T

Knowledge andAction

hat foilows r,vili draw inspiration fronl Aristotie's virtue theory for
an accrount of how human knowledge and action are related.

A. Aristotle
r. We begin r.vith a passage that illurninates Aristotle's ethics, frorn Book
ll, Clrapter 4, of the lrlicomachean [:thics;
It is possible to do sonrething that is in accorciance witir the laws ofgrarnnrar,
cither by chance or at the suggestion of another. A uran will be a gramnur*
ian, then, only when he has both done something grammatical and donc it
grammaticaliy; and this means doin; it in accordance with the gramuratical
krrowiedge in hirnself. (ENII a, no5azz-(>)

'l'his provides a key to Aristotle's view of hurnan flourishing as the funtlrrnrental ethical value. Please note that the second o'in accordance with"
(.ilnnot mean simply "coinciding with the content of." After all, what
orrc cloes nright coincide with the content of one's knowledge entirely by
,'llance. But Aristotle means to rule out such accidental coincidence, as is
t lcar in the first sentencre of the passage. There nlust be a tighter connection
tlrln jr-rst coinciclence letween one's knowledge that a certain sentence is
rtlrulrnratic:al ancl thc bcing granrnlatical clf one's utterance, in order for the
uttcr;Il)c:c to trc "in ccorcianc:cr with" the knowledge. The sentence may
lrc knowll to bc gnrnrnltic'a1, firr onc thinil, blrt its grarunratical utterance
rrr;ry bc clrrc orrly to tlrc ussrrr:rrrt'c of rr liar (to tlrc "suggestion ofanother"),
u,llilc tllc klrowlctlu('rr.'nlrtins irrrplicit rlrrl ill,rt tivc.

r34

KN()WLEDGIT AND ACl l()N

The view is fi,rrther specified in the capsulc statelllellt foupd in Book I,

Chapter 7, accordillg to which

KNOWLEDGE AND ACT'ION

True virtue resides tn the perfection of one's rational nature, and it is tllc
exercse of such virtue and only this that makes a life good.'
Thrs paints

. . . hura good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance r.vith virtue,

antl if there are more than one virtue, in accordnce lvith the best and most
cornplete. (ENI 7, ro98ar-r7)

And Chapter 9 explains furtirer:

activity of soul, of a certain
[Happiness] . . . has been said to be a virtuous
kincl. Of the reraining goojs, sonte ll1tlst necessarily pre-exist as conditions ofhappiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments. (ENI 9, ro99bz-8)

One last important conlponent appears in Book IV, Chapter r:

Now virtuous actions are noble and done for the sake of the noble. Therefore
the liberal ruan, iike other virtuous men, will give for the sake of the noble,
and rightly; fbr he r.vill givc to the right people, the riglrt anloullts' ancl at the
right iinre, with all the other quaiifications that accompany right giving; and
that too with plcasurc or without pain; for that which is virtuous is pleasant
orfree frorn pairr-least of all will it be painful. (ENIV r, rI20^4-7)

z. Beyond his own nlain statenrents, Aristotle's vierv stands otlt lnorc
clearly by contrast with the Stoic alternative, which seenls diametrically
opposed. Aristotelian flourishing involves the exercisc of one's virtuc's'
ntoral and intellectual. However, sonle virtues require external aids ftrr
their exercise, as when liberality reqrlires itlollcy. Ily contfast, all that thc
Stoics require for a full nteasure ofhappiness (f;rring wcll) and virtue is that
one properly order one's preferenc:es and clhoose raticltrally ()n th:rt basis.
r. It riht be tgrrght tht cxtcrnrl qoorls firrtlrcr hrppirrcss tltc_rv:ry :t gootl stotclr tirrthcls 'r
pl..riirrblc i,rt".ii.l strc, irs r,rr"r.i,'',".,,, to rcrl hlprirrcss, rvhith is irrtcrrrrlly (-()lrstittltc(l'
ilrrt this clrrtr.rt frc riglrt, givcn tllrt Iir Alistotlc lrl'irrrr rvcll is r'rrrs/lllrlr'rl by tttllrlc t titlll. sttt l
Nol ir
rs thc libcllrl h;rn,lirrg ovt'l ,r{'.1 lili. .rrrrl rrot .irrst tltc situttl.tt tllll ilt .t M.rtrix sr't'rlritl.
sillt r'
gotltls'
of
tt'lll
cx
p,rsst'ssiott
ivil
t
I
ol
vrr
t
rrorrr
\'
,,rrsist.
lr,rt
lr;rpprrrcss
t
tllrr
it plrLrsiIlc
Itttttt.ttt11,,,,,11(\'lll1l()ll\.l(tiVll\'..lltlcrltltt'tltl0tlt
rrt'rtls rsr',1 irl solttt rtlr lt .tr I tvtt 1'.

stark contrast.

'Who

B. Aristotle

Chapter 8 adds:
Yet evidetly, as we said, it leeds the cxternal goods as well; for it is ipossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper ecluipment. Irr many
actions lve usc friends and riches and political power as itrstruurcnts . . ' (EN
I 8, ro99a3r-bti)'

ll(',llilIvllIll{rtl\'l(Il\lt\"l)lllll)\tltl

l.t5

is right?r

and the Stoics

r. Take a culture where sheep are sacred and wolves evil. Shccp urc t() [)('
protected, wolves to be killed. Suppose you shoot and kill a shccp in woll 's
clothing. Your action is "in accordance" with virtue. Nevertllclcss, it l,rlls
short. We are focused on your doing in killing that shcep-that vcry tloiui.
not things done whereby you do that doing. This doing is clistint t fiorrr
any action ofyours, strictly speaking. An action of oing nrust illlplcurcr)l ,ur
irrtention to o, as such, and you do not intend to kill a.s/lccp, as sur'lr. Yor rl,'
intend to kiil that animal (clothed as a wo10, and that aninral i.r :r .r/rcr7r, lrrrt
you do not intend to ki1l it under rlris description.
Suppose next you shoot and kill a wolf in wolf's clothing. Nolv you tlo
intend to kill this arrinal, and this alrinlal is a wolf, and you tlo intcnrl ro
kill it under this dcscription. Now your full endeavor is in act:ortlrurt t' rvit lr
your virtue, as is its succcss. You do intend to kill that anintal bcfirrc v()u, ,rs
it happens a wolf, and you do intend to kill it as a rvolf. In a wrry tlris srrt t't'ss
i-s "in accordance with" your relevant conlpetences, practical rultl t ounitivr'.
You endeavor to kill that rvoif by shooting it, when you spot it, r ntl bclit'r,t'
it correctly to be a wolf. You thr.rs bring to bcar a colllplcx c:ornlrint'tl r'onr
pe tencre. This includes your ability to tell the look of a wolf , :rncl it irrclrrtlt's
;rlso your shooting cornpetence. So, your lethal shot at tht wolf-n,rrrilt'sls
rclevant virtues and conlpetences seated in you. Ncvcrthclcss, y()ur killrrri

r. 'I'hc atticle on Stoicisnr, by Dirk

Blltzll', in the .\r,lrlirrrl I:ucytloptlit rtl l'ltlosoplty ( onl.un\ .r

llrief'accottnt.AlsorelevantistheostensiblecontrrstrviththcsrrlposcdlySotr.rtir lrcu'rlr.r(
wisdorn is sullicient for happiness (for flourishing). llrrt scc l{trsscll.l,rrrcs olr "Wstlorrr .rrrtl
Hrtrpirressirtllutltl,duutts:7tl-:ll:,"Pltil()soplt(rs'lrryrrtt,rj(tq)("tol): r:r,lir.(()nrl)('llrrf'
cr-itiqtrr: of':tddutirr tllll( pssiluc in suppor-t ot'thc thcsis tl)rt So.r'.rtcs (rr l'l.rt,,'' Sot r.rttr)

rc1ly hcld tlrc vicrv tlrirt rt,istlonr rs rr1/ir'i'lt, urrtl rrot-jtrst l(l('rr,//)/, lirr lr.rprrrt'ss
. Iltrvctticdtotitcortlvs,rnt(('nlr.rll).rs\;r{csinlp()ttiurt lirrlllt'ttounl ol Aislrrttlr.trcllrrrs

tlrtisslrlrl;trtl,.tllc.tsltttllt< ttrtcrrslriglrlrrilrtctl.()ftorrrst',rrlirll.rrroililtrl',,il1,1((rilt.ilil
rrrort'tlct,nl.(S<'r'l,rr.r \t.rItlr{.rIltonArrrlotlt'st'tlrirslr1'l{irlr.utl
I

i.tt.I'tlnl'r!l

tl

I'lttlo't,1y

lil.rutrltlrt,\l,lrl,,r,i

KNOWLEDGE AND ACl'ION

ry6

KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION

of that wolf falls short. The performance of your basic action (say, pulling
the trigger) aimed to kill a wolf does manifest those perceptual and execu*
tive conrpetences on your part. But that airned performanre stillfalls short, in
that its success does not manifest competence, not fully, depending as it does,
essentially, ofl luck.*
Compare your performance of a basic action (again, pulling the trigger)
aimed to kill an animal that looks like a utolf. Here success does fully rnanifest
competence, and is fully apt.
The basic action (pulling the trigger) rnust trivially succeed, since one
pulls the trigger as a basic ar:tion if and only if one aims to pull the trigger
simply by doing so. lly contrast, consider the action of pulling the trigger
not only in an endeavor (or with the airn) to pull the trigger, even if one does
have that amin doing so. Suppose one aims (also) thereby to

kill

an animal

wolf. This is notjust a basic action. It has a larger rneans-end

structure. The end is ttt kill an animal that looks like a wolf. The nleans is to pull
ths trigger (since one knows it to operate a gun properly aligned with thc
wolf-looking aninr.al before one). The success of this more complex action
requires that one indeed kill an animal that looks like a wolf, and that one's
intentional aiming with the following content piay a suitable rational role
in one's decision to perforrn that basic action: to kll an anmal that looles likc
a wolf. Here one's conlpetence operates properly enough that one earns full
credit for the success.
Perhaps one also intentionally kills a wolf, in killing that anirnal (a
wolf) that looks iike a wolf. But one's competence is now dinrinished, as
it relies on an important element of luck: namely, on one's belief that ttrc
wolf-looking aninrai is indeed a wolf. This belief does turn out to be right
but only by credit-diurinishing luck.
that looks like

z. When Aristotle extols activity in accordance with virtue, does he llleln

to include your shooting of the sheep in wolf's clothing? Surely not. It
is even questionable that he nreans to include yollr shooting of the wolf'
in wolf's clothing. The kinds of luck involvecl in these killings-bacl in
the case of the sheep, good in the casc of thc wolt-sccrn inirtrical to lris
virtue-based view of the hunran goocl. For, rcr:all, Aristotlc cxplic:itly
4, ()r cln cllrrrrcc, or' ;rct'itlt'nt. ()r' nr('I(' t rrnlr'irlt'ltt t'. lrr u'l;tt firllor,vs, tlris f irt tltt'l.cl:lr,rr.ttiolr it
llc:lntto[rt.;ttt;rtltt'tl silcntlVloor'turtt'ntcsrrl "lrr.k." l'lrt'soll ttl',tit'ltli.rl lrltkitltctltlt'tl ls
itrr.'crsclV lrlolrtlllrtllt.rl lrl tlrt' rlt'',rq'q' ol r ()nll)('l('n( (' rll,ilil]('\1. tl ls .t t lt'rllt t.',ltt, lltR ()l ('\]('ll
, tt'r.lrt r('trr()\'rnflr,rr I

,'l lttr L

r37

How then should we understand his

cthics in keeping with the view that neither killing is action fully in accordance with virtue? Two very different ways deserve to be considered.
One way introduces italics in the capsule statement of Aristotle's view
that ". . . hurnan good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with
virtue." Having seen the animal before you in the field, you intend to kill
it, and settle quickly on a plan. By shooting it you would kill it; by aiming
vour gun at it, situating your trigger finger properiy, and pulling the trigser, you would shoot it. So, once you have aimed and situated your trigger
finger, then by pulling the trigger you would shoot it. And now you pull
the trigger by choice. You are free to so choose, and if you do so choose
you thereby endeavor to kill the anim.al. Given your epistemic and practic:al perspective on the situation, you choose through virtue. You endeavor
to kill that animal, you freely choose to do so, aud you work your will
lneans to rule out success by chance.

through intervening means.

Let us focus rlow on this "activity of sttul," namely, the free choice,
f reely determined. Here there is no slippage of the sort found in the killing of the sheep in wolf's clothing, nor in the kiiling of the wolf in wolf's
clothing. In those killings an essential means-end belief turned out to be
lolse or at least not known ttt be true. Such luck, whether bacl or good, is irrelcvant to the case of the choice. Either the choice requires no Ineans at all,
,rrrd you just choose, or the choice counts as a limiting case of rneans-end
;rc:tion, in which case the limiting means-end proposition could not possibly be false, nor even unknown to be true. That by choosing you would
,'hoose is trivially true and known to be so. In the case of a basic action,
nroreover, little or no gap separates the choice and the doing. Even if one
lrulls the trigge r by choce, byJree choice, no priority-of tinle, space, or efficicnt causation-distinguishes the choice frorn the doing. (It is after all
possible to change one's nrind right up to the very montent in which one
intcrvenes so as to cause the death.)
According to this interpretation, we avoid the prirna facie problem.s
irr Aristotle deriving frortr his fornrula that the hunran good consists in
.rt'tivity in accorclanc:c with virtue. The relevant activity is activity of soul,
rr,rrrrc:ly clloicc, and no spoilcr luc:k is possil-r1c in that case.
()n this irrtcrrrctutiorr, rro rlccr clifll:rc:ncc sccnls clisccrnible between
f

tlrc l)crirrrtctics

lntl

Irt' Stoit's.

llrtlr

sidcs

will surcly rccourrizc

prcfc'rcr)('cs,

lrotlr rvill rc,'r,rrizt'rr',r1t..'r'lv ortlt'r-ctl prcfi'rcttt'c's (irr:tt't'.rrtlrtncc witlr vir-*

trrr') ;ul,l rvill rt'.',)l1nrz('r lrorr t's tlr,rt propt'tlv ('xl)r'('ss tlrt'sr'rr-t'fi't't'nt't's (irr

r
KNOWLEDGE AND

r38

KN()WLtlDGE AND ACTI()N

AC ION

keeping with deliberative virtue). For neither side will there be the sort of
luck (bad or good) that affe cts action in our sheep and wolf crses.J
That interpretation clashes, however, with Aristotle's enrphasis on thc
need for external instruments and settings for properly virtuous action.
What follows will thus explore a different interpretation of Aristotle, and a
different way to connect knowledge and action.

in accordance with liberality.s True, the physical giving of the gift derives
from choice. But the action itself enconlpasses not only the choice but also
its proper inrplenrentation, through the intention involved (since choice
entails intention). In developing this option it will help to understand
nlore fully what is involved in hosting an intention. Though this option
is inspired by Aristotle, and though it seenrs a plausible way to understand
his view, it is no less interesting to clevelop it on its merits than as a way to
tu

C.

Aptness and Flourishing

I. The staternent of the alternative option does not italicize "soul" irr
the statement of Aristotle's view. It does of course need to cohere with
that statenlent, but it does so in a different way. The earlier interpretation
pales r.vith increasing understanding of the concept(s) of "soul" among
the Greeks.
I cannot improve on the following brief statenrent ofAristotle's view:
The soul of an animate oranism, in [Aristotle's] . . , frarnework, is nothing
other than its system of active abilrties to perforrn the vital functions that
organisnrs of its kind naturally perform, so that when an orlanisnr cn!{ages
in the relevant activities (e.g., nutriiion, urovenrent or thought) it does so in
virtue ofthe systern of abilities that is its soul,n

By contrast, the Stoic vierv restricts

. . . rather dramatically the proper subject nlatter of a theory of soul. In fact
it is arguabie that the Stoics, in lirniting the functions of soul in the way they
did, played an irnportant role in a complicated history that resulted in the
Cartesian conception ofrnind , . .7

Whereas the activities of the St<lic soul are plar,rsibly restricted to inner acts
such as choices, that is not Aristotle's view. Aristotelian ac:tivity of sotrl
can be constituted by externalia such as the actual hanclirrg ()vLlr of gootls

5. It sinrplifies theoretical fbrnrtrlati<>n to rrlkrw, as linlitir)q cirsc of'tlrc "lry" r"cl;rtiorr, thc t':rst'
where one os by oinu. Ilrrt firr ()ul plrrposcs tllis is <lptiorrlrl. Wc r..otrltl ort firr'.r t'orrt'cptiorr ol
basic cti<>n clctilrcrl rrot:ts "oinr sirrrply by oirtu" l)ut irs "oinq rvllclc tlrcrc is notlrinr-t clsc lt)'
intclltittllltllv dttirs whit'll ollc os." Alttl tllis rvotrltl rrot sigrrifit',lrltly it fli'('t tllc relt'vrtttt lc.r
stltt ittg itt otlr ltt:ritt tcx t, llrortqlt it rvortltl t't'tlr tit c sotrtc t clirlrtlu l:rt iol r,
lr. l;l'oltr tllt' ,u tir lr' t'rttrtlt'.l "An( r('nl 'l lrt',tr tt's ol Sorrl," lrr' l lt'rrrlr rk I trrcrrz, irr tlt' ,\l,tttlottl
I ir r, 'r loyt,,li,r ol l'ltilowtlr y.
'7 l:trrtu"Arrrt'rrt 'llrt',rrr',,o1 \orrl"rrrllrt',\t,tttlottl l'.rt,',1,ttr'11,rl ltltilr:otlry

r39

ndersta nc{ A ristotle.

z. Let's begin with pro-attitudes in general. These will involve favorings generall includirrg physical appetites but also resistible attractions to choose that
nray derive from the advice of others, for exanrple, or fronr reasoning of one's
own. Favorings in this general sense may also be emotional without being
physical, in that they derive from, or help constitute, our ernotions, including
those that are social without being physical. Conative dynamics, "deliberation" in a broad sense, whether conscious or unconscious, is a balancing act,
rvhereby favorings are weighed on the scales ofchoice until a resultant results.
In deliberation, such a favoring rnay be either initial or resultant. Ifinitial
it might take the forrn of a hope or a wish. Will such a hope or wish rise
to the level of intention when future directed? Not necessarily. Intention
is restricted to distinctive contents, whereas one can hope or wish for just
;rbout any outcome. Intention is at nlost a favoring that. one bring about a certain outcome.
If one cloes resultantly favor that one bring about a certain outcome
sometinre in the future, as opposed to merely wishing or hoping, must
one not assume that the necessary costs are worth paying? In the rany
cases where nleans are requirecl, rnust one not presuppose that these will
lrc economically enoug]r available? Of course, one need not be sure. But
you could hardly be seriously committed to bringing about the relevant
()Lrtconle, while convinced that you could bring it about only at prohibitive
cost. This could not be a serious commitment, not rationally anyhow.
()ne needs at least that ruuch, even if one does not yet have a detailed
plan in nrind. The plan at that point nrry anrount to little nlore than a plan

s. lt nrisllt lrc irlrructl tlr,rt Aris(otc'liln "rrt tivity <lf-sottl" is nurrowly rcstrit'tctl to activities cf
nrtlitio1, l()\'('rn('nl, or llrou1ltt, so tlrrl tlrcsc:r'c rtot.jrtst ('.\'r,,1/)/('J itt gcttcrii'firrlll. lJrrt, firr
ont'tlrirrg l)('r( ('l)tl()n \\'rll Irt' rrt lu,lt',1, strlt'ly',,rrtl rvitll l)('r'( cl)tion (of'tlrr't'nvit'ollrucrrt),:rrrrl
rrutlitiorr (rrrg,r's{ rollol lr,,r,l), t \t('ur,rlr,r (t lrt'olrt't Ist't'l, llrt'lootl irrrit'stt'tl) rvill lrt'tortittt
tivc ol tlrt'

,rr I r'rl r'.

I
r40

KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION

to make a plan, rnaybe even a cletailed plan for how the plan will be rnade.
Real conrrnitment, real intention to bring something about, in any case
seems to require that one think one will succeed, even if this thought falls
short of outright judgment andjudgmental belief.e

3. Let us here focus on a sinrple means-end action; say, turning on a light by

flipping a switch. If one intends to do this in the next while, one must have
some idea that the necessary costs will be worth paying. Getting up frorn
where one sits will entail nrore or less cost: for exarnple, one trray need to
look for the switch that is nornrally to be found in such a room. If unwiliing
to impiement sonre such plan, one is not seri.ous enough to be a real intender.
That of course does not mean that there must be some such plan that one
is prepared to implement, except insofar as looking for a plan at some future
time counts as already having a plan. If one has no aim to adopt such a plan,

then one is only wishing or hoping that one will bring about the outcome. In order to upgrade that favoring so that it constitutes intending,
one must have more by way of an actual or potential plan that will take
one from where one sits to attaining the outcorne.
Aristoteiian action involves choice based on a resultant favoring of
one's implernenting; a plan to attain a goal at which one thereby airns.
One chooseso one acts, in the endeavor to attain that goal, which
attempts to implenlent one's plan, We focus here, for simplicity, on simple endeavors, such as turning on a light, where an initial choice is all
it takes, if all goes well. A courpetentiy rnade choice would then be "in
accordance with" competence (virtue). This is why the choice to shoot
the wolf-looking anirnal is conrpetent.
Suppose we think of the actior as involving not just the choice, but
also, say, the physical handing over of the cash, in a liberally generous
action. In this case a competent action can still be disrstrous, as in thc
killing of a wolf-looking sheep. Moreover, the action can even be conrpetent and successful while still falling short, as in the killing of the wolfin wolf's clothing, where an essential nreans-encl belie f is (iettierccl.
Is not the shooting of the woif in wolf's clothing n accordottct'u,iflt virtuc?
Woulcl it not do all that a prarticular action r:an clo to constittrtc flotrrishins?
Arguably, it woulcl n<lt. ()rrc'c wc, incluclc the: cxtcrnlliu irtvolvccl in thrrt firll
action, incluclinu tllc clcltlr of thrrt wolf, on('c wc sly tll:rt tllis is prrrt of wlr;rt

,1. lJrrt

rr,.'tlr.rll.'r'.'ntrr.rlll tlu n ul) t(',r\()n\ lot tlottlrl on lln\ \( ()r('.

KNOWLEDC;F] AND ACTION

I4I

cotrstitutes the flourishing of the agent through the success ofhis action, the
momentum is hard to stop until we reach the proper Aristoteiian view. This
view would include, among the factors relevant to such flourishing, notjust
the success of the outcome but also the aptness of the agent's performance.
Only thus is the success not just "by chance" in the way Aristotle deplores.
Aptness would require not only that the a4ent's plan be implemented so
that the desired outcome does come forth. The outconle must also manifest
the agent's relevant competence. In particular, the agent must contpetently
irnplement his full plan, which includes the cornpetent adoption of the relevant sequence of steps, and its sustainnrent as it unfolds.
Of course, the shooting of the sheep in wolf's clothing does not attain
the agent's ain1, so it is not an action in accordance with virtue: it does
not even result in the success of the agent's main first-order aim, which
is to kill a wolf, not a sheep. What of the killing of the woif in wolf's
clothing? Why is this not an action in accordance with virtue? Because,
although the action succeeds in its main aim, it succeeds by luck, so that
relevant competence is not sufficiently nraniGst in the killing ofthat wolf'o

4. So much for distinctions relevant to Aristotelian flourishing. Did

Aristotle opt for one rather than another of these options? Why think that
only apt action is "in accordance" with virtue, unlike rnerely competent,
adroit action? Why think that in our example only the apt killing of a bare
wolfwould qualify, and not the competent killing ofa wolfin wolf's clothing rnistaken for a bare wolf? The stronger requirenlent, that of aptness, is
rnade reasonable by the intuitive thought that an action falls short if it succeeds too rnuch by luck rather than (manifest) conrpetence. That is why the
granrmatical utterance falls short because of how its granrntatical character
is owed to chance or to the suggestion of a liar.

Aristotle's prorninent example of Olympic success also encourages this

thought. Aristotle points out that our admiration and prizes go to rhe

to. Essentially involved in such supposed cor"lpetence is the agent's belief (explicit or implicir) that
ilthe anitual he sees looks like a woll, then it is a woll But this is something our shooter does not
know. Because he is Ciettiered, he does not rca7ly knotu how to brins about the lbllowing outcorrre: tlntt ln' kills thc wolf be,forc /rirr. (Which, in the intended sense, leaves it open that there be a
wolfbefbre hinr that he knows how to kill.) This "rpe:ri/icknow-hor,v is nrissins despite his rerention of a?ocral ability to kill wolves. He does not know tlut by shootinq the aninlal trefbrc'l"rirlr
that looks like a wolfhe wotllti kill a wolf. So, he lr'ks thc rerrrirctl sitrrltion-spccifit't'orrrprctclli:c. His stlccess in killilrg a wolf , by slrootirr tlrc rlrn;rl tlr;rt kroks likc .r rvolf , is lr('lr('c rr()r ;
stt(('csstllttll;ulifi'stst'clcvltnt('()ntl)ct('ll(('.()rlr':rt'rrtl.rrkstllt.t,rulrlt.l<'sPt.trfit (()nrl)(.t(.n((.

r42

KNOWLEDGE AND AC'I'ION

KN()WI EDGl: ANI) AC'tl()N

conlpetitor who actually competes allcl succeeds, and not to those who stay
on the sidelines, no nlatter how nruc'h nlore gifted they nray be. Relevant,
adnrirable goodness is fully preserlt only in the actiorl that succeeds. Only
derivatively, secondarily, might the competence, the disposition, als<r
be adrnirable. Even if there were no recognition of our distinctions in
Aristotle's writings (which, as we have seen, there is in fact), it would seenl
natural to distinguish between the Olyrnpic athlete who succeeds only by
luck and the one who succeeds aptiy, through competence. Only the latter
flourishes fully.

i.

Finally, thus interpreted, Aristotle enat-rles a solution to the Meno pLtzzle as to the value of knowiedge over lnere true belief. The traveler who
reaches Larissa through com.petence acts "in accordance with" virtue-

virtuous conrpetence-in a way denied to someone who picks the right

road but gets it right only by luck, not knowledge. The ignorant traveler
does of course reach Larissa. In that respect his relevant doings succeed, ancl
uright even qualify as competent if properly based orl reason for his choicc
of road. Nevertheless, the stlccress of his nlealls-end action cloes not nlorc
fully manifest conrpetence as opposed to luck. FIe no rnore deserves full
credit than does the lirnping, fainting Olympic runner who wins frorn way
behind only because the other runners are all struck by lightning near thr:
finish line. To reach Larissa through ignorant luck is not to flourish.

D. Knowledge

and Action

r. The inrportance of knowleclge

derives in good nleasure fronr how it

to human achievement generally. This ernerges through exantplcs
like the following:
relates

Hopeful Hunter is a tribesrtratt lost in thc woocls on A nloorrless night. His

hunt has been fruitless so far. Out of-borcdonr hc takcs a slrot il the clark,
hoping to hit some prey. Arnazingly, hc clocs thercby kill a rabbit. Thc shot
has of course a kincl of succe ss. but

littlc crcclit

rcckruncls t() ()rrr l)untcr.

Sirrrilarly situatcrl, Strpcrstitiorrs I lunter intcrprcts r liglrt brcczc us cn('()rrragcn)cnt fl'onr Iris qotl of'tlrt'lrunt to t;rkc:r slrot in tlrt'rl;rrk. llc bclir.vr.s tllut
tlrc gotl rvill gtrirlt' lris lr;rtttl :rttl (lr;rt lus slot rvill sur't't't'tl. ( )rr tlr;rt b:rsis. lrt.
t:rkt's lrls sllot in llt'tl:tt"k ,tntltlor's \u( ( ('('(1, lrut tlt.ulks orrly (rt I ;rtlv I rrr'k.

r43

ls either hunter, poised to clraw and shoot, able to shoot and thereby kill
their prey? If this nleans whether it is logically possible that the shot succeed, then the answer is, obviousiy, yes. Nothing precludes the logical possibility that such a shot kill sonre prey.

z. Does Hopeful Hunter at the mornent of shooting have the ability to then
kill sorne prey? Well, again, if this ilreans only whether he is "abie," whether
it is lrtgcally posshle that he shoot ancl kill, then the answer is just as obviously
yes. However, our talk of ability often requires n1ore. A shot in the dark
woulcl not normally be thought to nranifest ability. If the dark night is also
silent and odorless, if nothing can guide the hunter's hand, if the shot is ranclomly directed, then, even if success is logically possible, it would rnanifest
little ifany ability. Hopeful Flunter does not even believe that shooting as he
cloes has much chance of succeeding. In his opinion the chance is near zero,
which seemingly precludes any real ability to srlcceed by shooting.

