Académique Documents
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War
War T/ Ethics
Nuclear war is the end of all ethics
Joseph
The first of these ethical points is rather simple: if the intent of the overall war is
ethically unsound, then the use of any weapons in such a cause is wrong, be they
clubs or nuclear missiles. This fact does not let us differentiate ethically between nuclear
and non-nuclear arms, but merely returns us to a basis for our original assumption that
war can be just. This point does bear on the ethicality of all- out nuclear war,
however, since although the announced intent of the war may be to save the earth from
the yoke of Communism or Imperialism, the actual end of the war would probably be a
silent, smoking planet. Each of us must draw our own conclusions as to the ethicality of
such an action, based on our own cultural, religious, political, and ethical backgrounds.
But it is an old ethical axiom that no right action aims at greater evil in the results, and
my personal feelings on all out war is that there is no provocation that can
ethically support such devastation.9 In the eloquent words of John Bennett, "How
can a nation live with its conscience and . . . kill twenty million children in
another nation . . .?"10
War T/ Dehumanization.
Dehumanization is used as propaganda during wars
Vinulan-Arellano 03. [Katharine, March 22 yonip.com Stop Dehumanization
of People to Stop Wars http://www.yonip.com/main/articles/nomorewars.html ]
In war time, dehumanization is a key element in propaganda and brainwashing. By
portraying the enemy as less than human, it is much easier to motivate your troops to
rape, torture or kill. Ethnic cleansing or genocide would always be perceived as a crime
against humanity if human beings belonging to another race or religion are not
dehumanized.
Throughout history, groups or races of human beings have been dehumanized. Slaves,
Negroes, Jews, and now, Muslims. Up to now, women are dehumanized in many
societies -- they are made sexual objects, treated as second-class human beings. The
proliferation of the sex trade are indications of the prevailing, successful dehumanization
of women, worldwide. During wars, mass rape of women is common.
War T/ Disease
War increases the spread of fatal disease.
Boston Globe 07. [05-07, Spread of disease tied to U.S. combat deployments
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/05/07/spread_of_disease_tied_to_us_combat_
deployments/]
A parasitic disease rarely seen in United States but common in the Middle East has infected an
estimated 2,500 US troops in the last four years because of massive deployments to remote
combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan, military officials said. Leishmaniasis , which is
transmitted through the bite of the tiny sand fly, usually shows up in the form of reddish skin
ulcers on the face, hands, arms, or legs. But a more virulent form of the disease also attacks
organs and can be fatal if left untreated. In some US hospitals in Iraq, the disease has become
so commonplace that troops call it the "Baghdad boil." But in the United States, the
appearance of it among civilian contractors who went to Iraq or among tourists who were
infected in other parts of the world has caused great fear because family doctors have had
difficulty figuring out the cause. The spread of leishmaniasis (pronounced LEASH-ma-NYE-asis) is part of a trend of emerging infectious diseases in the United States in recent years as a
result of military deployments, as well as the pursuit of adventure travel and far-flung business
opportunities in the developing world, health officials say. Among those diseases appearing
more frequently in the United States are three transmitted by mosquitoes: malaria, which was
contracted by 122 troops last year in Afghanistan; dengue fever; and chikungunya fever.
Internal armed conflict in resource-rich countries is a major cause of human rights violations
around the world. An influential World Bank thesis states that the availability of portable, highvalue resources is an important reason that rebel groups form and civil wars break out, and
that to end the abuses one needs to target rebel group financing. The focus is on rebel groups,
and the thesis is that greed, rather than grievance alone, impels peoples toward internal
armed conflict.
Although examination of the nexus between resources, revenues, and civil war is critically
important, the picture as presented in the just-described greed vs. grievance theory is
distorted by an overemphasis on the impact of resources on rebel group behavior and
insufficient attention to how government mismanagement of resources and revenues fuels
conflict and human rights abuses. As argued here, if the international community is serious
about curbing conflict and related rights abuses in resource-rich countries, it should insist on
greater transparency in government revenues and expenditures and more rigorous
enforcement of punitive measures against governments that seek to profit from conflict.
Civil wars and conflict have taken a horrific toll on civilians throughout the world. Killings,
maiming, forced conscription, the use of child soldiers, sexual abuse, and other atrocities
characterize numerous past and ongoing conflicts. The level of violence has prompted
increased scrutiny of the causes of such wars. In this context, the financing of conflict through
natural resource exploitation has received increased scrutiny over the last few years.
When unaccountable, resource-rich governments go to war with rebels who often seek control
over the same resources, pervasive rights abuse is all but inevitable. Such abuse, in turn, can
further destabilize conditions, fueling continued conflict. Factoring the greed of governments
and systemic rights abuse into the greed vs. grievance equation does not minimize the need
to hold rebel groups accountable, but it does highlight the need to ensure that governments
too are transparent and accountable. Fundamentally, proper management of revenues is an
economic problem, and that is why the role of IFIs is so important. But it is an economic
problem that also has political dimensions and requires political solutions. Political will and
pressure, including targeted U.N. sanctions where appropriate, can motivate opaque, corrupt
governments to be more open and transparent. Where such pressure is lacking, as in Liberia
prior to enforcement of sanctions, continued conflict, rights abuse, and extreme deprivation of
civilians all too commonly are the result.
Modern military technology, especially the use of high-precision bombs, rockets, and
missile warheads, has now made it possible to attack civilian populations in
industrialized societies indirectlybut with devastating resultsby targeting the facilities
on which life depends, while avoiding the stigma of direct attack on the bodies and
habitats of noncombatants. The technique has been termed "bomb now, die later."
U.S. military action against Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and in the Iraq War has
included the specific and selective destruction of key aspects of the infrastructure
necessary to maintain c i v i l i a n life and health (see Chapter 15). During the bombing
phase of the Persian Gulf War this deliberate effort almost totally destroyed Iraq's
electrical-power generation and transmission capacity and its civilian communications
networks. In combination with the prolonged application of economic sanctions and the
disruption of highways, bridges, and facilities for refining and distributing fuel by
conventional bombing, these actions had severely damaging effects on the health and
survival of the civilian population, especially infants and children. Without electrical
power, water purification and pumping ceased immediately in all ma jor urban areas, as
did sewage pumping and treatment. The appearance and epidemic spread of infectious
diarrheal disease in infants and of waterborne diseases, such as typhoid fever and
cholera, were rapid. At the same lime, medical care and public health measures were
totally disrupted. Modern multistory hospitals were left without clean water, sewage
disposal, or any electricity beyond what could he supplied by emergency generators
designed to operate only a few hours per day. Operating rooms, x-ray equipment, and
other vital facilities were crippled. Supplies of anesthetics, antibiotics, and other
essential medications were rapidly depleted. Vaccines and medications requiring
refrigeration were destroyed, and all immunization programs increased. Because almost
no civilian telephones, computers, or transmission lines were operable, the Ministry of
Health was effectively immobilized. Fuel shortages and the disruption of transportation
limited civilian access to medical care.
Many reports provide clear and quantitative evidence of violations of the requirements
of immunity for civilian populations, proportionality, and the prevention of unnecessary
suffering. They mock the concept of life integrity rights. In contrast to the chaos and
social disruption that routinely accompany armed conflicts, these deaths have been the
consequence of and explicit military policy, with clearly foreseeable consequences to
human rights of civilians. The U.S. military has never conceded that its policies violated
human rights under the Geneva Conventions or the guidelines under which U.S. military
personnel operate. Yet the ongoing development of military technology suggests that
absent the use of weapons of mass destructionviolations of civilians human
rights will be the preferred method of warfare in the future.
War T/ Racism
War props up systems of racism and domination.
