EVANGELINE ALDAY, petitioner, vs. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent.

Facts:
FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati alleging that Alday owed
it P114,650.76, representing unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and
other charges incurred as an insurance agent. Respondent also prayed for exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit. Petitioner filed her answer and by way of
counterclaim, asserted her right for the payment of P104,893.45, representing direct
commissions, profit commissions and contingent bonuses and for accumulated premium
reserves amounting to P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for the allegedly unfounded
action filed by respondent.
Respondent filed a Motion to Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To
Declare Defendant In Default because petitioners answer was allegedly filed out of time.
However, the trial court denied the motion. A few weeks later, respondent filed a motion to
dismiss petitioners counterclaim, contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over the same because of the non-payment of docket fees by petitioner. In response,
petitioner asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment of
docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for having
failed to answer such counterclaim.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court found petitioners counterclaim to be
merely permissive and held that petitioners failure to pay docket fees prevented the court
from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent is estopped from questioning her non-payment of
docket fees because it did not raise this particular issue when it filed its first motion.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of the
petitioner.
3. Whether or not the counterclaim was permissive or compulsory

Held:
1. Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it. In the case at bar, respondent cannot be
considered as estopped from assailing the trial courts jurisdiction over petitioners
counterclaim since this issue was raised by respondent with the trial court itself the
body where the action is pending - even before the presentation of any evidence by
the parties and definitely, way before any judgment could be rendered by the trial
court.
2. This objection to the CAs jurisdiction is raised for the first time before this Court.
Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a
party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in
the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts
jurisdiction in the event that that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is

adverse to him. In this case, respondent actively took part in the proceedings before
the CA by filing its appellees brief with the same. Its participation, when taken
together with its failure to object to the jurisdiction during the entire duration of the
proceedings before such court, demonstrates a willingness to abide by the resolution
of the case by such tribunal and accordingly, respondent is now most decidedly
estopped.
3. BOTH. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular
courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing parties claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court set the criteria to determine
whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive,
a. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the
same?
b. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
c. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well
as defendants counterclaim?chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
d. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Another test, applied in Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the compelling test of
compulsoriness which requires a logical relationship between the claim and
counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court.
Petitioners counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium
reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to prove petitioners claims
differs from that needed to establish respondents demands for the recovery of cash
accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. This
conclusion is further reinforced by petitioners own admissions since she declared in
her answer that respondents cause of action, unlike her own, was not based upon the
Special Agents Contract.
However, petitioners claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the filing
by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.
The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid down by the Court in the case of
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion
a. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
b. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

c. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the
same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Suson v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that although the payment of the
prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not
result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it
has not been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that
petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her
permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion to
dismiss petitioners counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner
immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim
as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to
declare that respondent was in default for its failure to answer her counterclaim. The
trial court should have instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for
her permissive counterclaim.

Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. Vs. Hon. Albert A. Lerma,

et al.
Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. Vs. Hon. Albert A. Lerma, et al. , G.R. No. 143581. January 7, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner KOGIES and respondent PGSMC executed a Contract whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder
Manufacturing Plant for respondent. Respondent unilaterally cancelled the contract on the ground that petitioner had altered the
quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment it delivered. Petitioner opposed informing the latter that PGSMC
could not unilaterally rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment on mere imagined violations
by petitioner. Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against respondent before the RTC. Respondent filed its
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that it had the full right to dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment
because it had paid for them in full as stipulated in the contract. KOGIES filed a motion to dismiss respondents counterclaims
arguing that when PGSMC filed the counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and filed a certificate of non-forum shopping, and
that its failure to do so was a fatal defect. The RTC dismissed the petitioners motion to dismiss respondents counterclaims as these
counterclaims fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.
ISSUE: WON payment of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping were required in the respondents Answer with
counterclaim?
HELD: NO. The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance with
Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with Counterclaim
was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party
has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein. As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMCs

Answer is not an initiatory pleading which requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in denying KOGIES
motion to dismiss PGSMCs compulsory counterclaims. At the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against
KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that effective
August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in
compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.