Rule 40-56 Appeals

1 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
CECILIA B. ESTINOZO vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, FORMER SIXTEENTH
DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 150276. February 12, 2008.
THIRD DIVISION. NACHURA, J.
APPEAL AND CERTIORARI; MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Estinozo while
in Sogod, Southern Leyte, represented to
private complainants Gaudencio Ang,
Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo Cabardo, Salvacion
Nueve,
Virgilio
Maunes,
Apolinaria
Olayvar, and Mariza Florendo that she
was one of the owners of Golden
Overseas Employment and that she was
recruiting workers to be sent abroad. She
then asked from the said complainants
the
payment
of
placement
and
processing fees totaling P15,000.00.
Private complainants paid the fees, went
with petitioner to Manila. On the
promised date of their departure,
however, private complainants never left
the country. Came November 1986 and
still they were not deployed. This
prompted
private
complainants
to
suspect that something was amiss, and
they demanded the return of their
money. Petitioner assured them refund of
the fees and even executed promissory
notes to several of the complainants; but,
as before, her assurances were mere
pretenses.
Complainants then filed seven separate
Informations for Estafa against petitioner
with the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte.
On request of petitioner, the cases were
consolidated and jointly heard by the trial
court.
During the trial, in her defense, petitioner
testified, among others, that she was an
employee of the COA who worked as a
part-time secretary at FCR Recruitment

Agency owned by Fe Corazon Ramirez;
that she received the amounts claimed
by the complainants and remitted the
same to Ramirez; that complainants
actually transacted with Ramirez and not
with her and that she was only forced to
execute the promissory notes.
On November 9, 1994, the RTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the charges of estafa.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the case
to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the
trial court.
On May 30, 2001, within the 15-day
reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review,
petitioner filed with the appellate court a
Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Motion for Reconsideration. On June 28,
2001, the CA, in the its Resolution,
denied the said motion pursuant to Rule
52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and
Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).
Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the June 28, 2001
Resolution of the CA but the appellate
court denied the same, on August 17,
2001. Displeased with this series of
denials, petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 assailing all the issuances of the CA.
ISSUE: WON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS THE
PROPER REMEDY AVAILED OF BY THE
PETITIONER.
RULING:
No. The petition is the wrong remedy to
question the appellate courts issuances.
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that a party desiring
to appeal by certiorari from a judgment
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

or final order or resolution of the CA may
file a verified petition for review on
certiorari. Considering that, in this case,
appeal by certiorari was available to
petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her
right to resort to a special civil action for
certiorari, a limited form of review and a
remedy of last recourse, which lies only
where there is no appeal or plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
A petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 and a petition for
certiorari
under
Rule
65
are
mutually
exclusive
remedies.
Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal
or any other adequate remedy. The
nature of the questions of law intended
to be raised on appeal is of no
consequence. It may well be that those
questions of law will treat exclusively of
whether or not the judgment or final
order was rendered without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. This is immaterial. The
remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a
special civil action.
Granting arguendo that the instant
certiorari petition is an appropriate
remedy, still the Court cannot grant the
writ prayed for because there is no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the CA
in the challenged issuances. The rule, as
it stands now without exception, is that
the 15-day reglementary period for
appealing or filing a motion for
reconsideration or new trial cannot
be extended, except in cases before the
Supreme Court, as one of last resort,
which may, in its sound discretion grant
the extension requested. This rule also
applies even if the motion is filed before
the expiration of the period sought to be
extended. Thus, the appellate court
correctly denied petitioners Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Motion for

Reconsideration.
It is well to point out that with
petitioners erroneous filing of a motion
for extension of time and with her nonfiling of a motion for reconsideration or a
petition for review from the CAs
decision, the challenged decision has
already attained finality and may no
longer be reviewed. The instant Rule 65
petition cannot even substitute for the
lost appealcertiorari is not a procedural
device to deprive the winning party of
the fruits of the judgment in his or her
favor. When a decision becomes final and
executory, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case and not even an appellate
court will have the power to review the
said judgment. Otherwise, there will be
no end to litigation and this will set to
naught the main role of courts of justice
to assist in the enforcement of the rule of
law and the maintenance of peace and
order by settling justiciable controversies
with finality.
Spouses Reterta vs. Spouses Mores
G.R. No. 159941
August 17, 2011
Subject of Appeal
Facts:
The petitioners commenced
an action for quieting of title and
reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires
City averring that they were the true and
real owners of the parcel of land (the
land) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza,
Cavite, containing an area of 47,708
square meters, having inherited the land
from their father; that their late father
had been the grantee of the land by
virtue of his occupation and cultivation;
that
their
late
father
and
his
predecessors in interest had been in
open,
exclusive,
notorious,
and
continuous possession of the land for
more than 30 years; that they had


discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated
March 1, 1966 that their father had
purportedly executed whereby he had
waived
his
rights,
interests,
and
participation in the land; that by virtue of
the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769
had been issued in favor of respondent
Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources; and
that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T64071
had
later
issued
to
the
respondents.
The respondents, as defendants,
filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of case due to the land being
friar land, and that the petitioners had no
legal personality to commence the case.
The RTC granted the motion to
dismiss. The petitioners then timely filed
a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied their motion for reconsideration.
Therefore, the petitioners assailed the
dismissal via petition for certiorari, but
the CA dismissed the petition holding
that the basic requisite for the special
civil action of certiorari to lie is that there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. The remedy of the petitioners was
to have appealed the same to this
Court. But petitioners did not. Instead
they filed the present special civil action
for certiorari after the decision of the
court a quo has become final. Certiorari,
however cannot be used as a substitute
for the lost remedy of appeal.
The MR of petitioners was likewise
denied, hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred
in dismissing the petition for certiorari
Held:The CA seems to be correct in
dismissing the petition for certiorari,
considering that the order granting the
respondents motion to dismiss was a

final,
as
distinguished
from
an
interlocutory, order against which the
proper remedy was an appeal in due
course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary
remedy, is not substitute for appeal due
to its being availed of only when there is
no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Nonetheless, the petitioners posit
that
a
special
civil
action
for certiorari was their proper remedy to
assail the order of dismissal in light of
certain rules of procedure,specifically
pointing out that the second paragraph
of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court (An order denying a motion for
new trial or reconsideration is not
appealable, the remedy being an appeal
from
the
judgment
or
final
order) prohibited an appeal of a denial of
the motion for reconsideration, and that
the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court ( No appeal
may be taken from: xxx An order
denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration) expressly declared that
an
order
denying
a motion
for
reconsideration was not appealable. They
remind that the third paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided
that in the instances where the judgment
or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.
The petitioners position has no
basis.
For one, the order that the
petitioners really wanted to obtain relief
from was the order granting the
respondents motion to dismiss, not the
denial of the motion for reconsideration.
The fact that the order granting
the motion to dismiss was a final order
for thereby completely disposing of the
case, leaving nothing more for the trial


court to do in the action, truly called for
an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the
correct remedy.
The
fundamental
distinction
between a final judgment or order, on
one hand, and an interlocutory order, on
the other hand, has been outlined
in Investments,
Inc.
v.
Court
of
Appeals, viz:
The concept of final
judgment, as distinguished
from one which has become
final (or executory as of right
[final and executory]), is
definite and settled. A final
judgment or order is one
that finally disposes of a
case,
leaving
nothing
more to be done by the
Court
in
respect
thereto, e.g.,
an
adjudication on the merits
which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the
trial
declares
categorically
what
the
rights and obligations of
the parties are and which
party is in the right; or a
judgment or order that
dismisses an action on
the ground, for instance,
of res
judicata or
prescription.
Once
rendered, the task of the
Court is ended, as far as
deciding the controversy
or determining the rights
and
liabilities
of
the
litigants
is
concerned.
Nothing more remains to
be
done
by
the
Court except to await the
parties next move (which
among others, may consist of
the filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, or
the taking of an appeal) and
ultimately, of course, to
cause the execution of the
judgment once it becomes
final
or,
to
use
the
established
and
more
distinctive term, final and
executory.
xxx
Conversely, an
order
that
does
not
finally
dispose of the case, and
does not end the Courts
task of adjudicating the
parties contentions and
determining their rights
and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously
indicates
that
other
things remain to be done
by
the
Court,
is
interlocutory, e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 of the Rules, or
granting
a
motion
for
extension of time to file a
pleading,
or
authorizing
amendment
thereof,
or
granting
or
denying
applications
for
postponement, or production
or inspection of documents or
things, etc. Unlike a final
judgment or order, which
is appealable, as above
pointed
out,
an
interlocutory order may
not be questioned on
appeal except only as
part of an appeal that
may eventually be taken
from the final judgment
rendered in the case.
Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule
37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the


