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RULE 39: EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF


JUDGMENT
AIDA P. BAEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ
G.R. No. 133628. January 23, 2002
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
FACTS:
These 2 petitions stem from the decision of RTC
Cebu Br. 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16765. The 1st
seeks the reversal of the CAs decision setting aside
the orders dated October 1 and November 22, 1996 of
the RTC. The 2nd prays for the reversal of the resolution
of the CA denying the motion to dismiss.
On September 23, 1996, RTC Cebu Branch 20,
decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among
others the legal separation between Aida Baez and
Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual
infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property
relations and the division of the net conjugal assets;
the forfeiture of Gabriels 1/2 share in the net conjugal
assets in favor of the common children; the payment to
petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as
attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners share in
the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the
use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the
smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate
Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common children
within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
Petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal.
RTC granted Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion
to modify the decision on October 1, 1996 by
approving the Commitment of Fees dated December
22, 1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorneys fees
the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondents
ideal share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the
administrator to pay petitioners counsel, Atty. Adelino
B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorneys
fees chargeable against the aforecited 5%.
In another motion to modify the decision,
petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and exemplary
damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October
9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. Respondent Gabriel filed a consolidated
written opposition to the two motions, and also prayed
for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order.
On November 22, 1996, RTC denied Aidas
motion for moral and exemplary damages and
litigation expenses but gave due course to the
execution pending appeal.
In turn, in a petition for certiorari, Gabriel Baez
elevated the case to the CA. On March 21, 1997, CA
rendered its decision setting aside the Order dated

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October 1, 1996, the Omnibus Order dated November


22, 1996 and the writ of execution dated December 2,
1996 and the Order dated December 10, 1996 by the
RTC
On February 10, 1998, CA denied Aidas MR.
Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 132592, filed by
herein petitioner.
In the meantime, the trial court gave due course
to Gabriels Notice of Appeal and elevated on April 15,
1997 the entire case records to the CA. Aida filed with
the CA a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that Gabriel had failed to file with the CA a Record on
Appeal. CA denied the motion to dismiss as well as the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
petition in G.R. No. 133628. SC consolidated the
two petitions.

ISSUES:
I. The core issue in G.R. No. 132592 is whether
execution of judgment pending appeal was justified.
NO
HELD: Petitions are denied for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 132592:
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA
381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is allowed
when superior circumstances demanding urgency
outweigh the damages that may result from the
issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an
instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well
become a tool of oppression and inequity.
In this case, considering the reasons cited by
petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior
or urgent circumstance that outweighs the
damage which respondent would suffer if he
were ordered to vacate the house. We note that
petitioner did not refute respondents allegations that
she did not intend to use said house, and that she has
two (2) other houses in the US where she is a
permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely
putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to
justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To
do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather
than the exception.
Similarly, we are not persuaded that the
P100,000 advance payment to petitioners counsel was
properly granted. We see no justification to pre-empt
the judgment by the Court of Appeals concerning said
amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts
judgment was already on appeal.
Fajardo vs. Quitalig
A.M. No. P-02-1535
March 28, 2003
Return of Writ of Execution

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,


QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

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Facts: A complaint for ejectment filed by Fajardo and


Perez against Maria Datuin was finally decided against
the latter. The decision being final and executory. Upon
motion of complainant, the Court issued a Writ of
Execution on March 7, 2000 which was brought by
respondent Sheriff to the defendant Datuin on March 9,
2000. However the writ was not executed on first
instance because Datuin asked for a 2-week period to
move out.
Thereafter, the writ was still not executed because
Sheriff alleged that there was a restraining order
prohibiting him to do so. On March 24, 2000 upon
verification from the court, complainant found out that
there was no restraining order. So he told the
respondent to implement the Writ of Execution.
Respondent, accompanied by a policeman and the
barangay captain went to the place where the Writ of
Execution is to be implemented at 10:00 that morning
but when they reached the place, respondent did not
do anything except to ask the defendant to bring out
her personal properties. His reason is that an employee
of the Probation Office, Mr. Leonardo Martinez, talked
to him. At 5:30 p.m., the restraining order was brought
to the place, and the respondent told him that the writ
of execution can no longer be implemented.
Complainant asserted that respondent favored, or
showed partiality in favor of the defendant to his
prejudice.
In his Comment respondent denied the charge and
asked for the dismissal of the case, because he had
already implemented the Writ on August 24, 2000 as
evidenced by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. He
also pointed out that he had made an inventory of the
personal properties recovered from the subject
premises. That he had done so was attested to by
defendants mother, and witnessed by the barangay
captain and two councilors.
The OCA found respondent to have been negligent in
the performance of his duty as a sheriff and
recommended that respondent be ordered to pay a fine
of P5,000 and warned that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
Issue: Whether the findings of the OCA is correct
Held: Yes, the OCA is correct. As frontline officials of
the justice system, sheriffs must always strive to
maintain public trust in the performance of their
duties. Having the forsworn duty to uphold the majesty
of the law, they must see to it that the final stage in

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the litigation process


unnecessary delay.

is

carried

out

without

SEC. 14. Return of Writ of Execution. The writ of


execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in
part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full
within thirty days (30) days after his receipt of the writ,
the officer shall report to the court and state the
reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect
during the period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to
the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings
taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or
its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports
shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and
shall be filed with the court and copies thereof
promptly furnished the parties.
We find respondents explanation to be utterly
wanting. He is guilty of dereliction of his duty as a
sheriff, because he failed to (1) execute the Writ within
30 days from his receipt thereof, (2) submit his Report
of Service within the same period, (3) make periodic
reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully
satisfied, and (4) furnish the parties with copies of the
Reports.
By his own words, respondent admitted his
dereliction of duty. First, as we have said earlier, he
should have immediately executed the Writ when he
served it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000.
Second, he should have immediately reported to
the MTCC that he was unable to enforce the Writ
because another court had issued a TRO enjoining him
from doing so. Third, he should have informed the
parties, particularly the plaintiff or his counsel, about
his inability to enforce the Writ. Fourth, he should have
immediately enforced it twenty days after its issuance.
Fifth, he should have made periodic Reports to the
MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied and the
parties furnished a copy thereof. Sixth, within thirty
days from his receipt of the Writ, he should have
promptly made his Return, a copy of which he should
have immediately furnished the parties.
Clearly, the actuations of respondent constitute
disrespect, if not outright defiance, of the MTCCs
authority. In the absence of instructions to the
contrary, a sheriff has the duty to execute a Writ with
reasonable celerity and promptness in accordance with
its mandate.

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,


QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

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In several cases, the Court has said that the failure to


make a return of a writ within the required period is
nonfeasance.
EDGAR Y. SANTOS vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION) and PEDRO Q.
PANULAYA
G.R. No. 155618. March 26, 2003. EN BANC.
YNARES-SANTIAGO.
Motion for Execution pending appeal; Forum
Shopping
FACTS:
Petitioner Edgar Y. Santos and respondent Pedro Q.
Panulaya were both candidates for Mayor of the
Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the 2001
elections. On May 16, 2001, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed respondent Panulaya as the
duly elected Mayor.
Petitioner filed an election protest before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental. The decision of the trial court was
rendered after almost one year of trial and revision of
the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the
candidate with the plurality of votes. Petitioner
thereafter filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
Meanwhile, before the trial court could act on
petitioners motion, respondent filed on with the
COMELEC a petition for certiorari, docketed as SPR No.
20-2002, assailing the decision of the trial court.
Respondent likewise appealed the trial courts decision
to the COMELEC, where it was docketed as EAC No. A12-2002.
The COMELEC dismissed SPR No. 20-2002 after finding
that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the assailed judgment. Thus,
the trial court directs and orders the immediate
execution of its Decision promulgated on April 18,
2002, to install protestant/petitioner EDGAR Y. SANTOS
as the duly elected Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis
Oriental, to take his oath of office and assume the
functions and duties of Mayor after he shall have filed a
bond. After petitioner posted the required bond, the
trial court issued the Writ of Execution.
On August 21, 2002, respondent filed with the
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
of his petition in SPR No. 20-2002. After five days, he
filed a supplemental petition in SPR No. 20-2002.
Barely two days later, on August 28, 2002, and while
his motion for reconsideration and supplemental
petition in SPR No. 20-2002 were pending, respondent
filed another petition with the COMELEC, docketed as
SPR No. 37-2002. The petition contained the same
prayer as that in the supplemental petition filed in SPR
20-2002.
On September 3, 2002, the COMELEC issued an Order
directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante
and enjoining petitioner from assuming the functions of
Mayor. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but

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the COMELEC First Division did not refer the said


motion to the COMELEC En Banc. Hence, petitioner,
citing Kho v. COMELEC brought the instant special civil
action for certiorari before the SC.
ISSUES:
1. WON Execution pending appeal is proper in Election
cases.
2. WON respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
RULING:
1. Yes. The grant of execution pending appeal
was well within the discretionary powers of the trial
court. In order to obtain the annulment of said orders
in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that
the trial court gravely abused its discretion. He should
show not merely a reversible error committed by the
trial court, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In this case, no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the trial court in granting execution
pending appeal. However, the COMELEC set aside the
aforesaid order, saying that shortness of term alone is
not a good reason for execution of a judgment pending
appeal.
While it was indeed held that shortness of the
remaining term of office and posting a bond are not
good reasons, the SC stated in Fermo v. COMELEC that:
A valid exercise of the discretion to allow
execution pending appeal requires that it
should be based upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order. The following
constitute
good
reasons
and a
combination of two or more of them will
suffice to grant execution pending
appeal: (1.) public interest involved or
will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness
of the remaining portion of the term of
the contested office; and (3.) the length
of time that the election contest has been
pending.
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court
was rendered after almost one year of trial and revision
of the questioned ballots and found petitioner as the
candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent
appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the
meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the
Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as
determined by the trial court in the election protest,
had to be respected and given meaning. The
Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the
services of a mayor even while the election protest was
pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially
determined to have been chosen by the people.

