Taxicab Operators v BOT

FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. They filed the
petition seeking to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Bureau of Land
Transportation. The assailed memorandum order provides for the phasing out and
discontinuance in the operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and earlier.
Pursuant to the said memorandum, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing
Circular No. 52 instructing Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other personnel of the
BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a
schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public
conveyances.
ISSUE:W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise of police power
HELD: No, Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of Transportation the
power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices,
measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of
public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in the BOT circular, the overriding consideration
is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the people.

TANADA v TUVERA
FACTS:Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must
be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents contend; among others that publication in the OG is not a
sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect; publication in the OG is indispensable for
their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC.
ISSUE:Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of
injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

PHIL. CONSUMERS v SEC of EDUCATION

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit
corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The herein
respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the
Philippines.
On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports submitted a report entitled "Report and
Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably
recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's
policy on increases in school fees for the schoolyear 1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the report
of the Task Force and on the basis of the same, the DECS, through the respondent Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Secretary), issued an
Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the
Task Force. The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the ground
that the increases were too high. Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 dated
April 10, 1987 modifying its previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10%
to 15%, accordingly.
Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to
this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered
declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is
that the said Department Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also
maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing
before the said Department Order was issued.
In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized
by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not
always include the power to increase school fees.
Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are
interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees
are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of
substantive and procedural due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fixing of school fees through department order by DECS is a
valid delegation of legislative power
HELD: Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to
prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix
school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to
properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or
an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and
hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates
prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior
notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid
down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the
rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its
function is quasi-judicial in character.
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We
believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be
charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.
RATIO: Fixing rates and charges. - As regards rates prescribes by an administrative agency
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the
validity of such rates.

PHILCOMSAT v ALCUAZ
FACTS: By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to construct and operate such
ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals in the Philippines.
PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe)
and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control
and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later
promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC.
Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to
continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however
directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the
rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said
directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates
for public service communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were
constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power,
particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the
provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor
of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is
guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT
subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain
rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of
which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by
the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable
rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of
legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be
sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the

legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the
delegated power.

Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate,
its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner
prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation
of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only
standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held
that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due
process since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.

RCPI v NTC
Facts: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH
telegrams through petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of
17 March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in
Espiritu, Ilocos Norte.
Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. So, private respondent
filed a letter-complaint against RCPI with National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for
poor service, with a request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the
company. Taking cognizance of the complaint, NTC directed RCPI to answer the complaint and
set the initial hearing.
NTC held that RCPI was administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service under
Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and imposed the penalty of fine payable within thirty (30) days
from receipt in the aggregate amount of one thousand pesos.
Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates.
ISSUE: Whether or not Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) has jurisdiction to
impose fines
HELD: The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC
to render it.
NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the
Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure
by a public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders,
decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise,
so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to
violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission
applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or
disregarded.
No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the
Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit
grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including
telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither

has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There
appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and
powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those
expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such
body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective (Globe
Wireless case).

REPUBLIC v MEDINA?

ESPANOL v CHAIRMAN PVA

FACTS:Maria U. Espaol was the widow of the deceased veteran German Espaol, who
died in the service during World War II. She applied for monthly pension under R.A. No. 65
with the Philippine Veterans Administration (now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office). Her
application was approved and she received her monthly pension and her minor children their
monthly dependent's pension.
On November 1, 1951, the Philippine Veterans Administration (PVA), in pursuance of its
administrative policy, providing that those beneficiaries of veterans receiving pensions
from the U.S. Veterans Administration are no longer entitled to receive pension from the
PVA, cancelled Maria U. Espaol's monthly pension and that of her then minor children.
On February 25, 1974, or after more than 22 years from the date when her monthly pension was
cancelled, Maria U. Espaol filed with the CFI of Manila a petition for mandamus against
PVA for the restoration and continued payment of her monthly pension including that of her
dependents effective from the date of cancellation.
PVA contended that the action of appellee, effective from the date of cancellation on November
1, 1951, has already prescribed, inasmuch as the same was filed more than 10 years from the date
of cancellation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of Maria Espanol has prescribed
HELD:Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides that actions based on an obligation created
by law shall be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. It is important
to reckon the date, when the right of action accrues, as the same is the beginning for counting the
10-year prescriptive period.
The appellee cannot be said to have a cause of action, in compelling appellant to continue
paying her monthly pension on November 1, 1951, because appellant's act of cancellation,
being pursuant to an administrative policy, cannot be considered a violation of appellee's
right to receive her monthly pension.
It is elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce,
have the force of law, are entitled to great respectand have in their favor a presumption of

