Els Ethics

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BY: HANNA DESEMBRANA
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NATURE AND CREATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

1. Regala vs Sandiganbayan, GR NO. 108939 September 20, 1996
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION,
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING
THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of the
contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based the sanctity of fiduciary
duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the
law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In
this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the
confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the
Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No.
33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." 1
Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara,
Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and
Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law
firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law
Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the
organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and
incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More
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specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client
documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank
representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering
said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire
information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As
members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted
in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with
the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings. 2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred to
as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended
Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as
party-defendant. 3 Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant
on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. 4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro
Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and
Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted,
devised, schemed conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the
use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led
to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than
twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel
Corporation shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned
investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately
fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of
UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among
the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders.
On the other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984. 5
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts with which their codefendants are
charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1 In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients,
defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio
A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of stock in the
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corporations listed under their respective names in Annex "A" of the expanded
Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as
such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.
4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of
Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business purposes not
related to the allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago
transferred any material interest therein and therefore denies that the "shares" appearing in
his name in Annex "A" of the expanded Amended Complaint are his assets. 6
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the
allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. 7
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October
8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion
as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. 8 The Counter-Motion for dropping
petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its client covering their respective
shareholdings. 9
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private
respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG
Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24,
1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit
dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a);
and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the
respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or reexamination of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had
he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying
the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required
by respondent PCGG. It held:
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ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for
whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis
for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco
has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause against
him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency
and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by
Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's
COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the
disclosures required by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party
defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same
treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and
joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to
Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit. 12
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners
ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to
the strict application of the law of agency.
II
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The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering

petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as
nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal,
the identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial
distinction as would make the classification reasonable under the equal
protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in
favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that,
under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers
from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the
PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes
the identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity
of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged
matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the
dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds
and with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the
equal protection of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991
resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially
the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33
grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his
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client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm.
Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by private
respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn
mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained
during such lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the
identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the
documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status. 13
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as
party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss
Civil Case No. 0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a notice of dismissal'," 14 and he has
undertaken to identify his principal. 15
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger fish"
as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a deal with
petitioners the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of
the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for
whom they have acted, i.e, their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis
for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein. (Emphasis ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled "Primavera
Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government" respondent PCGG, through
counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to
establish through the ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those subscription payments in corporations included
in Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and
deeds of assignment, some in the name of particular persons; some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
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ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers
that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of these
corporations who are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed
deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank
deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the
nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment
and some of these assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our
claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Conjuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth,
that most of thes e corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we say that?
One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of
incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they have no
permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are
care of Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of the
principal things that we would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called
themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint.
Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of
their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely
being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to
nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against
petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them
without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may
be compensated by honorarium or for hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom
reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to
the person who requested him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent
and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or
servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. 19 A
lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and
superior to those of an ordinary agent. 20 Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as
a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court 21 and exercises his judgment in the
choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
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Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe
life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by reason
of necessity and public interest 23 based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a
good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. 24
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any
other professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of
established and stable tradition. 25 In Stockton v. Ford, 26 the U. S. Supreme Court held:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than
that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully
discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of
morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding
spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be
used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it. 27
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of
his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course
of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorneyclient privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
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An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every
peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that:
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Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of
judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In
the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer
is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does
not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of
fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.
Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most
sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between
legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his
secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the
judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self
incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically
nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed
innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole spectrum
of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of
disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence
which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic
and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective
representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and
professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case,
the answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery 30 Under this premise, the
general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege
and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. 31
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
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First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is
flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged to
grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the
name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the
issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an
election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election
laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had
advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember whether her client
had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity
before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court's contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under
the circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client
was privileged.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those
instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the
client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the "Sandino
Gang," a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law
partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and
Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino on
behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of
the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the
case, held:
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A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where
the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of
such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice
was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a
matter of California law, the rule also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird
exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client
privilege. "In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the
law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec.
2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the client's identity and the nature of his fee
arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential communications. 36
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, 37 prompted the New York
Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client
because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by
respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought
action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the information
only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary
examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the
second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to
him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the
man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made
to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired
him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney is such cases is clearly the
attorney for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence
contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim against him. 38
xxx xxx xxx
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice
or assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to
any other matter proper for such advice or aid; . . . And whenever the communication made,
relates to a matter so connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford
presumption that it was the ground of the address by the client, then it is privileged from
disclosure. . .
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It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the
attorney in this case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the
courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending
against him as service of the summons on him has not been effected. The objections on
which the court reserved decision are sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, 40 the lawyer involved was required by a lower court to
disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the court's
request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with the
purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the State
Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he
represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in
establishing by such evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such
testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for
certain people, but that, as the result of communications made to him in the course of such
employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain transactions. We
feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of compelling an
attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature
of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a
suit against his client. 41
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner, 42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed
taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case
criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought
advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then being
undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the
sum of $12, 706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money
representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore,
Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that
Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did
not know their names, and declined to name the attorney and accountants because this constituted
privileged communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's
repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay
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sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on,
and with no government audit or investigation into that client's income tax liability pending. The court
emphasized the exception that a client's name is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning
the legal services rendered that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to possible investigation
and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here
money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had
not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The
names of the clients are useful to the government for but one purpose to ascertain which
taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or
several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that
more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a
feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But
it may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons
the attorney here involved was employed to advise his clients what, under the
circumstances, should be done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the
general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to
the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. 44 Moreover, where the
nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation
would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of
the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would
then reveal client confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal
that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged
client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which
is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be not attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific
conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
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(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and
set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of,
among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners'
legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers.
Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very
activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the
necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words
of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . .
crime." 47
An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an attorney
for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing illegal
activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and
consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same
cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not
the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if
the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible
action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield
for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in
the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter.
The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on
the commission of a crime. 48 The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed
and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such conditions no
case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to
disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information
could be made the basis of a suit against his client." 49 "Communications made to an attorney in the
course of any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be
drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to each other, are under the seal of
confidence and entitled to protection as privileged communications." 50 Where the communicated
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information, which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there would
be not much in the information known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except that
revealing the name of the client would open up other privileged information which would substantiate the
prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it
falls within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the
principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This
exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings 51 and Tillotson v. Boughner. 52
What these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to
a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend on
utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the building
of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one
which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and
litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be revealed
by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. 53 It follows
that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the
latter's identity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has
a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by
them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their
clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may
not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case the it
would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much
"communication" as information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication
which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing
himself to charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty,
competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to
make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon, 54 the US
Second District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its
client by helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client
hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled
that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special breed of cases that often
loosen normally stringent requirements of causation and damages, and found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v. Scheller 55
requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly
before the end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of work done. The court,
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however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his client into signing a
new fee agreement while settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client found a new
lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than what was originally offered.
Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon 56 famously attributed
to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus
deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's
loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship,
but extends even after the termination of the relationship. 57
Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the
lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting goddess,
demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to
accept respondents' position without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by
Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the
spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of
life so share its passions its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and
actor? . . . But that is not all. What a subject is this in which we are united this abstraction
called the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives, but the
lives of all men that have been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we
are to speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a mistress only to
be won with sustained and lonely passion only to be won by straining all the faculties by
which man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of
the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within
recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers
themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on
them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein
petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of
coconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through insidious means and machinations,
ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investment Corporation, became the
holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of
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UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr.
Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription
payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves,
among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant
breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of
the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the
PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would
exact from petitioners a link "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
the (client) of a crime."
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents alleged that the private respondent
was dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a
nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the
interest of truth may require, which includes . . . the identity of the principal." 59
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a
statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners
have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of-court but also in the Answer to plaintiff's
Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in
furtherance of "legitimate lawyering." 60 Being "similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents
must show that there exist other conditions and circumstances which would warrant their treating
the private respondent differently from petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to
sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the
identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed to show and absolute nothing
exists in the records of the case at bar that private respondent actually revealed the identity of
his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire
arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to have
justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution, respondent
Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a "bare
assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, as manifested
by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere
requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA
lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and
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private respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were
not the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. 61
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the
respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was
treated as species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which
made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from
the records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven
application of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven
application of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. 62 Those who
fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to
the liabilities imposed.
. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal
norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a
recent decision: "Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is
that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances,
which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges,
those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions
cast on some in the group equally binding the rest. 63
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their
exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and
PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 64 It is grossly unfair to exempt one
similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others.
Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients
but also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorneyclient privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one
looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are
called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can
raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning
that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain
inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
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It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is
obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and
as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue
with respect to them when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity
would be to sanction an unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs
as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not
be allowed to continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not
sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination
and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan
(First Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D.
Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled
"Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST: NONE
2. IN RE: SYCIP, 92 SCRA 1 (1979)
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES.
JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K.
TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE
LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS
ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
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Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip,
who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on
February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names
of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were
ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the
practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: t.hqw
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or
the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual
property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized
the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a
deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy
a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the
relationship of attorney and client to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no
fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics
of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: t.hqw
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by
local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries
now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased
partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law
directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
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6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries
in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law
firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased
partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including
in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile
moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957,
stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A.
Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce
Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the
continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: t.hqw
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court
found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys
Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm
designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the
personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the high
standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed
which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys
are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: t.hqw
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include
the name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name,
shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.
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It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of
living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability.
In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name
under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be
held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus,
Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and
heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future
business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers
and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. "
Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death
of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of
deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will
have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can
initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first
factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up."
The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the
individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which
continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof.
What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a
professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal
qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a
commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9t.
hqw
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners
or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a
stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset
inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, t.hqw
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the
members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed
as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may
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be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will
as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or
for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
connection with the practice of accountancy. 10 t.hqw
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use
of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of
law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession,
(The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men
pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, no less a public
service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to
resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in
support of their petitions.
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It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom
but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom,
Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history
of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have
evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. t.hqw
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated
by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports
to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of
adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner
who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208)
(Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner
continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the
familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's
name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners
Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm
name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because
the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and
was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: t.hqw
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory
provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the
American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as
follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible
by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use." There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city
use the names of deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations
and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter
and reached The conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis
supplied)
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xxx xxx xxx

Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of
the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been
defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a
court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be
differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence
of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the
Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from
including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which
no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law
which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are
contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be
considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." t.hqw
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ...
aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to
mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion
as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with
their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may
within the allowed him by law. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in
competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan
nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn.
There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the
professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his
pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation
of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be
exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two
elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their
justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
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In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal
and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP"
and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of
individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST: Facts:
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed
away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered
consolidated.
Issue/s:
Whether the names of the deceased partners should be dropped.
Held:
Yes, the names should be dropped, but they may be included in the listings of
individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years which they served
as such.
The reason for this is, the names are being retained to improperly exploit their
advertisement value.
NOTE: I think the ruling in this case is no longer applicable because of Rule 3.02 which
states, the deceased partners name may still be used provided it is clearly
communicated [to the clients/public]. The purpose of which is for law firms to retain
goodwill.
3. DAROY VS LAGASPI, 65 SCRA 304 (1975)
4. HILADO VS DAVID, 84 PHIL 569 (1975)
BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, Petitioner, v. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO,
JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, Respondents.
Delgado, Dizon & Flores for Petitioner.
Vicente J. Francisco for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, WHEN EXISTS. "To constitute
professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid,
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promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the
case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of
any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
professional employment must be regarded as established . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ATTORNEY IS INHIBITED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF BOTH PARTIES. There is no law or
provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of both parties
to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in
the injunctions as provided in section 26 (e), Rule 123 and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 of the Rules of
Court.
3. ID.; INFORMATION PROFESSIONALLY OBTAINED BY ATTORNEY FROM CLIENT IS SACRED.
Information so received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to permit it to be used in the
interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of
confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security in, the relation of attorney and
client.
4. ID.; ID. The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the
opposite partys retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by him from
his first client.
5. ID.; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT IS FOUNDED ON PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC POLICY.
The relation of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The question is
not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasars wife, not only to
keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing.
Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
6. ID.; RETAINING FEE, WHAT IS. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel
to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate
counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the
other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express
understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its
payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services which he has
retained him to perform."cralaw virtua1aw library
7. ID.; INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM CLIENT BY A MEMBER OF THE FIRM. An information
obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm.
8. ID.; PROFESSIONAL CONFIDENCE, EXPIRATION OF. Professional confidence once reposed can
never be divested by expiration of professional employment.
9. ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION, EXTENT OF SUMMARY. The courts have summary jurisdiction to
protect the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the
administration of justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring
them to pay over money collected by them but embraces authority to compel them to do whatever specific
acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts, from the general
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principles of equity and policy, will always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard
the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The
courts act on the same principle whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to
answer declaration.
10. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; AS OFFICERS OF THE COURTS. Attorneys are officers of the court where
they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration of justice and as such
subject to the disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders and directions with respect to their
relations to the court as well as to their clients.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad
to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilados
now deceased husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the defendant; and on
June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel for the
plaintiff.
On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad as party defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the defendant
in substitution for Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue
representing the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him about her case, on
which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and the latter sent her
a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and
Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case was and is pending, to
disqualify Attorney Francisco.
Attorney Franciscos letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and identified as Exhibit A, is in full as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
"Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila
"July 13, 1945
"Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado
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"Manila, Philippines
"My dear Mrs. Hilado:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil case No. 70075 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, entitled Blandina Gamboa Hilado v. S. J. Assad, I find that the basic facts which
brought about the controversy between you and the defendant therein are as
"(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property described in the complaint, as the same was
purchased and/or built with funds exclusively belonging to you, that is to say, the houses and lot pertained
to your paraphernal estate;
"(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was with your husband, Mr. Serafin P. Hilado; and
"(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your knowledge on the aforesaid date of May 3,
1943.
"Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action against Mr. Assad will not ordinarily
prosper. Mr. Assad had the right to presume that your husband had the legal right to dispose of the
property as the transfer certificate of title was in his name. Moreover, the price of P110,000 in Japanese
military notes, as of May 3, 1943, does not quite strike me as so grossly inadequate as to warrant the
annulment of the sale. I believe, lastly, that the transaction cannot be avoided merely because it was
made during the Japanese occupation, nor on the simple allegation that the real purchaser was not a
citizen of the Philippines. On this last point, furthermore, I expect that you will have great difficulty in
proving that the real purchaser was other than Mr. Assad, considering that death has already sealed your
husbands lips and he cannot now testify as to the circumstances of the sale.
"For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advice you that I cannot appear in the proceedings in your behalf.
The records of the case you loaned to me are herewith returned.
"Yours very truly,
(Sgd.) "VICENTE J. FRANCISCO."cralaw virtua1aw library
"VJF/Rag.
In his answer to plaintiffs attorneys complaint, Attorney Francisco alleged that about May, 1945, a real
estate broker came to his office in connection with the legal separation of a woman who had been
deserted by her husband, and also told him (Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought by Mrs.
Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado had
made to the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was willing to accept
the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told the woman that the sales of real property during
the Japanese regime were valid even though it was paid for in Japanese military notes; that this being his
opinion, he told his visitor he would have no objection to defending the Syrian;
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she had instituted against a certain
Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband had made; that according to her the
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case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away from them; that as
he had known the plaintiffs deceased husband he did not hesitate to tell her frankly that hers was a lost
case for the same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted that the basis of her action was
not that the money paid her husband was Japanese military notes, but that the premises were her private
and exclusive property; that she requested him to read the complaint to be convinced that this was the
theory of her suit; that he then asked Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the property and she
answered yes, in the name of her husband; that he told Mrs. Hilado that if the property was registered in
her husbands favor, her case would not prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street, he was informed by Attorney
Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him and that when he, Agrava,
learned that Mrs. Hilados visit concerned legal matters he attended to her and requested her to leave the
"expediente" which she was carrying, and she did; that he told Attorney Agrava that the firm should not
handle Mrs. Hilados case and he should return the papers, calling Agravas attention to what he
(Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed him a letter which
has been dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expediente" to Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon told
him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agravas request that Agrava thought it more proper to explain to
Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case was rejected; that he forthwith signed the letter without reading it
and without keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs. Hilado since their last
meeting until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed extrajudicial settlement of the case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case stating that his American
lawyer had gone to the States and left the case in the hands of other attorneys; that he accepted the
retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the Court of Appeals,
dismissed the complaint. His Honor believed that no information other than that already alleged in
plaintiffs complaint in the main cause was conveyed to Attorney Francisco, and concluded that the
intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the point of creating the relation of
attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is undoubted: That Attorney Franciscos law
firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that this opinion
was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilados purpose in
submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Franciscos professional services. Granting the facts to
be no more than these, we agree with petitioners counsel that the relation of attorney and client between
Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued. The following rules accord with the ethics of the legal
profession and meet with our approval:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a professional one and not merely one of
principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to prosecute
or defend an action in court of Justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills,
contracts and the like." (Atkinson v. Howlett, 11 Ky. Law Rep. (abstract), 364, cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p.
6.)
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"To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have
been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation,
then the professional employment must be regarded as established . . ." (5 Jones Commentaries on
Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
"An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor
when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon,
just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court."
(Denver Tramway Co. v. Owens, 20 Colo., 107; 36 P., 848.)
"Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract may be express or
implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters
pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his
acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter." (7 C. J. S., 848- 849; see Hirach Bros.
& Co. v. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L. R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in
the course of professional employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the
duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from
acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but such
prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted. (In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In fact
the prohibition derives validity from sources higher than written laws and rules. As has been aptly said in
In re Merron, 22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information so received is sacred to the employment to
which it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the
adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential
security in, the relation of attorney and client."cralaw virtua1aw library
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this being
so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary the situation even if
we should discard Mrs. Hilados statement that other papers, personal and private in character, were
turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and
client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite partys retainer in the same litigation
regardless of what information was received by him from his first client.
"The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from thereafter
appearing on behalf of the clients opponent applies equally even though during the continuance of the
employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the attorney by the client." (Christian v.
Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 533, Footnote 7, C.J. S., 828.)
"Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party, in litigation, had formerly represented the
adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire as to
how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former client during that relationship, before refusing
to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party." (Brown v. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.) .
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"In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is unnecessary
that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which the former clients affairs might have a bearing on the
matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the attorneys knowledge thereof." (Body v. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
"This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on terminating his
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though,
while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his clients
disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. Pierce v. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201,
Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair,
consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is
said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would
lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainants cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results. To make the passing
of confidential communication a condition precedent; i. e., to make the employment conditioned on the
scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides,
would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers
upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an
investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with
his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate
turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorneys inaccurate
version of the facts that came to him. "Now the abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is
by hypothesis an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice." (John H. Wigmores Evidence, 1923,
Sections 2285, 2290, 2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the
dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice. (Strong v. Int. Bldg., etc.; Assn, 183 Ill., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792.) It is
founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to
keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing.
Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
So without impugning respondents good faith, we nevertheless can not sanction his taking up the cause
of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily
to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and
of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do
believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of
which he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of
justice."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is in legal practice what is called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from the realization
that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional
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advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf of
the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule
that a separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. "A
retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services,
and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being
retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him,
and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made
nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the
client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that Attorney Francisco did not take the
trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was written under the
circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that
his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated,
emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and stops him in the same manner and to the
same degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained from a client by a member or
assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628; 7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere
fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the name and
interest of the firm, but his information, by the nature of his connection with the firm is available to his
associates or employers. The rule is all the more to be adhered to where, as in the present instance, the
opinion was actually signed by the head of the firm and carries his initials intended to convey the
impression that it was dictated by him personally. No progress could be hoped for in "the public policy that
the client in consulting his legal adviser ought to be free from apprehension of disclosure of his
confidence," if the prohibition were not extended to the attorneys partners, employers or assistants.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date Attorney Francisco
first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right to ask for his disqualification. In
one case, objection to the appearance of an attorney was allowed even on appeal as a ground for
reversal of the judgment. In that case, in which throughout the conduct of the cause in the court below the
attorney had been suffered so to act without objection, the court said: "We are all of the one mind, that the
right of the appellee to make his objection has not lapsed by reason of failure to make it sooner; that
professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment."
(Nickels v. Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr., 374, 321 A. L. R., 1316.)
The complaint that petitioners remedy is by appeal and not by certiorari deserves scant attention. The
courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of
attorneys prejudicial to the administration of justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys
is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but embraces authority to compel
them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of attorneys to perform.
The courts, from the general principles of equity and policy, will always look into the dealings between
attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in
which they may stand unequal. The courts act on the same principle whether the undertaking is to appear,
or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718; 7 C.J.S., 1005.) This summary
remedy against attorneys flows from the fact that they are officers of the court where they practice,
forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration of justice and as such subject to the
disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court
as well as to their clients. (Charest v. Bishop, 137 Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.)
Attorneys stand on the same footing as sheriffs and other court officers in respect of matters just
mentioned.
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We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed. It is so ordered, without
costs.
DIGEST:
In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim Assad.
Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick.
In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he thenafter
entered his appearance in court.
In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be disqualified
because Atty. Dizon found out that in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional
legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no material
information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilados story, Atty. Francisco advised
her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned with a copy of the Complaint prepared
by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his
firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left,
leaving behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was stated
that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty.
Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a letter explaining why the firm
cannot take on Hilados case.
Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was
relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and that,
if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was already representing
Assad in court for four months in the said case.
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.
HELD: Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco.
Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latters consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted
did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in
such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
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5. STONE VS BANK OF COMMERCE, 174 US 412 (1899)

