. It also contradicts the RH Laws
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stated policy of guaranteeing universal access to non-abortifacient

contraceptives. Above all, this position is in breach of the provision of the
Constitution that outlaws abortion. In any event, I agree with the Courts ruling that
the second sentence of Section 9 does not authorize the approval of family planning
products and supplies that act as abortifacient.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative Agencies; Food and Drug Administration;
View that annulling Section 9 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law merely means
that it is beyond the powers of Congress to legislate the safe and non-abortifacient
status of certain forms of artificial contraceptives. That function must remain with
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) which has the required scientific and
technical skills for evaluating, testing, and approving each contraceptive before it is
publicly made available.This is not to say that all contraceptives and IUDs, present
and future, double as abortifacients and are not to be allowed. Annulling Section 9
merely means that it is beyond the powers of Congress to legislate the safe and
non-abortifacient status of certain forms of artificial contraceptives. That function
must remain with the FDA which has the required scientific and technical skills for
evaluating, testing, and approving each contraceptive before it is publicly made
available. The manufacturers and distributors have their responsibilities, too. They
have to warrant that their products do not function as abortifacients.
Same; Same; Right to Health; Family Planning Programs; View that the government
cannot promote family planning programs that violate the womens right to health.
Women have the right to be free from government-sponsored sickness,
government-sponsored pain, and government-sponsored defect. Since healthy vital
organs of the body form part of the right to health, women have the right to have
normally functioning vital organs. They have the right to walk in the park or in the
malls free from debilitating illnesses and free from worries and fears over
contraceptives that the government assures them are safe. The government cannot
promote family planning programs that violate the womens right to health. A law
that misleads women and states that hormonal contraceptives and IUDs are safe
violates their constitutional right to health.
Same; Same; Contraceptives; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law itself
recognizes that the use of contraceptives produces side effects or other harmful
results.Since the law does not define the meaning of the term safe, it is to be
understood according to its common meaning: free from harm, injury, or risk. The
RH Law itself recognizes that the use of contraceptives produces side effects or
other harmful results. Thus, it directs the FDA in Section 19 to issue strict guidelines
with respect to their use, acknowledging the need for abundant caution. Do
warnings of side effects and possible lasting harm make contraceptives and IUDs
safe? The answer is of course no. For instance, a simple warning against pet snakes
would say, Look at this snake. It is a safe pet to keep in the house. But just dont
keep it hungry. Dont forget to close the small door of the cage when you feed it.
And watch those small kids.
Same; Same; Same; View that the dangers of those side effects are more worrisome
since the Reproductive Health (RH) Law fails to provide standards of safe use of
contraceptives.The dangers of those side effects are more worrisome since the RH
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Law fails to provide standards of safe use of contraceptives such as: (a) a prescribed
standard of tolerance for side effects; (b) the service of a qualified physician who
can advice the user, especially the poor, of the dangers of contraceptives, not just
literature written in English so she can make intelligent choice; (c) the service of a
qualified physician who will, while she is under contraceptives, monitor their effects
on her, treat her for adverse side effects and complications, and provide her with
the right medicine; and (d) the contraceptives she takes do not act at the same
time as abortifacients in case an ovum is fertilized despite the use of such
contraceptives. The fact is that contraceptives interfere with normal body functions.
Women have ovaries so these can produce ova or eggs that can be fertilized to
ensure procreation and the continuation of the human race. Contraceptives prevent
healthy ovaries from ovulating, which is the reason for their being ovaries. One
cannot disable the womans ovaries or monkey with its functions for long periods
without affecting her health. Medical studies and reports show this to be the case.
Same; Same; Same; View that the determination of what medicine is safe and
useful to a person is a function of the science of medicine and pharmacy. It is not for
the Supreme Court or the legislature to determine.The legislatures attempt to
elevate into law its arbitrary finding that hormonal contraceptives and IUDs are safe
and non-abortifacient is irrational. The determination of what medicine is safe and
useful to a person is a function of the science of medicine and pharmacy. It is not for
the Court or the legislature to determine. Raising present-day scientific or medical
views regarding contraceptives to the level of law, when contested by opposing
scientific or medical views, is an arbitrary exercise of legislative power.
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; View that a health care service provider is not to
be compelled to render the services that would interfere with the natural human
reproduction process if the same conflicts with his conscience. This is consistent
with Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no law shall
be made prohibiting a persons free exercise of his religion.The law provides,
however, that the health care service providers objection based on his or her
ethical or religious beliefs is to be respected. Thus, he or she is not to be compelled
to render the services that would interfere with the natural human reproduction
process if the same conflicts with his conscience. This is consistent with Section 5,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no law shall be made
prohibiting a persons free exercise of his religion. But the irony of it is that at the
next breath the RH Law would require the conscientious objector to immediately
refer the person, whose wants he declines to serve, to the nearest health care
service provider who will do what he would not. The penalty for failing to do this is
imprisonment for 1 to 6 months or payment of a fine of P10,000 to P100,000 or both
imprisonment and fine. If the offender is a juridical person, the penalty shall be
imposed on its president or responsible officer.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court has correctly decided to annul
Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the Reproductive Health (RH)
Law-Implementing Rules and Regulations (RH-IRR), particularly section 5.24, as
unconstitutional insofar as they punish any health care provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not, in an emergency or life-threatening case, to another
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health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs.Unfortunately, the RH Law
requires him to take steps to ensure that the woman is pointed to another place
where she could get the IUD implantation she wants. In effect, the law compels the
doctor to do more than just keep quiet and let alone. It compels him at the pains of
going to jail to get involved and help in the commission of what his religious belief
regards as amounting to the murder of a child. And this is in order to satisfy the
need of the woman and her partner for sex without pregnancy. Remember, this is
not the case of a bleeding woman needing immediate medical attention. The Court
has correctly decided to annul Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR, particularly section 5.24, as unconstitutional insofar as they punish any
health care provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not, in an emergency
or life-threatening case, to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs.
Same; Same; Principle of Void for Vagueness; View that due process demands that
the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently clear to inform those who may be
subjected to it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties.Due process
demands that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently clear to inform those
who may be subjected to it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties. A
criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that
his contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute, or is so indefinite that it
encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions, is void for vagueness. A
vague or indefinite statute is unconstitutional because it places the accused on trial
for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.
Same; Same; View that the State guarantees under Section 2 of the Reproductive
Health (RH) Law the right of every woman to consider all available reproductive
health options when making her decision.The State guarantees under Section 2 of
the RH Law the right of every woman to consider all available reproductive health
options when making her decision. This implies that she has the right to seek advice
from anyone she trusts. Consequently, if a woman wanting to space her pregnancy
seeks the advice of a Catholic physician she trusts, the latter should not be sent to
jail for expressing his belief that taking oral pills or using copper IUDs can cause
abortion that her faith prohibits. This is valid even if others do not share the faith.
Religious conscience is precisely a part of the consideration for free choice in family
planning.
Same; Same; View that for now I am satisfied that Section 23(a)(1) has been
declared void and unconstitutional insofar as it punishes any health care provider
who fails or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.I concede, however,
that my above views on Section 23(a)(1) could be better appreciated in actual cases
involving its application rather than in the present case where I go by the are
provisions of the law. For now I am satisfied that Section 23(a)(1) has been declared
void and unconstitutional insofar as it punishes any health care provider who fails or

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refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on

reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
Reyes,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Reproductive Health Law; Parental Authority; View that the authority that is
exercised by parents over their unemancipated children includes the right and duty
to enhance, protect, preserve, and maintain their physical and mental health and to
represent them in all matters affecting their interests.The authority that is
exercised by parents over their unemancipated children includes the right and duty
to enhance, protect, preserve, and maintain their physical and mental health and to
represent them in all matters affecting their interests. The authority exercised by
parents over their unemancipated children is terminated, inter alia, upon
emancipation of the child. Emancipation takes place upon attainment of the age of
majority, which commences at the age of eighteen years.
Same; Same; Parental Consent; View that the last proviso of Section 7 restricts the
access of minors to modern methods of family planning; It requires a written
parental consent before a minor may be allowed access thereto.Section 7 seeks to
make modern family planning methods more accessible to the public. The provision
mandates that no person shall be denied information and access to family planning
services, whether natural or artificial. However, the last proviso of Section 7 restricts
the access of minors to modern methods of family planning; it requires a written
parental consent before a minor may be allowed access thereto. This is but
recognition of the parental authority that is exercised by parents over the persons of
their unemancipated children. That it is both a duty and a right of the parents to
protect the physical health of their unemancipated children. However, Section 7
provided an exception to the requirement of written parental consent for minors. A
minor who is already a parent or has had a miscarriage may be allowed access to
modern methods of family planning notwithstanding the absence of a written
parental consent therefor. This runs afoul of the natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of their children, which, under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution, should receive the support of the government.
Same; Same; Same; View that there is no cogent reason to require a written
parental consent for a minor who seeks access to modern family planning methods
and dispense with such requirement if the minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Under the Family Code, all minors, generally, regardless of his/her
circumstances, are still covered by the parental authority exercised by their parents.
There exists no substantial distinction as between a minor who is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage and a minor who is not yet a parent or never had a
miscarriage. There is no cogent reason to require a written parental consent for a
minor who seeks access to modern family planning methods and dispense with such
requirement if the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Under the
Family Code, all minors, generally, regardless of his/her circumstances, are still
covered by the parental authority exercised by their parents. That a minor is already
a parent or has had a miscarriage does not operate to divest his/her parents of their
parental authority; such circumstances do not emancipate a minor.
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Same; Same; Constitutional Law; View that considering that the last proviso of
Section 7 operates to divest parents of their parental authority over the persons of
their minor child who is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the same must
be struck down for being contrary to the natural and primary right and duty of
parents under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the State can neither
supply nor hinder. Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make
sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care
or treatment. Parents can and must make those judgments. Considering that the
last proviso of Section 7 operates to divest parents of their parental authority over
the persons of their minor child who is already a parent or has had a miscarriage,
the same must be struck down for being contrary to the natural and primary right
and duty of parents under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
Same; Constitutional Law; Age- and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education; Academic Freedom; View that Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom.The petitioners
claim that Section 14, by mandating the inclusion of age- and development
appropriate reproductive health education to adolescents, violates the academic
freedom of educational institutions since they will be compelled to include in their
curriculum a subject, which, based on their religious beliefs, should not be taught to
students. The petitioners claim is utterly baseless. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the
Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. The
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide
and adopt its aims and objectives, and to determine how these objections can best
be attained, free from outside coercion or interference, save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed
in the term academic freedom encompass the freedom of the school or college to
determine for itself: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how lessons
shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study. An analysis of the foregoing
claim requires a dichotomy between public and private educational institutions. The
last sentence of Section 14 provides that the age- and development-appropriate
reproductive health curriculum that would be formulated by the DepEd shall be
used by public schools and may be adopted by private schools. The mandated
reproductive health education would only be compulsory for public schools. Thus, as
regards private educational institutions, there being no compulsion, their
constitutional right to academic freedom is not thereby violated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that as regards public educational institutions,
though they are mandatorily required to adopt an age- and developmentappropriate reproductive health education curriculum, the claimed curtailment of
academic freedom is still untenable.As regards public educational institutions,
though they are mandatorily required to adopt an age- and developmentappropriate reproductive health education curriculum, the claimed curtailment of
academic freedom is still untenable. Section 4(1), Article XIV of the Constitution
provides that [t]he State x x x shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation
of all educational institutions. The constitutional grant of academic freedom does
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not withdraw from the State the power to supervise and regulate educational
institutions, whether public or private. The only requirement imposed by the
Constitution on the States supervision and regulation of educational institutions is
that the exercise thereof must be reasonable.
Same; Same; Right to Privacy; View that although considered a fundamental right,
the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to a narrowly drawn government
regulation, which advances a legitimate and overriding State interest.When a
government regulation is claimed to infringe on the right to privacy, courts are
required to weigh the States objective against the privacy rights of the people.
Although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless
succumb to a narrowly drawn government regulation, which advances a legitimate
and overriding State interest. As explained earlier, Section 14 aims to address the
increasing rate of teenage pregnancies in the country and the risks arising
therefrom, which is undeniably a legitimate and overriding State interest. The
question that has to be asked then is whether Section 14, in advancing such
legitimate and overriding State interest, has employed means, which are narrowly
tailored so as not to intrude into the right to privacy of the people.
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; View that the Constitution guarantees that no law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.In order to
properly assess the constitutionality of Sections 7 and 23(a)(3), the provisions
thereof must be considered in its entirety. Judicial scrutiny of the subject provisions
cannot be delimited to a particular provision thereof, i.e., the duty to refer, lest
the Court lose sight of the objectives sought to be achieved by Congress and the
ramifications thereof with regard to the free exercise clause. The duty to refer
must be construed with due regard to the other provisions in Sections 7 and 23(a)
(3) and the objectives sought to be achieved by R.A. No. 10354 in its entirety. The
Constitution guarantees that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. Religious freedom forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, and conversely, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
Same; Same; Same; Compelling State Interest Test; View that under the compelling
state interest test, a State regulation, which is challenged as being contrary to the
free exercise clause, would only be upheld upon showing that: (1) the regulation
does not infringe on an individuals constitutional right of free exercise; or (2) any
incidental burden on the free exercise of an individuals religion maybe justified by a
compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the States
constitutional power to regulate by means, which imposed the least burden on
religious practices.In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, in
cases where government regulations collide with the free exercise clause, the Court
further declared that, following the benevolent neutrality/accommodation standard,
the compelling state interest test should be applied. Under the compelling state
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interest test, a State regulation, which is challenged as being contrary to the free
exercise clause, would only be upheld upon showing that: (1) the regulation does
not infringe on an individuals constitutional right of free exercise; or (2) any
incidental burden on the free exercise of an individuals religion maybe justified by a
compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the States
constitutional power to regulate by means, which imposed the least burden on
religious practices.
Same; Same; View that primarily, the objective of R.A. No. 10354 is to provide
marginalized sectors of society, particularly the women and the poor, access to
reproductive health care services, and to health care in general, of which they have
been deprived for many decades due to discrimination and lack of access to
information.Particularly, R.A. No. 10354 seeks to provide effective and quality
reproductive health care services and supplies, which would ensure maternal and
child health, the health of the unborn, safe delivery and birth of healthy children,
and sound replacement rate, in line with the States duty to promote the right to
health, responsible parenthood, social justice and full human development. R.A.
No. 10354, as a corollary measure for the protection of the right to health of the
people, likewise recognizes necessity to promote and provide information and
access, without bias, to all methods of family planning. Primarily, the objective of
R.A. No. 10354 is to provide marginalized sectors of society, particularly the women
and the poor, access to reproductive health care services, and to health care in
general, of which they have been deprived for many decades due to discrimination
and lack of access to information.
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; Equal Protection of the Law; View that although
Section 7 provides that family planning services shall likewise be extended by
private health facilities to paying patients, it nevertheless exempts non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group from
providing full range of modern family planning methods. Instead, Section 7 imposes
on non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group the duty to immediately refer patients seeking reproductive health
care and services to another health facility that is conveniently accessible.
Although Section 7 provides that family planning services shall likewise be
extended by private health facilities to paying patients, it nevertheless exempts
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group from providing full range of modern family planning methods. Instead,
Section 7 imposes on non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group the duty to immediately refer patients seeking
reproductive health care and services to another health facility that is conveniently
accessible. In the same manner, the prohibition imposed under Section 23(a)(3) is
not absolute; it recognizes that a health care service provider may validly refuse to
render reproductive health services and information if he/she conscientiously
objects thereto based on his/her ethical or religious beliefs. Nevertheless, Section
23(a)(3) likewise imposes a corresponding duty on such conscientious objector to
immediately refer the person seeking reproductive health services to another health
care service provider within the same facility or one, which is conveniently
accessible.
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Same; Same; Same; Compelling Interest Test; View that the supposed burden on the
religious freedom of conscientious objectors in complying with the duty to refer
would have to be weighed against the States interest in promoting the right of the
people to reproductive health.The determination of whether there exists a
compelling state interest that would justify an incidental burden involves balancing
the interest of the State against religious liberty to determine which is more
compelling under the particular set of facts. In assessing the state interest, the
court will have to determine the importance of the secular interest and the extent to
which that interest will be impaired by an exemption for the religious practice.
Accordingly, the supposed burden on the religious freedom of conscientious
objectors in complying with the duty to refer would have to be weighed against
the States interest in promoting the right of the people to reproductive health.
Same; View that Congress recognized that, in enacting regulations to further the
reproductive health of the people, including access to modern family planning
methods, resistance thereto based on religious scruples would abound.Congress
recognized that, in enacting regulations to further the reproductive health of the
people, including access to modern family planning methods, resistance thereto
based on religious scruples would abound. Notwithstanding the presence of a
compelling state interest in the promotion and protection of reproductive health,
Congress deemed it proper to carve out exemptions that specifically take into
account the religious dissensions of conscientious objectors, which effectively
exempts them from the requirements imposed under Sections 7 and 23(a)(3). In this
regard, it cannot thus be claimed that the said provisions invidiously interfere with
the free exercise of religion.
Same; Constitutional Law; Religious Freedom; View that a health care service
provider who conscientiously objects, based on his/her ethical or religious beliefs, to
programs and services regarding reproductive health is exempted from the effects
of Section 23(a)(1) only insofar as it punishes a health care service provider who
knowingly withholds information on said programs and services.Accordingly, a
health care service provider who conscientiously objects, based on his/her ethical or
religious beliefs, to programs and services regarding reproductive health is
exempted from the effects of Section 23(a)(1) only insofar as it punishes a health
care service provider who knowingly withholds information on said programs and
services. Section 23(a)(1), in relation to Section 23(a)(3), recognizes that a
conscientious objector cannot be compelled to provide information on reproductive
health if the same would go against his/her religious convictions. In such cases,
however, the conscientious objector, pursuant to Section 23(a)(3), has the
correlative duty to immediately refer the person seeking information on programs
and services on reproductive health to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible.
Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; View that the purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a States jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statute or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly
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situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and

responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a States jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. Persons or
things ostensibly similarly situated may, nonetheless, be treated differently if there
is a basis for valid classification. The legislature is allowed to classify the subjects of
legislation; if the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and
not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. Classification, to
be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of
the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all
members of the same class.
Same; Same; Same; View that there is a substantial distinction as regards a
conscientious objector under Section 23(a)(3), who may be a public or private
health care service provider, and a public officer specifically charged with the duty
to implement the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR).There is a substantial distinction as regards a
conscientious objector under Section 23(a)(3), who may be a public or private
health care service provider, and a public officer specifically charged with the duty
to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 and its IRR. The Constitution provides
that a public office is a public trust. An important characteristic of a public office is
that its creation and conferment involves a delegation to the individual of some of
the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive, or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public
benefit.
Same; Spousal Consent; Parental Consent; View that Section 23(a)(2) does not
penalize the refusal of a health care service provider to perform reproductive health
procedures per se. What is being penalized by the provision is the refusal of a health
care service provider to perform such procedures on the ground of lack of spousal
consent or parental consent in certain cases.Section 23(a)(2) does not penalize
the refusal of a health care service provider to perform reproductive health
procedures per se. What is being penalized by the provision is the refusal of a health
care service provider to perform such procedures on the ground of lack of spousal
consent or parental consent in certain cases. Indeed, for reasons to be explained at
length later, a health care service provider cannot avoid the performance of
reproductive health procedure, in case of married persons, solely on the ground of
lack of spousal consent since there would be no justifiable reason for such refusal.
Same; Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; View that intimate relations between
husband and wife fall within the right of privacy formed by emanations of the
various guarantees in the Bill of Rights, to which State intrusion is proscribed.The
ponencia declared Section 23(a)(2)(i) as being contrary to Section 3, Article XV of
the Constitution, which requires the State to defend the right of the spouses to
found a family, thus unduly infringing on the right to marital privacy. The ponencia
explained that the said provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal
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ligation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, require mutual consent and
decision between the husband and wife as they affect issues intimately related to
the founding of the family. The ponencia pointed out that decision-making
concerning reproductive health procedure falls within the protected zone of marital
privacy from which State intrusion is proscribed. Thus, the ponencia concluded,
dispensing with the spousal consent is disruptive of family unity and a marked
departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution. It is conceded that intimate relations between husband and wife fall
within the right of privacy formed by emanations of the various guarantees in the
Bill of Rights, to which State intrusion is proscribed. However, I do not agree that
upholding a married individuals choice to submit to reproductive health procedure
despite the absence of the consent or authorization of his/her spouse would be
disruptive of the family.
Same; View that the law, in case of disagreement, recognizes that the decision of
the spouse undergoing the reproductive health procedure should prevail.It is
indeed ideal that the decision whether to submit to reproductive health procedure
be a joint undertaking of the spouses, especially on such a vital and sensitive
matter. It is inevitable, however, for cases to abound wherein a husband/wife would
object to the intended procedure of his/her spouse. In such cases, the right to
reproductive health of a spouse would be rendered effectively inutile. I do not see
how fostering such stalemate, which can hardly be considered as a harmonious and
blissful marital relationship, could protect the marriage as an inviolable social
institution. Thus, the law, in case of disagreement, recognizes that the decision of
the spouse undergoing the reproductive health procedure should prevail. In so
declaring, Section 23(a)(2)(i) does not invidiously interfere with the privacy rights of
the spouses. In dispensing with the spousal consent/authorization in case of
disagreement, the law is not declaring a substantive right for the first time; even in
the absence of such declaration, the decision of the spouse undergoing the
reproductive health procedure would still prevail. Section 23(a)(2)(i) is but a mere
recognition and affirmation of a married individuals constitutionally guaranteed
personal autonomy and his/her right to reproductive health.
Same; PhilHealth Accreditation; View that a health care service provider, his/her
religious objections to certain reproductive health care services aside, may still
render pro bono reproductive health care service, as a prerequisite for PhilHealth
accreditation, by providing information or medical services.That a health care
service provider has religious objections to certain reproductive health care services
does not mean that he/she is already exempted from the requirement under Section
17 for PhilHealth accreditation. The requirement under Section 17 is stated in
general terms and is religion-neutral; it merely states that health care service
providers, as a condition for PhilHealth accreditation, must render pro bono
reproductive health service. The phrase reproductive health care service is quite
expansive and is not limited only to those services, which may be deemed
objectionable based on religious beliefs. Reproductive health care includes: (1)
family planning information and services; (2) maternal, infant and child health and
nutrition, including breastfeeding; (3) proscription of abortion and management of
abortion complications; (4) adolescent and youth reproductive health guidance and
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counseling; (5) prevention, treatment, and management of reproductive tract

infections, HIV and AIDS, and other sexually transmittable infections; (6) elimination
of violence against women and children, and other forms of sexual and genderbased violence; (7) education and counseling on sexuality and reproductive health;
(8) treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders; (9) male responsibility and involvement, and mens
reproductive health; (10) prevention, treatment, and management of infertility and
sexual dysfunction; (11) reproductive health education for adolescents; and (12)
mental health aspect of reproductive health care. Thus, a health care service
provider, his/her religious objections to certain reproductive health care services
aside, may still render pro bono reproductive health care service, as a prerequisite
for PhilHealth accreditation, by providing information or medical services, for
instance, on treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders or on maternal, infant and child health and
nutrition.
Perlas-Bernabe,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Reproductive Health Law; Constitutional Law; Religious Freedom; Benevolent
Neutrality; View that with religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,
benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances.Under the benevolent-neutrality theory utilized by the ponencia in
support of its position, religious freedom is seen as a substantive right and not
merely a privilege against discriminatory legislation. With religion looked upon with
benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of
religion under certain circumstances. As case law instructs, it is the strict scrutinycompelling state interest test which is most in line with the benevolent neutralityaccommodation approach. This method of analysis operates under three (3)
parameters, namely: (a) the sincerity of the religious belief which is burdened by a
statute or a government action; (b) the existence of a compelling state interest
which justifies such burden on the free exercise of religion; and (c) in the
furtherance of its legitimate state objective, the state has employed the least
intrusive means to such exercise of religious beliefs.
Same; Same; Same; View that nothing in the law requires the conscientious objector
to refer the patient to a health care service provider capable and willing to perform
the reproductive health procedure objected to.Neither do I find Section 23(a)(1) of
the RH Law, as well as its RH-IRR provision counterpart, invidious of religious
freedom, particularly, of the Free Exercise Clause, for the reason that information
dissemination on health advice, including that on reproductive health, constitutes,
as mentioned, an inherent professional responsibility of health care service
providers to their patients. Informing the patient of his or her health options does
not, in any way, preclude the conscientious objector from, as also earlier stated,
sharing his or her religious beliefs on the matter. After disseminating the
information, and when the patient affirmatively decides to take the reproductive
health procedure, then the conscientious objector may opt not to perform such
procedure himself or herself and, instead, refer the patient to another health care
service provider based only on the qualification of accessibility; nothing in the law
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requires the conscientious objector to refer the patient to a health care service
provider capable and willing to perform the reproductive health procedure objected
to.
Same; Same; Same; View that Section 23(b) of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law
must be construed in the context of its surrounding provisions which afford the
conscientious objector the ability to opt-out from performing reproductive health
practices on account of his or her religious beliefs.As I see it, the problem lies only
with Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR going beyond what is provided for in the RH Law.
Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR is an erroneous construction of Section 23(b) of the RH
Law which must stand as constitutional. As earlier mentioned, the latter provision
only states general prohibitions to public officers specifically charged with the
implementation of the RH Law; nothing in its text negates the availability of the
conscientious objector exception to them, or to skilled health professionals such as
provincial, city, or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the [RH Law and the RH-IRR].
Section 23(b) of the RH Law must be construed in the context of its surrounding
provisions which afford the conscientious objector the ability to opt-out from
performing reproductive health practices on account of his or her religious beliefs.
As the aforementioned RH-IRR provision would be stricken down as invalid on ultra
vires grounds, I believe that an equal protection analysis is unnecessary.
Same; Same; Same; Parental Consent; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law
provision on parental consent does not amount to a negation or even a dilution of
the parents right to care for and rear their minor child who is already a parent or
has undergone an abortion towards the end of developing her physical character
and well-being.The RH Law provision on parental consent does not amount to a
negation or even a dilution of the parents right to care for and rear their minor child
who is already a parent or has undergone an abortion towards the end of
developing her physical character and well-being. Neither does the provision inhibit
the minors parents from preventing their child from acquiring detrimental health
habits. Recognizing that these minors have distinct reproductive health needs due
to their existing situation, the law simply does away with the necessity of presenting
to reproductive health care service providers prior parental consent before they are
given information and access to modern day methods of family planning. In a
predominantly conservative culture like ours, wherein the thought that premarital
sex is taboo pervades, a minor who is already a parent or one who has undergone a
previous miscarriage is, more often than not, subject to some kind of social stigma.
Said minor, given her predisposition when viewed against social perception, may
find it difficult, or rather uncomfortable, to approach her parents on the sensitive
subject of reproductive health, and, much more, to procure their consent. The RH
Law does away with this complication and makes modern methods of family
planning easily accessible to the minor, all in the interest of her health and physical
well-being. On all accounts, nothing stops the minors parents to, in the exercise of
their parental authority, intervene, having in mind the best interest of their child
insofar as her health and physical well-being are concerned.

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Same; View that ideally and as much as possible, spouses should, as the ponencia
puts it, act as one cohesive unit in the decision-making process in undergoing a
reproductive health procedure. However, when there is a complete disagreement
between the spouses, the assailed Reproductive Health (RH) Law provision provides,
by way of exception, a deadlock-mechanism whereby the decision of the one
undergoing the procedure shall prevail if only to prevent any unsettling conflict
between the married couple on the issue.There is nothing in the RH Law that
would completely alienate the other spouse in the decision-making process nor
obviate any real dialogue between them. This is a purely private affair left for the
spouses to experience for themselves. Ideally and as much as possible, spouses
should, as the ponencia puts it, act as one cohesive unit in the decision-making
process in undergoing a reproductive health procedure. However, when there is a
complete disagreement between the spouses, the assailed RH Law provision
provides, by way of exception, a deadlock-mechanism whereby the decision of the
one undergoing the procedure shall prevail if only to prevent any unsettling conflict
between the married couple on the issue. To add, the assailed provision, in my view,
also provides a practical solution to situations of estrangement which complicates
the process of procuring the other spouses consent.

