The Journal of

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Functional Neuroimaging Studies of Hypnosis and

Meditation: A Comparative Perspective
Laurence Dumont, BA*, ; Christophe Martin, BSc*; Inge Broer, BA*

1. Introduction

*Universit de
Montral
Department of
Psychology
CERNEC, CP 6128,
Montral, Qubec
H3C 3J7
Canada
e-mail:
laurence.dumont.1@
umontreal.ca

Over the last few decades, an increasing number

of functional neuroimaging studies have been
performed in regard to hypnosis and meditation.
The objective of this article is to review the main
areas of the literature on both subjects in order
to compare the neural substrates related to different components of hypnosis and meditation.
In the introductory section, we provide working
definitions of these two constructs and outline the
framework under which they will be examined.
In the next section, we present a series of functional brain imaging studies that have been conducted to investigate the impact of hypnosis on
the brain regions and systems involved in colour
perception, hand paralysis, pain, and the defaultmode network (DMN). In the third section, we
review neuroimaging investigations carried out to
examine the neural correlates of various meditation techniques, as well as the effects of meditation on the brain mechanisms related to emotion,
pain, and the DMN. In the fourth and final section, we compare findings from neuroimaging
studies of hypnosis and meditation reviewed in
this article (particularly related to pain and the
DMN), and offer a few concluding remarks.

1.1 Hypnosis
While the word Hypnosis is a term derived from
the Greek word hypnos which means sleep,
it has been shown that these two states have

little in common when it comes to brain activity (Halsband, Mueller, Hinterberger, & Strickner,
2009). Hypnosis is seen as either an altered state
of consciousness or a cooperative interaction in
which one person, the subject, becomes highly
focused and receptive to verbal suggestions given
by another person, the hypnotist. The subject is
guided by the hypnotist to respond to suggestions
for specific changes in subjective experience, sensation, perception, thought, emotion, or behavior. But hypnosis does not necessarily have to involve another person. Hypnotic suggestions can
also be self-administered: a hypnotic state that is
self-created is called autohypnosis (or self-hypnosis) (Rainville & Price, 2003). However there are,
to our knowledge, no fMRI studies investigating
self-hypnosis to date. Hence this review will focus on means of hypnotic induction that include
a hypnotist or a recording.
In order to get a clear picture of the workings
of hypnosis in the brain, two components must be
differentiated. The first aspect is the basic putative
change of state following a hypnotic induction procedure without further targeted suggestions (i.e.,
neutral hypnosis). The second aspect regards the
influence of specific suggestions provided during
a hypnosis session. Two main types of hypnotic
induction are recognized in the literaturerelaxation and active/alert inductionsthough most
neuroscientific studies have concentrated on the
former. The changes in subjective experience that
follow relaxation-based hypnotic inductions typically include mental relaxation (i.e, becoming at

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Over the last few decades, an increasing number of functional neuroimaging studies have been
performed with respect to hypnosis and meditation. The objective of this article is to review a number of these studies to compare the neural substrates related to different components of hypnosis
and meditation. We examine neuroimaging studies conducted to explore the impact of hypnosis on
the brain regions and systems involved in color perception, hand paralysis, pain, and the defaultmode network (DMN). We also review neuroimaging investigations carried out to examine the
neural correlates of various meditation techniques, as well as the effects of meditation on the brain
mechanisms related to emotion, pain, and the DMN. Given the discrepancy existing between the
findings from neuroimaging studies of hypnosis and meditation carried out in regard to pain and
the DMN, we conclude that it is premature to claim that hypnosis and meditation are mediated by
similar brain systems and neural mechanisms.

The Journal of MindBody Regulation

ease, letting go of tensions) and mental absorption (i.e., a shift from an effortful and ever changing focus of attention to the full concentration on
a particular object, whether it be internal or external). Such alterations lead to a decrease in the
sense of time (Kroger & Yapco, 2007). Hypnosis
can also be characterized by a reduced sense of
self-monitoring and self-agency. This reduction is
manifested by feelings of automaticity associated
with thoughts or actions (Rainville & Price, 2003;
Grant & Rainville, 2005; Price, 1996).

1.2 Meditation
The term meditation comes from the Latin meditatio which originally meant to think, contemplate . Meditation usually refers to a very
wide range of mental techniques associated with
Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic
traditions (Halsband et al., 2009). A popular
distinction between two components present in
meditation has been made by Lutz et al. (2008).
These components are open monitoring (OM)
and focused attention (FA). OM techniques involve allowing any sensations, thoughts, or feelings to arise and pass away from moment-to-moment, while maintaining awareness as an attentive
and non-attached observer without judgment
or analysis. These techniques cultivate metaawareness and observation of experience. FA
techniques involve focusing attention on specific
objects (e.g., mantra, religious pictures, scriptural
passage), body sensations (e.g., breath), or other
types of mental events (e.g., imagined images). A
third subdivision in types of meditation, automatic transcendental meditation, has also been suggested by Travis & Shear (2010). The purpose of
these techniques involves going beyond the usual
realm of sensations and experiences to transcend
their own activity.
These broad classifications intend to foster a
sense of coherence and help draw more general
conclusions about the effects and workings of
meditation. This would be achieved by separating
clearly different entities present in the realm of
meditation. The authors of both the original classification (Lutz et al. 2008) and its revision (Travis
& Shear, 2010) mentioned the fact that the different categories are neither exclusive from each
other nor constant during a meditation session,
between types of session, or even across practitioners. Such intricacies have yet to be explored by
research and should be brought forward in future
efforts to better characterize the phenomenology
of meditation.