6. GUERRERO VS HERNANDO
7. UY VS GONZALES, A.C NO. 5208
A.C. No. 5280
March 30, 2004
WILLIAM S. UY, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales for violation
of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The complainant alleges:
Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for
the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding
the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a
petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about to
be filed, respondent went to his (complainants) office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain
amount from him other than what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after
reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that
instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint
dated July 26, 1999 against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for
"Falsification of Public Documents."1 The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to
the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed
to have filed. Portions of said letter-complaint read:
The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino, married and a
resident of 132-A Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, Michael Angelo T.
UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors and residents of the aforesaid address, Luviminda G. Tomagos,
of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F.
Madayag, with office address at A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex, Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed as
follows:
That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land consisting of 4.001
ha. for the amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated at Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan,
Pangasinan, from FERMIN C. GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter
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in favor of the former; that in the said date, William S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-33122, covering the said land;
That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33122, in
the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his name, William S. Uy executed
a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor of his children, namely, Michael
Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy, wherein William S. Uy made it appear that his said children
are of legal age, and residents of Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth,
they are minors and residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them as farmers/beneficiaries, thus
placing the said property within the coverage of the Land Reform Program;
That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured the falsified
documents which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure from the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land Ownership Award
No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-named children. Some of these Falsified documents are
purported Affidavit of Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of Non-Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996,
without the signature of affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said date, Fermin C.
Gonzales was already dead ;
That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud undersigned,
still accepted the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, P300,000.00, in PNB
Check No. 0000606, and P40,000.00, in cash, as full payment of the redemption of TCT No.
33122knowing fully well that at that time the said TCT cannot be redeemed anymore because
the same was already transferred in the name of his children;
That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check, as evidenced by
the said check which was encashed by him;
That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and continue to
refuse to deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return and repay the said
P340,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned. 2
With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and grossly
disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his client. Respondent unceremoniously turned against
him just because he refused to grant respondents request for additional compensation. Respondents act
tarnished his reputation and social standing.3
In compliance with this Courts Resolution dated July 31, 2000, 4 respondent filed his Comment narrating
his version, as follows:
On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property situated in Brgy.
Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which the latter acquired by purchase from
his (respondents) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales, Jr.. On the same date, he paid complainant
P340,000.00 and demanded the delivery of TCT No. T-33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of
Redemption. Upon request, he gave complainant additional time to locate said title or until after Christmas
to deliver the same and execute the Deed of Redemption. After the said period, he went to complainants
office and demanded the delivery of the title and the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Instead,
complainant gave him photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and TCT No. T-5165. Complainant explained that
he had already transferred the title of the property, covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his children Michael and
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Cristina Uy and that TCT No. T-5165 was misplaced and cannot be located despite efforts to locate it.
Wanting to protect his interest over the property coupled with his desire to get hold of TCT No. T-5165 the
earliest possible time, he offered his assistance pro bono to prepare a petition for lost title provided that all
necessary expenses incident thereto including expenses for transportation and others, estimated at
P20,000.00, will be shouldered by complainant. To these, complainant agreed.
On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the lost title ready for signing and
notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to complainants office informing him that the petition is ready for
filing and needs funds for expenses. Complainant who was with a client asked him to wait at the anteroom
where he waited for almost two hours until he found out that complainant had already left without leaving
any instructions nor funds for the filing of the petition. Complainants conduct infuriated him which
prompted him to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition he
prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant was terminated
when he gave the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no longer any professional relationship
between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the
facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents
procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan. 5
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 6
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear on April 2, 2003 before the IBP.7
On said date, complainant did not appear despite due notice. There was no showing that respondent
received the notice for that days hearing and so the hearing was reset to May 28, 2003. 8
On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from one Atty. Augusto M. Macam
dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client, William S. Uy, had lost interest in pursuing the complaint he
filed against Atty. Gonzales and requesting that the case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed. 9
On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and recommendation, portions of
which read as follows:
The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the filing of the
Verified Petition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had confided to respondent the fact of
the loss and the circumstances attendant thereto. When respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to
the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which expressly provides that "A lawyer shall preserve the confidences
and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated." Respondent cannot
argue that there was no lawyer-client relationship between them when he filed the Letter-Complaint
on 26 July 1999 considering that as early as 14 April 1999, or three (3) months after, respondent
had already terminated complainants perceived lawyer-client relationship between them. The duty
to maintain inviolate the clients confidences and secrets is not temporary but permanent. It is in
effect perpetual for "it outlasts the lawyers employment" (Canon 37, Code of Professional
Responsibility) which means even after the relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve
the clients confidences and secrets remains effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules
of Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client,
use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own
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advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with the full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto."
On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty. Augusto M.
Macam, who claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that complainant is no longer
interested in pursuing this case and requested that the same be dismissed. The aforesaid letter
hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court). Moreover, in Boliver
vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, the Court ruled that "any person may bring to this Courts attention the
misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of the interest or lack of
interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to have violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended that he be SUSPENDED for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS from receipt hereof, from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and
member of the Bar.10
On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued Resolution No.
XV-2003-365, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent violated Rule
21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. 11
Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of complainant Uy
expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed against respondent, has no
persuasive bearing in the present case.
Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:
.
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same.
This is because:
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court
for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest
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in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence,
if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. 12
Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.
Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as
legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. 13 While it is
true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, 14 complainant failed to prove any of the
circumstances enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent.
Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the records reveals that the
relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal transaction or dealings
between them rather than the practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only
because he redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainants) son.
It is not refuted that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce its
title and execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him, complainant failed to
fulfill his end of the bargain because of the alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to respondent
as having prematurely transferred to his children, thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as
to secure the issuance of a new title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, with complainant assuming the
expenses therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces
with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer
with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or
charged for, neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about
which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and
received, in matters pertinent to his profession.15
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the present case. Evidently,
the facts alleged in the complaint for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents" filed by
respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with
complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the
land he has redeemed from complainant. Respondents immediate objective was to secure the title of the
property that complainant had earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client
relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition
was only incidental to their personal transaction.
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:
Canon 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
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b) When required by law;