petitioners, indicates that the proper
remedy against the denial of the
petitioners motion
for
reconsideration was an appeal from the
final order dismissing the action upon the
respondents motion to dismiss. The said
rule explicitly states thusly:
Section
9. Remedy
against order denying a
motion for new trial or
reconsideration. An order
denying a motion for new
trial or reconsideration is not
appealable, the
remedy
being an appeal from the
judgment or final order.
The restriction against an appeal of
a
denial
of
a motion
for
reconsideration independently
of
a
judgment or final order is logical and
reasonable.
A motion
for
reconsideration is not putting forward a
new issue, or presenting new evidence,
or changing the theory of the case, but is
only seeking a reconsideration of the
judgment or final order based on the
same issues, contentions, and evidence
either because: (a) the damages
awarded are excessive; or (b) the
evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision or final order; or (c) the decision
or final order is contrary to law. By
denying a motion for reconsideration, or
by granting it only partially, therefore, a
trial court finds no reason either to
reverse or to modify its judgment or final
order, and leaves the judgment or final
order to stand. The remedy from the
denial is to assail the denial in the course
of an appeal of the judgment or final
order itself.
The enumeration of the orders that
were not appealable made in the 1997
version of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court the version in force at the time
when the CA rendered its assailed

decision on May 15, 2002 included an
order
denying
a motion
for
new
trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
Section 1. Subject of
appeal. An appeal may be
taken from a judgment or
final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a
particular
matter
therein
when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken
from:
(a) An order denying a
motion for new trial or
reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a
petition for relief or any
similar motion seeking relief
from judgment;
(c)
order;
An
interlocutory
(d) An order disallowing

or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a
motion to set aside a
judgment
by
consent,
confession or compromise on
the ground of fraud, mistake
or duress, or any other
ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final
order for or against one or
more of several parties or in
separate
claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims
and third-party complaints,


while the main case is
pending, unless the court
allows an appeal therefrom;
and
(h) An order dismissing
an action without prejudice.
In
all
the
above
instances
where
the
judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule
65. (n)
It is true that Administrative Matter
No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27,
2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule
41, supra, by deleting an order denying
a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration from the enumeration of
non-appealable orders, and that such a
revision of a procedural rule may be
retroactively
applied.
However,
to
reverse the CA on that basis would not
be right and proper, simply because the
CA correctly applied the rule of procedure
in force at the time when it issued its
assailed final order.
MANALOTO VS VELOSO
ORDINARY APPEAL
FACTS: Manaloto et al. filed a case of
unlawful detainer before the MeTC
against Veloso. MeTC later on decided in
favor of Manaloto et al. This prompted
Veloso to go to the RTC which in turn
reversed the MeTCs decision. Prior,
however, to such RTCs decision and
while the appeal was pending therein,
Veloso filed a civil case of breach of
contract and damages against Manaloto
et al before the RTC, branch 227.
Manaloto et al in turn filed an omnibus
motion, praying for the dismissal of
velosos civil case (Breach of contract

and damages). Later RTC branch 227
issued a resolution/decision dismissing
velosos case. Veloso received a copy of
such resolution/decision on September
26, 2003. He then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said judgment on
October 10, 2003, which RTC-Branch 227
denied in an order dated December 30,
2003. He received a copy of the RTCBranch 227 order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration on February 20, 2004,
and he filed his Notice of Appeal on
March 1, 2004. However, the RTC-Branch
227, in an Order dated March 23, 2004,
dismissed Velosos appeal for being filed
out of time.
ISSUE: WHETHER VELOSOS NOTICE OF
APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.
HELD: No. Jurisprudence has settled the
fresh period rule, according to which, an
ordinary appeal from the RTC to the
Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule
41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days either from
receipt of the original judgment of the
trial court or from receipt of the final
order of the trial court dismissing or
denying the motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
In Sumiran v. Damaso, we presented a
survey of the cases applying the fresh
period rule:
As early as 2005, the Court
categorically declared in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals that by virtue of
the power of the Supreme Court to
amend, repeal and create new
procedural rules in all courts, the
Court is allowing a fresh period of
15 days within which to file a
notice of appeal in the RTC,
counted from receipt of the order
dismissing or denying a motion for
new
trial
or
motion
for
reconsideration.
This
would


standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and do away
with the confusion as to when the
15-day appeal period should be
counted. Thus, the Court stated:
To recapitulate, a party-litigant may
either file his notice of appeal
within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court's decision or
file it within 15 days from receipt of
the order (the "final order")
denying his motion for new trial or
motion
for
reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period
may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision
becomes
final
and
executory after the lapse of the
original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3.
In the case before us, Veloso received a
copy of the Resolution dated September
2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 dismissing
his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-0248341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen
days thereafter, on October 10, 2003,
Veloso filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of said resolution. The RTC-Branch 227
denied
Velosos
Motion
for
Reconsideration in an Order dated
December 30, 2003, which he received
on February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004,
just after nine days from receipt of the
order
denying
his
Motion
for
Reconsideration, Veloso already filed his
Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh
period rule, Veloso was able to file his
appeal well-within the prescriptive period
of 15 days.
GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE vs.
LUIS ESTEBAN LATORRE
G.R. No. 183926
March 29,
2010
RULE 45 IN RELATION TO RULE 41
FACTS:
Petitioner Generosa filed before the RTC

of Muntinlupa City a Complaint for
Collection and Declaration of Nullity
of Deed of Absolute Sale with
application for Injunction against her
own son, respondent Luis and one Ifzal
Ali.
Petitioner averred that Luis and Ifzal
entered into a Contract of Lease over a
1,244-sq. meter real property, situated at
No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmarias
Village, Makati City. The lease contract
declared that Luis was the absolute and
registered owner of the property.
Petitioner alleged that such declaration
was
erroneous
because
she
and
respondent were co-owners of the
property in equal shares.
PETITIONER narrated that: 1.) she and
respondent executed their respective
Deeds of Donation, conveying the
property in favor of The Porfirio D.
Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban
Latorre Foundation, Inc. Later on,
both executed separate Deeds of
Revocation
of
Donation
and
Reconveyance of the subject property
but such Deeds were not registered so
the property remained in the name
of the Foundation; 2.) She discovered
that respondent caused the annotation of
an adverse claim on the TCT of the
property, claiming full ownership over the
same by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale allegedly executed by petitioner in
favor of respondent. She claimed that the
deed was a falsified document; that her
signature thereon was forged by
respondent; and that she never received
P21 Million or any other amount as
consideration for her share of the
property. Thus, petitioner prayed that
Ifzal be enjoined from paying the rentals
to respondent, and the latter from
receiving said rentals; that both be
ordered to pay petitioner her share of the
rentals; and that respondent be enjoined
from asserting full ownership over the


property and from committing any other
act in derogation of petitioner's interests.
Petitioner also prayed for the payment of
moral and exemplary damages, litigation
expenses, and costs of the suit.
RESPONDENT narrated that: 1.) he was
a former Opus Dei priest but he left the
congregation after he was maltreated by
his Spanish superiors; 2.) for almost 20
years, the Opus Dei divested the Latorre
family of several real properties. In order
to spare the property from the Opus Dei,
both agreed to donate it to the
Foundation. Both also decided to revoke
the donation. The Foundation consented
to the revocation but due to lack of
funds, the title was never transferred and
remained in the name of the Foundation;
3.) petitioner lived with him and his
family from 1988 to 2000, and that he
provided for petitioner's needs, spending
a substantial amount of money; that
because of this, and the fact that the
rentals paid for the use of the subject
property went to petitioner, both parties
agreed that petitioner would convey her
share over the subject property to
respondent; and that petitioner executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
respondent; 4.) that petitioner left the
house because she detested his act of
firing their driver. It was then that this
case was filed against him by petitioner.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the sole ground that the venue of the
case was improperly laid since the case
was a real action. The property is
located in Makati City, hence, petitioner
should have filed the case before
the RTC of Makati City and not of
Muntinlupa City.
Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on
the ground of want of jurisdiction,
asserting that he was immune from suit
because he was an officer of the Asian
Development Bank.
RTC: 1.) issued a TRO; 2.) directed both
Ifzal and respondent to pay petitioner her

share of the rentals; 3.) ordered
respondent not to commit any act in
derogation of petitioner's interest over
the property. RTC denied respondent's
motion to dismiss. Thus, trial on the
merits ensued.
Respondent
filed
an
Answer
Ad
Cautelam, insisting that the case was a
real action and that the venue was
improperly laid.
The RTC dismissed petitioner's claim
against Ifzal because the dispute was
clearly
between
petitioner
and
respondent and ruled in favor of
respondent, declaring that the case
should have been filed and tried in the
RTC of Makati City.
Petitioner
filed
her
Motion
for
Reconsideration, which the RTC denied
for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition for
Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45.
ISSUES: I. Whether the RTC erred in
treating the venue as jurisdiction and in
treating petitioner's complaint as a real
action.
II. Whether the filing of the case
directly with this Court ran afoul of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Yes
HELD: The Petition is DENIED.
Petitioner came directly to this Court on a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41,
of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged
pure questions of law. In Murillo v.
Consul, we laid down a doctrine that was
later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court
had the occasion to clarify the three (3)
modes of appeal from decisions of the
RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or
appeal by writ of error, where judgment
was rendered in a civil or criminal action
by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where


judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and
(3) petition for review to the Supreme
Court.
The first mode of appeal, governed by
Rule 41, is brought to the Court of
Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal, covered by Rule
42, is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law. The third mode of appeal,
provided in Rule 45, is filed with the
Supreme Court only on questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is
doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. Our ruling
in Velayo-Fong v. Velayo is instructive:
A question of law arises when there is
doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the same must
not involve an examination of the
probative
value
of
the
evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them.
The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of
the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of
whether a question is one of law or of
fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court
can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.
In her Reply to respondents Comment,
petitioner prayed that this Court decide
the case on the merits. To do so,
however, would require the examination
by this Court of the probative value of

the evidence presented, taking into
account the fact that the RTC failed to
adjudicate this controversy on the merits.
This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus
becomes exceedingly clear that the filing
of the case directly with this Court ran
afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct
resort from the lower courts to the
Supreme Court will not be entertained
unless the appropriate remedy sought
cannot be obtained in the lower
tribunals. This Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the Constitution and by
immemorial tradition.
ARIEL A. TRES REYES vs. MAXIMS
TEA HOUSE and JOCELYN POON
[G.R. No. 140853. February 27,
2003]
FACTS: Ariel Tres Reyes was hired by
Maxims Tea House as a driver, assigning
him to its Ermita, Manila Branch. Ariel
thereafter was tasked to fetch the
employees of Savannah Moon. Ariel Tres
Reyes complied, and while he was driving
the van with the employees of Savannah
Moon inside, it collided with a truck. The
collision resulted to Physical Injuries
sustained by Tres Reyes and the
Employee. Thereafter, Tres Reyes was
terminated by Maxims Tea House.
Tres Reyes filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. The
Labor Arbiter however, ruled in favor of
Maxims Tea House and found Tres Reyes
grossly negligent for failure to avoid the
collision. Tres Reyes then file a PARTIAL
MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION
before the NLRC. The NLRC treated the
Partial Motion for Reconsideration as an
APPEAL, then ruled in favor of Tres Reyes
stating that he was not negligent.

10 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E
Maxims Tea House then file a special
civil action of Certiorari with the CA,
arguing that the the NLRC committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
want or excess of jurisdiction in giving
due course to petitioners Motion for
Partial Reconsideration notwithstanding
that it was a prohibited pleading under
Sec. 17 (now Sec. 19), Rule V of the NLRC
Rules of Procedure and despite want of
showing that it was seasonably filed.
The case was then brought before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE NLRC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
TREATING AS AN APPEAL THE PARTIAL
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF TRES
REYES.
HELD:YES. The issue involves a question
of substance versus form. Strictly
speaking,
a
motion
for
reconsideration of a decision, order,
or award of a Labor Arbiter is
prohibited by Section 19, Rule V of
the NLRC Rules of Procedure. But
said rule likewise allows that a
motion for reconsideration shall be
treated as an appeal provided it
meets all the requisites of an
appeal. Petitioner insists that his
pleading was in form a motion for
reconsideration, but in substance it was
an appeal which complied with all the
technical requirements. Respondents
counter that the formal requisites take
precedence.
We have minutely scrutinized the records
of this case, particularly the questioned
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but we
find no basis for the appellate courts
finding that said pleading did not contain
a statement as to when petitioner
received a copy of the decision.
Note that all that Section 3, Rule VI of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure requires with
respect to material dates is a statement

of the date when the appellant received
the appealed decision. We rule that
petitioners declaration in his motion that
he received a copy of the Labor Arbiters
decision on September 28, 1998 is more
than sufficient compliance with said
requirement imposed by Section 3, Rule
VI. We likewise find that the motion in
question was filed with the NLRC on
October
8,
1998
or
on
the
tenth (10th) day from the date of receipt
by petitioner of his copy of the Labor
Arbiters decision. Otherwise put, said
pleading
was
filed
within
the
reglementary ten-day period, as provided
for in Section 1, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules
of Procedure. The law on the timeliness
of an appeal from the decision, award, or
order of the Labor Arbiters, states clearly
that the aggrieved party has ten (10)
calendar days from receipt thereof to
appeal to the Commission.Needless to
say, an appeal filed at the last minute of
the last day of said period is, for all
intents and purposes, still seasonably
filed.
the
Court
of
Appeals
accepted
respondents averment that petitioners
Motion for Partial Reconsideration was
not verified. The records, however,
contradict their averments. We find that
petitioner
verified
his
motion
to
reconsider the Labor Arbiters decision on
October 8, 1998, or on the same day that
it was filed. We must, perforce, rule that
petitioner has substantially complied with
the verification requirement as provided
for in Section 3, Rule VI of the
Commissions Rules of Procedure.
In labor cases, rules of procedure should
not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense. They are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, and where their strict application
would result in the frustration rather than
promotion
of
substantial
justice,
technicalities
must
be
avoided.

Technicalities should not be permitted to
stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and
obligations of the parties. Where the
ends of substantial justice shall be better
served, the application of technical rules
of procedure may be relaxed.
Meanwhile, on February 15, 2000, the

appellate
courts
Fourth
Division
dismissed LBPs ordinary appeal primarily
holding that LBP availed of the wrong
mode of appeal. LBP filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was
denied.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO DE
LEON,
G.R. No. 143275
March 20,
2003
On July 14, 2000, LBP filed before this

Court a petition for review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. On September
10, 2002, this Court rendered a Decision
affirming the decision of the dismissal of
the appellate court due to the wrong
mode of appeal.
FACTS:The Respondent spouses Arlene

and Bernardo de Leon filed a petition to
fix the just compensation of a parcel of
land2 before the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac, Branch 63, acting as a Special
Agrarian Court. On December 19, 1997,
the agrarian court rendered summary
judgment fixing the compensation of the
subject property as follows: (1)
P1,260,000 for the 16.69 hectares of
riceland and (2) P2,957,250 for the
30.4160 hectares of sugarland.
The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR, for brevity) and LBP both filed
separate appeals using different modes.
DAR filed a petition for review while LBP
interposed an ordinary appeal by filing a
notice of appeal. DARs petition for
review3 was assigned to the Special Third
Division of the Court of Appeals while
LBPs ordinary appeal4 was assigned to
the Fourth Division of the same court.
On November 6, 1998, the appellate
courts Special Third Division rendered a
decision in the petition for review filed by
DAR, giving due course to the said
petition and was ordered by the
appellate court to recomputed the
compensation and pay the legal interest.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES HAD CHOSEN
THE WRONG MODE OF APPEAL.
HELD:
Yes. In affirming the dismissal by the
appellate court of LBPs ordinary appeal,
this Court held that Section 60of RA 6657
(The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law) is clear in providing petition for
review as the appropriate mode of
appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts.
Section 61(the provision on which LBP
bases its argument that ordinary appeal
is the correct mode of appeal from
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts)
merely makes a general reference to the
Rules of Court and does not categorically
prescribe ordinary appeal as the correct
way of questioning decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts. Thus, we interpreted
Section 61 to mean that the specific rules
for petitions for review in the Rules of
Court and other relevant procedures of
appeals shall be followed in appealed
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
LBP pleads that the subject Decision
should at least be given prospective

application considering that more than
60 similar agrarian cases filed by LBP via
ordinary appeal before the Court of
Appeals are in danger of being dismissed
outright on technical grounds on account
of our ruling herein. This, according to
LBP, will wreak financial havoc not only
on LBP as the financial intermediary of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program but also on the national treasury
and the already depressed economic
condition of our country. Thus, in the
interest of fair play, equity and justice,
LBP stresses the need for the rules to be
relaxed so as to give substantial
consideration to the appealed cases.
On
account
of
the
absence
of
jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60
and 61 of RA 6657 regarding the proper
way to appeal decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts as well as the conflicting
decisions of the Court of Appeals
thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for
availing of the wrong mode. Based on its
own interpretation and reliance on the
Buenaventura ruling, LBP acted on the
mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is
the appropriate manner to question
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Hence, in the light of the aforementioned
circumstances, we find it proper to
emphasize the prospective application of
our Decision dated September 10, 2002.
A prospective application of our Decision
is not only grounded on equity and fair
play but also based on the constitutional
tenet that rules of procedure shall not
impair substantive rights.
SPOUSES GODOFREDO ALFREDO and
CARMEN LIMON ALFREDO, SPOUSES
ARNULFO SAVELLANO and EDITHA B.
SAVELLANO, DANTON D.
MATAWARAN, SPOUSES DELFIN F.
ESPIRITU, JR. and ESTELA S.
ESPIRITU and ELIZABETH TUAZON,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ARMANDO

