WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthótes or Alétheia

International Phenomenological Society
Plato's Doctrine of Truth: Orthtes or Altheia?

Author(s): Henry G. Wolz
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Dec., 1966), pp. 157-182
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR AL]tTHEIA?

The stage which the interpretationof the Platonicwritingshas reached
is very odd indeed. If we divide the dialoguesroughlyinto three groups,
then we find that the "early dialogues,"with their emphasison search,
are generally said to be animated by the liberal spirit of the living
Socrates.' But the very attempt to find a definition for such terms as
"courage,""self-mastery,"or "virtue"itself, suggestsa belief in the possibility of rigid standardsfor the conduct of life which belies that spirit.
The dialoguesof the second group are ascribedto "the period of Plato's
supreme excellence as a dramatist."2 Here one would expect to find
of thoughtwhich
the playwright'steachingby indirection,the stimnulation
the dramatic
Instead
method.
Socratic
the
with
associated
is usually
elements are completelyneglected by the commentatorsor relegatedto
the byplay, and the main purposeof the dialoguesis seen in the presentation of such "Platonicdoctrines"as the theory of ideas in the Phaedo
which serves as the basis for a rigorous demonstrationof the immortality of the soul, and the rule of the philosopher-kingsin the Republic,
whose insight into the ultimate meaning of the world enables them to
judge with infallibility in matters both private and public. The "late
dialogues"which are characterizedby a "markeddecline of dramatic
power"3 one would associate with a more straightforwardexposition
and perhaps a more dogmatic attitude. This anticipationwould be in
keeping with the reason which is customarilygiven for the more rigid
outlook of the second group as against the first. For if this change is
rightly attributedto the decline of the memory of Socratesin the mind
of Plato, then the last group would be likely to continuethis trend.
Curiouslyenough it has of late become fashionableto see much of
the Socraticmethod and spirit in the "late dialogues."Cornford'scommentary on the Parmenides,for instance, is replete with remarkssuch
1 E. A. Taylor refers to them as "Socratic dialogues." (Plato, The Man and His
Work. Sixth Edition. London: 1949, p. XI.) Hermann Gauss calls them "Friihdialoge" and distinguishes them from the "Dialoge der literarischen Meisterschaft"
and the "Spidialoge." (Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos.
Bern: 1961.)
2 E. A. Taylor, op. cit., p. 20.
3 Ibid., p. 19.
157
158
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ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY
as these: "Faithfulto Socrates,he would rathermake us think for ourselves than tell us what to think."4 "We are ... to draw for ourselves
the necessaryinferences."a Cornfordgoes,so far as,to say that at times
"Plato's purpose is to puzzle the reader by apparentcontradictions"6
or that "differentmeanings,of the suppositionhave been disguised"7
and that he "leaves it to us to discover the relevant sense or aspect."8
interpretsPhilebus
HermannGauss, in his six-volume"Handkommentar"
65a to mean that Plato no longer regards.the supreme,"Good" as
directly accessible.9He finds that in the-Laws Plato has become much
more liberal as comparedwith the Republic where he advocatedstate
control of the arts,'0 and that he now holds that the founder of a new
state cannot simply look to the ideal but must have regard for various
aspects of the specific situation, such as the geographicalconditionsof
the site he has chosen, as well as the historicaltraditionin which the
prospectivecolonistshave been raised." In fact Gauss attemptsto trace
a process,of maturationand liberalizationof Plato's philosophy,which
finds its consummationin the dialogues written toward the end of his
life:
It seems that when Plato wrote the Sophist he had not yet altogether freed
himself from the illusion that a kind of permanent knowledge might after all
be accessible to us. He has not yet reached the height which he will reach
in the Timaeus where all our assertions about reality are regarded as no more
than eik6tes mythoi, that is as tentative and merely probable assertions, which
in principle can be overthrown and of which, in the name of philosophy, we
must hope that sooner or later they will in fact be overthrown and surpassed.12
It was,difficult enough to accept the old view which maintainedthat

one and the same author who so successfullyportrayedthe spirit of
Socratesin the early dialogueshad become so utterly inflexible in later
life. But the new one, which would have us believe that the wine turned
F. MacDonald Cornford, Plato and Parmenides. New York, 1951, p. 111.
Ibid., p. 107.
6 Ibid., p. 163.
7 Ibid., p. 217.
8 Ibid., p. 154
Note also: "They (the students of the Academy) are expected to compare the
arguments of each Hypothesis with those of the others and to find out for themselves the distinctions that must be drawn." (Ibid., p. 130.)
9 "Zuerst werden wir darueber nicht erstaunt sein, wenn es von diesem obersten
'Guten' heisst, dass wir zu ihm keinen direkten Zugang haben. Das ist, was wir
beim spaten Plato seit dem "Parmenides" ohnehin erwarten." (Hermann Gauss,
Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos. 3. Teil. Zweite Haelfte. Bern, 1961,
p. 43.)
4
5
10 Ibid., p. 70.
11
12
Ibid.
Op. cit., 3. Teil., Erste Haelfte, p. 223. My own translation.
PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALEiTHEIA?
159
sour had miraculouslyregainedits sweetness,places an unbearablestrain

on our credulity.A field of inquirywhich has reached such a state of
confusioncalls for a radicallynew approach.
To many interpretersof Plato, Heidegger's essay entitled Platons
Lehre von der Wahrheit13 seemed to open the way toward a radical
reappraisalof the dialogues. For when coming to terms with the great
thinkersof the Westerntradition,Heideggerdoes not rest content with
surface meanings,but penetratesto the very foundation,to the usually
unexpressedgroundupon which the philosophyunderconsiderationrests:
Die "Lehre" eines Denkers ist das in seinem Sagen Ungesagte, dem der
Mensch ausgesetzt wird, auf dass er daffir sich verschwende. Damit wir das
Ungesagte eines Denkers, welcher Art es auch sei, erfahren und inskiinftig
wissen k6nnen, miissen wir sein Gesagtes Bedenken.'4
In his essay Heideggersets out to show that the unheraldedbut fateful

event in the dialogueslies in the transitionto a new conceptionof truth,
a conceptionwhich has controlledphilosophicthinkingto this very day.
Truth as aletheia (unhiddenness),accordingto Heidegger, is the older
and more basic notion. It is situation-directedand hence requires a
flexible mind, sensitiveto the flux of things. Truth as orthotes (correctness) presupposesfixed standardsof judgment and is therefore likely
to foster a certain rigidity of outlook.'5 Heideggerfurther claims that
13 Martin Heidegger, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Zweite Auflage, Bern,
1954.
14 Ibid., p. 5. "The 'doctrine' of a thinker is that which is left unsaid in what
he says, to which man is exposed in order to expend himself upon it. In order to
learn and henceforth know what a thinker has left unsaid, whatever it may be, it
is necessary to consider what he has said." (Transl. by John Barlow in Philosophy
in the Twentieth Century ed. by William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken. New York,
1962, p. 251.) Translations cannot adequately reflect the power and suggestiveness
of Heidegger's language. It seemed therefore justified to cite the original German
in the text of this paper and add the translation in the footnotes as an aid to the
reader.
'5 It should be noted that Heidegger does not simply substitute one conception
of truth for another. Instead he tries to show that truth as orth6tes or correctness
is merely part of or derivative from a more integral -phenomenon, namely, truth
as aletheia. Consider, he suggests in Sein und Zeit (Sechste Auflage. Tfibingen,
1949, p. 217) a man with his back turned toward the wall making the assertion:
The picture on the wall does not hang straight. The assertion is found to be true
if, upon facing the wall, the man discovers the picture in the condition described.
The assertion -does not refer to representations or images, but to the concrete
situation and nothing else: "Jede Interpretation, die hier etwas anderes einschiebt,
das im nur vorstellenden Aussagen soil gemeint sein, verfilscht den phenomenalen
Tatbestand dessen, worilber ausgesagt wird." (Ibid., pp. 217-218.) The assertion
may be merely thought; or it may be expressed in a sentence which allows another
to share in the view of reality to which the assertion leads. The sentence may be
passed on from person to person, without a renewal of the contact with reality.
160
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PHILOSOPHY
because of the decline of aletheia and the simultaneousrise of orthotes

