Performance Analysis On The Security of Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) OVER ISP'S Network

International Journal of Advance Foundation and Research in Computer (IJAFRC)
Volume 2, Issue 10, October - 2015. ISSN 2348 4853, Impact Factor 1.317
Performance Analysis on the Security of Generic Routing

Encapsulation (GRE) OVER ISP'S Network
Seth Alornyo1 and Michael Asante2
1I.C.T Directorate, Koforidua Polytechnic
2Computer Science Department, KNUST, Kumasi
1bigseth1099@yahoo.com and 2mickasst@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
Generic Routing Encapsulation was analyzed to verify and establish the security vulnerability
associated with layer three (3) Open Standard Interconnectivity (OSI) model Virtual Private
Network (VPN) infrastructural design and operations. GRE only provides basic plaintext
authentication using the tunnel key, which is not secure, and tunnel source and destination
addresses. This paper hopes to further reveal other security weaknesses associated with GRE.
These involves not only revealing the use of plain text authentication using tunnel key but further
unravel certain IP services, Hypertext Transmission Control Protocol (HTTP) service requests
and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) session streams which can easily be intercepted by a
third party over the internet. A simulation of the ISPs network infrastructure was used to allow
packet flow through the Internet Service Provider (ISP).This operation allowed packets sent from
a source host through the ISPs network to a destination to be critically examined. Packet loss,
packet length, throughput graph, service response time and flow graph are some parameters used
to examine packet flow from a source host to a destination host over the ISP network. Open
source Network Protocol Analyzer, was used to capture traffic traversing over the Service
Provider network for analysis and interpretation. Analyzed data revealed that all TCP and HTTP
stream packets are sent in clear text which exposes all conversation between the routers within
the service providers network. Therefore Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) is not a
recommended protocol for secure Virtual Private Network (VPN).
Keywords: VPN, HTTP, TCP, Packet Stream, GRE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a worldwide, publicly accessible IP network. Due to its vast global proliferation, it has
become a viable method of interconnecting remote sites. However, the fact that it is a public
infrastructure has deterred most enterprises from adopting it as a viable remote access method for
branch and SOHO (Small Office Home Office) sites. The paper examines the security vulnerability
associated with GRE as a layer three Virtual Private Network method. GRE supports multiprotocol
tunneling. It can encapsulate multiple protocol packet types inside an IP tunnel. Adding an additional GRE
header between the payload and the tunneling IP header provides the multiprotocol functionality. IP
tunneling using GRE enables network expansion by connecting multiprotocol sub-networks across a
single-protocol backbone environment. GRE also supports IP multicast tunneling. Routing protocols that
are used across the tunnel enable dynamic exchange of routing information in the virtual network [1],
[2], [3], [4].
GRE tunnels are stateless. Each tunnel endpoint keeps no information about the state or availability of
the remote tunnel endpoint. This feature helps Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to provide IP tunnels to
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customers who are not concerned about the internal tunneling architecture at the ISP end. Customers
then have the flexibility to configure or reconfigure their IP architecture but still maintain connectivity. It
creates a virtual point-to-point link to routers at remote points over an IP internetwork[1],[2].
II. GENERIC ROUTING ENCAPSULATION
Generic routing encapsulation (GRE) is a tunneling protocol defined in RFC 1702 and RFC 2784. It was
originally developed by Cisco Systems for creating a virtual point-to-point link to Cisco routers at remote
points over an IP internetwork [5], [6], [7]. GRE supports multiprotocol tunneling. It can encapsulate
multiple protocol packet types inside an IP tunnel. Adding an additional GRE header between the payload
and the tunneling IP header provides the multiprotocol functionality. IP tunneling using GRE enables
network expansion by connecting multiprotocol sub-networks across a single-protocol backbone
environment. GRE also supports IP multicast tunneling. Routing protocols that are used across the tunnel
enable dynamic exchange of routing information in the virtual network [8] [9].
III. BASIC GRE IP HEADER CHARACTERISTIC
Figure 1 depicts the format of a GRE header in a network packet traversing over a network. The GRE
header is encapsulated in a payload found in between the source and destination IP header. These
payloads do not add any security protocol in the IP header hence renders the GRE packet not a secured
medium for communication [9], [10].
GRE flags: The GRE flags are encoded in the first two octets. Bit 0 is the most significant bit, and bit 15 is
the least significant bit. Some of the GRE flags include the following:
Checksum Present (bit 0): If the Checksum Present bit is set to 1, the optional checksum field is
present in the GRE header.
Key Present (bit 2): If the Key Present bit is set to 1, the optional Key field is present in the GRE
header.
Sequence Number Present (bit 3): If the Sequence Number Present bit is set to 1, the optional
Sequence Number field is present in the GRE header.
Version Number (bits 1315): The Version Number indicates the GRE implementation version.
A value of 0 is typically used for basic GRE implementation. Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
(PPTP) uses Version 1.
Protocol Type: The Protocol Type field contains the protocol type of the payload packet. In
general, the value will be the Ethernet protocol type field for the packet. For IP, the hexadecimal
value of 0x800 is used. This field enables the GRE to tunnel any OSI Layer 3 protocol[10],[11].
IV. OPTIONAL GRE EXTENSION
The GRE tunnel header can contain additional optional header information as shown below, depending
on the flags in the first two bytes of the GRE header. Figure 2 depicts an extended GRE header with
addition payload. The extended header contains a key and a sequence number. The key is used to
distinguish between tunnels using the same source and destination address. The key uses a basic
plaintext authentication to exchange keys. The use of plain text to exchange keys compromises on
security operation and standard because any attacker can intercept and alter the keys in transit. The
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extended GRE headers also do not provide the security needed to secure data transmission [12], [13],
[14].
Tunnel checksum: The tunnel checksum detects packet corruption. This option is not used often
because checksums are used on other layers in the protocol stack, typically to ensure the accuracy of the
GRE packets.
Tunnel key: Can be used for two purposes:
The tunnel key can be used for basic plaintext authentication of packets in which only the two GRE
endpoints share a secret number that enables the tunnel to operate properly. However, anyone in the
packet path can easily see the key and be able to spoof tunnel packets. A more common use of the tunnel
key is when two routers want to establish parallel tunnels sourced from the same IP address. The tunnel
key is then used to distinguish between GRE packets belonging to different tunnels.
Tunnel sequence number: This number is used to ensure that GRE packets are accepted only if the
packets arrive in the correct order. The main function of GRE is to provide powerful yet simple tunneling.
GRE supports any OSI Layer 3 protocol as payload, for which it provides virtual point-to-point
connectivity. GRE also allows the use of routing protocols across the tunnel [11], [12], [13],
[15],[16],[17].The main limitation of GRE is that it lacks any security functionality. GRE only provides
basic plaintext authentication using the tunnel key, which is not secure, and tunnel source and
destination addresses.
Figure 2: Extended GRE header (Adapted from Cisco Systems, 2010)