3. Rut is that only an illusion? Why not say that he does have that ability,
cven if he is not aware of it? A basic action is available to him, one he could
perforrn, by performing which he would bring about the killing of some
prey. And this is all it takes for hinr to be able to kill the pre|, for hirn to
have that nrere ability. Of course, Superstitious Hunter shares that ability,
cven if he too lacks the relevant knowledge. By hypothesis he does believe
he has it, indeed believes he knows what gives it to him, but the source of
his beliefis not a source of knowledge.
Neither Hopeful Hunter nor Superstitious Hunter seems to attain success creditable to the ageut. In each case, one might plausibly reason as
firllows: "The success is gained only through a kind of luck incompatible
with relevant credit. Neither hunter's success manifests their competence.
Poorly situated as they are, neither hunter so nluch as has the required
conlpetence."
hand, what is a cornpetence if notjust a disposition to sucwhen one tries? Why doesn't Superstitious Hunter have such a disposition? Surely he would succeed if he tried. He would apply his true belief
.rs to cfilcicnt lllcrtrs, wottld ac:t accordingly, and would thereby succeecl.
Thc inttritir>rr rcrsists. nonctllclcss, that even Superstitious Flunter
tlocs rrot srrct'ccrl tlrrouslr (rclcv:rrrt) corrrpctcncc. His ability to thcn
slrooI s()nlc l)r'('y is t'onstitutcrl irr csscntill p;rr-t lry ln inr:onlpctcl)t,
rrtrjtrstifictl lrt'lit'f . ll lr('\\/('r'c'to sut't'r'ctl on tlr:tt or't',rsion, it worrlrl lrc

4. On the other
r'ecrd

r44

KNOWI,EDGE AND ACT'ION

KNOWI-EDGI1 AND ACTI()N

a lucky accident. If he relied generally on the way in which he then

formed his belief, he would in general faii to attain a true belief, and
would fail to shoot any prey.
What is the conlpetence that can nrake the success of a shot relevantly,
fully enough attributable to the shooter? Even if there is no clear general
answer to this question, it may be thought, Superstitious Hunter has no

Competences are a special case of dispositions, such

r45
as

the sinrple clisposi-

apparent disposition that can constitute such a conlpetence. It is true that he

has a disposition to succeed when he tries to shoot sonre prey on that spe-

tion offragility. Suppose a pewter mug would shatter upon hitting a certain
stlrface but only because a hovering fiend would zap the mu[T as it hit the
surface. This would nrake the relevant conditional true: the rnug would
shatter on that occasion, but this would not rnake it fragile. For the latter
to be the case, one would need at a minimunl that the mug would shatter
when in a relevantly interesting conbination of condition and situation.
'f he essential presence of the determined fiend rnakes that situation irrel-

cific occasion. But this disposition is so inadequately based

cvant to the mug's fragility.

as

to constitute

no relevant competence to succee d creditably."

j. How might Superstitious Hunter arrive at his true beliefthat his shot in the
dark would succeed? He nright believe that his god of the hunt would ensure
that the shot would succeed, regardless of its direction or speed or timing.
Alternatively, he might have an irnaging ability that enables hirn to believe
that if he next shot thus, in a certain specific way (with that irnaged orientation and speed), his shot would succeed, and that this is so because this belief
is guided by the god (although in fact it's just what first came to rrrind, with
no reliable basis whatsoever). In neither case is it plausible that Superstitious
Hunter now has a relevant competence to hit prey. He does have a disposition
to do so, based essentially on his superstitious belief, but this beliefcannot constitute a competence that might rnake the success of his shot credtable to him.

6. Why

it that Superstitious Hunter would lack relevant conlpetence to

shoot prey with shots in the dark? A relevant competence would seenr. to
require a broader field of accornpiishrnent. The supposed competence of
Superstitious Hunter is stipulatively restricted to the particular occasion
involved. If he tried to succeed similariy with other shots in the dark aidecl
is

supposedly by the god of the hunt, his success ratio woulcl be near zero. No

competence of relevant interest is thus seated in hinr.

lr. No "relevant" competence,

trral cot:rpetence oltoo low

r,vhich is conrpatible with the :rgent's having solnc rluitc nrinia clegree to eirrn hinr ruore thrrn ncgligilllc crcdit. (At lcrst hc
conrpetcntly er.roueh, rvith tllc rrow spectling ofl'thc tror.v.) In wllt fi.rl

gets the shot o11

lows, rtn itttportattt distinction rvill contc to thc firc. Wc nrust tlistinqrrislr: (rr) tllc tlcsrct'
olcrcclit dtlc t() un ltr<'hcr, sut'll s llrrntcr., firr'tlrc su(.('css of-his slrrlt, fi'orrr (b) tllc tlcct'cc.,l
clcdit rlttc t<l ltirrr firr gcttirru firorl firl lris f lrrrrily tlr'orrslr krlling s()nl('l)rcv lry rrrc:rrrs of'sut lr
;r slrot. lt nr;v bc tlr.rt tlrt'r'c rv,rs.rlrsolrrtt'll'r.r lrt'llt'l ,rr,,ril,r[rlt'nr('.urs,,rrtl tlr.rt tlris slrot r,vitlr

rlskrr.trvltn()ll z('r()l)l()l).tl)lltlolsltrt('\\\\',tsllr<'r,t'r1l)('st()l)li,rll,rr'.rrl,rlrlt'.ulrl[lt'ltcrtll.ul
.ur\'()llrt'r. lf I ltrrrtt't". rlrot r',,lrtr'.'n It1'.rr, lt r(',r\()nrn1, tlr<'rr lrc rrrrl,,lrl strll r',un srlrst.llrlr,rl
,

t,',ltl tt,tvrrlr',1 tlr,",ll,rl tlot",',u(

r ('('(l

7. What a hunter needs for her relevant fr,rll conrpetence is know-how.

Sornetitnes this know*how involves knowledge of what rneans can be used
to kill a prey. Conrpetence can be constituted by a belief thar nleans M wili
bring about end E, but only if this belief is true, conlpetent or justified,
arrd, indeed, a case of knowledge. In a slogan: When knowledge*how is
c:onstituted essentially by a nreans-end belief, this belief must be a case of
knowiedge-that.
That is not to comruit to the vierv that conrpetence is always so constitttted, however; in rny view, it isn't. An inrnrense anlount of orlr conlpetence is of course knowledge constituted, but not all, not plausibly. There
is much basic conrpetence that conles with our brains, or is soon acquired
through early child development. There seenls no conlpelling reason to
itrsist that it too nlust always arlount to knowledge-how, especially if such
knowledge-how is understood to anount not just to ability, but to sonle
sort of implicit knowledge-that.
Though I see no need to do so, we ctnild also reco gnize a kind of
know-how that is not constituted by propositional knowledge of means.
I'lltts, it seerns to nre that I can be said correctly to "know how to bend
rrry forefinger," even without propositional knowledge of means whereby
I can do so (other than the linriting case ofrnyjust doing it by doing it). Nor
tlo I lose that knowledge when rny forefinger is inrmobllized by force or
raralysis or numbness. Now I still know how to do it despite being (temponrrily) trnable to do it. Yet, nry knowleclge how to do it is not constituted by
.rrty substlltial nlclls-urcl bclicf clf any sort. On this tack, knowledge-how
rtcccl not bc c'ollslitutcrl lry atry strbstlntial krr<lwlcclc-that, allcl hence we
ttt,qltl still lrc ulrlc to ;ttt;tlyzt' knor,vlctlgc-tlllt in tc:nlls of c'ornrc,tcr)r:c:, lrl
tllltlct'stltll,l ,',tlttfr1't1't( (' ,t\ ktrorvlcrlgc-llow, rvitll no vit'iotrs r-cgrcss. llut
,lcfi'lttlirtq,rl,rrrtsl vlt tort\r('l',r('\\otlllist.rt'krv,rrltl lrt'nolt-lr-ivi;rl,sint't.fil'
()lt('tlrilrrl rvt",l nr'r'rl lo r.n',rrlr't llrt'r'r)ntl)('lt'nr t'\\, 1tt.'1,'lrv ()n('('.tl rlllt,tilt

r46

KNoWLEDGE AND ACT'ION

KNOWLEDGE AND AC]TION

the insubstantiai knowledge that one can oby otrtg, under a practical modc.
of presentation. (Sorneone who can wiggle their ears at will would have
the insubstantial knowledge that he can do so by doing it, and can implernent that knowledge at will, but others lack that knowledge-how under a
practical mode of presentation. What is the dif{erence, and how does the
ear-wiggler gain his distinctive knowledge? Does he acquire an apt beiief,
at least a functional one? What then is the conrpetence that is rnanifest to
the effect of his having that knowledge-how?)
So, the easiest way to avoid the regress is to understand competence as
a certain sort of clisposition to succeed, which need not in turn be understood as knowledge-how constituted by knowledge-that, so that it lies
beyond sheer ability.''

E.

Does Apt Means-End Action

Require Knowledge of Means?

l-,..

as apt

Wt'rr,.rttl,l llt.'n lr,rvt'tltt',rtlton crlllt'l to rlt'n1 lll.rl rttrlt r,rnrt1'11'n(('ls;r killrl

lo tlt'tt1' tlr.rt tlr' ktt,trvlctl1t' lrorv tlt.rt l\ t.ult,ur()unt

krr.trvl<',1',t' lt.ttr', ,rt, ,rltt nr,rttvt'l\',

rtt, ll,,rltll)('l('tl( r'tr tlrcll.r I'rlr,l,rl [.tt,,t!lr',1ir' tlr.rt.

z.

Simone does have a kind of knowledge, it might be insisted, since she

does have an apt belief, a robust sort of knowledge beyond the "knowledge" of an electric-eye door.
Recall Sirnone's shot when she hits her target fionr her plane up aloft.
Her shot is clearly successful. It hits ancl destroys its target. Moreover, its
success manifests her competence, and is therefore apt.
Consider now her relevant full competence. This would include her ability to airn properly and to pull the trigger when the target lines up properly
with her equipment. She believes that if she pulls the trigger when things
line up that wa1l, she will hit, or is very likely to hit, the intended target.
Acquired in her training, this beliefis integral to her shooting competence.
A competence will often include as a constituent sonle such nreans-end
belief enabling action by specifying a nreans available to the agent that,
r,vith sufficient reliability, wili iead to the desired outconre. And now we
nlay reason as follows.
Strppose the belief is false. You cannot aq:tly attain an outcorne by taking
means that you believe will lead to that outconre, when it is false that they

belief faces the case of Sinron pilot in

training who might easily be, not in a real cockpit, but in a sinrulation, with
no tell-tale signs. In this thought ;xperinrent, trainees are strapped dowu
blindfold in their cockpits, and only then is the blindfold renroved. Let us
suppose Sirnone to be shooting targets accurately while flying a real planc:.
She nowjustifiably believes that her training is long over, that every m.orning
she goes up in a real plane. In fact, however, most of the time she is still in thc
simulation cockpit. On the occasions when she is aloft shooting rnissiles, hc,r
shots can still be not only accurate, surely, but also conrpetent, and even apt.
So nruch for Sinrone's physical shots and for hor,v their aptness is affectcd
by the danger to her conlpetence posed by her situation. What of her intcllectual shots, her juclgrnents and beliefs? She i.s flying her real plane, recall,
ancl takes herself to shoot a certain target. Suplose this bclie f to be accrunlrc
and competent. Can it also be apt? That is to say, c:an it bc a bclicf whosc
accuracry manifcsts Sintottc's cpistcrnit' ('()nrpctcncc? (lan it bc alt clcsritt'
the threat tcl hcr ('onrpctcncc rosctl by thc sirnulatiorr c'ockpit?
The view of knowledge

r47

t,l
t{)

will do so.
'What if the belief is true
though incompetent? Suppose it is formed with no
adequate evidence although it is the sort of belief that requires evidence. An
inconrpetent nleans-end belief could hardly help to constituce a conrpetence
fully creditable to the agent, one whose exercise rnight yield creditable success. This agent's success again rnanifests no relevant competence.

Consider how much of our action is nreans-end action, especially if we

include here not just causally efIrcierlt nleans, but rather any case of the
"by" relation, where we do sonlething y doing sonlething. The conlpetence required for apt perftrrmance ofsuch ordinary action would very often
involve apt nleans-end beliefs.

l. Such conlpetence is constituted by knowledge how to attain one's objectivc. What constitutes the competence is this know-how, but included in
ir is then the knowledge that the nleans would yield the outconre. Suppose
tlrat Sintone aptly hits her target in irnportarlt part through knowing that
lrcr nrc:rns u'oulc1 yielc1 her end. If she /or'.s know that by ptrlling that trigger
sltc woulcl hit tlrlt tllrgct, Irowcver, ancl if shc clocs know that she pulls the
trisscr, tlrcn slrc nrust know tll:rt sllc will hit hcr trrrsct. This is s<lnlc.thing
slrt'nust krlorv tlt'sri(t'lrorv "uns;rfc'''lrcr bclicf-sccnls, sint'c sllc nligltt s<r
t';rsilylr,rvt'l'rt't'rirrtlrt'sinul.rtiorrr'ot'kpit,rvlrt'rcprrllinglrc'r'triggt'rwotrltl
rt-.rtlrrct',rrrly,ur .rlr,rr I r\'(' .,lr(rl

r48

KNOWLEDGE AND AC]TION

KNOWT-EDGE AND ACTION

When Sirnone aptiy hits her targets up aloft, she seenrs to enjoy animal
knowledge of her surrounclings, and of how she can affect thern through
her basic actions. What is true of Simone is true of all animals whose conduct is thus explicable through nleans-er1d, belief-desire psychology. It is
through apt beliefs about our surroundings that we gain the know-how
that makes us effective animal agents.
That is all it takes for us to have anirnal knowledge, even in cases
where we may intuitively incline to think that the subject soinehow does
not really know. T'hs intuition can alstt be accornmodated, but perhaps
only by invoking a rc.llcctiue knowledge that can be lost with no loss of
animal knowledge.

F. Reflective Knowledge
I. A belief

anlourlts to aninral knowledge provided

it is apt, but it

anrounts to reflective knowleclge only if it is also nreta-conrpetent. This

'We
promises to solve our Sirnone problern.
had reached the conclusion
that if Simone is to hit her target aptly when aloft, she rnust then know
that by pulling the trigger she wr"'ulci hit her target. C)therwise her corlrplete competence to hit it at that time is in doubt. But how can she possibly know herseif to be flying a real airplane, when she might so easily
have been acting under sirnulation. It is hard to see how she could really
know that rnuch, thus situated.
'We
can now respond that Sinrone's knowledge is on the anirnal levcl
but falls short. Knowledge full well requires apt belief, or fully apt rep-

It requires, therefore, not only apt representation, but also,

on the second order, apt grasp (at least in the fornr of apt presupposition) that one's first-order representation is apt, where thc ac:curacy of '
resentation.

this second-order attitude rnust then nranifest the believer's

st:

cond-orclcr

competence.

2. Let us next twcak our exarnplc, so that thc sinrtrl:rtion

inc'luclcs an indis-

cernible screcn tltat is only sotttctinrcs trurtsr:rrcnt, rllowirrg Sir))()l)c to scr.'

thc sccnc: bc:yorrcl ntl slloot rcll turgcts. -f rrst ls oftcn tlrc st'rccn ('()rt:rins
ortly l nrovic, llowcvct'. wlrir'll ('()rr('sl)()nrls to Irotlrirtg lrcyonrl it. Wlr:rt
if'rtt ;t In()nr('rtr, tt,ltt'tt lltt' .srn't'tt tt,ill jrt.rt lt,t,,t' lo lt'lr,tttsl\t,t'ttlsinron(' w()r
,lt't's rvlrt'llrr'r slr(' woultl //1,'ll lr,' r,tlr' .urtl ( ()nrl)('l('nl irr lrtnnulrl t r'r't.rirr

r49

perceptual beliefs about what she does see through the screen? Can she now
answer with affirmative correctness even though just as easily the screen
nright then reflect oniy a filnr, with Simone unable to tell any difference?
At the rnonrent ofinterest she might indeed see the scene before her, seeing
that things are thus ancl so, even thoughjust as easily she would be seeing no
such thing, but only the contents of a movie.
Plausibly, Simone could then (at that nroment) competently affirm that
tlrings are ndeed thus ancl so before her, based on her apt visual expericnce as of their being (indeed) thr-rs and so. The scene is perfectly visible in
normal sunlight, as it is r,vhen she looks out the window some fine morning. And the knowledge thus acquired could of course help constitute
her conrpetence to shoot a target that she sees. Nevertheless, it is hard to
credit her af1irmation as really knowledgeabie. And we can now ofrer an

cxplanation.
Sinrone plausibly enjoys first-order "anin1al" knowledge of the scene
before her, as she views it through the perfectly transparent screen. She
then seenr.s to exercise her first*order visual competence to get it right. She
c:xercises (a) perceptual conrpetence to form visual experiences through her
visual systems, and (b) conceptual cornpetence to host appropriate visual
scemings on that basis, and to fornr visual judgments thus based in turn.
And this animal knowledge then helps constitute her conrpetence to shoot
the targets that she sees through the screen. I..levertheless, she is rnissing
sonrething episternically inrportant. For, she is unable to believe aptly that
;rs she forrns her judgnrent she has any such access to the scene before her.
'f his is because it is then random whether the scene is at that mornent
transjudge,
parent or illusory. As she is about to
she rnight just as easily then (at
tlre nroment ofludgnrent or infinitesimally thereafter) view a film as a real
s('clle, and she has no way to tell the difference. For this reason, she is unable
to judge or presLlppose-at that very nronlent as she decides whether to
,rfljnn-that her visually based affirm.ation would be likely enough to be
t'orrect. She is unable to know whether at the monrent of interest she has or
rvill have the SSS crompetence required.'l
(k>rtsicler thcn hcr.jtrclnrent that it is sunny outside at a nroment when
tlrc scrccrr r/o's ltntpcttto r'pcrfe'c:tly tratrsparent, errabling her to see that it
rs inclcccl sur)uv:rt tll:rt v('r'y n)()nrcnt. Tllc nlcrc qlJinnatior in the endeavor
II. Wt'(,ul .r\slrtttt' lll.rt, .rt lll, nr()ru( nl rltt' tn.rtlr'ltt't tt,lgtnt'nt. llt't sitt,rtiott totrltl
nl\l.illl,ll('()tt\l\'.trl rr,l/l//rr,/)'lt,'ntlr.rn\l),u('nl \(t('('nl()\(t('('lt rr.tllt lnovrr'.

sw,itt'lr

r50

KN()W LIlD(;E AND A(lTI()N

to aflirm correctly is then plausibly colllpetent on the first order. It is basecl

inrnrediately on the apt visual experience and the apt visuai seerning that
p. In aflirming accordingly, she thereby functions appropriately. The aflirnratioll then cloes get it right, and in so doing manifests a first-order conrpetence to nrake such correct visual affirmations. So, the afftrmation is not
only conlpeterlt but also apt. Flowever, the aflirnration might too easily
have been inapt, since the screen nright so casily havc bcen opaque (whilc
seanrlessly segueing into sonlething now quite clivergent fronr the reality
yonder). Something is thus seriously amiss in the relevantjudgnrent, which
falls short in the fbllowing respect.
To judge is to affirm in the encleavor to affirm aptly. But when she takes

it tlrat in aflirming

then affirm aptly, our subject is

incorrect. Given the randonr behavior of the screen, given that it is just as
likely that it would be transparent as opaque, she is wrong to think that shc:
utctuld then af{irnr aptly, if she affirnred at all on the nlatter at hand. Only by
luck can she at that nroment get it right with her relevant first-order perceptual affirmations airned at truth. True, her alJtrnrafttn tltat p is correct at that
ttronrent, when the screen happens to Lre transparellt (at least for a llronlent).
Her aflirmation is correct, and even apt, as rpt rs would be her aflirmations
based on her perceptions through an open window sorne sunny morning.
Why are they apt that way? Iiecause she happens to satisfy the interesting Shape and Situation requirenrents whosc conrbination with her visual
sorting skill gives her the conrpetence to sort the things she sees clearly disas she does she would

piayed under the sun before her.

Nevertheless, Sinrone's perceptual judgments through the randomly

transparent screen are not apt, since her affirmations are not guided to aptness through an apt appreciation of the conditions. Therefore, when shc
happens to view the scene hefore her through the trensparent screen, ancl
affirms about that scene in the endeavor to aflirnr aptly, she will affirnr aptly.
but her attainment of this ainr will not be apt. This is becatrse the ranclonrness of the screen precludes her believing aptly that her afftrnlatic>ns about
the scene beyoncl l,trltl thcn bc apt, that if shc thcn affinlrccl ebout thrt
scene, her affirnlation u,ottltlbc apt. T'his is nrclc fhlsc by tlrc firct thrt tlrt'
screen rnight:rs casily bc trattspurcnt lls n()t <ln tll:rt ot'r'lsion. S<1, it is not
sr> tlrat hcr rf{irnr:rtion tt,ottld rlrcn bc lpt. lr ttt:ry lrc tlllr tllc s('rcclr u,lllr.v

cllllrcc bc rr;ursl);rrcnt, so tlr:rt lrt'r';rflinn;ttiort n,lltlrcn lrc;rrt, lrrrt ('()nrpllilrlv it is not so tlr.rt lrt'r'.rfllrnl,rtitrl ll,.rll/,/ tlrt'rr lrt'.rpt. ( )lr tlrt't'olttt'.u'y, it
rrrir',lrt l()() ('.rstlV t lrt'lt lrt' ill,rrl.

KN()W Ltlt)(;li AND ACTI()N

I5I

3. In line with the foregoing reflec:tions, we need to distinguish affirnrations that are judgments fronr those that are not. An affirnration is a judgrllent only if it is in the endeavor to affirnr reliably and indeed aptly. It may
1r"rst be alethic, in the endeavor to afhrnr correctly, or it rnay have only sore
pragmatic and norl-cognitive aim. The guesses of a ganre-show contestant
can then be thus alethic affirnrations in the endeavor to get it right without
beingjudgrnental afiirrnations in the endeavor to get it right aptly.

Recall how our eye-exanl example shows that animal knowledge

ltot be credal. Suppose I have been flawlessly right for years in
n1y eye-exam guesses at a row far do'uvn the chart. The statistics assenlbled over decades by the technicians show that it has been no accident.
Sttmehtw I can know the letters at that row even when I take rnyself to
tre 4uessing. Of corlrse, I anl trying to gcrt it right. That is rvhat I anr supposed to do in order to undergo the test properly so as to yield a correct
eye-glass prescription. So, why is it that I have been guessing? Because
one can guess by affirming in the endeavor to get it right, as one does in
a ganre sholv, and as one cloes when one takes the eye exanr. What then
prevents the guess from being a judgment? What is the nrissing ingredicnt? Recali our proposal: In a judgnrent one nrust ainr to get it right reliably enough, even aptly. If so, then there is a kind of animal knowledge
that does not require belief at all (whether judgrnental or not), since it
requires only p;uessing,'a The knowledge attained by our eye-exam sub.ject is then a subcredal knowledge constituted by no credal affirnration,
try no judgment orjudgnrental belief.
Subcredal animal knowledge requires apt affirmation, but judgnrent
requires nrore. Withjudgnrent one aims fbr nrore than just gettirlg it right.
C)ne ainrs not just for srlccess but for reliable enough, even apt success.
AncJ to succeed with this airn, as one affirnrs, it is recluired that one be able
to tell tlrat one wttuld then get it right aptly, or at least that one u,ould likely
t'rtttugh get it right aptly. Thejudgnrental knower must have a second-order
srasp-a belief or presupposition-that her first-order affirrnation would
tllc.lt be apt. Suppose agaiu that she facers the randonrizing screen when
tlle sc:re:c:n happe ns to be transparent at the nlonrent of aflirnration. In that
rreed

(';lsc, Sirtronc clocs scrcnl tcl have the sutrcredal aninral knowledge that par-

ri;rlly constitutcs lrcr ('()nlpctcnc'c to shoot straight. Ilecause the screen

lrlrpcns t() l)('tr,rrrsr;u'('nt, slrc tlocs {r:t it right when she aftirms in line
r.. 'l lrt\ t('ttt.tttt\ \() ttt {rttt ( r.ttrrtlr', u ltt'lt'llt.

itl.'t. t\ rt()l

,r r/t,','l t',rt,'tt.

r52

KNOWLEDGE AND AC]'ION

with the perceptual conlpetences made possible by the transparency of

the screen. But she lacks the second-order com.pctence required forjudgnrental knowledge. She lacks the required conrpetence to judge, not just to
afiirm, aptly. This required competence rvould enable her to succeed aptly
in the endeavor notjust to get it right, but to get t right aptly.

4.

That is then what we nray be tracking commonsensically when we deny

that she really knows even when the screen is perfectly transparent so that
on the first order she fcrrrns apt perceptual aflirmations (ancl representa-

tions). Those afiirrnations (representations) fail to be guided to aptness by

the subject's awareness that they uottld be apt. Even though they are apt
when the screen happens to be trarlsparent, their attainment of ayttness is not
itself apt; it is spoiled by credit-iimiting luck.

our two Simone cases. Simone:

in her plane up aloft does have credal anirnal knowledge of the scene before
her on the ground, despite how easily she nright have been in the simulation cockpit instead. By contrasto when she faces the transparent screen,

J. There is however

a difference between

Simone lacks any credal knowledge of the scene before her.

That contrast between our two Sinrones derives from the following corresponding contrast. When up aloft, Sirnone's perceptual afiirrnations are unsafe in one way: as she makes her perceptual afhrmations,
she might easly hat,e been ili piaced to make thenr, since she might so eas*
ily have been in the simuiation cockpit. Clall this backwards-unsafcry, l)espitc
the backwards-r.rsafety of her perceptual affirnrations as she nrakes thenr,
Simone's affirnrations r,vhen aloft still seem safe in another wayr if she werc
to ask herself whether her affirmation u,ould thtnbe apt, as she contemplatcs
a perceptual affirmation, she can lnswer correctly in the afiirrnative. So, hcr
afti

rmation then

is

-forutard

s-

safe.

If Simone aloft lacks creclal anirnal knowledge, then, it is not for the rcrit. It is not because it is-llsc th:rt
she would afiirm aptly on the scenc before her. If Sinrone ak>ft lacks crccl:rl
animal knowledge it is rather because, cvcn if it happcns t() bc true: thlt il'
she affirrrr.ed perceptually, shc r,,rrulr/ afflnlt aptly, rhis is n()t sonlc)thing sllc is
in a position to know, 4ivcn hr>w casily shc tt,qltt tltut ltaw ''l rurclcr sinlrrlation, itrdisc:cnt ibly so.
(lonsiclcr'<ln tltc otlrcr lrlrttl Sinlorrc'ls slrc f;rt'cs tlrc nrntlornly tnrrrs
1)rrcnt s('rc('n. Ilt'r- rc'rt'e'1'rtrr;rl .rllirrrr,rtion rt tlr.rt poirrt is n()t onlv
son that the screen-dependent Sinrone lacks

KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION

i53

backwards-unsafe. It is also forwards-unsafe. As she considers at that

very moillent whether her affirmation would be apt, she cannot correctly
answer yes, since the screen might then as easily give transparent access
to the scene beyond as opaque access only to a novie. And this fits with
clenying Simone even credal animal knowledge when she depends on the
randomizing screen.

(. Given that result, what are we to think of Sirnone's successful shots

when the screen happens to be transparent? To rny mind she does shoot her
targets aptly, with succ'ess that manifests the shooting colrpetence required
fbr relevant credit. If so, then no sort of credal knowledge-how is required
for aptly successful, relevantly creditable intentional action. That still leaves
it open, horvever, that at least. subcredalknowledge-how be required. Even
when she faces the randomizing screen, Simone may still enjoy subcredal
knowledge of the scene before her, so long as the screen happens to be
transparerrt as she nr.akes her perceptual affirmations.

