Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
July 31, 1961
G.R. No. L-14657
PABLO FELICIANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LADISLAO PASICOLAN, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, and UNION C. KAYANAN, in his capacity as provincial Fiscal of Pampanga,
respondents.
Felimon Cajator for petitioner.
Union C. Kayanan for and in his own behalf as respondent.
Natividad, J.:
This is a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to decide on the merits a
motion filed by the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 1984 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, People vs. Carlos Pabustan,et al., in which he asks that the Court fix at P10,000.000
the amount of the bail for his liberty pending trial.
It appears that the petitioner, Pablo Feliciano, was one of the eighteen persons charged with the
crime of kidnapping with murder in an amended information filed on October 24, 1958, in
Criminal Case No. 1984 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, People vs. Carlos Pabustan,
et al. Upon learning of the filing of said information and that a warrant for his arrest had been
issued, the petitioner, fearing, according to his lawyer, that he might fall into the hands of
irresponsible police officers, and to avoid disgrace and humiliation consequent to an arrest and
incarceration, went into hiding. On October 30, 1958, however, Attorney Filemon Cajator, at the
instance of the petitioners wife, filed in the case a motion asking that the Court fix at P10,000.00
the amount of the bond for petitioners release pending trial. The Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga
opposed this motion, on the ground that the filing thereof was premature as the petitioner had not
yet been arrested. After hearing, the respondent Judge, then presiding the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, dismissed petitioners motion, on the ground that pending his arrest or surrender,
Pablo Feliciano has not the right to ask this court to admit him to bail. Hence, the instant
proceeding.
It is contended that as, under the Constitution, all persons shall before conviction be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong,
Article III, Section 1, paragraph (16), Constitution of the Philippines, and that the words all
persons used in said constitutional provision have been interpreted to mean all persons,

without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense,
Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, the respondent Judge has failed to
comply with a duty imposed by law in refusing to decide on the merits petitioners motion for
admission to bail and, consequently, mandamus lies to compel said respondent to do so.
We fail to find merits in petitioners contention. The petition at bar is in effect a petition for
admission to bail. And the rule on the subject in this jurisdiction is well settled. There is no
question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by petitioner. Such is the law in this jurisdiction.
But, the rule is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be
in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. Bail is defined under the Rules of
Court as security required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law,
Rule 110, sec. 1, Rules of Court. In the case of Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, this
Court held:
This constitutional mandate refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint
or information has already been formally filed. It lays down the rule that all persons shall before
conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong. According to this provision, the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of
any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested,
detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said
provision. But in order that a person can invoke the constitutional precept, it is not necessary that
he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he
is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee
of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense
and evidence of his guilt is strong.
And in the case of Manigbas vs. Luna, 52 O.G. 1405, it was held:
We hold that this petition is premature for its purpose is to compel the performance of duty
which does not exist there being no correlative right the use or enjoyment of it has been denied
which may be the subject of mandamus (section 67, Rule 3); and this is so because the right to
bail only accrues when a person is arrested or deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to
secure ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, `bail is
the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law. (Rule
110, section 1), and evidently the accused do not come within its purview.
In the instant case, the petitioner upon learning that an amended information charging him and
seventeen others with the crime of kidnapping with murder had been filed, and that a warrant for
his arrest had been issued, immediately went into hiding and until now is at large. Without
surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that the court fix the amount of the
bail bond for his release pending trial. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner is a free man and is
under the jurisprudence not entitled to admission to bail.

WHEREFORE, we hold that the petitioner has failed to make sufficient showing to entitle him to
the remedy herein prayed for. Accordingly, the present proceeding is hereby dismissed, with the
costs taxed against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B.L., Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23599 September 29, 1967
REYNALDO C. VILLASEOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAXIMO ABANO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Marinduque and THE
PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE, respondents.
Maximo Abano for respondents.
No appearance for petitioner.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The questions presented in this an original petition for certiorari, took root in Criminal Case 2299
(Court of First Instance of Marinduque) for the murder of Boac police sergeant Alfonso Madla,
lodged by the Provincial Fiscal against petitioner.1 Petitioner, defendant below, was, on motion,
admitted to a P60,000.00-bail. The amount of the bond was, on verbal representation of petitioner's
wife, reduced to P40,000.00. On May 29, 1964, petitioner posted a property bond, was set at
provisional liberty.
Before arraignment on the murder charge, however, respondent Provincial Fiscal amended the
information. This time he accused petitioner with "Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority with Murder."
On August 7, 1964, respondent judge sua sponte cancelled petitioner's bond, ordered his immediate
arrest.
On petitioner's motion. to reconsider, respondent judge, on September 9, 1964, after hearing,
resolved to admit him to bail provided he puts up a cash bond of P60,000.00.
On September 15, 1964, on petitioner's motion that the original bond previously given be reinstated,
respondent judge resolved to fix "the bond anew in real property in the amount of P60,000.00, but to
be posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein" with properties
which "must be in the possession and ownership of said residents for five years."

On October 1, 1964, petitioner came to this Court on certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary
injunction. He seeks to set aside respondent judge's orders of August 7, September 9 and
September 15, 1964; to reinstate the bail bond theretofore approved by respondent judge on May
29, 1964, and for other reliefs. He charges respondent judge having acted without any or in excess
of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and with violation of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court in issuing the disputed orders.
On October 3, 1964, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P1,000.00-bond. We
restrained respondents from enforcing the orders in question and from further proceeding with the
case. On November 5, 1965, we modified the writ of preliminary injunction; we lifted the portion
thereof which prohibited continuation of the proceedings in the case below, Criminal Case 2299, to
avoid delay in the prosecution thereof.
Upon respondents' separate returns, the case was submitted without argument.
1. We need not pass upon respondent judge's orders of August 7, 1964 cancelling
petitioner's bail, and September 9, 1964 admitting the accused anew to cash bail.
The August 7, 1964 order was superseded by that of September 9, 1964. This, in
turn, was replaced by the last order of September 15, 1964, by virtue of which the
cash bond required was reverted back to property bond. The two orders of August 7
and September 9, 1964 thus became functus officio.2 A rule of ancient respectability
is that it is not the function of a court of justice to furnish answers to purposeless
questions that no longer exist.3 Our inquiry accordingly narrows down to the threepronged attack levelled by petitioner against the September 15, 1964 order of
respondent judge. We propose to discuss them in seriatim.
2. Forefront amongst the three problems is this: Does the P60,000.00-bond fixed by
respondent judge transgress the constitutional injunction that "(e)xcessive bail shall
not be required"?4 Petitioner's submission is that he is a mere government employee,
earning but a monthly salary of P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of a family of five.
To be read with the constitutional precept just adverted to is Section 12, Rule 114, Rules of Court,
which provides that "the court may, upon good cause shown, either increase or reduce the amount"
of the bail, and that "defendant may be committed to custody unless he gives bail in the increased
amount he is called upon to furnish."
Along with the court's power to grant bail in bailable cases is its discretion to fix the amount thereof, 5
and, as stated, to increase or reduce the same.6 The question of whether bail is excessive "lays with
the court to determine." 7
In the matter of bail fixing, courts perforce are to be guided at all times by the purpose for which bail
is required. The definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court, gives this purpose "the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance." 8 And, in amplification thereof, Section 2 of the same rule states that the condition of
the bail is that "defendant shall answer the complaint or information in the court in which it is filed or
to which it may be transferred for trial, and after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Court of
First Instance upon application supported by an undertaking or bail, that he will, surrender himself in
execution of such judgment as the appellate court may render, or that, in case cause, is to be tried
anew or remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the court to which it may be remanded and
submit himself to the orders and processes thereof."

Expressions in varying, language spell out in a general way the principles governing bail fixing. One
is that the amount should be high enough to assure the presence of defendant when required but no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. 9 Another is that "the good of the public as
well as the rights of the accused,"10 and "the need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom
from unnecessary restraint before conviction under the circumstances surrounding each particular
accused",11 should all be balanced in one equation.
We are not to consider solely the inability of a defendant to secure bail in a certain amount. This
circumstance by itself does not make the amount excessive. 12 For, where an accused has no means
of his own, no one to bail him out, or none to turn to for premium payments, any amount fixed no
matter how small would fall into the category of excessive bail; and, he "would be entitled to be
discharged on his recognizance." 13
So it is, that experience has brought forth certain guidelines in bail fixing, which may be summarized
as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) Penalty for the offense
charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other
bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is
under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.14
But, at bottom, in bail fixing, "the principal factor considered, to the determination of which most
other factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid
punishment." 15 Of importance then is the possible penalty that may be meted. Of course penalty
depends to a great extent upon the gravity of offense.
Here petitioner is charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of a person in
authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the imposition of the capital punishment. Then,
Circular 47 dated July 5, 1946 of the Department of Justice, reiterated in Circular 48 of July 18,
1963, directed prosecuting attorney's to recommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of
imprisonment, corresponding to the medium period of the penalty prescribed for the offense
charged, unless circumstances warrant a higher penalty. The reasonableness of this circular has
already received this Court's imprimatur in one case.16 We are unprepared to downgrade this method
of computation, what with a compound of reduced peso value and the aggravated crime climate.
We see no discernible abuse of discretion, given the facts and the law, when respondent judge fixed
petitioner's bail at P60,000.00.
3. Exacting serious consideration is that portion of the disputed order of September
15, 1964, where respondent judge requires of the property bond be posted only by
"residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein." This question is of
first impression.
The drive of petitioner's argument is that this condition collides with Section 9, Rule 114, Rules of
Court, which in part recites:
Sec. 9. Qualification of sureties. The necessary qualifications of sureties to a bail
bond shall be as follows:
(a) Each of them must be a resident householder or freeholder within the Philippines.
xxxxxxxxx

We read this statute to mean that the directive that bondsmen be resident householders or
freeholders in the Philippines, is but a minimum requirement. Reason for this is that bondsmen in
criminal cases, residing outside of the Philippines, are not within the reach of the processes of its
courts. The provision under consideration, however, makes no attempt to cover the whole field of
what is necessary for a bondsman before he is allowed to make bonds in the various courts;" nor
does it "attempt to take away the inherent right of the court to properly administer its affairs." 17
Residence within the country is not the only thing that could be required by the courts; it is not
intended to tie up the hands of a judge to approve bail so long as it is offered by a resident
householder or freeholder within the Philippines. It is to be treated "as cumulative, rather than
exclusive, of the inherent power" of the courts to determine whether bail proffered should be
accepted. 18 For, in principle, a court has broad powers essential to its judicial function. 19
We look in retrospect at the situation confronting respondent judge. What prompted him to require as
condition that petitioner's bondsmen be residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying
therein? In his return to the petition before this Court, respondent judge reasons out that it has been
his experience that "it is hard to send notices to people outside the province." He explains that the
usual procedure of his clerk of court is to send notices by registered mail accompanied by return
cards; that when trial comes, the return cards in many instances have not yet been received in court;
that when the parties fail to appear; there is no way of knowing whether the notices have been duly
received; that he cannot order the confiscation of the bond and the arrest of the accused, because
he is not sure whether the bondsmen have been duly notified; that sending telegrams to people
outside the province is costly, and the court cannot afford to incur much expenses.
The posture taken by respondent judge does not offend the good sense of justice. Bail is given to
secure appearance of the accused. If bondsmen reside in far away places, even if within the
Philippines, the purpose of bail may be frustrated. There is the insufficiency of the mails as an
effective means of communication. And then, there is the problem of complying with the
constitutional mandate of speedy trial. If notice to sureties is not served, no trial can be had. For
sureties, in legal contemplation, are defendant's mancupators. In the circumstances here obtaining,
it would not seem unfair if the judge should require, as he did, that sureties be so situated that court
processes could reach them on time. Because, by both the Constitution and the law, sureties should
be sufficient. 20 And, sureties are deemed sufficient not only when they are of sufficient financial
ability. They must also be "of sufficient vigilance to secure the appearance and prevent the
absconding of the accused."21 They cannot be said to be of sufficient vigilance to secure defendant's
appearance whenever required, if the court should experience difficulty in communicating with them.
Here respondent judge only wanted to make sure that when the proper time comes for the court to
order the sureties to produce the person of defendant, no undue delay will be incurred.
Weighing as heavily against petitioner's case is the fact that a reading of his petition fails of an
averment that the requisite exacted that bondsmen be residents of and actually staying in
Marinduque would cause him prejudice. The burden of his argument solely that still a condition runs
counter to the rules of court. He did not even say that he cannot secure such sureties. On the
contrary, suggestion there is in record that he is a former agent of the governor of Marinduque.
Implicit in all these is that if error there was in the disputed order of September 15, 1964, petitioner
has not shown that it was prejudicial error calling for correction. 22
The situation here presented does not warrant substitution of our judgement for that of our judgment
for that of respondent judge's. We are not called upon to strike down respondent judge's order on
this point as an abuse of discretion.
4. Also assailed as beyond the power of respondent judge is the requirement that
properties to be offered as bond must be "in the possession and ownership of the