Same; PhilHealth Accreditation; View that as there is no form of compulsion, then

the conscientious objector remains free to choose whether to render pro bono
reproductive health care services or not. In the event, however, that he or she
decides not to render such services, the State has the right to deny him or her
PhilHealth accreditation.As there is no form of compulsion, then the conscientious
objector remains free to choose whether to render pro bono reproductive health
care services or not. In the event, however, that he or she decides not to render
such services, the State has the right to deny him or her PhilHealth accreditation.
Being a mere privilege, the State, through its exercise of police power, is free to
impose reasonable concessions that would further its policies, i.e., dissemination of
information and rendering of services on reproductive health, in exchange for the
grant of such accreditation.
Leonen,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Actual Case or Controversy; View that there is a
case or controversy when there is a real conflict of rights or duties arising from
actual facts.An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the
case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. To be justiciable, the issues
presented must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interest; a real and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief. The term justiciability refers to the dual limitation of only considering
in an adversarial context the questions presented before courts, and in the process,
the courts duty to respect its co-equal branches of governments powers and
prerogatives under the doctrine of separation of powers. There is a case or
controversy when there is a real conflict of rights or duties arising from actual facts.
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These facts, properly established in court through evidence or judicial notice,

provide the natural limitations upon judicial interpretation of the statute. When it is
claimed that a statute is inconsistent with a provision of the Constitution, the
meaning of a constitutional provision will be narrowly drawn.
Same; Same; View that it is true that the present Constitution grants the Supreme
Court with the exercise of judicial review when the case involves the determination
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.It is true that the present
Constitution grants this court with the exercise of judicial review when the case
involves the determination of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. This new feature of the 1987 Constitution affects our political
question doctrine. It does not do away with the requirement of an actual case. The
requirement of an actual case is fundamental to the nature of the judiciary.
Same; Same; Facial Challenges; View that the only instance when a facial review of
the law is not only allowed but also essential is when the provisions in question are
so broad that there is a clear and imminent threat that actually operates or it can be
used as a prior restraint of speech.Unfortunately, the ponencia failed to discuss
how several provisions of the RH Law became vulnerable to a facial attack, whereas
other provisions must await an actual case or controversy to pass upon its
constitutionality. The ponencia explained that the: x x x foregoing petitions have
seriously alleged that the constitutional human right to life, speech and religion and
other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. I restate, for
purposes of emphasis, parts of my disquisition on facial challenges in my dissenting
and concurring opinion in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237 (2014). After
all, the challenges to this present law and the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
are the publics reaction to the increasingly liberal but disturbing treatment that we
have given on the issue of rigorous analysis for the justiciability of controversies
brought before us. The invalidation of the statute is either on its face or as
applied. The only instance when a facial review of the law is not only allowed but
also essential is when the provisions in question are so broad that there is a clear
and imminent threat that actually operates or it can be used as a prior restraint of
speech.
Same; Same; Same; View that a facial challenge only applies to cases where the
free speech and its cognates are asserted before the court.The prevailing doctrine
today is that: a facial challenge only applies to cases where the free speech and its
cognates are asserted before the court. While as a general rule penal statutes
cannot be subjected to facial attacks, a provision in a statute can be struck down as
unconstitutional when there is a clear showing that there is an imminent possibility
that its broad language will allow ordinary law enforcement to cause prior restraints
of speech and the value of that speech is such that its absence will be socially
irreparable. Broken down into its elements, a facial review should only be allowed
when: First, the ground for the challenge of the provision in the statute is that it
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violates freedom of expression or any of its cognates; Second, the language in the
statute is impermissibly vague; Third, the vagueness in the text of the statute in
question allows for an interpretation that will allow prior restraints; Fourth, the
chilling effect is not simply because the provision is found in a penal statute but
because there can be a clear showing that there are special circumstances which
show the imminence that the provision will be invoked by law enforcers; Fifth, the
application of the provision in question will entail prior restraints; and Sixth, the
value of the speech that will be restrained is such that its absence will be socially
irreparable. This will necessarily mean balancing between the state interests
protected by the regulation and the value of the speech excluded from society.
Same; Same; Same; View that facial challenges can only be raised on the basis of
overbreadth and not on vagueness.Facial challenges can only be raised on the
basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated
how vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges
are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of
expression. None of these petitions justify a facial review of this social legislation.
The free exercise of ones religion may be a cognate of the freedom of expression.
However, the petitions have not properly alleged the religion, the religious dogma,
the actual application of the religious dogma where a repugnancy can be shown.
They have also failed to demonstrate that the violation of the amorphous religious
dogmas that they imagine should result in the invalidation of statutory text rather
than simply an adjustment in its interpretation and in its application.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Class Suits; Parties; View that a class suit is allowed
under the rules if those who instituted the action are found to be sufficiently
numerous and representative of the interests of all those they seek to represent.A
class suit is allowed under the rules if those who instituted the action are found to
be sufficiently numerous and representative of the interests of all those they seek to
represent. They must be so numerous that it would be impractical to bring them all
to court or join them as parties. Lastly, a common interest in the controversy raised
must be clearly established. These requirements afford protection for all those
represented in the class suit considering that this courts ruling will be binding on all
of them. We should be especially cautious when the class represented by a few in
an alleged class suit is the entire Filipino Nation or all the adherents of a particular
religion. This court must be convinced that the interest is so common that there can
be no difference in the positions and points of view of all that belong to that class.
Anything less than this standard will be an implied acceptance that in this important
adjudication of alleged constitutional rights, the views of a few can be imposed on
the many.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that class suits require that there is a possibility
that those represented can affirm that their interests are properly raised in a class
suit.Class suits require that there is a possibility that those represented can affirm
that their interests are properly raised in a class suit. The general rule must be that
they be real and existing. In constitutional adjudication, this court must approach
class suits with caution; otherwise, future generations or an amorphous class will be

335

bound by a ruling which they did not participate in. Not all these elements for a
proper class suit are present in the petitions filed in these cases.
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Immunity from Suit; View that a sitting president
cannot be sued. This immunity exists during the Presidents incumbency only.A
sitting president cannot be sued. This immunity exists during the Presidents
incumbency only. The purpose is to preserve the dignity of the office that is
necessary for its operations as well as to prevent any disruption in the conduct of
official duties and functions. Without this immunity, a proliferation of suits would
derail the focus of the office from addressing the greater needs of the country to
attending each and every case filed against the sitting President, including the petty
and harassment suits. The doctrine of presidential immunity is not a surrender of
the right to demand accountability from those who hold public office such as the
President. The Constitution enumerates the grounds when a President may be
impeached. This immunity is also no longer available to a non-sitting President.
After the end of his or her tenure, he or she can be made criminally and civilly liable
in the proper case.
Reproductive Health Law; Constitutional Law; Right to Life; View that a law that
mandates informed choice and proper access for reproductive health technologies
should not be presumed to be a threat to the right to life.The constitutional right
to life has many dimensions. Apart from the protection against harm to ones
corporeal existence, it can also mean the right to be left alone. The right to life
also congeals the autonomy of an individual to provide meaning to his or her life. In
a sense, it allows him or her sufficient space to determine quality of life. A law that
mandates informed choice and proper access for reproductive health technologies
should not be presumed to be a threat to the right to life. It is an affirmative
guarantee to assure the protection of human rights.
Same; View that the court cannot make a declaration of when life begins.The
court cannot make a declaration of when life begins. Such declaration is not
necessary and is a dictum that will unduly confuse future issues. First, there is, as
yet, no actual controversy that can support our deliberation on this specific issue.
Second, the court cannot rely on the discussion of a few commissioners during the
drafting of the constitution by the Constitutional Commission.
Same; View that the Constitutional Commission deliberations show that it is not true
that the issue of when life begins is already a settled matter.The Constitutional
Commission deliberations show that it is not true that the issue of when life begins
is already a settled matter. There are several other opinions on this issue. The
Constitutional Commissioners adopted the term conception rather than fertilized
ovum. New discoveries in reproductive science, particularly the possibility of
cloning, provide basis for the possible significance of viable implantation in the
uterus as the beginning of life and personhood. It is at implantation when a group
of cells gain the potential of progressing into a human being without further
intervention.
Same; Administrative Agencies; Food and Drug Administration; View that the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) is mandated to examine each and every drug,
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contraceptive or technology vis--vis the claims made for or against their inclusion.
The law specifically grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with the
competence to determine the scientific validity of the allegations of the petitioners.
The FDA is mandated to examine each and every drug, contraceptive or technology
vis--vis the claims made for or against their inclusion. I agree with the ponencia in
withholding any blanket pronouncement of any contraceptive absent the exercise of
the FDA of its functions under this provision. The FDA is mandated to ensure the
safety and quality of drugs released to the public.
Same; Contraceptives; View that the inclusion of contraceptives in the national drug
formulary is not new.The inclusion of contraceptives in the national drug formulary
is not new. The Philippine Drug Formulary: Essential Medicines List, Volume 7, of
2008 already listed it under Hormones and Hormone Antagonists. Contraceptives
are included, following five pillars designed to make available affordable, safe, and
effective drugs to the public. These pillars are: (1) the assurance of the safety,
efficacy and usefulness of pharmaceutical products through quality control; (2)
the promotion of the rational use of drugs by both the health professionals and the
general public; (3) the development of self-reliance in the local pharmaceutical
industry; (4) [t]he tailored or targeted procurement of drugs by government with
the objective of making available to its own clientele, particularly the lower-income
sectors of the society, the best drugs at the lowest possible cost; and (5) people
empowerment.
Same; Constitutional Law; Religious Freedom; View that if a health care service
providers religious belief does not allow a certain method of family planning, then
that provider may possibly withhold such information from the patient.If a health
care service providers religious belief does not allow a certain method of family
planning, then that provider may possibly withhold such information from the
patient. In doing so, the patient is unable to give voluntary informed consent to all
possible procedures that are necessary for her or his care. The law, in sections 17
and 23 allow accommodation for full care of the patient by requiring referral. The
patient that seeks health care service from a provider should be able to put his or
her trust on the provider that he or she would be referred to the best possible
option. There is nothing in the law which prevents the referring health care provider
from making known the basis of his or her conscientious objection to an available
procedure which is otherwise scientifically and medically safe and effective.
Between the doctor or health care provider on the one hand and the patient on the
other, it is the patients welfare and beliefs which should be primordial. It is the
patient that needs the care, and the doctor or health care provider should provide
that care in a professional manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that it is clear that a conscientious objector provision
whose coverage is too broad will allow too many to raise exception and effectively
undermine the purpose sought by the law.There is a difference between
objections based on ones conscience and those based on ones religion. Conscience
appears to be the broader category. Objections based on conscience can be unique
to the individuals determination of what is right or wrong based on ethics or
religion. Objections based on religion, on the other hand, imply a set of beliefs that
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are canonical to an institution or a movement considered as a religion. Others share

religious belief. Conscientious objection may also include those whose bases are
unique only to the person claiming the exception. Ones conscience may be shaped
by cultural factors other than religion. It is clear that a conscientious objector
provision whose coverage is too broad will allow too many to raise exception and
effectively undermine the purpose sought by the law.
Same; Same; Same; View that it is not clear in the ponencia whether the provisions
on referral by conscientious objectors are declared unconstitutional for all religions
or only for specific ones.The petitions do not show a specific instance when
conscientious objection was availed of as a result of the exercise of a religion. In this
case, we are asked to evaluate whether the provision that accommodates
conscientious objectors would, in the future, with unspecified facts, violate the
constitutional provision on religious exercise. Thus, it is also not clear in the
ponencia whether the provisions on referral by conscientious objectors are declared
unconstitutional for all religions or only for specific ones. This is the natural result
for speculative cases. This is dangerous constitutional precedent. If the declaration
is for all religions, then this might just result in a violation of the non-establishment
clause. A dominant majoritarian religion is now aided in imposing its beliefs not only
on patients but also on all those who have different faiths. Conduct which purport to
be religious practice and its relationship to the fundamental tenets of that religion is
a question of fact which cannot be part of our judicial notice. Otherwise, we
implicitly establish a religion or manifest a bias towards one in violation of the clear
and absolute separation between church and state.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court cannot make any judicial
determination to declare the Catholic Churchs position on contraceptives and sex.
We cannot make any judicial determination to declare the Catholic Churchs
position on contraceptives and sex. This is not the forum to do so and there is no
present controversy no contraceptive and no individual that has come concretely
affected by the law. This court must avoid entering into unnecessary entanglements
with religion. We are apt to do this when, without proof, we assume the beliefs of
one sect or group within a church as definitive of their religion. We must not assume
at the outset that there might be homogeneity of belief and practice; otherwise, we
contribute to the States endorsement of various forms of fundamentalism.
Same; View that the general rule encourages married persons to discuss and make
a conjugal decision on the matter; They are caught in a problem when they
disagree.Section 23(a)(2)(i) applies to a specific situation: when there is a
disagreement between married persons regarding the performance of a legal and
medically-safe reproductive health procedure. The general rule encourages
married persons to discuss and make a conjugal decision on the matter. They are
caught in a problem when they disagree. This agreement may fester and cause
problems within their family. The disagreement will not be created by the RH Law. It
will exist factually regardless of the law. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the law becomes
available to break this deadlock and privilege the decision of the spouse undergoing
the procedure. This is logical since the reproductive health procedures involve the
body, health and well being of the one undergoing the procedure. The marriage may
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be a social contract but is certainly not a talisman that removes the possibility of
power relationships. Married persons, especially the woman/wife, can still suffer
inequality. Married persons may still experience spousal abuse. Generally, it will be
the woman who will ask to undergo reproductive health procedures. The
interpretation of the majority therefore affects her control over her body. Rather
than enhance the zones of autonomy of a person even in a married state, the
interpretation of the majority creates the womans body as a zone of contestation
that gives the upper hand to the husband.
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that the equal
protection clause in this provision ensures that individuals, even those that enter
into a married state, do not coexist and suffer under conditions of marital inequality.
This due process clause implies and congeals a persons right to life. This includes
the individuals right to existence as well as her or his right to a quality of life of her
or his choosing. The State is not to sanction a program or an act that deprives the
individual of her or his control over her or his life and body. The equal protection
clause in this provision ensures that individuals, even those that enter into a
married state, do not coexist and suffer under conditions of marital inequality.
Same; Same; Same; View that the fundamental equality of women and men, the
promotion of an improved quality of life, and the full respect for human rights do not
exist when a spouse is guaranteed control the other spouses decisions respecting
the latters body.The fundamental equality of women and men, the promotion of
an improved quality of life, and the full respect for human rights do not exist when a
spouse is guaranteed control the other spouses decisions respecting the latters
body. The autonomy and importance of family should not be privileged over the
privacy and autonomy of a person. Marriage is not bondage that subordinates the
humanity of each spouse. No person should be deemed to concede her or his
privacy rights and autonomy upon getting married. By declaring Section 23(a)(2)(i)
as unconstitutional, the majority interprets the privacy and autonomy of the family
as also providing insulation of patriarchal or sexist practices from state scrutiny. This
is not what the Constitution intends.
Same; Parental Consent; View that the wisdom of all the members of the House of
Representatives, the Senate, and the President have determined that it would be
best to give the minor who is already a parent or has undergone a miscarriage all
the leeway to be able to secure all the reproductive health technologies to prevent
her difficulties from happening again.Those of us who have not and can never go
through the actual experience of miscarriage by a minor, those of us who cannot
even imagine the pain and stresses of teenage pregnancy, should not proceed to
make blanket rules on what minors could do in relation to their parents. None of us
can say that in all cases, all parents can be understanding and extend sympathy for
the minors that are legally under their care. None of us can say that there are
instances when parents would think that the only way to prevent teenage
pregnancy is a tongue lashing or corporeal punishment. We cannot understand
reality only from the eyes of how we want it to be. Only when we are faced with an
actual controversy and when we see the complications of a real situation will we be
able to understand and shape a narrowly tailored exception to the current rule. In
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the meantime, the wisdom of all the members of the House of Representative, the
Senate, and the President have determined that it would be best to give the minor
who is already a parent or has undergone a miscarriage all the leeway to be able to
secure all the reproductive health technologies to prevent her difficulties from
happening again. We must stay our hand for now.
Same; Administrative Agencies; Food and Drug Administration; View that insisting
that we can impose, modify or alter rules of the Food and Drug Administration is
usurpation of the executive power of control over administrative agencies. It is a
violation of the principle of separation of powers.The Constitution vests the
executive power upon the President. He or she, and not the judiciary, exercises the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, including the
Food and Drug Administration. The judiciary has no administrative power of control
or supervision over the Food and Drug Administration. Insisting that we can impose,
modify or alter rules of the Food and Drug Administration is usurpation of the
executive power of control over administrative agencies. It is a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, which recognizes that [e]ach department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. The system of checks and balances only allows us
to declare, in the exercise of our judicial powers, the Food and Drug Administrations
acts as violative of the law or as committed with grave abuse of discretion. Such
power is further limited by the requirement of actual case or controversy.
Same; View that the law impliedly accepts that the choice of intimate relationships
is better left to the individual and the influences of their culture, their family, and
their faiths.Unwanted pregnancies may result in clinical complications and deaths
of women during childbirth, of the fetus while inside the womb and of infants soon
after they are born. Unwanted pregnancies may be the result of lack of knowledge
of the consequences of the sexual act, or it could be due to the lack of information
and access to safe and effective reproductive technologies. The law impliedly
accepts that the choice of intimate relationships is better left to the individual and
the influences of their culture, their family, and their faiths.
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that the law
acknowledges the differential impact of lack of knowledge and access to
reproductive health technologies between the rich and the poor.The law
acknowledges the differential impact of lack of knowledge and access to
reproductive health technologies between the rich and the poor. It, therefore,
requires that proper information and access be made more available to those who
need it. It mandates the government to intervene at least in order to provide the
right information and, when requested and without coercion, provide access.
[Imbong vs. Ochoa Jr., 721 SCRA 146(2014)]

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60. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R.