c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by
judicial action.
The alleged "secrets" of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts
alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity
but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when
respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging
facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way
we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a
case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the administrative case filed against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales,
docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST:
FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of
a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and
discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed
before the Regional Trial Court.
When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainants office demanding a certain
amount other than what was previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him.
Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the
petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public Documents. The letter-complaint contained
facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the
petition which respondent was supposed to have filed.
Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is
withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition
thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant; that there was no longer
any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of
public document; that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were
culled from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds.
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The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility
and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?
HELD:
No. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents filed
by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with
complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the
land he has redeemed from complainant. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between
respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to
their personal transaction.
Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his
professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and
therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily
involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21.
There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a
misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from
instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.
8. RILLORAZA,ET AL VS EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATION PHIL.INC., 309 SCRA
G.R. No. 104600 July 2, 1999
RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO and AFRICA, petitioner,
vs.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The basic issue submitted for consideration of the Court is whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover
attorney's fees amounting to Twenty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy
Nine Pesos and Ninety One Centavos (P26,350,779.91) for handling the case for its client Eastern
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Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, though its services were
terminated in midstream and the client directly compromised the case with the adverse party.
The Facts
In giving due course to the petition, we carefully considered the facts attendant to the case. On August 28,
1987, Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) represented by the law firm San Juan, Africa,
Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA), filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, a complaint for recovery of
revenue shares against Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). Atty. Francisco D.
Rilloraza, a partner of the firm appeared for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00). On September 18, 1987, the trial court issued a resolution granting ETPI's application for
preliminary restrictive and mandatory injunctions. During this period, SAGA was dissolved and four of the
junior partners formed the law firm Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa (RADA), which took over as
counsel in the case for ETPI. The latter signed a retainer agreement with counsel dated October 1, 1987.
1
Petitioners presented the three aspects of the main case in the trial court. First, the traffic revenue shares
which ETPI sought to recover from PLDT in accordance with the contract between them. Second, ETPI
sought preventive injunctive relief against the PLDT's threats to deny ETPI access to the Philippines
international gateway switch. Third, ETPI called this the "foreign correspondentships aspect" where ETPI
sought preventive injunctive relief against PLDT's incursions and inducements directed at ETPI's foreign
correspondents in Hongkong, Taiwan and Singapore, to break their correspondentship contracts with
PLDT, using the threat of denying them access to the international gateway as leverage.
In this connection, ETPI filed with the trial court two urgent motions for restraining order, one on October
30, 1987 and another on November 4, 1987. As the applications were not acted upon, ETPI brought the
case up to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari.
On June 28, 1988, petitioner received a letter from ETPI signed by E. M. Villanueva, President and Chief
Executive Officer. In substance, the letter stated that ETPI was terminating the retainer contract dated
October 1, 1987, effective June 30, 1988.
On June 29, 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a notice of attorney's lien, furnishing
copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to the signatory of the termination letter and PLDT. On the same date,
petitioner additionally sent a letter to ETPI attaching its partial billing statement. In its notice, RADA
informed the court that there were negotiations towards a compromise between ETPI and PLDT.
In April 1990, petitioner confirmed that indeed the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and that the
same was entered as a judgment. On April 26, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for the enforcement of
attorney's lien with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and then appraised the Supreme Court thereof by
manifestation. 2 We noted the manifestation in a resolution dated July 23, 1990.
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On May 24, 1990, PLDT filed with the trial court a manifestation that it is not a party to nor in any manner
involved in the attorney's lien being asserted by Atty. Rilloraza for and in behalf of the law firm, 3 while
ETPI filed its opposition thereto on June 11, 1990.
The Lower Court's Ruling
The trial court in its resolution dated September 14, 1990 denied the motion for enforcement of attorney's
lien. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds that the Notice of Attorney's Lien filed
by the law firm of Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa has no basis in fact and in law,
and therefore denies the Motion for Enforcement of Attorney's Lien.
SO ORDERED.
Makati, Metro Manila, September 4, 1990.
(s/t) ZEUS C,
ABROGAR
Judge 4
On October 10, 1990, petitioner filed with the trial court a notice of appeal from the above-mentioned
order to the Supreme Court. On November 6, 1990, ETPI filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal contending
that the case could be brought to the Supreme Court only via a petition for review on certiorari, not by a
mere notice of appeal. In an order dated January 16, 1991, the trial court dismissed RADA's appeal.
The trial court said:
There is no more regular appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court. Under
the amendment of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act by R.A. 5440, orders and judgments of the
Regional Trial Court may be elevated to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on
certiorari.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore, premises considered, the order dated September 14, 1990 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside. The Notice of Appeal filed by movant RADA is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST:
RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO AND AFRICA vs.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, PHILS., INC.
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G.R. No. 104600, July 2, 1999