1.3 Comparison
Some nuances must be mentioned in order to
understand the subtleties that differentiate hypnosis and meditation and to avoid a black and
white portrait of similarities and discrepancies.
These nuances must be kept in mind throughout
the present review in order to maintain a critical eye on the reviewed literature, as the studies
themselves do not always take these factors into
consideration.
Both hypnosis and meditation experiencers feel qualitative changes in mental functioning such that their consciousness is distinct from
the way it usually operates (Tart, 1972). Other
elements common to both neutral hypnosis and
meditation include relaxation, attentional focus, concentration, and absorption (Holroyd,
2003; Otani, 2003). In addition, both hypnosis
and meditation are associated with alterations in
self-awareness, time sense, and perception (Ott,
2007). An interesting parallel to draw between
both states is the importance of the capacity to
immerse ones phenomenological experience in a
particular object. Regarding hypnosis, absorption
capacity has been strongly correlated to hypnotisability numerous times and is thought by some
researchers to be a core component of hypnosis
(Cardena, 1991; Nadon et al. 1991; Green & Lynn
2010). Absorption also seems to be linked to
meditation (Davidson et al. 1976).
Both hypnosis and meditation can be either
self- or externally- induced. In the case of hypnosis, the traditional way is to be brought into hypnosis by a hypnotist but it is possible for someone
to learn to hypnotize themselves or to follow a
recording instead of an actual human being. As
for meditation, while typically this activity is selfinitiated and self-monitored, it also often involves
a teacher that will guide the practitioners mental
activity before or during meditation. Halsband et
al. (2009) argued that social interactions were a
differentiating point between both states but the
preceding facts (self-hypnosis, guided meditation, etc.) cast doubt on this clear cut distinction.
Traditionally, hypnosis has been seen in the
terms of enhanced response to suggestions, yet it is
also possible to undergo neutral hypnosis without specific suggestions. Both componentsneutral hypnosis and targeted suggestionsoften fail
to be distinguished within the studies discussed
further, but it will be mentioned throughout the
review if the original authors addressed such nuances. The specific role of suggestion in meditation is far from being as clearly determined in the
scientific literature (for in-depth discussions on

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this topic, see Lynn et al., this issue; Farb et al.,
this issue). Indeed it might be argued that meditators use a form of self-suggestion to attain and/
or maintain a meditative state, or that the words
of a meditation teacher constitute suggestions (let
alone the question of how similar these suggestions might be to those used in hypnosis).

2. Functional neuroimaging
studies of hypnosis
2.1. Visual perception and conversion paralysis

* See McGeown et al. (2012)

for an extensive list of these
regions

In a seminal study, Kosslyn et al. (Kosslyn,

Thompson, Costantini-Ferrando, Alpert, &
Spiegel, 2000) sought to determine whether hypnotic suggestion could influence the brain mechanisms underlying visual perception. While being
scanned using positron emission tomography
(PET), highly hypnotizable participants viewed
two visual patterns and were instructed to perceive them in the four following ways: a colour
pattern in colour, an identical colour pattern as
gray-scale, a gray-scale pattern as gray-scale, and
an identical gray-scale pattern as brightly coloured. Following a hypnotic induction and suggestion (when compared to normal wakefulness),
areas in both hemispheres associated with colour
processing (in the fusiform/lingual region) were
activated when subjects were instructed to perceive colour, regardless of whether they were in
fact shown the colour or the gray-scale stimulus.
Activation of these colour-associated areas was
diminished when subjects were asked to see gray
scale, whether they were actually presented with
colour or gray-scale stimuli.
McGeown et al. (2012) conducted a follow-up
study to see if the effects obtained by Kosslyn et
al. (2000) were attributable to response to suggestion regardless of the induction procedure.
To do so, they presented both high and low suggestibles with identical suggestions in and out
of hypnosis. Following the subjective reports
of colour perception, responses to suggestion
in normal wakefulness were indistinguishable
from responses to an identical suggestion following hypnotic induction. Compared to low suggestibles, highly suggestible individuals showed
stronger responses to suggestions both in and out
of hypnosis. Behaviourally, only suggestibility influenced the response to the suggestion, despite
the presence or absence of hypnotic induction.
However, when looking at the fMRI data within
the highly suggestible participants, different activations (namely in the left inferior occipital gyrus,

both middle occipital gyri and various other regions at the voxel level, several of which were in
the DMN*) were present following suggestion in
hypnosis compared to suggestion in normal waking consciousness. This evidence highlights the
difficulty of dissociating the added contribution
of hypnotic induction to altered color perception
but eloquently replicates the power of suggestion
in modulating perception.
Other researchers have attempted to measure
the neural correlates of hypnosis-induced paralysis. In one study, Pyka and co-workers (Pyka,
Burgmer, Lenzen, Pioch, Dannlowski, Pfleiderer,
Ewert et al., 2011) scanned highly suggestible subjects with fMRI to investigate brain activity mediating hypnotic left-hand paralysis. Hypnotic
induction began with suggestions such as the
left hand feels weak, heavy. These suggestions
were followed by direct suggestions such as the
left hand is paralyzed, you cannot move the hand
anymore. Subjects under hypnotic suggestion
reported feeling that they were not able to move
their left hands. Interestingly, the left-hand paralysis induced by hypnosis was not associated with
activation of brain areas involved in the inhibition of movement. Indeed, functional connectivity analyses revealed enhanced connectivity of the
precuneus with the right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC), a cortical area known to be involved in cognitive control (Frith, 2000). Pyka
et al. (2011) argued that the increased coupling
of the precuneus supports the view that hypnotic
paralysis may be related to an altered representation of the self which affects motor abilities. These
researchers further proposed that the increased
coupling of the right DLPFC with the precuneus
may support the idea that hypnotic paralysis of
the left hand was maintained by cognitive control processes implemented by the contralateral
DLPFC. Similar results were obtained by Cojan
and collaborators (Cojan et al. 2011) using a go/
no-go task. In half of the blocks, a hypnotic induction was followed by suggestion of paralysis
of the left hand. A control group was also asked to
feign hand paralysis to account for willful withholding of the movement (though when reading the instructions that were given, it could be
argued that a suggestion had been made). Even
when under induced paralysis, preparatory motor activity was still found but activity from M1
was decoupled from the activity in the premotor
areas and functional connectivity was increased
in the precuneus. These findings support the notion that modifications in self-monitoring are at
play when eliciting suggested rather than willed
behaviour.