BORRAS and ADELIA LOBATON
BORRAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 144225. June 17, 2003.*
Appeals; Certiorari; In a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45,
the Supreme Court reviews only
errors of law and not errors of facts.
In a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, this Court
reviews only errors of law and not
errors of facts. The factual findings
of the appellate court are generally
binding on this Court. This applies
with greater force when both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals
are in complete agreement on their
factual findings.
FACTS: Spouses Alfredo sold for Php
15,000 to Spouses Borras a parcel of land
measuring 81,524 square meters which
was mortgaged with DBP for Php 7,000,
with the agreement that Spouses Borras
will pay the DBP loan and its
accumulated interest and the balance to
be paid in cash to the sellers.
Spouses Borras gave Spouses Alfredo the
money to pay the loan to DBP which
signed the release of mortgage and
returned the owners duplicate copy of
OCT No. 284 to the Alfredos. Spouses
Borras subsequently paid the balance of
the purchase price of the Subject Land
for which Carmen Alfredo issued a receipt
dated 11 March 1970. The Alfredos then
delivered to Adelia Borras the owners
duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, with the
document of cancellation of mortgage,
official receipts of realty tax payments,
and tax declaration in the name of
Godofredo Alfredo.
The Alfredos
introduced the Spouses Borras as the
new owners of the Subject Land, to the
Natanawans, the old tenants of the

Subject Land. The Borrases then took
possession of the Subject Land.
In January 1994, The Borrases learned
that hired persons had entered the
Subject Land and were cutting trees
under instructions of allegedly new
owners
of
the
Subject
Land.
Subsequently, Armando and Adelia
discovered that Spouses Alfredo had resold portions of the Subject Land to
several persons. This prompted the
Borrases to file an adverse claim with the
Register of Deeds of Bataan. Further,
they discovered that Spouses Alfredo had
secured an owners duplicate copy of
OCT No. 284 after filing a petition in court
for the issuance of a new copy claiming
in their petition that they lost their
owners duplicate copy. Spouses Borras
wrote the Alfredos complaining about
their acts, but the latter did not reply.
Thus, Armando and Adelia filed a
complaint for specific performance.
The trial court rendered its decision in
favor of Spouses Borras. Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court
of Appeals issued its Decision affirming
the decision of the trial court in toto.
In its petition for review under Rule 45
petitioners Alfredo contended that they
did not deliver the title of the Subject
Land to Armando and Adelia as shown by
Adelia Borras'
testimony on crossexamination.
ISSUE:
WON
THE
PETITIONERS
CONTENTION BE CONSIDERED?
HELD: No. Petitioners raise this factual
issue for the first time. The Court of
Appeals could have passed upon this
issue had petitioners raised this earlier,
At any rate, the cited testimony of Adelia
does not convincingly prove that
Godofredo and Carmen did not deliver
the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia.

Adelias cited testimony must be
examined in context not only with her
entire testimony but also with the other
circumstances.
In a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, this Court reviews only
errors of law and not errors of facts. The
factual findings of the appellate court are
generally binding on this Court. This
applies with greater force when both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals are in
complete agreement on their factual
findings.
N.B.
Civil Procedure; Actions; Reconveyance;
Quieting
of
Title;
An
action
for
reconveyance is one that seeks to
transfer property, wrongfully registered
by another, to its rightful and legal
owner.An action for reconveyance is
one that seeks to transfer property,
wrongfully registered by another, to its
rightful and legal owner. The body of the
pleading or complaint determines the
nature of an action, not its title or
heading. Thus, the present action should
be treated as one for reconveyance.
Prescription; An action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust prescribes in
ten years.To determine when the
prescriptive period commenced in an
action
for
reconveyance,
plaintiffs
possession of the disputed property is
material. An action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust prescribes in
ten years. The ten-year prescriptive
period applies only if there is an actual
need to reconvey the property as when
the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property. However, if the plaintiff, as the
real owner of the property also remains
in possession of the property, the
prescriptive period to recover title and

possession of the property does not run
against him. In such a case, an action for
reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would
be in the nature of a suit for quieting of
title, an action that is imprescriptible.
Laches; Neither is the action barred by
laches. Neither is the action barred by
laches. We have defined laches as the
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
time, to do that which, by the exercise of
due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. It is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
PEOPLE VS. CORPUZ, 412 SCRA
479(2003)
APPEALS
The principle that findings of facts of the
trial court, its calibration of the collective
testimonies of witnesses and probative
weight thereof and its conclusions culled
from said findings are accorded by the
Court great respect if not conclusive
effect does not apply if the trial court
ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued
cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which if considered would
alter the outcome of the case.
FACTS:
In
June
1998,
private
complainants
Belinda
Cabantog,
Concepcion San Diego, Erlinda Pascual
and Restian Surio went to Alga-Moher
International
Placement
Services
Corporation at 1651 San Marcelino
Street, Malate, Manila to apply for
employment as factory workers in
Taiwan. They were accompanied by a
certain Aling Josie who introduced them
to the agencys President and General
Manager Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes.
Mrs. Reyes asked them to accomplish the
application forms. Thereafter, they were

told to return to the office with
P10,000.00 each as processing fee.
On July 30, 1998, private complainants
returned to the agency to pay the
processing fees. Mrs. Reyes was not at
the agency that time, but she called
appellant on the telephone to ask her to
receive the processing fees. Thereafter,
appellant advised them to wait for the
contracts to arrive from the Taiwan
employers.
Two months later, nothing happened to
their
applications.
Thus
private
complainants decided to ask for the
refund of their money from appellant6
who told them that the processing fees
they had paid were already remitted to
Mrs. Reyes. When they talked to Mrs.
Reyes, she told them that the money she
received from appellant was in payment
of the latters debt. Thus, on January 13,
1999, private complainants filed their
complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation which led to the arrest and
detention of appellant.
On March 23, 2000, while the case was
before
the
trial
court,
private
complainants received the refund of their
processing fees from appellants sister-inlaw.
Consequently,
they
executed
affidavits
of
desistance8
from
participation
in
the
case
against
appellant.
For her part, appellant resolutely denied
having a hand in the illegal recruitment
and claimed that she merely received the
money on behalf of Mrs. Reyes, the
President/General Manager of Alga-Moher
International
Placement
Services
Corporation, where she had been
working as secretary for three months
prior to July 30, 1998. On that day, Mrs.
Reyes called her on the telephone and

told her to receive private complainants
processing fees. In compliance with the
order of her employer and since the
cashier was absent, she received the
processing fees of private complainants,
which she thereafter remitted to Mrs.
Reyes. She had no knowledge that the
agencys license was suspended by the
POEA on July 29, 1998.
On November 16, 2000, the trial court
rendered the assailed decision, finding
appellant Elizabeth Corpuz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale constituting economic
sabotage.
ISSUE:
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE APPELLANT
HELD: Yes. Appellant contends that she
is not liable for the foregoing illegal
recruitment activities considering that
she was merely an employee having no
control over the recruitment business of
the Alga-Moher International Placement
Services Corporation and that she did not
actually recruit the private complainants.
Moreover, she did not appropriate for her
own use the processing fees she received
and she had no knowledge that the
agencys license was suspended by the
POEA.
The trial court convicted appellant based
on its findings that despite the
suspension of the agencys license,
appellant still convinced the applicants to
give their money with the promise to
land a job abroad. Moreover, as the
registered secretary of the agency she
had
management
control
of
the
recruitment business.
It is axiomatic that findings of facts
of the trial court, its calibration of
the
collective
testimonies
of
witnesses and probative weight

thereof and its conclusions culled
from said findings are accorded by
this Court great respect, if not
conclusive effect, because of the
unique advantage of the trial court
in observing and monitoring at close
range, the conduct, deportment and
demeanor of the witnesses as they
testify
before the
trial
court.
However, this principle does not
apply if the trial court ignored,
misunderstood
or
misconstrued
cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered,
would alter the outcome of the case.
The exception obtains in this case.
The records of the case show that AlgaMoher International Placement Service
Corporation is a licensed land-based
recruitment agency. Its license was valid
until August 24, 1999. Likewise, appellant
was its registered secretary while Mrs.
Evelyn
Gloria
H.
Reyes
is
its
President/General Manager. Part of its
regular business activity is to accept
applicants who desire to work here or
abroad. Appellant, as secretary of the
agency, was in charge of the custody and
documentation of the overseas contracts.
Moreover, as stated in the last sentence
of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who
may be held liable for illegal recruitment
are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. In case of juridical persons,
the officers having control, management
or direction of their business shall be
liable.
An
employee
of
a
company or
corporation
engaged
in
illegal
recruitment may be held liable as
principal, together with his employer, if it
is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in illegal recruitment. Settled
is the rule that the existence of the
corporate entity does not shield from