Martin 90. [Brian, Associate Professor of Science, Technology, and Society at the University of
Wollongong, , Uprooting War, Freedom Press,
[http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/index.html]
Antagonism between ethnic groups can be used and reinforced by the state to sustain its own
power. When one ethnic group controls all the key positions in the state, this is readily used to
keep other groups in subordinate positions, and as a basis for economic exploitation. This was
clearly a key process in apartheid in South Africa, but is also at work in many other countries in
which minority groups are oppressed. From this perspective, the dominant ethnic group uses
state power to maintain its ascendancy. But at the same time, the use of political and
economic power for racial oppression helps to sustain and legitimate state power itself. This is
because the maintenance of racial domination and exploitation comes to depend partly on the
use of state power, which is therefore supported and expanded by the dominant group. From
this perspective it can be said that the state mobilises racism to help maintain itself.
There are several other avenues used by the state to mobilise support. Several of these will be
treated in the following chapters, including bureaucracy and patriarchy. In each case,
structured patterns of dominance and submission are mobilised to support the state, and state
in turn helps to sustain the social structure in question, such as bureaucracy or patriarchy. To
counter the state, it is necessary both to promote grassroots mobilisation and to undermine
the key structures from which the state draws its power and from which it mobilises support.
War T/ Everything
War causes destroys health, human rights, the
environment, and causes domestic violence
Levy and Sidel, 7 (Barry Levy- Adjunct Professor of Community Health at Tufts University School
of Medicine, Victor Sidel- Professor of Social Medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College,
War and Public Health, Edition 2, 2007)
War accounts for more death and disability than many major diseases combined. It
destroys families, communities, and sometimes whole cultures. It directs scarce
resources away from protection and promotion of health, medical care, and other human
services. It destroys the infrastructure that supports health. It limits human rights and
contributes to social injustice. It leads many people to think that violence is the only way
to resolve conflictsa mindset that contributes to domestic violence, street crime, and
other kinds of violence. And it contributes to the destruction of the environment and
overuse of nonrenewable resources. In sum. war threatens much of the fabric of our
civilization.
War T/ Environment
Models prove nuclear war destroys the environment
smoke kills crop and starts an ice age
Robock and Toon 12 Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University,
and Professor/Founding chair in the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at the
University of Colorado (Alan and Brian, Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of
nuclear war, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2012, Vol. 68, pp. 66-74,
http://thewe.biz/thewe_/_/pdf/climate-impact-of-nuclear-war.pdf)
Modern climate models not only show that the nuclear winter theory
is correct, but also that the effects would last for more than a decade
(Robock et al., 2007a, 2007b) because of an unexpected phenomenon: Smoke would rise to
very high altitudes near 40 kilometers (25 miles) where it would be protected
from rain and would take more than a decade to clear completely . As a
consequence, the smokes climate impacts would be more extreme than
once thought. For example, the new models show that a full-scale nuclear conflict, in
which 150 million tons of smoke are lofted into the upper atmosphere, would drastically
reduce precipitation by 45 percent on a global average while
temperatures would fall for several years by 7 to 8 degrees Celsius on
average and would remain depressed by 4 degrees Celsius after a decade
(Robock et al. 2007). Humans have not experienced temperatures this low
since the last ice age (Figure 2). In important grain-growing regions of
the northern mid-latitudes, precipitation would decline by up to 90
percent, and temperatures would fall below freezing and remain there
for one or more years . The number of weapons needed to initiate
these climate changes falls within the range of arsenals planned for
the coming decade (Toon et al., 2008).
War T/ Warming
Even the smallest nuclear conflict drastically alters the
climate and kills billions
Robock and Toon 12 Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University,
and Professor/Founding chair in the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at the
University of Colorado (Alan and Brian, Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of
nuclear war, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2012, Vol. 68, pp. 66-74,
http://thewe.biz/thewe_/_/pdf/climate-impact-of-nuclear-war.pdf)
The United States and Russia are not the only countries capable of
wreaking worldwide climate havoc. All of the nuclear states except North
Korea, with its relatively small arsenal if involved in a nuclear war, have the destructive
power needed to alter the global environment (Robock et al., 2007b). It is
not correct to assume that the effects of a regional war would be
contained within a limited zone . For example, consider a nuclear war in
South Asia involving the use of I00 Hiroshima-size weapons. In these
simulations, more than five million tons of smoke is lofted to high
altitude, where it absorbs sunlight before the light can reach the
lower atmosphere (Toon et al.. 2oo7b). As a result, surface temperatures fall and
precipitation declines (Robock et al... 2007b). The calculated results show a 10 percent global
drop in precipitation, with the largest losses in the low latitudes due to failure of the monsoons. Our
on crop production predict reductions of soybean and corn production in the US Midwest, and of rice
production in China, of 20 percent for several years and I0 percent even after a decade (Ozdogan et al..
2012: Xia and Robock, 2012).
Given the brutality of war. many people survive wars only to be physically or mentally scarred
for life (see Box 1-1). Millions of survivors are chronically disabled from injuries sustained
during war or the immediate aftermath of war. Approximately one-third of Ihe soldiers who
survived ihe civil war in Ethiopia, for example, were injured or disabled, and at least
40,000 individuals lost one or more limbs during the war.' Antipersonnel landmines
represent a serious threat to many people'' (see Chapter 7). For example, in Cambodia, I
in 236 people is an amputee as a result of a landmine explosion.'0
Millions more people are psychologically impaired from wars, during which they have been
physically or sexually assaulted or have physically or sexually assaulted others; have been
tortured or have participated in the torture of others; have been forced to serve as soldiers
against their will; have witnessed the death of family members; or have experienced the
destruction of their communities or entire nations (sec Chapter4). Psychological trauma may be
demonstrated in disturbed and antisocial behaviors, such as aggression toward family
members and others. Many soldiers, on returning from military action, suffer from
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). which also affects many civilian survivors of war.
data cited in the report "raises a giant red flag about the threat to humanity posed." Yet, as Dr. Peter Wilk, former national executive director of PSR writes in an op-ed
threat is of our own creation." As a joint statement by 124 states delivered to the United Nations General Assembly
in October stated: "It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that
nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances."
"Countries around the worldthose who are nuclear-armed and those
who are notmust work together to eliminate the threat and
consequences of nuclear war," Helfand said. In order to eliminate this threat, we must eliminate nuclear weapons.
today, the "
Terrorism
Terrorism T/ Econ
Academic studies prove terrorism hurts the economy
Abadie and Gardeazabal, 7 (Alberto Abadie- professor of public policy @ Harvard, and
Javier Gareazabal- professor of economics @ the University of Baque Country, Terrorism
and the World Economy, August 2007, http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~aabadie/twe.pdf)
It has been argued that terrorism should not have a large effect on economic activity,
because terrorist attacks destroy only a small fraction of the stock of capital of a country
(see, e.g., Becker and Murphy, 2001). In contrast, empirical estimates of the
consequences of terrorism typically suggest large effects on economic outcomes (see,
e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). The main theme of this article is that mobility of
productive capital in an open economy may account for much of the difference between
the direct and the equilibrium impact of terrorism. We use a simple economic model to
show that terrorism may have a large impact on the allocation of productive capital
across countries, even if it represents a small fraction of the overall economic risk. The
model emphasizes that, in addition to increasing uncertainty, terrorism reduces the
expected return to investment. As a result, changes in the intensity of terrorism may
cause large movements of capital across countries if the world economy is sufficiently
open, so international investors are able to diversify other types of country risks. Using a
unique dataset on terrorism and other country risks, we find that, in accordance with the
predictions of the model, higher levels of terrorist risks are associated with lower levels
of net foreign direct investment positions, even after controlling for other types of
country risks. On average, a standard deviation increase in the terrorist risk is
associated with a fall in the net foreign direct investment position of about 5 percent of
GDP. The magnitude of the estimated effect is large, which suggests that the openeconomy channel" impact of terrorism may be substantial.