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2.2. Pain
Pain is a multi-dimensional experience that includes sensory-discriminative, cognitive, emotional, and behavioural components (Price, 1996;
Peyron et al., 2000; Knudsen et al., 2011). These
various components are mediated by neural circuits commonly referred to as the pain matrix
(Peyron, Laurent, & Garcia-Larrea, 2000). This
functional brain network involves the brainstem, thalamus, insula, anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), primary (S1) and secondary (S2) somatosensory cortices. Neuroimaging findings support
the contention that two distinct neural circuits are
implicated in pain perception. On this view, the
somatosensory thalamus (lateral thalamic nuclei)
and its projections to the primary and secondary
somatosensory cortices are involved in the sensory component of pain, whereas the emotional
component implicate the medial thalamic nuclei
and its projections to the ACC and prefrontal cortices (Hofbauer, Rainville, Duncan, & Bushnell,
2001). As for the insula, this cerebral structure
acts as an intermediary between the sensory and
emotional components of pain (Augustine, 1996).
Rainville et al. (Rainville, Duncan, Price,
Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997) used PET and hypnosis
to investigate the cerebral structures involved in
the emotional aspect of pain. Hypnotic suggestions were given to healthy subjects to change
the unpleasantness of noxious stimuli (painfully hot water) without altering the perceived
intensity. The levels of activation within the ACC
were consistent with the perceived unpleasantness of these noxious stimuli, whereas primary
somatosensory cortex activation was unaffected.
Rainville and colleagues (Rainville, Hofbauer,
Paus, Duncan, Bushnell, & Price, 1999) utilized
PET also to explore the neural mechanisms underlying hypnotic states and responses to hypnotic suggestions. Regional cerebral blood flow was
measured during rest (Baseline), hypnotic relaxation alone (Hypnosis), and hypnotic relaxation
with suggestions (Hypnosis-with-Suggestion) for
altered pain unpleasantness. Subjects had their left
hand immersed in neutral or hot waterin the
Baseline and Hypnosis conditionsand in painfully hot water in the Hypnosis-with-Suggestion
condition. In this condition, suggestions for High
or Low pain unpleasantness were given to the
subjects. Results revealed that hypnosis was accompanied by both rCBF increases (in occipital
areas, inferior frontal gyri, right anterior cingulate sulcus, right anterior superior temporal gyrus, and left insula) and rCBF decreases (in the
right inferior parietal lobule, medial precuneus,
left posterior cingulate gyrus, left medial superior
frontal gyrus, and left posterior middle temporal
areas). Likewise, hypnosis-with-suggestions (for

both High and Low pain unpleasantness) resulted

in widespread increases (in medial superior and
left dorsolateral areas of the frontal lobes, right
dorsolateral frontal areas, left medial posterior
parietal areas, and left nucleus accumbens) and
decreases (in the right uncus, bilateral posterior
orbitofrontal areas, and left lateral cerebellum)
in rCBF. Rainville et al (1999) proposed that the
occipital increases in rCBF seen in the Hypnosis
condition reflect an altered state of consciousness
associated with possible facilitation of visual imagery. These researchers also speculated that the
frontal increases in rCBF associated with suggestions for altered pain perception might be related
to the verbal mediation of the suggestions, working memory, and topdown processes implicated
in the reinterpretation of the perceptual experience of pain. This conclusion is in line with the
results of a recent fMRI study (Raij, Numminen,
Nrvnen, Hiltunen, & Hari, 2009), which sought
to examine the neural correlates of hypnoticsuggestion-induced pain (during laser-induced
pain). The level of activation, measured by bloodoxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal, in the
right DLPFC during initiation of suggestion for
pain was found to be positively correlated with
the subjective intensity of the subsequent suggestion-induced pain. In this case, hypnotic suggestions modulated reactions on an emotional level
rather than on a perceptual level, confirming the
importance of reappraisal in response to these
suggestions.
Some investigators have combined experiential measures (e.g., self-rating of subjective experience; Varela & Shear, 1999) and functional brain
imaging to address the neurophenomenology of
hypnotic states. For example, Rainville and coworkers (Rainville, Hofbauer, Bushnell, Duncan,
& Price, 2002) used PET to scan healthy volunteers before and after the induction of hypnosis.
In these two conditions, subjects rated their perceived level of mental relaxation and mental
absorption, two of the crucial aspects characterizing the experience of being hypnotized. The
subjects left hand was submerged in either warm
or painfully hot water. In the hypnotic state, rCBF
increases were noted in the left insula, occipital
lobes, superior frontal and orbitofrontal areas,
and ACC (middle, rostral, perigenual), whereas
decreases in rCBF were observed in the right inferior parietal lobule and precuneus. Increases
in mental relaxation were correlated with rCBF
increases in the middle and perigenual ACC and
rCBF decreases in the mesencephalic tegmentum
of the brainstem and the thalamus. Rainville et
al. (2002) speculated that the negative correlations in the mesencephalic brainstem and thalamus may reflect the involvement of these cerebral