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,


QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

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All that was required for a valid exercise of the


discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that
the immediate execution should be based upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order. The rationale
why such execution is allowed in election cases
is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, to give as much
recognition to the worth of a trial judges
decision as that which is initially ascribed by the
law to the proclamation by the board of
canvassers.
To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant
execution pending appeal would, in the words of Tobon
Uy v. COMELEC, bring back the ghost of the grab-theproclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often
resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their
efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective
office. This would, as a consequence, lay to waste the
will of the electorate.
2. Yes. Respondent was guilty of forumshopping when he instituted SPR No. 37-2002 with the
COMELEC.
Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an
adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. For it to exist, there should be (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties as would represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
In the case at bar, respondent obtained an adverse
decision when his petition in SPR No. 20-2002 was
dismissed by the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration and a supplemental
petition, praying for the nullification of the trial courts
order for the execution of its decision pending appeal.
Two days after filing the supplemental petition, and
while the same was very much pending before the
COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for
certiorari, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002, wherein he
pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the
supplemental petition. In doing so, respondent sought
to increase his chances of securing a favorable
decision in another petition.
Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of
forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 37-2002, his
petition should have been dismissed outright by the
COMELEC. Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a

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ground for summary dismissal of the case, and


constitutes direct contempt of court.

RCBC vs. MAGWIN


G.R. No. 152878
May 5, 2003

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, vs.


MAGWIN MARKETING CORPORATION, NELSON
TIU, BENITO SY and ANDERSON UY
Whether the dismissal without prejudice for failure to
prosecute was unconditionally reconsidered, reversed
and set aside to reinstate the civil case and have it
ready for pre-trial are matters which should have been
clarified and resolved in the first instance by the court
a quo.
FACTS: On 4 March 1999 petitioner Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) filed a complaint for
recovery of a sum of money with prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment against respondents Magwin
Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and
Anderson Uy. On 26 April 1999, the trial court issued a
writ of attachment. On 4 June 1999 the writ was
returned partially satisfied since only a parcel of land
purportedly owned by defendant Benito Sy was
attached. In the meantime, summons was served on
each of the defendants, respondents herein, who filed
their respective answers, except for defendant Gabriel
Cheng who was dropped without prejudice as partydefendant as his whereabouts could not be located. On
21 September 1999 petitioner moved for an alias writ
of attachment which on 18 January 2000 the court a
quo denied.
Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for
pre-trial. For about six (6) months thereafter,
discussions between petitioner and respondents
Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy
and Anderson Uy, as parties in Civil Case No. 99-518,
were undertaken to restructure the indebtedness of
respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation.
On 9 May 2000 petitioner approved a debt
payment scheme for the corporation which on was
communicated to the latter by means of a letter dated
for the conformity of its officers, i.e., respondent
Nelson Tiu as President/General Manager of Magwin
Marketing Corporation and respondent Benito Sy as
Director thereof. Only respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his

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signature on the letter to signify his agreement to the


terms and conditions of the restructuring.
On 20 July 2000 the RTC of Makati City, on its
own initiative, issued an Order dismissing without
prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518 for failure of petitioner
as plaintiff therein to "prosecute its action for an
unreasonable length of time . . .."
Subsequently, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the Order by informing the trial
court of respondents' unremitting desire to settle the
case amicably through a loan restructuring program.
On 22 August 2000 petitioner notified the trial court of
the acquiescence thereto of respondent Nelson Tiu as
an officer of Magwin Marketing Corporation and
defendant in the civil case.
On 27 July 2000 petitioner filed in Civil Case
No. 99-518 a Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for
Pre-Trial Conference alleging that "[t]o date, only
defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the
letter which informed the defendants that plaintiff
[herein petitioner] already approved defendant Magwin
Marketing Corporations request for restructuring of its
loan obligations to plaintiff but subject to the terms and
conditions specified in said letter."
This motion was followed on 5 October 2000 by
petitioner's
Supplemental
Motion
to
Plaintiffs
Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial
Conference affirming that petitioner "could not submit
a compromise agreement because only defendant
Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the May 10,
2000 letter . . .." Respondent Anderson Uy opposed the
foregoing submissions of petitioner while respondents
Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito
Sy neither contested nor supported them.
The trial court, in an undated Order (although a
date was later inserted in the Order), denied
petitioner's motion to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518
for pre-trial because of the failure of the plaintiff to
submit a compromise agreement.
On 15 November 2000 petitioner filed its
Notice of Appeal from the said Orders. On 16
November 2000 the trial court issued two (2) Orders,
one of which inserted the date "6 November 2000" in
the undated Order rejecting petitioner's motion for pretrial in the civil case, and the other denying due course
to the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the "Orders
dated 8 September 2000 and 6 November 2000 are
interlocutory orders and therefore, no appeal may be
taken . . .."

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On 7 December 2000 petitioner elevated the


Orders dated 8 September 2000, 6 November 2000
and 16 November 2000 of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. In the main, petitioner argued
that the court a quo had no authority to compel the
parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to enter into an
amicable settlement nor to deny the holding of a pretrial conference on the ground that no compromise
agreement was turned over to the court a quo.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the petitioner is required to pay
again the requisite docket fees.
2) Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a claim
for failure of the parties to submit to a compromise
agreement.
HELD:
1)
No. There is no substantial policy worth
pursuing by requiring petitioner to pay again the
docket fees when it has already discharged this
obligation simultaneously with the filing of the
complaint for collection of a sum of money. The
procedure for dismissed cases when re-filed is the
same as though it was initially lodged, i.e., the filing of
answer, reply, answer to counter-claim, including other
foot-dragging maneuvers, except for the rigmarole of
raffling cases which is dispensed with since the re-filed
complaint is automatically assigned to the branch to
which the original case pertained. A complaint that is
re-filed leads to the re-enactment of past proceedings
with the concomitant full attention of the same trial
court exercising an immaculate slew of jurisdiction and
control over the case that was previously dismissed,
which in the context of the instant case is a waste of
judicial time, capital and energy.
What judicial benefit do we derive from starting
the civil case all over again, especially where three (3)
of the four (4) defendants, i.e., Magwin Marketing
Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy, have not
contested petitioner's plea before this Court and the
courts a quo to advance to pre-trial conference?
Indeed, to continue hereafter with the resolution of
petitioner's complaint without the usual procedure for
the re-filing thereof, we will save the court a quo
invaluable time and other resources far outweighing
the docket fees that petitioner would be forfeiting
should we rule otherwise.
It must be emphasized however that once the
dismissal attains the attribute of finality, the trial court

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cannot impose legal fees anew because a final and


executory dismissal although without prejudice divests
the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil case as well
as any residual power to order anything relative to the
dismissed case; it would have to wait until the
complaint is docketed once again. On the other hand, if
we are to concede that the trial court retains
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 99-518 for it to issue the
assailed Orders, a continuation of the hearing thereon
would not trigger a disbursement for docket fees on
the part of petitioner as this would obviously imply the
setting aside of the order of dismissal and the
reinstatement of the complaint.
2)
Besides the semantic and consequential
improbabilities of respondent Uy's argument, our ruling
in Goldloop Properties, Inc., is decisive of the instant
case. In Goldloop Properties, Inc., we reversed the
action of the trial court in dismissing the complaint for
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute its case, which was
in turn based on its inability to forge a compromise
with the other parties within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the order to do so and held Since there is nothing in the
Rules
that
imposes
the
sanction of dismissal for failing
to
submit
a
compromise
agreement, then it is obvious
that the dismissal of the
complaint on the basis thereof
amounts no less to a gross
procedural infirmity assailable
by
certiorari.
For
such
submission could at most be
directory and could not result
in throwing out the case for
failure to effect a compromise.
While
a
compromise
is
encouraged, very strongly in
fact, failure to consummate
one does not warrant any
procedural sanction, much less
an authority to jettison a civil
complaint worth P4,000,000.00
. . . Plainly, submission of a
compromise
agreement
is
never mandatory, nor is it
required by any rule.
As also explained therein, the proper course of
action that should have been taken by the court a quo,
upon manifestation of the parties of their willingness to
discuss a settlement, was to suspend the proceedings
and allow them reasonable time to come to terms (a) If

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willingness to discuss a possible compromise is


expressed by one or both parties; or (b) If it appears
that one of the parties, before the commencement of
the action or proceeding, offered to discuss a possible
compromise but the other party refused the offer,
pursuant to Art. 2030 of the Civil Code. If despite
efforts exerted by the trial court and the parties the
negotiations still fail, only then should the action
continue as if no suspension had taken place.
Ostensibly, while the rules allow the trial court
to suspend its proceedings consistent with the policy to
encourage the use of alternative mechanisms of
dispute resolution, in the instant case, the trial court
only gave the parties fifteen (15) days to conclude a
deal. This was, to say the least, a passive and paltry
attempt of the court a quo in its task of persuading
litigants to agree upon a reasonable concession.
Hence, if only to inspire confidence in the pursuit of a
middle ground between petitioner and respondents, we
must not interpret the trial court's Orders as dismissing
the action on its own motion because the parties,
specifically petitioner, were anxious to litigate their
case as exhibited in their several manifestations and
motions.
In fine, petitioner cannot be said to have lost
interest in fighting the civil case to the end. A court
may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur
but the real test of the judicious exercise of such power
is whether under the circumstances plaintiff is
chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not
acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude.
Unless a party's conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible,
contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial
grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or nonappearance in the case, the courts should consider
lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving
the desired end. In the absence of a pattern or scheme
to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton
failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the
rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar,
courts should decide to dispense rather than wield
their authority to dismiss.
Clearly, another creative remedy was available
to the court a quo to attain a speedy disposition of Civil
Case No. 99-518 without sacrificing the course of
justice. Since the failure of petitioner to submit a
compromise agreement was the refusal of just one of
herein respondents, i.e., Benito Sy, to sign his name on
the conforme of the loan restructure documents, and
the common concern of the courts a quo was dispatch
in the proceedings, the holding of a pre-trial conference
was the best-suited solution to the problem as this
stage in a civil action is where issues are simplified and
the dispute quickly and genuinely reconciled. By