This paper analyzes the effects of terrorism in an integrated world economy. From an
economic standpoint, terrorism has been described to have four main effects (see, e.g.,
US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 2002). First, the capital stock (human and
physical) of a country is reduced as a result of terrorist attacks. Second, the terrorist
threat induces higher levels of uncertainty. Third, terrorism promotes increases in
counter-terrorism expenditures, drawing resources from productive sectors for use in
security. Fourth, terrorism is known to affect negatively specific industries such as
tourism.1 However, this classification does not include the potential effects of increased
terrorist threats in an open economy. In this article, we use a stylized macroeconomic
model of the world economy and inter- national data on terrorism and the stock of
foreign direct investment (FDI) assets and liabilities to study the economic effects of
terrorism in an integrated world economy
The amounts of foreign direct investment in the U.S. before and after the September
11th attacks provide some suggestive evidence of the open-economy channel of
terrorism. In the year 2000, the year before the terrorist attacks, foreign direct
investment inflows represented about 15.8 percent of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation
in the U.S. This figure decreased to only 1.5 percent in 2003, two years after the attacks.
Conversely, foreign direct investment outflows from the U.S. increased from about 7.2
percent of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation for the U.S. in 2000 to 7.5 percent in 2003
(see UNCTAD, 2004). Of course, not all this variation in FDI can be attributed to the
effect of the September 11th attacks. As of September 2001 foreign direct investment
inflows had fallen from its 2000 peak not only in the U.S. but also in other developed
economies (see UNCTAD, 3In related research, Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer (2004)
study the effect of terrorism on life satisfaction. Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer (2007)
surveys the existing research on the economic impact of terrorism. 2 2002). These
figures, however, motivate the question of to which extent an increase in the perceived
level of terrorism was responsible for the drop in FDI in the U.S. that followed the events
of September 11th. Surveys of international corporate investors provide direct evidence
of the importance of terrorism on foreign investment. Corporate investors rate terrorism
as one of the most important factors influencing their foreign direct investment
decisions (see Global Business Policy Council, 2004).
this year or its projection of 3.5 percent growth for 2002. However, he
conceded that actual growth in 2002 is likely to be rather lower than 3.5
percent. The IMF compared the attacks to the costliest natural disaster in
modern history, the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan. That quake caused over
6,400 deaths, 35,000 injuries and property damage of $120 billion, or about 2.5
percent of Japan's gross domestic product. The direct impact of the Kobe quake
on the Japanese economy was larger than that of the attacks on the American
economy, the IMF said. However, the total effect of the terrorist attacks
on the U.S. economy could be more far-reaching, particularly if shaken
consumer confidence does not rebound, it said. "Since the terrorist
attack was a deliberate action with long-term security implications,
the effects on consumer psychology may well not be comparable," the
IMF said. The IMF's latest "World Economic Outlook" described
unusually large uncertainties and risks facing industrialized countries
and the developing world. "There is now no major region providing
support to global activity," the IMF said. "This has increased the
vulnerability of the global economy to shocks and heightened the risk
of a self-reinforcing downturn whose consequences could prove
difficult to predict." For the United States, the IMF projected the GDP would
grow a weak 1.3 percent this year, 0.2 percentage point lower than its May
forecast. For 2002, the IMF forecast U.S. growth would rebound slightly to 2.2
percent. The U.S. economy grew 4.1 percent in 2000. The IMF's outlook for
Japan, the world's second-largest economy, was even gloomier. Japan is
probably already in its fourth recession of the decade, the IMF said in projecting
Japan's GDP would shrink by 0.5 percent this year and manage only a tiny 0.2
percent gain in 2002. For Germany, the largest economy in Europe, the IMF put
growth this year at 0.8 percent, 1.1 percentage point below its May projection.
It forecast Germany would grow by 1.8 percent next year. The 12 European
nations that have adopted the euro as a joint currency will see growth of 1.8
percent this year and 2.2 percent in 2002, the IMF estimated. In one of its few
upward revisions, the IMF said it expected China's economy would grow by 7.5
percent this year, up by 0.5 percentage point from the May forecast, and by 7.1
percent in 2002. Growth in developing countries was expected to be 4.3
percent this year and 5.3 percent in 2002. Last year, the developing world
managed growth of 5.8 percent.
Terrorism T/ Disease
Terrorist attacks would include the use of diseases--increases the risk of spread
Dunn et al. 05 [Mark, Kate Jones, Shaun Phillips, Herald Sun, Lexis]
Terrorists have also not yet crossed the radiological dispersal bomb (dirty
bomb) threshold. A dirty bomb will disperse radioactive materials but
not cause a nuclear detonation and mushroom cloud. Materials for dirty
bombs include roughly a dozen radioisotopes that are ubiquitous in
international use as radiation sources for medicine, industry, and agriculture-and readily available to determined terrorists. A dirty bomb would not kill
many people, but it would cause enormous psychological trauma and
economic disruption (Ferguson et al. 2004). Regardless of whether or not
terrorists are just about to cross the nuclear bomb threshold, we must
assume that some of them eventually will. The best preventive measure is
to keep the weapons-usable material out of their hands.
Terrorism T/ Racism
Terrorism justifies racism
Mahoney and Kirk 2 (Honor, Editor and Lisbeth, Staff writer, EU Observer, Lexis)
(Jeff, The Globe and Mail, Spectre of racist backlash worries many in Canada)AQB
after the attacks Sept. 11 in New York and Washington, which are believed by U.S.
officials to be the work of Islamic extremists. Fears of an ugly racial backlash in
Canada and the United States have prompted Prime Minister Jean
Chrtien and President George W. Bush to reach out to the Arab and
Muslim communities in their countries and to urge their citizens to show tolerance.
Appearing at an Ottawa mosque last Friday, Mr. Chrtien said he was ashamed
of recent racial slurs and attacks on Canadian Muslims , including an
assault six days earlier in Ottawa on a teenaged boy of Arab descent. The poll
indicates that 82 per cent of Canadians share Mr. Chrtien's fears of a
backlash. The Globe and Mail-CTV Ipsos-Reid poll of 1,000 adults was taken between
Sept. 17 and 20. The margin of error is plus or minus 3.1 per cent 19 times out of 20
with a sample this size. Eighty-two per cent of the respondents said they
Structural Violence
This large and at first sight messy Part VII is central to this anthologys thesis. It
encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence
of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes,
Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Dalys version of
US apartheid in Chicagos South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class
hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the smelly working
classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and
social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions,
interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US
inner city to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39).
Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent selfdestruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly
embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central
genocides to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth
mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City.
presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force
against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as
encompassing all forms of controlling processes (Nader 1997b) that assault basic
human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray
zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing
into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification,
depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the
question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are
suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is
priming (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the genocidal continuum (as we call
that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of
human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to
the
it)
Disease
College
Pandemic Influenza:
There exists in the world today the possibility of a great influenza pandemic matching
those of the past century with the potential to far exceed the pain, suffering and deaths
of past pandemics. Although global pandemics are difficult to accurately predict,
scientists theorize that another pandemic on a scale of the deadly 1918 Spanish Flu
pandemic is imminent.
If a pandemic influenza occurs, as predicted by many in the medical and scientific
community, the number of Americans affected could easily overwhelm our medical
capability resulting in untold suffering and deaths. Although an influenza pandemic, if it
occurs, has the potential to devastate and threaten our society, an equally alarming
consequence is the effects it could have on the operational readiness of the United
States military establishment. With our current engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq,
along with other smaller engagements world-wide, if an influenza pandemic were to
strike the military, our level of operational readiness, preparedness and ability to defend
our vital national interests could be decreased or threaten. As a result of the pending
threat of an influenza pandemic, the United States military, must take decisive actions to
mitigate the potential devastation an influenza pandemic might have on operational
readiness.
An infectious disease pandemic could impair the militarys readiness, jeopardize ongoing
military operations abroad, and threaten the day-to-day functioning of the Department
of Defense (DOD) because of up to 40% of personnel reporting sick or being absent
during a pandemic, according to a recent GAO report (June 2007).