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structures in the regulation of wakefulness and
cortical arousal. In other respects, increases in
mental absorption during hypnosis were associated with rCBF increases in a distributed network
of cortical (e.g., rostral ACC, right inferior frontal gyrus) and subcortical (e.g., thalamus, upper
pons) structures critically involved in the brains
attentional system. Overall, these findings indicate that, in the context of pain modulation, the
basic alterations in subjective experience produced by hypnotic induction (without overt suggestion for pain reduction) are mediated, at least
in part, by modulation of activity within brain
regions playing a pivotal role in self-monitoring
and the control of conscious states (Rainville et
al., 2002).
Other research teams have sought to identify the neural mechanisms responsible for hypnotic analgesia. For instance, Schulz-Stubner et
al. (Schulz-Stbner, Krings, Meister, Rex, Thron,
& Rossaint, 2004) used fMRI to measure BOLD
signal changes induced by thermal pain in hypnotized subjects. Healthy volunteers had a heating device put on their skin to determine the
temperature at which each of them felt a comparable degree of pain (8 out of 10 on a 0 to 10
subjective pain scale). Next, the subjects were
hypnotized and scanned during repeated painful
heat stimulation. Brain activity was recorded also
when subjects were not hypnotized during painful heat stimulation. Under hypnosis, all subjects
experienced a significant pain reduction (down
to less than 3 on the self-reported pain scale) in
response to the painful heat. These subjective
reductions were accompanied by decreased activations in regions of the pain network including
S1 and the middle cingulate gyrus. Increased activation was seen in the left ACC. No activation
was detected within the brainstem and thalamus.
These observations suggest that hypnosis, even
without the presence of overt analgesic suggestion (but with mental imagery), may prevent pain
signals from reaching higher cortical structures
implicated in the conscious perception of painful
stimulation (Schulz-Stubner et al., 2004). These
findings are in good agreement with those of another fMRI study carried out on healthy volunteers (Vanhaudenhuyse, Boly, Balteau, Schnakers,
Moonen, Luxen, Lamy et al., 2009). In this investigation, painful stimuli (induced by a laser) activated the brainstem, thalamus, ACC, striatum, insula, DLPFC, and contralateral S1. In the hypnotic
state, and without overt analgesic suggestions,
the painful stimuli failed to produce significant
activation in these regions. Thus, the combined
evidence indicates that hypnotic induction seems
sufficient to exert a reappraisal effect on the emotional component of pain.

2.3. Default mode network

Recent work by Oakley and colleagues suggests
that modulations of the default mode network
(DMN; a network of brain regions that show
more activity at rest, i.e. in absence of goal-directed behaviour or external stimulation (Buckner,
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008)) might be a
promising avenue to explore for scientists who
wish to elucidate neural markers of a putative
hypnotic state (Oakley, 2008; Oakley & Halligan,
2009). Since then, a few studies have explored
hypnosis in relation to activity in the DMN.
McGeown and colleagues (McGeown,
Mazzoni, Venneri, & Kirsch, 2009) pointed out
that the experimental design adopted in a number of neuroimaging studies of hypnosis does
not allow for discrimination between changes
in brain activity resulting from the hypnotic induction procedure and changes arising from
task-related suggestions. These researchers proposed an alternative approach to attenuate the
confounding effect of task demand characteristics and performance expectations: to scan subjects during rest periods following the hypnotic
induction procedure (that is, while they are not
performing any specific task). Using such an approach, McGeown et al. measured the patterns
of brain activation and deactivation of high and
low suggestible individuals, while resting in a
MRI scanner, both in and out of hypnosis. When
hypnotized, highly suggestible subjects showed a
reduction of brain activity in the anterior parts
of the DMN (ACC, medial and superior frontal
gyri, left inferior and middle frontal gyri). No
detectable changes in DMN areas were noted
when low suggestible subjects underwent the
same hypnosis-inducing procedure. In contrast
to the default mode, which has been associated
with mind-wandering and internally-directed attention (Buckner et al., 2008; Mason et al., 2007),
hypnosis has been described as a state of readiness to respond to whatever suggestions are made
by the hypnotist (Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Tellegen,
1981). In this context, McGeown et al (2009) postulated that diminished levels of anterior default
mode activity during resting periods following
hypnotic induction indicate that high suggestible
individuals may be able to suspend spontaneous,
non-goal-directed cognitive activity.
Demertzi and co-workers (Demertzi, Soddu,
Faymonville, Bahri, Gosseries, Vanhaudenhuyse
et al., 2011) have used independent component
analysis (ICA) on resting state fMRI acquisitions
to assess functional connectivity between DMN
regions during neutral hypnosis. As compared
with a control condition of autobiographical
mental imagery, hypnosis produced enhanced

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connectivity in angular and middle frontal gyri,
and reduced connectivity in posterior midline
and parahippocampal structures. Demertzi et al
(2011) posited that these functional connectivity
changes between DMN regions reflected an altered self awareness and posthypnotic amnesia.
This is partly supported by the fact that subjective
reports of the occurrence of external thoughts
were significantly decreased in the hypnosis condition. But an absence of direct evidence towards
self awareness and amnesia in the present study
mitigates their conclusions.
Lipari and collaborators (Lipari et al. 2011) investigated the extent of DMN involvement under
pure or neutral hypnosis in a particularly highly
hypnotizable, or virtuoso, subject using both EEG
and fMRI in order to assess how specific or attributable that involvement was to hypnosis. Resting
state activity was assessed in a normal wakeful
state before hypnotic induction and again under
hypnosis without other suggestions (other than
those used during the induction, including let
your mind go and your mind must not know.)
Posterior DMN (in areas including the precuneus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, the retrosplenial cortex, the IPL and PH) BOLD signal was increased under hypnosis while anterior DMN (in
areas including the medial prefrontal cortex, the
middle frontal gyrus and the ACC) BOLD signal
was diminished during hypnosis. Activity outside
of the DMN (in motor and visual areas) was also
observed during hypnosis despite the lack of suggestions that could elicit such activity. This could
be attributed to singularities of the virtuoso and
is coherent with the exhaustion she felt following
the hypnotic session. But these results complicate
the hypothesis that neutral hypnosis can be best
described as a modulation of the DMN. Another
interesting point is the fact that the decreased activity in anterior areas, also related to the sense
of self and self-monitoring (Rainville et al., 1999)
are consistent with the phrases let your mind go
and your mind doesnt know used during the
hypnotic induction phase.
Taken together, these results appear consistent with the initial report of McGeown et al.
(2009) and suggest that the DMN is involved in
a distinct manner during neutral hypnosis. A
consistent anterior DMN involvement seem to
emerge from the findings, even if it two of the
three studies reviewed show decreased activation
(McGeown et al., 2012; Lipari et al., 2011; see also
recent evidence from Deeley et al. 2012) while the
other reported increased connectivity (Demertzi
et al. 2011). The role of the posterior DMN might
be an interesting avenue to explore but has only
been witnessed in one virtuoso subject (Lipari
et al. 2011). Importantly, it is difficult to say if the

changes in DMN are related to a special hypnotic

state or rather to specific suggestions employed
during the induction procedure.