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,


QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

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means of pre-trial, the trial court is fully empowered to


sway the litigants to agree upon some fair compromise.
Dismissing the civil case and compelling
petitioner to re-file its complaint is a dangerous, costly
and circuitous route that may end up aggravating, not
resolving, the disagreement. This case management
strategy is frighteningly deceptive because it does so
at the expense of petitioner whose cause of action,
perhaps, may have already been admitted by its
adverse parties as shown by three (3) of four (4)
defendants not willing to contest petitioner's
allegations, and more critically, since this approach
promotes the useless and thankless duplication of hard
work already undertaken by the trial court. As we have
aptly observed, "[i]nconsiderate dismissals, even if
without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a
solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they
lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of
individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate
reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear
lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better
served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and
final disposition of the cases before the court.
City of Iligan vs. Principal Management Group,
Inc.
G.R. No. 145260
July 31, 2003
Executions Pending Appeal
Facts: Mayor Franklin M. Quijano, acting for and in
behalf of the City of Iligan, Requested from the
Sangguinang Panlungsod, a resolution authorizing him
to open a domestic Standby Letter of Credit in the
amount of 14M in favor of Land Bank Realty
Development Corporation and/or PNCC with the
Principal Management Group as the funder. The City
Council approved Quijanos request and passed board
resolutions. A MOA on a turn-key arrangement was
entered into by the parties for the construction of a
sports complex which upon completion will be turned
over to Iligan City for acceptance and the issuance of
Certificate of Acceptance and Authority to Pay to
enable Land Bank Realty-PMGI to call on the SLC.
The construction site was donated by San Miguel
Enterprises Inc. wherein Iligan City, as donee, would
provide for all the expenses for the transfer of the
occupants therein. Thereafter, the construction of the
Sports Complex was stopped due to the refusal of
some occupants therein to vacate for the failure of
Iligan City to provide them for disturbance
compensation.

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Thereafter, Principal Management Group requested


payment from iligan City for the portions of the project
which they already finished. Iligan City on the other
hand responded on the negative, stating that the
agreed price of 14M will only be paid upon completion
of the project.
PMGI filed a complaint for the rescission of the MOA
and damages against City of Iligan. The latter then
filed its answer. Nevertheless, PGMI moved for partial
summary judgment claiming that there was no genuine
issue as to the obligation of the City of Iligan and that
the City of Iligan had not specifically denied under oath
the genuiness of the Letter of Credit and the MOA.
The Trial Court granted the motion of partial summary
judgment. On the other hand, City of Iligan filed a
motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied.
Considering that the MR by Iligan was denied, Iligan
City filed a notice of appeal.
A Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was then filed
by the PGMI, which was granted over the objection of
Iligan City.
The Court is convinced that there are good reasons to
allow the immediate execution pending appeal. Its
adjudication is based on [petitioners] own admission
hence, any appeal would be unmeritorious and would
only serve to delay execution of the final order subject
of the instant motion. The fact that an appeal in this
case if taken by [petitioner] will be a merely dilatory
tactic has been declared by the Supreme Court as a
good and sufficient reason upon which to issue
execution of the order under Section 2, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
The CA affirmed the decision. The appellate court also
ruled that certiorari would not be allowed in this case,
because there were other remedies still available to
petitioner, like the filing of a supersedeas bond to stay
the execution or the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether the Order granting execution pending
appeal was proper.
Held: Yes.
Executions pending appeal are governed by Section 2
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
"SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.-(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending
appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice
to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either
the original record or the record on appeal, as the case

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may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said


court may, in its discretion, order execution of a
judgment or final order even before the expiration of
the period to appeal.
"After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for
execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate
court.
"Discretionary execution may only issue upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing."
There are three requisites for the execution of a
judgment pending appeal: a) a motion must be filed by
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; b)
there must be good reasons for execution pending
appeal; and c) the good reasons must be stated in a
special order.
Execution pending appeal is, of course, the exception
to the general rule. Normally, execution cannot be
obtained until and unless (a) the judgment has become
final and executory; (b) the right of appeal has been
renounced or waived; (c) the period for appeal has
lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or (d)
having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and
the records of the case have been returned to the court
of origin -- in which case, execution shall issue as a
matter of right.
On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not
yet expired, the execution of a judgment should not be
allowed except if, in the courts discretion, there are
good reasons therefor.
Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an
exception to the general rule, the existence of "good
reasons" is essential. These reasons must be stated in
a special order, because unless these are divulged, it
will be difficult to determine on appeal whether judicial
discretion has been properly exercised by the lower
court.
Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances that
justify the immediate execution of a judgment, lest it
become illusory; or the prevailing party be unable to
enjoy it after the lapse of time, considering the tactics
of the adverse party who may have no recourse but to
delay.
In the present case, the good reason relied upon by
both the trial and the appellate courts was that the
partial adjudication of the case was based on
petitioners own admission; hence, any appeal based
on that point would be unmeritorious and merely
dilatory. Indeed, both courts ruled that an appeal by
petitioner would only serve as "a good and sufficient
reason upon which to issue execution."

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The ascertainment of good reasons for execution


pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and the appellate court will not normally
disturb such finding. Intervention by the latter may be
proper, if it is shown that there has been an abuse of
discretion.
Like the CA, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
courts grant of execution pending appeal. Indeed, this
Court has held that a good and sufficient reason upon
which to authorize immediate execution is when an
appeal is clearly dilatory
VILLARUEL vs FERNANDO
Judgments
Judgments; One of the exceptions to the rule that a
judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect except only to correct clerical
errors or mistakes is when circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.
FACTS: Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. (petitioner) is
the former Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation
Office (ATO), Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC). Respondents Reynaldo D.
Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. (Abarca), and Marilou
M. Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant,
and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the Civil
Aviation Training Center (CATC).

Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995


addressed to the respondents, detailing them to the
Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective
2 May 1995.
On 29 April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC
Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina
T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for
reconsideration of the detail order.
On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail order,
respondents reported to the Office of Undersecretary
Cal at DOTC.
Without
acting
on
respondents
request
for
reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on
19 July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under
preventive suspension for 90 days without pay pending
investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary
Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return

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to their mother unit since more than 90 days had


already lapsed. Respondents also sought the
intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a
result, the Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia
the action taken on respondents request for
reconsideration of the detail order.
On 22 November 1995, Secretary Garcia replied to the
Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum dated
9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall
respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia
declared that the law does not sanction the continuous
detail of respondents.
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner
failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their
mother unit. On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a
Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, which the
trial court granted on February.
Meanwhile, Judge Aurora Navarette-Recia of the trial
court was appointed Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights. Consequently, the case was re-raffled
and assigned to Branch 231 of the Regional Trial Court,
Pasay City.On 12 April 1996, the trial court issued an
order modifying the 23 February 1996 order of Judge
Recia. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to comply
with the 9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia
directing petitioner to recall respondents to their
mother unit until further orders by the trial court.
For petitioners continued failure to comply with the
writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to
cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to
declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer
within the period prescribed in the trial courts order of
26 January 1996. On 28 May 1996, the trial court
granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of
indirect contempt. The trial court issued a bench
warrant against petitioner.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts order finding
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. Also the trial
court declared petitioner in default for his failure to file
an answer to the petition for mandamus and damages.
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG,
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
granted respondents motion for the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari for being moot and academic.
The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-extendible

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extension until 13 December 1996 within which to file


petitioners memorandum. However, the OSG failed to
file the memorandum.
On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion, petitioner
alleged that the trial courts decision never became
final and executory as the trial court deprived him of
his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the
OSG failed to file Petitioners memorandum in CA-G.R.
SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal.
Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to
inform him of the dismissal of his appeal and of the
trial courts order granting respondents motion for
execution. Petitioner further asserted that the
Resolution of the Ombudsman superseded the decision
of the trial court.
The
Ombudsmans
Resolution
approved the following recommendation of the
reviewing Assistant Ombudsman:
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
respondent MODESTO
ABARCA, JR., is hereby
found
GUILTY
of
violation of Section 7(d)
of Republic Act 6713,
for which the penalty of
Suspension
Without
Pay for Six (6) Months
is
hereby
recommended
pursuant to Section
10(b),
Rule
III
of
Administrative
Order
No. 07, in relation to
Section
25(2)
of
Republic Act No. 6770.
It is also respectfully
recommended that the
charge
against
respondents
REYNALDO FERNANDO
and
MARY
LOU
CLEOFAS be DISMISSED
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial
courts ruling that the nature of the case before the
Ombudsman is different from the case before the trial
court. The former deals with a violation of RA 6713
office while the latter deals with an ultra vires act
punished with damages. The appellate court ruled that
the findings of the Ombudsman had nothing to do with