prosecution the corporate agent who
knowingly and intentionally causes the
corporation to commit a crime. The
corporation obviously acts, and can act,
only by and through its human agents,
and it is their conduct which the law
must deter. The employee or agent of a
corporation engaged in unlawful business
naturally aids and abets in the carrying
on of such business and will be
prosecuted
as
principal
if,
with
knowledge of the business, its purpose
and effect, he consciously contributes his
efforts to its conduct and promotion,
however slight his contribution may be.
The law of agency, as applied in civil
cases, has no application in criminal
cases, and no man can escape
punishment when he participates in the
commission of a crime upon the ground
that he simply acted as an agent of any
party. The culpability of the employee
therefore hinges on his knowledge of the
offense and his active participation in its
commission. Where it is shown that the
employee was merely acting under the
direction of his superiors and was
unaware that his acts constituted a
crime, he may not be held criminally
liable for an act done for and in behalf of
his employer.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, JUDY AMOR, JANE
GAMIL, minors GIAN CARLO AMOR
represented by ATTY. OWEN AMOR,
and CARLO BENITEZ represented by
JOSEPHINE BENITEZ
G.R. No. 127473
December 8, 2003
EVIDENCE; APPEALS
FACTS: Private respondents Judy Amor,
Jane Gamil, minor Gian Carlo Amor,
represented by his father, Atty. Owen
Amor,
and,
minor
Carlo
Benitez,
represented by his mother, Josephine
Benitez, filed with the RTC of Sorsogon, a

complaint for damages against petitioner
due to the latters failure to honor their
confirmed tickets.
It is alleged in their complaint that Judy
Amor purchased three confirmed plane
tickets for her and her infant son, Gian
Carlo Amor as well as her sister Jane
Gamil for the May 8, 1988, 7:10 a.m.
flight, PR 178, bound for Manila from
defendants branch office in Legaspi City.
On said date, Judy with Gian, Jane and
minor Carlo Benitez, nephew of Judy and
Jane, arrived at the Legaspi Airport at
6:20 a.m. for PR 178. Carlo Benitez was
supposed to use the confirmed ticket of a
certain Dra. Emily Chua. They were
accompanied by Atty. Owen Amor and
the latters cousin, Salvador Gonzales
who fell in line at the check-in counter
with four persons ahead of him and three
persons behind him.
While waiting for his turn, Gonzales was
asked by Lloyd Fojas, the check-in clerk
on duty, to approach the counter. Fojas
wrote something on the tickets which
Gonzales later read as late check-in 7:05.
When Gonzales turn came, Fojas gave
him the tickets of private respondents
Judy, Jane and Gian and told him to
proceed to the cashier to make
arrangements. Salvador then went to
Atty. Amor and told him about the
situation. Atty. Amor pleaded with Fojas,
pointing out that it is only 6:45 a.m., but
the latter did not even look at him or
utter any word. Atty. Amor then tried to
plead with Delfin Canonizado and George
Carranza, employees of petitioner, but
still to no avail. Private respondents were
not able to board said flight. The plane
left at 7:30 a.m., twenty minutes behind
the original schedule.
Private respondents then went to the Bus
terminals hoping to catch a ride

for Manila. Finding none, they went back
to the airport and tried to catch an
afternoon flight. Unfortunately, the 2:30
p.m. flight, PR 278, was cancelled due to
aircraft situation. Private respondents
were told to wait for the 5:30 p.m. flight,
PR 180. They checked-in their bags and
were told to hand in their tickets. Later, a
PAL employee at the check-in counter
called out the name of private
respondent minor Carlo Benitez. Plaintiff
Judy approached the counter and was
told by the PAL personnel that they
cannot be accommodated. Fojas who was
also at the counter then removed the
boarding passes inserted in private
respondents tickets as well as the tags
from their luggages.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in
favor of private respondents and ordered
petitioner
to
reimburse
private
respondents the purchase price of the
four (4) plane tickets plus damages,
attorneys fees and cost of the suit. On
appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTCs
decision. The motion for reconsideration
was
subsequently
denied
by
the
appellate court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT
IN UPHOLDING THE RTCS DECISION IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS?
HELD: Yes.
Evidently, in resolving the two issues
raised in the present petition, it is
inevitable and most crucial that we first
determine the question whether or not
the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling
that private respondents were late in
checking-in. Both issues call for a review
of the factual findings of the lower
courts.
rule is that only questions of law may be

raised by the parties and passed upon by
this Court. Factual findings of the
appellate court are generally binding on
us especially when in complete accord
with the findings of the trial court. This is
because it is not our function to analyze
or weigh the evidence all over again.
However, this general rule admits of
exceptions, to wit:
(a) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (b) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (c) when
the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d)
when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals
was
based
on
a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when
the factual findings are conflicting;
(f) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the
same
are
contrary
to
the
admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) when the Court of
Appeals
manifestly
overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and, (h) where
the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court, or are mere
conclusions without citation of
specific evidence, or where the
facts set forth by the petitioner are
not disputed by the respondent, or
where the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on
record.
Petitioner invokes exception (b).
In petitions for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general
As to the first issue: Whether or not
private respondents checked-in on time
for PR 178. The determination of this
issue is necessary because it is expressly
stipulated in the airline tickets issued to
private respondents that PAL will
consider the reserved seat cancelled if
the passenger fails to check-in at least
thirty minutes before the published
departure time.
After a careful review of the records, we
find no reason to disturb the affirmance
by the CA of the findings of the trial court
that the private respondents have
checked-in on time; that they reached
the airport at 6:20 a.m., based on the
testimonies of private respondent Judy
Amor, and witnesses Salvador Gonzales
and Atty. Owen Amor who were
consistent in their declarations on the
witness stand and corroborated one
anothers statements; and that the
testimony of petitioners lone witness,
Lloyd Fojas is not sufficient to overcome
private respondents evidence.
It is a well-entrenched principle that
absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion or any palpable error in its
findings, this Court will not question the
probative weight accorded by the lower
courts to the various evidence presented
by the parties. As we explained
in Superlines Transportation Co. Inc., vs.
ICC Leasing & Financing Corporation
The Court is not tasked to calibrate
and assess the probative weight of
evidence adduced by the parties
during trial all over againSo long
as the findings of facts of the Court
of Appeals are consistent with or
are not palpably contrary to the
evidence on record, this Court shall
decline to embark on a review on
the probative weight of the
evidence of the parties.
RUBEN AUGUSTO AND ATTY. NOEL D.

ARCHIVAL, PETITIONERS, . HON.
JUDGE TEODORO K. RISOS,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 27, LAPU- LAPU
CITY, CLEOFE OMOLON,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 131794. DECEMBER 10,
2003.
FACTS: Felisa Augusto and her siblings,
Jose Augusto, Magdalena Augusto and
Alfonso Augusto, all married, were the
co- owners of a parcel of land located in
Barrio Mactan, Opon, Cebu. The lot was
sold to Guillermo Omolon for P200.00.
Guillermo Omolon and his wife, Cleofe
Omolon. In the meantime, the property
was registered in the names of Monico,
Felisa, Jose, Filomeno, Teofilo and
Sinfroso, all surnamed Augusto, under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO3560.
Guillermo Omolon died intestate and was
survived by Cleofe Omolon.
Sometime in July 1995, Cleofe Omolon
filed a petition for the reconstitution of
the OCT before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu
City, which grants the petition and thus
directs the Register of Deeds of LapuLapu City to reconstitute the Original
Certificate of Title. However, upon
presentation of the aforesaid order to the
Office of the Register of Deeds of LapuLapu City, Cleofe was informed that the
owners copy had already been issued to
Ruben Augusto, pursuant to an Order
issued by the court dated August 23,
1996, and that based on the record, the
same was in the possession of Atty. Noel
Archival.
Hence, on May 14, 1997, Cleofe filed a

petition before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City,
alleging that as lawful co-owner and
possessor of Lot No. 4429, she had every
right to have and hold the owners
duplicate of the said OCT. She prayed
that
after
due
proceedings,
the
respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty.
Noel Archival be ordered to surrender the
owners copy of the said title.
In their Comment on the petition, therein
respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty.
Noel Archival alleged, inter alia, that the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Felisa,
Magdalena,
Alfonso
and
Jose,
all
surnamed Augusto, was falsified and
fictitious, and, thus, null and void. In the
interim, Cleofe had her adverse claim
annotated at the dorsal portion of the
title in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Lapu-Lapu City.On October 22, 1997,
the RTC issued an order directing
Atty. Noel Archival to produce the
owners copy of OCT No. 3560 to allow
the annotation of Cleofes interest, upon
which the owners duplicate copy of the
title may thereafter be returned.
The trial court declared that, based on
the pleadings of the parties, the issue of
ownership over the property had been
raised, a matter which the court, sitting
as a cadastral court, could not pass upon.
The trial court further ruled that pending
resolution of the issue of ownership over
the
property
in
an
appropriate
proceeding therefor, there was a need for
the annotation of the petitioners interest
over the property. The respondents
therein filed a Motion for a Partial
Reconsideration of the Order alleging
that Cleofes interest over the property
had been sufficiently protected by the
annotation of her adverse claim.
However, on November 14, 1997, the
court issued an Order denying the motion
of the respondents therein.
On November 26, 1997, the respondents