2.4. Summary
Findings from functional neuroimaging studies demonstrate that hypnotic suggestions can
modulate the neural activity supporting colour
perception and the experience of painful stimuli. There is also some evidence indicating that
suggestions of hypnotic analgesia can result in a
reduction of activity in certain areas of the pain
matrix. The situation is more complicated with
regard to the neural correlates of the putative
hypnotic state. Indeed, while some findings indicate that there is a reduction of activity in various
regions of the PFC following hypnotic induction
(McGeown et al., 2009), other findings indicate
that hypnosis (without suggestions) may be mediated by increased activity in distinct prefrontal
cortical areas (Rainville et al., 1999). Nonetheless
it seems that neutral hypnosis is associated with a
distinct anterior alteration of the DMN.

3. Functional neuroimaging
studies of meditation
3.1. Basic neural substrates
In recent years, many functional imaging studies
have explored the neural correlates of different
types of meditation, including OM, FA, transcendental, or even mixed meditative practices. In a pilot investigation, Newberg et al. (Newberg, Alavi,
Baime, Pourdehnad, Santanna, & dAquili, 2001)
scanned eight experienced Tibetan Buddhist
meditators with single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) while they focused their
attention on a mental image. They were scanned
twice, once during meditation and once during
normal resting wakefulness. Experientially, the
meditators reported becoming one with the visualized image during the meditative state. The
baseline activation patterns revealed a difference
in the thalamic laterality index in which meditators displayed a greater rightward dominance of
thalamic rCBF compared to controls. Increased
rCBF was measured in the cingulate gyrus, inferior and orbital frontal cortex, DLPFC, midbrain,
and thalamus during meditation relative to baseline. In addition, decreased rCBF activity in the
left posterior superior parietal lobe was negatively
correlated with the activity increase noted in left
DLPFC. Newberg and colleagues suggested that
the increased frontal rCBF may reflect focused
concentration while thalamic increases may be
correlated with increased cortical activity during

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* It is important to specify
that an extensive and longterm commitement to
meditation is necessary to
attain a certain mastery of
the discipline. It is the main
reason why a separation can
be drawn between practitionners who all seem to have
plenty of experience in the
eye of the layperson.

The Journal of MindBody Regulation

meditation. These researchers also proposed that
midbrain activation may be related to alterations
in autonomic activity during meditation, and that
the negative correlation between the left posterior
superior parietal lobe and the left DLPFC may reflect an altered sense of space experienced during
meditation. Other interpretations of these results
include the notion of an internal vs external focus
of attention.
In another study of concentrative meditation,
Brefczynski-Lewis and colleagues (BrefczynskiLewis, Lutz,, Schaefer, Levinson, & Davidson,
2007) used fMRI to examine the neural correlates
of one-pointed concentrationa form of FA
meditation that is practiced to increase attentional focus and reach a peaceful state in which preoccupation with thoughts and emotions is progressively diminished. The researchers compared a
group of Tibetan Buddhist monks with extensive
meditation experience to a group of age-matched
novice meditators. Subjects were instructed to focus on a small fixation dot presented on a screen.
Results showed that activation in brain regions
normally implicated in visual sustained attention
(e.g., FEF, both interparietal sulci, middle cingulate cortex, anterior insula, thalamus and lateral
occipital) was generally more robust for the expert meditators compared to novices. However,
whereas the monks with an average of 19,000
hours of practice (intermediate) exhibited greater
activation in these regions than the novices, the
monks with an average of 44,000 practice hours
(advanced) showed less activation*. This pattern
of results fits well with traditional descriptions
which present concentration meditation as initially requiring higher levels of effortful concentration but eventually becoming less effortful,
such that later phases of this meditative practice
necessitate minor effort (Brefczynski-Lewis et al.,
2007). Given this finding it becomes even more
difficult to compare the neural correlates found
in the different studies due to the inherent differences at various points of the learning process of
the meditator.
FMRI has also been utilized to investigate
brain changes associated with open monitoring (OM), or mindfulness, meditation. For instance, Ives-Deliperi et al. (Ives-Deliperi, Solms,
& Meintjes, 2011) scanned healthy volunteers who
had practiced daily mindfulness meditation for
a minimum of four years. Subjects were scanned
while performing a control task (random generation of numbers) and mindfulness meditation.
In the mindful condition, subjects were asked
to be aware of present-moment bodily sensations, thoughts and emotions without judging
or reacting to these physical and mental events.

Significant BOLD signal decreases were recorded

during mindfulness meditation relative to the
control condition in midline cortical structures
associated with interoception, including the precuneus, right medial PFC, and left ventral ACC,
and also the anterior insula. According to IvesDeliperi and colleagues (2011), these findings
indicate that mindfulness has an overall quieting effect on brain regions associated with the
subjective and cognitive aspects of emotions.
Yet, the task can be seen as an externally directed
task, while meditation is internally directed, and
thus, the absence of a neutral resting state control
limits their findings. These researchers also proposed, as a possible explanation of their results,
that mindfulness may promote emotional wellbeing through a process of disidentification. Such
a process would allow mindfulness practitioners
to realize that thoughts and feelings are transient
mental events that do not define a substantial self
(Martin, 1997).
The previously reviewed studies all presented different meditation techniques. Given that
the instructions or tasks performed during the
meditation conditions are quite different, one
can rightfully argue that the inconsistent findings are due to that very fact. In a recent fMRI
investigation, Manna and co-workers (Manna,
Raffone, Perrucci, Nardo, Ferretti, Tartaro et al.,
2010) contrasted the neural correlates of concentrative and mindfulness meditation techniques
within the same experiment. Theravada Buddhist
monks, expert in both Samatha (concentrative,
FA) and Vipassana (mindfulness, OM) practices (range of experience with meditation: 2553
years), participated in the study. In the concentrative meditation condition, subjects were asked to
observe and recognize any experiential or mental content as it arises from moment to moment,
without restrictions and judgement, including
breath and body sensations, percepts of external
stimuli, arising thoughts and feelings (p. 47). In
the mindfulness meditation condition, subjects
were instructed to focus their attention on breath
sensations.
Compared to a resting state, the concentrative meditation condition revealed a widespread
pattern of deactivation in the left hemisphere
(lateral anterior PFC, anterior and posterior insula, and precuneus) and right hemisphere (inferior frontal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus).
Additionally, activity was observed in the dorsal ACC and right medial anterior PFC. As for
the mindfulness meditation condition (relative
to rest), activations were noted in the left hemisphere, medial anterior PFC, superior temporal
gyrus, and superior parietal lobule.