sureties for at least five years." Respondent judge, in his return, relies on Circular 2,
dated January 23, 1964, of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, addressed,
among others, to Judges of First Instance. That circular recites that it had been
brought to the attention of the Department of Justice that in certain provinces,
unscrupulous persons who are spurious landowners, have been accepted as
sureties. The Secretary then suggested that "(i)t may be a good policy not to accept
as bail bonds real properties not covered by certificate of title unless they have been
declared for taxation purposes in favor of the person offering them as bond for at
least five (5) years."
Basically, reason is with this requirement. Its purpose, so the circular states, is to "prevent the
commission of frauds in connection with the posting of personal bail bonds and to protect the
interests of the Government." Really, if the bondsman is not the owner, bail fails of its purpose,
prejudice to the government sets in.
1awphl.nt

We note, however, that the order of September 15, 1964 spoke of properties in general. It did not
exclude properties registered under the Torrens system. A Torrens title is indefeasible. Failure of
specificness on the part of respondent judge then could have been a case of oversight. To obviate
misunderstanding, we take it upon ourselves to clarify that order. We do say now that the order of
September 15, 1964 is to be understood as excluding properties covered by Torrens titles from the
requirement that properties to be offered as bond must be "in the possession and ownership of the
sureties for at least five years."
5. In the end we say that respondent judge's order of September 15, 1964, as thus clarified, is here
confirmed considering the overall environmental circumstances. We are not to be understood as
laying down here specifics in bail fixing, bail approval or bail denial. Discretion, indeed, is with the
court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions
imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the
constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the
required remedy.
With the observations heretofore adverted to, we vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari, and to
dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein.
Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALEX MANALLO,

appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, J.:

Spouses Romeo Nabor and Liliosa Napay and their nine-year old 1 daughter
Rosaldiza Nabor tenanted and lived in a coconut plantation located in Barangay
Salugan, Camilig, Albay. Rosaldiza helped in the household chores by washing the
familys dirty laundry every Saturday at the barangay reservoir. The route to the
[1]

reservoir was uninhabited. Going there was quite a long trek. It usually took Rosaldiza
fifteen minutes to negotiate the grassy path from the reservoir to their house.
In 1989, Romeo engaged the services of Alex Manallo, as coconut gatherer. 2 Alex
helped the Nabor couple gather coconut produce once a week. 3 He was paid P150.0
per day for his services.
[2]

[3]

In the early morning of March 30, 1992, Liliosa left their house for the market.
Rosaldiza went to the reservoir to wash her clothes bringing with her a pail and a basin.
She wore a t-shirt and a pair of short pants. After washing her clothes, Rosaldiza took a
quick bath.4 At around 11:00 a.m. Rosaldiza , who was drenched all over, left the
reservoir and trekked the same route in going home. On her way, Alex suddenly
appeared from the bushes and grabbed Rosaldiza from behind. Alex was completely
naked. He covered her mouth and poked a knife on her neck. Rosaldiza dropped the
basin and the pail she was carrying and fought with Alex to extricate herself from his
clutches. However, he was too strong for her. Alex dragged her to a grassy portion,
pulled her down and pinned her to the ground. 5 She cried and shouted for help, at the
same time, resisting Alexs advances. However, when Alex boxed Rosaldiza on her
thighs and on her abdomen, she lost consciousness. When she regained
consciousness, Rosaldiza noticed that she was completely naked. She felt weak and
tired. Her private parts and body ached all over. She noticed semen in her vagina. 6
Fearing for her life and completely devastated, she cried bitterly. Alex dressed up and
warned her not to tell her parents, brothers and sisters of the incident, otherwise, he
would kill them all. Rosaldiza put on her clothes and ran home. By then, Liliosa was
already in the house. Rosaldiza related to her mother what had happened to her. 7
Stunned by the revelation of her daughter, Liliosa accompanied Rosaldiza to the house
of the barangay captain, but the latter was out of the house. The distraught Liliosa and
Rosaldiza proceeded to the house of barangay kagawad Elesio Obal to whom they
related that Alex had raped Rosaldiza. Liliosa, Rosaldiza and Elesio boarded a tricycle
and went to the Camilig Police Station 8 where Liliosa and Rosaldiza had the incident
reported in the police blotter.9 The trio then proceeded to the Rural Health Unit of
Camilig where Dr. Ma. Crispa Loria-Florece, the Municipal Health Officer, conducted a
physical, including pelvic and smear examination of Rosaldiza. Dr. Loria-Florece signed
and issued a medico-legal certificate10 which reads:
[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

*Physical findings:
-CONTUSSION right cheek
-HEMATOMA Distal 3rd, anterior aspect right thigh
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

I E findings:
-Hymen with fresh bleeding, lacerations at 3:00 oclock, 5:00 oclock, 6:00 oclock,
8:00 oclock positions.
-Cervix smooth, small and firm
-Adnexa (-)
-W/bloody & whitish stick mucous per examining
Finger
*Spec. exam: - cervix pinkish w/whitish secretion at post fornix.
*Vaginal smear With motile sperm cells.

According to Dr. Loria-Florece, the contusion and hematoma sustained by the victim
in the right cheek and right thigh could have been caused by fist blow or slapping of the
victim. The fresh bleeding and multiple lacerations of the hymen could have been
caused by sexual intercourse or the entry of a hard object. Rosaldiza was still a virgin
when the doctor examined her but lost her virginity about an hour from her examination
on the victim, since fresh hymenal bleeding usually stops in about one or two hours
from laceration.
Rosaldiza and Liliosa went back to the police station and executed their respective
sworn statements.
On April 27, 1992, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi
City, charging Alex with rape, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on the 30th day of March 1992, at more or less 11:00 oclock A.M. at Barangay
Salugan, Camilig, Albay, the accused with lewd design, armed with a knife, by means
of violence and intimidation, poked the victim Rosaldiza Nabor Y Nebres with said knife
and when the victim resisted, slapped her rendering her unconscious, and while in that
stae (sic) accused have carnal knowledge with Rosaldiza N. Nabor, to the latters
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11[11]

No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of Alex. He filed, on May 8,
1992, a motion for bail with no specific date and time for the hearing thereof. 12 Upon
the filing of said motion, the Executive Judge issued an order granting the motion and
fixing his bail bond at P50,000.00. 13 On the same day, Alex posted a property bond
which was immediately approved by the court. 14 Alex was forthwith released from
detention.
[12]

[13]

[14]

At his arraignment on June 17, 1992, Alex, duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty. Trial was set on June 18, 1992. 15 The prosecution prayed the trial
[15]

11
12
13
14
15

court to cancel the bond of Alex considering that his petition for bail was granted without
due hearing. However, the trial court held in abeyance resolution of the motion until after
the prosecutor shall have presented its witnesses on June 18, 1992. The trial court
stated that the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution would be its evidence in
Alexs petition for bail and trial on the merits. On June 18, 1992, the trial court issued an
order that Alex would remain free on his bond until June 22, 1992, the date set for the
hearing on his petition for bail. However, Alex failed to attend the trial on said date. The
trial court issued and order for his arrest. However, Alex could no longer be found at his
address. It was only six years thereafter, or on January 22, 1998, that he was arrested. 16
[16]

When Alex testified, he denied having sexually assaulted Rosaldiza on March 30,
1992. He claimed that they had been lovers engaging in sexual intimacies for over a
year even before March 30, 1992. He said that whenever they had sexual intercourse,
he gave her P100.00 to P150.00. He claimed that he came to know Rosaldiza in 1989
when he started working for the Nabors, and from that day on, they hit it off. He was
then 26 years old and Rosaldiza barely in her teens. He testified that Rosaldiza gave
him special attention by personally serving him lunch every time he gathered coconuts
and she flirted with him. He, in turn, used to tease her by asking her to become his
second wife. Every time he needed a smoke, Rosaldiza bought cigarettes for him and
always kept the change. He used to give Rosaldiza pocket money for her schooling.
Their relationship blossomed and in 1991 they started having sexual intercourse. Alex
claimed that every time he gathered coconuts in the landholding of the Nabors, he and
Rosaldiza invariably had sexual intercourse either at Honrado's nipa hut or in the grassy
wilderness.
Alex recalled that on March 27, 1992, at around 7:00 a.m., he left his house and
played basketball at the nearby basketball court. After an hour, he got thirsty and
proceeded to the house of Laura. Thereat, Laura handed him water. While drinking
water, Rosaldiza called him and asked for P300.00 for a new pair of shoes. He told
Rosaldiza that he would give the P300.00 at their usual tryst after his routine rounds of
his coconut plantation. Rosaldiza agreed. She then told Alex that she would first drop by
her house to get some laundry clothes so that her parents may not get suspicious. The
two met at the agreed place. She demanded that Alex give her the P300.00 but Alex
refused. He insisted that they have sexual intercourse first. Rosaldiza agreed. However,
after their sexual act, Alex still refused to give her P300.00, Rosaldiza got furious. She
warned Alex that she would tell her mother about their relationship. Alex pacified
Rosaldiza by promising to give her the money on Monday. He again sweet-talked
Rosaldiza by assuring her that in case she got pregnant, he would leave his wife and
they would settle in Manila. After appeasing Rosaldiza, they respectively went home.
When he arrived home, he ate his lunch and subsequently went to sleep. At about 1:00
p.m. his wife woke him up and told him that four policemen were looking for him. He
asked the policemen of their purpose and he was told that a complaint for rape had
been filed against him. He went with the policemen to the police station where he was
placed under arrest. He also told the court that when his wife Teresita visited him on that
day, he admitted to her his relationship with Rosaldiza. He said that after hearing his
16

confession, his wife Teresita cried and got angry.17

[17]

Teresita Manallo testified that when she visited her husband, Alex, in his cell after
his arrest, he confided to her that he had already admitted the charge. She likewise
testified that Alex had instructed her to talk to Liliosa and ask her forgiveness and if
possible to settle the matter with the Nabors. She claimed that on her way out of the
municipal jail she chanced upon the Nabors and relayed to them the instructions of
Alex. However, the Nabors rejected the offer of settlement. Liliosa was resolute in filing
a case against Alex.
On April 25, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision 18
charged, the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

[18]

finding Alex guilty as

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Alex Manallo is hereby found

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by using force and intimidation as
defined and penalized under Art. 335 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, to pay
complainant P75,000.00 as indemnity , P50,000.00 as moral damages and the costs.
SO ORDERED.19[19]

Aggrieved by the decision, Alex appealed to this Court contending that:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE
BUT RATHER ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE20[20]

Appellant concedes, even as he assails his conviction, that his defense is inherently
weak. He argues that the decision of the trial court dwelt mainly on the rationalization
discrediting the evidence for the defense and that not much was said why it gave
credence to the testimony of the private complainant. He claims that even assuming
that his testimony is unbelievable, as the trial court put it, that alone could not sustain a
verdict of conviction. He asserts that the prosecution must rest on the strength of its
own evidence and not relieved of the onus of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt by
the weakness of the defense.21
[21]

The contention of appellant does not persuade.