V. METHODOLOGY
The method adopted in this work is the structural design and the simulation of GRE tunnel network.GNS3
software was used to simulate the network with Cisco routers running original Internetwork Operating
System (IOS). Network device configuration and penetration testing can be established when using GNS3.
Routers used in the simulation are Cisco routers. Comparative analysis and penetration testing was done
to check the security level of a GRE tunnels. Open source Network Protocol Analyzer (wireshark) (Open
source Network Protocol Analyzer [16] was used to capture traffic traversing over the Service Provider
network for further analysis and interpretation.
Simulated Virtual Lab
In the simulated virtual lab, a site-to-site GRE tunnel VPN was configured with Cisco routers running IOS
(Internetwork Operating System) version 12.4. Once configured, the VPN traffic between Router 1 on
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interfaces Router 1 and Router 2 was captured using wireshark for further processing and analysis. Each
of the simulated networks connects to an Internet Service Provider (ISP).The Internet Service Provider
only provides internet subscription to the client (institution).The simulated network will provide
institutional connectivity to remote sites over the internet. A study into Service Providers network
architectural design outline certain configuration parameters which allows internet subscription from
client and other IP services hosted by the Service Provider. This paper has simulated those architectural
designs of Service Providers to allow connectivity to client.
Figure 3 illustrates the topological simulated network used to design the network infrastructure. The ISP
has two routers (ISP1 and ISP 2).ISP 1 connects router 1 and ISP 2 connects router 2. Router 1 and 2 are
considered as the edge routers and a client to the ISP. The ISP has a serial connection from ISP 1 to
ISP2.ISP 1 connects its edge router through a fastethernet 0/0 interface and ISP2 connects its edge
router through a fastethernet 0/0 interface. The ISP provides only internet access to router 1 and 2(edge
devices). A virtual cloud adaptor from figure 4 was used to virtualized the physical interface of a laptop
network adaptor to a Loopback adaptor interface. This virtualization enabled a laptop adaptor to be part
of the simulated network.
Figure 3: Simulated GRE tunnel network (Authors)
VI. CONFIGURATION OF THE NETWORK INTERFACE ADDRESSES (STEP ONE)