7. Yes, that example leaves it open that at least subcredal animal knowledge
is required fbr aptly successful, relevantly creditable intentional action. So,
that general claim is left open by the example. But is it a quite generally true
r:laim? Chapter 7 will begin with a focus on this issue.

INTENTIONAT. AC rr()N AND ^IUDGMENT

-#**ir
'{'
,$"d

Intentional Action
andJtdgment

A.

Taking Stock

r. We have explored

a connectiou between knowledge and apt .tctiot.t,

'We
have focusecl
action whose success ntanifests pertinent colllpeteltce.
so often does
forrn
huttratt
action
a
fornr,
nleans-end
a
takes
on action that
take. Clonsider the complete conrpetence recluired fbr slrch actiou to bc:
conlpetent and fur its sLlccess (in attaining its airn) to nranifest conlpetellce.
Such conrpetence seerned initially to require the agent to beleve knou,ledgt''
ably the relevant nreans-end proposrtion.
On further rcllection, that rlow appears too rcstric:tivc a view of apt

action, which ntay after all require rlothini nlore tharl a good guess,
especially if one rtrust act whetr nothing epistenrically better is available. In response we nray recluce the level of klowleclc requirecl ttr
that of sinryly thnkng that the nreans-end proposition is trueo so long as
this thought is colnpetently enough sustairred, c:ven with coltrpetellcc
'nvhose reliability lies well below Jo perc:t:nt. We rteec{ not evett insist
that this is literally knowleclge. We can allow that we speak rtretaphorically in calling such guess-like thoughts "ktrowled4e." This neecl tror
concern us if our interest is not so tnttch senlantic as rttctatrllrysic:al analysis. But we have seen how proper it see ttrs to rcc'optrizc in Errglisll r killtl
of subcredal aninlal knowle clge, as in the c:ase of thc, fllwle ss cyc-cxaltl
subject.

If crcdll lnilnl krrowlcrlgc is not rcrlttirctl for u t'oltlpctctl('c t() stt('('cctl,

pcrlrirps subr'rctlul :llliltr;rl kllowlcclsc (';ut sufllr'c? Arrtl pcrlrlrs kllowlctluc'
trf';rt lc';rst tlris low lcvcl is n'rttin'l?

r55

2. Evetr that rnuch is made cloubtful by actions still to sonle extent apt
and creditable without anything properly called knowiedge to serve as the
nleans-end connection. Not even subcredal knowledge seenrs required.
Take a case in which we need to choose arbitrarily by just supposing
that a certain nleans-end proposition is true. 'We may need to act on that
assunrption just as an arbitrary choice among 3o equal options, one of
which nrust be chosen. We might just barely guess by opting for straight
swimrning in one of 3o clirec:tions, and we nright reach land that way, and
our cloing so nlay be apt to some extent. Our guess is rnininrally competent.
At least we do not swinr in circles! So that seenls a way to get it right on the
direction of reac:hable land, in a way that manifests some degree ofaptness.l
C)n the other hand, we need not even positively guess. We need not positively think that the choice we have made is right, and that our choic e will
be a successful means to our end. 'We can insteacl lust supprrse and hope that
the chosen option will yield success, while acting on that assurnption. Here
one's action nright be succ:essful and even apt to some extent, despite the
element of luck owed to the arbitrariness of our supposition. Here again,
what may enable the action to attain sonre degree of aptness is that it succeed (one reaches land) in a way that nlanifests (suflicient) competence, so
as to be a success sonrewhat creditable to the agellt.

3, That conclucles our inquiry into r,vhether apt action requires knowledge
of at least the anirnal level. Arbitrary suppositiorl carlnot constitute knowlecige of any sort.' Apt action connects with epistemology rnore tenuously
than by requiring knowledge of the nreans to one's end. Nothing nrore is
necessarily required than arbitrary supposition on which one is willing to
risk action. Such supposition will sonretinres enable apt attainnrent of one's
end by connecting it to soille nleans, helping thus to constitute a much fuller
c:onlpetence nranifest in suc-cessful attrinnrent of that end.
A value ofaninral krrowledge hence resides not in its being neccssary for apt
intentional action, but rather in its often being a constitutive part ofwhat is

r. Oourpare the pitcher who ltrckily hits a honre nrn withont nranifbsting competence (period)
as a hotuc rtrn hirter (trnhkc the uniclrre llabe l{uth). It still seenls possible to say that his suc-

:.

cess nrirnifbsts s()lrc (sliglrt) tlcqrcc of'corrrpctcnce , rntl instrrntiatcs sourc (corresponclinely
sliulrt) tlcqrcc of-lptrrcss.
Hct'c wc slrorltl irrtclrlct tllc ";r'bitrrincss" of'tllc supl)()siti()ll til prct'lutlc tllc solt of'sublintin:rl rcli,rlrllitVtll.rt t'n.llrl('\()urcyc t'x:rrrrsrrlrjt't't'suucsst'st()(.()llstitutc.rsortof'sulrt'rcrl:rl
k rror','lctlHr..

r5

TNTENTIONAL ACl'ION AND .IUDGMENT

sufficient. This status

it often attains by constituting the subject's grasp of rel-

evarlt means-end infornration, however tenuous that grasp nray be, whether
through a reliable*enough though subcredal thought that the means will
yielcl the desired end, or through a rnore substantiai judgment to that effect.
Moreover, such "knowledgeable" success ts more fully creditable to the agent

than is the success due to suppositional luck. And the relevant crednl anirnal
knowledge would bring creclit beyond that ofits subcredal correlate.

4. Cornpatibly with

that, we can nevertheless uphold the Aristotelian view

of human flourishing as a life of acconrplishnlent, while activity of soul relevantly avoids luck to the extent that it is in accordance with virtue, and at
the limit in accordance ". . . with the best ancl nrost conrplete."

B. What

Is an Intentional Action?

A Preliminary Account
I.

Have we now stumbled on a problem for our analysis of intentional

action in Chapter r? An h.entional actittn was said to be constituted by the
apt success of an intenticln of the doer's, one that manifests the doer's competence to succeed with such intcntions.
What now shall we say about the swimnreruvho nlanages to reach shore?
Does he reach shore intentionally? It would seerl so. At least, he does aim to
do so. And he does attain that ainr. But does he do so aptly? Does the attainment ofthe aim nranifest a colllpetence to do so reliably enough?
Very plausibly it does not. At first the swinrrnerjust guesses at randonl one
of 3o directions in which he uright swirn, and the guess, as we saw, need
not even rise to the level of a thinking, however tentative, that land lies in
that direction. It nray be nothing nlore than an arbitrary supposition for the
sake of trying sonrething as likely to succeed as any of the other directions.
Shail we conclude that the swinrnrer reaches shore intentionally without
nraniftsting any conlpetence to do so? The success does seeul a nrrtter of
pure luck, which ostensibly refutes the account of intentional action as apt

intention.
Br-rt it is ftr fronl cle r that the swinlrucr's sLlcccss cloe s nrrf nlanifbst a spcciflc: cclrupc)tcncc to rcrc'lr sllorc. ()orrrpctcnr:cs ncccl n<>t trc infhlliblc, aftcr
:rll.'l'lrcy t';ur bc.jtrst rcli:tblc'to s()nrc'tlcgrcc,'uvllir'll t':ur bc cxtrcntcly krw.
A lron('r'un lrittt'r rrrirr,lrt,rnr firt'tlrc r.fit'r's, t'xt'r-t'sing;t t:ifi ttrun:rtt'llctl itt

INT'ENTIONAL ACTION AND ^IUDC;MHNT

r57

the history of the sport. Here reliability is still quite low, while artainmer
is nonetheless intentional and creditable to say the least.l
If our switnmer's shore is distant and the crossing clifticult, success may

manifest conlpetence that is outstanding. And he does certainly aim to

reach safe shore. This is the airn that keeps him swimming for hours.
Outstanding cornpetence is then rnaniGst, yes. Competence to reach
shore given the swimmer's capabiliti es and knout-how? This is not so clear.
According to our accotlrlt, however, it is this sort ofqper fic con-ryetence that a
success must manifest in order to be intentional. But why deny to
our swimmer the specific competence to succeed upon trying in those conditions?
Conrpare the tennis novice who swings wilclly as he receives a thunderbolt serve. There are matry ways he might have swung, rnany arcs that his
racket might have traced at rnany different angles. Ancl there is of course

one such way of swingine vigorously that

will vield a winning

rerurn.

Suppose he happens to swing that way, and does score a rvinning return. Is
he then competent to hit a winning return?

V/hy not say that he does have a competence to do so, though not a very
high conlpetence? After all, he does ainr to hit a winning return, alcJ he
does secure various elenrents of conrpetence in his performance. His eyes
are open. He is alert and focused. He faces and swings in the right direction' Et cetera' His overall competence to return that serve is of course
extremely low; nonetheless he has sorue degree of it. And this degree is then
exercised in pursuit of his firm and present aim to nrake the return. He does
succeed in doing so, nloreover, and his effort with that degree of aptness
is crucial to the success of his attempt. Here again it seenrs rather plausible
that the aim is attained intentionally, as was the aim of the swimmer.

2. Competence

cloes conle in degrees, within a dinrension reflecting ole's

probability of success, itr reievatrt conditions of shape and situation. One
has a degree of such "cotttpetence" proportionally to how likely one
would
be to succeed if one tried when so shaped and situated.
Conrpare the "length" of a piece of writing. A novel can attain sonle
clegree of length without counting as a longnovel. Similarly, an aIenr can
attairl sollle deree of (relevant) conrpetence without counting as a (relevarrtly) comltcfcttf agent. So, we lrlust clistinguish (a) attainrlret of success

. llrrt rlt'rrsc r't',,rll tlr.rr rrrl "rrt('llli'rr,rl" is t.nlr;ulr()unr t. "lr\,,lcsrrgrr,".ul,l

l'('\lt t( l('(l li.tln ttr ryl,lr.l.rlrlrrrlt'r,,litr.
).\lr(.(.( ll

is tlrrrs stiPlrl,1i1,1.1"

that nranifests sonle degree of (relevant) cornpetence in

given dotnain,
frorn (b) attainnrent of success that nranifests cttmpetuzcc (period) in that
domain. Attainrnents of sort (a) rnay qualify as intentional actiorts, and
for this they need only attain sollre degree of aptness, corresponding to
the degree of pertinent cornpetence then exercised by the agent. Only
with attainrnents of sort (b) do we reach success that is apt (period) in
a

that dornain. In this sense a donrain will nornrally allow a distinction

between (c) attainnlents to sonre clegree apt, rnaniftsting sonre degree
of relevant conlpetence, ancl (d) attainments that are apt (period), ancl
nranifest conlpetence (period), in that clonrain.
3. The foregoing account acconlrlrodates orlr swimrrter who reaches
who scores a hole-itr-one, ancl also the fbllowing

safe shore, the golfer

conrpelling

case.

A prisoner is told by hisjailer that throughout the conring night hisjaii cell r,r,'ill
be unlocked, but the jailer's testimony is only a cruel joke. The prisoner does
form the belief, though, and by acting on it that night, he escapes, since c:onlpletely by accident the door ras unlocked. Is his escape intentional? Is it apt?

It is hard to deny that the prisorrer

intentionally (by design).

Moreover, his escape does seern plausibly enough to manifbst a degree of
conlpetence alreacly seatecl in hinr as he lay irr bed preparecl to nrake his
n1ove. And that degree of conrpetence seellls also to lre r-nanifest in his
successful escape, even despite the irrrportant elenrent of luck involved.
A conrpetence need not be infallible, after all.
Note in any case the sharp contrast lretween the prisoner and l)avidson's
esc:apes

waiter. The waiter does intend to Llpset his boss, to c1o so by knocking over a
stack ofdishes. So he arranges the tall stack in the kitchen in preparation for the
execution of his plan. Br-rt before he can exc'cute, his nervy interntiotr nrakes
hinr nervous, which rnakes hinr sturttblc onto the stack, thus knocking it over
and upsetting the boss. Here there is a clear and powcrfirl intuition that thcr
waiter upsets the boss rruintentionally, even though he cloes so bcc:ause of his
intention to do so. 'What then rnakcs the cliflcrrcncc bctwecn this casc artcl otrr
earlier cases? Is it not true in all ofthcrn thlt thc ascnt suc:ccccls in tkrin what hc
intends, and succeecis accorcling to plarr? It is by krrockirrg ovcr tllc clisllcs thar
thc waite-r upscts tllc: boss. Anrl it is by s'uvirruirrg irr ccrtuin wirys thr tllc tcnnis
rtovit'c ntl tlrc g()lfi'r-ltt;rin su('('r'ss,;rrrtl by slvinlrrrirrg in :r t'crt;rin clircr'ri<ln
tlr;rt tlrt'srvirunrt'r 'c;rclrcs s.rlc'slr,r'c, rvlrit'lr is lris uo.rl. So, rvlrV is orn'intuition
s,t nru,'lr nr()r'('lxrrvt't litllv,rr,l tlr'. isivt'lv tlr,rt lltt'r'u',ritcr-sut't't't',ls lllil/1,'l'intcnI l(

)tt,tIly

INTENTI()NAL ACjTI()N AND .JUDGMENT

INTEN'II()NAL ACTt()N AND .TUDGMENT

r58

1,,1,r,rt

11,,,

rJg

4. Here

is a proposal. Suppose that intentional and apt action each requires

that there be a set ofspatiotenrporally arrayed basic actions such that the agent
takes it (at least in practice), with respect to each, that partly by doingir will he
attain his goal. And suppose that the agent must attain his goal rninimally suf.ficiemly by perfornring all nrernbers of this array of basic actions. Here I nrean
"actional rninimal sufiiciency." That is to say, although each mernber of the
set is essential to the set's sufficiency, no other basic action is required for the
goai to be attained. The attaining of the goal then constirutes an intentional
and even sonrewhat apt success provided it is a success that rnanifests sorre
degree ofspecific contpetence on the part ofthat agent.
In adclition, the rsent nrust have a plan at least inrplicitly in nrind, ar least
a deternrinable plan, by irnplenrenting which hc intends to reach his objective, such that the goal is attainecl in line with this plan.

The desirabilitv of this last component rnay be appreciated through

our golfer. Il he does hit a hole-in-c-rne, there will inevitably be a substantial anlount of luck involved. But the hole-in-one success nray still
derive front the intentional and apt success of the golfer's plan to drive
the ball to the green as close as possible to the hole. And the golfer's
determinable plan rnay be executecl properly. tsut there's a special case
wher:ein the golfer's hole-in-one would not so plausibly amount to an
intentional and apt success. Suppose the shot is hooked far to the side, but
ricochets offa tree so as to end up as a hole-in-one. Ths way of attaining
success would not only fall outside the golfer's vague plan, as a specification of it; rather, this r.vay of fulfilling the plan's ultimate objective
would cosflr with the plan. Intentional success would seenl to require
that the agent attain his objective, nranifesting in so doing a degree of
corllpetence to do so. Ilut it is also required that the attainnrent not be
confrnry to plau, ancl the conlpetence rnanifest tnust be a cornpetence to
successfully inrplenlent the plan.
-5. Finally, it is inrportant to distinguish an action's being intentionally succ'cssful front its being apt.lntentional success requires that the action mani-

fi:st a clegree of aptness, but aptness ptriorl requires xtffidcnt reliability, for

of that sort in thc pcrtinerrt clorn;tirt. Apt intentional success thus

rcclttircs llot.ittst s()lllc rlcsrcc of aptrre:ss, whic:h suflic:es for the being inten-

rrctit'rtrs

ritlllltl of

rhrt su('('css. Its

ln (rl)/ intcntionlrl su(-('css rccrrircs nlorc tllt

it rctu ircs ,rr,,lr(// lpt llcss.

bcinr

.jtrst s<lnrc tlt'ttlt'c' ol'.rrt nt.ss;

Wll:rt tlt'tt''lttitt's u'lrt'(lrt't';rn intt'lltion,rl ;rt'tiolr is;rpt pcriorl in its

tlottt.titl ol'rt'tfol nr,rn(.',"1lris u',rrrlrl r',rrv fi'onr rl.rrr,rirl ro tlonl,rin. Wllt.rr

IO

INTENTIONAL ACTION AND JUDC;MENT

is a basketball player's shot reliable enough to count as apt? What about a

baseball hitter's swing? A chess rrtaster's gambit? A cornedian's risky joke?
A detective's following of a lead? A scientist's line of inquiry? In each case
sonle judgment of appropriate risk must be nrade, one that takes into
account the relevant skills, shape, and situation of the perfornrer.

C. Two Further Problems

r.

Take again a golfer's hole-in-one. Cornpetence to hit a hole-in-one specifically (or at least reliability at cloing so), in his conditions nllrst of course be

very low. But that ostensible problenr we have aiready surpassed. The golfer
nonetheless does hit the hole-in-one intentionally. Ifin so doing he does not
manifest competence, nroreover, it is not necessarily because the competence
manifest is too low. We have already seen low reliability to be no insuperable
obstacle to intentional success.
More problematically, however, golfers nornrally do not airn at hittng
a hole-in-orue specifically. It need not be through so ainring that the golfer
attains his success, though the success is attained intentionally nonetheless.
'We
must hence relax the condition that in order to attain X intentionally
one nrust have aimed to attain X specificaily. One nlust have ainred to attain
Y, for sonle Y related appropriately to X. In the golfer's case, here is a likely
Y com.ing as close as possible to the hole (with sinking the shot being the
limiting case). Of course, that does not provide a general solution to how Y
rnust be related to X in general. One suggestion is this: X rnust be a deterrninate ofY. Better yet, X nrust be a deterrninate ofY such that the alent favors
Y&X over Y&-X in such a way that he aims to attain rnore specifically the
following [Y, preferably 4.In this way, an airn can be a conrplex, hierarchically orclered aim.a

+. Recall in any case the shot in the clark whereby Strperstitious Huntcr harpens to kill a ratrbit. I now see no good way to cleny that htrnter s nltrch crerlit as is cltrc: orrr ittcky golfcr anti
orrr lucky swimnrer. lt seenrs [rest to grrrnt thrrt Hrultcr tlocs "intcntiorr.rlly" kill tht rabbit.
as cloes our swinlllrcr rerrch slr<:rc, lultl as tlocs orrr golfi'r sink lris sllt>t. lrt car'll r'usc irrtprot'
tallt c()nlpctcnccs:rrc cxclt'iscd to thc ctlct't of';ur:rirrrctl*fi)r su('('css. (lorrrll:ttibly. it sccrttr
nllttcr of-tlcgt-cc ltor,v lllur'lr tllc srttt'ss is rlrtc to ltt<k Ilollt'tlrclcss,:tttl llolv Iltttt'lt tlttc to
('()rnl)ctcn( ('. Sonrt'rlt'1ilt'c ol't;rus.rlr It'tlrt \('('nls,lttt'(lrt'.r1t'ttl irt .rrr\,(.r\c. As to rvlllrt .lcglcc
of cottst'tttt'ntl.tl(tt'rlrt/tlrst lt'tltl ls tlt'rt'rvt'tl, llr.rl r.','nrs.r (()nl('\tu.rl ltr.ll('r (()ntlnri('nt ()rl
rclt'r'.ilrt llr.r( ll(r'rtltslrrrr lrVt trl tlr,'1t.'rlllr('lrl (l()lil.rlll ()l.r( tl()il.

INTLNl'rONAL

2,

ACl',f

I()N AND JUDGMENI

II

proble'r. suppose I play chess regularly with my young grand_

son, and I can see the fast inrprovenlent, btrt also the low confidence and
the nervous anxiety. Hence I continue to play so that (as I fuily expect) he
may start to win nlore atrd nrore of our matches, and gain confidence ancl
enjoyment in the san1e. Let us srlppose that to be my master intention as we
piay our next ganre. I ainr to lose by playins, since I feel confident that he
is now definitely the better playcr, to the point that by playing him I will
likely further his winning. Rut I want the garne to be real anci fair, so I play
to win, but rvith the overarching and guiding intention to lose. If I did
not aim to lose I would not play, since I've been fearing I may clamage his
fragile confidence, ancl discourage hinr to the point of quitting the sport
Seconcl

altogether.
Suppose I rvin the garue. Do I win intentionally? I clo intend to win. And
I attain my aim aptly, through the exercise of cornpetence. 'What if I lose?
Do I lose intentionally? Again, I ainr to lose, and if I artain that objective,
I will do so competentiy as well. It rvill not be a fake loss. Thar is nor what
I want. No, it will be a real loss, where I am reary trying to win. yet, my
|t)erdrdxng ainr is to fttse by so trying. Paracloxically, it appears that one
can
seriously aint both to win, and to lose. How can this be?
How? In the r,vay of our exanrple, with one aim being subordinate to the
other. But the subordinacy is special, not the usuai. The usual way in which
one airn is subordinate to another is through one's intention to attain the
latter by means of the fornrer. Our special way in which one ainr is subsidiary to another is through one's intention to attain the latter by hosting the
fornrer. Thus, it is not that I aim to lose to my grandson by tuinnng.Rather,
I aim to lose to ruy grandson by seriou sly aimingto win. Still, the questions
renrain: If I win, do I win intentionally? rf rlose, do I lose ntentionally?
I am not sure what to say. My or,vn inclination is to distinguish and label.
Perhaps the thing to say is that my losing would be ouerarchingly intenrional,
nry winntng deruatvely intentional. V/hy so? Well, rhe masrer intention
here is the intention to lose. That is what rnost deeply explains my conduct.
IJut in pursuit of that ainr, I do seriously ainr to win, as I clo want my grand.sorl to score a witl that is real, not.just fake. If I unexpecte dly win, however,
tlten rny wirl i.s still irrtcrltional, br.rt only clerivativcly so, since the guicling
nlaster intcnti<ln is tlrc intcnti<ln tr> losc, not to win.
Altcnltivcly,.rrrt.rlrigltt s:ry tlt:rt rlrrly tlrc lllltstcr, <tvcr;rrr.llillg illtcllti<tn
rvitll rvllit'll olrt' frt'l'li)tllls .r tloirr is t';r1l;rblt' of'nr;rki tlr;rt tl.irrg irrtt.rrti.nrl. ltut I sct' lr('r(' rr.tlrinll nr.r't. tlr,rrr.irrst ,r l,t.r-l.,,rl issrrt.. 'l'lrt.str u(.tur.t.'f

INTENTIONAL ACTION AND JUDGMENT

r6z

the relevant phenonlena is now in plain view, and it retnains oniy to apply
labels. True enough, that is not to say that labels catrnot be nrisapplied, by the
standard of the natural language. But nor is it given a priori that the language
will always stancl ready to deliver already dedicated labels that appropriately
distinguish what is there to be distinguished. C)urs, I sense, is a case ofthe latter sort. Is it really a deterlrrinate issue whether I win "intentionally" when
my rnaster intention was to lose, rny intention to win only clerivative?
In the appendix to this chapter, we take up what it is to intend, which
deserves our attention through its central involvenrent in our account of
intentional action. Ilut fbr now we continue to develop that account.

D. Intentional Action: A Further Development

r.
a

Let

us

next explore firore fully the metaphysics ofintcntional actiotr, via

nretaphysical

"by" relation.

When sonteone has ten cents in their pocket this coulcl be by having ten
pennies, or by having two nickels, or by haviug a dinre. These are all ways
of having that amount of nroney in one's pocket. When sonreone makes
the light go on, this could be by ac'"ivating a sensor' or by flipping a switch.
These are alternative ways of nraking the light go ot1. [f one activates the
sensor, this could be as passive a doing as when, pushed ofl a cliff, cne does
fall to the ground below. Alternatively, it could be a deecl, a doing of one's
own, and perhaps even something one does intentionally. This could in
turn be dorre by the raising of one's right lcg. Of collrse, one nright raise
one's leg as a ntere cloing, under the doctor's nrallet.
One's raising of that leg is not just the rising of the leg, rn'hic:h could be

INTENTI()NAL ACTION AND JUDGM tjN"r

r63

r/oes, not even to anything that one does passively. Still, one does perhaps
raise one's leg passively under the rrrallet, and uery plausibly otte nright raise
it thus passively in one's sleep, In this last case a doing is one's own doing-

is thus a "deed," let's cail

it that-even though it is not ntcntionally done.

There are thus things done by one's bod or its parts-as when the leg
is forced to move up-without being things done by oneself. The Ieg does
lllovc up, even if it is made to do so by the force appliect. And there are
things one does passively, deeds done without being done intentionally, as
when one nloves one's leg whiie asieep.

2. Cornpetence aligns with none of that, since it recluires intention,

which is absent in those cases. A competence is a disposition to succeed in attaining certain aims that one might have in a certain dornain.
A cornpetence is a disposition to attain those ains if one tried to attain
thern. Trivially, I would say, it is a disposition to attain thenr ilrtentionaliy, everr if this does not entail that the attainnlent nlust be consciously
intentional.
'We
are proceeding on the assumption that in order to do sonrething
intentionally one nlust clo it in accordance with one's nrost deternrinate
relevant plan, one that begins with a set of basic actions and eventuates in
the aimed-for outcome. Holv the outconre conles about nrust not clash
with that plan, as it does when a golf ball ricochets offa rree for a hole-inone. Moreover, the execution of the plan must consist in the performance
of a spatiotemporal array of basic actions whereby one nreans to attain the
objective via the plan. The plan might gain specificity as the time for action
approaches, if one thinks that one can still affect the outconre. That is why
tlre basic actions can be spatiotemporally arrayed.
-We

are thus relyini on the notion of an action that is basc. This I understarrd as sirnply a deed D that one does intentionally, there being no other
cleed f)' Ity tloing which one intentionally ainrs to do D (alternatively: there

3.

forced up by sonreone who seizes it, or could rise in a sLlrgeott's hands once
anlputated. There seenls a diflerence between those ways in which oneos
leg nright have risen, and one's raising that leg. The latter ts tcrhap,s sonlething that one r/oes, even though one crallnot help cloing it otlc:c the ntallet
strikes. If a purse is in the way, olle does kick that nurse; that is sorlrething
one surely cloes. If ollc: r/ocs roll clowrthill whctl ptrshccl frttrtl tltc: top, thett
in a sinlilar way onc riocs raisc' onc's lcg whc,rl tllc rlrllct strikcs. T'llcsc are:

bcing no such D' that one does intention ally in the endcaurrr to do D).
One inrportant uotion to be used below is that of an aim A's being
.rttairrccl pnrtly-by onc's cloirtsciecd I)'. The ainr nright be a deed of one's
owrr, clcccl l), as abovc. lltrt othcr ainrs nright also be attainecl portly-lty
clcccls tlf-onc's ()w n.

tlritrgs tlr:rt onc tlocs cvcn if'rlonc is llropcrly tlwttccl s "()l)c's tlwll tloiltg'"
lly t'ontt';tst, tltr'l'ising of'tlrc lcg tllrrt is rtllll)tlt:ttctl, or firrc'ctl trp plrysi,,rllv lry st,nt(.()lt('t'ls.',.rr l,y,r tlu\t ol'rvilttl, r't)l'l't'slr(tlltls l() l)()tlrirrg tll:tt tlllc

Wllcn ()r)c rinrs to tkr l), tlrcrc is;r clcccl l)'lt, wlliclr olrc intcrrtionally
.tillts to tlo l), wlrt'l-t' l)
l)' in tltt. lillitilrrr t';rsc. Wllt.n ollt. is t.ornpctcrrt
t<l tltl I) sttt't't'sslilllv, nt()t('ovt'r', tll.rl is lrt't';rust'()n(' is ( ()nrl)(.lr.nl lo tlo I)

IN'l ljN'l l()NAl z\(.'l l()N AND JU.DGMENT

tNl'riN'tloNAt ACl'lON AND IUDGMENT

164

by doing I)', for sonle D'; rvhich is cornpatible with the possibility that one
do D by doing D", fbr soflle I)" distinct from l)'' Oue may be competent
to do D by doing l)', rnoreover, bttt nof competent to do D by doing D"' In
that case, if one always tried to do D by doing D", one would not really be
competent to succeed when one tried to do D, In order to be conlpeterlt to
successfully do I) when one tried, there ntust rather be a I)' such that one
would succeed reliably enough when one triecl to clo D by cloing D', and
such that one would try reliabiy enough to do D by doing D'. (Or, rather,
there must be sonre set of actiolls like D' such that, in trying to do D, the
agent would reliably enotrgh pick one or another of the mernbers of that set
as

the deed by doing which they would try to clo D.)