Congressman Tom Davis, ranking member of the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform in the U.S. House of Representatives, requested the GAO
investigation. (1) The 40% number (above) comes from the Homeland Security Councils
estimate that 40% of the U.S. workforce might not be at work due to illness, the need to
care for family members who are sick, or fear of becoming infected. (2) DOD military
and civilian personnel and contractors would face a similar absentee rate, according to
the GAO writers.
Disease T/ Poverty
Disease is a cause of poverty
Malaria Consortium 2014
Poor health can impoverish, and poverty can lead to poor health. But it
also follows that improvements in one can benefit the other: this is why
it is important to
understand how poverty and disease are linked and how health
interventions can help alleviate poverty. 1. Cost remains a barrier to
improved health Despite a range of effective prevention and
treatment methods, these are often not fully adopted or accessed
due to costs. For people living in extreme poverty, even seemingly
low-cost solutions are often out of reach, with fees for consultation,
drugs and transportation often delaying or preventing people from
seeking of life-saving treatment. Treatment and prevention are often not
accessible to those who need them due to mismanagement and conflicting priorities of
national and international actors. This has been an intractable struggle for the 17 neglected
tropical diseases (NTDs), most of which disproportionately affect the poorest groups and
attract limited international attention. For example, the cost of treating a child for soiltransmitted worms comes to about $0.50 for an entire year and can make a huge difference in
improving life opportunities. Yet the disease still runs rampant, affecting over 1.5 billion people
worldwide, causing anaemia and malnutrition. 2. The causes of disease are perpetuated by
poor living conditions Poor sanitation and contaminated water supplies, as well as poor diet,
A high disease
burden carries heavy costs for individuals. Each day that a child
spends at home due to malaria or other illness is a day that they are
unable to go to school. For adults, being sick means that they cannot work and earn
money to support their families.
disease and the resulting stigma can lead to low employability and
fewer economic opportunities. Added together, these factors constitute a
major drag on the economy. Some experts predict that malaria alone inhibits GDP
growth by approximately 1.3% every year. 4. Seeking treatment costs time and money When
someone gets sick in a remote village, they often have to travel to the nearest health facility
for treatment a trip that will inevitably cost time and, most probably, money. For families or
individuals that are already facing economic hardships, this can be particularly detrimental.
Most of the money spent on treatment comes from patients own pockets.
Out-of-pocket
and have agreed to keep a health focus in the development of the new Sustainable
Development Goals, which will aim to reduce poverty by improving maternal and child health.
Disease T/ War
Disease increases the likelihood of war and genocide
Peterson, 3 (Susan- associate professor of Government at the College of William & Mary,
Security Studies 12, no. 2 (winter 2002/3), Epidemic Disease and National Security
http://people.wm.edu/~smpete/files/epidemic.pdf)
How might these political and economic effects produce violent conflict? Price-Smith
offers two possible answers: Disease .magnif[ies].both relative and absolute deprivation
and.hasten[s] the erosion of state capacity in seriously affected societies. Thus,
infectious disease may in fact contribute to societal destabilization and to chronic lowintensity intrastate violence, and in extreme cases it may accelerate the processes that
lead to state failure..83 Disease heightens competition among social groups and elites
for scarce resources. When the debilitating and deadly effects of IDs like AIDS are
concentrated among a particular socio-economic, ethnic, racial, or geographic group,
the potential for conflict escalates. In many parts of Africa today, AIDS strikes rural areas
at higher rates than urban areas, or it hits certain provinces harder than others. If these
trends persist in states where tribes or ethnic groups are heavily concentrated in
particular regions or in rural rather than urban areas, AIDS almost certainly will interact
with tribal, ethnic, or national differences and make political and military conflict more
likely. Price-Smith argues, moreover, that .the potential for intra-elite violence is also
increasingly probable and may carry grave political consequences, such as coups, the
collapse of governance, and planned genocides..84
the frequency of
armed conflict and civil war is
of
great interest
We present the parasite-stress model of intrastate conflict
by linking frequency of
civil war to the
intensity of infectious disease across countries
High intensity of
infectious disease leads to the emergence of xenophobic and
ethnocentric cultural norms These cultures suffer greater poverty
and deprivation
Resource
competition among xenophobic and ethnocentric groups within a
nation leads to increased frequency of civil war
with
regression analyses We find
a direct effect of infectious disease
on intrastate armed conflict and
the incidence of
civil war
Geographic and cross-national variation in
intrastate
a subject
. Previous theory on this variation has focused on the influence on human behaviour of climate, resource competition, national wealth, and cultural characteristics.
of the world.
due to the morbidity and mortality caused by disease, and as a result of decreased investment in public health and welfare.
support for
via its negative effect on national wealth. We consider the entanglements of feedback of conflict into further reduced wealth and increased incidence of disease, and discuss implications
Disease T/ Russia
Disease collapses Russia
Tucker 2001 JONATHAN B. TUCKER is Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute, Contagious Fears; Infectious Disease and
National Security., 6/22/2001, Harvard International Review,
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Harvard-International-Review/75213388.html//OF
By 2010, AIDS and malaria combined will reduce the gross domestic products of several sub-Saharan African countries by
20 percent or more, bringing these nations to the brink of economic collapse as they lose the most productive segment of
their populations. If current trends continue, a decade from now some 41.6 million children in 27 countries will have lost
one or both parents to AIDS, creating a "lost generation" of orphans with little hope of education or employment. These
young people may become marginalized or easily exploited for political ends, as in the increasingly pervasive
phenomenon of the child-soldier, putting AIDS-stricken countries at risk of further economic decay, increas8ed crime, and
months as growing political pressure has led multinational pharmaceutical companies to lower the price of AIDS drugs
sold to poor countries. The NIE on the global infectious disease threat provides unsettling but enlightening reading. It
shown little interest in nontraditional threats, would do well to heed this warning.
Hegemony
Heg T/ economy
US withdrawal would result in a new dark age and
collapse the global economy
Ferguson, 4 (Niall. Prof of history @ Harvard. Hoover Digest, A World without Power
July/August 4. http://www.hooverdigest.org/044/ferguson.html)
So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat
into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a
hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age
would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For
the world is much more populousroughly 20 times moremeaning that friction
between the worlds disparate tribes is bound to be more frequent. Technology has
transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on fresh water and the
harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has
upgraded destruction, too; it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it.
For more than two decades, globalizationthe integration of world markets for
commodities, labor, and capitalhas raised living standards throughout the world,
except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or
civil war. The reversal of globalizationwhich a new Dark Age would producewould
certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought
to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it
would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to
work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europes Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist
extremists infiltration of the E.U. would become irreversible, increasing transatlantic
tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China
would plunge the communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that
undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude
that lower returns at home were preferable to the risks of default abroad.
The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great
powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economyfrom New York to Rotterdam to
Shanghaiwould become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists
could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise
liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure.
Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the
Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In
Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in evangelical Christianity
imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would
continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend
services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately
guarded safe havens to go there?
United States and China over issues such as Taiwan, the U.S. military
posture in general should take this possibility into account. Measures
should be taken to correct the Chinese belief that they can confront the world with a fait
accompli in Taiwan. The United States needs expanded joint exercises with states in the
region. Ensuring access to key facilities in countries such as the Philippines, prepositioning stocks in the region, and increasing Taiwan's ability to defend itself would
also be prudent. The large distances of the East Asian region also suggest
The core argument itself is not new: The United States and the West face a
new threat--weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists-and, whether we like it or not, no power other than the United States
has the capacity, or can provide the decisive leadership, required to
handle this and other critical global security issues. Certainly not the
United Nations or, anytime soon, the European Union. In the absence of
American primacy, the international order would quickly return to
disorder. Indeed, whatever legitimate concerns people may have about
the fact of America's primacy, the downsides of not asserting that
primacy are, according to The American Era, potentially far more serious. The
critics "tend to dwell disproportionately on problems in the exercise of
[American] power rather than on the dire consequences of retreat
from an activist foreign policy," Lieber writes. They forget "what can
happen in the absence of such power."
to climate change, could plague large areas of the globe, from China
to the Horn of Africa, triggering mass migrations and political
upheavals. The influence of the United Nations, the World Bank and a
host of other international organizations that have maintained political
and economic stability since the Second World War will also plummet .