Even a cursory reading of the decision of the trial court will readily show that it
convicted appellant of the crime charged in light of the testimony of Rosaldiza and Dr.
Loria-Florece and the physical evidence adduced by the prosecution:
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence adduced, the court finds that the accused
did rape the complainant Rosaldiza Nabor on March 30, 1992. The court finds the
testimony of complainant Rosaldiza Nabor credible, natural, convincing and otherwise
consistent with human nature and the ordinary course of things. The conduct of
Rosaldiza Nabor and the subsequent events that transpired immediately after the
17
18
19
20
21

alleged sexual assault credibly established the truth of her charge.

After the accused left her, she came home running and shouting for help because
she was raped. Upon arrival at her house she spontaneously told her mother, she was
raped by the accused. They immediately reported to the barangay authorities, then to
the police.
The findings of Dr. Florece clearly supports complainants story. She examined the
complainant at 12:15 p.m. of March 30, 1992, which was about one hour after the rape.
The external physical examination showed a contusion on her right cheek and a
hematoma on her right thigh near the knee. These injuries is compatible with the
complainants testimony that she was slapped in her face and boxed in her thigh by the
accused as a result of which she lost consciousness.
The internal examination showed fresh bleeding hymenal lacerations at 3:00, 5:00,
6:00 and 8:00 oclock positions, meaning these lacerations were sustained about one
or two hours before the examination because hymenal laceration stops bleeding after
one or two hours says Dr. Florece. There were lacerations because complainant was
still a virgin according to Dr. Florece. The motile sperm cells were moving and alive as
found by Dr. Florece. These circumstances clearly show that the rape was committed
on March 30, 1992 and that there was no such sexual intercourse on March 27, 2003.
These lacerations also indicate that the penis was forcibly inserted into the vagina.
(People vs. Peero, 276 SCRA 564)
Dr. Florece, found a contusion on the right cheek of complainant, a reddish
coloration of the skin, slightly elevated or inflamed, a hematoma on the right thigh near
the knee, there was accumulation of clotted blood. The contusion on the right cheek
and the hematoma on the right thigh could have been caused by a fistic blow or by
slapping. The hymenal fresh bleeding lacerations could have been caused by a penis
in a sexual intercourse about an hour and a half before her examination because
hymenal laceration stops in one to two hours. There were lacerations because the
complainant was a virgin. The motile sperm cells found in the cervix were alive
indicating a recent sexual intercourse. All the foregoing facts and circumstances clearly
and indubitably prove that complainant Rosaldiza Nabor was raped by the accused
Alex Manallo on March 30, 1992 at about 11:00 a.m.22[22]

The trial court considered appellants flight from the scene of the crime, his having
jumped bail and for eluding arrest for six long years as evidence of his guilt for the crime
charged:
. Besides, the flight of the accused in jumping bail and going into hiding for (6)
years is evidence of his guilt. He would not have fled if his story is true. The court noted
that during the years that the accused was in hiding, the complainant was relentless in
her efforts to locate the accused so that he may be arrested. Complainants demeanor
in court showed insincerity.23[23]

Rosaldiza described how appellant waylaid her, forcibly dragged her to the grassy
area, pinned her to the ground and when she resisted, he hit her with his fist, rendering
her unconscious and when she regained consciousness, she discovered that she had
been deflowered by the appellant, thus:
22
23

PROS. DE MESA:
QMs. Witness, are you the same Rosaldiza Nabon, the private complainant in this
case?
A

Yes, sir.

Where were you on March 30, 1992 particularly in the morning of 11:00 oclock
more or less?

I was on my way home coming from the water reservoir of our place where I
washed our clothes, when suddenly a man who came from nowhere poked a knife
on me.

You said there suddenly appeared someone from nowhere who poked a knife on
you, who is this somebody that you mentioned?

Alex Manallo, sir.

Is this Manallo that you mentioned is the same Alex Manallo, the accused in this
case?

Yes, sir.

This Alex Manallo that you mentioned who according to you is the same Alex
Manallo who is the accused in this case, is he present in this court?

Yes, sir, he is here.

Can you point to him?

That man, sir (witness pointing to a certain person inside the court room who upon
being asked of his name, stood up and identified himself as Alex Manallo).

Now, after the accused Manallo the accused in this case poked a knife on you,
what happened next?

When this Alex Manallo poked a knife from behind me I looked back and
considering that I was then carrying a basin on my right hand and a paile (sic) on
my left hand I tried to free myself from his hold, however he was so strong that I
could not free myself.

While you were striving yourself to be free from the hold of the accused what
happened to the basin with the laundry clothes and the pail, what happened

It fell down.

And then what did you do?

He told me that I should carry again the basin and the pail which was then I was
carrying, after that he dragged me into the grassy portion.

Did you carry the basin and the pail?

Yes, because I was afraid.

And while carrying the basin and the pail you were being dragged?

Yes, sir.

Now, what happened after you were dragged into the grassy portion, what

happened next?
A

The accused pushed me and delivered fistic blows to my thigh and then I became
weak.

Now, after you were slapped and boxed by the accused which caused you to fall
down and become weak, what happened next?

He delivered fistic blows on the stomach and at that time I became unconscious.

And did you ever regain your consciousness?

Yes, sir.

And after that what happened next?

He was still near my head.

What was he doing?

He was dressing himself.

And what happened to you, what did you notice, if any?

I was already naked.

And what did you do after you found yourself already naked?

I just cried because I was very afraid because he might kill me.

And what did the accused do after you have regain your consciousness?

He told me that I should not report the incident to my parents including my brothers
and sisters. He said, I am going to kill you all because I have a 45.

And then, after he said that what did you do next?

I dressed up myself.

And....?

I proceeded home and he was left behind somewhere.

And then where did you go?

To my house.

And you were walking or running?

I was running.

When you reached home what did you do?

I shouted for help to my mother, Mama tabangan mo ako ta pigrape na ako, or if

translated in english, Mother help me because I was raped. 24[24]

Despite the threats of appellant to kill her and her family, Rosaldiza spontaneously
reported to her mother the bestial assault on her by appellant. As disclosed by the
records, Rosaldiza constantly cried during her testimony. Her tears add poignancy and
24

credibility to the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience. 25
[25]

On review, the Court find that the testimony of Rosaldiza bears the hallmarks of
truth. It is consistent on material points. The rule is that when a rape victim's testimony
is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by
inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full faith
and credit. It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the credibility of a rape victim
is augmented when she has no motive to testify against the appellant or where there is
absolutely no evidence which even remotely suggest that she could have been actuated
by such motive.26
[26]

Rosaldizas testimony is buttressed by the medico-legal findings of Dr. Florece. The

fresh lacerations in Rosaldizas hymen are the telling and irrefutable, the best physical
evidence of her defloration. The presence of motile sperm cells in the victims violated
organ affirms her charge more than words and anger alone could prove. 27 Her
contusion on the right cheek and hematoma on the right thigh are ample proof of
struggle and resistance against rape. These physical evidence showing the use of
brutal force on the victim when she was sexually assaulted certainly speaks louder than
words.28 In countless cases, we have taken judicial notice of the fact that it is highly
inconceivable for a young barrio lass, inexperienced with the ways of the world, to
fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private parts,
subject herself to public trial and tarnish her family's honor and reputation unless she
was motivated by a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.29
[27]

[28]

[29]

The trial court is correct in discounting the sweetheart defense of appellant. He

failed to establish the existence of such relationship. Rosaldiza specifically denied that
appellant was ever her sweetheart. In People vs. Apostol,30 this court said that
sweetheart defense is a much-abused defense that rashly derides the intelligence of the
Court and sorely tests its patience. Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love
affair must be supported by convincing proof. 31 He failed to discharge this burden.
Other than his self-serving assertions and those of his wife, there was no support to his
claim that he and complainant were lovers. His sweetheart defense cannot be given
credence in the absence of corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, pictures or
tokens32 that such romantic relationship really existed. Even if we assumed, for the
nonce, that appellant and Rosaldiza were indeed lovers, this fact would not have
precluded rape, as it did not necessarily mean there was consent. A love affair would
not have justified what appellant did subjecting Rosaldiza to his carnal desires against
her will.33 No young filipina of decent refute would publicly admit she had been raped
[30]

[31]

[32]

[33]

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

unless that was the truth. Even in these modern times, this principle still holds true.
Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ
violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust. 34
[34]

The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country,
young ladies by custom and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that
great caution is observed so that their reputation remains untainted. 35 Even assuming
arguendo that the offended party was a girl of loose morals, as claimed by appellant, it
is settled that moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction for rape
for even prostitutes can be rape victims36 .
[35]

[36]

The case for the prosecution was even fortified by no less than the evidence of the
appellant. His wife Teresita testified that he instructed her to plead for Rosaldizas
forgiveness and for the settlement of the case, and in obedience to said instruction,
Teresita did relay Alexs plea for forgiveness and for an amicable settlement to Liliosa,
the mother of the victim but that Liliosa turned down appellants plea:
ATTY. MUOS :
QAnd so when your mother-in-law came back from the municipal jail telling you that
youll be the one to go there because she cannot stand her son being beaten by
the policeman, what did you do?
A

I went to the municipal jail of Camalig, sir.

And what was the time that you went to the municipal jail of Camalig?

About 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, sir.

And when you arrived at the place, who were those person you saw in the
municipal hall, if any?

I proceeded first to Alex Manallo at the municipal jail of Camalig, sir.

And did you ask Alex Manallo anything why he was arrested?

Yes, sir.

And what did he tell you?

Alex Manallo informed me that he already admitted the act, and instructed me to
ask forgiveness from the mother for me, or if not to settle the matter, sir.

Is that all you asked of him?

Yes, sir.

Did you ask him something more?

No more, sir. I already went out of the jail.

COURT to witness:
Wait.
34
35
36

When you said he admitted doing the act, to whom?

He did not name, sir.

All right, when your husband told you that you ask forgiveness from the mother for
me, who is that mother, who is that person referred to as the mother that you are
supposed to ask forgiveness for your husband?

The mother of the complainant, sir.

And who is the complainant?