No. 157870, November 3, 2008
Case Title : SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner, vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme
Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law ; Statutes ; Definition of
the limits on legislative power in the abstract ;
Remedial Law; Actions; Power of Judicial Review; Parties; Party-in-Interest; The
power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide
controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed; Even with the
presence of an actual case or controversy, the court may refuse to exercise judicial
review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the
requisite standing to challenge it.It is basic that the power of judicial review can
only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the
statute sought to be reviewed. But even with the presence of an actual case or
controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the
constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing
to challenge it. To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule on standing is a matter of procedure; hence, it
can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it
can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest. There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and
candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he
has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other
preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax
the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the
paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect.Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
341

administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and
void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to
yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed.
Same; Same; Definition of the limits on legislative power in the abstract.Congress
inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations.
As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract,
the limits on legislative power in the following wise: Someone has said that the
powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the
ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the
departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution
or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of
legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash,
but over which it cannot leap.
Same; Same; The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not
be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in
the Constitution.In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing
and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement
Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator
to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated
in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution; Whether or not the drug-free bar set up
under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of
no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office
for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirementSec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as
sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges
the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution.
As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a
certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to
be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to
what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the
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Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to
be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would
be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drugtesting requirement.
Same; Same; Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165
requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional.Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view
and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure,
the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
Same; Same; A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is
not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the
student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be
promoted and protected.The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of
prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the people,
particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims.
Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion,
a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only
acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student
population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted
and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug use by our Nations
schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nations
laws against the importation of drugs; the necessity for the State to act is
magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just
upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. Needless to stress,
the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the
testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Same; Same; The mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA
9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not
exactly for the same reason.Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level
students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for
officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly
for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is
unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy, has failed
to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful
and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
Petitioner Lasernas lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does
not merit serious consideration.
Same; Same; If RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees,
the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional
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command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve
them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.Taking into account the foregoing
factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits
set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random
testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in
the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable
supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on
public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public
service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees,
the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional
command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve
them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
Same; Same; In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless; To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical
test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the
public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and
one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing
are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime
before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to
their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime
are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons
thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Same; Same; Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
declared unconstitutional.WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition
in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos.
157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL,
but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are,
accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.
[Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410(2008)]

344

345

61. Alejano v. Cabuay, 25 August 2005

Case Title : IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES), CAPT.
NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES), CAPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, PA, LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN, CAPT. MILO
MAESTRECAMPO, PA, LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN,
HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO,
petitioners, vs. GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO
ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ,
respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Habeas Corpus|Pre-Trial Detainees|Republic
Act No. 7438|Right to Counsel|Penalties|Punishments|
Words and Phrases|Habeas Corpus
Habeas Corpus; In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual
before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition as the
respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his detention but
such order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive
matters covered by the remedy.In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present
an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition.
The respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his detention.
However, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the
substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of
Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the
remedy of habeas corpus. For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for
habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the
remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should
issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case,
the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively
participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped
from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits
of their petition.
Same; The remedy of habeas corpus is not proper remedy to address the detainees
complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Centerthe
purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of
his liberty.The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus
is not the proper remedy to address the detainees complaint against the
regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas
corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The
346

purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of

his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the
release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas
corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is
not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
Same; Case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances where there is
deprivation of a persons constitutional rights.Case law has expanded the writs
application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a persons constitutional
rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one
or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where
the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. However, a mere
allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will
extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint
of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess. Whatever
situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of
constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.
Same; Pre-Trial Detainees; Republic Act No. 7438; Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit
their constitutional rights upon confinement but the fact the detainees are confined
makes their rights more limited than those of the public; RA 7438 expressly
recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable
measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.Pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. However, the
fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of
the public. RA 7438, which specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of
detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt
and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and
prevent his escape.
Same; Same; The regulations must be reasonably connected to the governments
objective of securing the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee.True,
Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting a
detainee client at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night. However,
the last paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes the express qualification that
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4(b), the detention officer has the power
to undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety
of the detainee and prevent his escape. The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA
7438 prescribes a clear standard. The regulations governing a detainees
confinement must be reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety and prevent
his escape. Thus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the
governments objective of securing the safety and preventing the escape of the
detainee. The law grants the detention officer the authority to undertake such
reasonable measures or regulations.

347

Same; Same; Right to Counsel; While the detainees lawyer may not visit the
detainees any time they want, the fact the detainees still have face-to-face
meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no
impairment of detainees right to counsel.In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of
Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention
centers allowable: such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the
detainees safety and prevent his escape. In the present case, the visiting hours
accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate
purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees. While
petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the
detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly
shows that there is no impairment of detainees right to counsel. Petitioners as
counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch
break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours
when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting
hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners
could always seek permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their clients
beyond the visiting hours. The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access
to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The
detainees right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the
hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given
time to confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit. Thus, at
no point were the detainees denied their right to counsel.
Same; Same; Penalties; The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrudes
into the detainees desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions to
punishment.Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from
their visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to
unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish
pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of
guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a
detainees desire to live comfortably. The fact that the restrictions inherent in
detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does not convert
those restrictions into punishment. It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and
purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will also infer intent to
punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative
purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. Jail officials
are thus not required to use the least restrictive security measure. They must only
refrain from implementing a restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it
serves.
Same; Same; Punishments; Words and Phrases; An action constitutes a punishment
when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer harm or disability, and (2) the
purpose of the action is to punish the inmate.An action constitutes a punishment
when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or disability, and (2)
the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. Punishment also requires that the
harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent
discomforts of confinement.
348

Same; Same; Same; Punishment cannot be inferred from the separation of the
detainees from their visitors by the iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact
visitsthe iron bars prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to
have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their visitors.In
the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees
from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The
iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact
but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical
contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not
even a strict non-contact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The
limitation on the detainees physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, nonpunitive response to valid security concerns. The boarding of the iron grills is for the
furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to
fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband
and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and
prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and
ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not
constitute punishments on the detainees.
Same; Same; Privacy of Communications and Correspondence; While letters
containing confidential communication between detainees and their lawyers enjoy a
limited protection in that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for
contraband but could not read the contents thereof without violating the inmates
right to correspondence, letters that are not of that nature could be read by prison
officials.American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees
non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail security. Hence, when a detainee
places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly
exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials. A pre-trial detainee has no
reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail. However, incoming mail
from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can open
and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents without
violating the inmates right to correspond with his lawyer. The inspection of
privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband. Thus,
we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the
detainees letters in the present case violated the detainees right to privacy of
communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the
folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of
sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have been
read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees
and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes
and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as
their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the
letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the
letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the
envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
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Same; Same; Same; That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude
on a citizens privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at
large but not to persons who are detained or imprisonedby the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy of rights.That a law is required before an executive officer
could intrude on a citizens privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the
public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to
privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the
limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights.
Same; Same; Same; In assessing alleged infringements on constitutional rights of
the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts balance the guarantees of the
Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators.In assessing the
regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on
the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts
balance the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison
administrators. The deferential review of such regulations stems from the principle
that: [s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict
scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration.
Same; Same; Same; Since appropriate regulations depend largely on security risks
involved, deferment in the present case to regulations adopted by military
custodian in absence of patent arbitrariness should be made.The detainees in the
present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup
detat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not
ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed
takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As
members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of
War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the
Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of
deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The
military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in
detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA
members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks
involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in
the absence of patent arbitrariness.
Same; Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; The ruling in this case does not foreclose the
right of the detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for
redress of grievances; Habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions
of confinementthe writ of habeas corpus will not lie if what is challenged is the
fact or duration of confinement.The ruling in this case, however, does not
foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts
for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison
350

facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be
reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive
relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and
inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question
conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is
challenged is the fact or duration of confinement. [Alejano vs. Cabuay, 468 SCRA
188(2005)]

351

62. Lumanog v. People, G.R. No. 182555 : September 7,

2010
Case Title : LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS,
petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Remedial Law|Hot
Pursuit|Warrantless Arrest
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Judgments; Judges are expected to make
complete findings of fact in their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects
of the case in the light of the evidence presented.The Constitution commands that
[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Judges are expected to make
complete findings of fact in their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects
of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency
to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such
conclusions are deduced.
Same; Same; Same; Memorandum Decisions; Though it is not a good practice, Court
sees nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completely copying the
memorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision clearly and distinctly
states sufficient findings of fact and the law on which they are based.In Bank of
the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, 375 SCRA 81 (2002), we held that though it is not
a good practice, we see nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completely
copying the memorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision clearly
and distinctly states sufficient findings of fact and the law on which they are based.
In another case where we upheld the validity of memorandum decisions, we
nevertheless took occasion to remind judges that it is still desirable for an appellate
judge to endeavor to make the issues clearer and use his own perceptiveness in
unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the law. No less
importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his judgment.
Same; Right to Counsel; Custodial Investigations; Custodial investigation refers to
the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a
particular person as a suspect. Police officers claimed that appellants were
apprehended as a result of hot pursuit activities on the days following the
ambush-slay of Abadilla. There is no question, however, that when appellants were
arrested they were already considered suspects: Joel was pinpointed by security
guard Alejo who went along with the PARAC squad to Fairview on June 19, 1996,
while the rest of appellants were taken by the same operatives in follow-up
352

operations after Joel provided them with the identities of his conspirators and where
they could be found.
Same; Same; Same; Extrajudicial Confession; Settled is the rule that the moment a
police officer tries to elicit admissions, or confessions or even plain information from
a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel.P/Insp. Castillo admitted
that the initial questioning of Joel began in the morning of June 20, 1996, the first
time said suspect was presented to him at the CPDC station, even before he was
brought to the IBP Office for the taking of his formal statement. Thus, the possibility
of appellant Joel having been subjected to intimidation or violence in the hands of
police investigators as he claims, cannot be discounted. The constitutional
requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a
police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from
a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. The purpose of providing
counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice
of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating
statements.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence
when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial
investigation.Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels
execution of his statement before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said
confession must be invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must
conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible
in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under
custodial investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The phrase preferably of his own choice does not
convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is
exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling the defense; A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by
the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsels
appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.The phrase
preferably of his own choice does not convey the message that the choice of a
lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the
tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who
can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. Thus,
while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation
cannot afford the services of counselor where the preferred lawyer is not available
is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as
he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not
raise any objection against the counsels appointment during the course of the
353

investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the

statement before the swearing officer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and
logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.We held that the modifier
competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It
stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of
a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by
a diligent and capable lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and
logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should
ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under
investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly
be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be
presumed innocent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Credibility of Witnesses; When it comes to
credibility of witnesses, the court accords the highest respect, even finality, to the
evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented
before it; The fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one
who rendered the judgment, but merely relied on the record of the case, does not
render his judgment erroneous or irregular.Time and again, we have held that the
testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is
clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court. Indeed, when it
comes to credibility of witnesses, this Court accords the highest respect, even
finality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the
witnesses presented before it. This holds true notwithstanding that it was another
judge who presided at the trial and Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. who penned the
decision in this case heard only some witnesses for the defense. It is axiomatic that
the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered
the judgment, but merely relied on the record of the case, does not render his
judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest
opportunity to weigh the testimonies, not having heard all the witnesses speak or
observed their deportment and manner of testifying.
Same; Same; Affidavits; The discrepancies between a sworn statement and
testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as
testimonial evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.Appellants make much
of a few inconsistencies in his statement and testimony, with respect to the number
of assailants and his reaction when he was ordered to get down in his guard post.
But such inconsistencies have already been explained by Alejo during crossexamination by correcting his earlier statement in using number four (4) to refer to
those persons actually standing around the car and two (2) more persons as
lookouts, and that he got nervous only when the second lookout shouted at him to
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get down, because the latter actually poked a gun at him. It is settled that
affidavits, being ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, but
do not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. The discrepancies between a
sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an
accused, as testimonial evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.
Same; Same; Out-of-court Identification; Procedure for out-of-court identification
and the test to determine the admissibility of such identification explained in People
v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995).In People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54
(1995), we explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to
determine the admissibility of such identification, thus: Out-of-court identification is
conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also
done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons
lined up for the purpose. . . In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-ofcourt identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness opportunity to
view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Out-of-Court Identification; The inadmissibility of a police
line-up identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification.In any case, the trial court did not rely solely
on said out-of-court identification considering that Alejo also positively identified
appellants during the trial. Thus, even assuming arguendo that Alejos out-of-court
identification was tainted with irregularity, his subsequent identification in court
cured any flaw that may have attended it. We have held that the inadmissibility of a
police line-up identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification.
Same; Same; Same; The presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used and
ballistic examination are not prerequisites for conviction.As this Court held in
Velasco v. People, 483 SCRA 649 (2006)As regards the failure of the police to
present a ballistic report on the seven spent shells recovered from the crime scene,
the same does not constitute suppression of evidence. A ballistic report serves only
as a guide for the courts in considering the ultimate facts of the case. It would be
indispensable if there are no credible eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it is
corroborative in nature. The presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used
and ballistic examination are not prerequisites for conviction. The corpus delicti and
the positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime are
more than enough to sustain his conviction. Even without a ballistic report, the
positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more than sufficient to prove
accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, since the identity of

355

the assailant has been sufficiently established, a ballistic report on the slugs can be
dispensed with in proving petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Alibi; To be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of
alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the person
charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the
reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time.Alibi is the
weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is
for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused
by the witnesses. To be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the
defense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the
person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its
commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time.
The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is
the least possibility of accuseds presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold
water.
Criminal Law; Murder; Treachery; The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime,
depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or to repel the aggression,
thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without any
provocation on the part of the victim.As regards the presence of treachery as a
qualifying circumstance, the evidence clearly showed that the attack on the
unsuspecting victimwho was inside his car on a stop position in the middle of
early morning traffic when he was suddenly fired upon by the appellantswas
deliberate, sudden and unexpected. There was simply no chance for Abadilla to
survive the ambush-slay, with successive shots quickly fired at close range by two
(2) armed men on both sides of his car; and much less to retaliate by using his own
gun, as no less than 23 gunshot wounds on his head and chest caused his
instantaneous death. As we have consistently ruled, the essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the
crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or to repel the
aggression, thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without
any provocation on the part of the victim.
Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; The essence of evident premeditation is that
the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive at
a calm judgment.Evident premeditation was likewise properly appreciated by the
trial court, notwithstanding the inadmissibility of Joel de Jesuss extrajudicial
confession disclosing in detail the pre-planned ambush of Abadilla, apparently a
contract killing in which the perpetrators were paid or expected to receive payment
for the job. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Alejo had stressed that as early as
7:30 in the morning of June 13, 1996, he already noticed something unusual going
on upon seeing the two (2) lookouts (appellants Joel de Jesus and Lorenzo delos
Santos) walking to and fro along Katipunan Avenue infront of the building he was
guarding. True enough, they were expecting somebody to pass that way, who was
no other than Abadilla driving his Honda Accord. After the lapse of more or less one
356