A loopback and a tunnel interface was configured on router 1 and router 2 fastethernet and the serial
interfaces. Fastethernet 0/0 on router 1 was configured with the IP address 200.1.1.1 and a subnet
mask 255.255.255.0.The IP address configured on fastethernet 0/0 is the out bound interface connected
to the service provider (ISP1) for internet access. Loopback interface 0 was configured with the IP
address 1.1.1.1 and a subnet mask 255.255.255.0.The loopback interface represent all internal hosts
connected to router 1. Router 2 was also configured with the same parameters. The loopback interface
was assigned the IP 2.2.2.2 and a subnet mask 255.255.255.0.Fastethernet 0/0 connects to Internet
Service Provider (ISP2) for internet access. Fastethernet 0/0 was assigned the IP 200.1.2.2 and a subnet
mask 255.255.255.0.A no shutdown command was issued on each of the configured interface to
activate the interfaces.
A tunnel interface (tunnel 0) on router 1 and router 2 which will be was to transport GRE packets from
router 1 and router 2 which was configured with the IP 12.12.12.1 and 12.12.12.2 respectively. Tunnel 0
was virtualized with the physical interface fastethernet 0/0 to transport packets flow through the
physical interface connected to the Internet Service Provider (ISP). The command tunnel source
20.1.1.1 and a tunnel destination 200.1.2.2 was issued on both routers to connect the tunnel (tunnel 0)
interface to the physical interface to transport packets to the ISP. Configured tunnel 0 on router 1 and
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router two (2) will be the transport medium to forward all VPN traffic through the ISPs network.ISP
(Internet Service Provider) network as shown in figure 14 was simulated with two routers, ISP1 and
ISP2. ISP 1 has two interfaces, interface fastethernet 0/0 and interface serial 1/0.Interface fastethernet
0/0 connects router 1 and interface serial 1/0 connects ISP 2. Fastethernet 0/0 was configured on ISP 1
router with the IP address 200.1.1.2 and a subnet mask 255.255.255.0,interface serial 0/0 also
configured with the IP address 200.11.22.1 with subnet mask 255.255.255.25.Each configured interfaces
were issued with the command no shut down to activate the interfaces.ISP2 router has two interfaces,
interface fastethernet 0/0 and interface serial 1/0.Interface fastethernet 0/0 connects router 1 and serial
1/0 connects ISP2 serial interface 1/0. Interface fastethernet 0/0 was configured with the IP address
200.1.1.1 with a subnet mask 255.255.255.0 and interface serial 1/0 with an IP address 200.11.22.2
subnet 255.255.252.A no shut down command was issued on each interfaces to activate the interface.
VII. CONFIGURATION OF ROUTING PROTOCOL ON CLIENT ROUTERS(STEP2)
In order to maintain connectivity between remote networks, EIGRP was configured to route packets
between all networks in the diagram. All connected subnets were added into the EIGRP autonomous
system on every router. The command:
Router eigrp 1
Network 10.0.0.0
Network 12.0.0.0
Network 192.168.0.0
The command router eigrp 1 enables and activates Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol
(ElGRP) under one (1) Autonomous System on router one (1), the command network
10.0.0.0,12.0.0.0.192.168.0.0 advertises the network which is directly connected to router 1, to the ISP
one (1) network.The command router eigrp1
Network 12.0.0.0
Network 2.0.0.0
Network 192.168.0.0
The command router eigrp 1 enables and activates Enhances Interior Gateway Routing Protocol under
one (1) Autonomous System on router 2, the command network 12.0.0.0, 2.0.0.0 , 192.168.0.0 advertises
the network which is directly connected to router 2, to the ISP2 network. Configuring autonomous
system enables eigrp to be under one administrative control.
VIII.
CONFIGURING ROUTING PROTOCOL ON ISP ROUTERS(STEP3)
The simulated network has two routers which establish connectivity to both clients (router 1 and router
2). Routing Information Protocol version 2 (RIP,v2) was configured on the ISPs routers. This enables the
ISP router receives network advertisement from router 1 and router 2 network.ISP1 router has two main
interfaces, interface fastethernet 0/0 and interface serial 0/1.Interface fastethernet 0/0 is directly
connected to router 1and interface serial 0/1 connected to ISP2 network. ISP 1 router was configured
with the command;
Router rip version 2
Network 200.1.1.0
Network 200.11.22.0
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ISP 2 router has two main interfaces, interface fastethernet0/0 and serial 0/1.Interface fastethernet 0/0
is connects router 2 and interface serial 0/1 connects to ISP 2 network. ISP 2 router was configured with
the command;
Router rip version 2
Network 200.1.2.0
Network 200.11.22.0
Networks advertised on ISPs router are networks which are connected to interface fastethernet 0/0 to
router 1 and interface serial 0/0 to ISP2 interface. Networks advertised on ISP2 router are networks
which connected to interface fastethernet 0/0 to router 2 and interface serial 0/0 to ISP1.
A ping command was issued from router 1 to the various configured interface to verify that connectivity
across local subnets using the ping command was reachable. All ping commands sent were all successful.
Step one (1) to step three (3) are the processes used to simulate the GRE tunnel from router 1 through
the ISPs network to router 2.
IX. NETWORK INTERFACE MODES(INTERFACE OPERATION ON ROUTER ONE)
The command show ip interface brief was issued on router one (1) and the output shown in figure 4
was obtained. Fastethernet 0/0 with an IP address 200.1.1.1 connects to the ISP one (1) network which
shows that the interconnectivity between the client router and the service provider is active (up) whiles
the protocol supporting the interface is also active (up).Interface tunnel 0 configured for Generic Routing
Encapsulation (GRE) is also active (up).
Figure 4: Interface Configuration Operation (Authors)