there is in Plato's writings a persistent ambiguity.'6 Now if Heidegger's
findings should prove correct, then one would expect the confusion in
the conceptionof truth to be reflected in Plato's attitudeof mind, and
we would then be able to put our finger on the cause of the perplexing
fluctuationbetween a liberal and a dogmaticspirit which seems to run
through all the dialogues.
The subtlety of Heidegger'sanalysis and the suggestivenessand richness of his thought sorely tempt the reader simply to accept his conclusions. But were he to do so, he would overlook the fact that the
Allegory of the Cave, a small and relativelyunimportantportion of a
single dialogue, forms the main basis of Heidegger's argument. In order
to do justice to his claim, Heidegger, as he himself admits, would have
to examine all the dialogues.'7 So quite apart from the light which all
of Heidegger's discussions of other thinkers shed on his own thought,
the 'essay on Plato can be consideredas no more than a Hinweis, an

indication as to a possible fresh approach to Plato. And of these
HinweiseHeideggerhimself has said in anotherconnectionthat they are
too often unthinkinglypassed on as the opinions of their author when
they should serve as "Weisung ... sich selber auf den Weg zu machen,
um der gewiesenenSache selbst nachzudenken"(directionsfor the road

of independentreflection on the matter pointed out which each must
travel for himself.)18
What militates most strongly, however, against an uncritical acceptance of the result of Heidegger's investigation, is the fact that he
approachesPlato as he had previouslyapproachedAristotle, Descartes,
and Kant. These thinkersmake an effort to give a clear accountof their
position, and so it is proper for Heidegger to start with their explicit
utterances and then attempt to penetrate to, the implied, unexpressed
ground. Plato, by contrast, not unlike the great tragedians,teaches by
While it still refers to things, to concrete situations, these are no longer experienced
by the one hearing or seeing the sentence. The assertion now hardens into some
sort of independent reality, and in that independent state it may be said either to
conform or not to conform to things. Only in that secondary sense can it be said
that truth lies in the assertion. But to regard truth of the assertion as the only
truth is to lose sight of the original heuristic and apophantic function of the assertion: "Die Aussage ist wahr, bedeutet: sie entdeckt das Seiende an ihm selbst. Sie
sagt aus, sie zeigt auf, sie 'Thsstsehen' (apophansis) das Seiende in seiner Entdecktheit. Wahrsein (Wahrheit) der Aussage muss verstanden werden als entdeckendsein." (Ibid., p. 218.)
16 Heidegger, Platons Lehre Von Der Wahrheit, p. 42.
17 Ibid., p. 5.
18 Heidegger's Preface to: William J. Richardson, S. J., Heidegger: Through
Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague, 1963, pp. viii-ix.
PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALETHEIA?
161
indirection.As a result he usually does not immediatelyreveal his position, for he is concerned more with the stimulation and subsequent
directionof thoughtratherthan with the advocacyof specific doctrines.
And so the insight which Plato is trying to convey is somethingwhich
must happen in the mind of the reader, as the result of a clash of ideas
which occurs in the dialogue.'9
It is doubtful whether the dramaticaspects of Plato's dialogues can
be ignored with impunity. We propose, therefore, to test Heidegger's
theory of a change in the conception of truth in the light of an interpretation which attempts to allow full sway to the dramatic elements
of the dialogues.And if we take as our point of departurea view which
emerges from the dialectical interplay of opposing positions, we are
likely to reach conclusionswhich are quite differentfrom those which
Heidegger derives from a literal reading. In fact it might well be that
Plato and Heideggerare then found to be allies ratherthan adversaries
in the struggleto attain to a satisfactoryconception of truth. Since a
considerationof all the dialogues is impossible,we shall try to do the
next best thing, namely to discuss those dialogueswhich most obviously
seem to confirm Heidegger'scontention. But first, merely by way of
reminder,a few words about Heidegger'sanalysisof the Allegory of the
Cave.
The very locale of the allegory,as Heideggerpoints out, suggests,truth
as unhiddenness:the dark cave, the sunlit world outside, various levels
of light and darkness between the two. Each stage in the paideia
of the inhabitants of the cave has its own truth, its own revelation of reality. The shadows which the chained prisoners see on
the wall are not simply nothing. These shadows offer themselves
or their reality to the understandingof the prisoners.The latter perceive
19This is clearly enough stated in the Seventh Letter, which is generally regarded
as authentic:
"....
in regard to ...
the subjects to which I devote myself
-...
certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in the
future, for there is no way of putting it in words like other studies. Acquaintance
with it comes after a long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself
and of close companionship, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping
spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining." (Seventh
Letter, par. 341c-d. Translated by L. A. Post. The Collected Dialogues of Plato.
Including the Letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Bollingen
Series LXXI, New York, 1961, pp. 1588-1589.) Italics added.
Note also the remarks on the indirect method of teaching in Republic, Book
VII, par. 518; Vol. I, p. 777; Apology par. 31, Vol. I, p. 414; Theatetus par. 149,
Vol. II, p. 150. The Dialogues of Plato, translated by B. Jowett, in two volumes.
New York, 1937. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Plato's dialogues
refer to this edition.
20 Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, p. 33.
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them, but do not or cannot inquire into the ground of their being, that
is, the fire and the objects which make them mere shadows. The cave
dweller who is released from his, chains,but confused by the brightness
of the fire in the,cave does not at once experiencea higherkind of truth
or reality; in fact he considers.the shadows which he saw before his
release as more true and more real than what confronts and bedazzles
him now. It is only when he gets outside the cave and becomes accustomed to the sun in whose light real things present themselvesthat he
is face to face with genuine truth and reality. After he has reentered
the cave and overcomethe first few moments of confusion,he sees the
shadows again, but now he knows them as shadows, with merely a
borrowedkind of reality.
There is, however, also the fire, the things outside the cave which
stand for the ideas and the sun which representsthe idea of ideas, the
source of intelligibility and reality for all things. The ideas are the
standardson a higher level to which beings on a lower level must conform. And accordingto Heideggerthe emphasisis being placed, not on
the levels of truth, but on the ideas:
Die Unverborgenheit wird zwar in ihren verschiedenen Stufen genannt, aber
sie wird nur daraufhin bedacht, wie sie das Erscheinende in seinem Aussehen
(eidos) zugiinglich und dieses Sichzeigende (idea) sichtbar macht. Die eigentliche Besinnung geht auf das in der Helle des Scheins gewiihrte Erscheinen
des Aussehens. Dieses gibt die Aussicht auf das, als was jegliches Seiende
anwest. Die eigentliche Besinnung gilt der idea.21
A more shift of emphasis alone would, of course, not be very convincing, and so Heideggerpoints to the well-knowntheory of ideas, and
especially to a passage from Book VI of the Republic which seems to
eliminate all doubt. There the philosopher-kingsare,describedas "men
who have in their soul a clear pattern of perfect truth, which they
might study in every detail and constantlyrefer to, as a painter looks

to his model, before they proceed to embodynotions of justice, honour,
and goodness in earthly institutions."22 The paideia is now understood
to consist in turningtoward and steadfastlyadheringto the ideas,which
21
Ibid., p. 34.
"To be sure unhiddenness is named in its various stages, but one can only consider it in the way it makes the phenomenal accessible in its outward appearance
(eidos) and the way it makes this emerging (idea) visible. Consciousness, properly
speaking, has to do with the way outward appearance manifests itself and is
preserved in the brightness of its steady appearance. Through this one can view
whatever each being is present as. Consciousness, properly speaking, applies to the
idea." (Transl. John Barlow, in Barrett and Aiken, op. cit., p. 261.
22 The Republic of Plato. Trans. by F. M. Cornford. New York, 1945, Book
VI, par. 484, p. 190.
PLATO'S DOCTRINEOF TRUTH: ORTHOTESOR ALETHEIA?
163
serve as a standardin the light of which all human activity is to be

evaluated:
Die Befreiung ergibt sich nicht schon aus der Losldsung der Fesseln und
besteht nicht in der Zuigellosigkeit,sondern beginnt erst als die stetige Eingewdhnung in das Festmachen des Blickes auf die festen Grenzen der in ihrem
Aussehen feststehenden Dinge. Die eigentliche Befreiung ist die Stetigkeit der
Zuwendung zu dem, was in einem Aussehen erscheint und in diesem Erscheinen das Unverborgenste ist.23
The notion of truth inherent in the theory of ideas, together with its
correspondingattitude of mind, seems in fact to be the very opposite
of aletheia. Instead of turning to things, to' the concrete,situation, the
inquirerturns.to the ideas; instead of flexibility and malleability,there
is now rigid adherenceto set standards.Heidegger'sconclusion seems
inescapable:
Indem Platon von der idea sagt, sie sei die Herrin, die Unverborgenheit
zulasse, verweist er in ein Ungesagtes, dass namlich fortan sich das Wesen
der Wahrheit nicht als das Wesen der Unverborgenheit aus eigener Wesenfiulle entfaltet, sondern sich auf das Wesen der idea verlagert. Das Wesen der
Wahrheit gibt den Grundzug der Unverborgenheit preis.... Wahrheit wird
zur orthotes, zu Richtigkeit des Vernehmens und Aussagens.24
The theory of ideas is generally regarded as established Platonic