(1) hour, he already heard successive gunshots, while in his guard post, from the
direction of the middle lane where Abadillas car was surrounded by four (4) men
carrying short firearms. All the foregoing disclosed the execution of a pre-conceived
plan to kill Abadilla. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of
the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to
carry out criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.
Same; Same; Death of a Party; Damages; Damages that may be awarded when
death occurs due to a crime.When death occurs due to a crime, the following
damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim;
(2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
and (5) temperate damages.
BERSAMIN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; The records of the present case show that
impermissible suggestion did not precede Alegos out-of-court identification of De
Jesus as one of the perpetrators of the crime; The procedure outlined in People v.
Pineda, 429 SCRA 478 (2004) and People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995), for a
proper out-of-court identification was neither disregarded nor violated.In contrast,
the records of the present case show that impermissible suggestion did not precede
Alejos out-of-court positive identification of De Jesus as one of the perpetrators of
the crime. Alejos testimony on September 3, 1996 reveals, on the contrary, that
Alejo even categorically declined to identify any suspect by mere looking at a
photograph. Verily, the procedure outlined in People v. Pineda, 429 SCRA 478 (2004)
and People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995), for a proper out-of-court
identification was neither disregarded nor violated.
Same; Same; In any criminal prosecution there are more and better circumstances
to consider other than the initial sketch of a police artist for determining the
reliability of an identification.At any rate, a discrepancy between a police artists
sketch of a perpetrator of a crime based on descriptions of witnesses at the scene of
the crime, on one hand, and an actual identification of the perpetrator by an
eyewitness given in court, on the other hand, is a very minimal factor of doubt on
the reliability of the identification. In any criminal prosecution there are more and
better circumstances to consider other than the initial sketch of a police artist for
determining the reliability of an identification. We have to remember that a police
artists sketch of a perpetrator of a crime is initially for purposes of pursuing an
investigation, and has seldom any impact on the case after that.
Same; Same; The validity of a decision is not impaired when its writer only took
over from another judge who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts.The validity
of a decision is not impaired when its writer only took over from another judge who
had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of the facts. No such grave abuse of discretion was
shown herein. The trial records demonstrate, on the contrary, that the factual
findings of the trial court and the assessment of the credibility of Alejo as an
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eyewitness rested on a most careful and thorough study of the evidence adduced
by both parties. Indeed, although he did not observe the demeanor of Alejo as a
witness, the writing judge (Judge Jaime N. Salazar) was not entirely deprived of a
proper sense of Alejos demeanor considering that the TSNs were replete with the
detailed manifestations on Alejos appearance, behavior, deportment, disposition,
and mien during the many days of his testimony that the various counsel of both
parties zealously put on record for memorialization.
Same; Same; The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof was speculative at
best.The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof was speculative at best. To
start with, that the family of the victim might have extended economic or financial
support to Alejo did not necessarily warrant the presumption of bias on the part of
Alejo as a witness. There was no evidence showing that any such support was for
the purpose of unduly influencing his testimony. Likelier than not, the support was
only an expression of the familys appreciation for his cooperation in the public
prosecution of the culprits, or for his resolve to ensure the successful prosecution of
the perpetrators.
CARPIO,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Presumption of Innocence; The presumption of
innocence serves to emphasize that the prosecution has the obligation to prove
not only each element of the offense beyond reasonable doubt but also the identity
of the accused as the perpetrator.The presumption of innocence serves to
emphasize that the prosecution has the obligation to prove not only each element
of the offense beyond reasonable doubt but also the identity of the accused as the
perpetrator. The accused, on the other hand, bears no burden of proof. The
prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the defense.
Same; Same; Out-of-Court Identification; Guidelines to determine the admissibility
and reliability of an out-of-court identification laid down in People v. Teehankee, 249
SCRA 54 (1995).In People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995), the Court laid down
the guidelines to determine the admissibility and reliability of an out-of-court
identification, thus: In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test
where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness opportunity to view
the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at the
time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Rules in proper photographic identification procedure explained
in People v. Pineda, 429 SCRA 478 (2004).In People v. Pineda, 429 SCRA 478
(2004), the Court explained the rules in proper photographic identification
procedure, to wit: Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the established
methods of identifying criminals, the procedure used in this case is unacceptable.
The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of
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photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The second rule
directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and
display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect.
Same; Same; Same; The clear import of Rodrigo is that an out-of-court
identification, made by lone witness, who was subjected to impermissible
photographic suggestion, fatally tainted the subsequent in-court identification made
by the same witness.The clear import of Rodrigo is that an out-of-court
identification, made by the lone witness, who was subjected to impermissible
photographic suggestion, fatally tainted the subsequent in-court identification made
by the same witness. Accordingly, the testimony of such witness on the
identification of the accused, by itself, cannot be considered as proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Without proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the perpetrator, the accused deserves
an acquittal.
Same; Same; Same; Due process dictates that the photographic identification must
be devoid of any impermissible suggestions in order to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.Due process dictates that the photographic identification must be devoid
of any impermissible suggestions in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In
People v. Alcantara, 240 SCRA 122 (1995), the Court declared: Due process
demands that identification procedure of criminal suspects must be free from
impermissible suggestions. As appropriately held in US vs. Wade, the influence of
improper suggestion upon identifying witness probably accounts for more
miscarriages of justice than any other single factor.
Same; Same; Right to Counsel; Generally, an accused is not entitled to the
assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part
of custodial investigation; An exception to this rule is when the accused had been
the focus of police attention at the start of the investigation.As stated in Escordial,
generally, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of custodial investigation. An exception to
this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of
the investigation. The line-up in this case squarely falls under this exception. It was
established that Joel was already a suspect prior to the police line-up. In fact, even
before Joels apprehension, the police had already zeroed in on Joel as one of
Abadillas killers. As such, Joel was entitled to counsel during the police line-up.
Same; Same; Hot Pursuit; Warrantless Arrest; The warrantless arrest of Joel, made
six days after the murder, does not fall within the ambit of hot pursuit; In law
enforcement, hot pursuit can refer to an immediate pursuit by the police.The
police arrested Joel, without any warrant, on 19 June 1996 or six days after the
killing. Six days is definitely more than enough to secure an arrest warrant, and yet
the police opted to arrest Joel and the other accused, without any warrant, claiming
that it was conducted in hot pursuit. In law enforcement, hot pursuit can refer to
an immediate pursuit by the police such as a car chase. Certainly, the warrantless
arrest of Joel, made six days after the murder, does not fall within the ambit of hot
pursuit.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Torturing the accused to extract incriminating

confessions is repugnant to the Constitution.Torturing the accused to extract
incriminating confessions is repugnant to the Constitution. Section 12(2), Article III
of the Constitution expressly provides [n]o torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against [an
accused]. The blatant and unacceptable transgression of the accuseds
constitutional rights, for the sake of delivering speedy, but false, justice to the
aggrieved, can never be countenanced. This Court can never tolerate official abuses
and perpetuate the gross violation of these rights. The presumption that a public
officer had regularly performed his official duty can at no instance prevail over the
presumption of innocence. [Lumanog vs. People, 630 SCRA 42 (2010)]

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63. Carbonnel v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.

187689, 07 September 2010
Case Title : CLARITA J. CARBONEL, petitioner, vs. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Right to Counsel|
Custodial Investigations
Remedial Law; Appeals; The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is mandatory.It is undisputed that petitioner appealed
the CSCRO IVs decision almost three years from receipt thereof. Undoubtedly, the
appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period when the decision had long
become final and executory. As held in Bacsasar v. Civil Service Commission (576
SCRA 787 [2009]), citing Talento v. Escalada, Jr. (556 SCRA 491 [2008])The
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is
mandatory. Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the
judgment final and executory and beyond the power of the Courts review.
Jurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes final and executory, it
becomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest. Such
decision or order can no loner be disturbed or re-opened no matter how erroneous it
may have been.
Constitutional Law; Right to Counsel; Custodial Investigations; The exclusionary rule
under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.It must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of
the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus,
the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies
only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.
Same; Same; Same; A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted
by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioners capacity to
represent herself and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel.While investigations conducted by an administrative
body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under
existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioners capacity to
represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in
administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary
measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
361

maintaining the dignity of government service. [Carbonel vs. Civil Service

Commission, 630 SCRA 202(2010)]

362

64. Govt of Hong Kong v. Olalia, 19 April 2007

Case Title : GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T.
OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
Syllabi Class : International Law|Extradition|Bail|Human
Rights|Due Process|Universal Declaration of Human
Rights|International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights|
Pacta Sunt Servanda|Standard of Proof
International Law; Extradition; Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in
this jurisdiction.Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the
question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
Same; Same; Bail; Human Rights; The modern trend in public international law is
the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human
rights.At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents
case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1)
the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in
the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value
now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding
duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of
the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that
the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking
root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only
to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For
one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity.
Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These
significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of
international law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; While on a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Universal Declaration of Human Rights are now recognized as
363

customarily binding upon the members of the international community;

Fundamental among the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.On a
more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and
states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10,
1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights
of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the
said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of
the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70
(1951), this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the
land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental
among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty,
and due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While this Court in Government of the United
States of America v. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623 (2002), limited the exercise of the
right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international
treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to
life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.The
Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of
the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly
the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in
order.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the
Court sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases
clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights.In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil.
70 (1951) and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, 90 Phil. 256 A(1951), this
Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have
been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As
previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of
364

Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail. If bail can be granted in
deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a
prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption
lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to
liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a
foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or
convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the
other state to surrender him to the demanding state.Section 2(a) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines extradition as the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold
him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government. Extradition has thus been characterized as the
right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused
or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of
the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal
proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding
is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to
treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that
is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he
fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of
the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of
extradition is also the machinery of criminal lawobviously, an extradition
proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process.But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by
the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also
the machinery of criminal law. This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused if such will best serve the interest of justice. We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state in case of urgency to ask for the
provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;
and that release from provisional arrest shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition
365

of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently. Obviously, an

extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a
criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. Temporary detention may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; By any standard, detention for an extended period of
more than two (2) years is a serious deprivation of a potential extraditees
fundamental right to liberty; While our extradition law does not provide for the grant
of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.Records show
that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to
bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having
been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was
this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant
him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion
for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The applicable standard of due process,
however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedingsin the latter, the
standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the
accused, in the former, the assumption is that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice; The prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he
or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.The applicable standard of
due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In
the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence
of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that
the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the
purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the temporary detention is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus
probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; While the time-honored principle
of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life,
liberty, and due process; An extraditee should not be deprived of his right to apply
for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.The
time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor
its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback
in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
366

necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so,
where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Standard of Proof; An extradition proceeding being sui
generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil casesthe potential extraditee must prove by
clear and convincing proof that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.An extradition proceeding being sui
generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the
standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply
given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee
from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed clear and convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk
and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case,
there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is
not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of clear
and convincing evidence. [Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
vs. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470(2007)]

367

65. Reyes v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182161, December 3,

2009
Case Title : REVEREND FATHER ROBERT P. REYES,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Writs of Amparo|Criminal
Procedure
Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; Coverage of the Writ of Amparo.The Court, in
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., 568 SCRA 1 (2008), made a
categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to
these two instances of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to
threats thereof.
Same; Same; Restriction on right to travel as a result of a pending criminal case is
not unlawful and thus not a valid ground to invoke issuance of Writ of Amparo.The
restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to
establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that
it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which
there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; Administrative Law; Petition to lift an
Hold Departure Order (HDO) issued by the Sec. of Justice should be filed in the court
where criminal case against petitioner is pending.We quote with approval the CAs
ruling on this matter: The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the
Supreme Court of its pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul that once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its
continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of
respondents MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has
not lost control over Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By
virtue of its residual power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertain
incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this Court. The relief petitioner
seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal
case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of Amparo, supra).

368

Same; Same; Same; Absence of actual controversy renders it unnecessary for

Supreme Court to pass upon constitutionality of Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular
No. 13 (On Hold Departure Orders).Petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of
amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.
Petitioners apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show
any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of
amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on
this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of
1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure
Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations
Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other
Purposes). [Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 606 SCRA 580(2009)]

369

66. Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 07 October

2008, G.R. No. 180906
Case Title : THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioners, vs. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO
MANALO, respondents
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Writ of Amparo ;
Writ of Amparo; Supreme Court; Words and Phrases; Extralegal Killings and
Enforced Disappearances, Defined; The promulgation of the Amparo Rule was an
exercise for the first time of the Supreme Courts expanded power to promulgate
rules to protect our peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the
martial law regime; The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; Extralegal killings
are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings, while enforced disappearances are attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct
or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.On
October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances. It was an exercise for
the first time of the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our
peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987
Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the
Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are
killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended
by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct
or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
Same; Words and Phrases; The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico and Amparo
literally means protection in Spanish.The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico.
Amparo literally means protection in Spanish. In 1837, de Tocquevilles
Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its
370

description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican
jurists. One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for
his native state, Yucatan, which granted judges the power to protect all persons in
the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated
into the national constitution in 1847, viz.: The federal courts shall protect any
inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights granted to
him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by
the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting
themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no
general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the
violation.
Same; Purposes of the Writ of Amparo; In Latin American countries, except Cuba,
the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human
rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas.The writ of
amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into
various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country. It became, in the
words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexicos selfattributed task of conveying to the worlds legal heritage that institution which, as
a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived. What began as a
protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of
constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the
protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo
contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo
casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial
decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions;
and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of peasants rights derived from the
agrarian reform process. In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of
Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses
especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries
adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional
rights, including socio-economic rights. Other countries like Colombia, Chile,
Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of
amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.
Same; Grave Abuse Clause; Habeas Corpus; While constitutional rights can be
protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus
under Rule 102, these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearancesthe swiftness required
to resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the
availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule
offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and
threats thereof; The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and, curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action.
371

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause
through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102, these remedies may not be
adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ
of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law
and civil law traditionsborne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience
of human rights abusesoffers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make
the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. The writ of
Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads
to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the
preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
Same; Evidence; With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the
torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of
the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves,
and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in
their written and/or oral statements.In Ortiz v. Guatemala, Case 10.526, Report
No. 31/96, Inter-Am.C.H.R.,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 332 (1997), a case
decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission
considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana
Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this
case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The
Commissions findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible
statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. These
statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took
when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained.
She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111
circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with
her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention. With
the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the
victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence
of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their
account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral
statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as
physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in
the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are
372

implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as
no surprise.
Same; Right to Security; Searches and Seizures; The right to security or the right to
security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, and at the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person,
including the extensions of his/her personhouses, papers, and effectsagainst
government intrusion.Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine
if it has indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the
right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz.: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge. . . At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones
person, including the extensions of his/her personhouses, papers, and effects
against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the states power over a
persons home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and
sanctity of the person himself. The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the
Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, 101 SCRA 86 (1980), viz.: The
purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful
invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted.
(Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to
privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and
security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139
[1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against
unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer
to a mans soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal
security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons.
Same; Due Process Clause; While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution gurantees essentially the right to be alive, the right to security of
person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life; In a broad sense, the right to
security of person emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his
life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation, including the right to exist,
and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a
deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of
life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to
be aliveupon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditionedthe right
to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz.: The life to
which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property
may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the
security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property. . .
373

pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of mans existence. In
a broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a persons legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while
existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things
which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament,
and lawful desires of the individual.
Same; Right to Security; Permutations of the Right to Security; A closer look at the
right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this
right: First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear, Second, the right
to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security,
and, Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights
by the government.A closer look at the right to security of person would yield
various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of
person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed
as the highest aspiration of the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some
scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but
essentially an individual international human right. It is the right to security of
person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the
UDHR provides, viz.: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
(emphasis supplied) Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily
and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded
without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of
the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful
physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself
escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against
persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by
the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the
guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right
to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or
their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