For a particular exanrple of the above, let D = putting sonle water in

certain basin, D' = twisting open the right faucet with one's right hancl, and
D" - twisting opell the left faucet rvith one's left hand'
Normally, however, one tnust coordinate one's own basic deeds so as to
bring about one's objective. One's basic deeds nrust forrtr a spatiotemporal
array such that olle attailts oue's aim only through the courbination of the
mebers of te array, where the array sufilces for the attainnre nt of the airn.

Here the ainr is attained suffrciently-by the combined doing of the basic
deeds

in the relevant array. So we have:

Attainment A is attained sufficiently-by set (array) X iffX is a rnaximal

deeds D partly-by each ofwhich is A attained'i

A is an inditidual

attaintnent by indiuidual
sufiiciently-by a set X, all deeds in which are deeds of I'

Attainment

set

of

I iff A is attained

Thus, one rnay filI the basin quickly by first opening the right faucet with
one's right hand, and then openine the left fattt-et with one's left hand. If no
other basic cleecl is requirecl for the actional sufliciellcy of that set, then the
quick filling of that basin is an individual attaillnrertt of onc's own.

-5.

A is a collcctittt,lttailuellt ift X is ir set srch that A is attillecl strfllciently-lty

are at least

ret

tw.

by group

(; ill-(;

sc't

X.

ncl therc

clone by clisparate agents. Attlinnlcnt A is thcn rt i'<llcctivc

is thc scr of all aents stch tht etch tlocs at lcrlst ollc rlcctl irr X.

cleeils in

rtttirr-

IJccatrsc rlll ot(.()nrc rlriuht bc rgcntirrlly <lvcrrlctcrrrtitlctl . lllorc tlistiltcti<llls rlrc rclcvtlt
llcrc,6rrt tllis initi;l skcrcli u'ill onlit.r firll tlisplrty ol'tlrcrll. Morcovcr, wc ('rlll rrow ltr:kc
rrsc

rlf'flrt. itlcrrs Ilt.r.c i 1ltlt'r'to rrrr:rlyzc r.ollt't tivc lrt'tirrn, grossilrlv irlvol'"'irtr-l ilgcllts spt'crrtl

lrr.',rtll'irrs'.1.1.,'r,l tir'q..r.",lr'st.t-(.sl)('('tryclr:rsit rloirrgs,u('('ss('r)lt.t ltotlrt'srrflitl('lll ,lll;l)'

rvlr,.r..l'ri.t1,,.. ,,.1,.,,.,,rr ()lrl( ()nr(.rs pt,,,ltt, t'tl. I lt'rt'u't'rlr.tll ttrrt tlo itllo stlt ll rltt i,l issttt's. lrot
ltlt.tl r,,r,r1,. tl\,, \\'(. t(.\lt t( t ()t l()( u\ lo,r srrrilt' ,tl,l('tll, lll,tttt,lr ltlt t'lt'r'.ltll l',tstt .l( llvitV
ttt,r\ lt. \1r.1(l(tl( llllr(,t.rllt' rr l(l('\lrl(',t(l

IJ

E. Intentional Action in Epistemology

Next we contittue to apply orrr ()r){.r()ing account of action to the special
case ofepistenroloey.

I.

judgnrent that p is try ()ur llccoulrt an afflrmation that p in the endeavor

to al{irm aptly on whcthcr p. Afilrnratiorl is nornrally a basic action, or
rt least so is afiirmation t() oncsclf, in the privacy of one's own mind.
Therefore, if the epistenric: ascnt succeeds nornrally in getting it right aptly
on that subject nlatter, thc:y will rttin that apt afiirnration by afiirming that
p. Moreover, if the judgrucnt not only attains success but does so aptly, then
the agent nrust attain not only the truth but also the aptness oftheir affirmation by affirming that p. This nreans that in order for the judgment to be
apt, the alethic affirmation involved nrust be _fully apt. It nrust be one that
attains aptness in its ainr of attainins truth, where this aptness nrust be aptly
attained as well.
As we have seen through exarnples, it is possible for sonreone to afiirm
aptly on a certain question without doing so Jully aptly. Their affirmation
nlay attain truth aptly without attaining aptness aptly. And it is the iatter
that is required for the-flr// aptness of the af{irmation, and for the aptness of
the associatedjudgment. Since ajudgrnent is an afiirmation in the endeavor
to answer the corresponding yes/no question aptly, a judgment will not
itself be apt if it sinrpiy attains success as a judgnrent. Given its constitutive
alrr, a judgnrcnt wiII attain aptness only if the apttrcss ancl notjust the truth of
A

the alethic affirntatctn is attained aptly.

'V7hen judgnrent
it is

an intentional action. It is an intentional apt affirn1atiorl. But intertional action requires only the attainrnent
of tlrat action's corlstitutive ainr through some degree of corrrpetence. This
degree need not lie above the threshold of reiiability required for epistenric
conrpetence. So, the apt correc:tness of that aflirmation need not itself be
aptly attaine d. ln order to aptly attaitr such aptnrs.s, one needs a second-order
conrpctenc:e to attain it reiiably enough. (Aptrtess can be attained inten*
ticlnally, ho'"vcvcr, witllout being attaincd reliably enough.)
succeecls,

Tlrtrs, rln rlpt jtrrlurucrrt rtralrfies oll orlr accoul)t as irr) apt irrrentional
It is (l) tlrc' :rt'tion of intcntionally gcttinu it right (on I certairr
wllt'tlrr'' (lu('stl()rr) rvrtlt;rn ;trt Positivt':lflir'rtrtion, rvllt'rt'([r) tlr:rt lc'tion ol

rr-tion.
rlrl/'

r,',,

rr itrr'// lcr lot'ttt,',,1 ,rltl1', srrt lr tll.rt ils \l( ('('\\ nr,rllifi'sts l)('r'tr
('(rll llr,'t.ll ol lll.'.'tt('lllt(
.ll'('lll.

r.'t'r,ltttr-'"

. ll('lll t otlll)('l('ll(

lN I llN I l()NAt A(,t l()N ANI).f

Ul)(jNil:N

TNTENTI()NAr. ACtrr()N AND

Wc lrr:ry tllus t.ollc:lutlc tlllt;r-jtrclgrrrcrrt

is rn illterllti<lll:rl ur.tion ofaffirrniltg
aptly' wltcrc this apt aflirr'irr rrrihr
itsclf be attairccl aptly. A juclg'renr
is
apt ifancl orrly if its cortstitutively
cortai'eci aflir'rati< >n is-fitlly apt.

2' Finall judg're't

is a

partrcularly sinrple sort ofapt

i'te'tional

JUDGMENT

167

Consider now a relation between such intention and the means-end

action involvecl in implernenting a plan:
Xing in the endeavor that one attain E involves an intention to bring about

action.

In a "simple" intentional action, tire

agent ai'rs to perfornr a deecr
D at t
partly-by perfornting a basic action
B at t.

correct aiethic afiirtnations ancl. correctjucignrents

are thus by our account
simple i'tentionar acti'ns. But
they are .iin.r"rr, in the f<rilowing
way.
rn a correct al'ethic afJtrmatiott,
the age't affirr's in the endeavor
to
(thereby)
affirm correctly' (scl, an alethic
affirr'ation carnot be rnotiv atetl.exclusur:ly
by pragrnatic encls' It nrust have
at least the nrininral epistenric
objective of
getti'g it right on the content affirnred.)
If the agenr does get it right with
their affirrnation, then, we have
the foriowing struc:ture: the age't
ffirms
correctlv that p ar t parrlv
-by affinniug rhatp ., ,.'rl";;;;j,',ilr,rri,rg
,rrr,
p at t is a basic actiott, their
alethic affirr'ation is the'
intentttuall.y c()rrecl
affir'atir>n, which thereby quarifies
^tt
as a sinrpre i'tentionar
action.
In a'luQgr*rtt' the agent affirrts in
the endeavor ro (thereby) afiirrrr
aptly.
If the agc:nt clocs attai' thar objective,
rhen, we have th. ftrio-ing
struc_
ttrre: rhe agerr ffirms aptry tltat
p ar t parrly-by afiirmngrhat p ar
r. Since,
again' aflirntirtg that p at t is a basic
,rction, ttr" ,g.nr's affrrnration
is an intentio'ally apt affirrrratiott, atrcJ constitutes,r,
irrt.'t"ionally successfuljudg'rert.
since the judgr'ent is a stru*rrre
co'srirutecl by ;;il;;;affir'ri'g
air'ed at apt aflir'ting, and since
it succeeds in this ai'r by nlea's
ofthat basic
action ofaflirr'ing, thejucig'rent
too is a sirrrple inte,tional actio'.

E: that is to say, it involves a resultant favoring that one bring about E by irnple-

rnenting

certain plan for doing so, where this plan includes one's now Xing.

Such resultant favorings (resultant attrctions to choose) nright be subc:onscious, and rnight then have a standing in the domain of the conative analogous to the standing of credences (resultant attractions to affirnr)

in the dorrrain of the cognitive. These are not necessarily attractions to

ficely choose or to freely affirn. Sonre of the strongest attractions nray be
irresistible, as when they clerive frorn a forceful conscious experience or
appetite. And some nray be irresistibly bndng, as when one is viciously
addicted.
Some choices are freely cleterrnined, in any case, as are sone judgments
or acts of afftrmation. A resultant favorina rnight or rnight not be intense

enough to constitute a disposition to nrake a conscious choice. Moreover,

the favorine that ttlrns out to be resuitant nlay be bound to thus result, with
bindirrg force, attd tnay also furce the ciroice. But if the force is that ofbindittg reasott, then the choice cu1 still be free, and this is a sort offreedom that
.judgrnent can also share.

These conscious choices have advantages sinrilar to the conscious

.judgrnerlts that constitttte conscious beliefi;. Enterirr4 one's conscious
rcasoning, for one thing, they can help coordinate collective action,
when expressed in the course of collective deliberation. For a social sper:ies, such advantages are considerable, even esscntial.

Appendix:

.W.hat

Is

It ro Intend?

we

might thi'k of inte'tion as a resulta't

firv'rirg of ore,s attairi'g rr
given goal' accornpalliecl by
at least a r'ininral pla' fbr
cloir{ s., where tlris
favori'g will then guicle olte's erdeavorirg
through that plar. Thc iritirl
plan will noritrally acquire specificity
r, ,r,r" gracl'aily apprruc.lrcs rc rirrr.
intended in the eoal' Thc proprsal
is

.rrly

necessary for irltcncliltr' ..t stlfflc:i..t,",'ph.,i.r.ily

sirt:c tlrc fill
antly firvorccl witlrout bcirrs lrl<>ptccl.

tlrrt srrc.lr :r

pl.r,rislrt

pla, is

6c rcstrlt-

C)ur resultant favorings, incluciing those that deternrine conscious

t'ltoices, or dispositions to so choose, are only a subset of a nruch broader
sct of favorings. This broader set includes all resultant favorings that corrcspond to afiirnrable optatives, of the form "-Would that p!" The proposititltlal corltents of these clptatives nray c:oncern the actions of others, and not
owlt. So why do we here focus on our particular resultant favorirrss? Why rnorcr spccifically do we focus on the choices, or dispositions
to t:ll<r<rscr, tllat arc btsccl otr frvorinss tltot ttttt'rlct in certain ways? Because
wc irrc intcrcstccl irt Aristotclian rr'tion, lrrcl on hr>w it can help constitute
flotrrisllillg, iltrlivitlt;rlly or irt sor'icty. Sut'lr rrction is go11 clircctccl, ancl thc
<,rtly oltc's

l)ursuit of';r go;rI irvolvt's irrtt'rrtiorr.

SOCIAL ROOTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDC;E

r6g

o'success,"

So

ctalRoots ofFluman
Knowledge

ocial factors affect epistemology in at least two ways. They bear on an

l)irnportant sort of belief, ancl also on a corresponding sort of epistemic
competence. This concerrls a kind of value possessed by knowledge, and
concerns also how the pragmatic can properly encroach on epistemology.

We begin with this latter issue.

A.

Pragmatic Encroachment

The Risk of Pragmatic Encroachment

What

sorts

of factors bear orl the huntins-relative evaluation of

an

archer-hunter's shot? This involves how well that shot contributes to the
overall hunting-relevant objective: say, a good afternootr's hunt. One way it
can contribute is by being successful, by aptly hitting a target of high (hunting) value, and killing that prey. Such aptness does not require that the shot
be also meta-apt. A shot can aptly kill its pre!, manifesting the archer's skill,
even though it was too risky a shot, and betrayecl poorjudgment. An apt
shot can thus fail to be nleta-apt. On a nreta*level we ask whether the risk
under4one is appropriate. What might this involve? How (:arl we understand a way of manaing and assessing risk while brac:kcting suc:h prac:tic:al
objectives as how rlruch it nratters to that huntcr or t() his tribc that hc not
rnisuse his energy, titttc, ancl rcsr>ttrcc:s?
Strppose rt srrrccss/irl ltttttt t<l lrc tlrc prinl:rry olr.jc<'rivc irr rllc rl<lnurin of
Irrrrrrirtg, unrl tlrc ('()rrcsl)()rrtlirrgly prirtt;rrv v:rluc in tlrc critit':rl cv:rlu:ttiorr 1lr-o1rcr-to tll,rt tlotr.rin. Yt's, of't'ortt'st', lrrrl rvl.t ls il tll.rt t'onstitutcs

i.e., hunting success? As it stands this objective is formal and must

gain content with the specifics of the particular hunt. What is the size and
character of the hunting party (down to the limiting case of an individual)? What is the sort of prey involved? Is it a sporting event or is it a hunt
for neecled food? For present purposes, however, we abstract frorn all such
detail and focus on the formal objective. The hunter's assessment ofproper
risk then plausibly depends on hor,v his shot, with its chance of success, is
combined with other shots he might take, and what shots others in the
hunting party might take, and also on the resuiting pattern's likely contribution to a successful hunt.' The evaluation hence needs to go beyond the
single probability assessment, to the assessment of patterns containing that
shot. A shot whose probability is too low, if considered in isolation, can stIl
be meta-apt, ifit contributes appropriately to an overall pattern that, while
containinl some such shots, still probably enough results in a successfil
hunt. (That can stil1 be so, even if what is involved in a hunter's successful hunt is not sharp and determinate, especiaiiy if she is part of a hunting party. Each hunter might then aim for a successful hunt, which might
involve the hunt of either the individual hunter or the hunting party.)
The like is louncl across otherwise disparate domains. Take a tennis champion in the heat of an irnportant rnatch. Gathering up all his might at a crucial point, he blasts a very flat, extremely low-percentage second serve past
his opponent. An excellent serve, of course, on one dimension: a successful
ace owed to the champion's skill. His shot has a rj percent chance of success,
let us say, while a hacker who tried a spinless serve hit so hard wouid have
a nearly zero percent chance. Nonetheless that shot rnay show extremely
poor tenns judsnlent. He should never have taken such a risk at that crucial
I'uncture, judged by the tennis-relative objective ofwinning the match.
Here is sonrething that does not help: that the champion noticed his girlfiiend entering the stancls and wanted to impress her. The shot did irnpress
lrcr, but that fact does not make it a bctter tenns shot. Another serve would
lrave been nlore appropriate: a high-percentage spin serve kicking high to
thc opponent's weaker backhand side. This would have been a more appropriate shot erven if it hacl just l-trissecl the service collrt, thus losing the point.

Wc nlust lrc f lcxiltlc orr lrow, iu:r sn,cll (()r)tcxt, tllc pr'()p('r'rrltinr;rtc lluntillu-l'cllrtivc:rilll is
sct: \\'lt('tlr('r'. lor t'x.rnrlrl<', tlrt'r',oo1l l11 is lcl,rtivt'to.rn ,lfit'r'lltl.rr', tll lt'l;tiv('t() ir tl:ry,s--111'

lrtrrrtingurl). liltlrt't rr'.r\',tlt,'.rrtnw'illltt',1,n,lrn\l)r'trlir;rt rvrlln()t \,.rryl,,('nclrr.rlll,ovt'r'tlrt'

SOCIAL R()()TS OF IIUI\'IAN KNOWLEDGE

r70

hard serve is never relevantly appropriate. It might be

appropriate despite being low percentage. This will depend fbr one thing on
how it fits within a pattcrn of shots over the course of the nratch. (tt might
unnerve the opponent, for exanrple, or leacl him to receive farther back.)
Sonr"ething sinrilar is true of the archery hunt. The averagc reliability
required for archery crompetence in a hunt will depend, for exanrple, on the
hitlnriss differentials conrpatible with a successful hunt. But a shot can still
be apt by ntanifesting a conlpetence that is not reliable outright, aud evell
when its reliability is quite low, so long as it is reliabie en()ugh. What nlatters
is how the shot, with its indiviclual reliability, fits within sonle trroader pattern that coordinates with the agent's past and future selves, ancl rtu'ith other

Not that the

{1at

agents altogether.
'We

turn next fronr perfornrance nornlativity in general to virtuc epistenrology more specifically.
Pragnratic Encroach nrent thror-r gh
Nornrs of Assertion and Belief
When we are told that knowleclge is the norm of assertioll, this can be
understood as advocating a necessary condition for propu assertiotr,
nanrely knowledge,'What is this propriety? Arguably, it itivolves social
epistenlic nornls, These rlray or may not derive fronr hunratr c:otlvetrtiotr.
They ntay rather be nornrs set, not by convelltioll, but by the neccls of att
inforrnation-sharing social species. Leaving open the exact source, cotltent,
and nature of such nonns, I rely only on the plausibility of their existence.
Without going further into the sourcre and objectivity of epistenric:
nornls, we can still wonder: What sort of thing deternrines thcir correctness? Let's suppose for the sake of ar[Turent that in some illlportant sensc
z. Thisisthenclefendedsalvay'olexpl;riuirrghorvrcpttsnalrtwcfirtrlccrtrtittMoorc-plrltt{oxicll
cl:rirus, such as "p btrt I don't know that p" or "p but I t'lon't believc it" or'"r bttt I'tll Itot.ittstified in believing it." What nrkcs knorviedge lilc nornl irs rlpposcrl t(), sity, tl'tlth, or belic:f', or
justified belief? Arguably, rvhat is rlistirrctive is that knowlcdqc is thc ntost tcttcrl strch trotlr
that explains the others. Ycs. tnrth.lrclicf', antl .jtrstificrl bclief':rrc lso tlorttts ilt that it wotrltl
be irrcorrcct t() assct-t,uvllcll rlnc l:rr'ks urty of-trutll,llclicf', tlr-jttstifit'.rtioll.lrttt tlr.rt is pllrrrsilrly
bcclrusc in lckinq rnv of-thcsc one l<.'ks rrlso ktl<lrvlctlgc. Stl it is krlrl',vlctluc tlt.rt tlltts tttrifics
tltc rclcvllllt sct ol'rrornrs. IIorvcvt'r', if'tllis is tlrc;rt-grttlcrtt, tllcrl kttorvlctluc (lt:tt ollc kttor'r's
rrr;ry [rc ;r nl()r'(' lrl.rrrsil,lc r'rrrtlitl,rtc lirr lrcirrg tltrr f/tr' rlol rtl ol'.tsst'l't iott. l lris rs [lt'c.ltsc tllct't'
.r lt. s<.vt.r'.rl M.rolt' l).u.r(l()\r,.rl ,l.rurrr t trvclt'.1 trot lry tlrr' krt.rr','lc,lit' ttot ttt lrttt orlly lrv tlrc
Lltrrrvlt'tl.1t' tlt,lt ()n( klr,,rr'. lr)rnr. rrol.rlrll,tlrr.'l,,ll,)\\'tltl',: "r lrrrl I tlttlltt rvllt'tllt'r I'lrr-irrstr
lir.,l lr llrrrrkrrrl', tlr.tt I knr)\\'rt " llut tltt'.,t'tsrtlt'.,r('l)( t tltll,'t.rl l,t.ttll l)l('\('lll ( ()ll( ('l ll\.

S0CIAL R()Ol

OI: IIUMAN KNOWLFDCE

T7I

knowiedge i.s a norm of assertion, that one falls short ifone afflrnrs, whether
publicly or privately, what one does not know. Such affirmation can be
an act either of thought or of speech. Judgment in particular is an aflirnrative act of thought.3 Knowledge then is a nornl ofjudgnrent. And this is of
course conrpatible with knowledge being apt belief, or belief whose correctness nranifests (sufficient) conrpetence and not (too rnuch) luck. The
conclusion to draw is then that aptncss is a norln of belief. And this fits our
picture platitudinously. A belief cloes surely fall short ifit fails to get it right
through conlpetence. It falls short in the way any perfornrance with an airn
falls short if it faiis to secure its ainr through conlpetence. That knowledge
is a nornr of belief is then a special c:ase of the fact tbat aptnes.r, success that
rrranifests cttrnpctcncc, is a norln of perJormancc.a
What, however, does such conrpetence require? Core epistemic colnpetence is a dispositional ability to discern the true fronr the false in a certain
donr.ain. Infallibly so? Surely not: that is askine too rnuch. Reliably? Well,
yes, reiiably enougll, What then is the standard? How rnuch reliability is
required for it to be, episternicaliy, reliability enough?
Is it really appropriate, hor,'ever, to reqriire a precise specification of a
threshold? Is this not as inappropriate as it would be to insist on an exact
threshold for justification enough to constitute justification, or an exact
threshold fbr confidence enough to constitute belief? We are content to
assunre that tlrcre are such thresholds (or twilight zones) for justificatiorl
and for belief. Why can't we extend that tolerant attitucle to the supposecl
threshold of reliability for epistenric competence? Can't we just assunre that
there is such a threshold, even if we callnot specify it rrrore precisely?
Fair enorigh. But we nright still wonder about the dimension of episternic justification and that of episternic conlpetence (whether these are
clifTerent or at bottorn the sarne), and even about the dinrension of confidence. All three are nragnitudes, each plausibly involving a threshold.
.t. This is a tenrporary expedient for expository purposes; in due course rve will find reason to
clistinsuish rrorc cl;rbot'atcly trctr'vceu thc state ofbelieving anri the assertive act ofjnclenrent.
.1. Tlris provirlcs rlrt urtlcrstlnrling of'thc'kuorvlctlce trornr olassertion difibrent fi-om that
firtnrcl in Tirrrotlry Willirrrlrson's Kr,rr,/r'r{qc tutd Its Linits (()xfirrd: ()xforcl university Press,
:ooo). Scc cspcr'irrlly ch. r t, "Asscrtion," rvltcrc thc kllowlcdcc rtrle is unclerstoocl as qoverning rr.r'rr'r/irrr corrstitutivclv, [r1'.rrr,rlt>ry lvitlr tllc w:rys irr rvlricll tlrc ltrlcs of'chcss cr>trstitutivcly
!a()vcrn tlrc Itic.t'.. ()ru';rtt'orrlt is irr tt'r'rrs <lf'lllc t'onstitrrtirlrr of'_jtttlgtttcltt:ultl sscrtiorr us
:t'tions, Irut tlrc (.()nstrtutiorr is tt'lt'ologrr.rl t.rtlrt't tll;ul n()r'nrirtivt'. f trr.lgrrrt'rtt is not lirt rs,trlrstilttlit'cl,.rflilrrr,rti,rrt tlt.rt ts sttlrlt'r t t() { ('lt.ttl) u()rnl\. [:r,t'rl rl.lllnnr.rtl()n l\,rr'r'{\'rrii)'srrlr.icr't
tostrr'lt ll()rr)l\, rl D,'r',1 Dill lrt'(ott\ltlillit,(l),\()\lrl)l('( t. ltt,l',rrrt rrt r\ l()r lr\( ()ll\tllulr\,('l\,.lli nr,r
tt()n \\'llll rt'll,rnr 'l,lr\ (lr('n( r'llrt'tt'lr',,1,r1t,.rl,,tttstrtlrlr()ll), rr.urrcl\'. Irtttlt.ul,l.rl)trrcrr

172

SOCIAL ROOTS OF HUMAN KNOWLE.I_JGE

'What
sorls of consicleraWe might still wonder how such a threshold is set.
tions deternr.ine it? In particular, is the epistenric threshold invariant across
the practical situations ofboth subject and attributor?
How reliable is reliable enough? Will this vary clepending on how much
is practically at stake for the subject? For the attributor? Take a fact that p.
Earlier we distinguished (a) the degree of reiiability required for arl appropriate public assertion of that fact (or for the clam to know it) from (b) the
degree required for the subject to just know it, regardless of whether he
claims to do so, and also from (c) the degree required even just to believe
competently thatp, to tnanifest in so believing a reliable enough conr.petence.
These degrees nray well coincide, determined as they all are by what we
can appropriately store for later retrieval even when the original basis is
lone from. memory. If we put aside pragmatic concerns such as whether
a check will bourlce, or whether one will be late for a tneeting in another
city, what then determines whether a conlpetence is episten:tically reliable
enough?

How can we

assess

risk of failure (false belief) once practical concerns

are set aside? The concerns that remain would be cognitive or theoretical.
'What
is distincUsing a catchall label, let's call thern "(purely) episternic."s

tive of these? They presunrably involve truth, and its reliable acquisition.
A competence is epistemic only if it is an ability, a disposition, to discern
the true trom the false in a certain domain. But infallibility is too rnuch to
require, which triggers once again our persistent question: How reiiable
is reliable "enough," and is this som.ething that varies from subject to subject, or from attributor to attributor, or both?
When we bring in extra-epistenric concerns about physical safety, or
bouncing checks, or irnportance of tinrely arrival, in the epistemc assessnlent
of a belief, are we proceeding as inappropriately as when we assess the tennis appropriateness of a serve by how well it inrpresses a friend entering the
stancls? There appear to be domain-intertral stanclards that deternrine proper
risk in tennis. And the sanle seenrs true of huntitrg, and ofindefinitely nlany
other domains of hunran perforrnanc:e. These adrnittcclly resist precise fornr.uiation. They presurnably concern ltow sucrct: ss is asscssccl intcrnally to thc
dornain. f)onrain-internal stattclarcls of suc:h suc(:erss wotrlcl lrclp clctcrtltillc

SOCIAL ROOTS OF FIUMAN KNOWLEDGE

173

dornain-internal standards for "reliability enough." For a hunt we have the

successful hunt, for tennis the winning match. Whether a particular perforlance is appropriate within either dornain depends on how appropriately
that perfornlance is meant to contribute-and how appropriately it does
contribute-to a pattern of activities with enough probability of attaining
domain-internal success, such as that of the hunt or of the rnatch.t'
As hunians and as fellow mernbers of our conrmunities and of our species, we depend cnrcially and variously on the acquisition and sharing of
information. The epistemically successful liG is a difiicult thing to define in
general ternr"s, as is the epistemically successful history of a comnlunity or
species. It seems a rnatter of collectively attaining and sustaining a picture
of the surrounding world that enables a level of prediction, control, and
understanding within an acceptable range, liven the possibilities and tradeoffs proper to the constitution and situation of the subject and/or his group.T
Here non-epistemic factors do plausibly bear. What determines the acceptable range depends on the needs of that life and corrlrnunrty, and on the
range ofpossible success allowed by participants' constitution and situation.
Epistemic competences are analogous to tennis and hunting competences. The latter abilities or dispositions attain their status as conlpetences
by how they bear on the proper objectives of tennis and hunting respectively. Whether a tennis or hunting ability is reliable enough depends on
whether its exercise can suffciently further the relevant objectives over the
span of a rnatch or of a hunt. This is compatible with the failure of many
instances of that exercise. And assessment of proper perforrnance must also
take into account h<lw effectively that particuiar perforrnance joins how
successful a pattern by that subject or group over the span ofa nratch or hunt.

Competence and Reliability

Irr our two comparison cases, hunting and tenni s, an unreliable abilrty can still
bc reliable enough to constitute a conlpetence. Despite its iow reliabilit

rlcrivtivc sclrt of lppropriatcncss for perfbrmance under

tlt'r'it'c is tcstcd witllout [rcine plorcrly sitrrlrtcrl . Thr<ltrsh siruilar flex-

rr. And lvc r,vill ncetl to llow lso a

sinlrrltion,

ls

wlrcn

;r

ilrilitv w('(..u1
5. ltrlrfirllt.t';rtt'oultwcnriry, lrt'r'rl l.,rult'outo(ltt'l'tontct-ttsllc'srtlcstltcpl'tttlt'ttti;rl:rlrtl ltlot:tl.
su, lr.slrcrlr.rlrslllt';t.sllrctr,.Ilt',rvt'lll.tt ()l)('nlot rto\t'..1n,1 ,ssltllt'lirl'srrrrrlrritVtlt.tl .ttlVtltllct

rrrrlrr,)n((.t n\l.rllrlrtrtltllr.,r.

l.rrrr,,,rtlr('rnrlltttlt'tllt'trtlt'ol tlrt"'rt,trllt.rl()ll)t.tl'ltl,lli(-."