doctrine,so that a contention,such as Heidegger's,which is implied by
it, should have no difficulty in finding acceptance.But what happens
if we tear ourselvesloose from the accustomedliteral readingof the text
and hold ourselves open and receptive to the possible effects of the
dialecticalinterplayof idea? The Euthyphro seems particularlysuitable
for making the experiment;it contains strong evidence in favor of
Heidegger's thesis and at the same time is not lacking in dramatic
elements.
The dialogue shows us Socratesengagedin the search for the definiPlatons Lehre von der Wahrheit, p. 30. Italics added.
"Liberation does not take place in the mere act of getting free from the chains
and does not consist merely in being untrammeled, but begins first as the steady
orienting of oneself so that one's gaze is made fast to the firm limits of the things
standing fast in their outward appearance. Actual liberation lies in the steadiness
with which one turns towards what manifests itself in its outward appearance and
is in this manifesting the most unhidden." (Transl. by Barlow, in Barrett and Aiken,
op. cit., p. 259.)
24 Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, pp. 41-42.
When Plato says that the idea is the master permitting unhiddenness he banishes
to something left unsaid the fact that henceforth the essence of truth does not
unfold out of its own essential fullness-as the essence of unhiddenness, but shifts
its abode to the essence of the idea. The essence of truth relinquishes the. basic
feature of unhiddenness.... Truth becomes orth6tes, correctness of the ability to
perceive and to declare something." (Tr. Barrett and Aiken, p. 265.)
23
164
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tion of a virtue, namely piety. Euthyphro, who is not very bright, needs
to be told what a definition is:
Is not piety in every action always the same? And impiety, again - is it not
always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety,
one notion which includes whatever is impious.25
And then Socrates describes the function of a definition, which when

found would make moral judgmentsso simple and so reliable:
Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to
which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or
those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an
action is pious, such another impious.26
The enquiryhas been occasionedby a concretemoralproblem.Euthyphro

is about to instituteproceedingsagainsthis father for causing the death
of a serf throughgross negligence.To the objectionsof his family that "a
son is impious who prosecuteshis father,"he replies with an appeal to
the behaviorof the gods. "Do not men," he argues,"regardZeus as the
best and most righteous of the gods? - And yet they admit that he
bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devouredhis sons, and
that he too had punishedhis own father(Uranus)for a similarreason."27
Through his insistence on a definition as a norm of judgment, Socrates
extricatesthe problem from the realm of religion and mythology and

raises the discussion to the level of rational inquiry. "And what if
Euthyphrodoes prove to me," he asks, "that all the gods regard the
death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anythingmore of the nature
of piety and impiety?" 28
From Mythos to Logos one might be inclined to name the theme of

this brief dialogue. Of course, a definition is not actually found, but this
is usually thought to be attributable to the Socratic method: Socrates
means us to find the definitionfor ourselves.As againstthe doctrinaire

position of Euthyphro,Socrates' call for a definition is very alluring.
Leavingdark superstitionfar behind, one feels transportedinto the clear
light of reason. The fact, however, that we have left behind not only
superstitionbut the concrete situationas well should give us pause. Just
how, we might ask, would the definitionof a moral excellence function
in the kaleidoscopicflux of human relationships?Would it tell us that
such and such an act is good or bad and thereforeought to be pursued
or shunned regardless of the consequences?What would happen to
human responsibility?Could we simply say that our task is to adhere
25 Euthyphro, par. 5, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 386.
26 Ibid., par. 6, p. 387. Italics added.
27 Ibid., par. 5-6, pp. 386-387.
28 Ibid., par. 9, p. 390.
165
to the definitionor rule, and that the consequencesare not our concern?
Does not the successful use of a fixed definition presupposea stable,
unchangeableworld, that is, one in which we clearly do not live? More
often than not we must choose not between good and evil, but between
the greaterof two goods or the lesser of two evils. But just what will
turn out to be the greater good or lesser evil only the given circumstances will reveal. Unless,the whole history of the world is spread out
before us, we can never say once and for all that such and such an evil
will never be outdone by a greaterevil and thereforemust be shunned
always and no matter what the circumstances.
"Let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremeson
either side, as far as possible,"29 Socrates warns at the end of the
Republic. But in the Euthyphrohe himself proposes an extreme. Shall
we say that when Plato wrote this dialogue he had not yet attainedto
the wisdom shown in the Republic?Or would it be more reasonableto
assumethat he had Socratesplay the devil's advocate?Then the Socratic
method would not be directed at Euthyphro, who evidently learns
nothing from his encounterwith Socrates, nor would it consist simply
in the questionand answermethod. It would ratherseem that by pitting
one extreme against the other, Plato is trying to make the attentive
readersee that it is not enoughto abjuresuperstitionand have recourse
to reason. For the appeal to a rule divorcedfrom life can spring from
as ruthless an attitude as that inspired by superstition.And just as
Euthyphro'sunshakeableconvictionis unjustifiedsince it implies familiarity with the will of the gods, so intellectualcertaintyin moral matters
presupposesa definition which the world in which we live does not
allow.30
Toward the end of the dialogue, Socrates suggests that piety be

defined as a kind of justice or ministrationwith referenceto the gods.
But what benefits can possibly accrue to the gods from the, deeds of
men? Is there anythingwhich only men can do? "Tell me, oh tell me,"
Socrates urges, "what is that fair work which the gods do by the help
31 Euthyphro, of course, does not know the
of our ministrations"?
to give it. It seems plausible,however,that
refuses
Socrates
answer,and
to
do
with bringing order into one's, own life
has
task
something
this
and maintenanceof order in the comestablishment
in
the
and helping
life nor the life of the community
the
individual's
neither
For
munity.
29 Republic, Book X, par. 619, p. 876.
"The difference of men and

30 Plato says as much explicitly in a later dialogue:
actions, and the endless irregular movements of human things, do not admit of
any universal and simple rule. And no art whatsoever can lay down a rule which
will last for all time." Statesman, par. 294, Vol. II, p. 322.
81 Euthyphro, par. 13, p. 396.
166
PHILOSOPHY
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is providedin a ready-madeform. And how can there be free men in

a free society, unless they are accountablefor their own way of life? It
is as if the, gods who are responsiblefor the order in the world, had
stoppedshort of human affairsand imposedupon men the task of completing the orderingprocess..
To bring about and preserve proper relations,among men is a continuous,never-endingtask. Neithercherishedtraditions,nor deeply rooted
desires are a reliable guide. We must tear ourselves,loose from habitual
modes of behaviorand from the immediateneeds arisingout of the concrete situationin order to gain a wider perspectivefor successfulaction.
But neithercan we expect to discoverfinal answers-inan abstractrealm
of ideas. Only the kind of reflection which allows for the intricate
interplayof idea and situationoffers any hope for the establishmentof
satisfactoryhuman relations.
If we are willing to accept this,interpretationthen we identify Plato's
position with neither of the two adopted by the participantsto the discussion. We would rather see it midway between the blind superstition
and traditionalismof Euthyphroand the rigid rationalismwhich in this
dialogue Plato chooses to place into the mouth of Socrates. And then
the Euthyphro would not confirm the, findings of Heidegger in the
Allegory of the Cave. For while Heidegger there sees aletheia under the
yoke of the idea,32it now appearsthat the idea stands in the service of
aletheia,helping the truth of things to shine forth in its own light.
While the Euthyphro,on a literalreading,would place moral behavior
under the control of a definition,the Crito would subjectthe individual
to the rule of law. Socratesis, usually thought to have died ratherthan
break the law which condemnedhim to death in spite of his innocence,
and this view can be amply supportedby referencesto the text. Socrates
stressesthe importanceof the laws for the welfare of the citizens. They
regulate the marriagelaws and provide for the education of the child.
"Well then, since you were brought into the world and nurturedand
educatedby us," Socrateshas the laws say, "can you deny in the first
place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers,were before you?
And if this is true you are not on equal termswith us; nor can you think
that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you ... Has a
philosopherlike you failed to discover that our country is more to be

valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ances32 "Indem Platon von der idea sagt, sie sei die Herrin die Unverborgenheit
zulasse, verweist er in ein Ungesagtes, dass niinlich fortan sich das Wesen der
Wahrheit nicht als das Wesen der Unverborgenheit aus eigener Wesensfillie entfaltet, sondern sich auf das Wesen der idea verlagert. Das Wesen der Wahrheit
gibt den Grundzug der Unverborgenheit preis." Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit,
p. 41.
PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALEfTHEIA?
tor...
."
167
33 The modem reader might stir uneasily at this point, for he
is wary about too submissivean attitudetoward the state. But the next
few lines are bound to make him cry out in dissent:
And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the
punishment is to be endured in silence; and if she leads us to wounds or death
in battle, thither we follow as is right; neither may any one yield or retreat
or leave his rank, but whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other
place, he must do what his city and his country order him.34
Such a principlecould have exoneratedthe worst of the war criminals

after the last war, aside from the dictator himself. It is true that the
imaginarylaws try to mitigatethe harshnessof their demand by "proclaimingto any Athenianby the liberty which we allow him, that if he
does not like us when he has become of age and has seen the ways of
the city, and made our acquaintance,he may go where he pleases and
take his goods with him."35 But even with the best of laws it can come
about that strict applicationof the law would work an injusticeso severe
as to make disobedience a moral obligation. Nor can it be rightly
claimed, as the laws do, that "he who has experienceof the mannerin
which we order justice and administerthe state, and still remains, has
enteredinto an impliedcontractthat he will do as we commandhim."36
A citizen can never, without forfeiting his freedom and responsibility,
give such a blank pledge of obedience in complete disregardof existing
circumstances.Even more embarrassingto a literal interpretationis the
fact that at the beginningof the dialogue,just before the discussionwith
Crito gets under way, Socrates adopts a position which is the very opposite of an unquestioningsubmissionto law:
And therefore we ought to consider whether I shall or shall not do as you
say. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be
guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears
to me to be the best.37
And just as the Eichmanns, if unquestioningsubmission to the law

is made a virtue, can shift responsibilityto, higher authority, so the
Oswalds,if individualreason reigns supreme,can justify their misdeed
by appealingto the outcome of their own reflections.
In the Crito, even more so than in the Euthyphro,the two extremes
are clearly stated. It is reasonable'to assume that they serve Plato to
bring home the paradoxicalnatureof civic virtue. For a good citizen at
33 Crito, par. 50-51, pp. 434-435.
34 Ibid., par. 51, p. 435. Italics added.
35 Ibid.
36
37
Ibid.
Ibid., par. 46, p. 430. Italics added.
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one and the same time must be obedient and yet hold himself responsible
for the consequencesof his acts. If we ask how this is possible, we will
find no direct answer in the dialogue. We might, however, discover a
hint, such as the one contained in the following remark made by the
laws:
We do not impose (our commands) rudely, but give him the alternative of
obeying or convincing us ... that our commands are unjust.38
To convince the ideal laws, which Plato elsewhere identifies with

reason,39 can only mean that we must show disobedience to constitute
the lesser evil. Vital as the laws may be to the maintenanceof order
and hence to the existence of the state, there may be occasions when
the harm which comes from the disregardor suspensionof the, law is
outweighedby the evil consequenceswhich would follow upon enforcement of the law. So laws have no absolute power. And now in order
not to give reason unrestrictedcontrol we must add that the sheer fact
that a law exists ought to weigh heavily in the determinationof the
greatergood or the lesser evil. So both law and reason must control our
actions but in such a way as to make one restrainthe other. However,
as we have seen in the Euthyphro,the greater good or the lesser evil
are not discoveredby looking to a definitionor idea. They arise out of
the interrelationsof the various goods, and evils which are present or
likely to occur under given circumstances.And so by trying to resolve
the paradox presentedin the dialogue, and following the suggestionof
Socrates to their natural conclusion, we are led back to the concrete
situation.But this means that Plato's thoughttakes,a directionwhich is
the very opposite of the one it is said to take in the opinion of Martin
Heidegger.
So far we have dealt only with two of the earlier dialogues,in which
the liberalspiritof Socratesis said to be still alive. In the later dialogues,
the more dogmatic characterof Plato's own philosophy is, alleged to
come to the fore. So it may well be that we have not as yet come to
grips with Plato's doctrine of truth. Since the theory of ideas forms a
prominentpart of Heidegger'sargument,40a brief examinationof it,
especially as it appearsin the Phaedo, becomes unavoidable.
A full discussionof the Phaedo is, of course, not possible. But the
theory of ideas, which has traditionallybeen regardedas its main philosophic yield, should at least be placed into its immediatecontext. The
Ibid., par. 52, p. 436.
regulate our cities and houses according to law, meaning by
the very term 'law' the distribution of mind." Laws, Book IV, par. 713, Vol. II,
p. 485.
40 Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, esp. pp. 20 ff. and pp. 38 ff.
38
39 "We must ...
PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALUTHEIA?
169
theoryoccurs in Socrates'discussionof his methodof inquiry.He relates

how in his youth he was taken in by the "naturephilosophers"who
soughtfor principlesof explanationamong.physicalthings. "Is the blood
the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire?" 41 these are
questions of the kind which Socrates said agitated him. But instead of
seeing more clearly he became more confused; or rather, becoming
aware of the distinction between factual juxtapositionand causal or
necessaryconnections,he recognizedthat what he took to be all explanation was no explanationat all:
For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to
things which I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well;
I forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths; e.g. such a fact as that
the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; for when by the
digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever
there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger
and the small man great.42
While necessary connections cannot be observed between things, they

can be detectedbetween ideas:
I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at things
with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the help of the senses. And I
thought that I had better have recourse to the world of mind and seek there
the truth of existence.4s
But this appeal to ideas, as he soon found out, was not without serious
limitations. The ideal would be to, discover an ultimate principle of
explanation,which would assign to each thing its proper place in the
total scheme. To such a principle he had hoped to be introducedby
Anaxagoas who had said that "mind was the disposer and cause of
all."44 But Anaxagorasdisappointedhim because he had "recourseto
air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities."45 Having to fall
back on his own resources, Socrates could do no better than assume
some likely principles of explanationand test them by means of their
synthesizingpower:
I first assumed some principle which I judged to be strongest, and then I
affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to the
cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue.46
Phaedo, par. 96, Vol. I, p. 481.
Ibid.
43 Ibid., par. 99-100, p. 484.
44 Ibid., par. 97, p. 482. Anaxagoras, Socrates thought, would give him a perfect explanation, that is, he would tell him, for instance, whether the earth is flat
or round, and then he would explain why it is necessarily so and why it is best
that it should be so.
45 Ibid., par. 98, p. 482.
46 Ibid., par. 100, p. 484.
41
42
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This "secondbest mode of inquiry"as Socratescalls it, cannot lay claim

to certainty,since it is not in possession of the ultimate principle nor
even of principles or ideas necessarilyreflectingthe essence or nature
of things.Some of them might perhapsbe derivedfrom a higheror more
comprehensiveprinciple, but the test would always be in reference to
experiencedreality:
If anyone assails you there (i.e., questions your principle), you would not mind
him or answer him until you had seen whether the consequences which follow
agree with one another or not, and when you are further required to give an
explanation of this principle, you would go on to assume a higher principle,
and a higher, until you found a resting-place in the best of the higher.47
It would appear, therefore, that if the strictly philosophicalpart of