The world will enter an increasingly unstable and unpredictable period
in which the advance of Western-style democracy is no longer assured,
the study said. "The United States will remain the single most powerful country but will
be less dominant," the report said. "Shrinking economic and military
capabilities may force the U.S. into a difficult set of trade-offs between
domestic versus foreign policy priorities." In the wake of the then just
erupting 2008 global financial crisis, "the better economic performance of
many authoritarian governments could sow doubts among some about
democracy as the best form of government," the report predicted.
Economy
the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the
undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose
any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is
Economy T/ China
Economic collapse turns Chinese relations and war
Mead 9 (Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy Council on
Foreign Relations, Only Makes You Stronger, The New Republic, 2-4,
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)
The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is
probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end
China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the
international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn.
The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private
enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country
without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property
The political
consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of
anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of
Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed
the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could
lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country,
markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class.
further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation
of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of
modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops.
India's
future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in
India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic
system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty
and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long-term growth,
and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration. The violent
Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious
extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's
economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil seriously damaged the
performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great
Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the
West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and
Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries
escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama
administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic
slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison
relations for years. For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge
from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that
it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more
severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose
trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face
new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil
prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S.
protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already
improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the
collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose
above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank
Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming
months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the
government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at
home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies
like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and
other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade
opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have
become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer
resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic
domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target
for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has
the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a
position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over
time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the
leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability
to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in
international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the
change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their
tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly.
They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They
are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically
develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent
and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast
social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating
social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives
them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the
world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the
United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France,
Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that
support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and
political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs
people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin
world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left.
Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of
the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable,
open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were
making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly
because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed
by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences,
many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide
that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half-hearted experiments not
only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively
worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to
Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central
Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists,
financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the
capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these
societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial
crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and
countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater
economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently,
financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and
wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and
enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great
powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial
crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system
under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the
Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the
two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises.
Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928,
but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf
Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what
rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to
be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world
economy back on track, we may still have to fight.
Economy T/ Democracy
Economic crises collapse global democracy
Diamond 9 Larry Diamond, senior fellow @ Hoover Institution Supporting Democracy,
March 2009, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090310_lennon_democracy_web.pdf,
Economy T/ Disease
Economic collapse causes diseases and growth solves it
Goklany 7 PhD, science and tech policy analyst for the US Dept of the Interior
Indur M, M.S. and Ph.D are from Michigan State University, the improving state of the world,
page number below in [brackets]
Thanks to the cycle of progress, humanity, though more populous and still
imperfect, has never been in better condition. The next few decades will
see a world that will almost certainly be more populated than it is today. If
the cycle of progress is unable to advance this additional burden or is
slowed significantly for whatever reason, our children will inherit a world
where hunger, poverty, and infectious and parasitic diseases claim ever greater
numbers, as well as where humanity's quest for food, clothing, and shelter diverts even
the cycle of
progress could continue to move farther and faster giving us a world
where the population has stabilized; where hunger and malnutrition have
been virtually banished; where malaria, tuberculosis, AIDS, and other infectious and
parasitic diseases are distant memories; and where humanity meets its needs while
ceding land and water back to the rest of nature. And although there will no doubt be some
larger shares of land and water away from the rest of nature. Alternatively,
environmental degradation and the climate might be somewhat warmer, they need not be
catastrophi-cally so. Almost everyone could have access to adequate sanitation and clean
water. The air and water could be cleaner even if "code red" days were to still occur
occasionally in Mexico City, Beijing, and New Delhi. And even in sub-Saharan Africa infant
mortality could be as low as it is today in the United States and life expectancies as high.
Perhaps the most hopeful sign that the further improvements in the human condition are
possible and that the second vision of the world is within grasp is that although today's
developing countries lag the developed countries in virtually every indicator of human and
environmental well-being, the former are ahead of where the latter used to be at equivalent
levels of economic and social develop-ment. This is indeed the case for every critical indicator
examined here, such as infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy, and access to safe water.
Profiting further from the experience of today's devel-oped world, developing countries have
also started addressing their pollution problems at much earlier levels of economic
components of the cycle: free trade in ideas, knowledge, goods, and human and fiscal capital;
education; and public health. But most important,
does not run out of power. Fueling the cycle of progress is not inevitable. Rarely have
the conditions responsible for technological change and economic growth come together at
any place for too long. The life span of virtually every empire, civilization, or political and
economic system can be measured in terms of a few centuries and sometimes even decades.
In fact, long-lasting entities such as the ancient Egyptian civilization or the Roman or Byzantine
empires are characterized more by their stability (before their eventual demise) than by long-
term gains in the average person's lot. To ensure that the cycle of progress keeps moving
forward, the institutions underlying that cycle need to be nurtured and, in many places,
strengthened. These institutions that power technological progress include free markets;
secure property rights to both tangible and intellectual products; fair, equitable, and relatively
transparent rules to govern those markets and enforce contracts; institutions for accumulating
and converting knowledge into useful and beneficial products; and honest and predictable
bureaucracies and governments. These insti-tutions also underpin a strong civil society.
However, building and strengthening these institutions may not be enough if society is hostile
to change and if richer societiesin their quest for zero risk reject imperfect ("second best")
solutions. The quest for perfection in an imperfect world should lead to progress, not paralysis.
In fact, the history of the progress in human well-being during the past two centuries is one in
which higher-risk technologies are progressively replaced by technologies that, while not riskfree, carry lower risks, If through a misapplication of the precautionary principle, humanity had
waited for the perfect energy source, it would still be living in the dark, shivering from the cold,
starving from hunger, and lucky to live beyond 40. Jared Diamond's retelling of the extinction
of the Norse civilization in Greenland provides us with a powerful parable of the perils of
shunning technological change.90As the Medieval Warming Period gave way to the Little Ice
Age, the Vikings stuck to their time-honored ways. Survival wasn't made easier by the fact that
they apparently had a taboo against eating fish.91 Even though they were isolated from their
traditional trading partners and despite having the successful example of the Inuits to learn
from, they did not adopt the latter's fishing and hunting techniques for reasons that cannot be
fathomed (perhaps that was because of inflexible social institutionsor a Viking version of the
precautionary principle). We saw shades of a similar dynamic play out, fortunately not to its
bitter end, when, in 2002, Zambia refused food aid because it contained GM corn from the
United States.92 Whatever the reason, because the Vikings were not open to technological
change, they failed to adaptand perished. As Diamond observes, "A society's fate lies in its
own hands and depends substantially on its own choices."931 contend that one of society's
critical choices is its attitude toward and openness to tech-nological change. Of course, it is
possible that with sufficient economic growth and technological change, the general pattern
that we see today with respect to human well-being, namely, matters improving with income,
will be less obvious in the future. Consider, for example, the curve depicting access to safe
water versus per capita income (illustrated in figure 6.13). Conceivably, with constant
technological change, the knee in the curve would shift further toward the left as more costeffective technologies are developed. At the same time, further economic growth could push
virtually all countries to the eight of the knee. Because of the combination of these two trends,
a few decades from now virtually everyone should have access to t<afe water. Similarly, a few
decades from now one may no longer be able to determine a strong dependence of life
expectancy on the level of economic development. Accordingly, some people might conclude
that economic growth, having served its purpose as the midwife for technological change, had
become superfluous. Others might conclude that further technological change itself is
unnecessary. Shades of these arguments are already evident in the opposition to GM foods and
the use of DDT. Notably, most of the opposition lo these technologies comes from people who
are quite comfortably off, that is, they come from societies where incomes are beyond the
knee of the well-being versus income curves, and they see little or no utility in enhancing the
quantity and quality of food, or in cost-effective vector control. Although I have shown that
these arguments are invalid today because of the large numbers worldwide who wouldand,
indeed, dobenefit from such technologies, is it possible that, after the evident problems of
today are more or less solved, these arguments would carry much greater weight? Could we
then eschew further economic growth and technological change? We dare not do so. First, as
noted, there are no perfect solutions. Every solution contains within it the germs of another
problem. Thus, horse-drawn transportationthe polluter of the city a century ag0wwas
replaced by the internal combustion engine. But today it is that engine that pollutes the city.