374

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In the Amparo context, it is more correct to say
that the right to security is actually the freedom from threatfreedom from
fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the
actionable wrong.In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from
fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the
actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to wellfounded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to
another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of
character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is
more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from
threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part
of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security
mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Same; Same; There need not necessarily be a depravation of liberty for the right to
security of person to be invoked.This third sense of the right to security of person
as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the United
Nations Human Rights Committee in not a few cases involving Article 9 of the
ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to
liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person
can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not
necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be
invoked.
Same; Production Orders; Searches and Seizures; The production order under the
Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement
under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitutionthis Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a
protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents;
The amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or
things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.In the case at bar,
however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague
allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and
affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned
generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the
relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in
the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been
shown. Petitioners arguments do not hold water. The production order under the
Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement
under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a
protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of
documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Same; The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and
prisoners behind secret walls.In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to
375

life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice
to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls. [Secretary of National
Defense vs. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1(2008)]

376

67. Balao v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011

Case Title : ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE
BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR and BEVERLY LONGID,
petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EDUARDO
ERMITA, GILBERTO TEODORO, RONALDO PUNO, NORBERTO
GONZALES, Gen. ALEXANDER YANO, Gen. JESUS VERZOSA,
Brig. Gen. REYNALDO MAPAGU, Lt. P/Dir. EDGARDO
DOROMAL, Maj. Gen. ISAGANI CACHUELA, Commanding
Officer of the AFP-ISU based in Baguio City, PSS EUGENE
MARTIN and several JOHN DOES, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Br. 63.
Syllabi Class : Writ of Amparo|Extralegal Killings|Enforced
Disappearances|Command Responsibility|Presidential
Immunity
Writ of Amparo; Extralegal Killings; Enforced Disappearances; Meaning of Extralegal
Killings and Enforced Disappearances.The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was
promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. It was formulated in the exercise of this Courts
expanded rule-making power for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these two situations.
Extralegal killings refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced
disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention,
or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private
individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person outside
the protection of law.
Same; Same; Same; Such documented practice of targeting activists in the
militarys counter-insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary
standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.We
hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the militarys counterinsurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the
Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance. In the case of Roxas v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211 (2010), the Court noted that the similarity
between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those
surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily,
carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction.
377

Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannot simply infer government involvement
in the abduction of James from past similar incidents in which the victims also
worked or affiliated with the CPA and other left-leaning groups.
Same; Same; Same; The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in
an amparo proceeding does not by any measure preclude impleading military or
police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were
committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence.Subsequently, we have
clarified that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an
amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or
police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were
committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may therefore
be impleadednot actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on
the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
Same; Same; Same; Definition of Responsibility and Accountability.In Razon, Jr. v.
Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the Court defined responsibility and accountability as
these terms are applied to amparo proceedings, as follows: x x x Responsibility
refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them,
the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement
in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the
level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Same; Same; Same; Reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units
they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful
investigation or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to
search for the victim.In view of the foregoing evidentiary gaps, respondents
clearly failed to discharge their burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of Jamess abduction. Such ineffective investigation extant in the
records of this case prevents us from completely exonerating the respondents from
allegations of accountability for James disappearance. The reports submitted by the
PNP Regional Office, Task Force Balao and Baguio City Police Station do not contain
meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. In
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the Court observed that such reports of
top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate
can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed
investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for the victim. In the
same case we stressed that the standard of diligence requiredthe duty of public
officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligencecalled for extraordinary
measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent

378

handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance

cases.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Immunity; The trial court clearly erred in holding
that presidential immunity cannot be properly invoked in an amparo proceeding.
As to the matter of dropping President Arroyo as party-respondent, though not
raised in the petitions, we hold that the trial court clearly erred in holding that
presidential immunity cannot be properly invoked in an amparo proceeding. As
president, then President Arroyo was enjoying immunity from suit when the petition
for a writ of amparo was filed. Moreover, the petition is bereft of any allegation as to
what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate
petitioners protected rights.
Same; Same; Same; A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an
inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from
the allegations of the party seeking the order.An inspection order is an interim
relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo
petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. A basic requirement
before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the
order. In this case, the issuance of inspection order was properly denied since the
petitioners specified several military and police establishments based merely on the
allegation that the testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous incidents of
similar abductions involving activists disclosed that those premises were used as
detention centers.
SERENO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Writ of Amparo; Extralegal Killings; Enforced Disappearances; While the substantial
evidence rule remains the standard in amparo proceedings, flexibility should be
observed; Courts must consider evidence adduced in its totality including that which
would otherwise be deemed inadmissible if consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced.Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo prescribes the threshold of
substantial evidence as necessary for establishing the claims of petitioners in G.R.
No. 186050. While the substantial evidence rule remains the standard in amparo
proceedings, flexibility should be observed. Courts must consider evidence adduced
in its totality, including that which would otherwise be deemed inadmissible if
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.
Same; Same; Same; Command Responsibility; The doctrine of command
responsibility is not mutually exclusive with the standard of responsibility and
accountability in amparo cases.The ponencia rejects the use of command
responsibility in amparo proceedings on the ground that the manner of impleading
commanders must be on the basis of their responsibility or accountability. It must
be pointed out that the doctrine of command responsibility is not mutually exclusive
with the standard of responsibility and accountability in amparo cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of command responsibility may be used in
amparo proceedings to the extent of identifying the superiors accountable for the
enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.The doctrine of command
379

responsibility may be used in amparo proceedings to the extent of identifying the

superiors accountable for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing, and
those who may be directed to implement the processes and reliefs in the amparo
case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presidential Immunity; A non-sitting President does not
enjoy immunity from suit even for acts committed during the latters tenure.The
majority Decision states that former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former
President Arroyo) should have been accorded presidential immunity, as she was the
incumbent President when the present Petitions were filed. This position is not in
accord with the ruling of this Court in Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452 (2001), in
which it was explicitly held that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity
from suit even for acts committed during the latters tenure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presidential immunity from suit exists only in
concurrence with the Presidents incumbency.In this Courts Resolution in Estrada
v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108 (2001), it was emphasized that presidential immunity
from suit exists only in concurrence with the Presidents incumbency.
Same; Same; Same; Granting the privilege of the writ may include an order
instructing respondents to conduct further investigation if such a directive is
deemed as an appropriate remedial measure under the premises to protect the
rights under the writ.The ponencia orders the referral of this case back to the trial
court for further investigation by the PNP and CIDG. As previously discussed, an
explicit finding of absence of a fair and effective investigation should have been
sufficient to grant the privilege of the writ of amparo. After all, there is no finding of
criminal, civil or administrative liability in amparo proceedings. In fact, granting the
privilege of the writ may include an order instructing respondents to conduct further
investigation, if such a directive is deemed as an appropriate remedial measure
under the premises to protect the rights under the writ. [Balao vs. MacagagalArroyo, 662 SCRA 312(2011)]

380

68. Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805,

November 15, 2011
Case Title : IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO,
PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ.
GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO,
P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an
officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE
PALACPAC under the name HARRY, ANTONIO CRUZ,
ALDWIN BONG PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN,
respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for partial review on certiorari and
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decisions of the
Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Writ of Amparo|Command Responsibility
Writ of Amparo; The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy
that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent
reliefs available to the petitioner.The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and
independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it
serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in
that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading
to subsequent investigation and action.
Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a
persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to
protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in
381

order to achieve unlawful ends. As an independent and summary remedy to protect

the right to privacyespecially the right to informational privacythe proceedings
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal,
civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven
through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database
or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or
information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification.
Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; There is no determination of administrative,
civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings.It bears stressing
that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in
amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial
killing.
Same; Command Responsibility; Nothing precludes this Court from applying the
doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain
responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to
determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address
the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial
measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying
the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain
responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
Same; Same; Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the
actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b)
accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i)
who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level
of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the
actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b)
accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i)
who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level
of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or
administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless

382

be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing

definitions.
Same; Same; The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,
necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior
within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.Having established the
applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it
must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military,
can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative. To hold someone liable under the
doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: a. the
existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior
and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b. the superior knew or had
reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and c. the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The president, being the
commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command
responsibility doctrine.
Same; Same; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or
threat to the right to life, liberty and security may be caused by either an act or
an omission of a public official.The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states
that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security may be caused
by either an act or an omission of a public official. Moreover, in the context of
amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the
respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. [Rodriguez vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84(2011)]

383

69. Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012

Case Title : MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, petitioner, vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PNPPROVINCIAL DIRECTOR OF ILOCOS NORTE, and P/SUPT.
WILLIAM O. FANG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF,
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, PNP PROVINCIAL OFFICE, ILOCOS
NORTE, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Br. 13.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Private Armies
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean
more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as
well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the
beginning of all freedom.The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty,
has long been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22
SCRA 424 (1968), thus enunciated: The due process question touching on an
alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the
objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a
sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to
privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: Liberty in the
constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental
restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The
right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom. As a matter of fact, this
right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. The concept of liberty would
be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique
individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint.Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a
fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA 456 (2007), this
Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz.: With respect to the
right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state
that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative
investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to
thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the
right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally
prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we
declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
384

compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid
down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy
as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to
ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions
adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that
this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed
legislative investigation.
Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones
right to the truth and to informational privacy.The writ of habeas data is an
independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of
private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted
authority.The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies
and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also
provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and
civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission. [Gamboa vs. Chan, 677 SCRA 385(2012)]

385

70. People v. Fieldad, G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014

Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR PIMENTEL,
appellants.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law ; Damages ; Interest Rates ;
Criminal Law; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might take.Fieldad argues that there can be no treachery since the jail guards
were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to maintain
peace and order within the compound. This argument is untenable. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might take.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.It is a
settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude
under grilling examination. Positive identification of the accused is entitled to
greater weight than the bare denial and explanation by the accused.
Criminal Law; Alibi; Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and
difficult to disprove.In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldads selfserving defense of denial and alibi must fail. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as
it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. True, the conviction of an accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution
evidence. Hence, when the prosecution evidence has firmly established the guilt of
accused beyond reasonable doubt, conviction is in order.
Constitutional Law; Right Against Self-Incrimination; The taking of paraffin casts
does not violate the right of the accused against self-incrimination.To be sure, the
taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of the accused against selfincrimination. In People v. Gamboa, 194 SCRA 372 (1991), we held: As to the
paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under
the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer.
This right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an
386

offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of

his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his
own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the
paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial
compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in
this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a
gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; A conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.A
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy can be inferred from
and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Once
conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Penalties; Parole; Since treachery
qualified the killings to murder and there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. However, it
must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Since treachery qualified the killings to murder and there being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.
However, it must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section
3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Same; Carnapping; Words and Phrases; Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.Carnapping is the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things. The elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual
taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
(3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; and (4) the
taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. All the
elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they
boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, Benjamin
Bauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.
Same; Same; Intent to Gain; Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act,
presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.As for intent to gain, we
held in People v. Bustinera, 431 SCRA 284 (2004): Intent to gain or animus lucrandi
is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term
gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which
in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed.
Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners consent
constitutes gain.
387

Same; Exempting Circumstances; Impulse of an Uncontrollable Fear of an Equal or

Greater Injury; A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion
was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but
against his will as well.To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants
claim that Leal forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal
liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury. For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A person
invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as
well. It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Testimonial Evidence; To be believed, testimony must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstance.To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstance. The circumstances under which appellants participated in the
commission of the carnapping would not justify in any way their claim that they
acted under an uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather,
the circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their flight from jail,
consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without
the consent of its owner.
Criminal Law; Carnapping; Penalties; The penalty for carnapping is provided in
Section 14 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6539; The imposable penalty is imprisonment
for not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not more than
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.The penalty for carnapping is provided
in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539: SECTION 14. Penalty for Carnapping.Any
person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of
this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without
violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for
not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied) In this case, the imposable penalty is
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose maximum term
388

shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term not
be less than the minimum prescribed. Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court
of imprisonment from fourteen years and eight months to sixteen years and two
months is in order.
Same; Damages; Nominal Damages; Moral Damages; No proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be adjudicated.No proof
of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be
adjudicated. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury.
Same; Same; Interest Rates; In addition to the damages awarded in the murder
cases and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damages
an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.In addition to the damages awarded in the murder cases
and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damages an
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid. [People vs. Fieldad, 737 SCRA 455(2014)]

389

71. Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
Case Title : JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law|Dangerous Drugs Act|
Mandatory Drug Testing
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; A person apprehended or arrested cannot
literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must
be read in context and understood in consonance with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
[A] person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person
apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and
understood in consonance with R.A. No. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons
arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law. Hence, a
drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among
others, the importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and transportation, manufacture and possession of dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof
during parties, social gatherings or meetings; being employees and visitors of a
den, dive or resort; maintenance of a den, dive or resort; illegal chemical
diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals; manufacture or
delivery or possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs during parties, social gatherings or
meetings; unnecessary or unlawful prescription thereof; cultivation or culture
of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof; and maintenance
and keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals. To make the provision applicable to all persons
arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to
unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the
alleged act of extortion.
Same; Same; Mandatory Drug Testing; Making the phrase a person apprehended or
arrested in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for
unlawful acts, not only under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 but for all other crimes, is
tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for
any crime.Making the phrase a person apprehended or arrested in Section 15
applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under
R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all
persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of
this provision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 570 SCRA 410
(2008), to wit: x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and
390

suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to

their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime
are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons
thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Constitutional Law; Exclusionary Rule; Right Against Self-Incrimination; What the
Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence,
when it may be material.In the Gutang v. People, 335 SCRA 479 (2000) case, the
Court clarified that what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his
body in evidence, when it may be material. The situation in Gutang was
categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from testimonial
compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the
accused. The Court said: This was a mechanical act the accused was made to
undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical
attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that
petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but
they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug
test. Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are
inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is replete with
other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Mandatory Drug Testing; The Supreme Court
(SC) cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or
offense for which the arrest is being made.It is incontrovertible that petitioner
refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer
prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts
proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing
under those circumstances. The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution
are clear: Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot

391

condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for
which the arrest is being made. [Dela Cruz vs. People, 730 SCRA 655(2014)]