the Phaedo were to end with the exposition of Socrates'"second-best"
method of inquiry,the dialoguecould hardly be called upon to support
Heidegger's contention. For the ideas to which Socrates here refers
cannotbe said to containthe truth of things. They are merelypostulates
which are somehow derived from experience and whose function it is
to help us discover some orderly relationshipbetween the elements of
experience. Heidegger could, however, appeal to the argumentwhich
follows and to which the expositionof the method appearsas a prelude.
For oddly enough the argumentproceeds as if the "second-best"were
the ideal method, as if the postulateswere the essences of things. Only
if Socrates could claim to possess insight into the very nature of the
human soul would it make any sense for him to maintainthat "deathlessness"is one of its necessaryattributes.
The difficultycan not be eliminatedsimply by saying that Plato was
unawareof the implicationsof Socrates'"second-best"method.48For in
the brief intervalbetweenthe expositionand the final argument,Socrates
uses the method as if he had a properunderstandingof it. When Simias
raises an objection againstSocrates'first set of argumentsby offering a
rival hypothesis, namely the harmony theory, which would imply the
mortalityof the soul, Socratesrefutes it precisely as one would a mere
postulate. He shows that it lacks consistency,that its consequencesdo
not agree with the observedfacts, that it is in conflict with other postulates which Simliashas accepted.49
Ibid., par. 101, p. 485.
Note for instance: "His hypothetical method, if our analysis of the Phaedo
has been correct, can never attain to absolute knowledge ... but, when we recall
that (Plato) believed in the possibility of absolute knowledge ... we must certainly
wonder why he devoted so much space to its elaboration ..." (Richard Robinson,
Plato's Earlier Dialectic. Second Edition, Oxford, 1953, p. 146.)
49 Socrates' refutation can be summarized briefly as follows: The harmony
theory leads to absurd consequences since it would make us say that the soul as
47
48
171
Before we come to grips with the problem which arises out of the
discrepancybetween Socrates'exposition of his method and its, use in
the final argumentof the Phaedo, we may perhaps be allowed a brief
referenceto the Protagoras.For this dialogue offers a furtherexcellent
illustrationof the proper use of the method. There Socrates challenges
Protagoras'claim of being able to teach political virtue to the young
men of the city, on the groundthat virtue is incapableof being taught.
It is significantthat Socrates.does not turn to the idea of virtue in an
attempt to show that teachabilityis incompatiblewith it. Instead he
examines the social situation,or, more specifically,the behavior of the
Athenians in the Assembly and the attitude of the great statesmen
toward their offspring.The latter, observes Socrates, "gave (their sons)
excellent instructionin all that could be learned from masters, but in
their own departmentof politics neither taught them, nor gave them
teachers."50 The former accept advice in technical matters only from
experts, such as architectsand shipwrights,"but when the question is
an affair of state," says Socrates, "everybodyis free to have a say carpenter,tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger;rich and poor, high and
low - any one who likes gets up, and no one reproacheshim, as in the
former case, with not having learned, and having no teacher, and yet
giving advice."51 The reason for this unconcernabout instructionand
trainingin political virtue must, accordingto Socrates,be sought in the
fact that this virtue cannot be taught.All that Socratesdoes and all that
he legitimatelycan do is to show that on the assumptionthat virtue
cannot be taught, the behaviorof the membersof the Assembly and of
the great statesmenwhich first appearedvery odd indeed, now makes
better sense. Protagorasin turn refutes,Socrates by appealinglikewise
to the social situation, although he refers not to the behavior of the
Atheniansalone but to intelligentmen in general.He claims that virtue
is innatein all men,52at least as a capacity,and that it requiresteachers
to realize that capacity.To Socrates'objectionthat there are no special
teachers as in the other arts, he replies that all the citizens help in the
a harmony contains within itself a discord or a harmony, according as it is vicious
or not; its implications are contrary to known phenomena, inasmuch as the soul
to some extent leads and controls the body, while a harmony is dependent on the
instrument; it is incompatible with the theory of recollection accepted by Simmias,
according to which the soul exists prior to its entry into the body, while a harmony appears after the instrument has come into existence. (Cf. Phaedo, par.
91-95; pp. 476-479).
50 Protagoras, par. 320, Vol. I, p. 91.
51 Ibid., par. 319, p. 91.
52 For the manner in which Protagoras arrives at the "innateness" of virtue,
see H. Wolz "The Protagoras Myth and the Philosopher-Kings," The Review of
Metaphysics, Vol. XVII, No. 2, December, 1963, pp. 219ff.
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RESEARCH
education of the young; and therefore it is difficult to find a teacher

such as Protagoraswho has the skill to add the finishingtouchesto what
the others have done. And if everybodypossesses political virtue, everybody should be allowed to speak on political mattersin the Assembly.
Thus the view of Protagorasalso casts a measureof reasonablenessover
the behavior of the Athenians. But the theory of Protagorassurpasses
that of Socratesin synthesizingpower, for it can accountfor phenomena
which Socrates, from his position, must leave unexplained.Why, for
instance, do we not "chastizeor instructthe ugly, or the diminutive,or
the feeble," asks Protagoras, but hold men responsible for political
virtue, except under the assumption that the latter are capable of
improvement"by study and exercise and teaching,"53 Why do people
not blame a man when he admits a lack of skill in any particularart,
but when he lacks "honesty ... or some other political virtue"54 and
publicly tells the truth about himself, they think he must be out of his
mind. For they considerthis virtue as so essentialto communitylife that
not even the wickedarewhollydevoidof it. And finallyProtagorasappeals
to the theory of punishmentwhich, he says, is held by all reasonable
people. For "he who desires to inflict rational punishmentdoes not
retaliatefor a past wrong which cannot be undone, (but) has regardto
the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who
sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again ... thereby
clearly implyingthat virtue is capable of being taught."55

Thus Protagorashas won the first roundof the argumentwith Socrates
not by showingthat he is right and his opponentwrong in the light of
some set standard,but by leading his audienceto a point of view from
which they discover a higher degree of intelligibilityover a wider range
of human experiencethan was obtainablewith the theory of Socrates.
Both attack and defense show a keen awarenessof the interplayof fact
and idea. The idea does not impose a structureupon reality, but merely
aids in the discovery of whatever structurethe concrete situation may
exhibit.
The digressionto the Protagorasseemed necessaryin order to direct
the spotlight of attention on the conception of truth which is implied
by Socrates'so-called "second-best"method of inquiry. For those who
see the Phaedo mainly as the source of the theory of ideas usually overlook or minimizethe importanceof this conception, and consider only
or at least place the main stress on the other conception which is
implied by the final argumentfor the immortalityof the soul. These
53
54
55
Protagoras, par. 323, p. 94.

Ibid.
Ibid., par. 324, p. 95.
PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALUTHEIA?
173
two conceptionsare not intermingledso that one could seek a way out
of the difficultyby maintainingPlato confusedthem. In fact the change
from one to other is so abrupt56 that one can hardly help seeing in
this juxtapositionof incompatibleviews an analogue to the juxtaposition of traditionalismand rationalismin the Euthyphroor of radical
freedom and responsibilityas against unquestioningobedience to law
in the Crito. The present problem is complicated,however, by the fact
that we are confrontednot with two extremeswhich of themselvessuggest a "mean," but with an authentic and an unauthenticconception
of truth.
We should now be willing to face both aspects of the paradoxwhich
Plato creates by having Socrates expound a method operating with
postulates and having him use it in an argumentwhich presupposes
insight into essences. And with the fuller understandingof the problem
at hand, we should now also have a better chance of finding a satisfactory solution.
When Socrates,after his disappointmentwith the nature philosophers
and expecially with Anaxagoras,had decided that he "had better have
recourseto the world of mind and seek there the truth,of existence,"57
he might have done so for one of two reasons:He might have expected
to find in the ideas the true reality or the essence of things, and truth
would then have become the conformityof the mind to the ideas. In
Heidegger'sterminology,truth would have become correctness(Richtigkeit, orthotes).By contrasthe might have seen the ideas.as devices, as
instrumentswhich, though rooted in reality, have as their primaryfunction to stimulateand direct thought,so that it places itself in the proper
perspectiveand thus discoversthe truth shiningforth from things. Then
the ideas would be in the service of truth, and the truth thus conceived
would be Heidegger'sale'theiaor unhiddenness.
In spite of the seeminglyradicaldifferencebetween the two views of
truth, they are not unrelated.History has in fact shown that one can
easily lead to the other. Scientific postulates, for instance, may. at a
given period and in regard to specific aspects of nature appear so successful that the inquireris temptedto, regardthem as revealingthe very
essence of things. This temptationmay prove irresistiblewhen coupled
with the common tendency of the scientist to allow as real only that
5 In this connection note: "It is well that we should be reminded that the
doctrine of Forms as causes is put forward by Socrates as a second-best doctrine
relative. to that which he had hoped to build on the principle suggested by
Anaxagoras. Nevertheless Plato seems, in our present section, and indeed throughout the rest of the argument which gives his final proof of immortality, to have
forgotten this. (R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo. Cambridge, 1955, p. 146.)
57 Phaedo, par. 99-100, p. 484.
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which falls within the range of his method and conforms to his postulates, and to regard as 'mere' appearancethat which does not.58 To
those who believed themselvesin the possessionof definitivetruth about
the cosmos, Galileo was a dangerousheretic; and many of those who
felt comfortablyat home in the world of Newton must have looked upon
Einstein as a subversiveintruderand a disturberof the scientificpeace.
Now it is hardly necessary to point out that Socrates devoted his life
to the task of ferreting out and exposing the, false pretenders to, wisdom.
But it is perhaps,less readily recognizedthat at least the first half and