:rlso;rsscss l11, 1iootl ;t lntili(( scrve is, onc tlt;t is rot prrrt of'lt lrt:ttch; its rrrllity
is prt'stttrt:rlrly cot tt'l.rtt'tl rt'rtll lrou.'lt:rrtl it u,oultl lr,vt'lrt'cll fi)rir) ()l)p()r)cnt t() lllrrrrllc it in
nt;rtt l.

,,. llltsirsutrt'rr,rt.rl,.r',r, l,r't'l,,rn('.ur.rl()1,()ll\l()llrt'sllot'slttlltttl',rt\l.nlr,('(;()r,llrorcrlirt't{lr,'

r.'1.'r'.lrl l\', l() .r Itllrr'1 ", lrl l nrti l l, nr.r 1. ol t t rrl lr.

174

SOCIAL ROOIS OtI HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

SOCIAL ROO'I'S OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

kill or the chartrBut

it
seenrs quite othperfornrance.
pion's winning ace, nraking this an apt
erwise in the epistemic donrain; or at lelst so it seems initially.
A speculative hypothesis that a detective, or a lover, or a rneteoroloist
feels in his bones to be correct, can be based on a considerable. ability that
nevertheless falls well short of being io percent reliable. An aflirmation on
such a basis is thus analogous to the long shot by ther hunter-archer or the
such an ability can be rnaniftst in the success ofthe hunter's

biasting serve by the tennis charnpiotr. These latter seen properly ASSessable as apt, so long as they succeed within the hunt or the nratch. Sttppose
the long shot does kil1 the prey and the blasting low-percentage serve does
win the point, and suppose these perfbrnrances to be part of a pattern reliably enough predictive of succress over the course of a hunt or of a match.
That particular hunting shot, and that particular serve, would then each
be assessed as both apt and neta-apt, as one rvhose sucrcess manifests a
domain-specific conlpetence of the perfortner, and one that runs appropriate risk (perhaps when viewed as part of a relevant overall pattern), even if
the risk of failure for that isolated perfornrance is quite high.
It seems otherwise, however, in the donrain of knowledge. Take the
speculative belief-in*one's-bones based on an ability to discern truth,
though with low reiiability. That belief will not be considered an instance
of knowledge, surelyi nor will it be rirought to hit the ttrark of truth through
a reliable enough cpistenric cornpetence exercised by the believer. If that
ability falls very far short of reliability, if it falls near the server's t5 percent
rate of slrccess, then it will not be granted the status of a knorvledge-level
epistemic competeltce. When taken at face value, its deliverarlces will provide neither knowledge nor reliably enough apt beliefl,
Why is a batter's 15 percent conrpetertce deerned outstanding, as is a

175

would hardly sufiice. The correctness of unreliable speculation cannot

nranifest epistemic cornpetence suffcient to constitute knowledge.
Take a thought that manifests a disposition with low truth reliability.
Why nright such a thought be deerued insuiciently reliable? Should this be
explained through our menlbership in an infornration-sharing species, and

in more specific epistenric corlrmunities? Why

does apt belief and

judg-

rnent require nlore reliable conrpetence than the baseball hit or the basketball field goal? At least in part, I suggest, the answer is that epistemic
conlpetences are relevant not oniy to the attainnrent of a good picture of
things for the believer, but also to inforrning others, enlarging thereby the
pool of shared infornration. Risky inforrned guesses do not pass rnuster as
objectively endorsable apt attainnrerrts of the truth, properly stored for later
use, and transrnissible tcl others through pr"rblic assertion,
Why not? Why would our need to infornr others have so much explanatory payoff beyond that of our need to know things ourselves? And why
might the social dimension of epistenrology inrport a requirenlent of reliability higher than seenls proper in other domains, where performance is
recognized as apt despite the low reliability of the competence rnanifest?
What follows will gradually develop an answer to these questions.

Aptness versus Reliable Aptness

basketball player's 40 percerrt three-point percentage., u'hile an epistenric

ability at those levels is disnrissed as subpar and inadequate to provide
knorvledge? True, those athletic percentages top the relevant clistributions
among humans and even anrong players. Suppose however that the ability
to speculate correctly on the part of thc clctcctive or the lovcr or tltc ttreteorologist also tops its relevant clistribution. All thrcc ofltltertt arc as goocl
at such risky, speculativc thought s is artyor)c, ancl [rr bcttcr thatl ltt<tst.

Take the Hail-Mary shot by a player in rhe last seconds ofa basketball garne.
The shot goes through the hoop and earns credit through the player's apt
perfornrance, even though this long shot had a very low chance of success.
A social entity, the teanr, is involved, and the player's perfornlance is assessed
as part of the team's perforrnance. Nevertheless, his unreliable shooting
corllpetence (frorn that far out) nright still be maniGst in a performance
that attains a clegree of aptness, his ganre-winning field goal. That shot can
rrranifest cronrpetence, evell if from that distance his percentale is quite
krw, say Io pe rce llt. The percentage clf the average player, after all, even the
average pro, nlay fall well trelow that.s Even if his relevant competence is
nc>t at all rellrarkeblc, nr()rcovcr, it cloes involve sonre skill. He at least threw
in thc rilrt gcrrcrrrl clirccti<lrr. In adclitir>n, therc was r1o alternative play

Ncverthclcss, tllis woulcl n()t nrlkc tllcir rcrtirtcrtt c()nlpctctlccs rclilblc

cnough to {ivc tlrclrr klrowlcclgc of'tlrc trrrtlr. Evcll it'r.vc tlid Irot ltlwrtys

ll. Notcirlso(ltllttltt'1rt'r'--pitr'ltot'pct-srvirttstrt'tt'sst',rtioof';rg,rotl lr;rscb:rlllrittcr(rrsoproscdto

rctrrirt'c'pistcnrit'r'cli;rbility:rlrovr'i() l)cr-('crrt

(:rs

rvt'tl,r), still

ll

l)cr('ct)t

tlrt'pcr' ,rt Ir.rl r.rti,r) rs srtrrl.ult'l,ru'.

r76

SOCiAL ROOT'S OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

SOCIAL ROoTS OF I{UMAN KNOWLEDGE

that would have had greater chance of success, as there was no time to pass
to a teamrate. The teanr-involving social dirnension of lrasketball hence
does not preclude that a perft>rnrance rrright attain an inr.pressive degree
of aptness while manifesting very unreliable conrpetence. Why not allow
similarly that aptness ofbelief might be based on unreliable competence?
The foregoing suggests a distinction between:
whose correctness nranifests sonle degree of conrpetence
on the part ofthe believer, and on the nratter at hand, and in the circunlstances,

srtmeuthat apt thought,

and
threshold ofreliable conlpetence
set by the needs ofhuman flourisiring in infornration-sharing conrnrunities.
reliably enough thought that is apt (lteriod), above

Given this distinction, we might rvell allow that a thought can attain
sonle degree of aptness rvithout alrrounting to knowledge. Thus, the
well-infornred hypotheses of a self-conficlent Sherlock Holnres or Albert
Einstein can anlount to sonrewhat apt thoughts (affirnrative thoughts),
while falling short of knowledge. In a way they are: sonrewhat apt affirmations, whose correctness does nranifest conlpetence far above the average for the sort of question and the circunlstarlces involved. Nevertheless,
they are not reliably enough apt aflirmations. They neecl to be confirmedin some cases through nlore peclestrian, reliable ways-before they can
attain the status of outright knorvledge. Only through such confirmation
could they finally attain the status of reliable enough apt belief. And only
thus can they be really apt (pcriod).
Note further how this nright help explain the sta nding of rorm-requiring
conlpetence (or epistenric justification) for assertion. There is a nornr of
assertion that derives fronr a default reliability requirenrent inrposed on
'We
mernbers of human cornnlunities.
are accordingly required to assert
only what manifests reliable enough competence. What is properly asserted
is only what is underwritten thus reliably. The standing ofthis norm derives
in turn front the requirements for altproltratc sharing of infornration, conducive to human flourishing through rnutual reliancc. So, the cxplarration
of the noril)'s stancling will clcrivc fronr tlrc rccltrircnrcnt of rcliability if
sharing is to c<lnclu(rc pr()pcrly to suclr flourislring."

A Better Solution: Understanding

Judgrnenral B elief properly
An exarnple used earlier is relevant here once again.
\)Vhen I go for rny ye'arly eye exam, I am asked to read
the lines of a chart
with letters that shrink line by line frorn a huge single letter at
the rop, to
those barely visible at the bottonr. At some poirr, I start
to lose confidence
that I arn getting the letters right, but I keep going until the
techician tells
n1e to stop and then records sonre result. At that
point there are nlany cases

where I am quite unsLlre as to whether it is an ,E' or an ,F,,

,p,
say, or a
rather
than an 'F', etc. Suppose, however, rt tllrns out that I am in fact
flawlessly
right year after year at a line where I arn thus unsure. At that
point I alr in
effecc "guessing." I do aflirtrt, to rnyself in private and
to the technician i'
public, and I do so in the endeavor to ger it right. And surely
we can sripulate that I thereby ntatrife'st a conlpetence that I clo not rccognize
as reliable
enouh' That is why I resort to guessing, when I aftirm as
I undergo the eye
test' Unbeknownst to lne nry afiinnations are surprisingly
reliable, as it tur's
out' How then do we Assess rny perfornrances? We are here conflicted.
In a
way I r/o knor- those letters, as shown by my impressive reliability.
Br,rt there
is also a pull to say that I do not rcnlll,l1s17. 'l7hat ac.counrs
for this? euite
plausibly' what is rnissittg is nry assessin nly "1uesses" ls
reliable enough.

That being so' we can draw a ciistinc:tion concerning the

first-order act or
attitude involvecl in one's cluestion as to whether the l"it., is
an ,E, (or a' .F,).

The act or attitude that we retain even once our conficlence wanes
sufficie'tly
is the affirrrlation, or the willingness to affirnr, that
the letter is indeed an ,E,,

rvhere one affirnrs in the endeavor

tt't
{(t it riglt ou that qtrcstirtrt. The act or attitude that we no longer perfbrnr or host is the afiirnration,
or willingness to
affirnr accordingly, in the encleavor to get it righr relably utouglt,

ndeerl aptly.

Accordingly, lve catr distinguish two sorts ofafiinrration. Aftirmation

in

tlre errdeavor to get it right relably ertortgh, and ndeetl aptly,on

a certain question is judgnu:n-\et us call it that. To affirnr in the encleavor
to get it right,
tuthtwl affirlning in the endeavor to set it right rcliabty ertoughir,
y conrrast,
only totlcss. (This lcaves it open that you can also guess in
other ways: for
cx:ltttple:, by rrrcrcly suttost{q or ssutnn.g in the encleavor
to get it right,
withotrt stl Ilttlt'll lts ttfTlrltlirru.) ()f r'orrrsc, citllcr a-juclgrncnt or a
1less can
ill frlt't scr it riqllr' ;tlttl if it rlocs gcr it rislrt, tlrc.jrrrlgnrcr)t ()r,,,"rr
,,,ieht or

rlliglrt r()tgct it riglrt rcli;rbly clougll.,,'liitlrt.rof'tltr.ln

,.

'l lr.' ,lt,tttrt.t, rt'lr'r'.utl lr.'tt'r. tll.rt rrl ( () l('nrl)ot.rl nlt'tsrtl!t'r ll\'( l('\lln()n\', lrul
llt,', t,).,., l('ntltrrr.tl nur('nr(trrr, .,lr.rt rtt,,,tl r',rrlr, t rr tllt l.tl,'r .r'lr'.'.,

177

r-;rr

tlltrs:lln()ultt to

rnt lrttl.'s.tls,r

\ll(

((

\\ "1 . l',tlt

^'r

ttt.t1 lt, .tll.un('rl rt'lr.rlrl1 t uttttttlt.t\ \r)()n .t\ tl t\.tlt.trrrt,tl.tl

.rll

SOCIAL ROOTS OF I-IUMAN KNOWLI]DGE

r78

SOCIAI, ROOl'S OII HUMAN KNOWLEDGIl

an apt intellectual perfornlance, a perforrtrance that attains its aiur irl a way
that manifests the perforrner's contpetence.
The kowledge that we are reluctant to attribute here requires full-fledged
jgdgntent, notjust a slless. Compatibly with that, we can allow a lower grade
of "knowledge," whether metaphorically or literally, olle that requires only
apt guessing, and not apt judging. Aptjuclging, nloreover, requires that the

perforrner attain his airn, and do so in a way that rnanifests "r'nough" relevant
conlpetence. Accordingly, to really know fiuclgnrentally) one nlust aflirnr in
the endeavor to get it right aptly (and relial-rly enough), ancl or]e lnust attain
that objective in a wav that rnanifests one's relevant conlpetence. Since the
eye-exanr glresser cloes not evenjtrdge, he cral)llot knor.vjuclunrentally."

Encroachment and Invariantisnr:

Reliability "Enough"?

.What

Is

Aptness then is success through conrpetence, where the cotnpetence urust

be reliable enoup4h. This enables a distinction betweeu the things we

knorn, full stop, ancl the things we know well enouh to act on thetn. One
might knorv solnething, after all, even though in a special context, e.l',
where one's expert opinion is required, otte does not know it well enough
for action. Just think of the stakc' involved in the c:ontcxt of a tluclear
reactor, or a law cottrt, or a surgery roonl. How nlore specifically do we
understand this variation?
We nrighr try saying that to know well enough in a high stakes situation
is to have a reliable enough apt belief. If we applicd our earlier fornlula,
then, we would have to say that as the stakes rise, the stttrject's krtowledge
dwindies or even disappears, providecl his conrpetetrc:e does not rise.
More plausibly, however, there is no sttch outright loss of krlowledge; what
chanses is only whether the subjc:ct knows weli cnolrgh irl thc' new context,
with its higher stakes, whether he knows well ettottgh to ellable proper reliancc
'l
on that belief as a prenrise in practical reas<ttlirtg. his threshcllcl cloes rise: reliability enoush for deciding about solrtethilt4 urtittt'rortallt llerc'cl llot bc crlouglt
whe the sttkcs risc. (This chlptcr's lppcrtclix gocs firrtltcr itrto this.)

r7g

The following exarnple nright help nrake plausible how the standard for
knowledge can remain stable through variation in the stakes.
Suppose that H(igh) is in a high stakes situation and has excellent evidence for
his belief that p, but not good enough to give hinr knowledge that p. L(ow)
for his part also has good evidence for believing that p, but not nearly as good
as H; yet L's evidence is good enough to give L knowledge that p, since the
stakes are so low in his context. Suppose H and L both store their beliefs
in the normal \ ay we do all the time. Weeks later they both believe the
sanle thing basedjust on their retelltive nlenlory, now while asleep and quite
removed from any high stakers situation. Should we now say that L knows
while H does not, even though L's evidential basis is weaker than that of H,
and there is no other relevant dlflbrence beyond the different stakes at the
tinre of acquisition of the respective beliefs?

Although that is a persuasive reason in favor of invariantism, here we

rnay just find ourseives conflicted,'' If we still find renrainine plausibility
in subject-sensitivity and variantisrlr, we need to reconsider how best to
acconlnlodate whatever nrakes these as plausibie as they are.
My suggestion is that "human knowledge" is not tied to the stakes at the
time ofacquisition, nor lt the tinre of evaluation. What we "knorv" periocl is a
rnatter of'uvhat we believe with reliable enough aptness for storage ofthat belief,
And the reliability required for such storage is the reliability pertinent to belief
and assertion by rrrembers of our inforrnation-sharing social species. Asserting
things that you do not believe with enough reliability woulcl thwart hunran
corl1ll1unities, since we cannot possibly keep track of the evidential etiology
of peoplc's beliefs. So, we need sonre agreed nleasLrre for assessing how nruch
weight to place olr the testimony that crosses fronr one subject to another, and on
tlrc retentiontltat crosses fronr our past selves to our present selves.
Accorcling to the present suggestion, then, one o'knows that p" periotl if
ancl only if one aptly believes that p reliably enough for storage of the belief
cvcn aftcr forgetting the original basis for its acquisition. No nrere guess is
4oocl enough to be storecl, so as to renrain in place even once its initial cretlcntials arc- sone; only knowled4e is suitable for such storage.
thc rroponolt of- lrlrurrrrrtic clrcrorcllrlrcnt not sirrrply tleny prcservationisr.ll
lrl)()ut nlcnolil kllorvlc.lgc? '['t'rrc. lt'op()ncnts of'rrrrqrrrlrtit' cncrolrcl)llrcrlt alrc:rcly
sccrrr irrrlrlicitlv t olrlritte rl t,r tlt'l\,ittr: l)rc\('rv;rtiorrislll, lrut tlr;rt \ccnrs rrirtrrr t;rr'ic nr>t

r. Wr>ultl

rI. Altllrlglr,t'lr,ryr'lirtrrsr.tl ,rn.jrrtlurrt'ntrlllrt'lit'1.rvrtllit\(()r)\trtrrtivc:rlll,litllttlolt.rlllclit'l

.lr,,.rirlrs.tt gcttir rt li{lrf lclr,rlrl)'t'rr,,rrrilt, so tlt.tl lltt'lt',tlt'ltllt tltttl,tl tt,tl't'l,ltc's ol'.itrtlgtlt<.trl ,rrr,l ,rl.rrtlrirrr<.rrt,rl Irr.lr..l, roltcl,ltt's llr,rl r('(llrtt' .,ltl1' litll, lrtttl.rl .lllllllltl\, .lll(l ll()l
lnl ('lrl l(,ll,ll,,,

tll\( l( )ll\ ('ll(l('.1\'( )l llll'\

.j

rrsl ;r

li',rirrrt'ol tltt'r'icr'"', lrut

.rr

intuitivc rrolrlt'rrr Iir firlll'rt's,rlvt'tllc t',rnfli('t, wc

rvttrtl.l of t oursr' ttt't'.1 l() ( ()n\r(l('t .rrtl' tnrlt'rt'tttlt'trt .u1rnn('nl\.rr'..ult\l l)rt'st'rr'.rliorrst.

Itttt I ruYrcll kn,rrr' ()l lr()n(' tlr.rl s.'t'nt ( ()nvrr( rttli. nol ,tt.l.uu\l .r lrrollt'tl1' litr rrrrrl.rtr'tl
lll t'st't \'.ll lt )ll l\lll

That, nloreover, is cotupatible with the fact that what you krlow weii
fbr it to
enough for storage Inay rrof be sonlething yotl know well enough
so you
high.
provide a proper practical brsis for action whetr the stakcs are
inight know sornethin "flat oLlt" even ifyou do not know it well enough
to act on it when the stakes are high'
on the flip sicle is the apt Hail-Mary shot, or its intellectual correlates in
thought
the beliefs of our inraginecl Holnres or Eiustein. Your affirnrative
still
might be apt even when it is not even flat-out knowledge' It nright
reliable
admirably get it right through conlpetence, with a competence
thought
enough for speculative thought, or thinking in the dark' Yottr
mighi still tall short: it might not be reliable enough for storage' 11or'
acrdirrgly, reliable e'ougtr for human knorvledge, plain and sir'ple'

B. Knowledge andJudgment
Belief and lts l\elation toJudgment
a certain
Earlier we clisti'guished two varieties ofbelief; first, crredence above
confidence thresh<llcl; secouci, afltrntative judgnent or the corresponding
disposition
disposition, This latter "af{irttrative" variety is belief as a kind of
corquestion
to affirm alethically, itt thcr etrcleavor to auswer the pertinent
on/off act of
rectly, reliably .rro.,gl',, ancl incleecl aptly. Sr-rch afiirrtration is atr
is then
t)enial
rnincl.
judgrnent rhat takes place iD the privacy of the subject's
both
affirmation of the n*g.tiorr, ar1cl suspension is the itrtentional ornission
(while
provisional
be
either
carl
ofaflirmatio, a'cl of de'ial, an o'rission that

one deliberatcs or pofiders) or else conclusive, settlecl.

why horn,ever shoulcl we think that there is any such all-or-nothing act
related acts
of afirrnrative thoug[t? lf oly we coulcl nrake selise of this act,

rnls of it. (Thus' denial of <p> is airnration of (not-P), ,rtd ,.trp"nsiotl on the questioll w|ethcr p is intentional
of denial
omission of affirnration that p, alone with intentional itntissiotl
private,
<lf
act
supposccl
that p.) Florv thcn shoulcl we ntakc, scrnse of tllc
affrrrrration? How nlore firlly lnd cxplic:itly shoulcl wc urrclcrstancl
'rental
is or rnight
this strpposccl:rct? Why sllr>ulcl wc s() nrucll us lltlw tllat tltcrc
could then be expiainecl in

te

bc :rtry stlclt?
Ljrrtlt'rli.rhly, llrt'r't' is of' (.()ur-s(. tlrt. .lr/.,t'l'.rr't

ttt,lt,

SOCIAL ROOTS OF HUMAN KNOWI-EDGE

SOC]IAL ROOTS OF IIUMAN KN0WLEDGE,

r8o

rt't firt

tlrt'tl tlttotttilt tlrt. .\(.,l,r

nililit.s,t,irtq lltttt vrclt uti

l,rrrr,,rr,rtr,.'. l'lrr,ttltllr stt,'ll

of-

ll.ttl',tl

rBr

to attain one or another of a vast nunlber of airns,

inclucling pragmatic airlrs divorced frorn disinterested intention to inforrn.
Fortunately, there rs very often the intention sinrply to infbrnr-to infornr
and not to nrisinforn-as a donrinant aim in hunran conlnlunication. Given
our capacity for strategic self-deception, a sinrilar distinction seems in order
forjudgment and beliefas for public assertion. Despite how susceptible we can
be to epistenrically irrelevant pragmatic factors, there is such a thing as disinterestecl beliefinfluenced purely by the ainr to get it right, to beiieve correctly.
Consider the irnportarlce of proper assertion for an inforrnation-sharing
a saying we can endeavor

social species. A newscaster or a teacher might assert with testimonial propriety even when they do not voice their own beliefs.'3 If the speaker plays
no role in any such epistenric institution, however, no such role as that of
newscaster or that of teacher, then their assertion is epistemically proper only
when it voices their own lrelief. Otherwise it would be irnproperly insincere.
But what sort ofbeliefis at issue here? Is it beliefas confident enough credence
or is it rather judgtnent, an act ofafiirrnation or a disposition to affirnr with the
aim ofafiirnring correctly, rvith truth, reliably enough, and indeed aptly?
Suppose such judgnrent to be r,vhat nrost directiy determines proper,
sincere public aflirmation. A speaker's afiirnlatiorl of what he does not n
this sense judge to be true wouid then involve an episternically improper
clash: what he is willing to say publicly then clashes with what he says to
hinrself nJitro interno.In orcler to avoid such inrpropriety, what the speaker
affirnrs publicly must conlport with what he rvould aflirnr to hinrself in the
privac:y of his own rnincl. Otherwise there would be either some speech
flaw, or sorne failure of sincerity. Fully epistenrically proper aflirmation
reqr-rires the avoidance of any such flaw or failure. It nrust express in unflawed speech what the speaker thinks (in act or disposition). The speaker
speaks with epistenric propriety only if he speaks as he thinks, with sincer-

ity and without linguistic flaw.'a

Is there an account in ternrs of credential threshold that rivals our account
in terms ofjudgment? Acc:ording to such a rival account what assertion

r.j. As-fcnnitcr Lrckcy has ruecle clelr, irt her 1.t',tntirrq.lron Llbrd.s (Oxfbrcl: Oxfbrd University
l)rcss, :oolt) rnrl in crrllicr papr'r-s.
1.1 . llr t'ourrtinr-r:rs pi5rrrit'nv srrclr lirrgtristic flw'. I :rlr;rssrrllillg tht flaws in thc chrnnel
of'tt'slintrrrirtl r',rrtlrrurit.rtion s() ('()ur)1. Strpptlsc s()nl('()r'rc rttlkcs lul crr()r irr rrtatripttlat'ott
illg s\"tttlt,rlt ,ts tltr't tvolk ou[ .t Pttlof
lt.rpcl , ,r [)r-otrf lll(',ult to tlctcrllint' lrclicf'tltrorrgh
irttttir\', ltr tn\'\'r('\\, tlr.rt rr',trtll'l t.rttnt.r\.ur ('l)l\(('rrrtt fl,rrr'. (iorrrr,rlilrll', rtl'torrrt', r'Pistt'll t tt ll.rr!

s(

illll(

1il t l tllt't

r'lrl

',r rr l

r82

SOCIAI, ROOTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

be proper expresstotl
requires by rvay of sincerity and avoidance of flaw would
thresh,;fi nr,lr,rc:e al,ouc a certain tlueslrcld ttf cotrfitlence. But what will set that
to himself in the
old? woulc1 it not be what the subject is rvilling to affrrm
privacy restrictiou'
endeavor to answer correctly? Maybe so, but why the

not just
why the restriction to what the subject affirms to hinrself? Why
otre faces the corunclerstand belief as a disposition to assert publicly when
ainr ofanswer*
responding qtlestion and one endeavors to answer it with the
then hold
coulcl
"lnute"
ing.orr"ctly? Well, for one thing' 11o one radically
Moreover, our answer itr terms of private affirmation is unaf-

any beiiefs.
factors might so
fected by the fact that epistenlically irreievant pragmatic
frnally' ours is tire
easily itrfluence what one is wiliing to say in public' Atrd'
conscious
account of belief that will nlost srrroothly bear on the subject's
theoretical
or
reasoning, as he invokes prernises in his practical deliberatioll
pondering, all ofwhich can take place in the privacy of his own thought'

'When Is a Belief Sufficiently lleliable

to Constitute Knowledge?
factors' You perconsider a streanl of thought or speech clean ofpragnratic
relevant question'
ceive that p, store that belief, ancl when later you field a
reasons,
your answer is in line with that stored belief. consider tlext the
beiief'
your
of
storagc
perceptual or otherwise, that prornpted the initial
basis on
is then retained long after the lapse from nlenlory of the

which
be reduced
which it was fornred. After that point your accessible basis rvill
just
the fact
to whatever still supports your continuitlg to so believe, often
that you can
that you cio still believe as yon clo, along with the reliability
properly attribute to your relevrtlt lncnlory'
degree of confi*
Despite having acquirecl such a belief with a very high
well facle in tancler' with dwindling awareness of
dence, this confiJ"n..
'ray
later confrdence wiil align
one,s original basis for so believing. In fact, such
with sytrchronic connot with the original conficlence anci its basis but rather
r of that bclicf' What is
fidence in o'e's f ..serrt reliability on the subject nratte
This can
.rf ,.lirbility thet is appropritc fbr retetttit>rr of a trclit:f?

tire clcgre.
for rclirtrlc:c tln that
dif{er cruc:i;rlly f.ronr thc clcgrcc r>frcliatrility latcr reclttirccl
il llis ptrblic asscrbclicf eithcr i, tlrc strbjcc:t's privatc r'onsc:ious rc:asortillg tlr
privrrtcly
ti.rr. Wllilt ()rc is l:rtl.r.irrstifrctl i,
'r:rsscrtiltg
filr
'tltrlicly
()l) tllc;tttlottllt:rt stltkc
irtt(l
'rcrtrisirru
lr;rrrrl
tlt.pt.rl tlrt.ttres(ion.rt
'vill.f-t..trr.sc
rlt''tsst't'titlg'
()f
()t
s()
(
t('('rn('s\
l)l-('lrrisirrt
.rltt.st.ll'()l 0nt.', , ()nlnttillttV ilt tltt'