filed a notice of appeal from the said
order to the Court of Appeals. On
December 5, 1997, the RTC issued an
order denying due course therefor, on its
perception that the orders subject
thereof were interlocutory; hence, not
appealable.
The respondents, now the petitioners,
filed the instant petition alleging that the
public respondent committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed orders, and that there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law available to them.
The petitioners argue that contrary to the
ruling of the public respondent, its
October 22, 1997 Order was final and
appealable, as the same disposed of the
case. In her comment on the petition, the
private respondent averred that the
October 22, 1997 Order of the public
respondent was merely interlocutory as it
did not fully dispose of the case and had
reserved the further determination of
other questions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the
public respondent is a final order hence
appealable.
HELD: NO. Section 1, Rule 41 of the
Rules or Court provides that an appeal
may be taken only from a final order, and
not from an interlocutory one. A final
order is one which disposes of the whole
subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to
be done but to enforce by execution what
has been determined. An order or
judgment is deemed final if it finally
disposes of, adjudicates, or determines
the rights, or some right or rights of the
parties, either on the entire controversy

or on some definite and separate branch
thereof, and concludes them until it is
reversed or set aside. Where no issue is
left for future consideration, except the
fact of compliance with the terms of the
order, such order is final and appealable.
In contrast, an order is interlocutory if it
does not finally dispose of the case.
In this case, the order of the public
respondent directing the petitioners to
produce the owners copy of OCT No.
3560 in the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the annotation of the private
respondents interest over the property is
merely interlocutory and not final; hence,
not appealable by means of a writ of
error. The public respondent had not fully
disposed of the case as it had not yet
ruled on whether to grant the private
respondents prayer for the surrender of
the owners copy of OCT No. 3560. As
gleaned from the order of the respondent
judge, he believed that he had no
jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the
issue of ownership over the property and
was disposed to dismiss the petition.
CORAZON ESCUETA VS. RUFINA LIM
G.R. No. 137162 January 24, 2007
(TIME FOR FILING PETITION;
CONTENTS AND VERIFICATION Sec. 3
Rule 38)
Facts: Respondent Rufina Lim filed an
action to remove cloud on, or quiet title
to, real property, with preliminary
injunction and issuance of [a holddeparture order] from the Philippines
against Ignacio E. Rubio. Respondent
amended her complaint to include
specific performance and damages.
In her amended complaint, Lim averred
inter alia that she bought the hereditary
shares (consisting of 10 lots) of Ignacio
Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy,
Alejandrino, Bayani, and other co-heirs;
that said vendors executed a contract of

sale dated April 10, 1990 in her favor;
that Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz
Baloloy received a down payment or
earnest money in the amount of
P102,169.86 and P450,000, respectively;
that it was agreed in the contract of sale
that
the
vendors
would
secure
certificates of title covering their
respective hereditary shares; that the
balance of the purchase price would be
paid to each heir upon presentation of
their individual certificate[s] of title; that
Ignacio Rubio refused to receive the
other half of the down payment which is
P[100,000]; that Ignacio Rubio refused
and still refuses to deliver to Lim the
certificates of title covering his share on
the two lots; that with respect to the
heirs of Luz Baloloy, they also refused
and still refuse to perform the delivery of
the two certificates of title covering their
share in the disputed lots; that Lim was
and is ready and willing to pay Ignacio
Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy upon
presentation
of
their
individual
certificates of title, free from whatever
lien and encumbrance;
As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite
of her knowledge that the disputed lots
have already been sold by Ignacio Rubio
to respondent, it is alleged that a
simulated deed of sale involving said lots
was effected by Ignacio Rubio in her
favor; and that the simulated deed of
sale by Rubio to Escueta has raised
doubts and clouds over respondents
(Lim) title.
Now the Defense of Baloloys, Rubio
and Escueta . . .
As per heirs of Luz Baloloy, Lim has no
cause of action, because the subject
contract of sale has no more force and
effect as far as the Baloloys are
concerned, since they have withdrawn

their offer to sell for the reason that
respondent failed to pay the balance of
the purchase price as orally promised on
or before May 1, 1990.
Rubio and Escueta's defense is that Lim
has no cause of Action because Rubio
has not entered into a contract of sale
with the latter. That the P100,000
respondent (Lim) claimed Rubio received
as down payment for the lots is a simple
transaction by way of a loan with Lim.
However, the Baloloys failed to
appear at the pre-trial. Upon motion
of respondent (Lim), the trial court
declared the Baloloys in default. Baloloys
then filed a motion to lift the order
declaring them in default, which was
denied by the trial court in an order
dated November 27, 1991. Consequently,
respondent was allowed to adduce
evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the trial
court rendered a partial decision dated
July 23, 1993 against the Baloloys.
The Baloloys filed a petition for relief
from judgment and order dated July 4,
1994 and supplemental petition dated
July 7, 1994. This was denied by the trial
court in an order dated September 16,
1994. Hence, appeal to the Court of
Appeals was taken challenging the order
denying the petition for relief.
Trial on the merits ensued between
respondent and Rubio and Escueta. After
trial, the trial court rendered its assailed
Decision dismissing the complaint and
amended complaint againts Petitioners
Escueta, Rubio and the Register of
Deeds. The counterclaim of petitioners is
also dismissed. However, [petitioner]
Rubio is ordered to return to the
[respondent],Lim,
the
amount
of
P102,169.80, with interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from April
10, [1990] until the same is fully paid.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial

courts order and partial decision,
but reversed the later decision.
The Decision dismissing [respondents,
Lim] complaint is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered.
Accordingly;
a. the validity of the subject contract of
sale in favor of [respondent] is upheld.
b. Rubio is directed to execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale conditioned upon the
payment of the balance of the purchase
price by [respondent] within 30 days
from the receipt of the entry of judgment
of this Decision.
c. the contracts of sale between Rubio
and Escueta involving Rubios share in
the disputed properties is declared NULL
and VOID.
d. Rubio and Escueta are ordered to pay
jointly and severally the [respondent] the
amount ofP[20,000] as moral damages
and P[20,000] as attorneys fees.
3. the appeal of Rubio and Escueta on
the denial of their counterclaim is
DISMISSED.
Petitioners
Motion
for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision
was denied. Hence, this petition.
Take
Note
Argument(s):
of
Petitioner's
ff.
1. CA did not consider the circumstances

surrounding petitioners failure to appear
at the pre-trial and to file the petition for
relief on time. As to the failure to appear
at the pre-trial, there was fraud, accident
and/or
excusable
neglect,
because
petitioner Bayani was in the United
States. There was no service of the
notice of pre-trial or order. Neither did
the former counsel of record inform him.
Consequently, the order declaring him in

default is void, and all subsequent
proceedings, orders, or decision are void.
2. Petitioner Alejandrino was not clothed
with a power of attorney to appear on
behalf of Bayani at the pre-trial
conference.
3. The amount encashed by Rubio
represented not the down payment, but
the payment of respondents debt. His
acceptance and encashment of the check
was not a ratification of the contract of
sale.
ISSUE: WON BAYANI BALOLOY WAS
PROPERLY DECLARED IN DEFAULT FOR
LACK OF REPRESENTATION.
HELD:For lack of representation,
Bayani
Baloloy
was
properly
declared in default.
Pre-trial is mandatory. The notices of pretrial had been sent to both the Baloloys
and their former counsel of record. Being
served with notice, he is "charged with
the duty of notifying the party
represented by him." He must "see to it
that his client receives such notice and
attends the pre-trial." What the Baloloys
and their former counsel have alleged
instead in their Motion to Lift Order of As
In Default dated December 11, 1991 is
the belated receipt of Bayani Baloloys
special power of attorney in favor of their
former counsel, not that they have not
received the notice or been informed of
the scheduled pre-trial. Not having raised
the ground of lack of a special power of
attorney in their motion, they are now
deemed to have waived it. Certainly,
they cannot raise it at this late stage of
the proceedings.
(Legal Basis . . .)
Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of