probablythe whole of the Phaedo concerns itself in the main with the
flaw of overconfidencebased on the wrong conceptionof truth and the
baneful effects it may have on inquiry. This will not become,evident,
however, unless we are willing to call into play the usually neglected
dramaticelements of the dialogue.
Far from promisinga compelling demonstrationfor the immortality
of the soul, Socrates at the, outset had merely wanted to "converse a
little of the probabilitiesof these things."59 One of his two young
Pythagoreanfriends warned that "it requires a great deal of argument

and many proofs to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists,
and has any force or intelligence."60 And after the first set of proofs
the other remarkson "how hard or rather impossibleis the attainment
of any certainty about questions such as these in, the present life." 61
Yet in the face of all these expressionsof uncertainty,and despite the
fact that Socrates has merely undertakento reconcile his faith with
current philosophicaland scientific speculations,most of the members
of the group felt that the immortalityof the soul had been convincingly
demonstrated.And so when the two young men raised serious objections againstthe argumentof Socrates,they felt shock and dismay:
58 Heidegger refers to Descartes as an illustration of this tendency: "Descartes
lisst sich nicht die Seinsart des innerweltlichen Seienden von diesem vorgeben,
sondern auf dem Grunde einer in ihrem Ursprung unenthullten, in ihrem Recht
unausgewiesenen Seinsidee (Sein = stindige Vorhandenheit) schreibt er der Welt
gleichsam ihr "eigentliches"Sein vor." Sein und, Zeit, p. 96.
Note also: "Es konnte allerdings zu gewissen Zeiten ein Grundentwurfvereinbdrt
werden, von dem aus festgesetzt wurde, was das Seiende zu sein habe. und dieser
Entwurf konnte waihrend einer Reihe von Jahren, ja, Jahrhunderten beibehalten
werden, herumgereicht werden uniter den "Zuinftigen."Die Weise des Umgehens
mit einem solchen vom "Subjekt"gemachten Entwurf zeigt sich etwa bei Galilei,
wenn dort erklUrtwird, was Natur zu sein habe und woraufhin man sie ansprechen
muisse: nimlich Bewegung von Massenpunkten." Katharina Kanthack, Vom Sinn
der Selbsterkenntnis.Berlin, 1958, p. 60.
r9 Phaedo, par. 70, p. 453.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., par. 85, p. 470.
PLATO'S DOCTRINEOF TRUTH: ORTHOTESOR ALETHEIA?
175
When we had been so firmly convinced before, now to have our faith shaken
seemed to introduce a confusion and uncertainty, not only into the previous
argument, but into any future one; either we were incapable of forming a
judgment, or there were no grounds of belief.62
In orderto heal the wound struckby the argumentand the objections

raised against it, Socrates,warns against the dangers,of overconfidence
in reason, an excess which so easily leads to its opposite, namely, complete distrust.But the most effective way to prevent a recurrenceof the
false sense of certainty,so Socratesseems to think, is to help his friends
gain a better understandingof the nature of the method employed and
the kind of truth it is. able to attain. Once they understoodit could not
yield certainty,they would welcome objectionsinsteadof being upset by
them. For these would either fortify the position establishedor replace
it by a better one.
So duringthe first half of the dialoguethe readerwitnessesthe drama
of a group of Atheniansengagedin a discussionon the immortalityof
the soul on the day one of their number is to die. And he vicariously
experiences their joy when the argument appears successful, dismay
when it is threatened,relief when Socrates comes to its rescue. In the
second half he is suddenlyforced to change from a spectatorto a participant. He can no longer content himself with following the argument
more or less passively.And if he formerlysmiled condescendinglyat the
ease with which Socrates'friends yielded to persuasionpromptedby a
desire for certainty,his own critical powers are now being put to the
test. For he finds himself confrontedwith the irreducibledisparitybetween Socrates' exposition of a method which yields only probability
and its applicationto an argumentwhich lays claim to certainty.
If he now casts a critical eye on the illustrationsof necessary connections which Socrates offers as a preliminarystep to the demonstra62 Ibid., par. 88, p. 473.
It is interesting to note how often the lesson which Plato is trying to teach in
the Phaedo has to be relearned:
"Whlatevermay be one's opinion as to our permanent acceptance of the analytical details of Einstein's restricted and general theories of relativity, there can be
no doubt that through these theories physics is permanently changed. It was a
great shock to discover that classical concepts, accepted unquestioningly, were
inadequate to meet the actual situation, and the shock of this discovery has resulted
in a critical attitude toward our whole conceptual structure which must at least
in part be permanent. Reflection on the situation after the event shows that it
should not have needed the new experimental facts which led to relativity to
convince us of the inadequacy of our previous concepts, but that a sufficiently
shrewd analysis should have prepared us for at least the possibility of what Einstein
did. P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics. New York, 1951, p. 1.
Italics added.
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tion,63 they will soon drop their disguise. Some are really empirical,
such as the relation between snow and cold, fire and heat, disease and
fever, and therefore not necessary at all; others, such as three being
inseparablytied to oddness, are merely analytical.But of the soul we

have even less clear a conceptionthan of snow, fire, and the like. And
so all hope vanishes that an argumentbased on necessary connections
will provide solace to Socratesin the hour of his death.
It now appearsthat the Phaedo leads the reader desirousof securing
his faith first in the directionof scientific and philosophicspeculations.
Through the reactions of some of Socrates'companionsPlato dramatically points to the dangersof attachinga faith too firmly to these disciplines, since they themselvesare not immunefrom the ravagesof time.
Then, after a lengthy preparationby way of an introductionto the
proper method of inquiry, the reader is confronted with a rigorous
logical argument,which, through its incompatibilitywith the method
described,is to shock him into an awarenessof the unattainableconditions which such an argumentwould have to satisfy.
These two movements of the dialogue do not end in sheer futility.
The hope they dash is a false hope which preventsthe emergenceof the
genuine article. They block avenues of escape in order to force the
reader to face himself. And so we must retrace our steps to the beginning of the discussionwhere Socratesgives a picture of the human condition. Man, he says, finds himself possessed of a craving for "the
pleasures of eating and drinking ... the pleasures of love ...
and other
ways of indulgingthe body."64 He soon discoversthat these pleasures

can only dull the cravingmomentarily,but cannot give it lasting satisfaction. Then there is the desire for knowledgewhich remainsfrustrated,
not because its object cannot satisfy but because in its genuine form its
object is not accessible."Whilewe are in the body," says Socrates,"our
desire will not be satisfied, and our desire is of the truth."65 Man can
hide the paradox and possible absurdityof his existence from himself.
He may lose himself in the world, in the concernsof his daily activities.
To Socrates, of course, the "unexaminedlife is not worth living."66
Once man has faced the human condition, he may despair or he may
seek refuge in the false certaintyof a dogmaticfaith about a life hereafter in which all his aspirationsare realized,in which all his yearnings
find satisfaction.Socrates falls prey to neither temptation."If while in
company with the body the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of
63
64
65
66
Phaedo, par. 105, p. 490.

Ibid., par. 64, p. 448.
Ibid., par. 66, p. 449.
Apology, par. 38, p. 420.
177
two things follows," he concludes, "either knowledge is not to be

attainedat all, or, if at all, after death."67 Or again: "For if what I say
is true,then I do well to be persuadedof the truth;but if there is nothing
after death, still, duringthe short time that remains,I shall not distress
my friends with lamentations."68 The possibility of complete annihilation, of the utter meaninglessnessof-human existence, is a real alternative for him. But facing this possibility squarelyand aware that neither
science nor logic can give him complete assurance,he is thrown back
upon himself. He now discovershimself as "geworfenerEntwurf,"69 as
thrown into the world and subject to very definite limitations,but yet
free to make significantchoices within these limitations.He may even
dream his dream about a better life to come, providedhe never forgets
that it may after all be nothingbut a dream. A better understandingof
Socrates' eschatologicalfaith also brings into clearer focus the human
mode of being in general. For the kinds of faith a man has, the kinds
of choices he makes, will determinethe manner of life he leads. And
whether it be faith in the possibility of creating a world community,
faith in the feasibilityof coexistence,or the simple trust in the integrity
of a friend - they all are without guarantee,they all involve risk of
failure, and they all have their ultimate source in and derive their
strength from the firm resolve of a free individual. And so Plato's
Phaedo is a call to more authenticexistence, and his task is much like
that of Heideggerwho would counteractthe leveling effects of modem
civilizationby calling the individualback to himself, in order to make
him face the human condition and help him become aware of the real
alternativesbefore,him and the choices he must make.70,
And now the myth at the end of the dialogue also reveals its proper
function. By telling of a world wider than the one we experience, by
comparingmen to "antsand frogs about a marsh,"71 it keeps alive that
sense of the mystery,of the Geheimniswhich accordingto Heideggeris
the conditionfor the possibilityof authentictruth.72For the realization
67 Phaedo, par. 66-67, p. 450. Italics added.
Ibid., par. 91, p. 475. Italics added.