SOCJIAI, ROOTS

llut our question

oF I{UMAN KNOWI-EDGE

r83

abstracts from such spec'ial contexts, where the risk exceeds

what is norrnally at stake in conveyance ofinformation or reliance ol1 a prrrl:

ise. Indeed, our question applics even whcn one is asleep, or unconscious

altogether. At that point one is still storing imnrensely nrany beliefs. What
determines whether a beliefis thus stored with epistemic propriety?
What is the use, the epistenric use, of such stored beliefs? Largely it is
the use they stili have even when we have forgotten the bases on which
they were initially stored, or retained over time. Howevero we do want our
beliefs to be reliable beyond some rnininrunr. We want to be able to appeal
to thenr properly at any arbitrary later tinrc rvhen they may becorne relevant.
So, we are allowed to store a belief when its basis endows it rvith at least

that minimunl level of reliability, Moreover, we want to store potentially

useful beliefs when they do reach that level, to the extent possible, without
overloading our lnenlory banks. 'We are now considering the subject and his

indefinite future, and the uses he rnay fincl for his stored beliefs. Even just
for an arbitrary subject in isolation fronr his group, some level of reliability
is required if he is to store a beliefwith episternic propriety. We would want
such a level in his stored beiiefs, so that we can in the indefinite future trust
those stored beliefs to have that level given just their storage in his nlenlory.
What is pragnratically at stake in a particular situation can vary enornrously, ofcourse, and the degree ofreliability required in a beliefworthy of
trust as a basisfor action will depend on the stakes in that particular situation.
Consider extraorclinary situations where the stakes are abnornraily high
and where reliability is at a prenriunr. These nlust be distinguished from
ordinary situations with normal stakes, A reasonable degree of reliability is
required for trormai questions in orclinary situations of quotidian interest.
f his is the degree of reliability requirecl for ordinary human knowledge.
As the stakes rise, we need knowledge above such ordinary epistenr,ic quality. We now need knowledge for sure (or for more sure). And we cannot
.jtrst draw a belief fronl storage and trust it simply on that basis, once we are
ilt a cotrtext that dernands additional reasons fbr trust. These special reasons
c'ould take eithcr of two fornrs. They coulcl anronnt to first-<lrder reasons
syrtr:hrotric-ally irr view for a cerrtain answer to our high-stakes qrlestion, or
rlrc:y c:oulcl anrottnt rather to special reasons ft>r lrelicving that we are particul:rrly rclirblc on such strbjcc:t nrattcr,'uvllcn situutccl as wc arc, when we
t l lcll consirlt'r' ort t' tttt'stior r.
Srlt'lr cortlcxts, \v('s.ry. r-r'tuirc';rl'urrrrrrrllly lriglr rcirs()n fir"rrusr.
llut rvlr,rt is tlrrr "tru\l"l I Iou, tlo u,r' rrr,rnrf i'st oru' tt'ust in .r lriqlr st.rkr.s

r84

SOCIAL ROOTS OF I{UMAN KNOWLEDGE

SoCIAI, ROOTS OF HUMAN KNOWI-EDGE

IlJ

judge affirmatively
situation? Do we nratrifest it by what we are willing to
so' then the stakes
If
even to ourselves in the privacy of our owu thoughts?
what we relevantly believe'
clo afterall affect what we know, for tirey affect

However, one cannot alu,ays take a speaker's say-so on trust, rnaking tlrc
knowledge so attained actionable. It depends on the question and situ;rtion, ancl rvhat is at stake. As the stakes rise, so do the requirenrents prr>pcrly
inrposed on speakers in determining how worthy they are of our trust in
the specific situation, and whether their testinrony yields knowledsc tlr;rt
is relevantly actionable. The normal hunran reactiorl is to accept testirrrorry
at face value, even without specific knowledge of the speaker's credcnti;rls.
Compare how rnemory operates unirnpeded, properly so, even oncc tlrt'
subject's awareness of the initial basis fades and disappears. This is lrow il
is for the great bulk of our body of beliefs. This is how it must bc, siv.'n
human linritations. It rvould be cognitively clisastrous always to relinrlrrislr

that way'
what we are willing to guess privately, to ourselves, is affected
tnere heightthe
that
deny
Even more plausibly, moreover, lve might
in the
ening of the practical stakes affects what we are willing to afiirm

our awareness oftheir source clwindled, or to reject all tcstimony unsupported by known credentials. We are built to retain belicfl cvcn
after we have lost arvareness of their initial basis ancl of how reliable thrr lr;rsis
rnay have been. And we are built to trust testimonv absent special reusons fir'

are willThey affect how we are rvilling to think airnlatively, what we

in the sense of
ing to airm to ourselves. And this affects what we believe
judgmento or afiirmative belief'
that the
There is however an attractive alternative optiotl. we nright deny
we are willing to affirnr
nr.ere heightenine of the practical stakes afrects what
might there be for
to ourselves, or ho* *. are willing to judge. What reasons
willing to affirnr
this denial? First ofall, the stakes nlay not affect what we are
Not even
question'
that
to ourselves in the sirnple endeavor to get it right on

endeavor

to afiirm correctly antl relialtly enotglr, aboue the

thresftold set by

the social epistemic

our soci(il epstemic ttorms, autl thus apfty. This is because

for appronorms pertain to what jucigmental beliefs we can properly store

stakes'
trornlal
with
priate later retrieval and sharing, in quotidian contexts
to
what the stakes nray happen to be at that rlrotnent is hence l1ot relevant
the
in
afiirrnation
as
our willingtless to i.,dg., not ifjudgrnent is defined
endeavor to affirm reliabl;t enough for trormal stakes'
we
what is affected instead by rising stakes, we nlight counter, is how
enough
feel confident
are willin gro clxooseon a givetr basis. Thus, we might
enough to bear our
is
solid
ice
the
judge and even to affirrn publicly that
to

*.ighr, whiie still hesitant to step on it, if

the water is too cold and r've fear

still willing
for our lives or evell just for ottr cornfbrt. On this view, we are
considerirlg
while
to thi.k, ancl eveu ,,, ,.y, that the ice is solid enough'
our judgrnent
this too uncertain to justify relevaut action' What is ntoreo
evelt constitute ordinary, conlnlollsense knorn4eclge, even though

rnight

this knowledge is not relevantly "actiottable'"

one's
The consiclerations bearing thtis otr the nrnemonic charrel fronl
channel fronl
past self to one's present selfapply sinrilarly to the testitnonial
wlrt> spc:tks in
one subject to anothcr. when we take at his r,'ord solllcollc
prclc:pistctttic
rvit|
his owl pefson, wc (:ilt) very oftc |clievc accorclitrgly
(:lll) lls:icrt tlltls irl
pricty, .cl rvc, cllll rcas()rr prac:ticully orr tll:rt blsis, ltltcl wc
tllc tcstificr is
ll.ppclls,
t,rll wllcll spcukillg ill .ur ()wll l)crs()ll. Wllcrl tlris
;ttltl
.ftc., vrit.irg lris stor-r.tl lrclict, ont'sr,,r't'tl ,ur,l rt't.tilrctl t't'li;rlrly t'ttottglt,
tlrt.st.,k..t ,'.)llttllllttit,tt('\

lllpl'11'rtll'trt

tllt'll("ll('1"

beliefs

as

soon

as

distrust.

A further interestirrg question concerns the degree of conficlenc:c tlr:rt

it is initially acquired. When that belicf is st()rc(l
and retained, what exactly is retained? Is it a credenc e tuith its ntal dr.qrrc ol'
con-fidence? Not so, and properly not so, at least in nrost crases. A higlr clcsrcc
of confidence is retainable only with retained awarcness of thc bclicf''s
excellent enough basis. On pain of vicious regress, howevcr, this latter
'What
"renrains" is rather a reltc:d trut
mttst be a kind of pseudo-retention.
attaches to a bclief when

fresh belief, ofsome degree of confidence, that one's synchronic first-orcler

belief is properly based on some reliable basis. Confident enough endorsenrellt fronr one's l-now perspective is required for proper retention of a
first-order beiiefwith a corresponding degree ofconfidence. That is at least
required once that belief is challenged, even i{ absent special reason or
occasion for reconsidering, it properly rernains by default.
Any redr"rction of your ability to endorse that first-order belief, from your
synchronic l-now perspective, is correlated with a crorresponcling reduction
ofyour episternic right to retain your high degree ofconfidence. The retained
belief now renrains only as a belicf once acquired. Only tirrough features of
one's sync:hronic I-now perspective can olle now enclorse it with a corresponcling clcgrcc r>fcc>nficlcnc:c. Atrcl thc c:rcclcrrr:c's clcgrcc oc:onfiilcnr:e'will
prorcrly fltlc in tanrlcnr witll rcchrction irr rlrc srrbjcc'r's llrilrty to cnrlorsc tlrrt

t-rctlcnr'c propcrly fl'otn ltis ongoing sc('()n(l-r,t'tlcr' l)('rsl)('('tivt'. Antl it u,ill

cv('ntu.tllv tlu,inrll,' lrr''l.rn, lltt' tl,'r1t','t' ol'r'onf itlt'n( (' r('(ltrrt',1 to sltsl.rirr tlrt'

r8

SOCIAI, ROOTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

SOC,IAI- ROOTS OF HUMAN KNOWI,ED(;E

subject's first-order belief. But what is that degree of confidence? Plausibly,

it

is the degree of confidence required for proper synchronic

afflrmation.
in a nornrai
context for such afTirmation? What is required at least for affirmation to oneself? Is this degree of confldence the sanre as the degree required for proper
synchronic affirmation to an interlocutor? This is rrrade inrplausible by how
nrisleadirrg public affirmation can be, if speaker and hearer each knows that
the other knows the stakes to be high. In such a case, confrdent assertion is
likely to convey notjust rvhere one takes the truth to lie, but also rvhere one
takes it to lie surely enough to rnake our knowledge relevantly actionable.
Consider the need to guide oneself individually while allowing for one's
cognitive and mnemonic linritations. Consider also our need to guide ourseives cooperatively, with proper allowance for those sanre linritations.
Some threshold of reliabiiity is thus recluired for storing our guiding beliefs,
so that our continuing disposition to affirtrr will satisfy that nrininral degree
ofreliability. This requires the subject's ability to remenrber without exces'W'e
rnust guard against a nrenlory that reduces reliability
sive distortion.
belorv the required nrininrum when the belief is later drar,vtr fronr storage
in a normal setting.
We need a store of beliefs,, of stored dispositions to aflirrn to oneself or
to others in nornral settings: i.e., rn ordiuary settings of hutnan reasoning
or cornrnunication. (iiven human stor;rge lirnitations, we canrlot always or
even often store awarelless of hcxv our beliefs are initially acquirecl, nor carr
we retain a running awareness of their crontinuing basis. Morerover, what is
nrost relevant to our epistemic cooperatioll is the act of assertion, nornrally
just flat-out assertion. This is how propositions can figure as prenrises of
reasoning, practical or theoretical. Propcr cooperation requires sinccrity,
nloreover, "sincerity" t,, oneself (avoidance, frrr exanrple, of wishful thinking) and sincerity to interlocutors.
What then

is the degree of confidence epistemically required

In surn, there is a mininlunl level of reliability requirecl in the cpistenric:

deliverances trusted in our daily lives. This includes the rnany gauges used
in a technological civiiization. We do not require inf,rllibility, since little if'
anything could then be trusted. llrrt we clo recluirc a lrigh lcvel of rcliability.
We are ourselves arlrong our ntain s()rrrces of infrlnlrati()n. This incltrcles
not only ottr fclklw lrtuualr bcirr4s lrut alscl ()rlr own plst sclvcs. Jrrst tlrc
frct thlt suclt l s()ur('c clclivcrs l pnrposition is u gootl rclls()r) to bclicvc tlrlt
proPositiolt,:rlrscnt sp1'1';l rt'.rsolts ltll'nristr-tst. Witllotrt irrrplit'it trtrst ilr
tlt'lt'stilrrlrV rll'r,ltr rrt'irllllrrlt's ()r'()ilr'()\Vil nl('nrtll'ir's, \V(' \V0trltl lrt'gr-t'.rtly,

r87

reduced epistertrically, well below the level of an isolatecl Robinson Crusoe

reliant on his nrenlory at every turn. Indeed it is hard to see how any human
could live once so raclically redr-rced epistenrically.
Accordingly, we need sollre consensus, whether natural or conventional,
on what is a rninirttulll level of conficlence (and corresponding reliability)
required for storage of a belief (rnaking allowance for the inevitable danrpening of reliability that will come with later reliancc on menlo ry). This,
I subrrrit, is the levei coordinate r,vith ordinary ltuman ktrowlcdge. the level
required for proper assertion, and for properly endorsed synchronic judgnrent (absent special reason for mistrust).
That is all conlpatible with heightened requirenrents for trust when the
stakes rise. This is perfectly in line with the sirnilar rise in our requirements
for trust irt any relevant gauge as the stakes rise. ()rdinary gauges may not
suflice in a nuclear plant, in a surgery roon1, or in a Formula One car. Much
higher reliability is required for our trust in such special contexts. Sonreone
who uses atl ordinary gauge in sorne such special context nray still know
what his gauge delivers, evelr if he should not there guicle his conducr by
rvhat he knows. He needs notjust such ordi naty knowleclge but knowledge
Jitr sure, or for tnore st:re. He might have knowledge all right, while still lackrng a c ti o n able knowle d ge.

Communication and the Value of Knowledge

A crucial conlpollent of our collective epistemic life is the act of sincere
affirrnation, which could take the fbrrn of either sincere private affrrnration
tcl oneself, or sincere public assertion

to others, in the endeavor to afiirnr

with truth.
Two critical dornains are here important. First, there is the domain of

r,vith epistenric correcrtness,

epistemic cotnntunication. Acts of conrmunication are subject to epistemic

iu various respects. They are assessable in respect of clarity, conc:iscltess, and also audibility or legibility (anci everl readability), and nrore.
assesslllent

When we spcak wc often ainr to c:onlnnlrlicate infornration, to convey it

fit>nl spcaker to hearer. What the spcaker knows beconres thereby knowblc to thc he:rrcr. 'fhis knowlerclgc involve:s trclic:f in thcr sense
of disposition

ro aflirttt.

Wlllt

is lflirrrrccl bcconlcs tllus rvlilrblc:

to otlrc:rs, ancl pcr6aps

b:rsis for rlrcir rltiolrrl lr-ti.r, pr()-

trs:llllc ill tllcir ()\\'tt l'(',rsottirrrr,;rntl ls l

vitlt'tl tllt'st;lk,'s.lt'(' .tl)l)t-orri;rte'. V;rriorrs fi,,rtrrrt.s of-tlrr, ;rt't of-t.olllllurir.;rtitlll llt't't)ll(' l'('l('\',llrl l.' tlrs,rilr t() ( ()nilillililr.rtt..

( l.lnlltttillir.,ltivt,,lr-ts.il.t.

r88

SOCIAL ROOTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

subject to such varied assessnrellt concenling the appropriate conveyance of

information. They can be better or worse in these various respects. This fact
holds a lesson in the study of the value of knowledge, to which we turn next.
We have taken note of the fact that an intended act of conltltunication
can be assessed in various ways: in respect of clarity, for example, or if aural
in respect of audibility, etc. This does not require that acts of communication nrust have some objective final value. Not even successful acts of comnrunication neecl have any such value. I may write in nry diary in beautiful
cursive "Today I had eggs for breakfast," or I rnay tweet this to the world at
large. My act can then be assessed in various conlntunicative respects: legibility, for exanrple, spelling, granlnrar, and so on. One such act can certainly be better than another. But none of this requires that there be some
distinctive, objective contmunicatue uahrc that constitutes a distinctive sort of
final value, not even one that is prima facie or pro tAntrt.
The same is true, of course, for critical domains generally. There is no
distinctive final archery value, or chess valne, even though archery and
chess performances can be assessed as better or wors e as perfttrnltnces of tlce
releuant s<trt.lt nright be replied tirat there is a crucial distinction betr.veen
archery shots and chess moves, on the one hand, and beliefs on the other
hand. Archery and chess are just invented clomains of amusement for
human beings. The domain of betiefs is trot at all like that. Beliefs and
the broader epistemic dornain arc unavoidable for hurnan beings, and
crucial for our individual and coilective success. Our participation in
that domain is crucial for the flourishing of our lives individually and in

society.

Compare however the donrain of speech. utterances in speech can of

in a sreat variety of respects.
Most of these respects of evaluation do not require ny consequentialist
understanding according to which there would be some distinctive communicative final vaiue, sonle final value that succc'ssfr-tl corrrtrrunicative
utterances would need to have. There is no such distirrctivc: flnal speech
value any more than there is a clistinctive chess final valuc r>r archery final
value. Nor is any such c:onllllunic:ative final valuc tttaclc eny nlore platrsible by the fact that r:onlnrunir'ation is not ortional firr hurtrattity, rlnlikc
-I'r-trc,
witlrorrt ('()nlnlunicuti<ln tlrcrc would lrc Iro llunlnr:hcss or archc,ry.
ity. (lolllllrulrit';rtion in f:rt't sccrns burcly lcss irrtllort;rnt to out'sociltl spccrourse be. assessed. Some are better than others

t'it's (lt.rrr is krrrtrvlcrlrlt'. Yt'l \v(' (,ul still ;tssr.'ss lrrlrt.ul ('()nununit'.t(ivc' .tt'ts
rvitlr.rul r'orrnnltttrrr', to ,urv tlislin('tt\,(' firr.rl t'.)lnntunit',ttir''t' r,,tlttt'. So wt'

SOCIAL ROO I S OF I{UMAN KNOWLEDGE

r8g

should sirnilarly consider whe ther episternic assessment of beliefs requires

any distinctive final doxastic or epistertric value
'Vfhy
not think ofit as follows instead? F{unran conrnlurlication is impor-

tant for hurnan flourishing, for the flourishing of individuals and for the
flourishing of groups. This does not require that there be any distinctive
connlunicative final value. It requires only that conlnrunication be a sufficiently important component ofenough human ways offlourishing, which
can take nlany and various fornrs. It is hard to irnagine a flourishing human
life that will not involve conrnlunication in some inlportant ways at some
stages at least of that life. Moreover, conrmunication enables flourishini not
only instrunrenrally, but even constitntively, as shorvn by the place of comrtrunication in hunran relationships. No human society can flourish while
deprived entirely of conrnrunication. But from this it hardly follows that so
tlruch as a singie act ofconrmunication need have any final value distinctiveiy
its own, or indeed any final value of its own at all. Much less does it follow
that all successful acts of comnrunication nlust have sonre such final value.
Just so, hurnatr knowledge is at least as irnportant for human flourishing

cornrnutricatiou, both for the fl<lurishing ofirrdividual lives, and for the
collective flourishing of groups. But this no nrore requires any distinctive
episternic final value thatr does the irnportance of comrnunication require
any distittctive cotnnlLlllicative final value. It is required at most that
knowledge be an important conlpolrent of enough hunran ways of flourishing, which can take many and various fornrs. We have found it difticult
to imagine a flourishing human life or society that wiil not involve conlnlunication in sotlle important ways. Sinrilarly, it is hard to inragine a flourishing hunran life or society deprived entirely of knowledge. Knowledge
of various sorts will sureiy figure as a conrponent of the flourishing of individual lives and of the flor-rrishing of human beings irr groups.
But is it really true that hunran flourishing requires knowledge in the
ways suggested? We face the A,[enoproblern and its variations. Why is knowlcclge better than nrerely subjectively corllpetent belief? Why is knowledge
bctter than ntcrely true belief? Well, conrpare this: Why is well-based haprilrcss or plcasure bcttcr than thc ccltrally subjectively pleasarlt tone of the
strbjcct ilt alt crrcricncc ntcllinc vic:tinlize:d by a controlling clemon? The
liti'ttfsttt'll rt llctlonit'vir'tinr is no nr()r'c u florrrislrins hunrrur life than is
rllc illttsory lifi'of'rt Mrlr-ix tlwt'llcr, wlrit'lr in,lr'ctl r'rn itsclf inc:luclc nluc:h
as is

rlltrsory or f .tlst'rlt'.rsurt'. I'lrt'srrIrjcr'ti,,'r't'lr,rr'.rr't('r'\v(,rrltl lrt.r'...rlr.rrotrglr, of('()lll-s(', 1rrrt its t onlt'nt tvorrl,l lr.' rllu\(\r'v ltont'lll,'1.'sr. Vl, tints ol t.\lrr.r'it,nr

t,

rgo

SOCJIAI, ROOTS OF

SOCIAL ROO'IS oF ITUMAN KNOWLEDGE

nrachines and Matrix frarneworks woulcl have sr-rbjective enjoyrnent, true

enough, but their lives lvould fall horribly short nonetheless, as is revealed
by our wholehearted preferences 'uvhetr a choice is forced. Better truth than
ftlsity in a human life, better c:ompetence than incornpetetlcre, yes, but better yet what is required for the full hunrau flourishing of that life, which is
inconrpatible with a life ofillusion, in the various fortus canvassed.

Appendix: Actionable Knowledge

Woulcl that be appropriate? Sure:ly not.

'We are thus prortrptccl to takc a closcr look at thc ar[4ulllcrlt tlllrt rulls
follows:
t. My tit'kct lr;ts lost.
). lf-il lr;rs lost. it is rvot'tlrlt'ss

ls

I9I

3. If it is worthless, it is best for nre to sell it, even fbr a penny.

4. It is best for nre to sell rtry ticket, evell for a penny.

It rnay be thought that this argunlent is bad, ancl that it

is bad sirnply

becattse one does not know its first premise. After all, only what one knows
can properly be used as a prentise in such practical reasc>ning. So that's why

the argunlent is bad. Its first prenrise cannot properly be used for good
enough reasoning in line with that argunrent.
'We
are supposed thereby to have a rcASOn to reject that a lottery proposition such as I can be known. However, consicler the practical syllogisrn that
continues the argurrletlt

If one knows that oing is the best thing for one to do now (r>ut of its relevatrt
reference class of options), does otre act wrotrgly if one does not o? What if
one also knows that there is a non-zero objective ch.ance (reiative to otle's
basic evidence) that oins is not best, ancl incleed that there is a tron*zero
objective chance that oing will be horrenclously bad. What if by conrparison what one knows is that only a mitrtrscule nrargin ofvaiue is secured by
oing? By hypothesis one knows that oing is best, so eiin is of cottrse best,
and in fact those horrendolls cronsequences will not ensue upon one's oing.
It ntight still be appropriate for one to hedge olle's trets, hou'ever, by rtot
aing.Just consider the ellorlnous rirk that one runs by oing, wheu this risk
is assessed relative to one's basic relevaut evicletrce.
Suppose for exarrrple that one knows one's ticket to have lost, cvetr without having seell the lottery results. Is it now appropriate fbr one to sell
one's ticket for a penny, since this will nrean a nt:t gain over the other relevant options? But rvhat if one knows that otre 's irascible partner will react
very badly if in fact one's ticket has wotr and one has solcl it frrr a penny.
Or suppose one knows or believes justifiably that God would punish with
eternal darnnation those whose actions turn out so baclly? Wcluld otle act
appropriately by disregarding the objective chance (relative to one:'s basic:
evidence) of such untrward rcsr-rlts? Suppose oue actecl in accord with what
one knows to be best, however srnall rtray be its rrrargin clflpositive valttc.

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

-s.

Ifit

as

fbllows:

is best for llte to sell nry ticket for a penny, then I shall so sell nry ticket.

6. I shall sell nry ticket for a pennv.

Ancl suppose the further conclusion of this practical syllogisrn is rny selling
of rrry ticket for a penny.
This argunlent rnight now be put in question through the sorts of considerations rdduced above. Whether it is appropriate for one to reason in
accord with the practical syllogisnr, and even to acr accordingly, woulcl
seern to depend ou rvhat other inforrnation is at one's disposal, including
the relevant objective chance that selling the ticket for a penny rnight have
disastrous consequencres. So, one can reject the full practical reasoning

involved without qllestioning whether prernise r is known. That prenrise

nright or nright trot be knowable. This argunrent would seenl to leave that
question unaflected.

EPISI'EMIC AGENC]Y

squash it at the end ofyour fall. A doctor's nrallet can nrake a patient kick a
nurse if the nurse is in the way ofthe reflex kick. So, the patient does some-

q#

thing (by kicking the nurse) even if it is not (in a relevant sense) a doing of
his, oue attributable to hirn as his owll doing. He exercises no real a;ency
by kicking the nurse, or by kicking at all on that occasion. The passivity
that is relevant to our project is epistemic passivity. The nature of this passivity will soon emerge.

Epistemic Agency

2. How does "justifrcation"

his chapter

will take up episternic agellcy' its varieties,

and its relations

ism'
to norntativitY, fre eclonr, reasons, conlp etenc e, ancl skeptic

A. Two Varieties of AgencY and

Epistemic NormativitY
or
lives contain states or events of three sorts: (a) suft-erings-pains
actions; and performances
itches, for example-or nlere doings, sttch as refiex
and (c) endeavof two sorts: (b) functionings (functionally assessable states);
a practical' ethical
ors (with a freely determined aim). This trichotonry has
on the latter'
focus
we
side; and a theoretical, epistemological side. Here
can and often clo
Endeavors populate a regicltl of freedonr.' Endeavors
dererminecl choices ancl juclgrrre'ts. The freedom that

r. our

derive from

f..jy

and fundanrendefines our region of encleavors rnight be sharp, libertarian,

Here we
derived'
and
tal or it might be a matter of clegree, conlpatibilist,
leave open that whole set of metaphysical issues'

193

fllere doings,
The region at the opposite extrerne contains suft^erings arld
fall passively
you
where the doer is relevantly passrve. If pushed off a cliff'
a rabbit passively if you
despite how fast you nray be uroving, ancl you kill

relate to those three divisions? And holv rnight

the deontic framework pertain? I rnean the franrework concerning what

one ought to believe, what one nlay believe, and even what is obligatory or
permissibie in the way ofbelief.
The region of freedorn is where the deontic episternic framework is lnost
clearly applicable, the region ofpassivity where it is rnost clearly inapplicable.
There is, however, al1 interrnediate region, which admits a kind of agency,
even if performances in that region are not freely determined endeavors,
which constitute or derive from choices orjudgrnents. Performances can be
rationally deternrinecl even when they are not freeiy determined.
Here is an example. After nleasurement reveals a given line to be an inch
loug, let a second line be unveilecl so as to forn the farniliar Mller-Lyer
pattern. This induces the illusion, and also the derived seerning that the
seconcl line is over an inch long. No pondering or decision is required; the
process is quite involuntary. One seenring, one attraction to assent, derives
r"ationally from others, by a sort of rational basing. C)ne seeming is based
rationally on other seenrings, everl if none is constitntive of, or derivative

from, any free judrnent or choice.

Even if tlre deontic frarnework does not strictly apply in that internrediate region, it does apply loosely. We rnay thus distinguish between

two frarneworks. There is, first, the strict deontic framework, which
presLrpposes free, intentional cleterrnination, such as that involving free
c:hoices and free judgments. Ilut there is, secondly, a more loosely deontic
.fitttctirtnal franrework containing no freely and intentionally determ"ined
cncleavors.

Within that seconcl, functional,

nornrrtive epistenric frarrrework we

instcacl ilsscss pr()pcrr fiurctioning, bc it scrvo-nlcchanic, biological, etc.

tlrcrc distirrr-Tuislr pcrfonn;u)('cs tlrtt ckr fl-orn th<lsc tltrrt do rrot s:rtisf:y at

.We

lc:ast

nrininr;rl st,urtl.u'..ls lirr rrr)l)('r'('l)i\tr'uit'()[)cr'.ltion. lior filnt'ri<lnul pcrfilrnr.u('('s rvt'lt't'l rl() l',l.llitrrtlr', r'r'st'lrtnlt'nt, ()r iuly srtt'll rt';tr'tivc t'nltltion.