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While no significant differences were found
when comparing mindfulness and concentrative
meditation among beginners, advanced meditators showed more activity during mindfulness in
the left DLPFC, bilateral anterior prefrontal cortices, left medial frontal gyrus, left precuneus, left
superior parietal lobule, left anterior insula, right
infero-frontal gyrus and transverse temporal gyrus. A greater BOLD activation was found during
concentrative meditation in the right dorsal ACC
and right medial anterior prefrontal cortex. These
results indicate that expert meditators cognitively engage in conscious processing of sensations,
thoughts, and emotions via self-regulation of
frontal, parietal, and insular areas in a meditation
state-dependent manner. Moreover, these results
suggest that the ACC and the DLPFC play antagonistic roles in the executive control of attention
during meditative states (Manna et al., 2010).
Due to methodological specificities, it is still
impossible to pinpoint with certainty the neural
correlates of meditation. Generally speaking, the
studies reviewed above show a distinct modulation of the attentional networks but the nature
and the extent of this modulation may fluctuate
with experience and tradition. Attentional networks seem to be recruited differently at various
stages in the experience of the meditator and,
once one has sufficient practice, mindfulness and
concentrative meditation appear to differentially
engage these circuits.

3.2. Emotion processing

To investigate the neural mechanisms through
which mindfulness modulates emotional responses, Taylor et al. (2011) carried out an fMRI
study that sought to explore the effects of a mindful state on the neural responses to emotionally
laden stimuli (Taylor, Grant, Daneault, Scavone,
Breton, Roffe-Vidal et al., 2011). Another goal of
this study was to examine the impact of the extent of mindfulness training on the brain mechanisms supporting the processing of emotional
stimuli. Experienced and beginner meditators
were scanned as they viewed negative, positive,
and neutral pictures in a mindful state and a nonmindful state of awareness. Mindfulness attenuated emotional intensity perceived from pictures.
Brain imaging data suggested that this effect was
achieved through distinct neural mechanisms for
each group of subjects. For experienced meditators, compared with beginners, mindfulness induced a deactivation of DMN areas (medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices) across all
valence categories, and did not influence responses in structures involved in emotional reactivity
during emotional processing. On the other hand,
for beginners relative to experienced meditators,

mindfulness induced a down-regulation of the

left amygdala during emotional processing. These
findings suggest that the long-term practice of
mindfulness leads to emotional stability by promoting acceptance of emotional states and enhancing present-moment awareness, rather than
by eliciting control over low-level affective cerebral systems from higher-order cortical brain regions (Taylor et al., 2011).

3.3. Pain
Similarly to hypnosis, meditation has been shown
to be highly effective is in its ability to reduce
the intensity and emotional perception of pain.
With respect to this issue, Grant and colleagues
(Grant, Courtemanche, & Rainville, 2011) used
fMRI to examine the brains of Zen meditators
during painful stimulation. To induce pain, thermal stimuli were applied to the inner surface of
the left calf. During pain induction, meditators
showed greater activation of primary pain processing regions (ACC, thalamus, insula), compared to controls. In addition, in meditators
relative to controls, decreased activity was found
in appraisal and emotion areas (e.g., lateral and
medial PFC, amygdala and posterior cingulate
cortex) during the administration of the painful
stimuli. Furthermore, reductions in functional
connectivity between executive and pain-related
cortices strongly predicted lower pain sensitivity
in meditators. Grant et al. (2011) hypothesized
that the disengagement of anterior brain systems
in meditators may reflect a functional decoupling
of the cognitive-evaluative and sensory-discriminative components of pain. Such a phenomenon
would allow Zen meditators to perceive painful
stimuli in a mindful manner, that is, more neutrally from an emotional perspective.
In one investigation conducted by Gard et
al. (Gard, Hlzel, Sack, Hempel, Lazar, Vaitl, &
Ott, 2011), mindfulness practitioners and controls were given unpleasant electric shocks in
the fMRI scanner during a mindful state and a
control condition. Mindfulness practitioners, but
not controls, were able to decrease pain unpleasantness by 22% during the mindful state. This
decrease was accompanied by reduced activation
in the lateral PFC and enhanced activation in
the right posterior insula during painful stimulation. These findings suggest that mindfulness
increases sensory processing and diminishes cognitive control, confirming the role of meditation
in the reduction of cognitive-evaluative aspects
of pain (Grant et al, 2011). In another investigation (Zeidan, Martucci, Kraft, Gordon, McHaffie,
& Coghill, 2011), arterial spin labelling fMRI was
used to investigate the neural mechanisms by
which mindfulness modulates pain in healthy