392

72. People v. Fieldad, G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014

Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR PIMENTEL,
appellants.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law ; Damages ; Interest Rates ;
Criminal Law; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might take.Fieldad argues that there can be no treachery since the jail guards
were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to maintain
peace and order within the compound. This argument is untenable. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might take.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.It is a
settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude
under grilling examination. Positive identification of the accused is entitled to
greater weight than the bare denial and explanation by the accused.
Criminal Law; Alibi; Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and
difficult to disprove.In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldads selfserving defense of denial and alibi must fail. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as
it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. True, the conviction of an accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution
evidence. Hence, when the prosecution evidence has firmly established the guilt of
accused beyond reasonable doubt, conviction is in order.
Constitutional Law; Right Against Self-Incrimination; The taking of paraffin casts
does not violate the right of the accused against self-incrimination.To be sure, the
taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of the accused against selfincrimination. In People v. Gamboa, 194 SCRA 372 (1991), we held: As to the
paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under
the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer.
This right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an
393

offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of

his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his
own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the
paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial
compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in
this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a
gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; A conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.A
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy can be inferred from
and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Once
conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Penalties; Parole; Since treachery
qualified the killings to murder and there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. However, it
must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Since treachery qualified the killings to murder and there being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.
However, it must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section
3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Same; Carnapping; Words and Phrases; Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.Carnapping is the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things. The elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual
taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
(3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; and (4) the
taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. All the
elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they
boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, Benjamin
Bauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.
Same; Same; Intent to Gain; Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act,
presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.As for intent to gain, we
held in People v. Bustinera, 431 SCRA 284 (2004): Intent to gain or animus lucrandi
is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term
gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which
in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed.
Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners consent
constitutes gain.
394

Same; Exempting Circumstances; Impulse of an Uncontrollable Fear of an Equal or

Greater Injury; A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion
was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but
against his will as well.To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants
claim that Leal forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal
liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury. For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A person
invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as
well. It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Testimonial Evidence; To be believed, testimony must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstance.To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstance. The circumstances under which appellants participated in the
commission of the carnapping would not justify in any way their claim that they
acted under an uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather,
the circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their flight from jail,
consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without
the consent of its owner.
Criminal Law; Carnapping; Penalties; The penalty for carnapping is provided in
Section 14 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6539; The imposable penalty is imprisonment
for not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not more than
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.The penalty for carnapping is provided
in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539: SECTION 14. Penalty for Carnapping.Any
person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of
this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without
violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for
not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied) In this case, the imposable penalty is
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose maximum term
395

shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term not
be less than the minimum prescribed. Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court
of imprisonment from fourteen years and eight months to sixteen years and two
months is in order.
Same; Damages; Nominal Damages; Moral Damages; No proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be adjudicated.No proof
of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be
adjudicated. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury.
Same; Same; Interest Rates; In addition to the damages awarded in the murder
cases and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damages
an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.In addition to the damages awarded in the murder cases
and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damages an
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid. [People vs. Fieldad, 737 SCRA 455(2014)]

396

73. People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009

Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
DIR. GEN. CESAR P. NAZARENO, DIR. EVERLINO NARTATEZ,
DIR. NICASIO MA. S. CUSTODIO, and THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIFTH DIVISION), respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Div.)
Syllabi Class : Courts|Appeals
Criminal Law; Double Jeopardy; Requisites; A judgment of acquittal is final and is no
longer reviewableit is also immediately executory and the State may not seek its
review without placing the accused in double jeopardy.Double jeopardy exists
when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a)
after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also
immediately executory and the State may not seek its review without placing the
accused in double jeopardy.
Same; Same; The absolute and inflexible rule is that the State is proscribed from
appealing the judgment of acquittal through either a regular appeal under Rule 41
of the Rules of Court, or an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule
45 of the same Rules.
The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars
multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would be
unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final
judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise
barred because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity
to prove the criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade the court to
enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the
constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is
not only the defendants already established innocence at the first trial where he
had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial
consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all
the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily
result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a
second trier of the defendants guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had
attended the first trial, all in a process where the governments power and
resources are once again employed against the defendants individual means. That
the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less
397

prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience. Thus, the absolute
and inflexible rule is that the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of
acquittal through either a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, or an
appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Certiorari; Appeals; An instance when the State can
challenge a judgment of acquittal is pursuant to the exercise of our judicial power
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, as implemented through the extraordinary writ of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.An instance when the State can challenge a
judgment of acquittal is pursuant to the exercise of our judicial power to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, as implemented through the extraordinary writ of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In such instance, however, no review of facts and law
on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of
the review is on whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e.,
whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the
court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the
question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question
of the decisions error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65
petition, the burdena very heavy oneis on the shoulders of the party asking for
the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
Courts; Appeals; Misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions
based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the
level of grave abuse of discretion, and the mere fact, too, that a court erroneously
decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction.We add that any error
that the Sandiganbayan might have committed in appreciating the evidence
presented at the trial are mere errors of judgment and do not rise to the level of
jurisdictional errors despite the allegation that the Sandiganbayan had gravely
erred in appreciating the evidence. Misapplication of facts and evidence, and
erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were
committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion. That an abuse itself must
be grave must be amply demonstrated since the jurisdiction of the court, no less,
will be affected. The mere fact, too, that a court erroneously decides a case does
not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction. We have consistently ruled that a Rule 65
certiorari does not involve the correction of errors of judgment. [People vs.
Nazareno, 595 SCRA 438(2009)]

398

399

74. Ocampo v. Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11,

2014
Case Title : VICENTE P. LADLAD, petitioner, vs. HON.
THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme
Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : International Law|Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other
Crimes Against Humanity (R.A. No. 9851)|Criminal Law|
Rebellion
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigations; Due Process; While
the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.A preliminary investigation is not a casual
affair. It is conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense
and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation
before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a
component of due process in the administration of criminal justice. In the context of
a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to
be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondents
side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide
whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has
been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the
investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
Due Process; The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit evidence in support of ones defense.The essence of due process is
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of ones
defense. What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has
been afforded a chance to present ones own side of the story cannot claim denial
of due process.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigations; As long as efforts to
reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present
countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.Section 3(d),
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint
based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long
as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to
present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. The

400

rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay
the prosecution of offenses.
Same; Same; Prosecution of Offenses; The Supreme Court has previously cautioned
that litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is
sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.We have previously cautioned
that litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is
sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. Having opted to remain
passive during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel
cannot now claim a denial of due process, since their failure to file a counteraffidavit was of their own doing.
Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; It must be pointed out that the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is
reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the
date of the resolution.As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion
for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is
reckoned from the date of receipt of the
676
resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from
Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal: Sec. 3. Period to
appeal.The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation if one
has been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only
one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.
Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; Search Warrants; No search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; Although the Constitution provides that
probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or
an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, the Supreme Court has ruled
that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.Probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Although
the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge
after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination
thereof. In fact, the judges personal examination of the complainant and the
401

witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of

issuing a warrant of arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the
prosecutors report and supporting documents showing the existence of probable
cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on
the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutors
resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in determining its existence.It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the
prosecutors report and supporting documents showing the existence of probable
cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on
the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutors
resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in determining its existence. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge
Abando painstakingly examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the
judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against them. Additionally,
petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in
the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as
the trial judge. Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial judges in the
issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan,
451 SCRA 533 (2005).
Same; Same; Prosecution of Offenses; Political Offense Doctrine; Under the political
offense doctrine, common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense,
are divested of their character as common offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.Under the
political offense doctrine, common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as common offenses and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. Any
ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not
homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion
as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the political offense doctrine is asserted as a
defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the
act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive
of the act to be conclusively demonstrated; The burden of demonstrating political
motivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind
which only the accused knows.When the political offense doctrine is asserted as a
defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the
act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive
402

of the act to be conclusively demonstrated. Petitioners aver that the records show
that the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP
rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can be
clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP
as co-conspirators. We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political
motivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind
which only the accused knows. The proof showing political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence
supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the
instant petitions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Zamboanga Del Norte v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 714 (2000), if during trial,
petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in
furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the
remedy.As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga
Del Norte v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 714 (2000), if during trial, petitioners are
able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of
rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution.A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which
downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the
complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party. (n) If it appears at any time before judgment that a
mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; If it is shown that the proper charge
against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss
the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as
petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.If it is shown that the proper
charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial court shall
dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion,
as long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy. Section 7, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, states: SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
403

the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information. Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only
applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has
been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a
competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid
plea during arraignment.
Leonen,J., Concurring Opinion:
Criminal Law; International Law; Rebellion; Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity (R.A. No. 9851);
View that acts committed in violation of Republic Act No. 9851, even in the context
of armed conflicts of a non-international character and in view of the declarations of
the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front, cannot
be deemed to be acts in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion.The
Informations and Warrants were issued for the crime of multiple murder. Petitioners
assert that they have a pending criminal charge of rebellion and that the acts raised
in their petitions should be dismissed because they are deemed to be affected by
the political offense doctrine. The political offense doctrine states that certain
crimes, such as murder, are already absorbed by the charge of rebellion when
committed as a necessary means and in connection with or in furtherance of
rebellion. I agree that this case should be remanded because there has been no
evidence yet to prove that the acts imputed to the petitioners actually happened or
are attributable to them. Judicial economy, however, requires that we state that
there are certain acts which have been committed on the occasion of a rebellion
which should no longer be absorbed in that crime. Acts committed in violation of
Republic Act No. 9851, even in the context of armed conflicts of a non-international
character and in view of the declarations of the Communist Party of the Philippines
and the National Democratic Front, cannot be deemed to be acts in connection with
or in furtherance of rebellion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and their effective
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level, in order to
put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to
the prevention of such crimes, it being the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.International
humanitarian law (IHL) is the body of international law that regulates the conduct of
armed conflicts, whether of an international or non-international character. This
body of law seeks to limit the effects of the conflict on individuals. The 1949 Geneva
Conventions and its Additional Protocols are the main instruments that govern IHL.
Nevertheless, IHL and the rules and principles contained in the Geneva Conventions
are largely regarded in the international sphere as having the character of general
or customary international law given the fundamental nature of the rules and
404

because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.

In the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9851 was enacted in view of its policy to
[renounce] war x x x, [adopt] the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land and [adhere] to a policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. Accordingly, [t]he most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at
the national level, in order to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these
crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes, it being the duty of
every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jus Cogens; View that jus cogens norms under the
Vienna Convention of Law of the Treaties are norm[s] accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as [norms] from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.Jus cogens norms under the
Vienna Convention of Law of the Treaties are norm[s] accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as [norms] from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character. The principles embedded in
Common Article 3 have been held to apply even to international armed conflict,
thus, depicting a universal character. It lays down fundamental standards which are
applicable at all times, in all circumstances and to all States and from which no
derogation at any time is permitted. As was stated, it sets forth a minimum core of
mandatory rules [and], reflects the fundamental humanitarian principles which
underlie international humanitarian law as a whole, and upon which the Geneva
Conventions in their entirety are based. These principles, the object of which is the
respect for the dignity of the human person, developed as a result of centuries of
warfare and had already become customary law at the time of the adoption of the
Geneva Conventions because they reflect the most universally recognized
humanitarian principles. (Emphasis provided) Hence, nonobservance of the
minimum standard provided for in Common Article 3 triggers a violation of wellaccepted principles of international law.
International Law; International Humanitarian Law; International Human Rights Law;
View that international humanitarian law and international human rights law are two
sets of regimes in international law.International humanitarian law and
international human rights law are two sets of regimes in international law. The two
regimes have been compared and contrasted with each other, to wit: The two sets
of rules certainly have a different history and often a different field of application,
both ratione personae and ratione temporis. Human rights thus apply to all people
and humanitarian law applies to certain groups of persons (for example, to the
wounded, to prisoners o[f] war, to civilians) and, furthermore, humanitarian law
applies only in times of armed conflict. On the other hand, human rights and
humanitarian law regulate, ratione materiae, similar rights at least insofar that
they all intend to increase the protection of individuals, alleviate pain and suffering
and secure the minimum standard of persons in various situations. (Emphasis in the
405

original) Thus, all persons are protected in both times of war and peace. The
protection accorded by human rights laws does not cease to apply when armed
conflict ensues. Still, some human rights are allowed to be derogated in times of
emergency which threatens the life of the nation. Nevertheless, provisions on the
right to life, prohibition from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and slavery
remain free from any derogation whatsoever, having acquired a jus cogens
character.
Same; Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes
Against Humanity (R.A. No. 9851); Criminal Law; Rebellion; View that Republic Act
No. 9851 defines and provides for the penalties of crimes against humanity, serious
violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), genocide, and other crimes
against humanity; These crimes are separate from or independent from the crime of
rebellion even if they occur on the occasion of or argued to be connected with the
armed uprisings.Rep. Act No. 9851 defines and provides for the penalties of
crimes against humanity, serious violations of IHL, genocide, and other crimes
against humanity. This law provides for the non-prescription of the prosecution of
and execution of sentences imposed with regard to the crimes defined in the Act. It
also provides for the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the crimes defined
in the Act. These crimes are, therefore, separate from or independent from the
crime of rebellion even if they occur on the occasion of or argued to be connected
with the armed uprisings.
Same; Same; View that spies and civilians suspected of being spies are also
accorded protection under Republic Act No. 9851.Even spies are accorded
protection under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Common Article 3
and Additional Protocol II are broad enough to secure fundamental guarantees to
persons not granted prisoner of war or civilian status, such as protection from
summary execution and right to fair trial. These fundamental guarantees are also
found in Article 75, in relation to Articles 45 and 46 of Additional Protocol I. Spies
and civilians suspected of being spies are also accorded protection under Rep. Act
No. 9851.
Same; Same; View that persons committing crimes against humanity or serious
violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights laws, and
Republic Act No. 9851 must not be allowed to hide behind a doctrine crafted to
recognize the different nature of armed uprisings as a result of political dissent.
Concomitantly, persons committing crimes against humanity or serious violations of
international humanitarian law, international human rights laws, and Rep. Act No.
9851 must not be allowed to hide behind a doctrine crafted to recognize the
different nature of armed uprisings as a result of political dissent. The contemporary
view is that these can never be considered as acts in furtherance of armed conflict
no matter what the motive. Incidentally, this is the view also apparently shared by
the CPP/NPA/NDF and major insurgent groups that are part of the present
governments peace process.
Same; Same; View that torture and summary execution in any context are
shameful, naked brutal acts of those who may have simply been transformed into
desperate cowards. Those who may have suffered or may have died because of
406

these acts deserve better than to be told that they did so in the hands of a rebel.
The rebel, in his or her effort to assert a better view of humanity, cannot negate
himself or herself. Torture and summary execution of enemies or allies are never
acts of courage. They demean those who sacrificed and those who gave their lives
so that others may live justly and enjoy the blessings of more meaningful freedoms.
Torture and summary execution in any context are shameful, naked brutal acts
of those who may have simply been transformed into desperate cowards. Those
who may have suffered or may have died because of these acts deserve better than
to be told that they did so in the hands of a rebel. [Ocampo vs. Abando, 715 SCRA
673(2014)]

407

75. Castillo v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165, 25 November 2009

Case Title : P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE
OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO BORLONGAN,
EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA,
and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN,
ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L.
BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, TISOY, and JOHN
DOES, petitioners, vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T.
CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION in the Supreme Court for Issuance
of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Syllabi Class : Writ of Amparo|Writ of Habeas Data
Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; The coverage of the writs is limited to the
protection of rights to life, liberty and security; The writs cover not only actual but
also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.The coverage of the writs is limited to
the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only
actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Same; Same; To be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondent must meet the
threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with an unlawful act or omission.To thus be covered by the privilege of
the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission.
Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the
Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between
the acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the
property.
Same; Same; Absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is
undue and continuing restraint on their liberty and/or that there exists threat or
intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons,
the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.Although respondents release from
confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent
any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and
continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation
that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of
the writ cannot be justified.
Same; Same; Petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary
remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and
executory decision in a property dispute.It need not be underlined that
respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary
408

remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and
executory decision in a property dispute.
Same; Same; Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a
defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for
writs of amparo and habeas data.At all events, respondents filing of the petitions
for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante
delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense
that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of
amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made
available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings. [Castillo vs.
Cruz, 605 SCRA 628(2009)]

409

76. Navia v. Pardico, June 19, 2012, GR Nos. 184467

Case Title : EDGARDO NAVIA,1 RUBEN DIO,2 and ANDREW
BUISING, petitioners, vs. VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in
behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO,
respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Writs of Amparo|
Enforced Disappearances|International Law|Words and
Phrases
Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; Enforced Disappearances; A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances in the country.A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The
Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an
expeditious and effective relief to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
Same; Same; Same; International Law; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
recognizes every human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains
that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must be
protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except
on grounds provided by and in accordance with law.Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human beings inherent right
to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and
security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and
security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with
law. This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security
without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance; Words and
Phrases; The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance defines enforced disappearances, as the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the law.The budding jurisprudence on
amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), when this Court
410

defined enforced disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally
accepted principles of international law and adopted the International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition of
enforced disappearances, as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851
defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows: Enforced or involuntary
disappearance of persons means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by,
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to
give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of
removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.Another
significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about after Congress
enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9851 on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof
defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows: (g) Enforced or
involuntary disappearance of persons means the arrest, detention, or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.