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the findings of the trial court, as the two forums are


separate and distinct from each other.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the Ombudsman
finding Modesto Abarca, Jr. guilty of violating Section 7
of RA 6713 rendered the execution of the trial courts
decision unjust and inequitable.
HELD: NO. The Ombudsmans Resolution Does
Not Render the Execution of the Trial Courts
Decision Unjust and Inequitable
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsmans
Resolution finding Abarca guilty of violating Section
7(d) of RA 6713 superseded the trial courts decision
finding petitioner liable for damages. Petitioner insists
that the Ombudsmans resolution rendered the
execution of the trial courts decision unjust and
inequitable.
Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may
no longer be modified in any respect except only to
correct clerical errors or mistakes. True, this rule admits
of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable. This, however, is not the case here. In the
present case, the Ombudsman issued his Resolution
prior to the finality of the trial courts decision. The
Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22 January 1997
while the trial courts decision became final and
executory on 14 June 1997. Therefore, the resolution of
the Ombudsman is not a supervening event to warrant
the stay of the execution of the decision of the trial
court.
Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding
Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713 did
not and could not supersede the decision of the trial
court holding petitioner liable for damages. The action
filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is
completely different from the action instituted by
respondents before the trial court. The two actions,
which are clearly separate and distinct from each
other, presented two different causes of action.
Petitioners cause of action arose from respondents
alleged violation of certain provisions of RA 6713
whereas respondents cause of action resulted from
petitioners refusal to recall respondents to their
mother unit at CATC. In the administrative case before
the Ombudsman, the issue was whether respondents
were guilty of violating RA 6713. In contrast, the issue
in the civil action before the trial court was whether
respondents were entitled to the issuance of the writ of
mandamus and damages.

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Spouses JAIME and PURIFICACION MORTA vs.


Judge ANTONIO C. BAGAGAN, Municipal Trial
Court, Guinobatan, Albay; and Sheriff DANILO O.
MATIAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Ligao,
Albay
A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1513
NOVEMBER 12, 2003
WRITS OF EXECUTION

FACTS: In their Administrative Complaint , Spouses


Jaime and Purificacion Morta Sr. charged Judge Antonio
C. Bagagan of the Municipal Trial Court
of
Guinobatan, Albay with gross ignorance of the law,
incompetence, bias and delay in the disposition of Civil
Case No. 481, entitled Jaime Morta, Sr. and Purificacion
Padilla vs. Jamie Occidental and Atty. Mariano Baranda,
Jr., for Damages with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, and Civil Case No. 482 entitled Jaime Morta,
Sr. and Purificacion Padilla vs. Jamie Occidental, Atty.
Mariano Baranda, Jr. and Daniel Corral, for Damages
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Complainants, who are the plaintiffs in the


aforementioned civil cases, alleged that on March 29,
1994, the Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay
rendered a decision in their favor. The defendants
appealed to the Regional Trial Court which dismissed
the aforesaid cases on the ground that the claims for
damages are tenancy-related problems which fall
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board
(DARAB). The plaintiffs filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals assailing the decision of the RTC.
However, in its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower courts ruling that the cases fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. Thereafter,
the First Division of this Court, acting on the petition for
review on certiorari filed by the plaintiffs, rendered its
decision affirming the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court, Guinobatan, Albay in Civil Case Nos. 481 and
482 and thereby setting aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Cases Nos. 1751 and 1752.

Complainants now alleged that despite the fact that


the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case
had already become final and executory, the

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respondent Judge still refused to issue a writ of


possession in their favor.

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Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 417 SCRA


415(2003)
WRITS OF EXECUTION; SUPERVENING FACTS

In his Answer/Comment, respondent judge explained


that he had denied complainants Motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession because, by the time
Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482 were finally decided by
this Court on June 10, 1999, they had already been
ousted from the lots in question pursuant to the
Decisions in DARAB Case No. 2413 and Civil Case No.
1920. In Civil Case No. 1920, respondent judge ordered
complainants to vacate the disputed lots. A Writ of
Execution/Demolition was thereafter issued on January
29, 1998. On the other hand, the DARAB Decision,
which became final and executory on October 27,
1998, directed them to cease and desist from
disturbing the peaceful possession of therein petitioner
Jaime Occidental.

The OCA found that the explanation of respondent


judge for not granting the Motion for Execution, filed by
complainants, was sufficient. According to the court
administrator, the records showed that they had
indeed been evicted from the lots they were claiming
when Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482 were finally decided
by the Supreme Court on June 10, 1999. Moreover, it
emphasized that this Court had merely affirmed the
Decision of the MTC insofar as the award of damages
was concerned.

ISSUE: Whether execution of a final judgment may be


refused.

HELD: YES. We agree with the OCA that respondent


judge acted correctly in not issuing a writ of
execution/possession. His action was consistent with
the Decision of this Court in GR No. 123417 affirming
that of the MTC as to damages. Besides, the latters
Order directing defendants not to molest complainants
in their peaceful possession was rendered moot when
they were ousted from the disputed lots by virtue of
the final and executory judgments in Civil Case No.
1920 and DARAB Case No. 2413. Indeed, the execution
of a final judgment may be refused, as in this case,
when there has been a change in the situation of the
parties that would make its execution inequitable.

The execution of a judgment may be stayed,


nothwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed
judgment by the Supreme Court if there are
supervening facts and circumstances which either
have a direct effect upon a matter already litigated
and settled or create a substantial change in the rights
or relations of the parties therein which would render
execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or
inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the
interest of justice.
FACTS: The Spouses Serrano were the owners of a
parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon
located at Road 4, Project 6, Diliman, Quezon City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80384, and
a parcel of land located in Caloocan City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15191. The couple
mortgaged the said properties in favor of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as
security for a loan of P50,000. By June 1969, the couple
was able to pay only the amount of P18,000.
On June 23, 1969, the Spouses Serrano, as vendors,
and Spouses Emilio and Evelyn Geli, as vendees,
executed a deed of absolute sale with partial
assumption of mortgage over the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 80384 and the house thereon for
the price of P70,000. The Spouses Geli paid the
amount of P38,000 in partial payment of the property,
the balance of P32,000 to be paid by them to the GSIS
for the account of the Spouses Serrano. The Spouses
Geli thereafter took possession of the property. In the
meantime, Evelyn Geli died intestate and was survived
by her husband Emilio Geli and their children.
Emilio Geli and his children failed to settle the amount
of P32,000 to the GSIS. The latter forthwith filed a
complaint against Emilio Geli and his children with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the rescission of
the deed of absolute sale with partial assumption of
mortgage. The defendants therein alleged, by way of
special defense, that the plaintiffs Spouses Serrano
failed to furnish them with a detailed statement of the
account due from the GSIS, thus amounting for their
failure to remit the balance of the loan to the GSIS. On
September 6, 1984, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering the rescission of the said deed.
Emilio Geli and his children appealed the decision to
the CA on October 19, 1984. During the pendency of
the appeal, the GSIS foreclosed the real estate
mortgage over the property for non-payment of the
P50,000 loan secured by the said property. At the sale

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on public auction, the GSIS was the highest bidder. A


certificate of sale over the property was thereby issued
by the sheriff in its favor on August 30, 1986. On
October 30, 1987 and November 3, 1987, Emilio Geli
paid the redemption price of P67,701.844 to the GSIS.
Official Receipts Nos. 905401 and 901685 for the said
amount with the notation for the account of Arturo
Serrano were issued. Accordingly, on February 22,
1988, the GSIS executed a certificate of redemption5
and turned over to Emilio Geli the owners copy of TCT
No. 80384 in the names of the Spouses Serrano. Emilio
Geli did not inform the Spouses Serrano and the CA
that he had paid the redemption price to the GSIS.
After the remand of the records, the Spouses Serrano
filed with the RTC on January 14, 1994 a motion for the
execution of the trial courts September 6, 1984
Decision. On February 15, 1994, the trial court issued
an order granting the motion and forthwith issued a
writ of execution. The writ, however, was not
implemented as the Spouses Serrano were then in the
United States. On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued
an alias writ of execution on motion of the plaintiffs.
This, too, was not implemented, because of the
defendants change of address. On May 9, 1996, the
trial court issued an order granting the motion of the
plaintiffs for a second alias writ of execution. On
September 6, 1996, the defendants filed a motion to
quash the same claiming, for the first time, that
defendant Emilio Geli had already redeemed the
subject property in 1988 from the GSIS. According to
the defendants, this constituted a supervening event
that would make the execution of the trial courts
decision unjust and inequitable.
On May 19, 1997, the trial court issued an order
denying the aforesaid motion of the defendants. It
noted that the payment by defendant Emilio Geli of the
redemption price to the GSIS took place before the CA
dismissed the appeal and before the decision of the
RTC became final and executory; hence, it did not
constitute a supervening event warranting a quashal of
the writ of execution.
The appellate court ruled that since Emilio Geli paid the
redemption price for the property to the GSIS in 1987
while his appeal was pending in the CA, the said
redemption was a supervening event which rendered
the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the
trial court against them unjust and inequitable.
Hence, spouses Serrano appealed with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE REDEMPTION
CONSTITUTED A SUPERVENING EVENT WHICH CHANGE

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THE RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES, THUS RENDERING