Interface Configuration Operation On Router Two (2)
The command show ip interface brief was issued on router two (R2) and the output shown in figure 5.
Fastethernet 0/0 with an IP address 200.1.1.2 connects to the ISP two (ISP 2) network which shows that
the interconnectivity between the client router and the service provider is active (up) whiles the protocol
supporting the interface is also active (up).Interface tunnel 0 configured for Generic Routing
Encapsulation (GRE) is also active (up).Clients connected to router one (1) can tunnel through (tunnel 0)
the ISPs network to router two (2).Hence the tunnel connectivity between router one (1) and router two
(2) can be established through the tunnel interfaces.
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Figure 5: Interface Configuration Operations (Authors)

X. TESTING ROUTING CONFIGURATIONS ON ISPS ROUTERS
The command show ip route was issued on ISP 1 router and the output shown in figure 6. ISP 1 router
has the above configuration in its routing table, public Internet Protocol (IP) 200.11.22.0 is directly
connected (C) to interface serial 0/0. Internet Protocol 200.1.2.0 is also directly connected to fastethernet
0/0 interface. This directly connected interface indicate the interconnectivity between the client router
and the ISPs network. Routing Information Protocol (R) advertises the 200.1.2.0 network through the
serial 0/0 interface with administrative distance of 120 and a metric value of 1 (120/1).
Figure 6 : Routing Configuration Testing (Authors )

Routing Configuration Operation On ISP Two (2)
The command show ip route was issued on ISP 2 router and the output shown in figure 9. ISP two (2)
router has the above configuration in its routing table, public Internet Protocol (IP) 200.11.22.0 is
directly connected (C) to interface serial 1/0. Internet Protocol 200.1.2.0 is also directly connected to
fastethernet 0/0 interface. This directly connected interfaces indicate the interconnectivity between the
client router and the ISPs network. Routing Information Protocol (R) advertises the 200.1.2.0 network
through the serial 0/0 interface with administrative distance of 120 and a metric value of 1 (120/1).
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Figure 9 : Routing Configuration Testing (Authors)

XI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
An HTTP request was issued from a laptop to a router two (2) to the ISP network. The output of data
captured over the ISPs network during the session established between the laptop and the web server
hosted on router three (3) is depicted in figure 10. Figure 10 depicts the output of packets sent from the
laptop over to web server hosted on router 2.All communication between the laptop and the web server
are sent in clear text. A HTTP traffic originating from the router can be intercepted by a third party. The
connection between ISP 1 and ISP 2 was captured by an open source network protocol analyzer
(wireshark)
Figure 10: Captured Packets Over Simulated ISP Network (Authors)

Figure 11 also depicts a sample TCP session captured packet which depicts the raw conversation
between the laptop and the web server over the tunnel network. Wireshark was used to capture and
display the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) session stream. The TCP session stream option on
wireshark enables packets to be displayed in a stream window as shown in figure 11.The stream
window displays all packets conversation between two end points . Samples of all Web programming
languages such as HTML and PHP are all sent in clear text over the
Tunnel network.
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Figure 11: Raw TCP Conversation on a Simulated GRE-VPN tunnel (Authors)