FACTS: Eastern Telecommunications, Phils., Inc. (ETPI) represented by the
law firm SAGA, filed with the Regional Trial court a complaint for the recovery or
revenue shares against PLDT. Atty. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm, appeared for
ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount. The latter was
dissolved and the junior partners formed RADA, which took over as counsel in the case
for ETPI. ETPI signed a retainer agreement with counsel wherein it was stated that in
cases of collection or judicial action, our attorneys fees shall be 15% of the amounts
collected or the value of the property acquired or liability saved. The retainer agreement
was terminated in 1988. the next day, RADA filed a notice of attorneys lien. In its notice,
RADA informed the court that there were negotiations toward a compromise between
ETPI and PLDT.
In 1990, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and the same was
entered as a judgment. The petitioner (RADA) filed a motion for the enforcement of
attorneys lien.
ISSUE: Is RADA entitled to the awards of attorneys fees they are claiming?
HELD: RADA is entitled to attorneys fees but the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the court of origin for the determination of the amount of attorneys fees to which
the petitioner is entitled.
Atty. Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until ETPI terminated the
law firms services in 1988. Petitioners claim for attorneys fees hinges on two grounds:
first, the fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was working for
SAGA, and second, the retainer agreement.
Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional services. A lawyer has
the right to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client, which
compensation must be reasonable. A lawyer would be entitled to receive what he merits
for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit
basis
9. GOVT VS WAGNER, 54 PHIL 132 (1929)
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J. O. WAGNER, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Manuel Escudero and William F. Mueller, for Appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONTRACTS; RESCISSION; RESTORATION AS CONDITION TO RESCISSION. The party who
asks for rescission must restore to the other party whatever has been received under the contract
(Government of the Philippine Islands v. Wagner and Cleland Wagner [1927], 49 Phil., 944).
2. ID.; ID.; ID. Proceeding under this rule of law, it is held that the amount which the Government
should refund to the defendants as a prerequisite to the rescission of the contract and the cancellation of
ELS: LEGAL ETHICS
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the patent and title is P4,000.

3. ID.; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT; POWER OF ATTORNEY. A person who is made an attorney-in-fact,
with the same power and authority to deal with the property which the principals might or could have had
if personally present, may adopt the usual legal means to accomplish the object, including acceptance of
service and engaging of counsel to preserve the ownership and possession of the principals property.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J.:
There are two branches to the appeal in this case. As between the Government of the Philippine Islands
and J. O. Wagner, Catherine Cleland Wagner, and J. J. Murphy, represented by counsel, the issue is the
amount of the refund which the Government should make to the defendants as a condition to rescission of
the contract of sale. As between the Government and J. O. Wagner and Catherine Cleland Wagner,
represented by other counsel, the issue is the jurisdiction of the courts over the persons of these
defendants.
I. In amplification of the preliminary introduction of the first branch of the case, it may be said that when
this case was in the appellate court before ([1927], 49 Phil., 944), it was ordered that the record be
remanded to the lower court "for the taking of testimony to determine the amount which the Government
should refund to the defendants as a prerequisite to the rescission of the contract, and the cancellation of
the patent and the title." In the body of the decision, the same thought was elucidated by this statement:
"The Government, having asked for rescission, must restore to the defendants whatever it has received
under the contract. It will only be just if, as a condition to rescission, the Government be required to refund
to the defendants an amount equal to the purchase price, plus the sums expended by them in improving
the land. (Civil Code, art. 1295.)" In compliance with the foregoing order and observations, a hearing was
had in the Court of First Instance of Benguet. Both parties offered a number of witnesses. After the
hearing, the court found that P1,200 had been expended by the defendants for improvements on lot 29-F
of the Baguio townsite, and that upon the payment of this sum, plus the amount of P960.60, the sale price
of the lot, the contract of sale would be rescinded and the patent and certificate of title for lot 29-F
cancelled.
As addressed to the judgment of the trial court naming a total of P2,160.60 as the amount to be paid by
the Government as a prerequisite to rescission of the contract, three errors are assigned, viz.
:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The lower court erred in admitting contour map, Exhibit A, and all testimony based thereon.
"2. The lower court erred in not finding that the defendants had spent P19,000 for improving lot No. 29.
"3. The lower court erred in finding that but P1,200 had been expended for improving lot 29, and in
ordering the rescission of the contract, and the cancellation of the patent certificate of title therefor."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Regarding the first error, the record discloses that the contour map, Exhibit A, was admitted without
objection. Regarding the second and third errors which go to the merits, it is evident at a glance that the
defendants cannot be allowed P19,000 for improving lot 29-F for otherwise this court would not have
reached the decision it did formerly, and would not have found as it did find "that the defendants, as well
as the intervenor, had failed to construct improvements on the land of the value of P15,000." The
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conclusions of the trial judge, which make reasonable allowances in favor of the defendants, of 3,000
cubic meters of excavation and filling at 40 centavos per cubic meter are not at all unjust. Six hundred
pesos for the plan for the proposed cinematograph building is not a proper item to be taken into account.
A refund for taxes may not be allowed since not contemplated in our order, and since not coming within
the purview of article 1295 of the Civil Code. However, having in mind the interest lost on the price paid
and the expenses which the defendants have incurred, we are inclined to be somewhat more liberal than
was the trial judge. Everything considered, we feel that a lump sum of P4,000 may fairly be substituted for
the P2,160.00 named in the judgment of the trial court.
II. That this court has not seen fit to take up and decide at the outset of this decision the challenge to its
jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the trial court, discloses how little the long and complicated arguments of
the intervenors have impressed the members of the court.
When these proceedings were initiated, service was made on J. J. Murphy as the owner of a one-half
undivided interest in the property, and on J. J. Murphy as the attorney-in-fact for the Wagners, the owners
of the remaining one-half interest. Counsel was engaged by Murphy, who represented the defendants
both in the trial court and in this court without objection. It was only after the record had been returned to
the trial court for the taking of further evidence that the jurisdiction of the court was impugned. The trial
court overruled such objection, as likewise did this court, but subsequently we permitted counsel to
intervene to elucidate his position.
At the time Murphy accepted service, he had in his possession the following power of
attorney:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Know all men by these presents, that we, J. O. Wagner and Catherine Cleland Wagner, husband and
wife, citizens of the United States of America now residing at Baguio, subprovince of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Philippine Islands, have made, constituted, and appointed, and by these presents do make,
constitute, and appoint J. J. Murphy, of Baguio, subprovince of Benguet, Mountain Province, Philippine
Islands, our true and lawful attorney for us and in our name, place and stead, to use, lease, sell and
convey lot numbered twenty-nine (29) section F, in Baguio townsite, subprovince of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Philippine Islands, of which land Catherine Cleland Wagner is the recorded owner as
demonstrated by official receipt numbered 792232 (seven hundred and ninety-two thousand two hundred
and thirty-two) issued by the Director of Lands, on May 3d, 1913, said lot containing eight thousand and
five (8,005) square meters, and for us and in our names to make, seal, and deliver, and in any and every
way and manner deal in the above-mentioned property.
"And in short our said attorney, J. J. Murphy, is given full and complete authority over this aforementioned
lot to do as he may deem best. Giving and granting unto our said attorney full power and authority to do
and perform all and every lawful act and thing whatever requisite and necessary to be done in and about
the premises as fully to all intents and purposes as we might or could do if personally present hereby
ratifying and confirming all that our said attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these
presents.
"In witness whereof, we have hereunto signed our names on this 14th day of May, A. D. nineteen hundred
and seventeen.
"Signed in the presence of:
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(Sgd.) "JAMES A. WRIGHT