Rosaldiza Nabor, sir. 37[37]

In a case of similar factual backdrop, the Court considered a plea for forgiveness
and for a settlement of the case as an implied admission of guilt:
Moreover, any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as
to his guilt was dissolved by the overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-inlaw on pleading for forgiveness from Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts,
which were testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself.
He chose not to deny their testimony. Finally, despite the unequivocal pronouncement
by the trial court that his guilt was "strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife
and relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and to
seek a compromise," the accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion as an
error and his Appellant's Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the
accused was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of
the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of
his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered
as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving
quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some
wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment against
on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution upon (an
offender). In People vs. Calimquim, we stated:
The fact that appellant's mother sought forgiveness for her son from Corazon's
father is an indication of guilt. (See People vs. Olmedillo, L-42660, August 30, 1982,
116 SCRA 193). 38[38]

This Court agrees with the trial court that the appellant is guilty of rape under Article
335 of Revised Penal Code as amended. The use by the appellant of a knife to
consummate the crime is a special aggravating circumstance which warrants the
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. However, considering that the
prosecution failed to prove any other aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
crime, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably
with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Anent the award of damages, the trial court has correctly awarded P50,000.00 as
moral damages, an award that rests on the jural foundation that the crime of rape
37
38

necessarily brings with it shame, mental anguish, besmirched reputation, moral shock
and social humiliation. 39
[39]

The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity should be reduced to P50,000.00 in line

with this Courts ruling in People vs. Banela,40 that if the crime of rape was committed
before the effectivity Republic Act No. 7659 41 , the amendatory law restoring death
penalty, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the offended party shall remain to be
P50,000.00.
[40]

[41]

Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of P25.000 should be awarded

pursuant to our ruling in People vs. Catubig,42 that the award for exemplary damages
is justified pursuant to Art. 2230 of the New Civil Code. Since the special aggravating
circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was attendant in the commission of the
rape, the offended party is entitled to exemplary damages.
[42]

The Court cannot write finis to this case without making of record its concern and
displeasure at the egregious procedural lapse of the trial court in granting bail to
appellant. It bears stressing that he was charged with rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 5. Burden of proof in Bail application. At the hearing of an application for
admission to bail filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of
either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the
witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify. (7a)43[43]

The trial court as mandated, in resolving a motion or petition for bail, to do the
following:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor
of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, the petition should be
denied.44[44]
39
40
41
42
43
44

In this case, the appellant filed his motion for bail on May 8, 1992. There was no
specific date and time for the hearing of said motion. And yet, on the same day that the
motion was filed, the trial court granted the said motion and fixed the bail bond for the
provisional liberty of the appellant in the amount of P50,000.00 without any factual basis
therefore stated in the order. Even when the public prosecutor prayed the court on June
17, 1992, for the cancellation of the property bond of the appellant on the ground that
the trial court granted his motion for bail without even affording the prosecution a
chance to be heard thereon and adduce its evidence in opposition thereto, the trial court
held in abeyance resolution thereof and even allowed the appellant to remain free on
his bond in the amount of only P50,000.00. Patently, the prosecution was deprived of its
right to due process. In Go vs. Judge Bongolan, et. al.,45 this Court emphasized that:
[45]

A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary
liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the
community from dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a
magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise
of jurisdiction.46[46]

The presiding judge of the trial court thus exposed his gross ignorance of the law.
As a consequence, the appellant jumped bail and managed to elude arrest for six years,
to the prejudice of the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Alex Manallo is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby
meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is ordered to pay to the victim
Rosaldiza Nabor P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000
as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for Rodolfo Salas.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the
City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and

45
46

prohibition, with a prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of
respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander
Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 for Rebellion, 1 and the subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987
granting the motion for reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00
to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration of July 17, 1987
which asked the court to allow petitioner to present evidence in support of its prayer for a
reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to bail may, under certain
circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and
whether such right may be waived.
The following are the antecedents of this petition:
In the original Information 2 filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, later amended in an Amended Information 3 which was filed on 24 October
1986, private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were
charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal
Code allegedly committed as follows:
That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and continuously
thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila and elsewhere in the
Philippines, the Communist Party of the Philippines, its military arm, the New
People's Army, its mass infiltration network, the National Democratic Front
with its other subordinate organizations and fronts, have, under the direction
and control of said organizations' leaders, among whom are the aforenamed
accused, and with the aid, participation or support of members and followers
whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, risen publicly and taken
arms throughout the country against the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government, the seat
of which is in the City of Manila, or of removing from the allegiance to that
government and its laws, the country's territory or part of it;
That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities
as leaders of the aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with, and in
support of the cause of, the organizations aforementioned, engaged
themselves in war against the forces of the government, destroying property
or committing serious violence, and other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful
purpose, such as . . .
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed before and after
February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in military
custody following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave.,
Manila; he had earlier escaped from military detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was
offered for his
capture. 4
A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus
for private respondent and his co-accused was filed with this Court 5 which, as shall hereafter be
discussed in detail, was dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the

agreement of the parties under which herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will
face trial before the court having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his coaccused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their person.
On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the court below a Motion to Quash the
Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, 6 to which petitioner filed an
Opposition 7 citing, among other grounds, the fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated
October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent categorically conceded that:
xxx xxx xxx
Par. 2 (B) Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face
trial before the court having custody over his person.
In his Order of March 6, 1987, 8 respondent Judge denied the motion to quash.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a
petition for bail, 9 which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 10 on the
ground that since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no
longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it
existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83,
No. 24) which was officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987.
In his Order of 7 July 1987 11 respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187,
granted private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon
private respondent the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two (2)
months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof. In granting the petition respondent
Judge stated:
. . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of Executive Order No.
187, the offense of rebellion, for which accused Rodolfo Salas is herein
charged, is now punishable with the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00, which makes it now bailable pursuant to Section 13,
Article III, 1986 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Unlike the old rule, bail is now a matter of right in non-capital
offenses before final judgment. This is very evident upon a reading of Section
3, Rule 114, aforementioned, in relation to Section 21, same rule. In view,
therefore, of the present circumstances in this case, said accused-applicant
is now entitled to bail as a matter of right inasmuch as the crime of rebellion
ceased to be a capital offense.

As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to grant bail to private
respondent considering his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is
to wipe out all vestiges of our democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that his release
would allow his return to his organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the government before
whose courts he invokes his constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge replied:
True, there now appears a clash between the accused's constitutional right to
bail in a non-capital offense, which right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights
and, to quote again the prosecution, "the existence of the government that
bestows the right, the paramount interest of the state." Suffice to state that
the Bill of Rights, one of which is the right to bail, is a "declaration of the
rights of the individual, civil, political and social and economic, guaranteed by
the Constitution against impairment or intrusion by any form of governmental
action. Emphasis is placed on the dignity of man and the worth of individual.
There is recognition of certain inherent and inalienable rights of the
individual, which the government is prohibited from violating" (QuisumbingFernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77). To this Court, in
case of such conflict as now pictured by the prosecution, the same should be
resolved in favor of the individual who, in the eyes of the law, is alone in the
assertion of his rights under the Bill of Rights as against the State. Anyway,
the government is that powerful and strong, having the resources, manpower
and the wherewithals to fight those "who oppose, threathen (sic) and destroy
a just and orderly society and its existing civil and political institutions." The
prosecution's fear may or may not be founded that the accused may later on
jump bail and rejoin his comrades in the field to sow further disorders and
anarchy against the duly constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear can
not be a reason to deny him bail. For the law is very explicit that when it
comes to bailable offenses an accused is entitled as a matter of light to bail.
Dura est lex sed lex.
In a motion to reconsider 12 the above order filed on 16 July 1987, petitioner asked the court to
increase the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per Department of Justice
Circular No. 10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the, provisional release of an accused should be in an
amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based on the medium penalty imposable
for the offense and explaining that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the private respondent
"had in the past escaped from the custody of the military authorities and the offense for which he is
charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the
perpetrator has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not consummated until the wellorganized plan to overthrow the government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien
system based on a foreign ideology is attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration 13 indirectly asking the
court to deny bail to the private respondent and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his
bail to appear in court for trial," a conclusion it claims to be buttressed "by the following facts
which are widely known by the People of the Philippines and which this Honorable Court may have
judicial notice of:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an
escapee from detention when arrested;
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;

3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his
arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a
false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared
owner whose identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of
P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest,
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the slightest intention to appear in court
for trial, if released." Petitioner further argues that the accused, who is the Chairman of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and head of its military arm, the NPA, together with his followers,
are now engaged in an open warfare and rebellion against this government and threatens the
existence of this very Court from which he now seeks provisional release," and that while he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of Executive Order No. 187 which restored the original
penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, yet, when the interest of the State
conflicts with that of an individual, that of the former prevails for "the right of the State of selfpreservation is paramount to any of the rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents in the United States of America holding "that
there is no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens
pending deportation proceedings, 14 and that an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial as he
presents a risk of flight; 15 and sustaining a detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with serious
felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals and to
the community which no condition of release can dispel. 16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the Order
of this decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

17

adverted to in the introductory portion

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds

the "supplemental" motion for reconsideration to be without merit and hereby
denies it but finds the first motion for reconsideration to be meritorious only
insofar as the amount of bail is concerned and hereby reconsiders its Order
of July 7, 1987 only to increase the amount of bail from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00, subject to the approval of this Court, and with the additional
condition that accused Rodolfo Salas shall report to the court once every two
(2) months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof (Almendras
vs. Villaluz, et al., L-31665, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58).
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the respondent Judge took into account the
"sudden turn-about" on the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein it conceded the right of the private respondent to bail but merely asked to
increase the amount of bail; observed that it is only a reiteration of arguments in its opposition to the
petition for bail of 25 May 1987; asserted that the American precedents are not applicable since the
cases involved deportation of aliens and, moreover, the U.S. Federal Constitution does not contain a
proviso on the right of an accused to bail in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against
excessive bail; and quoted the concurring opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of
Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs. Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108,
October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.

Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this petition submitting therein the following
issues:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING
REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS
OPPOSITION TO THE GRANT OF BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO
SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT
RODOLFO SALAS.
in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped from invoking his right to
bail, having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having custody of his person" in consideration of the recall of the warrant
of arrest for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in noncapital offenses, is not absolute when there is prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious
threat to the very existence of the State, in which case the prosecution must be allowed to present
evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he did not allow petitioner to present all the evidence it may desire to support its prayer for the
denial of bail and when he declared that the State has forfeited its right to do so since during all the
time that the petition for bail was pending, it never manifested, much less hinted, its intention to
adduce such evidence. And that even if release on bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing
the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally P30,000.00 only), failed to take into account the lengthy
record of private respondents' criminal background, the gravity of the pending charge, and the
likelihood of flight. 18
In Our resolution of 11 August 1987 19 We required the respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist from
implementing his order of 30 July 1987 granting bail to private respondent in the amount of
P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987, 20 private respondent asks for the outright dismissal of the
petition and immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS
HE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SAID RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT
IS PETITIONER WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.

III
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE
(RECLUSION PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS
MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IV
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS CORRECT. PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS NON-EXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN
WAIVED.
V
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE
VIOLATES NOT ONLY RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO
HIS OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private respondent.
September 1987. 22

21

The reply was filed on 18

In Our resolution of 15 October 1987 23 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to file simultaneously their memoranda within twenty days from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5 November 24 and 23 November 1987 25
petitioner and private respondents asked to be excused from filing their Memoranda and that the
petition and reply be considered as the Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the
Memorandum for private respondent, which We granted in Our resolution of 19 November 1987 26
and 1 December 1987, 27 respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the Solicitor General to express his stand on
the issues raised in this petitions, 28 which he complied with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May
1990 29 wherein he manifests that he supports the petition and submits that the Order of respondent
Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be annulled and set aside asserting that private
respondent had waived the light to bail in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail
to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking which he is sure to break; in determining bail, the
primary consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused at the trial of the case against him
which would be frustrated by the "almost certainty that respondent Salas will lump bail of whatever
amount"; and application of the guidelines provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure on the amount of bail dictates denial of bail to private respondent. The Solicitor
General likewise maintains that the right of the petitioner to hearing on the application of private
respondent for bail cannot be denied by respondent Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the
application for bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which
the private respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the

application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which the
penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored.
The restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for
bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is
charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is
attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. 30 It is, therefore, a
bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:
Bail, a matter of right: exception. All persons in custody shall, before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a
capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. 31 To that extent the
right is absolute. 32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact
that the accused was already convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment,
We granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency of his appeal from such
conviction. To the vigorous stand of the People that We must deny bail to the accused because the
security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates
that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong, We held:
. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital
in a republican state, like ours, to be derived upon mere general principles
and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty
is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with
guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill
of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6),
(7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1)
to the protection of several aspects of freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the
Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed,
carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign

to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the

right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and
those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released,
they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. 33 But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons, supra., We held:
The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions
contained in the Constitution of the United States and that of many states of
the Union. And it is said that:
The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of
the many states provide that all persons shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where the proof
is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and, under such
provisions, bail is a matter of right which no court or judge can
properly refuse, in all cases not embraced in the exceptions.
Under such provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases
of capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the
presumption thereof is great! 34
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the
instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is
discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail. 35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the respondent court to fix the bond at
P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing of
the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left
entirely to the discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489,
495:
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among
them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation
of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the
accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other case. . . .
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations which necessitate a grant of an
opportunity to be heard for the purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for the denial
thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule 114 does not authorize any court to deny bail.
II.