EXECUTION INEQUITABLE UNDER THE PREMISES
HELD: The Supreme Court granted the Petition.
Generally, the execution upon a final judgment is
a matter of right on the part of the prevailing
party. It is the ministerial and mandatory duty of
the trial court to enforce its own judgment once
it becomes final and executory. It may happen,
however, that new facts and circumstances may
develop or occur after a judgment had been rendered
and while an appeal therefrom is pending; or new
matters had developed after the appeal has been
dismissed and the appealed judgment had become
final and executory, which the parties were not aware
of and could not have been aware of prior to or during
the trial or during the appeal, as they were not yet in
existence at that time. In the first situation, any
attempt to frustrate or put off the enforcement of an
executory decision must fail. Once a judgment has
become final and executory, the only remedy left for
material attention thereof is that provided for in Rule
38 of the Rules of Court, as amended. There is no other
prerequisite mode of thwarting the execution of the
judgment on equitable grounds predicated on facts
occurring before the finality of judgment.
In the
second situation, the execution may be stayed,
notwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed
judgment by this Court. It is required, however,
that the supervening facts and circumstances
must either have a direct effect upon the matter
already litigated and settled or create a
substantial change in the rights or relations of
the
parties
therein
which
would render
execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible
or inequitable or when it becomes imperative in
the interest of justice. The interested party may file
a motion to quash a writ of execution issued by the
trial court, or ask the court to modify or alter the
judgment to harmonize the same with justice and
further supervening facts. Evidence may be adduced
by the parties on such supervening facts or
circumstances.
In this case, the payment by Emilio Geli of the amount
of P67,701.84 on October 30 and November 3, 1987 to
the GSIS for the account of the petitioners was made
while the appeal of the private respondents from the
summary judgment of the RTC was pending. The
summary judgment of the RTC had not yet become
final and executory. It behooved the said respondents
to prosecute their appeal and file their brief, where
they should have invoked the payment of the
redemption price as a ground for the reversal of the
trial courts summary judgment in their favor. The
respondents failed to do so, and even concealed the
payment of the loan for the account of the petitioners.
Worse, the respondents did not pay the requisite

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docket fees for their appeal, which resulted in its


dismissal. The respondents even opted not to file any
motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of the
CA dismissing their appeal. In sum, the respondents
allowed the decision of the trial court to become final
and executory. Consequently, the enforcement of the
summary judgment of the trial court can no longer be
frustrated by the respondents payment, through
Emilio Geli, of the amount of P67,701.84 to the GSIS in
1987.
D' ARMOURED SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION
AGENCY, INC., vs. ARNULFO ORPIA, et.al.
G.R. No. 151325

June 27, 2005

PROPERTIES
EXEMPT
FROM
EXECUTION;
exemption pertains only to natural persons and
not to juridical entities
FACTS:
On February 9, 1995, respondents, who were employed
as security guards by petitioner, and assigned to
Fortune Tobacco, Inc. filed with the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims
against petitioner and Fortune Tobacco. L.A. rendered a
Decision, declaring that all the respondents except
Antonio Cabangon Chua are jointly and severally liable
to pay complainants P1,077,124.29 for underpayment,
overtime pay, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay, 13th month pay, illegal deduction and refund of
firearms bond, and ten 10% percent of all sums owing
to complainants is hereby awarded as attorneys fees.
Fortune Tobacco interposed an appeal to the NLRC.
Petitioner did not appeal. NLRC affirmed with
modification the assailed Arbiters Decision in the
sense that the complaint against Fortune Tobacco was
dismissed. This Decision became final and executory.
Thus, the award specified in the Decision of the Arbiter
became the sole liability of petitioner. The records were
then remanded to the Arbiter for execution.
Upon respondents motion, the Arbiter issued a writ of
execution. Eventually, the sheriff served a writ of
garnishment upon the Chief Accountant of Foremost
Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom petitioner has an
existing services agreement. Thus, petitioners
receivables with Foremost were garnished.
Petitioner filed with the NLRC a "Motion to Quash/Recall
Writ of Execution and Garnishment" which was
opposed by respondents. Arbiter denied the motion
and directed the sheriff to release the garnished sum of
money to respondents pro rata. The MR was likewise
denied, hence, it interposed an appeal to the NLRC.
NLRC dismissed the appeal for petitioners failure to
post a bond within the reglementary period. Its MR was
likewise denied. Petitioner then filed with the CA a

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petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for


issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. CA
dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that
petitioners monthly receivables from the Foremost
Farms, Inc. (garnishee) are not exempt from execution.
HELD: The petition lacks merit. We have ruled that
an order of execution of a final and executory
judgment, as in this case, is not appealable,
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
On this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible.
Assuming that an appeal is proper, still we have to
deny the instant petition. Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC
Manual on Execution of Judgment provides:
"Rule IV EXECUTION
SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution.
Only the properties of the losing party shall be the
subject of execution, except:
(a) The losing partys family home constituted in
accordance with the Civil Code or Family Code or as
may be provided for by law or in the absence thereof,
the homestead in which he resides, and land
necessarily used in connection therewith, subject to
the limits fixed by law;
(b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;
(c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for
housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the losing
party such as he may select, of a value not exceeding
the amount fixed by law;
(d) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for
three (3) months;
(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges,
physicians,
pharmacists,
dentists,
engineers,
surveyors,
clergymen,
teachers,
and
other
professionals, not exceeding the amount fixed by law;
(f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his
personal services within the month preceding the levy
as are necessary for the support of his family;
(g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities
accruing or in any manner growing out of any life
insurance;
(h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in
his trade or employment of a value not exceeding
three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos;
(i) Other properties especially exempted by law."

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The above Rule clearly enumerates what properties are


exempt from execution. It is apparent that the
exemption pertains only to natural persons and
not to juridical entities. On this point, the CA
correctly ruled that petitioner, being a corporate entity,
does not fall within the exemption, thus:
"We cannot accede to petitioners position that the
garnished amount is exempt from execution.
Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain
and clear on what properties are exempt from
execution. Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently reads:
SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution.
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from
execution:x x x x x x x x x
(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the
judgment obligor for his personal services within the
four months preceding the levy as are necessary for
the support of his family.
The exemption under this procedural rule should be
read in conjunction with the Civil Code, the substantive
law which proscribes the execution of employees
wages, thus:
ART. 1708. The laborers wage shall not be subject to
execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for
food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.
Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court and Article 1708 of the New Civil Code is meant
to favor only laboring men or women whose works are
manual. Persons belonging to this class usually look to
the reward of a days labor for immediate or present
support, and such persons are more in need of the
exemption than any other [Gaa vs. Court of Appeals,
140 SCRA 304 (1985)].
In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined
only to natural persons and not to juridical
entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of
salaries, wages and earning from the personal
services rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule
further requires that such earnings be intended for the
support of the judgment debtors family.
It stands to reason that only natural persons whose
salaries, wages and earnings are indispensable for his
own and that of his familys support are exempted
under Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Undeniably, a corporate entity such as petitioner
security agency is not covered by the exemption.
Perez vs. CA

PROCEDURE
G.R. No. 157616
July 22, 2005
Effect of Judgments

Facts:
The spouses Digos, secured a loan from the
International Exchange Bank to finance their project for
the construction of townhouses. To secure the payment
of the loan, the spouses Digos executed a Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) over the said property. The
construction was delayed resulting to the failure of Sps.
Digos to pay their loan which subsequently caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of their REM. Consequently,
the property was sold at public auction, with the bank
as the highest bidder at P4,500,000.00, which
appeared to be the account of the spouses Digos at the
time. The Certificate of Sale executed by the sheriff
was, thereafter, registered at the Office of the Register
of Deeds.
When the period to redeem the property was
about to expire, sps. Digos ask for an extension from
the bank to redeem property, to which the bank after
previous refusal agreed to one month extension.
However, instead of repurchasing said property, the
spouses filed a complaint for the nullification of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
and sale at public auction and/or redemption of the
property against the bank. The latter filed a motion to
dismiss which was granted by the trial court.
Thereafter the bank sold the questioned property
to petitioners. Subsequently, another complaint was
filed by Sps. Digos against the bank, Perez and Ragua,
for the cancellation and annulment of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by
them in favor of the bank, the sale at public auction as
well as the certificate of sale executed by the sheriff,
and the Torrens title issued to them.
The Digos reiterated their allegations in their first
complaint that they were not notified of the sale at
public auction, and that the banks P4,500,000.00 bid
for the property was unconscionably low compared to
the prevailing market price of P25,000,000.00. They
also admitted their failure to pay their amortization on
their loans. However, they alleged this time that the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
and the sale at public auction were illegal because the
bank charged much more than the amount due on
their loan account, to wit: interest of 26% per annum
on the loan account covering January 2, 1998, whereas
under the promissory note executed in favor of the

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bank, the new interest rate should commence only on


March 4, 1993; penalty charges of 26% of the account,
and 5% penalty charges on top of the 26% interest per
annum, as shown by the banks statement of account.
The spouses Digos also averred that although they
pleaded for a restructuring of their loan account and a
moratorium on the payment of their account, they
were unaware of the erroneous computation of the
balance of their loan account. They maintained that
the banks consolidation of its title over the property on
September 19, 1999 was premature because they were
given until October 8, 1999 to redeem the property.
Perez and Ragua filed a motion to dismiss on
similar grounds of res judicata, splitting of a single
cause of action and forum shopping, which the trial
court denied. The MR was also denied.
Upon elevation to via certiorari (rule 65), the CA
rendered judgment dismissing the petition and
affirming the assailed orders. The appellate court
declared that there was no identity of causes of action
in the two cases because the first action was one for
injunction and redemption of the property, whereas the
second action was for the nullification of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
and the sale at public auction due to the erroneous
computation of the balance on the respondents
account with the bank; hence, the spouses Digos were
not estopped from filing their second action. The
petitioners filed a motion for a reconsideration of the
said decision, which the appellate court denied.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment in the first case is
res judicata to the second case.
Held: Yes. Splitting a single cause of action consists
in dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into
several parts or claims and instituting two or more
actions therein. A single cause of action or entire claim
or demand cannot be split up or divided so as to be
made the subject of two or more different actions.
A single act or omission may be violative of
various rights at the same time, such as when the act
constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal
obligations. The violation of each of these rights is a
cause of action in itself. However, if only one right may
be violated by several acts or omissions, there would
only be one cause of action. Otherwise stated, if two
separate and distinct primary rights are violated by
one and the same wrong; or if the single primary right
should be violated by two distinct and separate legal
wrongs; or when the two primary rights are each
broken by a separate and distinct wrongs; in either
case, two causes of action would result. Causes of