Same; Same; Same; Elements of Enforced Disappearances.From the statutory

definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements
that constitute it: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by
the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that
the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
Same; Same; Same; The petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.It is
now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that
the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and
proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an
411

amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable
element of government participation.
Same; Same; Same; In an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not
enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out
with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government.But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of
disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such
disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation
is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government
or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents,
officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition
whether as responsible or accountable persons. Thus, in the absence of an
allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens
disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating
his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as
responsible or accountable persons.
Same; Same; Same; A writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity.
But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo
petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element.We are aware that under
Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or
responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government
involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here,
petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam,
Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work
for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect
them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed
above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the
disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark
of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an
ordinary case of a missing person. [Navia vs. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618(2012)]

412

77. General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011

Case Title : HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner,
National Police Commission, petitioner, vs. HON.
ALEJANDRO S. URRO, in his capacity as the new appointee
vice herein petitioner HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL,
National Police Commission, respondent.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme
Court. Quo Warranto, Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Quo Warranto
Administrative Law; Appointments; Appointments may be classified into two: first,
as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is made.Appointments
may be classified into two: first, as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in
which it is made. Under the first classification, appointments can either be
permanent or temporary (acting). A basic distinction is that a permanent appointee
can only be removed from office for cause; whereas a temporary appointee can be
removed even without hearing or cause. Under the second classification, an
appointment can either be regular or ad interim. A regular appointment is one made
while Congress is in session, while an ad interim appointment is one issued during
the recess of Congress. In strict terms, presidential appointments that require no
confirmation from the Commission on Appointments cannot be properly
characterized as either a regular or an ad interim appointment.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; The power to appoint vested in the President
includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise
specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law.Generally, the power to
appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary
appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or
by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office
involved. The Presidents power to issue an acting appointment is particularly
authorized by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).
Same; Same; The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a
hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge
those functions pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee.The
purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the
discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions
pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. An acting appointee
accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is
called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his term of office is not fixed
but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Same; Same; A staggered term of office is not a statutory prohibition against the
issuance of acting or temporary appointment.Generally, the purpose for
413

staggering the term of office is to minimize the appointing authoritys opportunity to

appoint a majority of the members of a collegial body. It also intended to ensure the
continuity of the body and its policies. A staggered term of office, however, is not a
statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporary
appointment. It does not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary
appointments that the Administrative Code grants.
Same; Same; National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM); Nothing in the enumeration
of functions of the members of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) would
be subverted or defeated by the Presidents appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM
Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee.
We find nothing in this enumeration of functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM
that would be subverted or defeated by the Presidents appointment of an acting
NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent
appointee. Viewed as an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive
issuances will show that the NAPOLCOM has always remained as an office under or
within the Executive Department. Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the
petitioners acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the
NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.
Quo Warranto; Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a
public office.Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a
public office. Generally, quo warranto proceedings are commenced by the
Government as the proper party-plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court, an individual may commence such action if he claims to be entitled
to the public office allegedly usurped by another.
Same; The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an
office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right
to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.Since the
petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he
clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The
essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent
revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo
warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of
usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit
to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail. [General vs. Urro, 646 SCRA 567(2011)]

414

78. Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013

Case Title : CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law|Estafa Through Falsification of
Commercial Documents|Penalties
Constitutional Law; Custodial Interrogation; Words and Phrases; Custodial
interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner.The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of
admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in
custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by
law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under
custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the
commencement thereof, viz.: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two
other rights above. In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave
an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch
he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law
enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and,
(2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant
manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under
custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative
during the taking of his written statement.
Same; Right to Counsel; In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590
(2001), the Supreme Court declared that the right to counsel applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 362 SCRA
304 (2001), we declared that the right to counsel applies only to admissions made
in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case of
Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission, 630 SCRA 202 (2010): However, it must be
remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant
to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule
under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation. Here, petitioners written statement was given during an
administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an
anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. No
415

error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in
giving due consideration to petitioners written statement as there is no
constitutional impediment to its admissibility.
Same; Evidence; Confessions; A confession [or admission] is presumed voluntary
until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the
contrary.[I]t is settled that a confession [or admission] is presumed voluntary
until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the
contrary. Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his
written statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously. The
pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that
only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish.
Same; Same; Extrajudicial Confessions; It is a settled rule that where the defendant
did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence
of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having
been voluntarily executed.The fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of
protest and file any charges, criminal or administrative, against the investigator and
the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to sign
negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that
where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators,
where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement
shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed. Neither will petitioners
assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before affixing his
signature thereon just to get it over with prop up the instant Petition. To recall,
petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and had
been a bank manager for quite a number of years. He is thus expected to fully
understand and comprehend the significance of signing an instrument. It is just
unfortunate that he did not exercise due diligence in the conduct of his own affairs.
He can therefore expect no consideration for it.
Criminal Law; Forgery; Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the
signing of anothers name with intent to defraud.Forgery is present when any
writing is counterfeited by the signing of anothers name with intent to defraud. It
can be established by comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic or
genuine one. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of
government handwriting experts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the
courts. A trial judge is not precluded but is even authorized by law to conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; A rule of long standing in this
jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are accorded great weight and respect.In this case, the finding of forgery on the
signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the promissory notes and cashiers
checks was not anchored solely on the result of the examination conducted by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner. The trial court also
416

made an independent examination of the questioned signatures and after analyzing

the same, reached the conclusion that the signatures of Tan appearing in the
promissory notes are different from his genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit
Account Information and Specimen Signature Cards on file with the bank. Thus, we
find no reason to disturb the above findings of the RTC which was affirmed by the
CA. A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight and respect. Absent any reason to
deviate from the said findings, as in this case, the same should be deemed
conclusive and binding to this Court.
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the
evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present.The prosecution has the
prerogative to choose the evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the
discretion as to how it should present its case. Moreover, the presumption that
suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the
disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. In the present case, if petitioner
believes that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability by
establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the
most prudent thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the
right to have compulsory process to secure Tans attendance during the trial
pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2) of the Constitution. The records show, however,
that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of these, no suppression of
evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.
Criminal Law; Denials; Denials which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
who testified on affirmative matters.The Court is also not persuaded by the bare
and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the loans covered by the
promissory notes and the cashiers checks were personally transacted by Tan
against his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his
signature thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported
by established evidence. It is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. [They merit]
no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony
of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. The chain of events in
this case, from the preparation of the promissory notes to the encashment of the
cashiers checks, as narrated by the prosecution witnesses and based on
petitioners own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that he
committed the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.
Same; Falsification of Commercial Documents; Falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code refers
to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee, who did not
take advantage of is official position, of public, private or commercial
document.Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a private
individual or a public officer or employee, who did not take advantage of his official
417

position, of public, private or commercial document. The elements of falsification of

documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a
private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the RPC; and, (3) that the falsification was committed in a public,
official or commercial document. All the above-mentioned elements were
established in this case. First, petitioner is a private individual. Second, the acts of
falsification consisted in petitioners (1) counterfeiting or imitating the handwriting
or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all
respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or
proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was
committed in promissory notes and checks which are commercial documents.
Commercial documents are, in general, documents or instruments which are used
by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions.
Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a check is a means of payment
used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions. A
cashiers check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person
whose name and signature appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw the
amount indicated therein.
Same; Complex Crimes; Words and Phrases; A complex crime may refer to a single
act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a
necessary means for committing another.When the offender commits on a public,
official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, theft or
malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC,
there are two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act
which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a
necessary means for committing another. In Domingo v. People, 603 SCRA 488
(2009), we held: The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may
be a means of committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually
utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the
crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the
crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public,
official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is
caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a
necessary means to commit estafa.
Same; Estafa; Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party
or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation.Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party
or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
[D]eceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should
418

have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he

shall act upon it to his legal injury. The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By
falsely representing that Tan requested him to process purported loans on the
latters behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan in the
cashiers checks. Through these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from
the bank. Once in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same
in Eurocan Future Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take
hold of the money, misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use and
benefit, and these resulted to the damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount
of about P43 million.
Same; Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents; Penalties; The crime
of falsification was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa. Pursuant
to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case
should be that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in
its maximum period.Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial document. The
crime of falsification was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa.
Pursuant to Article 48 of theCode, the penalty to be imposed in such case should be
that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. The applicable penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, being
the more serious offense than falsification. [Tanenggee vs. People, 699 SCRA
639(2013)]

419

79. People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22,

2014
Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR alias
NOY, accused-appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law ; Miranda Rights ;
Custodial Investigations ;
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; The Rules of Court expressly
provides that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused.Chavez invokes his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the prosecutions
evidence is purely circumstantial and a conviction must stand on a moral certainty
of guilt. The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of an
accused: SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Factual findings by the trial court on its
appreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and even its conclusions derived
from the findings, are generally given great respect and conclusive effect by this
court, more so when these factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(CA).Factual findings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presented
by the parties, and even its conclusions derived from the findings, are generally
given great respect and conclusive effect by this court, more so when these factual
findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, this court has held that
[w]hat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offenders intent to take personal
property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually
carried out. In cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that
homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be
convicted of robbery with homicide.
Criminal Law; Theft; When a person has possession of a stolen property, he can be
disputably presumed as the author of the theft.There is a disputable presumption
that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful
act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him. Thus, when a
420

person has possession of a stolen property, he can be disputably presumed as the

author of the theft.
Same; Same; Penalties; The penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of
the stolen items.In any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on the
value of the stolen items. The lower court made no factual findings on the value of
the missing items enumerated in the information one Nokia cell phone unit, one
Motorola cell phone unit, six pieces ladies ring, two pieces necklace, and one
bracelet.
Constitutional Law; Miranda Rights; The Miranda rights were incorporated in our
Constitution but were modified to include the statement that any waiver of the right
to counsel must be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.The right to
counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda
rights, which require that: . . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the
right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a
court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and
to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires. The Miranda
rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the
statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made in writing and in
the presence of counsel. The invocation of these rights applies during custodial
investigation, which begins when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken
into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to
the person to elicit incriminating statements.
Same; Same; Custodial Investigation; Republic Act (RA) No. 7438 expanded the
definition of custodial investigation to include the practice of issuing an invitation
to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any
violation of law.Republic Act No. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial
investigation to include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law. This
means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be
apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting
exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in
a police station. As an additional pressure, he may have been compelled to
surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station. [People vs.
Chavez, 735 SCRA 728(2014)]

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80. People v. Fieldad, G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014

Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR PIMENTEL,
appellants.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law ; Damages ; Interest Rates ;
Criminal Law; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might take.Fieldad argues that there can be no treachery since the jail guards
were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to maintain
peace and order within the compound. This argument is untenable. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might take.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.It is a
settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude
under grilling examination. Positive identification of the accused is entitled to
greater weight than the bare denial and explanation by the accused.
Criminal Law; Alibi; Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and
difficult to disprove.In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldads selfserving defense of denial and alibi must fail. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as
it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. True, the conviction of an accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution
evidence. Hence, when the prosecution evidence has firmly established the guilt of
accused beyond reasonable doubt, conviction is in order.
Constitutional Law; Right Against Self-Incrimination; The taking of paraffin casts
does not violate the right of the accused against self-incrimination.To be sure, the
taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of the accused against selfincrimination. In People v. Gamboa, 194 SCRA 372 (1991), we held: As to the
paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under
the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer.
This right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an
422

offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of

his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his
own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the
paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial
compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in
this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a
gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; A conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.A
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy can be inferred from
and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Once
conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Penalties; Parole; Since treachery
qualified the killings to murder and there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. However, it
must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Since treachery qualified the killings to murder and there being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.
However, it must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section
3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Same; Carnapping; Words and Phrases; Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.Carnapping is the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things. The elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual
taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
(3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; and (4) the
taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. All the
elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they
boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, Benjamin
Bauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.
Same; Same; Intent to Gain; Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act,
presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.As for intent to gain, we
held in People v. Bustinera, 431 SCRA 284 (2004): Intent to gain or animus lucrandi
is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term
gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which
in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed.
Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners consent
constitutes gain.
423

Same; Exempting Circumstances; Impulse of an Uncontrollable Fear of an Equal or

Greater Injury; A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion
was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but
against his will as well.To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants
claim that Leal forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal
liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury. For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A person
invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as
well. It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Testimonial Evidence; To be believed, testimony must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstance.To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstance. The circumstances under which appellants participated in the
commission of the carnapping would not justify in any way their claim that they
acted under an uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather,
the circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their flight from jail,
consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without
the consent of its owner.
Criminal Law; Carnapping; Penalties; The penalty for carnapping is provided in
Section 14 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6539; The imposable penalty is imprisonment
for not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not more than
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.The penalty for carnapping is provided
in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539: SECTION 14. Penalty for Carnapping.Any
person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of
this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without
violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for
not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied) In this case, the imposable penalty is
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose maximum term
424

shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term not
be less than the minimum prescribed. Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court
of imprisonment from fourteen years and eight months to sixteen years and two
months is in order.
Same; Damages; Nominal Damages; Moral Damages; No proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be adjudicated.No proof
of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be
adjudicated. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury.
Same; Same; Interest Rates; In addition to the damages awarded in the murder
cases and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damages
an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.In addition to the damages awarded in the murder cases
and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damages an
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid. [People vs. Fieldad, 737 SCRA 455(2014)]

425