that's progress
continually replacing bigger problems with smaller ones, and the problems
that are left over will always be harder to solve. Second, even if humanity rests on its
laurels, the rest of nature will go on automatically probing its defenses
Tomorrow's solutions will no doubt have their own problems. But
Economy T/ Hegemony
Economic collapse turns hegemonygeopolitical shifts,
undermines will, destroys alliances
Rothkopf 9 David, Visiting Fellow @ Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace, 3/11/9. CQ
Congressional Testimony, Lexis
We have only experienced the first wave of shocks associated with the
international economic collapse. It is still too early to say how long the economic
dimensions of the global downturn will continue to challenge leaders and populations
worldwide, and while it is impossible to predict how much further conditions will deteriorate
before the global economy begins to recover as it inevitably will, one set of consequences of
the crisis can be predicted with a high degree of confidence. A crisis of this severity, one that
according to the most recent estimate by the World Bank will produce net global contraction in
2009, that has already brought U.S. stock markets to 12 year lows stripping away over half
their value, that has deeply eaten into world trade cutting volumes by almost a third and into
capital flows and shaken the global financial system to its very foundations, will unavoidably
produce a series of political aftershocks. A recent report for the Asian Development Bank
suggests the crisis has already obliterated approximately $50 trillion in asset value worldwide the equivalent of roughly a year of global economic output. We have already seen political
reactions in public demonstrations and other violent episodes in a diverse list of countries
including Greece, China, Haiti, Latvia, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Russia, Italy, Ireland, Iceland and
Lithuania. But these events are just the first rumblings of upsets that almost certainly will
ultimately be far more serious and will have important national security consequences for the
U.S.. Further,
shifts as power is concentrated in the hands of nations with available capital, drawn away
from those who are net borrowers, and greater and greater constraints limit the options of
nations who are likely to spend years seeking to work down the debts incurred during this time
of severe global contraction. This new reality was reflected in the fact that Director of National
Intelligence Blair in his February 12, 2009 testimony to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence on the Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment cited the crisis as the
primary driver of concerns in today's world. As he clearly stated, "The primary near-term
security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical
crisis. Without a degree of financial support and political flexibility for vital organizations like
the IMF and the World Bank that seems unlikely at the moment, we may well find ourselves at
a true crossroads for the international system. At precisely the instance that the crisis has
revealed a need for greater global regulatory oversight and stronger financial institutions to
prevent and to respond to crisis, rising nationalism, the political imperative of turning inward,
and limited resources threaten existing institutions with irrelevance and needed new ones with
more complex by the need to rethink the steering committee for this system and recognize the
That this
economic crisis has also produced a global crisis of confidence in
institutions from national governments to financial markets, from
international economic coordination mechanisms that have failed to
big corporations, only further exacerbates these already daunting
challenges. Beyond threats to stabilizing forces and the international
system, individual countries and key regions are also likely to see
decline and unrest brought on by the crisis. Some of this unrest is likely
to take the form of regime changes or social instability. Other risks
associated with the crisis will come as opportunists seek to use anger
at the failures in a system that is closely associated with the U.S. to
foment hatred, to fuel recruitment for extremist and anti-US
organizations and to simply produce distractions from local problems via the time-tested
rise of emerging powers and the declining relevance of some established powers.
means of identifying foreign or domestic scapegoats and lashing out against them.
These estimates suggest that roughly a quarter of Americas relative decline is due to
U.S. economic weaknesses (spending on the Iraq War, tax cuts, current-account deficits,
etc.), a sixth to Chinas superior performance and just over half to the spread of
technology to the rest of the world. In other words, self-inflicted wounds of the Bush
years significantly exacerbated Americas decline, both by making the decline steeper
and faster and crowding out productive investment that could have stimulated
innovation to improve matters.
All of this has led to one of the most significant declines of any state since the midnineteenth century. And when one examines past declines and their consequences, it
becomes clear both that the U.S. fall is remarkable and that dangerous instability in the
international system may lie ahead. If we end up believing in the wishful thinking of
unipolar dominance forever, the costs could be far higher than a simple percentage drop
in share of world product.
The authors' argument about the uniqueness of American hegemony rests on four main
pillars. The most obvious is economic: as they point out, the U.S. economy has
outstripped almost all of its competitors for much of the past century. This point is
developed by another of the book's contributors, Angus Maddison, and explored in
almost encyclopedic depth in the chapter by Moses Abramovitz and Paul David.
According to these authors, nothing achieved by the United Kingdom -- not even in the
first flush of the Industrial Revolution -- ever compared with the United States' recent
economic predominance.
Second, the authors point to the way the United States has very deliberately used its
power to advance multilateral, mutually balanced tariff reductions under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later the World Trade Organization). As Robert Gilpin
argues in his chapter, the tariff reductions achieved in the 1967 Kennedy Round
negotiations (and subsequently) owed much to "American pressures." Such pressure was
classically exerted through "conditionality" -- that is, the terms under which the
Washington-based International Monetary Fund granted its loans. This deliberate process
contrasts markedly with the willy-nilly way free trade spread in the nineteenth century,
as described by O'Brien and Hobson.
The third pillar of American dominance can be found in the way successive U.S.
governments sought to take advantage of the dollar's role as a key currency before and
after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods institutions, which, according to O'Brien,
enabled the United States to be "far less restrained ... than all other states by normal
fiscal and foreign exchange constraints when it came to funding whatever foreign or
strategic policies Washington decided to implement." As Robert Gilpin notes, quoting
Charles de Gaulle, such policies led to a "hegemony of the dollar" that gave the U.S.
"extravagant privileges." In David Calleo's words, the U.S. government had access to a
"gold mine of paper" and could therefore collect a subsidy from foreigners in the form of
seigniorage (the profits that flow to those who mint or print a depreciating currency).
Economy T/ Poverty
Growth solves poverty and collapse causes it
Dollar and Kraay 2 David Dollar is Head of the Macroeconomics and Growth
Group in the Research Department of the World Bank. Aart Kraay is a Senior Economist in the
Development Research Group of the World Bank's Development Economics Vice Presidency
(Growth is Good for the Poor. Journal of Economic Growth, 7. 2002.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/22015_Growth_is_Good_for_Poor.pdf)
that
-- and everyone else -- to increase their production and income. On the other
hand, we find little evidence that formal democratic institutions or a large degree of
government spending on social services systematically affect incomes of the poor. Our findings
do not imply that growth is all that is needed to improve the lives of the poor. Rather, we
mean that the potential distributional effects of growth, or the policies that support growth,
can or should be ignored. Our results do not imply that the income share of the poorest quintile
is immutable rather, we simply are unable to relate the changes across countries and over
time in this income share to average incomes, or to a variety of proxies for policies and
institutions that matter for growth and poverty reduction. This may simply be because any
effects of these policies on the income share of the poorest quintile are small relative to the
very substantial measurement error in the very imperfect available income distribution data
we are forced to rely upon. It may also be due to the inability of our simple empirical models to
capture the complex interactions between inequality and growth suggested by some
theoretical models. In short, existing cross-country evidence including our own provides
disappointingly little guidance as to what mix of growthoriented policies might especially
benefit the poorest in society. But our evidence does strongly suggest that economic growth
and the policies and institutions that support it on average benefit the poorest in society as
much as anyone else.