It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer
punishable by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on
24 October 1990 and which took effect after publication in at least two newspapers of general
circulation, amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalty for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads:
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. Any person
who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a
rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its
effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article
62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same. 36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No.
76009.
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in Criminal Case No. 8648926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for herein private respondent, and his coaccused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida
Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen.
Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among others, that the
petition be given due course and a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring respondents to
produce the bodies of herein private respondent and his co-accused before the Court and explain by
what authority they arrested and detained them. The following proceedings took place thereafter in
said case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas corpus, required respondents to
make a return of the writ on or before the close of office hours on 13 October and set the petition for
hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Return To
The Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and Josefina Cruz alias "Mrs.
Mercado", and Jose Milo Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were apprehended by the military on
September 29, 1986 in the evening at the Philippine General Hospital Compound at Taft Ave.,
Mangga being leaders or members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, New People's Army
and National Democratic Front, organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the Government through
violent means, and having actually committed acts of rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. After their arrest they were forthwith charged with rebellion before Branch
XII of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3
October warrants for their arrest were issued and respondents continue to detain them because of
the warrants of arrest and the pendency of the criminal cases against them. Respondents further
allege that, contrary to the allegation in the petition, herein private respondent was not a member of

the NDF panel involved in peace negotiations with the Government; neither is he and his
companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe conduct pass issued by competent
authorities.
3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the Court of certain agreements reached
between them. We issued a resolution reading as follows:
When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attorneys Romeo
Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan,
Casiano Sabile, Ramon Cura, and William Chua appeared for the petitioners
with Atty. Capulong arguing for the petitioners. Solicitor General Sedfrey
Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney
Josue E. Villanueva appeared for the respondents, with Solicitor General
Ordoez arguing for the respondents.
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested in open Court that in
conformity with the agreement reached with the government, the petition for
habeas corpus will be withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas to remain
under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be released immediately.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, also in open Court, confirmed the
foregoing statement made by petitioners' counsel regarding the withdrawal of
the petition for habeas corpus, declaring that no objection will be interposed
to the immediate release of detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, and that no bond will be required of them, but they will continue
to face trial with their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further, that they will not be
rearrested on the basis of the warrants issued by the trial court provided that
they manifest in open Court their willingness to subject themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court and to appear in court when their presence is
required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with petitioners' counsel
today relative to the compromise agreement that they have previously
undertaken to submit.
Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, that on his
oath as member of the Bar, the detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion have agreed to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, the Court ordered their immediate release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing manifestations and statements
and required both parties to SUBMIT to the Court their compromise
agreement by 4:00 o'clock this afternoon. Teehankee, C.J., is on official
leave.
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the parties submitted a Joint Manifestation and
Motion duly signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and Solicitor General Sedfrey
Ordoez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva,
counsel for respondents, which reads as follows:

COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by their respective

counsel, and to this Honorable Tribunal respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong, petitioners' counsel, and
Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoez on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks
were conducted to find out how the majesty of the law may be preserved and
human considerations may be called into play.
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the following terms of
agreement:
a. The petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by
petitioners and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will
be immediately released but shall appear at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion (People v. Rodolfo Salas, et al.,
Criminal Case No. 4886 [should be 86-48926], Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region) filed against them
under their personal recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having custody over his person.
c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of
formal manifestation before the Supreme Court that they will
submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their
person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to obtain the conformity
of the Government to the foregoing terms which were likewise accepted by
petitioner (sic) and their counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation during the hearing
on October 14 and the present manifestation in compliance with the
resolution announced in court this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed.
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:
G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo
Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce
Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon
Montao and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno] considering the Joint Manifestation and
Motion dated October 14, 1986 filed by Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V.
Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and Ricardo Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for
petitioners and Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Assistant Solicitor
General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva as
counsel for respondents which states that they have entered into an
agreement whereby: [a] the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by
petitioners, and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately

released but shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion [People
vs. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed against them, on
their personal recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person; and
[c] the warrant of arrest for the person of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of the formal manifestation
before this Court that they will submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person and in view of the said agreement, the petition
for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition
for habeas corpus but subject to the condition that petitioners' lead counsel,
Atty. Capulong, upon his oath as member of the Bar, shall abide by his
commitment to ensure the appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion filed against them.
Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.
It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal custody even
during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to bail." 37
Upon the other hand, private respondent asserts that this claim is totally devoid of factual and legal
basis, for in their petition for habeas corpus they precisely questioned the legality of the arrest and
the continued detention of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was not
resolved by this Court or by the compromise agreement of the parties but left open for further
determination in another proceeding. Moreover, the matter of the right to bail was neither raised by
either party nor resolved by this Court, and the legal steps promptly taken by private respondent
after the agreement was reached, like the filing of the motion to quash on 7 November 1986 and the
petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were clear and positive assertions of his statutory and constitutional
rights to be granted not only provisional but final and permanent liberty. Finally, private respondent
maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in the Joint Manifestation and Motion simply means
that private respondent agreed to continue to be in the custody of the law or in custodia legis and
nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment. It is
also defined as the detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the
"care and possession of a thing or person." (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third
Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741-742 citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com.
82 Pa. 306)
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled
jurisprudence, the "constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation that the person applying for
admission to bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty." 38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before
the court having custody over his person.
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of
the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his
co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them;
they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons."

Note should be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal
custody and court having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having
jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to
emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in custody. Had
the parties intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they
should have insisted on the use of a clearer language. It must be remembered that at the time the
parties orally manifested before this Court on 14 October 1986 the terms and conditions of their
agreement and prepared and signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had
already been issued by the trial court against private respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation
that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and
that only they shall be released, further confirmed the agreement that herein petitioner shall remain
in custody of the law, or detention or confinement.
In defining bail as:
. . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, . . .
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or interpretation for the
term "in custody of the law" than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 39 It
presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived
of liberty. 40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing
legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have
enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to
exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its
benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it." 41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character,
and, since the word "waiver" covers every conceivable right, it is the general
rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any
alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him
or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with
statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges
rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not

forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is
recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community
at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or
guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a
statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it
infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals
and the public interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute
and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that
constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and
even some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are
subjects of waiver. 42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo, 43 it was held:
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes:
(a) those in which the state, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b)
those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal
privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived; those of the second
may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action
which would be invalid if taken against his will." 44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; 45 the right to counsel and to remain silent; 46 and the right to
be heard. 47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of Rights.
Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:
. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly
suggests that the other rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such waiver
will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private
respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case
No. 86-48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry,
Josefina Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion,
are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

(THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio,
assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition
for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas
corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one
of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P.
Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the
Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation
established in February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational
opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students,
and support to research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its
behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from
Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson through the latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda
Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the said amount to the
Foundations treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundations account with the
Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then President
Joseph E. Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including its
operation on the illegal numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with
the Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other persons. Among such complaints
were: Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft Free
Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al. ,
docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T.
Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim.
Case No. 0-00-1757.

Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21, 2001. The
other respondents likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the
Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaints and on April 4,
2001, issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner
and several others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several
Informations against former President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his post
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. One of these Informations, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26558, charged Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001, the
Ombudsman filed an amended Information in said case charging Estrada and several
co-accused, including petitioner, with said crime. No bail was recommended for the
provisional release of all the accused, including petitioner. The case was raffled to a
special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The amended
Information reads:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN
A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his coaccused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A
combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:
(a)by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY
IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE
FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused
CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION
OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b)by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit public fund in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or
less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
[P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur
under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES

AND JANE DOES;

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT,
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000
SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDERED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50];
AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT
OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d)by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.47[1]

On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsmans Joint Resolution

finding probable cause against him for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, he filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation. 48
Petitioner likewise filed on said date, this time with the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent
Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further
Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File
Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the
Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the Charges against accused Edward
Serapio.49

[2]

[3]

On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
amended Information charging petitioner with plunder had already been filed with the
Sandiganbayan.50
[4]

In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on April 25, 2001

47
48
49
50

in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of
arrest for the accused, including petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued an
Order on the same date for the arrest of petitioner.51 When apprised of said order,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day to Philippine National
Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has since been detained at Camp
Crame for said charge.
[5]

The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner, in

Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001,
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for
hearing on May 4, 2001.52 For his part, petitioners co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada
filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to
bail as a matter of right.
[6]

During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the
prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the
June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be
heard before petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners petition
for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioners petition for bail, the
Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and petitioner. The following day, petitioner filed a manifestation questioning the
propriety of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his
(petitioners) petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001 resetting the hearings on
petitioners petition for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve the
prosecutions pending motions as well as petitioners motion that his petition for bail be
heard as early as possible, which motion the prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners April
6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed by petitioner had
already been resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding probable cause to hold
petitioner and his co-accused for trial.53 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said May 31, 2001 Resolution.
[7]

On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance

of petitioner as well as all the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the
hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The
Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the
manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of
51
52
53

the case, directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing considering
that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is
adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the
trial.54
[8]

However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on June 18, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due
to pending incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing to June 26, 2001. 55
[9]

On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying

petitioners motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail hearing
on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because on said date petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended Information on the grounds that as
against him, the amended Information does not allege a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information does
not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy; the money alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended Information to have
been illegally received or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in
Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended Information charges him of
bribery and illegal gambling. 56 By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the
holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The
prosecution contended that petitioners motion to quash the amended Information was
antithetical to his petition for bail.
[10]

The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on the
petition for bail of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to
resolve the pending incidents and the motion to quash of petitioner. However, even
before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the
prosecution, petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the Court declare
void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on his claim
that he was thereby effectively denied of his right to due process. Petitioner likewise
prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be declared to have
waived their right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised
on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioners guilt of plunder,
that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings. 57
[11]

Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan
a motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners
motion to quash the amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on said
date a copy of said resolution. 58 The motion to fix bail filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada
was also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
[12]

54
55
56
57
58

On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner
manifested to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for reconsideration
of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash and for the deferment of his
arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was no provision in the
Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayans rules granting the right to petitioner to file a
motion for the reconsideration of an interlocutory order issued by it and ordered
petitioner to orally argue his motion for reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead, impelling
the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 148769, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash, notwithstanding the
fact that material inculpatory allegations of the amended Information against him do not
constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is charged, under the said amended
Information, for more than one offense. Jose Jinggoy Estrada likewise filed petition for
certiorari with the Court docketed as G.R. No. 148965 for the nullification of a resolution
of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for Certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 31 May
2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001
Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIOS MOTION TO QUASH
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
I
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS AGAINST
PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A.The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a pattern
of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
C. The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended Information and alleged to
have been illegally received or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as
defined in Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
II

THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE.59[13]

Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information, he is charged with
plunder only in paragraph (a) which reads:
(a)by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;60[14]

Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the amended

Information of a combination or series of overt or criminal acts constituting plunder as
described in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 as amended. Neither does the amended
Information allege a pattern of criminal acts. He avers that his single act of toleration
or protection of illegal gambling impelled by a single criminal resolution does not
constitute the requisite combination or series of acts for plunder. He further claims that
the consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or kickbacks in furtherance of said
resolution turned over to and received by former President Joseph E. Estrada on
several occasions does not cure the defect in the amended information. Petitioner
insists that on the face of the amended Information he is charged only with bribery or
illegal gambling and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of the P4,097,804,173.17
amassed by former President Joseph E. Estrada in confabulation with his co-accused is
not ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.