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individuals. The experiment was performed after 4 days of mindfulness meditation training.
Noxious (thermal) stimuli were administered to
subjects during a restful state and a mindful state.
Mindfulness significantly diminished pain unpleasantness (by 57%) and pain intensity ratings
(by 40%) relative to the rest condition. Neurally,
mindfulness meditation decreased pain-related
activation of the contralateral S1. Mindfulnessinduced decreases in pain intensity ratings were
correlated with enhanced activity in the ACC and
anterior insula

cerebral structures implicated

in the cognitive regulation of pain processing.
Furthermore, decreases in pain unpleasantness
ratings were correlated with an activation of the
orbitofrontal cortexan area involved in the reappraisal of the contextual evaluation of sensory
events. Reductions in pain unpleasantness ratings
were also associated with a deactivation of the
thalamus. Zeidan and co-workers (2011) postulated that this thalamic deactivation may support a
gating mechanism implicated in altering interactions between afferent input and executive-order
brain regions.
One generally robust finding from the findings reviewed above is that mediation can help
reduce pain, even if the mechanisms supporting
this process appear to vary according to the extent
of the experience of the meditator. Indeed, participants in the study by Zeidan et al (2011) were
novices and showed distinct neural mechanisms
of pain modulation compared to the long-term
practitioners investigated in other reports (Grant
et al., 2011; Gard et al., 2011). Specifically, whereas
novices appeared to modulate pain by decreasing activity in sensory processing regions and
increasing activity in areas associated with cognitive control (Zeidan et al., 2011), experienced
practitioners achieved similar effects in a seemingly converse manner: enhancing sensory processing and down-regulating control mechanisms
(Grant et al., 2011; Gard et al., 2011). Because the
studies reviewed in the previous sections showed
differences attributable to the level of experience
of meditators, one can reasonably expect that this
relationship would hold true in the case of pain
modulation. Even if this claim is presently speculative, these issues could easily be investigated by
comparing in a single study the processes at work
during painful stimulation between novice and
expert meditators.

3.4. Default mode network

A handful of fMRI studies have examined functional connectivity between DMN areas during
various types of meditation. In one of these studies, Josipovic et al. (Josipovic, Dinstein, Weber, &

Heeger, 2011) recorded the brain activity of experienced meditators from the Tibetan-Buddhist
tradition, while they fixated without meditation
(fixation) or engaged in either non-dual awareness (NDA or transcendental) or FA meditation.
The anti-correlation between intrinsic (or DMN)
and extrinsic networks seemed to be stronger in
FA than in rest, and lower in NDA meditation
when compared to rest. On the other hand, correlation between areas within the DMN did not
change during NDA meditation and FA meditation, relative to fixation without meditation.
In another investigation, Brewer and colleagues
(Brewer, Worhunsky, Gray, Tang, Weber, & Kober,
2011) measured brain activity in experienced
meditators and matched meditation-nave controls as they performed three distinct meditations
[Concentration (FA), Loving-Kindness (practiced through directed well-wishing;) Choiceless
Awareness (OM or attention to whatever arises in
ones conscious field of awareness at any moment)]
(Gunaratana, 2002). Across all meditation types,
experienced meditators showed deactivation in
core regions of the DMN (medial prefrontal and
posterior cingulate cortices). Moreover, a greater
coupling in experienced meditators was found
between cortical areas of the DMN thought to be
involved in self-monitoring and cognitive control
(posterior cingulate, dorsal ACC, and DLPFC),
both at baseline (restful state) and during meditation. This account also reported a relative absence
of involvement of the extrinsic network, which is
coherent with the supposed absence of stimulusindependent thoughts achieved in meditation. In
addition, the consistency of connectivity patterns
within DMN areas across meditation and baseline periods indicates that meditation practice
may alter the resting-state experience such that it
is similar to a meditative state (Brewer et al., 2011).
The increased connectivity within the DMN, yet
lowered activity, seems to point towards a more
efficient recruitment of this network.
Aiming to confirm the notion that meditation alters the efficiency of DMN recruitment,
Jang and co-workers (Jang, Jung, Kang, Byun,
Kwon, Choi, & Kwon, 2011) employed fMRI to
investigate functional connectivity within the
DMN during a resting state (fixation on a foveal
crosshair). Healthy controls and brain-wave vibration meditation practitioners were recruited.
Brain-wave vibration meditation is believed to
help quiet the mind and release negative emotions
through focusing on bodily sensations while performing natural rhythmic movements. Thus, this
form of meditation likely reflects a combination
of both FA and OM practice. At rest, meditation
practitioners showed greater functional coupling
within the DMN in the medial prefrontal cortex

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area than did the control subjects. This suggests
that the long-term practice of meditation may
lead to functional alterations in DMN activity, even when meditation is not being practiced.
Such a conclusion is consistent with the findings of a fMRI study recently conducted Taylor,
Daneault et al. (2012). In this investigation, resting-state data were collected from experienced
mindfulness meditators and beginner meditators
(trained for one week before the study). Relative
to beginners, experienced meditators had weaker
functional connectivity between DMN regions
involved in self-referential processing and emotional appraisal. Moreover, experienced meditators had increased connectivity between certain
other DMN regions (e.g., posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus and right inferior parietal lobule),
compared to beginner meditators. These findings
suggest that meditation training leads to functional connectivity changes between core DMN
regions, possibly reflecting strengthened presentmoment awareness, accompanied by a reduction
in self-referential thoughts during rest. These
findings also reinforce the idea that mindfulness
training leads to changes in the functional dynamics of the DMN that extend beyond a state of
meditation per se. Overall, therefore, meditation
seems to influence the DMN both during and after practice, but it might have distinct impacts on
regions related to self-referential and emotional
appraisal, depending on the type of meditation
practiced.

3.5. Brain structure

Many long-term outcomes have been associated
with meditation and, in accordance with recent
findings in neuroplasticity, it is logical to hypothesise that meditation might have a tangible impact
on brain structure. Several studies in recent years
have shown plastic gray matter changes in brain
regions previously associated with meditation;
namely in the brainstem (Vestergaard-Poulsen et
al., 2009), in the hippocampus and frontal lobes
(Luders et al., 2009), and in the left inferior temporal gyrus and right hippocampus (Hlzel et al.,
2008). Furthermore, age-related decreases in gray
matter usually observed in normal adults seems
to be slowed or reversed in advanced meditators,
which is to say that meditation might have a protective effect on the brain (Lazar et al., 2005; Ott
et al., 2011). Finally, studies employing diffusor
tension imaging and fractional anisotropy also report increased cortical thickness and thicker callosal regions, confirming the long term impact of
meditation on the brain (Kang et al., 2012; Luders
et al., 2012).