EPISTEMIC AGENC]Y

194
'We

EPlSl EMIC] AGENC-Y

can of course have attitudes of approval or disapproval, but these do not

find expression in the praise that is correiated with blarne. Yes, there is a
broacler "praise" that requires only favorahle evaluati<ttt, and aligns as nruch
with adlriration as with the assessnlent of agency. We can distinguish the
praise or blarne that applies strictly only to the free agent from broader correlates appliclble also to the functional agent. Agents who nlerely function
are subject to flaws or faults, rathcr than to sitrs or infractiorts or otirer violations that presuppose fieedonr and intention.
o'praise"
However, we neecl not contnrit to any linguistic theses about
or "blare" or their proper or strict application. It is enotrgh to distinguish
the strict cleotic: attitudes frorn nlorc broaclly assessing attitudes, however
these rnay frnd expression in strict Engiish.'
The looser deoltic franrework still reqttires functionin[ls, assessable as
proper or not. Rational functionings, itt particular, involve rational tnotivation ofa sort. Here one func:tions in a ce rtaitr way based ou nrotivating re:tsons,
reasons-f v wlich one functions as one does.r Wherl the line in our exanrple
seets to nte longer than an inch, I function a c:ertain way, just as much as

when I kick t[e nurse because of the, doctor's nrallet. True. it is a passive sort
of functioning. I anr helplessly attracted to assessitrg the lirte as over au inch
z. I have distiguishecl between the re;rctive rttitudes that apply in the tegiotr of freedonr, ancl
our appr-ovai ancl ilisapproval in tire region of fnnctiolrings. ()rantcc1, "praise" crrtl tttarch
in step'rvit| acln"riration, rvhich wotrlcl ,rnt p."tuppose free agency. Arltl rve do extencl talk
.rr.n of "bl, te",fdrbeyond the repion of 1redonr, as when r,ve "blatne" a r'eak strut fbr the

an
collapse of a briige. Aircl there is also the bearing of ftrliy blatrre'r,vorthy negligence . Take
giues f,-.e rein to his unrellective attitudes although he shotrld have beeu urore
,.ihot,ghttiri." W.'c19 blare this agent, but we clo not necessarilv blarrre himsimply fbr havi,tg ,cie,i ill line with iris unreflectivc' anirlral-level beliefl nd clesires. We blar-ne hillr trrore
f,,iiy b...urc of the neeligence of rvhich he is "gtrilty." More over, when he propcrly does not

,g.rri ."ho

refl.t, rvhe' he ,.t, iiirn.tively or utonraticliy on his utrreflective anitnal-level beliefs

ancl clesires, we clo rlor necessarily praise hinr sinrply for havine acted it1 line with those
attitucles. We pr:rise hi,ri rl,o." tirlly because he rvas inrplicrtl,v sensitive to when
'nreflective
reflection is reqrrirecl, ,1 ir,r,1 the gootl seDse to ornit r-eflect totT Lrtlt()ttt rtt;q/iqorcc Algtrably

r95

long. I function well by doing so on a certain broaclly rational basis: on the

combined basis of that line's seeming longer than the nearby line that I clearly
renlerlrber to nreasure one inch, I irave reasolrs that ill conrbination lnotivate
me in a broaclly rational way to take the line to be longer than an inch.

3. In a giverl colltext, three verbal fornrulas can funcrticln with llormative

equivalellce: (a) I anr attractecl (to sonre degree) to thrnk that p, (b) it seenrs
to nre (to sonre extent) that p, (c) I givc sonre (positive) weight to the clainr
that p. The first of these connotes passivity, the last connotes activit and the
internrecliate clne connotes neither; it seenls agentially rleutrai. Fronr a nornrative point of vierv the three c-an cliffc-'r at nrost trivially, so that these passivity/
activity dif{erences beconre norrnatively negiigible. This is suggested already
by how little an agent nlay really "own" something that is nevertheless something lte "does," paradoxical as this nray seeltl. Consider how passive we can
be in kicking the nurse of otrr exanlple, evert though rvc verbally "do" something in that case. Despite the fact that we do it, it is not our "ow'r1" doing.
Conrpare the "doing" involved in giving some weight to the claim about
one ofthe lines, that it is over an irtch long. This too adds no significant agency
to the "attraction" we are sutject to when attracted to assent accordingly. Either
rvay, there is a kind of agency, but it is the unfree agency of proper functioning, as when the leg goes up in response to the nrallet. We ftlnction properly
precisely by being passively attrc:ted to the right extent, just as a nlegrletized
clevice can function properly by being attractecl to a nearby nragnet. The distinction between the passive and the active is here negligible by cornparison
with the distinction between states that are and those tht are not functionally
assessable. There are passive cioings that are not thus assessable (such as one's
squashing a rabbit at the end of one's fa11), unlike other passive doings (such as
ollr perceptual functioning

r,vheu we are attracted to a clainr about the color

shape of a perceived iterrr). Finally, the epistenric functionings

region are

lssessrble

or

in our nriddle

in a specific epistenric rcspccrt, by rclation to truth.

(but ot here), such sensitivrty and neglieetrce resicie in the region of fi-eedorlr.

points scctrt plattsiblc' enottgh'

pilot: the acclttisieoocl
we clo not stricrly
tio' clf irivial bc,liefi t,rt 11,i,1. "u.iy.1ay,l,r,r,ltrcr. Nr>r clo rvc strictly "trlatrrc" st>ltreotrc who
rvhethcrpr:rc.tical11,or thci1lrcticrrlly. The rrrrrltirnctiorr rlrisltt trc tltlc't<l tlritlk <r
'rahir.ctio.s,
trot
clrtrqs or hck olslecr, ,ir-rrriglrt ,irrrrly'show lick o1'rclcvnt skill. Wc tlcrlorc it, bttt tctttl
or
dccitlirl
llot
rvs
alttl
,,"..-jrrst
trdeirrg
utollutically
lirnctionir)s
if'lr"
to tjarc tc aget
fi.ccly. ()f'crlrrsc, filc rlistrnc'tiorrs :u'c nccrlcd Irclc, l.rrtit trlrtlly ort :r t'olttpatilrilist rrrctrrplrysics,li'ficcrl.lrrr. (lhrt rrrct:rrltvsics is 0fl'rlrrr rrl|crrtly firll .sclltl.) [rvcrr it:t t';tsc rvltcrc \'!'c llly

eu"r, iirue clo nor really need thein, the fbliorving linqttistic
-3. gri,r,
plausibly,
"praise"
epistcnric firnctioning on arrtonratic

rr.t,strrt(lyspc,rkirrr,/,/,11,.r,)nl('()n('li,r'rllrrrk lrrrlttt'r'rl ttt;tlliltlt'titltl(,lsrvltclrlllcirvisittttttttlls

r,lll1'lirr
lrlrrr r 1,, ,,, i1,,.,, lr,rl,,r,.,. rrrrrrt..rtll), ryt' rrrr,,lrt 'lil/ lrl.rrrt'lrirrr li,r Itcirrti,lr tlrk. ,lrl,l t'srt',
tuttittt,rltr tk,rvlrt'nll\\'.1\llnlr()r

l.url llt.tl lt.'ll,)lll.lllllll(Ilr)ll,.tttVllt'ltllt

tt'ltllr!t't

B. The Agrippan Trilemma

l{cHct'tiv(':rsscssnrcnt (';un()t rcur('ss irrtirritcly, n()r (':ur it t'irr'lc cnrllcssly.
Nor t';rrr it lr'lv rrltirrr.rtt'lv ()n s(tnrt'.n'l'ritr.u'y st,u)( ('. Wt' rrrust still l.rt'c tlris
AUr-irr,nl tr ilt'nun,r

ll rvt'.u('l() untlt'r\t.ur(l ('l)t\(('nu( lrstilir,rtion.

rg6

EPISTEMIC AGEN(]Y

EPISTEMIC AGENCY

triJudgments that endeavor after truth are subject to the Agrippan

lemma. Neither infinite regress nor circularity is ac:ceptable. Only rationaily appropriate founclational judgrnellts could ground other juclgnrents
and beliefs, however, so as to render thenr rationally appropriate in turn.
Arbitrary, freely determinecl jucigrrtents are rationally reptlgnant' But how
could ajudgment avoid arbitrarirless except through a proper rational basis?
Yet, a truly foundational jtrdgrnent's proper rational status cannot derive
wholly fronr sonre rationally supportive basis. After all, if it did derive its
status that way, therr its status would be, uot foundational, but (broadly)
inferential. We are thus driven back to the circle or the regress'
'We

are now ipterested in episternic assessillent, itl assessnrent ofjudgments and other cognitive states in respect of the sort of norlnative status
that is constitutive of knorvledge. This is a certaill sort of status that a true
belief needs in orcler to constitute knowleclge, whether at the aninral or at
the reflective level.a How calt we stop the regress of justification for rational

judgments while avoiding arbitrariness?

'W"e
next try regress stoppers that are not endeavors but are still perfornrances with obvious episteruic relevance, such as rational functionins
that derive fronr no free choice orjuclgnrent by the agent. Nolv we rnove to
the region interrnediate between freeclonr and passivity. Freely cleterrnined
epistemic juclgments (which are endeavors) can be based on clegrees of con-

fidence (creclences, crcclential states that are functionings), functionally

rational perfornr.arlc:es. Thus rtright lve hope to escape, in that foundational
way, the Agrippan triietllma for endeavors.
The trilenrnla applies once llrore, holever, tlow iu a new fornr. Consider
performances generally, even those that are not free endeavors. How might
such a perfornrance attain the epistenrically norutative status r:equired for
klowledge; how is this to be explaineci quite generally, whetr we include
both functionings and endeavors anlong our perfortltances? Again we need
foundational regress stoppers, but now regress-stopping foundations woulcl
not do the job sinrply by residing outsicle the region of freeclotrt. Norv wc
need states beyoncl thc rcgion of frcc:cloln, trr-rt also bcyorrd the nridcllc
region, the rcgion ilFfunc:tionillg. ()ur scrc:h for rcgre ss st()ppe rs llttlst ttlrl)

ncxt to tltc rcitltl tlf' tloll-fit I tt'tiol I

I passivity.

lr;lvc l(),rkt..l l,,r sUtlt.t \t,tlU\;llll()llri ()tll l)l';l(tit';rl rtttittltles. lrl tlrciI sc;tl'<'ll tirt:l
t(.1"t('s\ \t()l)[)rrl,i \l,rla\ llr<'1, t,tr',' ltt tt'tl l() l)l,ll"lll.ltl( .ltllltltlt't. I ,llll ll()t rrlvst'll rt't'tttlttlt'tl

.1. S()rrrc

tlr.rttlrl',(,llll1l\'('tlslltt'ttsltltt'llloll()ltllrlttttll\'(llll('l('\llll('l)l\lt'tttttlt''l't'tt'trrtt'11''t'ris
S"llt"'l't-l"t'r|ltt'tt'
l(llll( lll',llllr.tllott'lltt'l'rrrtl'rt1'rt''tt'rltllltcillt'ltttllr

r97

Our project being epistenlological, such regress stoppers must be nonfunctionally passive in episternic respects. An itch might be functionaliy
assessable as appropriate by callirrg for scratching, which might serve sorne
biological purpose. But the itch is not assessable epistenrically if it does nor
serve any epistenric purpose. So it is not the sort of thing that could have
epistemic status, not even episternic functional status, much less epistemic
free-agential status. Conrpatibly with all of that, however, it might still
serve as a regress-stopping basis for a proper episternic functionins, if the
subject immediately gains propositional awareness of his itch based rationally on nothing other than the itch itself. 'What makes hinr properly aware
of the itch is the self:presenring itch irself.
As with endeavors, so with firnctionings. It is no nlore plausible that
there could be a whole set of functiorrings each epistemically justified
entirely through rational support by other rnenrbers ofthe set. Foundational
endcauors woulcl be deprived of rational nrotivating bases to explain their
status as rational. Such endeavors would hence seerrl arbitrary and thus ircational. Foundationalfuncttuings do not share that same problenratic status.
Involving no choice at all, they invoive no arbitrary choice. Consider, however, a set of credences of various degrees of confidence, functional states
not chosen freely by the subject. It is nrost inrplausible that such a set could
attain the fu11 episternically nornlative status pertinent to knowledge sirnply in virtue of the rationai interrelations of its rnenrbers, in isolation fronr
the external world that determines their status as true or as false.
Given, self-presenting states have long had a prominent role in episternology. No doubt we can know directly when lve suffer an itch or a pain. We
need not obtain this knowledge rnerely through inference fiorn other things
'"ve knorv. This is fourrdational knowledge. Horv are we to understand its
special status? How can it have this status rvithout the support of reasons?

C.

Reasons and Foundations

t. l\cusorts ('onlc in at lcst tw() sorts: thc' f;rctivc ancl the stative. (lonsider
l f trcl qirul{c. IIort, rlocs;r rcltling trcr-on)c son)conc's rc:rs()n ft>r a irclief (r>r,
:lltcrnrttivcly, firr ;t positivc t'rcrlcncc: firr r positivc dcgrcc of <'onfidcncc)
.tlrottt tlrc;un()unt of-lirt'l r'('nr.rirrirrr?'l'lrt'strlrjct't ncctls to lrr':rw:rrc oitlr,.'
lr'.rrlittrl. .tlrtl tltis ,ttt,,u('n('\\ (.ur tlt,.'r r.'r\'(' ,t\ ,r st.t(ivt' t.rlion,rl lr,rsis firr .r

EPiSTEMIC AGENCY

rg8

belief (credence). What fornr nright this awareness take? It often takes the
form of a belief (or creclence), and this belief (credc'nce) can then combine
with other beliefs (;redences) or with pro-attitlldes so as to ground further
beliefs or pro-attitudcs. This is the fornr guidance can take through inferential reasoning, practical or theoretical.
The fact that one is in pain is of course a factive reason for belief (or credence, or confidence) that one is in pain. Getrerally if a fact is to ground a
belief, one neecls sotlte awareness ofit. But awareness that arnoullts to belief
that one is in pain wouid be useless in the present instance, since you would
need to have been guided alreacly in the fornration of the relevant belief.
This is why such facts or their truth*nrakers mttst be self-presenting if they
are to do their foundational work.

lt

cannot be that they wottld provide

guidance the way factive reasons nornrally do so, nanrely through prior
cognitive a\ /arelless of them (via which they are presented), through sonr.e
prior beliefor credence. So the question retnains as to the kind of awareuess

wili serve for the required guidance.

A distiction between constitutive awareness

of them that

ancl noticing awareness

junrp,
kick,
or snrile a srnile, this
or kick a
may help. When you junrp a

should not be viewed on an act-object nroclel, where the doing has a separable object. Rather, the jurnp isjust the jurnping in a certaiu w|o the kick
is the kicking in a certain way, anci likewise for the sntile, etc. Sinrilarly,

when you experience an experience-saY, an experience of pain, when

you feel a pain-this does not plausibly have an act-object analysis. Rather,
experiencing such an experience is experiencing in a certain way.s And,
since experience is a forrn of awareness (not a noticing sort of ar,vareness,
but a form of awareness nonetheless), therefore you canllot avoid being
aware ofyour experiences, since you nrust experience thern.
Accordingly, one cannot experience a pain without being "aware" of
it. And such awareness can then plausibly guide thc fornratiotr of a corresponding belief or creclence. You nright then belicve or bc inclined to
believe that you are in pain, and the rational basis for your belicf , or your

_S.

This is 6t to srr[scl'ibc to lr r.rrlicrrl ttlvcrbil thcory. sirlt'c tllc "wily irt rvhicll ytltt cxpcricttt'c
u,4rcll yetr cxrcrie nt't.u visu;rlcxpclir.rrt'c rrr;ry rctrrirc tlrc lrostirrgof';r rlopositiollrrl t tllltcllt. Tllis
glrr,r1,,,',riri,r,r,ri r'rurtcnt rn;ri'[',c l.rlsc, lror,"'t""'ct., so tlt;tt tllcl'c is tttl tl'rltll-tll:tkt't.to fitltr'tiorl rts tllc
'onc"s
cr lrcl it'r rt r'. 'l'lrc rlorosit ior r;t l t olt ct tt is l tot lltt"'oltct t" cit llo'. Wc tlotl't scrrs<lIi11'
.,1.,c,.t of
t()nl('ltt\. l{,rtlrcr, tlrt'rr()l)()\lll()ll.ll (()llt('lll lirvt's tlrt'(()llt('llt' ltot tltt'
cspcrrt'lttc
[)t'()l)()sttr,,lr.rl

1r[r1.tl.,rlllrt.t.rpt.rrt.rt'.Il()\lltl,,tlr,.'tt,r()\rlr(,ll,tl.,,t1.'tlll\('\\('llli.rllotlrt'rr'.tYttl('\l]('ll('ll(lllrl
Irrr,,,lVt.,lrrrllrt.lt.rvrrr',,,ltlr,rl\(n\ot\'('\l)('ll('t)(.',rr'lll,llt.'t',llt.tVt'tt,rtrlrt'tl\\'ll,ll\()('\'('1.

EPISTEMIC AGENCY

19g

inclination to believe, would be your awareness of your pain. This aware*

ness might play a proper role in yolrr cognitive dynanrics by giving rise to a
corresponding credence or belief.

z. That provides a way beyond the Agrippan trilenrilla pertaining to the

middle epistemic range populated by involuntary credences that forrn a
rational structure since sonle have their proper status by being based rationally on others. Pure experiences (such as experienced pains) in the region
of passivity can function as regress*stopping states that are not even perfornlances, and are hence unmotivated by reasons for which they are hosted.r'
perforrnance. This is true at least of
the constitutive awareness of a pain, the awareness ofit that you have sirnply
in virtue of suffering it. The pain is thus self-presenting since your constitutive awareness ofit comes necessarily with the pain itself. And the pain is not
nrotivated by any reason. (Here we foc:tts on physical pain, which occurs for a
reason-a cut or a bruise, etc.-but is not nrotivateci by reasons for which you
suffer it. Enrotional pains seenr irnportantly different, but we put those aside.)
Pains adrtrit not only constitutive ar,vareness, horvever, but also noticing
awareness. We apply concepts to our pains. We think of thern as pains, and
indeed as pains of various sorts. Think now of a hypochondriac who takes
his inragined pains to be real, or confuses with pain what is at nlost cliscomfbrt and not pain. Suppose he is near the region where pain shades ofrinto
cliscornfort, a region where he is often mistaken. I)oes he know that he is
really in pain sirnply because this tinre it is in fact a pain that is nraking it
seenr to hinr that he is in pain? IrJot plausibly.?
Even your awareness ofsuch

a state is

not

D. 'What Sort of State Can Constitute

a Rational Basis?

I.

Let us pausc ancl step back. We have posited various nrental states as cognitively rclcvant ancl takcr) note of thc cognitive nrincl-world relations that

(r.

Ilcrc l ;rll tlirkirrg ol'rr n,lr"nl;rl (.irsc, r()t tlr;t ol'st'lf -irllit tctl prrins, ',vlricll irrtl'otluccs irrclcv;lllt ( ()tlr[)lit ,rliOils.
'7. ()tll lt\'lr,rrlt.rtt,ltl.tr'r1l11' ts.rktn lo tltt'srt'.klt',1 lrt'r pr,tltlt.rn lirr uir,,cnrst ilrtcrrrrrlisnt.
Artolrlt'trrof tlttssort.rlrrllt'slrol lrl()('\l)('r ,'r,.'lt,rrt',llrt'ltt'1 ,)l(t('(l('ll(,'.rl,,,ut lllt'stt.t. lrt.lolt'

zoo

EPISTEMIC AGF,NCY

EPISTEMIC AGENCY

they enable. At one end are passive doings and other self-presenting nrental
states. These attract the subject to assent willy-nilly. They could properly
give rise to such attractiotr irr either of two ways. 'What onc is attracted to
believe is perhaps that one is in such a state, as when a headache attracts one to
believe that onc x{Jbrs a headachc. One thus seenrs to suffer a headache and it is
precisely the suffering ofthe headache that properly gives rise to the seeming.
Does one have r reason for that seeming, a reason for which one is then
attracted to accept that one suffers a headache? Surely one does, yet one's
being attracted for that reason does not require a separate awarelless that one

aches-a belief, perhaps, that one aches-based on which through

mttdus

one could collle to beiieve that one does ache, or at least to be attracted
to believe accorclingly. This is out of the question, since it would require that
one have already formecl the belief that one aches. Rather, the rational basing
must involve as a basis the headache itsele which nrust provide the motivating
basis for the seemiug, for the attraction to assent. This attraction must then
vie with whatever else rnight bear motivationally on rr''hat to think about
whether one is in pain (as opposed to discomfort). Out of the clash of such
vectors a resultant rvill enrerge (including as a linritins case the null vector).
That resultant vector will correspond to a resultant seeming or attraction.
Concerning the headache, the resultant vector will be a credence ofa certain
magnitude, perhaps a positive credence with high nragnitucle.
That is one way in which one rnight properly derive a credence with
high rnagnitude. But one rnight do so in a quite different wa|, where the
mental state that attracts one to asserlt has itself a propositional content. It
nright for exinrple be a visttal experience as if one sees a white and square
surface. Now one nray be attracted to accept notjust that one has such a vistual experience, but also that one does see such a surface. And again we need
to aliow that the visual experience can be self*presenting, so that its sheer
presence can provide a rational basis for the corresponding seerning that
one sees such a surface. That is to say, its ability to attract our assent need
not be rnediated by propositional awareness of it in turn. Seernings that are
based thus perceptually or experientially nright then vie with other rational
forccs-rational seemings or attrctions to assent. ()ut c>f this clash wotrlcl
emerge a resultant seerlrinq, a c:redencc whose nr;rgnituclc c'an lrc high.
p()nens

z. Wc llavc

survcyccl lt<lrv yott t'n finrction shrlrt of conscious frcc clroicc

lrigll nr:lunirrrtlc to tllc cfict'r tlr:rt p. Srrpp<lsc

you tltcn p,,st' tltt'tttt'sti,rr rt,llt'llrt'r'1.l MiRlrt yr)u ('\rlit itly t,rkt' llott'of'

s():ts to:tr-rttirc':t t'rcrlcnt'c of

201

your high degree of confidence-of your credence of high nragnitudeand apply a policy that calls for afiirming that p basecl on such a credence?
Might you apply your poiicy through a practical sylloisnr?
No, that is a blind alley. As we have seen already, all three ofthe Agrippan
options are precluded if we restrict ourselves to the region of endeavors.
Free judgntents cannot gain epistemic status arbitrarily, with no rational
basis for the gain. Nor can there be a set of free judgnrenrs each of which
derives its epistemic propriety entirely through rational basing upon other
rnernbers of the set. It does not really nratter whether the set is finite (the
case of circularity) or infinite (the case of infinite regress). In neither case is
it plausible that such a set could attain, in that purely set-internal way, epistemic propriety for its urember beliefs. In neither case could those n1en1ber beliefs attain thus the required episternic justification, a specific sort of
trortnative status required in a belief if it is to constitute knowledge. That
is to say, in neither case would such a status be attained-through such
nlere nrutttal interrelation-for the set's rnember beliefs. It is particularly
implar-rsible that such status could be earned in that set-internal way for
beliefs about an external world beyond the subject's nrind, despite the isolation of the whole set frorn that surrounding world. And the reievant "isolation" is the rational-basis isolation that would deprive onr fiee judgments
of any epistenric reliability.
But why should that spoil the practical syllogisnr for explaining how
judgments cran be formed freely and foundationally?
Here is why. 'We saw earlier why rationally supportive states are
lteeded beyond freely deternrined judgnrents. We need such reasons, so
as to escape foundational arbitrariness. But once we see why we need
such regress stoppers, it is clear why we nrust restrict how a free judgrnent can be "properly based" on such a reason. This basing cannot be
of the sort that involve s juclgnrental awareness of the basis, along with
belief that such a basis brings with it the truth of the belief to be based on
it. Tlris would involve modus pottcns reasoning, with freely judged premiscs arld a freeiy judged cove ring belief. And that rvould not escape the
rcsiolt tlf frcccloltt it-l the rvay rcquired. We would still need to consider
tlrc cristcrlllit'status r>Fthc frccly trcigccl prcnrises (and perhaps also that
of tlrc f rccly.j u rlucrl r'ovcri rr scr lcr:rl i za tior r).
Stl tlt;rt ('itttlrot lrt'r'iglrt. lnstr';rtl, lvc;rlrc;rl to tlrc fiurr'tionll statc itsclfts
,r r';rtion;rllr.rsis. Wt.sr.ur tlrt'tlivitlr.[rr.trvt'r'n tlrc rt.gion of-fi-ccrlonr:urrl tlrc
I't'tiot of'littt( lt(tnurrl\ Wc ltrr',rl..t',r lcl,r(iorr ol r,rliorr,rl l,rsirrri tlr,rt ,rll,,rt,s
r)

lil'lS l liM I(l A(;EN(lY

EPISTLMIC ACHN(,Y
a basis

within the region of functionings

f<rr a free

judgnrent in the region

of freedorn.

That is w'hy we appeal to transregional rational basing. Such basing spans

the border between two epistenric regions of nrental states: the region of
functioning and the region of freedonr; and sinrilar reasoning reveals how
useful it is also at the border between the region of passivity and the region
of functioning.

E. The Importance of Competence

L

So rnuch for the crucial place of tratrsregional rational basing in the

hurnan cognitive ecollomy. Horvever, our reasoning also highlights the
importance of collrpetence for the epistenric justification that is cortstirutive ofknowledge. Sornetirnes the rational propriety ofa credence does not
plausibly clerive entirely ifat ail fronr rational basing. Pertinent here are the
beliefs of super-blinclsighters, as well as our sinrplest arithnretic, geonretric,
and logical beliefi;, and other sinrple beliefs that require no rational basis.
What nlatters for the episternic propriety of these various bcliefs is in good
part sirnply that they derive fronr p:'oper episternic c:onrpetenc:e, which iu
these cases need not be reason basecl. Although hunran belief is very often
cornpetent through rational basing, it might also bc collrpetent through
subpersonal nreans. It is presunrably through subpersonal means that the
blindsighters know. Also indirect is the knowleclge that ovcr two seconds
have elapsed since one awoke, as one lies in berd about to get trp.8
Our reasoning pertains notjust to the unctional justification of rational
perfornrances within the regicln of proper functionin{. It pertains also
to the deontic justification of rational pe rfornrances within the rcgion of

8. What seenls here strbpersonal is the process wherreby olre is attrrrctetl t<l asscnt tcl thc relcvtnt
propositional content. The atmaction itselt'ofcourse rteetl not be stttrpersonal. Stilllacking irr
this crse is any crxpcricri1 statc analoqorrs lo onc's visu:rl expcricrrcc lrs of'a firc, siry, rlr l llrtntl,
etc. Very plausibly one nriqht insi-st tht rrtl r'licf'cart bc jtrstificd grorrntllcssl),, rvllich'uvr>trltl
seerrr particularly pllrrrsible whcn rrrplicrl to frtr{rrttctrl,t/ (:rs oprosctl to frnctior.rl) bclicf.
Tlrcre wotrLl always llc u rrior ittlclltltttl rr'r'rtrittg ()r'irttru('ti()n t() ;r\scr)t, olr'tlct.rclt.tlrlc fi'oltr
the firll-tlcdrcd l)clicf , sirlr.c r'oll;rtt'r;rl rcrsonirrg rrriglrt llrr"'r'blot kt'..1 till l,clrcl, ;rs rvitll tllc
solrrtion t() ir l);u';t(l()x. likc tlrc I i,rl or tllc Solrtt's. Altlr,rrrrilr I t,rkc tltis to lrc tlrt' rrglrt r,ir'rv ol
tlrc Itt:(tcr', I sttlrpt-t'rs i( lrt'r't'fill'.r strrlrlt'r ('\l)()\rll()n, ()n('ln,rtlrli.rlrlt'ul,lut'(()ur\('tlll() tl)('
rrt,rr

.'solrltrstrt.rlctl\'.ul.rrl llt.rl rlrllirr'. rrrtcllr'tltt.rlr.'tnrnirllrt'rlrlolrt'r r,rlrot.rltolr'.