When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or information. 61[15]
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The Information must allege
clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definition
59
60
61

and elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the requirement of alleging all the
elements of the crime in the Information is to inform an accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare for his defense. 62
Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 63 The use of derivatives or synonyms or
allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient. 64

[16]

[17]

[18]

In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused,
including petitioner, connived and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to
commit plunder through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or
similar schemes or means. And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information, petitioner
and his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on
several instances money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose
Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et al.,65 we held that the word
series is synonymous with the clause on several instances; it refers to a repetition of
the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of the law. We further held
that the word combination contemplates the commission of at least any two different
predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that plainly, subparagraph (a) of the
amended information charges accused therein, including petitioner, with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law and
that:
[19]

x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several

instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of
illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with
former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds
with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No.
7080. x x x.66[20]

It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt or

criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as Section
3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and the general rule is that
matters of evidence need not be alleged in the Information. 67
[21]

The Court also ruled in Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan 68 that the
aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million alleged in
paragraph (a) of the amended information is ill-gotten wealth as contemplated in
Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act 7080, as amended, and that all the accused
in paragraph (a) to (d) of the amended information conspired and confederated with
former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17.
[22]

62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner, are charged of
having conspired and confabulated together in committing plunder. When two or more
persons conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of others. In
contemplation of law, the act of the conspirator is the act of each of them. 69
Conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield
one arm and the law says that the acts, words and declarations of each, while in the
pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and declarations of all. 70

[23]

[24]

Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended Information of bribery and
illegal gambling and others. The Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is not
charged with the predicate acts of bribery and illegal gambling but is charged only with
one crime that of plunder:
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION
CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges
more than one offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code),
malversation of public funds or property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and
violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information are
not charged as separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section 1(d) thereof
does not make any express reference to any specific provision of laws, other than R.A.
No. 7080, as amended, which coincidentally may penalize as a separate crime any of
the overt or criminal acts enumerated therein. The said acts which form part of the
combination or series of act are described in their generic sense. Thus, aside from
malversation of public funds, the law also uses the generic terms misappropriation,
conversion or misuse of said fund. The fact that the acts involved may likewise be
penalized under other laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned only as predicate
acts of the crime of plunder and the allegations relative thereto are not to be taken or to
be understood as allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished under the
Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.71[25]

This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of the amended
Information that petitioner and his co-accused are charged only with one crime of
plunder and not with the predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that the
predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and
independent of the crime of plunder. Resultantly then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying
69
70
71

his April 4, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion contending that:

GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIOS
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (RE:
RESOLUTION DATED 31 MAY 2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND
COMMITTED GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY
PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO,
AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR
PLUNDER AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO.72[26]

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying his omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest
as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct a determination of
probable cause; and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the
charges him. Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded
exculpatory evidence and committed grave abuse of discretion in charging him with
plunder. He further argues that there exists no probable cause to support an indictment
for plunder as against him.73
[27]

Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman does not even
mention him in relation to the collection and receipt of jueteng money which started in
199874 and that the Ombudsman inexplicably arrived at the conclusion that the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation was a money laundering front organization put up by Joseph
Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even though the latter presented evidence that said
Foundation is a bona fide and legitimate private foundation. 75 More importantly, he
claims, said joint resolution does not indicate that he knew that the P200 million he
received for the Foundation came from jueteng.76
[28]

[29]

[30]

Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1) the P200 million
he received does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No.
7080;77 (2) there is no evidence linking him to the collection and receipt of jueteng
money;78 (3) there was no showing that petitioner participated in a pattern of criminal
acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200 million constitutes an overt
criminal act of plunder.79
[31]

[32]

[33]

Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is premised on the
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

absolute lack of evidence to support a finding of probable cause for plunder as against
him,80 and hence he should be spared from the inconvenience, burden and expense of
a public trial.81
[34]

[35]

Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government prosecutors is not beyond
judicial scrutiny. He asserts that while this Court does not ordinarily look into the
existence of probable cause to charge a person for an offense in a given case, it may
do so in exceptional circumstances, which are present in this case: (1) to afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority; and (4) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance. 82 Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds
for a reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the questioned joint resolution, the
Ombudsman disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the charge of plunder
and committed errors of law or irregularities which have been prejudicial to his interest. 83
He also states that during the joint preliminary investigations for the various charges
against Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which the plunder charge was only one
of the eight charges against Estrada et al., he was not furnished with copies of the other
complaints nor given the opportunity to refute the evidence presented in relation to the
other seven cases, even though the evidence presented therein were also used against
him, although he was only charged in the plunder case. 84
[36]

[37]

[38]

The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of

discretion in denying petitioners omnibus motion. They assert that since the
Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime of plunder, the
Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction over the case and to proceed to try the
same. They further argue that a finding of probable cause is merely preliminary and
prefatory of the eventual determination of guilt or innocence of the accused, and that
petitioner still has the chance to interpose his defenses in a full blown trial where his
guilt or innocence may finally be determined.85
[39]

The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners omnibus motion asking for, among others, a
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, because his motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsmans joint resolution did not raise the grounds of either newly discovered
evidence, or errors of law or irregularities, which under Republic Act No. 6770 are the
only grounds upon which a motion for reconsideration may be filed. 86
[40]

The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to charge petitioner with
plunder as a co-conspirator of Joseph Estrada. 87
[41]

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

This Court does not agree with petitioner.

Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans discretion
in the conduct of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan88 , the
Court ruled:
[42]

x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable cause, the

Ombudsmans discretion is paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court
said:
x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of noninterference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish
probable cause for filing of information against the supposed offender.

In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,89 the Court ruled thus:

[43]

Furthermore, the Ombudsmans findings are essentially factual in nature.

Accordingly, in assailing said findings on the contention that the Ombudsman
committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for estafa
through falsification of public documents, petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact
here. His arguments are anchored on the propriety or error in the Ombudsmans
appreciation of facts. Petitioner cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where
neither question of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third issue is
concerned, we find that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
respondents which would warrant the granting of the writ of certiorari.

Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan and the
Ombudsman for that matter committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their
resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden.
Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
and the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against petitioner for plunder. Neither
did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying petitioners motion for
reinvestigation of the charges against him in the amended Information. In its Resolution
of April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman that
probable cause exists against petitioner and his co-accused for the crime of plunder,
thus:
In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of the Amended
Information dated 18 April 2001 charging the accused with the offense of PLUNDER
and examining carefully the evidence submitted in support thereof consisting of the
affidavits and sworn statements and testimonies of prosecution witnesses and several
other pieces of documentary evidence, as well as the respective counter-affidavits of
accused former President Joseph Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose Jinggoy
Pimentel Estrada dated February 20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January 21,
2001 and Edward S. Serapio dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds
that probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants
88
89

of arrest of accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe. a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia
Rajas.90[44]

Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioners omnibus motion, the
Sandiganbayan noted that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in
accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman,
pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989); and that all the basic complaints and evidence in support thereof were served
upon all the accused.91 It was in light of such findings that the Sandiganbayan held that
there was no basis for the allegation that accused therein (including petitioner) were
deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsmans Resolution dated
April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge them with plunder after the conduct of
preliminary investigation in connection therewith. In addition, the Sandiganbayan
pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans
resolution, but failed to show in his motion that there were newly discovered evidence,
or that the preliminary investigation was tainted by errors of law or irregularities, which
are the only grounds for which a reconsideration of the Ombudsmans resolution may
be granted.92
[45]

[46]

It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional

right, but is merely a right conferred by statute. 93 The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the
same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the Information. 94 If the lack of a preliminary
investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the denial of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over
the case. Neither can it be said that petitioner had been deprived of due process. He
was afforded the opportunity to refute the charges against him during the preliminary
investigation.
[47]

[48]

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime

has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person
accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. 95 As the
Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, [a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. 96
[49]

[50]

90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other
officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to
said officers finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the
existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.97 The Court agrees with
the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated in
the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the facts, and that a
reinvestigation was necessary.
[51]

Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayans resolution denying

petitioners motion for reinvestigation since there is nothing to substantiate petitioners
claim that it gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was no need to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case.98
[52]

The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals 99 that an accused shall not be deemed
to have waived his right to ask for a preliminary investigation after he had been
arraigned over his objection and despite his insistence on the conduct of said
investigation prior to trial on the merits does not apply in the instant case because
petitioner merely prayed for a reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-discovered
evidence. Irrefragably, a preliminary investigation had been conducted by the
Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended Information, and that petitioner had
participated therein by filing his counter-affidavit. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had
already denied his motion for reinvestigation as well as his motion for reconsideration
thereon prior to his arraignment.100 In sum then, the petition is dismissed.
[53]

[54]

Re: G.R. No. 148468

As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of the parties, the
issues for resolution are: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before
hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a
motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail;
(3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4) Whether the People waived their
right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to
adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5) Whether
petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in Criminal Case No. 26558 and
should thus be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it deferred the
hearing of his petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a
plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on
97
98
99
100

Criminal Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be arraigned first prior to the
conduct of bail hearings since the latter can stand alone and must, of necessity, be
heard immediately.101 Petitioner maintains that his arraignment before the bail hearings
are set is not necessary since he would not plead guilty to the offense charged, as is
evident in his earlier statements insisting on his innocence during the Senate
investigation of the jueteng scandal and the preliminary investigation before the
Ombudsman.102 Neither would the prosecution be prejudiced even if it would present
all its evidence before his arraignment because, under the Revised Penal Code, a
voluntary confession of guilt is mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution,103 and petitioner admitted that he cannot repudiate the
evidence or proceedings taken during the bail hearings because Rule 114, Section 8 of
the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that evidence present during bail
hearings are automatically reproduced during the trial. 104 Petitioner likewise assures
the prosecution that he is willing to be arraigned prior to the posting of a bail bond
should he be granted bail.105
[55]

[56]

[57]

[58]

[59]

The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be
commenced, because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The People
stress that it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he file a petition for bail and
if he pleads guilty to the charge, there would be no more need for him to file said
petition. Moreover, since it is during arraignment that the accused is first informed of the
precise charge against him, he must be arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent
him from later assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not
properly informed of the charge against him, especially considering that, under Section
8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented during such proceedings
are considered automatically reproduced at the trial. 106 Likewise, the arraignment of
accused prior to bail hearings diminishes the possibility of an accuseds flight from the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may be had only if an
accused escapes after he has been arraigned. 107 The People also contend that the
conduct of bail hearings prior to arraignment would extend to an accused the
undeserved privilege of being appraised of the prosecutions evidence before he pleads
guilty for purposes of penalty reduction.108
[60]

[61]

[62]

Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001 and a plea of not
guilty had been entered by the Sandiganbayan on his behalf, thereby rendering the
issue as to whether an arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in
petitioners case moot, the Court takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling
precepts thereon pursuant to its symbolic function of educating the bench and bar.109
[63]

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an accused is not a

prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to
petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender.110 An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for
bail.
[64]

In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, 111 this Court ruled on the issue of whether an
accused must first be arraigned before he may be granted bail. Lavides involved an
accused charged with violation of Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense
punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The
accused therein assailed, inter alia, the trial courts imposition of the condition that he
should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post bail. We held therein that in cases
where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. 112
[65]

[66]

However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the
hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule
is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may
apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or
information is filed against him. 113 The Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be
understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as
well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence, we explained
therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and
thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he
can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. 114
[67]

[68]