"FRANCISCO AQUINO
(Sgd.) "J. O. WAGNER
"CATHERINE CLELAND WAGNER"
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
"PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
"CITY OF BAGUIO
"At the municipality of Baguio, in the subprovince of Benguet, in the Mountain Province, on this 14th day
of May, A. D. 1917, personally appeared J. O. Wagner and Catherine Cleland Wagner, known to me to be
husband and wife and the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that
the same is their free act and deed.
"J. O. Wagner exhibited cedula No. A-30072, issued at Baguio, P. I., on Jan. 6th, 1917.
"Before me.
(Sgd.) "PASCUAL PACIS
"Notario Pblico
"El nombramiento termina 31 de dic., 1917"
All that Wilbur S. Wilson and his counsel presented to offset the authority of Murphy was a cablegram
said to have been sent by the Wagners to Wilson on July 25, 1928, and reading as
"We authorize you take all legal means protect our interest lot 29-F, Baguio."cralaw virtua1aw library
J. J. Murphy had, of course, the right to represent his one-half undivided interest in the land in dispute. He
also had the right under the universal power of attorney to represent the Wagners. The intention of the
parties, which, as in all written instruments should prevail, was to give Murphy the same power and
authority to deal with the property which the Wagners might or could have had if personally present. The
usual legal means were adopted to accomplish the object. The most effective way by which Murphy could
preserve the ownership and possession of his principals property was by accepting service and by
defending the rights of the absent owners in the courts. Every act of Murphy was taken for the benefit of
the Wagners. Attorney Mueller handled the case for the defendants as ably and conscientiously as any
attorney could have done. (There can be noted 21 R. C. L., pp. 881-882; Lian v. Puno [1915], 31 Phil.,
259; 11 Manresa, Cdigo Civil, 1st ed., p. 455.)
The cablegram constitutes a very slight basis on which to claim a revocation by the principals of the
power of attorney. Moreover, to set everything aside which has taken place would prove of no benefit to
the parties.
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The result is to rule against the attempted intervention by sustaining the jurisdiction of the courts, and on
the merits to adhere to the appealed decision in its principal aspects.
In accordance with the foregoing, the intervention will be disallowed, and the judgment appealed from will
be affirmed, with the modification that in lieu of the items of P1,200 and P960.60 mentioned in the
judgment, P4,000 will be substituted. So ordered without special pronouncement as to costs in this
instance.
DIGEST: NONE
THE LAWYERS DUTIES TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION

1. RIVERA VS ANGELES, 339 SCRA 149 (2000)
DIGEST ONLY
Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2 others in a civil case. Rivera
and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable decision. Atty. Angeles received almost PhP 50,000 from one
of the defendants in the case as partial fulfillment of the judgement against the latter. Atty. Angeles,
however, never told his clients of the amount he had received and never remitted the same to him, leaving
them to discover such fact on their own. Rivera and his co-plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Angeles.
Held: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act amounted to serious
misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as
part of a lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of
litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and
confidence. The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the
money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses
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everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. For deceit in dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles was
suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
2. DUCAT,JR. VS VILLALON,JR. 337 SCRA 622 (2000)