Court states:
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition;
contents and verification. A petition
provided for in either of the preceding
sections of this Rule must be verified,
filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was
entered, or such proceeding was taken;
and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence relied upon, and
the facts constituting the petitioners
good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be.
There is no reason for the Baloloys to
ignore the effects of the above-cited rule.
"The 60-day period is reckoned from the
time the party acquired knowledge of the
order, judgment or proceedings and not
from the date he actually read the
same."
The Baloloys, apparently in an attempt to
cure the lapse of the aforesaid
reglementary period to file a petition for
relief from judgment, included in its
petition the two Orders dated May 6,
1994 and June 29, 1994. The first Order
denied Baloloys motion to fix the period
within which plaintiffs-appellants pay the
balance of the purchase price. The
second Order refers to the grant of
partial execution, i.e. on the aspect of
damages. These Orders
are only
consequences of the partial decision
subject of the petition for relief, and thus,
cannot
be
considered
in
the
determination of the reglementary period
within which to file the said petition for
relief.
Furthermore, no fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence exists in order

that the petition for relief may be
granted. There is no proof of extrinsic
fraud that "prevents a party from having
a trial or from presenting all of his case
to the court" or an "accident which
ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against, and by reason of which
the party applying has probably been
impaired in his rights." There is also no
proof of either a "mistake of law or an
excusable negligence "caused by failure
to receive notice of the trial that it would
not be necessary for him to take an
active part in the case by relying on
another person to attend to the case for
him, when such other person
was
chargeable with that duty, or by other
circumstances not involving fault of the
moving party."
Petition Denied.
Springfield Development Corporation,

Inc. bought certain parcels of land
including that of Petra and developed
said properties into a subdivision project
called Mega Heights Subdivision.
On May 4, 1990, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued
a Notice of Coverage, placing the
property under the coverage of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The heirs
of Petra opposed DAR. Then on August
27, 1991, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator
rendered a decision declaring the nature
of the property as residential and not
suitable for agriculture. The Regional
Director filed a notice of appeal, which
the Provincial Adjudicator disallowed for
being pro forma and frivolous. The
decision became final and executory and
Springfield proceeded to develop the
property.
The DAR Regional Director then filed a
petition for relief from judgment of the
DARAB Decision.
SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, INC. and HEIRS OF
PETRA CAPISTRANO PIIT, Petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE
OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 40,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB)
G.R. NO. 142628 February 6, 2007
(Rule 45 -The principal issue
presented for resolution is whether
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has
jurisdiction to annul final judgment
of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB))
FACTS: Petra Capistrano Piit previously
owned a lot in Cagayan de Oro City.
On October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted

the petition and gave due course to the
Notice of Coverage. It also directed the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to
proceed
with
the
documentation,
acquisition, and distribution of the
property to the true and lawful
beneficiaries.
The DARAB also issued an Order dated
May 22, 1997, ordering the heirs of Piit
and Springfield to pay the farmerbeneficiaries the amount of Twelve
Million, Three Hundred Forty Thousand,
Eight Hundred Pesos (P12,340,800.00),
corresponding to the value of the
property since the property has already
been developed into a subdivision.

That's why on On June 13, 1997,
Springfield and the heirs of Piit
(petitioners) filed with the RTC of
Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for
annulment of the DARAB Decision dated
October 5, 1995 and all its subsequent
proceedings. Petitioners contend that the
DARAB decision was rendered without
affording petitioners any notice and
hearing.
(The sad part) On motion filed by the
farmer-beneficiaries, the RTC issued an
Order dated June 25, 1997, dismissing
the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals
(CA) a special civil action for certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining
order. Petitioners alleged that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion
when it ruled that the annulment of
judgment filed before it is actually an
action for certiorari in a different color.
According to petitioners, what it sought
before the RTC is an annulment of the
DARAB Decision and not certiorari, as the
DARAB Decision is void ab initio for
having been rendered without due
process of law.
CA dismissed the petition for lack of
merit, ruling that the RTC does not have
jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision
because it is a co-equal body.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction
to annul a final judgment of the DARAB.
HELD:B.P.
Blg.
129
does
not
specifically provide for any power of
the RTC to annul judgments of quasijudicial bodies.
(Note must be made that the petition for
annulment of the DARAB decision was
filed with the RTC on June 13, 1997,

before the advent of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which took effect on July
1, 1997. Thus, the applicable law is B.P.
Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, enacted on August 10,
1981.)
DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by
Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A.
No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory
powers and functions. The DARAB
Revised Rules of Procedure adopted on
December
26,
198827specifically
provides for the manner of judicial review
of its decisions, orders, rulings, or
awards.
Rule XIV, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of
Appeals. Any decision, order, award or
ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on
any agrarian dispute or on any matter
pertaining
to
the
application,
implementation,
enforcement
or
interpretation of agrarian reform laws or
rules
and
regulations
promulgated
thereunder, may be brought within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof, to the Court of Appeals by
certiorari, except as provided in the next
succeeding section. Notwithstanding an
appeal to the Court of Appeals the
decision of the Board or Adjudicator
appealed from, shall be immediately
executory.
Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,
as
amended,
expressly
provides for an appeal from the DARAB
decisions to the CA.
The rule is that where legislation
provides for an appeal from decisions of
certain administrative bodies to the CA, it
means that such bodies are co-equal with
the RTC, in terms of rank and stature,

and logically, beyond the control of the
latter.
Given
that
DARAB
decisions
are
appealable to the CA, the inevitable
conclusion is that the DARAB is a coequal body with the RTC and its decisions
are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was
therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's
dismissal of the petition for annulment of
the DARAB Decision dated October 5,
1995, as the RTC does not have any
jurisdiction to entertain the same.
LETICIA DIONA, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA DIONA,
vs. ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A.
BALANGUE, REYNALDO A.
BALANGUE, and ESTEBAN A.
BALANGUE, JR.
G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
FACTS:Respondents obtained a loan of
P45,000.00 from petitioner secured by a
Real Estate Mortgageover their 202square meter property located in
Valenzuela. When the debt became due,
respondents
failed
to
pay
notwithstanding
demand.
Thus,
petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint
praying, among others, that respondents
be ordered:
(a) To pay petitioner the
principal
obligation
of
P45,000.00, with interest
thereon at the rate of 12%
per annum, from 02 March
1991
until
the
full
obligation is paid.
XXXX
(c) To issue a decree of
foreclosure for the sale at
public auction of the
aforementioned parcel of
land,
and
for
the
disposition
of
the
proceeds
thereof
in
accordance with law, upon
failure of the respondents
to fully pay petitioner
within the period set by
law the sums set forth in
this complaint.
Respondents filed a Motion to Extend
Period to Answer but despite the
extension, respondents failed to file any
responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion
of the petitioner, the RTC declared them
in default and allowed petitioner to
present her evidence ex parte. The RTC
granted plaintiffs motion and rendered a
decision ordering the respondents to pay
the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND
(P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the
unpaid principal loan obligation plus
interest at 5% per monthreckoned
from March 2, 1991, until the same is
fully paid.
Respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment claiming that not all of them
were duly served with summons.
According them, they had no knowledge
of the case because their co-respondent
Sonny did not inform them about it.
Meanwhile, Petitioner moved for the
public
auction
of
the
mortgaged
property, which the RTC granted. In the
auction sale petitioner was the only
bidder and thus a Certificate of Sale was
issued in her favor.
Respondents then filed a Motion to
Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set
Aside Execution Sale claiming that the
parties did not agree in writing on any
rate of interest and that petitioner merely
sought for a 12% per annum interest in

her Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC
awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60%
per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full
payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness
inclusive of the exorbitant interest from
March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned
from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00.
The RTC granted respondents motion
and accordingly modified the interest
rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12%
per annum.
Displeased with the RTCs Order,
petitioner elevated the matter to the CA
via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. The CA rendered a
Decision declaring that the RTC exceeded
its jurisdiction in awarding the 5%
monthly interest but at the same time
pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in subsequently reducing
the rate of interest to 12% per annum.
Respondents then filed with the same
court a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment and Execution Sale with
Damages.They contended
that the
portion of the RTC Decision granting
petitioner 5% monthly interest rate is in
gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court and of their right to
due process. According to respondents,
the loan did not carry any interest as it
was the verbal agreement of the parties
that in lieu thereof petitioners family can
continue
occupying
respondents
residential building located in Marulas,
Valenzuela for free until said loan is fully
paid.
The CA granted respondents motion for
reconsideration and order the annulment
of the judgement insofar as it awarded
5% monthly interest in favor of
petitioner;
Petitioner sought reconsideration, which

was denied by the CA in its June 26, 2006
Resolution,
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA
ERRED IN ORDERING THE ANNULMENT
OF JUDGMENT IN SO FAR AS THE
INTEREST RATE OF THE OBLIGATION IS
CONCERNED
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that
the award of 5% monthly interest
violated the right of the respondents to
due process and, hence, the same may
be set aside in a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court ruled that a Petition
for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted
only under exceptional circumstances
where a party, without fault on his part,
has failed to avail of the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies. Said
rule explicitly provides that it is not
available as a substitute for a remedy
which was lost due to the partys own
neglect in promptly availing of the same.
"The underlying reason is traceable to
the notion that annulling final judgments
goes against the grain of finality of
judgment. Litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere,
and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the issue or
cause involved therein should be laid to
rest."
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes

lack of due process as additional ground
to annul a judgment.In Arcelona v. Court
of Appeals, this Court declared that a
final and executory judgment may still be
set aside if, upon mere inspection
thereof, its patent nullity can be shown
for
having
been
issued
without
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of
law.
It also ruled that the grant of 5% monthly
interest to the petitioner is way beyond
the 12% per annum interest sought in
the Complaint and smacks of violation of
due process.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a
relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in
excess of what is being sought by the
party. They cannot also grant a relief
without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof. Due
process considerations require that
judgments must conform to and be
supported by the pleadings and evidence
presented in court. In Development Bank
of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court
expounded
that:
Due
process
considerations justify this requirement. It
is improper to enter an order which
exceeds the scope of relief sought by the
pleadings, absent notice which affords
the opposing party an opportunity to be
heard with respect to the proposed relief.
The
fundamental
purpose
of
the
requirement that allegations of a
complaint must provide the measure of
recovery is to prevent surprise to the
defendant.
In the case at bench, the award of 5%
monthly interest rate is not supported
both by the allegations in the pleadings
and the evidence on record. The Real
Estate Mortgage executed by the parties
does not include any provision on
interest. When petitioner filed her
Complaint before the RTC, she alleged
that respondents borrowed from her "the

sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the
rate of 12% per annum" and sought
payment thereof. She did not allege or
pray for the disputed 5% monthly
interest.
Neither
did
she
present
evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly,
the RTCs award of 5% monthly interest
or 60% per annum lacks basis and
disregards due process. It violated the
due
process
requirement
because
respondents were not informed of the
possibility that the RTC may award 5%
monthly interest. They were deprived of
reasonable opportunity to refute and
present controverting evidence as they
were made to believe that the
complainant petitioner was seeking for
what she merely stated in her Complaint.
Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly
interest be considered subsumed by
petitioners general prayer for "other
reliefs and remedies just and equitable
under the premises x x x." To repeat, the
courts grant of relief is limited only to
what has been prayed for in the
Complaint or related thereto, supported
by evidence, and covered by the partys
cause of action. Besides, even assuming
that the awarded 5% monthly or 60% per
annum interest was properly alleged and
proven during trial, the same remains
unconscionably excessive and ought to
be equitably reduced in accordance with
applicable jurisprudence.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs.

JOSE EVANGELISTA
G.R. No. 140945. May 16, 2005

ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENT
FACTS: Sometime in 1968, a real
property (915.50sqm) located in Quezon
City, was originally awarded by the
Peoples
Homesite
and
Housing
Corporation (petitioners predecessor) to
a certain Adela Salindon. After the death
of Salindon, it was transferred to Arsenio
Florendo, Jr., Milagros Florendo, Beatriz
Florendo
and
Eloisa
FlorendoKulphongpatana through an extrajudicial
settlement executed by the heirs of
Salindon. However, the award in favor of
Salindon was nullified and set aside in a
decision in G.R. No. L-60544, entitled
Arsenio Florendo, Jr., et al. vs. Hon.
Perpetuo D. Coloma, for having been
issued in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion, and petitioner
was declared the owner of the property.
Despite said decision, the property was
auctioned off by the Quezon City
Treasurers Office for unpaid real property
taxes by the Florendos. The highest
bidder was Luisito Sarte. Sarte filed a
petition for issuance of title and
confirmation of sale, which was granted
by the RTC QC. Consequently, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28182 was
issued in the name of Sarte, who divided
the property into Lot 1-A (TCT No
108070), and Lot 1-B.
It was in 1991 that petitioner filed Civil
Case No. Q-91-10071 for recovery of real
property with Sarte, the City Treasurer of
Quezon City and the Quezon City
Register of Deeds, as defendants. While
the case was pending, Sarte executed in
favor of respondent Jose Evangelista, a
Deed of Assignment covering Lot 1-A.TCT
No. 108070 was cancelled and TCT No.
122944 was issued in the name of
Evangelista. Subsequently, the Register
of Deeds annotated on TCT No. 122944
an Affidavit of Adverse Claim of petitioner

NHA.
Petitioner then filed a motion for leave to
file supplemental complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-91-10071, seeking to include
respondent Evangelista, Northern Star
Agri-Business
Corporation
and
BPI
Agricultural
Development
Bank
as
defendants (subsequent purchasers). The
trial court, however, denied the motion.
Thus, petitioner, filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed
of Absolute Sale, Real Estate Mortgage,
Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and
126639, and Damages, against Sarte,
respondent Evangelista, Northern Star
Agri-Business
Corporation,
BPI
Agricultural Development Bank and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. But the
trial court dismissed without prejudice
said case on October 23, 1995, on the
ground of the pendency of Civil Case No.
Q-91-10071.
The trial court, in Civil Case No. Q-9110071, rendered its decision in favor of
petitioner, stating that:
3. Any transfers, assignment, sale or
mortgage of whatever nature of the
parcel of land subject of this case
made by defendant Luisito Sarte or
his/her agents or assigns before or
during the pendency of the instant
case are hereby declared null and
void, together with any transfer
certificates
of
title
issued
in
connection
with
the
aforesaid
transactions by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise
ordered to cancel or cause the
cancellation of such TCTs;
Respondent then filed with the CA a
petition for annulment of the trial courts
judgment, particularly paragraph 3 of the
dispositive portion, referring to the nullity

of any transfer, assignment, sale or
mortgage made by Sarte. In his petition,
respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as
ground. According to respondent, since
he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-9110071,
he
was
prevented
from
ventilating his cause, right or interest
over the property, and the judgment was
not binding on him, as the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
The CA granted the petition and declared
null and void paragraph 3 of the
dispositive portion of the trial courts
decision insofar as petitioners title to the
property is concerned.The CA found that
respondent was not a party to Civil Case
No. Q-91-10071 and the trial court did
not acquire any jurisdiction over his
person. The CA also ruled that the
judgment violated respondents right
against deprivation of the property
without due process of law. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
the same was denied by the CA. Hence,
this Petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA
ERRED IN ANNULLING PARAGRAPH 3 OF
THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION ON
GROUNDS OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
AND LACK OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that
Annulment of judgment is a recourse
equitable in character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as where there is no
available
or
other
adequate
remedy.Jurisprudence and Section 2, Rule
47 of the Rules of Court lay down the
grounds upon which an action for
annulment of judgment may be brought,
i.e., (1) extrinsic fraud, and (2) lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process.
Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim, and in either case,

the judgment or final order and
resolution are void.A trial court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission
to its authority or by service of summons.
In this case, it is undisputed that
respondent was never made a party to
Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. It is basic that
no man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by
judgment rendered by the court.
Respondent is adversely affected by such
judgment, as he was the subsequent
purchaser of the subject property from
Sarte, and title was already transferred to
him. It will be the height of inequity to
allow respondents title to be nullified
without being given the opportunity to
present any evidence in support of his
ostensible ownership of the property.
Much more, it is tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional guarantee
that no person shall be deprived of
property
without
due
process
of
law.Clearly, the trial courts judgment is
void insofar as paragraph 3 of its
dispositive portion is concerned.
Petitioner further argues that it should
not bear the consequence of the trial
courts denial of its motion to include
respondent as defendant in Civil Case No.
Q-91-10071. True, it was not petitioners
fault that respondent was not made a
party to the case. But likewise, it was not
respondents fault that he was not given
the opportunity to present his side of the
story. Whatever prompted the trial court
to deny petitioners motion to include
respondent as defendant is not for the
Court to reason why. Petitioner could
have brought the trial courts denial to
the CA on certiorari but it did not.
Instead, it filed Civil Case No. Q-95-23940
for Annulment of Deed of Assignment,

Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate
Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos.
122944 and 126639, and Damages,
against herein respondent Sarte and
others. Unfortunately for petitioner, this
was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (Branch 82) on the ground
of litis pendentia. Be that as it may, the

undeniable fact remains -- respondent is
not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071,
and paragraph 3, or any portion of the
trial courts judgment for that matter,
cannot be binding on him.


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1 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE

CECILIA B. ESTINOZO vs. COURT OF

part-time secretary at FCR Recruitment

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

2 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE

Extension of Time to File a Motion for

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

3 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE

respondents motion to dismiss was a

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

4 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

5 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE

when the CA rendered its assailed

(d) An order disallowing

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

6 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE

velosos civil case (Breach of contract

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

7 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE

Petitioner Generosa filed before the RTC

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

8 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE

Ifzal and respondent to pay petitioner her

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

9 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE

by this Court of the probative value of

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

respect to material dates is a statement

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

Meanwhile, on February 15, 2000, the

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

On July 14, 2000, LBP filed before this

FACTS:The Respondent spouses Arlene

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ARMANDO

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia.

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

application forms. Thereafter, they were

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

witnesses and probative weight

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

Benitez, filed with the RTC of Sorsogon, a

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

rule is that only questions of law may be

In petitions for review on certiorari under

RUBEN AUGUSTO AND ATTY. NOEL D.

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

On November 26, 1997, the respondents

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

that said vendors executed a contract of

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial

1. CA did not consider the circumstances

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,

Springfield Development Corporation,

On October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,