3.6. Summary
Globally, the findings from functional neuroimaging investigations indicate that concentrative meditation techniques are accompanied by
enhanced activity in cortical areas known to be
involved in sustained attention. With respect to
the neural correlates of mindfulness, however,
brain imaging studies present conflicting results.
Effectively, whereas some investigations suggest
that mindfulness is mediated by an overall decrease in brain activity (e.g., Ives-Deliperi et al.,
2011), the results of other investigations indicate
instead that this form of meditation is correlated
with enhanced activity in various prefrontal, parietal, and temporal regions (e.g., Manna et al.,
2010). Findings from other studies suggest that
meditation can influence neural activity supporting the processing of emotional (Taylor et al.,
2011) and painful (Grant et al., 2011; Gard et al.,
2011; Zeidan et al., 2011) stimuli. Still, there are
consistent effects of meditation on processes involving the DMN and compelling evidence that
meditation leads to enduring changes in brain
structure.

4. Concluding remarks and

future directions
In this article, we have reviewed a number of
functional neuroimaging studies that have investigated the neural mechanisms underlying
the effects of hypnosis and hypnotic suggestion
on colour perception, hand paralysis, pain, and
the DMN. We also examined neuroimaging investigations conducted to identify the neural correlates of different meditation techniques, as well
as the impact of meditation on the brain mechanisms supporting emotion, pain, and the DMN.
Despite some experiential similarities between hypnotic and meditative states (e.g., mental
relaxation, attentional focus, concentration, mental absorption, letting go of thoughts) (Holroyd,
2003; Otani, 2003; Halsband et al., 2009), the results of the neuroimaging studies reviewed in this
paper do not allow us to posit that hypnosis and
meditation are mediated by similar brain systems
and neural mechanisms (in contrast to the position held by Grant & Rainville, 2005). The comparison between the neuroimaging investigations
of hypnosis and meditation performed in regard
to pain processing and the DMN will illustrate
why we reach such a conclusion. In the case of
pain processing, it has been demonstrated that
suggestions of hypnotic analgesia can produce a
decrease of activity in regions of the pain matrix
(e.g., S1, middle cingulate gyrus) (Schulz-Stbner

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et al., 2004). In contrast, mindfulness meditation
has been shown to be associated with increased
activity in certain pain matrix areas (e.g., ACC,
insula), depending on the level of training (Grant
et al., 2011; Gard et al., 2011; Zeidan et al., 2011).
As for the DMN, a decrease of activity in diverse
prefrontal cortical areas has been reported during a restful state following hypnotic induction
(McGeown et al., 2009). In addition, increased
connectivity in angular and middle frontal gyri,
and decreased connectivity in posterior midline
and parahippocampal structures, has been found
during this putative hypnotic state (Demertzi
et al., 2011). With respect to meditation, Taylor
et al. (2012) have reported a weaker functional
connectivity between DMN regions involved
in self-referential processing and emotional appraisal (dorsomedial PFC, ventromedial PFC, inferior parietal lobule) in experienced mindfulness
meditators (compared to beginner meditators).
Furthermore, Taylor et al. (2012) have shown enhanced connectivity between other DMN areas
(posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus and right
inferior parietal lobule) in experienced meditators. The processes through which these outcomes
are reached likely vary depending on the type of
meditation and the experience of the meditators.
It is important to point out that considerable
discrepancy exists among results of neuroimaging studies even within the individual domains
of hypnosis and meditation. A number of factors
might account for such inconsistencies. It should
come as no surprise that the use of different hypnotic suggestions targeting distinct sensory/perceptual systems leads to different patterns of neural activity (Rainville et al., 1999). Moreover, since
distinct kinds of mental events/processes are associated with different brain patterns, the control
condition is critical when interpreting the results
from neuroimaging studies of hypnosis (Demertzi
et al., 2011). In other respects, differing control
tasks, meditative techniques, and experimental
designs most certainly contribute to the discrepant findings found in the neuroimaging literature
on meditation (Ives-Deliperi et al., 2011). The level
of expertise of the subjects in meditative practices

and the sample size constitute other potentially

confounding variables (for a discussion of such
factors, see Grant, this issue).
Direct comparisons accounting for a wider
range of variables would be required in order for
neuroscience to really determine and compare
the processes at work in hypnosis and meditation. Such variables could include comparison
of both states in the same subjects, whether by
hypnotising advanced meditators or by asking
highly hypnotisable non-meditators to practice
meditation. The impact of suggestion while under hypnosis and while meditating could also
be assessed in order to see if meditation also facilitates the suggestion effect and if this effect is
mediated by similar neural mechanisms. In the
case of hypnosis, a comparison of the variables of
interest should be done both under neutral hypnosis and following suggestions in order to determine the precise contribution and the differential
workings of both. In the case of meditation, when
possible, two styles (or two variants of the same
style) could be compared in the same meditator.
Another possibility would be to take into account
a phenomenological report of the content of the
meditation or hypnosis session in order to control for the semantic content in terms of beliefs,
goals, and expectations.
This review aimed to outline and compare
the neural correlates and processes involved in
hypnosis and meditation. We reviewed a wide
range of findings, highlighted significant caveats
and drew conclusions as to where research should
head in order to attain a clearer understanding of
hypnosis and meditation, as well as of their similarities and differences. Even if the experimental
control of the critical variables we discuss (e.g.,
attitudes and beliefs, experience of the practitioner, and validity of the control task) might disnature the practices from their usual settings, such
assays would be necessary to determine if hypnosis and meditation differ only because of these
particular contexts and come together when
stripped from them, or are truly different in their
fundamental workings.

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