It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of
hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may
apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also
implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if
the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence
against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to
arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be authorized under the circumstances.
In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with
the hearing of his petition for bail.
110
111
112
113
114

With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a motion to quash
during the pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner maintains that a motion to quash
and a petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each
other. While he agrees with the prosecution that a motion to quash may in some
instances result in the termination of the criminal proceedings and in the release of the
accused therein, thus rendering the petition for bail moot and academic, he opines that
such is not always the case; hence, an accused in detention cannot be forced to
speculate on the outcome of a motion to quash and decide whether or not to file a
petition for bail or to withdraw one that has been filed. 115 He also insists that the grant
of a motion to quash does not automatically result in the discharge of an accused from
detention nor render moot an application for bail under Rule 117, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules of Court.116
[69]

[70]

The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an

accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the
release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth
under the Rules of Court.117 Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person
charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his
appearance at the trial.118 As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the
moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. 119
[71]

[72]

[73]

On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an

accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the Information.120 An accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general
rule, before arraignment.121
[74]

[75]

These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each
other. Certainly, the right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged
with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or
when charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing,
evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the
validity of the Information charging him with such offense. It must be conceded,
however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that
the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the
accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and
academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that the hearings on the
petitions for bail of petitioner and accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada in Criminal Case No.
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

26558 and the trial of the said case as against former President Joseph E. Estrada be
heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate his right to
have his petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearings might
be converted into a full blown trial on the merits by the prosecution. 122
[76]

For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save the court from
having to hear the same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same evidence
where it would allow separate bail hearings for the accused who are charged as coconspirators in the crime of plunder.123
[77]

In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in Criminal Case No. 26558
to participate in the bail hearings, the Sandiganbayan explained that the directive was
made was in the interest of the speedy disposition of the case. It stated:
x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than the accused Serapio
were to be excused from participating in the hearing on the motion for bail of accused
Serapio, under the pretext that the same does not concern them and that they will
participate in any hearing where evidence is presented by the prosecution only if and
when they will already have filed their petitions for bail, or should they decide not to file
any, that they will participate only during the trial proper itself, then everybody will be
faced with the daunting prospects of having to go through the process of introducing
the same witness and pieces of evidence two times, three times or four times, as many
times as there are petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such procedure is not conducive to
the speedy termination of a case. Neither can such procedure be characterized as an
orderly proceeding.124[78]

There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of

Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for
bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard
simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter of
whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two
different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against
another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will
not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must
take into account not only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but
also that of the accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and
the right of accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the
complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the
other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the observation of the United States
Supreme Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our
historic individual protections, including those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About
them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when that fashion has
122
123
124

become rampant over the earth.125

[79]

It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,126 this Court held that in a
petition for bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such
brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine
the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter
into any inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence
may be offered therein. It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference
to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of
corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing.
[80]

A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid
duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the
prejudice to the accused, especially so if both movants for bail are charged of having
conspired in the commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces essentially
the same evident against them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings
of the petition for bail of petitioner with the trial of the case against former President
Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the participation of the former
president in the hearing of petitioners petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a
completely different dimension. The proceedings will no longer be summary. As against
former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-blown trial which is
antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. Moreover, following our ruling in Jose Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose Jinggoy Estrada can only be
charged with conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information since it is not clear from the latter if the accused in subparagraphs (a) to (d) thereof conspired with each other to assist Joseph Estrada to
amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that petitioner can only be charged with having
conspired with the other co-accused named in sub-paragraph (a) by receiving or
collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money x x x from illegal gambling,
x x x in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling. 127 Thus, with
respect to petitioner, all that the prosecution needs to adduce to prove that the evidence
against him for the charge of plunder is strong are those related to the alleged receipt or
collection of money from illegal gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information. With the joinder of the hearing of petitioners petition for bail and
the trial of the former President, the latter will have the right to cross-examine
intensively and extensively the witnesses for the prosecution in opposition to the petition
for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will adduce evidence in support of his petition after the
prosecution shall have concluded its evidence, the former President may insist on
cross-examining petitioner and his witnesses. The joinder of the hearing of petitioners
bail petition with the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada will be prejudicial to
petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to
[81]

125
126
127

obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the
respondent court. The indispensability of the speedy resolution of an application for bail
was succinctly explained by Cooley in his treatise Constitutional Limitations, thus:
For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would with reasonable
certainty insure the attendance of the accused to answer the accusation, it would not
be justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him in a
greater or lesser degree, to the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not
determined that he has not committed any crime.128[82]

While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is
empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best
conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, 129 the Court
finds that it gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner
and the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears stressing that
the Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its May 4, 2001 Order the pre-eminent
position and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have the matter of his provisional
liberty resolved without unnecessary delay, 130 only to make a volte face and
declare that after all the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose Jinggoy
Estrada and the trial as against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be held
simultaneously. In ordering that petitioners petition for bail to be heard jointly with the
trial of the case against his co-accused former President Joseph E. Estrada, the
Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further and unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof
to the prejudice of petitioner. In fine then, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse
of its discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioners petition for bail with
the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada on its merits.
[83]

[84]

With respect to petitioners allegations that the prosecution tried to delay the bail
hearings by filing dilatory motions, the People aver that it is petitioner and his coaccused who caused the delay in the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of
numerous manifestations and pleadings with the Sandiganbayan. 131 They assert that
they filed the motion for joint bail hearing and motion for earlier arraignment around the
original schedule for the bail hearings which was on May 21-25, 2001. 132
[85]

[86]

They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital offenses. 133 In support
thereof, they cite Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states that
[87]

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.134[88]
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provide:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable.No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonement, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right, exception.All persons in custody shall be admitted
to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule x x x (b) and before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.135[89]

Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the
opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the judgment of his case.
However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary upon the
court.136 Had the rule been otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for an
application for bail by a person charged with a capital offense under Rule 114, Section 8
which states:
[90]

Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for

bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of
either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the
latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.137[91]

Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt
against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him
bail. Thus, upon an application for bail by the person charged with a capital offense, a
hearing thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an
opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of guilt against an
accused is strong.138 The prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present all
the evidence it may deems necessary for this purpose. 139 When it is satisfactorily
demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the courts duty to deny the
application for bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a
matter of right.140
[92]

[93]

[94]

In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this stage of the
proceedings. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to
prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has
refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not
waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the
135
136
137
138
139
140

petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan had already
scheduled the hearing dates for petitioners application for bail but the same were reset
due to pending incidents raised in several motions filed by the parties, which incidents
had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was
eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not
push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners application for bail is therefore
not imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly
to blame therefor, as is evident from the following list of motions filed by him and by the
prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:

Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1) leave to file motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation;
(2) conduct a determination of probable cause as would suggest the issuance of
house arrest; (3) hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest and other
proceedings pending determination of probable cause;

Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;

Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or Service of Warrant

of Arrest for Immediate Grant of bail or For Release on Recognizance,
dated April 25, 2001;

Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at Obando, Bulacan,

dated May 11, 2001;

Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22, 2001, praying for
Resolution of May 18, 2001 be set aside and bail hearings be set at the
earliest possible time;

Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or Recognizance, dated

May 27, 2001;

Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated

June 13, 2001, praying that he be allowed to file a Motion for
Reinvestigation; and

Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.141[95]

Motions filed by the prosecution:

141
142
143

Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001;142[96]

Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose Jinggoy
Estrada and Edward Serapio, dated May 8, 2001;143[97]

Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion

to Adjust Earlier Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001;144[98] and

Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and Transcription in Filipino,

dated June 19, 2001.145[99]

The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed to the aforesaid delay
by their filing of the following motions:

144
145

Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed by Jinggoy

Estrada, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080 and praying that
the Amended Information be quashed;

Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, praying that he be (1) excluded from the Amended Information for
lack of probable cause; (2) released from custody; or in the alternative, (3)
be allowed to post bail;

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated April 25, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house
arrest during the pendency of the case;

Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;

Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed
by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;

Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada, praying by

reinvestigation of the case by the Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of
the case;

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2, 2001, filed by

Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for five (5) within which to respond to the
Opposition to Motion to Quash in view of the holidays and election-related
distractions;

Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001,
filed by Joseph Estrada;

Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial arrangement, dated May

11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed
on house arrest;

Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6, 2001, filed by Joseph

and Jinggoy Estrada;

Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001, filed by Joseph
and Jinggoy Estrada;

Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed by Jinggoy

Estrada;

Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,

praying that they be allowed to be confined in Tanay;

Motion to charge as Accused Luis Chavit Singson, filed by Joseph

Estrada;

Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada, seeking reconsideration of denial of requests for house arrest, for
detention in Tanay or Camp Crame; motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;

Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as Mayor of San Juan,
Metro Manila, dated June 28, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;

Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by Joseph and

Jinggoy Estrada, praying that the resolution compelling them to be present
at petitioner Serapios hearing for bail be reconsidered;

Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;

Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada stating that Bishop Teodoro Bacani favors their house
arrest;

Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
waiving their right to be present at the June 18 and 21, 2001 bail hearings
and reserving their right to trial with assessors;

Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest; Production,

Inspection and Copying of Documents; and Possible Trial with Assessors,
dated June 19, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;

Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs, dated June 20,
2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;

Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, asking for
free dates for parties, claiming that denial of bail is cruel and inhuman,
reiterating request for gag order of prosecution witnesses, availing of
production, inspection and copying of documents, requesting for status of
alias case; and

Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting

for permission to attend some municipal affairs in San Juan, Metro
Manila.146[100]

Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases where the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an
accused charged with a capital offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a
hearing on said application. 147 The rationale for such requirement was explained in
Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:148
[101]

[102]

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing
that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of
146
147
148

whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly
be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal.149[103]

Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan

conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even
then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong
before he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for
petitioner, he contends that he is entitled to the issuance of said writ because the State,
through the prosecutions refusal to present evidence and by the Sandiganbayans
refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving that as
against him, evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner
contends that the prosecution launched a seemingly endless barrage of obstructive
and dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of bail hearings. Specifically, the prosecution
moved for petitioners arraignment before the commencement of bail hearings and
insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada
despite the fact that it was only petitioner who asked for a bail hearing; manifested that
it would present its evidence as if it is the presentation of the evidence in chief, meaning
that the bail hearings would be concluded only after the prosecution presented its entire
case upon the accused; and argued that petitioners motion to quash and his petition for
bail are inconsistent, and therefore, petitioner should choose to pursue only one of
these two remedies.150
He further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its
questioned orders and resolutions postponing the bail hearings effectively denied him of
his right to bail and to due process of law.151
[104]

[105]

Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new orders
canceling the bail hearings which it had earlier set did not render moot and academic
the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, since said orders have resulted in a
continuing deprivation of petitioners right to bail. 152 He argues further that the fact that
he was arrested and is detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself negate the
efficacy of the remedy of habeas corpus. In support of his contention, petitioner cites
Moncupa vs. Enrile,153 where the Court held that habeas corpus extends to instances
where the detention, while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.154
[106]

[107]

[108]

However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because petitioner was
149
150
151
152
153
154

arrested pursuant to the amended information which was earlier filed in court, 155 the
warrant of arrest issuant pursuant thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities.156
[109]

[110]

As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court
which jurisdiction to do so.157 In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be
granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid
arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state
action due to its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes. 158
Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially
valid under the law, had later become invalid, 159 and even though the persons praying
for its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty.160
[111]

[112]

[113]

[114]

The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of
petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
which had jurisdiction to issue the same161 applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001
after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against
petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to
the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been
issued.
[115]

The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile162 that habeas corpus will lie where the
deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of
subsequent developments finds no application in the present case because the hearing
on petitioners application for bail has yet to commence. As stated earlier, the delay in
the hearing of petitioners petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the
Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be
blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for
asserting ones right to bail.163 It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail
not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused
such discretion in refusing to grant bail, 164 or has not even exercised said discretion.
The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal
case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.
[116]