203

responsible free judgrnent. T'ruc cnough, the conrpetences pertinent to

the latter, to free endeavors, c:rur:ially involve the will, as Descartes saw so
clearly in recogn rzinga vt>litional f,rctrlty of free judgnrent, along with his
function al faculty of cliv i ncly cletcrrni n ed u ndersta ndins.
Flowever, nlere corrcsp()nclcnce betrveen a credence or belief and a
given, self-presentin4 statc-rlrere coincidence of content-wiil not suffice for the epistenric justification that knowledge requires. Take the correspondetrce between n)y sutrjcctivc visual field with ten speckles and my
direct belief that there arc tcn spcckles in that visual field. That correspondence fact does not suflice to ensure that nry belief is epistemically justifiecl.
In addition, relevant conrpcltencre is also required. My ability to subitize
rnust extend to the case of ten itenrs, which it is fbr fronr doing.
The phenonrenl of blindsight ancl tirne perception nrake it doubtful,
nloreover, that foundationalisnr nlust rely essentially on pre-beliefpsychological stetes based on which one can believe rationally. Although the conrpetence relevant to knowledge cran operate based on such states-states of
pain, for example, or of basic visual experience-it need rlot clo so. Again,
it can also operate by nreans of subpersonal nrechanisms that yield belief or
credence directly through causal inputs via light, open eyes, and a brain ancl
nervous systern that enable responsive ancl discrinrinative belief.
The like seenls true in addition about "introspective" knowledge. What
coulcl preclude direct, reliable knowledge of one's own nrentai ciispositions? Even rnental self-knowle'clge nrieht tre secured thus through direct
conlpetence, with no prior guiding awareness.

z. Recall why circuiarity and regress seern vicious regardless of whether

we restrict ourselves to free judgrrtents or include also rational functionings. It seenrs out of the question that r whole set ofjud[4rner1ts or beliefs or
credences could all be epistenricallyjustified or conlpetent sinrply in virtue
of their rational basing interrelations. Again, this is nrade implausible by
the following two considerations: first, that epistemic justification could
not be wholly isolated front truth; second, that such a set with its rational
intcrrclrtions cotrlcl bc rclcvantly isolatecl frortr truth, which would deprive
its lllernrbcrs r>f full trstiflcltion, n() nlattcr how well they nray interrelate.
Evcn intrir'lltc, rutionll intcrrcl:rtions within such a sct rr'tt) still be out of
touc'lr witll lrorv llrolr;rbly truc tl)c nrcnrbcrs rurry bc. An intricatc story held
irr rlrc nintl of':t ut'c.tt n,rv.'list r'ortltl lrost ntut'lr r;ttionrl irtrcrrcllttion with
Iro vt'stigc ol't-t'lt'v.urt trutlr. A llovt'list tlt't.uttl('(l t'ttottrllr t() st.rrt bclit'virrg

EPISTEMIC AGEN(]Y

204

EPISTEMIC AGENCY

his story would not thereby attain a status required for knowledge, that of
competently justified belief. And this carlnot be remedied simply through
the addition of nrembers, of further beliefs, not even unto infinity.
The rernedy favored by many requires relations to g;iven, self-presenting
states in the region of epistemic passivity. We do seern to stop the regress
ofjustification through such foundations, since these given, self-presenting
states are not of a sort to be justifiecJ, nor do they need to be justified in order
to provide justification for further credences or beliefs based upon them. We
might moreover thereby obtain the required relation to the world beyond
belieft and credences, since such self-presenting states are thernselves part of
that world beyond, ancl since they rrght in acldition provicle a reliable channel to the world altogether external to the subject's nrind.

3. Even if that all seems right, what does not seenl right is that only through
the postulation of stich foundationally basing, self-presenting mental states
could we secure the relevant relations of truth reliability to the world beyond
our nrinds. Might there not be subpersonal nrechanisms that equally reliably
relate our beliefs to that external world? Cases of biindsight and of tirrr,e perception show this to be rnore thanjust a collc:eptuai possibility.'
Moreover, we now have reason to reconsider the status of contentful
'We
had placed these in the region of epistemically
sensory experiences.
non-functional passivity, where the sutrject is in no $/ay an epistertric agent.
That region supposediy lies beyond the region of epistenric functionings, sonle rationally rnotivated by others, even if no mere functioning is
freely determinerl. But now we have found reason to countetrance such
finctionings-of the blindsighted, for exanrple, and of our titrre perceivers-that have no basis in the region ofpassivity, since they are based on no
proper nrental states at all. Thus. the credences of the blindsighted requirc
no nlental basis at all. They derive rather fronr sttbpersonal states involving
transmission of energy from the environnrent through the subject's receptors and his brain and nervous svstenr, where this all happens subpersonally
yet in soille way that is episternically cronrpctent ancl truth reliablc.

205

Such subpersonally conrpetent credences can thus gain proper epistemic sta-

tus, and can provide an epistenr.ic basis for further credences, and eventually'
even for free judgments. Contentful sensory experiences rre hence not properly
consigned to the region ofpure epistemic passivity; they deserve a place in the

region of functionings. For they too derive fronr subpersonal inputs through
the subject's brain and rlervous systenr, and they too can be nlore or less truth
conlpetent, There is hence no rational obstacie to locating them in the region
of functionings, along with credences and seernings, even if these latter distinctively involve concepts. Credences (and seenrings), it is true, distinctively
involve sonle stricter application of concepts. They rnight hence still deserve to
be distinguished fronr sensory experiences, irt that their contents are immediateiy available to serve as premises for conscious reasoning. Experiences by contrast may not be inrnrediately available for such conlpetent reasoning, not even
throtigh the use ofdenronstratives.'o This is a lesson ofthe speckled hen probiem.
Nevertheless, experiences can still be conrpetentiy veridicai, manifesting thus a
kind ofperceptual competence on the part ofthe perceiver. This distinguishes,
for exarnple, those with good, sharp vision frotn those not so well endowed.

F. The Self-Presenting
We earlier found a stopping place for the regress of justification r,vith passive
states, physical pains anrong thern. "Pains do have propositional content,"
cornes the reply, "anLl can hence be assessed episternically at least to the
sanle extent as perceptual experiences." This controversial issue we can
avoid, ifwe make sonle further distinctions.

r. We have already recognized that perceptual experiences are inherently

epistemic. Some are representational and can hence be assessed as vericlical or as illusory. But it is less plausible that pains, and especially itches,
rr pattenl thrrt to nlc lls rc-lisiorrs sisnificance, so that I can recognize it, and store
bclicti witll t'onr'cpts that ctlrrcsp<',nrl t() tllrlt vistrl plttcrll . To vou that pattetn might be
-just;r strriuglc. lrr tllis c;sc rrry lrclicfi clul fcatrrrc tlrat pirttcrn itsclf il their content in a rvay

ro. Take

9. Morcovcr, ()ur sirrrrlcst llclicli ol'lorit. ;tritlltttc(it., .urrl g('()nl('trv plovitlc lttltllcr c.\iltlllllcs rvlrcrc firtrrrl:rtiorrrl [rclit'l\,r(t.rrrr t'pis(t'rrrit.jrrstrfir'.rtroll rvrtlt nrt lrt'lp fiorrr lrrc-lrclit'l
scll' rrcst'trlirr11, grvcn lrrclrt,rl \l,tt('\. Mr'rt' rtrrlt'tsl.rntlirrr', tl.rrrrrltlr' lit\'('\ ttt tltt' .l( ( ('\\

\r'r'llt't',I lo tlrt'rt'lt'r,,rrrl scl ol rrrrrrlt'lrtllts,

r

rr

l,l,'t

rl .rtt,ltt t1', lt.tst',1

lrt'ltt'ls.

Ptrrr'111'11

\\'('.r('rt'lr.rl,lt','tt,tttqlt itt stl,lr

llrt is n ot v; ilrrblc t () \'()lr. A s yott look ;r\\ly ll'olrl t llc stltt iqglc 'tltrr priclr belief is accessible
llrrorrglr "tlrt'stlrrigglt' I.irrst ostt'rrrlt'rl " or tltc likc. lly ('()ntr:tst, I t'ltrl filrget lttxv I rcqtrirerl
rrrr,lrclicf rvi(ll n.r rlt'trilrrcnt to rls lirll (()r)l('nt tlt;( I t;ur n()w lc(:rilt il) st()t'rlg('. I lrriglrt fitl'
t'x.rrrrtl.'l('l.ilD.ttl illrl)r)lt.tnl r('lll',t()lt\ lrt'lrt'l ttl tlrr'r'lli'r t tll.t ilrl.ttltt's Ol tll,rt l)irltclr) ilr'('
u'ortlrl'()l \'('n('r.rlrr)n Ilrr'lolllr('r \or t ol stllnl,,ill, lt,'lt<'1, u'rtlr rts ltrrlcll'.lctt,trlslr,rtivt'/
I,1,'tt.,tI ,,,trl('nl. \\, 'ultl ur',ulltr r,'nl lV n,rttl ',lr,tut 1,,',lY r'l lrcltt l',
t

206

EPIS'I'IrM

EPIS'I'EMIC] AGENCY

are plausibly enough interpreted as having such content. So, we nright

prefer to suspendjudgrnent on pain representationalisn. For exantple, one
rnay well cloubt that a headache or even a foot ache has any distinctive
content such as "darage" of any sort. True, the footache does collle with
an inherent representation of an ostensible body part, which does seenr a
representational foot in the door.

IC AGEN(lY

is not dependent on their own epistenric status, which can be

detriment to their serving

as bases

207

lowly with no

fur further beliefs.

j. Maybe pains and itches are ontologically active in epistemic respects,

maybe not. In any case therre are phenonlena nrore fully passive through
lack of representational content. How about being consciotts, where this
spans

wakeful and drearn

states? Does the state

ofbeing thus conscious have

2. The fallback, fuller answer is one that can apply to all three itertrs: to

representational content?

clearly representational sensory experiences, itches, ancl pains, as well as to

other bodily sensations, and even to nrental phenoruetla generally, whether
representational or not. We need a notiorl of a nrental state that, whether
active or passive, whether representational or lrot, cln serve as an episternic
basis for belief, without so servin4 only depenclently on its own prior episternic status. Such states are thus "passive" in the sense that it is not their
successful and/or c:onrpetcnt epistcrnic: activity-if thcrc is any such-that
suits thern for serving as a proper basis for further epistenric perfbrnrance.
Any rnental state or rct that can thus serve as a basis would be relevantly
passive. That is to say, even if it is active, it is not its status as sttccessful or
conlpetent that bears on its qualifyins as a proper basis ftir epistenric perforrnance. A-false, unjustified belief can still serve as a perfectly fine basis for the
believer's justified belief that he holds that beliefl

6. Flowever we settle those questions, it now seenls dialectically

3. Of

course, once we realize this, it

will

be plausible enough that even free

ofjudgnrent or choice nright play a relevantly "passive" role. They too

can serve as bases for epistenric perfbrlnlnce withor.rt their suitability for
so serving depencling on their own epistetnic success or evell colnpetence.
acts

4. As that suigests, the episternic categorization relevant to the Pyrrhonian

problematic is hence not so nruch ontological as epistenrically functional. In
particular, there can be resress stoppers at each of the three re4ions clistinguished ontologically: (a) that ofpassivity, (b) that offunc:tiortiugs, ancl (c) that
offree encleavors. W.hat is distinctive of the occupants of (a) is that there is nir
possible confusion of a sort that renrains possiblc for the othe-'r two rcgiotts.
Since occupants of (a) are rlot relevantly aeeutial, there is tto tcrrtrtltit)n t()
think that the regress has not stoppccl with thenr fi.rr the rclsor) that wc ncc:cl
to assess thcir orvn pe:rfirnnancre erpisternicaily. Eithcr (i) thcy arc Il()t cvcrl rltus
asscssal-llc, as in tllc c:lsc ofphcrrorrrcrrllly lc't'cssilrlc nrcntll srltcs tllrt rtrc not
cvcr) rc[)r"csort;rtionll, srrclr rs itclrcs pcrlrrps, or clsc (ii) cvcrr if'rcprcscttt;ttion;rl, tlrcir';rlrility to fiurt'tiorr rnrpt'r'ly,rs c'ristt'rnic

lr.rst's

firr fin'tllt'r'bc'lit'fi

less

irnpor-

tant whether there are nlany, or even any, occuparlts ofthe region ofpassivity.

Here is what now seenrs the crucial point for our project: For epistemological purposes we can suspend judgrnent on whether the region of passivity
is ernpty or not. Actually, this had already seenred a relatively unirnportant
question, since even blindsighters can stop the regress while devoid of any
relevant passive states on which they can epistenrically base their beliefs. It is
cornpetence that really nratters fundanrentaliy, by stopping the reryess when
the competence is foundational and does not iuvolve rational basing.

G. Choice, Judgment, and Freedom

r. Our distinction

between two sorts of epistemic agency, the free versus

the unfree, bears on the Agrippan trilenrnra wielded by Pyrrhonian skeptics,
which we took up as follows. First we distinguished choices ancl judgrnents
that are fronr those that are not free. On sorne ostensible options the agent is
not plausibly fre e to choose. I do llot take myselfto be free to choose to take nry
pen right now and stick it deep into nry right eye. I anr perhaps free to do so [
I so cltttose. My arnr is free, rrty grip goocl, nly pen available, rny ainr fine, and so
on. But I do not believe I can now make that choice. I..Ior do I find it plausible
that, given nry actual present situation, I could in the next rninute choose to
clivorcc rny wife. Of course, had I been difrerently situated, or in bad enough
psychol<>gic:a1 shape, then I rnight well have been able to do so. But given rny
prcscnt shapc ancl situation, in nry jtrdgnlent I anr not able to so choose noq
rrot rc:rlly. ()n t:klscr irtsrcc:ti<ln tllc sc:opc of frcc c:hoicer se:r)llls narrt>wer than
rrriglrt h:rvc:rppcrrrccl on u t'sturl first l<lok. llut tlris is firr fit>nl shc>win that
lvc lr:rvc no fl't't'tlonl of't'lroir'c w'lrlttcvcr. Wc rl<l sccrrr fl'cc to t'lloosc wltcrt
w(':u-('r'.rtiorr.rlly rctlrritt'rl to t'lrrost'lrt'trvt't'n tw() rtptiotts nr'itlrcr of-rvllit'lr is

208

EPlSTEMlC] AGENCY

preferable to the other. From the tirn"e we choose which shoe to put on first as
we arise in the mornin4, to the tinre we choose which to renove first as we

retire, we face such choices at nrany turns. C)n many options f?lcecl in an ordinary day, nroreover, even when there are good reasons in favor of choosing a
certain way (unlike the case of the shoes), there will often be countervailing
reasons, and it will be up to usjr,rst how to strike a balance.
The case ofjudgrnent is different fronr that of choice in that there is no
'When tire weight of the evidence
such thing as proper arbitrary judgnrent.
favors neither the aflirmative nor the negative, one cannotjudge arbitrarily,
not properly. One nust rather suspencl. When the balance of reasotrs favors
neither choosing to put the right shoe on first nor choosing not to do so,
however, one can properly choose either way, arbitrarily.

That is one reason why it rnight seenr initially that the scope for free
choice far exceeds the scope for free judgrnent. It nright seem that there is
no scope for proper arbitrary judgrnent rn'hereas there is plenty of scope for
proper arbitrary choice. Since we are bound to be rational except when special forces drive us to irrationality, we are thus apparently forced to juclge as
we do whenever we do judge. Either we are subject to the force of reason,
or we are subject to some irrational force, to sonle bias, perhaps, or to sonr.e
culturally derived superstition. Choice and judgnrent difrer in that regard.
Choice can be very broadly arbitrarl without being irrational, so it can be
freely nrade with no need of force whether rational or irrational.
That does reveal a vast difference betweett choice and judgment in
respect of freedom. Nevertheless, we enjoy broad freeclonr both for choice
'We
need only recall how often we freely conclude deliband forjudgnrent.
'We then decide whether to accept that the balance
pondering.
eration or
of reasons sufficiently favors either side over the other, Very often, on issues
both weighty and trivial, it is up to the agent which way to turn.

z. An anim al/refrective clistinction may be helpfui at this juncture. Pienty

of general animal beliefs are acquired through childhoocl as orlr brain
develops and our culturai identty is formed. ()ther beliefs are acquirecl
later and renrain in storage cveu after wc forget how thc,y wcre) accltrirecl.
Both early and late, anirual bcliefs c:att gtticlc t>ttr c<>nduc:t subcc>rtsc:it>ttsly,

whcther tlle c:onclur:t bc plrysicrl or intcllcctrtul. llirtscs, firr c:xtttrlc,

('elt guiclc cvcn s()nrc()r)c wllo r,vorrlrl rr'jcr't thcnl wlrcrt brottgllt [o t'onsr'iorrsncss. Strt'lr gtntling irrrplit'it lrt'lir'fs;rrc ofictt lrt'yotttl tltc control
of-orn't'orrst'ious ll't't',rt{('n('y.'l llt'v ,ttt'.tt lt',rst not untlt' tllc tlil'r't'( r'olltl-ol
ol',r sirrrilt'lr,','.lroitt'. Wr',,lrn()l ( lt,tttri,'tltt'ttt tlt,rt \\',rv. l'lrs is tttt('lrolll

EPISTEMiC AGENCY

209

of the deep general beliefs acqr-rirecl through norrnal child developrnent and
of our constant flow ofperceptual beliefs.
Our distinction has aninral, action-guiding beliefs on one side, and
reflective judgments on the other. This distinction is akin to one between
deep biases and conscious, sincere suspension of judgrnent. Pyrrhonists
who avowedly suspend judgment need not be disavowing aninral beliefs
beyond their control. They nray only be fbrbearing from endorsing thenr
consciously and freely. The distinctions are sinrilar even if the bigot disavows his bias whereas the skeptic need not disavow his anirnal belief, he
need only forbear fom endorsing it through conscious judgrnent,
That is not to say that free judgrnent always diverges frorn animal belief,
Suppose we add a long colurnn in our heads as we view it on a piece ofpaper.
We rnay do so flawlessl andyet distrust ourcomputation and refuse to endorse
'We
the result.
consider whether to trust it and decide against doing so. Suppose
we next use pencil and paper. Now we rlray consider anew whether to trust our
result. And here again it is up to us, In this way we can control our beliefs. Ifwe
freely adopt and store the resuit ofour cronlputation, that can guide our conduct
in the ftlture, even after we have forgotten the source of our beliel
That is a case where we seenl freely responsible for the relevant belief.
But there are plenty of cases where present consc:ious reasoning is unable to af{ect entrenched beliefs acqr-rired through past childhood or
present perception. Recall the case of cleeply entrenched bias that is sincerely disavowed at the surface of consciousness. This suggests that conscious endorsenlent need not be driven by a corresponding anirnal belief,

Note furtherrnore what would otherwise follow, irnplausibly, about the

Pyrrhonian skeptic: that he nrust be either a liar or self-deceived when he
professes to suspendjudgment on conlnronsense beliefs.
Our reasoning suggests a distinction between such aninral belief and
reflective, judgnrental belief. Aninral belief can be constituted by a stored
state that guides conduct subconsciousiy. l\eflective, judgmental belief, by
contrast, is a disposition to judge afiirnratively in answer to a question, in
the endeavor to answer correc:tly, 'uvith truth, reliabiy enough or even aptly.
And this "judtttent" thrt one is disposed to render is a distinctive conscious act or const:iously strstaincrcl state. [t is this act or state that is lvithin
tlttr frcc ('()lrtr()l rtlrou[:ts oftcn;tntl rs llltrsitlly ls arc the choic:es we nlake
orclin:rrily ;rrrtl t llr' r'ollst'ious ilrtclrti<lns tll:rt wc strstuin.
Nott'fill.rllv tltt'rt'r'uli,rr lv.ry irr wlriclr rvc tr-ct'ly t'ontrol sur'lr bclicfs.
Strppost'tllt'lclt'r',rnt 1,,'lrt'l is ('()nstiltrtivclv.r tlist,rsition to,tsst.rrt lr-r'r'ly

2ro

TlPISTEMIC AGENC

uporl consideration if one encleavors to answer correctly and aptly. Let us

now distinguish dispositions based on the will fron those that are passive.
A disposition can be passive because its host is no agent at all, as with the
solubility of a sugar cube. A disposition can aiso be passive even when the
host is an agent, but still passive with regard to that disposition, as when
you are disposed to kick your leg undcr the doctor's rnallet. By contrast,
a clisposition seated in the will can anlount to a freely chosen or sustained
policy. Take the policy of signaling your turns as you drive, This can lead to
a choice, conscious or subconscious, to signal on a certain occasion as you
approach a turn. The particular free choice then irnplernents the policy, the
freely chosen general conrnritnlerlt to signal your turns. You are disposed
to signal as you approach your turns, and your particular chosen signalings
are guided by that policy, and rnanifest that freely sustained disposition.
That sanle idea is applicable to the sorts of beliefs now in our focus.
These are supposedly dispositiorls to affirrn freely, and such a disposition can itself reside in the rvill; it can itself anrount to a freely adopted
evidential policy. These beliefs thus stand in contrast to anirnal beliefs
acquired through the unfree "autonl atc" proper functioning of our cognitive nrechanisms. The conrnitrnents now in otrr focus are intentions
acquired dif{erently. They are instead chosen freely, so that the "mechanisnl" is itself voluntary. Our free'ly chosen commitrnents govern our
free judglxents when we consciously rveigh a question in the light of
all the reasons synchronically in view. Sorre inquirers are more careful, rnore conservative, than others. Their will to believe is on a tighter
leash, even when driven disinterestedly by the search for truth.
In addition to such will-involving conrrnitnlents, however, inuoluntary
competences of reasoning can also bear on ourjudgnlents. These involuntary
competences involve proper functioning built into our brains as we nlature
intellectually. Ofcourse these woulcl not themselves be freely chosen. By contrast, our voluntary dispositional beliefi are freely acquirecl and sustained, as
when one acquires and sustains the beliefthat SteveJobs was brilliant trut rnorally flawed. This involves a free choice to jr-rcige affinnativcly upon bringing that question to nrind, pcnding further relc:vant c:viclcncc, pnrviclccl wc
are ainring to get it aptly ri{rht. This rolic:y cr) bc chrrsccl, ;rsuin ficcly ancl
ratir>nally, if ncw cvirlcnt'c tlocs t:onlc to light. ()nc will rrcccl to wcislt tlrc
rrcw cvitlcnt'c llonrt'uvitlr wlr;rtcvcr otlrcr rclcv:urt rcirs()ns rtr;ry bc in vicw, :rncl
rlcr'itlc' wlrctlrcr-to t'll;tngt'()n('s llclicf : tlr;rt is t() s;ry. rvltctlrcr to t'lt;trtgc ol)c':i
"lrolir'y" lo.urs\vt'r ir tlrr',rf lir rrr.rti,"'t', to ont'st'lf ,;rrrtl to of llt'ts rvllt'n sin('('l'('.

lil'IS I llMl(l AGtiNCY

H.

2II

Is There No Safe Retreat from

the l)etermined Skeptic?

Are we now landed once again irt a sirrrilar predicantent? The skeptic could
after all replicate his doubts on thc sc'cond order. He could put irr question
our trust in our own second-orde'r crornpetence while touting the quality
of his corresponding selGtrust. Once again it would seenl stubbornly irra*
tional to just take our side with no supporting reasons. Rationality would
seem to require reasons synchronically avaiiable to ns, if we are to sustain
our self-trrlst properly against the doubt of clur opponent.
Is it irrational to ignore such an opponent? That depends on the context,
What else requires our attention at the titne? Suppose we put aside practical considerations. Even so, what other intellectual or epistenric concerns
require our attention at the tinre? There rnay surely corne a tinre when we
do best intellectually to insist on our side of a controversy based simply on
self-trust. Ancl our judgment on the lower order may also be well-enough
renderecl, as is requir:ed if that judernent is to constitute knowledge.
A knowledge-constitr-rtivejudgrnent neecl only avoid relevant epistemic flaws,
even ifit could still be enhancecl through further scrutiny and reasoning.
Take two opponents who proceed alike with equally plausible justification, Suppose thenr to be on a par as concerns any consciotts reasoning
they ernploy or nright easily en1ploy. Each considers hinrself reliable on
the question dividing thenr. Each has better things to clo than to resolve
their disagreenlent, rnoreover, even consiclering just intellectual or epistenric concerns. To this extent, accordingly, the two are equally rational in
agreeing to disagree, in carrying on with their intellectual lives. Flowever,
this does not entail that they are on a par epistenrically in doing so, nor
tlrat their beliefs, and their correspondingjudgnlents on the first order, are
cclually well justified epistemically, if what we pick out by such "justificarion" is the nornrative status requisite for knowledge." One ofthe disagreeing trcliefs nray be nruch betterjustified epistenrically than the other.
Thosc opponents are strikingly sinrilar in the ways cletailed. Despite
tlnt, onc of thcnr nrly trust hirlrsclf otr a {irr bcttcr cliachronic trasis than

rs llrt'sl.rtn\ "l)r(kr'.1 or1" Iry "t'llistt'rrrir'.jtrstilir',rtior," rvlriclr rlot's not rrrc';ul tll;rt tlris
('\l)t('s\t()n r\ lo Irc rlt'lrtt,l.rr "lll('\l.lltts t't'rttirt'tl Iirr tr()l)()sitttrtl.rl kon'lt',1{c." All tlrirrris
t,rrrstlt'rt',l, lrrr1',,-ll 1'rllcr .rt,'rnrrrr,tl,t',y'ol "tr)nrl)('l('n(t"'lor tlt.rl rl,,lut

l. l'll,t

EPISTEMIC AGENCY

212

'We

cannot ascend infinite ladders of synchronic endorsement. At sorne point our defense must rest, and it will then matter how
weil founded our relevant dispositions nlay be. At some point we will have
reached the end of the synchronic line. Only diachronic factors might then
bear episternically on the self-trust resident on that level, and those factors must be given their due. If you reason no more and no less well than a
given opponent, at a certain level ofreflection, but the two ofyou stiil difrer
epistenrically in the quality of your relevant diachronic dispositions, this
rnust be allowed its proper bearing in assessing your relevant judgments and
beliefs. Yor"r rnight now be well advised to stiffen your spine and move on.
As we have seen, lve rise above the animal level through eudorsement
based on reasons within our synchronic purview. This does not mean that
we depiorably fall short as reflective humans if unable to reach infrnite levels
of reflection available at most to the infinitely onrniscient. First of all, ought
implies can no less for episternic than for nroral agency.'' Besides, suppose
we could ascend to a higher level yet, under the prompting of disagreement
on a given level. And suppose our relevant beliefs would be epistemically
enhanced by success in this further endeavor. Even so, the better is not necessarily the obligatory. Our belief nright be irnprovable episternically through
such ascent without being so nruch as.flawcd even ifwe clecline to ascend, and
even if we do not so nruch as considcr ascending. We rnight just have better
things to do epistenrically than to defend our treliefon that higher plane.'3
does the other.

"No less," I siry, leaving roolll fbr inrpoltant and subtle issues on the way in which and the
extent to which tl-re ciictunl does rpply even itr the nroral realnr.
r3. This conclucling stance gains plirusibility when we distinguish between (a) positive suspension of belief and (tr) sinrply not seriously considering a questiorl, even wich that question
before our nrinds. The latter is i rethsal to go turther into the nlatter ofwhat attitucle to take
to that question, even the ttitutlc of suspending.
Moreovero it might just be that proper hunran cognitive practice requires no such clefense.
Given all the tracleofii involved in hulrran flourishing (incluciing the cognitive conlponents
of such flourishing), perhaps otrr cognitive practice reqrrires no such lhrther ascellt, despitc
the cognitive enhancement that r,vould supervene upon it. This raises crestions. sonre clearly
non-trivial. What is cognitive practice? What is coqnitivc prlctice? [s there l single hunran
such practice part ofa "hurrran fbmr oflife"? Or are there (nlso?) crrlttrrally specific practices that
bear (as well) on a kincl oi episteruiciustifrcation available to nrcnrbers of'the relevant cultrrrc?
Do all such practices have proper nornrtive bearing, or is tlrere rootl firr illusion in thent, arrtl
even for superstition, at least in the culturally spccitic oncs? T'llis ge rtcral aprroitclr rtiqht rcvcrrl
varieties of epistenticiustificatiou spc:cifrc to spccics ()r cvcn t'rrlturcs. cvc'lr if'tlrcy rrll shrrrc
inrportant stnlctulill sirnilr'itics and;t r'otntnon inl rrt rclillrlc lrttrilrnc'rtl of'trutll. Anlrclruir'
inttritions nligllt tllcrr rcflcct orrr r'onulritnl('uts to srt'll pr:rt'ticcs. lvltctlrt'r'lllcst',u'r'irr'r,itrrlrlc
thlorrgh rlornlulclrikl tlcvek.'pnlcn( or irrlrilrctlrvitll tlrc r'ulturt'. ( ii','cll tlt.rt illtrsitur,tttrl sttpcr'
stit ion .rt't':r ls. r.rt trtitt'tl itr llrrst' lv;rys. ll,rtvt'r't'l , tllcs<' rt',tr'tir't's rr',ttlrl r'('(llrr'('t'r'.tlu,tlion. Alttl
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