Sein und Zeit, p. 223.
70 In this connection see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Einfuihrung:Martin Heidegger,
Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Reclam, Stuttgart, 1962, pp. 104-105.
71 Phaedo, par. 109, p. 494.
72 "Indem das Geheimnis sich in der Vergessenheit und fur sie versagt, lasst
es den geschichtlichen Menschen in seinem Gangbaren bei seinen Gemiichten
stehen....
Die vermessene Vergessenheit des Menschentums beharrt auf der
Sicherung seiner selbst durch das ihm jeweils zugaingliche Gangbare. Dieses
Beharren hat seine ihm selbst unkennbare Stuitze im Verhaltnis, als welches das
Dasein nicht nur ek-sistiert, sondern zugleich in-sisiert, d.h. sich versteifend auf
dem besteht, was das wie von selbst und an sich offene Seinde bietet." (Martin
Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Frankfurt a.M., Vierte Auflage, 1961, p. 21.)
68
69
178
PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
of the fragmentarycharacterof man's experience exposes the preposterous claim of those who would impose their puny ideas on natureand
set themselves up as legislators for the whole world. But while the
awareness of the limitations imposed upon human experience makes
certainty impossible and thus destroys the sense of security, it also
banishes despair;for where there is uncertainty,there is also the possibility for hope. But whetheror not to trust the future and act courageously is a matterfor the individualto decide. And thus by creatingan
awarenessof the vastness of the world, the myth leads in the direction
of authentictruth and hence of authenticexistence.
Familiarity with the, distinction between authentic and unauthentic
truth, and the ease with which the former turns into the latter, casts a
different light not only on the theory of ideas, but also on the other
two mainstays of Heidegger's argument, namely the Allegory of the
Cave and the Idea of the Good. There is in fact a basic similaritybetween the Allegory of the Cave and the Phaedo Myth. In both we are
asked to place ourselves imaginativelyin the position of beings whose
experienceis more confinedthan our own, whetherthey be frogs at the
bottom of a pond or prisoners chained neck and foot to, a cave. We
are aware of the narrownessof the imaginaryexperiencebecause of the
suppressedbut not altogethereliminated awarenessof our own wider
experience. Similarly, in order to recognize our own experience as
limited, we must transcendit. But this means we must place ourselves
in a position beyond all human experience.And because it is beyond
all human experience,nothing can be said about it except that it is a
possibility.We can fill that emptinessimaginativelywith elementsdrawn
from our experience.But we must never forget that this content is not
directly experienced.The purpose of such transcendenceis not to give
us a new experience;it merely provides a vantage point from which to
survey and perceive more clearly our actual experience. The allegory,
therefore, speaks not only of the ascent to the light, but also of the
return to the dimly lit cave. It is only now that the shadows are seen
as shadows,that our experienceis seen as limited. So it does not seem
possible to agree with Heidegger when he says that for Plato paideia
consists in the "stetige Eingewdhnungin das Festmachen des Blickes
auf" (steadyhabituationso that one's gaze is made fast to") 73 the ideas.
For if the cave dweller must not remain lost in the shadows which
representthe things of our daily concern, neither must he be allowed
to get so firmly attachedto the ideas that he forgets experiencedreality.
For the ideas derive their raison d'etre from the service they render in
the world of shadows, and this, after all, is the world in which we live:
73
Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, p. 30. Barlow's translation op. cit., p. 259.
PLATO'S DOCTRINEOF TRUTH: ORTHOTESOR ALEiTHEIA?
179
A state can never be properly governed either by the uneducated who know
nothing of truth or by men who are allowed to spend all their days in the
pursuit of culture. The ignorant have no single mark before their eyes at
which they must aim in all the conduct of their own lives and of affairs of
state; and the others will not engage in action if they can help it, dreaming
that, while still alive, they have been translated to the Islands of the Blest.74
Under the stress of urgent desires the wall which separatesthe real
from the transcendentcollapses. Men deceive themselvesthat the postulates such as those of Socrates'second-bestmethod are the essences or
natures of things. And then on the basis of these postulated essences
they construct seeminglyrigorous proofs, such as that for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo, which are to give them comfortin their
hours of great distress. In the Republic a similar case of self-deception
is exposed. There it is recognizedthat even if the, postulates were real
essences, they would still constitute a multiplicityand hence require a
furthersynthesis,an ultimateprincipleof intelligibility,the idea of ideas,
the Idea of the Good.75If it were possible to train highly gifted young
men to gain access to this supremeidea, their judgmentswould become
infalliblefor they would have in their minds a "clearpatternof perfect
truth."76 We would then seem justified in handing over to them all
responsibilityfor making decisions, both for our own welfare and that
of the state. And thus we could rid ourselvesof the feelings of anxiety
and frustrationwhich are bound to result from having to judge highly
complexmatterswith our meagreintellectualendowments.A little reflection should make us realize, however, that this way of escape is not
possible. For an immense gulf separatesthe tentative guesses and suggestions with which we actually operate from the Idea of Ideas which
would reflect the ultimatemeaningof the whole universe.No arguments
are possiblewhich will furnishthe guaranteeswe crave for a meaningful
existence, nor is there a way of producinginfallibleleaders. But if our
desiresfor securityand relief from responsibilityare intense enough, we
are willing to overlook a few defects in the logic of our reasoning,as
well as a few weaknessesin our chosen leaders. To block this road of
escape Plato grantsthe motivatingdesiresimaginativefulfillmentin order
URepublic, Book VII, par. 519. Corford, op. cit., p. 233.
For a proper understanding of the expression "Idea of the Good," ("idea
tou agathou), note Heidegger's explanation: "to agathon bedeutet griechisch gedacht das, was zu etwas taugt und zu etwas tauglich macht ... Die 'Ideen' machen
daher, griechisch gedacht, dazu tauglich, dass etwas in dem, was es ist, erscheinen
und so in seinem Bestaindigenanwesen kann. ... Das, was jede Idee zu einer Idee
tauglich macht, platonisch ausgedruckt,die Idee aller Ideen, besteht deshalb darin,
das Erscheinen alles Anwesenden in all seiner Sichtsamkeit zu ermdglichen."
(Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, p. 38.)
76 Republic, Book VI, par. 484, Cornford, op. cit., p. 190.
75
180
RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY
to bring them out into the open. Then he exposes their absurdity.He
does this by pointing to some of the disastrous consequences which
would follow from the rule of these supermen, if they could be found.
Because of their superior wisdom - having gained access to the supreme
principleof intelligibility- they could no longer hope to make themselves understoodto their subjects; only through a strict conditioning
process could they hope to bend them to their will. As a result, as
Socrates ironically remarks, "they must send out into the country all
citizens who are above ten years old, taking over the children, away
from the present habits and manners of their parents, and bring them
up in their own way."77 But the deathblowto the desirabilityof the
philosopher-kingsis dealt in the myth of Er which concludes the
dialogue. For there we are told that at the choice of a new life, "most
of those who came up out of the earth, having sufferedthemselvesand
seen others suffer"chose wisely. The worst choice, however, was made
by "one of those who had come down from heaven, having spent his
former life in a well-orderedcommonwealthand become virtuousfrom
habit without pursuing wisdom."78 So something has gone radically
awry in the educational process to which the citizens of the ideal
Republic must submit.
On this interpretationPlato and Heidegger again are seen to join
hands in the pursuit of a common task. For Heideggertoo recognizes
the dangersof an excessive Flirsorge(solicitude)which would unburden
the other of all responsibility,act for him, and thus tend to reduce him
to a state of dependencyor even subjection.Genuine Flrsorge is concerned with the "Existenzdes Anderen";it does not performthe other's
tasks but prepareshim for his share of the responsibilitieswith which
the future is likely to confronthim. Above all, it will help him, through
the attainmentof authentictruth, to, achieve authenticexistence:"Diese
Firsorge ...
verhilft dem Anderen dazu, in seiner Sorge sich durch-
sichtig und far sie frei zu warden."("this kind of solicitude ... helps
the Other to become transparentto himself in his care and to become
free for it.") 79
This movementto and fro,between experiencedfacts,and explanatory
principlewhich the ascent out of and the descent into the cave symbolizes is found in all of the four dialogues.which we have examined.
Usually the ascent alone is explicitly described, and so a literalistic
interpretation is likely to let the second and equally important phase of
Ibid., Book VII, par. 540, p. 262.
Ibid., Book X, par. 619, p. 357.
Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 122. (Transl. John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson, New York, 1962, p. 159.)
77
78
79
PLATO'S DOCTRINEOF TRUTH: ORTHOTESOR ALtTHEIA?
181
the movement pass unnoticed. Whether or not we acknowledgethis