legality. Thus, appellant's act of cancelling appellee's monthly pension being presumed legal and
valid, cannot be taken as a violation of appellee's right to receive her monthly pension under
R.A. No. 65.
It is only when this Court declared invalid the questioned administrative policy in the case of Del
Mar vs. The Philippine Veterans Administration, supra, promulgated on June 27, 1973, can the
appellee be said to have a cause of action to compel appellant to resume her monthly pension;
because it is at that point in time, when the presumption of legality of the questioned
administrative policy had been rebutted and thus it can be said with certainty that appellant's act
was in violation of appellee's right to receive her monthly pension.
The 10-year prescriptive period, therefore, should be counted from June 27, 1973 when the
case of Del Mar vs. The Philippine Veterans Administration, supra, was promulgated, and
not from November 1, 1951, the date of cancellation by appellant of appellee's pension. The
action of appellee, which was brought on February 25, 1974, is therefore well within the 10-year
prescriptive period.

VICTORIAS MILLING v SSS

Facts:On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring
all Employers in computing premiums to include in the Employee's remuneration all
bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. Upon
receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote
the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to
a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and
bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium
contributions. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the
part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President
and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
Overruling the objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a
rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official
Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere
statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Petitioner
comes to Court on appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section
4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission.
Held:There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or
regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to
an administrative body.
When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law
with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be
enforced by a penal sanction provided therein. The details and the manner of carrying out
the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In

this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power
to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.
Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the
monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions
should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and
publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. The Resolution appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered

CO v CA
FACTS:In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vesselpetitioner
Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1983 a check drawn against the
Associated Citizens Bank in the sum of P361,528.00.1 The check dishonored for being a
CLOSED ACCOUNT.
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 222 was filed by the salvage
company against Albino Co and Co was later convicted.
Co contended that the RTCs basis for its verdict of conviction is the ruling by this Court in Que
v. People:
That a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless
covered by B.P. Blg. 22.
This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4)
years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the
delivery of a rubber or bouncing check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a
punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice:
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment
of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either
estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984
(Ministry Circular No. 12)almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the bouncing
check to the complainant .

ISSUE: Whether or not Co is liable under B.P. Blg. 22

HELD: No. Conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting
authority may reverse its administrative interpretation of a statute, but that its new interpretation
applies only prospectively.
It would seem, then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
Courts decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, -i.e., that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22should not
be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons similarly
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall
within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

HILADO v CIR
SUMMARY: Secretary of Finance revoked a general circular pursuant to which a taxpayer
claimed deductions from his gross income.
FACTS:Hilado filed his income tax return wherein he claimed the amount of P12,387.65 as a
deductible item from his gross income pursuant to the Collector of Internal Revenues General
Circular No. V-123, issued pursuant to certain rules laid down by the Secretary of Finance.
Subsequently, the new Secretary of Finance, through the CIR, issued General Circular No. V-139
which revoked General Circular No. V-123 and laid down the rule that property losses which
occurred during the World War II are deductible in the year of actual loss/destruction of said
property. As a consequence, the P12,387.65 was disallowed as a deduction from petitioners
gross income for 1951 and the CIR demanded from him the payment of P3,546 as deficiency
income tax for the year.
ISSUE:Whether the Secretary of Finance acted with valid authority in revoking General
Circular No. V-123 and approving in lieu thereof, General Circular No. V-139.
HELD:Yes. The Secretary of Finance is vested with authority to revoke, repeal or abrogate
the acts or previous rulings of his predecessors in office because the construction of a
statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors if the latter becomes
satisfied that a different construction should be given. General Circular No. V-123, having
been issued on a wrong construction by the law, cannot give rise to a vested right that can be
invoked by a taxpayer. A vested right cannot spring from a wrong interpretation.

An administrative officer cannot change a law enacted by Congress. Once a regulation which
merely interprets a statute is determined erroneous, it becomes a nullity. The CIRs erroneous
construction of the law does not preclude or stop the Government from collecting a tax legally
due.
Under Art. 2254 of the Civil Code, no vested/acquired right can arise from acts/omissions which
are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others.