[117]

[118]

The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

preempt the Sandiganbayans resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner.
The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for
bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1.In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are DISMISSED. The
resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED; and
2. In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolution of
respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex L of the petition, ordering a joint hearing of
petitioners petition for bail and the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as against former
President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner on July 10,
2001 is also SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 September 17, 1971

RICARDO DE LA CAMARA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City (Branch II), respondents.
Demosthenes Mediante, Puro Velez, Francisco Fabe, Federico del Puerto and Pelaez, Jalandoni &
Jamir for petitioner.
Hon. Manuel Lopez Enage in his own behalf.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la
Camara, in the sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the
constitutional mandate prohibiting excessive bail. 1 The merit of the petition on its face is thus
apparent. Nonetheless, relief sought setting aside the above order by reducing the amount of bail to
P40,000.00 cannot be granted, as in the meanwhile, petitioner had escaped from the provincial jail,
thus rendering this case moot and academic. It is deemed advisable, however, for the guidance of
lower court judges, to set forth anew the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be
observed in fixing the amount of the bail sought in order that full respect be accorded to such a
constitutional right.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay,
Misamis Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan,
for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the
Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968. Thereafter, on

November 25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for
multiple frustrated murder 2 and another for multiple murder 3 against petitioner, his co-accused
Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on January
14, 1969, came an application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the
assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He
likewise mantained his innocence. Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February 24,
1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing ofthe petition, the
defense had not presented its evidence.
Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail,
admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee
even if he had the opportunity,but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of
P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and
P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then came the allegation that on August
12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a
telegram to respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a
P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was likewise a motion for
reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence this
petition.
The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971 set forth the circumstances concerning the
issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to his mind would disprove
any charge that he wasguilty of grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the
challengedorder would find support in circulars of the Department of Justice given sanction by this
Court. He sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
In the hearing of the case set for March 31, 1971, there was no appearance for both the petitioner
and respondents with the former, upon written motion, being given thirty days within which to submit
a memorandum in lieu of oral argument, respondent Judge in turn having the same period from
receipt thereofto file his reply. Such a memorandum as duly submitted by petitioner on April 6, 1971.
Instead of a reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26, 1971, a supplemental answer wherein
he alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since then
remained at large. There was a reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition for lack of merit,
towhich petitioner countered in a pleading dated June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next day
with this plea: "The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose opposition, on behalf of
petitioner, to respondent's prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit. For, the issue
in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the present petition
that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless other Ricardo de la
Camaras who maybe awaiting the clear-cut definition and declaration of the power of trial courts in
regard to the fixing of bail." 4
While under the circumstances a ruling on the merits of the petition for certiorari is not warranted,
still, as set forth at the opening of this opinion, the fact that this case is moot and academic should
not preclude thisTribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligationof
fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of theConstitution that
excessive bail shall not be required.
1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the
evidence of guilt is strong. 5 Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regimeof liberty is honored

in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyondthe realm of probability, however, that a
person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make
himself scarceand thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such
an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a "mode short of confinement which
would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused" for the subsequent trial. 6 Nor
is there, anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when
evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding
against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would
be too great to be resisted.
2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that
is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention
of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United
States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. 7 As construed in the latest
American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence
at trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonablycalculated to fulfill
thus purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment." 8
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the
amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for
the information charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victim, and the sum of P355,200 for
the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of
constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the
amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that
the Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the twooffenses.
3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its face, appears to be
indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseor v. Abano. 9 The guidelines in the fixing of bail was
there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give
bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the
accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the
accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from
justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases." 10
Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of the
above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We
must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount
to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to
exercise our supervisorypowers to provide the required remedy." 11
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is
grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to
post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would
apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of
respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe
that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resists
thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a stateof desperation. In
the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only
mean that provisional liberty would bebeyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he
were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have beenno
disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise

to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." 12 It
is no wonder that the resulting frustration left resentment and bitterness in its wake.Petitioner's
subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What
respondent Judge did, however, does call for repudiation from this Court.
Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an
alleged reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest
characterization of such a result is that there was a clear reading of the Abano opinion when such a
meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to doso would be to reduce
the right to bail to a barren form of words. Not only isthe order complained of absolutely bereft of
support in law, but it flies in the face of common sense. It is not too much to say that it is at war with
thecommand of reason.
With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no ruling can be had on his plea to
nullify the above order.
WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar, J., took no part.

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 189122

Present:

-versus-

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA and
MENDOZA, JJ.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

March 17, 2010

x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for
his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required, 165[1] is
the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done
with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the dubious interval,
often years long, between arrest and final adjudication?166[2] Bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial
liberty and societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.167[3]
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been
sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on
application, he is admitted to bail.168[4] An accused not released on bail is
incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and
proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to
pay a debt to society he has never owed. 169[5] Even if the conviction is subsequently
165
166
167
168
169

affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom
pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance
of potential hardships of prison.170[6] On the other hand, society has a compelling
interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. 171
[7]

Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include

the prevention of the accuseds flight from court custody, the protection of the
community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. 172[8]
Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a
delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused.173[9]
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail
pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of
that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that
the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but
with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has
been in fact convicted by the trial court.174[10]

170
171
172
173
174

THE FACTS

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio
Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser
crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years
and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.175[11]

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.176[12] Pending appeal, he filed

an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight
on his part.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. 177[13] It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend
bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only
for strong reasons. Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a
175
176
177

sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside
the prison facility. It found that petitioner

failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued
confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x
Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical
attention while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his
personal physician.178[14]

For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could

be allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of
petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and
made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to
overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.179[15]

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application
for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than
178
179

six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending
appeal.

THE ISSUE

The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending
appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for
more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending
appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial

Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed
and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has
not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing
by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a)
That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent,
or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;

(b)
That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification;

(c)
That he committed the offense while under probation, parole,
or conditional pardon;

(d)
That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of
flight if released on bail; or

(e)
That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
(emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned

in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application
for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more
than six years imprisonment should automatically be granted.

Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural

and substantive rules.

BASIC PROCEDURAL CONCERNS

FORBID GRANT OF PETITION

Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to
challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the
interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.180[16]

180

Other than the sweeping averment that [t]he Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for bail pending
appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof
under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the prosecution, 181[17]
however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed
acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court
of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the
circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for
bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.
We disagree.

It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution
without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary.
Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this
where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
181

the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the
appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve
petitioners urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.

Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed

grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners application for bail pending
appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is
such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction.182[18] Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.183[19] It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a
petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.184[20]

Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending
appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically.
182
183
184

No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to

the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or imputation be inferred. As
observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its
discretion. The denial of petitioners application for bail pending appeal was not
unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill
health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose
of granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not,
or whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its
discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.

At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application and
interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the
extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.185[21] In this connection, Lee
v. People186[22] is apropos:

Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would at
most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by
185
186

certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as
regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of
review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the
courts.187[23] (emphasis supplied)

WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5,

RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS
INTERPRETATION

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six
years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said
paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or
commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous
escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions
of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under
probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of
flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the

187

pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.

The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity
in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an
authority in remedial law:

Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be
summarized in the following rules:

xxxxxxxxx

e.
After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of
the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);

f.
After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no
bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x188[24] (emphasis supplied)

188

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in

remedial law, is of the same thinking:

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the

offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On
the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)

years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied.189[25] (emphasis supplied)

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means
that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An
application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating 190[26]
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other
words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

189
190

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to
deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail
pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail
pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine
whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound
discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending
appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case
falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the
appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of
equity and justice;191[27] on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

191

On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario,
the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be
primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the
circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the
existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke
bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will
not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply
authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different
situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead,
petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said
provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending
appeal.

In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it

interprets the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where
the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding
six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is

always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of
whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of
this position is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied.
Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.

Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere factfinding body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This
unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the checklist of
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where
the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the
discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue
whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.

However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice.192[28] Choice

occurs where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of
options), there is more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the

192

outcome left to the decision maker. 193[29] On the other hand, the establishment of a
clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. 194[30] Thus, by severely
clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere factfinding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the
penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six
years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.

The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this
case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the
exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed
reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts
and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter.195[31] In view of the grave
caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all
circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his
conviction is affirmed.196[32] It should also give due regard to any other pertinent
matters beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record, character and
193
194
195
196

reputation of the applicant,197[33] among other things. More importantly, the

discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal
necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not
frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be determined
by the appellate court.198[34] In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of
bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but
presents a fairly debatable issue.199[35] This must be so; otherwise, the appellate
courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the
purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even
more significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that
the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound, 200[36] specially since
the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or
modified by the Court of Appeals except for substantial error.201[37]

Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned

in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bailnegating circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the

197
198
199
200
201

expressio unius est exclusio alterius202[38] rule in statutory construction. However,

the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea
that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The
provision categorically refers to the following or other similar circumstances.
Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial
or revocation of bail pending appeal.

Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to
unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from
adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial
court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the
listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in
cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be
more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years.
While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than
six years imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating
conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does
not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
202

Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail

pending appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses,
compared to those convicted of less serious crimes?

PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY

AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL

Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history

and evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal.

The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6,

Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance.
After judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First
Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.

Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance.

After conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be
bailed at the discretion of the court.

Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this
rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the
time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.

Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the commission
of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.

The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114

of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before
final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a
capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the
time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong.

Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this
Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at
the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis
supplied)

The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative

Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows:

The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in
Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which
provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody,
shall before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital

offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail
as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly
imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as
pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies
concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1)
When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law
existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged
in the complaint or information, he may be allowed to remain free on his original bail
pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to
Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
2)
When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or
information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
3)
When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial
court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed
in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now
pending appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the
following rules are laid down:

1)
This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten
(10) days from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this
Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered
by this Court;
2)
The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National
Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under
confinement pending resolution of his appeal;

3)
If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of
ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this
Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124
of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis
supplied)

Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94

dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as
follows:

SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a) before
or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional
liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but
not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a)
That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b)
That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
(c)
That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole,
under conditional pardon;
(d)
That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e)
That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the
accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on
motion and with notice to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used
in these Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)

SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or

life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
(emphasis supplied)

The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114

were thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.

The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a

more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence

to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with
leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a
non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional
Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail
pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in
trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion
perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at
any stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not
punished by reclusion perpetua.203[39]

The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail

pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus,
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter of
post-conviction grant of bail.

203

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by

clearly identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending
appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it
reiterated the tough on bail pending appeal configuration of Administrative
Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before
final conviction.204[40] Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail
pending appeal policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the
denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are
deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.

Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail

pending appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view
of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the
absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all
204

relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third

paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?

The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail

pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our
original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated. 205[41] While this
is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of
bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance
of bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion
particularly with respect to extending bail should be exercised not with laxity
but with caution and only for strong reasons.206[42] In fact, it has even been pointed
out that grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in
granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5.207[43]

Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:

205
206
207

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail
should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent,
and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally
speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the
presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is
rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From
another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate
punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to
attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.208[44] (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying

thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals209[45] (promulgated in 2001
when the present rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal
is a matter of wise discretion.

A FINAL WORD

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.210[46] From then on, the grant of
bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion
208
209
210

must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that
the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending
appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial
disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and
the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent
with the trial courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison.
Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the
deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending
appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and
appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a
certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds
or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction
invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our
criminal justice system and court processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits,
the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159,
with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.