Class11/15/2012,http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2012/11/15/economic-growth-notredistribution-most-benefits-the-poor-working-people-and-the-middle-class/,accessed 7/16 ]
RMT
look like if we can keep this economic growth going. Physicist Michio Kaku gave us an
indication of that in a March, 2012 interview in the Wall Street Journal, explaining, Every 18
months, computer power doubles, so in eight years, a microchip will cost only a penny. Instead
of one chip inside a desk top, well have millions of chips in all of our possessions: furniture,
cars, appliances, clothes. Chips will be so ubiquitious that we wont say the word computer.
Kaku continued, To comprehend the world were entering, consider another word that will
disappear soon: tumor. We will have DNA chips inside our toilet, which will sample some of
our blood and urine and tell us if we have cancer maybe 10 years before a tumor forms. He
adds, When you need to see a doctor, youll talk to a wall in your home, and an animated
artificially intelligent doctor will appear. Youll scan your body with a hand-held MRI machine,
the Robodoc will analyze the results, and youll receive a diagnosis that is 99% accurate.
Kaku further projected, In this augmented reality,the Internet will be in your contact lens.
You will blink, and you will go online. That will change everything. Kaku concludes, If you
could meet your grandkids as elderly citizens in the year 2100, you would view them as being,
basically, Greek gods. Just maintaining the real, long term, U.S.economic
growth rate of 3.2% from 1947 to 2007 would have doubled our GDP
of today 4 times, meaning a GDP 16 times as large as today, In that
future, the poor of the time will have the standard of living of the
American middle class in 2065. We will enjoy peace in our time, as the
American military will be so advanced and dominant that no one else
will even try to spend enough on their military to even threaten or
challenge us. A world of free trade resulting from this Pax Americana
will spread prosperity throughout the now third world.
offers authoritative insight and opinion on international news, politics, business, finance,
science and technology. Fred).
Growth Decreases Poverty In 1990-2010 the driving force behind the reduction of worldwide
poverty was growth. Over the past decade, developing countries have boosted their GDP about
6% a year1.5 points more than in 1960-90. This happened despite the worst worldwide
economic crisis since the 1930s. The three regions with the largest numbers of poor people all
registered strong gains in GDP after the recession: at 8% a year in East Asia; 7% in South Asia;
5% in Africa. As a rough guide, every 1% increase in GDP per head reduces poverty by around
1.7%. GDP, though, is not necessarily the best measure of living standards and poverty
reduction. It is usually better to look at household consumption based on surveys. Martin
Ravallion, until recently the World Banks head of research, took 900 such surveys in 125
developing countries. These show, he calculates, that consumption in developing countries has
grown by just under 2% a year since 1980. But there has been a sharp increase since 2000.
Before that, annual growth was 0.9%; after it, the rate leapt to 4.3%. Growth alone does not
guarantee less poverty. Income distribution matters, too. One estimate found that two thirds of
the fall in poverty was the result of growth; one-third came from greater equality. More equal
countries cut poverty further and faster than unequal ones. Mr Ravallion reckons that a 1%
increase in incomes cut poverty by 0.6% in the most unequal countries but by 4.3% in the
most equal ones. The country that cut poverty the most was China, which in 1980 had the
largest number of poor people anywhere. China saw a huge increase in income inequalitybut
even more growth. Between 1981 and 2010 it lifted a stunning 680m people out poverty
more than the entire current population of Latin America. This cut its poverty rate from 84% in
1980 to about 10% now. China alone accounts for around three quarters of the worlds total
decline in extreme poverty over the past 30 years. What is less often realised is that the
recent story of poverty reduction has not been all about China. Between 1980 and 2000 growth
in developing countries outside the Middle Kingdom was 0.6% a year. From 2000 to 2010 the
rate rose to 3.8%similar to the pattern if you include China. Mr Ravallion calculates that the
acceleration in growth outside China since 2000 has cut the number of people in extreme
poverty by 280m. Can this continue? And if it does, will it eradicate extreme poverty by 2030?
To keep poverty reduction going, growth would have to be maintained at something like its
current rate. Most forecasters do expect that to happen, though problems in Europe could spill
over and damage the global economy. Such long-range forecasts are inevitably unreliable but
two broad trends make an optimistic account somewhat plausible. One is that fast-growing
developing countries are trading more with each other, making them more resilient than they
used to be to shocks from the rich world. The other trend is that the two parts of the world with
the largest numbers of poor people, India and Africa, are seeing an expansion of their workingage populations relative to the numbers of dependent children and old people. Even so,
countries potentially face a problem of diminishing returns which could make progress at the
second stage slower than at the first. There is no sign so far that returns are in fact
diminishing. The poverty rate has fallen at a robust one percentage point a year over the past
30 yearsand there has been no tailing off since 2005. But diminishing returns could occur for
two reasons. When poverty within a country falls to very low levels, the few remaining poor are
the hardest to reach. And, globally, as more people in countries such as China become middle
class, poverty will become concentrated in fragile or failing states which have seen little
poverty reduction to date. The sweetest spot In a study for the Brookings Institution, a thinktank in Washington, DC, Laurence Chandy, Natasha Ledlie and Veronika Penciakova look at the
distribution of consumption (how many people consume $1 a day, $2 a day and so on) in
developing countries. They show how it has changed over time, and how it might change in
future. Plotted on a chart, the distribution looks like a firemans helmet, with a peak in front
and a long tail behind. In 1990 there were hardly any people with no income at all, then a peak
just below the poverty line and then a long tail of richer folk extending off to the right (see
chart 2). As countries get richer, the helmet moves to the right, reflecting the growth in
household consumption. The faster the rate, the farther to the right the line moves, so the
strong 4.3% annual growth in consumption since 2000 has pushed the line a good distance
rightward. But the shape of the line also matters. The chart shows that in 1990 and 2000, the
peak was positioned slightly to the left of the poverty line. As the shape moved to the right, it
took a section of the peak to the other side of the poverty mark. This represents the surge of
people who escaped poverty in 1990-2010. At the moment the world is at a unique sweet
spot. More people are living at $1.25 than at any other level of consumption. This means
growth will result in more people moving across the international poverty line than across any
other level of consumption. This is a big reason why growth is still producing big falls in
poverty. But as countries continue to grow, and as the line continues to be pulled to the right,
things start to change. Now, the peak begins to flatten. In 2010, according to Mr Chandy, there
were 85m people living at or just below the poverty line (at a consumption level between $1.20
and $1.25 a day). If poverty falls at its trend rate, the number of people living at $1.20-1.25 a
day will also fall: to 56m in 2020 and 28m in 2030. This is good news, of course: there will be
fewer poor people. But it means the rate of poverty reduction must slow down, even if
consumption continues to grow fast. As Mr Chandy says, unless growth goes through the roof,
it is not possible to maintain the trend rate of poverty reduction with so many fewer
individuals ready to cross the line.
Economy T/ Privacy
Economy T/ Racism
Economic collapse turns racism
AP 9. U.N. Chief: Bad Economy Threatens More Racism. URL:
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,517127,00.html. DA: 7/14/11.
racism "may be
institutionalized, as the Holocaust will always remind us," but that it
may manifest itself in more subtle forms through the "hatred of a
particular people or a class as anti-Semitism, for example, or the
newer Islamophobia." Many Muslim nations want curbs to free speech to prevent insults
and simple." Addressing intolerance in its various forms, Ban said
to Islam they claim have proliferated since the terrorist attacks in the United States on Sept.
11, 2001. They cite the 2005 cartoons of Muhammad published by a Danish newspaper that
sparked riots in the Muslim world, and allegations that authorities in the West have targeted
innocent Muslims through anti-terror and other police action. Those demands had been largely
resisted by the United States and other Western nations, some of whom are participating in the
conference. Ban steered clear of the issue of a global ban on religious defamation, as
a "new politics of
xenophobia" that is on the rise and could become dramatically worse as a
demanded by Muslim nations, but urged action against
result of new technologies that proliferate hatred.