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO
DUCUSIN,respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified letter-complaint [1] for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.;
Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the
lawyers oath. Investigation proceeded only against respondent Villalon because it was discovered
that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on February 3,
1996.[2]
In the letter-complaint,[3] complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon,
as counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he be
given the title over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and
covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to
verify the proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991, however,
complainant and his family were surprised when several people entered the subject property and,
when confronted by the companions of complainant, the latter were told that they were workers of
Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the barangay
authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not appear before it
and continued with the construction of the piggery in the presence of armed men who were
watching over the construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to complain about
the people of respondent Canares but nothing was done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply
however, the latter answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to
respondent Canares in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo
Ducusin. Complainant, however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document
nor received any money therefor, and he also denied having appeared before respondent
Ducusin who was the notary public for the Deed of Absolute Sale. Complainant discovered that
respondent Villalon claimed that complainants father allegedly gave the subject property to him
(respondent Villalon) as evidenced by a document of sale purportedly signed by complainant.
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In his Comment,[4] respondent Villalon denied that allegations of the complainant and in turn,
he alleged that the property was given voluntarily by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out of close intimacy
and for past legal services rendered. Thereafter, respondent Villalon, with the knowledge and
consent of Jose Ducat, Sr., allowed the subject property to be used by Andres Canares to start a
piggery business without any monetary consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land was then
signed by Jose Ducat, Sr. to evidence that he has conveyed the subject property to respondent
Villalon with the name of respondent Canares included therein as protection because of the
improvements to be introduced in the subject property. Upon presenting the title covering the
subject property, it was discovered that the property was registered in the name of Jose Ducat, Jr.
and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but the latter told respondents Villalon and Canares not to worry because
the land was actually owned by him and that he merely placed the name of his son, Jose Ducat,
Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then suggested that the subject property be transferred directly from Jose
Ducat, Jr. to respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat, Sr.) got the title and guaranteed that he
would return the document already signed and notarized, which he did the following
day. According to respondent Canares, the trouble began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to his office
demanding to know why he was not allowed to cut the trees inside the subject property by the
caretaker of respondent Canares.
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote [5] to this Court and averred that he neither signed
the Deed of Sale covering the subject property nor did he appear before the notary public
Crispulo Ducusin, who notarized the same. He averred that respondents Villalon and Ducusin
should be disbarred from the practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for forging his
signature and selling the subject property without his consent.
In his Rejoinder[6], respondent Villalon denied the allegations of complainant and maintained
that he is a member of good standing of the Integrated Bar and that he has always preserved the
high standards of the legal profession. Respondent Villalon expressed his willingness to have the
Deed of Sale examined by the National Bureau of Investigation and reiterated that the subject
property was orally given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October, 1991 that the
conveyance was reduced in writing. He added that the complainant knew that his father, Jose
Ducat, Sr., was the person who signed the said document for and in his behalf and that this was
done with his consent and knowledge.
This Court referred[7] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty.
Villalon guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years and
likewise directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No. M-3023 within
ten (10) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will result in his disbarment.
The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as follows:
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Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid
manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the Commission inspire belief
as to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill-motive on the
part of the complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the instant complaint and testify
falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the
Commissions full faith and credence.
Respondents evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he considered
himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings
hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly,
respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the
said property unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of
Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having
given the subject property to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact
that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said property.
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property, whether
gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would
consider himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or oral giving of the property
by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that.
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. 1 for the respondent and Exh. A-2 for the complainant)
allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares,
Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose
Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said
property.Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the
respondent himself when he said that the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose
Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act
of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wifes signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have
treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of
relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat,
Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document
which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned.
FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. 2 for the respondent and Exh. A-3 for the
complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject
property (which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of
questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having executed said
document. He claims that he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not
know; that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that
he has never received the amount of P450,000.00 representing the consideration of said
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transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was
supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that
the same was placed in the document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a
consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his
act and that he should have treated the document as another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing
the same to substantiate his defense.[8]
After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of
facts and observations of the Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which
were all adopted by its Board of Governors, are well-taken, the same being supported by the
evidence adduced.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined
or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. [9] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high
standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any
member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. [10]
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares
located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant
herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally given
to him by complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact
that the subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that
conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered
owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly
notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this
process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale
of Parcel of Land,[11] purportedly in favor of Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.,
respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale
without any Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that
Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word Conforme. As regards
the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, covering the
same property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon
admitted that there was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was placed
in that document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.s strong and credible denial
that he allegedly sold the subject property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and
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that he allegedly appeared before respondent notary public Ducusin, convince us that respondent
Villalons acts herein complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly proven.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of
the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [12]
We find, however, the IBPs recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to be imposed
upon respondent Atty. Villalon too severe in the light of the facts obtaining in the case at
bar. In Cesar V. Roces vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera,[13] this Court suspended therein respondent
Atty. Aportadera for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law for two main reasons:
(i)....His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the falsified sale of his clients
property merits the penalty of suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board of Governors; and
(ii)....The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented himself to Gregorio
Licuanan as being duly authorized by Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2) it was respondent
who prepared the various deeds of sale over Isabels subdivision lots; (3) Isabel was already
confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deeds date of execution; (4)
respondent knew that Isabel was hospitalized in Metro Manila when he subscribed the deed;
(5) he knew that Isabel died in Metro Manila soon after her confinement; and (6) he did not
give the seller a copy of the questioned deed of sale. [14]
Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show
that respondent Villalon had any direct participation in the notarization by respondent notary
public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991,
[15]
which was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly denied
having signed the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated this ___day of October
1991, allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same property, in favor of
respondent Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. was not notarized. The record also
shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that they live
in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that respondent
Villalon has been the lawyer for a number of years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of
gross misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant
Jose Ducat Jr., the latters TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty
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(60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so
will result in his disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalons personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST: NONE
3. TAN VS SABANDAL, 126 SCRA 60 (1993)