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action which are distinct and independent, although


arising out of the same contract, transaction or state of
fact may be sued separately, recovery on one being no
bar to subsequent actions on the others.
The mere fact that the same relief is sought in the
subsequent action will not render the judgment in the
prior action as res judicata. Causes of action are not
distinguishable
for
purposes
of res
judicata by
difference in the claims for relief.
Comparing the material averments of the two
complaints, it would appear that separate primary
rights of the respondents were violated by the banks
institution of a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage and the sale at public
auction; hence, the respondents had separate and
independent causes of action against the bank, to wit:
(a) the first complaint relates to the violation by the
bank of the right to a judicial, not extrajudicial,
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and for an
extension of the period for the respondents to redeem
the property with damages; (b) the second complaint
relates to the breach by the bank of its loan contract
with the respondents by causing the extrajudicial
foreclosure
of
the
real
estate
mortgage
for P4,500,000.00 which was in excess of their unpaid
account with the bank.
However, we are convinced that the institution by
the respondents of their second complaint anchored on
their claim that the bank breached its loan contracts
with them by erroneously computing the actual and
correct balance of their account when the petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
was filed by it designed to avert the dismissal of their
complaint due to splitting causes of action and res
judicata, following the dismissal of their first complaint
and the dismissal of their appeal through their
negligence. The Court is constrained to conclude that
this was a last-ditch attempt to resuscitate their lost
cause, a brazen violation of the principle of res
judicata.
Section 49(b)(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides in part:
SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment
or final order rendered by a court or judge of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their

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successors in interest by title subsequent to the


commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity.
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or
their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res
judicata, known as bar by prior judgment or estoppel
by judgment, which refers to a theory or matter that
has been definitely and finally settled on its merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction without fraud or
collusion.
There are four (4) essential requisites which must
concur for the application of this doctrine:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action.[31]
A judgment or order is on the merits of the case
when it determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties based on the ultimate facts as disclosed by the
pleadings or issues presented for trial. It is not
necessary that a trial, actual hearing or argument on
the facts of the case ensued. For as long as the parties
had the full legal opportunity to be heard on their
respective claims and contentions, the judgment or
order is on the merits. An order of the trial court on the
ground that the complaint does not state a cause of
action is a determination of the case on its
merits. Such order whether right or wrong bars another
action based upon the same cause of action. The
operation of the order as res judicata is not affected by
a mere right of appeal where the appeal has not been
taken or by an appeal which never has been perfected.
Indeed, absolute identity of parties is not a
condition sine qua non for the application of res
judicata. It is sufficient that there is a shared identity of
interest. The rule is that, even if new parties are found
in the second action, res judicata still applies if the
party against whom the judgment is offered in

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evidence was a party in the first action; otherwise, a


case can always be renewed by the mere expedience
of joining new parties in the new suit.
The ultimate test to ascertain identity of
causes of action is whether or not the same
evidence fully supports and establishes both the
first and second cases. The application of the
doctrine of res judicata cannot be excused by merely
varying the form of the action or engaging a different
method of presenting the issue.
Section 49(c) of Rule 39 enumerates the concept
of conclusiveness of judgment. This is the second
branch, otherwise known as collateral estoppel or
estoppel by verdict. This applies where, between
the first case wherein judgment is rendered and
the second case wherein such judgment is
involved, there is no identity of causes of action.
As explained by this Court:
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties will be final
and conclusive in the second if that same point or
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit;
but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not
conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue
arising in the second. In order that this rule may be
applied, it must clearly and positively appear, either
from the record itself or by the aid of competent
extrinsic evidence that the precise point or question in
issue in the second suit was involved and decided in
the first. And in determining whether a given question
was an issue in the prior action, it is proper to look
behind the judgment to ascertain whether the
evidence necessary to sustain a judgment in the
second action would have authorized a judgment for
the same party in the first action.
In the present case, before the private respondents
filed their first complaint, they already knew that the
balance
of
their
account
with
the
bank
was P4,500,000.00. They even offered to make
a P1,000,000.00 partial payment of their loan to reduce
their account to P3,500,000.00.
If indeed the bank made an erroneous
computation of the balance of their account as claimed
by the private respondents in their second complaint,
this should have been alleged in the first complaint as

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one of their causes of action. They failed to do so. The


private respondents unequivocably admitted in their
first complaint that the balance of their account with
the bank was P4,500,000.00 which was the precise
amount for which the bank sought the foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage and the sale of the property
at public auction; they even sought judicial recourse to
enable them to redeem the property despite the lapse
of the one-year period therefor.
Relying on these admissions on the part of the
private respondents, and the fact that the bank has
already consolidated its title over the property, the
Court thus dismissed their first complaint. The Order of
the Court dismissing the first complaint is a judgment
of the case on the merits.
The attempt of the respondents in their second
complaint to avoid the application of the principle
of res judicata by claiming the nature of their account
on the ground therefor and their legal theory cannot
prosper. Case law has it that where a right, question or
fact is distinctly put in issue and directly determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction in a first case,
between the same parties or their privies, the former
adjudication of that fact, right or question is binding on
the parties or their privies in a second suit irrespective
of whether the causes of action are the same. The
ruling of the CA that the action of the private
respondents and their legal theory in their second
complaint were different from their causes of action
and legal theory in the first complaint is not correct. A
different cause of action is one that proceeds not only
on a sufficiently different legal theory, but also on a
different factual footing as not to require the trial of
facts material to the former suit; that is, an action that
can be maintained even if all disputed factual issues
raised in the plaintiffs original complaint are concluded
in defendants favor.
In this case, the private respondents second
complaint cannot be maintained without trying the
facts material to the first case, and the second case
cannot be maintained if all the disputed factual issues
raised in the first complaint are considered in favor of
the bank.
The principle of res judicata applies when the
opportunity to raise an issue in the first complaint
exists but the plaintiff failed to do so. Indeed, if the
pleading of a different legal theory would have
convinced the trial court to decide a particular issue in
the first action which, with the use of diligence the
plaintiffs could have raised therein but failed to do so,
they are barred by res judicata. Nor do legal theories
operate to constitute a cause of action. New legal

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theories do not amount to a new cause of action so as


to defeat the application of the principle ofres judicata.
Indeed, in Siegel v. Knott, it was held that the
statement of a different form of liability is not a
different cause of action, provided it grows out of the
same transaction or act and seeks redress for the
wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different
causes of action simply because the theory of the
second would not have been open under the pleadings
in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a
second action after the loss of the first, merely by
having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery
opened by the pleadings in the first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the
grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in
issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the
suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The
plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every
ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon
which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon
them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for
the same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or
equitable, must present to the court, either by the
pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon
which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at
liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by
piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest
to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails.
There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal
presentation is allowed.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO. (now BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS), vs. TOMAS TOH, SR.,
AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANDALUYONG
CITY, BRANCH 214
G.R. No. 144018. June 23, 2003. SECOND
DIVISION. QUISUMBING
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL ON THE GROUND
OF ADVANCED AGE
FACTS: On August 29, 1997, Private respondent Tomas
Toh, Sr., together with his sons, Tomas Tan Toh, Jr., and
Antonio Tan Toh executed a Comprehensive Security
Agreement in favor of petitioner, wherein the Tohs
jointly and severally bound themselves as sureties for
the P22 million credit facilities, denominated as
Omnibus Line and Bills Purchased Line, to Catmon
Sales International Corporation (CASICO). Said credit
line expired on June 30, 1998, but the parties renewed
the same for another year, subject to the following
amendments: (1) a reduction in the credit line from P22
million to P7.5 million; and (2) the relief of Toh, Sr., as
one of the sureties of CASICO.