Economy T/ Terrorism
Economic decline leads to terrorism
Thomas 8 [John Thomas, Professor of Economics, January 18 2008, Becker-Posner Blog,
Accessed April 8 2008, http://www.becker-posnerblog.com/archives/2008/01/terrorism_and_e.html]
However lack of economic growth also helps terrorism. To manage in the modern world, every
country requires an intellectual class, and without sufficient economic growth this intellectual class is
often idle or their partially educated children are idle and likely somewhat unemployed, and thus ripe for
radicalism. Also, lack of economic growth tends to support the idea that the nation has fallen behind as a
great power. People always like to feel like their part of a great power and economic growth makes people
feel like if they are not part of a great power they are becoming part of one. Much of the discontent in the
Muslim world is from the idea that the Muslim world has fallen behind the West and thus it must become a
great power by any means necessarily.
Poverty T/ Terrorism
Poverty creates the structural conditions necessary for
terrorism to occur.
Rice, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 06
(Susan E. Rice, The National Interest, The Threat of Global Poverty, l/n)
However, the primary flaw in the conventional argument that poverty is
unrelated to terrorism is its failure to capture the range of ways in which
poverty can exacerbate the threat of transnational terrorism -- not at the
individual level -- but at the state and regional level. Poverty bears indirectly
on terrorism by sparking conflict and eroding state capacity, both of which
create conditions that can facilitate terrorist activity.
Oxford University economist Paul Collier finds that if a countrys per capita income
doubles, its risk of conflict drops by roughly half. A country at $250 GDP per
capita has an average 15% risk of internal conflict over five years, while a country at
$5,000 per capita has a risk of less than 1%. Conflict zones not only cost lives,
they can incubate virtually every type of transnational security threat by
creating the optimal anarchic environment for external predators. Al Qaeda
established training camps in conflict-ridden Sudan and Afghanistan, purchased
diamonds from Sierra Leone and Liberia, and now target American soldiers in Iraq.
While low per capita income increases the likelihood of civil conflict, conflict
zones, in turn, have been exploited by terrorists to lure foot soldiers and train
new cadres, as in Bosnia, the Philippines and Central Asia.
In extreme cases, conflict results in state failure as in Somalia and Afghanistan. When
states collapse, the climate for predatory transnational actors is improved exponentially.
Economic privation is an important indicator of state failure. The CIAs State
Failure Task Force found that states in which human suffering is rampant (as measured
by high infant mortality) are 2.3 times more likely to fail than others. While poor
economic conditions are not the only major risk factor for state weakness and failure,
they are widely understood to be an important contributor along with partial
democratization, corrupt governance, regional instability and ethnic tension.
Even absent conflict, poverty at the country level, particularly in states with
significant Muslim populations, may enhance the ability of Jihadist terrorists
to operate. Poor countries with limited institutional capacity to control their
territory, borders and coastlines can provide safe havens, training grounds,
and recruiting fields for terrorist networks. By some estimates, 25% of the
foreign terrorists recruited by Al Qaeda to Iraq have come from North and Sub-Saharan
Africa. To support their activities, networks like Al Qaeda have exploited the terrain,
cash crops, natural resources and financial institutions of low-income states from Mali to
Yemen. Militants have taken advantage of lax immigration, security and financial
controls to plan, finance and execute operations in Kenya, Tanzania and Indonesia. Al
Qaeda is now believed to have extended its reach to approximately 60 countries
worldwide.
Country-level poverty may also weaken state capacity to provide essential
human services and thereby render states more vulnerable to exploitation by
terrorist networks. In low-income countries, social and welfare services are often
inadequate, creating voids in education and health that may be filled by radical NGOs or
madrassas. In Indonesia, the Sahel and Bangladesh, for example, international Islamic
charities are closing the welfare gap. In Pakistan and Egypt, radical groups offer social
welfare services that governments fail to provide. In the Palestinian territories, Hamas
stunning electoral victory was due in part to its superior provision of social services.
Terrorist networks often use legitimate and illegitimate charities as fronts to garner
popular support.
Economy T/ War
Decline causes warstrong statistical support
Royal 10 Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,
in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and
Brauer, p. 213-215
(Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined
with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and
small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global
economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level.
'future
expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding
economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues
that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from
trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade
relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline,
particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources,
the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use
force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger
Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that
for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist
moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic
decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a
strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods
to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess.
2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of
terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across
borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore,
economic
scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an
increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political
science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al
statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni
systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises
and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and
deserves more attention.
Economy T/ Warming
Collapse turns warming and the environmentno funds
for green tech and other priorities
Richard 8 10/10/08 (Michael Graham, L.L.P, Law 4 Reasons Why Recession is BAD for
the Environment http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-graham-richard/4-reasons-whyrecession-i_b_133564.html) MFR
When squeezed, companies will reduce their investments into research &
development and green programs. These are usually not short-term profit centers, so
that is what's axed first. Some progress has been made in the past few years, it would
be sad to lose ground now. 2) Average people, when money is tight, will look for less
expensive products (duh). Right now, that usually means that greener products
won't make it. Maybe someday if we start taxing "bads" instead of "goods" (pollution,
1)
carbon, toxins instead of labor, income, capital gains) the least expensive products will also be
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2011/08/10/solving-climate-change/)//AH
The IPCC process has just released their first update to these models
since 2000. The overview paper is here. Im not going to delve into all of the details (for
which readers will no doubt thank me) I just wanted to make a few general points with the use
of a couple of their graphs. As a handy guide, RCPnumber should be interpreted thusly: the
higher the number after the RCP the closer we are to boiling Flipper as the last humans fight
on the desert shores of Antarctica. The lower the number the more we can say, Phew, we
dodged the problem. More specifically, RCP2.6 means CO2 peaks out at 490 ppm and then
declines. RCP8.5 means it gets to 1370 ppm and perhaps keeps going leading to that dolphin
BBQ. Note please that I dont have to believe these numbers, you dont, no one has to believe
any of this at all. However, we do need to realise that these are the numbers which are being
fed into the climate change models (perhaps more accurately, that these are the numbers that
will be) and thus produce those IPCC reports. Which means that anyone taking the outputs of
those IPCC reports seriously needs to take these inputs seriously. My general points can be
made quite simply with the aid of two of their charts. We know very well that
economic growth, from a roughly $50 trillion global economy in 2000 to a roughly $300 trillion
one in 2100. Thats not all that far off the growth rate we had in the 20th century. The second
chart: This is how much energy were going to use and where were going to get it from. We
need to be more parsimonious in our use of energy, yes. We need to use less of it per unit of
GDP (which is known as energy intensity and their desired decrease in that isnt far off what
the advanced economies already manage) but we dont actually need to use less of it overall.
Less oil, yes, but we can near double our energy consumption and still hit that we missed the
problem sweet spot. Its also amusing to note what a small role for solar and wind power is
necessary to hit that target. Again, I want to point out that these arent my assumptions,
theyre not made up out of whole cloth by some denialist, these are the assumptions which the
very scientists who tell us about climate change themselves think are the driving forces and
likely outcomes. Which leads to a very interesting conclusion indeed. We dont have to
stop economic growth at all, we can quite happily have around the
same amount of it that we had in the 20 th century. So thats a large
number of the Green Miserablists shown to be wrong. We dont have to reduce or
even severely limit our energy consumption: we just have to get the
growth in our consumption from other than the usual sources. A
large number of the Energy Miserablists shown to be wrong there
too. Or, to boil it right down, the IPCC is telling us that the solution to
climate change is economic growth and low-carbon energy
generation. Thats absolutely all we have to do. Or as I pointed out at book
length recently, a globalised market economy with a carbon tax will do just
fine.