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992
EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against
respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath as
member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
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From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which
were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after considering
his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to his
good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him
to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and
adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal
profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia
each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were acted
upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant Moises
Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing
respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and maliciously
excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without merit considering
that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in
BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they
are in no position to submit their respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his oath,
was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986,
certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and has been careful in his actuations in
the community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then President
of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization
from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own
counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz
City. Attached to Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24
February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto
L. Nuevas, stating that "the present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had
not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character and civic consciousness of
Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the IBP
testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief
Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any
certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
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Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of
Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing
to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to entitle him to take
the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a COMMENT on respondent's
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25 August
1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not aware of
any acts committed by him as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be
relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the
Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal,
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del
Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said
respondent, per complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have
secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon
investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free
patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage
was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed
the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by
its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court
Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte
and the Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been
convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case against him.
Based on the above findings, the Board does not find any acts committed by the petitioner
to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive
Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44)
and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that
there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER
the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform this
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Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his
"Sala" as soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by
complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal
and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was
Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44,
informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked
forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against
him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar
as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become
a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend
him for admission to the legal profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at
a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990, which also required a
comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated
thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition which
raises the question whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and
obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and finality of
the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to change or
amend said final resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the
foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore should not in the least be
considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the changing moods and
dispositions of the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming
change in tactics and strategy could not improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court
Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having
availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of
the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was already
considered closed and terminated.
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Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached between
the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural
Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in
Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the
surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of
public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining
from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan
to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29
January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment
on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus
Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case with his Court
and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the
Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8
June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending
compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to comment on
the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29
August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere
reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and that "there is
no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September
1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having
elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of his
show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several testimonials
attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the
objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the
civil case against him.
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It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was
instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's procurement of a
certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as security for a
mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He
did not submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986.
The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the bogus
certificate of title to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further
expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the
Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that
judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a confession
by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time said case was
instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983
and he was then submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character
without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now
entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment
facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which he could not but have known was
public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a
manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased by the termination
of the case filed by the Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made
because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable
settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the
intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as
collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction,
he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed against him was eventually
compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this
Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was
submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of
knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without awareness
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him. Those
testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral
character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have
not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already
expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to
his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of
another subject matter.
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Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for
the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training as well as in honesty
and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in
keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the
practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to
possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including
at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del
Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's
Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath
is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
4. IN RE:PARAZO 82 PHIL 230
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J.
Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared
on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline in large
letters "CLAIM LEAK IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters
"Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name "By Angel J.
Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the news item in
full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates
who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.
"These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject, days before
the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School.
"Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said subject
fully one week before the tests.
"The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were
similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university holding proudly around
the city.
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"The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the Supreme Court
institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test
papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations.
"The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels of the
revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the University of the
Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions had come into the possession of nearly all
the graduates of some private technical schools."cralaw virtua1aw library
To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice
Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year,
by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E.
Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for
purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here
be stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in charge of the Bar Examinations held every
year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the
Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and
pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court
conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of
the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to
the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations.
The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified
under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was
the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of
public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his
publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was given to him in
confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed. The investigators informed
Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of the public in the regularity and
cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations,
and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging him to
reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct
the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party
or parties responsible for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently
refused to make the revelation.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice
in the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the
Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The writer of this
opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and
he made a report thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this Court
dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of September
14, 1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination questions, which examinations were held in
August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were
authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to conduct an
investigation thereof, particularly to receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible
for and author of said news item. An investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic
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notes were taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marceliano R. Montemayor, the new
chairman of the committee of bar examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the
consideration of this Court.
"From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and consistently declined
and refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have given him the data and information on
which his news item was based, despite the repeated appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his
cooperation, in order to enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar
examination anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him,
explain to him that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that he reveal the source
or sources of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the revelation
demanded will be regarded as contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will
advise the Court of the result."cralaw virtua1aw library
Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13,
1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State
demands and this court requires that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news
item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law
practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations;
that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who were appointed by this Court
to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and correct the examination papers; and
last but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in the very
Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was further explained to him that the
Supreme Court is keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination
questions and is determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help,
specially the identities of the persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the
necessary data and evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be
no basis from which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that
under the law he could be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even
involve imprisonment.
Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the
consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the editor
and publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his request,
the investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his
counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence of his counsel, several
newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal
demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under oath, but he declined and refused
to make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to
reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public hearing was held
on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably argued
the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as
"SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical
of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information
appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless
the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of
the state."cralaw virtua1aw library
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This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does
interesting and important points of law as well as questions of national importance. Counsel contends that
the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers
only to the security of the state, that is to say that only when national security or public safety is
involved, may this Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or
information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which the conviction or
acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of fact, the vote of the Justices is not unanimous.
In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly the
Senate where it originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative body when this
Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the original bill
prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of
any newspaper was absolute and that under no circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source
of his information or news report. The committee, however, under the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco
inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds
that such revelation is demanded by the public interest."cralaw virtua1aw library
When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the author
of the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee "unless
the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause would kill
the purpose of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the
elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving
complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be committed. Senator Cuenco,
Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the
exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the
court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," said that the Committee could not
accept the Sotto amendment because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public
or the interest of the state requires that the names of the informants be published or known. He gave as
one example a case of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or
fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by
the Sotto amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a
vote, it was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase
"public interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by
the phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much
discussion this last amendment was approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally
approved.
In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases
involving the "security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last
amendment proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state,"
was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and
discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some
Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended by the
Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public interest," when Senator Cuenco
sponsored the bill before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the state"
(interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and discussed by
the Senate, used the words "public interest," Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the
phrase "interest of the state." This understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the
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discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases "public interest" and "interest of
the state," may account for the readiness or lack of objection on the part of the Senate, after it had
rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public
interest" to "interest of the state."cralaw virtua1aw library
In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft of
the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant
by "interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose to define or
fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the
state" can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These
synonymous phrases, "security of the state" and "public safety," are not uncommon terms and we
can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article
III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications
and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and
order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution provides that the
President may suspend the privileges of the writ ofhabeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc.,
when the public safety requires it.
The phrase "national security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I,
Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, Crimes against National
Security. Then, more recently, the phrase "national security" was used in section 2, and the phrase "public
security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the Peoples Court,
promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine
Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of newspapermen only to cases where the
"security of the state," i.e., "national security" is involved, it could easily and readily have used such
phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public safety," "national security," or "public security" of which it
must have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the
mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it extended the
scope and the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the
sources of his information.
The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader
than "security of the state." Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may
include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance, the
establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the
phrase "interest of the state" even under a conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and
matters of national importance in which the whole state and nation, not only a branch or instrumentality
thereof such as a province, city or town, or a part of the public, is interested or would be affected, such as
the principal functions of Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such
matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law or of medicine, impeachment of high
Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of the three coordinate branches of the
Government, their relations to each other, and the discharge of their functions, etc.
We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under
constitutional provision, Article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes
charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the
qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subjects of the
said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the
questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the examinees, and later make their report
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to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing
grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of members of the
Philippine Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practising law or occupying important Government posts
requiring membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several
hundreds, are added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to
maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well
as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in
keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this
noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and
show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar
Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It is of public knowledge that perhaps by
general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great demand for the services of
licensed lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The
predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as compared to those
of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the
Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and
other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar
to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar
Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and national importance.
If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get into the
hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some
examinees succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to the Bar
and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal
profession would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long
before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would naturally lose confidence in
the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court to seek redress or
to defend himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case
has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and adequate preparation and training, and
that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination
questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal career with this act
of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparation, have
honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this
anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the
public, they might be among those who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before
hand. And, incidentally, the morale of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools,
studying law and later preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in
them may be born the idea that there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is
possible and not difficult to obtain copies of questions before the examinations and pass them and be
admitted to the Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers
who in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners
at the request and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, one or two or more of them
that through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if
they have not themselves actually released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared.
The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar Examinations, specially those who copy or
mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly,
and more important still, the Supreme Court itself which has the overall supervision and control over the
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examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the confidence of the people in this High
Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might
be affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will
sufficiently cause the present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the
state," involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and
colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the
members of the Commitee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having
charge of and connection with said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which
represents one of the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine
Government.
In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 to this Court, we
have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the
Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render
possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of
charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are
officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac v. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have previously
stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of his informants, is essential and
necessary to the investigation of the charge contained in the publication already mentioned.
It will be noticed from Parazos news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, his informants,
law graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly consisting of the alleged
leakage of the Bar Examination questions to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If those persons
really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the
right place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted
an investigation, they should have come forward and furnished or stood ready to furnish the facts on
which to base and from which to start an investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the
curtain of press immunity.
Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination questions in
at least one subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one
week before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the
investigation said that examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no
copy or copies of said examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually
saw said alleged copies of examination questions; that they were actually and carefully compared with the
legitimate examination questions given out on the day of the examination and found to be identical; no
one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have been seen
with the said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as the university where they came from,
was known; and even the law subjects to which the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we
are not allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazos informants who claim to have seen all
these things.
In this connection it may be stated that in the last Bar Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately
nine hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There
were eight subjects, each subject belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar examiners.
There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of
questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination
papers involved, in the hands of eight different examiners. The examination books or papers bear no
names or identifications of their writers or owners and said ownership and identification will not be known
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until the books or papers are all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable
witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had actually been committed, - evidence on the identity of
the persons in possession of the alleged copies of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained
and made use of, the law subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this
Court does not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising
each and every one of the 7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity
or identity in the answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or
conclusion. Apart from the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base
its findings and conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of
evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to
conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the
identities of his informants, and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and
cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges contained in the
news item, said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or foundation.
When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his
informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to
start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above
board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein
and the public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as
agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting the examination papers, but
also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the
discharge of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by
investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty, even
annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the
investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent
that he reveal the sources of his information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold
them liable. It merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Courts endeavor to probe thoroughly the
anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures
to punish the guilty parties, if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations
themselves, in justice to the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say
this because in every examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution,
certain standards are unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a
result of the correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed
it, the examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to
understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make
allowances. On the other hand, if too many obtain a passing grade, the examiner may think that the
examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and
training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his
correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if
many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before examination day, and study and prepare the
answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the examinees have
easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were too easy, raise the
standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a number
of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the examinations.
In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel
J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news item or story
in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of this decision, and that, in
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refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The
respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the
persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act
commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)
Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand.
However, considering that cases like the present are not common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that
there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases
where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number
of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent,
the majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest
and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes
to this Court the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.
DIGEST:
Facts:Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948
BarExaminations
Issue:WON the bar takers violated the CPR.
Held:Yes. Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate
measures topreserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions,
including, as in the presentcase, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their
officials and subordinates, including lawyers,who are officers of the Court.The Court and the licensed
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of theways of achieving
this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known tobe
honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard
set by.
5. PANGAN VS RAMOS
A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979
SANTA PANGAN, complainant
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for
contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings in this
administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for postponement. These
motions were predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing
before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No.
35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D.
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Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro
D.D. Ramos" before said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right
to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his
parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an
abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternal surname.
This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio D.
Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those
who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed
in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As an officer in the
temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor and
frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage.
This has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In
representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has
violated his solemn oath.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him,
such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be overempahisized. These injunctions
circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his I nigh
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice
and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when he resorts to deception or permits
his client to do so." 2
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was
authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. The
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his first aberration in
this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and
warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspencion or disbarment from the practice
of law.
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of this Court is
directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible. The request of
complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is
hereby granted.
SO ORDERED
DIGEST:
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In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed
because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the records of the said case was
checked (one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found that he used the name Atty. Pedro D.D.
Ramos. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use such name because in his birth
certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos. D.D. stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw
being his mothers surname. However, in the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.
HELD: No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of
those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one
inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to
swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable
obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D.
Ramos instead of Dionisio D. Ramos, respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to
deception. The Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar
infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.

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NATURE AND CREATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

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The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering

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(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

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