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On March 17, 1999, Toh Sr. sued petitioner for the


recovery of his bank deposits with petitioner in the
amount of P2,560,644.68 plus damages. He claimed
that petitioner had debited, without his knowledge and
consent, said amount from his savings and current
accounts with petitioner bank and then applied the
money as payment for the Letters of Credit availed of
by Catmon Sales International Corporation (CASICO)
from petitioner. Thus, when Toh issued two checks to
Anton Construction Supply, Inc., they were dishonored
by FEBTCO allegedly for having been drawn against
insufficient funds.
Petitioner bank, in its answer averred that the debiting
of Tohs bank accounts was justified due to his surety
undertaking in the event of the default of CASICO in its
payments.
On July 30, 1999, private respondent filed a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, which the lower court
granted. Thereafter, Toh Sr. filed a Motion for
Discretionary Execution by invoking Section 2, Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of Court. He prayed that execution
pending appeal be granted on the ground of old age
and the probability that he may not be able to enjoy
his money deposited in petitioners bank. The RTC
granted private respondents Motion for Discretionary
Execution.
Petitioner without filing a motion for reconsideration of
the trial courts order brought the matter to the CA in a
special civil action for certiorari. The CA dismissed it.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON THE GRANT OF EXECUTION PENDING
APPEAL ON THE GROUND OF ADVANCED AGE OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TOMAS TOH, SR. IS PROPER.
RULING: Yes. The grant of execution pending appeal
on the ground of advanced age of private respondent
Tomas Toh, Sr. is proper as it is well within the sound
discretion of the trial court.
Discretionary execution is permissible only when good
reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment
before finality or pending appeal or even before the
expiration of the time to appeal. Good reasons are
compelling circumstances justifying the immediate
execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the
prevailing party may, after the lapse of time, become
unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the
adverse party who may apparently have no case
except to delay.
The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give
examples of good reasons to justify execution. The
determination of what is a good reason must,
necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. In other words, the issuance of the writ
of execution must necessarily be controlled by the
judgment of the judge in accordance with his own
conscience and by a sense of justice and equity, free
from the control of anothers judgment or conscience. It

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must be so for discretion implies the absence of a hard


and fast rule.
In this case, the trial court granted private respondents
motion for discretionary execution due to his advanced
age, citing our ruling in De Leon v. Soriano.
It
concluded that old age is a good reason to allow
execution pending appeal as any delay in the final
disposition of the present case may deny private
respondent of his right to enjoy fully the money he has
with defendant bank. The Court of Appeals found said
ruling in conformity with sound logical precepts,
inspired as it is by the probability that the lapse of time
would render the ultimate judgment ineffective. It
further stressed that the trial court was in the vantage
position to determine whether private respondents
advanced age and state of health would merit the
execution private respondent prayed for.
In De Leon, the SC upheld immediate execution of
judgment in favor of a 75-year-old woman. It ruled that
her need of and right to immediate execution of the
decision in her favor amply satisfied the requirement of
a paramount and compelling reason of urgency and
justice, outweighing the security offered by the
supersedeas bond. In the subsequent case of Borja v.
Court of Appeals, the SC likewise allowed execution
pending appeal in favor of a 76 year-old man on the
ground that the appeal will take years to decide with
finality, and he might very well be facing a different
judgment from a Court higher than any earthly tribunal
and the decision on his complaint, even if it be in his
favor, would have become meaningless as far as he
himself was concerned.
In the present case, private respondent Toh is already
79 years old. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
be denied that he is already of advanced age. Not a
few might be fortunate to live beyond 79 years. But no
one could claim with certainty that his tribe would be
always blessed with long life.
Private respondent obtained a favorable judgment in
the trial court. But that judgment is still on appeal
before the CA. It might even reach the SC before the
controversy is finally resolved with finality. As well said
in Borja, while we may not agree that a man of his
years is practically moribund, the Court can appreciate
his apprehension that he will not be long for this world
and may not enjoy the fruit of the judgment before he
finally passes away.
PANOTES VS CITY TOWNHOUSE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
FACTS: Panotes is the president of the Provident
Village Homeowners Association, Inc.. He filed a
complaint before the National Housing Authority (NHA)
against Provident Securities Corporation (PROSECOR),
owner-developer of the Provident Village in Marikina
City. The complaint alleges that PROSECOR violated
some of the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
957, one of which is its failure to provide an open

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space in the said subdivision. Later in a Resolution, the


NHA directed PROSECOR to provide the Provident
Village an open space which is Block 40. PROSECOR did
not appeal the said resolution hence the same became
final and executory. Panotes then filed a motion for
execution of the NHA Resolution. However it was found
that the records of the case were mysteriously missing.
Hence, his motion was provisionally dismissed without
prejudice. Meanwhile, PROSECOR sold to City
Townhouse
Development
Corporation
(CTDC),
respondent, several lots in the subdivision. Among the
lots sold were those comprising Block 40. CTDC was
unaware of the NHA Resolution ordering PROSECOR to
have Block 40 utilized as open space of Provident
Village.
When Panotes was succeeded by Araceli Bumatay as
president of the Provident Village Homeowners
Association, she filed with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for revival of the
NHA Resolution. Impleaded therein as defendant was
CTDC, whom she alleged as successor-in-interest of
PROSECOR. Later HLURB rendered its Decision in favor
of Bumatay, reviving the NHA Resolution and declaring
Block 40 of the Provident Village as open space for the
said subdivision. Said decision was affirmed by HLURB
Board of Commissioners and the Office of the
President. CTDC went to the CA which in turn reversed
the decision of the Office of the President.
ISSUE: Whether the NHA Resolution dated August 14,
1980 may be enforced against CTDC.
HELD: No. An action for revival of judgment is no more
than a procedural means of securing the execution of a
previous judgment which has become dormant after
the passage of five years without it being executed
upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended
to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the
judgment debtors case nor the propriety or correctness
of the first judgment.
Here, the original judgment or the NHA Resolution
sought to be revived was between Rogelio Panotes and
PROSECOR, not between petitioner Araceli Bumatay
and respondent CTDC, the latter not being the
successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.
Furthermore, strangers to a case, like CTDC, are not
bound by the judgment rendered by a court. It will not
divest the rights of a party who has not and never been
a party to a litigation. Execution of a judgment can be
issued only against a party to the action and not
against one who did not have his day in court.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., vs.
HONORABLE NEMESIO S. FELIX, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 56, Regional Trial

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Court, Makati City, RICHARD C. JAMORA, Branch


Clerk of Court, and EMERITA GARON, G.R. No.
148090
November 28, 2006

EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL; REQUISITES

FACTS: The private respondent Emerita Garon


("Garon") filed an action for sum of money docketed as
against Project Movers Realty and Development
Corporation
("Project
Movers")
and
Stronghold
Insurance Company, Inc. ("Stronghold Insurance").

In an Order dated 19 September 2000, the


Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 56 4 ("trial
court") granted Garons motion for summary judgment,
which included that all other claims and counter-claims
of the parties are hereby ordered dismissed.

On 6 October 2000, Garon filed a motion for


execution pending appeal. On 10 October 2000,
Stronghold Insurance moved for the reconsideration of
the 19 September 2000 Order of the trial court and in
an Order dated 23 January 2001, the trial court denied
Stronghold Insurances motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
In an Order dated 8 February 2001, the trial
court granted Garons motion for execution pending
appeal. The trial court ordered Garon to post a bond of
P20 million to answer for any damage that Project
Movers and Stronghold Insurance may sustain by
reason of the execution pending appeal. On 14
February 2001, Branch Clerk of Court Richard C. Jamora
("Jamora") issued a writ of execution pending appeal.
On 16 February 2001, Stronghold Insurance
filed a notice of appeal. Stronghold Insurance also filed
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to
assail the trial courts 8 February 2001 Order and the
writ of execution pending appeal. In its Resolution 8 of
23 February 2001, the Court of Appeals enjoined the
trial court, Jamora and Garon from enforcing the 8
February 2001 Order. However, it turned out that
notices of garnishment had been served before the
Court of Appeals issued the temporary restraining

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order (TRO). In its Order dated 7 March 2001, the trial


court denied Stronghold Insurances Urgent Motion for
the recall of the notices of garnishment.
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(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing


party with notice to the adverse party;
(b) there must be good reasons for execution
pending appeal;

ISSUE: Whether or not there are good reasons to


justify execution pending appeal.
HELD:
No. In granting the motion for execution pending
appeal, the trial court ruled:
A perusal of [t]he records of the instant case
will sustain plaintiffs claim that defendants raised no
valid or meritorious defenses against the claims of
plaintiff. The Court notes with interest the fact that
defendants admitted the genuineness and due
execution of the Promissory Notes and Surety
Agreement sued upon in this case.
We agree with Stronghold Insurance that Garon
failed to present good reasons to justify execution
pending appeal. The situations in the cases cited by
the trial court are not similar to this case. In Ma-Ao
Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Caete, Caete filed an action
for compensation for his illness. The Workmens
Compensation
Commission
found
the
illness
compensable. Considering Caetes physical condition
and the Courts finding that he was in constant danger
of death, the Court allowed execution pending appeal.
In De Leon, et al. v. Soriano, et al., De Leon, et al.
defaulted on an agreement that was peculiarly
personal to Asuncion. The agreement was valid only
during Asuncions lifetime. The Court considered that
Sorianos health was delicate and she was 75 years old
at that time. Hence, execution pending appeal was
justified. In this case, it was not Garon, but her
husband, who was ill.
The posting of a bond, standing alone and
absent the good reasons required under Section 2, Rule
39 of the Rules, is not enough to allow execution
pending appeal. The mere filing of a bond by a
successful party is not a good reason to justify
execution pending appeal as a combination of
circumstances is the dominant consideration which
impels the grant of immediate execution. The bond is
only an additional factor for the protection of the
defendants creditor.
The requisites for the grant of an execution of a
judgment pending appeal are the following:

(c) the good reasons must be stated in the


special order.
As a discretionary execution, execution
pending appeal is permissible only when good reasons
exist for immediately executing the judgment before
finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration
of the period to appeal. Good reasons, special,
important, pressing reasons must exist to justify
execution pending appeal; otherwise, instead of an
instrument of solicitude and justice, it may well
become a tool of oppression and inequality. Good
reasons consist of exceptional circumstances of such
urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the
losing party may suffer should the appealed judgment
be reversed later.
Fujiki v Marinay
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
Rule 39 Sec 48 : Foreign Judgments- A recognition of a
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage.
It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law.
FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese
national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January
2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15
May 2008 in Q.C. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were
able to reestablish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from
a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign

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Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)


praying that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese
Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).

law or fact. Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited


review on foreign judgments.