second phase in our attempt to understandPlato results not only in a
differentconceptionof truth, orthotesor aletheia,but also in a different
view of life. Reflections on what we mean by the various moral excellencies are essential to intelligentliving. But the results of these reflections must not harden into definitions, into fixed standardswhich we
ruthlesslyapply in complete disregardof the consequencesfor ourselves
and others. Laws are undoubtedlynecessaryto restrainthe self-interest
of the various members,of a community.But we must not appeal to
them no matter what the circumstancesin order to escape the anxiety
we might suffer by having to make vital decisions in a confused and
complex situation.The goals we pursueoften call for unstinteddevotion,
althoughwe have nothing more than a workinghypothesisto guide us,
a reasonablefaith which cannot guaranteesuccess. And finally we must
never turn our back completely on our political responsibilities,no
matter how irritatingand frustratingthey may become, and no matter
how competentthe leaderswho might be willing to run our lives.for us.
This is a very heavy burdento place on an individual,and a man must
make his choice, if he wants to be free, as did Orestes in Sartre's,Flies
when he said:
I shall bear it on my shoulders as a carrier at a ferry carries the traveler to
the farther bank. And when I have brought it to the farther bank I shall
take stock of it. The heavier it is to carry, the better pleased I shall be; for
that burden is my freedom.80
And so Plato and Heideggerare found to be more,akin in spirit and

intent than the traditionaland Heidegger'sown literalisticinterpretation
would have one suspect. And this holds true not only concerningtheir
doctrineof truth, but also in regardto their view of man, the two being
really inseparable.For Plato's man, not unlike that of Heidegger, can
choose betweenauthenticand unauthenticexistence:he can lead the "unexamined life," that is, he can lose himself in the world pursuinghis
various activities81 with the,unconceptualizedunderstandingof Umsicht
or circumspection;he can submitto the judgmentof others, be they the
anonymousMan of Heideggeror the unreflectingmany of Socrates;or
else, committingthe opposite error,they can try to impose a rigid con80 Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Flies," Act II, in No Exit and the Flies. Transl. by
Stuart Gilbert, New York, 1952, p. 140.
81 "Das Sicheinlassen auf die Entborgenheit des Seienden verliert sich nicht in
dieser, sondern entfaltet sich zu einem Zuriicktreten vor dem Seienden, damit
dieses in dem, was es ist und wie es ist, sich offenbare und die vorstellende
Angleichung aus ihm das Richtmass nehme." Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, p. 15.
182
RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY
ceptual scheme on things.82But as a true human being he must hold

himselfopen and sensitiveto the appeal of the complexityof things and
show regard for reality in all its forms, both insofar as it offers itself
and insofar as, it shroudsitself in mystery.83
One problem remains for consideration:Granted, someone may say,
that we can account for the simultaneouspresence of a liberal and a
dogmatic spirit in the dialogues by appealing to Plato's dramatic approach to philosophy.But if we are unwillingto follow Heideggerwho
points to the coexistenceof aletheiaand orthotesand the transitionfrom
one to the other, WHERE, then, in the history of philosophy, do we
locate the emergenceof orthotes?Perhapsthe tendencytowarda rigidity
of mind, which is implied in the notion of truth as Richtigkeit,always
was and always will be with us, whenevermen seek to escape the inextricablecomplexityof moral mattersby looking to fixed standardsof
judgment,and as long as they cannot control their cravingfor the kind
of security which demands certainty in matters of ultimate concern.
Then, at least insofar as the attainmentand preservationof authentic
truth and authenticexistenceis,concerned,Plato and Heidegger,bridging
a time span of over two thousandyears, would be united in a common,
never-endingtask.
HENRY G. WOLZ.
QUEENS COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK.
82 "Die Auslegung kann die dem auszulegenden Seienden zugehorige Begrifflichkeit aus diesem selbst schopfen, oder aber in Begriffe zwangen, denen sich das
Seiende gemaiss seiner Seinsart widersetzt." Sein und Zeit, p. 150.
83 "Die Freiheit zum Offenbaren eines Offenen lisst das jeweilige Seiende das
Seiende sein, das es ist. Freiheit enthillt sich jetzt als das Seinlassen von Seiendem" (p. 14). "Weil jedoch die Wahrheit im Wesen Freiheit ist, deshalb kann der
geschichtliche Mensch im Seinlassen des Seienden das Seiende auch nicht das
Seiende sein lassen, das es ist und wie es ist. Das Seiende wird dann verdeckt
und verstellt" (p. '17). "Was verwahrt das Seinlassen in diesem Bezug zur Verbergung? Nichts Geringeres als die Verbergung des Verborgenen im Ganzen, des
Seienden als eines solchen, d.h. das Geheimnis" (p. 19). (Martin Heidegger, Vom
Wesen der Wahrheit.)

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Plato's Doctrine of Truth: Orthtes or Altheia?

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR AL]tTHEIA?

It was,difficult enough to accept the old view which maintainedthat

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALEiTHEIA?

sour had miraculouslyregainedits sweetness,places an unbearablestrain

In his essay Heideggersets out to show that the unheraldedbut fateful

because of the decline of aletheia and the simultaneousrise of orthotes

the 'essay on Plato can be consideredas no more than a Hinweis, an

um der gewiesenenSache selbst nachzudenken"(directionsfor the road

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALETHEIA?

the subjects to which I devote myself

might study in every detail and constantlyrefer to, as a painter looks

PLATO'S DOCTRINEOF TRUTH: ORTHOTESOR ALETHEIA?

serve as a standardin the light of which all human activity is to be

The theory of ideas is generally regarded as established Platonic

And then Socrates describes the function of a definition, which when

The enquiryhas been occasionedby a concretemoralproblem.Euthyphro

extricatesthe problem from the realm of religion and mythology and

From Mythos to Logos one might be inclined to name the theme of

means us to find the definitionfor ourselves.As againstthe doctrinaire

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALETHEIA?

Toward the end of the dialogue, Socrates suggests that piety be

"The difference of men and

is providedin a ready-madeform. And how can there be free men in

philosopherlike you failed to discover that our country is more to be

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALEfTHEIA?

33 The modem reader might stir uneasily at this point, for he

Such a principlecould have exoneratedthe worst of the war criminals

And just as the Eichmanns, if unquestioningsubmission to the law

To convince the ideal laws, which Plato elsewhere identifies with

39 "We must ...

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALUTHEIA?

theoryoccurs in Socrates'discussionof his methodof inquiry.He relates

While necessary connections cannot be observed between things, they

This "secondbest mode of inquiry"as Socratescalls it, cannot lay claim

It would appear, therefore, that if the strictly philosophicalpart of

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALETHEIA?

education of the young; and therefore it is difficult to find a teacher

clearly implyingthat virtue is capable of being taught."55

Protagoras, par. 323, p. 94.

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALUTHEIA?

But it is perhaps,less readily recognizedthat at least the first half and

Pythagoreanfriends warned that "it requires a great deal of argument

PLATO'S DOCTRINEOF TRUTH: ORTHOTESOR ALETHEIA?

In orderto heal the wound struckby the argumentand the objections

inseparablytied to oddness, are merely analytical.But of the soul we

ways of indulgingthe body."64 He soon discoversthat these pleasures

Phaedo, par. 105, p. 490.

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH: ORTHOTES OR ALETHEIA?

two things follows," he concludes, "either knowledge is not to be

Ibid., par. 91, p. 475. Italics added.

PLATO'S DOCTRINEOF TRUTH: ORTHOTESOR ALEiTHEIA?

verhilft dem Anderen dazu, in seiner Sorge sich durch-

PLATO'S DOCTRINEOF TRUTH: ORTHOTESOR ALtTHEIA?

the movement pass unnoticed. Whether or not we acknowledgethis

And so Plato and Heideggerare found to be more,akin in spirit and

ceptual scheme on things.82But as a true human being he must hold

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WOLZ, Henry G. - Plato's Doctrine of Truth - Orthótes or Alétheia

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