Figure 12 illustrate the (Hypertext Transmission Protocol (HTTP) packets transmitted over the GREVPN
tunnel over the ISP network. All packets sent were able to reach the destination tunnel, there were no
packet loss during the transmission over the simulated tunnel network. Packet loss and system time out
were not recorded in the simulated network. All HTTP packet sent were delivered and processed by the
web server.
Figure 12: Wireshark HTTP/Packet Counter Lifetime Over GRE-VPN Tunnel(authors)

XII. CONCLUSION
The notion that Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) only provides basic plaintext authentication using
the tunnel key, which is not secure, and tunnel source and destination addresses does not imply that
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other protocols are secured when it in use and implemented over GRE-VPN tunnel network. GRE-VPN
(Virtual Private Network) tunnel sends TCP traffic in a clear text which makes it vulnerable for the manin-the-middle to attack the (Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnel.This paper has verified verify and
established that there exist a security vulnerability associated with layer three (3) Open Standard
Interconnectivity (OSI) model Virtual Private Network (VPN) infrastructural design and operations. And
that the provision of GRE only provides basic plaintext authentication using the tunnel key by GRE does
not seem to be secure. Again, this paper has revealed that there are other security weaknesses associated
with GRE and that the use of plain text authentication using tunnel key has further unravel certain IP
services, Hypertext Transmission Control Protocol (HTTP) service requests and Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) session streams which can easily be intercepted by a third party over the internet.
XIII.
FUTUREWORK
The future work will involve the analysis of data in-transit between a Service Providers routers and
its other counterpart network routers and also examine the security features required to safeguard all
data transmitted between different service providers.
XIV. REFERENCE
[1]
Farinacci, D., Traina, P., Hanks, S., & Li, T.Generic routing encapsulation (GRE) ,1994.retrieved
from http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1701.
[2]
Christian, P. Generic Routing Encapsulation over CLNS Networks2.RFC-3147, July,2001.
[3]
Glenn, R., & Kent, S. (1998). The NULL encryption algorithm and its use with IPsec, retrieved
from http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2410.
[4]
Stallings W-Network Security Essentials: Application and Standards (Pearson.2008) ISBN10:0132303787.
[5]
Harkins, D., & Carrel, D. (1998). The internet key exchange (IKE). RFC 2409, November.
,2005.ISO/IEC 17799, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Code of practice for
information security management.
Matthews, G. A., & Feinstein, B. S. The Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol (IDXP). ,2007.
retrieved from http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4767.
[6]
[7]
Oehler, M., & Glenn, R. (1997).HMAC-MD5 IP authentication with replay prevention1997.RFC

2085
[8]
Glenn, R., & Kent, S. (1998). The NULL encryption algorithm and its use with IPsec, retrieved
from http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2410.
[9]
Matthews, G. A., & Feinstein, B. S. (2007). The Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol (IDXP).
2007,retrieved from http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4767
[10]
Stallings W- Network Security Essentials: Application and Standards (Pearson.2008) ISBN10:0132303787.
www.ijafrc.org

[11]
Cisco System, Cisco 2014 Annual Security Report, page

https://www.cisco.com/web/offer/gist_ty2_asset/Cisco_2014_ASR.pdf.
68,
retrieved
from
[12]
Marques, P., Guichard, J., Raszuk, R., Bonica, R., Patel, K., Fang, L., & Martini, L. . Constrained Route
Distribution for Border Gateway Protocol/MultiProtocol Label Switching (BGP/MPLS) Internet
Protocol
(IP)
Virtual
Private
Networks
(VPNs)2006,retrieved
fromhttp://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4684.
[13]
Atkinson, R., & Kent, S. (1998). IP encapsulating security payload (ESP),retrieved from
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2406
[14]
Barker, K., & Morris, S. CCNA Security 640-554 Official Cert Guide: Pearson Education,2012.
[15]
Bhaiji Y-Network Security Technologies and Solutions: CCIE Professional Development (Cisco
Press, 2008)ISBN-10:1587052466.
[16]
Grossman, D., &Heinanen, J. (1999). Multiprotocol Encapsulation over ATM Adaptation Layer 5,
retrieved from http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2684.
AUTHORS PROFILE
Dr. Michael Asante received his Ph.D degree from the University of Reading in the United
Kingdom in 2007. He is a member of the Institute of Electrical, Electronic Engineering
(IEEE) and an executive member of Information Technology Association of Ghana (ITAG).
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Name: (1st author) SETH ALONYO
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Name: (2nd author) MICHAEL ASANTE
Name: (3rd author)
Paper Title: PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ON THE SECURITY OF GENERIC ROUTING ENCAPSULATION (GRE)
OVER ISP'S NETWORK
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PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ON THE SECURITY OF GENERIC ROUTING
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