RTC dismissed the petition. SolGen agreed the


petition.Fujiki' s MR was denied. Thus, a direct recourse
to SC from RTC under Rule 45 on a pure question of
law.

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, vs.


FEDERICO A. SERRA
G.R. No. 203241.July 10, 2013. SECOND
DIVISION. CARPIO.

ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize


the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: Yes. However, the effect of a foreign judgment
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. For
Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of
the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in
Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Section 48(b),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title. Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of

Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a


foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted
and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled
on grounds external to its merits, i.e., want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The rule on
limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
the protection of party expectations, as well as
respecting the jurisdiction of other states.

Final and executory judgment may be executed


by motion within five years; Exception
FACTS: Respondent Federico A. Serra (Serra) and
petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy wherein Serra agreed to lease his land in Masbate
to RCBC for 25 years.
However, when RCBC informed Serra of its decision to
exercise its option to buy the property, the latter
replied that he was no longer interested in selling the
property. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages against Serra in the RTC
Makati which ordered Serra to execute and deliver the
proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. Serra appealed to
the CA.
Meanwhile, Serra donated the property to his mother,
Leonida Ablao who subsequently sold the same to
Hermanito Liok. A new land title was issued in favor of
Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Nullification of
Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with Reconveyance
and Damages against Liok, Ablao and Serra before the
RTC of Masbate City.
The CA, and later the Supreme Court, affirmed the
order of the RTC Makati in the Specific Performance
case. On 15 April 1994, the decision in the Specific
Performance case became final and executory upon
entry of judgment.
On 22 October 2001, the RTC Masbate ruled in favor of
RCBC, declaring the donation in favor of Ablao and the
subsequent sale to Liok null and void. In a Decision
dated 28 September 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC
Masbate decision. Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, while Serra and Ablao filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the SC. In separate Resolutions dated
30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008, which became final
and executory on 27 August 20087 and 3 March 2009,
respectively, the SC found neither reversible error nor
grave abuse of discretion on the CAs part.

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On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of


the decision in the Specific Performance case. This was
opposed by Serra arguing that the motion for execution
was already barred by prescription and laches, and
that RCBC was at fault for failing to register as lien in
the original title the Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy. The RTC Makati denied RCBCs motion for
execution. RCBCs motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Thus, RCBC filed this petition.
ISSUE:
WON RCBCs motion for execution was already barred
by prescription and laches.
RULING:
No. The Rules of Court provide that a final and
executory judgment may be executed by motion within
five years from the date of its entry or by an action
after the lapse of five years and before prescription
sets in. This rule, however, admits of exceptions as
when execution may be made by motion even after the
lapse of five years. These exceptions have one
common denominator: the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor
and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that
where the delays were occasioned by the
judgment debtors own initiatives and for her
advantage as well as beyond the judgment
creditors control, the five-year period allowed
for enforcement of the judgment by motion is
deemed to have been effectively interrupted or
suspended.
In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC
seeks to enforce the decision which became final and
executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders Serra
to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor
of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC,
Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao, who
then transferred it to Liok. Serras action prompted
RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in
the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for
his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the
Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year
period to enforce through a motion the decision in the
Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the
Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and
RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25 August
2011, RCBCs motion is deemed filed within the fiveyear period for enforcement of a decision through a
motion.
The purpose of prescribing time limitations for
enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping
on their rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, RCBC
has pursued persistently its action against Serra in
accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has

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continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of


technicality. While strict compliance with the rules of
procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted
in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not
serve the ends of justice.
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO
YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON
YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA
vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A.
"GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY
G.R. No. 198680

July 8, 2013

FACTS: On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with


some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation
of Title and Reconveyance with Damages against
respondent Gaudioso alleging that Magdaleno Ypon
died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving
behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J. Claiming to be
the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice of
petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives
and successors-in-interest.
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful
son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of
Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School;
and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. Further, by
way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a)
petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the
complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the
case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest,
as there is no showing that the petitioners have been
judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.
RTC found that the subject complaint failed to state a
cause of action against Gaudioso. The plaintiffs therein
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
due to the counsels failure to state the date on which
his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of
Compliance was issued. Petitioners, who were among
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246, sought direct
recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case
on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state
a cause of action was proper.
HELD: The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another. It is well-

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settled that the existence of a cause of action is


determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this
relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause
of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to
be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief
prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.

heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered


judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had
been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.In this
case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those
of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there
lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of
the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who


were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are
the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same,
prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed
by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the
transfer certificates of title issued in the latters favor
be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if
admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the
reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that
the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should
be
made
in
the
corresponding
special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting
the same.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in


determining whether the same fails to state a cause of
action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to
the proper appreciation of the questions before
it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence,
since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an
ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was
altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out
that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship
which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
determined in the proper special proceeding. As such,
the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be
devoid of any legal effect.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who


are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in
the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession
of property. This must take precedence over the action
for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court
has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make
a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one
by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking the establishment of a status or right.

CITY OF CEBU vs. APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR. G.R.


No. 172852

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court


ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in
a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate
special proceeding for the determination of heirship
may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily
submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of

January 30, 2013

CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT; EMINENT


DOMAIN; LEGAL INTEREST
FACTS: The present controversy is an off-shoot of Civil
Case No. CEB-14632 for eminent domain over two (2)
parcels of land owned by spouses Apolonio and Blasa
Dedamo (Spouses Dedamo), filed by the petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 13, on September 17, 1993. The petitioner
immediately took possession of the lots after
depositing P51,156.00 with the Philippine National
Bank pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160.
During the pendency of the case, or on
December 14, 1994, the petitioner and Spouses
Dedamo entered into a Compromise Agreement
whereby the latter agreed to part with the ownership of
the parcels of land in favor of the former in
consideration of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
EIGHTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS
(P1,786,400.00) as provisional payment and just
compensation in an amount to be determined by a
panel of commissioners. Forthwith, the panel was

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constituted and a report was submitted to the RTC


recommending the sum of P20,826,339.50 as just
compensation. The report was adopted and approved
by the RTC in its Order dated December 27, 1996. 5
The RTC Order was affirmed by the CA and then
by the Court, in a Decision dated May 7, 2002, when
the matter was elevated for review in a petition
docketed as G.R. No. 142971. When the said decision
became final and executory on September 20, 2002,
the case was remanded for execution to the RTC,
before which, a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution was filed by Spouses Dedamo on April 4,
2003. On May 16, 2003, the RTC granted the motion
and ordered the issuance of the writ.
In the meantime, Spouses Dedamo passed
away and they were substituted in the case by herein
respondent.
On December 23, 2003, the petitioner paid the
respondent the sum of P19,039,939.50 which is the
difference between the just compensation due and the
provisional payment already made.
On March 24, 2004, the respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion before the RTC to order the
petitioner to pay interest on the just compensation
computed from the time of actual taking of the lands.
On April 30, 2004, the RTC denied the motion
and ruled that it can no longer amend a final and
executory judgment that did not specifically direct the
payment of legal interest.
Adamant, the respondent sought recourse
before the CA asserting that the petitioner is liable to
pay: (a) 12% legal interest on the unpaid balance of
the just compensation computed from the time of
actual taking of the property up to the date of payment
of just compensation; and (b) 12% legal interest
from the time the decision awarding just
compensation became final and executory on
September 20, 2002 until its satisfaction on
December 23, 2003.
Subsequently, the CA rejected the respondents
first claim since the issue was belatedly raised during
the execution stage and after the judgment of just
compensation attained finality. Nonetheless, it found
the second contention meritorious and awarded legal
interest accruing from the time the RTC Order dated
December 27, 1996 awarding just compensation was
affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court up to the
time of full payment.

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Both parties elevated the CA judgment to the


Court. The respondents petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 172942 where he sought, in the main, that the 12%
interest rate be reckoned from the date of taking of the
property and not from the date of finality of the
Decision dated May 7, 2002 in G.R. No. 142971. The
Court denied his petition on August 22, 2006 for failure
to sufficiently show that the CA committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment. The
respondents motion for reconsideration of the said
decision was denied with finality on November 27,
2006.
The petitioner prays for the annulment of the
award of 12% legal interest made by the CA in view of
the termination of the eminent domain case upon
payment of the just compensation in satisfaction of the
writ of execution. The petitioner further asserts that
the final judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-14632 which
did not explicitly pronounce the payment of interest
can no longer be modified lest the basic principles of
remedial law be defiled.
The respondent avers that Section 10, Rule 67
of the Rules of Court mandating the payment of legal
interest on just compensation forms part of every
judgment rendered in eminent domain cases even if
the same was not directly ordered therein. The
respondent also claims that the award of just
compensation must be reckoned from the date of
taking of subject lots and not from the date of finality
of G.R. No. 142971 because just compensation, before
it is paid, constitutes loan or forbearance of money that
entails the imposition of a 12% interest per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CA as to the
reckoning point from which the legal interest be
computed has obtained its finality.
HELD: YES. The petition is denied on the ground of res
judicata in the mode of conclusiveness of judgment. A
perusal of the allegations in the present case evidently
shows that the petitioner broaches the issues similarly
raised and already resolved in G.R. No. 172942.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of
judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or
when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them. Stated differently,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a
second case of a fact or question already settled in a
previous case.

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The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has


become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who
can no longer question the respondents entitlement to
the 12% legal interest awarded by the CA. The Courts
determination in G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning
point of the 12% legal interest is likewise binding on
the petitioner who cannot re-litigate the said matter

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anew through the present recourse. Thus, the


judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as
the relief sought in the latter is inextricably related to
the ruling in the former.

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